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GDPR and deleting users from wiki changelogs

According to the GDPR §17, users have a right to request the deletion of personal data. I am wondering how this applies to wikis. In my case, when users edit a page, that edit is associated with their username by writing it to a changelog of that page. Users can delete their account which will remove their profile data but it will not remove the name from the changelog. Is the their username alone, without any attached profile (like their email address or real Name) still considered personal data that has to be deleted?

Is the their username alone, without any attached profile (like their email address or real Name) still considered personal data that has to be deleted? For something to be ‘personal data’ it must information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. An identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly. In other words: If the natural person can be indirectly identified from the username, it is personal data. If he cannot, it is not personal data. This obviously depends on the circumstances. If the user used something very similar to his real name, or his email address or uses the same nickname on a lot of different systems, then it probably is personal data. If it is an unique pseudonym that is not used elsewhere, it is less likely. If you want to make sure you comply with the right to erasure, you may want to scrub your wiki database, replacing all the username of the deleted user with "anonymous" (or something like that). If you want to be able to treat these as separate users, your scrubbing process may use unique anonymous identifiers ("anon-1", "anon-2", and so on).

Why may the German government decide if Jan Böhmermann will be prosecuted?

According to the German ZEIT ONLINE article Bundesregierung prüft Strafbegehren der Türkei , Turkey requested that Germany prosecutes the German citizen Jan Böhmermann over a poem, and now German politicians in the Bundesregierung intend to decide if Böhmermann should be prosecuted. I don't get it. I thought Germany has a separaton of powers ?

The Bundesregierung is (like the police, the prosecuting authority, etc.) part of Germany’s executive. StGB § 104a defines under which conditions offences described in chapter 3 Straftaten gegen ausländische Staaten (transl. Offences against foreign states ), which consists of § 102 , § 103 and § 104 , can be prosecuted. One of the conditions is […] und die Bundesregierung die Ermächtigung zur Strafverfolgung erteilt = the Bundesregierung must authorise the prosecution.

Who, or what, is the custodian mentioned in the Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Rights Act?

According to the Illinois Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Rights Act (765 ILCS 745/11) : Provisions of mobile home park leases. Any lease hereafter executed or currently existing between an owner and tenant in a mobile home park in this State shall also contain, or shall be made to contain, the following covenants binding the owner at all times during the term of the lease to: ... (i) provide a custodian's office and furnish each tenant with the name, address and telephone number of the custodian and designated office. Who, or what, is the " custodian "?

A custodian is, in simple terms, a receptionist / site warden. Their role is not expressly defined in 765 ILCS 745 but see, for example, the Code of Ordinances Chapter 32 (Manufactured and Mobile Homes) for the city of Morrison, Illinois which identities a custodian's duties: Sec. 32-180. - Custodian's office required; registration duties. (a) Each mobile home park shall be provided with a custodian's office where each mobile home entering such mobile home park shall be assigned to a lot location, given a copy of the mobile home park rules, and registered according to the prescribed form...

What is the definition of computer virus by law?The definition seems to be broad

According to the Indian IT Act we cannot place computer virus(which includes cookies) without user permission but does that mean we need to take permission even for placing nessecary cookies? According to the IT Act the definition of computer virus as given here says that it is any information that executes itself as soon as another program is started. Now many apps are set to autostart with windows. (iii) "computer virus" means any computer instruction, information, data or programme that destroys, damages, degrades or adversely affects the performance of a computer resource or attaches itself to another computer resource and operates when a programme, data or instruction is executed or some other event takes place in that computer resource; Also, several websites deploy cookies and they too fall under this definition as provided here . Now the definition made there makes it seem many websites accessible in India are illegal. How is it possible? Is it really the definition made. (This is not legal advice) My question here is according to the definition many things including cookies and other daily b software become illegal which is not the case in India. How am I misinterpreting the definition? It is true that by taking permission this can be avoided but some cookies are necessary for the function of the website without consent so do we have to take permission for even necessary cookies?

It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.

What counts as "Reisebedarf" at German gas stations?

According to the Ladenschlussgesetz , gas stations in Germany are allowed to be opened during the night and Sundays, but are only allowed to sell gas, car things (like oil) that are needed for people to travel onwards and Reisebedarf (my attempt at a translation: travel necessities) Now, I have been at a gas station on Sundays and at night many times and it did not appear like they change what they sell for those times. Meaning they still sell, for example, alcohol, frozen pizzas, flowers, shaving gel, etc. Is "Reisebedarf" defined anywhere?

§ 2 (2) of the Gesetz über den Ladenschluß defines Reisebedarf : Reisebedarf im Sinne dieses Gesetzes sind Zeitungen, Zeitschriften, Straßenkarten, Stadtpläne, Reiselektüre, Schreibmaterialien, Tabakwaren, Schnittblumen, Reisetoilettenartikel, Filme, Tonträger, Bedarf für Reiseapotheken, Reiseandenken und Spielzeug geringeren Wertes, Lebens- und Genussmittel in kleineren Mengen sowie ausländische Geldsorten. Shaving gels are "Reisetoilettenartikel", alcohol and frozen pizzas are "Lebens- und Genussmittel" (but only allowed in ‎small quantities), and flowers are "Schnittblumen".

How do I obtain a court order to receive a certified death certificate of custodial parent to terminate income withholding order in Arizona?

According to the Maricopa county Arizona vital records, I cannot request a certified death certificate since I am not a family member (we were never married) or have a court order. I am needing to cancel income withholding payments to the clearinghouse since I have taken natural custody as we had joint-custody. The petition to terminate income withholding order says I need a copy of the death certificate. What should I do?

Issue a subpoena to the vital statistics department that keeps the death certificates to obtain the death certificate in a civil action. This could be in a continuation of the action that established to obligation to withhold, or in a separate action support by an affidavit and ideally, an obituary or other third party source, tending to show that the person is dead.

What is "hostilities" in the context of the Military Commissions Act of 2006?

According to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 : The term 'unlawful enemy combatant' means — (i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States What exactly does "hostilities" mean here?

The act does not define "hostilities", which means that its ordinary and usual meaning should be understood. Also, the act several times uses "hostilities" in connection with the term "combat", and once to describe the actions of a "terrorist group". It would seem then that "armed combat or terrorism" would be a good definition for "hostilities" in this act.

Can a person be held liable in California if an intruder falls into their pool which didn't have a fence?

According to the Municipal Code of Santa Monica : The swimming pool or spa, or the entire parcel on which it is located, shall be walled or fenced from the street or from adjacent properties; and where located less than 30 feet to any parcel line, shall be screened by a masonry wall or solid fence not less than 6 feet in height on the side facing such parcel line, subject to the requirements of Section 9.21.050, Fences, Walls, and Hedges. In the TV show Curb Your Enthusiasm the following story occurs: A person breaks into a house in Santa Monica for the purpose of robbery (not disputed) They run out through the back yard They stumble, fall into the unfenced pool and drown In real life, can the owner of the house be held civilly or criminally liable in this situation? On one hand, the pool did not have a fence despite it being legally required. On the other, they did enter the property illegally.

Short Answer In real life, can the owner of the house be held civilly or criminally liable in this situation? No. Long Answer On one hand, the pool did not have a fence despite it being legally required. On the other, they did enter the property illegally. Negligence Per Se And Attractive Nuisance The doctrine you are considering first is called "negligence per se" and states that failure to follow a penal statute or other law or regulation is negligent as a matter of law if the harm caused by failing to take the action it mandates is the kind of harm that the statute was intended to prevent. It isn't perfectly clear, but the answer to that is probably "no, this is not a negligence per se" case. Laws requiring pools to be fenced are largely directed at a particular type of tortious conduct called an "attractive nuisance" that could cause, for example, children who can't swim to be attracted to a pool that is dangerous to them without supervision. These laws are not intended to protect adult robbers (if the person engaged in robbery were an armed seven years old, that might be another story). California, however, has discarded the attractive nuisance doctrine that used to be part of its law, in 1970, in the case of Beard v. Atchison . Common Law Premises Liability In California The common law duty that a property owner owes to trespassers is to keep it free of deadly traps. You have liability if you turn your lawn into a literal mine field full of explosive land mines. But, you did not at common law owe a duty of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable accidental injury to trespassers such as robbers. So, there would be no common law duty here. But, California has abandoned the strict common law distinction in premises liability between invitees, licensees, and trespassers in lieu of a general duty to use reasonable care that is fairly tailored to the precise circumstances of the accident. California Civil Jury Instruction No. 1001 (2000) citing Ann M. v.Pacific Plaza Shopping Center , 6 Cal.4th 666, 674-675, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207 (1993). California, rather than focusing on the nature of the duty that the landlord owes to a trespasser, focuses more on this factor as part of the question of issues like whether the harm was foreseeable. A Statute That Is On Point And Controlling Here Despite this evolution in California's common law of premises liability, however, California does have a statute that singles out felons who are injured on someone else's property in the course of a felony, specifically, California Civil Code § 847 , which states (emphasis added): (a) An owner , including, but not limited to, a public entity, as defined in Section 811.2 of the Government Code , of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, shall not be liable to any person for any injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of any of the felonies set forth in subdivision (b) by the injured or deceased person. (b) The felonies to which the provisions of this section apply are the following:  (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter;  (2) mayhem;  (3) rape;  (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;  (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;  (6) lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years;  (7) any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life;  (8) any other felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm;  (9) attempted murder;  (10) assault with intent to commit rape or robbery;  (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer;  (12) assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate;  (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate;  (14) arson;  (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to injure;  (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury;  (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to murder;  (18) burglary; (19) robbery ;  (20) kidnapping;  (21) taking of a hostage by an inmate of a state prison;  (22) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon;  (23) selling, furnishing, administering, or providing heroin, cocaine, or phencyclidine (PCP) to a minor;  (24) grand theft as defined in Sections 487 and 487a of the Penal Code ;  and (25) any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an assault. (c) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises at the moment the injured or deceased person commences the felony or attempted felony and extends to the moment the injured or deceased person is no longer upon the property. (d) The limitation on liability conferred by this section applies only when the injured or deceased person's conduct in furtherance of the commission of a felony specified in subdivision (b) proximately or legally causes the injury or death. (e) The limitation on liability conferred by this section arises only upon the charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b) and the subsequent conviction of that felony or a lesser included felony or misdemeanor arising from a charge of a felony listed in subdivision (b).  During the pendency of any such criminal action, a civil action alleging this liability shall be abated and the statute of limitations on the civil cause of action shall be tolled. (f) This section does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner's agent which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. (g) The limitation on liability provided by this section shall be in addition to any other available defense. This statute is controlling and would probably immunize the property owner from liability in the fact pattern of the question. My initial review suggests that originally, it contained only parts (a) to (c) and (g) which are more emphatic. But, later, parts (d) to (f), which created narrow exceptions to this general rule, were added.

How does federal law prohibit the disclaiming of express warranties?

According to the National Consumer Law Center "[e]xpress warranties cannot be disclaimed" per the Federal Used Car Rule of the FTC. However, the CFR § 455 , et seq. , provisions don’t appear to prohibit this expressly at least. Common law arguments probably can be made for warranties being unilateral contracts such that require no privity, but I am unsure as to whether the NCLC would refer to common law doctrines “retained by the people” impliedly prohibited the case. What federal authority provides so?

Disclaimers may in some cases be effective The Federal Magnuson Moss Warranty Act 15 USC §§ 2301-2312 does not, as far as I can see, prohibit disclaimers of express warranties, provided that such disclaimers are prominent. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which serves as state, not federal law, express warranties that form part of the contract may not be disclaimed in the same contract. However, prior express warranties, particularly oral warranties, may be disclaimed, if the disclaimer is prominent in the contract, and if the contract is clearly understood by all parties to by the complete final agreement, excluding previous statements not included in the contract. (The UCC is not as explicit on this point as one might wish, see Saunders below.) In some states such disclaimers may be further limited in consumer transactions by consumer protection laws. UCC Provisions Section 2-316 of the UCC (adopted as law in all US states, eith minor modifications in a few) sates: (1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable . (2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." [Section 2-313] of the UCC states: (1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: (1)(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. (1)(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. (1)(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model. (2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. Section 2-317 of the UCC states: Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following rules apply: (a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or general language of description. (b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general language of description. (c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Other Sources [ Footnotes largely omitted; when given, placed in {braces} ] In "Can You Ever Disclaim an Express Warranty?" by Kurt M. Saunders, published in The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law , published by Pepperdine University's Caruso School of Law, volume 9, issue 1, the author writes: By making a promise or statement of fact about the goods, or providing a description of the goods that are part of the basis of the bargain of the contract, the seller creates an express warranty that the goods will conform to the description. ... As can be seen, an express warranty goes to the essence of what the seller has agreed to sell. An express warranty may be oral or written. Unlike implied warranties, which arise automatically and require no particular statement or action by the seller, express warranties result from any affirmative statement or action on the part of the seller relating to the quality or characteristics of the goods. ... To better understand how both the buyer and the seller are protected, an analysis of four specific fact situations will be helpful. The first situation involves an express warranty stated in the written agreement that also contains a general disclaimer, such as “seller disclaims all warranties” or “seller makes no warranties, either express or implied, with respect to these goods.” In this instance, the general disclaimer is inoperative. This result relies on a general rule of contract construction that when there is a conflict between specific and general provisions in the written contract, the specific provisions prevail. ... The second situation involves an express warranty stated in the written agreement that also contains a specific disclaimer. In this instance, the general rule of contract construction whereby a specific provision of the agreement prevails over a general provision does not apply because there is a head-to-head meeting of two specific provisions. However, the inclusion in the written agreement of an express warranty and a specific disclaimer cannot be construed as reasonably consistent with one another. In this case, section 2-316(1) explicitly states “negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.” The result in both the first and second situations is the same in that the disclaimer is inoperative. {See Husky Spray Serv., Inc. v. Patzer , 471 N.W.2d 146, 152 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a disclaimer of which buyer was unaware cannot exclude explicitly bargained-for express warranty). But see Hayes , 983 P.2d at 1286, where the court gave effect to a specific disclaimer of an express warranty because it was conspicuous in a contract between parties with equal bargaining power and the buyer had ample opportunity to inspect the goods before purchase. See St. Croix Printing Equip., Inc. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp. , 428 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). } The third situation involves an express warranty not appearing in a written agreement that contains a specific disclaimer of all oral express warranties. Generally, in a situation such as this, the express warranty is oral. In this instance, the seller’s specific disclaimer will prevail. This rationale served as the basis of the court’s holding in Boud v. SDNCO, Inc. , which involved a contract to purchase a luxury yacht. The contract included a disclaimer of any express warranty that might have been created during the negotiation process. When the buyer discovered numerous mechanical problems with the yacht, he sued to rescind the sale and argued that the disclaimer was not binding. The court, however, ruled that he could not avoid the effect of the parol evidence rule or claim that the parties agreed to any terms other than those in the written contract. As such, any express warranties were disclaimed. If an express warranty is contained in the written agreement, the buyer is provided with maximum protection from the effect of a disclaimer. However, if the express warranty is not contained in the written agreement, the seller is able to obtain maximum protection by complying with the parol evidence provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.45 Even so, it is probable that a disclaimer of an express warranty that is not conspicuous would be regarded as unenforceable. Although it is possible in limited circumstances to disclaim an express warranty, the effect of such disclaimers may be circumscribed. In Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), for instance, the buyers sought to rescind a contract for the sale to them of a mobile home that did not conform to the purchase agreement or the model shown and demonstrated to them.48 The seller relied on a disclaimer in the contract and the parol evidence rule. However, the court examined the language of the parol evidence rule and concluded that both parties must intend for the writing to be a “final expression of their agreement.” According to the court, since the buyers intended that the mobile home would conform to the model and the description given by the seller, it could not be seriously contended that the written contract was intended to be the final expression of the parties’ agreement. Where a seller has made oral statements or promises of fact about the goods sufficient to create an express warranty and later disclaimed them in the written contract, the buyer may be able to void the contract on the basis of fraud and misrepresentation if he relied on those tatements or promises. ... many courts have recognized a fraud exception to the parol evidence rule.{See Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co. , 355 F.2d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 1965) (explaining that the parol evidence rule does not apply to evidence of prior oral agreements when fraud or mistake is averred); Alling v. Universal Mfg. Corp. , 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 733–34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that parol evidence is admissible to show promissory fraud, only if "the false promise is either independent of or consistent with the written instrument"). ...} If the buyer can establish that the seller did not intend to abide by an oral express warranty when it was made, then parol evidence of prior oral promises or representations will be admissible to prove fraud. Saunders goes on to discuss situations in which a warranted disclaimer will make a contract unconscionable, and thus the disclaimer may be held unenforceable. He further points out that state consumer protection laws based on the Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law or on the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, may treat misleading disclaimers of warantees as unfair trade practices in consumer transactions, citing Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The page "Warranties and Online Sales" from the American Bar Association (ABA), after discussing the UCC provisions on express and implied guarantees quoted above, says: A seller may not exclude or disclaim an express warranty it has given. And ambiguous language will be interpreted to favor the person who did not draft the contract. A seller can, however, unless a special statute such as a lemon law provides otherwise, totally exclude or disclaim all express warranties (if it has not made an express warranty) by clear and conspicuous language. Statements or other evidence which might create an express warranty may not be admissable to prove the existence of the warranty, if the electronic record properly excludes such evidence. However, no authority for this absolute statement is cited by this ABA page. The page later states: A number of states have special laws that limit the use of the UCC implied warranty disclaimer rules in consumer sales. Some of these appear in amendments to the UCC and others are in separate statutes. The broadest approach is that of the nine states (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, Maryland, the District of Columbia, West Virginia, Kansas, Mississippi, and, with respect to personal injuries only, Alabama) which prohibit the disclaimer of implied warranties in consumer sales. There is a difference in these states whether the rules apply to manufacturers as well as retailers.

When will Pfizer et. al. be liable for injuries caused by the COVID-19 vaccine?

According to the PREP act , the companies developing and administering the COVID-19 vaccines cannot be sued for unintentional injuries resulting from the vaccine. I have seen enough commercials advertising class action lawsuits for other wonder drugs that this is making me hesitant to get the vaccine. It's bad enough to suffer some horrible side effect, but not even being able to seek compensation is just the last straw. My pulmonologist believes that these protections for Pfizer et. al. only last until these vaccines get full FDA approval; once they're no longer on emergency use approval they will be open to lawsuits. Is he correct? (I'm not anti-vax like Alex Jones . I get my flu shot every year. Please don't assume anything.)

The other answers have addressed the letter of the question you asked, but I wanted to correct a misconception in your question statement: ... It's bad enough to suffer some horrible side effect, but not even being able to seek compensation is just the last straw. Note that under the PREP Act, you can seek compensation from the government if you are injured by a covered vaccine, including (at this time) a COVID-19 vaccine: The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) authorizes the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) to provide benefits to certain individuals or estates of individuals who sustain a covered serious physical injury as the direct result of the administration or use of covered countermeasures identified in and administered or used under a PREP Act declaration. The CICP also may provide benefits to certain survivors of individuals who die as a direct result of the administration or use of such covered countermeasures. The PREP Act declaration for medical countermeasures against COVID-19 states that the covered countermeasures are: any antiviral, any drug, any biologic, any diagnostic, any other device, any respiratory protective device, or any vaccine manufactured, used, designed, developed, modified, licensed, or procured: a. to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, treat, or cure COVID–19, or the transmission of SARS–CoV–2 or a virus mutating therefrom; or b. to limit the harm that COVID–19, or the transmission of SARS–CoV–2 or a virus mutating therefrom, might otherwise cause; So it is incorrect to say that you would be unable to seek compensation if you were injured by Pfizer's COVID-19 vaccine. You would just have to seek compensation from the government rather than suing Pfizer. As noted in the other answers, this protection under the PREP Act will lapse by October 1, 2024. However, it is also entirely plausible that this vaccine will be recommended on a regular basis going forward, in which case it would end up being covered by the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program instead. This program is designed to protect manufacturers of vaccines that are routinely administered to children and pregnant women, the idea being that the threat of costly lawsuits might otherwise dissuade manufacturers from making such vaccines. Your seasonal flu shot, for example, is covered under this program; if you sustained an injury from that shot, you would be able to file a claim for benefits under this program. If we end up in a situation where COVID-19 vaccines are required regularly for most people (which seems entirely plausible at this point), then I would wager that they would end up being folded into this program.

Can one disclaim or renounce a British peerage after holding it for a year?

According to the Peerage Act 1963 , anyone may disclaim a hereditary title of nobility within one year of inheriting it, or within one year of the passage of the Act. Since the latter deadline has long since lapsed, is there currently any way to disclaim or renounce a peerage after having held it for more than a year? For instance, say the Earl of Exampleshire, who has held the title since 1990, becomes a fervent republican and wishes to completely dissociate himself from any noble rank. Short of lobbying for and obtaining new legislation (possibly in the form of a private act ), or being attainted for a heinous crime, is there any legal mechanism by which said Earl could rid himself of his title and all its attendant privileges and obligations? If the only realistic options involve the consent of the government or the legislative action of Parliament, and the government/Parliament refuses to cooperate, would the Earl have any recourse to the European Court of Human Rights ? That is, is there anything in the European Convention on Human Rights that could plausibly be construed as applying to such a case?

There is currently no means for the Earl to disclaim his title, if it has been longer than the permitted period since he inherited it. He also could not do so if he was the first holder, since the 1963 Act only applies to inheritance, and he cannot disclaim a life peerage. The reasoning from 1963 is that the Act was made for people who wanted to sit in the House of Commons, but could not do so due to an accident of birth - something they had no say in. For a life peerage, or peerage of the first creation, they should have refused the honour at the time it was offered. The situation is now a bit different thanks to the removal of all but 92 hereditary peers from the House of Lords in 1999, and the resignation provisions in the House of Lords Reform Act 2014 . If the Earl were one of the 92, then he could not disclaim the peerage until he resigned, or was disqualified under other provisions of the 2014 Act. On resignation, he would become able to vote in general elections, stand as a candidate, and sit in the Commons if elected. (By the way, Church of England bishops who are members of the Lords can also resign, but do so in a different way.) So any hereditary or life peer who feels that they are disenfranchised by virtue of sitting in the Lords also has the means to leave that chamber. That makes it difficult to make a human rights claim on the basis of Article 3 of the First Protocol . The European Court of Human Rights has upheld other kinds of voting restrictions in parallel circumstances, such as Ahmed and others v United Kingdom [1998] . In that case, several local government officials were barred from certain political activities, including standing for election, and brought a claim against the UK concerning violation of Articles 10 (free expression), 11 (free association) and 3 of Protocol 1 (free elections). The Court found that the restrictions were justified, and in particular that the applicants could avoid them by resigning. An opposite case was X v United Kingdom [1978] in which the applicant claimed a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) because he claimed to have the right to sit in the Lords but his petition to the Queen was denied. The Commission found that participating in the legislature is part of public law as opposed to a "civil right" within the scope of Article 6. Also, granting or withholding an honour has traditionally been held to be immune from judicial review - cited for example in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 - although this conclusion may no longer be completely solid since the well-known 2019 Miller case . That would apply for aspects of a peerage which are purely ceremonial in nature. The Earl might want to argue that his free expression is impaired by having a hereditary title at all. But there is nothing stopping him from calling himself by an ordinary name. British law doesn't require him to be called the Earl in any context, and there are plenty of peers who use their normal names while working at normal jobs. He has a defined place in the order of precedence, but I am not convinced that the situation would arise where he insisted on going to a fancy dinner and had a contretemps with the host over the seating arrangement that amounted to a human rights violation. Equally, he has the right to wear an Earl's coronet at a royal coronation, but our newly republican Earl would probably just not go. In the case of the Earl Marshal - a hereditary office which goes along with being the Duke of Norfolk - there are non-trivial duties involved, and an Earl Marshal might justifiably want to stop doing them. The past procedure has been for the Crown to appoint a Deputy Earl Marshal instead, as was done in 2000 when the Duke at the time was unwell. It would seem that a similar manoeuvre would work for any other hereditary offices that were more than nominal. If the Crown refused to do this, then perhaps a claim could arise under Article 14 (discrimination on the grounds of birth), but it would require a particularly intransigent Crown. Hereditary peers may hold property in a variety of entertaining feudally-derived ways, in addition to more familiar modes. The most relevant scenario to imagine is that our Earl owns Exampleshire Castle in "fee tail", meaning that he can't dispose of it even though it is horribly expensive for him to keep paying for repairs to its leaky roof - it must pass to his eldest son, and so forth. Even if the Earl is able to disclaim his peerage, he may still be on the hook for the property, depending on how everything is structured. However, there are generally legal workarounds these days, beyond the scope of this question, unlike when entails were so important to the plots of historical stories featuring the aristocracy. There is a current campaign by daughters of some peers to change the inheritance laws away from male-preference primogeniture, including on human rights grounds. It remains to be seen how that will work out, but a key difference here is that they are losing out by not being able to inherit, while the Earl is able to divest himself of all the disadvantages of the title, by simply not using it.

What motivated the Indian supreme court to legalize homosexuality?

