OptGuideOnDeviceClassifierModel β Complete Analysis
Overview
OptGuideOnDeviceClassifierModel is a 120 MB on-device language model shipped with Chrome Canary as a Chrome Component. Its manifest names it "Optimization Guide On Device Taxonomy Model", with a base model spec called taxonomy-tiny.
It is a Gemma 2 variant purpose-built for page-level classification β specifically extracting the brand and intent of web pages for Chrome's client-side scam/phishing detection pipeline.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Manifest name | Optimization Guide On Device Taxonomy Model |
| Base model | taxonomy-tiny v0.0.0.0 |
| Component version | 2026.2.12.1554 |
| Component ID (CRX) | eidcjfoningnkhpoelgpjemmhmopkeoi |
| File | weights.bin (126,025,728 bytes / 120.19 MB) |
| Execution config | Empty (0 bytes) β no prompt template bundled |
| Performance hint | 3 |
| Availability | Chrome Canary (not tested in Stable) |
| Optimization target | OPTIMIZATION_TARGET_MODEL_EXECUTION_FEATURE_CLASSIFIER (ID 72) |
| Chrome feature flag | ClientSideDetectionBrandAndIntentForScamDetection |
Purpose: Scam Detection via Brand + Intent Classification
Chrome's Client-Side Detection (CSD) system extracts page text from suspicious websites and sends it to this model with the following prompt (decoded from on_device_model_execution_config.pb of model ID 55):
You are a web page text scanner. Your task is to carefully review text from
a web page and answer the following questions in English:
1) What brand does the page represent?
2) In one complete sentence, summarize what this page aims to do.
Do not leak PII data.
You should output your answers strictly in the following JSON format:
{"brand": "<brand>", "intent": "<intent>"}
Do not use ```json``` block in your output.
Text: [PAGE CONTENT HERE]
The expected response conforms to this JSON schema:
{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"brand": { "type": "string" },
"intent": { "type": "string" }
},
"required": ["brand", "intent"]
}
When the detected brand/intent combination is inconsistent with the actual page behavior (e.g., a page claiming to be PayPal but actually harvesting credentials on an unrelated domain), Chrome flags the page as a potential scam via Safe Browsing.
Binary Format: LITERTLM Container
The weights.bin file is not a raw TFLite model. It uses the LITERTLM (LiteRT Language Model) container format β a proprietary Google ODML packaging format with a FlatBuffer header and multiple embedded submodels.
File Layout
Offset Component Size
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
0x00000000 LITERTLM FlatBuffer header 32 KB
Magic: "LITERTLM"
Version: 1
Submodels: 4 entries declared
Metadata:
model_type = "tf_lite_prefill_decode"
model_type = "tf_lite_embedder"
model_version = "1.0.1"
Authors = "ODML team"
0x00008000 TFLite #1 β Embedder 8.20 MB (8,601,600 bytes)
Input: token_ids [1, 1] int32
Output: embeddings [1, 1, 1024] float32
Op: lookup_embedding_table
TFLite runtime: 2.18.0
0x0083C000 TFLite #2 β Prefill + Decode 111.63 MB (117,055,216 bytes)
2 signatures: "prefill" and "decode"
39 inputs (embeddings + position + mask + 36 KV cache)
37 outputs (36 KV cache + logits [1, 1, 16384])
18 transformer layers
Full Gemma 2 architecture
0x077E0000 SentencePiece tokenizer 305.6 KB (312,918 bytes)
Vocab size: 16,384 tokens
Special tokens: <pad>=0, </s>=1, <s>=2, <unk>=3
256 byte-fallback tokens
Normalizer: nmt_nfkc
0x0782C656 Zero padding to alignment 14.7 KB
0x07830000 End of file 126,025,728 bytes total
How to Extract the Submodels
data = open('weights.bin', 'rb').read()
# TFLite embedder
open('embedder.tflite', 'wb').write(data[0x8000:0x83C000])
# TFLite prefill+decode transformer
open('decoder.tflite', 'wb').write(data[0x83C000:0x77DDEF0])
# SentencePiece tokenizer
open('tokenizer.model', 'wb').write(data[0x77E0000:0x782C656])
Architecture: Gemma 2 "taxonomy-tiny"
The model is a distilled Gemma 2 with reduced dimensions, confirmed by layer name analysis of the TFLite graph.
