metadata

base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
  - cosine_accuracy
  - dot_accuracy
  - manhattan_accuracy
  - euclidean_accuracy
  - max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
  - sentence-transformers
  - sentence-similarity
  - feature-extraction
  - generated_from_trainer
  - dataset_size:10000
  - loss:TripletLoss
widget:
  - source_sentence: >-
      value-neutral social science, this kind of negative depiction of managers
      would be deserved if it were empirically valid and based on careful
      research. However, it is not always either valid or carefully based. Some
      of the anti-manage ment bias comes a priori from theories that take as
      axiomatic that managers are prone to act in a bad way (e.g. agency
      theory). Some other part of the bias seems to be simply faculty members
      accepting popular negative stories about managers, which circulate in the
      community and are carried in the mass media. Again, a negative view of
      managers might be scientifically valid if based on large, representative
      samples. Yet, often the critical view propounded by management school
      academics about managers is based on a handful of cases. These cases are
      then taken to prove generalizations about managers being inherently bad or
      predisposed to unethical conduct. TABLE I Elements of business ethics
      teaching and their unanticipated negative consequences Teaching Business
      Ethics Causes Negative Consequences 1. Misdiagnosis of Causes of Problems
      True Causes Neglected Problems Solution Failure 2. Salience of Moral
      Authority of Academics Unethical Academics Lack Moral Authority to Teach
      Ethics Effectively 3. Ethical Philosophy Inconclusiveness ("No right
      answer") Ethics Scepticism Rationalizing Unethical Behaviour 4. Ethical
      Dilemmas Indecision 5. Free Choice Freedom Delusion Social Science
      Incompatibility Ethics Problems and Problems with Ethics 301 Extreme cases
      of misconduct that receive publicity are treated as being 'the tip of the
      iceberg', or as being a way to see into the true nature of managers.
      Again, at other
    sentences:
      - >-
        times, the results of larger scale social science inquiries are taken as
        proving widespread managerial wrongdoing when that conclusion is reached
        only by a particular interpretation of the data. Such interpretation
        uses one or other of the anti management theories, in that way creating
        an illusion that the anti-management theory is valid. In contrast, the
        empirical findings may better fit a theory that has a more positive view
        of managers. However, the anti-management discourse in modern management
        schools ignores such more pro-management theories. This violates the
        scientific ideal that a range of the ories should be considered in
        interpreting data. Again, it leads to the overlooking of pro-manage ment
        research, both theoretical and empirical. Unanticipated negative
        consequences of teaching business ethics Education in business ethics
        has five elements that can produce unanticipated negative consequences
        thereby rendering ethics education ineffectual or counter-productive:
        misdiagnosis of causes of prob lems, salience of moral authority of
        academics, ethical philosophy, ethical dilemmas and free choice.
        Misdiagnosis of causes of problems A contemporary way of reasoning is to
        go from a few cases, to over-generalizations of a negative kind about
        management, and thence to recommendations such as more ethics education
        in management schools. Each of these steps in the chain needs to be
        queried. Many of the prominent cases of managerial wrongdoing are not
        primarily failures of ethics but are poor managerial business judgements
        that led to corporate financial collapse, prompting unethical acts or
        accompanied by unethical acts. This can be seen in
      - >-
        ethics remains the extent to which it is central or peripheral to the
        curriculum. An Analysis of CSR, CI and Ethics Teaching in Business
        Schools 119 Business values driving the academic agenda? There are many
        views regarding the challenge of transferring ethical learning from the
        classroom into the corporation. Cordiero (2003) asserts the devel opment
        of ethical behaviour in managers ought to be grounded in their
        development as leaders, "ethics is not something a manager 'does'; it is
        something that a manager 'is'". Pfeffer and Fong (2004) argue that most
        effective and influential ethics education is best located within a
        pedagogic framework more akin to traditional professional education.
        This would incorporate clearly stated professional values and
        responsibilities, consistent with other established professions, a code
        of ethics and responsibilities should be defined with clear guidelines
        for those that violate professional standards, and disciplinary pro
        cedures to encourage non-tolerance of ethical malfeasance. The
        appropriateness of specific pedagogic options is not the only source of
        difficulty with regards to the effectiveness of ethics education in
        business schools. There is a strongly held view amongst some academics
        that business schools are reluctant to incorporate moral and ethical
        thinking into univer sity curricula (e.g., Scott, 1988; Sims and Sims,
        1991). Kelly (2005) has observed that a number of US business schools
        are reducing or removing ethics teaching altogether from their
        curricula, which might be as a result of a lack of availability of
        appropriately qualified staff, over-crowded curricula and indiffer ence
        among staff not involved in ethics teaching. Pfeffer
      - >-
        the interviews were conducted using ORC's CATI system. ORC utilizes a
        random-digit-dial sampling procedure that is fully replicated and
        stratified by region. According to ORC: "completed interviews are
        weighted by four variables: age, sex, geographic region, and race, to
        ensure reliable and accurate representation of the total population, 18
        years of age and older... The use of replicable sampling, standardized
        inter viewing procedures and representative weighting provides that all
        CARAVAN studies are parallel to one another. Thus, CARAVAN usage is
        appropriate both for point-in-time analysis as well as tracking and
        trend comparisons" (ORC, CARAVAN research report, 2006). For all the
        details of the sampling procedures and operation of ORC, see Appendix A.
        For the purpose of computing the BEI, we employed the weighted sample to
        minimize demographic fluctuations as a source of sampling error. Results
        Respondent characteristics All five 2006 national probability samples
        comprised 1045 adults (18 years of age or older) living in private
        households in the continental United States. The respondents'
        demographic characteristics for all five waves are presented in Table 1.
