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Can an employer force all employees to open bank accounts in the employees' names?

[asking regarding federal law in the U.S.A. only] Recently I have noticed low wage employers such as fast food and retail requiring employees to open a bank account through the employer. Such employers insist that, by policy, they only pay through a company-issued debit card and will not pay using traditional methods such as a paycheck. Some also offer to arrange direct deposit with a bank, but will not offer any other form of pay. Word of mouth seems to be that these policies are illegal, but I have had difficulty finding information on this topic that is not from the card-issuing entities. Can a U.S.-based employer legally mandate their employees open a bank account upon hiring? If employers can or cannot, what section of the law defines who can and cannot compel a citizen into banking against the citizen's will?

Under federal law, an employer may impose direct deposit as a condition of employment. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act at 15 USC 1693k only says that employers may not require an employee to have a bank account at a particular bank : No person may— (1) condition the extension of credit to a consumer on such consumer’s repayment by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers; or (2) require a consumer to establish an account for receipt of electronic fund transfers with a particular financial institution as a condition of employment or receipt of a government benefit. If the employee is allowed to choose their bank, then such a condition is legal under this law. The government's interpretation of this law is clarified in 12 CFR 1005 Supplement I at 10(e)(2): Payroll. An employer (including a financial institution) may not require its employees to receive their salary by direct deposit to any particular institution. An employer may require direct deposit of salary by electronic means if employees are allowed to choose the institution that will receive the direct deposit. Alternatively, an employer may give employees the choice of having their salary deposited at a particular institution (designated by the employer) or receiving their salary by another means, such as by check or cash. That said, individual states can create their own legislation, and many have made it illegal under state law for an employer to require direct deposit. You didn't name a particular state so I can't be more specific, but there is a chart here created by a payroll company showing the legality of such policies by state. Note that in some sense, the employee is not really being "compelled" or "mandated" to have a bank account - if the employer insists on using direct deposit, the employee is free to go look for a different job. US law does tend to recognize that there is a major power imbalance in employer-employee relationships, so there are many regulations; but at its root, it's treated as a contract between two independent parties who may each set whatever conditions they want, and enter into the contract only if they can agree. In contexts other than employment, I would expect even fewer restrictions on how a bank account could be set as a condition for something. For instance, it could be a condition for using a particular product or service. Again, if you don't want to open a bank account, you are free to not use that product or service.

Can a landlord force all residents to use the landlord's in-house debit card accounts?

[asking regarding state law in Ohio, U.S.A. only] Recently I have noticed landlords issuing their residents a debit card with attached bank account. This is typically implemented without prior notice and often with an additional fee attached. Typically the landlord will have a preexisting clause in the lease that says the landlord may choose to amend the lease at a later date. The landlord then amends the lease to insist that rent payments are only accepted in the form of deductions from a landlord-issued debit card. The landlord then will not accept payments using traditional methods such as a check. Word of mouth seems to be that these policies are illegal, but I have had difficulty finding information on this topic that is not from the card-issuing entities. Can a landlord in Ohio (U.S.A.) legally impose a mandate on their existing residents that a bank account be opened in their name and used for rent payment? If landlords can or cannot, what section of the law defines who can and cannot compel a citizen into banking against the citizen's will?

Typically the landlord will have a preexisting clause in the lease that says the landlord may choose to amend the lease at a later date. While that may be in contracts, I don't see that holding up in court. You can't unilaterally amend contracts to add new terms without acceptance on part of the lessee. Any clause in the contract like that will require notification of the lessee of the change and a chance for the lessee to terminate the contract without recourse on part of the lessor. Generally this must be done in the same format as the original lease (written). Most jurisdictions don't allow for a verbal amendment to a written lease. So in a way, yes, it is legal for a landlord to require payment via a certain method (like a direct debit from a bank account). They cannot however change the payment terms unilaterally without notification and acceptance. They can use language such as sending the notification (via registered mail) and then saying that a failure to respond is acceptance (because you are, by actions, accepting the terms by continuing to live there).

Law in fiction: acquittal of Moriarty in *Sherlock* TV series

[clarification: I'm posting this question here because it is arguably a better forum than scifi.SE] In "The Reichenbach Fall" ( Sherlock season 2, episode 3), Jim Moriarty breaks into the Jewel House at the Tower of London, the vault of the Bank of England, and Pentonville Prison. Of relevance here is the fact that he wants to get caught in the act (e.g., he deliberately stands unmasked in front of security camera, and then waits for the police to find him inside the locked-down Jewel House, sitting on the throne and wearing the Crown Jewels). At his trial, however, the jury unanimously finds him not guilty, and he walks free, much to everybody's surprise. Shortly after, he reveals to Holmes that the jurors declared him not guilty because he had his minions threaten them and their families with death and other horrible consequences, should they find him guilty. The whole chain of events is Moriarty's way of showing Holmes and Watson that he is beyond the reach of ordinary justice. Question: in UK law, is the judge obliged to accept the jury's not-guilty verdict, even in cases where the defendant is so obviously guilty as in this episode? More precisely, does the judge have the power to ignore the jury's verdict (on the grounds that the verdict is inherently incompatible with the available evidence) and start a retrial with a different jury? This question, of course, presupposes that the judge either hasn't been threatened or has decided to maintain his/her integrity in the face of threats.

Currently, following Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 sections 54-57, the court can certify that interference or intimidation has resulted in acquittal, in which case the acquittal can be set aside.

UK-Cambodia Child support

a child was born in Cambodia, to a Cambodian mother, and a British father: Does the father legally have to support this child, if the child is still living in the Cambodia, and the father goes back to the UK. If not, what are the exceptions? If yes ,what steps should the mother take? If not, what other options/ideas are there that would help mother support the child?

Short Answer : The mother may have to apply to the court in cambodia for a maintenance order, but it could be difficult to enforce. Long Answer : It depends whether or not there is a child maintenance order in place, as: Parents cannot enforce an arrangement made informally between them, it must be made legally binding first [...] if no ( REMO, see below ) agreement exists then, the receiving parent would have to apply via local courts and a payment may be much harder to enforce. Source If there is a child maintenance order in place, then the relevant legislation is the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972 ( REMO). REMO has two gateways to enforce such an order: either with "Reciprocal Countries" designated by s.1 of the Act, or with "Convention Countries" scheduled in the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (Convention Countries) Order 1975 Unfortunately, cambodia does not appear on either list although, oddly, it is a signatory to the 1956 Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance but for some reason the UK Parliament decided against its inclusion in the 1975 Order.

Can i have the police impound a car which is obstructing my driveway?

a few days ago someone parked their car across my driveway. between my fence and the road there is about 5 meters of land including a foot path and gutter/runoff ditch. my road extends from my front gate and over a pipe which is meant to preserve the gutter's flow. this was late at night and the car sat there for well over an hour. luckily they moved on however if they remained there I would have had problems getting out for work as because of how deep this gutter/run off ditch is. now I know that in Australia if they were on my property I could charge them for trespass but the 5 meters of land outside my front fence, despite the fact I am the one who gets fined if the grass isn't kept short and I have to maintain my driveway, belongs to the local council. I am wondering, if a car parked itself in a way in which impeded me being able to leave, regardless if they were on my property or council land (ie. parked on the nature strip but blocking my driveway) could I then call the police to impound the car?

Generally, you can't tow someone else's car without their permission. You could contact the police, but as they're not actually committing a crime (unless the road has no parking/stopping signposts), it's unlikely that the police would take any action. However, in most states, the Road Rules (or equivalent) penalise drivers for obstructing access to driveways, for example New South Wales: Road Rules A driver must not stop on a road in a position that obstructs access by vehicles or pedestrians to or from a footpath ramp or a similar way of access to a footpath, or a bicycle path or passageway unless ... A police officer (or usually even a council officer) may issue an infringement notice. However, someone parked across your driveway is unlikely to be a priority for them. I was unable to find any law empowering the police to tow away vehicles merely because they obstruct access to a driveway.

Perma-Banned from game for offsite comment - is that legal?

a friend and I play a pokemon-browsergame, which also offers monthly subscriptions for premium currency and benefits (=real money invested). We are also on a discord server with some friends, where we talk about the game. Note: this is a privatly run server and has no affilation with the game, the mods or anyone besides us. One of the Admins posted something along the lines of: "Don't generalise. "Only the sith deal in absolutes" may be from sci-fi, but there's a very real truth to it. Bad cops suck. Good cops who do things RIGHT, don't." On our sever (again, not the site) my friend just jokingly wrote "Bad Nazis suck. Good Nazis wo do things RIGHT, dont'." Because they disagreed with the above mentioned statement. So apparently we had someone take a screenshot, send that to a moderate on that site and my friend got now permantly banned and no refund of their monthly subscription. The reasons they gave were about toxic behaviour and rudeness. I also don't agree with my friends statement, but it was a hyperbole and was in no way meant to hurt someone. Alas, they refuse to talk to them or let them explain. The permalock is final. Sorry for the long explanation. The question here is just: is there anything they could legally do here? (for context: the website is based in the UK and in their rules they wrote the british laws apply). Thank you all very, very much in advance!

Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages , probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics ).

Does a business require jurisdiction permits when operating across jurisdictions?

a hypothetical site provides independent contractors to do massage and this site offers contractors in many countries and in almost any city of u.s.a. but i know that the municipal codes of many jurisdictions say: that this kind of company needs a massage permit and/or an outcall permit and that this kind of company must have a business office in a specific zone of the specific municode's jurisdiction (ex. c1) ? and so, does this company really need to get these permits in hundreds of jurisdictions (every place that they service) ? and does this company also require an additional business office in multiple jurisdictions, regardless whether they'll actually use the additional offices? edit (2019 dec 27): i was conceptualizing a business that gets paid referral fees by the clients and independent contractors

does this company really need to get these permits in hundreds of jurisdictions (every place that they service) Yes. Typically, there would be a contract between the national company and a local subcontractor who provides the service, and the local subcontractor would get the occupational and business licenses under its name doing business as the name of the national company with the national company's permission. The subcontractor must do whatever is necessary to meet the requirements of local law, and if local law says massages can't be provided outside of a brick and mortar location in a particular land use code zone then that is all that can be lawfully provided in that jurisdiction. It is actually uncommon to require a brick and mortar office location for an outcall business when outcalls are permitted, but I'm sure that some jurisdiction does that. Of course, outcall massage is regulated primarily on the grounds that it is a front for prostitution, and honestly, the proposed national business in this question smells like just such a business. does this company also require an additional business office in multiple jurisdictions, regardless whether they'll actually use the additional offices? See above. Also, most jurisdictions don't require a physical office to do business, but do require that the national company register its corporation as one authorized to do business in that jurisdiction and have a registered agent for service of process in that jurisdiction. There are companies, such as The Corporation Company, that provide registered agents with physical registered offices for other companies on a fee for service subcontracted basis.

Usage of gplv3 software to deliver output

a little confused about something here. Specifically I want to talk about Neo4j and it's licensing. It's a dual license, GPLv3/AGPLv3, and I want to find out exactly what that's supposed to mean to me as a consumer of the software in binary form. If I wanted to use the free Neo4j Community Edition, which I beleive is the GPLv3 license, for (let's pretend) a blog project, which would access the RESTful API to acquire data from the db. Am I free to keep my source code private? The way GPL keeps getting trumpeted to me, is that anything to do with the code must be open sourced. As in, if I were to modify Neo itself I would need to display those changes publically. But the wording gets fuzzy to me and begins to make me think that the concept of simply using the binary on my server, anything reaching out to touch it, must become open source. In extension, with this licensing, is one able to use Community Editon inside of a corperate/business setting for either internal tools or publishing of free content publically, so long as services being provided arent in any way locked behind a payment gate?

Thanks to Zizouz212 who made me aware of opensource.stackexchange.com I was able to find this question https://opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/2779/using-neo4j-community-edition-in-commercial-applications Within that answer bu Philipp, found something that spelled it all out for me: This is also explained in the article I linked above: If you’re building a database application that will run inside your organization (or for your personal use), then you are free to use Community Edition, whether or not your software is closed source. A very close analogy is MySQL®, which is also licensed under the GPL. So there ya have it

What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article?

a) Ask party in deposition whether they made the statements and if they deny it, gather other evidence or witnesses that confirm that they made the statement? b) Ask the party at trial whether they made the statement and let the jury decide whether they made the statement? Are there other scenarios / approaches?

What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place . For instance, records reflecting the submission & editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).

Could there be a lawsuit against actionnetwork.org for sending unstoppable spam?

actionnetwork.org is a mass-email tool for politics. Once a user has signed up for ANY campaign newsletter that is built on actionnetwork, all other campaigns on actionnetwork are free to spam the user. There is no way to unsubscribe from all actionnetwork emails. They will only let you unsubscribe from one newsletter at a time - and there are thousands. Is this illegal in the US? Can they be sued?

Such a lawsuit will fail The CAN-SPAM act applies to commercial emails. The emails you describe are political emails and outside its jurisdiction. All you can do is tune your junk mail filter.

Under what circumstances can the police detain you?

after watching the video about the recent fiasco in Mckinney Texas I was curious about whether any of the teens that the officer pulled over had the legal right to just walk away. Under what scenario is a police officer allowed to detain you? Do they need a reason to believe that you committed a crime, or can they just detain you without any reason at all? If you need a state, use Texas, if you need a city, use McKinney. Please make it clear under what scope the laws actually reside.

Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while.

how sensitive data can be shared between companies?

am in Germany where personal data is a very sensitive issue, now to my case: am applying over a "service Company A" to work for a huge company ABC, my profile was presented to HR 4 weeks ago, 3 weeks later another "service Company B" is trying to do the same, this second company had a HeadHunter that told me, he has a good connection with the HR of ABC and he knows that am applying over another company too... he offer me the benefit of getting a job interview first if i tell him that i want to be presented as candidate for the position over his company instead of the other one that was there 3 weeks before... apart from the fact that this beha. is a totally unfair to the other company that was waiting before it that somehow legal?? can this headhunter use its private connections to somehow benefit its company and clearly affect the "service Company A"?? thanks

This question has nothing to do with sharing sensitive data between two companies. The question is really whether Company A's contract with you obligates you or the hiring company to pay a commission when Company B gets you the job. This depends pretty much entirely on the terms of Company A and Company B's contracts with you and with the hiring company. If the contract with Company A entitled it to a commission if you get hired, regardless of how that comes about, then they are entitled to a commission. In real estate, it is common place that the entire commission goes to the only real estate agent on the deal if there is just one, and is split evenly between two real estate agents if there is both a real estate agent for the seller and a real estate agent for the buy involved. In the U.S. real estate market, this arrangement on commission sharing is not something that is dictated by law and is instead enforced by the rules of a professional association that controls the multiple listing service for real estate and is joined by almost everyone in the industry. Usually that professional association mandates that disputes between members over commissions from the same sale be resolved by the association's mediators. Now, your question concerns Germany and concerns headhunters, rather than real estate agents. But, I wouldn't be at all surprised, particularly given the way that Germany deals with many similar issues in its economy, to find that there is an association of headhunters which everyone who participated in that activity must join (or usually does join) and that commission disputes are resolved by arbitration through the association of that dispute. We don't know from your question, who Company A and Company B have contracts with and what the terms of those contracts are, so it isn't possible to answer that question knowing only what we do. There is certainly nothing wrong or improper about Company B using its personal connections to cause an employment applicant to get a job with a hiring company on a paid basis. This is what headhunters are in the business of doing. And, there is nothing inherently unfair about one company getting business that a competitor in the same industry tried to get, in the absence of some sort of contractual prohibition applicable to the prospective employee or the hiring employer. The only question is who should be entitled to what commission and we don't know enough to answer that question given the information that the question provides.

Why is the standard for proof of guilt much lower in civil law systems?

and a lot of guarantees like right against self incrimination are also not available in civil law systems. What is the reason behind this? It is said that the stakes are much lower in civil cases, but how is that? I mean civil cases in common law systems. I misunderstood that a country can have multiple legal systems since its stated that my country (India) has a mixed legal system

I understand that by "civil law systems" the OP means to refer to civil (vs criminal) cases, not to the civil law (vs common law) systems. The standard for proof of "guilt" (which is not actually called "guilt") is indeed "much lower" in civil cases, but the reason for that is not that it has to be so, but that the standard of proof in criminal cases has to be much higher. In civil cases none of the parties face criminal conviction. One party will just lose some money or property, will have to perform some work, will lose some opportunities etc. So, initially, both parties play the same game and each of them is in to lose it down to a similar level of peril. What follows is that, at the baseline, neither of the two parties should be in more advantageous position to prove their rightness than the other. In other words, if any of them proves that they are more than 50% likely to be right than the other, they should win. Indeed, why would one party have to prove their rightness beyond reasonable doubt? If it was so, it would mean that the other party would effectively have to prove their rightness to only a small degree, which would be utterly unjust. lot of guarentees like right avainst self incrimination are also not available in civil law systems. what is the reason behind this ? False. If saying something from a witness stand would risk you being prosecuted, you can refuse to say it regardless of whether you are giving evidence in a civil or a criminal case.

Wave Broadband service refusal

and thank you for your time, I have a question in terms of the legality of a dispute between wave and myself. My grandma is displaying the signs of altzheimers so my girlfriend and myself moved in with her, however she has been forgetting to pay her bills so we took over paying rent, power, garbage etc. My girlfriend works from home, and therefore needs to be able to access the internet, however when we tried to contact Wave about setting up internet, we found out that my grandma had an unpaid bill with them, (that she refuses to square up) so they refuse to provide to this address regardless of the fact it wouldn't be in her name, nor would she be using it. Is this legal? I was under the impression it was illegal to attempt to hold somebody accountable for another's debt.

Wave Broadband is a private company; they can probably decide to not provide service to an address that is in arrears or collections. I'm sure there is a clause in their service contract that states they can do that, and there would be local or state laws to support that. Whatever public service commission governs the state may also allow that. It's possible that Wave is breaking the law by denying service to a whole address, but doubtful. You can check with the state level public service commission.

a murder in death penalty us state but the culprit was'nt caught until 45 years later during which that state had since abolished capital punishment

as said if a murder was committed in a US state that had the death penalty for that offence at the time but the person who committed it was'nt caught until 45 years later(during which the death penalty for murder in that state had been outlawed/abolished)could they"upon conviction"still face execution/be executed?whatabout under U.S federal law/s?

It depends on how the death penalty is abolished. The death penalty was partially abolished by the state supreme court in Washington in State v. Gregory – for the third time. The court states that "None of these prior decisions held that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional, nor do we". Instead, it was found unconstitutional in its application: it is "invalid because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner". This is similar to the situation with Furman v. Georgia , where The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings 4 years later in Gregg v. Georgia , SCOTUS found that the revised procedure was consistent with the 8th Amendment. In these cases, imposition of the death penalty was invalidated, so any person so sentenced could therefore not be executed. These rulings were time-independent, that is, they refer to the imposition and carrying out of sentence, regardless of when the crime was committed. Dobbert v. Florida interacts with these cases. Dobbert committed murder in the period when there was no constitutional execution, but the trial was carried out under a modified procedural regime that constitutionally allowed for execution. The court states that The new statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed, and there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime so the revised procedures could be followed even though the statutory change was enacted after the crime was committed. This is one way in which a sentence could be "abolished" when the act was committed. and yet imposed at sentencing. In the ruling, the court attempts to clarify the no ex post facto law clause of the Constitution. Citing Beazell v. Ohio ,the court observes that It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto So for instance suppose that a legislature decides to modify the statutory penalty for murder to 10 years in prison. That is therefore the penalty for any murder carried out at the time. If a person person commits murder in that period, even if they are not tried or sentences until after the legislature re-imposes the death penalty, that new sentence cannot apply to murder in question. The crucial difference involves distinguishing changes in the law of procedure, vs. what the actual penalty will be. As also stated by the court, the concept of "ex post facto law" involves not just change in law, it crucially involves making things worse for the defendant: It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law There is no general US legal finding that a person is entitled to a lesser penalty when the legislature statutorily reduces the penalty for a crime, however that effect could come from appropriate legislative action, as plays a role in Concepcion v. US . Congress enacted a retroactive amelioration of the law (pertaining to weight thresholds related to sentencing in drug laws). SCOTUS presupposes in their ruling that this is possible because of this act of Congress (the issue in this case is about court discretion in what information is considered – a procedural question). Retroactive application of a change in a punishment statute is not automatic, it requires specific legislative enactment.

