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What is the difference between applicable law and governing law?

there: I have a question about what the difference is between applicable law and governing law. Are they the same (one) concept or different? In addition, what is choice of law? Does it mean the plaintiff or defendant can choose the governing law or applicable law? I am not a law student. Could you give me a brief explanation or some examples about it? Thank you.

Choice of law (also called conflict of laws ) arises when a legal dispute occurs across legal boundaries. For example, suppose I live in New York, and sign a contract to buy computers from you, a company headquartered in California. If we have a dispute about the contract, we need to decide which state's law and which courts (and juries) will be used to resolve the dispute. The law that applies to our dispute is called the applicable or governing law. In many cases, it doesn’t matter which law or court we use. But in some cases, it matters a lot. For example, the California law may be friendlier to customers, or a jury in New York may be friendlier to me than to a California companies. Since we know that the choice of law and court may matter, we may specify in the contract which laws and courts will be used to resolve any disputes. (These may not be the same. The contract could say that our case will be heard in the SDNY using CA law.) The clause that says which laws apply, and which courts will apply them, is called a governing or applicable law clause. Here’s an example many of us have used, probably without realizing it: APPLICABLE LAW By using any Amazon Service, you agree that the Federal Arbitration Act, applicable federal law, and the laws of the state of Washington, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Conditions of Use and any dispute of any sort that might arise between you and Amazon.

Could you briefly tell me the difference between strict liability and negligence?

there: I have three questions about strict liability, if you can give me some brief and plain explanations. What is the difference between strict liability and negligent liability? i.e. strict liability basis vs. negligence basis. What is the difference in burden of proof between the two bases? I am wondering whether the rule of res ipsa loquitur is only applicable to strict liability cases. What is the difference between the final compensation based on the two bases? For example, a claimant under strict liability will pay the full amount of damages rather than have the right to limit his liability and therefor pay less? I am not a legal student. My textbook mentions the burden of proof and compensation based on the two bases, but it doesn’t interpret them clearly. I am confused why the two bases are different , and what impact they give to us in today's claim handling. Thank you. Any help is welcome.

Strict Liability This means that a defendant is liable for committing the action and it does not matter what his mental state was nor what he intended to do when he committed the action. Easy examples are possession of narcotics (you have them, it doesn't matter what you were going to do with them, you're liable) or statutory rape (it doesn't matter if she said she was 18, if she showed a (fake) ID, etc., if you sleep with someone underage, you're liable). Negligence This is failing to behave with a level of care that a reasonable person would have behaved with under the same conditions. In order to prevail on negligence claim, one must establish four elements: the existence of a legal duty from the other person to you the other person's breach of that duty you having suffered an injury proof that the breach of that legal duty was the cause of that injury While usually this has to do with actions taken (e.g., you negligently sped your car out of a parking lot...) in situations where there is a duty to act, even an omission can suffice. The Difference? Strict Liability and Negligence are both standards are liability. Put simply, negligence law requires a defendant to pay for the harms done by their unreasonable activity; strict liability requires a defendant to pay for all harms caused by their activity, regardless of whether the activity was reasonable or unreasonable. Res Ipsa Res Ipsa Loquitur doesn't apply to strict liability. Strict liability is strictly the simple formulation described above: you did it, it's on you. None of your "But-buts..." or proclamations of "I was misled!" are going to get you off the hook. Res Ipsa Loquitur is Latin for "the thing speaks for itself." Basically, it allows a Plaintiff to create a rebuttable presumption of negligence by the defendant by proving three things: The thing that happened was the type of thing that generally doesn't happen without negligence. It was caused by something solely under control of the defendant. The plaintiff did not contribute to causing that thing that happened. Difference in Final Compensation This is hard to answer because of the types of cases usually found applying each. Strict liability is usually seen in criminal law in the ways described above and in tort law in specific circumstances... One is owning an abnormally dangerous animal and another is conducting abnormally dangerous activities. The dangerous animal concept is why pitbill owners don't want the breed classified as a "dangerous breed." Nonetheless, though, here's a Harvard article actually comparing compensation in strict liability vs. negligence lawsuits! I hope this helps.

GDPR: can we ask the building owner to share and/or destroy data about one's RFID activity?

this is a follow up of https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/84184/do-rfid-key-cards-track-the-user-through-entry-ways It seems most buildings store the activity of one's RFID key activity. In the era of GDPR, I was wondering whether I would be allowed to ask for that data or ask for that data to be destroyed?

I would start by enquiring as to WHICH Personal Data they have about you and if any was obtained via "Track and Tracing" (RFID). If the answer is YES, I would further inquire about the Lawful Base (since, and assuming you have not Consent to it), plus processing "purpose" and "scope". If they argue Legitimate Interest, you can request the performed Impact Assessment and based on the answer you have documented grounds to demand it's erasure or at least a confirmation of processing "scope" limitation, that you may resort to if a dispute arises. It helps to get documented proof... and this is one linear way to do it.

Can a child sue their parents?

this is a theoretical question I am asking to satisfy my curiosity; hopefully this will never need to be useful for somebody Say a child is facing lots of abuse at home, or have parents who discriminate against them for being LGBTQ or is disabled. Could in theory, if the child had enough money and resources, sue their parents? Is there a country where this is legal? I know CPS exists in places like the United States; this is purely a theoretical question

Minor children can, in theory, sue their parents, in many countries, as long as they can prove a cognizable harm. The simplest case is where a parent commits a crime against the child, such as rape; this would also include embezzlement. "Abuse" is a term used in laws, for example RCW 26.44.020 (Washington state), but that sense of "abuse" doesn't include e.g. "overbearing behavior" or "obnoxious politics". If a child is disabled and the parents taunt the child for that disability, it is possible that the child could sue to terminate parental rights. The case is even clearer if the parent fails in their parental obligations to the child. Lgbtqia child rights are less well-defined. The background assumption is that the parent has the exclusive right to determine the child's upbringing, which includes things such as political beliefs, religion, and matters touching no family and sex. Norway is one of those countries with relatively few restrictions on "how you live your life", and they are considering a law against "conversion therapy", but there is presently no law prohibiting a parent from denouncing their child's lifestyle. It is possible that Barnevernet (child protective services) could intervene in a particular case, but they would not sue a parent on behalf of the child unless the parents actually violated the law.

Kansas - Can an apartment charge me a pet deposit/fee despite specifying in the lease that no deposit or fee would be necessary?

this is in Kansas. Suppose that a tenant T signed a one year lease for an apartment that allows pets under the condition that a deposit/fee would be charged, but the person who put together the lease made a mistake and neglected to include the deposit or the fee despite knowing I would be bringing a pet. The lease was signed by T and the apartment manager, and T, accordingly, hasn't been charged for about 6 months. However, suppose that T received a letter stating that T was in "violation" of the lease because T had not been paying the fee. Apparently someone in the office realized the mistake and is trying to make amends. But it seems that T would not be in violation of anything in the lease as they're aware that T has had a pet and it clearly states T neither owes a deposit nor a monthly fee. It is their company's policy to charge a pet deposit/fee, but the lease T and the manager signed clearly states they wouldn't charge T anything. Suppose that it was clearly a mistake on the manager's part, but a lease is a lease. Is T obligated to pay a deposit and this monthly fee, or do the terms of the lease as written override their policy, especially given how much time has already passed?

According to Kansas renter rights , your landlord cannot charge you for a pet deposit if it wasn't specified in your lease. If by chance, you have already paid your landlord money for your pet, you may be able to recover those charges . If your landlord refuses to reimburse you or continues to insist that you pay a vet fee, you may want to consider getting a tenant lawyer .

Who is responsible for damage caused by hacked account in China?

this is my father's problem but I will write in first person to make things easier. If this is not the right place to ask such a question please point me in the right direction, I am just looking for help. Short story: We were doing business with the Chinese company and their email was hacked. This led to us making a transfer for the 'wrong' account and loosing the money in the process. Are they (Chinese company) somewhat responsible for this, or is it 100% our fault, according to Chinese law ? Long story: We were doing business with the Chinese company, our firm is located in Poland. Since this is quite the distance, we hired additional, 3rd party guy in china (for many reasons, but one of them was increased security, or so we thought). Around a week ago, both the Chinese company and our guy got their email hacked by the same 'thieves' without them (and us obviously) noticing anything. They basically redirected communication between us and China, so every email went through them. They (in the name of the Chinese company) requested that the incoming money transfer should be made on their new account (different bank, but name of the company and people matched). So we contacted out guy in China to make sure everything is 'fine', but obviously He's account was hacked too so we basically talked with the same guy/s. Since this was a big transfer, and change of bank account raised our eyebrows a bit, we contacted the Chinese company through our second email, on their second email. As you probably guessed, it was hacked too. So we made the transfer, send them (thieves) confirmation of it, they photo-shopped it into correct data and sent it to the Chinese company, so we even got the response "We have the confirmation of your payment, we are starting to ship the goods" through the We-chat. We realized something was wrong when after a week Chinese company asked as where is the money since we were not responding to their emails (obviously thieves were not letting them through). I have to admit, they (thieves) did it perfectly in my opinion. They hacked two individual entities. when you look at the emails now you can tell that something might be wrong. Chinese company could have noticed it, since "new" emails started coming from ...@ourdomain.com , and not from ...@ourdomain.pl , as usually, but we also could have contacted them through other means of communication than email. My question is , is there any Chinese law that states the Chinese company is even in some part responsible for our loss? I know that in theory thieves are 100% responsible for this, but currently Chinese company's attitude is: Well, it is your fault, you made the wrong transfer, you have to pay for the goods we sent . Thank you in advice for any help in our matter.

