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under ors 137.123(1), ""[a] sentence shall be deemed to be a concurrent term unless the judgment expressly provides for consecutive sentences.""

see id. 73.001 (west 2017) (defining libel as ""defamation expressed in written or other graphic form"").

to hold otherwise would be to permit counsel to frivolously expose their adversaries to unnecessary litigation costs.

this rebuttable inference stands even when the [s]tate offers no evidence of how the defendant came to possess the vehicle in which drugs were found."" (quoting lee v. state, 835 so. 2d 1177, 1179 (fla. 4th dca 2002))).

plaintiffs rejected the deal, at which point it was dead.

"" this ""expansive statutory language"" has been interpreted to require the juvenile court "" 'to consider the totality of the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the subdivisions enumerated in [section 300,] subdivision (j).' "" (in re ashley b. (2011) 202 cal.app.4th 968, 982-983.)

this court's prior holding in atoka, inc. v. thornton, 566 s.w.2d 686 (tex.civ.app. eastland 1978, no writ), is expressly overruled insofar as it holds that an order of dismissal for want of prosecution also disposes of the cross action by implication.

see 6th cir. (""published panel opinions are binding on later panels.

miranda is inconsistent with the earlier issued opinion in garcia, we decline to follow it based on this circuit's rule that one panel may not overrule a prior panel opinion and the earlier precedent controls.

a more in-depth summary of the factual history underlying this lawsuit can be found in hunter v. town of mocksville, 789 f.3d 389 (4th cir. 2015), our earlier opinion in this case.

any language in the crouch opinion contrary to this opinion is disapproved.

id. at 78-79 (3).

first national bank of hollywood v. markham, 342 so.2d 1016 (fla. 4th dca 1977), is disapproved.

the decisions in coffey and kleeman misinterpret the nonuse provision of section 228.190.1 and, on that point, no longer should be followed.

further, we no longer adhere to the view of ianniello and its progeny that relationship and continuity are necessary characteristics of a rico enterprise.

the judgment also declared that if that amount was not paid by january 27, 2017, the home would be sold at a judicial auction.

the holding in associated is rejected inasmuch as we believe the district court placed undue emphasis on section 316(a), which we have found must be read in context with the other sections of the code, and also on that area of legislative history which we have found inconclusive.

id. at 658, 505 n.w.2d 553. our supreme court held: we read these provisions of the vehicle code and the no-fault insurance act in pari materia as indicating that an unexpired registration plate affixed to the vehicle serves as presumptive evidence that the vehicle is validly registered with the secretary of state, and that it carries the statutorily mandated no-fault automobile insurance.

see boles, 554 so.2d at 961 ([i]f the county and other persons are not bound, then the status of the road as public or private is subject to being litigated again, and the results of later litigation may be inconsistent with the results of the initial litigation.).

the cases of us diagnostic v. shelby radiology, p.c., 793 so.2d 714 (ala. 2000), wilma corp. v. fleming foods of alabama, inc., 613 so.2d 359 (ala. 1993), hinkle v. cargill, inc., 613 so.2d 1216 (ala. 1992), dean v. myers, 466 so.2d 952 (ala. 1985), and caron v. teagle, 408 so.2d 494 (ala. 1981), are overruled to the extent, but only to the extent, that they conflict with this holding.

in an important footnote to its opinion, the culligan court disapproved language in several court of appeal decisions "indicating that the proper scope of review of such litigating positions of the board (announced either in tax bulletins or merely as the result of an individual audit) is to determine whether the board's assessment was arbitrary, capricious or had no reasonable or rational basis.

cases suggesting the contrary are, to that extent, overruled.

we disapprove gamez to the extent it conflicts with our decision in this case.

d. del. 2006); accord, pls. d.i. 92, ex. a (letter from chetan bachale, consumer account analyst, ocwen loan servicing llc, to daniel tabb (mar. 9, 2016) (""as the bankruptcy has been discharged, you are no longer personally liable for the debt.

to the extent it is inconsistent with our opinion in the present case, we disapprove the court's decision in in re phelon.

requiring parties to make their objections clear on the record is not an onerous burden, and it is one that ensures that the bankruptcy court is squarely presented with the facts and legal arguments necessary to reach a reasoned decision considering the interests of all affected parties.

we overrule people v. johnson (1989) 47 cal.3d 1194, 255 cal.rptr. 569, 767 p.2d 1047 to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.

specifically, the commission determined that claimant was entitled to ttd benefits only from october 5, 2011, through october 19, 2011.

e.g., farmers ins. exchange v. adams (1985) 170 cal.app.3d 712, 722 [216 cal.rptr. 287] (dicta); premier ins. co. v. welch (1983) 140 cal.app.3d 720, 728 [189 cal.rptr. 657]; safeco ins. co. of america v. guyton (9th cir. 1982) 692 f.2d 551, 554-555.

specifically, we explained:

state v. carrawell, 481 s.w.3d 833, 837 (mo.banc 2016).

mr. henderson makes much of the fact that the district court applied 2b1.1(b)(15)(a) contrary to the recommendation of the probation officer.

