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Choosing Which 20% to Inherit

A relative has recently passed away in Spain. I live in the UK. They have left me 20% of their estate, my brother will receive 80%. I'm expecting this might be 20% of cash and some items such as a mobile home and motorbike, etc. However they also owned land in Spain that contains an olive grove. I've heard that this land was bought naively when the relative was in the UK (before they went to live in Spain). I think the issue is that the land is undesirable, because it's part of an abandoned village that has renovation laws covering it, i.e. something like it can only be renovated back to it's original form and not flattened and rebuilt with new houses. Whatever the laws, my relative chose to keep the land and simply harvested the olives each year. My question is, when inheriting 20% of someone's estate, do you get to pick and choose what you take? I.e. could I take 20% of everything else, but leave my 20% of the land to my brother, or even the Spanish government/crown?

The following is for UK law - no idea what happens in Spain. The will is a set of instructions that the executor of the will is required to carry out. It is the executor that decides how to give effect to the deceased's wishes. If the will is as simple as "I give 20% to X and 80% to Y" then this is an unusually simple will (no make, I mean, its a right pain to give effect to). Then to give effect to this the executor must divide the estate by value. In general, you do not choose what you get, the executor does. However, if you, the other beneficiaries and the executor can reach agreement on distribution then the executor can give effect to that. Let's say, you can all agree that the value of the estate is (say): Cash and other negotiable instruments - $20,000 Personal effects Motor home $15,000 Motor bike $5,000 Other $20,000 Land in Spain $140,000 Then 20% is $40,000. If you all agree that you will take the Cash, the Motor home and the Motor bike then the executor can give effect to that. If you can't agree then the executor will be required to liquidate the assets and split the cash and/or put the assets in joint names; which makes you "partners" in the asset which you may not want to be. You can certainly gift anything you own to your brother after you get it but it would probably have to pass through your hands first for tax reasons

Employee intimidation

A relative of mine has worked at a small company for the past 10 years as a senior design engineer. The MD (and owner) of the company asked him to go and spend the day with another employee filling out some paperwork, which wouldn't normally be part of his job spec. When he returned to his office a few hours later his desk, work computer, everything was cleared out. The MD has stated that there is no longer a need for research, and commented that this employee wouldn't be here for much longer. However this seems quite intimidatory and I would guess this is an attempt to avoid paying redundancy by the employer. This employer has a history of employee lawsuits matters. Can anyone suggest a course of action? Or are there grounds for legal action? Location: Ireland.

Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job.

Are any permits required for an unofficial learning pod of homeschooled children?

A relative of mine lives in Washington and would like to start a "learning pod" for their children which would work as follows: One parent contracts a teacher to work for them full time All the other parents pool in money to help pay the salary Kids from 8-10 households gather in someones home (they're lucky to live in a rural area so there's tons of space) and learn as they would in a normal school No contracts would be signed and no one except the teacher is profiting from the arrangement. If required the parents can wire the money directly to the teacher to avoid the organizer having control over finances. Likewise the space is being provided free of charge. No one will officially call it a "school" or advertise it as such (in fact, there would be zero public advertising). On paper all the kids will be homeschooled and not enrolled in any educational institution whatsoever. Would any permits be required for such and arrangement? If yes, would anything change if one of the parents play the role of a teacher and no one is paying any money whatsoever for any services?

Parents Can't Legally do That To count as "homeschooling in the state of washington it must consist of a parent (or parents) instructing his or her own children. If another parent, much less a hired teacher, is doing the teaching this is a private school and must be licensed and approved. Thew Washington laws are summarized in the page "Home Based Instruction" from the Washington State office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. This Says: RCW 28A.200.011 states that each person whose child is receiving home-based instruction under RCW 28A.225.010 (4) must file annually a signed declaration of intent that he or she is planning to cause his or her child to receive home-based instruction. current school year. This data is used to maintain student enrollment statistics and project enrollment statistics and trends. This page also links to The Pink Book: Washington State Laws Regulating Home-Based Instruction (PDF) This provides some greater explanation and frequently asked questions around home-based instruction. The Pink Book says: compliance with the law? RCW 28A.225.010 requires all parents of any child 8 years of age and under 18 years of age in this state to cause such children to attend the public school of the district in which the child resides for the full time when the school is in session, unless: The child is attending an approved private school or is enrolled in an extension program of an approved private school. The child is receiving home-based instruction. The child is attending an education center. The school district superintendent has excused the child from attendance ... RCW 28A.225.010(4) defines instruction as home-based if it consists of planned and supervised instructional and related educational activities, including curriculum and instruction in the basic skills of occupational education, science, mathematics, language, social studies, history, health, reading, writing, spelling, and the development of an appreciation of art and music provided for a number of hours per grade level established for approved private schools (see question 3 below) and if such activities are provided by a qualified parent. RCW 28A.225.010(4) requires that the instructional and educational activities be: a. Provided by a parent who is instructing his or her child only and is supervised by a person certificated under Chapter 28A.410 RCW. The supervision consists of and includes planning of objectives by the certificated person and the parent, a minimum each month of an average of one contact hour per week with the child being supervised by the certificated person, and evaluation of such child’s progress by the certificated person. The number of children supervised by the certificated person shall not exceed 30. b. Provided by a parent who is instructing his or her child only and who has either earned 45 college-level credit hours or the equivalent in semester hours or has completed a course in home-based instruction at postsecondary institution or a vocational-technical institute. c. Provided by a parent who is deemed sufficiently qualified to provide home-based instruction by the superintendent of the local school district in which the child resides. The actual laws, linked above, confirm that home-based instruction can only be provided by an actual parent to his or her own child. Instructing a child of some other parent, much less hiring a teacher, moves this out of the category of home-based instruction, and into that of a private school. And to be valid for school attendance, a private school must be approved and licensed, and offer a minimum of 180 days per school year, or 1000 hours of instruction, with an approved curriculum, and certified teachers, and various other requirements.

Who owns an un-documented cellar/bunker? (UK Law)

A relative of mine purchased a house about 35 years ago. After a few years he discovered a bricked-up doorway leading to what was probably started as a WW2 bunker. It was abandoned and empty, and judging by some of the detritus (old papers, liter and sweet wrappers) it was last used in the 1950's Over the years this cellar/bunker has been water-proofed, painted, ventilated and converted (to a high standard) into a workshop, playroom, gym, office and utility room and generally become part of the house. Here's the problem. The rooms are quite substantial, they extend under two neighbors houses, three gardens, and even under a public road. There's no documentation on the bunker/cellar, they're not mentioned in the deeds or shown on any plans. The rooms make up more than half of the living area of the entire house. My relative is likely to have to sell up and move into an old-peoples home. Here's the question, who own these rooms? The only access is through the house, but there's evidence of a 2nd bricked up doorway which probably leads to the cellar of the house house two doors down (the houses are of a similar layout). The house is in an area that's rocketed in value since it was purchased, and if the underground rooms are deemed part of my relatives house then that more than doubles the living space and probably doubles the value of the house. After having lived in and maintained these rooms for over 30 years can he claim any sort of squatters rights? Whats to stop the person who lives two doors down knocking through the wall into his entrance and claiming ownership of the parts of the rooms under his house? Update - back when the bunkers were first found my relative did attempt to research the bunkers, but didn't find anything about who/why they were built.

Who Owns The Bunker? Your relative obviously owns the cellar up to their land property boundary. The people who own the other land would have originally been the owners of that portion of the bunker, assuming that it was not permissive (if it was permissive, an easement by estoppel probably would have arisen). So, then the question is, whether the people in the chain of title to the relative acquired ownership of that portion of the bunker by adverse possession. Normally, adverse possession is acquired when someone occupies land under a claim of right that is open, notorious and hostile. While the use of the bunker would be "hostile" in this case (because the other property owners didn't have access to the bunker), it is not at all clear that it was "open and notorious". Indeed, apparently, the other land owners weren't aware that it existed. So, there would probably not be "squatter's rights" in this situation. Also, adverse possession can't run against the sovereign, so to the extent that the bunker goes under public land (e.g. a public street), that also can't be adversely possessed and that portion of the bunker remains the property of the sovereign land owner. @PaulJohnson in a comment to another post notes that: It sounds like your relative has one of the secret bunkers built for the "Auxiliary Units" who were to wage guerilla war from behind the lines after a successful German invasion. bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-37947840/… If this were the case, and the government authorized its construction, there would probably be an implied easement that would allow the bunker to be the property of the person owning the entry to it, rather than the other property owners. But, as you note, proving that case would be difficult. It might be possible to scour declassified civil defense records from the WWII era to determine if this was the case, but you might need to employ an archivists or historian to get to the bottom of this question. What if they sell it? Suppose that they do sell it. What happens? Since title is certificated in Britain, there would be no title insurance company to compensate the buyer if someone later claimed to own the property. Your relative would have a warranty of title inherent in the deed to the portion of the property that is legally described in the deed (unless the property were sold by a quitclaim deed specifically disavowing any promise that what was sold was owned by the seller), but that warranty would probably not include the portions of the bunker outside the boundaries of their lot because that is not included in the legal description of the property on the property certificate or the deed. So, if it was sold, the buyer might not have any claim against the seller if the buyer did not get good title to the entire bunker, and would have no one to sue at all, if your relatives died before litigation over ownership of the bunker arose. The buyer might sue your relatives for common law fraud if the bunker were described in the marketing materials for the sale, but if they were told that some of the bunker went outside the lot and that its legal status was unknown, or if the property was sold by a quitclaim deed, that suit would probably not be successful. Other Options Depending upon whether the owner is on good terms with his neighbors, the owner could probably buy the subsurface rights or some sort of easement to that property from the neighbors under whose land it runs, and might even be able to purchase such rights from the local council where it runs under a street. Negotiating the price would be tricky. On one hand, it doesn't hurt the other owners at all. On the other hand, they have the power to deprive your relatives of all use of the property. Often deals like this are done for nominal consideration between people on good terms with each other, but for extortionate prices when people are not on good terms with each other.

What recourse do I have against a person falsely claiming to reside at my home?

A relative who has never lived at our house is in the habit of falsely using our home address as their place of residence whenever disclosing their place of residence for legal purposes, rather than using their own. Additionally, this relative is the family wastrel/black sheep/prodigal child, and is intentionally using our address in order to avoid the consequences of their bad behavior, and as a result, we receive bills and other legal documents intended for this relative, but what is more troubling, we also receive visits from debt collectors and officers of the law who are looking for this relative. We cannot even tell these people where to find our relative, as they know that we will not help hide them, and so we are not told the relative's current address or other contact details. We are in the position where this relative's actions have become intolerable, but asking the relative to correct their residential address registration with all entities where our address has been falsely substituted has been refused - apparently our discomfort is amusing to our prodigal relative. We are at the point where this relative has destroyed any shred of affection that we may have had for them, and we are prepared to apply the full force of the law in order to have this situation corrected, no matter how negatively it may impact our relative. We and our relative live in Victoria, Australia, so what laws of that jurisdiction may we reasonably expect to be able to use to redress this situation? EDIT Ideally there would be some criminal matter with which we could have our relative charged, since we do not have - nor do we feel that we should have to expend - the financial resources necessary to protect ourselves from our relative by bringing a civil suit.

You could seek an injunction prohibiting this This would make any future instances contempt of court. However, there are a number of difficulties: it’s expensive. Only the Supreme Court can issue injunctions and you would expect to pay about $20,000 in legal fees and court costs, possibly more if it was contested. you need to serve your relative with the application and the injunction. As you don’t know where they are this is problematical. it’s limited to Victoria and wouldn’t stop them using your address while they were in other states, territories or countries. Proactively notify likely organisations You could write to likely government departments, credit reporting agencies, major retailers etc. advising them that this person does not live at your address. Depending on the efficacy of their systems this may stop them using your address in the first place.

Is a repair technician responsible for the issues he created?

A repair technician was hired to repair a microwave (MW), but instead he broke the oven attached to said MW, and then said that he cannot repair either appliance unless I make the back of both appliances accessible by making certain alteration that involve carpentry and possibly electrical work. According to the contract, I am responsible to make the items being repaired accessible. However, I was not appraised that there were any access problems beforehand, and solving those problems is not worth repairing the MW. However now that he broke the oven I have no choice: the same access is necessary to fix the oven. Given the choice between leaving MW dead or paying for the access I would leave the MW dead. Given the choice between leaving both MW and oven dead or paying for the access I have no choice but to pay for the access. Is the technician responsible for reimbursing for the work necessary to create the access? His position is that I would have to pay for the access to repair MW anyway. My point is that if he didn't break the oven I wouldn't do that. In fact, I would be very happy at this point to have the things as they were before he showed up: the dead MW on top of functioning oven. Which one of us is right? If I would sue him to restore the appliances to their pre-attempted-repair condition, would I prevail?

Was the technician negligent? Just because he broke the oven, doesn't mean that he negligently broke the oven. In breaking the oven, he would have to have done something that a reasonable technician would not have done. Even if he was negligent, is the liability for his negligence excluded by the contract you signed when you hired him? And, if so, is such a limitation allowed under local law? In many parts of the USA, the answer is yes. In either circumstance, the technician is liable for nothing. Notwithstanding, assuming the technician is liable, there is little doubt they are liable for the cost of the repair. They are unlikely to be liable for the cost of providing access as, by the contract, you are responsible for providing this.

If I gave a reporter permission to record a phone call, do I have a right to receive a copy?

A reporter (for a large online news source) has recently deeply plagiarized work that I did, last year, and I'm filing a complaint with his Editor-in-Chief. He did record the lengthy call, and I'd like to know if I have a right to obtain a copy of that recording. If it makes any difference, I'm in California and he's in New York.

You have the right to request a copy of the recording from the editor-in-chief, but no legal basis for demanding a copy (at present). In general, there is no right to receive a copy of a recorded conversation, unless you make that a condition for consent (which would be necessary in California). Under Cal. Pen 632 , consent is required from all parties in "any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto", but also excludes "any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded". When one party says "I'm going to record this", your only recourse is to stop talking – you no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy. You would need to get an actual agreement with the editor to provide you with a copy of the recording. However, you could force production of the recording if you filed a lawsuit against the editor, and the recording was material to the case.

Is a Request to Stay Case Pending Appeal Considered an Equitable Remedy in the USA?

A request for injunctive relief is an equitable remedy and courts have broad discretion in granting or denying it. Is a request to stay case pending appeal also considered an equitable remedy?

canada Yes: "The remedy sought by the appellant [a stay pending appeal] is an equitable one. To be accorded such equitable relief, the applicant must come to the court with clean hands." National Bank Financial Ltd. v. Barthe Estate , 2013 NSCA 127, at para 26 . In Canada, courts of appeal are statutory courts so all their power derives from statute, but some of those powers (such as the power to grant a stay pending appeal) are still understood to be equitable powers.

If a request for personal data is made under the GDPR rights but the requestor refuses to give ID for verification what should the company do?

A request for personal data to be deleted is made under the GDPR rights but the requestor refuses to give ID for verification and only provides an email address.

If the data controller has “reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request”, then “the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject” (Art 12(6) GDPR). Until the data subject provides this information, the request is paused. But what are reasonable doubts, and what additional information can the controller request? The GDPR itself provides no clear guidelines, though general principles apply – the additional information must be necessary, adequate, and proportionate for the identity conformation purpose. The controller's obligation to comply with access requests must be balanced with the controller's obligation to ensure the security of data by rejecting invalid requests. Just accepting any request without any verification would also be a breach of the GDPR. For example: If the company identifies data subjects by email address, then demonstrating control over the email address would be an appropriate verification step. But just mentioning the email address would not be enough since it could be someone else's email address. If the company provides a website where data subjects have created user accounts, then being able to log in to the account would be an appropriate verification step. In these examples, asking e.g. for government photo ID would not be appropriate because that doesn't help strengthen the link between the person making the request and the personal data being processed. Such data collection would be disproportionate and unnecessary. In contrast, if you walk into a bank and ask for a copy of your data, it would be entirely appropriate for them to ask for government ID because (a) the higher general risks warrant stronger checks, and (b) such ID will help confirm that the person making the request is indeed the proper account holder. The bank will also have been legally required to request ID when the account was originally opened, so that asking for ID as an identity verification measure during this later request won't involve collection of more data than they already have. (These examples were made up by me and are not official, but read on.) The EDPB has issued draft guidelines on the right of access 01/2022 , which also discuss the issue of additional information for identity verification in sections 3.2 and 3.3. In particular, paragraphs 73-78 talk about IDs: 73. It should be emphasised that using a copy of an identity document as a part of the authentication process creates a risk for the security of personal data and may lead to unauthorised or unlawful processing, and as such it should be considered inappropriate, unless it is strictly necessary, suitable, and in line with national law. […] it is also important to note that identification by means of an identity card does not necessarily help in the online context (e.g. with the use of pseudonyms) […]. 75. In any case, information on the ID that is not necessary for confirming the identity of the data subject, […] may be blackened or hidden by the data subject before submitting it to the controller, except where national legislation requires a full unredacted copy of the identity card (see para. 77 below). […] 76. […] Example: The user Ms. Y has created an account in the online store, providing her e-mail and username. Subsequently, the account owner asks the controller for information whether it processes their personal data, and if so, asks for access to them within the scope indicated in Art. 15. The controller requests the ID of the person making request to confirm her identity. The controller's action in this case is disproportionate and leads to unnecessary data collection. […] Example: A bank customer, Mr. Y,, plans to get a consumer credit. For this purpose, Mr. Y goes to a bank branch to obtain information, including his personal data, necessary for the assessment of his creditworthiness. To verify the data subject’s identity, the consultant asks for notarised certification of his identity to be able to provide him with the required information. The controller should not require notarised confirmation of identity, unless it is strictly necessary, suitable and in line with the national law […]. Such practice exposes the requesting persons to additional costs and imposes an excessive burden on the data subjects, hampering the exercise of their right of access. 77. Without prejudice to the above general principles, under certain circumstances, verification on the basis of an ID may be a justified and proportionate measure, for example for entities processing special categories of personal data or undertaking data processing which may pose a risk for data subject (e.g. medical or health information). However, at the same time, it should be borne in mind that certain national provisions provide for restrictions on the processing of data contained in public documents, including documents confirming the identity of a person (also on the basis of Art. 87 GDPR). Restrictions on the processing of data from these documents may relate in particular to the scanning or photocopying of ID cards or processing of official personal identification numbers. To summarize: controllers can request IDs only in comparatively niche scenarios, and must then take additional safeguards to protect the sensitive document (e.g. instructing the data subject to redact parts of the ID, not making copies, and immediately deleting the ID after successful verification). A lot here comes down to national laws, which may explicitly require or forbid use of the ID in this context. The EDPB guidelines are not binding or normative, especially since this guidance is still in the public consultation phase. However, the guidelines present an overall consensus of the national data protection authorities in the EU, and the guidelines are regularly cited by courts. In practice, many controllers do ask for disproportionate amounts of data. Sometimes this seems to be an attempt to discourage data subject requests, which would clearly be non-compliant. In some cases, this is due to a narrow interpretation of “reasonable doubts” in which they try to eliminate any doubt about the identity. If the data subject and data controller cannot agree on a suitable identity verification process, then the data subject can: Art 77: lodge a complaint with a data protection authority, and/or Art 79: sue the data controller in court, both for compliance (fulfilling the request) and for compensation (if damages were suffered). It is worth noting that the data controller is responsible for being able to demonstrate compliance (Art 5(2) accountability principle), such as demonstrating the apparent reasonable doubts to a supervisory authority or to a court. When the controller requests ID, the controller has the burden of proof to show that this is compliant.