You are Well, obviously, the scammers are but you aren’t going to catch them so your loss is your loss. You may want to check if any of your insurance policies cover being scammed. It’s common business practice to verify all changes in banking details by telephone (using a known number, not one in an email) precisely to prevent this kind of scam. Sorry you had to learn this the hard way.

If i sell something on a web app, can i be held liable if they pay with a counterfeit bill and i take it to the bank?

this question is for the jurisdiction of the united states, Washington state, pierce county, tacoma city. i am planning to sell some stuff on a phone app called "offer up" and one of the main features of the app is that it can show you items that are for sale within driving distance, and as such, you can drive to people, or people can drive to you, that day, exchange cash for the goods, then be on your way. my question is If i sell something on a web app, and the person pays me with a counterfeit bill, and i don't recognize the bill as counterfeit, will i be held criminally liable when i take it to the bank? or do i have to "knowingly possess" the counterfeit bill, will the fact that i was scammed hold up and not get me arrested, charged, or convicted? thanks.

In general, you have to have the intent to defraud for this to be criminal.

Home maintenance: contractor paying separate company to obtain permit

tl/dr: I'm trying to perform some home improvement projects in preparation for selling in 6 months. My jurisdiction requires a permit for one part (replacing siding on one side of the house). I know someone who is well qualified to do the work and is in the process of becoming a general contractor. Since he isn't one yet, he was going to pay another company to pull the permit for him. I'm not sure if this is perfectly standard and legal, or something that may cause problems when I go to sell my home. Is this above the board? I'm planning on selling my home in ~6 months and I'm working on some minor home improvements to get ready for that. One thing I need to do is replace the siding on one side of my house. I've called all the companies in my area who would be best suited to do this, and they are all booked up, literally, for months. It's apparently the busy season. I happen to personally know someone who has done some small projects around my house. He's also well qualified to replace the siding on my home - I know his history and he's done work far more complicated than this. He isn't a licensed contractor because he has changed careers a couple times, and is now in the process of becoming a licensed contractor. Because I couldn't find a company to do this work for me I asked him about it, and he was the one who pointed out that a permit would be required. He said that I could either pull the permit myself or he could pay another company to get the permit on his behalf (I believe from the same company that is sponsoring him to become a general contractor). I initially looked into pulling the permit myself (mainly out of interest in the process), but stopped when I realized that local regulations may stop me from selling my home within a year of "performing" my own home renovations. Presumably if I pull my own permit it will be assumed that I performed my own renovations. Therefore my plan right now is to let him get the permit himself, through a company that he has a relationship with. This adds an extra ~$450 to the cost of the job - $150 for the permit, and the rest goes to the company that is obtaining the permit. I don't know if that extra $300 is simply for the costs associated with filing the permit, or if it is to cover their increased liability for taking "responsibility" for the job. However, I'm not sure if him having someone else get a permit for him is typical operating procedure or the sign of potential legal trouble down the road. Mainly: Does this mean that the work would effectively be "licensed and insured" by whatever company he has get the permit? Or, if something goes wrong, would this mean that I effectively hired an unlicensed contractor to do work on my house, potentially exposing myself to liability? Obviously my preference is for option #1, and since the name of a licensed/insured company will in fact be on the permit, I actually expect option #1 to be the case. Still, I want to make sure I'm not potentially setting myself up for trouble.

This would depend on the regulations for such permits in your Jurisdiction, which i see is Florida but such rules are often at the county or city level. It is likely that if the company obtains the permit they are certifying that the work was done under the supervision of one of their license holders. If that is false, it may be a violation of regulations on the part of the company which could subject them to some penalty if it comes out, and it might be fraud on your part, because you would be effectively representing that the work was done by a licensed contractor when it was not. If the company did not do the work and was not paid for the work, it is very unlikely that their insurance would cover the work -- indeed if such a claim were made it would probably constitute insurance fraud. So the work would probably be uninsured. One possibility: The company might be willing to take on the job and sub-contract it to the person you know and have it covered by their insurance, with one of their people checking it over to provide the required supervision. They would take a commission on the work, or some sort of fee, for this service, no doubt. They might or might not be willing to enter into such an arrangement, but if they did, it would be above board, which i think the other idea would not be.

Rental: am I responsible for all maintenance, including that caused by wear and tear, under $200?

tl/dr: My property manager (PM) states that I'm responsible for all maintenance under $200 in the home, regardless of whether it is the result of damage I cause. This is on the basis of a clause in the lease that I find very ambiguous. This also is at odds with my (admittedly non-expert) understanding of real estate law. Is it possible I'm actually on the hook for repairs clearly caused by standard wear-and-tear, and which are not at all my fault? I just moved into a new rental home and there have been a number of maintenance items that have needed repair, which the owner has paid for. However the property manager has recently stated that we are responsible for all maintenance items under $200. That sounds very much at odds with my understanding of "real estate law" (aka the landlord is always responsible for basic wear and tear), and didn't sound like anything I read in the lease so I looked it over. There are two clauses in the lease related to maintenance: TENANT TO MAINTAIN; USE OF PREMISES; TENANT shall be responsible for the cost of all minor repairs and damages to the PREMISES due to the default, negligence, or willful misconduct of TENANT or TENANT'S family or guests, including [long list of perfectly reasonable things]. TENANT to alert the LANDLORD to any declining conditions inside and outside of the PREMISES included but not limited to [another list of things]. This seems perfectly normal and reasonable to me. Farther down it says: Maintenance: The Tenant agrees to properly maintain the home and complete, at his own expense, all daily maintenance EXCLUDING furnace/AC, water heater, appliance replacement and major repairs. The tenant is responsible for the cleaning of all clogged drain lines. If the home is located within a community governed by a Homeowners Association, Tenant does hereby agree to abide by the rules and bylaws of said Association ( Exceeding $200 maintenance threshold contact owner/landlord ) (emphasis mine). That last bit - Exceeding $200 maintenance threshold contact owner/landlord - is what the PM pointed to as establishing that I am responsible for all maintenance under $200. That is not at all how I understood that sentence. The reason is because this is a section talking about daily maintenance , i.e. the regular things that need to happen to keep a house running - changing air filters, light bulbs, snow removal, etc... and that the $200 threshold only applies to items such as these. However the PM believes this means that I'm instead responsible for any maintenance under $200. To pick a specific example, the basement just lost all power. An electrician just left and determined that there is a wiring issue in the walls and a new wire needs to be run. From the perspective of the PM, if the electrician charges less than $200 it is my responsibility because of this clause in the lease. I can't decide if I simply misread this lease because of my own expectations on the division of duties between tenant and landlord (aka the landlord is always responsible for all normal wear and tear - such as a wire breaking somewhere in the walls), or if the PMs understanding of this clause is completely at odds with basic property management law and therefore incorrect. Obviously though I need to figure out which is the case so I know how to respond. If I signed a lease I shouldn't have because I misread an important clause, then I'm going to have to eat this one and let it be the cost of learning an important lesson... So... Is my PMs understanding of the situation correct?

Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law , the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions , (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear . (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.

What is the right daily rate for annual leave in the UK when unspecified in employment contract?

tl;dr I had an amount of annual leave at the end of my contract and I want to determine the daily rate for payment in lieu of the untaken days of annual leave. My employer initially paid half the rate that I expected, then made another payment at a rate close to my yearly salary divided by 260 days (52 weeks and 5 days a week). I would like to request one of the two daily rates below and find the legal basis for it: salary divided by 230, to account 30 days of annual leave entitlement into account salary divided by 222, as above, and also bank holidays (8 per year in the UK). No details in employment particulars I checked the Employment Rights Act of 1996 and it requires details on the rate for payment in lieu of leave: 1 Statement of initial employment particulars. ... (4) The statement shall also contain particulars, as at a specified date not more than seven days before the statement (or the instalment containing them) is given, of— ... (d) any terms and conditions relating to any of the following— (i) entitlement to holidays, including public holidays, and holiday pay (the particulars given being sufficient to enable the employee’s entitlement, including any entitlement to accrued holiday pay on the termination of employment, to be precisely calculated), My offer letter does not include these details and I have no other legal documents. Scenario for "payment in lieu" Consider the following scenario. For simplicity, let's assume: my contract had 24 days of annual leave (2 per month) a month has 20 working days I left my employer on the last day of September I had 18 days left of annual leave to take I could either (i) have requested a payment in lieu for the annual leave; or (ii) let the contract extend to cover the 18 days of leave. I think that "payment in lieu" means that my gross payment should be the same in both cases (net payment differs depending on the monthly tax-free allowance in the UK, but that's between me and the taxperson). In case (ii) I could have extended the contract by 20 days to cover the full month of October: for 18 of those days, I would have taken leave from my stock at the end of the contract; for the other 2 days, I would have taken leave accrued by being on payroll during the month of October. If October had a bank holiday, then I would still have had one day of annual leave at the end of October. Questions am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? is there a legal basis for such a request?

am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? No. You are not being “paid in lieu” of anything; you are being paid your accrued entitlement. Payment in lieu refers to payment instead of some other obligation. In employment it usually refers to an employer paying an employee instead of requiring the employee to work out the notice period which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? Neither. The correct rate is the one your employer used - your annual rate divided by the number of days you get paid for. Annual leave continues to accrue while you are on annual leave (or any other paid leave). is there a legal basis for such a request? No.