        EXHIBIT 1A Questions comprising the Business Ethics Index Personal/Past
        1. Based on your own experiences as a consumer in the past year,
        businesses you dealt with generally behaved: Very unethically Somewhat
        unethically Neither nor Somewhat ethically Very ethically Vicarious/Past
        2. Based on what you heard from others or the media in the past year,
        businesses behaved: Very unethically Somewhat unethically Neither nor
        Somewhat ethically Very ethically Personal/Future 3. Based on your
  - source_sentence: >-
      solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real
      virtues: it endorses a non-relational (internalist) conception of
      intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view
      ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it
      seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its
      intelligibility
    sentences:
      - >-
        satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such
        as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal
      - >-
        of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely
        non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive
        consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects,
      - >-
        at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the
        virtues of adverbialism can be had from within the act-object framework,
        provided we understand intentional objects correctly. I use Crane as a
        guide here, and build on his work on intentional objects. In the end, we
        can provide a suitable solution to the problem of thinking
  - source_sentence: >-
      might be discounted as intellectual laggards; they are also the
      disciplined and reflective professionals in the field. And among these are
      not only the artists and the poets, who might be suspected of carrying
      their creative habits over into their ordinary speech, but also the
      non-artists, whose interests in art are detached 378 MEANING RANGE IN WORK
      OF ART 379 and factual. These are the critics, the museum professionals,
      some philosophers, and even cultural historians and anthropologists. It is
      by no means characteristic of any of these latter groups today that they
      eschew the notion of meaning from their discussions of art. Quite the
      opposite. It is at least a nine to one probability that any considerable
      observation or discourse that one comes upon anywhere about art today will
      make some direct or implied reference to the meaning of art. A music
      critic speaks of the "intellectual content" of Beethoven's symphonies. A
      literary critic affirms that in poetry "the .... aesthetic effect of
      intellectual cogency is not to be slighted."' Another "disagrees" with
      some of the political views expressed by a poet in his poetry. An
      interpretation of the French impressionists in painting finds that a
      central aim of this school was to attain "the greatest possible degree of
      truth" in the presentation of its subjects.2 The writer of an introductory
      essay in a catalogue of a recent and notable exhibition of contemporary
      American painting states it directly: "Essentially, the artist is seeking
      to give visual
    sentences:
      - >-
        the lower right‐hand corner of figure 1. You should answer no to each
        question, which is the view advanced by Daniel Boisvert, who has
        emphasized, in favor of his view, that pejorative terms seem to have
        precisely this kind of dual content—for example, the offensive racial
        slur ‘n——r’ clearly has a descriptive content, but it is also associated
        with a contemptuous attitude.12 In accordance with a no answer to
        question Q1, the contemptuous attitude it is associated with is the
        same, no matter what sentence it figures in and even when embedded under
        negations, inside conditionals, or in questions. In accordance with a no
        answer to question Q2, it is the same attitude for different
        speakers—always contempt for a certain racial group. In accordance with
        a no answer to question Q3, the descriptive content is the same for
        every speaker. And in accordance with a no answer to question Q4, the
        contemptuous attitude associated with this word derives from the
        descriptive content of the word, together with the attitudes prevalent
        in the social background in which the word was originally used. So the
        descriptive content does not depend on the associated attitude. So in
        Sections VIII and IX, I will look at precisely which sorts of advantages
        may possibly accrue to hybrid views in the lower right‐hand corner of
        the figure. I will argue that there are many sorts of advantages which
        cannot accrue to this sort of view but also that this view does allow
        for certain subtle
      - >-
        form to conceptions of truth."3 These are fair samples of considered
        statements about art which are characteristic of recent and present-day
        thinking by various specialists who concern themselves with it. Any
        reader of the literature about art will know that they can be multiplied
        practically without limit and from all quarters. The fair reader will
        know also that, although many such statements are semantically vague and
        ambiguous, their general intent is plain enough. There is among them
        common agreement that art conveys ideas which can be meaningfully
        stated. That is, in application to art they disagree with the
        positivistic thesis of meaning. They hold that not only can one think
        about art (which is not the issue), but also that you can think about
        thinking in art-which is the issue. With the disagreement thus set, I
        want to ask as my main question: Does the positivistic analysis of
        meaning invalidate the ascription of cognitive meaning to works of art,
        or does it not? A simple affirmative answer implies (1) correctness of
        the positivistic analysis of meaning on all points pertinent to its use
        in rejecting meaning claims for art; (2) either logical ignorance or
        perversity on the part of those who persist in speaking of the meaning
        of art. A simple negative answer implies (1) a faulty or incomplete
        analysis of the concept of cognitive meaning, or (2) a misunderstanding
        on the part of the logical or semantic critic of the nature of art with
        a resulting misapplication of the concept of meaning to
      - >-
        Once this step is taken, it is not difficult to go on and say that any
        perception of a painting is an 'interpretation'. When this is said, the
        sense of 'interpretation' has been stretched, and we have what borders
        upon an octopus use of the term. I wish to show that the acceptance of
        an octopus use of 'interpretation' does not solve any of the standing
        problems in aesthetics and that it produces additional problems. In
        order to do this, I must first describe the differential use of
        'interpretation' in the arts. *) 'Conversations with Marin', Corothy
        Norman, Art News, Dec., 1953, p. 59. 2) 'Everyone wants to understand
        art. Why not try to understand the song of a bird? Why does one love the
        night, flowers, everything around one, without trying to under stand
        them? But in the case of a painting, people have to understand.' Artists
        on Art, Robert Goldwater and Marco Tr?ves (ed.), Pantheon, 1945, p. 421.
        3) 'The vast majority of English folk can not, will not consider a
        picture as a picture apart from any story which it may be supposed to
        tell.' Ibid, p. 346,7. 199 CAMPBELL CROCKETT II. THE DIFFERENTIAL USE OF
        'INTERPRETATION' IN THE ARTS. Problems concerning 'interpretation' often
        arise in the arts, and we discuss and frequently disagree about
        surrealistic paintings, the novels of Kafka and Camus, and modern dance.
        When we raise questions con cerning the 'interpretation' of these and
        other works of art, often we do not know how to take what we see, hear,
  - source_sentence: >-
      of the open society, he condemned complacency towards social institutions
      and so, if only tacitly, condemned complacency towards the institutions of
      science ([1944-1945] 1957, [1945] 1962).6 Not only did he fail to
      criticize scientific institutions explicitly, he too held up
      science-beautified as Socratic seminar-as a model for rational conduct in
      general and in politics in particular. In not working out the implications
      of his critical and democratic ideasfor institutional science Popper
      faltered. His beautification of science as institution was inconsistent
      with his critical philosophy of social institutions.7 What then are the
      scope and limits of republicanism applied to science? Both philosophers
      provide insights and ideas with which to criticize each other and, it is
      to be hoped, clarify the issues. In the body of this paper I condense them
      into four questions. Two questions focus on control. Should science be
      exempted from the democratic control of the wider society as Polanyi
      maintains (?2)?; or, is critical and democratic reform of
      institutionalized science possible along Popperian lines (?3). The two
      remaining questions focus on the impact of scientific norms and results on
      the host society. Is real existing science a suitable model for society in
      general along either Polanyiite or Popperian lines (?4)?; and, is science
      just one among the social institutions or, as both Polanyi and Popper
      claim, does its pursuit of truth make it exceptional and if so, how (?5)?
