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any language to the contrary in prendiville or other cases is overruled.

the committee's use of the possessive pronoun to reference ""place of business"" (as used in penal law 400.00), akin to the construction employed by penal law 265.03 (3) (""such person's . . . place of business""), demonstrates that, consistent with the legislative effort to standardize this act, ""place of business"" was meant to be a uniform phrase in these sections of the penal law (see matter of dutchess county dept. of social servs. v. day, 96 ny2d 149, 153 [2001] [""[c]ourts must harmonize the various provisions of related statutes and . . . construe them in a way that renders them internally compatible""] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; yatauro v mangano, 17 ny3d at 427).

richard's attempts to rely on the circumstances of his injury and medical treatment to undermine the validity of his miranda waiver and statement to weirauch are unavailing.

we note that the supreme court has expressly disapproved of the practice of relying on statements in separate opinions to determine whether a case has been overruled.

mendez and alterra healthcare are not in accord with this principle.

his prejudice arguments necessarily depend on his argument that his mental state was compromised at the time of his pleas, which we determined was not borne out by the record in the context of his due process claim.

easiest way to see the majority's error is to take its own example: an airline passenger who rejects a $300 voucher for taking a later flight.

accordingly, we approve in part and quash in part the district court's decision in this case; we disapprove liu v. mandina, 396 so.2d 1155 (fla. 4th dca 1981); and we direct that this cause be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

loudermill, 470 u.s. at 546.

in light of the unmistakable language in lincoln savings loan that "the presence of an ensuing benefit ... is not controlling," we conclude that such parts of richmond television, darlington-huntsville, and georator as may be interpreted as establishing a one-year standard for distinguishing between capital and current costs, are no longer authoritative.

that distinction does not affect our holding, however, because we overrule the primary holding of huss on the basis of koon.

##note: people v. jones was reversed not overruled.

the federal immigration judge and the board of immigration appeals (bia) found respondent removable, but the ninth circuit summarily remanded in light of its earlier penuliar decision holding that "aiding and abetting" a theft is not itself a crime under the generic definition of theft.

bradford and hollingsworth are overruled to the extent that they hold that 5g1.2(d) is discretionary and that remand is necessary where the apprendi violation can be cured by running sentences consecutively under that section.

to the extent our decisions in brown, beale, and later cases, e.g., watson v. united states, 612 a.2d 179, 182 (d.c. 1992), impose a more exacting standard of relevance, we disavow them.

the case has never been cited in texas and we regard the holding to be contrary to subsequent supreme court and commission of appeals decisions and that it has therefore been overruled.

any language in the bleuer case in conflict with or contrary to the opinion expressed herein is withdrawn and disapproved.

unpublished presque isle circuit court family divisionlc no. 15-084025-ds after remand before: m. j. kelly, p.j., and ronayne krause and boonstra, jj. per curiam.

the timeliness of bradshaw's attempt to obtain a pdr rehearing determines when his conviction became final and when the limitations period began to run.

to the extent the holdings in glick, contestible, moreland and sunshine realty are in conflict with the requirements of due process, they are overruled.

however, in both these cases, the children had a permanent, stable home with their biological mothers, and there was ""no expectation that they would ever be put up for adoption""; thus, termination of these fathers' parental rights was not warranted.

because brown is inconsistent with both the plain language of the mail fraud statute and precedents of the supreme court, we overrule brown and hold that the district court did not err when it gave the pattern jury instruction for mail fraud.

finally, although thomas did not appear to have a possessory interest in the taxi, we have held that a permissible inference may be drawn that people who know each other and are traveling together in a vehicle ""in circumstances indicating drug use or selling activity are operating together, and thus are sharing knowledge of the essentials of their operation.""

the cases of louisville and jefferson county planning and zoning commission v. grady, ky., 273 s.w.2d 563, and boyd v. louisville and jefferson county planning and zoning commission, 313 ky. 196, 230 s.w.2d 444, are expressly overruled.

""based on these medical reports and the testimony before it, the board of appeals was unable to conclude or find as a matter of fact that eberle's permanent disability"" was the natural and proximate result of his workplace accidents required for him to receive accidental disability retirement benefits.

to the extent treadwell, supra at 742743, 684 s.e.2d 244 and wilkes v. state, 293 ga.app. 724, 726(2), 667 s.e.2d 705 (2008) can be interpreted to hold otherwise, they are overruled.

in hall, for example, a capital murder case, we evaluated the prosecutor's statements that ""the only thing colder than the grave of [the victim] is [the defendant's] heart"" and that, after shooting a store clerk in the head, the defendant ""walked out coolly, calmly, and collected, with a .357 revolver waving at patrons in the store.""

to the extent the plaintiffs had suggested there must be a defect because of the ""high"" incidence of repair, ""they allege[d] no facts that give meaning to the term 'high.'""

to the extent that they follow or approve of the holding in ex parte erwin, supra, the following cases are also overruled.

accordingly, we are compelled to declare la.civ. code art. 160 unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions and to overrule loyacano v. loyacano

""when a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence (a) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (b) of defendant's being the perpetrator of the offense.""

in re rubottom is incorrect and must be overruled.

the holding of travelers express co., inc. v. rener, 493 s.w.2d 549 (tex.civ.app. 1973, no writ) is disapproved.