Is there a Constititional right to medical care other than an abortion?

tl;dr version: I have a Constitutional right to pay for an abortion from a willing medical provider, even if a local statute purports to forbid it. Do I have an analogous general Constitutional right to pay for and obtain other kinds of medical care despite local statutes or are my rights limited to abortion? So, the landmark US Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) found that there was a Constitutional right to abortion under many situations even if apparently banned by state law. In other words, many state abortion laws are unconstitutional. Is abortion the only medical procedure that people in the US currently have a Constitutional right to, or are there other medical procedures or interventions that are similarly protected under the US Constitution? If other medical procedures are protected, what principles apply to determine which interventions are Constitutionally protected and which are within the police power of states to ban or allow at their discretion? For example, suppose Maine passes laws banning laser eye surgery, appendectomies, skin grafts, and all forms of addiction therapy. Is there precedent to indicate whether these laws would necessarily be Constitutionally infirm under the principles upholding Roe v. Wade? In other words, is abortion exceptional among medical procedures in being Constitutionally protected or is there a general Constitutional right to reasonable health care despite statutes attempting to restrict it? Restated, I know that I have a Constitutional right to an abortion. Do I also have Constitutional rights to open-heart surgery, tumor removal, and Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, or are my Constitutional health care rights limited to abortion only? This is not an abortion debate thread. Please keep all answers within the scope of present Constituional law and principles, regardless of what might or might not happen later this year. To be clear (and addressing user253751's comment), I am omitting provider willingness and patient ability to pay from this question . So (hypothetical), my doctor is willing to perform laser eye surgery, I am able to pay, but state law makes all eye surgery a felony. Is this law Constitutional? Discussion: It is interesting that access to abortions is Constitutionally protected while access to medical cannabis is, apparently, not, even though both qualify as health care and are controversial enough to have been banned by statutes in more than one jurisdiction. What's the principle that determines why abortions are protected but cannabis is not? user6726's mention of the right to refuse vaccines is the opposite of what I am asking. I'm asking more about the right to receive a vaccine despite the legislature or the executive saying I'm not allowed to. If I want the vaccine, I can find a provider willing and able to give it to me, and I can pay, do I have a liberty interest in getting the vaccine despite local law saying that the vaccine is only for small children?

In the US, the most wide-spread proscription against a medical treatment (broadly construed) is that only 10 of 50 states allow physician-assisted suicide. In Washington v. Glucksberg (one of the states that subsequently made such suicides legal), SCOTUS affirms that such a law does not violate the Due Process Clause. Given a historical analysis, the court concludes that an "asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause". O'Connor in her concurring opinion further states that "There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths", but this falls short of a ruling that a person has a protected liberty interest in seeking medical care. Cruzan v. Director affirms that "[a] competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment" (also noting that "informed consent" may derive from common law or specific state constitutions). Reciting prior reasoning on Due Process and medical treatment and referring to Jacobson v. Massachusetts (smallpox case), they note that "the Court balanced an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State's interest in preventing disease". There seems to be a dearth of cases affirming a protected liberty interest in seeking a particular medical procedure. Were the court to announce a fundamental right to seek some medical treatment, that right could still be subordinated to the states compelling interest in preventing some harm associated with a medical procedure, with legal review being carried out under a strict scrutiny standard. It should be borne in mind that Congress does limit access to drugs and devices, hence there is no constitutionally-protected right to take LSD as a treatment for mental problems. To the extent that a procedure relies on a (not-yet approved) device, that device must be approved by the FDA.

Am I required to return a package that was sent to me in error?

tl;dr: Do I have to return a package that was sent to me that I've already been refunded for? Background: In early October, I pre-ordered the Microsoft Band 2; a fitness monitor. It wasn't scheduled to be released in Canada until late November (~20), so I didn't expect it anytime soon. Near the end of October however, I received a tracking number from Microsoft, and had my credit card charged for the full amount of the product. Sure enough, it had been sent a month early, apparently in error. I checked the tracking page, and marked my calendar for the 2nd of November, excited I was getting it early. Well, the 2nd came and went. To my frustration, the package ended up getting stuck in customs for days. Then, I received an email from a "Chuck Norris" (I'm not kidding) that Microsoft had realized their error, and couldn't allow me to have the package early. Instead, my order was cancelled, refunded, I was given a $20 credit for their online store, and told to reorder the Band if I still wanted it. I decided to wait. The package was sent back to China, and sat there for about a week. This picture tells the whole story nicely: Yesterday though, I received a shipping notification. As you can see from the history above, it's since cleared customs, and is scheduled to be delivered today at noon (about 6 hours from now), despite me having received a full refund and credit . What are my options when it arrives? Am I allowed to receive it, then notify Microsoft of the error and offer to pay? Ideally, I'd like to brush it under the rug and not pay (I think Microsoft has enough money to forget about a couple hundred bucks), but I realize that that could bite me down the road. At the advice of @ratchetfreak, I read Microsoft's "Terms of Use and Sale" , and couldn’t find anything about orders shipped in error. The only somewhat relevant thing I could find was if there's an error on their website relating to my order, they reserve the right to charge me the correct price (12.) (which I'm fine with). I live in Calgary, Canada. Update as of Nov. 14: The shipping history is still exactly as the picture above; "in transit" in Winnipeg. It appears to be a glitch in their systems unfortunately, as I suspect it was stopped at customs; again. Update 5 years later: I never got it, as this parcel was stuck at customs for seemingly forever before being sent back.

Receive it and keep it. If MS wants to be paid they can either charge your card or send you an invoice. They will look really stupid if they sue you over this and need to explain to the judge why they didn't take one of the two options before taking legal action.

How do courts redress jury decisions when evidence of jury bias is present?

tl;dr: How do courts redress jury decisions when evidence of jury bias is present? Example case I know from Georgia: victim hit by a drunk driver. The players and timeline below. Plaintiff (victim) is a female of a different race of the jury as was her attorney. The victims had an attorney who asked her to increase the percent of the award under the contract because he needed help getting the case settled. That lawyer told her she would have a team of two working on the case. The first lawyer wound up not working on the case after she agreed to the increase and he essentially handed the case to the other attorney. The victim had documents proving medical visits, lost wages, and medical bills. The defendant (drunk driver) had numerous attorneys appointed by the insurance agency that extended the case out over six years. The last lawyer was a female of the same race as the jury. The defendant, the drunk driver, did not appear in court. The defendant never spent a dime on legal fees and never showed up in court. The insurance company paid for an attorney to represent her; the insurance company could not be mentioned during the hearing. The attorney for the victim offers a settlement to the insurance company. The settlement was for the legal limit of $25K under GA law. At the hearing, he requested a judgement of $80k. The defendant's insurance company attorney counters the offer for $12K in writing before the hearing and $15k the day of trial. The first written offer refers to a legal code that would make the plaintiff pay the legal fees if the Jury does not award at least 75% of the offer. Neither party accepted the other's offer to settle. The jury was composed entirely of a different race than the plaintiff; it had all women except for one male and was not a diversified group. The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony. (Note: the total amount of the medical expenses and individual bills were listed on the statement.) Victim's attorney objected and motioned jury bias based on that question, which was denied by the judge. The jury ruled in favor for the victim with an award of only $500. My research shows that investigate questions by a jury and trying to impeach a witness does show bias but I could not find the code, only legal articles. The victim felt that was an inadequate amount and wanted to appeal the decision. The victim's attorney refused to file an appeal or any motions that the victim requested stating that judges almost never overturn a jury's verdict. The victim wanted to file a motion on her behalf. She was not able to file the motion because she was under contract with her attorney and if she fired him she was liable for all of his fees. The lawyer informed her that the verdict has made her obligated to pay the insurance company back their legal fees. (Note: The victim did not file a lawsuit against the insurance company she filed a lawsuit against the drunk driver.) My research shows that you can file a motion for the judge to give a Judgement notwithstanding a verdict and additur the amount of the award. There were numerous reasons this would be allowed jury bias was one of them. Jury prejudice is another. The final settlement was the victim take the $500 and not file an appeal; both attorneys threatened her with the obligation to pay their legal fees if she did anything else. I could not find anything that allowed the victim out of the contract with her attorney and to act on her own behalf without being obligated to pay her lawyer his legal fees.