      5. For the argument that The Logic of Scientific Discovery contains a
      social view of science see my The Republic
    sentences:
      - >-
        aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to
        the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has
        introduced various desiderata for an aggregation procedure.
        Proposition-wise majority voting emerges as a procedure that satisfies
        all desiderata
      - >-
        of Science (Jarvie 2001). 6. In citing page numbers for these works I
        shall be using the more readily available 1957 book edition of 1944-1945
        and the fourth (1962) edition of 1945. 7. In some of his later essays
        and addresses Popper shows considerable awareness of the deficiencies of
        institutionalized science, especially its implication in war technology
        (Popper 1994, chs. 4 and 6). Yet he does not look back to and revise his
        earlier presentation. 547 I. C. JARVIE 2. Democratic and Authoritarian
        Republics. Should science be exempted from the democratic control of the
        wider society? Polanyi's principal argument for exemption relies on his
        special view of scientific authority. Popper, a critic of all authority,
        offers a challenge to Polanyi's argument for exceptionalism. Polanyi
        wrote much on the social relations of science, finding there lessons for
        democratic society itself (1945, 1951, 1958, 1961, 1962). His work
        combines reliable ethnographic reports with controversial social and
        political analysis. To understand why he tries to fuse republicanism
        with authoritarianism we need to outline salient features of his social
        analysis of science. Polanyi views the working of science as
        "coordination by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives" much like
        teams working on a large jigsaw puzzle. Every puzzler keeps in mind the
        pieces held and the elements of the picture so far assembled, and
        remains watchfully aware of the progress of others. Polanyi's jigsaw
        puzzle metaphor harbors a difficulty. Unlike the picture cut up by the
        jigsaw, the world-picture is not a prior given.
      - >-
        to be used as an instrument, science must keep an essential measure of
        self-identity and autonomy. We could conclude this brief confrontation
        by saying that science is and must be both "neutral" and "non-neutral",
        according to the aspect of it we take into consideration. It can and
        must be neutral as far as it is a system of reliable knowledge; it
        cannot and must not be neutral as far as it is a human activity
        implicated with all the other aspects of the human praxis. All this may
        be rather clear, and is certainly very important to recognize, but new
        problems arise at this point. According to the two one-sided positions
        considered above, a kind of struggle was envisaged between science on
        the one side and the whole of its "external" environment on the other.
        For the ones the problem was that of preserving at all price the
        integrity of science, its independence and freedom towards the outside
        while for the others the problem was that of eliminating this arrogant
        pretension by reducing science to the dismasked role of being just a
        pawn in the complex game of the socio-political battle. What is common
        to both positions is the antagonistic way they envisage the relationship
        between science and the extra-scientific world. But we must note that
        this antagonistic way of thinking is by no means automatically
        eliminated once we become aware that science is somehow two different
        things at the same time, i.e. a system of knowledge and a human
        activity. For the problem immediately
  - source_sentence: >-
      reflective conceptual scheme of the the observer's world. So, even though
      we can differentiate by analysis the conditions of our awareness, there is
      no actual awareness short of conceptual incorporation into a functional
      and rational world. Not only is there no thinking without signs; there is
      no experience short of thirdness. This does not imply that such
      experiences are whole and complete relative to consciousness. That for
      both Hegel and Peirce never happens short of the Absolute ? however
      different their visions ofthat Absolute may have been. What it does mean
      is that there is no direct access to any reality as it presents itself
      either the Cartesian mental or the Cartesian physical, that can warrant
      any claims for an epistemological direct realism. That thought is always
      mediated by sym bols gives the basis for the "critical" in Peirce's own
      critical common-sen sism, and puts him in line with Santayana and Sellars
      (perhaps Wilfred as well as Roy Wood) for critical realism. While this is
      the case epistemologically, Peirce wanted to maintain that such an account
      requires ontologically the reality of all three pheno menological
      categories. He chided Hegel for dwelling on thirdness to the exclusion of
      secondness and firstness, treating the triadic form as "a mere
      RECONSTRUCTING DECONSTRUCTION 377 fashion of dress." "Had Hegel, instead
      of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to
      them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality,
      pragmaticists might have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their
    sentences:
      - >-
        truth" (CP5.436). Peirce maintained that they are all three as
        ontologically required as are firsts and seconds required for triadic
        relations in logic. Reaction and feeling are implicit in the continuity
        of habit, actuality and quality in the generality of law, and
        interpretation presupposes facts with which to come to terms. Since
        Peirce, the neo-posi tivists have tried to reduce thirds to seconds,
        clearly without success. Among the reactions to that pristine scientism
        have been the current waves of neohegelian fervour that attempt to move
        the other way, by absorbing feeling and action into interpretation.
        Peirce's ontological realism is based on logical conditions for
        phenomenology , and thus resists the reductionis ts urges in both
        directions. These epistemological and ontological realisms are grounded
        in the dynamical object. Peirce understood dynamis much as Aristotle
        understood the material condition of change, as serving a conditional
        limit and as suggesting a teleological fulfillment. Peirce thought it
        conditional because it was interactive with other circumstances of
        action and experience. The determination of it as a limit to action and
        experience depended upon how it related to other conditions in its
        circumstantial context, and that can be dealt with in thought and action
        only in an actualized and conceptualized form. None the less, the
        dynamical object stands over against thought and action, and it requires
        coming to terms with it to make sense of the world and to act in it.