Can I pick off the fruit from a plant that another resident of my building has placed and maintained in our building's common courtyard?

A resident in a building has placed and maintained a plant in our building's common courtyard. Can another resident of the same building legally pick off the fruit from this plant? I am mostly interested in the following jurisdictions: California, United States Massachusetts, United States

No. The fruit of a tree belongs to the owner of the land it is planted on 1 . As this is common property it belongs to all the owners. 1. Or in some states, like California, the owner of the land above which the fruit literally hangs owns the fruit, but in this example, that wouldn't make a difference.

Can a landlord insist on late fee for payment mailed but not recieved

A residential tenant has an arrangement by which the tenant's bank automatically issues and mails a rent check to the landlord by US mail 3 days before the rent is due. This arrangement has been in place for several years, by agreement, with no problems. One month the check does not arrive. The landlord, after waiting for more than a week after the sue date, telephones the tenant to ask for the rent. The landlord also demands a 5% late fee. The bank says that the check was duly mailed (first class, not certified or insured) on the usual date, and sends (by fax) a written notice to this effect to the landlord, at the tenant's request. It may be that the check was mis-delivered or not delivered by the USPS. The landlord's address has not changed. The check has not been presented for payment. Obviously the tenant must pay the proper rent to the landlord. A replacement check would seem proper, along with a stop-payment on the original. But is the landlord entitled to t he late fee? If the matter were brought to a small claims court, would the fee be awarded to the landlord? The tenant was originally under a written lease, but it lapsed and a month-to-month tenancy is in effect by verbal agreement and demonstrable practice over several years. There was no specific agreement on who is liable for errors by the postal service. The tenant is in Maryland, the landlord is in Georgia. The landlord is a private individual, owning fewer than 10 rental properties. An answer citing a state law, court decision, or relevant UCC section would be preferred.

It’s the tenant’s responsibility to pay the rent Not doing so, even for reasons beyond the tenant’s (but not the landlord’s) control is a breach of contract. It’s not enough that the tenant made reasonable effort - they have to succeed. Breach of contract entitles the landlord to damages - it does not entitle them to a penalty. Damages are the reasonable costs and losses that the landlord suffered - e.g. anything reasonably charged by the managing agent and lost interest at bank rates. A penalty is a charge in a contract intended to punish the wrongdoer beyond damages - these are illegal in all contracts at common law.

What are common law cases "lost in the mists of time"?

A respected user writes in another answer: Long-standing precedents whose origins are lost in the mists of time What are these long standing precedents, how are they known, and how can they be authoritatively understood, litigated, and ruled on, when they have been "lost in the mists of time"? What are some examples of these precedents?

Time immemorial is 1189 CE Do you know how many documents survive from 1189 CE? F#*k all, that’s how many. We don’t have the original case law because, quite simply, we don’t have the original case law. In any event, “time immemorial” is simply a legal fiction stating the date to which you had to be able to trace land ownership before you had indefeasibility of title. Common law goes back way beyond that and even way beyond the Norman conquest in 1066. At a certain point, it doesn’t matter. Things are done that way because things are done that way. For example, Pythagoras’ Rule (the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides) was not discovered by Pythagoras. It was known to both the Babylonians and Egyptians 1,000 years before Pythagoras was born yet it will likely be Pythagoras’ Rule for as long as the human race endures.

Is it indirect discrimination or otherwise unlawful to maintain a menu that does not include vegan options?

A restaurant R has a menu of various things but does not include vegan options. As veganism is a protected philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010 and the Grainger test, this omission affects vegans disproportionately. If the restaurant was a steakhouse intended to cater specifically to meat enthusiasts or ideological carnivores, then I could imagine the non-accommodation as being a legitimate end to a proportionate aim, but otherwise, has a restaurant not committed unlawful discrimination against vegans?

Caveat about the "Grainger test" as applied to veganism Grainger plc v Nicholson is a 2010 employment discrimination case. It established a five-point test for whether a philosophical belief triggers the protection of the Equality Act 2010. See the judgment here, §24. A 2020 preliminary hearing in Casamitjana v The League Against Cruel Sports found that the claimant (= plaintiff, for US readers) held a belief in ethical veganism that did meet the five-point test. I would note that Casamitjana’s beliefs are much stronger than "simple" veganism. The judgment at §17-§22 enumerates a list of Casamitjana’s behaviour, much of which goes well beyond what the average vegan undertakes, such as avoiding the use of bank notes (manufactured from animal products) or public transportation (buses kill insects). I would assume that "simple" vegan beliefs could still meet the "philosophical belief" test, but I can see obvious differences with the Casamitjana case and would not advise anyone to rely solely on it. The restaurant case I refer to this excellent answer regarding a different hypothetical . The key question is whether the restaurant’s choice of menu is "a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim" . In that case, the restaurant might argue that they chose what dishes to offer based on the cook’s ability, on a commercial strategy of selling only high-end dishes, or other similar considerations. (Note that I have not practiced law in E&W, and any real-world respondent would do well to consult a qualified sollicitor before relying on that argument.) As a non-legal answer, I would also argue that such an application of the Equality Act 2010 would be extremely burdening. For instance, ethical vegans could sue any restaurant offering any non-vegan options at all (regardless of whether there are vegan options on the menu, they would not want to patronize such a restaurant), or transportation company using leather seats in their vehicles; Orthodox Jews might sue any business open on Saturdays; and so on. However, I do not know how that objection could be worked into a legal argument.

Can a company demand employees use part of their paycheck to buy their services?

A retail chain my friend worked for wanted to boost sales of a membership that included benefits like free shipping and preferred pricing. They gave each employee a small bonus on 1 paycheck equal to the price of the membership and employees were told the bonus was to be used to buy a membership for themselves. Apparently, they believed it would help employees sell the membership if they experienced the benefits themselves. From the company's perspective, sales of the membership at POS were an important metric for the company; there were long-term company goals for membership sales. Presumably they gave employees money for the membership instead of the membership itself so they could transact more sales and claim to be closer to hitting their total sales goal. Was it legal for the company to make this additional payment while requiring it be used to buy their own service?

If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it. What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing.

Retired Police Officer (still state licensed) obligation to report a crime

A retired Police Officer still holds state license (former chief of police in small suburb). A family member of the officer tells him of an [alleged] assault against her What is the oath or sworn obligation of the retired officer to report the crime and how long do they have to report it (if they are legally required too)? Please link to any state licensing site / page where it shows their obligation.

What is the oath or sworn obligation of the retired officer to report the crime? Short answer Any legal obligation to report a crime depends on whether or not his license is a permanent peace officer license . Long answer Article 2.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states that: (a) It is the duty of every peace officer to preserve the peace within the officer's jurisdiction. To effect this purpose, the officer shall use all lawful means. (b) The officer shall *: (1) in every case authorized by the provisions of this Code, interfere without warrant to prevent or suppress crime; (2) execute all lawful process issued to the officer by any magistrate or court; (3) give notice to some magistrate of all offenses committed within the officer's jurisdiction, where the officer has good reason to believe there has been a violation of the penal law ; and (4) arrest offenders without warrant in every case where the officer is authorized by law, in order that they may be taken before the proper magistrate or court and be tried. *NOTE the use of shall which IMO imposes a specific duty for a positive act, whereas in England and Wales the comparable legislation uses may which allows for some discretion and flexibility. Article 2.12 of that Code defines a peace officer to include: (1) sheriffs, their deputies, and those reserve deputies who hold a permanent peace officer license issued under Chapter 1701, Occupations Code; (2) constables, deputy constables, and those reserve deputy constables who hold a permanent peace officer license issued under Chapter 1701, Occupations Code; (3) marshals or police officers of an incorporated city, town, or village, and those reserve municipal police officers who hold a permanent peace officer license issued under Chapter 1701, Occupations Code... Section 1701.307 of the Occupations Code does not expressly exclude the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement from issuing a permanent peace officer license to retired officers (but it does require the recipient to satisfy certain requirements such as minimum training standards, health checks etc). Unless he has such a license he does not appear to be under any legal obligation to report a misdemeanor. __________________________ As an aside, there are three mandatory reporting laws in Texas: when someone observes a felony resulting in serious injury or death; and when the victim of abuse or neglect is a child or vulnerable adult - but none appear relevant to the OP without confirmation.

U.S. copyright law (revisited)

A revisiting of this question. Hypothetical facts Alice buys a hardback book from the publisher for $70. On Wednesday, Wanda pays Alice $10 rent for the exclusive right to use the physical book in question for that day. On Wednesday, Wanda makes a digital copy of the book and posts it online to an account only Wanda can access. Wanda returns the book to Alice on Wednesday evening. On Friday, Wanda opens her digital file copy of the book Wanda rented from Alice Wednesday. Question Have any copyright laws been broken? If so, when were they broken? Was Wanda guilty on Wednesday? Thursday? Or Friday? On Friday was Wanda guilty before opening the file? How about after opening the file but before reading the file? How about after reading the file?

Yes Wanda is guilty, probably when she created the file, certainly when she no longer had a right (through rental) to the original. Unlike Alice, she would have a much harder time arguing fair use in relation to creating a 'backup' when her right to the original was for such a limited period of time. Even if she could show this, her right to have any copy ceased when she returned the original.

In which contexts can a landlord disclose a prospective tenant's personal information to third parties?

A roommate and I are applying to apartments and rental houses in Baltimore, Maryland. One landlord gave us a form for us to fill out references for our employment and past rentals. We felt the form was pretty invasive because it collected a lot of personal information not directly related to evaluating us as tenants. In particular, it asked for: our SSNs, our drivers license IDs, our current address, it requested to inspect our current residence, etc. Despite our better judgement, we filled it out anyway. In following up on our employment references, he forwarded the entire reference form to my employer. This is deeply disturbing to us. Especially because my employer obviously doesn't have my roommate's SSN. Is this a violation of our rights? If so, which laws did he violate?

The Maryland Social Security Number Privacy Act could be relevant. There are limits on how a SSN can be transmitted, but one context where it is allowed is: (b) (1) The collection, release, or use of an individual's Social Security number as required by State or federal law; (2) The inclusion of an individual's Social Security number in an application, form, or document sent by mail, electronically transmitted, or transmitted by facsimile: (i) As part of an application or enrollment process; (ii) To establish, amend, or terminate an account, contract, or policy; or (iii) To confirm the accuracy of the individual's Social Security number; Use of SS numbers is common (though not mandatory) in running credit and background checks. There are no apparent restrictions on revealing a person's driver's license number.

Is there such a thing as "indirect" defamation?

A says to B, "You are a lousy drug dealer." They are overheard by a bystander, C, with consequent damage to B, who really isn't a drug dealer. My understanding is that "defamation" does not exist for conversations between two parties, but does occur when one or more third parties become involved. So the issue here is, at what point does C become a third party. I'll use two cases for illustration: 1) A, B, and C are together in the same room. A addressed B but not C. 2) A and B are inside a building, C walks by at the "right" moment and overhears A's remarks through an open window. He also sees A and B. Do either or both of these cases constitute defamation of B by A to C?

The answer is likely "yes" in both scenarios, because defamation can be either intentional or negligent. This is what the Restatement says: (1) Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person defamed. . . . COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS Comment: a. Manner of making publication. A publication of the defamatory matter is essential to liability. (See § 558). Any act by which the defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communicated to a third person is a publication. . . . . . . k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defamatory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it to a third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so communicated. (See § 8A). It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third person, the conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication. Illustrations: A and B engage in an altercation on the street where there are a number of pedestrians. During the course of the quarrel, A in a loud voice accuses B of larceny, the accusation being overheard by a number of passers-by. A has published a slander. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 (1979).

Can someone back out from an agreement to pay someone else money if they fail to achieve a goal?

A scenario similar to this has undoubtably been considered before but I haven't come across anything that is in the same vein. In any case, would this example be a specific type of contract/agreement and would it be legally enforceable. Agreement: Person A is determined to stop smoking in six months time. Person A and Person B make an agreement whereby Person A shall deposit into an escrow account $10,000; if at the end of six months Person A has successfully stopped smoking then the agreement stipulates all the money is returned to him. If he fails in his goal and is still smoking after six months, then Person A has instructed that Person B shall be entitled to claim the $10,000 and spend however he wishes; it is intended to serve as an incentive and to discourage failure in achieving the goal. What would a court say to Person A if - after 3 months he decided he was no longer interested to stop smoking and wanted his money back?

common-law What would a court say to Person A if - after 3 months he decided he was no longer interested to stop smoking and wanted his money back? For simplicity, let's take the contract between the escrow service and A/B out of the equation. There is no contract between A and B because there is no consideration moving from B . B parts with nothing for their chance to get $10,000. So, if A takes the case to the court after 3 months they will get their money back (again, not considering troubles with escrow). B will have no legal entitlement whatsoever.

Destination-based sales tax collection. What if you do not know the destination's address?

A scenario: I am selling online software and I provide advanced features for premium members. As far as I understand I do not ship or deliver anything physically. I also do not ask customers for their address information and can accept any payment (e.g., bitcoin). What sales tax do I charge if I do not know their county and address? Can I assume that the sale happened at my "store's" location and charge them a standard sales tax based on that?

The answer may vary depending on your state. If you're in a state that's a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement ,* there's a designated heirarchy for sourcing sales of digital goods: First, if you're making delivery to the customer at your location, source to the location where you make the sale. If not, source to the location where your customer will receive the product. Neither of those works for you, so you'd continue down the list to the first one you can apply: The purchaser’s address that you maintain in the ordinary course of the your business; The purchaser's address obtained during the consummation of the sale; The address where you first make the product available for transmission or the address from which you provided the service. By my reading, that means that in the absence of an address, you basically come back full circle and source the sale back to your own location. * Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming

Does the President of the United States really have powers of arrest, as per "Designated Survivor"?

A scene in the TV show "Designated survivor" shows the President (Kiefer Sutherland) arresting a state governor for treason. Is this really a thing? Can the POTUS really arrest citizens for crimes? And are there limits on this? Is it (as with Presidential Pardons) something which applies only to federal/serious crimes, or can Trump arrest a teenager for jaywalking if he feels like it?

There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject .) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.

Known incorrect expert testimony to the SCOTUS, which may not deceive the common man. Is it illegal?

A sceptics answer discusses the misleading statistical analysis in the Texas vs. Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan and Wisconsin lawsuit that lead to the claim that there is less than a one in a quadrillion chance of Biden winning these states. However, what struck me was the footnote at the bottom of page 22 , that make 2 statements that to me as a non-mathematician are obviously incorrect. The text is: As Z increases, the number of zeros increase exponentially. A Z of 396.3 is a chance in 1 in almost an infinite number or outcomes of finding the two results being from the same population There are 2 incorrect statements here: As Z increases, the number of zeros increase exponentially An exponential relationship means that as the independent variable (here Z) increases the dependent variable (here number of zeros) changes proportionally to a constant raised to the power of the independent variable. In this case, the number of zeros does go up a lot, and in a fairly complex way, but not precisely exponentially. A Z of 396.3 is a chance in 1 in almost an infinite number All finite numbers are equally far from infinity as all other finite numbers. "Almost infinite" has no meaning that I am aware of. A Z of 396.3 indicates a p value that has a lot of zeros. While I do not know anything about whoever wrote this, I find it unbelievable that someone would be able to calculate Z correctly, but not be aware enough of these very basic concepts to know that these statements are incorrect. I know very little about supreme court justices, but find it similarly unlikely that people who are very good at judging probabilistic statements would not know the true meanings of these words. However, the "man on the street" may well interpret these statements in a way that leads to a correct understanding, which could roughly be stated as "a lot". My first thought when I read this was that these statements were intentional perjury to the SCOTUS in expert testimony, and therefore a serious crime. Is this interpretation correct?

This is not testimony, but rather advocacy, and is not subject to perjury laws. The only possible consequence is that an opponent could point out flaws in the argument, and this might anger or put off one or more Justices and thereby might influence votes against the party making such an incorrect statement. (Or that could happen even though no other party mentions the matter.) But it is more likely that it will have little or no impact at all -- the Court is well-known to pay little attention to statistical or other mathematical arguments, including ones generally agreed to be correct. But you never know in any particular case. It is, by the way, quite rare for new testimony to be offered at the Supreme Court level, on indeed at any appellate level. Statements of alleged facts are often included in briefs, but these are not under oath and are not testimony. However, this case is one of the rare cases filed under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and is not an appeals case, as @phoog points pout. Thus there could be testimony in the court holds a hearing, but the statement linked in the question is not testimony.

Open release of a personal attorney email to a school board

A school board gets an email from superintendent's personal attorney restricting questioning of the superintendent. Is it legal to read publicly in an open public meeting?

Is it legal to read publicly in an open public meeting? Yes. Generally speaking, a lawyer's communications to third parties or his client's prospective adversary(-ies) are not protected from disclosure. From a legal standpoint, the lawyer's email to the school board is equivalent to the scenario of the superintendent himself being the sender.

Who has ultimate responsibility for a child injured on a school trip?

A school is going on an excursion. The child is given the permission slip to take home and get signed by his legal guardian, but he forges the signature instead. On the excursion, he gets injured. Who is legally responsible for the child? Is it the school (since the waiver is void, and by default the school is responsible for the child when a roll is taken) or the parent (since the school sincerely thought the parent had signed the waiver and if the waiver was correctly signed then the parent would be responsible)? Preferred jurisdiction Australia; I will accept any answer however.

So many things were not addressed, so a precise answer is not possible. But to try to raise the proper questions you should be thinking about: Should the school have known the permission slip was forged? Was the forgery particularly bad, and the school was lax in not examining it? Did the student have a history of forging slips that the school should have been aware of? If the school was negligent in accepting an obviously bad signature, they may find their exposure is increased. If the school had no reasonable way to know the slip was forged, they were acting reasonably in taking the student on an excursion. Was the injury typical, foreseeable and recoverable? Such as a broken ankle on a hike? Minor accidents happen even when all reasonable precautions are taken. The injury will heal with time and care. Was the activity that lead to the injury inherently risky / dangerous? There is definitely a question of if the school took all reasonable precautions. Even if permission was legitimately given, the school is responsible for taking reasonable precautions, especially if the activity has inherit and obvious dangers. (for example, river-rafting or rock climbing) What sort of "responsibility" are you interested in? If you're asking who is financially responsible for the cost of treating the injury, then regardless of how it occurred, it would likely fall to the child's health insurance (presumably provided by the parents). If the school was truly negligent in allowing a forged permission slip to a dangerous activity, then they could be found responsible for extraordinary costs associated with the injury, other costs (pain, suffering, loss of opportunity, emotional consequences, etc) and perhaps even punitive damages. If you're suggesting that someone might be criminally responsible, then a very high bar would need to be cleared. It would need to be proven that a school representative (eg. teacher or administrator) deliberately put the kid in danger for some reason, knowing what the likely outcome would be. That standard seems extremely unlikey to be met.