There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.

Are the abbreviations "IANAL" and "TINLA" legally valid substitutes for their full forms?

tl;dr: I've often seen the disclaimer " I am not a lawyer " abbreviated as "IANAL". And I've often seen the disclaimer " this is not legal advice " abbreviated as "TINLA". Is it legally just as effective to use the abbreviations as disclaimers by themselves, instead of using their full form disclaimers? Or are people wasting space and time by adding "IANAL" or "TINLA" to their writing? too long; don't read: There seems to be plenty of debate about whether such disclaimers (either in full form or abbreviated) are even required at all, for example, in these questions . (FWIW, I think equivalent disclaimers apply site-wide within Law Stack Exchange, as stated in the Tour and Help Center .) But I'm probably using the wrong terminology, because everything I find in Internet searches pertains to style/grammar of abbreviation usage generally, or to using vs. avoiding these specific disclaimers generally (regardless of form) , whereas I'm wondering about the validity of the abbreviations specifically, as valid legal substitutes for their full forms . In other words, if someone writes just "IANAL" or "TINLA"... Does it have the same legal effect as if they had written " I am not a lawyer " or " this is not legal advice " (respectively)? Or... Is it legally equivalent to having omitted the disclaimer entirely, i.e. effectively useless? Not sure if this rabbit hole is relevant, but thinking about it some more, I wonder if it might boil down to questions of a more general nature: (A) Within a self-contained written work, does an abbreviation have the same legal effect as its full form (even in the complete absence of the full form or any other explicit definition of the abbreviation from the written work)? (B) Are there specific requirements regarding which abbreviations qualify to legally represent which specific full forms? At the time of this writing, Wikipedia's List of legal abbreviations states that: It is common practice in legal documents to cite to [ sic? ] other publications by using standard abbreviations for the title of each source. Abbreviations may also be found for common words or legal phrases. Such citations and abbreviations are found in court decisions, statutes, regulations, journal articles, books, and other documents [emphasis added]. Though these statements are currently unsourced [ citation needed ] and may not represent a worldwide view of the subject , they seem to suggest that (A) might be true. Is there a formal legal definition for this somewhere? For (B), definitions for "IANAL" and "TINLA" seem to be absent from common legal definitions at this time, for example, Wikipedia's list and some of the online resources linked there: ALLACRONYMS Legal Abbreviations Cardiff University's Index to Legal Abbreviations The Law Librarians' Society of Washington, D.C.'s Common Abbreviations and Legal Citation Examples for Selected Federal Government Documents Yet definitions for " IANAL " seem to be commonly found online, and similarly for "TINLA" (perhaps less-so, but still common) – so common as to be entirely unambiguous, by my assessment. So is this sufficient for them to qualify as valid legal abbreviations for their respective full form disclaimers of " I am not a lawyer " and " this is not legal advice "?

Stating "This is not blue" or "TINB" on something that is self-evidently blue is of no legal effect Legal advice has the following characteristics: Requires legal knowledge, skill, education and judgment Applies specific law to a particular set of circumstances Affects someone's legal rights or responsibilities Creates rights and responsibilities in the advice-giver If the advice you give meets these criteria then it is legal advice. However, if you are clear that you are not a lawyer and that you are not giving legal advice then this undermines the characteristics above. That is, what would be legal advice without such a disclaimer may lose that characteristic if the disclaimer is genuinely given in the particular circumstances. Context matters: "this is not legal advice (wink, wink)" is not a disclaimer and doesn't turn legal advice into not legal advice. Similarly, the disclaimer must be genuinely understood by the recipient so that they are adequately warned to do their own research or seek actual legal advice before taking the course of action outlined. Using an abbreviation is more likely to be misunderstood but, again, context matters. In the context of this particular site (see various meta questions), which goes out of its way to explain that this is not legal advice the disclaimer is hardly necessary and the abbreviation would be fine. More generally Communication is always under tension between clarity and brevity. It should be detailed enough that it can be understood by its audience but not so long that its audience switches off. Abbreviations, acronyms, symbols and jargon (all of which I’m going to abbreviate to abbreviations) sacrifice clarity for brevity. Depending on the context and the target audience an abbreviation may or may not need to be spelled out in full. In formal writing, it is good practice to spell them out when first used and put the abbreviated form in parenthesis immediately afterward. Alternatively, scientific and engineering reports may use a glossary at the front or back to list them all in one place. It is extremely good practice to explain these abbreviations in any document that is intended to have direct legal consequences like legislation or a contract. Here clarity is waaaay more important than brevity. In a similar vein, it is quite common for such documents to explicitly define real words that already exist to narrow or broaden their scope in the interests of clarity. However, sufficiently common abbreviations may not be spelled out even in these. For example, USA, UN, UK, and EU are in such common usage that they would not need to be spelled out. Similarly, state or province abbreviations would not need explanation within their own country - while an American should know what IA means they might struggle with NSW. Similarly, some contractions may be so common within a profession or industry that no explanation is needed. For example, no scientist or engineer would need to be told what Pa, N, and m mean. In more informal settings (like texts or WhatsApp chats) spelling them out would make you look like a pompous dickhead. If it's sufficiently clear that a reasonable person in the position of the recipient would understand it then legal consequences can flow from it. Ultimately the decision of it it was clear would be a matter for whoever was deciding any dispute about it.

Can NGROI defense be argued after a guilty verdict?

tl;dr: In the U.S., can a "not guilty by reason of insanity" (a.k.a., NGRI or NGROI) defense be offered after a guilty verdict but before sentencing? In criminal prosecutions in the U.S. it is common and generally considered prudent for a defendant to refuse to expose himself to questioning at trial. This forces the prosecution to use independent evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements of the crime charged were satisfied. A defendant may want to entertain a claim that he was insane at the time a crime was committed, but avoid entering that claim when there is a significant probability that the state will fail to obtain an conviction on the merits of the case against him. So my question is: If a jury returns a guilty verdict for a crime, can a defendant subsequently (but before sentencing) argue to the court that he was insane? Or does that defense always have to be offered at trial for the crime, before the case is sent to the jury?

I assume that the person alleges insanity at the time of the crime, and not incompetence to stand trial. The best but dim hope would be to introduce evidence as a mitigating factor for sentencing – this would not avoid a conviction, but you might think it could reduce the penalty. Oregon v. Guzek , 546 U.S. 517 says that you cannot (automatically) introduce mitigating evidence after the trial: the State may limit the innocence-related evidence he can introduce at that proceeding to the evidence he introduced at his original trial This case does not say that mitigating evidence can never be introduced at the sentencing phase, it says something complex about Oregon state laws on the matter, 8th and 14th Amendment rights, and 28 USC 1257(a) . Taking examples from Washington, you either plead guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity . The rules also state that Written notice of an intent to rely on the insanity defense, and/or a claim of present incompetency to stand trial, must be filed at the time of arraignment or within 10 days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit. All procedures concerning the defense of insanity or the competence of the defendant to stand trial are governed by RCW 10.77 . RCW 10.77.030 says (1) Evidence of insanity is not admissible unless the defendant, at the time of arraignment or within ten days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit, files a written notice of his or her intent to rely on such a defense. (2) Insanity is a defense which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence. This precludes making the argument after trial. (2) is a question of fact that has to be made by the jury, meaning that the evidence for and against the claim must have been introduced at trial (and there's no do-over if you don't like the outcome of the first trial).

Why the deal between IBM and RedHat needs approval from China?

today I read cnbc magazine and they asked why shares are not 190$ when IBM is paying premium price of 190 but now are 170, one of the reason was that China has not still approve the deal. I am not sure why China has to approve this deal ?

China approved new antitrust laws in 2008. There are always variations in the details from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but China's Anti-Monopoly Law shares the key features of its counterparts in most other major economies. Therefore, in addition to prohibitions on the abuse of monopoly power, and prohibitions on price-fixing, it also requires businesses to request and receive government approval before moving forward with acquisitions of a certain size. This requirement applies to any transaction involving companies with at least ~$63 million in annual sales in China, so the IBM-Red Hat deal would easily trigger review by the Ministry of Commerce.

are there any jurisdictions around the world where courts having discretion not only for sentancing but also for pradons and parole?

various UN tribunals for warcrimes and genocide have this but I haven't seen this in any other country where they have broad discretion like this. would this be against the principle of seperation of powers ? since pardoning and sentancing is something traditionally associated with legislature and executive powers

Pardons and paroles are different things, usually. A parole is the recognition that society is best served if the convict spends the remaining sentence outside prison. It is an important legal principle that people can only be imprisoned for their crimes, after being sentenced in a due process. When the prison term is up, the prisoner must be free to go. Yet changing the release date ist the most powerful tool to influence the behaviour of the prisoner while in prison. (Others are privileges like a TV set in the cell, or punishments like solitary confinement). The penal system wants to "bribe" an inmate to do things like vocational training, or anger therapy, which help with reintegration in society but which are not strictly required of a prisoner. So the prisoner is "bribed" with early release to behave "better" than required. That's a function of the justice system. In other cases, the legal system may believe that immediate release, under the supervision of a parole officer, is the best way to deal with a criminal. Again a function of the justice system. A pardon, on the other hand, has developed from the royal right to grant a reprieve without giving a justification. This can be seen as a way to do justice when the letter of the law leads to an injustice. The judiciary is bound by laws, and laws should not be written for any one specific case. Today the power of pardon is often given to the head of government or to the head of state (note that it is often the head of state, not the head of government).

usage of the same applicationname

we are currently developing a mobile-App for Android and IOS and we would like to use a name for this application, that already exists: "YouTrack". BUT of course our application has nothing to do with the existing app. The existing app is for tracking issues in software, our app is for motorsports. Is it safe to use the name for our Application?