Specifications
| Parameter | Value | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture family | Gemma 2 | QK normalization + post-FFN norm = Gemma 2 exclusive features |
| Transformer layers | 18 | layer_0 through layer_17 in tensor names |
| Embedding dimension | 1024 | Embedder output shape [1, 1, 1024] |
| KV cache dimension | 256 per layer | KV input/output shape [1, 1, 1, 256] |
| Vocabulary size | 16,384 | Logits output shape [1, 1, 16384]; SentencePiece vocab |
| Normalization | RMSNorm | rms_norm/mul, rms_norm/rsqrt, rms_norm/square |
| Pre-attention norm | Yes | pre_attention_norm/rms_norm |
| Pre-FFN norm | Yes | pre_ffw_norm patterns |
| Post-FFN norm | Yes | Post-FFN norm present (Gemma 2 specific) |
| QK normalization | Yes | key_norm/rms_norm (Gemma 2 specific) |
| Positional encoding | RoPE | maybe_rope/concatenate |
| Attention type | Full attention | No sliding window patterns found |
| Activation | GeLU (likely) | Standard for Gemma 2 |
| Quantization | Mixed INT4/INT8 | 120 MB for 18 layers with 1024 dim implies heavy quantization |
| Estimated parameters | ~100β200M | Based on file size and quantization assumptions |
| TFLite signatures | prefill (no logits) + decode (with logits) |
Standard ODML LLM execution pattern |
Comparison with Known Models
| taxonomy-tiny | Gemma 2 2B | Gemini Nano v3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Layers | 18 | 26 | ~32 |
| Embed dim | 1,024 | 2,304 | unknown |
| Vocab size | 16,384 | 256,128 | 256,128 |
| File size | 120 MB | ~2.6 GB | 4.07 GB |
| QK norm | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Post-FFN norm | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sliding window | No | Yes (alternating) | Yes |
| Purpose | Classification | General | General |
Single Transformer Block Structure
From tensor name analysis, each of the 18 layers contains:
layer_N/
βββ layer_N.pre_qkv/
β βββ pre_attention_norm/rms_norm/ (RMSNorm)
β βββ attn._pre_attention_fn/
β βββ maybe_rope/ (RoPE positional encoding)
βββ attn.dot_product_attention/
β βββ dot_attn._qkv_fn/
β βββ key_norm/rms_norm/ (QK normalization)
β βββ dot_general (Q*K)
β βββ tfl_softmax
β βββ dot_general (attn*V)
β βββ reshape/transpose
βββ layer_N.post_qkv/
β βββ attn.post_qkv/attn_vec_einsum/ (output projection)
β βββ add (residual)
β βββ add1 (post-attention residual)
βββ layer_N.update_cache/
β βββ attn.update_cache/concatenate (KV cache update)
βββ [pre_ffw_norm + FFN + post_ffw_norm] (feed-forward block)
Final output: final_norm/rms_norm β decode_softmax β logits [1, 1, 16384]
Tokenizer: Reduced Gemma Vocabulary
The embedded SentencePiece model uses a 16,384-token vocabulary β a dramatic reduction from Gemma's standard 256,128 tokens. This is consistent with a classification-focused model that doesn't need the full multilingual generative vocabulary.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Vocab size | 16,384 |
| BOS token | <s> (id=2) |
| EOS token | </s> (id=1) |
| PAD token | <pad> (id=0) |
| UNK token | <unk> (id=3) |
| Byte fallbacks | 256 tokens (<0x00> through <0xFF>) |
| Normalizer | nmt_nfkc |
Notably, Gemma's conversation tokens (<start_of_turn>, <end_of_turn>) are absent from this vocabulary β they map to UNK (id=3). The model does not use chat-turn formatting.
Sample vocabulary entries:
[ 260] = '.' [ 500] = 'βsuch' [ 1000] = 'βamount'
[ 2000] = 'βQ' [ 5000] = 'βtradition' [10000] = 'βComputer'
[15000] = 'βPhilosophy' [16383] = 'β<custom370>'
Chrome Integration Pipeline
User visits a page
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Safe Browsing Heuristics β Pre-filter: URL reputation, phishing
β (CSD - Client Side Det.) β patterns, keyboard lock API, etc.
ββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ
β Page flagged as suspicious
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Page Text Extraction β Extract visible text content from DOM
ββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Prompt Construction β "You are a web page text scanner..."
β (from model ID 55 config) β + page text appended
ββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ
β
βββββββ΄βββββββ
βΌ βΌ
βββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββ
β Gemini β β taxonomy- β Whichever model is available
β Nano β β tiny β (taxonomy-tiny is 33x smaller)
β (4 GB) β β (120 MB) β
ββββββ¬βββββ ββββββββ¬ββββββββ
β β
ββββββββ¬ββββββββ
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β JSON Response Parsing β {"brand": "PayPal",
β β "intent": "credential harvesting"}
ββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Verdict Logic β Compare brand claim vs. actual domain,
β β intent vs. page behavior
ββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Safe Browsing Warning β Red interstitial page shown to user
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Trigger Conditions
The classifier does not run on every page. It triggers when Chrome's CSD heuristics detect suspicious signals:
- Phishing URL patterns (Safe Browsing prefix match)
- Keyboard Lock API usage (common in tech support scams)
- Aggressive popups or fullscreen requests
- Form fields requesting sensitive data (passwords, SSN, credit cards)
- Urgency language patterns