Is it legal to copy property's listing from other's website

as the question suggest. I've built a scrapper which scraps two websites to get property listing from there. As someone told me to scrape other website is illegal. but I think the listing ad of property is not a property of website. so I can scrape it. can someone tell me it is legal to get others property advertisment?

"...the listing ad of property is not a property of website." Why do you think that? Just because a website exists does not mean you can legally scrape it. Read the Terms of Service of the site; there is a good chance the TOS forbids scraping or copying of any part of the website in any manner, including scraping. If the property listings are from a third party service that provides real estate listings to websites, then those property listings are licensed to that website, and by scraping them you will likely be violating the TOSs of those two services. By illegally scraping the content of a website, you are opening yourself up to being involved in copyright infringement and/or being liable to be the subject of a civil lawsuit.

Can someone who does not consider himself a US citizen be extradited and punished for a US felony crime due to a US citizenship?

based off of the answer to this question: If one leaves the US to commit an act illegal in the US but legal in the country they travel to are they guilty of a crime? My first bizarre loophole question has to do with situations when someone is a US citizen, but consider themselves to be citizens of a different country with different laws.. Lets say you have two Individuals Bob, age 17, and Alice, who just turned 18, who live in, and are citizens of, some non-US country X, who are dating and have a sexual relationship. Say country X considers the age of consent 16, recognizes dual citizenship, and has an extradition treaty with the US... However, Alice happened to have been born on a cruise while the cruise ship was sailing through US territorial waters, thus making her a US citizen. She has never done any of the things which can cause someone to officially lose their US citizenship. Federal law states it is illegal for a US citizen to have sex with an individual under the age of 18 in a 'foreign place' I'm wondering what, of any of these scenarios, would be illegal due to the above law and could theoretically lead to either extrication, or to arrest when/if they ever visited the US at some later date (and if one is possible but not the later). Alice never realizing she was born actually born in US waters and never thinking of herself as a US citizen, and she never visited the US or engaged in any of the activities that cause her to lose citizenship If the above would not be sufficient would any of the below situations potentially lead to prosecution: Knew she was also a US citizen and had once claimed some minor right or privileged due to being a US citizen. Occasionally visits a friend or relative within the US for brief periods, using her US citizenship to allow easier entry to the US, without going through the steps of the VWP. Once stayed in the US with said friend/relative for slightly more then 90 days (beyond the length a regular tourist can stay) many years ago Had just spent spent 91 day summer vacation with her family relative before returning to her home country and having sexual relations with Bob. Alice and Bob both live in and were citizens of X but originally met when both were on a vacation to the US, ultimately having a sexual relationship in their home country. Would Alice potentially face prosecution, if not would this change if: The couple had (legally) engaged in sexual activity in the US prior to traveling back home The couple originally met in a state where sexual intercourse would have been illegal and so waited until returning home before having a sexual relationship? Alice bought bob plan ticket home, so she is officially 'transporting' bob? (section a of the above law applies) Alice and bob did have a relationship prior to their visit to the US which continued during their US visit. I realize that prosecutor discretion would usually result in no one choosing to prosecutor most if not all of the above cases, despite any legal right, but I'm asking rather they could face charges if a prosecutor did choose to move forward for some reason. I don't know why they would, maybe they are angry at Alice for some other legal act and this is their way of bending the laws to punish Alice in some way, maybe someone is putting pressure on Alice as some political maneuver to pressure her important father into something, maybe some prosecutor is just really gung-ho in prosecuting crimes for some reason whatever... *Edit: Looking back at the law I linked I realized that the definition of illicit sexual encounter, when outside of US territories, is effectively defined as a commercial sexual act, which negates all my examples since no one was being payed. However, I'm not interested in the specific law so much as how any law making activities on foreign territory illegal would be applied to citizens, and only used this law because it was the only one I knew of to reliable reference. For now umm...just pretend that illicit sexual act part of the law was not limited only to commercial acts when answering this question? I think the heart of what I'm trying to understand wouldn't change if that law were slightly different and that's easier then my rewriting all of the above. ps. A US citizen can travel to Angola and have sex with a 12 year old without any repercussion so long as he doesn't pay anyone if I'm reading the law right? That's something I really didn't need to know about. I knew I shouldn't have used that particular law as my example for this... pps. Also the definition of "any person can be charged with a criminal offense" seems extremely vague since it doesn't specify what country/state laws would apply for deciding if the person could be charged with a criminal offense, and I'm sure if you look far enough countries have outlawed all kind of things as sexual offenses, like being in the presence of a women who isn't wearing a hijab.

Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence.

if i only record my own voice in a telephone conversation can i legally use it

can I record a conversation with my phone when I am speaking to someone on the call. the only voice recorded is mine , and the other persons voice is not recorded. can I legal use this in court

There are laws against recording conversations, which were passed in response to a government practice of listening in on conversations between people. The weaker form of such laws says that at least one party to the conversation must consent to the recording. The stronger law, operative in Washington, California and about a dozen other states, is that all parties to the conversation must consent. The intent behind these laws is to require consent or knowledge of one or all of the people being recorded. What is not entirely clear (in all-party states) is what constitutes a communication, and what a party is, given the wording of the statutes. Washington law is an example of an all-party consent law, which states a prohibition against recording without "first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication". The law does not state this in terms of "the consent of those persons who are recorded". It is unclear whether a person who could in principle hear and be heard (e.g. in a room full of people, with the phone on speaker) are "participants" since the term is not defined. California law refers to "the consent of all parties to a confidential communication", again with no specific mention of people who do not speak, and also no exception made for "parties" who are not actually recorded. The court in CA has determined that a confidential communication is one in which the parties have a reasonable expectation that no one is listening in. Suppose that A and B are having a quiet conversation in public, and they do not expect that anyone else can hear them, but there are other people nearby. This is a confidential conversation, recording of which requires permission of all parties. A and B can agree to record the conversation. A common sense understanding of "party" would find that if C can actually hear the conversation, he is still not a party to the conversation, therefore he does not have veto power over A & B recording their conversation. To the best of my knowledge, the courts have not ruled on what exactly constitutes a "party" or "participant". Nor have they ruled on what constitutes a "communication". It is possible, but legally untested, that you can record yourself (e.g. with a recorder in the room with you) talking into a phone, where there is some other person on the other end of the line: you're just recording your monologue. However, the legal utility of doing this is really not obvious, and you really need to hire an attorney who is versed in your jurisdictions case law on the topic, before sticking your head in the noose.

Clarify section of the Hire Purchase Act

can someone let me know if i'm reading this correctly. Is point 2 stating that if I purchase a vehicle from a private seller, and he/she does not inform me that the vehicle is subject to a hire purchase agreement, then the title of the vehicle still goes to me? As I purchased this vehicle in good faith, and wasn't informed. Some of the terminology trips me up: disposition: the act of the sale? debtor: the finance company? Section 27 Protection of purchasers of motor vehicles. This section applies where a motor vehicle has been bailed or (in Scotland) hired under a hire-purchase agreement, or has been agreed to be sold under a conditional sale agreement, and, before the property in the vehicle has become vested in the debtor, he disposes of the vehicle to another person. Where the disposition referred to in subsection (1) above is to a private purchaser, and he is a purchaser of the motor vehicle in good faith without notice of the hire-purchase or conditional sale agreement (the “relevant agreement”) that disposition shall have effect as if the creditor’s title to the vehicle has been vested in the debtor immediately before that disposition. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/53

The new buyer (ie purchaser ) gets the car and title, and the seller (ie debtor ) retains the HP debt with the finance company (ie creditor ). Under a Hire Purchase/Conditional Sale agreement the finance company generally own the car until the end of the finance agreement. If a person has the vehicle on such a finance agreement then sells it to a private and innocent purchaser the purchaser gets good title to the car. The only recourse the finance company has is against the person who had it on finance or any of the trade buyers/sellers in between. http://www.lawgistics.co.uk/legal-article-business-law/motor-trade-advice/special-rights-to-customers-buying-cars-subject-to-hire-purchase

can police accept my guilt in a state of shock?

can the police legally take my admission to a car crash when I am in a state of shock in the middle of a car crash? and if not under what act?

Basically, it is up to the court . The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".

can states interpret an international law however they want?

can they even interpret it to effectively negate the rule of not using domestic law as a justification for non fullfilment of obligations by interpreting the treaty in a way that suits them ?

There is a lot behind the word "can" in your question. If you are simply asking whether states have the sovereign power to interpret international law however they want, then sure. But they might be wrong (thereby leaving themselves in violation of the treaty they are failing to implement), and if they are intentionally doing so to avoid fulfilment of international obligations, then this is itself a violation of international law. States must take actions in good faith towards implementing treaties in their domestic law. See Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention . See also: What gives rise to binding obligations at international law?

i am charged with violating SORNA's registration. A county judge recently ruled SORNA unconstitutional. what to do? what should my ESQ do for me?

charged with "failure to register", been on bail for over a year. have "call to the list" the 30th of this month for trial! my public defender shows no interest in defending me. two days i stumbled upon a local county judges' decision that SORNA and the registration process is punitive ruled it unconstitutional. I called my lawyer 3 times with no response. what should he be doing for me in response to this decision? i have NO faith in my lawyer and want to ensure i am getting a fair shake. this has been a very long road, and i appreciate any help and advice you could give me.

Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.

Absent any indication one way or the other, are groups presumed to be majority rule or unanimous descision?

cite case law. Is there a difference between jurisdiction? Does size and type of group matter? Statutory vs private boards makes a difference?

A "group" is a rather Ill-defined concept. If the group is a familial or social group then their decisions are not legally binding so it doesn't matter. If the group is the creature of a contract then the contract will tell you. If the contract is silent then a decision would amount to a renegotiation of the contract and would have to be unanimous. If the group is a creature of statute (e.g. company boards, incorporated associations etc.) then the statute will tell you. The statute may tell you that the group can create its own rules. There may also be different levels of majority specified (simple, 2/3, 3/4 etc.) and also if it is a majority of the whole or just those in attendance. So, yes, jurisdiction matters; yes, size matters and yes; type matters,

Can I used leaked datasets as entries in my Application?

currently writing a Booking clone application. I wanna fill it with users,I currently have 553m users from Facebook leak. The project will not be sold or anything,its just for show. Can I do it? Someone using the Application will not be able to see other users etc. But lets say for example a random guy tries to make an account after cloning and he tries his credentials,my system will not allow it if hes already fake "registered". Do i have any issue with that?

This isn't a matter of copyright. One cannot copyright a name and copyright does not protect personal data, although the related database right might well be relevant, depending on the country involved. But the question is tagged GDPR. If the GDPR applies, that is if the app developer is in the EU or the UK, or if the service is targeted at the EU or UK and some of the users are in the EU or UK, there will be a problem with this. A User's name and other info are clearly Personal Data (PI) under the GDPR, and there must therefore be a lawful basis for the processing. If user named were obtained via a leak, there is no consent, and it is hard to see what basis could plausibly apply.

who has the power to interpret the UN charter?

does the power to interpret the UN charter explicitly fall within the hands of the state parties ? and what would be the consequences of multiple state parties having different interpretations ?

Everyone has the power to interpret the charter, as with any document. The important question is who has the power to resolve disputes of interpretation? Even there, as with most of international law, the answer is more or less "anyone whose authority all parties to the dispute accept." The charter itself establishes (chapter 14) the International Court of Justice as the UN's "principal judicial organ" (article 92). Members of the United Nations agree to comply with the court's decisions subject to enforcement by the UN Security Council on application of the opposing party (article 94). Article 95, however, says that members may also seek dispute resolution in other tribunals. It does not apply any limits to this freedom, much less exclude disputes of interpretation of the charter itself.

Can I waive my constitutional rights?

e.g. in the EPL ( Eclipse Public License ) the last statement reads like this. Each party waives its rights to a jury trial in any resulting litigation. Can I waive my fundamental constitutional rights? If that be the case, wouldn't it be possible for a legal entity to coerce or cheat a person into a contract that violates his/her constitutional right/s? Isn't the law of the land above all (including contracts)? Can the law through due process come to conclusion that a person be denied his constitutional rights because he signed a contract that was illegal/unconstitutional in the first place? This is not a duplicate of these questions Can I waive my statutory rights? How can felons be denied Constitutional rights?

Actually, the concept "right" means that it can be waived: you may exercise the right, but do not have to. If it is an obligation , you can't "waive" the obligation; but the right to free speech does not mean that you must speak, and the right to bear arms does not mean that you must bear arms. You may decline to exercise, or waive, a right. Sternlight 16 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 669 (2001) in "Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial" partially addresses this (the focus though is on binding arbitration). One thing to note is that the Seventh Amendment does not appear to apply to issues in state court (it is a separate and fascinating question to wonder what parts of The Constitution are incorporated against states, and why). All is not lost for the constitutional question, we just need a different constitution. By the agreement terms, "This Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of New York". Therefore, New York's Constitution (Article 1 Sect 2) is also applicable: Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law . Thus, the right may be waived. Waiver of a right to jury trial is not the same as waiver of the right to trial: what the agreement says is that litigants would have a civil bench trial, where the judge determines whether there was a breach. In New York, NY CPLR § 4102 allows parties to waive civil trial by jury (and unlike California ), such waiver terms have been upheld , but the courts have recognized that there is a problem, so it's not always obvious whether such waivers in contracts are legal.

'payable in like kind'? 'non-electing' shares?

each share of Series B Preferred Stock shall, by virtue of such transaction and on the same terms as apply to the holders of Common Stock, be converted into or exchanged for the aggregate amount of shares, securities, cash or other property ( payable in like kind ) receivable by a holder of the number of shares of Common Stock into which such shares of Series B Preferred Stock could have been converted immediately prior to such transaction if such holder of Common Stock failed to exercise any rights of election as to the kind or amount of shares, securities, cash or other property receivable upon such transaction (provided that, if the kind or amount of shares, securities, cash or other property receivable upon such transaction is not the same for each non-electing share, then the kind and amount of shares, securities, cash or other property receivable upon such transaction for each non-electing share shall be the kind and amount so receivable per share by a plurality of non-electing shares ). Kindly explain the terms in Bold&Italic .

This excerpt is a little bit hard to parse without knowing what kind of transaction is being referred to, but I will give it a shot. payable in kind means paid in property with no easily established monetary value, instead of stock or money or securities. For example, my uncle was once a shareholder in a wild rice distributor that ceased to be economically viable as a going concern because it couldn't sell its inventory for a reasonable price. So, it wound up its business and dissolved itself. But, rather than selling the warehouse full of wild rice it had left at a fire sale price when the market was weak and distributing cash to its shareholders, it instead, after paying its creditors with the proceeds of all of its cash and assets other than wild rice, made a liquidating distribution in which shareholders received X pounds of rice per share. My uncle's share of the inventory was roughly a UPS Van filled to the brim with wild rice, some of which he kept for personal consumption, some of which he held for sale when the price of wild rice recovered, and some of which he distributed in forty gallon lots to almost everyone in his extended family. My own family's forty gallons lasted us about fifteen or twenty years. non-electing shares This contemplates that there can be a transaction in some classes of stock can elect to participate and others may not, such as a partial liquidation of the company. Non-electing shares don't participate in the plan, while electing shares do. For example, perhaps electing shares get cash but not very much, while non-electing shares get an in kind distribution of the remaining shares.

How Would One Prove That Their Rejection From an Education Program is the Result of Defamatory Content?

edited to generalized the question If someone is claiming that they were rejected from an education program because of defamatory content, how do they provide evidence to substantiate this claim? (Most programs will not disclose specific reasons why a candidate is rejected.)

if I sue the author of the libelous [sic] content and claim this as part of my damages, will I have to directly show that my rejection was due to the school believing the content? Yes. Furthermore, how could this be proven? Ideally, by having evidence that this was the reason from the school that rejected you. This could be testimony from someone who knows or written evidence of how your application was assessed. Both of which could be subpoenaed and both of which might not exist. Further, if the basis is unlawful under anti-discrimination law, the school has an incentive to pretend that they used a different basis. Alternatively, if you could demonstrate a clear change in the tone of correspondence from the school before and after the allegedly libellous post(s) were made or came to the attention of the school. However, ... You don't seem to have suffered any damage from this rejection as your application fee was refunded. Showing that this particular rejection will affect your future earnings would be ... problematic, especially in light of the fact that it appears that graduate education was not so important to you since you only made one application.

Can you text a business/sole trader promotional material if they put their number online?

eg. An electrician has put their mobile number on a website to attract business. Can I legally contact that electrician to tell them about a product that he/she may be interested in? .. Everything is based in the united kingdom.

No. From here : Organisations must not send marketing texts to individuals without their specific, valid and prior explicit consent. This consent must be recorded and kept as proof of consent. There is a limited exception for previous customers, which is known as the soft opt-in. A soft-opt in only applies if the organisation have obtained the contact details in the course of a sale (or negotiations for a sales) of a product or service to the customer; they are only marketing their own similar products or services; and they gave the customer an opportunity to opt-out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message thereafter.

When does an improvement patent require (or not require if that's easier) a license from the holder of the original patent?

first post here! I was curious when an improvement patent requires a licensing agreement with the holder of the original patent? I did some preliminary research, but everything I can find online is pretty vaguely worded. If you need more specifics to narrow scope, I'm asking in regards to a design patent on a software.

A patent owner's rights are defined by the claims in the patent. Some improvements just add to what is defined in a claim. The patented item has an A, a B, and a C. Your improvement has an A, a B, a C, and a D. By being a superset of the old thing, you fall under the definition of the old thing so you need their OK. If you find away to make it without a C, then you do not fall under that claim. Many improvements solve the problem a completely different way and do have A, or B or C at all. Patents do not cover what is achieved, they cover the way it is achieved.

Testament valid / children disinherited GEORGIA

following scenario: A man lives and dies in Georgia. He served in the army and was located for a specific time in Germany. While he was there he was in a relationship with a woman. She became pregnant. The man signed the acknowledgement of paternity while the woman was still pregnant. He left Germany some weeks before his child would be born. A few days / weeks after his return he married in the states. He adopted the son of this fresh married wife and soon after the marriage she became pregnant with a girl. So far as a background. Now the man dies in the scenario. He created a testament will many years ago when his son in Germany was only a couple of years old. In this testament and will he mentioned that he is married and that he has 2 children (the adopted one and the girl). In a paragraph you can find this: "Except as otherwise provided in this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, I have intentionally anitted to provide herein for any other relatives or for any other person, whether claiming to be an heir of mine or not." Questions: is the son from Germany disinherited by the sentence mentioned above? As it is his son (he is named as father in the birth certificate) and he didn´t name him in the testament and will: is this positive for the son to contest the will? if the family of the man wants the son from Germany to sign the acknowledgment of service and the son refuses: what will happen next? Thank you!