        Ultimately, were we to consider it as some sort of surd
      - >-
        logic of relations; although what the intimate connection is between
        these studies and his metaphysics Peirce leaves the reader to guess at
        random. 4 This approach has many obvious affiliations with the
        "presuppositionless ' studies of essences by Descartes, Husserl, and
        Santayana, although in the light of Peirce 's devastating critique of
        the Augustinian-Cartesian philosophy in his earliest papers, too much
        can not be made of this similarity. And after the nature of Thirdness
        has been discussed it will be seen how full of presuppositions Peirce 's
        analysis really is. 368 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Let us turn to the
        categories themselves. The Category of Firstness indicates the aspect of
        freshness, life, freedom, variety, and spontaneity in the phaneron. Thus
        it would seem that Firstness presents the phase of atomicity,
        specificity, or sheer quality in experience. A quality is just what it
        is, and in its sheer immediacy is utterly disconnected with any other
        quality. On the other hand Peirce regards Firstness as a "pure nature"
        or quality to which embodiment and localization are essentially foreign
        (1.303). A quality is eternal, independent of time or of any realization
        (1.420); it is simply a "may-be," whose nature is that it might be a
        specific moment in a phaneron. Nevertheless Firstness is not a general
        or universal, since to be a universal involves reference to embodiment
        and localization (1.304). It is not easy to reconcile these various
        characterizations of Firstness. Peirce seems to shuttle back and forth
        between regarding Firstness
      - >-
        peculiar theory. Royce does not appear to distinguish the mystic's
        motive from the motive ot speculation in general, the motive which the
        mystic has in common witb the realist, the motive drawn from the defects
        of that (wonderfully depicted) "finite situation that ;sends us all
        alike looking for true Being ". In so far as mystic and realist alike
        have the intention not alone to find true Being, but to define it, both
        must be equally condemned by Royce's proof that " Each in the end
        defines Nothing whatever ".1 But what if the difference between mystic
        and realist lay precisely in this point: that the purpose of the mystic
        is not to define anything at all, but to do something which by every
        device he has tried to differentiate from all processes of defirning or
        of speculating. I believe this to be the case; and that, the logic of
        Royce thus passes over his head. The purpose of the mystic lies in the
        region of the practice of religion; and his essential theoretical
        message is, that there is a practical cognition of the Absolute which
        philosophical knowledge necessarily fails to reach. The point of
        difference between the mystic and all speculators (including the
        speculative mystics as speculators) seems to me to be this:A philosophy
        does not supply the thinker ipso facto either with the incentive to
        worship or with the power to worship. Thought may perhaps persuade us of
        God's immediate presence in experience, and yet it leaves us empty of
        the idea of 'approach'; it
model-index:
  - name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
    results:
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: nomic
          type: nomic
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.972
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.028
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.968
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.972
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.972
            name: Max Accuracy
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.971
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.029
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.9695
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.971
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.971
            name: Max Accuracy

SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

Model Type: Sentence Transformer
Base model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v3")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'reflective conceptual scheme of the the observer\'s world. So, even though we can differentiate by analysis the conditions of our awareness, there is no actual awareness short of conceptual incorporation into a functional and rational world. Not only is there no thinking without signs; there is no experience short of thirdness. This does not imply that such experiences are whole and complete relative to consciousness. That for both Hegel and Peirce never happens short of the Absolute ? however different their visions ofthat Absolute may have been. What it does mean is that there is no direct access to any reality as it presents itself either the Cartesian mental or the Cartesian physical, that can warrant any claims for an epistemological direct realism. That thought is always mediated by sym bols gives the basis for the "critical" in Peirce\'s own critical common-sen sism, and puts him in line with Santayana and Sellars (perhaps Wilfred as well as Roy Wood) for critical realism. While this is the case epistemologically, Peirce wanted to maintain that such an account requires ontologically the reality of all three pheno menological categories. He chided Hegel for dwelling on thirdness to the exclusion of secondness and firstness, treating the triadic form as "a mere RECONSTRUCTING DECONSTRUCTION 377 fashion of dress." "Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their',
    'truth" (CP5.436). Peirce maintained that they are all three as ontologically required as are firsts and seconds required for triadic relations in logic. Reaction and feeling are implicit in the continuity of habit, actuality and quality in the generality of law, and interpretation presupposes facts with which to come to terms. Since Peirce, the neo-posi tivists have tried to reduce thirds to seconds, clearly without success. Among the reactions to that pristine scientism have been the current waves of neohegelian fervour that attempt to move the other way, by absorbing feeling and action into interpretation. Peirce\'s ontological realism is based on logical conditions for phenomenology , and thus resists the reductionis ts urges in both directions. These epistemological and ontological realisms are grounded in the dynamical object. Peirce understood dynamis much as Aristotle understood the material condition of change, as serving a conditional limit and as suggesting a teleological fulfillment. Peirce thought it conditional because it was interactive with other circumstances of action and experience. The determination of it as a limit to action and experience depended upon how it related to other conditions in its circumstantial context, and that can be dealt with in thought and action only in an actualized and conceptualized form. None the less, the dynamical object stands over against thought and action, and it requires coming to terms with it to make sense of the world and to act in it. Ultimately, were we to consider it as some sort of surd',