If someone leaves a scooter from a vehicle sharing service in my yard can I dismantle it?

A scooter from a vehicle sharing service ( Bird ) was left in my yard. What laws do I break if I dismantle it? Does the owner have any civil claim against me? Assume the scooter can be reassembled. Also assume that I have no contract with Bird. I’ve never even been on their website.

What laws do I break if I dismantle it? That is an interesting question. As far as I can see, legally the scooter would be considered lost property . The owner (the company Bird Rides, Inc) presumably did not put it there (some user did), and they still want it back (so it is not abandoned property). Exact rules vary, but usually you must make a reasonable effort to return the item to the owner . What exactly that means will depend on local laws. Sometimes there is an official Lost and found office where you can deposit or report lost property, which absolves you of further responsibility. Sometimes you may even have to make a reasonable effort to find the owner yourself. In Minnesota specifically, probably you would have to notify the owner. Not doing so may constitute theft under article 609.515 of the Minnesota Statutes : 609.52 THEFT [...] Subd. 2.Acts constituting theft. (a) Whoever does any of the following commits theft and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3: [...] (6) finds lost property and, knowing or having reasonable means of ascertaining the true owner, appropriates it to the finder's own use or to that of another not entitled thereto without first having made reasonable effort to find the owner and offer and surrender the property to the owner; or [...] So you are not allowed to "appropriate" the scooter, without trying to contact the onwer. Just disassembling it and storing it is probably ok (but I'm not a laywer etc.). It's not clear whether you are required to contact the owner if you don't "appropriate" the scooter. However, the official recommendation of the Minneapolis Police Department is to do so: Lost, Stolen and Found Property Check [...] For other found items, please take the item to the nearest Minneapolis Police Precinct and turn it in to the desk officer. So to be on the safe side, you should probably report the scooter either to Bird Rides, Inc directly, or to your local police station. Does the owner have any civil claim against me? Assume the scooter can be reassembled If you do not damage the scooter in any way, then probably not. The only damage they could claim would be the cost of reassembly - however, a) this might be too trivial to be worth it for them, and b) you could claim you needed to disassemble it because otherwise you would not have had space to store it. Again, to be on the safe side you should probably notify Bird Rides, Inc and ask them to collect the scooter within a certain timeframe. If you also notify them that you will disassemble the scooter if it is not collected until a certain time, I don't think they will have a claim against you later.

In Toronto, can a security guard withdraw the yellow parking violation notice he issued?

A security guard, not a police or Parking Enforcement officer, issued a yellow parking violation notice in Toronto. Does he have the discretion to withdraw or retract it? He alleged that he can't — once he issues a ticket, it's on the books. Is he correct? I'm aware of submitting an online dispute to a Screening Officer.

This is likely to be a matter of policy rather than law That is, it’s not likely there is a law prohibiting it but it is highly likely that the person’s training and their employer’s policy on the matter is that they must complete a ticket once they start it. It’s a pretty universal anti-corruption measure - it prevents the situation where they are writing the ticket, the owner appears and offers them half the value of the fine in cash to stop: well, they can’t stop so they can’t be tempted by the bribe. Of course, the bribe can be offered before they start but, when fighting corruption, you minimise the opportunities rather than eliminate them. I know that police and rangers (private people can’t issue tickets) in new-south-wales are so restricted.

Are buyer contingencies still needed if no Ernest money

A seller and I have agreed that no Ernest money will be paid in the contract. However, there are no financial or appraisal contingencies in the contract to void the contract if I can’t get the loan or the house doesn’t appraise for at least the purchase price. My questions is, are these contingencies needed if there is no Ernest money put down?

I am assuming that your contract is in a jurisdiction of the U.S. or of one of the several countries with similar contract law . are these contingencies needed if there is no Ernest money put down? With or without earnest money, a contract does not need to outline contingencies. Strictly speaking, outlining in a contract some of these contingencies might even be redundant (but "redundant" should not be construed as "discouraged") because notions of frustration or impracticability of a contract are --by default-- cognizable in contract law . See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 265 and 266. In a context of real estate transactions, a buyer's unexpected inability to secure the funds for the purchase would certainly render the contract impracticable. However, the seller might still be entitled to reasonable restitution in the event of impracticability or frustration. See Restatement at § 377. For instance, if as a result of that contract the seller missed other opportunities which were provably more profitable, the buyer might have to compensate the seller for that difference. That is one good reason for outlining in a contract what remedies (if any) are available in the event that a contingency precludes the completion of that contract.

Is an uncocked semi-automatic with ammo in the clip considered “loaded”?

A semi-automatic must be racked, to put a round in the firing chamber, before it can be fired. Is there a legal definition of “loaded” that considers option 2 of the following states of loadedness as not being “loaded”? Empty Ammo in the clip, but not in the chamber (pulling the trigger would do nothing) A round in the chamber, safety on Ready to fire (safety off) Obviously option 2 is not relevant to a revolver, which only requires a trigger pull to bring the next round in front of the firing pin.

It depends on your jurisdiction. Check the applicable laws; there's probably a section named something like "definitions" that gives the meaning of terms such as "loaded". For example, from RCW 9.41.010 (the "Terms defined" section of the "Firearms and Dangerous Weapons" chapter of the Washington State laws): (17) "Loaded" means: (a) There is a cartridge in the chamber of the firearm; (b) Cartridges are in a clip that is locked in place in the firearm; (c) There is a cartridge in the cylinder of the firearm, if the firearm is a revolver; (d) There is a cartridge in the tube or magazine that is inserted in the action; or (e) There is a ball in the barrel and the firearm is capped or primed if the firearm is a muzzle loader. So in Washington State, any of your examples 2-4 would be considered "loaded" for the purposes of firearms-related crimes.

In practice what kind of claims can't be brought to court after signing a settlement agreement?

A settlement agreement contains the following term: Parties agree that this settlement extinguishes all claims each party may have against the other. What affect does such a term have in theory and in practice? When a case is dismissed without leave, the plaintiff can't make the same claim again. I here that in reality this has little affect, as the plaintiff can change something small and say it's a whole knew case. Is it the same for settlement agreements? For example if someone sues someone for damage to rental property, if they settle, could the plaintiff sue again claiming he found more damage than he was first aware of? Could he claim for something unrelated, like if the renter didn't pay in full the last months rent (assuming that hadn't been brought in first case)?

if they settle, could the plaintiff sue again claiming he found more damage than he was first aware of? Generally speaking, no. It would be the plaintiff's responsibility to ensure awareness of what he was settling for. For the settlement to be voidable and be entitled to resume the claims, there would have to be additional circumstances, such as: having settled under duress or hardship; settlement being induced by fraud (arguably silent fraud suffices for that); counterparty's breach of the settlement. These conditions are no different than the principles of contract law. Could he claim for something unrelated, like if the renter didn't pay in full the last months rent (assuming that hadn't been brought in first case)? It ultimately depends on the scope and intent (be it inferred or explicit) that can be ascertained from the settlement. That being said, a catch-all phrase such as " extinguishes all claims " tends to make it harder for the prospective plaintiff to prove that his new claim transcends the scope or intent of that clause or settlement. I here that in reality this has little affect, as the plaintiff can change something small and say it's a whole knew case. Is it the same for settlement agreements? What they told you about making "a whole new case" by means of making small changes is inaccurate. Once the controversy has been settled or become res judicata , making small changes to overcome it is a futile attempt to relitigate matters. This applies to all disputes, whether or not they relate to contract law. If the changes are not so insignificant, the plaintiff is considered to have waived them anyway for bringing them up only when it is too late.

Resellers under GDPR - disclosure of data processors or countries of data storage?

A significant number of web-design and I.T. consultancy companies typically re-sell third party services related to their own as part of their product/service portfolio, to give a few examples, website hosting, domain names, email hosting, VOIP phone services etc. Sometimes these may be white-labelled services promoting the reseller's brand and hiding the fact they don't provide the service directly themselves. This is good for resellers as it increases their service portfolio and turnover, good for customers because it reduces their involvement in the complex technical arrangements and enables a sort of one-stop shop for their I.T. requirements, however these resellers would definitely be data processors themselves under the GDPR. In the insurance world, it is required for companies to publish/disclose the name of the company that underwrites the insurance. Is there any similar requirement under GDPR for data processors (resellers in this case) to disclose the country or countries where the data is stored and processed, or the names of third party data processors involved? I'm struggling to find anything to this effect but without such a requirement it makes compliance very difficult for data controllers (and processors looking to sub-contract to further data processors) when shopping around for compliant solutions if this information is not disclosed/published prior to enquiring.

Q1. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose sub-processing arrangements and the names of the organisations involved in this? "The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller. In the case of general written authorisation, the processor shall inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 2 This clearly states that the processor would need to make clear that they are subcontracting the services and get permission for this as part of the contract, but doesn't specify whether the subcontractors must be named and identified. Perhaps there is other prior existing subcontracting legislation that requires them to be named? Some procurement contracts as supplied by controllers may specify a list of nominated (allowed) sub-contractors or require the full identification of sub-contractors though I've not found anything in law that requires they be named other than as part of a specific contractual obligation. Q2. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose the country or countries where data is stored and processed? "Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor : ... (h) makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 3(h) This clearly states the data processor must make available to the data controller all details required to demonstrate compliance. It's quite likely larger organisations may choose to make this simple for data controllers by supplying this information in the form of a completed Data Privacy Impact Analysis document. "Each controller and, where applicable, the controller's representative, shall maintain a record of processing activities under its responsibility. That record shall contain all of the following information: ... (e) where applicable, transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, including the identification of that third country or international organisation and, in the case of transfers referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 49(1), the documentation of suitable safeguards; ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 30 Paragraph 1(e) This clearly states the data controller must maintain a record of the country or countries involved if any of these are outside the EU, and so this information must be made available to the controller as stated above.

What does the phrase "or anyone close to you" mean in juror questionnaires

A silly example: "Do you or anyone close to you prefer pancakes to waffles?" Does the phrase refer to my immediate family (spouse, children, parents, or siblings)? My extended family (grandparents, aunts/uncles, cousins)? Friends? Work associates? Google just gave me a bunch of example questions but no definition, so I'm just wondering if there is a generally accepted interpretation.

This is not a technical legal term. If you hate your mother and haven't spoken to her for years, she's not "close to you". It's someone you like a lot; not just tolerate. If your wife, who you love, prefers pancakes over waffles and you say "No", you have committed perjury and if they find out you can be sent to prison. You can try to defend yourself against the perjury charge by proving that you hate her, unless there's convincing evidence that you don't.

Has a company been indicted for failing to pay taxes on benefits?

A similar question has been asked on Skeptics.SE . The New York Times wrote on Friday : The Manhattan district attorney’s office has informed Donald J. Trump’s lawyers that it is considering criminal charges against his family business, the Trump Organization, in connection with fringe benefits the company awarded a top executive, according to several people with knowledge of the matter. [...] Several lawyers who specialize in tax rules have told The New York Times that it would be highly unusual to indict a company just for failing to pay taxes on fringe benefits. None of them could cite any recent example, noting that many companies provide their employees with benefits like company cars. Has a company been indicted for failing to pay taxes on benefits?

Yes. There have been indictments of individuals for failing to pay taxes on fringe benefits, such as the 2019 prosecution related to multiple instances of fraud including failing to report $410,000 of fringe benefits for People's Express , a bankruptcy start up airline. Often executives are prosecuted criminally, but corporations are actually easier to obtain convictions against (for example, corporations do not have protections under the 5th Amendment against self-incrimination). But since civil and criminal fines are hard to distinguish, it is more common to seek civil fines than criminal convictions against corporations, while pursuing criminal penalties against key officers and employees of the corporations. The U.S. Department of Justice has a set of policies (also here ) regarding when corporations themselves should be prosecuted criminally that have parallels in state prosecutor's offices. A list of corporate criminal prosecutions in the 1990s (mostly for non-tax violations) can be found here . For example, in 1991, the Georgia Pacific Corporation was convicted of tax evasion and fined $5 million. Tax fraud prosecutions are rare but hardly unprecedented , although large civil penalties are vastly more common. There is nothing terribly new about it either. For example, an academic article on defending criminal tax prosecutions against publicly held companies was published in 1978 . Simply stealing money meant for employee fringe benefits or taxes on those benefit is a more commonly prosecuted crime. At the federal level, in 2020, there were 593 tax evasion convictions in the US. In 2019, 848 people were sentenced, and in 2018 — 1,052. 945 prosecutions were recommended for tax crimes in 2020 in the U.S. In 2018, there were 1,050 recommendations. In 2019, the number of recommended prosecutions was 942, and in 2020 — 945. State tax fraud prosecutions are similarly rare but not unprecedented, although the raw number of cases per year is smaller because the federal statistics cover the entire United States, while state tax fraud cases comes from just one of fifty states. Almost all tax code provisions are the subject of fraud prosecutions at some point, and the common bond of the provisions is not the nature of the tax code section violated, but the willfulness of the violation. Detailed breakdowns of tax fraud prosecutions by type of tax code provisions violated are hard to determine, without detailed reviews of court records, because they all fall under the same criminal code sections. Many current federal prosecutions focus on tax fraud related to COVID related tax credits and cryptocurrencies. But federal tax prosecution agencies don't track fringe benefit fraud as a distinct subtype of case , and fringe benefit tax fraud could be variously classified as employment tax fraud, abusive tax schemes, general tax fraud, or corporate fraud.

Fraud.signature

A simliar question was asked about frauding over a signature. My question is what if they copy and pasted your signature to a contract.of course the person has proof that this signature was done fraudlent.would it be a criminal case or other.I wanted to go civil lawsuit.but I also have fraud in there also.since someone .copy and pasted my signature to a contract of obligation of paying a bill.

Before you file a lawsuit, check whether the legislature in your jurisdiction requires any exhaustion of administrative remedies . If so, proceed accordingly, prior to filing a complaint in court. The legislation would also specify whether a complaint against the city shall be filed in a specific court or venue. Most likely you would have to sue the city. Although unlikely, if you have identified specific individuals as responsible for the forgery, you might want to list them as defendants as well. Based on the context, you will need to identify whether you are suing these individuals in their official or personal capacity. If you decide to proceed in court, be mindful that you will be required to establish through evidence that your signature was forged. Although you state that of course the person has proof that this signature was done fraudlent (which I assume that by " the person " you mean yourself) your case seemingly requires a rather complex analysis of factual circumstances. Since you have provided almost no context and no details on how this happened, it is impossible to make any suggestions on how to accomplish that. Regardless of whether you opt to pursue the matter in civil court, you might also want to report with the police that your signature has been forged. Also there it is crucial that you provide sufficient, relevant information, lest the police dismiss the matter as too vague or too unpersuasive to conduct an investigation.

Is "conflict of interest" applicable to entertainment and music industries?

A simplified version of the general way people usually understand the concept of "conflict of interest" can be found on Wikipedia : "More generally, conflicts of interest can be defined as any situation in which an individual or corporation (either private or governmental) is in a position to exploit a professional or official capacity in some way for their personal or corporate benefit." From what I understand, being in the capacity to help hire one of your friends or family members to a sought-after position or a financially benefitting position constitutes a "conflict of interest" and can break a "duty of loyalty (cf Wikipedia article). Nevertheless, there are hundreds of famous "families" in the arts and entertainment industries (the Afflecks, the Barrymores, the Baldwins, Brodericks, Brlins, Buseys, Chaplins, Presleys... full list here ). In some cases, I understand that it could be out of pure luck that a famous person's family member would also end up having a position in the entertainment industry. In many other cases, I believe that someone's "helping a friend out" or just placing their friends or relatives into the business. Does this not count as a conflict of interest? Legislation for which I'm interested: USA

Conflict of interest, as a term of art, is usually applied to situations where the subject should be impartial or where there is a power differential between the subject and the other person in the relationship. Conflicts of interest are often defined and limited by law or an ethics code. Thus, labeling a relationship a conflict of interest is based on agreed-upon standards. The people who are governed by the law or whose profession follows a code are bound by the rules. The relationships that you point out are not governed by such rules. The people are not bound by any duty to be impartial.

Are businesses required to try every possible combination of methods for verification under GDPR?

A site maintains accounts containing: email password display name account preferences Two accounts containing the same password, display name, and account preferences may or may not exist but they will have different email addresses. Email is therefore the defining thing that separates them and makes each account unique. If a person provides a password, display name and the account preferences there may be one or two accounts with that combination. Should a business on recieving a GDPR request containing this information (ie points 2 to 4 above) search for multiple accounts, and reply if there is just one but deny the request if there is more than one? Similarly if only one person has an account preference or password no one else has and they send the password in a GDPR request then must the business check if the password is unique or not and respond if it is? The reason asking this is because right to access as given above will introduce security problems. Example : A business has an account made by an user having: email : ll@l.l password : 1lL@ display name : ll preferences : yes If a person comes and says my password is this, my display name is this and my preferences are these must a business check if this combination is unique or not and then send a reply to ll@l.l to that person? But this will be security risk.

GDPR recital 64 says: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. The GDPR does not specify exactly what methods of verification are "reasonable". GDPR Article 11 paragraph 2 provides: Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. This is amplified by Recital 57 which says: If the personal data processed by a controller do not permit the controller to identify a natural person, the data controller should not be obliged to acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation. However, the controller should not refuse to take additional information provided by the data subject in order to support the exercise of his or her rights. Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. GDPR Article 12 paragraph 6 provides: Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. All of the above seems to indicate that the Data Controller must follow reasonable practices, but is not required to guarantee a positive response to a Data Subject who cannot supply reasonable evidence of identity. Moreover the Controller is required to reliably ascertain the identity of the Subject before providing information or acting on a request. Incidentally, good security practice is that the site does not retain the actual password. instead it hashes the password with a good cryptographically secure hash function, and stores the hash. This means that the site cannot reliably determine if a password is unique among all passwords saved by the site, and searches among passwords are not normally done, and would not be reasonable. A site using an email address as the User Identifier would normally enforce at the time an account is created that the email is unique among all emails registered on the site. A user who cannot provide the email would typically be rejected as not able to be identified, unless the site retains additional ID info not listed in the question. I think such a practice would be considered to be reasonable in the current state of technology.

Can a sitting U.S. president be imprisoned without impeachment?

A sitting U.S. president can not be indicted for federal crimes as a matter of constitutional separation of powers and DOJ policy, among other reasons. The president's constitutional protections and powers (e.g., pardon power, etc.) do not extend to the state level. For example, POTUS can pardon people (including himself) on federal crimes. But can not pardon people for state crimes. Now imagine a scenario where a POTUS, while sitting in office, is indicted by a particular state Attorney General for a crime, say murder, under state statutes. In that scenario, can POTUS be tried, convicted and jailed for those crimes without being impeached? As a practical matter, could it actually happen? How would it actually play out given the supremacy clause and other practical considerations of jailing the chief federal executive? Edit I do not think this question is a duplicate of Can a sitting president of the United States be indicted by one of the states? . That question is limited to the issue of indictment only. This question assumes indictment powers and deals with trial, conviction and, most notably, imprisonment. Given the existing answer to that question, these differences seem relevant and could lead to different or more qualifications on the existing answer. And, finally and perhaps more importantly, this question also seeks to extract the details of the logistics of how an arrest and/or jailing and imprisonment might or might not be feasible and/or actually occur.

Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president.

Driving through a red after traffic lights have been broken

A situation happened to me today that got me thinking. I live in Victoria, Australia. I was driving and entered an intersection on a green light to make a turn. I waited until there was no oncoming traffic, by which time the light turned amber, to complete my turn. As I was completing my turn the lights started to flash amber, which indicates an error with the signals and that drivers need to follow the rules for unregulated intersections. (There are also some pedestrian crossings with red-amber-green lights that flash amber as part of their cycle before turning back to green, but not in the area I was driving.) After I completed the turn I could see that at least the next two sets of lights had been affected too and were flashing amber as well. As I approached the first set it changed back to red and I was able to stop in time. I was wondering what would have happened if I drove through the intersection just as the light changed to red (with not enough time to stop) and got a fine for driving through a red light? Would the authorities realise that there had just been an outage of the traffic lights and not issue it or would I have to prove that the lights had just been down to avoid having to pay the fine?

If you were to be issued a ticket in such circumstances, you would likely be able to bring up an affirmative defense that it was not possible for you to stop safely in the circumstances, an action most likely required by the statutes. P.S. I've actually sat through a traffic trial where some guy in KW, Ontario, was defending against a red-light ticket he has gotten when passing a red light in the winter. I recall that his defense basically amounted to the fact that he would not have been able to stop safely in the circumstances (a requirement / exception of the statute), that the pavement was too slippery, other cars were nearby (maybe a car that followed, which would not have been able to stop had he stopped?), and that the light was likely still yellow when he crossed into the intersection (he took quite some time to cross-examine the cop). I recall that he was acquitted, but the guy did look quite exhausted from the trial!

Refusal to Accept Information in Certain Forms

A situation that I was in recently got me thinking. Let me state the question first, then give context: if the DVLA can (legally) say that they do not take (or give) information via email, can I (legally) say that I do not take (or give) information via the post? The idea behind this is that I don't want to do post, because it takes so long and I don't have any proper proof of what I've sent. That said, this is a hypothetical question, not something that I'm trying to implement -- I am merely interested in the legal nature of it! I had previously written context here, but the first answer is focused almost entirely on the specific case and why the DVLA have that policy. I understand why this is the case, I am merely asking out of legal curiosity, not have a whinge!

In general if you receive a letter about something then a court is going to deem that you have been notified, so you can't just declare to the DVLA or anyone else that letters to you have no effect. If you were to try arguing that in a court then the judge would probably also fine you for violating the Silly Buggers (Prohibition of Playing) Act. On the wider implied question of why the DVLA makes this policy: The trouble with phone calls is that there is no audit trail. So if the DVLA accepted phone notification they would be unable to prove exactly who said what, so you could tell a bunch of lies and then claim it was the DVLA employee's fault for entering it wrong. (Yes, I know phone calls can be recorded, but keeping a record of everything for 6 years is orders of magnitude harder than spot checks for QA). Emails are easier, but still have a tendency to go astray. Also some people don't look at their email regularly or may change their address when they change their ISP. They do however tend to notice when an envelope is delivered. You are legally required to tell the DVLA when you change address, so the DVLA is entitled to assume the address they have for you is good, and hence its your fault if you ignore a letter they send to you.

Other customer grabbing my shopping

A situation that was discussed on another site: A goes to a store, sees an item he wants to buy, and puts it into his shopping trolley. It's the only item of that kind left in the store. B comes along. B would also want to buy the item. But the only item left is the one in A's shipping trolley. So B tries to take the item from A's shopping trolley. A hasn't paid for the item yet, and we assume that B is willing to pay the store. What is the legal situation here? What is A allowed to do to prevent B from taking it, including in the case that B is physically stronger and A is not strong enough to hold on to the item?

Simplest answer would be to contact store security, or store management. They could then refuse to sell the item to the other person.

Can one claim adverse possession by simply securing an existing boundary in England?

A small (.5Acre) plot of land sits adjacent to our property boundary, officially designated "grazing land" it is in practice wild scrubby, sometime-flooded ground that sits between our garden and the road in the countryside. We would love to use it so we can keep it tidy and plant screening but it appears to belong to our local county council and their stated policy is not to sell council-owned land * , which would be our preferred option. We had been considering the long game and adverse possession claims. It is already fenced with an unlocked gate, so it seems adding another fence would be rather foolish. If we lock the existing gate and then start tending to the land and boundary - keeping the fence in good repair, planting and weeding, etc - would this be recognised as maintaining a private boundary? * In fact their policy is they will only sell land designated as surplus, however you cannot request or notify land for consideration which means in practice small, low value plots are never going to be processed as such

On the assumption like most, if not all, local government owned land this plot is properly registered, then a successful claim for a ten-year adverse possession will depend on whether or not the council (or others) opposes the claim. If this opposition is successful then a subsequent twelve-year adverse possession may succeed. See Schedule 6 of the Land Registration Act 2002, which is summarised by the HM Land Registry's Practice Guide 4 : after 10 years’ adverse possession, the squatter will be entitled to apply to be registered as proprietor in place of the registered proprietor of the land on such an application being made the registered proprietor (and certain other persons interested in the land) will be notified and given the opportunity to oppose the application if the application is not opposed (by ‘opposed’ we mean that a counter notice is served; see Giving counter notice to the registrar in response to notice. Instead, or at the same time, the registered proprietor may object to the application on the ground that there has not been the necessary 10 years’ adverse possession; see Objecting to the squatter’s application for the implications of such an objection.), the squatter will be registered as proprietor in place of the registered proprietor of the land if the application is opposed, it will be rejected unless either it would be unconscionable because of an equity by estoppel for the registered proprietor to seek to dispossess the squatter and the squatter ought in the circumstances to be registered as proprietor the squatter is for some other reason entitled to be registered as proprietor the squatter has been in adverse possession of land adjacent to their own under the mistaken but reasonable belief that they are the owner of it, the exact line of the boundary with this adjacent land has not been determined and the estate to which the application relates was registered more than a year prior to the date of the application. However, if it is opposed then all may not be lost... in the event that the application is rejected but the squatter remains in adverse possession for a further 2 years, they will then be able, subject to certain exceptions, to reapply to be registered as proprietor and this time will be so registered whether or not anyone opposes the application The "certain exceptions" are at paragraph 6(2) of the Schedule: ...a person may not make an application under this paragraph ( i.e. a 10 + 2 years claim ) if— (a)he is a defendant in proceedings which involve asserting a right to possession of the land, (b)judgment for possession of the land has been given against him in the last two years, or (c)he has been evicted from the land pursuant to a judgment for possession. Whether "simply securing an existing boundary" is enough will depend, as is often the case, on the particular circumstances to establish factual possession: Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession exercised on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot both be in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed … Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no one else has done so. ( para 2.1 of Practice Guide 4 )

Is a developer liable for illicit use of an app?

A software developer receives a Content Infringement complaint against his app, which facilitates video downloads from YouTube. The software developer believes he is not responsible for the act of someone who downloads videos without permission of the IP owner. My Question is: How can the developer get rid of such IP complaints, by specifying any statements of disclaiming? This answer does not help me.

Liability for copyright infringement can arise directly or vicariously. A person can be direct liable if he personally makes an unauthorized copy of someone else's protected work. A third party can also be held liable for that infringement if he has knowledge of the infringing activity and makes a material contribution to the infringing activity. If an app is basically only good for downloading YouTube videos, the vast majority of which are protected, a court will likely infer that the app was made for the purpose of facilitating copyright violations. That was basically what happened with Grokster, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that Grokster was liable for all the copyright infringement happening through its app: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913 (2005) . The best way for the developer to get rid of the IP complaints is probably to disable the app.

Software license conditioned on company size or revenue

A software license might be different if the company where the software is being used is larger or smaller. So if Joey is an independent freelance contractor with his own company with revenue less than the limit and working for the giant multinational billion dollar revenue company, is it the smaller or the larger revenue that counts towards the licensing? Typical examples are Docker and Unity, where license and cost depends on where the usage is.

This will depend first and foremost on the terms of the license. There appears to be no direct violation of a law - businesses have great freedom to set prices. For some special goods like food, governments may have price controls that limit tis freedom, but software licenses are generally not is such categories. The most common exception to this would probably be (F)RAND licensing - (fair, ) reasonable, and non-discriminatory . This is typically not a direct legal restriction, but one that follows from common technical standards processes such as ISO. Companies that submit patented technologies for standardization commonly agree to non-discriminatory pricing

What (combination of) licenses is popular for public/shared proprietary software (“Feel free to contribute, but only we can make commercial use”)?

A software product (a web service) is being developed. In essence, I want the software code to be hosted publicly on GitHub. Anyone should be able view, download, modify, use for personal use, and contribute back with improvements as they want, meaning most of the "open source" principles - but not all, as... ...Only I may make commercial usage of the software code. But the more I search on the Internet, the more confused I get about this topic. According to me, this situation has to be a common desire by developers or organizations , but yet it seems hard to find a clear answer to exactly how an organization can achieve this. I have a hard time believing that each person or organization has to call in a lawyer that writes a custom license each time, right? In other words, reinventing the wheel all the time. Isn't there a straightforward, popular, or common license or license model that achieves this? Perhaps "dual licensing" is the only way to achieve this? If so, are there any examples of GitHub projects that do this?

You're not going to find an OSI-approved or FSF-approved license that meets your needs because these licenses comply with the OSI definition or FSF definition of open-source software, and your requirements don't. Looking at your requirements, it looks like you want a license where users can modify the software and use it for private use, but cannot use it for commercial use. I ran a search on TL;DR Legal to see what licenses match. There are some one-off licenses that appear to be written by individuals or groups or written by companies that explicitly call out a particular software package. One appears to be a modification of the Apache License . I wouldn't recommend simply using one of these without not only reading them thoroughly yourself, but also consulting a lawyer - just because they started with a license that is trusted doesn't mean that a change they made didn't cause problems if it were to be challenged. For a project hosted on GitHub, it doesn't need to be open-source. You can upload a project that is all rights reserved, but by using GitHub, you do need to allow others to view and fork your repository . However, I wouldn't expect many outside contributors. Why should I give you my hard work if you're just going to turn around and make money on it? That's essentially free labor. I'm not aware of any listing of vetted licenses that are designed for commercial use of software, like how the OSI and FSF maintain lists of licenses. There is a Binpress license generator , but again, it's not a vetted license. How much stake you put into license generator or some random license you find on the Internet is up to you and the level of risk that you find acceptable. If you want to make money on your open-source software, you may want to rethink your approach. In my experience, I've usually seen dual licensing achieve this. One license is a custom written commercial license while the other is a very strong copyleft license, like GPL or AGPL (depending on how you intend your software to be used), which forces companies to also open-source their software if they use yours. It doesn't explicitly prevent commercial usage, but many companies will either look for an alternative that has a more permissive license or purchase the commercial license to prevent their software from being required to be open-source as well. You may also be interested in questions on Open Source about how to monetize open-source projects . There are options out there - selling support and maintenance or related services or selling additional documentation or examples. Under this model, all of your software is free and open source under any of the well-known open-source software licenses, but you make money supporting users of the software.

Is a retroactive patent infringement possible?

A software researcher (from an American university) published a new method/algorithm and then an implementation of it, licensed under the MIT license. I wrote to him to ask if he had filed a patent or if he intended to do so in the future and he told me that neither he nor the other authors intend to patent the method and that I don't have to worry about it (but I do it anyway). My doubts are: if I publish an application that uses this method (and/or part of the code), if one day the author patents the method (or sells the method to some company who then patents it), can I simply get out of trouble by removing the publication of the application or is there some form of retroactive infringement (does it make sense to speak of infringement if no patent existed when I published the software)? If yes, how much time do I have to unpublish my software before I can be sued for infringement (I mean, I can discover a bit later that a patent was filed!) how do I know if a patent is filed, since it may not have the same name of the publication? That is, how to find it? Thanks in advance.

If they have not filed before the publication, there will be no ability to later file in most of the world. In the U.S. there is a sort-of one year grace period to file after publication. You will not have a way to definitively know if there is an application pending until it publishes or issues. Normally an application publishes and is open for the public to see 18 months after the first priority filing. That applies to the rest of the world, but in the U.S. it is possible to opt-out of publication. In that case no one can see he application until the day it issues as a granted patent, if ever. If you are making, selling, offering for sale, using or importing an infringing process or product when a patent issues you could be sued for patent infringement. I do not see how this can be seen a "retroactive". As a practical matter, if you fold immediately upon the patent issuing it is unlikely you will end up with any liability. You can set a search in more than one search facility to trigger if a patent is issued to one of the known inventors or use with other criteria but this is not foolproof. Edited Of course your product could infringe any number of patents unrelated and unbeknownst to the party who published the software. That party not patenting has nothing to do with what others may have filed before they published.

Can sole member LLC add 1% partnership to deduct large business expenses?

A sole member LLC has business expenses that can only be partially deducted from the individual's taxes because they far exceed the company's income. The company changes to a partnership adding an individual but with only 1% interest. The new partner contributes cash to the company to cover the business expense deficit and then deducts that same amount as a business expense from their new company from the taxes on their own existing income. By diverting an amount that would have been paid to the IRS to their new company and then deducting that same amount, the overall transaction nets to zero but the company covers it's business expenses. Can partners only deduct business expenses proportional to their interest in the company? Even if they made an equivalent cash contribution to the company? Can someone only deduct business expenses from taxes on income from that business only or all of their income regardless of the source?

Contributing cash to a company is not tax deductible It’s either a capital contribution or a loan; either way it’s not an expense deductible to the individual (nor income to the company).

Could a judge sentence someone who isn't on trial?

A somewhat common TV trope is for a judge to sentence someone who isn't actually on trial - for example, the real culprit bursts into the middle of a trial and confesses, and then the judge says, "In that case, I sentence YOU..." Could this ever happen for real? (United States) It seems like a major violation of due process. The closest real-world example I can think of is that I know judges have had people thrown in jail for bad behavior in the courtroom. But I'm not sure if that counts as a "sentencing" or if it is more like an arrest for contempt of court.

No. This isn't possible. A judge can only sentence someone after they have pleaded guilty or been found to be guilty, following an indictment or criminal complaint, and multiple advisements of rights.

Is it legal for using the limited free storage of Google Drive freely for business? Or should one buy a license for it?

A space of 15 GB is given free by Google Drive. Is this only for personal use or can I use this freely for business?

Previously , this was prohibited under the Google Drive TOS, when there was a separate TOS for Google Drive. They then subsumed Chrome, Chrome OS and Drive under the unified Google TOS, so the current agreement for Drive is composed of the pan-Google terms plus the Google Drive Additional Terms . Neither the core terms nor the additional terms (current versions) restrict one to non-commercial usage.

Can a social network be sued for violation of freedom of speech if an official government account is banned?

A spanish political party announced they are suing Twitter in Spain and United States for violation of freedom of speech after an account of them was banned. Details of which arguments are going to use werent disclosed, but I just remembered United States president was forbidden by an United States court to ban Twitter followers because his account was a government account and that would be a violation of freedom of speech to the followers. Could a social network be sued for violation of freedom of speech with the same argument, that they can't ban a government account because that hurts the freedom of speech of the citizens of a country?

In a democratic country, they cannot be sued successfully. Freedom of speech is for the citizens, not the government. And it is a company doing the banning, not the government. So the situation is totally different in two significant ways. (That assumes laws not too different from the USA. Obviously a country might have laws that make it illegal for companies not to publish what a political party says).

What laws protect minority share holders from having their share rights changed by special resolution?

A special resolution done by majority share holders can simply change the rights of certain shares and make them useless. They can reduce the share's voting rights or reduce dividend payment.

It is true that a shareholder who controls a majority of the votes can be quite powerful indeed. This is a somewhat murky area of the law, but in many cases, a majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty to do what is best for the corporation as a whole (not just the majority shareholder, but all shareholders), an obligation that logically parallels the obligation of the board of directors (which controls a corporation with much the same effect as a majority shareholder). In Delaware, where most large corporations are incorporated , a major shareholder or group of shareholders can have less than 50% of the vote can still be considered de facto majority shareholder if they have influence over the rest of the shareholders. Majority shareholders, either de jure or de facto , are required to act only with "entire fairness" to all the shareholders, and courts may invalidate or otherwise grant relief on transactions made by majority shareholders that are not fair to all shareholders. If a majority shareholder takes actions directly, it has the burden of proof in court to show that any actions taken accord with the "entire fairness" standard. A more in-depth discussion of these issues can be found in this article out of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.

Can my will gift digital files to specific people?

A specific bequest is defined as such: the gift in a will of a certain article to a certain person or persons Here it says: A specific bequest is a gift (bequest) or a specific item or asset to a named person or entity. Does a computer file count as an item? Can I say that person A should get file A from my laptop and person B should get file B? I imagine that I can, but it is not immediately clear to me that "item" or "article" includes digital files.

Wills are governed by state law, but yes you may. Almost anything that can be legally owned/possessed can be bequeathed. When a copyright holder dies their copyrights (intangible property) are transfer to the estate or heirs as proscribed in the will or state law if no will exists.

Does using some software for research (intended for publication) count as "public performance"?

A specific example is section 2.1.3 of the NVIDIA license agreement: https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/drivers/geforce-license/ , from which I quote: No Sublicensing or Distribution. Customer may not sell, rent, sublicense, distribute or transfer the SOFTWARE; or use the SOFTWARE for public performance or broadcast; or provide commercial hosting services with the SOFTWARE. So what does it mean for some software to be used for "public performance"? Hypothetically, say I want to publish a research paper, and I use an NVIDIA GPU to obtain data/results (e.g. training neural networks), and put that data in my paper. Does this count as public performance and violate this agreement?

"public performance" is a term used in copyright law mostly for music, dance, drama, and audio-visual works, where it means to actually perform the work in front of an audience. For a book it could mean to read the book aloud in front of an audience. It is not largely used for software. I suppose that demonstrating or running the software in front of an audience would be a public performance. Running the software and using its output in a publication would not be a "public performance" as I understand it. As long as the user has the right to access the software, which normally includes the right to run it, the output may be used with no further or special permission.

Physical Punishment in Schools/College

A sports teacher slapped my friend twice in the face in front of the class for not attending the sports class. Should this be allowed? Tomorrow we are going to be on a strike so what points and facts in the light of law I should put on the table.

The school-teacher-student relationship has historically often been given some of the same privileges and legal exemptions that are granted to the family-parent-child relationship, corporal punishment among them. All I can find on Pakistani law suggests corporal punishment is legal but discouraged : At federal level, corporal punishment is lawful in schools under Article 89 of the Penal Code. Ministerial directives in the different provinces have instructed teachers not to use it, in some cases even in private schools ... but these are clearly not enforced in practice.