Is it safe to use the name for our Application? YouTrack is a registered trademark of another company producing software. Said software is 14 years old, so there is no question here of who came first. The trademark is valid in the EU. In Germany specifically, this is covered by MarkenG . You using the same name for your software as the one registered as a trademark for their software goes against many of the points, but the most obvious one is (2) Dritten ist es untersagt, ohne Zustimmung des Inhabers der Marke im geschäftlichen Verkehr in Bezug auf Waren oder Dienstleistungen 1. ein mit der Marke identisches Zeichen für Waren oder Dienstleistungen zu benutzen, die mit denjenigen identisch sind, für die sie Schutz genießt, Translated: Third parties shall be prohibited, without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark, from using in the course of trade in relation to goods or services 1. Use a sign identical with the trademark for goods or services identical with those for which it enjoys protection, So the name is in no way "safe". Given that there is "YouTrack", "uTrack" and even "u-track" already, don't you want a unique brand people can recognize as yours? Isn't that the point of a name ?

Non-profit granting rights of use of software to for-profit

we have two organizations - one for profit and one non-profit, that are related. The Non-profit benefits from use of Slack, GSuite and other tools at a discount due to the non-profit nature of the organization. The for profit organization is donating resource time, office space to the non-profit. In this case, would the non-profit be allowed to 'license' the use of the SaaS to the for profit (in exchange for the office space, resources, technical help, etc)? I imagine that the main problem would be in the T&C of these tools (Slack/Gsuite for non profits, etc), but could not find anything myself. Thanks! Brian

You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable , non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack.

insurance refund check made payable to me and my ex husband

we were to receive a $924. insurance refund due to overpayment on a house we sold. my ex husband had the check sent to his new address without telling me , signed his name and forged my name and cashed the check, when i found out about it and asked him he admitted he forged the check and said there is nothing i can do about it. i called the insurance co they said its not up to them to police if its forged or not. do i call the police? Should i call the bank that cashed the check? is small claims court really worth the trouble to get half of $924?

You should call the police. If you talk to any bank they will say "well we had your signature on the cheque". They aren't in a position to perform criminal investigations. You might first consider telling your husband that you are calling the police. After all, the downsides for him of having a criminal record, and whatever criminal punishment there is, will far outweigh $462. However there is no guarantee that the police can prove anything. It may end up being your word against his. If you can do it legally you might try recording him admitting that he forged the cheque.

Picture credits -> must the page of inclusion be named?

we're currently developing a website. For this we use pictures for which we need to place an attribution on the legal notice page. Now we're wondering if it's enough to place the following information there: file name path image content (i.e. the visual image itself) the copyright (maybe including link) Is this enough or do we need to include also the urls of the sub pages where we place the image? Thanks in advance! Bye The_Unknown

Just giving a credit does not absolve you of the copyright regulations. The person who owns the copyright on the images would need to allow you to use them.

Constitutionally can the judge issue an arrest warrant for driving without a license?

went to court and I asked for a appeal and didn't have the money for the appeal so can they arrest for this...??? Or make payment to the fine which she try to make sign but didn't..

Driving without a license is illegal in every state in the US, and a judge presented with evidence that establishes probable cause that a person has engaged in driving without a license can issue a warrant for that person's arrest. Doing so is in no way prohibited by the US Federal Constitution, nor by any state constitution.

is it possible to use evidence from another countries in a german case?

what do I mean by that? well in Germany people's criminal records aren't public like in the US (you know when someone is a pedo or a rapist their name is revealed to the public) but in Germany it seems not to be the case for privacy reasons I guess?(not sure if it true) now if someone had a long criminal record and a lot of people reported him to police in another country which is publicly available is it possible to use these records against him? and also when it comes to voice recordings is it possible to use recordings from another country where recording people without consent is legal and normal? so in short " is it possible to use evidence that isn't accessible to the german public from another country? "

I think you are mixing different issues here. For privacy reasons, media in Germany must not name certain suspects, and sometimes not certain convicted criminals. This leads to news reports like "the presumable perpetrator, Thomas A., ..." and it is (in theory) not publicly known who this "A." is. The police and the courts know the full name, of course. And so do viewers in the courtroom. Generally speaking it is possible to watch court proceedings in Germany. In high-profile cases slots may be limited and taken by the press, and there might be high-security cases (usually the same), but for average cases one can simply show up and listen. One cannot take pictures, however. A criminal record may be entered into a trial. It might establish a pattern, or influence sentencing. Germany has lay judges (Schöffen) rather than an US-style jury, so there is less concern of preventing prejudice to a jury; the lay judges deliberate with the professional judges. Evidence from abroad may be entered into a trial. The German prosecution can request assistance from the police and prosecutors in other countries. That's relatively easy within the EU, more difficult for other countries. Other countries send information to the German police, prosecutors, and intelligence services. At times, intelligence information can be used by German agencies to judge a situation but not revealed in court, so it cannot be used in a prosecution. The agencies know about a terrorist, but they cannot prove anything without betraying this confidence. There are logistical and legal problems with that -- generally witnesses testify in court, where the judges judge their credibility . Witnesses can be heard by teleconference, but that is the exception. So when the evidence is used in court, it usually becomes accessible to parts of the German public (those on the viewer's gallery of the courtroom). There are some situations where the public is excluded, e.g. where minors are involved.

Title VII of 1991

what is the protection requirement of Title VII of 1991 the plaintiff must follow to successfully file an action? I already included the time limit .

The EEOC rules are summarized here . Briefly, there are prerequisites, such as filing a charge of discrimination, and when they dismiss your charge, you will get a Notice-of-Right-to-Sue. You then have to file the suit within 90 days (I assume that is the time limit you referred to). Then you either hire an attorney to pursue the lawsuit for you, or you do it yourself. If you are suing under the Equal Pay Act, you may go directly to court. Having decided who to sue and what the cause of action is, and having checked statutes of limitation, you draft a formal complaint setting out the elements, fill out some forms, and file it with the clerk of the relevant court. The rules of federal procedure (general) are here , so follow them (to the extent relevant). Some of them are more informational / definitional, e.g. Rule 3 "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court". You also need to observe district-specific rules. If you were in Western Washington, you could use this handy pro se guide .

what effects does a court recording it's reasons for a judgement ? (India)

when a court is required to record it's reasons for a decision , what effects does it have on future cases ? CrPc 354https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1266667/ sepecifically When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. does it mean they have to follow the same reasoning in every case ?

It means that they have to provide reasons so an appellate court can review the decision. If they don't, the appellate court will remand the case for a statement or reasons before reconsidering the sentence on appeal.

Do tenant need to sign damage documents after leaving their rented appartment?

when my landlord checked my room on my leaving day he claimed that my room wasn't clean ( for example the mattress under the cover were dirty with black spots on them ). but the thing is they were always like this even when I arrived and he wanted me to buy him a new one! and not just that there was damaged stuff in the house like a broken cheap chair that was under the stairs ( that no one will notice or even buy any attention to ) and he told me that it wasn't broken before and I need to get him a new one as well (he visited the house many time and I am sure he know about it) the important thing he took a document ( not sure about the name in german ) and marked missing or damage on it and he wanted me to sign it, of course, I refused because I didn't break anything, then he told me if I don't he can sue me for not signing that document.....still I refused. so after a while, he sent me few emails telling me to pay or he will call the police because I still owe him ( he claimed that even tho he never returned my 500 euro deposit as well ) so I just ignored him so was it the right call? not to sign it? and also, can he just take that much money for cheap damages? I mean a mattress and chair doesn't cost 500 euro according to his emails he will contact a company called schufa and he will inform them that I don't pay bills and by doing this I will not be able to rent in Germany (that according to his claims I am not sure what schufa is, or what it can do)