##note: r.j. reynolds tobacco co. v. ciccone is the current case that is being dealt with, therefore it is not being overruled.

in so holding, we approve the second district's decision in thompson and disapprove the third district's decision in higgs.

thus, bledsoe does not control our holding in this case.

to the extent that gregg, places the initial burden upon the state to prove that a warrantless search or seizure took place, it is overruled.

in any event, if they are contrary to the result we have reached, we overrule them.

the reiterations of statements from the city of pasadena case in water users etc. assn. v. railroad com., 188 cal. 437, 443 [3] [ 205 p. 682] and baldwin v. railroad com., 206 cal. 581, 587 [3] [ 275 p. 425], also are disapproved.

in both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders, the court found that the children's presence in the parents' home remained contrary to their welfare and ordered that they remain in an out-of-home placement.

crim. app. sept. 25, 2012), perm. app. denied (tenn.

any language in people v. harrison, 176 cal.app.2d 330, 335 [ 1 cal.rptr. 414], which could be understood as being in conflict with the views expressed herein is disapproved.

further, in mooney v. state, 1999 ok cr 34, 17, 990 p.2d 875, 70 o.b.j. 2412 (aug. 31, 1999), this court adopted "the united states supreme court's decision in united states v. dixon, 589 u.s. 688, 113 s.ct. 2849, 125 l.ed.2d 556 (1993), overruling grady v. corbin, 495 u.s. 568, 110 s.ct. 2084, 109 l.ed.2d 548 (1990), and [did] away with the `same transaction' test.

on the contrary, what impresses me is the obduracy of high-minded state courts, like that of new york under the leadership of judge cardozo, in refusing to adopt the federal rule of exclusion.

we disapprove the contrary view expressed by the third district court of appeal in fontainebleau hotel corp. v. united filigree corp.

in the hrs get chapter, hrs 237-22 provides that payments for sales, gross receipts, or use taxes paid out of state will be offset.

father next challenges several portions of mother's testimony that, he alleges, painted an unjustified picture of him as hot-tempered and cruel.

we therefore overrule hart and reverse the district court's order denying the motion on the merits and remand for the district court to treat harris' motion as a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus and to provide harris with an opportunity to cure any pleading defects.

because c.o.'s responses to the district court's questions during the competency inquiry independently supported the court's on-the-record competency ruling, the district court's purported reliance on c.o.'s trial testimony in making its ruling was inconsequential.

for this reason, we hold that kikumura is no longer valid as long as the guidelines are advisory.

the texas health and safety code, in turn, defined intellectual disability as ""significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period.""

however, this statement in boland ii is inconsistent with dodds.

we take this opportunity to announce a consistent, if not always clear-cut rule to be followed in future cases: both victim impact and victim character evidence are admissible, in the context of the mitigation special issue, to show the uniqueness of the victim, the harm caused by the defendant, and as rebuttal to the defendant's mitigating evidence.

the issue of preservation of a challenge to a jury instruction has developed over time in this commonwealth.

"" (people v. berryman (1993) 6 cal.4th 1048, 1085, overruled on other grounds in people v. hill (1998) 17 cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)

we now expressly overrule the bowers and braden courts and hold that the plaintiff's minority does not toll the medical malpractice statute of repose.

schulte v. venture stores, inc., 832 s.w.2d 13 (mo.app. 1992), and hoskin v. younger cemetery corp., 838 s.w.2d 476 (mo.app. 1992), to the extent that they conflict, are overruled.

based on a comparison between inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation, the state's actions in placing him there for 30 days did not work a major disruption in his environment.

of course, lucas and garcia, dealing with mandatory minimum sentences, are likewise overruled to the extent they conflict with harris and this opinion.

further, we hereby overrule state v. harbert, 758 p.2d 826 (okla.

""sitting in equity, the district court is a 'court of conscience.'""

whether or not ""under"" and ""arising out of"" carry different meanings, neither supports the ""but for"" construction.

it is not actionable under section 1983; the contrary suggestion in williams v. city of chicago, 525 f. supp. 85 (n.d.ill. 1981), is disapproved.

to the extent that people v. wilson, 224 cal.app.2d 738 [ 37 cal.rptr. 42], is inconsistent with this conclusion it is disapproved.

a trial court should grant the state's motion for a dismissal if the request meets the good cause and open court requirements of crim.r. 48(a).

why close? because, says the fan, the phillies lost each inning by only one run.

we therefore overrule brice and hold that equitable tolling applies to the vaccine act.

when the question of illegality of the present sentence was raised by one of the judges on the panel in this appeal, the author referred this case to the court en banc, which (with judges barry, byrnes, ciaccio, ward, and williams dissenting) disapproves liddell on this point as erroneously decided.

the alternative holding in heaps v. toy, supra, finding the contract in that case contrary to good morals, is inconsistent with the numerous california decisions upholding contracts between nonmarital partners when such contracts are not founded upon an illicit consideration, and is therefore disapproved.