Under Georgia inheritance law, when a person writes a will then, unless the will is proven invalid, the provisions of the will are followed. If a person dies without a will, then the laws of intestate succession apply, whereby potentially all children receive a share of the estate. The courts will presumably interpret "anitted" in the will to mean "omitted". The son from Germany is not necessarily disinherited by the sentence. The outcome depends on the provisions stating who will receive what portion of the estate. Typically, a will would say e.g. "I bequeath my stuff to my son Billy Rae and my daughter Becky Sue", so the fact of omission of Karl Johan suffices to not entitle Karl Johan to a share. If the will specifies "my two children", then there is an opportunity for litigation, since "my children" might be interpreted to mean "my two natural issue", or "the two whom I treated as my children, one having been formally adopted" (who would be entitled to a share under Georgia law – adoption is as thick as blood under the law). On the third hand, if the will designates as beneficiaries "all of my children whether by lineal descent or by adoption", Karl does fall into that category, however, Karl's sister has been explicity excluded by that sentence, likewise his mother, aunt etc. Karl can contest the will, but whether it would benefit him to do so depends on what the will actually says. The consequences of refusing to sign an acknowledgment of service are hard to assess, but it will at the very least draw out the process. However, under Georgia law, it does mean that you agree to the terms of the will and do not contest it. So, if Becky Sue is the nominated executor and has signaled her intent to ignore Karl, in signing the acknowledgment of service, Karl has indicated that he'll abide by her decisions. Therefore, Karl should not sign and should lawyer up to contest the will or choice of executor (and Karl should hire a Georgia attorney to do this, since German inheritance law i different).

Recording conversations

france How and when is it legal to a) record someone without their awareness and/or consent, b) broadcast or publish that recording and c) use that recording in court ? I think it's illegal to use that kind of recording in court at all , for example police was thrown out because they recorded criminals in jail without their awareness, and that was considered invalid. But does that extend to someone receiving (for example) death threats from anonymous phone calls, and deciding to record their calls ? The distinction I'm making between recording and publishing the recording is that it's how it works for photos : you usually have the right to photograph about anything (military bases are an exception), but privacy and the "right of image" prevent publishing things unless they are in a public context (sort of). Is it the same for audio recordings ? In general, I'm asking to what extent there are restrictions on recording someone without telling them in the context where the recorded person may exert a threat on, or assault, the recording person. Also, let's stay in contexts where the recording person is part of the conversation, i.e is at one end of a phone call or has a mic on physically. Not cases of leaving a microphone under a table or wiretapping someone.

france According to this , it's illegal in France to record without awareness, and generally illegal without consent (though consent can be implied). Here's the most relevant portion: In France, it is illegal to record or transmit conversations (including phone conversations) without the consent of all the parties to the conversation. However, if the recording is done in full view of the concerned parties without them objecting to it when they are in a position to do so, then consent is presumed, and you’re allowed to record the conversation.

Germany: Does a github.io hosted site require imprint / data privacy statement according to the GDPR?

github offers free publicly accessible data storage. Many people use that to present their personal profile where they e.g. advertise for freelancing services. An example url could be http://username.github.io . If I have such a personal page where I advertise services, do I need to make sure I have an Impressum and a data privacy statement to comply with the new General Data Protection Regulation DSGVO ? It would be hosted by github and linked to and accessible only via github, not e.g. a domain of mine. Though it would still be possible to e.g. include a contact form that sends visitor data to my email address.

a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.

Can't get meaning from absence of notice of copyright symbol

here i am starting writing blog post and i am totally new,i am using some contents from online power point presentation which don't have any copyright notice on it so is there any copyright infringement issues What it means if the documents not contain © symbol and are posted in public domain have no grounds for violating copyright

The text in the image means, For works published after 1989, a copyright notice is not required for a work to enjoy copyright protection. If you use an unmarked work in a way that violates copyright, you cannot defend your use by claiming that the unmarked work is not under copyright. In most nations, all creative works are automatically under copyright per the Berne Convention. Prior to widespread adoption of the Berne Convention, authors needed to explicitly write a copyright notice on each work to make it covered under copyright. A notable example of such a failure to mark a work is Night of the Living Dead published in 1968, which did not include correct copyright markings and became part of the public domain immediately. Such an event can no longer happen under modern copyright laws, since copyright now applies by default, not because of a marking. The only effect copyright markings have in modern use is on innocent infringement. If you infringe a modern work the doesn't have copyright markings, you still infringe copyright, but you may be able to reduce the penalty by claiming that you didn't know copyright applied to the work. If the author includes a copyright notice, then you cannot claim ignorance of copyright.

Is a landlord required to explain how utility is assessed

here is a hypothetical story. A tenant is renting an apartment in San Francisco CA, and they started noticing that their utility bill keeps climbing every month. They started looking closely and noticed the following trend: (it would amount $16-$20 per trash bag thrown away) A hypothetical lease states: My question to the community is, would the tenant have any right to demand detailed explanation how to the bill is calculated or the lease is pretty solid and the tenant must absorb whatever charges the landlord throws at them. The concern is that there is not accountability or transparency in how these fees are assessed. What if the landlord decides to send a bill of $500 for trash. That would unreasonable. Does this hypothetical tenant have any legal standing to demand itemized computation. Would such a tenant have a chance of winning a case if they would pursue a case against a landlord in the California Court of Law demanding either reduction of the cost or rendering this porsion of the lease invalid. Thanks in advance

would the tenant have any right to demand detailed explanation how to the bill is calculated or the lease is pretty solid and the tenant must absorb whatever charges the landlord throws at them. The clause is valid, but it does not entitle the landlord to arbitrariness or discretion. The method is explicit in that tenants are to be charged " [t]he provider's bills ". Landlord's evasion of tenant's scrutiny causes reasonable suspicion of breach of contract and/or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing . That covenant is implied in every contract. During court proceedings, the tenant will be entitled to conduct discovery on the defendant landlord, the non-party provider, and other non-parties who might be relevant to the claim(s). Since the clause is valid, relief in the form of striking that clause from the lease seems unlikely to be granted. In case of overcharge, the relief for breach of contract will be primarily in the form of reimbursements plus interest (see sections 3300 et seq of CA Civil Code), or the corresponding deductions on subsequent bills. Additionally, the tenant may pursue injunctive relief to the effect of securing transparency on landlord's billing practices.

How can one find a comprehensive enumeration of all the precedent setting cases that pertain to a particular issue or rulings on a given statute?

how can one find a comprehensive enumeration of all the precedent setting cases that pertain to a particular issue or the application of a particular statute?

new-zealand The Law Society provides this research service where specially trained people scour through all relevant databases and return to you what they have found. Though this service is only available to lawyers (and other people associated with the profession), a lawyer can submit a request for you. Find one that charges in 15-min (or less) time chunks (instead of rounding up to hours) and the price will be reasonable. Some of the databases are freely available: NZLII and JDO , but they are far from being comprehensive. Comprehensive databases are available commercially e.g. CaseBase , though subscriptions typically cost several thousand $ per annum.

what does "force" and "criminal force" apply to in Indian Penal Code?

how is "force" interpreted in section 349 Indian Penal Code? Force.—A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of mo­tion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into con­tact with any part of that other’s body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other’s sense of feeling: Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the three ways hereinafter de­scribed. (First) — By his own bodily power. (Secondly) —By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person. (Thirdly) — By inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move. Can someone pointing an object which they might not bring into contact with them but which still distresses them count as force or assault? for example ponting a some object at someone and they're scared of the object so they move whenever the object appears before them. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&orderno=390#:~:text=Whoever%20intentionally%20uses%20force%20to,is%20used%2C%20is%20said%20to see the illustrations section of this linked law for example. based on the illustrations would my example come under the definition of criminal force ?

Can someone pointing an object which they might not bring into contact with them but which still distresses them count as force or assault? This would be an assault, contrary to section 351 IPC: Whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to commit an assault. Explanation .—Mere words do not amount to an assault. But the words which a person uses may give to his gestures or preparation such a meaning as may make those gestures or preparations amount to an assault. Illustrations (a) A shakes his fist at Z, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause Z to believe that A is about to strike Z. A has committed an assault. (b) A begins to unloose the muzzle of a ferocious dog, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause Z to believe that he is about to cause the dog to attack Z. A has committed an assault upon Z. (c) A takes up a stick, saying to Z, "I will give you a beating". Here, though the words used by A could in no case amount to an assault, and though the mere gesture, unaccompanied by any other circumstances, might not amount to an assault,the gesture explained by the words may amount to an assault.

how much would a hacker be fined for using others online money?

how much would a hacker be fined for using others online money? (according to international law) Let's say for using $10,000, $1,000, $100, or $10.

There are no international laws that govern all hacking around the world. Generally however, criminal statutes require that the accused, if convicted, be ordered to pay restitution to their victim(s). This is generally for the actual financial amount required to restore the victim to their position, had the crime not occurred. For your examples, it would be for the actual amount stolen, as well as any other costs involved such as legal fees, conduct money for court appearances or lost income that the victim would otherwise have earned for example when they were giving evidence, or possibly bank interest that the victim would have otherwise earned. This is all in addition to any statutory or other sentence (fines, imprisonment), which vary around the world - if you want a specific answer, give a specific jurisdiction.

How public a speech be so that it's in range of Indonesian anti blasphemy laws?

http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/why-is-ahok-in-prison-a-legal-analysis-of-the-decision/ Ahok is convicted of insulting religion by saying people may use certain quranic verses for dishonest goals. The thing is, not one people that hear his speech claims that he is offended by Ahok's speech. However, his speech is videotaped. Some people claimed they are offended after watching the video. That leads to the question. How public your speech can be for Indonesian anti blasphemy laws to kick in? Say you talk in private to someone about religion. Say that someone record that. Say someone that watch the recording get offended. Does that count? And if so, where in the law is that written? A little background: https://steemit.com/ahok/@freeross/who-is-ahok-and-what-is-his-problems-in-indonesia Ahok is a very effective governor. With much less budget he can make rivers clean, fix all roads, give universal healthcare, and funds the poor's education. Oh, he also eliminates corruption due to his ebudgeting. And he is very popular. Duh. So, his political opponent use anti blasphemy laws to bring him down. Whether he blasphemes or not is very politically controversial. Not one that listen to him. So someone would seek his video, pretend to get offended, and sue him in court. Hence, the current question. How public your speech should be to get jailed by this rubber flexible law. If you say something privately, and someone record it, and publicly show it, will you be jailed? If so, should you not talk bad about religion anywhere privately? My concern is a hypothetical case. Say I talk something about religion. And I talk to a few people. Yet the talk is recorded and then latter people that want me death for totally unrelated reason use a youtube video and claim they are offended. If this is the case, then the law effectively prevent people from talking about religion in any place even when it's not public.

The English version of the law says By a maximum imprisonment of five years shall be punished for whosoever in public deliberately expresses their feelings or engages in actions that: a. in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia; b. has the intention that a person should not practice any religion at all that is based on belief in Almighty God. from the Bahasa Indonesia law Dipidana dengan pidana penjara selama-lamanya lima tahun barangsiapa dengan sengaja di muka umum mengeluarkan perasaan atau melakukan perbuatan: a. yang pada pokoknya bersifat permusuhan, penyalahgunaan atau penodaan terhadap suatu agama yang dianut di Indonesia; b. dengan maksud agar supaya orang tidak menganut agama apapun juga, yang bersendikan ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa The law does not define "public", so it would normally mean what it means in ordinary language (and that is not at all easy to figure out: it might be considered "public" if the expression was made to a single person). However, in this case, it was clearly in public (at a speech with about 100 people) that the statement was made. The law does not say that those people who constituted "the public" that heard the statement have to have been offended. Rather, (first) the statement has to be made in public (it was), and second, it is "in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia". That's a matter for the court to sort out. It appears, for example, that Shi'a teachings are legally blasphemous (case of Tajul Muluk). Unfortunately, there aren't any accessible resources here pertaining to the court decisions, so it's not clear if there are any concrete limits on what could be found to be blasphemous. However, it is established law that deviant teachings are legaly blasphemous, see the 39 case synopsis and the end here .

Is Roger Ver punished for 10 months in Prison Because of his Speech?

http://voluntaryist.com/howibecame/rogerver.html#.W9gtcuKYNhF Is there a precedent? He claimed that others doing the same thing are given a slap on the wrist and only him get sent to jail. How exactly the law works in Roger Ver's case? Are there any other real reason why Roger got 10 months in prison? It was basically a firecracker used by farmers to scare deer and birds away from their corn fields. While everyone else, including the manufacturer, were simply asked to stop selling them I became the only person in the nation to be prosecuted. The reasoning for the prosecution became crystal clear after a meeting with the US prosecuting attorney and the under cover ATF agents from the debate. In the meeting, my attorney told the prosecutor that selling store-bought firecrackers on Ebay isn�t a big deal and that we can pay a fine and do some community service to be done with everything. When the prosecutor agreed that that sounded reasonable one of the ATF agents pounded his hand on the table and shouted ��but you didn�t hear the things that he said!� This summed up very clearly that they were angry about the things that I had said, not the things that I had done. Is what Roger Ver said true? Is it reasonable or likely to be true? For example, is there a pattern where those that love freedom are more likely to be screwed by justice system in US? \ There is a discussion here https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=120969.0 It seems that many people easily buy such firecrackers through post and is doing just fine.

Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000.

Under article 128 of Narcotic law in Indonesia, Users are protected from being charged under what laws?

http://www.flevin.com/id/lgso/translations/JICA%20Mirror/english/4868_UU_35_2009_e.html Article 128 (3) Narcotics addicts that are old enough as referred to in Article 55 paragraph (2) are currently undergoing medical rehabilitation 2 (two) times the period of medical treatment in the hospital and/or medical rehabilitation institutions designated by the government was not sentenced. Was not sentenced with what? One lawyer says that a person going through rehabilitation will not be prosecuted by article 111 to 127 of the same law. However, the lawyer said he knows it from cops. Another lawyer says it won't help. Also the lawyer says that this applies only if amount of physical evidence is lower than some threshold. Is it true? If so, where is it written?

One lawyer says that a person going through rehabilitation will not be prosecuted by article 111 to 127 of the same law. However, the lawyer said he knows it from cops. Another lawyer says it won't help. Also the lawyer says that this applies only if amount of physical evidence is lower than some threshold. It isn't at all uncommon for the law to be unclear or ambiguous. The correct meaning may be indeterminate, in which case you have to assume that in the event of a dispute, that any possible interpretation could be ruled to be correct. There isn't always one "true" answer. If law enforcement has a clear view of what that means, this is important to know, whether or not this view is "correct" in an absolute sense. What you need to know and what is helpful depends a great deal upon why you need to know.

Was the Iraq war an act of terrorism, according to the UK definition?

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1 Reading the above legal definition, was the UK's action in Iraq terrorism? (and for that matter, were the actions in Libya and Syria terrorism as well?) The war clearly falls within all of subsection (2), was designed to influence the Iraqi government (well, remove - but that falls within influence), so 1)(b) is satisfied, and even without the ideological motive that the United States government later adopted (spreading Democracy), at the very least there was a political motive for the war, therefore 1)(c) is satisfied.

R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 Quoting from the trial court, the judgement includes a jury question to the judge: “Re: definition of terrorism in [section 1 of the 2000 Act], would the use of force by Coalition forces be classed as terrorism? The judge replied: the use of force by Coalition forces is not terrorism. They do enjoy combat immunity, they are ordered there by our government and the American government, unless they commit crimes such as torture or war crimes … The Supreme Court noted that an ordinary language interpretation of the definition would include military activity, even if that activity is approved by the UK government. As a matter of ordinary language, the definition would seem to cover any violence or damage to property if it is carried out with a view to influencing a government or IGO in order to advance a very wide range of causes. Thus, it would appear to extend to military or quasi-military activity aimed at bringing down a foreign government, even where that activity is approved (officially or unofficially) by the UK government. However, an ordinary language interpretation isn't the ending point of the analysis (as demonstrated by the judge's reply which uses the principle of combat immunity). The Supreme Court left open the possibility that international law could make the definition narrower than the ordinary language interpretation, but they don't get to that question in this case. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to express any concluded view whether the definition of “terrorism” goes that far, although it is not entirely easy to see why, at least in the absence of international law considerations, it does not.

The Gender Pay Gap and the Equality Act 2010 (UK)

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/part/5/chapter/3/crossheading/sex-equality If the Equality Act 2010 Part 5 Chapter 3 protects employees from differences in wage based on gender for the same work, then where does the Gender Pay Gap issue arise from? I have been able to find figures on the differences in annual wage between men and women but nothing on a difference in hourly wage which leads me to believe that, in the UK at least, the gender pay gap is a myth. Can someone please provide information to explain the legal issues, if any, the UK has in terms of equal wage, and help explain what aspect of the law complaints on unequal pay arise from. Are employers lowering women's wages illegally or is the issue with annual pay? Any help would be much appreciated.

The law is hard to enforce Lets look at what the law prohibits - paying different rates of pay for the same work based on gender. Does that mean that two workers doing the same work must be paid the same? No, it just means that the reason for the difference cannot be based on gender. For example, one worker may be more productive than the other, or a better negotiator, or have been employed longer, or etc. etc. None of these reasons is prima facie gender based (although some may contain inherent gender bias) and all of them would be a defense to a business alleged to be breaching that law - remember the government must prove that the reason for the difference is gender. Notwithstanding, most employers comply with the law and pay women equal rates to men for the same work all else being equal. Causes of the gender pay gap The gender pay gap is a cultural problem, not a legal one. From the European Commission's web page , different rates for the same work "explains a small part of the gender pay gap, due to the effectiveness of the European Union and national legislation." They list 4 causes that are much more significant: The undervaluing of women's work - "Jobs requiring similar skills, qualifications or experience tend to be poorly paid and undervalued when they are dominated by women rather than by men. For example, the (mainly female) cashiers in a supermarket usually earn less than the (mainly male) employees involved in stacking shelves and other more physical tasks." Segregation in the labour market - "Women and men still tend to work in different jobs. On the one hand, women and men often predominate in different sectors. On the other hand, within the same sector or company women predominate in lower valued and lower paid occupations." For example, doctors are paid more than nurses, plumbers are paid more than hairdressers and store-persons are paid more than cashiers - guess which jobs have traditionally been and still are male and female dominated? Traditions and stereotypes - "While around 60% of new university graduates are women, they are a minority in fields like mathematics, computing and engineering. Consequently, there are fewer women working in scientific and technical jobs. In many cases this results in women working in lower valued and lower paid sectors of the economy." I work in construction, when I studied electrical engineering in the 1980s there were 3 women in a year of 47 students; there are now more female engineers and architects then there were but there are still far more male ones. In terms of actual construction workers, the number of female builders, electricians, tilers and bricklayers I encounter is approximately none. Balancing work and private life - "Family, care and domestic responsibilities are still not equally shared. The task of looking after dependent family members is largely borne by women. Far more women than men choose to take parental leave. This fact, together with the lack of facilities for childcare and elderly care, means that women are often forced to exit the labour market." These are cultural and structural issues in society and the economy - they are highly resistant to legal solutions.

Getting away with murder in Yellowstone National Park?

http://www.vice.com/read/theres-a-50-square-mile-section-of-yellowstone-where-you-can-get-away-with-murder Is there something to the idea explained on the page linked above? It says portions of Yellowstone National Park are in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, but Congress placed the entire park in Wyoming's federal judicial district. And then it says: Article III of the Constitution requires federal criminal trials to be held in the state in which the crime was committed. And the Sixth Amendment entitles a federal criminal defendant to a trial by jurors living in the state and district where the crime was committed. But if someone committed a crime in the uninhabited Idaho portion of Yellowstone, Kalt surmised, it would be impossible to form a jury. And being federal land, the state would have no jurisdiction. The part about the state having no jurisdiction is something I wouldn't have guessed. It is, after all, within a state, and murder trials are usually not held in federal courts.

