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GDPR: Storing consent for non-personal data cookie

According to GDPR you need to store information about consent given to using cookies. We don't process any personal data, but we place an analytic cookie (to recognize returning visitors) so we need to ask for the consent. Do we have to store this consent? We don't process any personal data so we don't need privacy policy, only cookie policy explaining that we place an analytics cookie. But storing this consent, requires us to store user identifiable information about the consent: user (IP), date, consent version etc. So, to have non-personal data cookie, we need to create privacy policy for recording information about user who agreed to that non-personal cookie?

Cookies are information stored on the end users device and require consent¹ per the ePrivacy directive, even if the cookies or similar technologies don't contain personal data. Conditions for consent are defined by the GDPR. This was also confirmed by the "Planet49" case. 1. consent is required unless the storage of or access to information on the end users device is either strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, or necessary for technical reasons. E.g. functional cookies like a shopping cart feature in a web shop are fine, as are cookies used solely for security purposes or technical features like TLS session resumption. It is however likely that this cookie does qualify as personal data in the sense of the GDPR. The cookie contains an ID that lets you single out/distinguish this user from all other users, even though that ID doesn't link the user to a real-world identity. It is also possible to argue that the cookie is entirely anonymous, but the safer approach is to treat it as personal data. Similarly, other features of the website necessarily involve the processing of personal data, such as processing the user's IP address, if only for the purpose of responding to their HTTP requests. The GDPR's criteria for valid consent are mainly about ensuring that the consent is a freely given unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes. For example, consent can never be the default, it needs to be an opt-in. However, Art 7(1) GDPR says that the data controller has the burden of proof of showing that valid consent was given. The GDPR itself does not provide further guidance on what this means specifically. I would argue that it can be decomposed into two aspects: Showing that valid consent was given. The manner in which you ask for consent must enable a free choice, and must respect that "no consent" is the default. For example, you could archive screenshots of the cookie management flow to show that there is a free choice. You could archive the frontend software so that it can be demonstrated that the cookie is not set until consent is given. Showing that this user gave consent. There is a wide variety of opinions on how to do that. My personal opinion is that the existence of a cookie paired with a valid consent flow to set that cookie demonstrates that the cookie can only have been set in a valid manner. However, there are consent management solutions that provide additional insight, such as the user's entire history of giving and revoking consent. For example, the user's browser might generate a pseudonymous ID enabling that user's consent history to be stored on some server. Indeed, that would be personal data, and this would have to be disclosed transparently. It would not be valid to use the consent management information for other purposes, for example by using the consent management ID for analytics purposes. Storing the user's consent history is definitely appropriate if you have a concept of identity, such as for signed-in users. I have doubts whether this is also helpful on websites that don't have user accounts, and I have not heard of a case where the existence of such records made a difference. After all, such records can only be relevant if the user gave consent but later disputes this in a complaint with a DPA or in a lawsuit. Which approach to choose will depend on more specific guidance provided by your country's data protection authority, and on the risk balance appropriate for your business. After all, the purpose of such compliance work is not to be 100% safe from lawsuits, but to reduce risks from enforcement/litigation to acceptable levels. What is acceptable is ultimately a business decision. E.g. the only 100% safe way to do web analytics is to have no analytics at all, but that is not acceptable for most businesses.

What does 'Right to Erasure' actually cover?

According to GDPR, any person has ' Right to Erasure ( Recital )' and have his/hers sensitive information deleted. Does that mean that an organization can keep all non-sensitive data for a user? For an example, if there is a Database record: Phone| Option| Actived| Deactivated| ... (555)-123-4567| A| 2017-04-12| 2018-01-10| ... If all sensitive information is deleted and information is reduced, such as: Phone| Option| Actived| Deactivated| ... (XXX)-XXX-XXXX| A| 2017| 2018| ... This process of hiding users data is considered anonymization and as such should not be applicable . On the other hand, this approach will ensure that information about users who had option A activated last year will be kept without storing the users personal information. However, by matching multiple sources, someone COULD potentially still find out what this number was. Does this mean that reasonable effort was put into securing the users sensitive data or does 'Right to Erasure' mean just that, delete everything about that user? That seems like it would seriously harm a lot of organization analytic.

You did read the exceptions? (3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that processing is necessary: d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) in so far as the right referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing; or e) for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.

What is a "significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disorder" for the purpose of firearm disqualification in Hawaii?

According to Hawaii Statutes §134-7 (3) (my emphasis), no person who Is or has been diagnosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders as defined by the most current diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association or for treatment for organic brain syndromes; shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition therefor, unless the person has been medically documented to be no longer adversely affected by the addiction, abuse, dependence, mental disease, disorder, or defect. Standard canons of interpretation provide that there are no superfluous words in statutes, so presumably the legislature intended to divide people with "behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders" into two groups - one whose diagnoses were "significant", and the other whose diagnoses were "insignificant". What is this distinction? That is, what are the criteria that distinguish someone with a "significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disorder" from one who has a diagnosis that is insignificant ? I did find a formal definition of "serious" (not significant ) mental illness at Hawaii Statute §431M-1 , "Serious mental illness" means a mental disorder consisting of at least one of the following: schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder, bipolar types I and II, obsessive compulsive disorder, dissociative disorder, delusional disorder, and major depression, as defined in the most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association and which is of sufficient severity to result in substantial interference with the activities of daily living. This definition clearly countenances the existence of persons with "non-serious" mental illnesses, but I am not convinced that this is the intended definition for state firearms prohibition, both because of the different qualifying adjective ("serious" versus "significant") and because this statute falls under a different title (Insurance). I also considered that there might be administrative guidance as to the meaning of this term. I found a firearms permit questionnaire from the Honolulu Police department, but it simply asks, Have you ever been diagnosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disorder? without providing any guidance as to what is meant or what criteria the applicant should use to determine significance, or even whether the applicant should apply legal or clinical factors. I can think of all sorts of possibilities for how one could reasonably interpret the clause: This refers only to people whose disorder is so significant that they have been declared legally incapacitated and placed under guardianship. This ties in with eligibility for certain disability benefits such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). If the person doesn't receive any of these benefits, and/or has been found to be ineligible for them due to insignificance of their illness, they are not ineligible under this clause. This applies only if a person has been specifically advised by a health care practitioner that the person is too ill to safely use a firearm. There is an administrative agency, such as the Department of Health, that formally and individually evaluates persons with diagnosed behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders in order to determine if their conditions are "significant" enough to trigger firearm ineligibility. If someone has gone through this process and received a determination of Insignificance, they can be confident that they are not covered by this law, can answer "no" on application forms, etc. There is an official list of "significant" diagnoses, and all other diagnoses are considered "insignificant". The individual makes their own determination - the statute is not intended to apply penalties, but rather to provide gentle guidance to persons with disabilities to not engage in activities that they are not able to handle, the same way that a person with uncontrolled diabetes might be discouraged from entering a speed cake-eating competition. All diagnoses are initially deemed "significant", but the "no longer adversely affected" clause allows a health care practitioner to certify that a person can safely use a firearm despite their diagnosis (even though, at first glance, it appears to apply only in cases where the illness is no longer present at all ). This question is not a debate thread on gun control or disability rights. If this clause has been ruled void or unenforceable (e.g. unconstitutional, void for vagueness, etc.) but remains in the statute book for historical reasons, that's an answer.

It is, practically speaking, impossible for a layman to know whether a given situation constitutes a significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disorder. Instead, a technical expert would make that determination. So most of the question isn't legal, it's psyychiatric. There is a book that spells this out ( Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5) ), which is the current standard (updated from DSM-4). This article discusses some of the differences, if that helps. W.r.t. DSM-4, the authors note that the phrase “clinically significant” is in some ways tautological here; its definition is precisely what is at stake when defining a mental disorder. The legal stance that the Hawaii legislature took is that they don't get into the business of defining "significant" as opposed to "insignificant", they defer to the professional organization. In a legal proceeding, if there is a professional difference of opinion, the two sides would testify as to the defining criteria in DSM-5 and the facts that the experts have observed about the individual. However, on the face of it, it is simple. Have you been officially diagnosed with a significant mental disorder. If no, you can buy a gun, if yes, you may not buy a gun.

Do nonimmigrant aliens in the US accrue unlawful presence while imprisoned?

According to INA 212(a)(9)(B) , an alien who is unlawfully present for more than 180 days during a single stay in the US, and then departs the US, is banned from the US for 3 years. If they were unlawfully present for more than 1 year during a single stay and then departed the US, they are banned for 10 years. According to INA 212(a)(2) and INA 237(a)(2) , conviction of certain crimes renders an alien inadmissible or deportable. However, there is no general rule that aliens who have been convicted of felonies are deportable or inadmissible. It depends on the specific type of crime. For example, DUI can sometimes be a felony, but is generally not a crime involving moral turpitude unless there are aggravating circumstances. Thus, an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence may be convicted of certain crimes such as DUI and may potentially be imprisoned for over a year without facing any immigration consequences. However, if the alien is a nonimmigrant, their status may expire while they are in prison. This would seem to cause them to become unlawfully present, potentially for a long period of time. Being incarcerated, they could not depart the US in order to stop the accrual of unlawful presence. They also most likely wouldn't have any basis to apply for an immigration benefit that would help them maintain their status. Upon release, they might be deported, but there's no guarantee of that happening; they might also leave the US voluntarily. I wonder if they would then be subject to a 3- or 10-year bar on account of their unlawful presence while being unable to leave?

I looked at the rules for unlawful presence in both USCIS's Adjudicator's Field Manual chapter 40.9.2 (although the parts of this regarding people in F/J/M status accruing unlawful presence while out of status is blocked by the courts, so this guidance reflects the rules actually in effect, though this distinction is not relevant for this question) and the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual 9 FAM 302.11-3 , and neither place mentions any exceptions for people who are imprisoned. So my guess is that, yes, a nonimmigrant who is imprisoned, for which no other exception applies, does start accruing unlawful presence if their I-94 expires while in prison.

What are the limits on the president's power to remove nonimmigrants using INA 221(i) and INA 237(a)(1)(B)?

According to INA 221(i) (8 USC 1201(i)): After the issuance of a visa or other documentation to any alien, the consular officer or the Secretary of State may at any time, in his discretion, revoke such visa or other documentation. ... In addition, INA 237(a)(1)(B) (8 USC 1227(a)(1)(B)) provides that: Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any other law of the United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation authorizing admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked under section 1201(i) of this title, is deportable. Read together, these two provisions of law seem to suggest that most nonimmigrants can be deported for almost any reason: the President can identify some class of nonimmigrants and order the Secretary of State to revoke the visas of all such nonimmigrants based on almost any justification; all such individuals can then be placed in removal proceedings; and almost all of them would be ordered removed (the main options that I'm aware of to avoid removal are to make an asylum claim or to marry a US citizen and apply to the immigration judge for adjustment of status). It seems hard to believe that Congress intended to grant the executive branch such expansive powers. What, if any, are the limits on this scheme?

The first limitation is that the president cannot revoke a visa, and cannot literally compel the Secretary of State to do so. The Sec'y must decide whether to comply with the order. The second limitation is that as that paragraph states, There shall be no means of judicial review (including review pursuant to section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title) of a revocation under this subsection, except in the context of a removal proceeding if such revocation provides the sole ground for removal under section 1227(a)(1)(B) of this title . In such case, the courts may review whether the revocation is legal,that is is consistent with the totality of applicable law. Apart from being consistent with the wording of the statute passed by Congress, this includes consistency with constitutional requirements, federal regulation, and law as constructed by judicial interpretation. Revocation is addressed regulatorily at 22 CFR § 41.122 . There are various classes that are statutorily and/or constitutionally protected, for example race and religion are not allowed classes of immigrants subject to visa-revocation. In Wong v. DOS , 789 F.2d 1380, plaintiff was granted a visa which was later revoked on illegal grounds, that dependent were not physically present within the consular district, which is not a permissible grounds under 22 CFR 41.134(a). This relates to 8 USC 1182 , which enumerates lawful reasons for deeming an alien inadmissible (health, criminality, government officials committing particularly severe violations of religious freedom, etc.). In this case, a consular officer revoked the visa and the court found that the revocation was illegal under existing regulations. On the other hand, in the case Noh v. INS , 248 F.3d 938, plaintiff's visa was revoked by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services (DOS). The court found that the Deputy Assistant Sec'y was not acting as a consular officer so was not subject to those rules. In a lower court review, the Board of Immigration Appeals refused to hear the appeal because Our jurisdiction does not include review of a State Department official's decision regarding the issuance or revocation of visas, which is within the domain of the Department of State The federal appeals court agrees. Plaintiff also claims that revocation was based on "no facially legitimate reason whatsoever". The court did not reach the question of whether a literally arbitrary basis would subject the decision to judicial review, since "the Secretary offered a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for revoking Noh's visa", namely that it had been obtained illegally. This follows from the holding of Kleindienst v. Mandel , 408 U.S. 753 that In the exercise of Congress' plenary power to exclude aliens or prescribe the conditions for their entry into this country, Congress in § 212(a)(28) of the Act has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive Branch. When, as in this case, the Attorney General decides for a legitimate and bona fide reason not to waive the statutory exclusion of an alien, courts will not look behind his decision or weigh it against the First Amendment interests of those who would personally communicate with the alien. where again the decision was based on a lawful grounds for exclusion. This decision confirms that Congress has delegated powers to the executive branch (Congress can also undo or limit that delegation, if it decides). While the cases can be distinguished in terms of whether the action is a refusal to issue vs. a revocation of a visa, nothing in the statutes or case law suggests that such a difference would result in more stringent guidelines for revocation. There is no case law that addresses the situation where the Sec'y of State or person to whom power has been delegated provides no grounds whatsoever. The question of "Congressional intent" would not underlie a successful appeal. On occasion, the courts make decisions based on findings of "Congressional intent", but only in case the wording of a law is unclear and the courts have to decide what the words mean. In this case, there is no unclarity in what Congress said, and the courts do not usurp the power of Congress to pass constitutionally-valid laws.

Is it illegal to listen to Air Traffic Control transmissions in the UK?

According to Is it illegal for Joe Public to listen to ATC in the UK? over on Aviation.SE, although aviation transmissions are broadcast publicly, in the clear, unencrypted; it is illegal to listen to them live on a scanner or such. What law prohibits this? I believe it dates to WWII fears of spies. I also believe the UK is the only country with such a law. You can freely listen to New York's JFK or Amsterdam Schiphol's ATC without a problem. Has anybody been successfully prosecuted under this law?

The Radiocommunications Agency (now OFCOM) issued some guidance about this in 2001. The specific offence is defined by s5 Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 : Any person who ... uses any wireless telegraphy apparatus with intent to obtain information as to the contents, sender or addressee of any message (whether sent by means of wireless telegraphy or not) of which neither the person using the apparatus nor a person on whose behalf he is acting is an intended recipient ... shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. It's also an offence under s5(1)(b)(ii) to disclose the contents of any such message, so the reception and disclosure of radio messages not sent by or addressed to you are both offences. I don't know if there have been any successful prosecutions specifically for monitoring aircraft communications. I doubt whether a hobbyist listening for his own enjoyment would attract the attention of the authorities, but if he started to publish recordings of the traffic then that might well do it.

What are perfected grounds of appeal?

According to Julian Assange 's anti extradition campaign, in late August his lawyers had filed their "perfected grounds of appeal". Just what does it mean for the grounds to be perfected?

Julian Assange's current litigation is an appeal to the High Court, pursuant to section 108 of the Extradition Act 2003 , against the Home Secretary's extradition order of 17 June 2022. The procedure for extradition appeals to the High Court is set out in section 3 of Part 50 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 . Rule 50.20 requires Assange to apply for leave to appeal by filing an appeal notice which identifies his grounds of appeal. There is also a requirement to file skeleton arguments under Practice Direction 50E in Division XI of the Criminal Practice Directions 2015 . Rule 50.30 provides for an extradition appeal to be determined in appropriate cases by a divisional court . That is what happened in the last appeal, United States of America v Assange [2021] EWHC 3313 (Admin) . The " specialist court within the King's Bench Division of the High Court" which determined that case is known as the Administrative Court . The Administrative Court is quite similar to the Court of Appeal and its senior members sit on both courts . The last appeal was determined by the Lord Chief Justice and a Lord Justice of Appeal. So, it would not be surprising if the orders made for case management of this Administrative Court proceeding adopted the practice of the Court of Appeal. The practice of "perfection of grounds of appeal" is described in section A8 of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division Guide to Commencing Proceedings (July 2021). In that jurisdiction, perfected grounds "consist of a fresh document which supersedes the original grounds of appeal and contains inter alia references by page number and letter (or paragraph number) to all relevant passages in the transcript," which may not be available when the grounds are first prepared. Practice Direction 50A emphasises the importance of expedition in extradition appeals, especially "where the issues are such that further information from the requesting authority or state is needed." It is likely that the case management orders made in Assange's appeal allowed him to file some initial grounds of appeal and later "perfect" them, possibly after receiving documents that were not available when the grounds were first lodged, or a grant of leave to appeal. This accords with the normal use of the verb "to perfect" in legal contexts (eg. the perfection of a judgment or security interest), which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as: To complete or finish successfully; to carry through, accomplish. In early use also: † to bring to fulfilment or full development ( obsolete ). Now chiefly Law and Finance .

Is there a definition of "biological sex" in U.S. law?

According to MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT / SUBJECT: Military Service by Transgender Individuals : • Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration's policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria. • Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service. • Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex . (emphasis mine) So this seems to rely heavily on one's biological sex, but a US legal definition of biological sex is not something that's easy to find online . Is there one at all? If so, what's the text?

I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.

Do the laws of mathematics apply in Australia?

According to Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister of Australia "The laws of mathematics are very commendable, but the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia" . My question is, is this true? For example, in the US, Benford's law , a law of mathematics, can be used as evidence in a court of law . More examples of laws of mathematics being used in court can be found here . My question is then, can the laws of mathematics be used in Australia? For example, could Benford's law be used in Australian court, or would be thrown out, seeing as the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia? What about other sciences?

A law - generally - is a piece of legislation passed by a state, or in common law systems, may also be the principles that are stated within decisions by courts. Your question seems to interpret a "law" of mathematics as a law in the legal sense. However, despite the word "law" being used in both contexts, they refer to different things. A law in maths (if there are such things) refers to some sort of logical "truth" that is immutable if certain axioms are followed. We are clearly not talking about the same kind of "law". Sure, mathematic principles may be brought up in the evidence of an expert witness, say with regards to the mathematical likelihood of an event happening. But rest assured such evidence is not law. Law isn't something you bring to court as evidence.

What constitutes having a history of violent behavior against the person or another according to Maryland firearms law?

According to Maryland statutes, Title 5, Subtitle 2, § 5-205 (b) (6) (my emphasis), someone who suffers from a mental disorder as defined in § 10-101(i)(2) of the Health - General Article and has a history of violent behavior against the person or another ; is disqualified from possessing a "rifle or shotgun". How is having a "history" of violent behavior defined? More specifically, is this based on clinical factors specifically related to violence as a symptom of the person's mental disorder (meaning that whether any person is disqualified can be determined by reviewing medical records), or is it a practical definition, evaluating the behavior of the person independent of any specific legal or medical findings of violence or risks of violence? One might argue that having a "history of violent behavior" means having a conviction for such behavior, but the statute in question already provides for several ways of disqualifying a person as a result of past criminal convictions, implying that this is intended to be interpreted separately - i.e. that a person might have a "history" of violent behavior despite never having been formally convicted of any of it. I already checked 10-101(i)(2) and it does define "mental disorder", but not a "history of violent behavior" associated with such a disorder. Most of the other disqualifying criteria in the statute are more specifically defined - for example, one of the other factors is being (my emphasis) "a habitual drunkard as defined in § 5-101 of this title " rather than "a habitual drunkard". That definition itself is conviction-based - that is, just drinking a lot, or even "problem" drinking is not enough to trigger firearms disqualification - one must fulfill the very specific criteria for quantity and recency of alcohol-related convictions. Title 5, Subtitle 2, § 5-205 (e) provides a means of seeking relief for a disqualification under (b) (6), but I'm asking about the criteria that triggers the disqualification itself . That is, it appears that there are two categories of people with mental disorders here: Persons with history of violence (but no disqualifying convictions for such violence), who must petition for relief under § 5-205 (e). Persons without a history of violence, who need not seek relief under § 5-205 (e) because they were never banned from possession in the first place. The question, then, is what distinguishes these two populations. Is it bare facts of the past? Is it based on formal adjudications of violence not rising to the level of a criminal conviction (e.g. lawsuits, school discipline, etc.)? A formal clinical determination by the diagnosing clinician? A determination made by a special state behavioral specialist? The process for petitioning for relief also requires ( Title 5, Subtitle 1, § 5-133.3 (d) (1) ) that one disclose "a complete and accurate statement explaining the reason why the applicant is prohibited....", meaning that this procedure would appear to be useless for determining whether a person is currently disqualified. That is, someone who doesn't know whether they have a disqualifying "history of violent behavior" can't at the same time disclose this history.

Mental disorder is defined in the referenced section as follows: (i)(1) “Mental disorder” means a behavioral or emotional illness that results from a psychiatric disorder. (2) “Mental disorder” includes a mental illness that so substantially impairs the mental or emotional functioning of an individual as to make care or treatment necessary or advisable for the welfare of the individual or for the safety of the person or property of another. (3) “Mental disorder” does not include an intellectual disability. There are about two dozen cases in Maryland interpreting the statute, but none of them that I could locate in a cursory search addressed the subsection in question. Maryland does, in a case involve a question of capacity to consent in a rape case, distinguish between the definition of "mental disorder" used in the firearms statute which calls for expert testimony to establish (not necessarily in advance of the determination), and the question of incapacity to consent for purposes of sexual assault crimes, which does not. Fuentes v. State , 164 A.3d 265, 275 (Md. 2017). I believe that you have accurately identified the two categories of people with mental disorders who are not subject to other subsections of the law (e.g. those with a prior involuntary commitment or a prior insanity plea). it appears that there are two categories of people with mental disorders here: Persons with history of violence (but no disqualifying convictions for such violence), who must petition for relief under § 5-205 (e). Persons without a history of violence, who need not seek relief under § 5-205 (e) because they were never banned from possession in the first place. This brings us to your question. The question, then, is what distinguishes these two populations. Is it bare facts of the past? Is it based on formal adjudications of violence not rising to the level of a criminal conviction (e.g. lawsuits, school discipline, etc.)? A formal clinical determination by the diagnosing clinician? A determination made by a special state behavioral specialist? A fair reading of the statute and case law suggests that a clinical determination by someone must be made that the individual has a "mental disorder", and that if the person does have a "mental disorder", then the bare facts of a prior act of harming himself or herself, or harming another, violently, without regard to any formal adjudication, is disqualifying. Usually, when a statute contains a relatively unspecific term, called a "standard" as opposed to a very specific definition, called a "rule", a higher court reviewing a decision will defer to the finder of fact (i.e. whoever heard or reviewed the evidence and made a determination based upon it). It will affirm that decision if there was any evidence presented which would support the conclusion reached, or which would support a reasonable inference from the evidence that would support the conclusion reached. This is a highly deferential standard of review and assumes that the common sense of a neutral person presented with the evidence is the most accurate way to resolve what a term means in context when the reality of life and the evidence that could be relevant is too messy and varied to codify in detail. In the same vein, most accidental injury cases hinge on the question of whether someone was "negligent" which is given only a very vague definition that does not resolve on a case by case basis whether particular actions were or were not negligent, and leaves open the possibility that exactly the same conduct could be treated differently by different finders of fact, when a case is a close call. The process for petitioning for relief also requires (Title 5, Subtitle 1, § 5-133.3 (d) (1)) that one disclose "a complete and accurate statement explaining the reason why the applicant is prohibited....", meaning that this procedure would appear to be useless for determining whether a person is currently disqualified. That is, someone who doesn't know whether they have a disqualifying "history of violent behavior" can't at the same time disclose this history. I do not believe that a court would find that this is too vague to be enforceable. A "history of violent behavior" has a reasonable understandable plain English meaning, which is what applies in the absence of other considerations. Any past violent or suicidal actions would have to be disclosed. With due respect to Erik Roskes, M.D., he may not be very familiar with the case law of what does and does not constitute a law too vague to be enforceable . The closest precedent is probably Johnson v. United States (U.S. 2015) in which the Supreme Court ruled that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague and a violation of due process where the language applied to crimes that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." The court determined that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague because of the combination of two factors: (1) it focused on the ordinary case of a felony, rather than statutory elements or the nature of the convicted's actions, leaving significant uncertainty about how to assess the risk posed by a crime and (2) the clause does not give an indication of how much risk is necessary to qualify as a violent felony. But, in Johnson the question was whether there was a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another" in an ordinary case involving an offense, which involves two layers of probabilistic analysis, while Maryland Firearms Law § 5-205(b)(6) involves only a determination of whether past conduct of a person with a "mental disorder" was violent towards him or herself, or another person, which is much less abstract. The ordinary meaning of "a history of violent behavior" in this context is merely, "have you engaged in violent behavior in the past", subject to the possible qualifier that it must be at a time when you were suffering from the "mental disorder", many of which that are pertinent to these cases (such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder) usually manifest only in adolescence or later. The fact that a certain level of subjectivity is involved in making a determination does not render it unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

Why is it illegal to annoy someone via electronic communication in Massachusetts?