    'logic of relations; although what the intimate connection is between these studies and his metaphysics Peirce leaves the reader to guess at random. 4 This approach has many obvious affiliations with the "presuppositionless \' studies of essences by Descartes, Husserl, and Santayana, although in the light of Peirce \'s devastating critique of the Augustinian-Cartesian philosophy in his earliest papers, too much can not be made of this similarity. And after the nature of Thirdness has been discussed it will be seen how full of presuppositions Peirce \'s analysis really is. 368 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Let us turn to the categories themselves. The Category of Firstness indicates the aspect of freshness, life, freedom, variety, and spontaneity in the phaneron. Thus it would seem that Firstness presents the phase of atomicity, specificity, or sheer quality in experience. A quality is just what it is, and in its sheer immediacy is utterly disconnected with any other quality. On the other hand Peirce regards Firstness as a "pure nature" or quality to which embodiment and localization are essentially foreign (1.303). A quality is eternal, independent of time or of any realization (1.420); it is simply a "may-be," whose nature is that it might be a specific moment in a phaneron. Nevertheless Firstness is not a general or universal, since to be a universal involves reference to embodiment and localization (1.304). It is not easy to reconcile these various characterizations of Firstness. Peirce seems to shuttle back and forth between regarding Firstness',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

Dataset: nomic
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.972
dot_accuracy	0.028
manhattan_accuracy	0.968
euclidean_accuracy	0.972
max_accuracy	0.972

Triplet

Dataset: nomic
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.971
dot_accuracy	0.029
manhattan_accuracy	0.9695
euclidean_accuracy	0.971
max_accuracy	0.971

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 10,000 training samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 10 tokens mean: 255.88 tokens max: 655 tokens	min: 14 tokens mean: 255.08 tokens max: 490 tokens	min: 15 tokens mean: 270.3 tokens max: 562 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
finite equational basis. The extension of this theorem to the quasivariety case by J. Czelakowski, W. Dziobiak [5] and the first author [16] followed. Finally, K. A. Baker and J. Wang proved [2] that a variety V with DPSC and Vsi (Vfsi) strictly elementary has finite equational basis. The new proof of Baker's theorem presented in [2] is based on the above mentioned result of K. A. Baker and J. Wang, and the fact that each finitely generated congruence-distributive variety hats DPSC [2, Theorem 2]. In order to obtain a proof of Pigozzi's theorem one can easily carry over the latter fact to the quasivariety case (Proposition 7) and use our Theorem 2. Pigozzi's theorem was already reproved by W. Dziobiak in [6] and by M. Maróti, R. McKenzie in [12]. But, according to our knowledge, the proof presented here is the shortest one, as is the proof of Baker's theorem given in [2]. However, both these proofs are non-constructive. The results more general than Pigozzi's theorem are known nowadays. The first author of this article proved in [17] that a locally finite relatively congruence-distributive quasivariety Q has a finite quasi-equational basis provided the class Qfsi is strictly elementary. W. Dziobiak, M. Maróti, R. McKenzie and the first author proved [7] that each finitely generated relatively congruence-meet-semidistributive quasivariety has a finite quasiequational basis. It is a quasivariety version of Willard's theorem [20]. Finally, K. Palasinska proved in [18] that a finitely generated	protoalgebraic filter-distributive strict universal Horn class is finitely axiomatizable. 2. Toolbox We briefly recall basic facts from quasivariety theory we will need. A standard book about quasivarieties is [8] and about universal algebra are [4, 14]. One may also consult the classical position [11]. Definable Relative Principal Subcongruences 111 We assume that all considered algebras are in the same finite language. A quasivariety Q is a class of algebras defined by a set S of quasi-identities (strict universal Horn sentences). The set E is called a quasiequational basis of Q. Recall that a class is strictly elementary, or finitely axiomatizable, if it may be defined by a single sentence. Notice that a quasivariety Q has a finite quasi-equational basis if and only if Q is strictly elementary. The smallest quasivariety Q containing a given class Ç is SPPu(ö), where P denotes the product class operator, Pu denotes the ultraproduct class operator, and S denotes the subalgebra class operator [8, Corollary 2.3.4]. If G is a finite family of finite algebras, then Q = SP(£), and every such Q is called finitely generated. Let Q be a quasivariety. A congruence a on an algebra A is called a Q-congruence provided A/ a G Q. Note that A G Q if and only if the equality relation 0^ on A is a Q-congruence. The set Cong (A) of all Q-congruences of A forms an algebraic lattice which is a meet-subsemilattice of Con(A) [8, Corollary 1.4.11]. We use the symbol V2 for the lattice join in Cong(A). A nontrivial algebra S	CEP. It follows from this result that V(Qmn), (, n) 0 {(0, 0), (1, 0)}, does not have AP. Using Priestley duality we show in Section 3 that the class of finite quasi-Stone algebras has AP. We do not know whether the whole class QSA has AP. This problem was posed by H. P. Sankappanavar in [8]. In Section 5 we explain briefly how to obtain the free quasi-Stone algebra over a set S from the free Q-lattice over S. Priestley Duality for Quasi-Stone Algebras 85 The concepts and results on distributive lattices and universal algebra that are used here are well known and can be found in the books [1] and [3]. We assume that the reader is familiar with Priestley duality for distributive lattice (see [6] and [7]), the theory of Q-distributive lattices ([4] and [5]) and the theory of quasi-Stone algebras ([8]). 2. Duality The results of this section rely on ?2 of [4]. For a distributive lattice L with 0 and 1 we will denote its Priestley space by X. X can be represented as the set of prime filters of L ordered by set inclusion, the topology on X having as a sub-base the sets of the form {P E X: a 0 P} and {P C X: a E P} for each a E L. The map a 9-+ {P C I: a E P} is a lattice isomorphism of L onto the lattice of clopen increasing subsets of X, where join is set union, meet is
London 2001 . 8 J. Milbank C. Pickstock G. Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy. A New Theology, Routledge, London New York 1999; J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason, Blackwell Publishing, Maiden 20062, esp. chapt. 12, pp. 382-442; S. Zižek J. Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ. Paradox or Dialectic?, MIT Press, Cambridge London 2009, pp. 110-233. The most notable figures in this context are: J. Derrida, The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret, trans, by D. Wills, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago 2007; Id., Violence and Metaphysics, in Writing and Difference, trans, by A. Bass, Routledge, London 1978, pp. 79-153; G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans, by P. Patton, Columbia University Press, New York 1994, pp. 5-11; G. Deleuze F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans, by B. Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1987; M.C. Taylor, Altarity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1987; m! Dooley, The Politics of Exodus: S0ren Kierkegaard's Ethics of Responsibility, Fordham University Press, New York 2001. This list is provisional and highly selective. The historical-intellectual contours of poststructuralism are drawn by Johannes Willem Bertens in The Idea of the Postmodern. A History, Routledge, London New York 1995. 