According to the Pew Research Center article Key findings about religion in India , 97% of the Indian population is religious. Now, in all of the popular religions like Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, homosexuality is seen as a sin/unnatural, yet in 2018 homosexuality was legalized in the whole of the country. I simply can not understand how this happened, because in my experience, people who are religious hold very tight to their beliefs, so how was such a liberal ruling instilled unilaterally on the whole country? Some commenters found it controversial that I said Islam, Christianity and Hinduism prohibit homosexuality. Here are the relevant Stack Exchange posts: Christianity on homosexuality Hinduism on homosexuality Islam on homosexuality Some people try to write this matter away by arguing that India is secular according to the constitution, for them I bring up the following facts: India has laws restricting funding from abroad for certain religions, including Christianity. See here for instance. India has laws restricting dietary traditions on religious lines. Eg: Beef ban India has blasphemy laws, 'hurt sentiments' laws. See section in Wikipedia specifically under laws restricting freedom of expression India has laws making it harder for inter-faith couples to marry/cohabit. See love Jihad laws Indian governments sometimes build temples, fund temples, and manage temples [places of religious worship, not institutions like schools/hospitals]. See funding of Ram Mandir temple , many other examples exist. On paper it is said to be secular, where the law is independent of religion, but the facts suggest to me otherwise.

Because the 1860 law that criminalised “unnatural” sex is unconstitutional In essence, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India decided that criminalising sex between consenting adults violated the Constitutional right to equality. You have a Law in the Constitution that says people have to be treated equally. You have another law that says people in same-sex relationships are to be treated differently. The law in the Constitution wins. According to the BBC : Thursday's decision was delivered by a five-judge bench headed by India's outgoing chief justice Dipak Misra and was unanimous. Reading out the judgement, he said: "Criminalising carnal intercourse is irrational, arbitrary and manifestly unconstitutional." Another judge, Indu Malhotra, said she believed "history owes an apology" to LGBT people for ostracising them. Justice DY Chandrachud said the state had no right to control the private lives of LGBT community members and that the denial of the right to sexual orientation was the same as denying the right to privacy. The courts in India, like they are in most common law/civil law jurisdictions are interested it questions of law. Questions of sin and morality they are happy to leave to religion.

What distinguishes civil offenses from theft of services?

According to the Q&A information at Why is stealing from an employer a criminal act when stealing from an employee is a civil act? , an employer declining to give an employee a paycheck is a civil offense, not a criminal one. However, if a friend hires someone to fix something in their house, but after the repairs are done, the friend refuses to pay, this would likely fall under theft of service. What is the difference between the two scenarios? Also, how does this extend to Internet usage and services. For example, if I play a movie from a streaming service and screen-share on Zoom, I would be committing civil copyright infringement (if it is not fair use), but if I give other people my login credentials for the streaming service, it would be theft of service, I think, depending on the jurisdiction ( http://nashvilleattorneynow.com/criminal-defense/nashville-criminal-attorney-explains-theft-tennessee-netflix-password-sharing/ ). Is there a clear distinction between the civil and criminal offenses in cases like this, what is that distinction, and why is that? Also, how does this distinction affect the outcome for a person liable/guilty of either?

if a friend hires someone to fix something in their house, but after the repairs are done, the friend refuses to pay, this would likely fall under theft of service. This is incorrect. The most common distinction is intent. (The federal Canadian criminal code provision for theft (Section 332) requires intent to commit the crime, although " false pretenses " (Section 362) is probably a better match within the Canadian criminal code to theft of services and also requires a showing of intent). If breaching a promise to pay that the person making the promise to pay intended to be honor when the promise was made fails to pay (e.g. due to poor budgeting or losing a job) this is a breach of contract. Similarly, if someone accidentally attaches the wrong cable line to their TV and gets the premium package rather than the regular one, but didn't realize that fact, the cable company might have a claim for negligence or for unjust enrichment, but this would not constitute theft. In contrast, obtaining services knowing at the outset that you do not intend to honor your promise yet deceiving the service provider with your promise is theft. Theft (in the context of a theft of services) is intentionally obtaining services by deceit with an intent not to pay for them at the time that they are obtained. Proving this intent is usually prohibitively difficult and no something that law enforcement will choose to press charges regarding, but with very clear evidence (e.g. an audiotape of the person making a promise to pay bragging immediately before or after making the promise to pay about how he never intends to pay in the first place, or in a case with a pattern of conduct involving many service providers on multiple occasions), charges can be pressed and a conviction can be won. Also, to be clear, it has nothing to do, per se , with the power relationships of the parties. If an employer picks up a bunch of day laborers telling them that they will be paid an agreed rate at the end of the day for the work they are made to do, and the employer not only doesn't pay them at the end of the day but didn't intend to do so in the first place and perhaps has a practice of picking up day laborers and then refusing to pay them without good cause, that is theft of services a.k.a. wage theft. if I play a movie from a streaming service and screen-share on Zoom, I would be committing civil copyright infringement (if it is not fair use), but if I give other people my login credentials for the streaming service, it would be theft of service, I think, depending on the jurisdiction This isn't a good analogy as it implicates copyright law which is quite different from other bodies of law. Some acts are both civil and criminal copyright violations. But criminal copyright violations are generally not a theft of services. In Canada , the typical criminal copyright violation involves the sale or rental of the copyright protected material to third parties for money. how does this distinction affect the outcome for a person liable/guilty of either? Civil law violations are a basis to bring a lawsuit against someone who breaches the law in a civil manner for money damages sufficient to compensate the person bringing the lawsuit for the damages that they have suffered. Theft is a criminal offense. The prosecutor's office decides whether or not to bring charges and if it does bring charges does so (in Canada) in the name of the Crown, at the government's expense under criminal procedure rather than the civil procedure applicable to lawsuits. The victim is usually a witness and is usually consulted, but is not a party to a criminal case. If a conviction is obtained for a criminal offense, the penalty is usually some combination of incarceration, a fine, probation and community service, as authorized by statute, with court costs and restitution to the victim tacked on as an afterthought. The measure of what is owed as restitution is typically more grudging than the measure of the damages that can be awarded in a civil lawsuit. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive. Someone who is prosecuted for committing a crime can also be sued if the evidence supports both civil and criminal claims. Someone who is sued can also be prosecuted if the evidence supports both civil and criminal claims.

How to prove landlord didn't return damage deposit within required time

According to the Residential Tenancy Act a landlord must return the damage deposit within 15 days time. Isn't it easy for a landlord to not do this but pretend he had tried? For example what if the landlord claims on the 15th day he put a check in a mailbox, on the other side of the country, and then says it must have gotten lost in the mail? Or does act mean it must have been received by the ex-tennant within those 15 days? If the landlord fails to return the deposit within 15 days, the tenant is entitled to double. If after litigation has started against the landlord (but no hearings had taken place yet) if the landlord then returned the regular damage deposit, could the tenant still accept it and still sue for the double or does accepting it cancel the claim for double?

The law also specifies, in subsection (8), how the deposit is to be returned: (a) in the same way as a document may be served under section 88 (c), (d) or (f) [service of documents], (b) by giving the deposit personally to the tenant, or (c) by using any form of electronic (i) payment to the tenant, or (ii) transfer of funds to the tenant. where (88)(c,d,f) are by sending a copy by ordinary mail or registered mail to the address at which the person resides or, if the person is a landlord, to the address at which the person carries on business as a landlord; if the person is a tenant, by sending a copy by ordinary mail or registered mail to a forwarding address provided by the tenant; by leaving a copy in a mailbox or mail slot for the address at which the person resides or, if the person is a landlord, for the address at which the person carries on business as a landlord; The laws says that within 15 days the landlord must do one of the following: (c) repay, as provided in subsection (8), any security deposit or pet damage deposit to the tenant with interest calculated in accordance with the regulations; (d) make an application for dispute resolution claiming against the security deposit or pet damage deposit. That is, the law requires an action by the landlord, and not a specific result: otherwise, the law would have to say "the landlord is responsible for assuring that the tenant receives the deposit within 15 days". Finally, the tenant must supply a forwarding address, and it he does not within a year, he loses the deposit. Section (90) of the law furthermore defines when a document is deemed to be legally received: A document given or served in accordance with section 88 [how to give or serve documents generally] or 89 [special rules for certain documents], unless earlier received, is deemed to be received as follows: (a) if given or served by mail, on the 5th day after it is mailed; (b) if given or served by fax, on the 3rd day after it is faxed; (c) if given or served by attaching a copy of the document to a door or other place, on the 3rd day after it is attached; (d) if given or served by leaving a copy of the document in a mailbox or mail slot, on the 3rd day after it is left. So it is entirely possible that a landlord sent the deposit as required by law, and the deposit takes forever to get delivered. This case from the RTB may be useful: The tenant had the burden of proof to establish that the deposit existed and that 15 days had expired from the time that the tenancy ended and forwarding address was given, without the landlord either refunding all of the deposit or making application to keep it. In this instance, the landlord admitted that he had not returned the deposit within 15 days – the landlord shouldered the tenant's burden of proof. In another case , the tenant initially failed to provide a forwarding address, and tenant's initial application for double refund was accordingly dismissed. Tenant then sent the forwarding address by registered mail, however the mail was returned by Canada Post to sender, "unclaimed". Based on this, plus section (90), it was found that the tenant did mail the forwarding address on a specific date, and therefore it was served to the landlord 5 days later, even though he did not receive the address. The point is that the law only requires the landlord to send the refund, so the tenant would have to prove that the refund was not sent by that date. Then it becomes a matter of looking at the preponderance of evidence – is it more likely that the landlord didn't send the deposit on time, or than he did? If the landlord uses registered mail, that pretty much makes it an open and shut case. If not, there is still the question of how long after the deadline the refund was received – if it was a month, that makes the claim of timely action implausible.

Can religious institutions discriminate when selecting their own clergy?

According to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission , it is illegal to discriminate against a current employee or candidate based on race, color, religion, sex (including gender identity, sexual orientation, and pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information. Does this apply to religious institutions selecting their own clergy? I'm going to guess that it's allowed if there is a religions reason (e.g. the Roman Catholic church has a religious restriction forbidding women from being priests). But if there is not a religious reason, would they be permitted to discriminate? For instance, could a Protestant church that does not have any religious restriction regarding the race of clergy still choose to discriminate based on race for their own reasons (perhaps they only want to hire a black pastor, or say that they will reject candidates who are black pastors)? Or are religious institutions given some sort of protection regarding their hiring practices?

This is known as the " ministerial exception ". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC , an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability.

Do the Postmaster's actionsviolate 18 U.S. Code § 595. Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments?

According to the US Code Title 18 Section 595 : Whoever, being a person employed in any administrative position by the United States, or by any department or agency thereof...uses his official authority for the purpose of interfering with, or affecting, the nomination or the election of any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. I'm not a legal expert, but as far as I can tell, Postmaster DeJoy is a person employed by the United States government, is using his official authority as leader of the USPS, for the purpose of affecting the 2020 presidential elections by reducing the capabilities of the USPS to process mail-in ballots. Am I missing something here, or are his actions indeed a violation of federal law?

Probably not There's a difference between knowing DeJoy is guilty, and proving he is guilty. The first is a matter of your personal views on epistemology; the second is a matter of law. The statute says an official cannot use "his official authority for the purpose of interfering with..." In other words, in order to charge DeJoy, the government needs evidence that he is making these changes for the purpose of interfering with the election. According to news reports, DeJoy claims his purpose is legitimate: To balance the USPS budgets. He claims the PO is losing so much money that drastic cuts are required unless Congress increases funding. Given that the USPS is running a deficit, it will very hard to prove that DeJoy's explanation is just a smokescreen, that his real purpose is to screw up the election. So, unless there is a smoking gun, it seems likely he would not be charged, let alone found guilty. Note: Edited for clarity in light of comments

Can the US Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over cases in which it has original jurisdiction be limited?

According to the US Constitution, the US Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party". Original jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court cannot be limited (nor expanded) by the US Congress, but the appellate jurisdiction can. My understanding is as follows: the US Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is not necessarily exclusive, and thus other courts can also have original jurisdiction over these cases, which is known as concurrent jurisdiction. The plaintiff can thus choose the court in which he files the lawsuit. If the plaintiff chose to start the case not in the US Supreme Court, but rather in another court having original jurisdiction, then the US Supreme Court could have only appellate jurisdiction over such case. Is it correct? If so, could the US Congress strip the US Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over cases over which the US Supreme Court has original jurisdiction? Edit: In an already deleted answer, It was argued that SCOTUS' original and appellate jurisdiction is mutually-exclusive, according to Marbury v. Madison . However, it seems that SCOTUS has rejected this argument in Cohens v. Virginia in which SCOTUS held that "where the words admit of appellate jurisdiction, the power to take cognizance of the suit originally does not necessarily negative the power to decide upon it on an appeal, if it may originate in a different Court" and "The general expressions in the case of Marbury v. Madison must be understood with the limitations which are given to them in this opinion".

This is an interesting question that, to the best of my knowledge, has never presented itself. The statutory limitations on the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court are very narrow and to my knowledge, there has never been an attempt to limit it with respect to matters of which it has original jurisdiction as well. To make it a bit more concrete, one class of orders which is not appealable in federal court jurisprudence is an order remanding a case that is removed to a federal court back to its state court of origin. The reasoning behind this rule is that if there is concurrent jurisdiction, there is no legally cognizable harm in doing so in the judgment of Congress, and if the state court lacks jurisdiction, then the lack of jurisdiction can be appealed in the state court action and a new federal case can be commenced in a court with jurisdiction over the case. If SCOTUS decided that a limitation on its appellate jurisdiction in this case was unconstitutional, as a practical matter, no one else could overrule its decision, so, effectively, it would have to consent to the limitation. A closely related unresolved question of constitutional law is whether Congress has the power to deprive all courts of jurisdiction over some particular otherwise justiciable legal right necessarily established by the U.S. Constitution as an end run around amending the U.S. Constitution. Legal scholarship tends to suggest that this is not allowed, but Congress has not been bold enough to test this in a way that the courts interpreting laws in a manner to avoid constitutional questions, have had to resolve.

Presidential line of succession and age

According to the US Constitution, the minimum age for the offices of the President and Vice President is 35 years old. The minimum age to be in the House of Representatives is 25 years old. If both the President and Vice President were no longer able to hold office, the Speaker of the House of Representatives is next in line to become acting President. What happens if the Speaker is under 35 years old? Is the Speaker still sworn in? Or do they move down the succession list? What if the rest of the line of succession is below 35?

This is an interesting question. Requirement to "Qualify" The relevant provision seems to be subsection (b) of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (codified at 3 USC 19 . That subsection provides that: (b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President. Thus a Speaker would not become acting President unless the Speaker "qualifies". I believe this would include fulfilling all the requirements for a President, including the minimum age, and the requirement that the President be a "natural born citizen". Subsection (d)(1) further provides that: If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify , there is no President pro tempore to act as President under subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security. The Act has never been invoked, nor have either of the two prior Presidential Succession Acts, so there is no case law or precedent available. The Wikipedia article on the Act describes the history of all three versions, and the times when an invocation might have occurred. Questioned Constitutionality The Wikipedia article quotes a statement by Judge M. Miller Baker made during a September 2003 joint hearing before the U.S. Senate's Committee on Rules and Administration and Committee on the Judiciary. This statement argues that the Act as currently written is unconstitutional. The statement reads: The 1947 Act is probably unconstitutional because it appears that the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate are not "Officers" eligible to act as President within the meaning of the Succession Clause. This is because in referring to an "Officer", the Succession Clause, taken in its context in Section 1 of Article II, probably refers to an "Officer of the United States", a term of art under the Constitution, rather than any officer, which would include legislative and state officers referred to in the Constitution (e.g., the reference to state militia officers found in Article I, Section 8). In the very next section of Article II, the President is empowered to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments" and to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, "Officers of the United States". These are the "Officers" to whom the Succession Clause probably refers. This contextual reading is confirmed by Madison's notes from the Constitutional Convention, which reveal that the Convention's Committee of Style, which had no authority to make substantive changes, substituted "Officer" in the Succession Clause in place of "Officer of the United States", probably because the Committee considered the full phrase redundant. [1] Since the Act has never been invoked, this contention has never been tested in a court. Given the 25th Amendment's provisions for filling a vacancy in the office of Vice-President, the likelihood of the act ever being invoked is much reduced. Notes [1]: "Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Presidency" . Prepared Statement of M. Miller Baker, Joint Hearing Before the Committee on Rules and Administration and the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. September 16, 2003. Archived from the original on January 14, 2021. Retrieved July 11, 2018 – via GlobalSecurity.org. [This citation is copied from the Wikipedia article.]

On the (Equi)Potency of Each Organic Law of the United States

According to the United States Code , there are four organic laws of the United States: The United States Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 , The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of November 15, 1777 , The Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787 , and The Constitution of the United States of America of September 17, 1787 . QUESTION: Does this mean that all four of the above are " equipotent "? If not, on what basis are they ranked? I ask this question because in Supreme Court decisions, it seems to me that it is only the U. S. Constitution that is, in practice, considered.

Does this mean that all four of the above are "equipotent"? No. The inclusion of these foundational documents in the Front Matter of the United States Code does not indicate anything regarding their legal status. It is more of a political statement, as a preamble to all laws in today's sovereign federal state, describing the foundation of the United States of America and its constitutional order. The only constitutional law in force today in the U.S. is the Constitution for the United States of America , beginning with We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. and the subsequent amendments. The ratification of the Constitution replaced any previous constitutional orders in effect between the States. A new government was created by the Constitution and replaced the old one under the Articles of the Confederation: Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble. Owings v. Speed The States abandoned their old agreement (the Articles of Confederation) and subjected themselves to the new Constitution. Of course, the other documents remain historically very significant and may shine lights on the interpretation of the present Constitution, for example, in Texas v. White , the reference made to the concept of "perpetual union" found in the Articles. The Declaration of Independence is not so much a legal document per se but a declaration of the existence of the States sovereign from the British Crown; but such sovereignty is not a result from the declaration, but from the acts of war. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, while remaining in effect under the Constitution by Acts of (the new) Congress, is in any case spent as its territorial extent is extinguished by the establishment and admission of states, who enjoy equal status under the Constitution. See for example, Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans and Strader v. Graham .

Do any USA states require accepting US cash for payment of goods or services?

According to the United States Federal Reserve: There is no federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or services. Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether to accept cash unless there is a state law that says otherwise. Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12772.htm Are there any states, districts, regions, or territories within the USA that mandate that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept US currency or coins as payment for goods or services?

Not at the level of the state, but businesses subject to King County (WA) jurisdiction will, effective Jan. 1 2025, have to accept cash (within limits: not larger than $20 bill, not more that $200) for in-person transactions. Ad hoc exemptions are allowed in case of significant theft history, business operated at home, or with only one on-site employee.

How can the title "13" be so common?

According to the Wikipedia disambiguation page for 13 , there are nineteen albums, four songs, two movies, two novels, a card game, a manga, a musical and a play all titled "13", not counting stylizations or alternate forms such as "Thirteen", "13th", "Number 13" or "XIII". Wouldn't there be some trademark issues?

You cannot copyright a word or name in and of itself, so you can't sue someone for having a novel titled 13 so long as their novel is distinct from your own. Trademarks can use certain words or word combinations, but often in a way that is stylized or symbolic of a particular unique style and may include font, coloring, and other unique artistic takes. For example, McDonalds cannot copyright or trademark the letter "M" but it can trademark the "Golden Arches" a unique stylized "M" that they use as signage to at all their locations. If the name is a brand of a certain product such, then the name can be trademarked but only with respect to that product. For example, if the Acme Wash-Master is a dish washing machine they can't sue Ace Wash Master, a unique dog bathing system, for using the name "Wash Master" since it's both styled different (Acme uses a dash between words. ACE uses a space) and non-competitive product lines (most people would not wash dishes in a dog bathing device... and one would certainly hope that no dog owners ever said to themselves "Fido stinks and my tub is busted. The dish washer will do in a pinch!").

Does the Limitation Act 1980 apply to criminal acts before 1980?

According to the Wikipedia page for the Limitation Act 1980 , fraudulent breach of trust can be prosecuted any amount of time after the crime. However, I was wondering if this applies to crimes committed before the limitation act was passed. In other words, if I had committed a fraudulent breach of trust in 1975; could be taken to court in 2017?

The Limitations Act of 1980 and its predecessors apply to civil actions brought by private individuals. It is not a criminal statute of limitations. I will answer with regard to civil cases, rather than criminal ones. Section 40 of the Limitations Act of 1980 incorporates by reference a schedule of transition provisions that govern this question, and when a cause of action is not governed by the 1980 Act it usually defaults to the predecessor 1939 Act. The problem is both bigger than just the fraudulent breach of trust unlimited statute of limitations under Section 21 of the Act, since the deadline only runs from when an action accrues that can be long after the act giving rise to the claim actually happened, and smaller, because the act (and also its predecessor 1939 act ) allow statutes of limitations to be extended for equitable reasons under certain circumstances. The 1881 Limitations Act, Section 27 had an exception to the general rule for concealed fraud tolling the statute so long as it was concealed, which probably carried over into the 1939 Act. Section 9 of the transition provisions states in the relevant part that: (1)Nothing in any provision of this Act shall— (a)enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act or (as the case may be) by the Limitation Act 1939 before the relevant date; The 1939 Act limitations ran from when the act was committed, not when it was discovered, until the 1963 Act changes that. A full analysis of the breach of trust issue is found in this law review article .

Is Simplex noise still patent protected? (What is "anticipated expiration"?)

According to the Wikipedia page on Simplex noise : Uses of implementations in 3D and higher for textured image synthesis are covered by U.S. Patent 6,867,776, if the algorithm is implemented using the specific techniques described in any of the patent claims. The patent is expected to expire on January 8, 2022. That date has recently passed, but there was no update to the article about any change to the patent status. Following the reference to the patent itself, it shows the following entries: 2022-01-08 - Anticipated expiration Status - Active What exactly does this mean? Is the algorithm still protected by the patent?

What exactly does this mean? Is the algorithm still protected by the patent? Assuming, without independently confirming, that the patent in question has indeed expired (and it would be very unusual for a patent of this kind to be extended near the end of its term), the claims made in the patent for which it sought patent protection are now part of the public domain and may be used without a royalty and without permission from the patent holder. One should proceed with caution, however, because often an implementation of a patent also utilizes other patents with different claims that have a different expiration date. In a complex device, it wouldn't be unusual for dozens of patents to come into play. Likewise, an implementation of a patent may be associated with some trademark protections (like a distinctive, non-functional design associated with a particular company), or with derivative work copyright protections. So, if you want to implement an expired patent in a manner that does not infringe other patents, copyrights, or trademarks, ideally you would confirm that there are not also other patents, copyrights, or trademarks that are still in force that govern some aspect of how you apply the expired patent.

Is there something legally stronger than a pardon that does not constitute an admission of guilt?

According to the Wikipedia page on pardons : In some jurisdictions, accepting such a pardon implicitly constitutes an admission of guilt (see Burdick v. United States in the United States), so in some cases the offer is refused. A modern example of this is the UK's January 2017 passage of the "Policing and Crime Act 2017", informally known as the "Alan Turing law", which pardoned men convicted under various laws against homosexuality. George Montague was one man convicted under these laws who said he would not accept the pardon . "To accept a pardon means you accept that you were guilty. I was not guilty of anything. I was only guilty of being in the wrong place at the wrong time," he told BBC Newsnight. Montague said that he would accept an apology (which I presume would just be a public admission of the government's regret and would not carry any legal weight), but I'm wondering if there is anything legally stronger than a pardon that would not constitute an admission of guilt?

Yes In NSW Australia, the particular terms of art are: a quashed conviction, where the original conviction has been overturned either through appeal or for additional evidence coming to light ( Part 4 of the Criminal Records Act) an extinguished conviction, where changes to the law (either through legislation or changes to precedent) have retroactively meant that the act you were convicted for was never an offence. Homosexuality crimes are in fact one area of NSW law where you can apply to have a conviction extinguished ( Part4A of the Criminal Records Act): the application is not automatic as it requires demonstrating that the other person involved consented and was not a minor. In both cases, in the eyes of the law no offence has ever been proved (i.e. you are innocent).

Would using Windows 10 Home on a PC in a build farm violate the license terms?

According to the Windows 10 (Retail) license terms : c. Restrictions. The manufacturer or installer and Microsoft reserve all rights (such as rights under intellectual property laws) not expressly granted in this agreement. For example, this license does not give you any right to, and you may not: ... (v) use the software as server software , for commercial hosting, make the software available for simultaneous use by multiple users over a network, install the software on a server and allow users to access it remotely, or install the software on a device for use only by remote users; * emphasis mine I'm thinking of getting one of these and using it in a build farm. (A build farm is a group of computers whose primary purpose is to download source code and compile applications — often for different platforms.) The device includes a licensed copy of Windows 10 Home. Would using the device for the purpose described above fall within the scope of the license? In particular, I am concerned about the first phrase ("use the software as server software"). This seems a bit vague. What type of usage would this prohibit?