According to Massachusetts State General Law, Chapter 269, Section 14A, it is illegal to send repeated communications to someone with the intent to annoy the person, punishable be 3 months in a correctional facility and up to $500 in fines. Why would annoyance be illegal only if the communication method is electronic?

Annoyance may be illegal even if it's not done electronically; it just wouldn't be prosecuted under this specific law. Under Chapter 269, § 14A , it is illegal when a person: contacts another person by electronic communication ... for the sole purpose of harassing, annoying or molesting the person or the person’s family. That same law also makes it illegal when a person: contacts a person repeatedly by electronic communication and uses indecent or obscene language to the person. But Massachusetts prohibits annoyance in several other contexts, as well: Chapter 265 § 43 , the anti-stalking statute, deals with engaging in "a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a specific person which seriously alarms or annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress." Chapter 266 § 37E , the identity-theft statute, covers activity that "seriously alarms or annoys such person or persons and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress." Chapter 268 § 13B uses the same language in prohibiting harassment of jurors, witnesses, etc. Chapter 272 § 43 , penalizes "whoever, in or upon a railroad carriage, steamboat or other public conveyance, is disorderly, or disturbs or annoys travelers in or upon the same by profane, obscene or indecent language, or by indecent behavior." Chapter 272 § 53 penalizes "persons who with offensive and disorderly acts or language accost or annoy another person." Note that these kinds of laws are often interpreted very broadly, so even though a law may exist purporting to govern annoyance, it may still be suspect under First Amendment analysis. An somewhat similar annoyance law in New Jersey was just pared back by the Supreme Court there last year.

What is the 'legislature' in international law?

According to Migdals International Law : International law ... has no legislature. Whilst the General Assembly of UN, comprising of delegates from every member country, seems to fit this role, it's rulings are not binding, save for certain organs of the UN, for certain purposes. But at the same time, Migdal says that domestic or national law should be distinguished from international law since the main qualities that obtain in national law do not obtain in international law. Their models are different . But then this poses a problem as to what to call the General Assemby at the UN. It's more than just an assembly of people, they are after representatives of the sovereignties of nations. And whilst their rulings are not binding they do have moral gravity. That the international community regards such an assembly as having worth can be seen in fact that preceding the UN, there was the League of Nations and which can now, in hindsight, be viewed as a preliminary step towards the UN. Q. Has anyone discussed, theoretically speaking, that is philosophically speaking, what the General Assembly, ought to be called - if not a legislature?

The UN General assembly is pretty clearly not a "legislature". That word means a body empowered to make binding laws, which neither the UN as a whole nor the GA is. I have seen the UN as a whole called an "international organization" and an "inter-governmental organization". I have not seen any discussion of the proper term for the GA specifically.

how long can someone be detained in Police and Judicial custody in India?

According to NCRB, about 77% of prisoners in India are undertrials. and CrPc 167 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1687975/ states that the maximum someone can be kept in Judicial custody is 90 days, or 60 days, depending on the gravity. However, it appears from the report that many prisoners are detained beyond this period. According to another forum focused in Indian law , this is due to "charge sheet pending and prosecution requests of accused confronting prosecution witnesses." https://tripakshalitigation.com/difference-between-police-custody-and-judicial-custody/ This says that if a police report is filed then the person can be detained up to a maximum of half the maximum period of imprisonment for the offence. What ? there was a recent post where someone was in pre trial detention for 1.5 years. is this legal ? Edit;; speaking of the legality of this CrPc 438 allows anticipatory bail for someone who has apprehension that they might be arrested on an accusation of a non bailable offence is this possible to apply after a chargeheet or police report has been filed ? edit;; thank you

As per Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the maximum period for an accused to be detained in police custody is 15 days and judicial custody is specified as 90 days subject to the proviso under Explanation I therein, where payment of bail is the condition required to be fulfilled. In addition to this, conditions may be prescribed by the detaining court while providing bail, which may enlarge the period of undertrial detention if left unmet. Undertrial detention Although the prescribed period of detention is a maximum of half of the period of sentence under the law for which he has been accused, the percolation of this to prisoner releases seems to be an implementation issue, which Indian courts have tried resolving by prioritising cases pending for more than 5 years and providing personal bonds; and forming an Under Trial Review Committee . Notably, in Bhim Singh v. Union of India, the court acknowledged the implementational hurdle. direct that jurisdictional Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate/Sessions Judge shall hold one sitting in a week in each jail/prison for two months commencing from 1st October, 2014 for the purposes of effective implementation of 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To answer your doubt regarding anticipatory bail, It is a provision enabling a right to future release to a person even before the person is arrested, regardless of whether " cognizance has been taken or a chargesheet has been filed ".

Can one get information about US federal misdemeanor citations?

According to New Hampshire Public Radio , in June 2019, Officials with U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued tickets to 29 people for alleged immigration violations at a checkpoint on I-93 near Woodstock on Sunday. The violations were for legal visitors to the U.S. who didn’t have appropriate paperwork on them, as required by law, accordign [sic] to the CBP. Will there be any information in the public record concerning these citations? I suspect that they allege violations of 8 USC 1304(e) . Is there any way to confirm that? Nine years ago, an article on the American Immigration Lawyers Association's blog stated that "a search of court records reveals no prosecutions federally for this offense." If the federal government has started trying to enforce that statute after not having done so for some long period of time, it seems like it should be big news.

Yes, but it's expensive. Federal court records -- including misdemeanor citations -- are available through PACER .

Oregon adoption consent and revocability - legal requirements are not required?

According to ORS 109.321 consent to adoption cannot be revoked once 6 conditions are met, one of those being a duly signed and attested Certificate of Irrevocability and Waiver. I recently spoke with someone from the Child Welfare Program in my County, who told me the fact that I didn't sign a Certificate of Irrevocability and Waiver isn't relevant in my case, due to the fact that I signed a consent to entry of stipulated judgement terminating my parental rights. Why does a stipulated judgement mean the requirements in ORS 109.321 do not need to be met, for any consent I signed to be irrevocable?

That law specifies 6 exceptions (ORS 109.323-109.329). A stipulated judgment, which is an agreement to settle a case, itself doesn't mean that, but the circumstances of the agreement, could (if it terminates parental rights).

Is an asylee applicant exempt from buying a health coverage?

According to Obamacare non residents are exempt from mandatory health coverage. Based on the Marketplace regulation : Applicants for asylum are eligible for Marketplace coverage only if they’ve been granted employment authorization or are under the age of 14 and have had an application pending for at least 180 days. So an asylum applicant with a work authorization is eligible to get a Marketplace coverage. That's pretty clear. But is that mandatory? Being eligible doesn't make it mandatory, does it? Is an asylum seeker exempt from buying a health coverage? VERY IMPORTANT: I'm asking about an asylum applicant with a pending case ( not an approved asylee). So, if a person applied for asylum two years ago, and her case is still pending, then is she still exempt from the mandatory health care coverage pursuant to obama care act?

The healthcare insurance requirement is enforced via IRS, and the details are spelled out here . This means, since the documnt is written by the folks that write income tax instructions, that much patience is required to follow all of the conditions that they specify. There is an exemption in case the required coverage costs more than 8% of household income, or, income is below filing threshold. There are many entries in the chart of exemptions here . Potentially applicable would be the large box of residency-based considerations. Most apply to US citizens or permanent residents, but one clause applies to A nonresident alien, including (1) a dual-status alien in the first year of U.S. residency and (2) a nonresident alien or dual-status alien who elects to file a joint return with a U.S. spouse; The word "including" is significant, since it means nonresident aliens, and also dual-status aliens or those who file jointly with a US spouse. (That is, "including" does not mean "limited to just"). Just before that, there is also a provision exempting those Not lawfully present in the U.S.and not a U.S. citizen, or U.S. national (for this purpose, an immigrant with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status is not considered lawfully present and therefore is eligible for this exemption) so under any reasonable interpretation of the terms, an asylum applicant is either not lawfully here, or is and is a non-resident. Also FYI I am not attempting to suggest what the person can or should do, I'm describing the general law, as I understand it, pertaining to the individual mandate. Call a lawyer for actual legal advice.

What does endorse mean?

According to Oxford Languages, sign (a check or bill of exchange) on the back to make it payable to someone other than the stated payee or to accept responsibility for paying it . I'm having trouble understanding the bolded part. "sign (a check or bill of exchange) on the back to make it payable to someone other than the stated payee" is clear. This basically means that if my father is the stated payee on the cheque, and he endorses the cheque using my name, then I will be able to encash the cheque as well. However, what does "to accept responsibility for paying it" mean?

It means if the check bounces, you still have to pay A check is a negotiable instrument which means it can be passed from hand to hand as a promise to pay before eventually being converted to cash. However, if I hold the check from you but it’s originally from someone else, you are promising to pay me irrespective of if the original drawer makes good on their promise to pay you.

Is or isn't it illegal to reveal a/the whistleblower's name?

According to Politico : But [US Senator Rand] Paul told reporters Tuesday he is "more than willing to and probably will at some point" name the whistleblower. "There is no law preventing anybody from saying the name whether you're in the media or you're an elected official," he said. Sergio Gor, a spokesman for Paul, added, "The whistleblower statute protects the accuser from being fired but says nothing about skeptics revealing his name. There is absolutely no statute that prevents anyone, other than the inspector general from releasing the accuser’s name." "There is no law preventing anybody from saying the name whether you're in the media or you're an elected official," he said. So, it is this claim correct, basically, is the whistleblower protected from retribution, but there is no law prohibiting his identity being made public by anyone (except the IG apparently)?

There is actually more than one law covering whistleblowers, so the other answer is only partially correct. According to the NYT , the case in question here is also covered by the Inspector General Act of 1978 Do whistle-blowers have a right to remain anonymous? Only in a limited way. Another part of the Inspector General Act says that agency watchdogs “shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the inspector general determines such disclosure is unavoidable.” In line with that law, the inspector general for the intelligence community, Michael Atkinson, did not include the whistle-blower’s name in his report to the acting director of national intelligence, Joseph Maguire. Mr. Maguire testified last week that he did not know the name of the person [...] But the legal prohibition on disclosing the official’s name applies only to Mr. Atkinson. It does not bar Mr. Trump and his allies from trying to identify him or disclosing his name if they figure it out. (It would be illegal under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act for any official to disclose his name if he is a covert agent, but no one has suggested that he is.) The same information can be found in an OIG FAQ Q: Will OIG reveal employee identities or the fact that they cooperated? A: OIG investigators will respect the confidentiality of Department employees as provided by law. Section 7 of the Inspector General Act states that “[t]he Inspector General shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation.” During the course of some investigations, it may be unavoidable that the identities of individuals involved will become known. However, OIG strives to protect the confidentiality of Department employees who provide OIG with information. In addition, employees should be aware that reprisal against any employee for cooperating with OIG is forbidden by the Inspector General Act and DAO 207-10, Section 4. Further, OIG takes whistleblower protection very seriously and, along with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, investigates alleged reprisals against employees for making protected disclosures to OIG. So Paul's spokesperson seems to be correct.

Does any host provider currently comply with GDPR?

According to Rec.81; Art.28(1)-(3) of the GDPR regulation , "The carrying-out of processing by a processor should be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, binding the processor to the controller" A controller that wishes to appoint a processor must only use processors that guarantee compliance with the GDPR. The controller must appoint the processor in the form of a binding written agreement, which states that the processor must: only act on the controller's documented instructions; impose confidentiality obligations on all personnel who process the relevant data; must ensure the security of the personal data that it processes; abide by the rules regarding appointment of sub-processors; implement measures to assist the controller in complying with the rights of data subjects; assist the controller in obtaining approval from DPAs where required; at the controller's election, either return or destroy the personal data at the end of the relationship (except as required by EU or Member State law); and provide the controller with all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR. I've checked every major host provider there is and none offers such guarantees. So question is, how do I as a controller comply with GDPR if there's no host provider (aka processor) who'll sign a contract addressing all 8 points required by the GDPR? The regulation clearly states that controller is responsible for this.

Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post : If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here . If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps.

Why would I be subject to liability for negligently poking a person's eye out?

According to Restatement of Torts, Second (I've only scratched the surface), to be liable for battery, the actor must have an intent, though the intent might not have been to bring about the specific damaging outcome. Both the harmful and offensive contact varieties of battery require a bad intent: §13 "An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact...", and per §16, "If an act is done with the intention of inflicting upon another an offensive but not a harmful bodily contact...the actor is liable to the other for a battery although the act was not done with the intention of bringing about the resulting bodily harm". §18 Battery: Offensive Contact says more or less the same thing with "offensive" inserted. Furthermore, §18(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1,a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a mere offensive contact with the other's person although the act involves an unresonable risk of inflicting it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm. So, if A throws a dart at a dartboard while B is right next to it, and hits B in the eye, it would seem that this is not battery, and poor B might be out of luck. I think this would be generic negligence, where §281 "The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if: (a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion...". The problem is, the description of the interest in freedom from harmful bodily contact only protects against the interest w.r.t. intentional contact, so where does the protection of that interest come from in terms of unintentional contact. Specifically: is there a general rule that every protection against an intentional invasion of interest entails a protection against unintentional invasion of that interest? (I assume the "duty" is a generic and universal one).

It is generic negligence. In most United States jurisdictions, Negligence is a tort requiring (1) duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) but-for and proximate causation, and (4) harm. In most human interaction, one person has a duty to act as a reasonable person to avoid harming another person. So if you do something a reasonable person would not do, and that causes harm, you can be liable for the resulting harm. The reason for this is that you have the ability to control your activity, and you should be willing to engage in reasonable activities without risking civil liability. Thus it discourages unreasonable behavior if you have to pay for the harm that results from your lack of reasonable care. Because negligence requires breach of duty under a reasonable person standard rather than requiring intent, it necessarily creates a sphere of protection around the invasion of interests recognized by intentional torts that also have harm as an element. However, that sphere of protection does not protect against all unintentional invasions, just against those unintentional invasions which are sufficient to support a case for negligence in a given jurisdiction.

Does Canadian law differ from US law concerning undue influence of jurors?

According to Reuters, the judge in the murder trial of Derek Chauvin today sharply criticized Maxine Waters' comments on the case, saying she might have given the defense grounds for appeal in the event of a conviction. He also said: "I wish elected officials would stop talking about this case, especially in a manner that's disrespectful to the rule of law and to the judicial branch and our function." Source: https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/judge-blasts-us-rep-maxine-waters-abhorrent-comments-about-chauvin-trial-2021-04-19/ I've heard that there are stronger protections against the improper influence of sitting jurors in Canada than in the U.S. I'm interested in how they work.

Ultimately this raises a question of balancing two fundamental rights: The right of the accused to a fair trial within due process of law & the right to freedom of expression (or in the case of press publications as in most of the cases cited by this answer, the very related freedom of the press). Both the US & Canada safeguard these rights in their constitutions (Amendments I, V, XIV & Charter ss. 2(b), 11(d) respectively) so any differences would be in their approaches to balancing these rights. United States I've found Some Aspects of the Law of Contempt of Court in Canada, England, and the United States (Jacob S. Ziegel, 1960) to be highly informative on the historical development of contempt of court and provided a good baseline understanding. In reference to Bridges v. California 314 U.S. 252 (1941), it states Although the Court recognized that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization" and that "it would be a trying task to choose between them", it held nevertheless that an abridgment on the freedom of the press was only permitted by the Constitution when there was "a clear and present danger" that the offending publication would actually interfere with a fair and impartial trial. The majority opinion rejected the "reasonable tendency" test which had been applied by the lower courts, and still is the yardstick by which such publications are measured in England and Canada. I'd also like to quote the following paragraph from Bridges as it raises two points I'd like to comment on: What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious, and the degree of imminence extremely high, before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow. The first point is that due to its broad language, the court gives a certain priority to the First Amendment. The second point involves the age of my citations: the "clear and present danger" test is from Schenck v. United States , largely considered to be overruled by the more stringent Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) "immediate lawless action" test. This does raise the question of whether Bridges can then be considered good law. I unfortunately can't find any good references discussing Bridges in a post- Brandenburg context, however, I would argue it is still valid. While the Schenck test has been overruled, the Bridges citation I gave in fact foreshadows the Brandenburg test by using the language of "imminence" and stating the Schenck test was not necessarily the limit of the First Amendment, but just a minimum bar. I would then argue that Bridges can quite easily be considered good law by simply substituting the Schenck test with the Brandenburg one without really affecting the court's ratio decidendi . Canada Ziegel's article is even more out-of-date when it comes to Canada as it is pre- Charter . For a modern Canadian overview of out-of-court contempt of court I've found A Comment on "No Comment": The Sub Judice Rule and the Accountability of Public Officials in the 21st Century (Lorne Sossin & Valerie Crystal, 2013). The article cites Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. [1994] 3 SCR 835 as directly tackling the balance of these rights. In it the court acknowledged the pre- Charter common law of giving deference to the accused's right to a fair trial, but noting that the Charter now requires a balancing of these rights The traditional common law rule governing publication bans -- that there be a real and substantial risk of interference with the right to a fair trial -- emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of those affected by the ban and, in the context of post- Charter Canadian society, does not provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression. When two protected rights come into conflict, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both rights. A hierarchical approach to rights must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law. The common law rule governing publication bans must thus be reformulated in a manner that reflects the principles of the Charter and, in particular, the equal status given by the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11(d). Ultimately, the court concluded that a balance of these rights was the following test: A publication ban should only be ordered when: (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. While Dagenais more clearly explains the balancing of these two rights, the article also cites R. v. Vermette [1988] 1 SCR 985 which is a much more similar situation to Maxine Waters commenting on an ongoing trial. The article summarizes as follows: While the trial was ongoing, the premier of Quebec, René Lévesque, denounced one of the defence witnesses in the National Assembly, despite warnings by the Speaker that such comments would be prejudicial to the accused. The trial decision even contains the following comment from the judge: When speaking in the National Assembly, however, the Premier enjoyed the privilege of Parliamentary immunity. Had it not been for this immunity, he could have been cited for contempt of court. Comparison At a constitutional level, it can be seen that the balancing of these two rights are not the same in the US and Canada. The US gives much greater weight to freedom of speech, while Canada allows restriction of speech if doing so more greatly benefits another Charter right and there is no reasonable alternative. On a practical level, there are also differences in how jury trials are run, maybe even as a direct result of the constitutional differences. In Dagenais , the court quotes the following: Generally speaking, however, the approach taken in the United States seems to be to allow for the widest possible latitude in media reporting of events transpiring prior to and during the course of the trial of an accused person. This is counterbalanced, in the interests of ensuring an impartial and unbiased jury, in a number of ways including, during the jury selection process, by an often searching examination into the attitudes, biases and even the personal and financial affairs of potential jurors and, after the jury selection process has been completed, by the sequestration of the members of the jury while the trial is in progress to reduce the risk of their exposure to the media and other publicity generated by it. In Canada, by contrast, the process of jury selection is neither as prolonged nor as exhaustive as a general rule; indeed the kind of questioning and probing into the affairs of potential jurors that is sometimes seen in the United States would be unlikely to be permitted under our system. Moreover, in Canada the sequestration of jurors throughout a trial occurs only exceptionally. The strong bias of our system is to prevent the dissemination before the conclusion of the trial of media publicity that might be prejudicial to the accused's fair trial. The US & Canada simply follow different constitutional approaches here and have slightly different priorities when it comes to balancing rights.

How did the USA justify its war against Vietnam by way of International Law?

According to Shaws book on International Law: The Soviet Union made considerable use of legal arguments in its efforts to establish its non-liability to contribute towards the peace-keeping operations of the UN [sic]. And the Americans too, justified their activities with regards to Cuba and Vietnam by reference to international law. Q. What were the US arguments, I assume at the UN, with regards to its war in Vietnam? If it's not clear, I'm not asking here about the political dimensions but it's legal dimensions; (although the political dimension would be welcome).

They were there at the invitation the government of Vietnam This is the justification. The government of South Vietnam was the internationally recognised government of South Vietnam (at least by the USA and it’s allies - it’s not a requirement of international law to be recognised by everyone). They were engaged in counter-insurgency against internal rebels. They asked the USA and other nations to help. Those nations agreed to help.

How does pressing charges for slander work?

According to The Law Dictionary It is also necessary to prove that their slanderous words about you are all lies. How does this make sense? Isn't it on the burden of a person making a claim to prove it's true? For example if someone is telling everyone I have been stalking them (and it's not true) how can I prove I didn't, can't I only ever disprove their evidence?

Defamation (Libel and Slander. See J. Jonah Jamerson for the difference between the two) is not a protected act of speech because it is speech used to harm someone on claims of actual damage. Since you are doing this in small claims, you simply have to file the suit in your local court to have the case go through (assuming you don't have a lawyer, who does this for you). The Burden of Proof will depend on Jurisdiction. In the United States, speech is Protected Free Speech until proven otherwise, so you will need to prove this is a defamatory statement. You can get his evidence as to why he's making a truthful statement in the discovery process, but be willing to provide dates and times to show you were not there when he claims you were OR to show that you had a valid non-him related reason to be near him. Depending on how he is phrasing it, if you have not been convicted of stalking and he has not filed any motions against you in court, then you can use that to prove that this is false. If he has, he has the burden of proof to prove you are a stalker (although he doesn't have to say you are an alleged stalker... the media covering the case will say as such until proven guilty.. yes, even if the crime is caught on camera and it's definitely you, media writing rules still call the accused as such until proven guilty). In the U.K. and other Common Law Jurisdictions, the burden of proof is on him to prove the claim is valid. In addition, you need to prove that these charges have damaged you in some capacity. A loss of friendship, romantic encounters, housing or employment opportunities or membership to private club or service from businesses because of these untrue statements. At some part, you must show that his statements factored into a negative decision against you (probably to a significant degree). Also be sure that these are statements of fact (OP is a stalker) and not belief/opinion (I believe OP is stalking me/ I think OP is stalking me) or hearsay ( The First Poster told me that OP is stalking me). The last two statements are technically true in that he has assessed the situation from his perspective and has come to this conclusion OR he is repeating a statement made to him by another source. Only the first statement is false. Finally, in the United States, you need to prove malice on the part of the guy making the false claim IF you are a public or limited public person (a celebrity or a politician in the latter case, or someone who was temporarily a known person due to other matters like being related to another crime or news story that has put you into the press). TL;DR: It is Defimation if: It is false. It is stated as true fact and not opinion or hearsay. It has caused significant damage to you. In the U.S. the burden of proof is on you (U.S. Only). If you are a public entity (Politician, Celebrity, or subject of press coverage) you must prove intended malice towards you (U.S. Only).

Under HIPAA, do I have the legal right to see the electronic records themselves?

According to US Health and Human Services, if my provider keeps an electronic medical record, I have the right to view an electronic copy of my records. However, this guidance is unclear on one thing: If my clinic stores my record in its system as a Clinical Data Architecture file, do I have the right to view my record as a Clinical Data Architecture file? Or can the provider legally refuse such a request as long as they are willing to give me my medical data in a different electronic format - such as a Word document?