Legal ramification of becomming incompetent with regards to financial accounts

A spouse becomes mentally incompetent as a result of an auto-accident. What happens to the individual brokerage and bank accounts of the incapacitated spouse? Would a power of attorney (POA) or durable POA come into/or go out of effect? How would the competent spouse gain control over these individual accounts? Are there any legal or financial tools to prepare for such events?

united-states If there is a durable POA in place naming the non-incapacitated spouse as agent, the non-incapacitated spouse could act on behalf of the incapacitated spouse with respect to accounts for which the non-incapacitated is not a signer already. If there is not a POA in place, the non-incapacitated spouse could apply to a court of probate jurisdiction to be appointed as the guardian (i.e. guardian of person) or conservator (i.e. guardian of property) of the incapacitated spouse. I am not aware of any U.S. jurisdiction in which a non-incapacitated spouse has the right to act on behalf of an incapacitated spouse without a court order or a durable POA. To prepare for this possibility, spouses can execute durable powers of attorney, which often also include a clause designating the agent as the person with priority to serve as the conservator of the principal spouse in the event of incapacity. A spouse could also be set up as co-signer without an ownership interest of a spouse's account. A durable power of attorney can be immediately effective and survive disability, or it can be a "springing power" which takes effect upon incapacity. The process for determining when the principal is incapacitated when a durable power of attorney with a springing power is involved depends upon the language of the power of attorney, the financial institution's policies, and the law (in the U.S. almost always state law) of the place where the power of attorney is to be used. Sometimes a statement from the power of attorney agent is sufficient to trigger a springing power of attorney. Sometimes a doctor's letter is necessary. Sometimes a financial institution officer is given discretion regarding how to show to their satisfaction that the power of attorney principal is incapacitated.

Legality of "Version x or later" licenses

A standard way to license something under the GPL, is to grant a license to the "GPL version 3 or later", meaning that the recipient receives a license under the license terms of the GPLv3, or at their choice any later version of the GPL. I have been told that in the EU, or at least Germany this is impossible because the license constitutes a contract, and it's not lawful to enter into a contract that has terms that are unknown to you at the time of entering it. Is this correct?

The terms are known - GPL version 3 or later. Just write it a bit more complicated: "I hereby sell you the software X. You are allowed to use the software under the terms of the GPL license version 3. I have the right to change the license terms, at any time and repeatedly, to the terms of a later version of the GPL license". So everything is absolutely known and fine.

Question regarding share of profit and loss in LLP

A started an online business (India) on his own. Now he wants B and C as partners to register an LLP. But A wants to retain 20% of share (he calls it founder's share) aside without any liability of loss. From remaining 80% A, B & C will hold 30%, 30% and 20% respectively for their partnership, but we have to share the entire 100% loss in the ratio of this partnership. Now the situation stands as: Share of Profit : A:B:C = 50 : 30 : 20 Share of loss : A:B:C = 37.5 : 37.5 : 25 Moreover, A claims, if we need to add a partner, our existing shares will go down in the ratio of this partnership, leaving that 20% founder's share untouched. Now the question is: Is all this legally valid and fair enough? Is it fine for us (B and C) to join this?

Yes, this is a valid deal as per the Indian law, though is not necessarily fair. We have removed the 'founder share' from the deal and moved to a simpler deal with a share ratio of 50:30:20. The founder, A, is already getting value for his contribution in the form of the largest portion of share, so there is no need to allow additional benefits.

Can a state regulate international money transfers?

A state representative from Texas next week will introdce HB 1760. The bill as presented will require persons here illegally who wire money outside the country to pay a 3% fee plus $5 per transaction. It will require those who do present a state issued ID in order to avoid the fees. So anyone wishing to wire money who is a legal citizen must present ID but if they leave it at home or do not wish to have it recorded in a database will have to pay. Is something like this even allowed to be regulated by a state? I thought it was in the federal government's domain to regulate international commerce?

Short Answer: No. Texas bill HB 1760, if enacted in that form would be void on its face. Long Answer: Immigration Pre-Emption This law would be void on its face because the federal government has the exclusive right to discriminate based upon immigration status and in the absence of a federal law expressly authorizing state governments to enact such legislation. This is because it is a regulation based upon immigration status where federal law occupies the entire field and pre-empts any and all state legislation. Similar laws, for example, related to landlord-tenant arrangements by illegal immigrants in Texas, have been held to be void. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch , No. 3:06-CV-2371L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (granting a preliminary injunction enjoining Farmers Branch Ordinance 2903 adopted on Jan. 22, 2007). A detailed analysis of federal pre-emption of state and local immigration laws with lots of supporting legal citations can be found here . Why Propose Such A Law? The legislator proposing the law almost surely knows that his bill is unconstitutional on its face, but it simply introducing it to make political points and as a model for Congress, which would have the power to enact such a law. It is also far less likely, although possible, that the legislator has a good faith belief that the federal courts might overturn existing precedents to uphold this law. Interstate and International Commerce Pre-Emption There is also some pre-emption of state authority to regulate interstate and international commerce as a result of the " dormant commerce clause ". But, that pre-emption is not nearly so complete, because the foundation of most commercial transactions involves the application of state law governing contracts and business dealings between private parties. (The dormant commerce clause actually applies with more force to discriminatory interstate regulation of commerce than international regulation of commerce and is also bolstered by the two "privileges and immunities clauses" in the United States Constitution as amended.) What Could Texas Do? Texas probably could enact a law that would tax people who wire money anywhere to pay a 3% fee plus $5 per transaction, because state taxation power is basically plenary and unlimited, so long as it isn't structured in a form that is pre-empted by federal law (as in the case of HB 1760) or unconstitutional (e.g. poll taxes are prohibited). If it were only applied to journalists, it would violate the First Amendment. If it were only applied to out of state transactions, it would probably violate the dormant commerce clause unless it met a heightened rational basis level of scrutiny or some sort of reasonableness standard. The dormant commerce clause would also probably violate it if it applied to all international transactions, but this would be a closer call. There might also be pre-emption from existing federal legislation regulating or taxing the same transactions, or from bilateral or multilateral treaty obligations that limit the imposition of such fees (at least for wires to some treaty party countries) such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which is managed by the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Is it legal for a store to accept payment by debit card but not be able to refund to it, even in event of staff's mistake?

A store accepts payment by payment cards, including debit and credit cards. Refunds are allowed, however due to a technical problem refunds cannot be made to debit cards. Sometimes a refund is necessary if a mistake was made, for example if the clerk scans the same item multiple times or the scanning gun malfunctions. This happened and the customer paid by debit and didn't have a credit card. (The mistake was caught after the customer read the receipt). Also the store does not carry cash. The store can give him the products that he paid for, but may the customer insist on getting a refund? Could the store give the customer credit, or must they actually return the money?

Could the store give the customer credit or must they actual return the money? The store has the legal obligation to return the money if the customer demands to be reimbursed. Section 155(4)(a) of the BC Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act explicitly provides reimbursement " to a consumer or class of consumers ". The store's unilateral, inflexible decision to give the customer credit in lieu of a reimbursement is in violation of sections 8(3)(a) and 9(1) of the Act. That approach constitutes undue pressure to enter into an additional consumer transaction, more so where management is aware of the issue and refuses to fix it .

How consumers taxed with a cryptocurrency prepaid card?

A store decided to issue a prepaid card that can be loaded with cryptocurrency and used only in that store. Will the customers pay tax when they load the card, use it, or both? I am interested in US law.

united-states Acquiring cryptocurrency in any form, including on a prepaid card, is not a taxable event. Whether income taxes are due when it is used depends upon the value of the cryptocurrency in question when the card is used. Of course, sales taxes would also often be due at some fixed percentage of the purchase price when using the card. If the cryptocurrency goes up in value between acquiring it and using it, that is a capital gain. If it goes down in value between acquiring it and using it, that is a capital loss.

Storm damage to tree

A storm broke a healthy branch which fell into neighbors backyard. If I have this now damaged tree removed, am I admitting liability for neighbors cleanup?

Not necessarily. Many jurisdictions prohibit admission of evidence of subsequent remedial acts to show liability, although it could be admitted to show that it was possible to do something. Also, the law of border trees is quite arcane and involved, and frequently subject to local ordinances, state laws, and common law rules all at once (and isn't terribly uniform from one place to another). But, usually, the bottom line for your liability to your neighbor will be whether you were negligent in maintaining the tree, which in the case of a healthy branch and an extraordinary storm, you usually would not be.

Can one reasonably respond to a bogus employer demand letter without a lawyer?

A strange situation has came to me recently. Me and my former employer have not parted on the best of terms, and a few months later, I have received a letter from an attorney representing my former employer, which demands payment for damages, and the listed reason is a complete non sequitur and feels bogus, for example done as spite to waste my time and/or money. Is there any resource for individuals to respond to this type of demand letter, before a lawyer is contacted, perhaps to request clarification, or must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Location is USA

must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Consistent with others' answer, no, you don't need a lawyer. But your question in and of itself is indicative of the steep learning curve you would need to undergo in order to avoid " shooting yourself in the foot ", as the saying goes. By this I am not encouraging you to get a lawyer (in fact, here on stackexchange and elsewhere I promote litigation in pro per ). Instead, I encourage people to learn about the applicable statutes, procedural laws, how to conduct legal research, and to draft/present their arguments in court. Here are some suggestions regarding your response letter: Avoid sarcastic admissions such as " Right, for sure I am at fault for the employer's [fill_in_the_blanks] ". If you ask for a clarification, clearly state that you expect reasonably sufficient detail as well as any and all records that substantiate the alleged damages. Although that won't strictly limit the allegations the employer can make in court proceedings, the attorney's reply might help evidencing the employer's vexatious approach later on. Avoid wording that may be misinterpreted as consciousness of guilt . Be assertive and truthful. Keep in mind the lawyer is gauging (1) how easily he can intimidate you, and (2) whether he can make additional claims to harass you via court proceedings. From now on, all your interactions with the attorney and the employer should be in writing (preferably email, given its reproducibility). When unethical individuals are aware that their position is devoid of merit, they are very tempted to indulge in false accusations (of threat, for example). Thus, communications in writing constitute objectively verifiable proof of who is acting unlawfully. Even if the attorney premises on your contract (or employment agreement/manual, or company's guidelines) the alleged damages, the clauses at issue might be illegal and therefore void. For instance, from 2007-2012 my former employer (an Indian IT intermediary) prohibited me --via contract-- to disclose my salary. The contract contained the typical lawyered babbling, but that doesn't mean that all of it was legal. In 2013 I realized that the prohibition violated Michigan law, and he had no option but to strike the entire clause. That being said, I didn't sue him for that, but for other more important matters which are currently pending review in the U.S. Supreme Court . Absent any further context in your inquiry, it is hard to make additional suggestions on how to proceed.

Is hospital ER liable for an injury of a deranged untestrained patient?

A stroke patient who is clearly deranged due to the stroke arrives to ER. The patient is not listening to instructions and acts out. The patient is told to stay on the bed and not to get up and left unattended. The patient gets up, falls face down, and breaks her nose. The broken nose weeks later complicates treatment. Is the ER liable?

This would be a question of fact for a jury, informed by expert testimony, to evaluate. There is no one correct answer and it is a mixed question of law and fact. The jury is given a very broad legal standard and has to apply it to the facts. The jury is not told how other cases with similar facts have been resolved by previous juries and the judge and appellate courts can't consider how factually similar cases were decided on the disputed factual issues either. Some of the key mixed issues of law and fact would be: Duty: Has a medical professional-patient relationship been established, and if so, with whom? Negligence: Did a medical professional who had this person as a patient fail to act with the care of a reasonable medical professional of this type? This would be mostly a question of fact for a jury to resolve on a case by case basis based upon expert testimony particular to that case. Also, there are some circumstances when a gross negligence rather than a negligence standard would apply based upon specific state tort reform laws. I have no idea what reasonable medical professionals would do in these circumstances. Factors like how busy the ER was at the time would also be relevant. Causation and Injury: To what extent did not taking the act alleged to be negligent and found by a jury to be negligent cause an injury and if so, how much of the harm was attributable to that negligent act as opposed to the underlying condition for which treatment was sought? This would be primarily a question of fact to be resolved based upon factual and expert testimony. Was was the relationship of the patient to the ER and to the medical professionals who were allegedly negligent? What was the relationship of the medical professionals involved to the ER? What does state law say about the responsibility of this particular hospital (which might be private, state and local, or federal) for medical malpractice by medical professionals providing services in the ER? If the entity to be sued is a governmental one, what exceptions to sovereign immunity apply in this jurisdiction for this type of entity? Most entity liability is vicarious due to acts of negligence by its employees and agents. But sometimes entity liability is direct due to having bad policies in place that are negligent across the board for an entity of that type to have in place. Did the patient have comparative fault? In many states the jury is charged with allocating what percentage of fault is due to each party, when multiple people (including the "victim") are negligent, and not with an all or nothing negligence determination. If the patient was deranged due to voluntary intoxication or drug use or just being stubborn and ornery, the jury might attach some percentage of comparative fault to the patient. Did the patient fail to mitigate damages? A related issue to comparative fault is that the patient has a duty to use reasonable efforts to minimize the amount of injury that the patient suffers, for example, by following doctor's orders. This is rarely a complete defense and probably wouldn't be in this case, but the defendants being sued could argue, for example, that some of the broken nose related complications in the treatment were due to not following discharge instructions properly, rather than necessarily from the broken nose itself.

Licensing header for protecting the idea

A student asked me which license suited best for her project, but I couldn't reply. Here's what she told me: The student project was in collaboration with a brand; The goal of the project was to help to brand to make new tools and to grow; She didn't sign anything, no legal document, at first. But when the project was finished, her professor told the students their had to sign a document he forgot to give. This document stated the "[student] yields graciously to [the brand] every work...". She didn't sign it as is, but added that she wanted the following point; All she wants is if [the brand] uses the whole project or part of it, internally or publically, they mention her name noticeably everywhere her work can be visible. Is there a license or something she can write on a LICENSE file, or at the top of the header of the files?

If the student is not performing work for hire (and she probably isn't) then she owns the copyright in the work. Irrespective she has a moral right in the work - outside of the US this includes a right of attribution. She can licence it however she wants. She can choose not to licence it as well. Currently she holds all the cards and if the brand owner wants to use the project they will have to agree to her terms.

In Arizona, can a company require you to cancel a subscription service in person?

A subscription service in Arizona is claiming their service can only be cancelled at the customer's home office, in-person, which is the one that the customer originally signed up with. What if the customer lives very far away from the office or even out of state? The website states that not even the corporate office can make changes to the account; everything must be done in-person at the home office. Is there some sort of protection against this that would allow a customer to cancel over the phone with a corporate office if they live a certain distance away?

Various states have cancellation laws guaranteeing a certain right of convenience to cancelling a renewable contract: Arizona is not one of them. (Additionally, some states have service-specific laws such as gym membership cancellation laws , which I assume is not relevant here though in Arizona it includes cancellation by certified letter). In general, the terms as stated in the contract will hold. If the contract says that you have to physically go in to the office where you initially signed up, you have to physically go in to the office where you initially signed up, regardless of the inconvenience. If cancellation by certified letter is not allowed under the contract, then you may have to be inconvenienced. One possible alternative is to grant someone a Special Power of Attorney , or more generally, hire a lawyer to do the cancelling for you. You can't use that POA form if you don't live in Arizona.

What happens to a judgment when one of the parties dies?

A sues B, wins a judgment, and can't collect because B has no money. A dies. Is B off the hook? B dies first. Does A have a claim against B's estate?

In both cases, the estate takes over. If A dies, then B owes the money to A's estate. If B dies, then B's estate owes the money to A. If B's estate is empty, then the debt is retired, because a debt cannot be inherited.

May an invocation of spousal privilege support an adverse inference?

A sues B. At trial, B asks A about statements he made to his wife. A objects, invoking the spousal communications privilege. The court sustains the objection, so the statements do not come in. B then calls A's wife as a witness. A objects, invoking the spousal testimonial privilege. The court sustains the objection, so the wife does not testify. B asks for a jury instruction saying that the jury may make adverse inferences against A about the testimony that was excluded based on the spousal privilege. A objects. Must/may the court give that instruction? Does the answer change depending on whether it is the litigant or the spouse who invokes the privilege?

Must/may the court give that instruction? No. It would be error for the court to give that instruction. The only privilege for which an adverse inference instruction is generally authorized in civil litigation is the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This is because when you invoke it, you are implicitly asserting that your testimony could be used against you, if you gave it, to show that you were guilty of a crime, and because a relevant question will be about events pertinent to the lawsuit. An adverse inference is also not allowed for invoking the 5th Amendment when you are a defendant in a criminal case because that would undermine its purpose in the the criminal justice system. An invocation of a marital privilege, in contrast, merely implies that you are married, which is not something that would normally and naturally suggest that you did something for which there is civil liability. One could probably imagine a fact pattern in which being married was a disputed issue that could give rise to liability (e.g. under the "family car doctrine"), of course, in which the invocation of the privilege would estop A from asserting a defense on the ground that he isn't married to A's wife (either at the time of the communication if the confidential communication privilege is raised, or at the time of the testimony, if the right to not testify against a spouse privilege is raised, as the case might be). Tricky cases would involve people who were unmarried at the time of the accident but subsequently married. But, outside very unusual facts, people generally don't deny that they are married in a lawsuit and then try to assert the marital privilege in a lawsuit. Does the answer change depending on whether it is the litigant or the spouse who invokes the privilege? No.

Police reporting the crimes of police

A supreme court decision says police do not owe a personal duty to individuals. However, police do have an oath of office and duty to the laws of the state. If a police make an unlawful arrest: In Texas it is known as 'unlawful restraint'. Unlawful restraint is a class A misdemeanor unless the victim is recklessly exposed to substantial risk of injury which then makes the crime a third degree felony. For example, if an officer points a firearm at the unlawfully arrested person that would be a felony. Other police on the scene are backup and immune from prosecution because they were merely there and did not physically make the arrest. Question 1: Are any police on the scene responsible for reporting the crime of unlawful restraint which has become a felony in their presence? Question 2: Would the police in not reporting the crime be implicating more involvement than mere presence and thereby threaten their immunity stance? If the police do not owe a duty to protect the person being unlawfully restrained, it would seem they still owe a duty to uphold the laws of the state like they would for the crimes of jaywalking, driving without a seat belt, or rape. This seems pretty complicated to me. If the police do not owe a duty to the citizen to arrest another officer for violating the law do they at least owe a duty to the law to make a criminal complaint regarding the violation they witnessed? And if so, and if they do not, would they be more accountable than the populace who are required by law to report felonies? Texas Penal Code - PENAL § 38.171. Failure to Report Felony

The statute in question (which is unusual and not part of the law in most U.S. states) is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted;  and (2) fails to immediately report the commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency under circumstances in which: (A) a reasonable person would believe that the commission of the offense had not been reported;  and (B) the person could immediately report the commission of the offense without placing himself or herself in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death. (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. There is no indication that violation of this section gives rise to civil liability. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez came to its conclusion that there was no civil liability of a police department or police officers for failure to enforce a restraining order in the face of language in a state statute whose plain language fairly clearly created a mandatory duty to that effect. The offense of unlawful restraint Texas Penal Code § 20.02 is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child younger than 14 years of age; (2) the actor was a relative of the child;  and (3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the child. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if the person restrained was a child younger than 17 years of age;  or (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor recklessly exposes the victim to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury; (B) the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant;  or (C) the actor while in custody restrains any other person. (d) It is no offense to detain or move another under this section when it is for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or detaining an individual lawfully arrested. (e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age; (2) the actor does not restrain the child by force, intimidation, or deception;  and (3) the actor is not more than three years older than the child. In practice, almost any restraint by a police officer would not obviously be outside the immunity for a lawful arrest sufficient to give rise to the duty to report a felony. Also, the person who decides whether to press charges is the prosecuting attorney who has a strong long term strategic interest in maintain a positive relationship with law enforcement and who often subjectively views law enforcement as his client even though this is the correct as a matter of legal doctrine. Question 1: Are any police on the scene responsible for reporting the crime of unlawful restraint which has become a felony in their presence? In general law enforcement may have a duty under department policy as a matter of employment law, but there is no general legal duty for a police officer to report a crime committed in their presence. Law enforcement officers, like prosecutors have wide discretion over whether they will choose to enforce crimes in the U.S. But, since Texas has a mandatory reporting law, this comes down more to a matter of interpretation and a restraint by an officer would almost never never give rise to a felony due to the privilege for an arrest. Also, it isn't at all obvious that a law enforcement officer has to report the crime to anyone but him or herself to satisfy the requirements of the law, and there is no duty for a law enforcement officer to act upon a report of a felony. Question 2: Would the police in not reporting the crime be implicating more involvement than mere presence and thereby threaten their immunity stance? Generally not. To have liability personally, the law enforcement officer would have to be a co-conspirator. Usually conspiracy liability would require an affirmative action in support of the illegal action and not merely inaction in the form of failing to report a crime. Police have qualified immunity from civil liability for any act that is not a clearly established violation of a constitutional right. If the police do not owe a duty to protect the person being unlawfully restrained, it would seem they still owe a duty to uphold the laws of the state like they would for the crimes of jaywalking, driving without a seat belt, or rape. This is mistaken. Law enforcement officers have no legally enforceable duty to uphold any laws. They may have a moral duty to do so, and they may have a strong employment relationship pressure to do so, but a law enforcement officer faces neither civil nor criminal liability for merely failing to enforce a criminal law when they know a crime has been committed. If the police do not owe a duty to the citizen to arrest another officer for violating the law do they at least owe a duty to the law to make a criminal complaint regarding the violation they witnessed? Arguably, there is a criminal law duty to report a clear felony, but since the duty is only to report the matter to a law enforcement officer and they are a law enforcement officer, it isn't clear that this statute applies at all. A report of a suspected felony is not a criminal complaint. And if so, and if they do not, would they be more accountable than the populace who are required by law to report felonies? No. As noted above, they are arguably less accountable than members of the general public.