Article III, Section 2 of The Constitution requires that The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed Since the Idaho portion of Yellowstone is part of the state of Idaho and is not part of a non-state, ergo the trial shall be held in Idaho, according to The Constitution. One jurisdictional statute, 16 USC 24 , says The Yellowstone National Park, as its boundaries now are defined, or as they may be hereafter defined or extended, shall be under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. All the laws applicable to places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall have force and effect in said park. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to forbid the service in the park of any civil or criminal process of any court having jurisdiction in the States of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming . All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of Wyoming. So the crime would be a federal matter. I put emphasis on a sentence that doesn't have a straightforward interpretation. There is another jurisdictional statute 28 USC 131 , the problematic one, which states: Wyoming and those portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana and Idaho constitute one judicial district. Court shall be held at Casper, Cheyenne, Evanston, Lander, Jackson, and Sheridan. Therefore, the crime must be tried in Wyoming. Moreover, the judicial district of Wyoming also includes that unoccupied portion of the park in Idaho. This statute conflicts with Article III, Section 2, which requires court to be held in Idaho. Since The Constitution has precedence over federal statutes, the instruction to hold court in Wyoming is unconstitutional. The 6th Amendment does not pose a particular problem, with its requirement that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law since the jury could be of Idahoans, and transported to Wyoming – the 6th addresses the nature of the jury, not the location of the trial. It is an open question what the 6th Amendment refers to in talking of "state and district", since district is not defined at a constitutional level. The only district with constitutional stature is the District of Columbia, which is not a state, and therefore there could be no "state and district" if we mean "district, as specifically mentioned in The Constitution". The Judiciciary Act of 1789 first created federal judiciary districts, signed by Washington on September 24, 1789, and the 6th Amendment was passed by Congress the next day. It is reasonable to assume that this is what they meant by "district". 28 USC 131 does say that all of Wyoming plus a sliver of Idaho are a judicial district, so one could have a jury composed of citizens of Wyoming which satisfies the "jury of the district" requirement, but that would not satisfy the "jury of the state" requirement. If anyone lived in that area, those people could constitute a "jury of the state and district", but you would still have a clash between the statutory and constitutional requirements for venue.

Is it legal to buy software license keys from "bulk" sites?

http://www.windows7keyonsale.com/about.html Seems legit. They buy license at bulk and sell it.

There are many aspect to this. First of all, there is a license which is a deal between a manufacturer of the software and the entity who bought those keys (assuming that key dealer bought them lawfully). This license often directly forbids further sale of such keys. So according to manufacturer they can be "pirated". Secondly, there is a law applicable to your jurisdiction. Eg in EU resale of used software is always legal and cannot be taken away by the license. So according to the law they may be legal. Another issue here is what proof of purchase you'll get from the key dealer? Your local jurisdiction may not recognize this transaction at all without a proper receipt or invoice. This only skims the surface, because later you might want to exercise rights from the license (eg right to tech support or updates), however the license might be already violated. So you might end up in situation in which the software is legal to poses but not fully-functional (or perhaps not functional at all). Finally, there is the question of good faith. Were you acting in good faith buying those keys? If you have the knowledge that keys are stolen, then you're committing a different crime here, sometimes even "worse" than pirating.

In US do you have right to stop thieves from leaving?

https://9gag.com/gag/a3KMe67 A woman is caught shoplifting and in this video the guard called the police. Is what the black man did illegal? I've heard before that a thief have "right" to flee, and trying to knock him out is not justified because you can only use violence to protect your self, instead of yourmoney.

In most U.S. states, a citizen's arrest using proportionate non-deadly force is authorized when the citizen has witnessed the crime or has been asked by a law enforcement officer to assist in making an arrest. The U.S. Constitution is not violated by this authorization. For example, in Colorado, citizens arrests (not made at the direction of a law enforcement officer) are authorized by Section 18-1-707(7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes , which states that: A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. Generally speaking it is illegal in the context of a citizen's arrest to use: disproportionate force, force applied to punish rather than detain someone, or deadly force, although there are times when deadly force is authorized for reasons similar to those that would apply for self-defense in the absence of a citizen's arrest. Deadly force is generally not authorized to protect tangible personal property or most forms of real property, but some places authorize the use of deadly force to protect a residence. I've heard before that a thief have "right" to flee, and trying to knock him out is not justified because you can only use violence to protect your self, instead of your money. While it is understandable that you might think this based upon U.S. Supreme Court cases like Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the law is actually more nuanced and that case held that: when a law enforcement officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, the officer may not use deadly force to prevent escape unless "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." It was found that use of deadly force to prevent escape is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of probable cause that the fleeing suspect posed a physical danger. Thus, it is illegal to shoot to kill a fleeing thief or shoplifter, even though it is not illegal to restrain a shoplifter physically to prevent that shoplifter from fleeing the scene prior to the arrival of the police.

Alternate recourse to assault

https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/News/surveillance-video-released-hotel-incident-jazz-musicians-son/story?id=74985452&cid=clicksource_4380645_7_heads_posts_card_hed Given the assault shown on the video (female suspect tackles minor): if NYC (city) does not prosecute, what recourse does the minor's parents to obtain justice? State / Federal?

There's always civil action possible; "assault and battery" has a civil variant as an "intentional tort" Civil assault and battery are torts. A tort is a wrong committed by one person against another, causing damage. Specifically, civil assault and battery are intentional torts. [...] Intentional torts are torts that are committed on purpose. In addition to assault and battery, causes of action such as false imprisonment, slander, and fraud typically fall under this category. While the requirements of duty, breach, causation and damages are the same, the added element of the tortfeasor’s intent is taken into consideration as well. If a plaintiff cannot prove that the tort was committed intentionally, it may be a case of negligence as opposed to an intentional tort.

Presidential Martial Law Authority

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fired-attorney-sidney-powell-back-advising-trump-chart/story?id=74823842&cid=clicksource_4380645_2_heads_hero_live_hero_hed Trump and Powell met in the Oval Office Friday night, ABC News has confirmed, and were joined by Trump's former national security adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who has been publicly prodding Trump to take unprecedented steps to seize a second term -- including declaring martial law and ordering the military to oversee new elections in the battleground states that Trump lost. Does POTUS have the authority to declare martial law and order the military to oversee a new election in battleground states? I am not a lawyer and would appreciate a high school level explanation and then maybe a explanation for lawyers.

"Martial law" is not a cleanly-defined legal concept in US law, but it is generally understood to refer to placing a region of the US under military control. POTUS, Congress and state governors can do it, to some extent. Art. 1, §9 (speaking of powers denied to Congress) says that "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it". Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus is one fundamental element of "martial law". Art. 2 §2 (presidential powers) grants relatively little power to POTUS, but does say "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States", so as commander in chief, POTUS can command the army, but in general requires authorization from Congress. At the outset of the Civil War, Lincoln declared a numbered of things which Congress ratified, but this did not include a declaration of martial law. In Ex parte Merryman , 17 F. Cas. 144, the Taney (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States) stated that "the president, under the constitution of the United States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, nor authorize a military officer to do it". Congress eventually retroactively legalized the suspension of habeas corpus. Without Congressional approval of the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, a "declaration of martial law" would be meaningless and toothless. The Posse Comitatus Act further limits the ability of the army to meddle in domestic affair, and 18 USC 1385 states that Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. One of authorizations by Congess is The Enforcement Acts , which empowered federal intervention when states refused to protect the constitutional rights of citizens, and this was invoked more recently during the Eisenhower administration and in connection with the Mississippi Burning murders. Another much older authorization is the Insurrection Act of 1807 , now at 10 USC Ch. 13 allows use of the military (§252): Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The next section §253 would, no doubt, be the statutory provision invoked for use of the military: The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it— (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution. The rhetoric that would need to be associated with such an executive order (sending in the troops) would resemble that in Texas v. Pennsylvania et al, which did not turn out well for POTUS. Moreover, nothing at all authorizes POTUS to declare elections void and to order new elections (therefore, the military cannot be employed to engage in such an illegal action).

Does Texas have standing to litigate against other States' election results?

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/states-blast-texas-bid-overturn-election-seditious-abuse/story?id=74656637 What standing is required (if any) for an entity (person, corporation, state, etc.) to litigate against the election results (be national or local)? Please bear in mind I am NOT a lawyer.

UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore , 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims , 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson , is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a "Presidential election" of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876 , which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis : Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. "This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states," said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing argument s are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.

Qualified Immunity in Wright Minnesota Shooting

https://abcnews.go.com/US/minnesota-police-officer-fatally-shoots-driver-traffic-stop/story?id=77013068 Given that a Minnesota policewoman used a firearm, when she verbally indicated she would Taser a fleeing suspect. Assume there is no malice or racism component to the shooting and that she thought she had the non-lethal taser, when in fact she had a lethal firearm. What is the range of charges she would face? What if any defense does qualified immunity provide in a case of such a serious error?

Federal Civil Rights Liability Qualified immunity is a doctrine that applies to lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking compensation for an intentional violation of constitutional rights under color of state law. The qualified immunity inquiry is not reached in the first place if the prima facie case is not established because the conduct allegedly violating a constitutional right under color of state law, even if it is a well established constitutional right (i.e. one memorialized in a reported and controlling appellate court decision that is factually similar), if the action was merely negligent rather than intentional. Thus, most likely, there is no federal civil remedy to the victim, unless even the use of the taser would have been a violation of a well established constitutional right under color of state law. Non-deadly force, like a taser, is subject to a lower threshold of justification than deadly force, like a firearm. Of course, under general Fourth Amendment principles applicable to the states, an attempted arrest which appears to be what the OP describes, must be supported by probable cause that a crime was committed for which an arrest would be authorized. So, if this is the violation of rights alleged, there may be a federal civil rights remedy. But, further examination of the facts show that there was apparently a warrant for the arrest of the person shot outstanding. So the officer probably has a legal basis to use non-deadly force to make an arrest pursuant to the outstanding warrant, but probably did not have a legal basis to use deadly force to make an arrest. Federal Criminal Liability The most common charge under federal criminal law for excessive use of force by a police officer, is a criminal violation of civil rights. But this, like the civil remedy, requires a showing of an intentional violation of civil rights which the OP tends to suggest is absent unless the officer lacked probable cause to make an arrest. State Law Civil Liability At the state level, law enforcement officers acting under color of state law are immune from civil liability except as authorized by state law in an exception to sovereign immunity. Generally, there is no exception to sovereign immunity for a negligent use of force by a police officer. So, the police officer probably can't be sued successfully by the victim's estate under state law. State Criminal Law Considerations For criminal law purposes, whether or not the law enforcement officer's actions were a crime under state law would dependent upon both the elements of the offense: probably manslaughter or negligent homicide in this case, and the scope of force authorized under state law in the case of a law enforcement officer seeking to arrest a fleeing suspect. Usually, under state law, the use of reasonable force to make an arrest supported by probable cause is allowed and the use of deadly force to make an arrest support by probable cause is allowed only if there is a threat to the public based upon probable cause to believe that a particularly serious violent felony was committed. Qualified immunity is not applicable to state criminal law liability, although express statutory defenses in a state criminal statute might be similar in some cases. Caveat Of course, all of that analysis assumes that the story of the officer's motive and intentions was truthful. There is very good reason to be skeptical of this fact and to believe that the use of a firearm was not a negligent mistake, and that race was a motivating factor. Simply saying that one's motives were good is not a free pass and a jury doesn't have to believe the law enforcement officer.

Oklahoma city reverses face mask requirement amid threats of violence

https://abcnews.go.com/US/oklahoma-city-reverses-face-mask-requirement-amid-threats/story?id=70481052&cid=clicksource_4380645_4_three_posts_card_hed OK and OH are reversing requirements \ mandates to wear face masks amid violence & claims of constitutionality. What exactly is the constitutionality argument? Where do governors and local leaders gain their authority to issue a mask requirement? Is the threat of violence against workers criminal? https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ohio-governor-face-mask-order/story?id=70472856 "It became clear to me that that was just a bridge too far. People were not going to accept the government telling them what to do," he said on ABC's “This Week." I feel that I do not understand the governing dynamics. From my view: a seemingly reasonable order is rebuffed with violence and is walked back by authorities. Any clarification is appreciated. I do understand that there is a population segment does not like to be 'told what to do' and that they fiercely guard \ exercise constitutional rights and will protest any perceived erosion of said rights. Apparently, the violence and enforcement of mask usage in a US pandemic extend back to the 1918 Pandemic in San Francisco. Maybe anyone that uses the word unprecedented to describe COVID-19 should read the history of the 1918 pandemic. describe COVID-19

Threats of violence are illegal. No law forces a government to engage in a discretionary act in the face of threats of violence, nor do laws prohibit such decisions. The choice to "make a law" (issue an order) is entirely political, and the threat of violence is one of the motivations behind some political acts. Governments generally have enacted emergency powers laws that say what the governor / mayor / county executive may do in emergency situations. They are generally written to anticipate circumstances surrounding natural disasters, uprisings and invasions, and disease outbreaks, and empower the executive to issue whatever orders are deemed necessary for public health and safety. They can differ a lot in how specific they are. There are a few rights that are expressly spelled out in the Bill of Rights (freedom of speech, right to bear arms, quartering soldiers etc.) which constitute a bright line that cannot be crossed. There is no explicit constitutional provision that protects your right to contract, but it was generally held that there are other rights that are implicit in the Constitution, or that follow from other provisions (until the court decided otherwise). Even though there is no express constitutional provision guaranteeing that you have the right to walk around in public peacefully minding your own business, this is generally held to be a fundamental right. The Supreme Court then may at some point identify a fundamental right, as they have done (the rights to marry, vote, procreate or use contraceptives...). The government cannot infringe on fundamental rights unless they do so to achieve a compelling government interest (public health and safety is a good example), and then the question is whether an infringement is properly justified. For that to happen, the law has to be narrowly tailored to the purported purpose, and be the least restrictive way of achieving that end. As for mandatory face masks, there is a potential equal protection argument related to the fact that it may be illegal to wear face masks in public. Some of the arguments set forth relate to the disproportionate impact upon the poor or the disabled (if they cannot wear a mask for compelling reason). It imposes an extreme burden on the poor and especially the homeless (I'm not one, and I cannot get a face mask in the store. "Order it on Amazon" isn't an answer for many people). So mandatory (public) masks significantly infringes the right of people to live (buy food), and does so unequally. Whether or not such considerations are upheld to the highest courts remains to be seen.

Identification requirement

https://abcnews.go.com/US/white-georgia-sheriffs-deputy-beating-black-man-viral/story?id=72981224 A Lyft/Uber is pulled over for a broken headlight. Why is the passenger compelled to produce identification to law enforcement? Are identification rules uniform throughout the US or does it vary widely from state to state?

Identification rules vary from state to state, but there is no state which would require a person in Mr. Walker's position to identify themselves to law enforcement. The passenger is compelled to produce identification to law enforcement through the threat of illegal violence.

Why is Sim Lim Scammer in Jail even though technically his victims agree?

https://coconuts.co/singapore/news/33-months-jail-sim-lim-square-conman-jover-chew-whos-getting-treatment-depression/ Sim Lim scammer is in jail for "scamming". That one is obvious. We sort of know that he is scamming. But how he scammed seems pretty legit He obfuscate unreasonable terms deep within a thick contract. Basically people buy iPhone. Then he ask people to sign a contract that they agree to pay $1500 worth of insurance. People buy it and lost thousands of dollars. Yes. This guy is a scammer. There is no doubt. But the victim technically sign an agreement. So what crime laws does the Singaporean government use against this Sim Lim scammer? How would this be different in many other countries? I've heard in insurance industry, some people sell insurance at price 100 times the normal price. The strategy is similar, namely contract obfuscation. Is there a law that makes certain contracts unnecessarily complex for purpose of obfuscation a crime?

Process And Cultural Considerations He is in prison because he pleaded guilty to the crimes he was charged with by the prosector. So, there was no trial at which evidence contesting the charges was analyzed and compared to the relevant legal standard. As the linked story reports: In court, the 33-year-old conman pleaded guilty to 12 charges of cheating that transpired from January to October 2014. The story also reports that he was suffering from severe depression at the time that he entered his plea. So, he may have been overcome with hopelessness and self-hate over ending up in his position and entered his guilty plea, in part, for that reason. Put another way, he may have pleaded guilty because he genuinely felt guilty. Also, in much of East Asia, it isn't uncommon for criminal defendants to plead guilty to charges when they feel that they indeed morally wronged the victims and were wrong in the eyes of society, even if they might have technical grounds to fight the charges legally. A decision to plead guilty in a case where there is some plausible ground upon which the defendant could dispute his guilty, isn't without justification and isn't necessarily irrational in these criminal justice systems. Determinations of guilt and innocence and sentencing decisions are both made by judges, and judges convict defendants at much higher rates than juries do, in places where there is a right to a jury trial. (Singapore, even if it has "lay judges" that are part of a panel with a regular judge, doesn't have the equivalent of a U.S. jury, and "lay judges" tend to be highly deferential to the views of the career judge leading the panel.) Pre-Western legal theory in China (and East Asia more generally, Singapore is dominated by Chinese elites even though it is ethnically diverse), there was a distinction between Confucian philosophy which placed an emphasis over decision making by enlightened "good" men, over the "rule of law" which had a connotation of being rule by devious lawyers who manipulated technicalities to pervert justice. So, societal attitudes of both every day people and elites, both in and out of the legal system, frown on and have an aversion to and skepticism of defenses to legal charges that appear to be mere technicalities that is much more vehement than it is in the West, where "rule of man" is considered undesirable and despotic, while "rule of law" is considered a key component of a just society even if it sometimes has undesirable consequences in individual cases. In addition, in much of East Asia (based upon my personal discussions with judges from many East Asian countries while I was in law school where many East Asian judges came to study during mid-career sabbaticals), judges, de facto , regardless of the applicable legal standard, often strongly presume that everything that the prosecution tells them is true and that the defendant and any witnesses supporting a defendant are probably lying. It is similar to the pro-law enforcement bias of many U.S. judges in credibility disputes, but on steroids. So, pleading guilty rather than going to trial in much of East Asia, is often simply a matter of avoiding an exercise in futility that could cause the judge to view the defendant more harshly causing the judge to impose a stiffer sentence than might otherwise be imposed for the crime. Furthermore, in Singapore in particular, and also in much of the rest of East Asia, the capacity of the general public to organize extra-legal efforts to punish someone who is widely believed to have violated social norms is considerable. In this particular case, the public had raised a substantial war chest through an internet based fund raising request, to persecute this man, and conducted an investigation whose results were used to reveal details about his personal life that he wished he could have kept private, even before charges were filed. Singapore is a city-state, so there is really no place to hide. If the public thinks that you are a crook who got away with it, the potential that the public will act on your bad reputation is great. Accepting a judicially determined punishment for your alleged crime may be the most practical way to end further extra-legal punishment for your alleged crimes. The Alleged Crime Fraud can be established if someone is actually mislead, even if the unknowingly authorize a document that somewhere contains the information. If the person promoting the scam discourages people from reading the contract language, this is particular likely, but simply having an excessively long contract that does not disclose a key term conspicuously when that key term is not otherwise brought to the consumer's attention in the transaction could also constitute fraud. Also, "scamming" or "cheating", which is what he pleaded guilty to doing, is not necessarily a charge for fraud. For example, it may be that in Singapore that charging an unconscionable price for a good or service (i.e. a price grossly disproportionate to its fair market value) is a crime in and of itself, even if there is full and knowing consent to the price. In most places, overcharging is only a crime during a natural disaster or other emergency, which is considered exploiting people in a vulnerable situation or profiteering from a disaster or crisis. But, it is also true that in most places, an unconscionable contract can be invalidated by the person victimized by it, even if the contract was validly entered into by the parties. In many places, it is a civil offense to cause a consumer to enter into an unconscionable agreement and this is punishable by restitution and a fine or penalty. Singapore is notorious for criminalizing conduct that would, in other places, only be a civil offense in other places or a basis for bringing a lawsuit or a defense to a lawsuit, so it would not be surprising to me if "cheating" was a crime separate from fraud that was easier to prove in that legal system.