Section 2 says that they grant you the right to install and run one instance of the software, that it can be used by one person at a time, and that grant is contingent on complying with all of the terms of the agreement. The restrictions clause says that Microsoft reserves all rights, except those expressly granted in the agreement. They do mention some specific things not allowed, but that is not a complete list. Few rights are expressly granted (for example, w.r.t. multiple versions, they state a limit on what you can do – you can't install multiple versions, which is not the express grant of any right). They do actually permit you to allow up to 20 other devices to access the software for "file services, print services, Internet information services, and Internet connection sharing and telephony services on the licensed device", and "You may allow any number of devices to access the software on the licensed device to synchronize data between devices". Suppose that MS had reserved no rights: then you would have the right to do anything you want (in terms of the things that MS has any say over). If MS says "all rights reserved", that means that grant you no rights. What they say is that they only grant you those rights that they expressly grant you. So apparently, you cannot install and execute word processor software on the device, since those actions are not expressly permitted. Since this cannot seriously be what they mean, then you cannot rely on the terms of the license to know when they will and will not come after a person for copyright infringement.

Easiest way for buyer to obtain copyright when hiring on Fiverr or Freelancer.com?

According to the accepted response in this question , when one hires a freelancer, the freelancer owns the copyright to whatever work they produce, unless the copyright is explicitly transferred to the buyer via a valid contract. If one wants to own the copyright to a given work and does not want to go through the hassle of writing up a full blown contract every time he hires someone on Fiverr/Freelancer.com, what is the easiest/fastest way to ensure that he obtains full ownership? If the buyer simply puts a message in the chatbox that he is hiring as "work for hire" is that enough? If yes, must the message be added before the project is accepted or anytime before payment is made is enough? What if the buyer forgot to include the message but wishes to do so before payment is released, would that work?

Explicit contract Work for hire is only one way to get a copyright from an artist, but Work For Hire does not work for every type of art or work. Work for hire has to be noted in the contract for the work. The other way is having the artist sign a copyright transfer, specifically worded to transfer any transferable right to the buyer. In some jurisdictions such a transfer would be called an "exclusive, unlimited license" as for example in germany , the actual "Urheberrecht" (~authorship; which is often translated to copyright), isn't transferable, but all the "verwandte Rechte" (related rights), including usage and exploitation rights can be licensed away. The benefit of such a transfer is, that it works for things, Work for Hire can't be applied to.

Is the game company required to help and take actions for a player who got scammed in the game for virtual currencies?

According to the answers in this question , you are legally responsible when scamming someone for virtual goods in a game. However, in most of the cases it is very hard to actually get any information about a player, who he or she is, which just makes it useless. However the game company do have all the information about the situation, the player, the transaction, chat conversation and so on. They have all the tools to solve this. But they refuse to. My friend was just scammed in a scenario like this, and since he couldn't verify exactly who the player is, there is not much to go on, except contacting the ones in charge of the game company. Their Customer support replies like this in an e-mail converstaion: Please understand that thieving or scamming isn't illegal and therefore I can neither punish the other player nor compensate you for your lost ***** Coins. The company is based in Germany. Also notice that the virtual coins are initially purchased with real money (80 euro) from the game website. Something to note is that the only reason my friend wanted to buy this virtual item from a player in the first place is because: The item is very rare and/or shouldn't even exist in that area. It only exists there because of bugs (that the game owner solved and are aware of, but they keep the items to exist there). This gives the seller an opportunity to scam. There is a myth about this item in that area, and the game company strategically wants it to stay a myth, so they never actually say if is possible to retain or not (people have tried for 10 years and failed) It is not possible to trade virtual coins to an item in this area in the game. It is only possible to send or give the item or virtual coins in advance. The players did have a deal. So to wrap up: Is the game company required to help you in a situation like this, where you have the evidence of being scammed for virtual currencies, and can you require them to take actions? (I.e give you the money back, or similar) Edit: I am not claiming the company is responsible, however the other player who failed to complete his deal of the contract, is unreachable except with the help of the company. Also note that the game isn't about stealing or scamming, if you lose items due to death in the game then it's part of it. However in this case it's more of a one to one deal/contract (written contract), with real life money involved (except they were converted to virtual coins first) , that question has been answered here though .

Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.

What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?

According to the answers in this question it's legal to photograph someone in public without their consent. I'm assuming the answers still hold true for video or audio recording (such as what can be done with a smart phone). What counts as public? For example, if you're at the gym or you're in an office and record yourself and by chance someone else gets in it, or a conversation is overheard, is that illegal? Or if you paid to watch a sporting event at a stadium? There are certainly times when T.V. shows do it, such as Candid Camera , and I seem to recall a news station who would use a hidden camera carried by the interviewer. In this video someone recorded how easy it was for him to break into the building and I don't think he had prior approval to do so. I'm targeting the question towards Canada.

In the U.S. this is a notoriously perilous area of the law, particularly because the laws regarding recording vary so much between the states. A good source for this question is the RCFP . To give you an example: In Pennsylvania it is a felony to record "oral communication" in any circumstance in which the speaker would be justified in expecting it to not be recorded. Legally, as soon as you turn on an audio recorder in PA, you had better make sure nobody unaware that you're recording wanders within range of your microphone!

If elected officials are exempt from CRA Title VII, what protects their civil rights?

According to the answers to Are county clerks exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? , elected officials of pretty much any sort are exempted from the protections offered citizens under Title VII. But it seems that without this protection, municipalities could enact laws such as "no Muslim or person with a physical or mental disability may hold an elected position." Something clearly protects this from happening. Yes, it is a violation of the constitution, but from my understanding laws are what establish protections against constitutional violations.

The protection lies in the fact that these sorts of restrictions are expressed in state laws, and states are Constitutionally forbidden from denying to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or from interfering with religion. The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids states from making any law impeding free exercise of religion, or having the effect of establishing a state religion. This means that any law that forbids people of any religious denomination (including atheists) from holding any office (elected or not) under any level of government is unconstitutional. See Torcaso v. Watkins . Moreover, Title VII's protected classes are also (with the exception of sex) suspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause. A state or local government may not pass a law discriminating against a suspect class unless it is a narrowly tailored law which is the least intrusive way to achieve a compelling state interest. In practice, that means a state can't pass a law discriminating on the grounds of national origin, race, or religion. Sex is a quasi-suspect class; government discrimination on the grounds of sex must further an important state interest in a way reasonably related to that interest; again, in practice this will tend to rule out laws saying "no women can be elected to this post." The Americans with Disabilities Act actually does not exclude elected officials. It defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." The Equal Pay Act doesn't apply to elected officials, but again, sex is a quasi-suspect class. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act also excludes elected officials, and this is the one case where a state really could discriminate -- the applicable test is whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, which is not an especially high bar.

Can an estate sue for defamation over statement made before decedent died?

According to the answers to this question you can't be (successfully) sued for statements you make about someone who is already dead. But what if you said something defamatory about John Doe while he was still alive, he then died, and his estate then files a lawsuit against you before the statute of limitations has passed? Could such a lawsuit succeed?

In the United States, this is a matter of state law and is not uniform. The common law rule under English law (which the English themselves later codified) (see also here ) and the majority rule in U.S. states is that defamation actions do not survive the death of the party that is defamed (although a judgment secured at the conclusion of a defamation action does survive the death of the judgment creditor). See, e.g., this North Carolina statute , and this Indiana statute . But defamation actions arising during life survive the death of the defamed party in Montana . And, this Pennsylvania statute , at least on its face, appears to provide that a defamation action would survive the death of the plaintiff.

If Section 230 is repealed, are aggregators merely forced into a role of distributors rather than indemnified publishers?

According to the article by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) "Section 230 is Good, Actually" Section 230 says that any site that hosts the content of other “speakers”—from writing, to videos, to pictures, to code that others write or upload— is not liable for that content , except for some important exceptions for violations of federal criminal law and intellectual property claims. They go on to say, Basically, Section 230 means that if you break the law online, you should be the only one held responsible, not the website, app, or forum where you said the unlawful thing. Just to be clear, that isn't strictly correct, right? A quick wikipedia search shows that in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. As a distributor, CompuServe could only be held liable for defamation if it knew, or had reason to know, of the defamatory nature of the content. As CompuServe had made no effort to review the large volume of content on its forums, it could not be held liable for the defamatory content. In one source online , I even saw Section 230 described as Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation So which is it? Does the removal Section 230 mean a site will be held liable for the content created by others? Or, does it mean that a site will only be held liable if they engage in optional moderation or acts of "publishing" (such as filtering and removal of offensive material). It seems like it's still the creator that is liable. And you can still have a free and open moderation-free internet in a post-Sec 230 world? Handling spam Update: On spam, the same case above Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) states that, CompuServe's ultimate right under the contract to remove text from its system for noncompliance with its standards merely constitutes control over the result of CCI's independent work. This level of control over the Journalism Forum is insufficient to rise to the level of an agency relationship. With this text, I don't think it's sufficient to say that in a post-Section 230 world removal of content would be defamation per se, it seems it has satisfy some standard.

you can still have a free and open moderation-free internet in a post-Sec 230 world Sure, but remember what moderation-free means: no moderation whatsoever . That means no removal of offensive content like trolling, profanity-laden or racist rants, or even outright spam. Stack Exchange, for example, gets thousands of attempted spam posts a day , despite the fact that very few of them actually get through, and the ones that do are usually quickly removed. Section 230 protects Stack Exchange's ability to do this without incurring liability for what users post. Imagine a Stack Exchange in which spamming was allowed . So I would say that the EFF's statement is substantially accurate, in that the ability of sites to perform such moderation is fairly essential to their ability to function as communities. The fact that they could avoid liability by not moderating is not relevant if it would make the site unable to function properly.

What are the consequences of having multiple wives as a Hindu in India?

According to the civil code for muslims in Wikipedia , it is found that a man can have multiple wives and there are certain laws for how he act in case of divorce. a Muslim man is allowed to marry up to four wives at a time he can divorce his wife without entering into any legal processes he does not need to provide financial support to his ex-wife after three months of the divorce, whereas men of other religions are likely required to support their ex-wives forever But, now suppose I am Christian / Hindu and I decide to use law-2. I divorce my wife without entering into any legal process, what consequences would I face?

What are the consequences of having multiple wives as a Hindu in India? The consequences may include a criminal conviction as Christian and Hindu polygamy is unlawful (except for Goan Hindus) - only Muslims may have multiple wives: Section 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, prohibited polygamy for the Christians. In 1955, the Hindu Marriage Act was drafted, which prohibited marriage of a Hindu whose spouse was still living. Thus polygamy became illegal in India in 1956, uniformly for all of its citizens except for Muslims, who are permitted to have four wives and for Hindus in Goa and along the western coast where bigamy is legal. A polygamous Hindu marriage is null and void.[6] While the punishment specified in Sections 494 and 495 is applicable, it is rare if the first spouse does not have an objection. Source Suppose I am Christian / Hindu and I decide to use law-2. In India, a Christian or Hindu cannot rely on Muslim legislation to lawfully dissolve a marriage. Christians use, as applicable, sections 10 or 10A of the Divorce Act 1869 . Hindus use, as applicable, sections 11 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 . One consequence of not " entering into any legal process " is that the spouse could petition for a lawful divorce by claiming, for example,  "spousal desertion" - sections 10(2)(ix) and 13(1)(ib) for Christians and Hindus respectively.

Which parts of classical enactments division do the laws of Gortyna contain?

According to the classical scheme, modern enactments include 3 parts: hypothesis, disposition, and sanction. Is this scheme applicable to archaic laws of 7-5 BCe? For example: "if you rape a free woman, you have to pay 10 staters". Is the part: "if you rape a free woman" a hypothesis or a disposition? To me it looks like the hypothesis because it contains conditions. And is the next one: "you have to pay 10 staters" a disposition or a sanction? It looks to me as the disposition part, because there's no information about what will happen if you don't pay.

Is this scheme applicable to archaic laws of 7-5 BCe? Not in the example you provide, although legal systems that predate the Gortyn code contain portions which present the structure hypothesis-disposition-sanction. Disposition is defined as " the final determination of the court in a criminal charge ". Thus, the law " if you rape a free woman, you have to pay 10 staters " only contains a hypothesis and a sanction. The disposition is implicit, i.e., implied by whether or not the accused person is sanctioned. By contrast, some portions of ancient laws do contain a[n explicit] disposition. As an example, consider rules 11 and 12 of the Code of Hammurabi . Both rules include the proposition (or disposition) " he is an evil-doer " right in between a hypothesis and the corresponding sanction.

Copyright act 1976

According to the copyright act, Limited use of copyright work is permitted on the payment of specified royalties and compliance with statutory conditions. What does this line mean. I think it states that If a buyer pays royalty to the original owner of the work and complies with statutory conditions then use of copyright acts is restricted. Am I right in my reasoning?

No. It means that if you pay a royalty to the owner of the copyright, you may use the work in certain ways that comply with the statutory conditions. But, if you do not pay the royalty, you may not use the work at all.

Is "use of force" the same thing as "use of physical force"? Are there examples of types of force that are not physical?

According to the dictionary, the definition of rape is the following: Unlawful sexual activity and usually sexual intercourse carried out forcibly or under threat of injury against a person's will or with a person who is beneath a certain age or incapable of valid consent because of mental illness, mental deficiency, intoxication, unconsciousness, or deception. My question focuses around the usage of the term "forcibly". In this context, is "use of force" and "use of physical force" synonyms? Are there any other notable instances of non-physical force in the legal system? Be advised that my question is not about sexual assault - that was just an offhand example of a violent crime.

No and yes respectively Force in general refers to acting under a compulsion. Physical force is specific that the compulsion arises from violence or physical power. Examples of non-physical force include: Legal obligation: the witness was forced to answer the question . Blackmail: the victim was forced to pay the ransom to the hacker . Contractural: after his car fell in the river, he was still forced to make the payments . Ethical: despite vowing to never have children the tragic death of her brother forced her into the unexpected role of mother to her niece and nephew .

What is Stamp Duty Land Tax used to fund?

According to the gov.uk website, UK residents need to pay Stamp Duty Land Tax when they buy a property over a certain value. Where does this money go and what is it used to fund?

It goes into the Consolidated Fund and thereafter is used the same way as the rest of the government's money; there's no special destination for this particular set of tax receipts. That was also the case for its predecessor tax, stamp duty (which still exists for some other transactions other than the ones in land covered by SDLT). Without tracing the legislative history too far, the Finance Act 2003 created SDLT as a tax, and provided for it to be collected by HM Revenue & Customs the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 says that HMRC must put all their receipts into the Consolidated Fund, apart from certain exceptions which don't include SDLT As a matter of policy, HM Treasury strongly prefers the "one big pot" system. See the Government manual Managing Public Money , 2021 ed., at 5.6.3: Proposals to create new taxes in order to assign their proceeds to new spending proposals are rarely acceptable. Decisions on tax are for Treasury ministers, who are reluctant to compromise their future fiscal freedom to make decision. The general reason here is that if there is one big pot of money, the government has a freer hand than if there were (say) separate funds that could only be spent on road maintenance, or agricultural subsidies, or whatever. Additionally, within the context of the "Exchequer Pyramid" also explained in that document, the one big pot is used in overnight market operations by the Debt Management Office, and having more money available for that purpose is generally useful. While this particular facet of the system has been in operation only since 1998, the general pattern of having one big pot of money has been policy since at least the early 19th century. When "stamp duty" originated in 1694 (5 Wm & Mary c. 21) it was one of several taxes created at about that time, and intended to fund the Nine Years' War (as we now call it; obviously not a label of the time). Over the next century, it was continued and expanded, since it was found to be convenient to administer, and capable of raising good sums of money. But that time period then brushes into the modernisation of the public finances, including the creation of the Consolidated Fund as mentioned. Rather than taxes being special affairs created for specific spending needs, we had a form of government with more predictable outgoings and an interest in being systematic about the management of the national debt. In the case of SDLT, its creation involved rationalising the aspect of "stamp duty" that was relevant to most people's lives (buying property). One policy aim was that by severing it from the former version of stamp duty, it would become easier to provide different rules for how it could work, specific to the nature of the property market. There is no particular policy need to have it fund any given aspect of public spending, including war with France. These days, war with France would be paid for out of general funds.

Why does the U.S. have much higher litigation cost than other countries?

According to the institute for legal reform ( https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/media/ILR_NERA_Study_International_Liability_Costs-update.pdf ), liability/GDP ratio is 1.66% which is almost three times that of the Eurozone. This is a complex question, for sure, but what are the key reasons that the U.S. has such high litigation costs?

Litigation Costs v. Liability Insurance Cost It is worth noting that what the Institute for Legal Reform, a tort reform lobbying group, is stating, is not that the U.S. has "higher litigation cost" than other countries. They are financed mostly by businesses that have to pay liability insurance expenses and are motivated in their analysis to come up with any analysis to argue in favor of reducing those expenses for their backers. This Institute is stating that liability insurance costs are greater in the U.S. and that this is a good way to infer that the things that liability insurance costs pay for in the U.S. are more expensive (and both of these narrow propositions are largely true). But, liability insurance costs have two big components: (1) claims paid, and (2) costs paid in the litigation process itself. And the contexts in which these costs are incurred has to be balanced with other parts of the overall systems. As economists like to say, there is no such thing as a free lunch. Higher claims paid may be good or bad. Higher claims paid discourages businesses and individuals from doing things that hurt other people, and compensate people who are hurt by wrongful conduct and to the extent that a claim paid does both of these things an an appropriate amount (or even higher considering that not all wrongful harms are litigated for a variety of reasons). But if they are too high they may discourage business activity by overcompensating injured people in a way that discourages business activity that does more good than harm. Litigation costs are a necessary evil. These cost also discourage tortious conduct, but not so precisely as they can discourage lawful conduct that is improperly the subject of litigation as well (and in many personal injury circumstances it is not obvious in advance to 100% certainty who is at fault) and they don't compensate people who are hurt by wrongful conduct. But litigation costs are necessary to operate the system. To the extent that more litigation costs in the aggregate better distinguishes between rightful and wrongful claims, they have value, to the extent that they do not, they have less value. Alternatives Within The U.S. It is also possible to make different choices on the value of litigation costs and U.S. jurisdictions have done this in some circumstances for particular kinds of litigation. Most U.S. jurisdictions (maybe all of them) impose strict liability on an employer for workplace related injuries greatly reducing the litigation cost share of compensating workers for injuries on the job at the cost of making employers pay for injuries caused by fellow workers or the negligence of the injured employee, rather than the employer or its management. This is called the worker's compensation system. Some U.S. jurisdictions have made a similar risk reward determination in the case of minor automobile accidents, in a system called " no fault insurance " barring lawsuits for small automobile accidents (a key defined term in such systems) and requiring drivers to instead self-insure form injuries and damages in small automobile accidents, to reduce litigation costs, and limiting litigation to automobile accidents with serious injuries or very major property damage where the costs of litigation are justified in light of the magnitude of the harm for which fault needs to be allocated. Short Conclusion In sum, while liability insurance costs are higher in the U.S., that doesn't necessarily mean that the money is not well spent and appropriate. This is a political choice with pros and cons attached to it. Caveats I haven't moved to close this question because a lot of the key factors are matters of comparative law between systems of accident liability. But this is usually considered as a political and policy issue, usually raised in Politics.SE instead, with which there is often overlap with Law.SE Also, I haven't really sourced this answer, because it is long and time consuming just to get the major considerations out. There is an extensive academic literature for essentially all of the points that I discuss. But most of my own sources are hard copy books that I can't link and would be time consuming to locate sources for online that I don't have easily available at this time. One good overview of several of the long standing basic comparative civil procedure points discussed below is this article from 1987 by John Langbein , who historically was one of the leading academic scholars in the area of comparative civil procedure. Drivers Of Claims Paid Costs There are at least eight big factors that impact the substantive amount of liability awards involved, not all of which may apply in any particular two country comparison. One of the big things that liability insurance costs pay for in the U.S. is liability for medical expenses caused by tortious or allegedly tortious personal injuries that are paid for by third parties and not litigated elsewhere. In most countries, some form of universal healthcare system pays for medical costs and those universal healthcare system paid medical costs can't be recovered in litigation. In the U.S., in contrast, medical expenses are always recoverable in personal injury litigation even if those costs were actually paid by health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or worker's compensation insurance (in cases where the lawsuit is alleging personal injury from someone other than the employer), due to something called the collateral source rule , then the person who actually paid for the medical expenses is entitled to some of the amount recovered by the injured person in the personal injury lawsuit as a consequence of what are called " subrogation rights ." Basically, the U.S. shifts a lot of what would be paid for a different kind of public or private insurance in other countries onto liability insurance. The relative amount of money spent on one kind of insurance rather than another isn't really a big deal in the larger scheme of things. The virtue of the way that other countries do it, is that there are fewer people who are injured without an ability to pay for medical care without severe economic disruption in those countries than in the U.S. and untreated medical injuries or massive economic disruption to injured people is more problematic than treated medical injuries that don't cause massive economic disruption. The flip side of that however, is that by not clearly allocating the costs of medical care to the people who cause severe injuries as a tort liability based system does, businesses have less of an incentive to be careful and injury rates are reduced more slowly. The U.S. has seen a massive reduction in accidental injury over the time period that tort reformers allege has witnesses a surge in tort liability. An older but heavily cited article on comparative law regarding the collateral source rule and subrogation rights (and other aspects of those topics) is found here . Some countries, like Germany, for example, appear to have the injured party formally assign a right to sue to someone who made payments to the injured party for the injured party's benefit. The U.S. has a high costs of living, in general, and of medical costs in particular. Even in countries where there are awards of medical costs, U.S. awards for this area large because health care costs are much higher in the United States, on average, than in any other country in the world (for reasons beyond the scope of this answer, but as pertinent to this question, including many reasons not related to the malpractice liability associated costs of medical providers). Furthermore, the U.S., while it does not have the highest cost of living in the world ( it ranks twenty-one although some key regions of the U.S. with high liability insurance costs have a much higher cost of living), has a high costs of living relative to most countries. So, claims for lost wages and damage to property, and claims for non-economic damages and punitive damages that are indirectly influenced by the high cost of living in the U.S. are influenced by this fact. If you cause a U.S. worker to lose ten years of wages due to their wrongfully incurred injuries, you may have caused $500,000 of damages prior to considering the time value of money. The same injury to a worker in China or Mexico might be $50,000 or less. and 4. The United States personal injury lawsuit system allows for the recovery of non-economic damages for items like pain and suffering, emotional distress, inconvenience, disfigurement, and the like, which is not allowed, or is allowed more sparingly, in most countries other than the United States; but this is offset by the unavailability of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Image from here . In part, the U.S. rule allowing non-economic damages, however, counterbalances the fact that most legal systems allow a prevailing party in a lawsuit seeking damages for personal injury to recover their attorney fees, while U.S. law does not allow a prevailing party in a personal injury lawsuit to recover their attorney fees in most cases . Instead, attorneys for injured parties customarily charge a contingent fee (often 1/3rd of the gross recovery) for their services, and defendants in personal injury cases have their attorney fees paid for by their liability insurer. So, while non-economic damages seem like a much broader recovery in the U.S. system than in non-U.S. systems of personal injury lawsuits, net of attorney fees recoveries that aren't available in the U.S. but are available elsewhere, this difference is not so great. While no rule mandates this and there are types of cases (e.g. civil rights, privacy and defamation cases) where economic damages don't tend to be proportionate to non-economic damages, in the U.S., in a typical personal injury case, non-economic damages tend to be proportionate to and less than the economic damages award in a case. Thus, in a case with $1,000,000 of economic damages awarded, a $500,000 non-economic damages award might be typical. Many people assert that the availability of punitive damages awards is an important factor; it is actually a very minor factor. In the U.S., when someone tortious injures another and that injury is intentional or reckless, a jury may award punitive damages in addition to the economic and non-economic damages intended merely to compensate the victim of the tort. If the economic damages in the case are significant, this can't be more than an amount proportionate to the compensatory (both economic and non-economic damages combined) award, typically not more than 1-3 times the amount of compensatory damages awarded. When the compensatory damages are very small (e.g. $100), the proportionality standard isn't so strict, but the award of punitive damages still can't be unduly large. While, in theory, one could imagine a world where this is a major factor, this is actually mostly hype from tort reform advocacy groups. Punitive damage awards are rare and as a share of aggregate tort liability awards in the U.S. account for a low single digit percentage share of the total. See, e.g. U.S. Justice Department statistics. (punitive damages awarded in 5% of cases that go to trial where Plaintiffs prevail, i.e. 700 out of 25,000 trials, only about 3% of cases filed go to trial , and the median punitive damages award is $64,000). Thus, punitive damages are awarded in about one in 1190 tort cases filed. U.S. tort awards are mostly made by juries, while this is exceedingly uncommon in all but a handful of other countries. In most countries, even those with common law legal systems, all, or very nearly all civil litigation is resolved by judges without juries , and in civil law legal systems not based upon the English legal system, serious tort damage awards are made by a panel of judges and can be reviewed de novo (i.e. redetermined from scratch) by a bigger panel of judges on appeal. In contrast, the lion's share of U.S. personal injury lawsuits that go to trial are resolved in jury trials. Judges are, for a variety of reasons including desensitization from seeing many cases and social class attitudes, stingier in their award of tort damages on average than juries, and this is particularly true in the case of panels of judges that balance out extreme opinions, relative to the extremes possible with a single judge. The causes of this mirror the fact that judges are much less likely to acquit a criminal defendant than a jury, on average. Of course, there are always exceptional cases and a damages award is based upon a human evaluation of the facts. In the U.S. a jury's award of tort damages is also much harder to reverse on appeal than a judge's award of tort damages in any system, since it simply states a dollar award and the appellate court must uphold it if there is any plausible justification for such an award in the evidence presented at trial and not merely because the actual articulated reasons of the jurors (which aren't considered in U.S. civil cases) were actually proper and supported by the evidence in the record. Another related point is the juries are less predictable than judges and single judges are less predictable than panels of judges. Unpredictability causes cases to settle in the U.S. that might have been resolved in favor of one party or the other in another system, and this uncertainty, on average, works against defendants and in favor of people who have been injured. Even in civil law systems with panels of judges, however, there is still a significant amount of uncertainty, because the law of when there is liability in tort for injuries is governed by standards that are fairly vague in almost every country. The U.S. has a thinner social safety net meaning that litigation is often the only way to obtain needed economic resources when someone suffers harm from an injury. In lots of countries there is a robust social safety net of unemployment, disability and welfare payments that can provide income security in the event of lost employment due to an injury. In the U.S. these options are much more meager, so the net benefit that an injured person can receive from suing rather than relying upon the social safety net and not suing even though they could is much greater in the U.S. than in other countries. This is despite the fact that U.S. system of tort liability is more heavily fault based than the system used in civil law countries. In the U.S., while there are situations which are exceptions to the general rule, most tort lawsuits involve proof of negligence by the person that caused the harm, and that the damages suffered were caused by the negligent act. In civil law countries, there is much less of a focus on whether acts of the defendant that caused the person harmed to suffer injuries. It isn't truly a strict liability system but it is closer. The reduced necessity to prove negligence reduces the cost of litigation in civil law countries while increasing the amount of awards. Basically, there are far more cases in the U.S. where the decision is that the defendant injured the plaintiff but that there is no liability because "shit happens" than in civil law countries. Drivers Of Litigation Costs Participating in the process of recovering damages for tort injuries (i.e. true litigation costs) usually involved more aggregate litigation costs for the defendants (and for plaintiffs, defendants and courts combined) in the U.S. than elsewhere. Several factors drive this difference, including factor eight above and five additional factors. Not all of this apply in every particular two country comparison. The U.S. and other common law systems systemically allocate more litigation expenses to the parties than to the courts, than civil law countries. Image from here . From here (although there is considerable variation in the number of lawyers per capita in each U.S. state , the U.S average is 4 per 1000 people, but South Carolina with the fewest lawyers per capita has 2, Massachusetts and Connecticut have 6, New York has 9, and the District of Columbia has 77). Countries with civil law litigation systems (based on the systems of Continental Europe) have vastly more judges (about ten times as many) who are more pro-actively involved in the litigation process per attorney representing a party, than in the U.S. or other common law countries. Because of this, even if the total litigation cost to all parties and the system itself were equal in common law and civil law countries, a greater share of the cost would be paid for by the government through judicial system budgets at public expense, and less would be paid for by the parties. This also has the indirect effect of causing U.S. judges to avoid involvement in the case as much as possible until as late as possible in the case in the hopes that the delay will cause it to settle, even if the delay in resolving an issue causes the parties to incur more litigation costs than would have been necessary if the judge had paid attention sooner. The Extreme Finality of Jury Trials Results In Systemic Over-Expenditure On Litigation Costs. In the U.S. system, you get one shot at trial, and particularly given the issues present in a typical tort lawsuit for personal injury, this is virtually unreviewable on appeal. This means that a competent trial lawyer for a party needs to rule out or prepare for every possible uncertainty in advance, rather than only those possibilities at trial that are likely. In a civil law system, you can prepare for only what is likely and if you are surprised at trial, you can appeal the factual findings made and introduce evidence or arguments to address the surprises you encountered on appeal only if they actually come up. This kind of trial preparation is much less expensive than the extreme no stone left unturned approach that is typical in the U.S. As an answer from @JohnFx to this question notes, a lot of this pretrial preparation manifests itself in the form of "discovery" costs. A related subset of this factor is that the behavior of judges when presented with a tort case is much more predictable than the behavior of a random panel of citizens selected only at the end of a case. Knowing who will decide the case can focus and reduce the kind of preparation of needed and what kind of outcome is likely. For example, you can know from experience that certain kinds of testimony and evidence will be given weight by a particular judge or panel of judges to a greater degree than you can with a jury where evidence that may have lots of impact to one juror may not have as much impact as a different kind of evidence with a different juror. The stakes are higher in U.S. litigation so more litigation expense is justified as proportional to the higher stakes. If you have a serious personal injury case in the U.S. with $2,000,000 of medical costs, $1,000,000 of plausible non-economic damages award, and $500,000 of other economic damages for a total of $3,500,000 at stake, it is rational for both sides to spend money to maximize the quality of their case than they would in a case where only $500,000 plus attorneys fees can be awarded to a winner and a loser pays the other side's attorney fees, in system where medical costs paid by a third party aren't litigated and non-economic damages aren't awarded. Attorney compensation is more heavily regulated in other countries. In the U.S. attorneys are allowed to charge what the market will bear. In many countries there is government regulation of attorney fees that limit hourly rates or per task rates and don't allow for contingent fee awards. This can make U.S. litigation fees higher than in other countries. Earlier resolution of cases on the merits is possible in most other countries because decision making isn't reserved for a jury trial at the end. A logistical reality of a jury trial system in the U.S. is that the jury meets once for a few days and can't be reconvened. This means that pre-trial resolution of issues reserved for the jury is allowed only in the clearest cases where no jury could reach a different result that would be upheld on appeal. In contrast, in almost every other country, where judges resolve all or almost all tort lawsuits, it is much more feasible to arrange decision making in a manner calculated to minimize litigation costs. For example, in a U.S. personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff must almost always present evidence of both liability (i.e. that they were wrongfully injured by the defendant) and damages (e.g. lots of medical expert and medical expense and cost of care and lost wages testimony) in the same trial that happens over the course of a few days. In many other countries it is common to bifurcate the trial so that liability is tried first and evidence of damages is only presented once the issue of liability is determined. In many other countries it is also common to resolve issues of special preconditions to liability, such as whether the driver of a truck causing injury was acting within the scope of employment, or whether a statute of limitations has run, on the merits based upon both disputed evidence and law, before the liability trial. In cases that don't go the distance to a trial on all issues, this reduces litigation costs. And, even if the resolution of early issues like preliminary issues or liability is favorable to the plaintiff, wins on those issues may cause the later issues in the case to be resolved without a trial and settled. Interest Disclosure Since I questioned the motives of the Institute for Legal Reform based upon an interest biasing it in a particular direction, I will also disclose my own relevant interests and experiences. I litigated many cases on behalf of insured defendant with casualty insurance (or the self-insurance pool equivalent) at a firm where I was employed for three years early in my career. Over the remainder of my career (more than twenty years), I have represented roughly the same number of plaintiffs in litigation where insurance is potentially a source of recovery, and a smaller but not insignificant number of defendants who also have insurance defense counsel. Most of my litigation practice involves commercial and probate cases where there is no insurance coverage for either side. I also represent many clients in transactional and commercial litigation matters who are business owners or businesses that have to pay significant liability insurance premiums in the course of their business or profession and have done considerable asset protection planning work and have taught courses on that subject to other lawyers. I have been self-employed as an attorney for more than fifteen years, and in that time period I have had to maintain both health insurance and liability insurance policies. My practice has also involved a small, but constant and significant, amount of representation of U.S. based clients with legal affairs that involve other countries such as international trade, business investment, tax, probate and child custody matters that require familiarity with the legal systems of other countries. I was an award winning law student in these subject of comparative law in law school where I was also a senior editor in the Michigan Journal of International Law.