How does a poor bombing fugitive suspect afford a 200 dollars an hour lawyer?

A suspected jihadist who fled Paris on the night of the Paris attacks and hid for 4 months in Belgium as a fugitive, has recently hooked up with a prominent high profile Belgian lawyer, the kind that could ask in excess of 200 euros an hour of his time. How is that kind of defense funded? Does the lawyer take it on for cheap for the thrill, or do lawyers always work for regular pay? If so, does money just arrive transparently/opaquely in a fund from donations from conservatives similar to the defendant and by jihadi benefactors? Are they tracked? Can they be anonymous? Can donations for a defense be sourced internationally?

Everyone is entitled to legal representation; if you can't afford one, one will be provided by the state, however, that is not your question. Clearly lawyers in Europe are massively underpaid if the best of them can only charge 200 Euros per hour; a middle of the road barrister in Sydney will set you back about $800. How is that kind of defense funded? The dependent may be wealthy, or have a wealthy family, or friends, or have the defence funded by a benefactor, or have the lawyer work for free or at a discount, or ... Does the lawyer take it on for cheap for the thrill, or do lawyers always work for regular pay? Like anyone else in business, the lawyer sets his own rate which may be zero if he wants. It's unlikely that it is for "the thrill" but it could be for exposure, or because he is a friend of the family, or for the challenge (it will be a difficult case to win), or because he believes in everyone's right to a fair trial, or ... If so, does money just arrive transparently/opaquely in a fund from donations from conservatives similar to the defendant and by jihadi benefactors? Possibly. Unless there is reason to believe that the funding is sourced from criminal activity how anyone spends their money is up to them. Are they tracked? Why would they be? Can they be anonymous? Sure. Can donations for a defense be sourced internationally? Yes. To be clear. If this man has done what he is alleged to have done then he should get the fullest punishment that the law provides. However, until the allegation is proven, the man is entitled to be treated as innocent and is entitled to defend himself in court to the best of his and his lawyer's ability.

Who is eligible to attend US public high schools?

A teen who's a US citizen grew up and studied in a foreign country. He wants to return to US. Would he be eligible to attend public high school in the US (grade 10-12)? He isn't paying US tax (his parents aren't US citizens). But he's going to living in his friend's house though (who's a tax payer).

Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages.

Which law regulates child labor for a teen that has dual citizenship?

A teen with dual citizenship (Taiwan and U.S.) is seeking to work during his summer vacation. He's 14 right now (8th grade), which allows him to work by U.S. FLSA, but he is prohibited to work by Taiwan's child labor law which states that he must have graduated from 9th grade. He's currently applying to a U.S.-based international company for a remote job. Is he allowed by law to work for a U.S.-based company? He is living in Taiwan.

You'd have to look careful for example at the Taiwanese law. Does it disallow companies in Taiwan to hire minors, or does it disallow minors to take jobs in Taiwan? In 99.99% of all cases the effect would be the same, but in this case the minor is in Taiwan, and the company in the USA. If their law disallows minors to take jobs, then the matter is clear. If it disallows companies to hire minors, then there is the question if the US company hiring a remote employee is covered by this or not. On the other hand, if employment is against Taiwanese law, how can they enforce it? Normally enforcement is against the company, not the minor.

Calendar month in property letting (UK)

A tenancy agreement gives the end date of the tenancy as being on the 30th of a month, where the month has 31 days. The rent is stated as being amount x per calendar month. Is it right, therefore, that for the final month, only (30/31)*the monthly rental amount is paid, or does the definition calendar month mean 30 days (as other calendar months only have 30 days in? Would be great if someone could clarify this for me!

If you pay rent per calendar month, you pay the same amount each month on the same date. In your case, the 30th. The rent is calculated by dividing the total for the year by 12, or by multiplying the weekly rent by 52/12 (4.3 recurring). You don't pay for 31 days in January, 28/29 in February, 31 in March, 30 in April etc.

Early Termination of Non Residential Florida Lease: Security Deposit

A tenant enters into a 24 month non residential office lease, pays for months 1 though 5 and unilaterally indicates to move out in early month 7. The tenants move out at approximately 7.5 months. Assume: there is no provision in the lease for early termination the landlord does not agree to early termination there is no material breach of the contract other than tenant non payment the tenant has prepaid the last month's rent the tenant has a prepaid security deposit in the amount of 2 months rent the tenant returns the rental in perfect condition The tenant has effectively prepaid for 3 months of rent. In the absence of a provision for termination in the lease: Why should the landlord have cause to collect (keep the deposit): for month 6 and 7? for any months subsequent to month 7? if yes to subsequent, how many months? Months 8, 9, ... until new tenant is found? By moving out early without landlord agreement, did the tenant abandon month 24 and its corresponding payment?

The landlord is entitled to damages Damages under a contract are to restore the innocent party to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. This means the landlord is entitled to rental payments of a monthly basis for the balance of the lease. However, the landlord is also obliged to reasonably mitigate the damage, typically by finding a new tenant as soon as possible. Let’s make the example concrete. Let’s assume the rent is $1,000 per month and that there is no pro-rata clause in the contract (as is typical). That means whether the tenant uses 1 day or 31 days of a month, they owe a full month’s rent. When the tenant moves out, they owe $3,000 (plus interest). They also have an ongoing obligation to pay rent each subsequent month. This gives unmitigated damages of $17,000. The landlord spends $500 to clean and get the property ready to rent. $1,000 commission to the agent and $500 on advertising. After 2 months they find a tenant at $800 per month. Damages would be $3,000 for the unpaid rent, $2,000 for the out of pocket, $2,000 for the unoccupied months and 14 x $200 = $2,800 for the lower rent. So, $9,800. Typically, a security deposit can be put against unpaid rent but might not be allowed to be deducted for economic loss from a breach.

Is a commercial landlord liable for damage due to roof leaks?

A tenant has a modified gross lease of a small commercial warehouse in San Fernando, CA. During the rainy seasons of 2017-2018 and the very wet 2018-2019, the tenant reported, on multiple occasions, leaks from the roof. These never seemed to have been properly addressed. More recently, there was a severe enough leak that caused some damage by splattering as it dripped. The water is a dark rust color, and stains everything it touches. More recently, water trapped in the ceiling insulation (which is held up by a plastic barrier) proved to be too heavy for the plastic and it ruptured, leaking all over numerous belongings. The landlord is unwilling to cover this damage, telling me that's what the tenant's insurance is for. The tenant has insurance that should cover this, but one of the few obligations the lease places on the landlord is to keep the roof in good working order. What are the legal options? It's very hard to search for information for commercial leases; almost everything online is about residential leases. EDIT: Is the landlord typically liable for damage to contents in a situation like this (that is, when they've failed to maintain the roof in proper working order, and the resulting water ingress damages the contents)? Or is it some kind of standard practice that the tenant's insurance should pay, and then the insurance company deals with the landlord? The next question is, what kind of attorney handles this sort of thing? The most important thing is to get the landlord to fix the roof to prevent further damage. Talking to other tenants suffering similar damage, it seems they're reluctant to fix it, and downright unwilling to pay for damages.

Generally speaking, keeping the roof in working order is the obligation of the landlord in a commercial modified gross lease. It would honestly be quite unusual for the tenant's insurance to cover it, and it would likewise be unusual for the landlord not to have insurance that covers an incident like this to the extent that it is insurable (usually, deterioration of a roof is not covered by anyone's insurance unless it is caused by a specific event like a hail storm, or toilet seat from an aircraft that blew up in mid-flight crashing down on it (if you miss the allusion to "Dead Like Me", don't sweat it)). If the tenant's insurance does pay, it would normally have a right to subrogate against the landlord (i.e. sue the landlord for the money that it was out), but many commercial leases have an anti-subrogation clause that prohibits a tenant's insurer from pursuing a subrogation claim against the landlord (not all leases have such a term, but many do), since this is really the landlord's responsibility. The landlord ordinarily would be liable to the tenant for damage foreseeably caused by the failure to the landlord to do what the landlord is obligated to do, but this is complicated because the tenant has a duty to mitigate damages if reasonably possible. So, rather than just allowing its stuff to be water damaged, the tenant is obligated to do what is necessary to prevent the damage (at least, if this is cheaper than allowing the damage to occur) and then sue for the cost of mitigation, rather than for the damage itself. Another point to consider is that in many commercial leases, the landlord's obligation to repair is not triggered until a demand is made, the landlord refused, the tenant gives a written notice of default to the landlord, and the landlord does not address the problem within a "cure" period of a specified number of days after receiving the notice of default. A review of the lease for such provisions is in order. If the landlord is allegedly in default, it may be possible to bring a lawsuit to compel the landlord to do the repair, or better yet, for the tenants to give the proper notices, then to make the repair, and then to withhold rent in the amount of the alleged damage or to sue the landlord for the cost of mitigation and to collect a judgment by withholding rent as a setoff against the judgment. If the lease is long enough for the litigation to run its course and still have enough of the lease left to setoff against rent due to collect, that may be a viable option. what kind of attorney handles this sort of thing? Real estate, business law, commercial litigation and business litigation would all be common specialties for a law firm that handles this kind of dispute to advertise. Lawyers who primarily do criminal law, immigration law, custody cases, personal injury, personal bankruptcy cases, and defense of residential evictions, would typically be inappropriate. The lawyer will not be cheap, but usually, in a commercial lease situation, the dollar stakes are considerable.

Is laches an applicable defense for a debt that was never contractually agreed upon in writing?

A tenant has a parking spot in their building for a period of 8 years and was never billed for it by the management. Management discovered their book keeping error and has turned around to retroactively bill them for the entire time. Is laches applicable in this situation? It should be noted that no written agreement was ever signed by the tenant. The monthly price for the parking also was raised during that period and no written notice was ever provided to the Tenant. Tenant was being charged a minimal fee for the 'rental' of a remote to access the garage but no other charges ever appeared on their monthly statements. Now they are being asked to pay $10K+ in back fees.

The equitable defense of laches is not applied the same way in every jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions apply it only to equitable claims. Others also apply it to claims arising in law or by statute. A claim for breach of an oral contract arises in law, so in some jurisdictions only the statutes of limitations and not laches applies, while in others, laches as well as the statute of limitations might apply. If laches does apply in this jurisdiction, one must typically show (1) a delay in asserting a right or a claim; (2) the delay was not reasonable or excusable; and (3) either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains OR prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. The second and third elements are typically the issues in dispute in a laches claim. A prejudice argument might be that the person using the parking space wouldn't have continued to use it if he had believed that the person leasing it was going to impose a charge beyond the one actually imposed. Ultimately, this would be a fairly close call if the defense of laches is available for this kind of claim in this jurisdiction. There is also an argument that the right to collect the charges has been waived, although not a very strong one. With respect to the statute of limitations, there are different ways to characterize the violation. If each month of parking without paying is viewed a separate breach of contract and the statute of limitations is three years, only 3/8th of the amount claimed would be timely. But, if it is viewed as a single continuing violation, the entire claim might be timely. To the extent that the parking agreement is viewed as a lease for a time in excess of one year, the statute of frauds might require it to be in writing for it to be enforceable, in which case it is not a breach of contract case, but is instead a trespass case. Viewed as a trespass case the statute of limitations would typically be different and shorter, and the tort might only arise (and compensation might only start to be due) once a demand is made upon the person using the parking space to pay a higher amount (resulting in a much, much lower amount owed).

Question about Ontario N9 form

A tenant provides an N9 form to a landlord ( http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Notices%20of%20Termination%20&%20Instructions/N9.pdf ), a tenant's notice to end the tenancy, on November 5, 2019 stating that they would like to move out of the rental unit on December 4, 2019. Let's say the original (1 year) lease was supposed to end on August 31, 2020. I was under the impression that the tenant's termination date must be 60 days after the giving of this notice. Would this mean that the tenant would still be responsible for providing the rent for December, as 60 days would not be until Jan 4? Additionally, would the tenant be responsible for payment of the 4 days in January (4/31 of the rent)?

If you turn in an N9 form and move before the six month period is over, the landlord is supposed to make his best effort to rent the property to someone else. If no one else rents it, then you should compensate the landlord for whatever the losses were. That means, if it takes two months to find someone to rent the apartment, that you should help cover losses for those two months and you would be off the hook for the remaining four months of the lease period. Both of you are supposed to do your best to mitigate the losses, on each end. http://landlord-law-ontario.blogspot.com/2014/10/the-problem-with-n9-notices-of.html

Should a business testimonial advertisement without any contact information be used "as is" in a publication?

A testimonial advertisement was provided by a business (for their own endorsement) in a publication. Traditionally, print advertisements may need some sort of visual text contact information to be included to be considered and viewed as an "advertisement"? If contact information or a call to action is not used, would this testimonial ad be considered/viewed as editorial in the publication?

To the best of my knowledge, there is no legal requirement that an advertisement include contact info for the firm whose goods are being promoted. Certainly such a requirement is not present in all possible jurisdictions. If the publication is concerned that the offered composition (text plus any images) would look like an editorial endorsement, they could simply place a tag such as "paid advertisement" over or adjacent to the composition. (I have seen this done in various publications.) Or they could require addition of the advertiser's name and contact info before they accept they ad. This would be a matter of the publication's policies and business judgement. I do not believe it would be a matter of a legal requirement in the US at least, and I have not heard of any jurisdiction where it would be.

Who owns the software created by a dissolved startup company?

A theoretical company existed which used to be registered in the United Kingdom and has since been dissolved. The company was a SaaS(Software as a service) company. The code was written by Person A , who was a minority shareholder director of the company. There was no copyright, trademark or other license on the actual code files themselves and the original developer has access to the entire complete codebase. Question: Who 'owns' the code? What freedoms does Person A have to use the code in a similar or project of their choice?

When a company is dissolved, someone takes over the company's asserts, often the creditors, or they may be sold for what they will bring. Failing anyone else, it may be the crown. Assuming that the copyright was in fact owned by the company (and not by someone else and merely licensed to the company), someone owns it, (just as someone owns the physical property that the company had) but it may be hard to find out who. It is even possible that the owner is not aware of the copyright. As for Person A, that depends on the details of A's contract or agreement with the company. A may be a co-owner (unlikely). A may have rights to use the code to some extent. Or A may have no more rights than I do (that is, none at all). According to "Ownership of copyright works " an official UK government web page: Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or a film, is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work (subject to any agreement to the contrary). The expression “in the course of employment” is not defined by the Act but in settling disputes the courts have typically had to decide whether the employee was working under a ‘contract of service’ (eg as an employee) or a ‘contract for services’ (eg as a freelancer or independent contractor). Where a person works under a ‘contract for services’ he will usually retain copyright in any works he produces, unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary. Thus if person A was acting as an employee of the company, the copyright would automatically be owned by the company, in the absence of any written agreement between A and the company. The page goes on to state: When you ask or commission another person or organisation to create a copyright work for you, the first legal owner of copyright is the person or organisation that created the work and not you the commissioner, unless you otherwise agree it in writing. However, in some circumstances, for example when copyright is not dealt with in the contract to commission the work, courts may be willing to find that there is an implied licence allowing the commissioner to use the work for the purpose for which it was commissioned. This does not necessarily result in a transfer of ownership. Instead, the commissioner of the work may only get a limited non-exclusive licence. ... Thus if A was acting as an employee in creating or co-creating the code, and there was no written agreement on the matter between A and the company, A would have no rights to the code, and the copyright would pass to whoever purchased or was awarded it after the company dissolved. Such a copyright might well have been included in a purchase of "all other assets" (or some such language) and no explicit or specific mention of it been made. The situation in the US would be basically similar. Work by an employee within he scope of employment is a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH) under US copyright law( See 107 USC 101), and the employer is legally the author (which is not true in UK law), unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. The natural person(s) who in fact created the wok have no rights unless an agreement grants such rights. On dissolution the copyright does not end, nor is it transferred to the creator, but passes to whoever bought it, or bought or was awarded the general assets of the company (such as in a bankruptcy proceeding).

Can a thief sue someone whose house he was robbing?

A thief entered a house by crossing an electric fence. The fence was turned off when the thief came in, but it was turned on before he fled. When he tried to escape over the fence, he got shocked and suffered serious injuries. He sued the owner of the house. The legal principle is an occupier of a premises owes a duty of care to all his invitees & visitors. The thief was neither an invitee nor a visitor like a postman, delivery boy, etc. But the home owner was also liable. Why?

Yes australia Occupiers Liability The law recognises these categories of visitors: Contractural - people who pay to enter. Invitees - which are not people you invite despite the name; they are people whose visit will bring an economic benefit to the occupier, customers in a shop for example. Licensees - people who don't bring the occupier economic advantage, guests in your home for example. It also includes people who would be contractual visitors except they haven't been charged for their entrance. Entrants as of right - lawful users of facilities that are open to the public. Trespassers - Your hypothetical thief. The occupier (generally not the owner) owes a duty of care to each category of visitors but their duty is lower the lower down the scale you go. However, that said, the practical distinctions between the categories are eroding as the duty ratchets up so that all are owed the same duty. However, the duty to trespassers still remains less than the others. This is usually expressed as a duty to their "common humanity". Basically, if you don't go out of your way to create hazards, you should be ok. Negligence However, occupiers liability is often not pursued and the case is brought in the tort of negligence instead (or as well). Indeed, in some jurisdictions ( victoria , england , new-zealand ) negligence has entirely supplanted occupiers liability. There the duty is pretty much as originally laid down by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 at 580: You must take reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which you can reasonably forsee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be, persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected. Is a trespasser your neighbour? You bet they are.