applicability, compact oxford english dictionary 64 (2d ed. 1987).

we find that the failure of the trial court to enter the necessary affirmative finding as to the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon is a clerical error; we overrule creeks to the extent of any conflict

affirmed in part and remanded schellhas, judge ramsey county district courtfile no. 62-cr-16-7992 lori swanson, attorney general, st. paul, minnesota; and john j. choi, ramsey county attorney, peter r. marker, assistant county attorney, st. paul, minnesota (for respondent) cathryn middlebrook, chief appellate public defender, steven p. russett, assistant public defender, st. paul, minnesota (for appellant) considered and decided by ross, presiding judge; schellhas, judge; and kirk, judge.

the district court considered multiple factors, and the risk assessment information was not determinative.

criminal appeal from the court of common pleas of mahoning county, ohiocase no. 16 cr 810 before: carol ann robb, gene donofrio, kathleen bartlett, judges. judgment: affirmed. atty. paul j. gains, mahoning county prosecutor, atty. ralph m. rivera, assistant prosecuting attorney 21 west boardman street, 6th floor, youngstown, ohio 44503, for plaintiff-appellee and atty. edward a. czopur, degenova & yarwood, ltd, 42 north phelps street, youngstown, ohio 44503 for defendant-appellant. robb, p.j.

nevertheless, according to doe, wherever one draws the line between battlefield captive and long-term detainee, he falls on the latter side.

and to the extent that tichenor relied on united states v. demaree, 459 f.3d 791 (7th cir.2006), to distinguish the guidelines from criminal statutes, that is the very ex post facto case that peugh abrogated.

under tennessee rule of evidence 801, ""'hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.""

14 a trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

in other words, villodas-rosario's miscarriage-of-justice claim attempts to reargue the plea colloquy error that we have already addressed.

thus, reliance on the statutory definition would impair the court's analysis because it would not provide a useful comparison to the court's descriptive dictionary definitions of ""producing"" and ""fabricating.""

turning first to the most important factor, we already have seen that the cursory analysis in division 2 of harrison and its progeny is unsound and inconsistent with the proper interpretation of statutes similar to ocga 5540 (a).

we expressly overrule nightclubs on this issue and hold that, as a general matter, 23a.010(4) satisfies the first amendment.

to the extent that mardanlou suggests otherwise, we overrule it.

therefore, to the extent that swindle is inconsistent with ely and this decision, it is overruled.

according to napa auto parts, the straws drove the vehicle ""for approximately six [] weeks and [] for between 500 to 600 miles prior to the accident with no incidents.""

66 in my view, the court of appeals decision in state v. austin, 2013 wi app 96, 349 wis. 2d 744, 836 n.w.2d 833, is on all fours with the facts of the instant case.

we also recede from scott v. state and sweeting v. state insofar as they hold that the limits of a court's inherent power over the subject matter are defined by the extent to which its actions are lawful.

however, to the extent that that case is in conflict with our present holding, it is hereby overruled.

for the reasons set forth above, we now overrule skov, o'neal and pettigrew.

therefore, we approve the decision under review and disapprove the holding in in re forfeiture of 1978 bmw that an innocent co-owner's interest in property is forfeited along with the guilty co-owner's interest.

this sentence is hereby overruled so that the liability between banks involving payment of an item on a forged or unauthorized endorsement will be clearly governed by the decision in the instant case.

in orpustan, we disapproved rodgers v. state farm mutual auto. ins. co., 13 cal.app.3d 641 [ 91 cal.rptr. 678]; and pacific automobile ins. co. v. lang

to the extent that in re mapes, d.c. s.d.cal. 1954, 120 f. supp. 316, is inconsistent with this holding, it is hereby overruled.

judge dickler is thus immune from suit.

the same evidence supports the jury's true finding of the special circumstances allegation, which requires an intent to kill and an intent "" 'to cause extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or another sadistic purpose.'

kelly is disapproved to the extent that it stands for the proposition that any judicial division of community property necessarily precludes the subsequent litigation of community property rights in an asset known to exist at the time of the earlier proceedings, and which could have been adjudicated at that time.

as justice donohue points out, several non-expert witnesses testified at trial that they saw or heard gunshots.

for the same reason, we disapprove dictum in people v. rivera (1985) 41 cal.3d 388 [ 221 cal.rptr. 562, 710 p.2d 362] to the effect that the rule of burton, supra, 6 cal.3d 375, survives the high court's holding in fare, supra, 442 u.s. 707, as a "component of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."

because jones/walker relates only to sufficiency of the evidence, we hereby disavow the language holding otherwise in sandoval.

halley v. birbiglia, 390 mass. 540, 545 (1983).

s.c. code ann. 29-3-660 (2007) (""[i]f the mortgage debt be secured by the covenant or obligation of any person other than the mortgagor the plaintiff may make such person a party to the action and the court may adjudge payment of the residue of such debt remaining unsatisfied after a sale of the mortgaged premises against such other person and may enforce such judgment as in other cases.""