Why cops, in this case, didn't simply seize the stereo?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arizona_v._Hicks I look at this case. A cop saw expensive stereo. The cop check the serial number and found that the stereo was stolen. The cop move the stereo a bit and get the serial number. The evidence is thrown out of court. However, I've heard cops can seize cash on even less suspicion. Basically many cops see cash, think it's from drug dealing, and seize it. The mere act of bringing cash is punishable by civil forfeiture without trial. By that logic , the cop that suspect the stereo is from a crime, should also be able to seize the stereo. Once the stereo is seized, it's easy to just look at the back and see the serial number. Another way to look at this: Why didn't the cop just use civil forfeiture laws to seize the stereo and then, after the stereo is on cops' hand, the cop can just see the serial number? Did the cop have a right to seize the stereo under civil forfeiture law? Can the cop see the stereo serial number after seizing the stereo? If the answer two both question is yes, then why bother getting a warrant to look behind? Also, what should have the cop done on that circumstances to capture the burglar? Nothing?

In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here.

Why did FBI establish such intense surveillance to prove Jeremy Hammond's guilt?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Hammond Jeremy Hammond was a computer hacker who attacked Stratfor firm. Once FBI was able to pinpoint the real identity of the person behind one of the nicknames who claimed they hacked Startfor, they started extensive investigation on Hammond. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/03/stakeout-how-the-fbi-tracked-and-busted-a-chicago-anon/ While sup_g may indeed have been a "credible threat," he was in the end no match for the overwhelming federal resources of the FBI agents hunting him down. Over the last month, federal agents staked out his home in Chicago constantly, dug up old police surveillance records, tapped his Internet connection, used directional wireless finders to locate and identify his wireless router, and relied on Sabu back in his New York City apartment to let them know when sup_g went on or offline. "sup_g" was one of Hammond's nicknames. Why would FBI go to such great lengths if they already revealed the identity of the perpetrator? Why FBI considered it not enough to correlate an Internet nickname to a physical person? If they required evidence, why did they just not search Hammond's computers after making sure one of aliases that claimed to have hacked Startfor is indeed Jeremy Hammond?

The cited Wikipedia article explains why the FBI took the case so seriously, and in a serious case, the FBI is meticulous about being able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt on all possible charges. It also didn't know what other crimes or conspiracies might be involved and needed to be able to prosecute any newly discovered offenses. The Wikipedia article notes, in the pertinent part: On March 5, 2012, Hammond was arrested by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in the Bridgeport neighborhood of Chicago for his involvement in the December 2011 cyberattack on Stratfor, a private intelligence firm. The intrusion compromised 60,000 credit card numbers, $700,000 in fraudulent charges, and involved the download of 5 million emails, some of which were subsequently published by WikiLeaks. . . . He was one of six individuals from the United States, England and Ireland indicted. The FBI was led to Hammond through information given by computer hacker Hector Xavier Monsegur ("Sabu"), who became a government informant immediately after his arrest in early 2011, and subsequently pleaded guilty in August 2011 to twelve counts of hacking, fraud, and identity theft. . . . Information from Monsegur helped lead the authorities to at least eight co-conspirators, including Hammond, and helped to disrupt at least 300 cyberattacks . . . . Sabu was detained pending trial; in denying bail, Judge Loretta A. Preska described Hammond as "a very substantial danger to the community." . . . In May 2013, Hammond pleaded guilty to one count of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Upon his guilty plea, Hammond issued a statement saying, " I did work with Anonymous to hack Stratfor, among other websites" . . . Hammond was sentenced on November 15, 2013, to the maximum of ten years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.

Why are the other three police officers in the Murder of George Floyd case also charged?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_George_Floyd Kueng, Lane, and Thao: State charges: Aiding and abetting second-degree murder Particularly for Thao, he did not touch Floyd at all. So Thao should be protected by Gonzales v. Castle Rock? https://www.insider.com/tou-thao-said-he-didnt-know-george-floyd-was-having-medical-problems-2022-2 The government alleged in an indictment that ex-officers Thao, Lane, and Kueng failed to provide medical aid to Floyd. Thao and Kueng also face charges for failing to intervene in Chauvin's use of excessive force against Floyd. Police officer failing to act is specifically protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)?

Police officer failing to act is specifically protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)? Almost every general rule of law has exceptions. In particular, there are exceptions to the general rule that there is not a legal duty to take action to enforce a law. Law enforcement officers have a duty to guard the physical health and safety of someone in their custody. When they are acting as a team, this duty is owed by all of them. Law enforcement officers are responsible for crimes that they commit. An "aiding and abetting" charge implies that the jury must find that the officers present were intentionally working together as a team to commit a crime, rather than acting as individual. In the same vein, you can be liable for conspiracy or felony murder by serving as a look out for a murderer, even if you don't actually pull the trigger. These officers actively prevented third-parties from intervening or creating a credible threat that they would intervene if a bystander stepped in to help Floyd and as part of the same patrol owe duties with respect to each other's conduct that unrelated third-parties dod not.

Does Seila Law allow the U.S. president to fire anyone working in any U.S. agencies without cause?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seila_Law_LLC_v._Consumer_Financial_Protection_Bureau Does Seila Law v. CFPB allow the U.S. president to fire anyone working in any U.S. agencies without cause? I am wondering if there might be exceptions. The law targets specifically independent agencies, but does it include all independent agencies or some of them only. What are the criteria for determining if an agencies fall under the "umbrella" of the law? And are dependent agencies included, meaning all U.S. agencies?

"Seila Law" is a law firm, not a law. They were a party in a recent SCOTUS decision, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau , 591 U.S ___, which involved the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by Congress, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The court held that the structure of that law (regarding appoinntment and firing of the director) is unconstitutional: The CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers. More specifically, Article II vests the entire “executive Power” in the President alone, but the Constitution presumes that lesser executive officers will assist the President in discharging his duties. The President’s executive power generally includes the power to supervise — and, if necessary, remove — those who exercise the President’s authority on his behalf. The President’s removal power has long been confirmed by history and precedent. The law in question addresses a single position, director of CFPB, not all government agencies. "Agency" is defined in 18 USC 6 as includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense. "Department" is then defined as one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government. POTUS firing power is about the executive branch, not the judicial or legislative branches, so it depends on what you mean by "agency". You can infer possible outcomes based on this ruling, but what they literally said is that particular law is unconstitutional.

Is this fraud? Selling something technically true but most customer wouldn't have bought it?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Comisar#cite_note-4 Steve Comisar sold solar powered clothes drier. He then sent ropes. I wonder how the US government would handle this? Is this fraud? Technically a rope can indeed be used to dry clothes, namely by hanging it.

I wonder how would US government handle this? Is this fraud? Technically a rope can indeed be used to dry clothes, namely by hanging it. We don't have to guess how the US government would handle this because this individual was charged and convicted for this conduct and similar conduct by federal prosecutors on multiple occasions and sentenced to federal prison for doing so. See, for example, here , here (the FBI considered him "the Jeffrey Dahmer of fraud" and convicted him of fraud at least four times, usually of telemarketing fraud), here , here , and here ("Comisar was convicted in Los Angeles federal court in 1983, 1990, 1994 and 1999 for various telemarketing frauds.") The usual form of telemarketing fraud would be mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) or wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344). Per those links the elements of mail fraud and wire fraud, respectively, are as follows: "There are two elements in mail fraud: (1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent acts)." Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 n. 10 (1989); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) ("The elements of the offense of mail fraud under . . . § 1341 are (1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme."); Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 703, 704 (1994) (cases cited). and The elements of wire fraud under Section 1343 directly parallel those of the mail fraud statute, but require the use of an interstate telephone call or electronic communication made in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)); United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994) (wire fraud is identical to mail fraud statute except that it speaks of communications transmitted by wire); see also, e.g., United States v. Profit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 n. 1 (8th Cir.) (the four essential elements of the crime of wire fraud are: (1) that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally devised or participated in a scheme to defraud another out of money; (2) that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud; (3) that it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used; and (4) that interstate wire communications were in fact used) (citing Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 6.18.1341 (West 1994)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2289 (1995); United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1994) (two elements comprise the crime of wire fraud: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (2) use of interstate wire communication to facilitate that scheme); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (essential elements of wire fraud are: (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, interstate wire communications to execute the scheme), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 193 (1995); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993) (to prove wire fraud government must show (1) scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, (2) defendant's knowing and willful participation in scheme with intent to defraud, and (3) use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of scheme); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Wire fraud requires proof of (1) a scheme to defraud; and (2) the use of an interstate wire communication to further the scheme."). The definition of a fraudulent scheme for mail and wire fraud statute purposes is broader than for common law fraud: The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes do not define the terms "scheme" or "artifice" and the courts have traditionally been reluctant to offer definitions of either term except in the broadest and most general terms. Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1335 ("Congress did not define 'scheme or artifice to defraud' when it first coined that phrase, nor has it since. Instead that expression has taken on its present meaning from 111 years of case law."). The fraudulent aspect of the scheme to defraud is to be measured by nontechnical standards and is not restricted by any common-law definition of false pretenses. "[T]he words 'to defraud' in the mail fraud statute have the 'common understanding' of '"wrongdoing one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes," and "usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, chicane, or overreaching."'" Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924))). "The concept of 'fraud' includes the act of embezzlement, which is '"the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's own care by another."'" Id. (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902)). No actual loss to a particular victim need be shown and the fraud can be one that only deceives gullible people per this source . See also Shaw v. United States , 196 L.Ed.2d 372, 137 S.Ct. 462 (2016) (lack of financial loss is not a defense). The mailing or wiring can be done by a third party and need not contain actual false statements themselves per this source (indeed a fraudulent scheme is not required to involve a false representation of fact at all). See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States , 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (stock trading in advance of publication of a Wall Street Journal column to profit from a predictable effect on the stock market is actionable as fraudulent scheme under the mail and wire fraud statutes even if the columns themselves are true); SEC v Zanford , Case No. 01-147 (U.S. 2002) (false statement of fact not required for fraudulent scheme liability). If a fact that would prevent a reasonable customer from being misled is omitted, it is still a scheme to defraud. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941). See also Worden v. California Fig Syrup Company , 187 U.S. 516 (1903) (it was misleading and fraudulent to call a product "Fig Syrup" when fig syrup was present in the product but was only a minor ingredient making up a small part of the total product). For example, in this case, the description, by not clearly stating that it is a clothesline that is being sold, even if the statements made could be construed to be technically true, is still mail fraud because the omission is likely to mislead a reasonable customer without a complete disclosure of the fact that it is a clothesline being sold for far more than going price for a clothesline at the time.

Is it a crime to attend the Olympic games after a diplomatic boycott as a civilian if you're a diplomat?

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/africa-decision-not-boycott-beijing-093000132.html African countries have ignored Washington's call for a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, instead expressing support for China's hosting of the Games and warning that the event should not be a platform for politics. Is it a crime to attend the Olympic games after a diplomatic boycott as a civilian if you're a diplomat? I am wondering if there are legal ramifications to a diplomatic boycott of the Olympic games in the United States, or if the diplomatic ban simply mean that the U.S. won't pay the diplomats to attend the Olympic games as diplomats.

It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata , but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment.

FOIA website - 90% of requests are "Under Agency Review"? What am I missing?

https://foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/search/advancedSearch The vast majority of entries on "Under Agency Review" with no details, requester names or requester organizations. Even requests submitted back in 2020. What am I missing? Does the FOIA just never get round to 90% of requests or is there something else? ETA: My question is different than the one answered here: FOIA request takes too long

Government compliance with FOIA is notoriously bad. I found the following article in the Duke Law Journal illuminating: FOIA, INC. . There are some eye-opening statistics in there, like p.1375: At the end of FY 2014, the oldest pending requests across the federal government dated back to 1993. More details on the response times from several large federal agencies begins on p.1423. (The article goes into detail to show how, in those agencies, commercial requesters have overwhelmed even well-funded FOIA offices.) It seems that the largest issue in compliance is a lack of resources. Apparently, "We don't have funding to comply with the law" is an acceptable response for the executive branch.

Can I ask a retail store for video & audio they may have of me?

https://g.co/kgs/Mprheh Please read the link I provided. It will take you to a Google review I have left for a retail store in my area. It'll explain it all! Thank you for all and everyone's help. Also, I spoke with the store manager this afternoon and he said that I was accused of verbally attacking an associate (which I didn't do) and pointing my finger at her (they won't tolerate that!) LOL I may have pointed my finger at her but that was it....oh, I did tell one of them to get off her "high horse" and she told me to quit calling her names lololol!!!! I've got a call into the corporate customer service. Is there anything else I can or should do? I don't care if I shop there again but they have my name on a piece of paper by the registers that says "rude " " banned"

Can I ask a retail store for video & audio they may have of me? According to your Google review, you were " informed that [the] store doesn't have video surveillance ". This suggests that asking the retail store for video & audio would be unavailing: The store cannot give you something that does not exist. Is there anything else I can or should do? Apparently not. It is within the store's freedom of contract you refuse to do business with someone, provided that the reason for refusal does not constitute unlawful discrimination, deceitful practice, or maybe few other motives. Your description does not seem to fit any of those categories. they have my name on a piece of paper by the registers that says "rude " " banned" Placing on the cashier a piece of paper with your name and the words "rude" and/or "banned" is not defamatory. The word "rude" would qualify as statement of opinion , and claims of defamation are only about statements of fact . The word "banned" is a statement of fact , but it seemingly is a true one since the manager notified you that you are no longer allowed to shop there. Claims of defamation are about false statements of fact. Lastly, it is unclear from your description and Google review whether or how the store got your name. Unless you paid with cash or gift card, the matter of the receipt would be clarified by looking/showing the bank account record of the purchase.

GPDR/ICO registration. Do I need to register? (Their site is inconsistent.)

https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/data-protection-fee/exemptions/ lists exemptions as: Staff administration Advertising, marketing and public relations Accounts and records Not -for -profit purposes Personal, family or household affairs Maintaining a public register Judicial functions Processing personal information without an automated system such as a computer. Since 1 April 2019, members of the House of Lords, elected representatives and prospective representatives are also exempt. but https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-fee/self-assessment/y/N/Y/Yes/Yes lists the exemptions as only: Judicial functions; elected representative functions personal, family or household affairs not connected to commercial or professional activities (including CCTV to monitor your domestic property, even if you are capturing images outside the boundaries of your property); or to maintain a public register (ie you are required by law to make the information publicly available). This feels like the ICO are deliberately overreaching in order to increase the number of £40/year fees. Are they overreaching and how can I find out? (Note: I'm happy to pay the £40/year fee if I'm legally obliged to. On principle, I don't want to pay if I am being misled by their website's self-assessment guide.)

Both of the pages linked in the question are from the ICO. The other exemptions listed on the first page linked but not on the second, seem to be handled on other pages of the self-assessment tool. I have not tried to verify that every exemption listed on the fist page is properly handled, but that seems to be the case. Which exemption do you think is included in the list on the fist page, but is not covered on the self-assessment tool?

Is it illegal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA?

https://meta.stackexchange.com/q/388551/178179 mentions that SE will force some firms to pay to be allowed to train an AI model on the SE data dump (CC BY-SA licensed) and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA. This makes me wonder: Is it illegal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA? I found https://creativecommons.org/2021/03/04/should-cc-licensed-content-be-used-to-train-ai-it-depends/ : At CC, we believe that, as a matter of copyright law, the use of works to train AI should be considered non-infringing by default, assuming that access to the copyright works was lawful at the point of input. Is that belief correct? More specifically to the share-alike clause in CC licenses, from my understanding of https://creativecommons.org/faq/#artificial-intelligence-and-cc-licenses , it is legal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA, unless perhaps if the output is shared (2 questions: Is the output of an LLM considered an adaptation or derivative work under copyright? Does the "output" in the flowchart below mean LLM output in the case a trained LLM?).

united-states The flowchart included in the question is trying to summarize a rather large amount of legal uncertainty into one image. It must be emphasized that each decision point represents an unsettled area of law. Nobody knows which path through that flowchart the law will take, or even if different forms or implementations of AI might take different paths. The short and disappointing answer to your question is that nobody knows what is or isn't legal yet. To further elaborate on each decision point: The first point is asking whether the training process requires a license at all. There are two possible reasons to think that it does not: AI training is protected by fair use (see 17 USC 107 ). This is a case-by-case inquiry that would have to be decided by a judge. AI training is nothing more than the collection of statistical information relating to a work, and does not involve "copying" the work within the meaning of 17 USC 106 (except for a de minimis period which is similar to the caching done by a web browser, and therefore subject to a fair use defense). The second point is, I think, asking whether the model is subject to copyright protection under Feist v. Rural and related caselaw. Because the model is trained by a purely automated process, there's a case to be made that the model is not the product of human creativity, and is therefore unprotected by copyright altogether. Dicta in Feist suggest that the person or entity directing the training might be able to obtain a "thin" copyright in the "selection or organization" of training data, but no court has ever addressed this to my knowledge. This branch can also be read as asking whether the output of the model is copyrightable, when the model is run with some prompt or input. The Copyright Office seems to think the answer to that question is "no, because a human didn't create it." The third decision point is, uniquely, not a legal question, but a practical question: Do you intend to distribute anything, or are you just using it for your own private entertainment? This determines whether you need to consult the rest of the flowchart or not. The final decision point is whether the "output" (i.e. either the model itself, or its output) is a derivative work of the training input. This would likely be decided on the basis of substantial similarity , which is a rather complicated area of law. To grossly oversimplify, the trier of fact would be shown both the training input and the allegedly infringing output, and asked to determine whether the two items have enough copyrightable elements in common that copying can reasonably be inferred.

Why did the DA choose to prosecute the mother instead of the bully?

https://nypost.com/2017/11/28/mom-faces-jail-for-secretly-recording-daughters-bullies/ In this case, some kid bully another. I am not sure if bullying is a crime or not. It seems that some violence is involved. I think we have a crime for that, called battery or something. Yet, despite the complain of the mom, nothing was done. So the mom collect evidences for bullying. And she got charged instead. To me, the result is not "intuitive". To me, what should have happened is that the Mom shouldn't even bother doing the recording. She reports to school. School reports to cops. Cops do investigating and do the recording. We have evidence. The bully sent to jail. I think that "should have been" what happened. It's not. It's as if the society as a whole "approve" and "promote" the bullying by making sure there is no way the bully faced justice. The cops don't get involved. And the only way to get evidence is criminalized. If I were a DA, and say I want to get elected, I would throw the bully in jail. And if a bully is thrown in jail, then the "recording" event wouldn't have happened in the first place. I understand that DA does not have obligation to prosecute any crime. However, repeated battery seems like a reasonably obvious crime. If that's not crime, what is? Now, usually, if people have a few legal options, they pick the one that's the most profitable. What "profit" does DA have in prosecuting the mom instead of the bullies. As someone beaten up when I was a kid, I am wondering about this for a long time. Why do society more interested in protecting something I perceive as more trivial, like recording, compared to something far more substantial, like beating.

This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.

Is it criminal to surveille women as per the Lindberg?

https://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2019/10/03/investigation-greg-lindberg-paid-for-spying-compilation-of-dossiers-on-women-in-whom-he-was-interested/ Is it criminal to surveille women as per the Lindberg? Attach GPS tracking to subject's car? Stalking?