Is downloading a torrent chunk copyright infringement?

A torrent works by breaking a file into small chunks, each of which can be shared between peers. This speeds up downloads because peer A could be sharing chunk 1 with you while peer B could be sharing chunk 8 with you etc. (See BitTorrent and Torrent file .) The torrent client would need to reconstruct the file in order for you to use it. None of the chunks is useful on its own. Each is typically 1/1000th - 1/2000th of the entire video file. None is generally even viewable as video without adjacent chunks due to the type of video codecs in common use. In Canada, is it copyright infringement to use a modified (say, self-written) torrent client that simply downloads the chunks and immediately discards them from memory upon receipt, never storing any chunk on disk, and never reproducing any portion of the original file larger than an individual torrent chunk, and doesn't host or otherwise make the chunk available to other users. Does the analysis change if you only download and immediately discard one of the chunks? To simplify answers, let's assume that the fair dealing user right is not implicated.

In Canada, copyright means "the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public..." ( Copyright Act §3(1) ). This question asks whether the work or any substantial part of the work is reproduced when an individual torrent chunk (typically approximately 1/1500th of a file) is downloaded to volatile RAM and immediately discarded. 1 If not, is a substantial part of the work reproduced if the downloader-and-discarder repeats the activity on more of the torrent's chunks (each being discarded before downloading another torrent chunk)? Substantiality As quoted above from the Copyright Act, when reproducing only a portion of a work, the statute only prohibits reproduction of a "substantial part" of the work. "[T]he Act does not protect every “particle” of an original work" ( Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73 ). Substantiality is not measured by quantity. "Whether a part is substantial must be decided by its quality rather than its quantity" ( Ladbroke (Football), Ltd. v. William Hill (Football), Ltd., [1964] ). Copyright Board's substantiality decisions Is a small chunk of a torrent a substantial part? The Copyright Board has looked to several signals in judging substantiality, one of which is whether "[the part] may be so closely identified to the work as to allow the reader to recognize the work" ( License Application by Pointe-à-Callière, Montreal Museum of Archeology and History for the Reproduction of Quotations, Copyright Board of Canada [2004] ). In some video codecs, possessing 1/1500th of the encoded file would not allow playback such that the result would be recognizable as a portion of the original. The Copyright Board has also held that in the case of XM satellite receivers, which hold "4 to 6 seconds of the Satellite Services' multiplex signal at all times in its random access memory (RAM)", that "the 4 to 6 second buffer fails to satisfy the substantiality requirement. It is not a substantial part of the protected work." ( Collective Administration of Performing Rights and of Communication Rights (Re) [2009] ). If downloading and discarding one torrent chunk is not reproduction of a substantial part, does downloading and discarding multiple (even all) chunks become a reproduction of a substantial part of the work? The Copyright Board has said, regarding the 4-6 second buffer in the XM satellite receiver ( ibid. ): "The rolling 4 to 6 seconds of a musical work is not an aggregate of an entire work. At no time does a subscriber possess a series of 4 to 6 second clips which when taken together would constitute a substantial part of the work. It matters not that over time the totality of all works transmitted are reproduced. We are dealing with a rolling buffer and at no time can we line up all of the fragmented copies amounting to one complete copy of a musical work." Discussion In my opinion, downloading a chunk of a torrent file to RAM and immediately discarding it is not reproduction of a work or a substantial part thereof. It is not copyright infringement. Repeating this activity for several torrent chunks of the same torrent file is likewise not copyright infringement. The above analysis is dependent on assumptions regarding the type of file (a media file, encoded using a format that doesn't produce recognizable sub-portions 2 , split into approximately 1500 chunks). Other types of files and torrents would not fall under this analysis and thus the hypothetical download-and-discard activity could still be infringement. Consider a 5 minute .wav file, split into a torrent having only 2 chunks. A 2.5 minute .wav chunk would be recognizable as a portion of the 5 minute original, and 2.5 minutes of a 5 minute work would be much more likely to be considered a substantial part. Notes 1. I know of no torrent client that behaves this way. It would have to be a custom-written torrent client designed specifically for this ostensibly useless task. 2. Although, I don't think the assumption of unrecognizable subportions is necessary, since the 4-6 second buffer in the XM Satellite receiver was recognizable.

selling custom made jacket with other company logo on it, is that legal in CA?

A trader buys an original brand jacket, adds some custom images and texts to the jacket, then sell it online with the original brand logo still on it. Is that legal? I know that people sell custom print t-shirt online without the original logo though.

The first-sale doctrine says that someone who legally bought a trademarked product is permitted to use the trademark when later reselling that product to a 3rd party. However, altering the product before reselling it is something different. When a product is altered in a way that there is a "material difference" to the original product, then the first-sale doctrine might no longer apply. Why is that? Because those alterations might violate warranty. Or poor or inappropriate alterations might impair the quality of a product in a way that it is not clear for the consumers if the problem is with the original product or with the alteration. Which is why, for example, a court in Kansas once ruled that simply removing the serial number of a product is very likely an alteration that breaches the first sale doctrine (I said "very likely" because this is just a preliminary injunction, not an actual ruling). In case of clothing, the original trademark owner might have a legal argument of inappropriate alterations harming their brand identity. For example, when a modification adds a political or obscene message that doesn't fit with the brand image of the original manufacturer. People seeing someone wear that article of clothing in public with both the slogan and the brand logo might not realize that it is a modification by an intermediate trader and erroneously attribute that statement to the original manufacturer. Will they win in court? Well, a company like VF Corporations can probably afford much better lawyers than the guy with an embroidery machine in their basement who sells on eBay. For that reason it's usually safer to sell altered products without using the name and logo of the original supplier.

Linked treaty documents

A treaty T is signed by two state actors A1 and A2 . It says: Both sides agree to put in place a single customs territory (described herein) for an interim period of two years (described herein). Both sides will use best endeavours, in good faith, abiding by their respective legal orders, to negotiate the agreements referred to in declaration D . Declaration D (another document) says: Both sides have agreed this declaration. This declaration accompanies T , that has been endorsed by A1 and A2 , subject to ratification. This declaration establishes the parameters for future economic cooperation between A1 and A2 , to take effect immediately after the interim period defined in T . For the period beginning immediately after the interim period defined in T , both sides agree to develop an economic partnership that builds on the single customs area defined in T . Are the agreements within D legally binding in international law? In other words, does the positioning of provisions in a separate document, linked with the "good faith" article, change things? If the answer is no , if a new executive government is elected within A1 on a platform that differs from D , by what legal mechanism could the agreements in D be reneged on? The heart of my question is this: does the positioning of provisions in a separate document, linked with the "good faith" article, change the legally binding nature of the contents of the other document? I realise that a country can simply walk away from a treaty obligation, but I am assuming that both states operate within the rules-based order as far as possible.

A treaty (or contract) spread across multiple documents is just as binding as one in a single document. A treaty, once ratified, is enforceable by courts with relevant jurisdiction - these may be specific international courts/tribunals like the International Court of Justice or the Court of Arbitration for Sport or domestic courts in both/either country (treaties detail which). Other answers have pointed out that there is no enforcement mechanism should a nation state choose to ignore such a judgement but there can be serious consequences to that state or its leaders - sanctions, seizure of foreign assets, travel bans etc.

Resale lemon laws

A truck is sought with the express intent of plowing (in RI). A truck, with a plow attached, is offered (in RI). The owner states that to the best of his knowledge, the truck plows and is in good condition. A standard bill of sale is produced for the truck at a cost. (The truck was purchased for $5k, above the cost of small claims.) A verbal agreement is offered that if there are any issues with the truck, it may be returned and the deal may be nulled. A third party was present during the sale, witnessed this, and is able to attest to it. The truck was taken immediately to 2 mechanics, and later a third, for inspection. All three mechanics independently determined: • Front chassis is rusted through. • Nothing can be performed to fix it, aside from purchasing a brand new frame, which is not cost practical. It has only been used for transit to these local mechanics for inspections. The seller has refused all phone conversations. The seller has stated textually that he has no intent to negate the deal, that the truck was inspected by a mechanic of his choice prior to the sale. . Are options available to negate the deal, as the truck remains in the original condition and is not what was originally verbally agreed upon: a truck in working condition without issues capable of plowing and trailering for heavy work use.

"Lemon laws" are about new cars and manufacturing defects. Used vehicles are sold "as is", except that dealers are obligated to offer a 30 or 60 day warranty that the vehicle will continue to function. Using the term "owner" suggests that this is not a dealership sale. Generally speaking, you are out of luck, except for the verbal add-on to the sales agreement. If there is no written agreement, just a verbal contract and exchange of money for truck, you may be able to enforce the contract in regular court. The prospects decrease if there is a written agreement that does not include the money-back guarantee, and become effectively zero if there is a clause that says "This is the whole agreement, the car is sold as-is". Assuming there is no written agreement, then you and perhaps the third party would testify as to the money-back guarantee, the seller would testify that there was no such guarantee (or that you misunderstood what he said), and the court would decide which version of the story is more believable.

Death Tax For Trust

A trust was created in California, US whose settlor was living in Oregon, US when he/she passed. The trust assets have been liquidated and all creditors and medical debts paid. Are there any other financial obligations that need to be met (state, federal, or ortherwise) before the final division and disbursement can take place? Is there any death tax on a trust valued at under 300K that is meant to be divided 3 ways?

The estate tax cutoff is more than $11 million, so there is no estate tax obligation. There is also no state estate or inheritance tax obligation in this case. You indicate that all medical debts have been paid, so I assume that there are no Medicaid liens outstanding. The trust is required to pay state and federal taxes on any income earned during the period when it was not a "grantor" trust for tax purposes (e.g. when it was not revocable, usually all income arising after the death of the person establishing the trust until the trust is fully distributed to the beneficiaries). Whether or not any income was earned depends upon how the trust was managed. It would be common for a trust of that size that was liquidated when the stock market was rising to have enough income to owe some income taxes. The federal tax form involved is form 1041 and there is a counterpart state form (Oregon income taxes, not California income taxes would apply.) These tax forms are generally too difficult for someone who isn't a tax professional to complete. I do my own, but I'm a lawyer with a significant tax component to his practice. So, a professional accountant should be hired to prepare and file the final Form 1041 for the trust from trust assets. The trust may or may not have to actually write a check for taxes due in connection with this form. Often when distributions are made in the same year that income is earned, the tax burden is shifted from the trust to the beneficiaries, who each receive a Form K-1 in connection with their receipt of trust distributions that is part of Form 1041. Certain assets received by a trust are called "income in respect of a decedent" and count as trust income. These assets include a final paycheck of a decedent (usually small, but sometimes including a large bonus or commission or contingent fee payment), and any retirement assets distributed to the trust (such as IRA or 401(k) liquidations). Capital gains taxes are due only to the extent that the sales prices exceed the date of death values. But, if there was substantial appreciation of financial assets from the date of death to the date of liquidation, it wouldn't be unusual for there to be some capital gains taxation due. Another hold up could be the final tax return (Form 1040 and the corresponding Oregon State tax form) of the decedent. This must be filed if any tax is due from the decedent's last year of life, or if any refund is payable from the decedent's last year of life. The tax due would be trust expense and the refund would be a trust asset.

What should a contract contain to protect an employees rights to work on unrelated side projects in their free time

A typical IP clause in an employment contract says that works created "during the course of your employment" belong to your employer. This is essentially echoing the "work for hire" principle in UK employment law. The notion of during the course of your employment looks to be open to interpretation . It seems to mean: while you are on company time but it can also mean: while you are employed to do something of a particular nature for us you can only do it for us. I am explicitly concerned about software development, which falls under copyright law in the UK. Many software developers have several side projects which they want to keep independent from work for their employers. An oft quoted example is that its okay for you to do something completely different like write a novel but not okay for you do something similar to your employer, like say software development. There are many kinds of software development. Some which might overlap with work for an employer and some that might not. Before everything was software this was less recognised but it could still be an issue. Further as many are now in remote / flexible working environments, It is less clear which hours are "employee hours" and which are "company hours" unless someone keeps a very strict logbook (which is desirable and challenging by not impossible). It is also assumed that you would keep your work on an entirely separate computer system from your employers. I have heard of many contracts which unfairly favour the employer, for example: Any rights in Intellectual Property belong to the Company. This will apply whether you make, discover or create Intellectual Property in the course of the duties of your employment, on the Company premises, at home or elsewhere, and whether you carry out the work in the Company’s time or in your own time. This is clearly a red flag which needs to be negotiated if you care about your side projects. If you successfully negotiated away the "or in your own time" clause would evidence of that negotiation be sufficient to demonstrate the intent of the contract as in the employees favour? This example suggests: Products resulting from the Employee’s duties according to the terms of employment – individual or joint, including ideas, software development, inventions, improvements, formulas, designs, modifications, trademarks and any other type of intellectual property are the exclusive property of Employer, no matter if patentable. This does not explicitly mention an employees right to their own side projects. Is it sufficient? Is an extra clause explicitly stating your rights to side projects necessary? Does anyone have an example of contracts that provide some kind of explicit protection for employees own work (perhaps like the CA law) or where this has been negotiated successfully?

Is an extra clause explicitly stating your rights to side projects necessary? No. The samples you provide already contain semantics to limit the scope of the clause to the "duties or terms of the employment". In the first sample clause, the element of " carry[ing] out the work [...] in your own time " is premised on " the course of the duties of your employment ". The clause reflects awareness that the employee might do work in his free time, but only the IP pursuant to the duties of employment becomes employer's IP. The interpretation that " whether you carry out the work in the Company’s time or in your own time " encompasses any and all work regardless of being within the scope of duties of employment is wrong because it purports to treat the conjunctions " and " and " or " as synonyms. This position contravenes the principle formulated in Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §203(a), and which most likely has its equivalent under UK law: " [A]n interpretation which gives a[n] [...] effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part [...] of no effect " (emphasis added). Treating "and" and "or" as synonyms inevitably renders one of these conjunctions without effect. The second clause is more straight-forward because it hardly delves in the alternative circumstances under which an employee might perform work. The clause unequivocally provides that it refers to " [e]mployee's duties according to the terms of employment ". It is important to ensure that other language in the contract does not supersede the rationale developed here, though. For instance, some crafted definition of "course of employment" could lead to a different conclusion, and hence the need to clarify any intended exceptions for side projects.

Destroying a bank by depositing checks

A typical bank branch sees a few people per day. I could deposit thousands of checks a day. It would be physically impossible for the bank to handle. They could implement a policy to handle this but then they are denying that their branch is able to handle it. Is it possible to simply destroy the banking system by depositing large numbers of checks? Is there any legal consequence?

You greatly underestimate the capacity of banks to handle high volumes of transactions. There are many corporate and governmental bank customers that deposit thousands of checks a day. At the peak of tax season, the IRS deposits millions of them per day. Nationwide, about 4,389,000,000 checks are deposited each year and 17,500,000 checks are deposited each day (in the entire U.S.). You would need millions of checks per day to overwhelm a bank. And, while it is not a crime to deposit a check, it is generally a crime to deposit a check written on a cancelled bank account or with insufficient funds. So, unless you have a lot of money to deposit (which people who try crazy schemes like this one usually do not), sooner or later, you will run out and you will start knowingly writing bad checks, which usually is a crime. Banks are free to decide that they will not do business with you as a customer, or will establish special procedures for dealing with you in particular (e.g. assigning you a "personal banker"). They are also free to refuse to, for example, handle deposits of checks under $1, and can enact policies limiting the number of deposits a customer can make per day (most mobile deposit systems already have such limitations). Many bank accounts also charge a fee for each check deposited, so if you deposit 1,000,000 checks per business day, you are going to be paying the bank an immense amount of transaction fees. And, most deposit agreements may be amended prospectively by the bank at any time with notice to you if they find that they want to change its terms. Simply put, as a practical matter, your evil plan to deposit the bank to death won't work. There is no viable way to conduct a sustained "denial of service attack" on a bank by making too many deposits.

Verification of a contract

A university has a contract with the government. Does a university need to confirm the existence of a contract when the third party asks?

If this is a government university in the US, the matter would be controlled by that state's public records law. An example is 42.56 RCW Public Records Act . Generally, you have to make available any public record. In the definitions, that includes any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. which a contract would be an example of. The obligation to make accessible is in 42.56.070, which requires that (1) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (8) of this section, this chapter, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. Thus there are some exceptions to what must be made available. One partial exception is, as that subsection continues that To the extent required to prevent an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy interests protected by this chapter, an agency shall delete identifying details in a manner consistent with this chapter when it makes available or publishes any public record; however, in each case, the justification for the deletion shall be explained fully in writing. hence you can't make a public records request to obtain my address, phone number, SS number and so on. Also as mentioned above, subsection (8) instructs that This chapter shall not be construed as giving authority to any agency...to give, sell or provide access to lists of individuals requested for commercial purposes, and agencies... shall not do so unless specifically authorized or directed by law And there is a sub-exception therein that lists of applicants for professional licenses and of professional licensees shall be made available to those professional associations or educational organizations recognized by their professional licensing or examination board, upon payment of a reasonable charge therefor On the front of personal information, the law indicates more or less what personal information is excluded, in 42.56.050 : (1) Would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public There are quite a number of other exceptions: Records in the medical marijuana authorization database established in RCW 69.51A.230 containing names and other personally identifiable information of qualifying patients and designated providers are exempt from disclosure Actual enumeration data collected under RCW 35.13.260, 35A.14.700, 36.13.030, and chapter 43.62 RCW shall be used and retained only by the office of financial management and only for the purposes of RCW 35.13.260, 35A.14.700, 36.13.030, and chapter 43.62 RCW. The enumeration data collected is confidential, is exempt from public inspection and copying under this chapter, and in accordance with RCW 43.41.435, must be destroyed after it is used. The following investigative, law enforcement, and crime victim information is exempt from public inspection and copying under this chapter: (1) Specific intelligence information and specific investigative records compiled by investigative, law enforcement, and penology agencies, and state agencies vested with the responsibility to discipline members of any profession, the nondisclosure of which is essential to effective law enforcement or for the protection of any person's right to privacy; and especially pertaining to security : The following information relating to security is exempt from disclosure under this chapter: (1) Those portions of records assembled, prepared, or maintained to prevent, mitigate, or respond to criminal terrorist acts, which are acts that significantly disrupt the conduct of government or of the general civilian population of the state or the United States and that manifest an extreme indifference to human life, the public disclosure of which would have a substantial likelihood of threatening public safety, consisting of... (and a lot more). So in Washington (and many similar states), if University of X has a contract with W, that fact is a public record and subject to some degree of disclosure. The actual content might be heavily redacted, pursuant to the numerous exceptions that exist, but the existence of a contract is not subject to suppression. Also, there is no requirement to disclose records for the purpose of commercial exploitation. Federal law might be relevant, if the university were a federal university, but there are none. There are federal military academies, which are not termed "universities", but with an expanded understanding of "university", military academies would be subject to federal law, the Freedom of Information Act . Federal agencies are subject to an analogous obligation to disclose, with exemptions (for example: This section does not apply to matters that are— (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; If any party to the contract is a government agency (state or federal), one can pursue a records request. Consequently, the only university contracts which are entirely exempt from disclosure are those between a private university and a non-governmental party.