Under HIPAA , you have the right to Ask to see and get a copy of your health records from most doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers such as pharmacies and nursing homes, as well as from your health plan. Get either a paper or, if the records are kept electronically, and electronic copy of your records. Also, according to 45 CFR 164.524(c)(2)(i) , The Privacy Rule requires a covered entity to provide the individual with access to the PHI in the form and format requested, if readily producible in that form and format, or if not, in a readable hard copy form or other form and format as agreed to by the covered entity and individual. Therefore, to answer your question, you have the right to recieve an electronic copy of your records in the format you request, "if readily producible in that form and format." Otherwise, you will have to agree upon a format. In your scenario, is seems that the Clinical Data Architecture file is not readily available and producible, so you may have to settle for a Word or PDF doc. Note: There are limited circumstances when an individual may be denied access to their records. Examples include: The request is for psychotherapy notes, or information compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a legal proceeding. An inmate requests a copy of her PHI held by a covered entity that is a correctional institution, or health care provider acting under the direction of the institution, and providing the copy would jeopardize the health, safety, security, custody, or rehabilitation of the inmate or other inmates, or the safety of correctional officers, employees, or other person at the institution or responsible for the transporting of the inmate. However, in these cases, an inmate retains the right to inspect her PHI. The requested PHI is in a designated record set that is part of a research study that includes treatment (e.g., clinical trial) and is still in progress, provided the individual agreed to the temporary suspension of access when consenting to participate in the research. The individual’s right of access is reinstated upon completion of the research. The requested PHI is in Privacy Act protected records (i.e., certain records under the control of a federal agency, which may be maintained by a federal agency or a contractor to a federal agency), if the denial of access is consistent with the requirements of the Act. The requested PHI was obtained by someone other than a health care provider (e.g., a family member of the individual) under a promise of confidentiality, and providing access to the information would be reasonably likely to reveal the source of the information.

Need clarification for legal relationship containment for multiple spouses

According to US law, can a person have a husband and a wife at the same time? If so, how is their property distributed after death?

Currently there is nowhere in the USA where polygamy is legal. So regardless of their sexual or gender expression or orientation, being married to MORE THAN ONE person at the same time is illegal. If, however, it turned out that someone had more than one spouse at their death, I'm sure that property distribution would be a matter for the probate court to sort out. As far as legally-married "trans spouses", for lack of a better term, I don't see why that would that impact inheritance in any way?

Can I trademark a 10-year-old-dead-trademark?

According to US law, if trademark 'ABC' has expired under 'Section 8/9' more than 10 years ago (2010), and has not seen any activity so far, can I trademark it?

After some research, you can IF : The trademark is NOT used in trade, per example, if Apple failed to renew the trademark but is activelly using on products, they can always renew filling a new application. As said on Trademark Now : The risk comes from the Lanham Act. Through this act, a mark is not abandoned until it’s been discontinued without intent to resume use. While the USPTO will not track the mark in their registry as active because the paperwork has not been filed, this doesn’t mean that the mark isn’t still being used by a business who has an acceptable reason for not maintaining it in the registry. If you can prove in court that the original owner had no intent to continue its use, then have at it. Understand, however, that the subjectivity of the process will give you problems if the previous owner pushes back. 2. The expired trademark is NOT in the 6-month grace period after expiration in wich, the original owner can renew. I learned also that you could always ask(And is the best course of action), i spoke with some companies who had expired trademarks and they usually are willing grant the trademark, since the product/brand has been long dead.

What crime is killing a foetus without the mother's consent?

According to US law, when a person approaches a woman who is pregnant in the third trimester, usee a knife and "takes the life of the unborn child" while the woman survives, is this crime a murder or a personal injury to the pregnant woman, or both? Does anything change depending on the month that the pregnancy had reached?

Murder is most often prosecuted by the states, not the US government, and each state greatly varies on the subject. Some states consider a fetus to be a person at any stage in its development; some require harsher punishments if the defendant knew the victim was pregnant; and some have no specific mentions of whether a fetus makes any difference in the law. You can see a great breakdown of the various laws and how they are applied to fetuses in this per-state table . Any federal crimes that are prosecuted by the US federal government are also subject to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act which recognizes a fetus as a victim if it is injured or killed while committing a list of federal crimes.

Misprision of felony by a (potentially) foreign entity

According to USC, 18 U.S. Code § 4. Misprision of felony Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. Say if someone posted a post on SE that is clearly a crime under US federal laws. However it is unclear whether the author is of US citizenship. Is it a legal obligation for a US citizen to report such posts to authorities? Is it considered active concealing by down/close/delete voting the post? My understandings: No. Since it is required that the case is cognizable by a US court, and it is not the case if the author is not a US citizen or on US territory; since it is unclear whether the author is a US citizen, one does not have knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States. Hence a US citizen is not legally obligated to report such posts, and down/close/delete voting is not a crime.

From the Statute (emphasis mine): conceals and does not as soon as possible make known This means hiding the knowledge of the crime, and will require authorities to prove that there was an effort to conceal the crime. No American has the legal obligation to report felonies, except in certain cases (child molestation, an offense about to happen for certain professions, etc.).

What law were these counter-protestors in Vienna charged under?

According to Vienna Police Charge 3 Men For Waving Israeli Flag at Rally , which cites a German-language article in Vice magazine, three people were charged for pro-Israel counter-protesting at a "Pro-Palestinian" rally. What law were they charged under, and has its validity been challenged either for its constitutionality or under human rights protections given by the European Union?

This is the cited article . Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz , which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed.

If Gamble v. United States ends up creating a precedent, how could the federal and state governments agree on who gets to prosecute?

According to Wiki : The separate sovereigns doctrine holds that because the federal and state government are "separate sovereigns", the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to prosecution of the same crime under both federal and state laws. The doctrine can be seen in mid 20th century Supreme Court decisions; the 1959 cases of Abbate v. United States and Bartkus v. Illinois ruled in affirmation of the doctrine. Lets say the Supreme Court rules that double jeopardy rules should apply even if the crime is prosecutable under both federal and state laws. In this case, how could the federal and state governments possibly agree on who gets to prosecute a given crime? Are there examples of other countries solving a similar issue in their jurisdiction? As an example, lets say Washington state wants to protect its marijuana industry against federal prosecution. It then creates a law mandating a $500 fine for anyone found violating federal marijuana laws. Now anyone who needs to get rid of federal prosecution could just plea guilty to a state court, pay a $500 fine and walk away scot free. The federal government could pull off a similar trick to undermine state laws.

Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction.

What are the consquences of the Martin Act?

According to Wikiepedia, New York states's Martin Act gives the New York Attorney General far more power to prosecute securities fraud (usually a Federal crime) than most other states. Does that also mean that New York state courts exercise more jurisdiction over alleged securities fraud than those of most other states, and if so, how? For instance, what could Eliot Spitzer do in New York courts that he could not have done in some other states?

I would personally dispute the claim that the Martin Act's provisions, per se , are an important factor in what makes NY Attorney General prosecutions under the act more potent than in other states. Most state attorneys' general have broad authority under state securities laws, often called "Blue Sky Laws" to prosecute securities law violations. Instead, the effectiveness in the New York Attorney General in this area is principally a function of the historical accident that New York City is the center of the American securities industry. So, almost all securities transactions of national economic importance have a nexus with New York state that makes it possible for the New York Attorney General to assert jurisdiction, usually because some or all of the doing took place there, even if the victims are mostly located outside of New York State. Further, in part because the New York Attorney General is capable of intervening is so many securities law cases, the New York Attorney General has more staff with specialized expertise in handling these kinds of cases than a typical state attorney general's office.

Is the Scarborough Fair Melody Really in the Public Domain?

According to Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Scarborough-Fair-Melody.png the melody to the tune Scarborough Fair (which had been popularized in the 1960s by Simon and Garfunkel) is in the public domain. Is this claim correct; and if so, can someone today write a new set of lyrics to accompany the basis of the said melody, and publish it?

Yes Both melody and lyrics source back to the middle ages, as for instance described here . The difficulty could be to make sure you rely your derived work on a variant that is really in the public domain. E.g. if you use notes or lyrics from the Simon & Garfunkel version and derive from there, you might violate their copyright.

Why would a person choose to amend their will via a codicil rather than create a new one?

According to Wikipedia , a codicil is as follows: In the United States, a codicil is a document that changes an existing will. Amendments made by a codicil may alter, explain, add to, subtract from, or confirm – and otherwise amend a will in any other way, minor or major, short of complete revocation. It is subject to the same formal requirements as a will. I would think that it would be just as easy to print off a new copy of the will with the necessary amendments, so time saving wouldn't be a reason to create a codicil. If it has the same formal requirements as a will (which I take to mean it needs to be signed by witnesses and such), then why would a person create a codicil?

In modern usage, it is far better to replace a will then to create a codicil primarily because there is only one document to verify the veracity of. As you say, it would be just as easy to print off a new will. However, the ease of printing off a new one is a relatively recent technological development. When wills were typed on a typewriter or, in even earlier times, handwritten, the advantages of a codicil are much more apparent; particularly when you pay your lawyer by the hour.

Does rape really need to include a penis in England and Wales?

According to Wikipedia , rape occurs in English law when "a man penetrates another person with his penis without the consent of the person being penetrated" but any sexual act that does not include a penis is not classified as rape. This is very counter-intuitive to me, especially since this definition seems to care more about perpetrator's body than about the victim's body (the classification changes if penis is replaced by any other object but does not change according to the orifice being penetrated). The Wikipedia page linked above also mentions the crime of "assault by penetration", which apparenty carries the same maximal penalty as rape but I wasn't able to find any data about minimal or average penalty, or about wider consequences of being charged with either crime (such as being barred from certain jobs or having to disclose one's criminal history in some contexts). I'm trying to wrap my head around this situation. Do I correctly understand that technically a person cannot be convicted of rape in England and Wales for a sexual assault that did not include their penis? Is "assault by penetration" the same as "rape" for all practical purposes and it's just a surprising naming convention, or is there genuine differece? I'd also love to learn if this naming convention lead to any issues (e.g. rape victims objecting to not having their assaulters charged with rape, etc.).

The crime specifically entitled "rape" under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is defines as the case where a person A (a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis, (b) B does not consent to the penetration, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. There is a separate crime called "assault by penetration" where (a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of his body or anything else, (b) the penetration is sexual, (c) B does not consent to the penetration, and (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. Then there is the crime defined as "sexual assault" defined as (a) he intentionally touches another person (B), (b) the touching is sexual, (c) B does not consent to the touching, and (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. You should note that A is defined as "a person" and not "a male": use of the masculine pronoun in the statute does not mean that the law only applies to males qua offenders. The statutory maximum penalty for rape and assault by penetration is imprisonment for life. For sexual assault, it is 10 years in case of conviction on indictment or 6 months plus a fine for summary conviction – this relates to how you are found guilty , with or without a jury (with a jury = conviction on indictment). It's not entirely clear why assault by penetration and rape are separately defined under this law. In an earlier law, The Sexual Offences Act 1956 , the law said "It is felony for a man to rape a woman", and the meaning of rape is not statutorily given. There was also a crime of indecent assault where again the meaning of indecent assault is not statutorily given. The two current sections could have been merged, and maybe there was debate over whether the punishment should be different (that's a history of politics question). From a practical POV, a woman cannot commit rape under the UK definition, so section 2 may be seen as a way to fix that.

How does the punctuation/capitalization of the 2nd Amendment affect its interpretation?

According to Wikipedia : The importance (or lack thereof) of these differences has been the source of debate regarding the meaning and interpretation of [2nd] the amendment, particularly regarding the importance of the prefatory clause. One version was passed by the Congress, and a slightly different version was ratified. Passed by Congress (emphasis mine): A well regulated M ilitia , being necessary to the security of a free S tate, the right of the people to keep and bear A rms , shall not be infringed. Ratified: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. From this I have two questions: Which one is the actual/legal text (or is that questionable)? How can the differences affect the amendment's interpretation? Although this question is opinion-based, I'm looking more for how the textual differences have been argued in court or by legal scholars.

District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008) is the Supreme Court's latest and clearest interpretation of the 2nd Amendment. The majority's analysis is almost entirely a textualist/original-meaning interpretation. They took the following to be the text of the 2nd Amendment: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. The capitalization differences were treated as inconsequential in the analysis. The opinion refers to "the phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause", with no capitalization when mentioning it. In interpreting the object of "keep and bear Arms", "Arms", the opinion immediately removes capitalization in its own discussion of the term. They even explicitly rule out the possibility that "keep Arms" has any special meaning: No party has apprised us of an idiomatic meaning of “keep Arms.” Thus, the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.” The opinion also refers to Vermont's adoption of Pennsylvania's "right to bear arms", calling any differences in capitalization or punctuation inconsequential: In 1777, Vermont adopted the identical provision, except for inconsequential differences in punctuation and capitalization. Neither of the two dissents make anything of the difference in capitalization. None of the 68 amicus briefs mentioned the difference in capitalization. It did not come up in oral argument . The Brief for the Professors of Linguistics (in support of Petitioners) says: The Amendment’s first and third commas signal a pause for breath and can be omitted without affecting the meaning. They say that the second comma is consequential, but that comma is consistent between the two variants that you quoted.

Could someone who participated in a legal execution in the USA be arrested for murder in France?

According to Wikipedia France is the most visited country in the world. At the same time, the USA is still practicing the death penalty. For example, 28 people were executed in 2015 . For each execution a lot of evidence can be potentially gathered (official documents, video footage, declarations of individuals, etc). So could the people who have taken part in an execution be considered guilty of "collective murder"? Is it possible that they could be arrested as soon as they arrive in France?

I said this in a comment, but I'll put it in an answer. When France forcibly confines an American, the United States is entitled to ask France, "what the hell do you think you're doing, trying to confine our citizen in your country?" There are really just six basic answers that the United States will accept, and nothing in this scenario is specific to France or the US (it applies any time a foreign national is arrested by any country), and the six responses are the six basic principles of jurisdiction: Active nationality: "He's our citizen too! What the hell do you think you're doing, questioning how we treat our own citizens?" The US doesn't generally get to question how France treats French citizens, even if they're also American citizens. And France gets to require its citizens to obey French law anywhere in the world. Subjective territoriality: "He broke our laws on our soil. We don't care that he's your citizen, he has to obey our laws while he's here." This and nationality are by far the most well-accepted answers. Protective: "He threatened our state. We have the right to protect ourselves." This applies to things like attacking French government personnel or forging a French passport or similar: France isn't protecting its citizens, it's protecting France itself. Objective territoriality: "He may have committed this crime outside France, but its effects happened inside France. We can punish him for causing those effects." For instance, if you're in the US but hack a computer in France, France has an argument that they get to punish you for that. Passive nationality: "He may be American and have done this outside France, but he hurt our citizens. We have the right to protect our citizens." Again, a plausible argument. This is not necessarily a strong argument, but it can be made. Universality: "This thing is a crime against all of humanity. It's something that needs to be stamped out by all countries working together, without worrying too much about whether or not the defendant actually affected the country prosecuting him in any way." This is very rare. Murder is not a crime of universal jurisdiction. It's limited to more severe crimes, as well as crimes of a fundamentally international nature. So piracy is on the list, as is plane hijacking, as is genocide. Killing an ambassador is on the list: you're a threat to international order. But normal murder? Not even close. It's not a crime with international implications, and it's not a crime which is so fundamentally horrific that it needs to be ended by any means necessary. The death penalty has never been considered to be that fundamentally horrific, and likely never will be, particularly when (as in the US) it is limited to people who have committed something that is an extremely serious crime in any country (i.e. murder). The only way France could make a remotely plausible argument that it gets to punish American executioners is if they're dual citizens or if they executed a French citizen. Then France can't arrest the executioner because US is a sovereign state and gets to impose its own penal laws. But normally? France couldn't arrest them even if it wasn't for the fact that they're executing US government policy, because Americans in America don't generally have to obey French laws.

Who I have to pay if I make Game/Music/Movie about monkey king (journey to the west)?

According to Wikipedia Journey to the West is a Chinese novel published in the 16th century during the Ming dynasty and attributed to Wu Cheng'en. So I wonder who I will have to pay license if I make Game/Music/Movie about monkey king (journey to the west). I have tried to search around the internet for similar situations, but I can't find the answer. Similar situations are: Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons A Chinese Odyssey The Grow 2 Oriental Legend (an arcade game I played when I was a kid)

No one There was no such thing as copyright law in 16th century China. Even if there was the product would have long since become public domain - the country with the longest copyright law in the world is MExico at 100 years after the death of the author.

Can the Canadian administration ("government") enter into international agreements, treaties etc. binding Canada without legislative ratification?

According to Wikipedia citing a CBC coverage Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mélanie Joly told to reporters that "[u]nder the Canadian system the government, the executive branch, has jurisdiction and there's no need to go through Parliament [to secure ratification of Canada's agreement to the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO]". Is this the exception to the rule or effectively, or the administration (government) can effectively rule by decree over the legislation so long as it merely implements duties resulting from international treaties or agreement? Or is the exception due to the technicality that Canada's duty towards NATO is already established, and the accession of Finland and Sweden is "merely" an amendment of Canada's agreement to those underlying NATO treaties? I would personally be surprised if the Canadian administration ("government") could enter into any international obligations without a sort of ratification in the legislative branch.

Yes. See this article for some information about the treaty making process: In Canada, the treaty-making process is controlled by the executive branch of the federal government, while the Parliament of Canada (“Parliament”) is often responsible for passing legislation to implement international treaties at the federal level. ... Although this entire process is controlled by the executive branch, the federal government does involve Parliament in this stage of the treaty-making process by tabling treaties and relevant explanatory documents for debate in the House of Commons. So while the executive branch can enter into treaties at will, they can't create or alter domestic laws without legislative approval. For example, if a treaty required that Canada make certain things illegal, then the legislature would have to pass legislation making that thing illegal to make Canada compliant with its treaty obligations. Approving a new NATO member wouldn't affect domestic law at all, as there is no bill the legislature would need to pass to implement it. It would effect military operations, but the executive branch already has the power to decide military strategy (the King is the commander-in-chief of the military, he delegated those powers to the governor general, and the governor general by convention only acts on the advice of the Cabinet). Note that unlike many other countries (such as the US), the Canadian constitution is mostly silent on the topic of international treaties, only mentioning treaties agreed to by the UK on behalf of Canada (at the time the constitution was written, Canada couldn't agree to treaties itself), so there are no constitutional requirements for the legislative branch to approve any treaties. Also note that treaty implementing legislation is almost always passed, since the executive branch needs to maintain the support of a majority of the legislature. If the legislature doesn't pass implementing legislation, then the legislature would also be very likely to pass a no-confidence motion, which would usually trigger a new election.

Can one "possess" something without receiving or producing it?

According to Wikipedia, concerning the legal status of fictional pornography depicting minors in the US link here : The mere possession of said images is not a violation of the law unless it can be proven that they were transmitted through a common carrier, such as the mail or the internet, transported across state lines, or of an amount that showed intent to distribute. The phrasing is extremely confusing. How can something be legally possessed without it having been received by way of something like the internet (viewing an image on a webpage) or mail or without it being produced by the offender? Is the only legal recourse if the obscene material materializes in the offender's hand? Maybe if it's transmitted from out of country? To me, it sounds like being in possession of such material is, in effect, illegal in the US because it had to have been either received from the internet via looking at a website that displays the image, or it had to have been produced by the offender, both of which describe receiving or producing, which is illegal. If this implies that viewing something like lolicon is illegal in the United States, how are websites like 4chan allowed to permit that sort of content?

Overview If the visual depiction(s) involved, or any of them or any communication concerning them, or any component of them has been transmitted by the US mail, or in interstate or foreign commerce, or by a facility affecting such commerce, or a person involved has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce as part of the offense then these laws may apply, but not otherwise. Note that the internet may be considered to be "a facility affecting such commerce" even if the internet transmission was within a single state. Thus if person A creates such an image within the US, and hand-delivers it to person B who is in the same state, or retains it without transmitting it or intending to transmit it, there could be no conviction under federal anti-child-porn laws. This is true only if the image is not obscene under Miller * and is not the image of any real child, so 2251 et seq do not apply. If the image is legally obscene, then stte laws are much lore likely to be invoked. Note that if a person is found to be in possession of an image of child pornography it is not enough to say that it must have been received from someone . The government must prove that it was received in interstate or foreign commerce, or that at least one of the other restrictive provisions is met (possession with intent to distribute, image or component previously transmitted in interstate or foreign commerce, person involved traveled in interstate or foreign commerce as part of the scheme, etc) Note also that the "fictional" aspect of Section 1466A, specifically 1466A (c) has been argued to be in violation of the First Amendment, and to the beat of my knowledge there has been no binding court ruling upholding that provision. in United States v. Dean (2011) there were procedural obstacles to a facial challenge, in this first Handley case there was a guilty plea, Audette was never formally charged, and in the case of Christian Bee there was again a plea deal. A case of pure fictional child pornography, with no actual child involved in any way, might well not be upheld under Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition . However, when the image of a fictional child is found to be obscene under the Miller test, then there can be a conviction. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition permitted a conviction for non-obscene images only if they were images of real children. Images found to be obscene lose all first amendment protection, and simple possession of them was permitted by Stanley only as part of the right to privacy, not under the First Amendment. Section 1466A specifically applies only to content that is obscene under Miller . Any interstate or foreign transmission is enough for a conviction for such obscene images. 2008 Handley case In United States v. Handley , 564 F. Supp. 2d 996 (S.D. Iowa 2008) the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa wrote: Defendant argues Free Speech Coalition gave constitutional legitimacy to pornography in which no real children are used. The Court disagrees. Free Speech Coalition dealt with whether the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8) (B) and (D), abridged the freedom of speech. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241, 122 S. Ct. 1389. Section 2256(8) (B) banned child pornography that appeared to depict minors but was produced without using any actual children. Id. at 239, 122 S. Ct. 1389. Because the statute criminalized material that was neither child pornography involving actual children under Ferber nor obscenity under Miller , the Supreme Court concluded the CPPA sought to reach beyond obscene material, and the statute was struck down as overbroad and unconstitutional. Id. at 256, 122 S. Ct. 1389. Section 1466A (a) (1) and (b) (1) do not suffer from the same defect as those found in the CPPA in Free Speech Coalition . Sections 1466A(a) (1) and (b) (1) specifically include as an element of each offense that the material must be obscene. Free Speech Coalition required that the prohibited material fall into one of the categories recognized by Ferber or Miller, and sections 1466A(a) (1) and (b) (1) meet this requirement. Asa district court decision, this is not binding precedent, but it may well be followed in future cases. Federal statutes The key federal laws on child pornography are: 18 U.S. Code § 2251 - Sexual exploitation of children 18 U.S. Code § 2252 - Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors 18 U.S. Code § 2252A - Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography Subsequent sections in 18 USC Chapter 110 18 U.S. Code § 1466A - Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children 18 USC § 2251 (a) and (b) apply only to a person who: knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed 18 USC § 2251 (c) applies only if (2) (A) the person intends such visual depiction to be transported to the United States, its territories or possessions, by any means, including by using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or mail; or (2) (B) the person transports such visual depiction to the United States, its territories or possessions, by any means The various subsections of 18 USC § 2252 and 2252A contain similar restrictions to things "mailed, or transmitted in interstate or foreign commerce, or affecting interstate commerce" or onboard US flagged ships or aircraft, or in government facilities. Section 1466A includes a very similar restriction, that a communication in concerning with the offense must have raveled by the US mail, or in interstate or foreign commerce, or a facility affecting such commerce, or a person involved must have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce in connection with the offense. Moreover this sectio0n applies only to images that are actually legally obscene, unlike 2251 and 225s et seq .

What limitations can be placed on the activities of "shell" companies?

According to Wikipedia, one of the reasons for using a shell company is that "Shell companies can be used to transfer assets from one company into a new one, while leaving the liabilities in the former company." My understanding, from a response to an earlier question, is that this much is legal. But suppose the assets have been pledged as collateral for liabilities, and there are contracts governing this process. If shell companies are used to "shuffle assets" between, say companies A, B, and C, so that the assets and liabilities are separated, is this still legal? Or can these transactions be "collapsed" so that one combined company has ownership of both assets and liabilities and the contracts that govern them?

If a company transfers out so much of its assets that it is left insolvent at the end of the transaction, without receiving substantially equivalent value in exchange, outside some very isolated circumstances where substantially equivalent value is conclusively determined to be present as a matter of law (e.g. certain auctions), the transaction is a "fraudulent transfer" and the transferor and transferee can be held liable as a result under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act present in every U.S. state, and under parallel provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Sometimes, this can apply even when the liabilities don't arise until after the asset has been transferred out, when the liability is foreseeable and the company is undercapitalized. Often this kind of situation can also give rise to liability on a piercing the corporate veil or "alter ego" theory against the owners of the company, or to liability imposed on directors and/or officers of the company for making distributions or transfers of assets that render a company insolvent.