10 J. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1997. 1 Id., On Religion, p. 119. 614 LEO STAN attack against established Christianity and its underlying critique of classical metaphysics12. Kierkegaard matters to Caputo because he discloses a universal horizon to religiosity, above and beyond the partial (and always contentious)	instantiations of particular religions. (2) Contrary to Caputo's efforts to universalize Kierkegaard's religious thought, a rather particularistic approach has been advanced by the Christian theologian John Milbank, one of the founders of Radical Orthodoxy. In a groundbreaking essay, titled The Sublime in Kierkegaard 13 , Milbank actually agrees with the poststructuralist reception and tries to describe to what extent Kierkegaard anticipates the postmodern image of the self. One of the reasons Milbank invokes in this direction is that the Kierkegaardian model of subjectivity remains somehow devoid of any universal significance14. For him, Kierkegaard's (religious) selfhood is «endlessly liable to fracture and postponement», «simultaneously preconstituted and deconstituted by a repetitious dynamic which permits only an illusory self-mastery»15. As 12 Moreover, Caputo relies on Kierkegaard's opposition to any rational grounding of religious experience with the subsequent privileging of the processual, finite, incommunicable, passionate, jocose, and thus always perspectivai side of the self's interaction with the divine. See Id., Instants, Secrets , and Singularities : Dealing Death in Kierkegaard and Derrida , in M. J. Matuštik M. Westphal (eds.), Kierkegaard in Posti Modernity, Indiana University Press, Bloomington Indianapolis 1995, pp. 216-238; Id., Radical Hermeneutics , Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1987, pp. 1 1-35, 92, 262, 292, 294; Id., How to Read Kierkegaard , W.W. Norton & Company, New York London 2008, pp. 3, 16, 55. Ironically enough, Caputo wishes to be part of the postmodernist reception of Kierkegaard, which, as already stated, prefers to insist on the nonand even	B ' 'provides the measure against the recurring idolatric tendencies across the spectrum of culture-spheres' (p. 12) a transcendence which is missed by theorists like Habermas. Kierkegaard is often held up in this collection as a corrective to some twentieth-century excesses or distortions. Thus, Patricia Huntington argues that Heidegger's ontologizing of Kierkegaard 'depletes the latter's thought of its ethical import' (p. 44). C. Stephen Evans contrasts Kierkegaard's Christian therapy with Freud's fatalism and pessimism. Matustik traces the way in which Kierkegaard evades modernity's political categories, whilst Westphal claims that Levinas's ethical philosophy lacks Kierkegaard's hope for an ultimate reconciliation of self and Other. This is no simple hagiography of the Danish master, however. True, the essayists are by and large keen to dispel some images of Kierkegaard, and to stress his relevance to social ethics (Perkins, McBride, Evans, Matustik) and REVIEWS 23I as a partner in dialogue for feminist thinking (Berry, Lorraine). But there are notes of criticism too. Huntington points to Kierkegaard's failure to develop a critique of our inherited symbolic order a failure in which he can be supplemented by a reading of Derrida. Alison Leigh Brown writes of Kierkegaard's evasion of feminine imagery for the divine and a need to resist his logic of sacrifice. Jurgen Habermas's contribution criticizes Michael Theunissen for his Kierkegaardian equation of transcendence with a God relationship. Thus, in various ways, a critique of Kierkegaard's conservatism and other-worldliness is upheld. The interest of the collection lies partly in its tensions tensions between those who
`constructed opposition between Spinoza and Hegel. Where Zizek views Hegel's non-dualistic relational epistemology as a substantial improvement over Spinoza's purported dogmatic`	`account of a reality which is external to the perceiver, I argue that Hegel inherited such an epistemology from Spinoza. Ultimately, it is Spinoza who provides Hegel with`	`makes sense of things. In Section II, the discussion turns to Hegel's notion of a 'form of consciousness'. I argue that Hegel's notion of a 'form of consciousness' is best understood as comprising a worldview. The principal advantage of articulating stances in a Hegelian way is that such an interpretation explicitly details both the theoretical and affective attitudes`

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 500 evaluation samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 23 tokens mean: 257.39 tokens max: 530 tokens	min: 23 tokens mean: 256.21 tokens max: 530 tokens	min: 19 tokens mean: 265.53 tokens max: 814 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
cause harm.6 The authors identify the line between reckless and negligent conduct as the line between awareness and unawareness of the risk one is creating.7 In their view, there is no morally significant difference between punishing someone who himself lacked awareness of a risk even if a reasonable person would have been aware ofthat risk and strict liability. They argue that in either case the actor may be punished without proof that she herself consciously disregarded an unjustifiable risk,8 and that there is no principled way of identifying the universe of risks to which one ought to advert.9 And because they assume that negligent behavior lacks the element of choice and therefore falls below the threshold for culpability, they deem it improperly consequentialist to consider whether punishing negligence would promote the penal goal of communicating and enforcing norms for future conduct.10 II. THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST NEGLIGENCE What sort of argument are the authors making against negligence liability? 'Negligence' might simply be the evaluative label the authors place on the category of conduct that they consider morally non-culpable. The argument might run that criminal culpability requires a guilty mind, a guilty mind requires con6 Id. at p. 79. 7 Id. at p. 69. 8 Id. atDD. 81-82. 9 Id. at η. 76. 10 Id. at p. 78. 436 SUSAN Α. BANDES scious choice, negligence is by definition a lack of conscious choice, and hence negligence is non-culpable. Negligence might simply connote a lack of mens rea in	its most general sense: an absence of blameworthiness.11 Alternatively, it might connote a lack of mens rea in its more specific, elemental, sense: the absence of a conscious or subjective state of mind. In either formulation, the term 'negligence' makes no real contribution. It is essentially a legal conclusion serving the same purpose as the term 'non-culpable,' rather than a term identifying a type of conduct. This is the sort of argument that merges the descriptive task of identifying the mental state with the normative task of determining whether the mental state should be punishable.12 This does not strike me as a fair or plausible reading of the authors' argument. Rather, there is ample support for the conclusion that the authors are making a descriptive argument about the negligent state of mind as a fact in the world.13 The argument is that negligent actors do not make a conscious choice to risk or cause harm. Their actions are beyond their control.14 Moreover, 'character traits are not under actors' direct control, nor can we change our characters at will, at least not at any given moment in time'.15 This argument about the nature of negligence rests on two basic descriptive assumptions. First, it assumes that the negligent actor is unaware of the risk she is taking. Second, it assumes that at the time she undertakes 11 See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law (5th ed. 2009), pp. 118-119 (distinguishing broad 'culpability' meaning of mens rea from narrow 'elemental' meaning of the term). 