Lawyer request change in Court proceedings by defendant or plaintiff

According to the law, can a defendant or Plaintiff change his/her lawyer after certain court proceedings in both civil/criminal cases. Example. A Court is adjourned and given a certain date for next proceeding. Now the Plaintiff or Defendant would like to change his/her lawyer giving reasonable reasons for the same. Reasons could be : Personal emergency call for the Lawyer, Lawyer falling sick/unwell etc Is this allowed in the judiciary? If yes, what are the rules? Who gives the permission grant to either the defendant or plaintiff to change the lawyer? Is it the Judge or panel of Judges?

Once a trial has started, a lawyer can only be replaced with leave of the court The judge will consider the reason and where the case is at, and if they are satisfied that the replacement is in the interest of justice, they will give that leave. Before that, there is no limitation.

Job interview according to the laws of Washington State, USA

According to the laws of Washington State, USA; 1) Is it legal for a person to be asked their preferred pronouns during an candidate job interview? 2) Is it legal for a company to ask anything that could cause bias during a candidate job interview? 3) Is it legal for a company to require or force the interviewer who conducted the job interview to use the candidate preferred pronouns, even if that interviewer does not want to do so? Thank you

There are no specific Washington laws that would deviate significantly from the US law answer. You cannot ask a person a question about their sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation (gender identity and employment are established law in Washington, and possibly the law at the federal level), but at least under present legal standards, a question about preferred pronouns is not necessarily in violation of that restriction. However, it is implausible that such a question would be asked in a interview for the purpose of not offending the candidate, since pronouns are sex-uniform for first and second person, so you would simply address the candidate as "you". Asking for preferred pronouns in an interview is tantamount to asking for prohibited information on sex and sexual orientation. Very many questions that can lead to bias, and are perfectly legal, for example "Have you ever operated a fork lift?" creates a bias against a person who gives a negative answer, when the job is operating a fork lift. There are protected categories such as sex and religion, and asking questions about those categories can lead to legal action against the company. This is the state's list of prohibited categories, which includes Opposition to a discriminatory practice; Presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability; Use of a trained dog guide or service animal; HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C Status; Race/Color; Creed; National Origin;Sex (including pregnancy); Marital Status; Age (40+); Sexual Orientation, including Gender Identity; Honorably discharged Veteran or Military Status; State Employee or Health Care Whistleblower Status Since you refer to the hiring entity as a "company", I assume the entity is a private business. A private business may mandate that an employee express a particular viewpoint in the course of employment, or prohibit them from doing so. So if the boss tells you to use or not use a particular word, that is legal. An exception would be if there is a religious basis for your resistance to complying with the employer's rule. An employer cannot mandate that you act contrary to the principles of your religion, and they must make reasonable accommodations in case there is some conflict. Thus if your religion prohibits you from eating lettuce or working on Saturday, they cannot force you to do these things. I am not aware of any religion that actually dictates that it is forbidden to address a biological female who identifies as male as "he", but that doesn't matter, since the law also does not make determinations as to what are "legitimate religious beliefs". If a person purports that they must, according to their religion, use the pronouns "she" (etc.) when speaking of a biological female, then that is the end of the matter: the employer must make a reasonable accommodation. In other words, it depends on why the interviewer doesn't want to.

How does one get a Personal Violence Order against someone whose name is not known?

According to the local courts in the Northern Territory, to apply for a PVO the defendant's name and address is required. How does one go about getting a PVO against a neighbour whose name no one in the community knows ? Note: This question is not about a domestic violence order, but a personal violence order where violence is anticipated. The police are not authorised to give out interim PVOs (They do give out interim DVOs)

Here's what I had to do : After going through this harrowing phase, I thought I will post an update in case some one is in such a situation. The Northern Territory's Personal Violence Restraining Order act has a clause (section 21) which basically says if the applicant believes a third party knows the defendant's name then the applicant can request the court to order the third party(power, water, electoral roll, etc) to provide the name if the applicant has already made reasonable efforts in finding out the persons name and hasn't been able to. The third parties will only oblige to a court order. I am almost certain every state/territories' act (in Australia) will have such a clause. It was a challenge to get the court registry to accept the application as the front counter staff/supervisor/supervisor's supervisor were all unaware of this provision (to make an application for a PVRO but get the judge to first order the third party). I had to carry with me the act with the highlighted portion for them to read, analyse and consult with other court staff to even take my application in. At least in the NT there are community legal help services available for no fee and I highly recommend them.

Criminal law in the Vatican State

According to the media a former ambassador from the Vatican to the Dominican Republic is being put on trial in the Vatican for being in possesion of child pornography. This makes me wonder how the legal system works in the "country" of the Vatican State. What, for example, is the penalty for what this person is accused of doing? In what way, for example, is the Pope involved in the judicial proceedings in the Vatican? Are there any good references on this?

The penalty in this case What, for example, is the penalty for what this person is accused of doing? This (or at least an upper limit) is given in the very article you cite: At the time of his arrest the Vatican said that if convicted he could face up to 12 years in jail. There's your answer to that question. The laws of the Vatican - and a good reference I don't want to embark on a complete explanation of the way laws work in the Vatican City, but I have found a "good reference" . In a nutshell, The VCS came into existence as a sovereign nation in 1929 with the signing of the Lateran Treaty between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy. The signing effectively ended the “Roman Question,” the decades old tension between the Catholic Church and the nation of Italy. Prior to the treaty, the relationship between the Church and the country was governed by the Law of Papal Guarantees, an Italian law that allowed the Pope a certain amount of autonomy within the borders of Italy. The Lateran Treaty consisted of three separate documents spread over twenty-seven articles and four annexes: an agreement acknowledging the Vatican as an independent state, also known as the Treaty of Conciliation; a concordat on church state relations between the city state and Italy; and a financial convention liquidating the financial claims of the Holy See against Italy. In signing the treaty, Italy ceded 108.7 acres of Rome to the Holy See, thus creating the world’s smallest sovereign nation. At the signing, Pope Pius XI was represented by Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, papal secretary of state, while King Emanuel III was represented by Benito Mussolini, prime minister of Italy. The Lateran Treaty was incorporated into the Italian Constitution sixteen years later in 1947. . . . On the same day that the Lateran Treaty was signed, the VCS adopted a constitution in the form of six constitutional (or fundamental) laws: Fundamental Law of the City of the Vatican; Law of the Source of Laws; Law on the Rights of Citizenship and Sojourn; Law on Administrative Organization; Law on Economic, Commercial, and Professional Organization; and Law of Public Security. Under the second of these laws, the sources of VCS law were comprised of the Codex Iuris Canonici (Canon Law Code), and “[t]he laws promulgated for the City of the Vatican by the Sovereign Pontiff or by any other authority delegated by him, as well as the regulations lawfully issued by the competent authority.” Article 3 of this law also allowed for the use of Italian law as well as provincial and municipal Roman law when they did not conflict with canon law, the rules of the Lateran Treaty (and, later, the 1984 Concordat), or divine law. The role of the Pope The VCS is a unique entity in that the state’s monarch is also the spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church throughout the world. As the elected absolute temporal monarch of the state, the Pope has full legislative, executive, and judicial authority over the jurisdiction. The Pope delegates most of this authority to a variety of organs within the Vatican City, all of whose members may be appointed or removed at the discretion of the Pope. The powers and duties of these various organs are described in detail later in this article. In other words, everybody answers to the Pope. He may not oversee this particular case, but he theoretically could. More specifically, though, The judicial system of the VCS is organized as follows: a sole judge (Giudice Unico) presiding over a court of limited jurisdiction; a three-judge Tribunal (Tribunale); a four-member Court of Appeals (Corte d’Appello); and, finally, the Supreme Court of Appeals (Corte di Cassazione). It is important to distinguish these judicial organs from those of the Roman Curia, which is the administrative arm of the Holy See. Cases from temporal VCS courts are not generally reported, but a listing of the types of cases tried before each of the courts is published in L’Attivita della Santa Sede, the annual yearbook.

Is the New Jersey quarantine rule a legal requirement or merely a recommendation?

According to the official New Jersey COVID-19 Information Hub as of March 8, 2021 (emphasis in original), Travelers and residents returning from any U.S. state or territory beyond the immediate region (New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) should self-quarantine at their home, hotel, or other temporary lodging following recommendations from the CDC:... The self-quarantine is voluntary, but compliance is expected . The site comes out and seems to say that the quarantine is voluntary, but then says that "compliance is expected". Is there a legal penalty or intervention for not following the above guidelines, or are these rules enforced solely through social pressure (frowns, social ostracism, gossip, etc.)? To be clear , I'm not asking for the socially responsible or healthy choice, but the legal one. For example, if someone were to walk into a NJ government office and loudly proclaim that they had just arrived from Texas and won't be self-quarantining, is there anything they can do except appeal to the person's conscience? In other words, is the description of the quarantine as "voluntary" more a recognition that public health authorities are not actively monitoring and pursuing visitors as a matter of practice or is it a recognition that the state literally has no legal means to force visitors to comply? Also to be clear , I'm asking solely about the general quarantine described above. Cases where someone has tested positive for COVID-19 or been specifically identified as a close contact of someone who did are out of scope for this question. Why someone would want to travel to New Jersey is out of scope for this question.

Is the New Jersey quarantine rule a legal requirement or merely a recommendation? Even if the rule had force of law, the language indicates that self-quarantine is optional. The term "expectation" merely indicates the government's preference. Black's Law Dictionary defines voluntary as " unimpelled by another's influence [...]. Proceeding from the free and unrestrained will of the person. [...] Produced in or by an act of choice ". Likewise, should is defined as " usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from 'ought', ". is the description of the quarantine as "voluntary" more a recognition that public health authorities are not actively monitoring and pursuing visitors as a matter of practice or is it a recognition that the state literally has no legal means to force visitors to comply? It suggests the former, although "monitoring" is different from "enforcing". The authorities could monitor merely for purposes of doing projections, that is, without penalizing the people who decide not to self-quarantine. The excerpt reflects that in the government's opinion the circumstances do not warrant making [self-]quarantine compulsory.

Are names used within a TV show (for example, the name of a fictional business) automatically copyrighted?

According to the personal account of one of the founders of the Bubba Gump Shrimp Co, he waited hours outside the gates of Paramount Studios to license the name "Bubba Gump Shrimp" (which first appeared and was popularized by the film Forrest Gump) to use with his shrimp business, hoping to capitalize on the fact that millions of people would be familiar with the name thanks to the movie. This raises the question; is a fictional business name used inside a movie or TV show automatically copyrighted ? If a popular TV show features a fictional business, can I open a business just like it in real life - with the same name and in the same industry?

It’s not copyrighted but it is trademarked Names of businesses generally do not have copyright protection because they usually lack the necessary element of creativity required for a literary work. Either they are a name (e.g. Ford), a common word (e.g. Apple) or are purely descriptive (e.g. International Business Machines - IBM). However, they do have trademark protection. This is true whether the business is real or fictional. Now, trademarks can lapse if they are not used so if the BGSC has not been created until now, the movie studio would have a hard time claiming trademark, however, at the time there was clearly a trademark.

Have all U.S. wars since world war 2 been unconstitutional?

According to the website of the U.S. senate: The Constitution grants Congress the sole power to declare war. Congress has declared war on 11 occasions, including its first declaration of war with Great Britain in 1812. Congress approved its last formal declaration of war during World War II. Since that time it has agreed to resolutions authorizing the use of military force and continues to shape U.S. military policy through appropriations and oversight. However, Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution remains unchanged. Since congress has not officially held a vote for declaring war - have they essentially been intentionally ignoring the constitution for the last 60 or so years? I thought the purpose of the constitution was to bind the government in its powers? The Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, the Afghanistan War of 2001 and the Iraq War - none of them were initiated with an official vote by congress.

The Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, the Afghanistan War of 2001 and the Iraq War - none of them were initiated with an official vote by congress. This is inaccurate. President Truman did break from precedent when he initiated a "police action" (read: not a war) on the Korean peninsula in mid-1950, and perhaps took advantage of an impending July recess when that "police action" started to look more and more like a "war". There were however plenty of votes that Congress held during the remainder of the year that supported the actions that President Truman was taking. There were quite a few people serving in congress that raised a fuss about it at the time, but ultimately went along and funded the operations. Congress passed H.J. RES 1145 , dated August 7th, 1964 after a US ship was attacked in international waters (the Gulf of Tonkin, which is why this legislation is more informally known as the "Gulf of Tonkin resolution"). This gave President Johnson authority to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam. After awhile, Congress decided to retake some control back from President Nixon when they passed the "War Powers Resolution" in 1973. From their point of view this gave the Commander-in-Chief the power to protect American interests while at the same time limiting the scope of any action possible by placing a time limit on what the President can do unilaterally. A President can commit forces if they feel it necessary, but must notify Congress within 48 hours of doing so and only allows action to proceed for a total maximum of 90 days. After that, for any military involvement by the United States to continue, Congress must authorize it. Because of that legislation, Congress now passes what people call "AUMFs" ( a uthorization for the u se of m ilitary f orce). Desert Storm was authorized by a bill titled "Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678". Military operations in Afghanistan were also approved in a similar way with a bill titled "Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States" which was signed into law by President Bush on September 18th, 2001 (one week after 9/11). All of this is to say that Congress has, in effect, ceded some of the power granted to them under the Constitution to the Office of the President, but not without reason. The ultimate answer to your title question, however, is that we have absolutely no idea. The only people with standing that can challenge in a court of law any given action would be Congress itself, and it has never chosen to do so. And, really, why would it when it can just pass legislation targeting anything the President does that they don't at least tacitly agree to? That way they can get what they want without having to worry how a squeamish Supreme Court may rule. It doesn't help matters that pretty much every single President since Nixon has in some form argued that the War Powers Act itself is unconstitutional. Additionally, there's not a single member of any branch of the Armed Forces which would listen to orders given to them by any member of Congress which contradict orders given to them by the President because doing so is likely to land them in jail. What we've more or less settled in to is that yes, Congress controls the power of "war making" by controlling the funding of the operations themselves, and the President can fulfill their obligation to protect and defend the United States and it's interests regardless of whether Congress is currently back home kissing babies at the moment. Below is a non-exhaustive list of pre-World War II military actions that the US participated in or against foreign territories without a formal declaration of war: "The Indian Wars" * First Barbary War (1801-1805) Philippine–American War (1899-1902) Pancho Villa Expedition (1916) *- The Indian Wars is actually a 300+ year long intermittent conflict between European Settlers (after awhile referred to as "Americans") and different groups of Native Americans who had lived on the continent for thousands of years. This one bullet point could easily be deconstructed into dozens of individual conflicts.

What action can I take if an employer asks me to work more than 48 hours per week?

According to the working time directive : You can’t work more than 48 hours a week on average Suppose that an employee has been coerced into working more than 48 hours a week. According to the same page: Your employer can ask you to opt out, but you can’t be sacked or treated unfairly for refusing to do so Suppose also that: The employee is not in a profession exempt from the working time directive The employee has not signed an opt out clause The amount of hours worked is not in question, e.g. is logged in a timesheet system My question is, what action can the employee take in a case like this?

According to the UK government website at https://www.gov.uk/maximum-weekly-working-hours the first port of call is ACAS. Alternatively you can refuse to work on average more than 48 hours per week averaged over 17 weeks (that's what the regulations state...) and your employer can either live with your refusal or they can sack you. At which point you take them to an industrial tribunal for wrongful dismissal. Effectively your employer can ask you to exceed 48 hours per week until such time as your 17-week average would exceed 48 hours per week... I presume your contract of employment allows this (or does not specifically forbid it) and provides some form of extra remuneration / time off in lieu / states that you have to work as they request without extra remuneration. Personally if you are in this situation, I'd live with it until it reached the working time directive limit and then refuse to do more than 48 hours per week... and in the interim I'd join a union and start looking for a new job. That way if you refuse to work and they sack you, you have a union to help you take your (ex) employer to industrial relations tribunal and/or you would have an alternative job. Even if you on average don't exceed the 17-week average I'd consider changing jobs because an employer that forces you to work long hours is waving a red flag as to their suitability as employer already. Be aware also that if they don't pay you extra you should check that your employer is then not in breach of minimum pay regulations... that's a whole new stick you can beat them with.

Public Domain provisions in Norwegian law

According to this , Norway has a "joint collecting society in Norway for musicians, performing artists and phonogram producers", Gramo, that performing artists must pay a levy to Gramo when publicly performing works that are in the public domain. According to this , there are "legal provisions" in place that ensure this. What exactly are these legal provisions?