Maybe The anti-stalking law in North Carolina is § 14-277.3A. Stalking. . The provision making certain conduct illegal is subsection (c) (subsection (a) is a preamble giving reasons for tha law, and (b is a definitions section). Subsection (c) reads: (c) Offense. - A defendant is guilty of stalking if the defendant willfully on more than one occasion harasses another person without legal purpose or willfully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person without legal purpose and the defendant knows or should know that the harassment or the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to do any of the following: (c)(1) Fear for the person's safety or the safety of the person's immediate family or close personal associates. (c)(2) Suffer substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment. However, if I have understood the news story linked in the question correctly, strong efforts were made in this case to be sure that the women involved did not know of the surveillance. If the evidence supports that, then I fail to see how the women were put in fear for their safety, or suffered substantial emotional distress. Therefore, it seems to me that § 14-277.3A at least was no0t violated. It may be that some other law was violated, and similar conduct in another state (which it seems did occur) might violate the law of a different state -- not all anti-stalker laws are written in the same way. Ans I am not a lawyer, and may have overlooked something. The described conduct seems to me reprehensible, and perhaps should be made illegal. But I don't see how the specific anti-stalker law in North Carolina (§ 14-277.3A) was violated, assuming the accuracy of the linked news story. The relevant US federal law would be 18 USC § 2261A. Stalking which provides: Whoever— (1) travels in interstate or foreign commerce or is present within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or enters or leaves Indian country, with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the course of, or as a result of, such travel or presence engages in conduct that— (A) places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to— (i) that person; (ii) an immediate family member (as defined in section 115) of that person; (iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that person; or (iv) the pet, service animal, emotional support animal, or horse of that person; or (B) causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress to a person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A); [commits an offense] None of this applies unless there is an intent to "kill, injure, harass, [or] intimidate" and if the intent was in fact to keep the surveillance sectet, there was no such intent to "kill, injure, harass, [or] intimidate" nor to cause emotional distress. So again I don't see a basis to charge violation of 18 USC § 2261A unless there is evidence of actions beyond those discussed in the news story, or the circumstances were such that a reasonable target would have been placed in fear or felt harassed or intimidated. This is much the same conclusion, for similar reasons, as I reached about the NC law.

Why do the manufacturers using an operating system have to pay patent royalties based on the operating system?

https://rcpmag.com/articles/2014/08/04/microsoft-sues-samsung.aspx In 2011, Samsung signed a contract agreeing to pay Microsoft royalties for using the Linux-based Android mobile operating system in Samsung tablets and mobile phones. As part of the deal, Samsung also agreed to market Windows Phone devices and the two companies shared some patented technologies. Now Microsoft is complaining that Samsung has "stopped complying with its agreement," according to a Friday announcement attributed to David Howard, Microsoft corporate vice president and deputy general counsel. The announcement of the lawsuit heavily implied that Samsung stopped complying with the 2011 contract after Microsoft announced the acquisition of rival device maker Nokia last September. Moreover, Howard contended that Samsung is resisting now because it currently makes more money from its Android-based devices than it did when it inked the deal back in 2011. Why do the manufacturers using an operating system have to pay patent royalties based on the operating system? Shouldn't Google be the one to pay, also why isn't Microsoft also suing Google? I thought it really strange and that it didn't make sense for a manufacturing company to pay for a generic operating system patent. Also, isn't there a 15 year expiry, meaning the patent should be invalid right now? It was from some years ago, so I was wondering what happened and if the patent still applies and the patent is also valid in other regions. Even if they agreed to pay, if the patent is invalid, should Samsung really have to pay Microsoft?

First, just to be clear, this is an old story from 2014. Second, Microsoft wasn't seeking payments for patents on the OS per se, but on the drivers for the chips that connect the cell phone to the cellular networks. In 2014 Microsoft bought Nokia . Part of Nokia's value was that it held a whole bunch of fundamental patents for cellular communications . Microsoft was suing Samsung on the basis of those patents. Samsung in turn claimed that Microsoft's acquisition of Nokia, and their attempt to charge for the Nokia patents violated the terms of a 2011 agreement between Samsung and Microsoft. Samsung and Microsoft settled the dispute in 2015. The terms of the settlement were confidential. Microsoft and Google did wage a separate patent battle in the courts of the US and Germany. This was also settled in 2015. This is all water under the bridge now. In 2018 Microsoft joined the Open Invention Network (OIN) , a consortium of companies that agreed to license their patent portfolios to Linux royalty-free, and agree not to assert their patents against Linux systems.

How can we answer questions about tabletop game rules without infringing copyright?

https://rpg.stackexchange.com/ is a stack dealing with table top RPG games, the most prominent being Dungeons and Dragons (D&D). Answering questions almost always relies on information from rule books sold by the makers of D&D. Due to stack culture reasons, answers directly referencing the rules are valued far more than experienced perspectives. To avoid link rot, it is essentially a requirement to copy-paste the relevant portions of the rules into the answer. These portions could be a few sentences, or even a few paragraphs, often they are the entire rules for a spell or character ability. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Ultimately SE is using this content to turn a profit, so we can't naively think we are merely sharing information with friends and are immune to copyright law. Are we actually allowed to share this pay-walled information? To what extent is this kind of content infringing copyright? What should we be looking out for to prevent issues?

This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107 . In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing . In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b) , which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.

How far can cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies go?

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164085/sidtoday-dea-the-other-warfighter.pdf This is a report explaining that DEA was aided by NSA's surveillance system at the time they were persecuting a wanted criminal Gonzalo Hinojosa while he had been in Panama by using data obtained by NSA's systems. The report suggests this person was very evasive and dangerous perhaps this is why DEA collaborated with NSA. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering Another example of LE and NSA cooperation. Shouldn't NSA be concerned only about foreing intelligence without doing anything related to LE? If there is a reason for such cooperation to exist, how far can cooperation between a LE organization go with an intelligence agency of the same country? And what type of criminal actions substantiate to do this? Terrorism, child abuse, et cetera. For example, if FBI wanted to research more about a wanted person inside another country out of their reach, may it use NSA's systems to track down this person's movement with cellular networking? Or spy on his Internet activity with surveillance systems mentioned?

As far as the legal powers of the organisation(s) allow By this, I mean that if what the DEA was doing was allowed under the laws that govern the DEA, and what the NSA was doing was allowed under the laws that govern the NSA, then they can cooperate as much as they want. The could investigate jaywalking together if they wanted (of course, this would have to be jaywalking within Federal jurisdiction). Divisions in executive government are practical rather than legal. That is, the executive can carry out "intelligence" and "law enforcement" and as a practical matter, they are carried out by different agencies. However, they are functions of the executive and could be carried out by one mega-agency if they wanted to set things up that way. Indeed, the Department of Homeland Security is such a mega-agency.

Are there anything misleading about this ads?

https://skylinktvantenna.com/orderint-mod-sh/vsl1.php I removed all tracking links There is this statement that I believe is fraudulent But how can you watch all this for free? The secret lies behind a law that no television operator in the world wants you to know. This specifies that they must provide, in addition to the conventional signal, a signal per radio. In order not to break the law, all operators therefore broadcast this signal. It basically said that there is a law that requires all cable TV company to also send broadcast for free via air. They don't want it but they have too. And you can get them by using antena. It sounds a lot like nonsense to me. For comparison In my country, most TV are free and most are on air. But that's not because there is any law that requires it. The TV makes money from advertising. Of course, there are paid TV without ads. But those TVs are not available in anyway for free and requires a decoder to watch. I suspect that is what's actually happening with this "antenae". If that's the case, is this fraud? What I am mainly interested is whether there are laws that are like what the ads say. Namely that are there actual laws that force cable company to broadcast their shows for free. The seller is basically selling a normal antenna and behaves as if their product is special.

Your question first asks whether it's fraud, and then asks whether there are in fact such laws. You don't state the jurisdiction, and your question implies that you are somewhere other than the US, so there's really not much we can do to say what laws there are in your jurisdiction. As far as the fraud issue, suppose we assume for the sake of argument that the claim is false. Assuming that your jurisdiction defines "fraud" in manner similar to how the US defines it: In the United States, common law generally identifies nine elements needed to establish fraud: (1) a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the representer’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the representer’s intent that it should be acted upon by the person in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the injured party’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the injured party’s reliance on its truth; (8) the injured party’s right to rely thereon; and (9) the injured party’s consequent and proximate injury. https://www.mitchell-attorneys.com/common-law-fraud You seem to be presenting "The law requires broadcast of the content" as (1). So we need this to be false (2); again, I don't know what your country or its laws are, but for the sake of argument, let's assume that the claim is false. The third condition is its materiality. This means that it must actually be relevant. This would be difficult to prove. Does it really matter whether it's true? Does its falsity affect the value of the product being offered? Similarly, for (5) and (7), in what way would buyers being "acting" or "relying" on this claim? How would a decision whether to purchase something depend on the claim? And there is (9): you would have to show that you actually suffered as a result of the claim being false. I suppose that if there's a show that you want to watch, and you, when you bought the antennae, were expecting be able to watch it using the antennae, but it turned out that you weren't able to, then you would have a case. You would have to show that your belief that you would be able to watch it was caused by the defendant's claim, that your belief was a reasonable inference from that claim, that the defendant intended you to believe that, and that you have damages from not being able to watch the show.

Do you automatically own half the IP created by your spouse?

https://twitter.com/richgel999/status/1334061416433807360 This Twitter thread raised an idea I'd never heard before: that in a marriage intellectual property is jointly owned by the spouses, which could prove complicated in divorce, and make an open source license invalid if it wasn't made with the consent of the spouse. Is there any legal merit to this idea, that without any explicit agreement (or a prenup) your spouse will own half the IP that you create? Do any countries' copyright laws explicitly discuss this situation, or is there any relevant case law?

That is the case in the state of Washington, for example. All property acquired during a marriage is considered community property. This can make things complicated since there are state-specific rules that can arise in case of a divorce ( Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Communications, Inc : the couple declared no community property at the time of the divorce, meaning the wife who was not a party in in infringement case, had no standing – and therefore the infringement suit could procede). This page goes into details. There are 9 US states with community property regimes: it is also the law for Sweden, Germany, France and Italy. In the US, permission from one author is sufficient to constitute "having permission" w.r.t. copyright: an owner of the copyright can license the work, and you do not have to get permission from all owners. This does not invalidate an open source license: spouse 1 can grant such a license even if spouse 2 refuses to grant such a license. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue , 218 F.3d 432 partially answers the question in Louisiana specifically w.r.t. copyright. A lower court held that the state-specific quirk of giving a non-author an equal interest in copyrighted IP must be swept away in the interest of uniformity of federal law. The lower court indeed rejected an argument based on 17 USC 301 which declares federal law to be superior to legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to that set out in Title 17: but community property law is not equivalent to Title 17, it's much broader. The higher courts reasoning is a tall wall of words which boils down the their conclusion that "we disagree with the district court only to the extent that it held the conflict between Louisiana community property law and federal copyright law irreconcilable absent congressional intercession", and having found a way that didn't involve Congress, they declared the work-creator to be the sole owner of the IP created during the marriage. See also the myriad citations contained therein. What this case in particular shows is that the specifics of the states community property laws will have an effect on how a courts would rule on such an IP question.

Could cases regarding violations of the ECHR be heard before UK courts prior to the Human Rights Act 1998?

https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/the-european-convention-on-human-rights/ The above article that I have been reading suggests that an application to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg should only be made if domestic routes have been 'exhausted', seeming to imply that domestic courts had jurisdiction to hear cases regarding violations of the ECHR (see the section under 'How is it enforced?'). However, the article goes on to state that the HRA was introduced to 'bring rights home' and enable people to protect their rights in domestic courts, suggesting that this was not the case prior to the act. These two suggestions seem somewhat contradictory to me. Is there something that I have misunderstood? Thanks!

Before the Human Rights Act 1998 , you could not complain on European Convention on Human Rights grounds to domestic courts. The UK as a state was signatory to and therefore bound by the Convention. However, public authorities in the UK were not required by domestic law to comply with the Convention. In some circumstances domestic courts could take into account the Convention but nevertheless they were not bound by it. The fact that (generally) before making an application to the European Court of Human Rights you had to exhaust all available domestic processes just means that the state was entitled to the opportunity to make things right, there was some political leeway afforded to it, and the practical matter of cutting down the sheer number of cases to be heard by the European Court. It is a bit like having to exhaust a regulated company's complaints process before complaining to the regulator. The regulator will tend to reject the complaint if the complainant hasn't been through the company's (reasonable) steps. Among other things the Human Rights Act 1998 gave effect to the European Convention in Human Rights law. Now public authorities including the courts were bound by the Convention and complaints could be made domestically on Convention rights grounds. Chapter 1 of the White Paper for the-then Human Rights Bill may be of interest: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf Alternatively paragraphs 10-17 of The Government's Independent Review of the Human Rights Act https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt5802/jtselect/jtrights/89/8905.htm .

Can a company selectively allow violations of their Terms of Service?

https://venturebeat.com/2018/12/28/netflix-permanently-pulls-itunes-billing-for-new-users/ Unless iTunes shuts down the Netflix app they will be selectively permitting one of their vendors to blatantly violate their Terms of Service which explicitly states that anyone that attempts to circumvent Apple's ability to profit from subscription services within their store will have their apps removed. I'm curious if there's any legal restriction on a company deciding selectively who they enforce their terms on and whom they don't.

I think the assumption that Netflix operates on the same terms as are offered to small-scale developers is highly questionable. Netflix are big enough that they have probably negotiated their own terms. Notwithstanding, a party to a contract is free to allow (‘waive’ being the legal term) violations of that contract by the other party. These can be one off or enduring waivers and agreed before or after the breach either explicitly or, by inaction, implicitly.

What is personal jurisdiction and how can it allow someone to not respect the copyright of another individual?

https://web.archive.org/web/20110713050011/http://blog.internetcases.com/2009/01/22/no-personal-jurisdiction-over-australian-defendant-in-flickr-right-of-publicity-case/ The court similarly found that any purported agreement with Wong via the Creative Commons license was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The Creative Commons license did not require Virgin to perform any of its obligations in Texas. Instead, the license permitted the photograph to be used anywhere in the world. Furthermore, Chang failed to show that Virgin performed any of its obligations in Texas. It used the photograph solely in Australia, the one place that, according to Virgin’s evidence, it was authorized to sell its products and services. Finally, because Virgin only used the photograph in Australia, the license that permitted its use was centered in Australia, not Texas. What is personal jurisdiction and how can it allow someone to not respect the copyright of another individual? Also, does that mean that Chang can sue Virgin in an Australian court?

A court must have both personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction Personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the parties to the case, for example, a New York court does not have personal jurisdiction over a murder committed in California. Subject-matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the law, for example, a Small Claims court can only hear cases where the amount in dispute is below the small claims threshold. In the case you cite, the court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction because the alleged tort took place in Australia, not Texas. Or, more precisely, the connections to Texas were too insubstantial to enliven it’s jurisdiction. Importantly, this was not a breach of copyright case. It is undisputed that Virgin had a valid licence (the CC-BY 2.0 that the photographer had granted to Flickr) and complied with it. Chang was pursuing “a number of tort claims including misappropriation of Chang’s right of publicity”, not copyright infringement. Further, unless the photo was a selfie, Chang would not be the copyright owner; copyright in a photograph belongs to the photographer, not the subjects. Chang can sue in any or all of the states or territories in Australia where the ad was broadcast and the relevant court would probably decide that it did have personal jurisdiction. However, the case would fail because breach of the “right of publicity” is not a tort recognised under Australian law. That is, if Virgin had done what they did in Texas it might have been illegal but because they did it in Australia, it wasn’t.

Fake video from saab

https://web.archive.org/web/20230715091936/https://forums.flightsimulator.com/t/fake-gripen-video/599765 See above. Saab released a video falsely claiming the gripen turned 9g. It was actually a 4g turn. Do the customers of the gripen have the right to sue the company for false advertising?

No. There is no reason for anyone to believe that a country's Air Force would purchase a military jet fighter in reliance upon a comment made by the company in a promotional video intended for the general public. And, even if it did, generally "buyer beware" applies to international purchases of military equipment. It would not be reasonable for the UAE to rely on the video in question as authoritative. And, I very much doubt that the specifications of the jet fighter provided by the seller to the UAE military said the same thing.

What law makes intending to cause harassment alarm and distress an offence in the UK?

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-62793135 I know that s5 makes conduct “likely to cause” … harassment alarm or distress a crime on a strict liability basis. But what provision makes intention to cause it a crime?

Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (which was amended by section 154 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ). [F14A Intentional harassment, alarm or distress. (1)A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, he— (a)uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b)displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress. (2)An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is also inside that or another dwelling. (3)It is a defence for the accused to prove— (a)that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other dwelling, or (b)that his conduct was reasonable. (4)F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.]

Is the act of receiving a 'happy ending' illegal in Canada?

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/massage-therapist-s-happy-endings-incident-spurs-federation-to-take-action-1.4659016 In the recording of the interaction at the Kirkland police detachment, the officer tells her that it is unlikely the man will be found, that the punishment would be minimal if he were ever convicted and that the expectation of "happy endings" comes along with the profession. I was surprised to read this on a news article, because the law clearly states that it's illegal. While happy endings are legal in Montreal, they are not provided by certified and licensed massage therapists who are closer to physiotherapists in the services they provide and who usually work out of athletic therapy clinics, gyms, and spas. https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/05/08/opinion/happy-endings-not-part-job So there are two articles that seems to suggest it's legal, while the law states the opposite. https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/c36faq/ Purchasing sexual services and communicating in any place for that purpose is now a criminal offence for the first time in Canadian criminal law. A person convicted of this new offence may be sentenced to up to 5 years imprisonment if prosecuted on indictment, and 18 months if prosecuted by summary conviction. Mandatory minimum fines also apply, including higher mandatory minimum fines if the offence is committed in a public place that is or is next to parks, schools, religious institutions or places where children can reasonably be expected to be present. A person convicted of purchasing sexual services from a person under the age of 18 years may be sentenced to up to 10 years imprisonment. Mandatory minimum penalties of 6 months imprisonment for a first offence and one year for subsequent offences also apply. The new purchasing offence applies to transactions that take place over the Internet, such as paying someone to provide a sexual service in front of a webcam. A “sexual service” is a service that is sexual in nature and whose purpose is to sexually gratify the person who receives it. “Obtaining a sexual service for consideration” involves an agreement for a specific sexual service in return for payment or another kind of consideration, including drugs or alcohol. It doesn’t matter whether payment is made by the person who receives the sexual service or by another person. Activities that amount to “obtaining a sexual service for consideration”, if a person pays for them, include: sexual intercourse; masturbation; oral sex; lap-dancing, which involves sitting in a person’s lap and simulating sexual intercourse; and, sado-masochistic activities, provided that the acts can be considered to be sexually stimulating or gratifying. So which one is it?

The third link clarifies that purchasing sex is a crime, but selling it is not: The new prostitution laws do not criminalize the sale of sexual services. They also protect those who sell their own sexual services from criminal liability for any part they may play in the prostitution offences that prohibit purchasing sexual services, advertising those services, receiving a material benefit from the prostitution of others or procuring others for the purpose of prostitution. It also isn't unusual for a local law enforcement or prosecution agency to adopt a policy of not prosecuting an offense available under the law for certain circumstances. Perth, Australia had such a policy for many years and perhaps still does. The first article makes clear that the particular police officer's statement in the case mentioned was inaccurate as an explanation of the current state of the law or local law enforcement policy, and reflected insensitivity and misconduct on the part of the police officer: In the recording of the interaction at the Kirkland police detachment, the officer tells her that it is unlikely the man will be found, that the punishment would be minimal if he were ever convicted and that the expectation of "happy endings" comes along with the profession. Cavaliere insisted she wanted to file a report and left the station with forms to fill out, but said the incident left her feeling unsupported and scared to return. She did return the next day accompanied by her boss and file a report with a different officer the next day. A Montreal police spokesperson said the officer's reaction was "sad" and "wrong," but does not reflect the service as a whole. The second article is not open access, but appears to be a reaction to, and misinterpretation of, the same incident. A comprehensive discussion of the somewhat complicated situation can be found at Wikipedia .