Can a LGBT person sue the parents of a child who refuses to sell lemonade to them?

According to Wikipedia, running a lemonade stand is a business. If a child has been instructed by his/her parents not to sell lemonade to a LGBT person, can the LGBT person sue the child's parents based on sexual-orientation discrimination? Or are home-based businesses exempt from having to serve everyone in the general public?

There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law , which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.

Are American grandchildren of Portuguese citizens entitled to Portuguese citizenship?

According to Wikipedia: As of July 29, 2015, those born outside Portugal who have at least one grandparent of Portuguese nationality, are granted Portuguese citizenship by extension immediately. The new registration procedure replaces the current provision of Article 6, no. 4 according to which a person who was born abroad and is a 2nd generation descendant of a citizen who has not lost his or her citizenship can acquire Portuguese citizenship by naturalization, without a residence requirement. The amendment still needs to be signed by the President before entering into law. It cites this webpage as the source for the claim. Suppose you have two grandparents (now deceased) who were born in Madeira (a semi-autonomous region of Portugal) and later immigrated to the United States, but that neither of your parents are Portuguese citizens. In that case, would you be eligible for Portuguese citizenship without the residency requirements?

The current law does suggest so. The law does not actually contrast "nationality" and "citizenship" as the translation suggests: it says that the grandparent "não tenha perdido essa nacionalidade" (has not his his/her nationality). The part that would remain to be determined is whether both grandparents lost their Portuguese nationality somehow. The most likely reason for that would be renouncing Portuguese citizenship, for example to take US citizenship. That matter could probably be resolved by researching the law of Portugal and the US at the time the grandparents became US citizens (if they did). Both countries currently allow dual citizenship and as far as I know the US has never required a person to formally renounce their other citizenship to be naturalized. The verbiage in the current US naturalization oath that resembles a renunciation of citizenship: I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen... might suffice. Loss of nationality under Portuguese law simply says Perdem a nacionalidade portuguesa os que, sendo nacionais de outro Estado, declarem que não querem ser portugueses. ("Those who, being nationals of another state, declare that they do not want to be Portuguese lose Portuguese nationality") Some other countries make it much more difficult to renounce citizenship. One would need a Portuguese con-law attorney to know whether this legally means that you must first become a national of another state, and then declare that you don't want to be Portugese (or, can the renunciation precede the moment of naturalization?). (The fact of coming from Madeira is not significant since Madeira is still part of Portugal, whereas coming from Mozambigue would be). The main practical questions is, what were the laws at the relevant time?

Is hiring a dominatrix legal in Canada?

According to Wikipeidia it is illegal "to purchase or advertise sexual services". This statement seems very broad and would include more than copulation. I noticed on a dominatrix website, they asked for photo ID and payment by credit card. If the activity was illegal I would have thought they would avoid leaving a paper trail. I heard the ID is to make sure the clients are not minors. Is this true? I had once gone to a dungeon party. Personally I found many activities not at all sexual. Just for example's sake some people pretended to be dogs. Since there was no money exchanged this wouldn't break the law, but if someone paid a dominatrix to treat them like a dog, would it? Would details like if they were nude or if genitals were touched make a difference? Does the law define what is meant by "sexual"? In general "BDSM" refers to something sexual and from a quick search most definitions of dominatrix refer to BDSM. So in this sense would they be illegal?

The closest possible prohibition is found in s. 286.1 of the Criminal Code, which makes it an offence to pay for the "sexual services of a person." "Sexual services" is not a defined term. The Department of Justice provides its opinion about what this term might cover , but that is not determinative. In relation to a charge of the previous version of this prohibition (which also used the term "sexual services"), counsel was unable to direct the judge to a definition of the term, and the judge was unable to find one ( 2015 ABPC 241 ). The judge adopted a test that requires the service to include "some sexually suggestive physical act on the part of the person providing the sexual service". This is a test somewhat stricter than the one proposed by the Department of Justice in that in addition to merely being "sexually stimulating or gratifying," there physical act itself must be "sexually suggestive." [50] What is a “sexual service”? Counsel have not directed me to, nor have I been able to find a definition of the term “sexual services”. [51] Sexual services” would clearly include any type of sexual intercourse, or physical contact for purposes of masturbation. It would also include posing for nude photographs. A request “to touch or feel the breasts of the [female] complainant” is an attempt to obtain the sexual services of the complainant. In my view, “sexual services” would also include dancing in a sexually provocative or stimulating fashion. In terms of a general definition, I think the phrase “sexual favours rendered ...for the sexual gratification of the customer” is sufficient. [52] However, I am of the view that the “sexual services” or “sexual favours for the sexual gratification” of a person requires that there be some sexually suggestive physical act on the part of the person providing the sexual service. The sexually suggestive physical act may be many things, such as posing nude, or sexually suggestive dancing, or suggestively removing clothing. That list is not exhaustive, and, with the creativity of the human mind, I doubt one could ever create an exhaustive list. However, the common element is that some sort of sexually suggestive physical act is necessary to constitute the sexual service. [53] In the case at bar, the accused had M.C. engage in what one might call “fantasy role playing”. If the role playing involved M.C. performing a sexually suggestive physical act, then the definition of “sexual service” might well be satisfied. However, in the case at bar, M.C. took on the fantasy role of being the slave in a master/slave relationship. M.C. did not perform any acts as a slave. The “slave role” was one in the mind of the accused (and perhaps M.C.), and had its expression in the content of emails and text messages between Mr. Peterson and M.C., but M.C. did not engage in physical acts for the sexual gratification of the accused. ... [54] M.C. was cast in the role of a slave in fantasy role playing, but the playing really only occurred in the heads of Mr. Peterson and M.C. That does not constitute the act of Mr. Peterson obtaining the sexual services of M.C. [citations removed] But this was a lower trial court's reasoning that has not been adopted by others yet, and no other court has needed to develop the definition at the margins.

Is it forbidden to fire a gun in self-defense in a national park?

According to Yellowstones official website : Hunting is strictly forbidden in Yellowstone, as is target practice. And visitors should not use guns as self-defense against large wildlife , but rather carry bear spray and take other safety precautions. They don't quote any regulations or court cases which raises the question: is it actually illegal to use a gun in self-defense within a National Park? Are there any court cases discussing this, if the question is ambiguous? P.S. Lets avoid discussing whether or not guns are superior to bear spray for self-defense purposes. See this answer on Outdoors.SE for a good overview of the subject.

Yellowstone is part of the National Park Service. Parts of it are located in Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. The rules concerning firearms on National Park Service properties are set forth at the National Park Service website . Some key excerpts from this are as follows: In areas administered by the National Park Service, an individual can possess a firearm if that individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm and if the possession of the firearm complies with the laws of the state where the park area is located. 54 U.S.C. 104906. . . . Unless expressly authorized, Federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon in NPS facilities. These buildings include, but are not limited to, government offices, visitor centers, ranger stations, fee collection buildings, and maintenance facilities. 18 U.S.C. 930. . . . Unless authorized, the use or discharge of a firearm within a park area is prohibited. 36 CFR 2.4(b) and 13.30(c). In parks where hunting is specifically mandated or authorized by federal statute, firearms may be used to hunt in accordance with NPS regulations and state laws. 36 CFR 2.2. The referenced statutes state (emphasis added): 18 U.S. Code § 930 - Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilities (a)Except as provided in subsection (d), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal facility (other than a Federal court facility), or attempts to do so , shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. (b)Whoever, with intent that a firearm or other dangerous weapon be used in the commission of a crime, knowingly possesses or causes to be present such firearm or dangerous weapon in a Federal facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (c)A person who kills any person in the course of a violation of subsection (a) or (b), or in the course of an attack on a Federal facility involving the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be punished as provided in sections 1111, 1112, 1113, and 1117. (d)Subsection (a) shall not apply to— (1)the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or employee of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of law; (2)the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a Federal official or a member of the Armed Forces if such possession is authorized by law; or (3) the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes . (e)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal court facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. (2)Paragraph (1) shall not apply to conduct which is described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d). (f)Nothing in this section limits the power of a court of the United States to punish for contempt or to promulgate rules or orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting the possession of weapons within any building housing such court or any of its proceedings, or upon any grounds appurtenant to such building. (g)As used in this section: (1)The term “Federal facility” means a building or part thereof owned or leased by the Federal Government, where Federal employees are regularly present for the purpose of performing their official duties. (2)The term “dangerous weapon” means a weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or serious bodily injury, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a blade of less than 2½ inches in length. (3)The term “Federal court facility” means the courtroom, judges’ chambers, witness rooms, jury deliberation rooms, attorney conference rooms, prisoner holding cells, offices of the court clerks, the United States attorney, and the United States marshal, probation and parole offices, and adjoining corridors of any court of the United States. (h)Notice of the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) shall be posted conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal facility, and notice of subsection (e) shall be posted conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal court facility, and no person shall be convicted of an offense under subsection (a) or (e) with respect to a Federal facility if such notice is not so posted at such facility, unless such person had actual notice of subsection (a) or (e), as the case may be. . . . 54 U.S. Code § 104906. Protection of right of individuals to bear arms (a)Findings.—Congress finds the following: (1)The 2d amendment to the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. (2)Section 2.4(a)(1) of title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that “except as otherwise provided in this section and parts 7 (special regulations) and 13 (Alaska regulations), the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon, trap or net”. (3)The regulations described in paragraph (2) prevent individuals complying with Federal and State laws from exercising the 2d amendment rights of the individuals while at System units. (4)The existence of different laws relating to the transportation and possession of firearms at different System units entrapped law-abiding gun owners while at System units. (5)Although the Bush administration issued new regulations relating to the 2d amendment rights of law-abiding citizens in System units that went into effect on January 9, 2009— (A)on March 19, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction with respect to the implementation and enforcement of the new regulations; and (B)the new regulations— (i)are under review by the Obama administration; and (ii)may be altered. (6)Congress needs to weigh in on the new regulations to ensure that unelected bureaucrats and judges cannot again override the 2d amendment rights of law-abiding citizens on 83,600,000 acres of System land. (7)Federal laws should make it clear that the 2d amendment rights of an individual at a System unit should not be infringed. (b)Protection of Right of Individuals To Bear Arms in System Units.— The Secretary shall not promulgate or enforce any regulation that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm, including an assembled or functional firearm, in any System unit if— (1)the individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm; and (2)the possession of the firearm is in compliance with the law of the State in which the System unit is located. The references regulations in Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations state (emphasis added): § 2.2 Wildlife protection. (a) **The following are prohibited: (1) The taking of wildlife, except by authorized hunting and trapping activities conducted in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section. (2) The feeding, touching, teasing, frightening or intentional disturbing of wildlife nesting, breeding or other activities.** (3) Possessing unlawfully taken wildlife or portions thereof. (b) Hunting and trapping. (1) Hunting shall be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically mandated by Federal statutory law. (2) Hunting may be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically authorized as a discretionary activity under Federal statutory law if the superintendent determines that such activity is consistent with public safety and enjoyment, and sound resource management principles. Such hunting shall be allowed pursuant to special regulations. (3) Trapping shall be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically mandated by Federal statutory law. (4) Where hunting or trapping or both are authorized, such activities shall be conducted in accordance with Federal law and the laws of the State within whose exterior boundaries a park area or a portion thereof is located. Nonconflicting State laws are adopted as a part of these regulations. (c) Except in emergencies or in areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the superintendent shall consult with appropriate State agencies before invoking the authority of § 1.5 for the purpose of restricting hunting and trapping or closing park areas to the taking of wildlife where such activities are mandated or authorized by Federal statutory law. (d) The superintendent may establish conditions and procedures for transporting lawfully taken wildlife through the park area. Violation of these conditions and procedures is prohibited. (e) The Superintendent may designate all or portions of a park area as closed to the viewing of wildlife with an artificial light. Use of an artificial light for purposes of viewing wildlife in closed areas is prohibited. (f) Authorized persons may check hunting and trapping licenses and permits; inspect weapons, traps and hunting and trapping gear for compliance with equipment restrictions; and inspect wildlife that has been taken for compliance with species, size and other taking restrictions. (g) The regulations contained in this section apply, regardless of land ownership, on all lands and waters within a park area that are under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States . . . . § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a) None of the provisions in this section or any regulation in this chapter may be enforced to prohibit an individual from possessing a firearm, including an assembled or functional firearm, in any National Park System unit if: (1) The individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm; and (2) The possession of the firearm is in compliance with the law of the State in which the National Park System unit is located. (b) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and parts 7 (special regulations) and 13 (Alaska regulations), the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon, trap or net (2) Weapons, traps or nets may be carried, possessed or used: (i) At designated times and locations in park areas where: (A) The taking of wildlife is authorized by law in accordance with § 2.2 of this chapter ; (B) The taking of fish is authorized by law in accordance with § 2.3 of this part. (ii) When used for target practice at designated times and at facilities or locations designed and constructed specifically for this purpose and designated pursuant to special regulations. (iii) Within a residential dwelling. For purposes of this subparagraph only, the term “residential dwelling” means a fixed housing structure which is either the principal residence of its occupants, or is occupied on a regular and recurring basis by its occupants as an alternate residence or vacation home. (3)(i) Traps, nets and unloaded weapons may be possessed within a temporary lodging or mechanical mode of conveyance when such implements are rendered temporarily inoperable or are packed, cased or stored in a manner that will prevent their ready use. (ii) An individual may carry or possess an unloaded bow or crossbow when accessing otherwise inaccessible lands or waters contiguous to a park area when other means of access are otherwise impracticable or impossible if: (A) The individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the bow or crossbow; and (B) The possession of the bow or crossbow is in compliance with the law of the State in which the park area is located. (c) Carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of transportation is prohibited, except that carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a vessel is allowed when such vessel is not being propelled by machinery and is used as a shooting platform in accordance with Federal and State law. (d) The use of a weapon, trap or net in a manner that endangers persons or property is prohibited. (e) The superintendent may issue a permit to carry or possess a weapon that is not otherwise authorized, a trap, or a net under the following circumstances: (1) When necessary to support research activities conducted in accordance with § 2.5. (2) To carry firearms for persons in charge of pack trains or saddle horses for emergency use. (3) For employees, agents or cooperating officials in the performance of their official duties. (4) To provide access to otherwise inaccessible lands or waters contiguous to a park area when other means of access are otherwise impracticable or impossible. Violation of the terms and conditions of a permit issued pursuant to this paragraph is prohibited and may result in the suspension or revocation of the permit. (f) Authorized Federal, State and local law enforcement officers may carry firearms in the performance of their official duties. (g) The carrying or possessing of a weapon, trap or net in violation of applicable Federal and State laws is prohibited. (h) The regulations contained in this section apply, regardless of land ownership, on all lands and waters within a park area that are under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States . . . . § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a) Irritant chemical devices, including bear spray, may be carried, possessed, and used in accordance with applicable Federal and non-conflicting State laws, except when prohibited or restricted under § 13.50. (b) Paragraphs (d) through (g) of this section apply to all park areas in Alaska except Klondike Gold Rush National Historical Park, Sitka National Historical Park and the former Mt. McKinley National Park, Glacier Bay National Monument and Katmai National Monument. (c) Except as provided in this section and § 2.4 of this chapter, the following are prohibited - (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net ; (2) Carrying a weapon, trap, or net ; (3) Using a weapon, trap, or net . (d) Firearms may be carried, possessed, and used within park areas in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws, except where such carrying, possession, or use is prohibited or otherwise restricted under § 13.50. (e) Traps, bows and other implements (other than firearms) authorized by applicable State and Federal law for the taking of fish and wildlife may be carried, possessed, and used within park areas only during those times when the taking of fish and wildlife is authorized by applicable law or regulation. (f) In addition to the authorities provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, weapons (other than firearms), traps, and nets may be possessed within park areas provided such weapons, traps, or nets are within or upon a device or animal used for transportation and are unloaded and cased or otherwise packed in such a manner as to prevent their ready use while in a park area. (g) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, local rural residents who are authorized to engage in subsistence uses, including the taking of wildlife under § 13.480, may use, possess, or carry traps, nets and other weapons in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws. . . . § 13.50 Closure and restriction procedures. (a) Applicability and authority. The Superintendent will follow the provisions of this section to close an area or restrict an activity, or terminate or relax a closure or restriction, in NPS areas in Alaska. (b) Factors. In determining whether to close an area or restrict an activity, or whether to terminate or relax a closure or restriction, the Superintendent must ensure that the activity or area is managed in a manner compatible with the purposes for which the park area was established. The Superintendent's decision under this paragraph must therefore be guided by factors such as public health and safety, resource protection, protection of cultural or scientific values, subsistence uses, conservation of endangered or threatened species, and other management considerations. (c) Rulemaking requirements. This paragraph applies only to a closure or restriction, or the termination or relaxation of such, which is of a nature, magnitude and duration that will result in a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the area; adversely affect the area's natural, aesthetic, scenic, or cultural values; or require a long-term modification in the resource management objectives of the area. Except in emergency situations, the closure or restriction, or the termination or relaxation of such, must be published as a rulemaking in the Federal Register. (d) Written determination. Except in emergency situations, prior to implementing or terminating a closure or restriction, the superintendent shall prepare a written determination justifying the action. That determination shall set forth the reasons the closure or restriction authorized by paragraph (a) of this section has been established. This determination will be posted on the NPS Web site at www.nps.gov . (e) Restrictions on taking fish or wildlife. (1) Except in emergencies, the NPS will consult with the State agency having responsibility over fishing, hunting, or trapping and provide an opportunity for public comment, including one or more public meetings near the affected NPS unit, prior to implementing a closure or restriction on taking fish or wildlife. (2) Emergency closures or restrictions may not exceed a period of 60 days and may not be extended without following the nonemergency procedures of this section. (f) Notice. A list of closures and restrictions will be compiled in writing and updated annually. The list will be posted on the NPS Web site at www.nps.gov and made available at park headquarters. Additional means of notice reasonably likely to inform residents in the affected vicinity will also be provided where available, such as: (1) Publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the State or in local newspapers; (2) Use of electronic media, such as the internet and email lists; (3) Radio broadcast; or (4) Posting of signs in the local vicinity. (g) Violating a closure or restriction is prohibited. While the website notes that "Visitors should not consider firearms as protection from wildlife," this is advice, rather than a prohibition on using firearms in that fashion. It is a warning that firearms are a poor choice rather than a prohibition on using them for self-defense purposes. Also, if a use of firearms as self-defense against wildlife is determined to be unjustified, the park visitor might be charged with hunting without a permit. The state gun control laws in the pertinent states are summarized as follows (by the High County News newspaper) (apologies for the small print):

Can the US congress "break any deadlock that crops up between the president and the judiciary by ... impeaching a president or judge"?

According to a BBCnews article : Congress could break any deadlock that crops up between the president and the judiciary by creating a law that overturns his decision - or even impeaching a president or judge. Is it true that impeachment is a constitutional option to break any deadlock that crops up, as the BBC describes?

Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review ( Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224 ). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.

What protections does Europe provide for US patents (that China doesn't)?

According to a NYtimes article yesterday Xi Jinping had promised that China would protect intellectual property , then he reneged before the trade talks faltered. I am trying to understand the context of IP protection in China. Consider the following scenario. A US company today owns an (invention, not design) patent on the ideas in a product. The company markets and sells this product worldwide—Europe and China included. The company does not own a parallel patent in either the European Union or China. What is the difference between Europe and China? In particular: What stops a European company from selling a product in Europe infringing on a US patent? Is this any different in China at present? What stops a Chinese company from selling a product in China infringing on a US patent?

Foreign firms have long complained that enforcing their intellectual property rights in China is difficult due to local judicial protectionism, challenges in obtaining evidence, small damage awards, and a perceived bias against foreign firms. . . . Local Judicial Protectionism One major complaint levied against China’s IPR regime is that cases brought to an intermediate court (at the municipal level) will suffer from local judicial protectionism. Long and Wang found in their 2015 study that in IP cases between Chinese firms, plaintiffs litigating in their hometown are significantly more likely to win. . . . Challenges in Obtaining Evidence In order to effectively litigate intellectual property cases, IP holders need evidence. In the United States, parties usually obtain information through the pre-trial procedure of discovery, which includes interrogatories and depositions, as well as requests for admissions and access to documents, real property, or other relevant items for review or testing. In China, on the other hand, no formal process of discovery exists, and there is no requirement that IP infringers provide evidence, such as sales or accounting documents, that could be used to show infringement. In fact, the burden to provide evidence is on the plaintiff. Many companies have claimed that this makes it impossible to conduct fair IP litigation in China. . . . Small Damage Awards . . . . Many businesses have complained that pursuing intellectual property cases in Chinese courts is not worthwhile because the damages awarded are too small. Some estimates indicate that patent holders currently receive around 36 percent of the damages they seek in litigation, with damage awards averaging around just 80,000 RMB ($12,400) and legal fees between 10,000 RMB and 30,000 RMB ($1,550 to $4,650). . . . Bias Against Foreign Firms Finally, a string of high-profile losses to relatively unknown Chinese companies in patent infringement cases by companies like Apple, Samsung, Sony, and Dell have convinced many observers that it is impossible for foreign firms to get a fair shake in China’s courts. . . . The material quoted above, from this source , described the historical complaints about Chinese patent law, and then goes on to suggest that many of these concerns have lessened due to legal and policy changes in the last few years. Generally speaking, in Europe, the patent enforcement process is similar to that in the U.S. You might also consider asking this question again in the Patents.SE forum for more specialized insight.

Can "obscenity" be used to forbid a political sign?

According to a New York Times story "She Hates Biden. Some of Her Neighbors Hate the Way She Shows It." a woman in the Borough of Roselle Park, N.J has been ordered to take down a political banner because of its "obscene" content under a local law, or face daily fines. While the story does not directly quote the banner, it seems that it says "Fuck Biden" or something close to that. The Mayor of the town was quoted as saying: This is not about politics in any way, ... It’s about decency. The mayor is also reported as saying that the same steps would have been taken if the banner had supported Biden and opposed Trump in similar language. According to a story in NJ.Com : Roselle Park Municipal Court Judge Gary Bundy ordered the Willow Avenue homeowner to remove the signs with profanity within a week or face a $250-a-day fine. Patricia Dilascio is the property owner but her daughter, Andrea Dick, had the signs, three of which include the F-word, on display. The Judge was quoted in that story as saying: This is not a case about politics. It is a case, pure and simple, about language[.] This ordinance does not restrict political speech. Neither this town or its laws may abridge or eliminate Ms. Dilascio’s freedom of speech. However, freedom of speech is not simply an absolute right. It is clear from state law and statutes that we cannot simply put up the umbrella of the First Amendment and say everything and anything is protected speech. The action was brought under Roselle Park code section 3.8 which provides that: § 3-8.1 Obscene Materials or Actions Prohibited. [1980 Code § 152-1] It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, business association, club, group of individuals or any combination of the aforementioned to knowingly photograph, act in, pose for, print, sell, offer for sale, give away, exhibit, publish or offer to publish or otherwise distribute or pander, make, display or exhibit any obscene material, communication or performance or other article or item which is obscene within the Borough. § 3-8.2 Determination of Obscenity. [1980 Code § 152-2] The word "obscene" shall mean any material, communication or performance which the average person applying contemporary community standards existing within the municipality, would find, when considered as a whole: a. Appeals to the prurient interest; b. Depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct as hereinafter specifically defined, or depicts or exhibits offensive nakedness as hereinafter specifically defined; and c. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Can a local court in the US validly make such an order, given the protections of the US First Amendment?