While it's hard to prove a negative, it looks to me like the claim is false and arises from a misunderstanding of who pays the levy and who receives it. Reference text For reference, I'm going to cite the relevant passage of your first link from FFUK, the Norwegian fund for performing artists: Changes in legislation entail that users must pay remuneration to Gramo (joint collecting society in Norway for musicians, performing artists and phonogram producers) for the use of copyright-protected recordings, and a levy to the Fund for the use of non-protected recordings. This applies both to broadcasting and to other public use. The basis for this appears to come from § 45b of the Copyright Act *: Sound fixations of the performances of performing artists can, within the period of time specified in section 45, against remuneration, be made available to the pubic [sic] through public performance. [...] Both the producer of the fixation and the performing artists whose performances are reproduced are entitled to remuneration. [...] For public performance of sound fixations that are not protected under the copyright act, the Act No. 4 of 14 December 1956 relating to a levy on the public performance of performing artists’ performances, etc. applies. Explanation FFUK is a fund for performing artists, not one that takes from performing artists. In this situation, it is not the performing artist that pays the levy, but rather those who make use of a "sound fixation" (recording) of a performance of the performing artist. An example would be a TV network that wishes to broadcast a pre-recorded orchestra performance. If this performance is a song under copyright, then that TV network must pay remuneration to Gramo so that the songwriters, producers, performers etc. can receive compensation. However, if that song is in the public domain then Gramo has no claim to any remuneration. This is where FFUK is involved. The Act No 4. of 14 December 1956 authorizes levies for these performances of public domain songs, and it is under this act that FFUK operates. The TV network must pay them a levy so that the performers may still be compensated as they still have rights over the performance of a public domain song. While all this explains the first link you cite, I realize that I'm not directly addressing the claims in the second link. I simply can't find a legal basis for those claims, and still think it's more likely that it's confusing levies for the performance of public domain works (non-existant as far as I can tell) with levies for using performances of public domain works. I would be happy to be corrected if I'm wrong though. *Linked are unofficial translations of the law because I do not speak Norwegian. The linked Copyright Act is a consolidated version from 2007, the most recent for which WIPO had an English translation. There was a small amendment in 2009 , which with the help of Google Translate, does not affect the analysis. There were more extensive amendments in 2015 , but those only came into force October 1, 2015, after the date of your question.

Can one sell allowed product and "give" unallowed product for free?

According to this : A student was selling paninis to other students. When campus police made him stop because it's against school rules to sell food outside of approved bake sales, he began selling paper towels for the same price and giving a free panini with each paper towel. In general would one be allowed to give away a product for which one lacks a permit to sell, conditioned on people purchasing a product for which no permit is required?

If the ability to get a Pannini is conditioned on buying paper towels for money, then he isn't really selling paper towels for $2 and the Pannini for free, he is really selling a package consisting of paper towels and a Pannini for $2, so it would probably still be illegal. The phrase lawyers and judges use to talk about attempts to create loopholes like this one is " too clever by half ", which means: "Shrewd but flawed by overthinking or excessive complexity, with a resulting tendency to be unreliable or unsuccessful."

Is the National Enquirer guilty of the crime of blackmail?

According to this Guardian article , the National Enquirer has written to Jeff Bezos threatening to publish nude pictures of Bezos unless he stops his investigation into how the Enquirer obtained some private messages. According to this article by law professor Eugene Volokh in the Washington Post, this is the "paradox of blackmail", where A threatens to do something legal unless B does something else which is also legal. The paradox is, how do we define the crime of blackmail in such a case without also criminalising all sorts of perfectly honest and beneficial behaviour, such as threatening a lawsuit unless stolen money is repaid. So my question is, assuming the Guardian article and Bezos's assertions are accurate, has the National Enquirer committed the crime of blackmail? I'm specifically interested in whether this is a crime under the relevant laws, rather than whether this falls under the dictionary definition of blackmail.

Eugene Volokh has now opined on exactly this question. He says that legitimate threats need to have a "nexus" between the threat and the required deed. Hence threatening a lawsuit to recover money is not blackmail because the lawsuit is about the money. However in this case there does not seem to be a nexus between the photographs that the National Enquirer is threatening to publish and the investigation that it wants terminated. Hence the National Enquirer is probably guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(d): Whoever, with intent to extort from any person ... any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate ... commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Volokh also notes that the NE has probably also violated Washington state law, as that covers acts against people and property in Washington even when committed by an out-of-state actor.

Is it true that the UK head of state does not require a passport to travel?

According to this Guardian quiz , the British monarch is not required to have a passport. The question asks "Which of these things does the Queen not need to have?" and gives the options: "A driver's licence", "A licence plate on vehicles", and "A passport". The correct answer is: All of the above That's £75.50 saved every few years not having to renew a passport for a start. The Queen learnt to drive in the military in the 1940s but is not formally required to have a licence, and is able to drive in unmarked vehicles I can understand the first two since both a driver's licence and vehicle licence plates are internal state matters and a state can decide to do whatever it wants with them. However, a passport, while also issued by a state, is a document that is required by other states to let you travel. The official site of the British Royal Family states that: As a British passport is issued in the name of Her Majesty, it is unnecessary for The Queen to possess one. All other members of the Royal Family, including The Duke of Edinburgh and The Prince of Wales, have passports. That's all well and good, but I don't understand how the UK can waive the requirement here. Surely it is up to the country the monarch is traveling to to decide whether or not they have the required documents to be allowed entry. So is this actually true, does the Queen of the UK not require a passport and, if so, what's the legal basis for it? Can't another country refuse her entry for lack of a passport or is there some sort of global law/regulation that allows any head of state to travel without the proper documentation?

My understanding is that officially a passport is document issued by the origin state extending the protection of that state to the individual the holds it. Originally it would only be given to official representatives of the state. The queen IS the state. She has ultimate authority over the armed services, and it is her protection that is being extended by a passport. She does not require any further protection to be extended to her, as she is the source of the protection.

Double Jeopardy in Texas v. Young?

According to this Texas Tribune article, in Texas v. Young, Clinton Young was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Fifteen years later, a Texas court of appeals has thrown out his conviction and remanded him to a county jail, where he will wait while the state decides whether or not to retry him. My question is how can they retry him? Wouldn't that be violating double jeopardy?

If you are convicted you can be retried (indeed, on appeal, you asked for a retrial). Double jeopardy prevents retrials in cases of acquittals and some mistrials, not convictions.

When a company sues the "U.S.", who are they really suing?

According to this Wall Street Journal report , Huawei is suing the "U.S.". What does this really mean? Are they suing the entire U.S. government, a branch of the U.S. government, the people of the U.S., or something else? And in which type of court will this lawsuit be heard?

According to this Wall Street Journal report, Huawei is suing the "U.S.". What does this really mean? Are they suing the entire U.S. government, a branch of the U.S. government, the people of the U.S., or something else? This means that he is either (1) suing the United States government as an entity, or (2) a federal government official, in either (a) an official capacity action seeking injunctive or habeas corpus relief, or (b) in a personal capacity in a Bivens action (suing the official for violating his constitutional rights). It is not possible to sue "the people of the U.S." It is also not possible to sue a branch of the U.S. government unless it is an independent agency with a federal corporate charter that gives it the right to sue and be sued in its own name (e.g. the U.S. Post Office or AMTRAK or the FDIC). You cannot, for example, properly sue "the Commerce Department" or the "IRS", although a generous judge might treat such a suit as a suit against the United States of America. The jurisdictional statute (5 U.S.C. § 702) cited in the Complaint states (emphasis added): A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. **An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action , and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States: Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. The pleading linked by @Putvi, in that answer, indicates that the suit is against the United States of American and against several U.S. government officials in their official capacity seeking declaratory relief and injunctive relief in a U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (i.e. (1) and (2)(a) above, but not (2)(b)). And in which type of court will this lawsuit be heard? A suit against the U.S. as an entity seeking money damages is brought in the U.S. Court of Claims. But, usually, such actions are either for contract disputes, or plain vanilla negligence torts where there is a waiver of sovereign immunity (e.g. a routine car accident against a Department of Commerce official driving carelessly from one work site to the next in an official vehicle an causing an accident). In this case, however, it is a suit brought in a U.S. District Court which has jurisdiction over all forms of suits against federal government officials and separately incorporated entities whether seeking money damages or injunctive relief, and suits against the United States as an entity that do not seek money damages. (FWIW, If I recall correctly, U.S. District Courts also have jurisdiction over inverse condemnation actions and eminent domain actions even though they are claims for money damages against the United States.) The nominal defendant in a habeas corpus action is the prison warden or comparable jail official (often a sheriff). Even if there were a mix of federal and non-federal claims, the U.S. District Court would have jurisdiction over the non-federal claims via both supplementary jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.

$1,000 Minimum for Criminal Copyright Infringement

According to this answer , criminal copyright requires at least $1,000 of copied work within a 6 months period: An element of criminal copyright infringement, a minimum amount of copying. I believe the US statute specifies at least $1,000 worth of copied works within a 6-month period, but by policy the DOJ does not prosecute unless the matter is much bigger than that. If one copies $500 worth of work from 20 different copyright owners, do we add up all work to the total (= $10,000) or does it mean $1,000 per owner?

Criminal copyright infringement is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) . It is established when the infringement was committed: (A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000; or (C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution. So, there is no monetary threshold required. If there is $1000 worth of infringement, that just gets around the requirement to demonstrate the purpose under (A). The amount is an aggregate of all infringements included in the charge. The wording is "1 or more copies... of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000 ". And this becomes a felony under if the total comes to more than $2,500 (18 U.S.C. § 2319). The Department of Justice describes this offence and the felony variant here , but it's a pretty straightforward reading of the text. See also Lydia Pallas Loren, " Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement " (1999): This Act criminalizes the reproduction or distribution of one or more copies of copyrighted works that have an aggregate retail value of over $1,000 during any 180 day period." You can see an real indictment making these felony charges against Kim Dotcom and others here . Note how they break the charges down into different 180-day blocks of time, each alleging infringement of works having a total retail value of more than $2,500.

Are there any opportunities to Socratically question an opposing counsel on their legal arguments in a civil trial?

According to this answer, https://law.stackexchange.com/a/90414/48046 Opposing counsel was called as a witness for examination in the American scopes trial. Is such a practice allowed in English trial practice? Concerns here that come to mind: Must a witness have previously filed a witness statement per se if they are to be called to the stand? Opposing counsel nonetheless will be physically present and available at the trial, AND will have drafted/submitted case presentation or argument outlines to the court on which they may be questioned. If not, are there any other techniques which may be employed to be able to achieve this sort of direct dialogue wherein the coherence/integrity of the opposing counsel’s legal arguments may be challenged?

What would be the point? Legal arguments are not made in front of the jury or the witness. Nor are they made on oath. They are made to the judge who hears the position of both sides and can ask questions if they want. Normally, the discussion is polite and relatively free-flowing. The judge may put forward their own view of the law. They may consult statute books or query case law to sort it out then and there. If it’s really complicated, the judge may call for written submissions citing authorities and may call an adjournment while that happens, or they may excuse the current witness and come back to them when the matter is resolved.

Is the affirmative defense of self-defense available for the crime of terroristic threats?

According to this article , the DOJ may charge individuals who attempt to spread COVID-19 with terroristic acts/threats. Suppose that an individual, say Bob, is being assaulted or otherwise a crime is being committed against an individual for which it is generally appropriate to use self defense in response. Call the criminal Joe. Suppose this occurs in one of the fifty states of the United States (if your answer is state specific please note it in your answer). Suppose that Bob coughs on Joe in an act of self defense and generally attempts to defend himself by spreading his illness. Suppose that an objective lay person and Bob himself believes that Bob is infected with SARS-COV-2 (causing the disease of COVID-19). Also, an objective lay person and Bob would feel that Joe’s actions if not stopped would cause imminent harm to Bob, but would not result in death. Suppose further that Bob believes that his acts of coughing would act as a deterrent to reduce the chance of Joe assaulting/attacking Bob. Is this a legally permissible act for Bob to do? Is there any crime Bob is committing?

This isn’t self defence Self defence involves reasonable steps to end an imminent threat. How does causing the assaulter to die in 2 weeks of Covid deal with the imminent threat?

Is Apple scanning user content for child abuse a violation of GDPR?

According to this article Apple is scanning all the photos users have on their devices to detect possible child abuse. The article explains that a NeuralHash of each image will be uploaded to Apple servers. It also claims that the NeuralHash is only a fingerprint of the image. But that is not true, a hashing made by a neural network is reversible, the reconstructed image will not be as good as the original, but it can be compared to a lossy compression with high loss. Is this compatible with the European GDPR? Can a corporation upload user content to their servers without asking the user permission? Related question: https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/68507/can-countries-prevent-foreign-corporations-like-apple-from-acting-as-private-pol Update: Thanks to the pointer from @Fizz I found the reference to the exception for child abuse recently voted. It is a bit ambiguous because as a law it should be immediately applicable, but member states should anyway update their legislation to avoid conflict. And the news reporting the laws mention some constraints. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2463 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0568

According to a Politico article from July this year EU Parliament lets companies look for child abuse on their platforms, with reservations The European Parliament on Tuesday approved a controversial law that would allow digital companies to detect and report child sexual abuse on their platforms for the next three years. Tuesday's vote was the final hurdle for the bill, and will allow companies to scan their platforms for explicit material without fear of violating Europe's strict privacy laws. The bill pitted the European Commission, who proposed the bill, and children's rights activists against the Parliament and Europe's privacy regulators, who fear the bill could undermine the EU's privacy rules. The results showed 537 MEPs voted in favor of the bill, with 133 against and 24 abstaining. Despite the result, [some] European lawmakers warned that the rules are "legally flawed" and could crumble in front of a court. [...] MEPs also said that the blanket scanning of private messages of European citizens to look for evidence of child grooming could clash with another set of privacy rules protecting personal data, the GDPR. To allay the Parliament's concerns, EU countries agreed to modify the Commission’s law to add additional safeguards, including bringing in Europe's network of privacy watchdogs to advise on what technologies should be used to do the scanning, and how they should be used. They also left out audio messages from the bill. The changes prompted Sippel, who was negotiating on behalf of the Parliament, to sign off on the bill. So YMMV, but insofar it looks pretty legal unless a court decides otherwise. It seems Apple went public with their plan after this EU law was passed, so they probably took it into account. For what's that worth, there's an analysis from someone at Cambridge (in the Compliant and Accountable Systems Group, Department of Computer Science and Technology) that: EU law would require that Apple obtain the consent of individual iPhone users for on-device scanning. This consent would need to be opt-in, rather than opt-out; there would need to be a real possibility for users to refuse consent; users’ access to iCloud could not be made conditional on giving consent to CSAM Detection; and users must be able to withdraw consent without suffering loss of iCloud service. This may place a welcome brake on the deployment of on- device CSAM detection in the EU. However, these barriers may be removed by future EU or Member State legislation – just as similar potential barriers for automated CSAM detection by certain messaging services have already been removed by EU legislation. So it seems that there would be a way for Apple to do this "device scanning" even in the EU with user (clickwrap) agreement... The paper enumerates the things than can be made implicit (bundled) in a GDPR agreement, and then goes on to argue that probably none of these apply to Apple's CSAM on device, and so they'll probably need a separate checkbox for CSAM... which the paper's author is pretty sure the users would not check. Importantly, because consent must be specific, consent to one purpose (such as processing to detect CSAM) can’t be presumed from consent to another purpose (such as processing for cloud backup). Nor can consent to processing to detect CSAM be ‘bundled’ with consent to cloud backup. GDPR strongly indicates that ‘bundling’ – the practice of making access to a service conditional on giving consent to processing that is not necessary for that service – is not permitted. [...] It is unlikely in the extreme that even minimally informed holders of CSAM would give consent to Apple’s CSAM Detection system. The paper more tenuously (IMHO) argues then that Apple needs do the same for their server-side scanning in the EU, i.e. get explicit consent, because it's somehow tied to the on-device scanning via the iCloud account. (The author also makes their personal disapproval of CSAM in all forms more explicit towards the end of the paper.) But still that someone who disapproves of CSAM entertains that it might be deployed via clickwrap user consent (albeit with a separate checkbox) is noteworthy. In this context I'll note (even though the paper doesn't), that there is a 2019 CJEU decision that pre-checking certain kinds of checkboxes (like for "nonessential" cookies) is not legal. I suspect CSAM will fall in this kind of category... so they won't be able to have the checkbox for it pre-checked, unless Apple does something more devious and make it so that image hashes become "essential" to something else that the user would more readily like to agree to... Also, looking at a current (August 1) Apple description of their system, it seems they only plan to run the image hashing on the device (and upload a threshold-encrypted version of the result, so that only multiple, cumulative "hits" on several images would be detectable/decryptable on the server), which would basically make their system (as currently envisaged) inoperable without the local hash step. I've also looked at Commission's 70-page impact assessment for their most recent proposal (the one discussed at the beginning of this answer), but it only discusses things like PhotoDNA and server-side hashing. So I guess they were unware that someone might plan to do [only] client-side hashing as part of a CSAM design. If this goes to an EU court, I guess an issue will be when and why iOS would create those (threshold-encrypted) vouchers that contain the images hashes, e.g. if they'd be considered an essential part/step of an otherwise approved purpose...

Is it legal to translate light novel works from Korea and publishing it on a website located in the EU?

According to this article Translation is typically considered a derivative work. While this varies from country to country, translation is considered derivative because it exists in relation to an original work, in this case a work of literature such as a novel or poem. Even though it is derivative, translations are eligible for copyright as an original work. Since a translation, especially literary translation, involves considerable creative effort, labour and skill on the part of the translator it can be registered as an original work. Thus my question is: Is it legal to translate light novel works from Korea and publishing it on a website located in the EU ? If it's legal, would it still be legal to do so when a US/EU company has the legal rights to translating it ?

I don't know of any country in which doing such a translation without permission from the copyright holder would not be an infringement of copyright. To be more positive, making such a translation would infringe copyright in every country that I am aware of unless one had permission from the copyright holder. If done with permission, the translation would be a new work with its own copyright, again in every country that I know of. The Berne Copyright Convention Art 2 Section 3 says: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. If the original work is extensive enough and original enough to be protected by copyright, so will the translation, unless the original is primarily art, with a very short caption, say 5-6 words. The the caption alone would not be sufficient to be protected, and neither would the translation. The translator(s) will normally hold the copyright in the translation, unless it is a work-for-hire or the copyright has been assigned/sold to someone else. The copyright holder of the original work will also have rights, including the right to prevent or permit further derivative works, as they would also derive from the original. Terms for publishing the translation would be a matter of agreement between the copyright holder on the original, and the holder on the translation.

Can grand juries indict people without the prosecutor asking?

According to this article about Bridgegate : Then, in a dramatic twist, Brennan called for any New Jersey citizen currently serving on a grand jury to exercise their legal right to summon him to testify before them and indict the governor. "If anybody in the state of New Jersey is currently sitting on a grand jury, I implore you: Summon me before you," urged Brennan. "I will come before you with the transcripts and the evidence and you can get an indictment. Any grand jury, without prodding from the prosecutor, can call witnesses and demand evidence and demand this case be prosecuted...without the prosecutor's help. " Dennis Kearney, a former assistant prosecutor in Essex County who's now a partner in the criminal defense firm of Day Pitney, said such a move, while technically possible, would be unprecedented, and "very unlikely" to happen. "The idea that a grand jury would 'go rogue'?" asked Kearney. "I've never seen it, and I go before grand juries for a living." The phrase "demand this case be prosecuted" is rather ambiguous, and I'm not sure whether they mean that the jury could air Christie's dirty laundry in public until the prosecutor agreed to formally ask for an indictment, or that the jury could actually perform the indictment on its own. Do grand juries have the power to indict people all by themselves, or does the prosecutor have to initiate the process? Are there any known examples of a grand jury "going rogue" as they describe?

Traditionally, anyone could bring a bill of indictment to a grand jury. This article from Creighton Law Review provides some historical context. Government prosecutors are the overwhelming norm now, but private prosecution used to be more common. Indeed, New Jersey still has limited authorization for private prosecution (Court rule 3:23-9(d) ). The New Jersey rule governing the grand jury is 3:6 , and rule 3:6-8(a) on return of indictment says: An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors and shall be returned in open court to the Assignment Judge or, in the Assignment Judge's absence, to any Superior Court judge assigned to the Law Division in the county. With the approval of the Assignment Judge, an indictment may be returned to such judge by only the foreperson or the deputy foreperson rather than with all other members of the grand jury. Such judge may direct that the indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial and in that event it shall be sealed by the clerk, and no person shall disclose its finding except as necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons. Note that the jurors decide on an indictment and return the indictment to a judge, not the prosecutor. In the rules governing grand juries, the prosecutor is allowed to be present and to speak, but has no official controlling role, other than whatever leadership is granted by the foreman. I don't know whether it is universal that grand juries do what the prosecutor tells them to, such as indicting a ham sandwich, but at least theoretically they have the power to act independently. The rules actually do not say who can ask questions of a witness, which could lead one to conclude that of course it is the prosecutor (and that the prosecutor does everything, except vote on the indictment).

What limited legal rights do bondholders, suppliers, and employees have in a corporation?

According to this article corporations prior to the 1970s were run differently; until the idea that Milton Freidman put forth that a corporation's job was to maximize shareholder value; before that bondholders, suppliers, and employees had equal limited legal rights with the shareholders; quoting from the article: "In this regard, shareholders stand on equal footing with the corporation’s bondholders, suppliers, and employees, all of whom also enter contracts with the firm that give them limited legal rights." What were these limited legal rights, and how was this different from the way corporations worked post Milton Friedman?

First of all, there was no material change in the law, this is a misunderstanding (to some extent a misunderstanding intended by the author) of what is being explained. The change being discussed is actually a change in how economists and corporate law theorists think about corporations. The basics of corporate law did not change significantly in the 1970s. There were some minor changes starting to take place then in law and practice, however. The most notable of these were the rise of insider trading laws with real bite, the innovation in financial practice of the leveraged buy-out which precipitated "poison pill" defense from board of directors, and the surge in CEO pay often in the form of stock options. There has been a shift in perspective and framing of the issues, but these changes are not huge changes in corporate law per se . Legal decisions allowing "poison pills" were minor anti-shareholder rights innovations. Tax laws encouraging stock option compensation were minor shareholder value oriented innovations. The theoretical basis of insider trading laws is a doctrinal muddle. No one conception of the corporation is completely dominant today and drives all legal theory and policy decisions. Secondly, Lynn Stout is engaged in a misleading bit of ret-con in her article and is presenting a misleading history of the evolution of corporate law scholarship. This history, by the way, isn't terribly old. The right to form a corporation without a specific piece of authorizing legislation of the kind that creates a government agency, for example, is only about 150 years old or so, and both internationally and until quite recently, was much harder to form (e.g. many countries, such as South Korea, require proof that a corporation has insurance in place and sufficient capital to pay its debts before it is allowed to incorporate - corporate law firms still face some of these restrictions in the U.S.) Before then, each corporation was an individual legislative concept to some extent. The notion that corporations should maximize shareholder well being, because they own the corporation, is the older and traditional view. Milton Friedman and the authors of "The Theory of The Firm" were simply restating the consensus view in a more focused and economically defined manner, not innovating. These pieces were published as apologies for that traditional view once it started to be challenged. The view of a corporation as a web of contractual relationship with bondholders, suppliers, employees, customers and shareholders is the more modern view that started to gain currency sometime around the 1960s and 1970s, which is why people like Milton Friedman felt the need to articulate a defense of the traditional view that had previously merely been assumed and gone unchallenged. The web of contracts theory was articulated initially to a great extent by corporate law theorists seeking to provide a theoretical justification for corporations to act in a responsible manner that treats its employees well, behaves honestly, goes above and beyond its legal obligations to honor the spirit as well as the letter of the law, etc. Some of the most notable corporate law responses to that theory are the law of publicly held companies in Germany, which requires that employees have a minority number of seats on the board of directors of a company, and the laws in some Scandinavian countries that call for rough gender parity on corporate boards of directors. There have also been a smattering of laws passed at least authorizing corporations to consider factors other than profit maximization. Another related version of corporate theory to the web of contract theory is the "director primacy" conception of the corporation that sees a corporate board of directors as the hub of that web of contracts and the body which corporate law should protect the power of. Professor Stephen Bainbridge at UCLA Law is one of the leading proponents of this minority view of corporate law which was starting to emerge in the 1980s to justify efforts by corporate boards to defend themselves from the emerging threats of leveraged buyouts and proxy fights. Bainbridge's view is nonetheless significant because it is an overarching theory that explains a variety of major corporate law doctrines, particularly in Delaware, whose law is dominant in the governance of publicly held corporations, that seem to be at odds with a shareholder primacy view of corporate law. It can explain the legitimacy of both "poison pills" and large CEO pay packages, the Delaware court's hostility to derivative suits, and its hostility to shareholder activism. To some extent, the "director primacy" view of corporate law is the web of contracts theory twisted and seen through a conservative lens that uses the theory to urge the law to crush the kind of shareholder activism for social good and employee rights that the original web of contracts sought to advance. The rights of everyone other than a shareholder in a corporation are simply contract law rights - bond contracts, purchase and sale contracts, employment contracts, etc. The web of contracts theory argues that the legal rights of shareholders vis-a-vis a corporation really aren't that different and that this relationship is really more like any other contract right rather than really being a genuine ownership relationship like the kind of ownership someone has over their other property that should be entitled to special consideration. This view has a lot to do with the fact that in publicly held companies, in reality, shareholders have no meaningful role in the governance of the corporation or selection of members of the board of directors via the occasional Soviet style ballots for directors that they complete. Instead, in this context, shareholders apply the "Wall Street Rule" and sell stocks of companies that they feel are ill governed and don't worry too much about their practical inability to compel dividend distributions since they can take profits from retained earns by selling their stocks. This makes them look more like people with any other commodity to trade with purely contract and not political/ownership rights. This view doesn't translate well to closely held corporations where shareholder governance rights, in practice, are much more meaningful. Also, for completeness, it is worth noting yet another emerging view of corporate law theory, developed mostly by liberals who favor campaign finance restrictions for corporations and want to restrain what they see as abuses of power by big business. This is the anti-corporate personhood movement that questions the assumption of all previous theorists that corporations should be treated in most respects as a "person" under the law. For what it is worth, in my opinion, this movement improperly conflates abuses and power divisions that arise from businesses being very large and those attributable to the corporate form of business organization itself which actually can be very helpful in regulating businesses and redressing the harms that individuals suffer from corporate activities, by making it unnecessary to identify who within the corporation in particular causes a harm attributable to the corporation in litigation and regulatory contexts.