When starting and ending a lease or after renovations, it is normal to go through the flat and to note the state of the flat including any damages ( Übergabeprotokoll ). If damage wasn't present at the beginning but is now present, that indicates (but doesn't prove) that you broke it. The protocol should be factually correct, and ideally include photos of any relevant aspects (e.g. dirt, scratches). If there are disagreements, both standpoints should be noted. By signing you confirm that the protocol is correct, so you shouldn't sign if you think the protocol is too vague or misleading. It is not legally required to make or sign such a protocol, but when done correctly it protects both parties: it lets the landlord charge you as necessary to fix your damage, but also protects you from charges relating to things that were not listed as damaged in the protocol In this case, it seems that no protocol was made at the start of the lease. This makes it difficult to prove – for either party – what you actually damaged. If you can't settle this between yourselves, the landlord would have to sue you. They have six months to file a lawsuit, so they can keep the deposit until these things are settled. But they should really provide an itemized bill of the actual costs. If there are no remaining disputes, courts sometimes require the deposit to be returned more quickly, e.g. within two or thee months. Just as the landlord can sue you, you can use the legal system to get your deposit back. The first step towards court collection proceedings would be to write a dunning letter in which you request repayment within some reasonable deadline (e.g. two weeks), and in which you note that the joint walkthrough of the flat did not show any damage that wasn't already there upon moving in. This should be sent via certified mail, not email. The landlord would then have to dispute the debt, otherwise you can go to a lawyer to help you request a court order. While the legal route might not be prohibitively expensive, it probably isn't worth the effort. Instead, make sure that the landlord has your current address so that you can communicate via mail instead of email (important so that you can react if they do try to sue you). Insist on an itemized bill. Offer to settle for some amount between what you really owe and what they claim – probably still cheaper than involving lawyers. The Schufa is the German credit rating agency. Businesses and landlords notify Schufa when you don't pay your bills. To rent a flat in Germany, you are effectively required to have a clean Schufa report. In this case, the landlord doesnt' (yet) have grounds to report anything to Schufa because there is no undisputed debt. You can access the reports on your Schufa profile four times per year without cost via a GDPR data subject access request ( DSGVO-Anfrage ). You can dispute incorrect entries.

when uploading videos to tiktok/youtube, as oringal content creators what copyright do we transfer to the platform, what is left to the creators?

when uploading videos to tiktok/youtube, as original content creators what copyright do we transfer to the platform, what is left to the creators? where can we learn more those "laws" on their platforms? Do we have any laws that transfer ownership completely, meaning that as soon as we use the platforms to upload content we agree to transfer the owner?

when uploading videos to tiktok/youtube, as original content creators what copyright do we transfer to the platform, what is left to the creators? Most of these platforms provide that the creator retains all copyright but grants the platform a non-exclusive and irrevocable license to redistribute and reuse the content. Where can we learn more those "laws" on their platforms? They are found in the terms of service. Do we have any laws that transfer ownership completely, meaning that as soon as we use the platforms to upload content we agree to transfer the owner? Most platforms avoid this, probably because they do not want to alienate potential users. Most people would not upload their videos or other creations to a platform that would sue them for making subsequent use of the uploaded material. For example, from YouTube's terms of service : Rights you Grant You retain all of your ownership rights in your Content. In short, what belongs to you stays yours. However, we do require you to grant certain rights to YouTube and other users of the Service, as described below. Licence to YouTube By providing Content to the Service, you grant to YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferable, sublicensable licence to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display and perform it) for the purpose of operating, promoting, and improving the Service. Licence to Other Users You also grant each other user of the Service a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to access your Content through the Service, and to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display, and perform it) only as enabled by a feature of the Service. Duration of Licence The licences granted by you continue until the Content is removed as described below. Once removed, the licences will terminate, except where the operation of the Service, use of Content permitted before your removal, or the law requires otherwise. For example, removal of Content by you does not require YouTube to: (a) recall Content that is being used by other users within any limited offline viewing functionality of the Service; or (b) delete copies we reasonably need to keep for legal purposes.

"Reverse whois" for UK land ownership...?

when we want to know who owns a given piece of property, we can consult HM Land Registry. But suppose we wish to find out what properties are owned by a given person or company? What are the best resorts for these types of information? I'm thinking of looking into getting a whole official copy of the HMLR dataset and then running some algorithmic analysis to cross index it. But I'm hoping there is anything more direct? Is this information intended to be accessible or inaccessible or neither per se?

This is a live political issue. Currently, the various datasets are incomplete and have known accuracy issues. Considering a particular parcel of land: It might not be in the Land Registry at all. About 85% of land in England and Wales is registered, and less in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scottish registered land might only appear on the paper "Register of Sasines", as opposed to the more recent electronic database, or potentially in even older county-specific sasine registers. The owner might be a company, partnership, trust, etc., rather than a natural person. The ownership and control of that company (etc.) can be hard to trace. Companies House data is not verified; companies can be incorporated overseas; the trusts register is not publicly searchable; things can be muddled. Raw data might not show that a dozen properties, each owned by a single company that owns nothing else, are in fact ultimately controlled by a particular person of interest. Different people may own the freehold, or a leasehold, or have various other forms of ownership or control. Even a long-term tenancy may be of interest for database purposes. Because of continuing interest in anti-money laundering, tax evasion, and general accumulation of wealth, there have been plans to have a new "register of beneficial ownership". Such a register would record, for each plot of land, the name of the human beings who actually own and control it in the end. In the anticipated structure, each of those people would have an identifying number, and so we would get your proposed reverse index where you could look up a person and see what they owned. The register introduced by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is the " Register of Overseas Entities " (ROE). However, as the name suggests, it only covers companies/partnerships/etc. from outside the UK. It's operated by Companies House. Overseas entities who have dealt in UK land since 1999/2014/2022 (depending on which part of the UK the land was in) have to list their beneficial owners. Because this is new, it is also not very complete yet: it only went live on 1 August 2022 and no penalties apply until the deadline of 31 January 2023. In Scotland, the " Register of Persons Holding a Controlled Interest in Land " (RCI) is meant to do the same but not just for overseas entities. It is live since 1 April 2022 and the initial registration period ends on 1 April 2023, so again it may not be very complete just yet. There will likely be more political tussle over potential creation of a more extensive UK-wide register. Until that exists, this is a known problem with the extent of current data. You can get a partial view but even that will be frustrating when it comes to the most interesting chunks of property.

What do, "X speed limit while children are present", street signs mean, specifically?

while I'm driving near schools I often notice street signs that say something like, "speed limit 15 mph while children are present". I am curious what this means specifically. Does it still count if any child is in school? What if they're outside, but in a fenced area? Is there some specific distance from the road that drivers need to be aware of? What is the specific meaning of these types of signs?

Legally speaking, it's hard to say, because it depends on the laws in the particular jurisdiction. There is a wide variation in how these warnings are phrased, and how they relate to local law, for example it may be limited to "when flashing" (which seems to be the pattern in Washington, but that's more a matter of practice than state requirement ). Federal Way WA can indicate school speed limits "when flashing" or "when children present", in case 1.) School Children are occupying or walking within the marked crosswalk. 2.) School children are waiting at the curb or on the shoulder of the roadway and are about to cross the roadway by way of the marked crosswalk. 3.) School children are present or walking along the roadway, either on the adjacent sidewalk or, in the absence of sidewalks, on the shoulder within the posted school speed limit zone. It appears that "when present" is a theoretical option in that town, and instead they rely on flashing lights and photo-enforcement. This definition follows from a state administrative rule 468-95-335 that defines "when children present" this way, and the state no longer uses the "children present" standard. In another state / town, the law could be different.

In the eyes of the law, is a crime committed by a child too young to be charged, actually a crime?

with the recent JonBenet Ramsey documentary, many people now feel Burke was the killer. Since he was only 9 yrs old, he could not be charged in Colorado since the minimum age was 10 yrs old at the time (under that age a juvenile cannot commit a crime, so no crime occurred??). His parents were indicted as accessories (perhaps not the exact term) but never brought to trial. Many wonder why - is it possible that due to shielding laws, no evidence against Burke could be introduced (due to his age or the fact he was not being charged) and therefore there was very little that could be presented in court? Can an adult be an accessory to a 'non-crime' if Burke is completely shielded, and in essence no crime was ever committed in the first place?

In general, a guilty action also requires a mens rea, or guilty mind, in order to be guilty of a crime. A child who is too young to form an intent to commit a crime cannot be guilty of a crime. The toddler who finds a loaded gun and shoots someone isn't guilty of assault or murder because the toddler couldn't have formed the intent to commit the crime. Under the more modern Model Penal Code definitions, Strict liability laws are applied regardless of intent, but negligent, reckless, knowing, and purposeful states of mind all require some level of intent, and again, a child is unable to form this intent. The defense of infancy is a defense against the formation of a mens rea by a child's age. In English common law, under the age of 7, infancy was a complete defense. Age 7 to 14, infancy was a rebuttable presumption, and over 14 were presumed capable. In the US, some laws set different ages, as corrected in the comments, CRS 18-1-801 states that "No child under ten years of age shall be found guilty of any offense."

Is it legal to download subtitles from youtube videos

youtube videos have different types of subtitles, there is manual subtitles where the author writes his video's captions and uploads them, and there is the auto generated subtitles by youtube. these subtitles can be downloaded in a geeky way, Question: is it legal to download and use these subtitles whether they're auto generated or written by the author himself?