( 4056, subd. (a)(3).)

""[a] prima facie case of good faith purpose is achieved by the mere allegation . . . that the information sought is for a proper purpose.""

it was the petitioner's burden to prove that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds.

accordingly, we approve the third district's decision in this case and disapprove gill to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.

see brown v. state,

to the extent that our writing in hilltop village is inconsistent with what is said here, the former opinion is overruled.

all other amendments require the court's permission or a stipulation of the parties.

{ 31} we find that the contempt in this case was criminal in nature.

##note: people v. davis was affirmed not overruled.

we have concluded that sheehan should be overruled and that the opinion of the court of appeal prepared by justice bray and concurred in by presiding justice pierce and justice regan, as modified, correctly treats and disposes of the constitutional question presented.

see state v. white (white i), 815 p.2d 869 (ariz.

but a rule in which this court ""ma[de] a certain fact essential to the death penalty ... would be substantive""; it would change the range of conduct warranting a death sentence.

the court today provides no assurance that plea deals negotiated in good faith with guilty defendants will remain final.

we consider this case en banc in order to recede from this court's opinion in williams v. state, 409 so.2d 253 (fla. 4th dca),rev. denied, 417 so.2d 331 (fla. 1982) to the extent that it conflicts with our decision here.

see, e.g., frechette, 583 f.3d at 378-79 (16 months); morales-aldahondo, 524 f.3d at 119 (three years).

accordingly, we now overrule chard and disavow statements in subsequent cases suggesting its correctness.

we thus overrule marcum, american surety co. of n.y. and harrod, supra, to the extent that they approve submitting the issue to the jury, and other cases that leave this question to the jury.

the fifth circuit relied on harbison v. bell, 556 u. s. 180 (2009), in which a prisoner appealed from an order that denied counsel under 3599 for a state clemency proceeding but that did not address the merits of any habeas petition.

davis v. united states, 564 u.s. 229, 236-37 (2011).

however, appellant's defensive theories strengthened the state's need for this evidence.

we further recede from our decisions in metropolitan dade county v. marusa, 295 so.2d 704 (fla. 3d dca 1974), and victor v. stierheim, 380 so.2d 1319 (fla. 3d dca 1980), to the extent that they may conflict with our holding in the present case.

further, to the extent that any of this court's other reported opinions suggest an analysis contrary to the one set forth today, they are hereby disavowed.

to the extent that paprskar v. state, supra, applied the general test of waiver of constitutional rights set forth in johnson v. zerbst, supra, it is no longer viable.

wachter v. united states, 689 f. supp. 1420, 1422 (d. md. 1988) (applying maryland law); hales v. pittman, 576 p.2d 493, 499 (ariz.

thus, given the lack of meaningful analysis in gonzalez, that the gonzalez court misconstrued watson, and, critically, that the decision was at odds with well established case law, we now come to the conclusion that it must be overruled.

the supreme court said that the paroline factors are ""rough guideposts for determining an amount that fits the offense.""

finally, to the extent that schenck holds that there is no fiduciary duty on the part of the introducing broker in circumstances similar to those presented in the case at bar, we reject the holding.

but the most relevant definition of ""such"" is ""of the character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied.""

to the extent that stalvey, 25 fla. l. weekly at d961, hoffman, 745 so.2d at 987, siddal, 728 so.2d at 364, whiting, 711 so.2d at 1214, andharrell, 691 so.2d at 46, held that as a matter of law a trial court is precluded from considering the applicability of section 921.0016(4)(f) to crimes involving sexual conduct with minors, we disapprove those decisions.

holds otherwise, it is hereby overruled.

we agree with the court of appeals and the dissent, post, at 324-325 (opinion of thomas, j.), that "[t]he settlement agreement and promissory note here, coupled with the broad language of the release, completely addressed and released each and every underlying state law claim.

to the extent that they are inconsistent with the supreme court's holding, thus overruled is a line of decisions by this court which had previously upheld the validity of the cited court of appeal rule on the question, including:

and the village's argument on this point.

construed in a light most favorable to support the jury's verdict, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find edge guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of peeping tom.