Isn't "upskirting" illegal in the UK? Why?

According to this article https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2018/jun/15/upskirting-happened-to-me-and-now-im-changing-the-law-video "upskirting" is not illegal in the UK. That sounds unbelievable in my ears. Can someone confirm this claim? Also, why isn't this considered sexual assault or something like that? Taking of someone's clothes in a sexual way, without the camera, must be a crime, mustn't it? So why is it not a crime to take a photo of the "act"?

It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."

Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case?

According to this article in Newsweek, people are calling for Amy Coney Barrett to recuse herself from the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case because she has strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups. While these people are probably right that she is biased, this still seems a little odd to me. Barret does not have ties to 303 Creative LLC itself, or to anyone directly involved in the case. She just has ties to people with strong opinions on the issue, which seems like something that would apply to many judges in many cases. Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case?

Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? Not really. Supreme Court justices decide unreviewably whether or not to recuse themselves from cases, informed by general canons of judicial ethics which guide their decisions even though they are non-binding on Supreme Court justices. There is a strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from particular cases in which the justice was involved as lawyer prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice. There is also a fairly strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases where they have a strong, personal, and particularized to them (as opposed to general to people of their class and situation) financial interest (e.g. from cases involving companies in which they have large investments or family members who are top managers). In the example given of the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case, her strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups would normally not be a ground for recusal. General strong policy dispositions are normally not a basis for recusal. But, if instead, she were an investor in (or even a long time regular customer of) 303 Creative LLC, she would probably recuse.

How does the Spanish legal system determine cases of vicarious abuse?

According to this article in Spanish, the Spanish legal system recognizes instances of vicarious violence ( violencia vicaria ) in cases in which a person abuses or even kills their child in order to emotionally abuse their partner (or possibly only in cases in which a male partner abuses their child in order to harm their female partner). As noted in the article, there have been a number of convictions for vicarious abuse. Of course, there are other reasons why some people might hurt their children, such as part of a pattern of abuse toward the children unrelated to spousal abuse, for the purpose of collecting life insurance money, as part of sexual abuse, and so forth, so presumably there exist certain criteria in the Spanish legal system to distinguish these cases. What are the legal standards in Spain for classifying abuse or violent crimes against children as vicarious violence?

The article seems to state the legal standard which I repeat here in a Google Translate version: The former Government delegate for Gender Violence, Miguel Lorente , defines vicarious violence as "violence that, when it seeks to hurt and harm women, instead of doing it directly, seeks to harm people who have special meaning for them." Harming a child or other person with special meaning to the true target of the violence is, of course, already a serious crime in Spanish law. A finding that the crime was a form of vicarious violence is a sentencing enhancing finding of fact by the court that makes a convicted defendant eligible for what U.S. lawyers would call "life in prison with possibility for parole" even though Google Translate provides a more literal translation from the Spanish of the words used to describe the enhanced sentence for which someone becomes eligible if this is established. Of course, there are other reasons why some people might hurt their children, such as part of a pattern of abuse toward the children unrelated to spousal abuse, for the purpose of collecting life insurance money, as part of sexual abuse, and so forth, so presumably there exist certain criteria in the Spanish legal system to distinguish these cases. Other than the legal definition set forth above, there does not appear to be any further legal guidance for the courts in determining if this sentence enhancing fact has been established. It is merely a question of fact for the judges on the court to determine based upon the evidence presented at trial by the prosecution and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Lawyers for the defendant can argue that this sentence enhancer should not apply because one of the different motives in the quoted material from the question was the actual or predominant motive, and the prosecution can argue that it was indeed vicarious violence, and then the judges have to decide whether they think that the prosecution has met its burden of proof to establish this motive and impose the enhanced sentence (which is authorized, but not required, even if it is established). This isn't going to be the easiest point to make in a typical case for the defendant. Usually, the defense is primarily going to be trying to cast doubt upon whether the prosecution has met its burden of showing that the defendant is guilty of the underlying crime at all, and, for example, having the defendant testify that he did it because he was a pedophile, rather than to hurt his wife is not going to help him all that much. Instead, I would expect that the usual approach of the defendant's lawyer would be to argue that the prosecution's evidence, if believed, supports a prosecution theory of the case that, for example, this murder was about insurance money and not about intimidating the defendant's wife. Another way the the defense could fight this sentencing enhancing claim at trial would be to argue that the specific evidence of the prosecution offer to show the defendant's alleged vicarious violence motive isn't credible in all of the ways the one generally casts doubt on the credibility of evidence in a court case. For example, the defense might offer evidence from a different witness than one offered by the prosecution that cast's doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's witness. Or, the defense might ask (or have the judges in the case ask) questions of the witness who is the key witness on the vicarious violence motive issue, that casts doubt on that witnesses' own testimony (perhaps by pointing out contradictions in the testimony or that the witnesses couldn't have been where the witness claimed to be in earlier testimony). Also, it doesn't appear that vicarious violence has to be an either/or question. Nothing in the definition of vicarious violence suggests, for example, that a defendant can't both have a motive to collect insurance money, and a motive to intimidate the child's mother, at the same time, "killing two birds with one stone" so to speak.

Title IX and the "Dear colleague" letter

According to this article in the New York Post: the Obama administration, which in 2011 issued a “Dear Colleague” letter that detailed certain disciplinary processes universities must use to adjudicate sexual assault complaints. These processes lowered the standard for finding a student guilty. They encouraged colleges to keep students who hadn’t been found guilty away from their accusers. They made it harder for accusers to defend themselves by banning direct cross-examination of accusers and they allowed accusers to appeal not-guilty decisions. Emphasis mine This surprised me (I let out an audible "what the..." ) because what is described above seems like a clear breach of due process, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. This prompted me to read the actual letter, found here ; however, I could not find any mention of appealing a not-guilty verdict, which—I think—is not allowed by the Double Jeopardy clause , also in the Fifth Amendment. Where are the laws that affirm what is bolded in the quote above? Edit This is the actual letter: https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures.

How is it legal for the US miltary to decide to help a film maker based on the script?

According to this article on TV Tropes and this article in The Guardian , the US military will provide facilities to film makers, as well as advice to help them get the details right. However this is on condition that the film portrays the military in a positive light. There's a catch — a Department of Defense project officer will keep an eagle eye on the script and production phases. If they don't like the portrayal of the military in your film, they will yank the co-operation. This was a major reason for the failure of the TV series Supercarrier . Other movies DoD rejected include Forrest Gump (because the army protagonist was stupid), Mars Attacks! (because everyone was stupid), and Independence Day . However the First Amendment prohibits the government from making such decisions based on the content of the speech. The first amendment reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. According to this article on Viewpoint Discrimination: Viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination particularly disfavored by the courts. When the government engages in content discrimination, it is restricting speech on a given subject matter. When it engages in viewpoint discrimination, it is singling out a particular opinion or perspective on that subject matter for treatment unlike that given to other viewpoints. Later on the article cites a particular case: In Rosenberger , the Court held that a student religious journal at the University of Virginia was entitled to the same subsidy from student activity funds received by secular student journals. The Court concluded that the university’s policy of withholding the subsidy from student religious journals was a form of viewpoint discrimination: "[T]he University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints..." The DOD behaviour would seem precisely parallel to that of the University of Virginia in Rosenberger , in that it does not exclude criticism of the military as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those films with critical viewpoints. How is the selection of movies for support by the DOD not a form of viewpoint discrimination? Edit: Government Speech Doctrine A couple of responses have raised the government speech doctrine . This allows the government to make statements that are not content-neutral, and to pay others to do the same. The doctrine was first defined in a case where government subsidies for medical clinics included a condition that the clinics not provide advice about abortion. The Supreme Court held that since the government was paying for the doctors to give advice it could require them to say or not say anything it wanted. However this would seem to be in clear contradiction with the Rosenberger case mentioned above, where the government (through the University of Virginia) was prohibited from putting a viewpoint condition on its subsidies to student journals. In Matal vs Tam the Supreme Court followed a three-part test to determine if a particular instance of speech is by the government or not: Does the medium have a history of use to convey messages by the government? In the case of popular films where the government is not clearly identified as the maker this would seem to be false. The customary "the producers would like to thank..." at the end of the credits is insufficient to override this. Does the government maintain direct control over the messages conveyed? This is a grey area; the Guardian article above seems to show the DOD having veto power over aspects of the scripts, but paradoxically the fact that the film makers could always choose to walk away and make the film without government help seems to suggest that this control is only indirect. "Direct control" would mean the DOD themselves writing a script and then hiring film makers and actors to produce it. Does the public closely identify the message with the government? Again this would seem to be false. People go to a film to see a good story, not to listen to government propaganda, and the films in question do not advertise themselves as presenting the government point of view. So the claim that a film which receives DOD assistance is thereby deemed to have been made by the government does not seem to stack up. At the very least it would be a significant expansion of the government speech doctrine.

This question is addressed in "Viewpoint Discrimination in the Military's Filmmaker Assistance Program and the First Amendment", Communication Law and Policy 19:3 (paywall). Support of media is enabled under a DoD policy "Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-Oriented Picture, Television, and Video Productions" (version available in the wild here ), which states that [W]hen cooperation of the producers with the Government results in benefitting the Department of Defense or when this would be in the best national interest, based on consideration of the following factors: 3.1.1 The production must be authentic in its portrayal of actual persons, places, military operations, and historical events. Fictional portrayals must depict a feasible interpretation of military life, operations, and policies. 3.1.2. The production is of informational value and considered to be in the best interest of public understanding of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Department of Defense. 3.1.3. The production may provide services to the general public relating to, or enhancing, the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting and retention programs. 3.1.4. The production should not appear to condone or endorse activities by private citizens or organizations when such activities are contrary to U.S. Government policy It should be noted that the policy has not been challenged in court. As the author observes, "[t]he military has a legitimate need to engage in advertising and public relations, as it needs to promote a positive image to attract and retain personnel for an all-volunteer military service, as well as for other purposes". The author observes that the Supreme Court has noted that "'judicial deference… is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support armies," which is granted to Congress in the Constitution. that is, one should expect deference to the military by the courts. See Goldman v. Weinberger , 475 U.S. 503, which held that The First Amendment does not prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to petitioner, even though its effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs. That Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing a yarmulke in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations. A general law prohibiting wearing of a yarmulke in public would be tossed out on 1st Amendment grounds in a heartbeat: but the military enjoys not well defined latitude to restrict expression. For example, exclusions of protests on military bases has been upheld ( US v. Apel , which kicked the the First Amendment can down the road). One possibilitiy is that the court may engage in forum analysis ( Cornelius v. NAACP Leg. Def. Fund , 473 U.S. 788, see also Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes , 523 U.S. 666) as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes Public streets would be a public forum: the nature of military facilities is the threshold question. If a limited or nonpublic forum is involved, a restriction on speech may be valid if it is reasonable and viewpoint neutral ( Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez , 561 U.S. 661). Military bases fall in the nonpublic forum category. This is one prong of reasoning possible (which the author does not endorse), that in a nonpublic forum it is reasonable to consider the purpose of the underlying program. The author observes that "[u]nder an unconstitutional conditions analysis, a court would need to find that the restriction on speech at issue -- not presenting the military in a negative light -- only applies within the confines of the program itself. Along with that, the program must allow producers to engage in such speech outside of the program. That is the case here, as producers are free to make productions that are critical of the military, or that portray it in a negative light, just without the full support provided to producers who portray the military more positively". The court in Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U.S. 173 found that When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles...it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as Communism and Fascism. ... when the government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is entitled to define the limits of that program. Under the assistance program, the military does not place "a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program" (Rust at 197). Producers can be critical of the military in their productions, but have no constitutional right to do so while being assisted by the government. The final answer is far from obvious: perhaps someone will sue and we can get a definitive answer.

Finland: Criteria to judge a drawn picture child pornography (and legality of virtual child pornography in general)

According to this article on Wikipedia (and this for the source): [...] and realistic, if it resembles in a misleading manner a picture or a visual recording produced through photography or in another corresponding manner of a situation in which a child is the object of sexually offensive conduct. I have trouble interpreting that sentence, especially the part in bold. If I understand correctly, the only criteria to make the drawing illegal is that the drawing looks very similar to (and can be mistaken for) a real photo, and it can be paraphrased like this? [...] if it resembles, in a misleading manner (or in another corresponding manner), a picture or a visual recording produced through photography of a situation [...] And in general, what is the official stance on the legality of drawn child pornography (the type that can be encountered in some Japanese material like hentai and visual novels) in Finland, and is there any other criteria like obscenity in the US?

A believe that "in another corresponding manner" modifies "produced through photography" not "misleading", That is, the sentence fragment may be paraphrased as:L if it so resembles a photograph or an image or video produced through photography, or produced by some similar method, so that it could mislead a person into believing that it is a photograph or video, and if such image or video is of a situation in which a child is the object of sexually offensive conduct. The above does not seem to include most drawings, but I cannot speak to the official Finnish attitude to drawings of such situations, nor to what other laws there may be on child porn in Finland.

Do firefighters contitute a legislative power?

According to this article ref here , ref here , ref here and ref here: ...History has just been made, as the first legislative body in the country officially announces their support for reopening the 9/11 investigation. Citing “overwhelming evidence” of preplanted explosives, the fire commissioners of Franklin Square and Munson... Video of the whole event here ...the Franklin Square and Munson Fire District, which oversees a volunteer fire department serving a hamlet of 30,000 residents just outside of Queens, New York, became the first legislative body in the country to officially support a new investigation into the events of 9/11... What legislative body is that? It is said that they support a new independent investigation but whose responsibility is to start an investigation like that? Are firefighters a legislative body in the USA? Lawyers' Committee for 9/11 Inquiry have been trying the open a new investigation without result for years why is it any different now?

The fire district has five elected members who oversee the organization's $2.5 million annual budget. They are elected officials who vote on policy, but it's a stretch to refer to them as a "legislative body." Most fire departments in the United States are divisions of other government agencies and do not have their own elected officials. Here's a more detailed explanation of the Franklin Square and Munson Fire District from a New York state government report (PDF): The Franklin Square and Munson Fire District (District) is a district corporation of the State, distinct and separate from the hamlet of Franklin Square, Nassau County, in which it is located. The District covers an area of about three square miles consisting of Franklin Square, Garden City South and parts of West Hempstead, and serves about 30,000 residents. It has approximately 110 active volunteer members. The Board of Fire Commissioners (Board) is composed of five elected members and is responsible for the District’s overall financial management and safeguarding its resources. The Board appoints a Treasurer and a Secretary. The Treasurer acts as the District’s chief fiscal officer and is responsible for the receipt and custody of District funds, disbursing and accounting for those funds and meeting any other reporting requirements. The Secretary is responsible for keeping a complete and accurate record of the proceedings of each Board meeting and all Board-adopted rules and regulations. The District’s 2016 general fund budget appropriations totaled $2,520,280, which were funded primarily by real property taxes.

Why are lawyer referral fees considered "unethical?"

According to this article the Avvo lawyer referral program was ruled unethical. the Avvo website offers an impermissible referral service, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct 7.2(c) and 7.3(d), as well as improper fee sharing with a nonlawyer in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4(a). Joe Pastorek seems to agree: As old Professor Rault used to teach at Loyola–usually referring to Pastorek v. Lanier Systems Co., 249 So.2d 224 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1971)–“If you call a tail a leg, how many legs does a cow have? Four! The tail is still a tail, no matter what you call it!” Whether you use language to disguise something or not, it’s legally still what it is. I guess “It is what it is” is a legal truism. I always wondered if this was the basis of Justice Roberts’ thinking in the ACA “it’s really a tax” holding. However, as Ernie Svenson points out: Whenever I read about these kinds of turf war battles between the regulatory protectionists and the new innovators of legal services I’m more interested is someone (Bueller? Anyone?) explaining: (1) what harm the old rule was designed to protect against (2) is that harm still a real problem, and/or as much of a problem, and (3) does the new innovator’s system cause harm? [emphasis mine] It’s astonishing that we lawyers never feel any obligation to revisit the reasons for a long-standing prohibition. We keep our blinders on and focus total analysis on the letter of the law. So how exactly is Avvo’s scheme (assuming as we lawyers in Louisisna apparently must) causing some grevious public harm? BTW, I was shocked to learn a year ago that in Florida local bar associations make referrals to attorneys and get a fee for doing so. I was never able to get anyone to explain to me how that’s okay. But hey maybe the reasons for laws that were passed long ago don’t matter. Our elders were wise so we should just “shut up and do what we’re told” So my questions are: What harm the old rule was designed to protect against? Is that harm still a real problem, and/or as much of a problem? Does the new innovator’s system cause harm?

Attorneys are supposed to get paid for doing work for clients with the client's best interests at heart. Attorney #1 paying a referral fee when attorney #2 does not might influence you to recommend attorney #1 even though that is not in the best interest of the client. Replace "referral fee" with "kickback. A bar association presumably has either an objective or, more likely, a semi-random referral method.

Do Canadian publication bans apply to the contents of court documents?

According to this government website, a publication ban is defined as: A publication ban is an order the Court makes that prevents anyone from publishing, broadcasting, or sending any information that could identify a victim, witness, or other person who participates in the criminal justice system. The publication ban is intended to allow victims, witnesses, and others to participate in the justice system without suffering negative consequences. But do these bans also apply to the contents of court documents themselves? For instance, this court document . Would I be allowed to talk about this on TV? Write about it on a website? Distribute copies of this PDF online/in-person? Also what on earth does the sentence "These Reasons have been edited for publication purposes" mean?

The publication ban applies universally, even to the court's own publication of the reasons. The court will not typically publish material in violation of its own publication bans. The judgment you cite says, "These Reasons have been edited for publication purposes." That normally means that the reasons as published have been edited with that publication ban in mind. However, the wording of that publication ban seems to encompass information that is apparently in the published reasons, which is perplexing. A good publication-ban notice will indicate the statutory or inherent jurisdiction under which the ban was granted, the specific category of information prohibited from dissemination, and the time scope of the ban. The actual drafting of the language of the ban in a judgment is up to the judge and court practices. A much better example is this one : Pursuant to s. 486.4, s. 486.5 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, information that may identify certain witnesses and undercover police officers may not be published, broadcast or transmitted in any manner. All other publication ban orders issued during this proceeding have expired. This version of the Reasons for Judgment complies with the existing publication bans. It would be even better if it were to explicitly say it applies indefinitely or until further court order. A pretty perfect example is this one : A publication ban has been imposed under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code restricting the publication, broadcasting or transmission in any way of evidence that could identify a victim/witness/undercover officer, referred to in this judgment by initials . This publication ban applies indefinitely unless otherwise ordered. This is good because it identifies which people publications cannot identify (victims, witnesses, or undercover officers, who are referred to in the judgment by initials), it states the statutory source of the ban, and it identifies the length of the ban. In the case of the example you provide, I would reach out to the court registry or communication officer to get more details about the ban before publishing anything about the case. Also, while the reasons themself may not identify the victim/witness/etc., a third-party publication might combine together information in a way that "could identify" them. Publications are prohibited from doing this. Publications must also not republish information that could identify the protected person even if that information was inadvertently left in the published reasons of the court.

Can descendants modify copyright of parent's work?

According to this link if a work was published in 1969 then the copyright would be for 95 years after publication date. If the original author has died, is there any method for descendants to modify the copyright, specifically something like releasing the work into the public domain? Maybe related that would help answer the question would be this - can copyright be transferred to descendants? If it were transferred, e.g., in a will, does the original length of the copyright still apply, just that the ownership would be to the new owners?

Intellectual property is property and the owner can do all the things that can be done with property including selling it, gifting it and bequeathing it. It can also be licensed; the closest analogue to normal property being renting or lending it except you can license to more than one person at a time. The current owner can do anything the original owner could do with it. Transfer of ownership does not affect the duration or status of the rights at all.

Does the establishment clause prevent schools from promoting religious doctrine as truth?

According to this man... https://donotlink.it/7PyG The modern notion that the separation of these powers implies opposition or incompatibility is a gross misrepresentation of the founders beliefs and intentions, imposed on the nation by a cabal of hyper-partisan Democrat secularists led by Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black (a virulent anti-Catholic and one-time member of the Ku Klux Klan), along with his co-conspirator Lyndon Baines Johnson, author of the “Johnson Amendment” that purported to ban church involvement in politics. Black wrote the majority opinion in the 1947 US Supreme Court case Everson v Board of Education which redefined the separation of church and state as a barrier to church/state cooperation – reversing over 150 years of legal precedent in which it had been recognized as a facilitator of church influence in government. It was this early and egregious example of judicial activism in Everson that shifted America from following the Judeo-Christian presuppositions of the founders to the Secular Humanist presuppositions of Cultural Marxism: preventing government from recognizing the authority of God in our law and history. Except I know the founding fathers said differently. https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/06/constitutional-myth-4-the-constitution-doesnt-separate-church-and-state/240481/ It goes both ways then?

Does the establishment clause prevent schools from promoting religious doctrine as truth? Yes, in conjunction with the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution that gives the First Amendment effect vis-a-vis state and local governments. The modern notion that the separation of these powers implies opposition or incompatibility is a gross misrepresentation of the founders beliefs and intentions, imposed on the nation by a cabal of hyper-partisan Democrat secularists led by Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black (a virulent anti-Catholic and one-time member of the Ku Klux Klan), along with his co-conspirator Lyndon Baines Johnson, author of the “Johnson Amendment” that purported to ban church involvement in politics. This is ahistorical bunk from a conservative Evangelical Christian website that doesn't even try to come across as a neutral or unbiased account. Separation of church and state was a concept well understood and prized at the founding (e.g. by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison), and was incorporated in many state constitutions in the time period during which the federal constitution was viewed as applicable only to the federal government. But, even then the U.S. Constitution had some narrow provisions that were applicable to the states including a ban on religious tests for public office that also applied to state and local governments. Also, most states also separated church and state in their own state constitutions, often in language parallel to the First Amendment, but sometimes stronger. For example, the parallel provision adopted in Colorado's Bill of Rights when it became a state in 1876 stated: Section 4. Religious freedom. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state. No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship, religious sect or denomination against his consent. Nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship. The Treaty of Tripoli (1796), for example, made clear that Christians and Muslims were equal and that the government favored neither, and was not a Christian nation. At that time, France (an ally of the United States) was pretty much the only other country in the world without an established national church. Many of the notable Founders were deists . In all or most of the Southeast United States. there was never an established church. The last established churches in the United States (in New England, see, e.g. here ), were disestablished before the Civil War. The successor denominations to the established churches of New England are the Congregational churches, the United Church of Christ, and the Unitarian Church (which later merged with the Universalist Church, a church which was never an established church but had similar doctrines). The Bill of Rights eventually started to be applied to state and local governments relying doctrinally on authority granted in the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution adopted during the Reconstruction era (specifically, in 1868). The incorporation doctrine applying the Bill of Rights to the states via 14th Amendment was first applied in 1897 . Portions of the First Amendment had been incorporated not later than 1925. The free exercise clause of the First Amendment was incorporated in 1940. Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U.S. 296 (1940). It was all but inevitable that Everson (see below) would be decided that way that it was when it eventually came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1947, many years before the U.S. Supreme Court made that ruling. Like all major U.S. Supreme Court rulings, this ruling was preceded by lower court rulings reaching the same conclusion. Black wrote the majority opinion in the 1947 US Supreme Court case Everson v Board of Education which redefined the separation of church and state as a barrier to church/state cooperation – reversing over 150 years of legal precedent in which it had been recognized as a facilitator of church influence in government. It was this early and egregious example of judicial activism in Everson that shifted America from following the Judeo-Christian presuppositions of the founders to the Secular Humanist presuppositions of Cultural Marxism: preventing government from recognizing the authority of God in our law and history. This is also false to the point of being laughable. Everson v. Board of Education (U.S. 1947) followed already well established law and doctrine. There has never been a time in U.S. history after disestablishment in which facilitation of church influence in government was recognized. This is fake history produced by Christian Dominionists to further their own political ends. This isn't to say that Everson v. Board of Education wasn't an important holding. But, it was not a sharp departure for prior law. It was merely clarification of the details of existing law that was well established in particular stark and quotable terms. To quote a brief portion of the Atlantic article linked in the question: The attack on separation began as an attack on a letter by Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, dated Jan. 1. 1802. Jefferson assured the Baptists that "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church & State." In 1985, then-Justice William Rehnquist wrote that "unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years." But this argument ignores a historical fact. It's not Jefferson's metaphor. Even in 1802, separation was already deeply rooted in American religious history. In 1644, the American theologian Roger Williams, founder of the first Baptist congregation in the British New World, coined the phrase to signify the protection that the church needed in order to prevent misuse and corruption by political leaders: "The church of the Jews under the Old Testament in the type and the church of the Christians under the New Testament in the antitype were both separate from the world; and when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made his garden a wilderness." It is this concept--that use by political leaders of religion for their own ends was a danger both to the faithful and to the peace of society--that the Constitution embodies. James Madison wrote that government involvement with the church "implies either that the civil magistrate is a competent judge of religious truth; or that he may employ religion as an engine of civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of rulers in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation."