Was any statute violated when Tyre Nichols was kicked in the head?

https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/tyre-nichols-bodycam-video-memphis-police-release/ "The videos show different angles of Nichols being pepper sprayed, kicked in the head while being restrained , punched and struck multiple times with a baton." https://www.wdsu.com/article/body-cam-footage-released-of-tyre-nichols-deadly-arrest/42691615 "Two officers can then be seen atop Nichols on the ground, with a third nearby, for about 40 seconds. Three more officers then run up and one can be seen kicking Nichols on the ground." If Nichols is handcuffed in a prone position, under what circumstances can Police kick Nichols in the head? Was any statute violated when Tyre Nichols was kicked in the head?

The one that allows police to use reasonable force to effect an arrest and detention I don’t specifically know which one that is in Tennessee law but it’s bound to be there. If it isn’t, and police are operating under ancient common law, then this is the standard anyway. Whether force used in a particular case is reasonable is a matter of fact for the jury to decide. The judge will instruct the jury on the relevant law as to what circumstances would justify kicking a restrained person in the head, if any.

Do US presidential pardons include the cancellation of financial punishments?

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/20/anthony-levandowski-pardoned-after-stealing-trade-secrets-from-google.html says: Anthony Levandowski pardoned after stealing trade secrets from Google In August, Levandowski was sentenced to 18 months in prison for stealing trade secrets. In March, Levandowski declared bankruptcy after a court said he had to pay $179 million to Google over his split with Waymo. Do US presidential pardons include the cancellation of financial punishments?

Yes Presidential pardons only deal with breaches of Federal law. So, if the punishment is a fine then that penalty is waived. However, if the fine is punishment for breach of state law, the pardon does not touch it - he would need a pardon from the relevant state Governor(s). But Anthony Levandowski is not being punished with a fine, he was punished with a jail term. What he owes Google is damages for breach of contract or a tort, both civil matters and almost certainly under California law, not a punishment for an offence. This is not something he can be pardoned for by a President (if under Federal law which is unlikely) or a Governor (if under state law). His actions constituted both an offence against the state, which can be pardoned, and caused damage to another person (Google) which can’t. He owes this money as a debt just as if he had bought something from them or borrowed money from them.

Was Lolade Siyonbola legally required to provide ID to police another student called on her for sleeping in a Yale dorm common room?

https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/09/us/yale-student-napping-black-trnd/index.html From what I've read, Connecticut is not a stop and identify state. However, I understand that people are required to identify if police have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed (but if there is no such suspicion, they are not required to identify even in stop and identify states) But does it qualify as reasonable suspicion that another student called police and said Siyonbola "appeared they weren’t … where they were supposed to be"? And if so, what laws might be put into place to protect individuals from situations like this where someone makes a prejudiced police complaint against them?

Since the incident was on private property (inside a building), a person does not have the same right to be there that you would have on the street outside the building. Yale police therefore can legally make a determination whether a person is trespassing (for example, by asking for identification), especially when there is an allegation that a person is trespassing. A law holding a person criminally or civilly liable for reporting their "suspicions" to the government without e.g. "reasonable suspicion" could easily run afoul of the First Amendment.

Term limits extensions

https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/10/politics/michael-cohen-trump-cnntv/index.html What would need to happen in order to enable a US president to govern for a 3rd term?

The two-term limit is embeded in the Constitution at the Twenty-Second Amendment. A third term would therefore require a constitutional amendment to allow more than two terms. Under Article V , constitutional amendments can happen in one of two ways: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.

Why some fraud is more easy to convict than others?

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8344189/Lori-Loughlin-Mossimo-Giannulli-plead-GUILTY-college-admissions-scandal.html This "fraud" seems reasonable. Parents want to put kids in better school. They hire a consultant. They may not even know it's a bribe. Are we bribing anyone if we pay someone to make our resume looks good? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-avpx8UTakI This one seems like more obviously fraud. It's done again and again and again. Yet, I've heard it's so common that most oil changes company are scam and no body got prosecuted. Why is the more obvious fraud is not the one prosecuted more easily? What are the elements?

This "fraud" seems reasonable. Parents want to put kids in better school. They hire a consultant. They may not even know it's a bribe. Are we bribing anyone if we pay someone to make our resume looks good? The headline case in that Daily Mail article wasn't about asking someone to help you improve the presentation of your resume, it was about lying that the two girls were "rowing stars when neither had ever played the sport". This was one aspect of the cases in the 2019 college admissions scandal , which is well worth reading about to understand the extent to which the parents went. Including: arranging to falsely certify children as having a learning disability so that they would get extra time in exams and get other accommodations and have their exams in locations under the organiser's control (where other people might take the exams) falsifying the results of exams falsifying sports credentials by bribing sports staff and coaches to lie about the child's ability altered documents and set up social media profiles to create fake sports star identities It was like an espionage operation! I don't know if we can say those cases were easily prosecuted - they took eight years to come to trial. And there may well be more we don't know about. Singer claimed that "arranging to falsely certify children as having a learning disability" went on 'all the time'. [oil change scams] On the face of it, it seems fraudulent to tell someone they need an oil change when you know they don't so that they give you money for that service. It's certainly fraud to charge someone for changing their oil when you didn't. I don't know about selling more expensive oils - seems like audio cable sales to me, could be fraud if you tell someone you'll definitely notice a distinct difference between this $10 product and that $1000 product. But it likely 'happens all the time'. The law regarding fraud depends on the jurisdiction and there might be civil and/or criminal fraud. But in essence fraud is committed when the person intentionally deceives another person to cause a gain to himself or others or inflict loss or risk of loss on others. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fraud

Must restaurants serve water for free to their customers in France?

https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/Publications/Vie-pratique/Fiches-pratiques/Carafe-d-eau-verre-d-eau ( mirror 1 , mirror 2 ) states: La carafe d'eau ordinaire en accompagnement du repas est inclue dans le prix du repas. The flask of ordinary water accompanying the meal is included in the price of the meal However, as Relaxed mentioned : The page doesn't exactly state that, it says that restaurants cannot charge for tap water, not that they must serve some. Must restaurants serve water for free to their customers in France?

First of all, the site you found is governmental, so a rather good find in the first place. It indicates: Au restaurant, la carafe d'eau ordinaire en accompagnement du repas est inclue dans le prix du repas. En outre, les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson doivent indiquer la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. In the restaurant, the carafe of plain water to accompany the meal is included in the price of the meal. In addition, catering establishments and drinking establishments must indicate the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. The relevant law cited in the further article is Order No. 25-268 of June 8, 1967 , which was repealed in 2016, but speaks about that such a charge needs to be included in the price. However, a different order concerning the display of prices from 1987/1990 is still active. This specifies in Article 5: Les cartes et menus doivent comporter, pour chaque prestation, le prix ainsi que la mention "boisson comprise" ou "boisson non comprise" et, dans tous les cas, indiquer pour les boissons la nature et la contenance offerte. Cards and menus must include, for each service, the price as well as the mention "drink included" or "drink not included" and, in all cases, indicate for the drinks the nature and the capacity offered. Likewise, an environmental law in the shape of Article L541-15-10 demands the following: A compter du 1er janvier 2022, [...] Les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson sont tenus d'indiquer de manière visible sur leur carte ou sur un espace d'affichage la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. Ces établissements doivent donner accès à leurs clients à une eau potable fraîche ou tempérée, correspondant à un usage de boisson. From 1 January 2022, [...] Restaurants and drinking establishments are required to indicate in a visible manner on their menu or on a display space the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. These establishments must give their customers access to fresh or temperate drinking water, corresponding to the use of beverages. Since the latter law actually requires them to give access to free drinking water (which is tap water) on request, they are allowed to not bring it out with the meal, as long as they have the required note that tells about it. However, many restaurants will deliver a flask of it on its own, sometimes even before you order. As a side note: the serving of free water to meals is pretty much a custom in France, even if the waste reduction law of 2022 is very new still and the old law that had mandated it went away in 2016. When I last was in Paris in about 2005, I had to ask for water in one restaurant as they didn't deliver it on their own with the meal, upon which the server asked if I would prefer it chilled or warmed. In none of the about 10 different food places I visited in the week, water or table charges did show up on the bill, very much in accordance with the 1987/90 law. In one restaurant also the slices of baguette served while we choose our meals were off the bill, even though we asked for a refill of those.

How to prove I live in a specific address?

https://www.flhsmv.gov/ddl/address.html I need to provide proof of address for the DMV, but the process can be difficult because: I live with someone else; I do not pay rent/utilities; and they will not assist in the process. The Florida DMV asks that you need two of these for proof of address, which can be tough: 1.Deed, mortgage, monthly mortgage statement, mortgage payment booklet or residential rental/lease agreement Can't -- don't have any of the above because I'm not paying rent nor am I a homeowner. Florida Voter Registration Card Cannot be obtained until after proof of address was obtained initially for the relevant application I'm trying to go for now. Florida Vehicle Registration or Title Don't own a car/vehicle. Florida Boat Registration or Title Don't own a boat. Statements (Certification of Address Form) Customers with one proof of residential address may self-certify using the Certification of Address form as the second proof of residential address document A caveat also states that this must be accompanied by the person you live with's signature and/or their actual presence, which I explained that they refuse to do so. A utility hook up or work order Don't pay bills. Automobile Payment Booklet Don't own a car. Selective Service Card This is only for males. Medical or health card I have one, but it doesn't have my address on it so it's not proof, according to the DMV. Medical bill Never had one. Homeowner's insurance policy or bill Not a homeowner. Automobile insurance policy or bill Don't own a car. Educational institution transcript forms Have no such things and cannot obtain any since I am not in the public school system as of now. Professional license issued by a government agency in the U.S. Caveat -- must be currently valid and up-to-date and it isn't, and this is what I am initially trying to get renewed in the first place. W-2 form or 1099 form I am self-employed, so neither of those can work for me. Form DS2019, Certificate of Eligibility for Exchange Visitor (J-1) status This is only for Visa/resident/non-citizen card holders. A letter from a homeless shelter, transitional service provider, or a half-way house verifying that the customer resides at the shelter address I'm not homeless and none else applies. Utility bills Don't pay utilities. Mail from financial institutions; including checking, savings, credit card statements or investment account statements I haven't been issued paper mail by a bank since years -- everything digital. I also don't have credit card debt because I've never had a credit card and have no other "investment statements." Mail from Federal, State, County or City government agencies (including city and county agencies) If I was getting federal mail I'd be worried -- it's never happened. Personal mail that does not list the recipient as “occupant”. Example: Magazines, journals, etc. I throw all that junk out, or hardly get it in the first place. Transients - Sexual Offender/Predator/Career Offender: �����- FDLE Registration form completed by local sheriff's department Doesn't apply -- I get plenty of sex without offending anyone. What can I do? I was thinking of writing a certificate or affidavit stating that I admit under some penalty of perjury that I live in the address -- however, I can almost bet they'll still want the person who pays rent to sign, so I'm out of options. I suppose I could get a credit card and rack up a bill and get statements, but that would probably take at least a month and I need this certificate very soon.

Mail from financial institutions; including checking, savings, credit card statements or investment account statements Pay a bank or credit card company $2 or some other nominal fee to have them send you a physical copy of a statement.

How can private businesses compel the government to collect tax?

https://www.forbes.com/sites/kirimasters/2019/08/08/california-lawsuit-says-amazon-should-pay-billions-in-back-taxes/ Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. How does that make any sense? How can a private company force the government to collect taxes?

Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. No, this is not true. Mr. Grosz filed a lawsuit asking the court to force California to collect tax revenues. The lawsuit is still pending before the court without a decision on the merits. As the saying goes, anyone can sue for anything; their success is another matter. The apparent legal basis for standing is section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows taxpayers to sue against wasteful or illegal government spending: 526a (a) An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency ... The Plaintiff has claimed that, allegedly, there is a mandatory duty to collect taxes and that failure to do so constitutes a waste. The court will decide if it will accept this argument and compel the collection.

What legal recourse does Huawei have to have the U.S. remove it from their blacklist?

https://www.ft.com/content/978f169a-8175-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b China has lashed out at the US over its blacklisting of Huawei, accusing it of abusing national security exceptions to global trade rules during a tense meeting at the World Trade Organization. I am wondering if Huawei has any legal recourse it can take to challenge the U.S. government in court. I am wondering, because it seems like a national security issue and if treated as such I don't think a legal recourse from Huawei is even possible. Is it the case, or is it more complicated than it seems?

In order for Huawei to sue in US courts for relief, they would have to overcome the clear statutory basis of the relevant presidential orders . There is no believable story where either Trump or Biden exceeded their statutory and constitutional authority – that is a dead end. Then you might imagine that there could be some treaty to which the US is party, which somehow prohibits blacklisting Huawei. But there is e.g. no US-China free trade treaty. You might think that perhaps there is some WTO rule that prohibits blacklisting. Even if there were, WTO rules are subordinate to US law. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act states that No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect. So we're back to the fact that Congress passed a law which allows POTUS to make this determination and do what he did (2 presidents did). The statutory authorization is broadly about a national emergency w.r.t. a threat "to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States", not limited to national security.

Do British Overseas Territories count as United Kingdom with regards to 90 days rule when applying for British citizenship?

https://www.gov.uk/becoming-a-british-citizen This one of the criteria: Spent no more than 90 days outside the UK in the last 12 months Read the full guidance notes and the requirements booklet before applying. So I've followed the guide and booklet , still not sure. Guide To satisfy the residence requirement you must not have been absent for more than 90 days in the last 12 months. And the total number of day’s absence for the whole 5 year period should not exceed 450. Booklet AN Wiki image with very descriptive filenamae: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom#/media/File:United_Kingdom_(%2Boverseas_territories_and_crown_dependencies)_in_the_World_(%2BAntarctica_claims).svg Here is another page: https://www.gov.uk/register-british-citizen/stateless-people Phrase UK or a British overseas territory suggest these are different things? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom#Dependencies The United Kingdom has sovereignty over seventeen territories which do not form part of the United Kingdom itself: fourteen British Overseas Territories[22] and three Crown dependencies. Three have specifically voted to remain under British sovereignty (Bermuda in 1995, Gibraltar in 2002 and the Falkland Islands in 2013). If overseas territories qualify - job done. If not - there might be some loopholes. An unavoidable consequence of the nature of your work. For example, if you are a merchant seaman or someone working for a UK based business which requires frequent travel abroad. Assuming my job is disaster relief, it should justify my presence on British Virgin Islands? EDIT / UPDATE: Another loophole could potentially be staying on the vessel registered in the UK?

British Overseas Territories do not count as part of the UK. Assuming my job is disaster relief, it should justify my presence on British Virgin Islands? Assuming you were only on the BVI for a maximum of 179 days and there was a compelling work reason (e.g. you were helping out with a disaster that struck the BVI because that's your job), it's possible the Home Office would consider the absence justified and it wouldn't count against you. This is highly fact-specific and depends on the evidence you submit, the reason you were absent, and so on. If the Home Office doesn't accept the absence as justified, you would fail to satisfy the residency requirement needed to apply for citizenship. Another loophole could potentially be staying on the vessel registered in the UK? This is not a loophole. You must be physically present in the UK to satisfy the residency requirement. Being aboard a vessel, registered in the UK, outside of the UK's territorial waters would still count as an absence from the country.

When are attorneys' fees awarded?

https://www.governor.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt336/files/documents/nh-v-ma-action.pdf The pdf file linked above concerns a lawsuit that is very far from typical of lawsuits in the U.S.A. or anywhere else: One of the states is suing another. Nonetheless it reminded me of a question that has sometimes crossed my mind. Notice that on page 32 is says "New Hampshire requests that the Court order the following relief" and one of the listed items is "Award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees;" Sometimes it is said that in England winning plaintiffs are awarded lawyers' fees and in the U.S.A. they are not. One reason this has been puzzling to me is that high-profile lawsuits covered in the news media often are reported to involve plaintiffs requesting that attorneys' fees be awarded, although in other contexts lawyers say that is not done in this country. Under what circumstances are attorneys' fees awarded?

Under what circumstances are attorneys' fees awarded? Typically that is provided by statutory (be it state or federal) law or in the contract (if any) between the parties. Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party. See M[ichigan]CL 570.1118 . One common condition for awarding attorney fees is whether a party was vexatious or frivolous: MCL 600.2591 . For various causes of action, statutory law awards attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff . See MCL 15.240(6) and 600.2911(7) . This means that a defendant would not be awarded attorney fees even if he prevailed. That has prompted would-be defendants to preemptively file suit in an attempt to overcome the risk of having to pay attorney fees if the adversary prevailed. In 2017 this tactic became trending in Michigan and other states in the context of FOIA requests (or requests for public records).

Can I sue Lloyd's Bank on grounds of religious discrimination?

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/lloyds-bank-removes-overdraft-fee-from-islamic-accounts-9291932.html Does a bank have the right to disadvantage clients (overdraft charges) purely on the basis of their religious beliefs? Can a client be excluded from a free overdraft facility based on their religion?

It doesn't seem as if the bank is discriminating in the way you suggest. They offer two types of account: (A) accrues or charges interest and (B) does not accrue or charge interest. The bank says you can choose A or B whatever your religion. You the customer choose A or B, possibly depending on your religion. So I do not see what cause of action you have or what damages you have suffered. Therefore I don't think you could sue them.

How to ensure that the order drawn by a party is checked by another party?

https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part40/pd_part40b#1.1 Drawing up and filing of judgments and orders 1.1 Rule 40.2 sets out the standard requirements for judgments and orders and rule 40.3 deals with how judgments and orders should be drawn up. 1.2 A party who has been ordered or given permission to draw up an order must file it for sealing within 7 days of being ordered or permitted to do so. If he fails to do so, any other party may draw it up and file it. 1.3 If the court directs that a judgment or order which is being drawn up by a party must be checked by the court before it is sealed, the party responsible must file the draft within 7 days of the date the order was made with a request that the draft be checked before it is sealed. (emphasis mine) 1.4 If the court directs the parties to file an agreed statement of terms of an order which the court is to draw up, the parties must do so no later than 7 days from the date the order was made, unless the court directs otherwise. 1.5 If the court requires the terms of an order which is being drawn up by the court to be agreed by the parties the court may direct that a copy of the draft order is to be sent to all the parties: (1) for their agreement to be endorsed on it and returned to the court before the order is sealed, or (2) with notice of an appointment to attend before the court to agree the terms of the order. In the point 1.5 if the court order is drawn up by the court, it is to be agreed by the parties. In the point 1.3 if the court order is drawn by the party, it is checked by the court. There is no mention of another party checking, agreeing, verifying. In my layman understanding that can create a situation where a party drafting the order is in an advantageous position because they can submit an order, without asking another party for approval. Me being that "another party" - how to ensure that I also can approve the court order?

In section 1.3, what is contemplated is that a judge has given a ruling orally from the bench and directed one of the parties, usually the prevailing one, to commit it to writing. The other party can object to the court if the party committing the oral order to writing screws it up and misstates the court's bench ruling. But, we aren't too worried about a party misstating what the judge meant to say in an oral order from the bench that a party commits to writing, because if the order isn't what the judge meant to say, then the judge can decline to sign it in that form. The party drafting the order has very little discretion since that party is bound and required to simply memorialize what a judge has already decided should be the outcome. In section 1.5, in contrast, what is contemplated is that the parties have reached a stipulation in open court which the judge has committed to writing and the agreement of both parties is sought to confirm that the written order prepared by the judge to memorialize the stipulation of the parties accurately reflects what was agreed to orally. In this case, the judge is not in as good of a position to be sure that the judge's own written order accurately restates the oral agreement of the parties, because it wasn't the judge's idea in the first place.

Can a litigant in person prepare the bundle?

https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/family/practice_directions/pd_part_27a Responsibility for the preparation of the bundle 3.1 A bundle for the use of the court at the hearing shall be provided by the party in the position of applicant at the hearing (or, if there are cross-applications, by the party whose application was first in time) or, if that person is a litigant in person, by the first listed respondent who is not a litigant in person. I'm the applicant litigant in person and previously the solicitors of the respondent have breached the protocol. I have brought that to the attention of the Court and also reported the issue to the SRA (Solicitor Conduct Authority). The most recent Court order says: The Applicant's solicitor to prepare the hearing bundle for the next hearing. I do not have a solicitor. I would like to know if the Court order has more importance than the Practice Direction and as a litigant in person, can prepare the bundle myself?