In the Vietnam War era case of Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) the US Supreme court held that the use of the word "fuck" in political speech was protected. As the opinion says: Appellant Paul Robert Cohen was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court of violating that part of California Penal Code § 415 which prohibits 'maliciously and willfully disturb(ing) the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person' ... On April 26, 1968, the defendant was observed in the Los Angeles County Courthouse in the corridor outside of division 20 of the municipal court wearing a jacket bearing the words 'Fuck the Draft' which were plainly visible. There were women and children present in the corridor. The defendant was arrested. The defendant testified that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft. In affirming the conviction the Court of Appeal held that 'offensive conduct' means 'behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace,' and that the State had proved this element because, on the facts of this case, '(i)t was certainly reasonably foreseeable that such conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a violent act against the person of the defendant or attempt to forceably remove his jacket.' ... The conviction quite clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message to the public. The only 'conduct' which the State sought to punish is the fact of communication. Thus, we deal here with a conviction resting solely upon 'speech,' cf. Stromberg v. California , 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931), not upon any separately identifiable conduct which allegedly was intended by Cohen to be perceived by others as expressive of particular views ... ... Appellant's conviction, then, rests squarely upon his exercise of the 'freedom of speech' protected from arbitrary governmental interference by the Constitution and can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the manner in which he exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the substantive message it conveys. This does not end the inquiry, of course, for the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses. ... ... ... this case cannot be said to fall within those relatively few categories of instances where prior decisions have established the power of government to deal more comprehensively with certain forms of individual expression simply upon a showing that such a form was employed. This is not, for example, an obscenity case. Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic. Roth v. United States , 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). ... ... While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not 'directed to the person of the hearer.' Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U.S. 296, 309, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult. Nor do we have here an instance of the exercise of the State's police power to prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction. Cf. Feiner v. New York , 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago , 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). ... ... Of course, the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe , 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). ... .. the issue flushed by this case stands out in bold relief. It is whether California can excise, as 'offensive conduct,' one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse, either upon the theory of the court below that its use is inherently likely to cause violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary. The rationale of the California court is plainly untenable. At most it reflects an 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance (which) is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist ., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen. ... ... we cannot overemphasize that, in our judgment, most situations where the State has a justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one or more of the various established exceptions, discussed above but not applicable here, to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of individual expression. ... ... we discern certain more particularized considerations that peculiarly call for reversal of this conviction. First, the principle contended for by the State seems inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? ... ... we cannot overlook the fact, ... that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. ... ... we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. It is, in sum, our judgment that, absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. Because that is the only arguably sustainable rationale for the conviction here at issue, the judgment below must be reversed. Thus the Court held that, when used in a political rather than an erotic context, the word "fuck" was protected free speech, not subject to government prohibition, at least under the circumstances of the Cohen case. As the use of this word is farm more publicly acceptable now than it was in 1968 or 1971, It is hard to see how this ruling would change. I would expect a court to overturn the judgement against the woman who posted the banners. Further Information In the Wikipedia Article about the Cohen case it is said that: The Court ultimately found that displaying a mere four-letter word was not sufficient justification to allow states to restrict free speech and that free speech can be restricted only under severe circumstances beyond offensiveness. The ruling set a precedent used in future cases concerning the power of states to regulate free speech in order to maintain public civility. Other important cases cited in the Cohen opmion include: Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940) in which a man attempting to promote his religious views played a phonograph record to others on a public street. The others found the record offensive, and Cantwell was convicted of a breech of the peace and of soliciting without a license. Te US Supreme Court overturned the conviction in what has become a landmark case. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District*, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) was a case in which a high-school student was part of a group who decided to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War and were suspended from school. It should be noted that the terms of the Borough ordinance closely track the Miller decision , the current Supreme Court case defining obscenity. However that decision requires that to be "obscene" a text or image must be in significant degree sexual -- this is what is meant by "appeals to the prurient interest". § 3-8.2 (a) of the code (quoted in the question) requires that to be found obscene content must "appeal to the prurient interest", but it is hard to see how the political signs described in the news stories (and pictured in one of them) so appeal.

Can congressional leaders "expel" elected members of Congress?

According to a Washington Post article about Alabama Senate candidate Roy Moore, in the spotlight for an apparent history of sexual relations with teenagers, congressmen are trying to... pressure GOP nominee Roy Moore to withdraw from the Alabama Senate race amid allegations of sexual misconduct, declaring him “unfit to serve” and threatening to expel him from Congress if he were elected. That last part is the interesting one. Do members of Congress have the power to "expel" a democratically (if controversially) elected senator from the United States Congress?

The leaders can't do it unilaterally, but the members collectively can expel other members. It requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate. US Constitution, Article I, Section 5: Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. Normally this would be preceded by a committee investigation, which might issue a recommendation as to whether the member should be expelled. To date, fifteen US Senators have been expelled via this process: see https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm . Fourteen of them were in 1861 for supporting the Confederacy, and the other was in 1797 for "Anti-Spanish conspiracy and treason". There were several more cases in which the Senate considered expulsion but ultimately voted not to, and others in which the Senator in question resigned under threat of expulsion.

Has "ideological payment" or "emotional payment" qualified someone as a mercenary in a Western or international court of law?

According to a certain rendition of the Russian viewpoints: The persons were motivated entirely by private gain, in this case the "feel-good" emotion that comes with killing Russians [...] So, while "killing Russians" may not be exactly a high-minded reason to take up arms, have Western or international courts of law ever held that this kind of "ideological/emotional payment" qualifies someone as a mercenary?

If your motivation isn’t material, you aren’t a mercenary Under the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries , 4 December 1989: A mercenary is any person who: a Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; b Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; c Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; d Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and e Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. Furthermore, if these people were serving in the Ukrainian military, even In dedicated foreign units, they aren’t mercenaries.

UAE now banning Virtual Private Network (VPN) access. Are business travelers exempt?

According to a few news articles , the UAE is passing a new law with heavy penalties for using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) . Another report says : Travelers also come under this law and if caught using any VPNs could face fines as well as jail time. The text of the law will be: Whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery, shall be punished by temporary imprisonment and a fine of no less than Dh500,000 [£100,000] and not exceeding Dh2,000,000 [£400,000], or either of these two penalties. Allegedly it's to protect local companies, but also obviously helps penalise those circumventing blocks of say, Whatsapp. However, many people legitimately need to connect to their company VPNs for work. If you're in the UAE for business reasons, are there ways to get an exemption from this law?

This article is from an official Emirates news agency, which confirms the change (Federal Law 12/2016). This is a change to Federal Law 5/2012 , replacing Article 9 (the translation into English is odd because the verb phrase goes first). The level of the penalty has increased (minimum 150K → minimum 500K; maximum 500K → 2M). Incarceration is changed from "imprisonment" to "temporary imprisonment", which might mean that previously the term was life. In either case, they have an "and" problem that the punishment is "(temporary) imprisonment and a fine ... or either of these two penalties". Presumably the Arabic version is dispositive. Apart from that, the new version of the law identifies the offender as Whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery whereas the old law only said whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery. Thus the meaning of "computer network protocol address" is defined as being equivalent to "IP address". In other words, there is no substantive change beyond the stiffer penalty. There does not seem to any provision allowing one to ask for exceptions. Article 30 of the underlying law strongly suggests that there is no exception and you should not ask. On a separate note, only Etisalat and Du are authorized to provide telecommunications services, pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 3/2003 . This article from August 24, 2015 also links to a number of related articles indicating that everything is illegal.

Can I get my answers deleted from Stack Exchange?

According to a moderator statement in meta that I read, Stack Exchange claims a "license" on the answers and questions which a user has posted. From a copyright standpoint can a claim be made or a DMCA takedown override this "license", whatever it is?

Users grant StackExchange a licence : You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. That should be determinative, but there was also some question as to whether StackExchange users can be deemed to have agreed to these terms. For this reason, I'll also review some case law relating to what are known as "click-wrap" agreements where the terms are made available via a hyperlink. In my opinion, StackExchange's way of displaying links to their Terms of Service during registration meets the requirements that have in the past been sufficient for courts to deem the user to have read and agreed to those Terms of Service. See for example, Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp. , 697 F. 3d 110 (2012), especially the section titled "Notice" for reference to other cases: A person can assent to terms even if he or she does not actually read them, but the "offer [must nonetheless] make clear to [a reasonable] consumer" both that terms are being presented and that they can be adopted through the conduct that the offeror alleges constituted assent. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. , 306 F. 3d 17 (2002) 1 frames the notice test in terms of a "reasonably prudent offeree" and whether they would "have known of the existence of license terms". In Guadagno v. E Trade Bank*, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (2008), the court found that clicking on an acknowledgement icon near an underlined, highlighted link to an agreement was acceptance of that agreement: In the instant case, a highlighted, underlined link to the Agreement was directly above the acknowledgement box, along with notice that "The following contain important information about your account(s)." A reasonably prudent offeree would have noticed the link and reviewed the terms before clicking on the acknowledgment icon. I think the most similar case is Fteja v. Facebook, Inc. , 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 Dist. Court, SD New York (2012), although not at an appellate level. In order to have obtained a Facebook account, Fteja must have clicked the second "Sign Up" button. Accordingly, if the phrase that appears below that button is given effect, when Fteja clicked "Sign Up," he "indicat[ed] that [he] ha[d] read and agree[d] to the Terms of Policy." This is very similar to StackExchange's sign-up process: That court outlined a lot of case law and concluded that "Fteja assented to the Terms of Use and therefore to the forum selection clause therein". A DMCA takedown could be successful if submitted by somebody other than the StackExchange user where that other party asserts copyright ownership in the contributed material. This could happen if a StackExchange user infringed copyright by posting material that they didn't have the right to reproduce. 1. Opinion authored by now Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor.

Can President Trump shoot off the nukes whenever he wants to, even for no reason?

According to a recent editorial in Scientific American(March 1,2017 "Take the Nukes off a Short Fuse"), the president of the United States can order missiles to be shot off without anyone else concurring. Also, are military personnel legally bound to obey this? Maybe a soldier could legally disobey such an order on the grounds that it was an illegal order or that it "shocked the conscience?"

The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requir­ing the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawful­ness of an order is a question of law to be deter­mined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful.

How can the the USA legally ask illegal immigrants to pay taxes while denying them any legal basis of citizenship?

According to a report released by The Institute of Taxation and Economic Policy in February 2016, they state that: 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States are paying annually an estimated amount of $11.64 billion in state and local taxes, on average an estimated 8 percent of their incomes. Q. What is the legal basis of asking illegal immigrants in the USA to pay 'state and local taxes while denying them any basis for citizenship? Q. And underlying that, the ethical and moral justification?

Paying taxes need not have any legal connection to citizenship or potential citizenship. There is no constitutional provision, or law, which limits taxation to citizens or those on a path to citizenship. Legal immigrants, those on visas, and indeed tourists, must all pay various taxes, including hotel taxes and sales taxes. Lawful immigrants who work in the US must pay federal and (in most states) state income tax, and I believe some undocumented immigrants pay Federal income tax as well. Many countries tax people who are not citizens, nor immigrants in line for citizenship, and this has been true far back in history. Indeed the Romans taxed pretty much every inhabitant of and visitor to the Roman Empire, most of whom were not Roman Citizens. Things haven't changed that much since. It might be argued on philosophical grounds that such people should not be required to pay taxes, or should not be required to pay certain specific taxes. But that is not the law at this time, and this forum is not for debating what the law should be.

What is a sure shot way of proving citizenship of India?

According to a ruling by the Bombay High Court in 2013, an Indian passport cannot prove citizenship. Also, in 2019, the Government of India claimed that 'common documents' were enough to prove citizenship. What are the documents or paperwork which can prove someone is an Indian citizen? Reference: https://theleaflet.in/indian-citizenship-law-a-mess-proving-citizenship-even-messier/

What are the documents or paperwork which can prove someone is an Indian citizen? As is often the case, it depends on the context: who is seeking to prove the person's Indian citizenship? For what purpose? How did the person become an Indian citizen? For example, if the person became Indian by naturalization, a naturalization certificate would usually be necessary. If a person became Indian by birth then evidence establishing the relevant facts will be needed, and this evidence will typically include a birth certificate. We can see that a passport isn't necessary to prove citizenship because a first-time passport applicant needs to prove citizenship in the application. Whatever documents are acceptable for this must therefore constitute proof of citizenship. But there is always the possibility that an Indian citizen in possession of any document, including a passport, does something that causes the automatic loss of Indian nationality, such as naturalizing in a foreign country. At that point, the former Indian citizen will be in possession of documents that appear to show Indian citizenship without actually being an Indian citizen. Therefore, we can establish that no document or set of documents can be conclusive proof of Indian citizenship. Depending on the context, the person who needs to be convinced of a person's Indian citizenship may or may not need to take into account the likelihood that the person has somehow done something that would cause loss of citizenship. An airline agent boarding a passenger for an international flight to India will be satisfied by the passport. The immigration officer processing the passenger on arrival might however make a brief inquiry into possible expatriating acts. A judge in a court case may go as far as to undertake an intensive legal-factual analysis in which documents play a limited role, if any. Thus, the answer to your question What is the sure shot way of proving citizenship of India? is that there is none. There is always the possibility that a good-faith attempt to prove the citizenship of an Indian citizen will fail. There is always the possibility of a noncitizen having documents that were issued legitimately and purport to show that the person is an Indian citizen. In the 2013 case, it appears that the passports were issued in error . The court did not rule that passports cannot be used to prove Indian citizenship but that it "may not be enough to prove you are an Indian citizen if you were born after July 1, 1987" (quoting the Times of India here, not the court).

Is it really illegal for someone who's not a postman to use a mailslot in the USA?

According to an answer given here "It is illegal for anyone other than the USPS to put mail in someone's mailbox" From https://about.usps.com/news/state-releases/tx/2010/tx_2010_0909.htm By law, a mailbox is intended only for receipt of postage-paid U.S. Mail. This sure is a strange law. Why was it made? So it's illegal for someone to deliver their own mail in the US? What about non-mail items, like locking the door and putting the key through the mail slot, is this technically illegal in the US?

A mail slot is not a mailbox. So putting a key through a mail slot after locking the door is not the same as putting the key in a mailbox.

Obtaining source code from an uncooperative company when you're an author

According to an answer on Methods for obtaining source code from an uncooperative company : You're probably out of luck. The company distributing this firmware has an obligation to provide you the source code, but this obligation is to the copyright holder. You are not the copyright holder. The copyright holder would have to sue them for license compliance. Does this change for someone who wrote some of the code and the copyright of that portion is under their name? For example, would someone like Ulrich Drepper (the author of several components of the Linux kernel) be in a different situation than the OP of that question with regards to having rights to the source code if other copyright holders (like SFC) don't sue?

It depends on the license the code comes under and whether theres a copyright-assignment requirement for that project. In the case of the Linux kernel, the license is the GPLv2, and there is no copyright assignment requirement - so anyone who can prove ownership of code within the shipped binary (important caveat there - the Linux kernel is configurable, so parts of it can be excluded from the binary) can pursue a claim of copyright infringement if the source code is not distributed according to the license. With the case of things like GCC (until the most recent version), while the project uses the GPL (v3), it also required copyright assignment to the FSF, meaning the original authors do not hold the copyright and thus have no standing to sue (authors rights not-with-standing). They have now dropped this requirement in the latest GCC version, but it stands for older versions. As copyright holder, you have no ability to actually force the binary distributor to comply with the terms of the license - you can merely threaten them with, and pursue, a claim of copyright infringement. In court, you can sue to stop them from infringing further and to pay punitive and actual damages. You may be able to get them to agree to conform with the license terms, but its highly doubtful that a court would agree to force them to conform with the license terms (there has yet to be a copyright-infringement case orientated around open source software that has resulted in a court forcing the infringing company to GPL their own code they were trying to protect by non-compliance). So, to answer your question, theres no actual avenue here which results in you obtaining the source code you have copyright ownership of - the legal actions you can take are ones of stopping infringement and claiming damages. You might be able to come to an out-of-court settlement or a voluntary agreement to provide the code, but court actions will be about stopping the infringement and damages.

Which law dictates what medical research is and the conditions under which it can be carried out?

According to an answer to this post , the legality of asking someone questions about what they experienced after consuming a drug changes if the questioner initiated the consuming of the drug, in which case it’s medical research and has to conform to medical research regulations, vs. if you ask after they already took a drug, in which case it can be seen as market research and not medical. What law dictates what defines “medical research” and rules such as the one above? Is it 45 CFR ? Thank you

What is and what isn't a medical trial is a decision of the FDA , and they outline their process on their own website . The FDA is allowed to regulate under a repeatedly updated set of laws since its inception: Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (esp. 21 USC chapter 9) Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 (alterations to 21 USC chapter 9) Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (more additions and adjustments to 21 USC chapter 9) Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007 (many many revisions to the whole of 21 USC, including chapter 9)

Why can't a cryptocurrency be classified the same way as airline points or store rewards?

According to an article I read on Law360 (paywalled), Facebook's Libra could never be successful as envisioned because the tax reporting burden on it will be too high. Essentially, users will constantly need to track the value of their Libra vs the US dollar to report their taxes accurately in US dollars. Here's an excerpt: Users hoping to pay for everyday transactions with Facebook Inc.'s planned cryptocurrency could be required to keep near-constant tax records, a major impediment to the company's dream of establishing a convenient worldwide digital currency. If tax authorities were to consider Facebook's Libra an asset — as most do digital currencies now — then they would likely consider any exchange to be a realization of gain or loss, requiring taxpayers to keep records and potentially pay capital gains tax. To create a cryptocurrency “as widely accepted and as easy to use as possible” that “people can use with confidence and convenience in their everyday lives,” as Facebook has promised, the company would need either to create an unprecedented tax compliance program for its users, or to persuade tax authorities around the globe to change how they treat cryptocurrencies. My question is, why can't Libra just be classified like any "points" offered by a company or group of companies? For example, I earn Starbucks points and I don't calculate the value of a Starbucks point in US dollars every time I get a coffee.

It's always amazing to me why some people find it so difficult to understand, just because the word "crypto" is involved. It goes like this: Cryptocurrency is an asset, like any other asset. It's also a currency, but that part can be ignored for this purpose. Buying an asset, any asset, is (usually) not a taxable event. "Buying" in this case consists of exchanging US$ for the asset, just to be clear. Selling an asset, any asset, is (usually) a taxable event. Exchanging an asset for another asset is (usually) also a taxable event. So exchanging a cow for two sheep is a taxable event. The taxable event consist of being deemed to have sold the cow for an "amount realized" equal to the value of two sheep. That amount, less the cost of the cow (the "adjusted basis") is taxable gain (or loss), short or long term - depending on how long the cow was held before the exchange. The outcome is the same if you replace the two sheep with several hundred cups of coffee or several hundred hamburgers; the outcome is still the same if you replace the cow with any currency (other than the US$), crypto- or otherwise. And that's (almost) all there is to it...

Can usage of Google Analytics (without consent) be considered a legitimate interest?

According to another answer here explicit consent is not required for Google Analytics, however I'd like to know why, as I am not a lawyer and my own interpretation is that GA use cannot be a "legitimate interest" in the context of a simple website that's just publishing articles in the open. So first of all it is true that Google Analytics can use anonymized IPs , however GA also drops a tracking cookie used to distinguish users, with an expiration time of 2 years. And AFAIK tracking cookies are considered "personal data" under the GDPR, even if they are pseudo-anonymous. Recital 47 says this: The processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes may be regarded as carried out for a legitimate interest So it seems possible, however due to the use of "may" all this says is that "analytics" can be regarded as a legitimate interest, however the publisher still needs to establish the legitimate interest. And that same recital 47 says this: ... the existence of a legitimate interest would need careful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place I don't see how visitors of a website can expect being tracked upon opening a website and the website can definitely work without tracking, so I don't see how this can be a legitimate interest. So what am I missing, anybody with legal expertise that can help out?

You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none : ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive . Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR.

legal term explanation required

According to below mentioned clause ,Am I allowed to join other IT company in the practice Computer Software House or not "To refrain from directly or indirectly competing with the Employer or working for another competing organisation in the practice of Computer Software House within UAE for a period of 24 months (not exceeding 24 calendar months) following the expiration or termination of the Employment Contract."

Anti-competition clauses are legal under UAE law, see here and here . Article 127 of UAE Labour Law specifically allows non-compete clauses related to access to clients of business secrets, provided that the agreement must be confined, in terms of time, place and the nature of the business, to the extent necessary to safeguard the employer's legitimate interests. which means there is no fixed upper duration of the restriction. This article analyzes some of the nuances of UAE law on this point, and they observe Concerning the timely limitation, a reasonable duration for a non-competition clause normally ranges between 3 months to 2 years from the date of termination of the employment contract. In the past, it was often held that the (previous) automatic employment ban of 6 months after termination have a similar effect as a non-competition clause i.e. preventing the employee to enter the country during this time; hence, it was concluded that a specific non-competition clauses included in the employment agreement should only be limited to 6 months as well. Under a ruling by the Dubai Court of Cassation, Petition NO. 58/2008 (as summarized in the preceding analysis), violating a non-compete clause with a duration of 2 years can be enforced, but the onus is on the employer (plaintiff) to prove that they have suffered the alleged damage.

What exactly does "without prejudice" mean and how does it work?

According to businessdictionary.com without prejudice means Law phrase: Without abandonment of a claim, privilege, or right, and without implying an admission of liability. This sounds pretty good. So why doesn't everyone use it all the time, or at least have it included with the boilerplate email footer like "this message is confidential". Could it back fire in the sense if the writer included it, then they could not use their message as evidence in court? According to a comment on LinkedIn made by Edward Prybylko Without Prejudice is a codified expression meaning that you reserve the right to revoke or amend the agreement of the contract, much like the ellipses ("...") How does this work? What would be stopping a person from amending a contract to change the price of things unilaterally, just the fact no one would sign a contract with the phrase? Is "without prejudice" normally used in written communications (like emails) or more in formal contracts that are being signed?

I virtually never see "without prejudice" used in anything but court documents, unless the writer does not know what he's saying. A typical example would be when a person sues someone, but brings the case in the wrong court. The judge would dismiss the case without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could refile somewhere else. In contrast, if the person filed in the correct court, but the judge ruled that the plaintiff had done nothing wrong, the judge would then dismiss the case with prejudice. I believe I have on some occasions seen the phrase used in legal correspondence, perhaps noting, for example, that a party was willing to settle his sexual harassment claim for X amount of money without prejudice to their claims for some unrelated issue. In either event, "without prejudice" is typically referring to the ongoing ability to litigate a claim. I'm not entirely clear on how you're envisioning it being used as e-mail boilerplate, but I can't see any reason to do so. If you did, that would not have any effect on the e-mail's admissibility. EDIT: One other note, because I hadn't looked at it before. The LinkedIn article to which you linked and the comments on it are basically nonsense. Legal advice from a graduate of the "School of Life" is about as valuable as life advice from a graduate of a school of law.

Can I use CC BY-NC licenced music in my freemium mobile game?

According to creativecommons.org, a CC BY-NC license stands for a Creative Commons license that prohibits you to use the material in "Commercial Purposes" and for the commercial purposes they have defined it in this way: A commercial use is one primarily intended for commercial advantage or monetary compensation As freemium games (especially mine) can be played without spending even a penny and the in-app purchases are only meant to accelerate the process (so is not primarily intended for commercial I think?), is this game still intended as a commercial project with the definition given above? And should I ignore using such music?

If they receive a benefit (e.g. ‘better’ gameplay) in return for their payment it’s commercial. If the payment is a pure gift (e.g. “I worked hard on this game, if you like it sling me a few bucks”) then it isn’t.

Exactly which individuals born in the United States are not subject to its jurisdiction?

According to federal regulations , individuals born to foreign diplomats who are on the Blue List are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and thus are not US citizens at birth. But what would happen in the case of a child born in the US if One parent is a foreign diplomat, and the other is a US citizen? One parent is a foreign diplomat, and the other is a lawful permanent resident? One parent is a foreign diplomat, and the other has some non-diplomatic status such as F-1 student? (Aside: The Canadian Citizenship Act is much more explicit. A person born in Canada to a foreign diplomat parent will acquire Canadian citizenship at birth if the other parent is either a Canadian citizen or permanent resident [ link ].)

As long as they have diplomatic immunity, they don't have a residency status. If either parent didn't have diplomatic immunity, then the child is a subject to the jurisdiction and they become a citizen at birth. The short explanation with the reasoning can be found on the uscis website . Namely Children born in the United States to accredited foreign diplomatic officers do not acquire citizenship under the 14th Amendment since they are not “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” and If one parent was an accredited diplomat, but the other was a U.S. citizen or non-citizen U.S. national, then the child was “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and is a citizen.

Is there a volume limit on FOIA requests? Could I effectively request every police report?