Can a developer claim credit / ownership of my software licensed under the MIT License?

A user forked a repository made by me that is licensed by the MIT License. He made a few changes to the code and added the following line to the README.md Made by [HisName]! Contact me at [HisName]#0675 Is that legal?

Providing your copyright notice (if any) and the MIT license has been included, yes.

Is it legal to assume drivers will stop at amber light when it is safe to do so in Ontario?

A vehicle is positioned in a controlled intersection waiting to turn left from a two-way road. The light turns amber, and the driver waits for traffic to legally pass through the intersection. Assuming the rest of the traffic will stop, the vehicle proceeds with the left turn. However, another vehicle proceeds through the "late" amber light and crashes into the vehicle turning left. In Ontario, the Highway Traffic Act states the following: Every driver approaching a traffic control signal showing a circular amber indication and facing the indication shall stop his or her vehicle if he or she can do so safely, otherwise he or she may proceed with caution. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 144 (15) The driver or operator of a vehicle upon a highway before turning to the left or right at any intersection or into a private road or driveway or from one lane for traffic to another lane for traffic or to leave the roadway shall first see that the movement can be made in safety ... R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 142 (1) In a BC ruling, Domil v. Cheung , the supreme court noted the following: [98] In Kokkinis, Madam Justice Newbury said the following about an accident occurring at another busy intersection in Vancouver (at para. 10): …An amber light is not, as the current witticism suggests, a signal to accelerate or to pass traffic that is slowing to a stop. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Esson noted in Uyuyama, in a busy city like Vancouver and at a busy intersection like 25th and Granville, an amber is likely the only time one can complete a left turn. Drivers approaching intersections must expect that this will be occurring. Putting a burden on a left-turning driver to wait until he or she sees that all approaching drivers have stopped would, in my view, bring traffic to a standstill. We should not endorse such a result. [99] Madam Justice Newbury’s observations apply with equal force to the busy intersection of Main Street and King Edward. In this case, the driver "running" the amber light was found to be 100% at fault. I cannot find any similar rulings in Ontario, however. Would a similar ruling be made in Ontario, i.e. are drivers allowed to assume vehicles will stop at an amber light when it is safe to do so, and what rulings have been made on similar scenarios in the past?

I'm not convinced that there is a uniform rule. Usually, liability for a traffic accident is considered in light of the facts as a whole to determine if a driver is negligent. The black letter law cited in the question, which is likely to be identical in all Canadian jurisdictions, is that the driver "may proceed with caution". But, what constitutes appropriate caution could vary based upon visibility, road conditions, traffic speed, the skill of the person driving the car, and any number of other possible conditions. If you know the driver of the other car that would influence a great deal whether you were being cautious or not in making a decision, as would the knowledge of someone who is regularly at that intersection about how others typically behave there.

Do we have to take down the material for 14 days even if the DMCA notice is erroneous?

A very large site and my site are both licensed to use product images created and photographed by the same vendor. Now the large site comes after my site and sends a DMCA notice to my hosting provider, asking us to take down quite some of our most popular products. While it's absolutely a false claim and it's possible that they had no idea we were licensed just as they were, it seems I have to take down the infringing materials and send back a counter-notice and wait for 14 days ? My question is is this fair? 14 days are enough for Google to de-index the page and for it to lose all the ranking juices. Not to mention the sales losses . What if they actually know we are licensed but just wanted to ruin our site rankings and keep coming after us in future? Do we still have to follow the legal procedures to take down whatever products they claim infringing for 14 days? What better options do we have here? Update After I first posted this question, my host restored the allegedly infringing product after 14 days of my providing the counter DMCA notice. Now the same complaint is after us again on another of our popular products. This is really annoying and stupid. How can I end this once and for all? We are not physically in United States, can we still find someone to win the lawsuit for us? Or is there any other way to stop them?

There is a slight confusion here: The large company sent the DMCA notice to your host, not to you. You are not taking down anything. The host does that. If the DMCA takedown notice is following all the rules, then your host has two choices: Take down your content, or be willing to be part of a copyright court case. Assuming that the host doesn't want to go to court and potentially lose tons of money, they will take down your content. Until you send a counter notice. Now you can only legally create a DMCA notice as the copyright holder or their agent. Whoever sends the takedown notice must under threat of perjury declare that they are the copyright holder of material that they believe you are infringing upon. It seems that company is not the copyright holder, therefore perjury. (If they make a mistake, and your material is not their copyrighted material, that's legally Ok. But if they are not copyright holder, that is perjury). If you are sure that happened, a good lawyer will love to take them apart.

UK law: compromising digital material - compelling someone to inform who showed them a naked video

A video depicting a friend, is allegedly circulating at my local pub which is embarrassing and demeaning to them, showing them naked, though not actually engaged in any relational activity. The person who made the video is not currently known. My friend was informed of this video circulation by another person, "Party X", who was shown the video by "Party Y". Party X is not under suspicion, but refuses to tell my friend who Party Y is. It is not necessarily the case the Party Y actually recorded the video, since it may have been sent to Party Y by messenger or other means so further parties may be involved. Under UK law, can Party X be forced to identify Party Y?

england-and-wales There is nothing in the criminal law to compel Party X to identify Party Y in this scenario - they are under no legal obligation to contact the police or anyone else, and a witness summons, for example, cannot be served as there is no trial. That said, one option is for the victim to make a complaint to the police for an alleged offence of what is colloquially referred to as " revenge porn" contrary to s.33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 : (1) It is an offence for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made — (a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and (b) with the intention of causing that individual distress. ... The definitions of "private" and "sexual" may be found at s.35 : (2) A photograph or film is “private” if it shows something that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public. (3) A photograph or film is “sexual” if — (a) it shows all or part of an individual's exposed genitals or pubic area, (b) it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature, or (c) its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual. The police can then ask Party X to either provide a witness statement identifying Party Y or, if Party X is concerned about unwarranted repercussions etc, to provide this information in confidence and their involvement will be protected as Sensitive Material as per para 2.1(9) and 6.14 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice .

Can a corrupt sherriff cause all cases from a department to be dismissed?

A video detailing the incident Victor Hill, the former sheriff of Clayton County, Georgia, was charged with seven counts of willfully depriving detainees at the Clayton County Jail of their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable force by law enforcement officers. Specifically, the grand jury who indicted him alleged that Hill caused the seven victims to be strapped into restraint chairs at the jail without any legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and for a period exceeding that justified by any legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose. The grand jury further alleged that these offenses caused physical pain and resulted in bodily injury to the victims. The trial is already over. On October 26, 2022, a jury convicted Hill on six of the seven counts. As to each of those six guilty counts, the jury further found that the offense caused physical pain and resulted in bodily injury to 6 different victims. It's safe to assume that if leadership at a department is corrupt. Rank & File officers were likely corrupt as well. Can a corrupt sheriff cause all cases from his department to be dismissed while he was in charge?

Can a corrupt sheriff cause all cases from his department to be dismissed while he was in charge? There have been cases of mass dismissals when the corruption by the law enforcement officer involves a pattern and practice of falsification of evidence provided to courts in those cases. One of the most notable such cases was this one : More than 24,000 convictions in 16,449 cases tainted by former state chemist Sonja Farak have been dismissed in a court case brought by the ACLU of Massachusetts, the Committee of Public Counsel Services (CPCS), and law firm Fick & Marx LLP. The new numbers appear in a report issued by a court-designated “Special Master.” . . . For nearly nine years, former state chemist Sonja Farak used drugs that she stole from or manufactured in the Amherst Lab, causing thousands of people to be wrongfully convicted of drug crimes based on unreliable evidence. Since her arrest in 2013, Farak’s lab misconduct has been compounded by prosecutorial misconduct, including by former prosecutors with the Attorney General’s Office who – according to a judge’s findings – intentionally deceived a court and defense lawyers about the massive scope of Farak’s misconduct. In 2017, the ACLU of Massachusetts and CPCS, together with Fick & Marx LLP, called for dismissal of every case tainted by Farak and subsequent years of prosecutorial misconduct. In April 2018, the Supreme Judicial Court ordered that thousands of convictions be dismissed. But, misconduct in how detainees are treated in jail does not go to the guilt or innocence of those defendants and therefore would not usually lead to mass dismissals. A prosecutor could decide on a non-legal basis that a defendant has suffered enough from mistreatment in jail and dismiss the charges, and sometimes this is done on an isolated basis. But, mistreatment of detainees would rarely if ever be a basis for a mass dismissal of charges and would be in the sole discretion of the prosecutor as an exercise of discretion not compelled or suggested by any legal requirement.

Legality of the shooting of a gorilla at the Cincinnati Zoo

A video has been all over the internet today. It shows a gorilla at the Cincinnati Zoo in contact with a 4 year old child who had fallen into the enclosure. The gorilla was shot and killed. The gorilla in question was considered " critically endangered " but the Endangered Species Act does not apply if the death of the animal in question was a result of self-defense. That being said, the gorilla was treating the boy in approximately the same way it would one of its own children and it was unlikely that the boy would have been seriously injured. Given that and the fact that there were probably several other ways for the child to have been rescued which would not have involved the death of the gorilla, is there a legal basis for charges to be brought up against the responsible party or could they reasonably argue that it fell under defense?

The relevant (criminal) defence is Sec 11(b)(3) [the Civil defence in Sec 11(a)(iii) is an easier one]: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defence to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species. I would say that the defendant could easily demonstrate a "good faith belief that he was acting to ... any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species." Even if there were other ways to rescue the child other than lethal force to the gorilla they all would have necessitated exposing the child to a longer period of danger, exposing another person to danger or may have had less predictable outcomes (e.g. tranquilisers have an onset time) all of which would be unconscionable.

Can Police legally search inside apartment residences for a suspect without a warrant and without consent?

A video of the incident. Timestamped to when they begin surrounding the apartment for brevity. Jan 4th 2022 The Miami Police department was searching for 2 suspects involved with grand theft auto and credit card theft. They find one and believed they chased the other into a small apartment complex. Police surround the complex and proceed to knock on doors, ordering the residents out of their apartments to search for the suspect. They later find the suspect walking around outside. Can Police lawfully order all the residents out of their apartments in search of the remaining suspect or would anyone resistant to these orders be in their legal right to deny the order?

The Supreme Court has ruled that warrentless searches may be made under certain defined exigent circumstances which include imminent danger to the public, imminent destruction of evidence, immense escape of a suspect, or in the case of rendering emergency aid. These do not violate the 4th amendment protections under the Constitution, because the probable cause for a warrant clearly exists, however the warrant process will significantly delay the appropriate response. In such circumstances, any evidence in plain view can be seized and they would not be permitted to search areas where no reasonable person would think to look for them (so if they came in looking for a fleeing suspect, they could not search your closed sock drawer). While OP did say the complex was small, they didn't specify how many units were accessed in this way, but I would gather that they visually checked only the ones they beleived that the suspect could have entered. This would qualify as exigent circumstances at the time, as the suspect could potentially be armed, forcing residents to let him in under threats of violence, or lawfully reside in the complex, which presents an imminent threat to public safety AND is a suspect who police are actively pursuing. The fact that the police were wrong does not change the math because this is based on facts available at the time. On could even argue that the suspect became aware of the door to door search, at which point, he fled his hiding spot in the complex, which lead to his arrest.

Are there any restrictions on "Open Access" material?

A video on Wikipedia claims that Open Access articles come with "full reuse rights" (sections 0:04 and 5:38 ). Are Open Access articles as open as public domain works? Is the definition of the rights of Open Access articles equivalent to that of the Public Domain ? Would the implementation (e.g. manner of distribution) be a factor?

Is an article licensed under an Open Access license equivalent to a public domain work? No. Intellectual property practitioners and professors often describe copyright as "a bundle of sticks." This means that intellectual property laws grant the creator of a copyrightable work a large number of rights, and the creator can grant or deny others each of those rights individually. So, for instance, an author can grant a publisher the right to publish his or her book in one country, but not in another, or to copy it verbatim but not to alter it. The purpose of a license, any license, is to specify which of those rights pass to the licensee (the end user) and which stay with the licensor (the creator). This is true of creative commons just as it is for any other license. For example, many open access publishers publish under the Creative Commons CC-BY journal. This is an attribution license; it requires as a term of the license that you give credit to the original creator. This is something you would not have to do with a public domain work. In addition, under CC-BY, you have to include a copy of the license with each copy you distribute, and you cannot add your own copy protection to any copies you distribute. Again, these sort of restrictions do not apply to a public domain work. In short: the purpose of a license--any license--is to define the ways in which you can, or can not, use the licensed materials. Any license that contains any provisions restricting the licensee's use is going to be more restrictive, by definition, than the use of something in the public domain.

Is it illegal for websites to host children fighting with the purpose of humiliation

A video recently came to my attention that involved two children ages approximately 5,and 6, or so and the video consisted of the boy and girl wrestling - but not in a fair competition, but to humiliate the little boy. He was called a sissy and similar derogatory terms, and it was posted on a website that hosts some adult/pornographic content as well as discussion groups/forums. There was no question about the intent of the video because the voice-overs flat out said it was to show the little boy what a worthless sissy he was. Obviously, this can be emotionally dangerous to a first or even second grade child who is just realizing the reality of societal definitions of masculinity/femininity. And I have another aspect to consider. What can happen legally to the promoters/parents for promoting and distributing on the internet

In the US, derogatory speech is protected under the First Amendment. There have been a number of attempts to limit internet speech that is deemed to be "harmful to minors" which have not been successful, and at that the laws have based the characterization of harm as "being obscene" pursuant to the Miller test . Moreover the law were limited to commercial dissemination to children, whereas your scenario is about children. It is possible that a parent of a participant would get into child-welfare type legal trouble for encouraging their child to assault another child, but that would not include encouraging a child to use unkind words against another child.

Illegal worker definition

A visitor to the UK stays with a UK citizen, offers cleaning services in exchange for room & board. Would a work visa be required for this? Thank you

The appendix to immigration rule for visitors V4.5-6 lists prohibited activities. One of the first prohibitions (f) is against providing goods or services, with a note that there is a set of permitted exceptions. The more generic page on standard visitors states that you can't do paid or unpaid work. Appendix 3 of the rules page says what is allowed, which includes such things as scientists "gather(ing) information and facts for a specific project which directly relates to their employment overseas", but does not include "working as household help in exchange for room and board". There are provisions for domestic workers to accompany an employer, which would not be applicable. In light of these restrictions on trading services for something of value (i.e. payment), I would conclude that the activity is prohibited.

Volunteer Created Work: Who Owns the Copyright?

A volunteer creates many works for a nonprofit, without signing anything or giving ownership of the works to the nonprofit . The work is used, but after about a year, the volunteer resigns and, a month after the resignation, demands the nonprofit cease and desist all use of his/her intellectual property. This includes the logo, website, photos, documents, videos and artwork. Must the nonprofit comply with the former volunteer's demand? Because the volunteer was not an employee, the copyright laws don't apply and copyright falls, by default, to the volunteer, however, if the nonprofit has been using the material for some time, does that constitute a gift to the nonprofit, in some way?

The volunteer owns the copyright However, does the non-profit have a licence and on what terms? The volunteer has allowed the non-profit to use the material royalty-free for a period of time so there is clearly a licence. A court would try to determine what the party’s intentions were when that licence was granted. On the facts, it’s possible that a court would rule that the licence was perpetual so the non-profit can continue to use it. It’s also possible that it could rule the licence is revocable in which case they couldn’t. The non-profit can continue to use it, get sued, and find out. Or, they can try to strike a deal with the ex-volunteer.

Evidence found during police search of incorrect address listed on search warrant

A warehouse is a single structure with several divided units separated by concrete walls. These units have different sequential addresses; 1000 Fake St (unit A) 1001 Fake St (unit B) 1002 Fake St (unit C) 1003 Fake St (unit D) Lets say a person is selling marijuana from unit C. Police get a search warrant for unit C but mistakenly enter the wrong one (unit B). Inside of unit B, Police find 1 lb of marijuana. Can this evidence be used against the suspect who is listed as the renter/owner of unit c? Can the renter/owner of unit b, be charged for the marijuana? Is this evidence even admissible in court? In a situation where a judge doesn't allow the submission of this evidence in any case. Can the rightful owner of the marijuana ask for it to be returned even thou it is illegal in the state?

Here is an excellent (and extensive) explanation of jurisprudence regarding the "good faith exception" to the admissibility of evidence found due to an error. In short: Yes, the contraband found in Unit B would be evidence admissible in court. (Of course, evidence found in Unit B would only support charges against whomever had a nexus to that property. If the owner of Unit C had no access to Unit B, then evidence in Unit B would not per se implicate him in a crime.) Law enforcement will not return seized property if it believes the property is "contraband." As an example, in Pennsylvania a person can petition a court for return of property seized by law enforcement: Rule 588 requires the petitioner to establish entitlement to lawful possession of the property, but the motion will be rejected if the State successfully argues that the property is contraband, or "derivative contraband" (which has been defined in case law to mean there is "a specific nexus between the property and criminal activity").

What is the legal status of "warrant canaries"?

A warrant canary is a repeated claim by an individual or organization that they have not been served any warrants with an attached gag order. The idea is that you can say whatever you like if you have not been served such a warrant, but if you are ever served a warrant you simply stop publishing your warrant canary. Attentive listeners or readers would infer that you have been served a warrant, contrary to the intent of the gag order. The EFF gives an overview of these warrant canaries here: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/warrant-canary-faq What legal theories would support or harm the case of anyone attempting this technique?

The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.

Can a police officer, under these circumstances, enforce the following arrest warrant out of Jurisdiction?

A warrant is issued for the arrest of Jimmy Jones for crimes committed in Springfield County. Officer Bob is an officer with the Shelbyville Police Department, a city in Simpson County near the boarder of Springfield County. Officer Bob knows that Mr. Jones is hiding in Springfield County and that it is time critical such that Officer Bob cannot contact proper authorities. No crime described in the warrant occurred in Simpson County. Can Officer Bob enforce this warrant in Springfield as an officer of Shelbyville PD? The correct answer should be able to show specific case law. Jurisdiction: Fictional U.S. State (AKA I'm not looking for a specific state law but a federal law ruling.).

Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.

Does a website owner (data controller) have to disclose its data processors in its privacy policy?

A website owner is data controller. Most website owners are using web hosting companies, i.e. data processors. Each website owner must have a GDPR compliant privacy policy. Must each website owner disclose which data processors are being used? Must each website owner list in its privacy policy which hosting provider is in use and where data is located?

No. Art. 13 and Art. 14 lists the information to be provided to the data subjects. No information about the data processor needs to be provided. However, the data controller must disclose its data processors to the supervisory authority when requested . But there are specific situations where the data processor must be disclosed to the data subject, for example to request consent as specified in Art. 49(1)(a) .