12	intention, focusing instead on corpo rate irresponsibility and negligence. He argues that corporate intention to do harm will not gen erally be identifiable. What could be more easily identifiable is a lack of awareness of risk, a lack of concern, perhaps a degree of irresponsibility. These "dispositions" can be readily absorbed by the culture of an organisation or part of an organisation, and can be extremely difficult for individuals to resist. In such a context the organ isation might be seen as having a moral equiva lent of civil liability, where we would not be looking for intention in order to hold the mis creant liable, but rather a lack of care leading to harmful consequences. Gibson does not argue that the concept of intention is erroneous, simply that the concept of negligence is more produc tive. However, shifting focus to corporate negli gence does not in fact remove the problem of corporate intention. A negligent corporation is one that can be held responsible for its failure to act prudently and with thought to the conse quences of its actions. To be held responsible for its negligent actions or inaction it must be capable of acting otherwise in this context, of acting prudently and far-sightedly. And prudent, far-sighted action involves intention, even if it is only the negative intention of avoiding certain outcomes. So a culpably negligent corporation must be capable of such intentional action. The problem of intention simply returns by another route, despite Gibson's efforts. A more fundamental rethinking of the issues is undertaken by Ouyang and
clear the air and set the stage. Consider a green spot. Call F the fact of its being green. It is as "simple" a fact as I can think of. Yet, being a fact, F, like any other fact, has constituents which are things. In this sense no fact is "simple." (The familiar difference thus revealed between the uses of 'simple' as applied to facts and to things, respectively, will play a role in the last part.) Which thing or things are the constituents of F? Some answer that they are two, namely, an individual (the spot) and a character (the spot's color). The answer seems obvious; to me it is obvious. But, then, it has not been and still is not obvious to many. Up to a point, of course, everyone agrees that in being presented with F he is presented with the color. Beyond that point, though, some try to make distinctions. They might claim, for instance, that the individual and the character are not presented in quite the same way, only the former but not the latter being "wholly presented." Objections against calling the character a thing, as well as against calling an expression directly referring to it a name, as either unusual or confusing, may be a linguistic symptom of this attempt to distinguish. An extreme and explicit variant of it is to insist that F has only one constituent (which is a thing) and that this constituent is neither the spot nor its color but,	rather, the "colored spot." We have come upon the root of the realismnominalism controversy, a disagreement so fundamental that one might expect it to be relevant to almost any question a philosopher is likely to raise. I shall take it for granted that F has two constituents which are things and which are presented to us 20 INEFFABILITT AND ONTOLOGY whenever F is presented, namely, the individual and the character. But I shall also argue that F has three further constituents which in some sense are presented to us whenever F is. The accent in this paper is on these additional three-this excess, as it were, over either one or two constituents. This is the peculiar way in which, fundamental as it is, the difference between one and two, if I may so express myself, does not matter for my purpose. When I know that this is a green spot, I know also that (i) the spot is an individual, (2) the color is a character, and (3) the former exemplifies the latter (and not, perhaps, the latter the former). How could I know all this if it were not, in some sense, presented to me? To grasp the idea more firmly, consider for a moment a visual field containing two spots, one red, one green. When this field is presented to me, I also know which spot exemplifies which color and, for that matter, also that no spot or color exemplifies the other spot or color. How, to repeat,	cannot be opposed to, for they are part of Reality. Their true logical opposite is not Reality but the Absolute, and to it they are opposed as the finite to the Infinite, the relation being, if viewed from the side of appearances, on,e of total dependence; if viewed from the side of the Absolute, one of absoluteness, independence or irrelativity. (2) Whatever appears to be is.-By saying that a content is real, we mean in the first instance, that it is a logical function of the real system with which we come in contact in perceptive experience. Now this real system (the real world of common-sense) is itself an intellectual construction, and it owes its reality to its being a logical function of the absolute and all-inclusive system. If these positions are granted, it will follow that every appearance is real if every appearance in its integral and proper nature is a function of the absolute system. Since it is in the content of error and illusion, if anywhere, that we must look for unreal appearance, I propose to undertake an analysis which I hope will serve the double object of at once justifying this test of reality and of showing that every appearance satisfies it. Consider such cases as the following: the variations of colour which an object presents in different lights and at different distances; the blueness, for example, of the hills on the horizon, which we refuse to refer to them as their real colour, or the ghostlike appearance of a scarecrow at night to a belated wanderer,
their end and in their fate,... willingly or not, everything that might be considered the stuff of psychology, kit and caboodle, will follow the path of the signifier. (Lacan 1988, pp. 43-44) 2 For convenience, Lacan's works shall be cited henceforth in the text with date and page number, for example (1948, p. 17); other citations shall be by name, date, and page number (unless the author is indicated in the immediately preceding text, in which case only date and page number will be cited). 3 This is Lacan's word, from the opening quotation above. 