On the face of it, transcripts are derivative work covered by copyright (even if automagically generated). You are allowed to use them if the use is fair use or if you comply with YouTube's terms of service.

How can a cash sale result in a voidable title?

§ 2-403. Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods; "Entrusting". Please look at the statute above. It is fairly short. There is a link to it here: https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/2/2-403 I am confused by what is meant by the part that says "cash sale". Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. EDIT: is it possible that by putting quotes around "cash sale" this was a tongue-in-cheek way of saying counterfeit money? I don't think statutes are ever tongue-in-cheek, right?

The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them.

Is "elektronische Post" (§ 5 Telemediengesetz) necessarily email?

§ 5 of the Telemediengesetz (German) lists what, for instance, website providers have to include in the typically called Impressum of the website. The second sentence of (1) is: Angaben, die eine schnelle elektronische Kontaktaufnahme und unmittelbare Kommunikation mit ihnen ermöglichen, einschließlich der Adresse der elektronischen Post, Which according to cgerli.org ( PDF ) translates to: details which permit rapid electronic contact and direct communication with them, including the electronic mail address, Does the term elektronische Post (which translates to electronic mail ) necessarily mean email (via SMTP)? Of course one would immediately think of email (and some might use this term as synonym for "E-Mail", but it’s not really idiomatic), but then why doesn’t it say "E-Mail" or "SMTP"? Because it doesn’t explicitly say so, my assumption is that it doesn’t have to be an email address, but just some address that allows to communicate electronically. Like a term for a category of communication protocols (i.e., protocols which allow to send messages in electronic form) instead of refering to the specific SMTP . (Which would make sense, because email might lose popularity, and then the law wouldn’t have to be updated.) So, must it be an email address ( RFC 6068 ) or may it be an address for a different protocol that allows to send/receive messages in the Internet?

This question was content of a judgement: KG · Urteil vom 7. Mai 2013 · Az. 5 U 32/12 The First maxim is important: "Die nach § 5 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 TMG bestehende Pflicht zur Angabe der "Adresse der elektronischen Post" meint die Angabe der E-Mail-Anschrift." Translation: The existing duty for indication of the "address of electronic mail" (or like your translation: electronic mail address) according to § 5 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 TMG means the E-Mail-Address. So the answer is YES.

What makes someone a "principal officer of an executive department"?

§4 of the 25th amendment makes reference to "a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" – Congress has not provided anything else. 5 USC 101 lists the "executive departments". Art II § 2 of the Constitution says that the president shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for It is reasonable (but not self-evident) that having been nominated to be a principal officer of, e.g., the Dept. of Justice does not thereby make you one. What legal precedent can be called on to decide if an acting department head "counts" as a principal officer for purposes of the 25th Amendment §4, either for determining what number constitutes a "majority", and for determining whose written declarations are to be considered?

The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question.

When does a cogeneration plant feed power to the net, according to the german KWK-G 2015?

§7 (1) of the current german KWK-G (Law concerning co-generation plants) makes a huge difference for power fed into the grid, or not. Say an installation consumes 150-200 kW contiually, and operates a 100kW el CHP - so there's never any net backfeed into the net. This describes a typical sewage gas CHP at a wastewater plant. Is this cogeneration plant feeding into the net according to §7 (1)? The relevant wording is "Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird, beträgt: ..."

(1) Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird und auf den die §§ 61e bis 61g und 104 Absatz 4 des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes in der am 31. Dezember 2022 geltenden Fassung nicht anzuwenden sind, beträgt... The german is - unlike Ohwilleke complains with the english translation - quite clear: Electric energy to qualify under this paragraph needs to: [be produced] by implication get put into a network for public consumption [in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist] needs to not be regulated under §§ 61e to 61g or 104 (4) EEG (law partaining renewable energy) §61 was repealed and removed in the 2023 version, a §104 does no longer exist either. Old versions of §61 EEG and §104 EEG are archived. The various §61a to g regulated which type of producer got which percentage and §104 regulated who gets money for produced energy. Among those regulations, which make the meaning of §7(1) KWKG very clear is §61e EEG (2022) (1) Der Anspruch nach § 61 Absatz 1 verringert sich auf null Prozent der EEG-Umlage für Strom aus Bestandsanlagen, wenn der Letztverbraucher die Stromerzeugungsanlage als Eigenerzeuger betreibt, (1) The entitlement pursuant to Section 61 subsection 1 is reduced to zero percent of the EEG surcharge for electricity from existing systems, if the end consumer operates the power generation system as a self-producer, Under the old law, you need to actually produce more than your own requirement to be entitled to a payout, as producing less was meaning you are only an Eigenerzeuger. Even under the new requirement, Einspeisung is a standing term in Germany: It is only Einspeisung if the electrical energy is actually put into the public energy network ("Zufuhr von Strom in das öffentliche Versorgungsnetz").

Regarding "Right to be Forgotten", what's the definition of a "search engine"?

§§ — The decision by Europe's highest court allows people living in Europe to ask for links to "inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant" material to be removed from search results , although it will still be available on the original web page [.] Google Search might be unambiguously considered as a "search engine", but what about other websites like Blogger, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Quora, StackExchange, 4chan, Reddit, etc? Are news websites which store their own archives of old news considered a "search engine", or " original web page", or both? (Notice that material must be removed from search results yet is allowed to remain available on the original web page.) Let's assume that John Doe (either an imaginary student, salaryman, politician, etc ) exercised his right to be forgotten. Then, : Does a blogger have the right to list links and prior search results of John Doe's past on his personal blog which is public ly available? If the blogger also writes about John Doe's past (i.e. the blogger creates original material ), would the blogpost now be considered "original web page" and allowed to be available?

The judgment ( Google Spain and Google (Judgment of the Court) [2014] EUECJ C-131/12 ) is definitive on this point at paragraph 41: ...the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference... In your example, the blogger would be unaffected by the decision as his links are presumably collected and sorted by hand. However, the blog itself may be removed from Google et al at the request of John Doe.

Are you allowed to use different sci fi terms for an official published project?

’m working on a project for a sci-fi franchise and I was wondering if I am allowed to use concepts I thought up of that also appear in a Google Search after the fact. So I have a term I want to use but someone has used it online. Is it legal to use it since I thought of it on my own?

Names might be protected by trademark law. For example, Lucas Films and now by extension Disney has a trademark on the word "Droid" , so if your work contains robots, you better call them something else. If your robots happen to be large and well-armed, then you might think about calling them "Mechs", but that might also get you into trouble, because it's a trademark FASA enforces for their Battletech franchise . So if you consider using the name of a science fiction concept you picked up somewhere, first make sure that it's not a registered trademark. But there are also unregistered trademarks which can be legally enforced. The prerequisite for enforcing an unregistered trademark is that the name is "used in commerce". That means that the person who wants to enforce the trademark must sell some product or service under that name. So if someone "used the term online", make sure they don't use it commercially.

Are there any other ways to effect "responsibility to protect" without a UN security council approval?

“Responsibility to protect” is a UN pledge against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity which allowed states to authorise force as a last resort against other states if those crimes aren't being prevented or are actively being done by a state. The UN security council has vetoed many resolutions enabling this. But is the only way to enforce this through the UNSC?

The General Assembly can pass a resolution, and unlike Security Council resolutions, no nation has veto power. However, except in procedural matters where the resolution can bind the General Assembly, such resolutions are not binding on member states. They are considered to be "recommendations". Chapter VII resolutions i.e. Security Council resolutions are binding. Enforcement requires assent by the Security Council.

Did any ancient legal systems require covenants/oaths/contracts to be made in the morning?

“Then Abimelech went to him from Gerar, and Ahuzzath one of his friends, and Phichol the chief captain of his army. And Isaac said unto them, Wherefore come ye to me, seeing ye hate me, and have sent me away from you? And they said, We saw certainly that the Lord was with thee: and we said, Let there be now an oath betwixt us, even betwixt us and thee, and let us make a covenant with thee; That thou wilt do us no hurt, as we have not touched thee, and as we have done unto thee nothing but good, and have sent thee away in peace: thou art now the blessed of the Lord. And he made them a feast, and they did eat and drink. And they rose up betimes in the morning, and sware one to another: and Isaac sent them away, and they departed from him in peace.” (Genesis 26:26-31, KJV) Did any ancient legal system place any significance on oaths or agreements being made in the morning? It appears that Isaac and Abimelech and his companions discussed the agreement in the evening but did not formalize it until the morning. Was this actually required for legal purposes in any ancient jurisdictions? (In this case, it was an agreement between a king and another person, so "laws" aren't really relevant, but I'm curious if this was standard practice.) I don't want to debate the historicity of the Bible. I believe that this interaction truly did occur, but the question itself (did agreements have to be made in the morning?) is valid regardless of one's opinion on whether or not this really happened. I tagged this as contract-law because a contract seems to be the closest modern concept to the oath here.