Can law enforcement dig up endangered plants to recover evidence of a crime?

According to this meme if you bury a body underneath an endangered plant, it is then illegal for law enforcement to dig up the body. Is this true?

The Meme is Incorrect Law enforcement in the united-states may disturb or dig up plants that are listed as endangered species while unearthing evidence of a serious crime. 16 U.S. Code § 1538 subsection (a) ,(2) provides that: (2) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of plants listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title, it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to— ... (B) remove and reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass law; Digging up a member (or members) of an endangered plant species during a legitimate criminal investigation as part of a focused search for evidence would not be to " maliciously damage or destroy" them, nor would it be in "knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State". This notion (that evidence is safe if buried under endangered plants) misunderstands what is prohibited by the law.

Is the opportunity and/or potential to get tenure in the Texas State university system contractable?

According to this news item of March 30, 2023 about Texas Senate Bill 18 - Public universities could no longer offer tenure for professors under Texas Senate bill | TPR - public universities in Texas would not be able to offer tenure to professors after Sept. 1. If eventually signed into law by the governor, faculty in the University of Texas system who have tenure will retain it; but faculty who do not have tenure will not be able to apply because there will no longer be tenure. Questions: Is the opportunity and/or potential to get tenure contractable? Do current faculty who have taught, published and worked towards tenure under the assumption they will be able to apply for tenure - do they have a case for breach of contract if the law goes into effect and they cannot apply for the benefits of tenure? University of Texas System documents: Rule 31007: Tenure | University of Texas System 2022-23 Promotion & Tenure - Office of the Executive Vice President and Provost - University of Texas System

The state legislature does get to say how the governmental institutions of higher education are run, so they can stipulate what is in the contract. There is no aspect of the current contract which guarantees future tenure, and it is standard that the rules of tenure can change and untenured faculty must follow whatever the current rule is at the time one is reviewed for tenure. That would include the elimination of tenure. The university rules say that the university rules can be changed (and describe how those changes are made). However, university rules are subordinate to the statutes governing the universities, and you can't sue the legislature for breach of contract. The law, as proposed , specifically limits the duration of any employment contract to 3 years. Incidentally, there is no corresponding House bill, and the deadline for filing such a bill in this session has passed, so this specific piece of legislation will not be enacted.

In the US what is/are the legal definitions of 'workplace'?

According to this online USA guidance many US states give smokers the same sort of anti-discrimination class as for example pregnant mothers or other groups. Most states have some laws that protect smokers from discrimination and However, 29 states and the District of Columbia do prohibit discrimination based on legal activities outside the workplace, which includes smoking tobacco. What, in these states, constitutes 'the workplace'? For example, while under mandatory Covid19 homeoffice, while participating in teleconferences from home, is the home a 'workplace' for the purposes of these laws? Can an employer dismiss a smoker for smoking at home during mandatory homeoffice (and on a teleconference) or would this be perceived as discriminatory?

In the US what is/are the legal definitions of 'workplace'? Absent a statutory or contractual definition, the plain meaning is adopted " unless doing so would result in absurd, unintended consequences ", Hassell v. Bird , 5 Cal.5th 522 (2018) . Pulaski v. California OSHA , 90 CalRptr.2d 54, 69 (1999) points out that " '[w]orkplace' is commonly understood as covering any place where work is performed. This is especially true where worker health and safety is concerned ". See also [non-precedential] [ Covia Communities v. McInerney , (Court of Appeals of California, Dec. 2019)] 3 (" The plain meaning of the term [...] does not limit 'workplace' to one location [...]. Nor does the plain meaning of 'workplace' require that the employer own the subject property "). Thus, a person's homeoffice also fits the definition of 'workplace'. Can an employer dismiss a smoker for smoking at home during mandatory homeoffice (and on a teleconference) or would this be perceived as discriminatory? Discriminatory means that the dismissal is motivated by the status of employee being insofar as a smoker rather than his act of smoking during the performance of work. By way of analogy, consider the laws against discrimination based on a person's sexual orientation: The ban on that discrimination does not entitle the employee to engage in sexual intercourse during a teleconference. Most bans on smoking in the workplace are intended to protect other employees' health and safety. From the remark in Pulaski , it follows that smoking at home during mandatory homeoffice time would not impair other employees' health and safety. That being said, the employer might have valid reasons for prohibiting to smoke during a teleconference. For instance, doing so could be perceived as unprofessional, and therefore detrimental to the image of the company.

Am I free to use any publicly available data for visualization purposes?

According to this page : Data itself is not copyrightable. For instance, demographic counts, weather measurements, phone numbers, chemical structures, currency values, facts about individuals and events, and similar types of factual information may be used without permission. From this, it seems like any type of publicly available data can be used to create visualizations, even without asking for permission. Is that true?

You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data.

Can Australians Accept The Ritchey Permissive License?

According to this post , in Australia you cannot disclaim all warranties. The Ritchey Permissive License does ( "The material is provided without warranties of any kind" ), but it also states "You must be legally capable of being bound to all the requirements of this license" . Would this prevent Australian's from accepting the license, or would portions of the license simply not be upheld in that jurisdiction?

Probably First of all, a warranty is different from a guarantee under Australian Consumer Law ( ACL ). The license purports to exclude the former but not the latter. So, on a literal reading, the license doesn't offend the ACL and is probably fine on that basis alone although this may not be what the licensor intended. Notwithstanding, even if "warranty" and "guarantee" are to be read interchangeably it is not clear that this would offend the ACL. Since this is a supply of services (not goods) there are only three guarantees in the ACL: Guarantee as to due care and skill (60), Guarantees as to fitness for a particular purpose etc. (61) and Guarantee as to reasonable time for supply (62). It should be obvious, given the nature of the website, that 61 and 62 are not going to be applicable. So, this leaves only 60: If a person supplies, in trade or commerce , services to a consumer , there is a guarantee that the services will be rendered with due care and skill. Before this ACL guarantee is engaged there needs to be a consumer (which there is) and the supply must be "in trade or commerce". Trade or commerce is not defined in ACL except circularly in terms of geography: "trade or commerce" means trade or commerce within Australia or between Australia and places outside Australia. This is a deliberate choice by the legislature because s51(i) of the Constitution grants the Commonwealth legislative power "with respect to trade or commerce" and clearly legislation cannot define a term that is used in the Constitution (without definition) but it can narrow its definition for the purposes of the Act. "Trade or commerce" is interpreted by the courts based on the totality of the circumstances. A supplier is "in trade or commerce" if they are routinely or regularly engaged in 'business' (for-profit or not-for-profit) and the particular supply forms part of that business. However, supplies that are 'personal' rather than 'business' in nature are not captured. Similarly, activities by a 'business' that are not "in trade or commerce" such as lobbying (unless their business is as a lobbyist) are excluded. Note that the Act refers to "supply" - this includes supplies that are neither contracts and/or for which the consumer provides no consideration. For example, a supermarket giving free samples of a foodstuff is a "supply" "in trade or commerce" and is captured by the ACL. With respect to this particular site, it appears to be a private blog and therefore the supply is not "in trade or commerce" so the ACL guarantees are not engaged. Now, if you wanted to take something under this license, which requires you to use this license when you 'onsell' and you were doing so in the context of a "supply" "in trade or commerce" to a "consumer", you wouldn't be able to.

Usage of the US President's likeness without his consent

According to this question , depending on the jurisdiction, individuals have certain "personality rights" over the use of their name and likeness. I know that, in the US, these can vary from state to state, and that public figures generally lose some of these rights when their name/likeness becomes famous. But I still believe that commercial use of a public figure (e.g. making a toy, selling a shirt, etc) without their permission would violate those rights. Are these rights (again, in the US specifically) affected when an individual becomes a government official, particularly a federal government official? I'm vaguely aware of the idea that the federal government doesn't have the same intellectual property rights as private citizens, but I have no idea if this affects individuals. (The motivation for this question is this image which is slightly NSFW but I assume it would apply regardless of the specific usage of the president's likeness.)

One does not lose legal rights by becoming a government official, so POTUS retains the right to sue for defamation, hold copyright, sue for trespass or breach of contract, and so on. The standards for defamation change when one becomes a "public figure" (you have to show "actual malice"), but this is much broader than being a government official. Anything that is a "work of the US government" is not protected by copyright, so presidential decrees, as government works, are not protected by copyright. I do not know of any state where one legally loses publicity rights as a function of being famous, or being an elected official. California Civil Code §3344 spells out the right of publicity in that state, which says that anyone who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent can get sued. However, there is a "fair use" escape clause: For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a). The law doesn't say exactly what constitutes a "political campaign" or "public affairs broadcast or account", but since politicians get caricatured in the papers all the time, with no requirement for consent, it is highly likely that the use you point to would be found to be part of a "political campaign" or "public affairs account". Additionally, under the First Amendment, you can criticize a government official, and that right is not limited to just critical words. It is obvious that the things on sale are basically criticism of POTUS, and you can't use the law to suppress such criticism. Accordingly, one could also criticize Tom Cruise (not a government official) using his likeness on such an object. However, one cannot exploit his image to sell perfume.

How long are schools allowed to confiscate items from students?

According to this question and the corresponding answer , schools are legally allowed to confiscate items from students. This is not considered theft, as the intent is not to permanently take the item away from the student. My question now is, how long is a school allowed to confiscate items from a student? "Common Sense" would indicate something like until the end of the class, or the end of the school day - or more formally, until the student leaves the school building. However, I recall teachers confiscating phones until the end of the week, and even refusing to hand them back upon the parent's request, citing that "the student would just play on their phone again anyways". I can't imagine that this is legal, or that a teacher has the authority to confiscate an item for longer than necessary. I am mostly interested in answers regarding Austria, but answers regarding other jurisdictions are accepted as well. Furthermore, I am talking about "general" items in a student's rightful possession. This excludes things like cigarettes, alcohol, weapons, etc., which may by themselves warrant different procedures.

According to regulation 373/1974 § 4(4) (which I presume is still in force due being amended in 2020), confiscated items must be returned by the end of Unterricht (unsure of exact translation, either end of class or school day): Gegenstände, die die Sicherheit gefährden oder den Schulbetrieb stören, dürfen vom Schüler nicht mitgebracht werden. Derartige Gegenstände sind dem Lehrer auf Verlangen zu übergeben. Abgenommene Gegenstände sind nach Beendigung des Unterrichtes bzw. der Schulveranstaltung oder der schulbezogenen Veranstaltung dem Schüler zurückzugeben, sofern es sich nicht um sicherheitsgefährdende Gegenstände handelt. Sicherheitsgefährdende Gegenstände dürfen nur dem Erziehungsberechtigten – sofern der Schüler volljährig ist, diesem – ausgefolgt werden, wenn deren Besitz nicht sonstigen Rechtsvorschriften widerspricht. This translates to (translation by @MechMK1): Objects, which are a threat to safety or disturb the school proceedings, may not be brought along by the student. Such objects have to be handed over to the teacher upon request. Such taken objects have to be returned after the end of the end of the lesson or the course, or the school-related event, as long as the object is not a threat to safety. Objects which are a threat to safety must only be handed over to the parents or legal guardians - or, if the student is of age, the student - if the ownership of said object is not unlawful. Thanks to Vienna lawyer Dr. Johannes Öhlböck who wrote an article pointing me to the regulation. I'm not fluent in German and I can't find an explicit definition of Unterricht in the associated laws. Google currently translates it as lesson , but Duden has a broader definition close to "scheduled, regular instruction by a teacher" and the Vienna city website claims cell phones can kept until end of day . Interestingly during research I found a Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile) article stating that in 2017, a Berlin administrative court allowed confiscation of a cell phone through a weekend.

Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework - defined national security objectives

According to this release from the White House they state: the United States is to put in place new safeguards to ensure that signals surveillance activities are necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of defined national security objectives What does that mean? Isn't that a cart blanche to track anything and anyone on the whim of what anyone sees as a “threat” ? You criticize something? OK, potential threat. You ask a question: OK, potential threat. You post this question: OK, sketchy person. etc. I'm not trying to be hyperbolic but history has shown quite often that “national security objectives” has a rather wide interpretation; not the least when it comes to non-US citizens. Anyone know what safeguards and legal standing EU citizens has in this deal? Is there any article / reports or the like that judge what the deal entails, i.e. from a critical viewpoint?

The statement says that The new Framework marks an unprecedented commitment on the U.S. side to implement reforms that will strengthen the privacy and civil liberties protections applicable to U.S. signals intelligence activities. That at least claims to be a restriction on surveillance, not an increase in authorization for surveillance. The statement also says that the US will: establish a two-level independent redress mechanism with binding authority to direct remedial measures, and enhance rigorous and layered oversight of signals intelligence activities to ensure compliance with limitations on surveillance activities. That seem to be rather different from allowing surveillance on a "whim". Until the details of this new "framework" are published one cannot judge how effective these measures are likely to be, they might be mere lip service. But let us look at the reason behind them. Since the Schrems II decision, EU entities have, in many cases, been restricted from sharing data with US entities, or storing data on US-located servers, because of a concern that current US law did not sufficiently protect the privacy of EU residents. These restrictions have been a problem for many US businesses. It seems that this new framework is aimed at giving enough privacy protection to lower these restrictions. It will be up to the EC and the European Courts to judge if the framework achieves that goal. If they decide that it does not, they can decline to lower, or reimpose, the data transfer restrictions, which would make the framework pointless for the US. It is in the US's interest to keep the EU authorities satisfied on this point. In the article "United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework: Setting the Scene for Schrems III?" from the National Law Review it is states that: The success or failure of the new agreement will depend on the extent to which it overcomes the flaws identified by the ECJ in Schrems II. The ECJ ruled against the EU Commission’s adequacy decision in favour of Privacy Shield, finding that data subjects were inadequately protected against electronic surveillance or “signals intelligence” activities carried out under US Federal authority, and that data subjects impacted by such activities had no viable route to redress. ... It is important to remember that Schrems II did not strike down Privacy Shield, which has continued to operate since July 2020. Rather, the European Court of Justice ruling struck down the EU Commission’s adequacy decision in favour of Privacy Shield. Consequently, a key objective of the new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework is not to replace Privacy Shield, but to revive and enhance it with new mechanisms to address the flaws identified in Schrems II. Participating companies and organizations that take advantage of the Framework to legally protect data flows will continue to be required to adhere to the Privacy Shield Principles, including the requirement to self-certify their adherence to the Principles through the U.S. Department of Commerce. The language of the White House fact sheet suggests some areas likely to attract close scrutiny once the full details are available: What degree of impact on individual data subjects will be considered acceptable, and in what circumstances? The US government is not promising to refrain from the use of signals intelligence and electronic surveillance. It is promising only that intelligence activity will be limited to “legitimate national security interests” and that the impact on individuals will not be “disproportionate”. How far the composition of the proposed Data Protection Review Court will ensure that it is truly independent of the Federal government? According to this NY Times story : The deal includes a way for Europeans to object if they feel that their privacy has been violated, including through an “independent Data Protection Review Court,” the White House said in a fact sheet released after the news conference. The deal still needs to be made final, the United States and the European Commission said in a joint statement, adding that the White House would put its commitments in an executive order. Businesses that send European Union data to American servers have pushed hard for the governments to reach a new deal. Since the last pact was struck down more than 18 months ago, regulators in European countries have said companies cannot use certain web services, like Google Analytics and Mailchimp, because doing so could violate the privacy rights of Europeans. Meta, the parent company of Facebook, said this year that it might shut down its services in Europe if the governments didn’t resolve their differences. Google’s top lawyer had urged “quick action to restore a practical framework that both protects privacy and promotes prosperity.” The Friday announcement is the latest development in a lengthy debate about how far governments and tech companies should go to protect users’ privacy. Europe’s top court twice struck down pacts governing data flows between the United States and the European Union over concerns that the data would be exposed to American surveillance programs. All of this is based on the joint announcement by the US and the EC, with detailed documents apparently yet to come.

Is certification required to become an author's editor?

According to this source , I would not need a license to be a freelance editor. But if I had a business, the source says I may need to register the business, and I also may need a vendor's license depending on the circumstances. However, would I need to undergo any registration if I edit a single author's books? Also, would my services be taxable? If relevant, assume I am paid per page.

Editing is protected speech under the First Amendment. The government may not require any license to perform such services, though an author could impose whatever credentialing requirements she chooses. If you have created a business to provide those services, that business may need to be registered with/licensed to business in the state generally, but again, it would not require any special licesnse to perform editing services. Whether you provide those services as an individual or as the agent of a business entity, any income you derive from editing is subject to taxation the same as any other income you receive.

Does Shari'a law permit execution of apostates?

According to this source : According to Islamic law apostasy is punishable by death, imprisonment or confiscation of property and blasphemy is punishable by death. Conversion from Islam to another faith is also considered as a serious offence under Islamic law. Individuals who have committed blasphemy or converted from Islam have three days to withdraw their behaviours or face punishment. Children of ‘apostates’ are still considered Muslims unless they reach adulthood without returning to Islam, in which case they may also be put to death [Society-based targeting, 1.2]. Is this true? Hypothetically if a Shari'a country also has a freedom of religion right (without a restrictions clause) how would the conflict be resolved between the two?

There is no single answer under Shari`ah law, for example because apostacy is not a single thing, and because there are multiple schools of interpretation. This article gives a fairly detailed analysis. This other article focuses on statutory implementations of the prohibition against irtidād and its punishments. In Brunei, Section 112(1) of the Syariah Penal code allows execution for a Muslim who declares himself non-Muslim and does not repent, and Iranian law also apparently allows the death penalty. Presumably the same holds of current Afghanistan.

Are FBI agents eligible to be whistleblowers?

According to this summary document on house.gov , they're not. I thought this was very interesting considering all the hubbub in the House of Representatives about the FBI agents being or not being whistleblowers. Who Is(n’t) Covered? Most executive branch employees, former employees, and applicants fall within the WPA’s protections because they are part of the merit system that governs the federal civil service under Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Employees of the Government Publishing Office, a Legislative Branch agency, are also covered. (5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)). However, some executive branch employees are excluded from the WPA’s protections, including (but not limited to): ❖ Political appointees (e.g. federal inspectors general) ❖ Uniformed military service members ❖ Noncareer Senior Executive Service employees ❖ Employees of the 17 different intelligence community “elements” and the FBI ❖ Members of the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps ❖ Officers of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) Commissioned Corps ❖ Employees of the U.S. Postal Service

This particular list of excluded branches seems to refer to those who are able to excercise whistleblowing protections through the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. It does not mean that employees excluded by these rules would be unable to whistleblow at all. Rather, the government channels through which they are able to seek protection are likely through a different office. In so far as I can tell, USOSC might restrict the FBI from protection services because they protect employees who go to the Media. FBI agents often handle classified material which would not be allowed to be disclosed to the media and many intel agency employees are required to submit any documents they intend to publish based off knowledge aquired from their employment for a pre-publishing review to make sure no classified material is leaked, and would thus limit the way the employee could whistleblow. Just because this particular office does not provide protection services to the listed employees, it does not mean there is an agency or department that does provide them (Usually the Office of General Inspector for the particular agency in question. While they are attached to the agency they cover, they are not within the chain of command of the agency itself and are independent to them.). For that reason, just because the rules that apply to most do not cover FBI Whistle Blowers, it does not mean an FBI employee cannot become a whistle blower. They just cannot use the services of USOSC in their whistleblowing efforts.

Diversity of Citizenship in Federal Court Jurisdiction?

According to this thread , one of the three criteria in filing suit to compel arbitration in federal court is diversity of citizenship . Suppose Party A enters into a business contract with Party B. Party B sells the business to Party C in such a way that Party C inherits any previous contractual agreements signed by Party B. Party A and Party C now dispute the interpretation of the contract signed between Party A and Party B. Party A and Party C live in one state. Party B lives in another state. While Party B is no longer directly liable for the contract, he is able to provide testimony (if subpoenaed) regarding the interpretation of the contract that would be helpful to Party A. Does any of this constitute diversity of citizenship in regards to federal jurisdiction? Or once Party B sells the business the fact that he signed the agreement with Party A and/or can testify as to the intent of the lease is meaningless?

Diversity of citizenship concerns parties to an action. In the given circumstances, Party B is a witness, not a party. That is, whether A sues C or vice versa, neither would name B as a defendant. The determination of diversity jurisdiction occurs in the initial stages of the suit. Because A and C are citizens of the same state, there is no diversity of citizenship. Similarly, if Bob and Alice sign a contract when they live in different states, but then one moves to the other's state, and then a controversy arises under the contract, there is no diversity of citizenship. For reference, 28 USC 1332(a) : (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between— (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an action between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same State; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.

How can one arrest a police officer/constable?

According to this video at about 10:15 you can only arrest a cop for an indictable offence. It claims that under the criminal justice and courts act 2015, a police officer commits an offence if he or she exercises the powers and privileges of a constable improperly and further knows or ought to know that the exercise is improper, for which he/she could be imprisoned up to 14 years. How can such provisions be given effect?

The segment of the video I watched is wrong or misleading in several ways. The speaker apparently claimed to be performing a "citizen's arrest" on a police officer on the basis of s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The question above also talks about s.26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2013, which deals with an offence of improperly exercising the powers of a constable. Somebody who is not a police officer is allowed to arrest somebody else without a warrant only under tightly defined circumstances. These are given in s.24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (inserted by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005). The elements include that the offence be indictable, which does not mean as claimed in the video that "you can get sent to prison for it", but refers to the mode of trial. Some summary offences are imprisonable. Since the offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act is a summary one, rather than indictable, we fall at the first hurdle. A further qualifiction is that this power of arrest can only be exercised if the person believes it would be impractical for a constable to do it instead, and that the arrest is necessary to stop the arrestee from escaping, hurting themselves or someone else, or damaging property. In the video, the police officer does not look like he is doing any of those things, and there is another officer right next to him. Thus it would be hard to argue that there are reasonable grounds for arresting the officer in this way. Also, while members of the public may object to the conduct of police officers, that does not always amount to an offence under s.26 of the 2013 Act. The offence there is about corruption, exercising the powers of a constable for personal benefit. That personal element does not seem to be shown in the video. There are some other mistakes in the part I watched. A lawful arrest cannot be effected just by using the words "I am arresting you". The arrestor has to take or imply some directive action as well, or else there is no arrest at all: just two people continuing to stand awkwardly. This also goes to the point about needing to stop the arrestee from causing injury (etc.) - if you aren't actually taking steps to restrain them then you can't say you're preventing the harm. The point of the provision is to take the fact of an arrest (I am stopping you from getting away) and make it a legal arrest; it can't conjure up an arrest where none exists. In a citizen's arrest there is no need to give a warning about "anything you say may be used against you" or whatever. This is applicable to the police when they are questioning suspects, which is not what is happening here. Indeed, while the police can arrest somebody without warrant because they want to investigate whether they've committed a crime, a regular person can't. Although there is a statutory requirement to tell somebody why they've been arrested, coming from ECHR as well as domestic common-law principles, the police are not expected to cite the law with precision. It's OK to say "I'm arresting you for selling heroin" rather than "I am arresting you because I have reasonable grounds to suspect you of supplying a controlled substance to another without lawful authorisation, contrary to section 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971". While there are more rules that kick in during pre-charge detention or questioning, the law recognizes that the operational circumstances of an arrest make a briefer explanation more appropriate. Indeed, more formal language would defeat the point of the rule, which is that the arrestee should know what's going on. "You can only arrest a cop for an indictable offence" is not quite right. You (a non-constable) can only lawfully arrest anyone for such an offence, and if the other conditions are met. A constable can be arrested for any kind of offence: there's no special immunity for summary offences. As to the general question of "How can one arrest a police officer?", the usual way is to become a police officer yourself. Almost all arrests, especially those involving police misconduct, are done by the police. For corruption it is likely that an arrest would be made after a long investigation and after the issue of a warrant, rather than on the spur of the moment. As a normal person, wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty is an offence (Police Act 1996, s.89), and affecting an arrest may amount to assault on the officer. That does not make it impossible to arrest an officer in this way, just fraught with future difficulty.

How can pro bono lawyers of a libel defendant become defendants themeselves?