According to guidelines published by HHS.gov, some fees apply in certain scenarios: Fee Guidelines There is no initial fee to make a FOIA request, and in some cases no fees are charged. Departmental Regulations allow us to recover part of the costs associated with processing FOIA requests. For fee purposes, FOIA divides requesters into three categories: 1 Commercial use requesters are charged for any search time, document review, and duplication 2 News media, educational, or scientific requesters are charged for duplication only, after the first 100 pages 3 All other requesters are charged for search time (after two hours) and duplication (after 100 pages) You may make a specific statement in your request limiting the amount of fees you are willing to pay. If you do not state a specific fee limit we will assume that you are willing to pay all fees incurred while processing your request. So I realize fees might make this prohibitively expensive. That aside: To add some context for a use-case where I might want to make mass requests for all police reports involving burglary or shootings: Buying my first home, I didn't think to search for any articles mentioning shootings in the area. A shooting happened very close to my house. I searched and realized there were a significant number of local news stories mentioning shootings on my street over the past few years. I thought it might be useful to make an app that, based on the user's location, scrapes police reports for reports mentioning burglary / violence key words at a nearby address. I'm wondering about, fee considerations aside, whether some legal limitations on FOIA would prevent someone from requesting all police reports matching these criteria, potentially a large number of documents.

First note that HHS is a federal agency, and "the police" are not a federal agency. You have to look into the law governing the specific agency. At the federal level, this is controlled by 5 USC 552 , which starts by saying what every agency must make available. Under certain circumstances, an agency can charge search fees, but there is no limit under federal law regarding the maximum number of requests that can be made. If you want police records, you have to investigate the rules of your state. In Washington , once you have passed the subject-matter bar (records that are exempt from disclosure), there is, again, no limit on the number of requests that can be made by an individual / organization. This is explicitly recognized in Zink v. City of Mesa , 140 Wn. App. 328 where the court finds that "the PDA does not place a limit on the number of record requests an individual can make", even when the number of requests made of this tiny village was arguably a significant burden on their resources. It depends on what the governing law is. I am not aware of any state that stipulates a maximum number of requests, but there are a lot of states to check.

Does encoding constitutional rights in state law have any effect?

According to https://local12.com/news/local/student-religious-liberty-act-sponsor-says-it-protects-rights-critics-say-its-not-needed , Rep. Catherine Ingram argued that a recent bill in Ohio - requiring employees of public schools to respect certain religious freedoms of students - was "redundant and unnecessary" because the rights it purported to grant were already afforded to students by the First Amendment. Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is true that the rights described in the state law are indeed all ones that are already granted, clearly, by the constitution. Let's also suppose that both the bill and the current Constitutional case law are clear enough that it's unambiguous that this is the case. Does Ingram's conclusion then follow? Does having a right granted by the Constitution indeed mean that encoding that same right in state law has no legal effect? Or can the "redundant" encoding of such a right in state law in fact have some effect - perhaps by impacting what entities can be sued for violating the right, or in what sort of court?

If they are word-for-word the same, no However, if they are different, courts will treat them as different and try to give effect to that difference. The general attitude of courts is that if the politicians took the time to draft, debate and pass legislation it must have a purpose. This will generally have the result of broadening the actions that are afforded the protection so that actions that were not protected by the Federal law now might be protected by the State law. It's also possible that by enacting a State law that may (intentionally or not) engage other state laws including, for example, one that gives a right to sue or engages criminal or civil penalties for breaching State law that may not exist for a breach of Federal law only. It also throws precedent into confusion. While it is likely that existing precedent would apply to the State based law its also possible (because the statutes are not word-for-word identical) that there would be some confusion leading to more litigation until the precedent settles. This is probably not a good thing.

Will the new australian telecoms bill allow to compel companies to build spy functionality into their software?

According to https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r6195_aspassed/toc_pdf/18204b01.pdf companies could be required to enhance their software to allow for spying. They would enforce this via a "technical capability notice". However, in Section 317ZG (p.84) they should not be compelled to build "systemic weaknesses". What is the difference here? Changing software to allow spying leads to a weak system, or is it not? Note: this is not specifically about encryption. This is covered separately in the bill.

Nobody knows. The relevant parts of the bill: 317ZG: (1) A technical assistance request, technical assistance notice or technical capability notice must not have the effect of: (a) requesting or requiring a designated communications provider to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection; or (b) preventing a designated communications provider from rectifying a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, in a form of electronic protection. (2) The reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to implement or build a new decryption capability in relation to a form of electronic protection. (3) The reference in paragraph (1)(a) to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into a form of electronic protection includes a reference to one or more actions that would render systemic methods of authentication or encryption less effective. ... For the purposes of subsections (4A) and (4B), an act or thing will, or is likely to, jeopardise the security of information if the act or thing creates a material risk that otherwise secure information can be accessed by an unauthorised third party. So, a company can't be forced to break an encryption algorithm, or introduce a vulnerability that affects everyone equally. But... 317B: systemic vulnerability means a vulnerability that affects a whole class of technology, but does not include a vulnerability that is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person. For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the person can be identified. systemic weakness means a weakness that affects a whole class of technology, but does not include a weakness that is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person. For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the person can be identified. They can be compelled to break the encryption used by a specific person, or introduce a vulnerability into encryption as used by a specific person. Key escrow could be considered a technology that satisfies both criteria, although it carries the risk that the stored keys could be stolen by an unauthorized third party. It's up to the courts to decide if this constitutes a "material risk". There are other techniques that involve installing backdoors for everyone and then only activating a particular backdoor, but they carry the same risk as key escrow, plus the additional risk of independent discovery of the backdoor. Again, this is something the courts will need to rule on.

Legal Considerations When Self-Publishing a Book

According to https://wordsrated.com/self-published-book-sales-statistics/ , 300 million self-published books are sold each year. I am thinking about, in the future, uploading (i.e., self-publishing) two books to Amazon: (i) One that I re-typeset that I believe is in the public domain. (ii) One that I composed myself. I don't know who will appear as the publisher---perhaps, say, "ABC publishing" (if Amazon allows me to insert a name) or Kindle Direct Publishing. In any case, I am wondering if either I or KDP Amazon could get sued if, say, (i) someone wanted to contest my assertion that the first book is in the public domain; or, (ii) if someone did not like what I wrote in the second case and wanted to sue for whatever reason? Reasonably, can such occur; and if so, who would get sued---me or Amazon? If me, how may I protect myself? I would like to make the books available to the French and United States markets.

The vendor has available the DMCA safe harbor provisions if you decides to infringe someone else's book – the copyright owner notifies them that they don't have the copyright holder's permission, so they take the book down (independently the copyright owner sues you for infringement). There is a complicated procedure where they contact Amazon, Amazon tell you you've been accused of infringement and they take it down, they you can counter-claim that you have the right to distribute the book, then the owner files a suit against you). If Amazon doesn't comply with the DMCA formalities, they can be sued for contributory infringement. However: the copyright owner is the only person empowered to legally object – simply asserting that a book is "not in the public domain" carries no legal weight. If you are the copyright holder, but someone doesn't like what they can say, they can't do anything about it legally unless what you wrote is defamatory or is "illegal for you to publish" (you publish a fact that you cannot publish under a non-disclosure agreement; it constitutes a gross invasion of privacy...). The "whatever reason" matters very much. The consequence for you is that you will get sues and have to pay a bunch of money, plus the court will probably prevent any further distribution of the book. There are other sanctions in France, which I don't address here, for instance there are laws against publishing racist insults in France that don't exist in the US.

Is the Pelosi-Trump "f-you clap" State of the Union photo in the public domain?

According to https://www.cjr.org/covering_trump/viral-nancy-pelosi-photo-clap.php , one photographer from The New York Times was given exclusive photography privileges for this federal government event: ...New York Times White House photographer Doug Mills was appointed pool photographer for the State of the Union—a designation that meant he would be the only photographer allowed on the House floor during the event... That would incline me to think it should be a government record, but since it was taken by a photographer for a private news organization, I'm left uncertain. So, to rehash: Is the Pelosi-Trump "f-you clap" State of the Union photo in the public domain? If copyrighted, would modifying it into a form of satire allow one to skirt the copyright restrictions?

I don't think it's in the public domain. It is true that "works of the United States Government" cannot be copyrighted ( 17 USC 105 ). However, "work of the United States Government" is defined as a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties. ( 17 USC 101 ) The pool photographer isn't an officer or employee of the United States Government; he works for the New York Times. The satire question is separate and I don't know the answer to that.

Can I sue in Michigan small claims court for misrepresentation on a sale?

According to https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/forms/scao-approved/instdc84.pdf : If your damage is the result of an intentional wrongdoing, such as fraud, libel, slander, malicious destruction of property, or assault and battery, you cannot bring your action in the small claims division of the district court unless the wrongdoing is for a dishonored check, consumer protection violation, or recreational trespass. I made a purchase in which I later discovered the sellers had concealed damage in need of repair. Sellers are individuals, not a business. Is this classified as fraud for which I cannot seek restitution in small claims, or is there any technicality on which this case might be accepted at small claims court in Michigan?

Can I sue in Michigan small claims court for misrepresentation on a sale? Yes. MCL 600.8401 limits only the amount of money that can be recovered in Small Claims proceedings, not other elements underlying the claims. See Kerekes v. Bowlds , 179 Mich.App. 805, 812 (1989) (" The purpose of the small claims division is to facilitate the resolution of disputes involving small sums. "). Even if ones reads into Kaiser v. Smith , 188 Mich.App. 495, n.1 (1991) a prohibition of claims of fraud in Small Claims court, your matter appears to be a contract dispute regardless of whether fraud could be an alternative claim. That is because " [A]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with ordinary care the thing agreed to be done, and . . . a negligent performance constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract ", Webb v. David Eric Williams, Inc. , (COA, unpublished, 2009) (citations omitted). Schomaker v. Armour, Inc. , 550 N.W.2d 863 (1996) reflects an instance of a claim of breach of contract that was decided in Small Claims. Something to bear in mind is that " a party appearing in small claims court waives the right of appeal " unless the case is decided by a magistrate. See MCL 600.8427 and Schomaker .

how common are federal misdemeanor charges?

According to https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/hollywood-man-arrested-on-federal-charge-after-his-drone-crashed-with-an-lapd-helicopter/2466525/ a man was recently arrested on a federal misdemeanor charge for unsafe operation of his drone. My question is: how often are people arrested on federal misdemeanor charges? I get the impression the federal government typically only brings charges when the crime exceeds some minimum criteria.

They are far more uncommon than felony prosecutions, and far more uncommon than state misdemeanor prosecutions, but they aren't at all unheard of. According to the United States Sentencing Commission , about 96 percent of the ~80,000 criminal cases in the federal courts in 2019 were felonies, so that leaves something like 3,000 misdemeanors. Spread across the districts, it averages out to about 31 misdemeanors per court annually.

In what sense is the City of London a "corporation"?

According to its recently quoted annual report, legislation treats it "as a corporation". In what sense is this true and in which is it not true?

Although the word typically refers to a specific type of business entity, "corporation" simply means a group (or "body") of people or other entities that are collectively endowed with a status that treats them as though they were a single legal person that can exist indefinitely. In common-law jurisdictions like the U.K., this includes municipal corporations, which generally consist of the people living within the corporation's territorial boundaries, exercising their collective will through their elected representatives, and assigned certain rights and obligations as a result of their collective status. Although the same word is used, it would generally not be the case that a municipal corporation would be governed by the same laws as business corporations or trade guilds, which are also sometimes referred to as corporations. Barclay's and the City of London are both corporations, and therefore are treated as entities capable of making their own decisions, with rules allowing for their decision-making bodies to keep them "alive" in perpetuity. But there are also many obvious differences. The City of London does not have shareholders in the same sense that Barclays would, nor is it obligated to register its existence or undertake most of the other responsibilities facing a corporate entity. Wikipedia has more detail broken down by jurisdiction.

Does the decision against Grenoble mean that Rennes would also have to reimpose their burkini ban in public swimming pools?

According to latest news someone ( possibly the central French government, although that's not terribly clear) won a legal challenge against the city of Grenoble, which had recently lifted their burkini ban in public swimming pools. France’s highest administrative court on Tuesday upheld a ban on so-called burkinis in Grenoble’s public swimming pools. Interestingly enough however, according to an older VOA article, Rennes had made the same decision some years back but that apparently wasn't challenged in courts. A few years ago, local authorities quietly changed pool rules allowing all kinds of swimsuits, including burkinis. Initial controversy soon quieted down. Now, of the thousands swimming in Rennes public pools each year, local government says, just over a handful wear burkinis. So, does the decision of the "highest administrative court" also automatically force Rennes to go back on their decision regarding burkinis?

Rennes changed their rules in 2019 to allow the burkini. The ruling rejects the petition from Grenoble, and Rennes is not mentioned. The rationale is that the action was to satisfy a demand by a category of users and not all users. This might inspire a similar lawsuit by similar plaintiffs (Les interventions de la Ligue des droits de l’homme, de l’association Alliance citoyenne, la Ligue du droit international des femmes), but nothing immediately follows for Rennes from this ruling.

Can I sue a government agency for removing Facebook comments?

According to lawyers.com : “Even if a social media site is maintained as an official government tool, it may not be a public forum for purposes of free speech. For instance, government agencies don’t have to let citizens voice their opinions on official websites that are meant only to pass on information. But the picture changes once public agencies or officials set up sites or accounts that allow people to post comments and voice their opinions freely. Although there may be reasonable restrictions on things like vulgarity or spam, the officials may not delete comments or block users just because they don’t like the opinions being expressed—what’s known as “viewpoint discrimination.”‘ There is a certain Facebook page that is ran by a bureaucracy of the federal government, and I have several screenshots proving they remove, or hide, hundreds of comments on every post. Can I sue this government agency for removing Facebook comments?

As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years.

How many felonies does Santa Claus commit?

According to legend, Santa Claus engages in certain behavior every Christmas eve. How many felonies does he commit? He sees you when you're sleeping ... Peeping Tom He knows when you're awake ... Stalking He comes down your chimney ... Breaking and Entering He knows if you've been bad or good Invasion of privacy Harassment He operates a factory Kyoto Protocols? Clean Air Regulations? Operating a business without a license He makes toys Trademark infringement Patent infringement He makes books and music Copyright infringement He makes elves work for him for no pay ... Labor law violations He operates a flying sleigh: Numerous FAA regulations violations Numerous breeches of sovereign airspace When the sleigh is on the ground: Speeding Lack of proper licenses, insurance and registration He transports valuable cargo internationally: Crossing international borders without a passport Tariff evasion He doesn't file tax returns Failure to pay gift taxes Failure to file a tax return Tax evasion This is just a partial list. Jurisdiction: Worldwide

There appears to also be bribery of local officials as well. Not to mention, He operates with impugnity out of "The North Pole" which is I believe a TRADEMARK of a certain (now aging) USA male porn actor. I'm SO guessing that Santa is gonna appear out of nowhere, when the arctic oil drilling rights are being carved out among the abutter nations...and he's going to sit his fat tuchie all over those rights. Yaw, biotches! SANTA be in da hous! EDIT: it's almost certain that if Santa delivered a "My Little Pony" doll to little Elise in Akron, Ohio, USA...he violated a bevvy of Bern convention laws around intellectual property. Come to think of it..."Santa" is somewhat of a MODEL for "China" when it comes to IP law...

Is it true that men are forced to pay child support for children they didn't consent to have?

According to many in the men's rights movement , a woman who, in any way, gets pregnant from a man will be able to get child support from him, which in most states is proportional to a man's wealth. This is even if the man clearly didn't consent to have children. For example, Drake once allegedly put Tabasco in a used condom to avoid fathering a child with a woman he doesn't want to have children with. Many say that if a woman successfully takes semen from a discarded condom and impregnates herself, then she is not punished, but the father would be forced to pay child support. Is it true that there are no laws that protect men from non-consensual reproduction? The child is really his biologically The man consented to sex, but not to having children The woman did something non-consensual so that the man would impregnate her The woman is eligible for child support anyway Jurisdiction? Any country you know. In Indonesia, I know that a man can choose not to support any child. So I have never heard a case of stealthing against men. Of course, if the child is really the man's child and the sex is consensual and the child is not there due to malicious acts, quite often the man chooses to take care of the child anyway.

Is it true that men are forced to pay child support for children they didn't consent to having? Yes. This is true in every U.S. jurisdiction, in the U.K., and in every jurisdiction of which I am aware in the E.U., and it is the rule in many other jurisdictions. The duty to pay child support in these jurisdictions flows from the relationship between the father and the child, and is not a contractual concept based upon consent. The primary exceptions to this general rule are cases where a parental relationship is legally terminated (e.g., in connection with the adoption of a child born out of wedlock), and cases in which someone becomes a sperm donor in a statutorily authorized arrangement that generally does not involve sexual intercourse. Historically, roughly speaking in the early 19th century, and earlier in English common law, and most other European and European-colonist jurisdictions, a man only had a duty to support the children of his wife or the children of his deceased former wife if he was a widower. Even further back, in the Roman empire from which the foundations of Roman civil law were derived, a father had a right in his sole and absolute discretion to commit infanticide, killing his infant children, a right which was a major political issue in the Roman empire from sometime in the 100s CE until it collapsed. Some jurisdictions, such as Japan, only established a legal duty to pay child support to a custodial parent in any circumstances in the late 20th century, although those jurisdictions still recognized the legal duty of a father to support a child in his custody. It is also worth noting that women in every country of which I am aware have a duty to support the children to which they give birth, whether or not they consented to impregnation (e.g. even if they were raped), or to giving birth (e.g. even if they wanted an abortion but were denied access to abortion by law or otherwise). This support obligation persists in almost every case, even if the woman's child is in the custody of another parent or guardian, and a woman is much more likely to face criminal prosecution for failure to support her child than an uninvolved father (although criminal prosecutions of men for non-support do happen). So, the claim that this constitutes sex discrimination is ill-founded.

Applicability of Data Protection Laws When Talking to a Lawyer

According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. Can I tell such details legally to my lawyer when referring to individuals related to a case without the data owner's approval? I live in the European Union.

According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2 : This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses.

US regulations regarding internet gambling

According to my sources, the SAFE Port Act makes online gambling illegal. According to this source, the act [...] had attached to it a section making it illegal for banking institutions to allow their customers to send money to offshore gambling sites. And according to a blog post on fbi.gov , What’s allowed? Some free online games, fantasy leagues, and Indian gaming sites that aren’t strictly defined as Internet gambling. It’s also illegal for businesses to run gambling websites and to solicit online bets. Even companies handling transactions for cyberspace bettors can face federal charges. I need clarification on what forms of gambling websites are legal vs. illegal. And what about gambling items in a videogame?

The relevant legislation is found in sections 5361-5367 of the United States Code. The key prohibition is in section 5363 . To fall within the scope of this prohibition, a person must: (1) be "in the business of betting or wagering" and (2) accept a payment in connection with the participation of another person in "unlawful Internet gambling". So you need to look at (1) what is betting or wagering and (2) what is unlawful Internet gambling. Both terms are defined in section 5362 and discussed on Wikipedia . Assuming that you are running a video game that is not a thin veneer over a casino, and the users are gambling in-game items that are not purchased with actual money, then you are unlikely to be found to be engaged in the business of betting or wagering, especially given the exclusion in section 5362(1)(E)(viii) for "participation in any game or contest in which participants do not stake or risk anything of value."

How does the Uniform Plumbing Code apply to me, for the purposes of home renovation?

According to my state, Texas, Occupations code, Chapter 1301. PLUMBERS, it says in SEC. 1301.255. Adoption of Plumbing codes, Section 1301.255 adopts the Uniform Plumbing Code and the International Code Council's International Plumbing Code as they existed on May 31, 2001. The statute notes that the Texas State Board of Plumbing Examiners may adopt later versions of this code. As of June 2021, the 2018 edition of the Uniform Plumbing Code and the 2018 edition of the International Code Council's International Plumbing Code have been adopted by the State Board's Rule 367.2 in Title 22 of the Texas Administrative Code. Rule 367.2 also adopts codes incorporated by reference within the 2018 International Plumbing Code, which include the International Code Council's 2018 International Fuel Gas Code and the 2018 International Residential Code. See the text of Rule 367.2 for details. Does this bind me as a homeowner doing personal home renovations, or just plumbers for hire?

You can purchase your own copy of the UPC at just about any outlet that sells books including Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/2018-Uniform-Plumbing-Code-Tabs/dp/1944366075 Yes, your local AHJ (agency having jurisdiction) almost certainly has adopted this code or something very similar to it and you need to pull a permit, have the required inspections, and follow the code with any modifications or changes.

Multiple Life Tenants

According to my textbook, there are three ways that a life tenancy with multiple life tenants can be carried out. (1) Life estate lasts until the last life tenant dies; the share of each survivor increasing by means of a remainder (2) Life estate lasts until the last tenant dies; the share of the deceased life tenant passing through her estate (3) An estate for joint lives; the life estate ending when the first tenant dies Can you tell me what the bolded part for (2) would look like? It looks like it is trying to say that the heirs of the life tenant will inherit it after the life tenant dies. How is that any different from a Fee Simple Absolute?

A, B and C are life tenants in a type 2 multiple holder life estate that continues until the last of them die, at which time the remainder interest owner, a college, becomes the owner. The college has a vested remainder interest. A dies. The new owners are A Jr., B and C until both B and C are dead. A Jr. also dies. The new owners are A the third, B and C until both B and C are dead. B dies. The new owners are A the third, B Jr., and C. C dies. The interest of A the third, B Jr. and C each terminate and college's vested remainder interest becomes a fee simple absolute interest. @DaleM is correct that "It’s not fee simple because the interest ends when the last survivor dies." In real life, a more common scenario would be for a widow to have a life interest and then convey it to one or more her children for her life (a life estate per autre vie), or for her to mortgage her life estate and default, leaving the lender with ownership of the property for the remainder of her life. Of course, actually, any kind of legal life estate is now very rare and far more often, legal ownership would be vested in a trustee, and beneficial ownership would be as is set forth in a trust agreement with no particular terminology used to describe the different kinds of rights that can be afforded to the equitable beneficiaries of the trust.

Why has a domestic violence case made public online? (California)

According to my understanding California law prohibits the courts from giving online access to the documents in a domestic violence cases (for example through websites such as unicourt). Is that correct? Secondly, if the documents of a domestic violence case are made available online (presumably through error), what recourse does one have to take them down?

Is that correct? Your understanding is correct. But, as explained below, the correctness of the prohibition is --at best-- highly doubtful. The prohibition is pursuant to 18 USC 2265(d)(3) , and it purportedly is premised on " such publication [being] likely to publicly reveal the identity or location of the party protected under such order ". The prohibition is futile because, in most cases, the respondent to that order already knows both identity and location (in addition to other information such as phone number, email address, workplace, and so forth) of the party who filed or was granted the request for protection order. Furthermore, in order to comply with the protection order, the respondent obviously has to know the identity of the person for whom the protection is granted and to whom the respondent is ordered not to approach anymore. The prohibition as to disclosure of requester's location might be useful only in instances where the requester has relocated and is trying not to be traceable by the aggressor or stalker. But even there redacting the victim's location in those instances makes more sense than a prohibition across the board. By contrast, many instances of domestic violence and harassment could be prevented if courts gave public access to these records. That is because a cautious person could do a search on an individual to ascertain whether associating with the latter is safe. For instance, consider the scenario where a female is thinking of dating some male of whose past she does not know something she should know for her safety. what recourse does one have to take them down? A simple notice or perhaps an informal request to the court might suffice. If that fails, the person would have to file a motion in that matter. If the motion is ignored or denied, the matter can be escalated to an upper court in the form of a petition for writ of mandamus or its procedural equivalent. Nevertheless, since the prohibition supposedly is aimed to protect the identity and location of the victim, it would be odd for the respondent to argue he is interested in protecting the identity and location of his former victim. Obviously a respondent's interest in enforcing the prohibition of disclosure is to avoid the embarrassment and loss of reputation resulting from the protection order(s) against him.

Are nootropics illegal in the UK from April 2016?

According to new Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 , the UK's government announced that new legalisation bans all substances deemed as “psychoactive” drugs excluding controlled drugs such as caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, etc. According to definition of psychoactive substance, this is any substance which can produce a psychoactive effect in a person who consumes it. Some shops already withdrawing supplies of nootropics from sale. Does it means after the Act comes into force, then nootropics (smart drugs or cognitive enhancers) become illegal in the UK? For example racetams such as Aniracetam , Oxiracetam , Noopept , etc., since they're psychostimulants?