I would like to know if the Court order has more importance than the Practice Direction and as a litigant in person, can prepare the bundle myself? A court order issued in a particular lawsuit has priority over a general rule of procedure. It is not clear from the context provided if the Court direction that the Applicant's solicitor" do something, when you do not have a solicitor, means that the Court was using sloppy wording and intended that you do it, or reflects the fact that the Court forgot that you didn't have a solicitor and would have required the other party to do it if it had remembered that fact. Both possibilities are plausible in this situation. The Court's Order is even more ambiguous in light of the fact that the next sentence in 3.1 which you omit from the quoted material in the question, states that: Where all the parties are litigants in person none of them shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be obliged to provide a bundle, but any bundle which they choose to lodge must be prepared and lodged so as to comply with this practice direction. When in doubt concerning that kind of ambiguity the best course of action would be to contact the office of the judge in charge of the case and ask the clerk or assistant who answers what you should do, or what the judge's order means. That person will give you an answer, or have the court consider the matter and issue a new clarified order, or direct you to someone else with whom you can discuss your question. It also isn't entirely impossible that the order given to you was actually intended for another case entirely and that the judge or someone in the judge's office simply got confused and entered the order in the wrong case. I've experienced that kind of inadvertent mistake by a judge (getting a court order meant for someone else in a different case in one of my cases) once every couple of years as a practicing attorney. It's rare, but it does happen.

Legalistic reading of passport Law

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1543 Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. Taken literally, since fake passports are used as movie props, this means all actors and supporting staff should be imprisoned for not more than 15 years. In laws like this is there some implied clause that damages must be incurred or is using a fake passport implied to be ok if you say it is a fake passport? Because I dont see that stated literally.

The key word is "uses". What does it mean to use a passport? It means providing it as evidence of identity. No one acting in a movie is attempting to convince anyone else - in real life - of their identity with a simulated passport. Nor is anyone impersonating a police officer or kidnapping anyone or falsely accusing anyone in the normal process of making a movie.

UK Copyright and IPR in the course of employment: Employee vs Worker

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/11 : 2)Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or a film, is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work subject to any agreement to the contrary. UK employment law distinguishes (possibly with difficulty?) between employee and worker. I have signed a contract to work as an agency worker. The contract has clauses (eg no obligation to offer or accept work) to ensure it is not a contract of employment. Can I confidently assume that, as a worker, IPR in the all work I produce is mine, unless I sign something that explicitly gives it away? Part of my uncertainty is that I am unclear whether 'employee' in this Act necessarily means exactly the same as 'employee' as used in employment law.

You’re an employee A person is an employee if they are engaged under a “contract of service” rather than a “contract for service”. The distinction in the common law dates from the 19th century when industrialisation created more and more employees and those employees slowly gained more and more rights. Legislation in the UK (and most other common law jurisdictions) does not usually further define employee so the common law definition is still relevant. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is no different. The courts have developed 3 tests to determine if a person is subject to a contract of service. These were stated by MacKenna J in Ready Mixed Concrete (SE) Ltd v Minster of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497 A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled. (i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master. (ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master. (iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service. These are known as the control test; the integration test; and the multiple test. It is now considered that the control test and the integration test (which were both developed first) are now merely factors, albeit significant factors, of a single multiple test. I can put the point which I am making in other words. An obligation to do work subject to the other party's control is a necessary, though not always a sufficient, condition of a contract of service. If the provisions of the contract as a whole are inconsistent with its being a contract of service, it will be some other kind of contract, and the person doing the work will not be a servant. The judge's task is to classify the contract (a task like that of distinguishing a contract of sale from one of work and labour). He may, in performing it, take into account other matters besides control. The definition is a little tautological: a contract is a contract of service if it has the elements of a contract of service. This case was also important as it clearly establishes that whether a contract is an employment contract is a matter of law and the parties cannot redefine their relationship with words - if it meets the requirements of a contract of service then that’s what it is even if it describes itself as something else. A duck test is required. The sorts of questions that are relevant to the multiple test are: Can you work whatever hours you like? Can you work where you like? Do you get paid for what you produce (rather than by the hour or day)? Can you hire somebody else to do the work? Do you have to fix defective work without additional pay? Can you make a profit or loss? Can you be sued if you screw up the work? Do you use your own plant and equipment? Do you carry your own public risk/professional indemnity insurance? Do you provide services to multiple clients and can you choose the quality of service you give to each? From your description, the “agency” sounds exactly like a labour hire employer. The fact that you can pass on individual placements is not enough to make this a contract for service since, if you do accept the placement, you can’t send me to do the work, you can choose to work from 6-10 in the morning and 6-10 in the evening 4 days per week, you get paid by the hour etc. This is a contract of service and the agency is your employer. Any copyright you create belongs to them. It is likely that their contract with their client assigns it to the client but that is of no interest to you.

Can a parent company be forced to pay for the liabilities of a spin off company in the U.S.?

https://www.npr.org/2021/10/21/1047828535/baby-powder-cancer-johnson-johnson-bankruptcy The health products giant used a quirk of Texas state law to spin off a new company called LTL, then dumped all its asbestos-related liabilities — including the avalanche of lawsuits — into the new firm. LTL filed for bankruptcy last week in a federal court in Charlotte, N.C., a move designed to sharply limit efforts to recover damages for those who say they were harmed by J&J's baby powder. "Johnson & Johnson doesn't have this liability anymore. They pushed all of it into the company they created just to file for bankruptcy," said Lindsey Simon, a bankruptcy expert at the University of Georgia School of Law. Can the parent company be forced to pay for the damages after the spin off move was made? I don't know how a company can create a spin off, dump the liabilities there and then let the company fail and not have to pay any cent. Can a new lawsuit be made against J&J to pay for the damages still or is this move totally legal in the U.S.?

Can the parent company be forced to pay for the damages after the spin off move was made? Generally speaking, yes. The transaction, taken as a whole constitutes a fraudulent transfer of the parent company to LTL. The bankruptcy trustee has the power to sue the parent company to make good on this fraudulent transfer, at least under U.S. Bankruptcy law (Title 11, United States Code) and probably under Texas law as well.

Is this obvious gambling legal?

https://www.omaze.com/products/tesla-model-y-kimbal-musk It basically is a lottery. Instead of buying lottery tickets, you "donate" and have a chance to win Tesla. Is it even legal in US? Is it okay to organize something like this in US if you market it outside US?

No First, gambling is not illegal - only illegal gambling is illegal. Lotteries are legal in the United States when operated by or under licence from a state (44) or territory (3). That's legal gambling. It's illegal when operated by somebody else. Clearly, Omaze isn't one of these; but they aren't running a lottery. They are running a sweepstakes . Not only is this legal, but it also isn't gambling because in a sweepstakes the players do not pay to play. If you look closely, you can see a link that says "enter without contributing". Look even deeper and you can see "NO PURCHASE, PAYMENT, OR CONTRIBUTION NECESSARY TO ENTER OR WIN. Contributing will not improve chances of winning. Void where prohibited." No stake means no gamble.

Why is the FBI rather than state investigators looking into these judges who take bribes?

https://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-374-28194-6 In personal injury cases in the U.S.A., large amounts of money can be involved and lawyers work for contingent fees. Thus it can be worth a lawyer's while to pay a substantial bribe to a judge. Scott Turow's novel Personal Injuries is about an FBI investigation of judges in the fictitious Kindle County who take bribes. (All of Scott Turow's novels are stories about lawyers and judges in or from Kindle County in a fictitious midwestern state whose name is never mentioned.) These are not federal judges. So why would it be the FBI rather than authorities of the state in which Kindle County is located?

The federal Hobbs Act has been interpreted to prohibit state and local officials from accepting bribes, under the theory of "extortion under color of right". Violation of the Hobbs Act is a federal felony, so the FBI here is investigating a federal crime, which is their job. As explained on Wikipedia , it has been common since the 1970s for federal law enforcement to investigate and prosecute public corruption at the state and local level, presumably for the practical reason that they are less likely to be involved in the corruption itself. The Hobbs Act and a few other federal laws (mail and wire fraud, RICO, etc) are mentioned as providing the legal authority for this. You can read more about this aspect of the Hobbs Act, its interpretation and enforcement, in the US Attorneys' Manual . They give a citation to United States v. Murphy , 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985) which is a case very similar to what you describe: a local judge was convicted of a Hobbs Act violation for accepting bribes in exchange for fixing the outcomes of cases.

Why is attempted murder punished more harshly than murder?

https://www.shouselaw.com/nevada/attempted-murder.html#2 Attempt murder as a category B felony carries two to twenty (2 - 20) years in state prison. The judge will impose an additional one to twenty (1 - 20) years if either: the defendant used a deadly weapon, or the victim was age 60 or older That's 40 years. https://www.shouselaw.com/nevada/murder.html#4 Death penalty (only if there are aggravating circumstances that outweigh any mitigating circumstances), or Life in prison without the possibility of parole, or Life in prison with the possibility of parole after 20 years, or 50 years in prison with the possibility of parole after 20 years That's 20 years unless you get life (which only about half do). Why is attempted murder More likely to get 40 years? I think it's because the attempted murder victim would be around to annoy the police therefore the sentence must be longer.

Murder carries certain penalties , and attempted murder is distinguished from murder only with respect to penalty. Without the circumstances allowing execution, the punishments are life without parole, life with possible parole after 20 years, or a definite term of 50 years with possible parole after 20. There are separate "enhancements" for crimes against elders or use of a deadly weapon , and if these circumstances exist, they are applicable to both murder and attempted murder. In all cases of enhancements, the enhancement cannot exceed the penalty for the crime (also, it runs consecutively). The punishment for attempted murder is not the same as the punishment for murder: since murder is a class A felony, attempted murder is defined as a class B felony, which has a penalty between 2 and 20 years. Compare that to actual murder which carries a minimum sentence of 50 years. In no case can a person committing actual murder serve less time than a person attempting murder, even with "enhancements".

Contradictory information in nevada credit card statute of limitations

https://www.solosuit.com/posts/145 I am using Nevada because it has the longes statute of any state. It says the written contract is 6 years. Yet open accounts are 4. Which one is it? Are credit card lawsuits so rare that this has never been tested? The law says NRS 11.190  Periods of limitation.  Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.4639, 125B.050 and 217.007, actions other than those for the recovery of real property, unless further limited by specific statute, may only be commenced as follows So the specific statute for open accounts is 4 years but the written contract is 6. Which one applies to cc debt?

Which one is it? Are credit card lawsuits so rare that this has never been tested? Nevada does not seem to have addressed this issue. This does not imply that credit card lawsuits are too rare. Maybe lenders & debt collectors file suit early enough to preempt the relevance of the statute of limitations. As for jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, the footnote in Mertola, LLC. v. Santos , 422 P.3d 1028 (2018) reflects that there is no consensus on how to classify credit card debts: The issue of when a claim accrues regarding credit card debt is unsettled, in part because courts have not consistently categorized credit card accounts. We reject Ms. Jarvis' argument that they are analogous to installment contracts. This Court concludes that credit card accounts are more properly categorized as open accounts. (citations omitted) But absent any details that would support a different conclusion, a court in Nevada might as well adopt the rationale in Re Richardson , 557 B.R. 686, 691 (2016) : [A] credit card debt arises from a written agreement and, therefore, is subject to the longer, five-year statute of limitations under Arkansas law. In re Pettingill, 403 B.R. 624 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.2009). The court in Pettingill determined that the issuance of a credit card is an offer, and the contract becomes binding when the card holder retains and uses the card, thereby agreeing to the terms of the written agreement. (citations omitted) Since your description reflects that the credit card is premised on a written contract, the applicable statute would be NRS 11.190 1(b). Hence six years. I am using Nevada because it has the longes statute of any state. It is unclear from your post whether you are drafting a contract or dealing with an actual/prospective claim. If the latter, be mindful that in general a [potential] party does not get to choose which state's legislation would apply. Unless the contract specifies a choice of law, the applicable legislation would be deduced from the location where the claim ensued.

What does "monitor the behavior of individuals in the EU" mean?

https://www.truevault.com/blog/do-i-need-to-be-gdpr-compliant.html GDPR was created by the European Union to protect its citizens, and so it only affects organizations with some kind of relationship with the EU or its people. That said, it does not only apply to companies based in an EU country. According to Article 3, you will be affected if you are a data controller or data processor and any of the following apply: you are established in the EU (or somewhere else subject to EU law), or you offer goods or services to individuals in the EU, or you monitor the behavior of individuals in the EU. What does the last point here, "monitor behaviour of individuals in the EU", mean? Let's say, for basic functionality of a website, some rudimentary use of cookies is required to make the UI function as expected. Would that amount to "monitoring behaviour", because some UI state information might be saved in cookies?

The text from Article 3 of the regulation is: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Article 3 is about the scope of the regulation. This particular question is clarified by Recital 24 (emphasis added). 1 The processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union should also be subject to this Regulation when it is related to the monitoring of the behaviour of such data subjects in so far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. 2 In order to determine whether a processing activity can be considered to monitor the behaviour of data subjects , it should be ascertained whether natural persons are tracked on the internet including potential subsequent use of personal data processing techniques which consist of profiling a natural person, particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes. The point of all this is that if you are collecting data about someone who is currently in the EU then the GDPR applies to you, regardless of where you are. The "currently in the EU" bit is significant: the GDPR doesn't apply if you collect data about the activities of an EU citizen who happens to be currently in the US, but it does apply to a US citizen who is visiting the EU. The term "behaviour" is used to distinguish data about what someone is currently doing from static data such as date and place of birth (which is presumably much more tied to nationality than current location). Based on this recital, it seems unlikely that some functional cookies constitute "monitoring". If the cookies are only used for short-term functionality then you can make sure of this by giving the cookies a short expiry date or making them session cookies .

Why would Twitter not be able to flag / annotate / censor any content it sees fit?

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/ As I understand it, the 1st amendment is to protect 'free speech' from government censorship, not platform censorship. Is this not correct? In others words, the first amendment 'leashes' government. UPDATE: a basic constitutional doctrine called State Action . It’s the notion that the Constitution only limits things the government does, not things that private individuals do. (and presumably social media, a private corporation) If the above presumptions are correct, why wouldn't a commercial platform (Twitter, Facebook, social media, etc.) be able to remove or annotate content as it sees fit (i.e. Terms of Service or otherwise)? IANAL and do not understand the purpose of the document

The essence of the order 's argument is that in editing user generated content outside of the provisions in one section of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the platform necessarily excludes itself from the protections afforded by another section of the CDA. The EFF says: ... Even though neither the statute nor court opinions that interpret it mush these two Section 230 provisions together, the order asks the Federal Communications Commission to start a rulemaking and consider linking the two provision's liability shields. The order asks the FCC to consider whether a finding that a platform failed to act in "good faith" under subsection (c)(2) also disqualifies the platform from claiming immunity under section (c)(1). In short, the order tasks government agencies with defining “good faith” and eventually deciding whether any platform’s decision to edit, remove, or otherwise moderate user-generated content meets it, upon pain of losing access to all of Section 230's protections. ... The order also argues that the very popular social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are the functional equivalent of the public square, not merely private providers protected by the First Amendment, and therefore should not be able to edit user generated content. The EFF article quotes from a Supreme Court judgment that says "merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First Amendment constraints." Recommend the full article: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/trump-executive-order-misreads-key-law-promoting-free-expression-online-and See also Techdirt's article, The Two Things To Understand About Trump's Executive Order On Social Media: (1) It's A Distraction (2) It's Legally Meaningless . [edit] Eugene Volokh wrote a good explainer with background . Regarding the social-media-platforms-become-state-actors argument, see this recent D.C. Circuit judgment on appeal ( Freedom Watch v Google etc ): Freedom Watch's First Amendment claim fails because it does not adequately allege that the Platforms can violate the First Amendment. In general, the First Amendment 'prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.' Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). Freedom Watch contends that, because the Platforms provide an important forum for speech, they are engaged in state action. But, under Halleck, 'a private entity who provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.' ... This was a group that alleged Google, Facebook, Twitter and Apple "conspired to suppress conservative political views ... its audience and revenues and succeeded in reducing each". Very similar to Trump's complaints. And "this idea that Section 230 requires sites to moderate in a neutral fashion has become very popular even though it has no basis in reality or law" - Ken White (aka Popehat) in another good explainer and podcast about this .

How does the court distinguish between plagiarism and inspiration in songs?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JL4JXEv-RY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqqq8uqSDnk How does the court distinguish between plagiarism and inspiration in songs? I heard these two and I found they sounded very similar, but weren't completely the same. Is there a set of criteria we can use to judge if a song was plagiarizing another rather than taking inspiration from another song? Does the law allow a composer to heavily borrow from another song without being subject to a lawsuit in the United States?

First of all, "plagiarism" is more of an academic than a legal term. It means using another's work without proper credit, and particularly in a way that falsely makes it appear to be ones own work. This is severely criticized in academic and journalistic circles, and may result i a person losing a job or being expelled from a degree program, but it is not in and of itself a legal issue. What a court is concerned with is copyright infringement . Some things are plagiarism but not copyright infringement. For example, copying without acknowledgement from a work written two hundred years ago might well be plagiarism , but would not be infringement because the soruce is not protected by copyright. i can, for example copy from the music of Bach all that I want, because it is long out of copyright. On the other hand, if I copy a recent work without permission but properly attribute my source, it is not plagiarism, but may well be copyright infringement. When faced with a claim of copyright infringement, a US Federal court will look at several things. First of all, it will check if the copyright has been registered within eh copyright office. Under US law, one must registered before bringing a copyright suit. If there has been no registration, the suit will be dismissed. The court will also consider evidence of similarity, unless the defendant admits copying. Usually if this is disputed there will be expert testimony that the similarity is so great that simple coincidence cannot explain it. Thsi will consider the notes, the duration of each tone, rhythm, chords, keys, and other musical elements. To establish copying there should normally be a significant similarity over an extended passage at least. I have read of cases where similarity of a passage 35 notes long was enough to m establish copying. But there is not clear cut rule on this. A passage just a few notes long could be identical by accidental recreation, and will not generally prove copying. The court will also consider evidence of access. The plaintiff will often introduce evidence showing that the alleged infringer had access to a copy of the source work. This is not absolutely essential, but is very helpful to the plaintiff's case. The court can also consider claims of common source. If the defendant says that the allegedly infringing work was in fact based on an older work now out of copyright, which the plaintiff's work was also based on, that would tend to defeat a claim of infringement. The court might also consider claims that the alleged source work was not in fact original and should not have copyright protection. And if the defendant admits copying, but claims that this was a fair use of the source work, the court will analyze the statutory dour factors, and possibly other relevant factors to determent whether this is valid fair use or not. This is where claims of "influence" tend to be resolved. There is no clear cut set of criteria for how much copying is allowed. I have not followed the links, because I am not a musical expert and my judgement of the degree of similarity would not be meaningful, and even if it were, the degree of similarity alone would not prove whether there has been infringement. Note that it is also possible that one of these composers has actually gotten permission from the other, perhaps in return for a fee, to use part of the other's work. In that case there would be no infringement, as long as there was permission. The book My Life in Court by Louis Nizer has a detailed description of a successful suit for infringement of a copyrighted song, the so-called "rum and coca-cola" case ( Baron v. Leo Feist ). The book describes in detail the evidence presented by plaintiff and defendant. See also the Music Copyright Infringement Resource provided by The George Washington University Law School & Columbia Law School, which lists many cases of alleged copyright infringement of music, from 1844 to 2021, giving results and excerpts of court opinions as well as other information about each case.