he filed a ""motion to suppress and motion to dismiss vindictive prosecution"" in which he argued that the trial court should exclude ""all evidence resulting from [his] detention and arrest"" because the arrest and the search of his person violated his constitutional rights.

i disagree, however, with the majority's decision to overrule state v. smith, 200 conn. 465, 512 a.2d 189 (1986), and state v. tatum, 219 conn. 721, 728, 595 a.2d 322 (1991).

id. at 133.

accordingly, to the extent our decision in ashness is inconsistent with this opinion, we decline to follow it.

higgins v. am. nat'l gen. ins. co., 01-193 (la. app. 5 cir. 9/25/01); 798 so.2d 1078, 1083.

we also overrule or disapprove of the following cases to the extent they permitted special verdict forms in habitual offender proceedings which did not allow the jury to find that the defendant was not a habitual offender even though there was a finding that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions

the holding in farnsworth, supra, is overruled.

to the extent they are inconsistent with our analysis, we disapprove darden v. general motors corp., supra, 40 cal.app.4th 342, and its progeny, barr v. acands, inc. (1997) 57 cal.app.4th 1038.

## note: could not find overruling language specifically for each of the cases listed in the snippet.

state v. jefferson, supra; state v. williams, supra and state v. beard, supra, are therefore overruled to the extent that they are in conflict with this opinion.

g. state writ petition

it is rare that a sentence is so grossly disproportionate to the crime as to meet the threshold inquiry.

to the extent that mcsheridan holds section 502(b)(6) to be a limit on tort claims other than those based on lost rent, rent-like payments or other damages directly arising from a tenant's failure to complete a lease term, it is overruled.

however, if it is shown on the trial of a felony of the second degree that the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony, then on conviction the defendant shall be punished for a felony of the first degree.

father's remaining issues challenge various provisions of the trial court's modification order.

to the extent that any dicta therein may impliedly suggest that intent is a necessary ingredient of the element of concealment, we decline to follow it, in light of our en banc holding today.

thus the reasoning of the court of appeals in trulock was unsound.

we, therefore, overrule jackson and its progeny and hold that where the evidence authorizes a finding that a defendant's reckless conduct is an included crime in an aggravated assault, verdicts finding him guilty of both of those offenses are not mutually exclusive.

to the extent dye, 2009 ok 52, 230 p.3d 507,griffith, 2009 ok 51, 230 p.3d 488, and cossey, 2009 ok 6, 212 p.3d 447 conclude otherwise, they are overruled.

to the extent that foster holds otherwise, it is overruled.

rather, by en banc opinion, we recede from a portion of our earlier decision in allstate insurance co. v. sutton, 707 so.2d 760 (fla. 2d dca 1998), and deny mr. king's motion for attorneys' fees.

the minnesota legislature similarly limited the lewis court's holding.

2. evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts.

bottoson, 833 so.2d at 695 (citing hildwin v. florida, 490 u.s. 638, 109 s.ct. 2055, 104 l.ed.2d 728 (1989); spaziano v. florida, 468 u.s. 447, 104 s.ct. 3154, 82 l.ed.2d 340 (1984); barclay v. florida, 463 u.s. 939, 103 s.ct. 3418, 77 l.ed.2d 1134 (1983)).

instead, they clandestinely and deceitfully listed derek as bobby's father.

we disapprove britton, supra, 156 cal.app.3d 689, sedillo, supra, 135 cal.app.3d 616, and palmquist, supra, 123 cal.app.3d 1, to the extent they suggest otherwise.

on appeal, bailey contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in not finding that bailey had presented a prima facie case concerning his batson challenge and that the judge failed to follow proper procedure once bailey had made his prima facie showing.

fontenot v. petmecky is overruled.

similarly, the supreme court did not assess what happens to a capital felony classification when death becomes constitutionally unavailable as a sentence; the question in mills did not require it, but the question here does.

after the august 4, 2015 judgment, frauenshuh had no reason to perceive any judicial error with respect to the association's claim against frauenshuh for kraus-anderson's defective construction, and frauenshuh's rule 60.02 motion is not based on a judicial error in the district court's original ruling.

based on the foregoing reasoning, we approve the second district's holding in c.e.l. and disapprove of the third district's opinion in d.t.b.

id. 717f(e). once ferc makes that required finding and issues a ""certificate of public convenience and necessity"" (""certificate""), a pipeline company can begin construction.

see gtech (wherein gtech had an exclusive remedy in the procurement code's bid protest procedure - which was litigated to a final determination and was on appeal to this court - but had no other remedy at law to challenge the department of revenue's refusal to act in accordance with the procurement code's bid protest procedures).