It is, technically speaking, illegal to produce, supply, offer to supply, possess with intent to supply, possess on custodial premises, import or export psychoactive substances. There is nothing said on possession for personal usage or usage itself. "For the purposes of this Act a substance produces a psychoactive effect in a person if, by stimulating or depressing the person’s central nervous system, it affects the person’s mental functioning or emotional state; and references to a substance’s psychoactive effects are to be read accordingly," so I guess nootropics fall under this definition. In practice, however, this law is very bad legislation (technically bans many normal unharmful, or even beneficial, substances), and it gives quite some space for the enforcement discretion, and I am not aware ho it is enforced in practice.

Is the Church of Saint Anne in Jerusalem French territory?

According to news reports, there were altercations between French and Israeli security personnel when French president Macron visited the Church of Saint Anne in Jerusalem's Old City, with a BBC report claiming that the church is "considered French territory", due to it having been gifted from the Ottoman Empire to France in 1856. Did the Ottoman Empire actually transfer sovereignty over the church to France, or did they simply grant ownership and/or other rights over the property to France? If so, did such French rights survive 1) the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the granting of the Mandate for Palestine to the UK, 2) after the end of the Mandate, the military occupations of Jerusalem's Old City first by Jordan and then by Israel, and 3) Israel's unilateral extension of its sovereignty to East Jerusalem, including the Old City?

No, the Church of Saint Anne in Jerusalem is not an integral part of the French territory. The Ottoman Empire transfered the property rights (they did not cede their sovereignty) of the church to France. It is, however, the property of the French state and is listed as 1 of 4 properties in the Holy Land that have a special Domaine national status, just as the Palace of Versailles has. The national domains are real estate complexes presenting an exceptional link with the history of the Nation and of which the State is, at least in part, owner. The recent (2020-01-22) changes made to the english version of the Wikipedia article , that make this claim, were probably based on the franceinfo – France Télévisions report of the same date, which uses the term territoires français instead of domaine national . The BBC article repeats this claim together with a photo supplied by Agence France-Presse , but not in the body of the article. The Wikipedia article has been updated (2020-01-23), with this claim removed. In both videos of Presidents Chirac (1996) and Macron (2020), they do not make such a claim. Their actions do, however, reflect that of a property owner. Despite the fact that the Fischer-Chauvel Agreement of 1948 has not been ratified, the Israeli officials respected (however reluctantantly) the wishes of the property owner. International law does not forsee, that a property belonging to another country is an integral part of that country's territory. The only restriction that exists is in the case of an Embassy/Consulate, where permission must be explicitly granted before local officials may enter the property to perform a sovereign act (such as an arrest). Église Sainte-Anne de Jérusalem En 1856, après la guerre de Crimée, la France reçut l'église du Sultan Abdülmecid Ier en remerciement de son aide à la Turquie[2]. Sainte-Anne fut donc restaurée et l'État français la confia en 1877 à Monseigneur Lavigerie et à sa Société des missionnaires d'Afrique. Entre 1882 et 1946, le lieu abrita un séminaire pour la formation des prêtres grecs-catholiques. In 1856, after the Crimean War, France received the church of Sultan Abdülmecid I in thanks for its aid to Turkey [2]. Sainte-Anne was therefore restored and the French State entrusted it in 1877 to Monseigneur Lavigerie and his Society of Missionaries of Africa. Between 1882 and 1946, the place housed a seminar for the training of Greek-Catholic priests. Note : Source is given as: Ruth Kark, Michal Oren-Nordheim, Jerusalem and Its Environs: Quarters, Neighborhoods, Villages, 1800-1948, Wayne State University Press, 2001, p. 58 . In 1856, the sultan gave over to the French government the ruins of the Church of St. Annes inside the Lions' Gate. En 1996, lors de la visite de Jacques Chirac dans la partie arabe de Jérusalem, le président français refusa d'entrer dans l'église tant que des soldats israéliens qui l’accompagnaient n'en seraient pas sortis. Le 22 janvier 2020, lors d'une nouvelle visite présidentielle, Emmanuel Macron a lui aussi exigé que les services de sécurité israéliens sortent de ce territoire français , rappelant « les règles qui existent depuis plusieurs siècles »[5]. In 1996, during Jacques Chirac's visit to the Arab part of Jerusalem, the French president refused to enter the church until Israeli soldiers who accompanied him left it. On January 22, 2020, during a new presidential visit, Emmanuel Macron also demanded that the Israeli security services leave this French territory , recalling "the rules that have existed for several centuries"[5]. Source [5]: franceinfo – France Télévisions (2020-01-22) C'est un coup de sang qui n'est pas sans rappeler celui de Jacques Chirac en 1996. Des échanges tendus se sont tenus entre Emmanuel Macron et les forces de sécurité israéliennes qui encadraient sa visite à Jérusalem, mercredi 22 janvier, rapporte le reporter de franceinfo sur place. Le président de la République est arrivé avec plus de trois heures de retard mercredi dans l'église Sainte-Anne, l'un des territoires français de Jérusalem où les forces de l'ordre israéliennes ne sont pas autorisées à entrer. Aux alentours de 15 heures, heure française, une bousculade s'est produite à l'entrée de ce lieu de culte. Emmanuel Macron a alors haussé le ton, en anglais : "Everybody know the rules. I don't like what you did in front of me. Go outside. I'm sorry. You know the rules. Nobody has to provoke nobody" ("Tout le monde connaît les règles. Je n'aime pas ce que vous avez fait devant moi. Allez dehors. Je suis désolé. Vous connaissez les règles"), a-t-il lancé au milieu d'une foule compacte. Les forces de sécurité israéliennes ont ensuite quitté le domaine. It was a bloodshed that is reminiscent of that of Jacques Chirac in 1996. Tense exchanges were held between Emmanuel Macron and the Israeli security forces who framed his visit to Jerusalem on Wednesday, January 22, reports the reporter. from franceinfo on site. The President of the Republic arrived more than three hours late Wednesday at Sainte-Anne church, one of the French territories in Jerusalem where Israeli law enforcement officials are not allowed to enter. Around 3 p.m. French time, a stampede occurred at the entrance to this place of worship. Emmanuel Macron then raised his voice, in English: "Everybody know the rules. I don't like what you did in front of me. Go outside. I'm sorry. You know the rules. Nobody has to provoke nobody" ("Everyone knows the rules. I don't like what you did in front of me. Go outside. I'm sorry. You know the rules"), he launched in the middle of a compact crowd. Israeli security forces then left the area. Church of Saint Anne, Jerusalem In 1856, in gratitude for French support during the Crimean War, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid I presented it to Napoleon III. It was subsequently restored, but the majority of what remains today is original. The French government claims St. Anne belongs to the French government. French claim French presidents have claimed that the church is under French protection, owned by its government, and is French territory . In 1996, during Jacques Chirac’s visit to Jerusalem, the French president refused to enter the church until Israeli soldiers who accompanied him left. Similarly in January 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron was involved in an altercation with Israeli security officers at the church.[6] The French claim seems to be based on the Fischer-Chauvel Agreement of 1948 , if not based on an earlier basis. The Fischer-Chauvel Agreement was an agreement made in 1948 between the French and Israeli governments involving the status of French institutions in the newly founded State of Israel and claimed by France as " Domaine national française ". The agreement was signed for Israel by Maurice Fischer (1903–1965), an Israeli diplomat in France at the time. The agreement was never ratified by Israel.[1] The French claims are based on claimed acquisitions predating the formation of the State of Israel. Domaine national L'article 75 indique notamment que « Les domaines nationaux sont des ensembles immobiliers présentant un lien exceptionnel avec l'histoire de la Nation et dont l'État est, au moins pour partie, propriétaire. » Cet article modificateur crée une nouvelle section « domaines nationaux » dans le Code du patrimoine (section 6, chapitre 1er, titre II, livre VI, partie législative, soit les articles L621-34 à L621-41). Le décret paru le 29 mars 2017 ne donne pas non plus de liste. National domain Article 75 indicates in particular that "The national domains are real estate complexes presenting an exceptional link with the history of the Nation and of which the State is, at least in part, owner. This amending article creates a new "national domains" section in the Heritage Code (section 6, chapter 1, title II, book VI, legislative part, ie articles L621-34 to L621-41). The decree published on March 29, 2017 does not give a list either. Domaine national français en Terre sainte ... - l'église Sainte-Anne, à Jérusalem-Est. French national domain in the Holy Land ... - St. Anne's Church in East Jerusalem. Sources : Wikipedia Church of Saint Anne, Jerusalem Fischer-Chauvel Agreement Domaine national (French only) Église Sainte-Anne de Jérusalem VIDEO. "Je n'aime pas ce que vous avez fait devant moi" : le coup de colère (en anglais) d'Emmanuel Macron contre les forces de sécurité israéliennes (franceinfo – France Télévisions, 2020-01-22) BBC ‘Go outside’: France’s Macron berates Israeli police at Jerusalem church - 2020-01-22 Jacques Chirac "Do you want me to go back to my plane?" - YouTube - 1996

What would happen under Texas civil procedure law if multiple claimants file against the same defendant for the same SB.8. incident?

According to provision 171.210 of SB.8, Texas residents may sue the defendant in the plaintiff's county of residence. So what would the procedure be if multiple suits are filed for the same incident & defendant in multiple counties (by various "competing" plaintiffs)? Would these suits proceed independently? Be joined on appeal? I think it's interesting because the law limits statutory damages more or less to the first winner. (I say "more or less" because actual proof of payment is required to preclude a judge from awarding statutory damages, so theoretically multiple county judges can legally award these, as long as it happens before there is proof of payment for any of them.) This is what the section says: Sec. 171.210. CIVIL LIABILITY: VENUE. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, including Section 15.002, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a civil action brought under Section 171.208 shall be brought in: (1) the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) the county of residence for any one of the natural person defendants at the time the cause of action accrued; (3) the county of the principal office in this state of any one of the defendants that is not a natural person; or (4) the county of residence for the claimant if the claimant is a natural person residing in this state. (b) If a civil action is brought under Section 171.208 in any one of the venues described by Subsection (a), the action may not be transferred to a different venue without the written consent of all parties. Given the "or" before (4) I take it the plaintiff has choice of venue between the variants listed, if more than one would apply.

Multiple Suits Seem to be Allowed Under SB8 It appears that only a previously completed suit for which the full $10,000 damages has been paid bars a further suit. (This is specified by 171.208(c).) As far as I can see, SB8 contemplates and permits multiple suits fer the same act provided that no one has been completed and paid in full. That seems to be by design. So far as I know there has not yet been an actual case where multiple suits have been filed for the same action, so there is no way to know how a court would in fact address such a situation. Excerpts from SB8 Part of SB8 is section 171.208, which provides: Sec. 171.208. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OR AIDING OR ABETTING VIOLATION. (a) Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who: (1) performs or induces an abortion in violation of this subchapter; (2) knowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion, ... ... (c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter. Section 171.210 provides: (a) Notwithstanding any other law, including Section 15.002, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a civil action brought under Section 171.208 shall be brought in: (1) the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) the county of residence for any one of the natural person defendants at the time the cause of action accrued; (3) the county of the principal office in this state of any one of the defendants that is not a natural person; or (4) the county of residence for the claimant if the claimant is a natural person residing in this state. (b) If a civil action is brought under Section 171.208 in any one of the venues described by Subsection (a), the action may not be transferred to a different venue without the written consent of all parties.

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act require deleting/blocking media that is not accessible?

According to recent news, the University of California, Berkeley has decided to remove 20,000 educational videos from YouTube to address findings by the Department of Justice that these videos do not satisfy accessibility standards set by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See the university's statement , and this report on reason.com . While it makes sense to require certain accessibility standards for media when it is created, it seems ludicrous to require deleting or blocking media after it has been created. After all, this helps neither people with special accessibility needs nor those without them. Does the ADA actually contain passages that can be used to require deletion / blocking of media that do not satisfy accessibility standards? And if yes, what is the motivation for that (assuming one it is documented somehwere)?

I believe the relevant section is 28 CFR 35.150 - Existing facilities § 35.150 Existing facilities: (a)General. A public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This paragraph does not - Because of this, it seems theoretically possible that someone could complain that the youtube videos of lectures are not accessible enough to disabled persons, and therefore have them taken down. Regardless, it seems that UC Berkley decided to preemptively take down the videos in order to "reset" their online lectures catalogue and make large improvements. But yeah, nothing in the statute says they must take such videos down, but it would be a theoretical violation of the law to leave them up .

In what forum would Iran sue Pakistan in for damages?

According to reports, Iran may claim $18 billion in damages from Pakistan for an unfinished pipeline if Pakistan does not complete its part of it as agreed. What forum would such a claim take place in?

According to reports , one potential forum is the International Court of Arbitration . All reports I see say that the agreement specifies that the forum will be an arbitration forum. Whether it can be any arbitration forum or if it must be the ICC, or can be selected from a list, depends on the specific wording of the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement of 2009, which I have not been able to find.

Which EU-related jurisdictions in Americas apply the GDPR regulation?

According to some information, a person will need to be a resident in an EU country in order to be protected by the GDPR regulation. Are there jurisdictions in North or South America where residency similarly conveys GDPR protection for EU citizens?

There are various bits of France which are not actually in Europe. Several of them are in the Caribbean, and French Guiana is in South America. See Wikipedia . These are parts of the EU (although not part of Schengen or the EU VAT Area), so residency will grant protection under GDPR.

is uncensorship in japanese porn illegal

According to some laws in japan censorship is a must for adult films but why does uncensored porn in JAPANESE ADULT VIDEOS ,PORNHUB,ETC exist is that legal? of not what charges they could be facing?

Article 175 of the Criminal Code says: A person who distributes, sells or displays in public an obscene document, drawing or other objects shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 2 years, a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen or a petty fine. The same shall apply to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale. This has been interpreted to require pixelization, blurring, censorship bars, or other means of obscuring genitalia. See the 2013 guilty plea by publishers of Core Magazine for an example prosecution under art. 175 for insufficient censorship. The law apparently does not reach material that is produced and edited and sold outside of Japan (even if filmed in Japan). See e.g. the discussion of Realm (1976) in Kirsten Fischer, The Art of Censorship in Postwar Japan , p. 198-199: [the film] was not prosecutable because of Ōshima’s innovative production strategy ... He had imported the film stock from France, shot the film in Kyoto, and then exported the undeveloped film back to France, where he developed and edited it and finally distributed it internationally, including importing it back to Japan. A "heavily cut form [was] eventually screened in Japan."

How is state citizenship acquired and lost?

According to the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution, All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. I have questions concerning the latter type of citizenship (i.e., citizenship of a particular US state, not citizenship of the United States as a whole). I suppose that the issue of state citizenship comes into play when someone wants to exercise certain state-specific rights (e.g., voting in state elections) and possibly also when the state imposes obligations (e.g., if a state, like the federal government, wants to impose income tax on its own citizens regardless of their residence). A plain reading of the 14th Amendment clause makes it clear that state citizenship is acquired by residence. But the wording doesn't preclude the possibility of state citizenship being acquired by other means. Are there any other circumstances under which state citizenship may be acquired? Is it up to each individual state, or are there federal laws that come into play? Even if it's up to each individual state, do most of them at least apply the same general rules? For example, do any states offer citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis) to persons who are residents of other states but who are the children and/or descendants of a state citizen? Do any states offer citizenship by place of birth (jus soli) to persons born in the state but who have since moved away? Do any states offer naturalization processes to become state citizens that do not require them to be residents? Is there any precedent for US citizens to have dual or multiple citizenship among the various states (e.g. dual citizen of NJ and NY, or citizen of TX by birth, OK and KS by descent, AZ by naturalization, and LA by residence)? The clause also says nothing about loss of state citizenship. Again, is it up to each individual state when citizenship is lost, or does it always happen automatically when a citizen takes up residence in a new state? I'm particularly interested to know whether it's possible for a person to hold multiple state citizenships simultaneously, and whether it's possible for a person to retain their state citizenship if they move to a new country (as opposed to moving to a new state within the US).

Citizenship in a U.S. state is governed primarily by the first sentence of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states (emphasis added): All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. So, in the case of a natural person who is a U.S. citizen, the state in which you are domiciled is the state in which you are a citizen. The clause also says nothing about loss of state citizenship. Again, is it up to each individual state when citizenship is lost, or does it always happen automatically when a citizen takes up residence in a new state? I'm particularly interested to know whether it's possible for a person to hold multiple state citizenships simultaneously, and whether it's possible for a person to retain their state citizenship if they move to a new country (as opposed to moving to a new state within the US). The notion of domicile or residence is singular in the case of a natural person. When you become a resident of a new state, you cease to be a resident of the old state, unless some other specific law applies. It is not generally possible for a natural person to hold multiple state citizenships simultaneous (in theory), and if a person is domiciled outside any U.S. state (e.g. if they are domiciled in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, or France), they are not a citizen of any U.S. state. Common law domicile, which is relevant for constitutional law purposes, can be changes in a single day, not particular period of residence is required. If you leave your home in say, Georgia, and move into an apartment in say, Ohio with an intent to remain in Ohio indefinitely, your domicile switches to an Ohio domicile immediately. Common law domicile is generally what would control for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction purposes under 28 U.S. Code § 1332 and Article III of the United States Constitution. However, even though the U.S. Constitution clearly authorizes Congress to extent diversity of citizenship jurisdiction granting access to the federal courts to every lawsuit to which a non-U.S. citizen that resides in a state and a U.S. citizen that resides in a state, I do not know from memory if 28 U.S. Code § 1332 has been interpreted to have that effect in cases where the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory required $75,000, or if instead, a lawsuit between a non-citizens who reside in the same state as a U.S. citizen resident of a state is not subject to diversity jurisdiction in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction is concurred and not exclusive, so if someone tries a case in state court when diversity jurisdiction would have been available without trying to remove it to federal court, the state court still has full jurisdiction over the case). This said, some state and local laws, and even some federal laws, create rights and obligations that arise from residency defined in a manner other than the constitutionally provided notion of state citizenship under Section 1 of the 14th Amendment, and there is both state and federal law governing the deemed citizenship of legal persons other than "natural persons" such as corporations and partnerships. For example, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (a model law enacted as state law in every U.S. state) and Parental Kidnapping Protection Act, and a treaty governing international child custody cases, for purposes of child custody jurisdiction there is a definition of a concept called the "home state" of a child, which differs materially from the common law definition of the domicile of a child which previously informed jurisdiction in child custody cases. The statutory definitions aren't identical, but basically look back about six months from the present, rather than looking at the current instant only, to determine where a child resides for purposes of child custody jurisdiction. Under state and federal law respectively, there are certain changes in de facto place of residence that do not change legal domicile for purposes of eligibility to vote in federal, state, and local elections. Soldiers deployed away from the military base that is established as their home, e.g., in a foreign war or military base, remain citizens of the state where their home is even though they don't reside there on a day to day basis. Students living in dormitories away from their parents' home only sometimes acquire a domicile and citizenship in the state where their dormitory is located - almost never in the case of an economically dependent minor present in another state with parental permission, and mostly based upon the subjective intent of the student in the case of a college student. Usually, prison inmates continue to be citizens of the state where they were domiciled at the time they were sentenced, even if they are housed in another state on a contract basis, or are convicted of a crime in a state where they did not reside at the time. Historically, married women were, as a matter of law, deemed to be domiciled and to be state citizens of the state where her husband resided, but that rule has been abrogated. Now, the state citizenship and state of residence of married women is determined independently of the state citizenship and state of residence of her spouse. Despite the common law rule, states have rather elaborate operational definitions of state residence for different purposes. For voting in state and local elections, a residency period of thirty-days or so has been tolerated as a historical administrative necessity. Similarly state residency periods for eligibility to get divorced in a state are similar. State residency rules for purposes of in-state tuition, hunting and fishing license fees, park entrance fees, and the like, vary considerably, and the U.S. Supreme Court has largely chosen to rule that the privileges and immunities clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the 14th Amendment do not apply to these cases. The privileges and immunities clauses became mostly a dead letter in U.S. Constitutional law as a result of the Slaughterhouse Cases , 83 US 36 (1873), in which judges seeking to limit the effect of the 13th and 14th Amendments passed in the wake of the U.S. Civil War interpreted them in a manner that gave them only a narrow effect. And, unlike Plessy v. Ferguson , the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that authorized the segregated Jim Crow regime in the former slave states until it was overruled by Brown v. Board of Education , the Slaughterhouse Cases largely remain good law. It is largely because of a line of cases that started with the Slaugherhouse Cases that very few rights and duties are defined as incident to either United States citizenship or state citizenship, rather than to state defined residency for a particular purpose or being a "person", which, in turn, has made state citizenship such a limited concept that many civically well educated people do not even know that it exists. The Slaughterhouse cases also caused the federal constitutional individual rights jurisprudence that incorporates these rights against state and local governments to develop mostly under the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment, rather than its privileges and immunities protections. States are not permitted to limit admission to a licensed profession or occupation in the state to state residents only under the privileges and immunities clause, but can somewhat vary the rules that apply to state residents v. people who are not state residents. For state income tax purposes, a majority of nights residing in a state normally controls in a simple two-state case. Some states are in interstate compacts (i.e. Congressionally approved interstate treaties) with each other about how income is allocated when a person resides in multiple states during the course of a tax year. But the wording doesn't preclude the possibility of state citizenship being acquired by other means. Are there any other circumstances under which state citizenship may be acquired? Is it up to each individual state, or are there federal laws that come into play? Even if it's up to each individual state, do most of them at least apply the same general rules? Many state and local government afford privileges usually only afforded to state citizens to state residents who are not U.S. citizens. This case include, most famously in the case of New York City local elections and in elections to special districts where property owners are entitled to vote, a right to vote in local elections that is afforded to people who are not U.S. citizens (federal law prohibits this in federal elections). Sometimes this is in the discretion of the state or local government. But, since immigration and naturalization law is vested solely and exclusive in the federal government under the U.S. Constitution, there are many circumstances in which non-citizen residents of a state or local government must be treated identically to citizen residents of a state or local government outside the few areas where federal immigration laws authorize a distinction and outside of the few areas where the benefits or privilege or obligation is expressly tied to citizenship as opposed to residency (e.g. jury duty). Footnote on the Slaughterhouse Cases The following summary is from the link above: Facts of the case Louisiana passed a law that restricted slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans to a single corporation. Pursuant to the law, the Crescent City Live-stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company received a charter to run a slaughterhouse downstream from the city. No other areas around the city were permitted for slaughtering animals over the next 25 years, and existing slaughterhouses would be closed. A group of butchers argued that they would lose their right to practice their trade and earn a livelihood under the monopoly. Specifically, they argued the monopoly created involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and abridged privileges or immunities, denied equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Question Did the creation of the monopoly violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion 5–4 DECISION FOR VARIOUS MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL F. MILLER The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to national citizenship, not to state citizenship. The Court held that the monopoly violated neither the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, reasoning that these amendments were passed with the narrow intent to grant full equality to former slaves. Thus, to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment only banned the states from depriving blacks of equal rights; it did not guarantee that all citizens, regardless of race, should receive equal economic privileges by the state. Any rights guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause were limited to areas controlled by the federal government, such as access to ports and waterways, the right to run for federal office, and certain rights affecting safety on the seas. Moreover, the Court held that the butchers bringing suit were not deprived of their property without due process of law because they could still earn a legal living in the area by slaughtering on the Crescent City Company grounds. Thus, the Court concluded that the Louisiana law was constitutional. Justice Stephen Johnson Field’s dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be construed as only protecting former slaves. Rather, he believed that it incorporated strands of common-law doctrine and needed to be interpreted outside the Civil War context. This position would later become widely accepted. Later cases would also interpret U.S. Constitution, Art IV §2 Cl. 1, which states that: The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. very narrowly, following the lead of the Slaughterhouse cases , mostly by holding that particular privileges and immunities other than a narrow core handful of state law rights and privileges and duties, were not associated with state citizenship per se .

Is British Columbia violating the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic by requiring foreign drivers to exchange their license within three months?