4 Human infants are, obviously, gendered, and thus usually referred to with pronouns such as "he or she" and "him or herself." However, since I will constantly be making pronominal reference to infants in my discussion of Lacan's account of the mirror stage, gendered but gender-neutral pronouns would become extremely awkward, making an already-complicated exposition even more muddled. (For example, the next sentence would read as follows: "The infant anticipates a not-yet-experienced coherence and unity of self as he or she recognizes him or herself in the unified body seen in the mirror.") Hence, when making pronominal reference to infants in this paper, I shall use "it" and "itself." This is not meant to dehumanize infants in any way (on the contrary), but rather to facilitate communication of complex ideas. & Springer The Alienating Mirror 21 1 Lacan the event in which a consciousness becomes a self-consciousness. Recognizing an as-yet unrealized unity in the body-image in a mirror and	recognizing this image as its own, the infant becomes aware of itself as a unity, and thus gains selfconsciousness. But Lacan's account diverges markedly here from Hegel's classic account of the acquisition of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For Hegel, the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness cannot occur, as it does in Lacan's account, without reference to another consciousness.5 If self-consciousness or ego formation is only possible on the presupposition of certain kinds of social interaction, then the mirror stage is not the initial moment of ego-formation, as Lacan suggests, but rather the culmination or conclusion of an extended social process. In order to substantiate this objection, I will first have to present Lacan's account of the mirror stage and ego-formation in some detail. I will then be able to show why the infant's self-recognition in the mirror seems to be prefaced upon some sort of prior mutual-recognition with another subject. In conclusion, I will be able to identify some potential implications of this critique for Lacan's account of the subject and point toward several other promising directions for research. Lacan's account of ego-formation in the infant can be presented very briefly. The two papers in which Lacan himself presents his view are each a mere seven pages in length.6 The key idea, as we have already sketched, is that at a certain stage in an infant's development, when the infant first recognizes its image in a mirror, reacting with jubilation to the recognized image,	wholeness, marks his dynamics with 3 Hypatia Otherness throughout his psychic development. It is this simultaneous desire and fear, simultaneous dependence and disavowal, that shapes him into a split, violent subject warring always against the Otherness of his own embodiment. THE STUFF OF NIGHTMARES . . I want to look more carefully at these boundaries-boundaries between self and Other; and the projection of this internal, psychic Otherness onto boundaries between physical selves and others. I want to look more carefully at these boundaries and projections, at our cultural obsession with them, and at the violences that these produce. It is perhaps too easy in the telling of this story to turn one more time to Rene Descartes (1986) and lay this all at his doorstep-Descartes, the dualistic madman who forever severed our bodies from our minds, and consequently our selves from other selves. That story is perhaps too easy and too worn to illuminate these dynamics. In a more contemporary telling of the Cartesian dualism, Lacan portrays for us in the mirror stage the formation of a subject as an effect of the idealization of a body-in-control. To become a body-incontrol-or at least to pursue this as an ideal, which is necessary to become a legible and meaningful subject in western symbolics-the subject must clearly identify the rigid boundaries between itself and others, including that Other reflected back to it in the image of the mirror. The warring against his Otherness that marks this subject as forever split demands that he separate

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

eval_strategy: steps
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.01
warmup_ratio: 0.1
batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

overwrite_output_dir: False
do_predict: False
eval_strategy: steps
prediction_loss_only: True
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
eval_accumulation_steps: None
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.01
adam_beta1: 0.9
adam_beta2: 0.999
adam_epsilon: 1e-08
max_grad_norm: 1.0
num_train_epochs: 3
max_steps: -1
lr_scheduler_type: linear
lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
warmup_ratio: 0.1
warmup_steps: 0
log_level: passive
log_level_replica: warning
log_on_each_node: True
logging_nan_inf_filter: True
save_safetensors: True
save_on_each_node: False
save_only_model: False
restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
no_cuda: False
use_cpu: False
use_mps_device: False
seed: 42
data_seed: None
jit_mode_eval: False
use_ipex: False
bf16: False
fp16: False
fp16_opt_level: O1
half_precision_backend: auto
bf16_full_eval: False
fp16_full_eval: False
tf32: None
local_rank: 0
ddp_backend: None
tpu_num_cores: None
tpu_metrics_debug: False
debug: []
dataloader_drop_last: False
dataloader_num_workers: 0
dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
past_index: -1
disable_tqdm: False
remove_unused_columns: True
label_names: None
load_best_model_at_end: False
ignore_data_skip: False
fsdp: []
fsdp_min_num_params: 0
fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
deepspeed: None
label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
optim: adamw_torch
optim_args: None
adafactor: False
group_by_length: False
length_column_name: length
ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
dataloader_pin_memory: True
dataloader_persistent_workers: False
skip_memory_metrics: True
use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
push_to_hub: False
resume_from_checkpoint: None
hub_model_id: None
hub_strategy: every_save
hub_private_repo: False
hub_always_push: False
gradient_checkpointing: False
gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
include_inputs_for_metrics: False
eval_do_concat_batches: True
fp16_backend: auto
push_to_hub_model_id: None
push_to_hub_organization: None
mp_parameters:
auto_find_batch_size: False
full_determinism: False
torchdynamo: None
ray_scope: last
ddp_timeout: 1800
torch_compile: False
torch_compile_backend: None
torch_compile_mode: None
dispatch_batches: None
split_batches: None
include_tokens_per_second: False
include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
neftune_noise_alpha: None
optim_target_modules: None
batch_eval_metrics: False
eval_on_start: False
batch_sampler: no_duplicates
multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	nomic_max_accuracy
0	0	-	-	0.932
0.04	100	0.0092	0.0087	0.934
0.08	200	0.0073	0.0078	0.95
0.12	300	0.0063	0.0069	0.952
0.16	400	0.0073	0.0060	0.956
0.2	500	0.0066	0.0056	0.958
0.24	600	0.0056	0.0060	0.958
0.28	700	0.0056	0.0059	0.954
0.32	800	0.006	0.0050	0.968
0.36	900	0.003	0.0045	0.968
0.4	1000	0.0035	0.0045	0.964
0.44	1100	0.0047	0.0041	0.968
0.48	1200	0.0039	0.0051	0.956
0.52	1300	0.0036	0.0043	0.964
0.56	1400	0.0042	0.0051	0.956
0.6	1500	0.0045	0.0041	0.97
0.64	1600	0.0026	0.0038	0.97
0.68	1700	0.0044	0.0037	0.968
0.72	1800	0.004	0.0043	0.97
0.76	1900	0.0039	0.0038	0.97
0.8	2000	0.0046	0.0043	0.97
0.84	2100	0.0042	0.0040	0.968
0.88	2200	0.0032	0.0040	0.972
0.92	2300	0.0047	0.0040	0.97
0.96	2400	0.004	0.0036	0.974
1.0	2500	0.0026	0.0035	0.978
1.04	2600	0.0024	0.0040	0.968
1.08	2700	0.001	0.0040	0.97
1.12	2800	0.0016	0.0039	0.972
1.16	2900	0.0011	0.0030	0.976
1.2	3000	0.0012	0.0034	0.976
1.24	3100	0.0009	0.0035	0.972
1.28	3200	0.0009	0.0037	0.97
1.32	3300	0.0004	0.0035	0.972
1.3600	3400	0.0003	0.0037	0.97
1.4	3500	0.0006	0.0038	0.97
1.44	3600	0.0008	0.0036	0.968
1.48	3700	0.0002	0.0036	0.968
1.52	3800	0.0002	0.0037	0.968
1.56	3900	0.0002	0.0038	0.968
1.6	4000	0.0003	0.0038	0.968
1.6400	4100	0.0003	0.0038	0.968
1.6800	4200	0.0003	0.0038	0.97
1.72	4300	0.0002	0.0038	0.97
1.76	4400	0.0005	0.0035	0.97
1.8	4500	0.0005	0.0034	0.974
1.8400	4600	0.0005	0.0039	0.964
1.88	4700	0.0002	0.0040	0.964
1.92	4800	0.0003	0.0040	0.964
1.96	4900	0.0002	0.0039	0.968
2.0	5000	0.0003	0.0038	0.968
2.04	5100	0.0001	0.0038	0.97
2.08	5200	0.0001	0.0037	0.97
2.12	5300	0.0001	0.0037	0.968
2.16	5400	0.0001	0.0036	0.972
2.2	5500	0.0002	-	0.971

Framework Versions

Python: 3.10.12
Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
Transformers: 4.42.4
PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
Accelerate: 0.32.1
Datasets: 2.21.0
Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}