If it means anything, it's probably about being sober rather than because of the time of day. To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing in the Bible or halakha that says oaths must be made in a specific part of the day. What we do find, in common with other ancient cultures, is an expectation that oath-making involves an invocation of divine authority, as the deity is being asked to punish someone if they break their agreement. Consequently, oath-making is often accompanied by a sacrifice (c.f. 2 Chronicles 15, or the Iliad book 3 for a non-Hebrew example), which needs a certain amount of preparation - not only finding the animal, but also being in a state of ritual purity. The precise wording and intent of the oath are also important, since one does not want to be bound to the wrong thing. All of this adds up to not doing the ceremony after a big party with lots of drinking. In this passage, they wait until morning, not because the morning is special in itself, but because it's undesirable to undertake a solemn religious commitment while inebriated or just tired. It may be that the morning is a "good" time because it's convenient to carry out morning prayers and ablutions and then immediately go on to the oath-making, but that does not mean that ancient Hebrew religious practice required promises to be made in the morning. In law, we also have the idea of being potentially held to an undesired agreement, if it was concluded while drunk or otherwise impaired. Legal systems differ in how they resolve it. The Talmud includes, for example: With regard to one who is intoxicated, his acquisition is a binding acquisition; that is, he cannot retract the transaction when he is sober, and similarly, his sale is a binding sale. Moreover, if he committed a transgression for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, he is executed; and if the offense is punishable by lashes, he is flogged. The principle is that he is like a sober person in all matters, except that he is exempt from prayer. ( Eruvin 65a , trans. William Davidson) The covenant here is not a commercial contract, but would probably have included an element of prayer and sacrifice (even if not mentioned explicitly in the passage), and that is the part which demands sobriety. Roman law also had rules about impairment by reason of insanity, which is a similar idea; a permanently insane person cannot make contracts (Ulpian in Digest 3.5.3) but in other circumstances a drunk person might be held to their agreement. Somewhat to the contrary, drinking some amount of wine might be part of the formal oath ceremony in some cultures. In ancient Greece, as in the Iliad example, libations were made to the gods (especially Zeus Horkios, "oath-keeper") and the wine would have been formally consumed. Herodotus also records ( Histories 4.70) that the Scythian oath ceremony involved drinking a mixture of wine and blood. This does not mean that the participants were intoxicated - there was probably not much wine and it was probably not that strong - but I mention it for completeness. By the way, the part of the Talmud cited above also includes the statement from Rav Nachman that "As long as I have not drunk a quarter-log of wine, my mind is not clear. It is only after drinking wine that I can issue appropriate rulings." Contemporary judges might or might not agree, but they'd be more circumspect in saying it.

What effect does this ruling have on the burden of proof, if any?

“[T]he Act does not require consumers to take any affirmative steps to secure relief for the failure of a manufacturer to service or repair a vehicle to conform to applicable warranties—other than, of course, permitting the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle . . . . In reality, . . . , the manufacturer seldom on its own initiative offers the consumer the options available under the Act: a replacement vehicle or restitution. Therefore, as a practical matter, the consumer will likely request replacement or restitution. But the consumer’s request is not mandated by any provision in the Act. Rather, the consumer’s request for replacement or restitution is often prompted by the manufacturer’s unforthright approach and stonewalling of fundamental warranty problems.” ( Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1050 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 853], original italics.)(California Jury Instruction CACI 3201) This effectively means that most often manufacturers evade lemon branding provisions for the purposes of California's jurisdictions. But does the text in bold (in its context) create any sort of presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, of the same fact that is that manufacturers are presumed to do this when the lemon buyback facts are actually present? Can you use this as a presumption at court?

No, there is no Presumption Created The bolded statement is an expression by the Judge of the CA Court of Appeal who wrote the opinion of his or her experience in such matters, based on other such cases that have come up. It might incline a future court, particularly a trial court, not to stretch its discretion in favor of the auto manufacturer. But it forms no part of the binding holding, it is obiter dictum . The actual binding holdings are: [T]he evidence supports the implied finding that GM had ample time in the period between March 8 and April 12, 2007, in order to comply with the Act. No evidence supports GM's assertion that in this case the matter of restitution was a labor intensive process that required months to accomplish. [T]he Act does not require consumers to take any affirmative steps to secure relief for the failure of a manufacturer to service or repair a vehicle to conform to applicable warranties-other than, of course, permitting the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle․ the manufacturer has an affirmative duty to replace a vehicle or make restitution to the buyer if the manufacturer is unable to repair the new vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts, and the buyer need not reject or revoke acceptance of the vehicle at any time.   The buyer need only provide the manufacturer with a reasonable opportunity to fix the vehicle. [A] violation [of the Act] is not willful if the defendant's failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present. Lukather's testimony and GM's telephone logs permitted the trial court to make the following reasonable inferences:  GM knew or reasonably should have known from information available from the dealer on March 8, 2007, that the Cadillac was a “lemon” and Lukather had selected the restitution option.   Nevertheless, for the next two months GM did not act in good faith to provide Lukather with the restitution remedy;  rather, GM actively discouraged Lukather from pursuing this remedy by telling him that the Cadillac was repaired and he should pick it up, that he should select another car at the dealer, that he would not get all of his money back, and that it would take several months for GM to act on his request for restitution. [This constitutes willful violation of the act.] As in Jiagbogu, the imposition of a requirement that Lukather mitigate his damages so as to avoid rental car expenses - after GM had a duty to respond promptly to Lukather's demand for restitution - would reward GM for its delay in refunding Lukather's money. None of these holdings alter the burner of proof, and all of them appear to be in accordance with previous decisions, cited in the opinion. In short, this decision affirms and restates the existing rules under the California Lemon Law, and do not change the law in any significant way. Future similar cases ought to be decided in much the same way, absent a change in the law.

Defining good faith

“‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned .” OCGA §11-1-201(19). “‘Good faith’ in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.” OCGA §11-2-103(1)(b). Above are two statutes defining good faith. Good faith is required to be a good faith purchaser. A purchaser must be a good faith purchaser in order to qualify as a Bona Fide Purchaser (BFP). Please tell me what the bolded parts mean.

"honesty in fact" means not making false statements of fact, in short not lying about the facts. And as a comment calls to my mind, it also means not engaging in deception by ommission. That is it means not failing to state relevant and material facts about the transaction. A "good faith purchaser" is one who bought not as part of a scheme or with any deceptive intent. It is one who bought at a fair price or what s/he believed to be a fair price. It is one who bought because s/he desired to own the property. It is not, for example, one who bought at an unfairly low price, using some improper advantage, or extorting a low price, or concealing inside information. It is not one who bought on behalf of another who could not afford to appear in the transaction.

In GDPR terms is the hash of a user ID considered personal data?

“‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person”. Taken from https://gdpr.eu/eu-gdpr-personal-data If I cryptographically hash (e.g. sha-512) my user's ID and give it out to a third party, do I have to delete that data when the user deletes their account? Is it considered personally identifiable data and therefore under GDPR? Or is it considered anonymized sufficiently? There's no way for the third party to go from the hashed user ID to data on my service but knowing a user's ID I can always check if the data on the third party's platform is about them. Edit Somebody asked It occurs to me that the OP is not just sending the id to the third-party; what would be the point? That other data might be able to identify the individual even without the id In my case, the other data definitely can't identify the user it's data related to crashes on their device.

You quoted the definition of personal data from Art 4(1) GDPR. This definition of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: […] To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. […] If the user ID is unique, then the hashed user ID will be unique as well. Thus, the hashed ID will enable “singling out”, and would still count as identifying in the sense of the GDPR. You also claim that there's no way to reverse the hash. This is not quite correct. Assuming that the hash function itself is secure, then the only way to crack the hash is to brute-force the input. The difficulty of brute-forcing depends only on the entropy of the input data, not on the size of the output hash. It is thus comparatively easy to crack hashes of short low-entropy strings like sequential integer user IDs, IPv4 addresses, or weak passwords. In contrast, it would be difficult to crack long random user IDs, such as UUID version 4 identifiers created from a cryptographically secure RNG (CSPRNG). Even if the hashes can't be cracked, they are not anonymous – you can link them to the original user ID, after all. The GDPR only considers data anonymized if there are no “reasonably likely” means to re-identify the data subject. If this de-identification is reversible, it's called pseudonymization instead. If storage allows, a better technique to generate pseudonymous IDs is to create a table that maps the true ID to a CSPRNG-random ID. Unlike a hash, the random ID cannot leak extra information about the original ID. This pseudonymization technique could perhaps also be turned into irreversible anonymization by deleting the ID mapping, assuming that no “singling out” can happen. Pseudonymization is a very good security measure. It is explicitly mandated whenever appropriate in Art 32 GDPR. So you should probably use it. It's just that GDPR continues to fully apply to processing of the pseudonymized data. Since the pseudonymized data is the data subject's personal data, you may be required to delete it when receiving an Art 17 request for erasure. You may also be required to forward the request to others with whom you shared the data. However, the right to erasure has many conditions and exceptions. If you actually need to keep the data for a particular purpose, chances are good that you can keep it.