According to this wikipedia article , Lord Aldington managed to join pro bono legal defenders for Nikolai Tolstoy as defendants in his libel lawsuit. "In 1996 the Court of Appeal upheld an order Aldington had obtained that made lawyers acting for Tolstoy pro bono parties to the case, and thereby jointly liable with Tolstoy for any costs or damages awarded to Aldington." How could this happen in the U.K.? Is this "normal" British justice, or was the law twisted to benefit a highly placed plaintiff? Could this happen in the US, Canada, Australia, or anywhere else in the English-speaking world? Perhaps the issue is one of "champerty and maintenance," the theory being that the pro bono lawyers "subsidized" the defendant, and therefore had the means to pay. If that's the case, what's to prevent rich Englishmen from going around and suing poor people they dislike, knowing that the latter don't have the means to defend themselves?

I think Michael Flatley of "Riverdance" was accused of rape, countersued, and managed to get the opposing lawyer to court as well, with a judge saying that the lawyer knew that the whole case was just blackmail and a lawyer trying to help his client to blackmail somebody has no protection by the law. (The woman wanting about $30 million for rape damages ended up ordered to pay £11 million for libel). So something like that may have happened here as well. On the other hand, I heard of cases where a third party sponsoring a law case (by paying for lawyers etc. ) with the goal of benefitting from the case (even if it is just to get their money back) can become liable for damages. Basically if A with deep pockets gives B who has no cash money to sue C, and C wins, then C can try to get money back from the rich A, not only from the penniless B.

Is calling abortionist criminals defamation?

According to well-established precedent, Texas' heartbeat bill is not valid law. Is it therefore defamation to claim that those who violate it are "breaking the law"? Also, even if the bill were a valid law, AFAIK it's not a criminal statute. Is it defamation to claim that those who violate it are "committing a crime"?

Is it therefore defamation to claim that those who violate it are "breaking the law"? AFAIK it's not a criminal statute. Is it defamation to claim that those who violate it are "committing a crime"? No. These assertions rather constitute statements of opinion and therefore are not actionable. For it to constitute a possibly actionable statement of fact , it would have to falsely impute to someone a specific, ascertainable act or conduct. Furthermore, in some contexts the matter at issue is so sensitive that its implications on someone's reputation is independent of whether a bill reaches enactment. Abortion is one such topic. A person's view of an abortionist is very unlikely to be influenced by the ensuing legislation. To people who oppose abortion, abortionists are equally repugnant regardless of whether the act of aborting additionally constitutes a violation of some statute. Conversely, abortion supporters are not going to have a worse impression of an abortionist merely on grounds that abortion becomes outlawed.

Why is secrecy of correspondence treated differently than telephone or electronic surveillance

According to wikipedia "secrecy of correspondence" "Paper letters have, in most jurisdictions, remained outside the legal scope of law enforcement surveillance, even in cases of "reasonable searches and seizures". " Why is communication with letters treated differently than communication by other means?

They aren’t treated differently In most jurisdictions, law enforcement requires a warrant to intercept/open/read the contents of physical or electronic correspondence. Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a warrant is not required to read the metadata: who is communicating with whom, how and when but not what . That is they can read what’s written on the outside of the envelope or the routing information of the email/SMS. Telephony is not correspondence because it is not the intent of the parties to create a permanent record. It is usually treated as any other conversation - if it carried out in a place and manner that the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy it’s usually illegal to record it (electronically or by writing it down). If it’s said publicly, it isn’t illegal.

Why can’t claims under s214 Housing Act 2004 be issued in the small claims track?

Accordingly myriad materials online including as authoritative as Shelter, section 214 claims must be brought under the Part 8 procedure, even where the maximum possible award would fall well within the threshold for the small claims track. What is the purpose of the Part 8 claim procedure, and why must s214 claims use it?

Why use Part 8? Because the Civil Procedure Rules say so. See Practice Direction 56.2(2.1) : ...the claimant in a landlord and tenant claim must use the Part 8 procedure as modified by Part 56 and this practice direction. And Rule 56.1(1)(f) : (1) In this Section of this Part ‘ landlord and tenant claim means a claim under – ... (f) section 214 of the Housing Act 2004. What is its purpose? Shelter's handy guide offers this: The Part 8 procedure is used where a rule or practice direction requires or permits it [ see above ], or where the claimant seeks the court's decision on a question that is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact.

Where is the Houston anti-Food Sharing Ordinance?

Accoring to this article about the anti-Food Sharing Ordinance in Houston, Mayor Anise Parker and city council passed an anti-food sharing ordinance that bans serving charitable meals on properties, public or private, without consent from the Mayor's office. Where can I find this ordinance?

The ordinance is 2012-269 was signed by Mayor Parker in 2012 you can find it as AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 20 OF THE CODE OF ORDINANCES, HOUSTON, TEXAS, RELATING TO FEEDING THOSE IN NEED; CONTAINING FINDINGS AND OTHER PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FOREGOING SUBJECT; PROVIDING FOR SEVERABILITY; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY. The section amended landed in Chapter 20, Article V: Charitable Food Service.

Sham contest- does this work in practice?

Acme Co is putting together a big promotional mashup for something that's internal to the company, but they need images from outside that help illustrate the theme. So they hold a photography contest on that theme. They say they will award seven top prizes of $7K each, but there's a $100 entry fee (plus rights to use of the entered photo) to encourage pre-filtering. One person can enter up to twice, each with a separate fee. Winners are supposed to be selected based purely on skill, not on luck. There are no geographic restrictions on eligibility. Judges' decisions are final. The contest gets run and the time comes for announcing the winners. Acme says "Hi all, thanks much for your entries. We got 50 good entries that we plan to use in our mash-up, and we're pleased to announce four people who are our winners: Mike B., Janice D., Nannette C. and Mike B. again. Congratulations to them and thanks everybody for entering!" There are three people who are winners, which is less than both four and seven, and both of those are in turn well under 50. Acme Co saves a bunch of money by not awarding the other prizes. In practice, none of the other entrants can individually do anything because they can't prove they would have won, and it would be an even more expensive failure to get to that point. (Is that true?) Has Acme Co. found a way to save money that is safe under the law in practice? If not, why not? What are the real risks? How and when can this strategy break down? What would any of the non-winning entrants be able to do about this in practice? CA, US is given as an example jurisdiction, but feel free to answer for others if you know others better.

They say they will award seven top prizes There are three people who are winners Acne lied about how many winners there would be and the fact that there were proposed to be more than there were may have induced people to enter. Well, that looks like sufficient evidence to prove the tort of misrepresentation right there. I'll run the class action on a contingency basis.

How far does liability extend in a civil conspiracy?

Acme LLC makes widgets. Bob is a member of Acme. Bob tries to take Acme's widget maker, thinking he can operate the machine himself, but breaks it in the process. Of course Bob has also violated his covenants as a member of Acme. Acme sues Bob and obtains a money judgment against Bob for damages – to the machine, to Acme's business, and for the costs of litigation. But Bob is as poor as he is stupid, so Acme can't collect on the judgment. Acme had a contract with Charlie to supply widgets. In the course of suing Bob, Acme discovers that just prior to Bob's perfidy Charlie had entered an agreement to buy widgets directly from Bob, instead of from Acme. Charlie knew that Bob could only supply widgets by taking the widget maker from Acme. In this scenario it seems like Charlie and Bob have committed some sort of tortious conspiracy. What are the correct legal terms? I think "tortious interference" and/or "tortious inducement," but not sure. Charlie has plenty of money. In this scenario is Charlie liable for any of the damages that Acme was awarded against Bob? If so, on what common law basis?

How far does liability extend in a civil conspiracy? It extends to joint and several liability insofar as that " is another vital instrument for maximizing deterrence " Paper Systems Inc. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. , 281 F.3d 629, 633 (2002) . Charlie's awareness that Bob would have to misappropriate Acme's equipment implies that Charlie was in a position of being able to deter Bob. Accordingly, Charlie's failure to try deterring Bob (let alone notify Acme) also renders Charlie liable to Acme. Similarly, EMI Sun Village, Inc. v. Catledge , 16-11841 , (11th Cir. June 2019, unpublished): [T]he law regarding conspiracy [in Florida] is well-settled, and provides that an act done in pursuit of a conspiracy by one conspirator is an act for which each other conspirator is jointly and severally liable. (brackets in original, citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Alexander , 123 So.3d 67, 80 (2013) ). But joint and several liability is applicable only in regard to " compensatory damages, [whereas] punitive damages [if available] are assessed separately against each defendant [...] [so as] [t]o ensure compliance with the constitutional demand for fairness ", Green v. Howser , 942 F.3d 772, 781 (2019) (brackets added). Ascertaining the sense or direction of one or more claims of tortious interference/inducement involves additional details. For instance, if even prior to agreeing with Charlie Bob had set his mind to taking Acme's equipment, Acme has no viable claim against Charlie for tortious interference/inducement in regard to Bob's relation with Acme. That is because, although unbeknownst to Acme, the relation was essentially broken beforehand. From another angle, if breaking the equipment harms Acme's business with other clients, Acme would have claims for tortious interference in which Bob and Charlie would be jointly and severally liable regardless of Charlie's knowledge of Acme's other relations. Likewise, Acme has a viable claim of civil conspiracy pursuant to the harm Bob caused to Acme's property.

What happens if the officers of a company refuse to show up at board meetings?

Acme, Inc. is a California corporation. They have quarterly board meetings. To have a quorum, they need one of the officers to show up: the CEO, the CFO, etc. None of the officers are willing to show up for board meetings. The majority shareholders aren't willing to take any action. The directors have the power to fire the officers, but only at a board meeting with a quorum present. What can the directors do?

This answer assumes the officers are also directors - otherwise it wouldn't make sense that a quorum required one of them. It also assumes that for some reason, the non-officer directors are not the majority shareholders or appointed by the majority shareholders - which is odd but seems to be the case based on the question. There are three answers to this question: IF NO SHAREHOLDERS WANT TO TAKE ACTION The directors have a duty to act in the best interests of shareholders in almost all situations in CA (the exceptions aren't relevant here). If the majority shareholders aren't willing to take any action, then I presume they don't think the officer-directors' behavior is adversely impacting shareholder value, and there is no problem to solve from the director's point of view UNLESS there are minority shareholders who view this as a problem. If there are no minority shareholders who view this as a problem - then stop here, this is the answer. IF THE FRUSTRATED DIRECTORS ARE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (OR APPOINTED BY THEM) In this case, if the minority shareholders do not have the power under the bylaws to force a shareholder vote or special meeting with lighter quorum rules, or reduce compensation of officers, or hire a new officer that would come to a meeting and complete the quorum, then, in their capacity as minority shareholders (not as directors) they should file a shareholder derivative suit against the CEO for breaching his or her fiduciary duty of care to the corporation. Lack of participation in board meetings is a clear cut breach of of the duty of care and the lawyer that the CEO hires will tell him or her this and most likely the suit will never need to be litigated - just filing it will get the attention needed. IF THE FRUSTRATED DIRECTORS ARE OUTSIDE / INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND THERE ARE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS WHO THINK THIS IS A PROBLEM They should make sure their attempts to uphold their own fiduciary duties to the corporation are fully documented and then they should resign. There are other things they could try - but why bother with such a dysfunctional shareholder group. Last note: with more information about the board composition, bylaws, and role of the question-asker, it would be much easier to zero in on one solution.

What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?

Across the world, the current pandemic, and various government responses to it will impact on parties abilities to perform their obligations under a contract. What are the legal implications of this?

Force Majeure An event like the current Covid-19 event is what is known as a force majeure event; a Latin term meaning "superior force". It refers to an event that is beyond the control of the parties to a contract such as war, civil disturbance, acts of God and disease. Common law jurisdictions In common law jurisdictions (most of the English-speaking world), force majeure is not a legal doctrine but a creature of the particular contract. That is, the extent to which a contract does or doesn't deal with such events is the extent to which such events apply to that particular contract. For example, a construction contract may specify that a contractor is responsible for the care, protection and reinstatement of the works unless damage is caused by war. So, if the damage is caused by war the principal bears the risk but if it's caused by, say, flood, the contractor bears the risk. If a contract is silent on the matter (in general or in the specific) then the parties obligations remain unchanged by the event and failure to comply is a breach of contract. For example, absent a provision in a contract, in the current pandemic: if a supplier is contracted to supply a component that was made in a foreign country and that cannot now be sourced from there; they will be in breach of their contract if they do not supply it. If it can be sourced from a local manufacturer at twice the price of the foreign source then that is the contractor's loss. if a company is contracted to provide engineering services and their staff cannot travel (either because they are sick or because of government restrictions) then they will be in breach of their contract and the principal can seek damages. if a construction contractor is obliged to finish by a given date and the government closes all construction sites, they will be in breach if they do not complete by that date notwithstanding. These may seem to be unjust outcomes but, at the end of the day, somebody in the contract has to carry the cost of force majeure events and the development of the common law has left it for the parties to decide who. That is, at the time of negotiating the contract, the law allows that if the parties wanted to consider the risks of say, a pandemic, and spell out whose risk that was, they were free to do so and if they didn't that's their own fault - in the absence of such allocation, the parties must do what the contract says they must do. Common law jurisdictions have traditionally not seen it as the role of government to interfere in the details of private contracts. Common law has a much narrower doctrine of frustration but this requires that the principal purpose of the contract be impossible to perform, not merely harder or more expensive to perform. Even much harder or much more expensive. Civil law In civil law jurisdictions (continental Europe with their ex-colonies and most of Asia), force majeure is a legal doctrine. It is a defence to liability where the defendant: had nothing to do with the event - this pandemic would fit, is unpredictable - it is not certain that the pandemic was unpredictable. There have been pandemics before and many organisations around the world exist specifically to respond to them. Lest this seems needlessly pedantic, there have been cases decided that because a flood occurred 69 years ago, this flood was predictable; similarly, an avalanche 50 years ago rendered this one predictable. If predictable, then the defendant is obliged to have prepared for it. The consequences must have been unpreventable. So, even though it exists in civil law it is not a get out of jail free card. International law The UNIDROIT Principles encompass force majeure as follows: Non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-performance was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.

Did Avi Yemini illegally record "Jim Jefferies" by using a hidden mobile phone?

Activist and YouTuber Avi Yemeni recorded the conversation he had with "comedian" and show host Geoff Nugent A.K.A "Jim Jefferies". The conversation seemed to have taken place on a professional broadcasting set. Jefferies' show recorded the conversation as well, with production cameras. The reason Yemeni recorded the conversation was in anticipation for how he believed Jefferies or his production company was going to twist his words and make him look like something that he is not. His intuition was proven correct. Yemeni has now filed a lawsuit against the production company and Jefferies for defamation. I read one comment that suggested that Yemeni illegally recorded the conversation by using a hidden camera and did not receive consent to do so. My question is, under New York state law (which is where the lawsuit was filed), is it illegal to record the conversation in question the way it was done in this specific case? I did read that NY state is a one-party consent state when it comes to recording. I'm looking for clarification. This shows the video in question: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odCQhAezB_Q

Did Avi Yemini illegally record “Jim Jefferies” by using a hidden mobile phone? No. One- and two-party consent rules are about confidentiality of a conversation rather than an issue of whether either party gets to monopolize the recording(s) of their conversation. In this case, the conversation took place with both parties' awareness that the conversation was being recorded for its subsequent broadcast[ing] or transmission to the public. At that point it is irrelevant whether there were additional devices recording the same conversation. The parties' aforementioned awareness is tantamount to mutual consent, and thus it precludes either party from alleging a violation of the confidentiality that the two-party consent rule seeks to protect.

When UK Act of Parliament refers to the Secretary of State, which exactly is meant by that?

Acts of the UK Parliament often give "the Secretary of State" the power to make regulations, orders or other type of secondary legislation. For example, section 22(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998: The other provisions of this Act come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint; and different days may be appointed for different purposes. But as Wikipedia says , there are currently 16 different secretaries of state in the UK. So when an Act of Parliament says just that the Secretary of State may do something, then which secretary of state may do it? Does it mean that any secretary of state may do it?

When the Act was originally passed it didn't say Secretary of State, it said "Lord Chancellor". So depending on when the Act came into force fully, the current wording may be moot. The text of the Act was modified by The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 2003 to make the Secretary of State for Consitutional Affairs responsible. That office was discontinued in 2007, and the post of Secretary of State for Justice created. Not being specific in the 2003 Order allows the Prime Minister to reorganise government departments without needing to modify legislation to track the changes. Secretary of State is defined in the Interpretation Act 1978 : “Secretary of State” means one of Her Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State. So, legally, when the text of an Act isn't specific, the power isn't vested in the relevant Secretary of State but can be exercised by any of them.

Assignment of Contracts in business acquisition - do they require notice?

Actual scenario: The Terminix International Company Limited acquires local pest control company, Insight Pest Solutions of Omaha, Nebraska. I, the consumer, had previously been in contract with Insight Pest Solutions and had not been billed or heard from them since July, 2018. Yesterday, May 28, 2019, I received a bill from Terminix for $89.96. This morning, May 29, 2019, I called Terminix and they insist the bill is valid for services provided in April 2019. First of all, we never received notice from either company that their would be any, let alone a substantial, change in service provisions. Second, Insight Pest Solutions never cashed our last check payment from August 2018, and our bank credited us because it was a Wells Fargo Bill Pay check that is debited when initially sent. Neither has Insight Pest Solutions ever provided further billing or contact, nor did they explain the uncashed check. They just disappeared. Does Terminix have legal right to claim our service contract to be in force, without ever having given notice of a pending change? This question doesn’t include the fact there is no evidence that either company provided services in April 2019, for which Terminix is trying to collect. I’m prepared to pay the bill to protect my credit score. I worked hard to get a 839 FICO score. Haven’t missed a payment in 15 years and now this asinine matter pops up. I have filed a complaint with the Nebraska AG, but still plan to pay the bill if I don’t hear back from Terminix in a few days. They claim they are escalating my complaint, yet I’m not sure how to terminate a contract that I don’t want to recognize before they actually do show up at my door, or claim they did.

In general, contracts are assignable be either party unless they are for personal services or expressly provide that they aren’t. Apart from the practicalities of performing the contract, there is no requirement to inform when assignment takes place. So, if the previous company had a valid contract with you and they or the new company provided services for which you are obliged to pay, you have to pay the new company.

Does DMCA applies on decompiled assets from apk

Actually this question ( Does DMCA cover apps? ) does not cover my answer. Actually I have made an android app which is published on play store. I had trained some machine learning models which I used in my app and they were present in my apk. Recently I realized that some developer from China has decompiled my apk and used my machine learning models in their app. But cleverly they modified my models content with some fake data, and on runtime they put the right data within the model to make them work. I cannot access the right data to make the model work because it is encrypted in c++ files. I am wondering is there any way I can file DMCA take down notice against the developer. Or it is considered the "Fair use" in terms of DMCA ( I am new to this act ). Please help me. Thanks

Your software is protected by copyright: decompiling, fiddling with, and redistributing your software is infringement. If they published their product e.g. with Google, then you can file a DMCA takedown notice, with the host service. At that point, Google will take the item down; the other party may or may not file a counter-notice (claiming that they have the right to distribute the material), and if they do, Google will notify you. Then you have to notify Google that you are suing the other party (there is a 14 day outer window for this), at which point if you did your part, Google has taken the item down and you resolve this in court. It is only when you get to court that the factual question of whether this is actually infringement is asked and answered. If you have a clever NOOP signature in the code which they didn't manually remove, you should win. The burden is on you to show that they copied your software.

Is AdBlocker legal? Can't we get a legal action about AdBlocker as web masters?

AdBlock is one of the most popular ad blockers worldwide with more than 60 million users on Chrome, Safari, Firefox, Edge as well as Android. We have calculate that one of our site loss almost $10,000 each year because of AdBlocker. Simply what they do is, they remove the advertisement which are on our website when a user who use Adblocker visits. So as a third party, they change the website content just before display it to the user. Is it legal? Can't we get a legal action about AdBlocker as web masters?

Can't we get a legal action about AdBlocker as web masters? No. I assume that by "web master" you mean a server admin who contracts with entities which are seeking to advertise their goods and services. An advertiser pays the server to transmit (or send(), in terms of a socket API) certain content to whoever submits a GET or POST request ("the client"). The scope of the contract ends there, and the end consumer or client is not a party to that contract. Any point beyond the server admin's routers, it is perfectly lawful for end users to run some program on the client side where the purpose of that program is to (1) parse any packets received in the client socket, (2) filter out some of it, (3) and forward the rest to a browser. Bringing legal action against AdBlocker would be somewhat akin to suing producers of TV remote controls under the allegation that the mute button functionality blocks advertisement content.

A case of discrimination?

Adam has a "philosophical belief" that the fairness of most forms of discrimination is debatable, as a special case of his belief that most anything should be debatable in a democratic society. He expresses this belief to Bob, who condemns the belief and cuts off communication. Did Bob discriminate against Adam? In particular, does the belief (assuming its sincerity) qualify as a protected "philosophical belief"? would Bob's action be considered discriminatory if it were in response to some other protected characteristic such as race? From the EHRC guide :

Under The Equality Act 2010 §13(1), A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. Religion or belief is listed as a protected characteristic under §4. However it is not established that the described characteristic is a "belief" in the relevant legal sense. See Grainger plc and others v Nicholson , which established criteria for deeming an ordinary belief to be a protected belief: The belief must be genuinely held. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not be incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. It is established, then, that belief (ergo disbelief) in man-made climate change is a protected belief. Similarly, ethical veganism (and its denial) is a protected belief ( Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports ). This article lists as additional established protected beliefs: Left wing democratic socialism The sanctity of life, extending to a fervent anti-foxhunting and anti-hare coursing belief A genuine and deeply held belief in Scottish independence A belief in spirituality and the ability of mediums to communicate with the dead The “higher purpose” of public service broadcasting in promoting cultural interchange and social cohesion Public service and the need to engender in others a desire and commitment to serve the community for the common good That it is wrong to lie under any circumstance The United Kingdom should not be ruled by a hereditary monarch but should be a democratic and secular republic Your cited belief is not on the list, but you could try to make law with a test case. Beyond the determination that something is discrimination, consequences for any part would also have to prove that the discrimination is prohibited. Under the Equality Act §39, for work, that means "An employer (A) must not discriminate against a person (B)", which is to say if Adam and Bob are customers in the lobby, neither party will be sanctioned, nor will they if they are employees of Timmy. So I assume that Bob is Adam's employer.

How might the legal system resolve court dates in a situation like the following?

Adam has a defamation suit against his ex-wife Eve for a lot of money in the United States. Adam also has a contract to perform professionally abroad from months 1 to 4. The latest court date (in the U.S.) is month 4 but it was originally well before month 1. Adam wants to reschedule so that the court proceedings don't interfere with his contract. Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? Does the court date give Adam a legal excuse to violate the terms of his contract abroad? Or is Adam caught in a "Catch 22" type situation whereby he will be in contempt of court if he isn't in the United States in month 4 and in breach of contract if he isn't abroad in month 4?

Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star ). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment , rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection . I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect.

Can a person be charged above the amount of damages by laws as a fine?

Added after edit: Is there any clause in the Constitution of California that prevents a law from attaching fines that are worth more than the actual damage that was caused by violation of the law?Has there been any such cases? _______________________________________________________________________ The jurisdiction is : USA -> California The law used as example is: CCPA The CCPA states that if someone fails to respect a user's privacy rights, the website owner may be charged $7,500 per visitor or violation. Now, let's say a company has 10 million users from California. The website either fails to delete IP logs of the visitors or suffers a data breach. The company only makes $100,000 per month through ads, with operations costs of $10,000 per month. Can the company be given a $7,500 * 10 million = $75 billion dollar fine? Are there any laws that prevent this? In general, can any law just demand any amount from anyone?

Damages are (generally) not constrained by the defendant’s ability to pay The purpose of a fine is to punish the wrongdoer and dissuade others from offending. The purpose of damages is to restore the wronged party to their original position. In recent times, there is a tendency to link fines to corporate profits or revenues but that is generally as a means of increasing the fines rather than limiting them. If a fine or lawsuit bankrupts the defendant then it bankrupts the defendant.

Question about legal side of port scanning during bug bounties

Additional info I'm living in the UK(Scotland) and testing targets are scattered around the world(but mainly in UK, EU and USA) I'm just writing some wrapper around the recon tools that I want to use during bug bounties. The question is about the legal side of using port scans(I'm thinking about using rustScan or nmap). I'm assuming that when it isn't on the list of things that I shouldn't be doing then it should be fine. But what about situations with shared hosting or situation in which the server belong to a different company than web app that I need to test. Any easy way to be sure when it should be fine to use it and when I should do recon without it? Thanks

Every Internet access company, network, webhost, telephone company, etc, has a TOS (Terms of Service) that 99% of the time forbids any automated access by bots or any type of pentesting such as port scanning. To legally port scan, you will need to get permission from each part of the network used as to not violate one or more TOSs and be civilly (and possibly criminally) liable. Of course, many pentesters do not have permission to port scan or look for bugs, but that doesn't absolve them of liability; they are just too many for network admins and company security staff to track and catch. See Legality of scanning a site with SSLLabs SSL Server Test in order to find and report weaknesses