According to the 1949 Geneva Convention citizens of any country that signed the agreement are able to drive in any other country for up to one year with an international driving permit: No Contracting State shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year. (Article 1, paragraph 2) ... Each Contracting State shall allow any driver admitted to its territory who fulfils the conditions which are set out in Annex 8 and who holds a valid driving permit issued to him, after he has given proof of his competence, by the competent authority of another Contracting State or subdivision thereof, or by an Association duly empowered by such authority, to drive on its roads without further examination motor vehicles of the category or categories defined in Annexes 9 and 10 for which the permit has been issued. (Article 24, paragraph 1) The only requirement as set out in Annex 8 is... The minimum age for driving a motor vehicle under the conditions set out in Article 24 of the Convention shall be eighteen years. But at the same time British Columbia (which is a member state of Canada, which is a party to the convention) requires foreign drivers to exchange their licenses within three months of becoming a resident: a person who has become ordinarily resident in British Columbia and who has a validly issued and subsisting driver’s or operator’s licence or permit issued according to the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she was most recently ordinarily resident, for 90 days after he or she became ordinarily resident in British Columbia; Isn't there a conflict between domestic and international law in this situation? Or am I misunderstanding the 1949 Geneva Convention?

My own answer to the question is yes, but not directly . As with many other laws it would take a court ruling to definitively spell out how international agreements are applicable to a given situation. Unfortunately it doesn't seem that such a court ruling was ever produced so far: Google Scholar fails to list any US court cases relevant to the Convention on Road Traffic. The only somewhat relevant case is Busby v. State in which the court rules that one cannot drive in Alaska with an IDP after having been previously restricted from driving in Alaska. The court does stress out that: The Convention does forbid a signatory country (or subsidiary state) from imposing or enforcing license revocations in a manner that discriminates against residents of other signatory countries. But Busby does not claim that he was the victim of such discrimination. Busby's license was revoked for conduct that would have led to license revocation if committed by an Alaska resident. (Indeed, Busby's license was revoked while he was an Alaska resident.) And Busby does not claim that he was singled out for prosecution because he was a resident of a foreign country—i.e., that the State would not have charged him with the offense of driving with a revoked license if he had still been an Alaska resident. This could possibly mean that the court believes that the Convention only applies to foreign residents, but its not spelled out specifically. Searching for Canadian court cases likewise doesn't turn up anything useful . The only relevant case is R. v. Lawend where the person in question was trying to drive in Ontario on a foreign license after previously having had their Ontario license suspended. Here the court rules similar to the decision in Alaska in that having a foreign license does not allow one to circumvent locally imposed license restrictions. Searching for UK case law doesn't turn up any relevant court cases . Australian case law is likewise mute on the subject . There is also a relevant legal opinion by the Department of State quoted in the Digest of United States practice in International Law, 2002 : Reading these provisions as a whole, we believe that the State of Georgia, consistent with the CRT, (1) must permit an alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license issued by a country party to the CRT only if the alien has been lawfully admitted to the United States; (2) must permit a lawfully admitted alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license of a CRT party only during the first year after the alien’s admission ; and (3) may, in accordance with Georgia’s residency laws, require an alien resident in Georgia to obtain a Georgia driver’s license as a condition for continued authorization to drive. By the same token, nothing in the CRT would prevent the State of Georgia from applying more liberal rules with respect to the driving privileges of aliens. In Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 2014 the author further analyses how the 1949 Geneva Convention is applicable within the United States. First, to settle the definition of "international traffic": Nonetheless, the United States ultimately accepted that “the purpose of chapter II was to establish, in effect, an international code of minimum safety requirements. By indirection, the rules of the road set forth in the convention would apply to the pattern of domestic as well as to international traffic . The author the meaning behind Article I of the Convention: Article 1 states in part that no party “shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year.” This provision, on its face, indicates that the parties recognized that the treaty would benefit individuals. In no way does this recognition compel a conclusion that the Convention is self-executing, but it does suggest that the treaty is of a type that the Senate might have understood to be directly enforceable. And finally on the issue of whether or not the treaty is "self-executing": For these reasons, it is likely that courts will continue to treat the Geneva Convention as self-executing. Nonetheless, a court might conclude that, with respect to section II’s rules of the road, the governmental obligation is merely to “take appropriate measures” and that such an obligation is too vague to be enforced judicially. So it seems absolutely clear that the Convention intended for participating countries to allow foreign drivers to drive abroad for up to one year. However international treaties are not self-executing by default in Canada , unlike the US: Canada is bound by the terms of treaties that it enters into and breach thereof may give rise to international claims. However, in Canada treaties are not self-executing; they do not constitute part of the law of the land merely by virtue of their conclusion. So even though British Columbia is violating the 1949 Geneva Convention one cannot directly rely on said international agreement to enforce their rights. But another state party could theorethically sue Canada on behalf of its citizen to request that Canada rectifies its laws with accordance to the agreement.

What counts as a surrounded perimeter in Ireland?

According to the 2004 amendment to the 2002 Public Health (Tobacco) Act, which I believe is still legally binding, smoking tobacco is prohibited except in certain conditions. Among them are the following: (7) This section shall not apply to— (a) a dwelling, (b) a prison, (c) subject to paragraph (d), a place or premises, or a part of a place or premises, that is wholly uncovered by any roof, whether fixed or movable, (d) an outdoor part of a place or premises covered by a fixed or movable roof, provided that not more than 50 per cent of the perimeter of that part is surrounded by one or more walls or similar structures (inclusive of windows, doors, gates or other means of access to or egress from that part), It is that last portion that I am curious about. In standard mathematical usage, the perimeter of a zone is its linear bound. So, for instance, under this interpretation, if one side of the space is the entrance to my establishment, and I put a two-foot wall (say) on two of the other three sides, then it is illegal to smoke tobacco in that region? Contrariwise, perhaps the law is based on surface area instead. If I put up three walls, each of which covers 51% of the region between itself and the roof, is it illegal to smoke tobacco in that region? Is there some other criterion for the minimum amount a wall must surround on this perimeter? For instance, perhaps a 45% height wall is not considered a wall at all, and so if I have a 90% height wall, and two 49% height walls, in addition to the wall that contains the entrance, smoking can be permitted, even though there are walls on three sides and more than 50% of the total area is covered. If a wall has to go from floor to ceiling, I can easily create a smoking space that is walled in putting in a 6-inch gap, say. For that matter, is the wall (presumably with an entrance) between the outdoor part and my establishment included in the perimeter, under any of those interpretations? Which of these meanings, or any other, is at play in Ireland's laws regarding public smoking?

The word "perimeter" must be read in line with the Interpretation Act 2005, Section 5(1) if there is any doubt about the meaning of the word: 5.—(1) In construing a provision of any Act (other than a provision that relates to the imposition of a penal or other sanction)— (a) that is obscure or ambiguous, or (b) that on a literal interpretation would be absurd or would fail to reflect the plain intention of— (i) in the case of an Act to which paragraph (a) of the definition of “Act” in section 2 (1) relates, the Oireachtas, or (ii) in the case of an Act to which paragraph (b) of that definition relates, the parliament concerned, the provision shall be given a construction that reflects the plain intention of the Oireachtas or parliament concerned, as the case may be, where that intention can be ascertained from the Act as a whole. In this case, the word "perimeter" would likely be given its ordinary, plain, every-day meaning. That is not the same as the "standard mathematical usage" of the word.

If someone is cybersquatting myname.com, can I claim it back?

According to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act , Cybersquatting on a trademark is illegal. However, someone registered myfirstname.com. Do I have any legal right to ask them to sell it to me at a reasonable price ($10)?

Under the ACPA, a trademark owner may bring a cause of action against a domain name registrant who Has a bad faith intent to profit from the mark Registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that is Identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark Identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of a famous mark Is a trademark protected by 18 U.S.C. § 706 (marks involving the Red Cross) or 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (marks related to the “Olympics”) A trademark is famous if the owner can prove that the mark “is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner”. “Trafficking” in the context of domain names includes, but is not limited to “sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration”. The ACPA also requires that the mark be distinctive or famous at the time of registration. In determining whether the domain name registrant has a bad faith intent to profit, a court may consider many factors, including nine that are outlined in the statue: Registrant’s trademark or other intellectual property rights in the domain name; Whether the domain name contains the registrant’s legal or common name; Registrant’s prior use of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of goods or services; Registrant’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible by the domain name; Registrant’s intent to divert customers from the mark owner’s online location that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark; Registrant’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or a third party for financial gain, without having used the mark in a legitimate site; Registrant’s providing misleading false contact information when applying for registration of the domain name; Registrant’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others; and Extent to which the mark in the domain is distinctive or famous. The ACPA does not prevent the fair use of trademarks or any use protected by the First Amendment, which includes gripe sites. In Mayflower Transit, L.L.C. v. Prince, 314 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D.N.J 2004) , the court found that the first two prongs of Mayflower's ACPA claim were easily met because (1) their registered trademark was distinctive and (2) Defendant’s “mayflowervanline.com” was confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s Mayflower trademark. However, when the court was examining the third prong of Plaintiff’s ACPA claim, whether Defendant registered its domain name with the bad faith intent to profit from Plaintiff, the court found Defendant had a bona fide noncommercial use of the mark, therefore, the ACPA claim failed. “Defendant’s motive for registering the disputed domain names was to express his customer dissatisfaction through the medium of the Internet.” The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority is not liable for injunctive or monetary relief except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard. While § 1125 protects trademark owners, 15 U.S.C. § 1129 protects any living person from having their personal name included in a domain name, but only when the domain name is registered for profitable resale.

Under what laws did Israel evict Palestinians from their homes?

According to the BBC news last night, the latest violence in Israel / Palestine began after Palestinians were evicted from their homes in favour of Israelis. It seems highly draconian. What laws does the Israeli government have (or use) to evict people from their homes?

Short answer A pro-settler organization called Nahalat Shimon is using a 1970 law to argue that the owners of the land before 1948 were Jewish families, and so the current Palestinian landowners should be evicted and their properties given to Israeli Jews. Long answer

What is the penalty for not complying with a quarantine order?

According to the CDC, in most US states, breaking a quarantine order is a criminal misdemeanor. If someone broke a quarantine order, what would be done? Since the person is still contagious, would they still be incarcerated immediately?

Since the person is still contagious, would they still be incarcerated immediately? First of all, the law takes time to operate. While there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial, nobody is ever incarcerated as a judicial punishment or penalty "immediately". The police has a time-limited right to detain persons until they can be brought to court, and then the court system approves further detainment if necessary. There are no real rules as to where and how detainment takes place, except that the conditions must be humane. In practice, if a patient who broke a quarantine order was a real menace, they would probably find themselves chained to a hospital bed in relatively short order. The trial would probably be postponed until the person sufficiently recovers from the illness that they can aid their legal defense. If the state won on the charges in trial, the person would then be incarcerated. Prisoners get sick too, and it is common for them to be transferred to partnering hospitals that have special wards for patients in custody - which means additional perimeter security and typically chains on the hospital beds.

To what extent is coaching legal in California?

According to the California Code, Business and Professions Code - BPC § 2903 : (a) No person may engage in the practice of psychology, or represent himself or herself to be a psychologist, without a license granted under this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.  The practice of psychology is defined as rendering or offering to render to individuals, groups, organizations, or the public any psychological service involving the application of psychological principles, methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting, and influencing behavior, such as the principles pertaining to learning, perception, motivation, emotions, and interpersonal relationships; and the methods and procedures of interviewing, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior modification, and hypnosis; and of constructing, administering, and interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests, attitudes, personality characteristics, emotions, and motivations. To me, this sounds like it would cover a lot of behavior that people who market themselves as coaches engage in. WeTrainLifeCoaches which trains life coaches in California suggests: There are no legal requirements to become a general life coach in California, so the best way to show your legitimacy to clients is by receiving certification from an agency. The best-known certification agency is The International Coach Federation (ICF), which offers different levels of life coach certification. As they speak about there not being a legal requirement, it seems like the coaches they train are not automatically licensed via the above-quoted profession code. In actual case law, where's the line between what coaches can legally do and what they require being licensed under that section?

In California, psychologists are regulated under Ch 6.6 within Division 2 (Healing Arts) of the Business and Professions Code . §2902 identifies the essential restriction on the business practice, stating that "A person represents himself or herself to be a psychologist when the person holds himself or herself out to the public by any title or description of services..." using various forms of the word 'psychologist', as well as "when the person holds himself or herself out to be trained, experienced, or an expert in the field of psychology". In order to say that you are a psychologist, you have to hold a professional psychologists's license. Likewise to hold yourself out as a nurse, you need a nurse's license. A consequence of being a licensed psychologist is that under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, you may assess a patient's mental state, and you must keep that information confidential. A life coach cannot make a diagnosis, and cannot prescribe cures for mental conditions. §2908 in particular allows other people to do some of what psychologists do: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent qualified members of other recognized professional groups licensed to practice in the State of California, such as, but not limited to, physicians, clinical social workers, educational psychologists, marriage and family therapists, licensed professional clinical counselors, optometrists, psychiatric technicians, or registered nurses, or attorneys admitted to the State Bar of California, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques by referral from persons licensed to practice medicine, dentistry, or psychology, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques which offer avocational or vocational self-improvement and do not offer therapy for emotional or mental disorders, or duly ordained members of the recognized clergy, or duly ordained religious practitioners from doing work of a psychological nature consistent with the laws governing their respective professions, provided they do not hold themselves out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words “psychological,” “psychologist,” “psychology,” “psychometrist,” “psychometrics,” or “psychometry,” or that they do not state or imply that they are licensed to practice psychology; except that persons licensed under Chapter 13.5 (commencing with Section 4989.10) of Division 2 may hold themselves out to the public as licensed educational psychologists. Analogously, we can talk about the law here without running afoul of UPL laws, because "talking about the law" is not the same as "practicing law". It is a fairly formalistic distinction, but I or a life coach can talk about what would be good for your soul, as long as I don't claim to be a psychologist dispensing professional advice.

Is it legal to rent exclusively to members of a religious college?

According to the Civil Rights act, one is not allowed to discriminate based on religion when it comes to housing. What about one who wants to rent only to members of a certain religious institution (such as students in a religious seminary).

There are exemptions, and "justifications", in 24 CFR 100 . The exemption is 100.10: (c) Nothing in this part, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to: (1) The sale or rental of any single family house by an owner, provided the following conditions are met: (i) The owner does not own or have any interest in more than three single family houses at any one time. (ii) The house is sold or rented without the use of a real estate broker, agent or salesperson or the facilities of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings. So such a restriction could be allowed if e.g. you live in the house and rent only a few rooms, or a single family home marketed and managed in the right way. There is also an exemption for religious organizations and private clubs allowing rental to members only. 100.500 lays the groundwork for disparate impact hot water. It says: (a) A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. So only renting to students in a particular seminary would most likely have a disparate impact. There is, however, the possibility of justifying the policy, following 100.500: (b) (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section. So let's say that the offended party has made the case that the practice will have a discriminatory effect, then the accused can set forth the aforementioned justification: (c)(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant. (c3)(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. The crux of the matter is having a "substantial, legitimate nondiscriminatory interest", i.e. why would you want to rent to only seminary students.

How does personal drug possession affect interstate commerce?

According to the Controlled Substance Act : § 801. Congressional findings and declarations: controlled substances.... ...(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because - (A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate commerce, (B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribution, and (C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such possession. (4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. (5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic. (7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions designed to establish effective control over international and domestic traffic in controlled substances. From what I understand, this means that because of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ...Controlled Substances may not be exchanged through interstate commerce. Also, because it is impossible to determine whether drugs produced for intrastate commerce are also crossing state lines, then: (5)... it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic. Therefore, no intrastate commerce is allowed. However, I don't understand how possession or manufacturing of drugs for personal consumption is covered in the Commerce Clause. For example, let's say I wish to grow one cannabis plant for personal consumption. In what way does this affect the cannabis market in other states so that Congress has the power to prohibit it?

To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').

What does “potential for abuse” mean in the Controlled Substance Act?

According to the DEA’s Denial of Petition To Initiate Proceedings To Reschedule Marijuana from 2011, one reason for the cannabis plant’s Schedule I status is because it has “no currently accepted medicinal use” and it’s “chemistry is not known and reproducible”. The DEA admits “cannabinoids” have medicinal value, but they do not consider the cannabis plant to be a reliable source. However, just because the DEA fails to recognize something has medicinal value does not mean it should be illegal. Alcohol, tobacco, sugar, coffee, etc., are not recognized as “medicine”, yet they are all lawful and legal to sell. So the DEA appeals to the other requirement of the CSA- “the potential for abuse”. According to the denial: ITS ACTUAL OR RELATIVE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE The first factor the Secretary must consider is marijuana's actual or relative potential for abuse. The term "abuse" is not defined in the CSA. However, the legislative history of the CSA suggests the following in determining whether a particular drug or substance has a potential for abuse: a. Individuals are taking the substance in amounts sufficient to create a hazard to their health or to the safety of other individuals or to the community. b. There is a significant diversion of the drug or substance from legitimate drug channels. c. Individuals are taking the substance on their own initiative rather than on the basis of medical advice from a practitioner licensed by law to administer such substances. d. The substance is so related in its action to a substance already listed as having a potential for abuse to make it likely that it will have the same potential for abuse as such substance, thus making it reasonable to assume that there may be significant diversions from legitimate channels, significant use contrary to or without medical advice, or that it has a substantial capability of creating hazards to the health of the user or to the safety of the community. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., Sess. 1 (1970) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4603. In considering these concepts in a variety of scheduling analyses over the last three decades, the Secretary has analyzed a range of factors when assessing the abuse liability of a substance. These factors have included the prevalence and frequency of use in the general public and in specific sub-populations, the amount of the material that is available for illicit use, the ease with which the substance may be obtained or manufactured, the reputation or status of the substance "on the street," as well as evidence relevant to population groups that may be at particular risk. If I’m understanding this correctly, it means the DEA has the authority to add anything to the list of Controlled Substances based on the fact that it’s popular , it’s widely available for illicit use (because it’s illegal), it’s easy to obtain or manufacture (because it’s a plant), and it may pose a risk to a particular group of people (ex. diabetes and sugar). So even if I were to petition the DEA to deschedule cannabis because the National Institute on Drug Abuse admits that cannabis is not physically addictive , it is not a gateway to drugs , it does not cause cancer or emphysema , there is no evidence it negatively affects driving , there is no evidence it causes an early onset of psychosis , and there is no evidence it negatively affects teen IQ - the DEA could ignore all of that. If this is true, is it Constitutional? If it’s not true, how should “potential of abuse” be understood in the CSA? Additional source: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/marijuana_law/2014/02/marijuana-rescheduling-and-the-potential-for-abuse-factor.html

Is your question how to define "potential for abuse" or whether this is constitutional? On the first question, potential for abuse probably means just what DEA says it does, at least until the agency changes its definition. If you'd like to induce a coma or suicidal state, you should read up on the concept of Chevron deference, which generally gives administrative agencies a lot of leeway to interpret vague congressional mandates. Assuming Congress hasn't directly addressed the issue in question and the agency's interpretation of its mandate is a permissible one, the court will generally defer to that interpretation rather than imposing its own. Applied here, it seems safe to say that Congress did not directly address what it means to have "potential for abuse." So the question becomes whether the DEA's definition is permissible. What's "permissible"? Probably anything that is not unconstitutional and not contrary to the congressional mandate. By that standard, it's hard for me to see how this definition is impermissible. Even if I could persuade a court of a better way to define the term, or if the court came up with a better definition on its own, Chevron says to just leave the agency's definition in place. Assuming the interpretation is unreasonable, there's a much better chance at court intervention. The problem I see, though, is that we're only talking about refuting one prong of the test for potential for abuse, which is itself just one of several factors used in scheduling decisions. I suspect the courts would want to see that none of those four factors supported a finding of potential for abuse, and then that the scheduling decision also couldn't be supported when considering the other relevant factors: scientific evidence of pharmacological effects; state of current scientific knowledge; history and current patterns of abuse; scope, duration and significance of abuse; and risk to the public. That's the approach dictated by the Supreme Court, so it's constitutional until the Court changes its mind. The doctrine is, however, highly controversial. Some further reading, if you hate yourself enough to dig into it: http://fidjlaw.com/administrative-law-update-calls-for-end-to-chevron-deference/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/25/gorsuch-is-right-about-chevron-deference/?utm_term=.937ca5c4cca2 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125081

Paid sick leave for full-time employee in DC

According to the District of Columbia’s Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act , both full- and part-time employees to be paid sick and safe leave for use under certain circumstances. I'm working as a regular full-time employee for a company, that has the only office in Washington DC. There is an internal document in the company, that states that In accordance with the District of Columbia’s Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act, special full-time exempt, part-time and temporary employees are eligible for up to five (5) days of paid sick leave. ... Regular full-time employees are not eligible for paid sick days under this policy. Instead, they may take any accrued PTO for any reason, including illness. Is it legal, or this statement is misinterpretation, and I'm also eligible for paid sick leave?

It looks like your PTO already met the legal qualifications for the law were met by your PTO policy prior to the law's enactment. The linked material lists the exemption for full time employees. You should have a leave balance in your pay stub (and if not, you should talk to your company's payroll department to find out your balance(s)) and can use leave that you have for sick leave (they just aren't calling it sick leave it). Likely your leave is valid for sick or vacation leave combined or you have two pools (sick and vacation) that you can use any leave pool for sick days (typically, sick leave will be paid out on departure from the company and has no caps on banking it (if you have X amount of hours per year and don't take sick days at all, you can add that to the sick leave you get next year) so you can retire early by using the sick leave to cover the time you would have remaining to work before retirement benefits can take over. Vacation or Annual may also payout but has a cap on banking (often this bank will be the days per year value of the year. If in year one you take no vacation days, you can still have X vacation days banked in addition to year 2's days, but you need to use that same amount by the end of year two or you will lose the hours banked in year one. Basically amounts to longer Christmas Break for a lot of people).

Any obligation to return an accidental second payout?

According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), if you receive an item you did not order - it should be considered as a gift - and you are not obligated to pay for it - or return it. Question is, what is the affect of this law on online sales? The example in hand is, a person sells something on a web auction platform. Where the platform owners are the third-party as far as money goes. So Person A sells an item, and Person B buys it. The platform owners, accept the payment, and when the goods have been transferred (lets say digital goods), then the platform owners release the funds to the seller. However, what happens if they send the payment twice.

The party that made the overpayment would have the right to sue you for "unjust enrichment" or "breach of contract" (since the terms of service no doubt provide or strongly imply that you are entitled to only one payment per sale), if you didn't voluntarily return the overpayment following a demand to do so, even though you received it through no fault of your own. Most of the core cases involve clerical errors in the bank account number used for a bank deposit. In general, there is a right to recover an accidental transfer of property to another, even in the absence of a clearly applicable contractual arrangement. As another example, if you were accidentally given a valuable coat at a coat check by accident and didn't notice it until later, the true owner would have a right to have it returned. The FTC regulation applies (as demonstrated by the link cited in the question) to intentional unsolicited deliveries of merchandise (which would always be tangible personal property by definition) to you through the mail. It does not apply to transfers of money, or to the accidental mis-delivery of property to the wrong person or the wrong address. The law in question is as follows: 39 U.S. Code § 3009 - Mailing of unordered merchandise (a) Except for (1) free samples clearly and conspicuously marked as such, and (2) merchandise mailed by a charitable organization soliciting contributions, the mailing of un­ordered merchandise or of communications prohibited by subsection (c) of this section constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice in violation of section 45(a)(1) of title 15. (b) Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. All such merchandise shall have attached to it a clear and conspicuous statement informing the recipient that he may treat the merchandise as a gift to him and has the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. (c) No mailer of any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, shall mail to any recipient of such merchandise a bill for such merchandise or any dunning communications. (d) For the purposes of this section, “un­ordered merchandise” means merchandise mailed without the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient.

What addresses can be a primary place of business for an LLC in Florida?

According to the Florida "SunBiz" website , the Article of Organization must list a "Principal Place of Business Address" in addition to a mailing address and the registered agent address. Those instructions make it clear that: a) a PO Box is acceptable for the Mailing Address and b) the registered agent must have a physical address but says almost nothing about the nature or requirements of "principal place of business." My question is, for a LLC that will have no physical location where it conducts business, what addresses can be listed? I don't want to use my personal home address for obvious reasons of privacy. Can I use my registered agent address (assuming the registered agent service I use will agree to it)? If so, is that typical? Can I use a basic PO Box (as opposed to a more sophisticated and expensive "virtual office" service)?

After additional research, including talking with a couple of registered agent services, the answer is that the Principal Place of Business address is required to be a physical street address. However, some registered agent services allow you to use their office address as your LLC's principal address (if you hire them as your registered agent, of course).