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How do rules of conduct apply when acting in a pro hac vice role in another state?

A lawyer's client sent me a mild threat via text message. I have contacted the attorney on 4 separate occasions requesting an explanation/response from the attorney. They have not responded. Are there any ethics rules regarding this lawyer's conduct and failure to respond? Thx.

Are there any ethics rules regarding this lawyer's conduct and failure to respond? Yes. A lawyer admitted pro hac vice will typically be obligated to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct for both the jurisdiction in which he is barred and in the jurisdiction in which he had been admitted pro hac vice . Both Texas and Florida have substantially adopted the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which require a lawyer to act diligently and promptly on his client's behalf. This requires an attorney to act on his client's behalf in a reasonably timely way, which the attorney in your hypothetical sounds like he is not be doing. By failing to respond to correspondence from an opposing party, an attorney can weaken his client's position or even affirmatively subject his client to new obligations. I'm not sure exactly what kind of correspondence you're imagining, but any attorney worth his salt could come up with plenty of ways that failing to communicate with an adverse party could harm the client: subjecting him to new contract obligations under UCC 2-207, allowing a settlement offer to lapse, pissing off the opposing party enough to move ahead with a lawsuit, or pissing off the judge who eventually handles the case, who will be none too happy to see that one side was being intransigent. If such a failure to communicate diligently and promptly was not reasonable, the lawyer could be subject to discipline. Practically speaking, though, none of this is likely very relevant for your purposes. My understanding is that unless you're the client, most states wouldn't even permit you to file any kind of complaint against the attorney based on this type of conduct. The ABA rules do impose obligations on attorneys with respect to their dealings with third parties -- they must be honest and fair, but a violation usually requires a more affirmative act than just failing to respond to your correspondence. Again, I'm not sure exactly what you're asking about, but if this is a real legal dispute, you should consult a real attorney, as the advice available on the Internet is often exactly wrong.

Is this a conflict of interest for the lawyer

A lawyer, in the united states, is hired by person X to prepare her will and a medical directive giving her son the power to speak for her on medical issues (e.g. a POA for medical) if the mother cannot speak for herself. The attorney does the work and then the mother pays for the work. After some time, the son sends an email to the attorney stating that there is reasonable evidence that the mother should be in a care facility. The son would like to put the mother in a care facility against her wishes and would like the lawyer to handle the case. Would it be a conflict of interest for the lawyer to take the case?

As a threshold issue, the question frames a situation in which a conflict of interest could sometimes arise. But the facts in the question really aren't rich enough for a full analysis of whether or not there is a conflict of interest. This question is controlled (more or less entirely) by New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 . This states: Duties to Former Clients (a) A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another client in the same or a substantially related matter in which that client's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing. (b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client, (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and (2) about whom the lawyer, while at the former firm, had personally acquired information protected by RPC 1.6 and RPC 1.9(c) that is material to the matter unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this paragraph, neither consent shall be sought from the client nor screening pursuant to RPC 1.10 permitted in any matter in which the attorney had sole or primary responsibility for the matter in the previous firm. (c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client. (d) A public entity cannot consent to a representation otherwise prohibited by this Rule. Rule 1.9 also has official comments that would be highly persuasive: Client-Lawyer Relationship 1 After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. 2 The scope of a "matter" for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. [3] Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client’s policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. Lawyers Moving Between Firms [4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. [5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. [6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. [7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). [8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. [9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(e). With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Comment [22] to Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. There is also considerable commentary often in the form of official ethics opinions from a state attorney regulator or bar association, and case law interpreting this (which since it is largely uniform nationally includes case law from other states that is given great weight if there is no in state case law on point). The opinions and cases examine the general principles about in far more specific fact patterns which helps guide the analysis in a particular case.

Tort: Parental negligence in leaving a child unattended in a car

A layman, I'm looking at educating myself with the basics of law. Jurisdiction: India Relevant Law: Perhaps None Applicable. I may be wrong. This content I have writes to present a legal principle with an example, and the lesson. Principle: A person is not liable for a tort committed by his/her child except when the parent affords the child an opportunity to commit it. Example: A mother takes her 7yo child with her in the car to the market. Once there, she kills the engine, engages the handbrake, and puts the car in gear. Then she goes shopping leaving the child unattended in the car. The child, in playing with the controls, sets the car in motion which then kills a pedestrian. The lesson here is that the mother is liable in tort as she was negligent. It appears to me the mother took all necessary precautions in engaging the handbrake, and putting the car in gear. How is the legal principle established in this example?

The registered owner of a motor vehicle in India has vicarious legal liability for accidents involving the vehicle (at least absent a theft of the vehicle) even if the owner is not the person operating the vehicle at the time. The link discusses a case where there was liability on the part of the registered owner and the registered owner's insurance company for an accident of the operator of the vehicle who purchased the vehicle when the parties had not yet registered the change in ownership. See Surendra Kumar Bhilwale v. The New India Company Assurance Limited , Civil Appeal No. 2632 (SCC June 18, 2020). But the same body of law applies in the case in the question.

Does the Fair Housing Act protect more privileged groups

A legal professional friend of mine recently told me that when a cooperative housing organization is considering whether to offer a lease to an applicant, it is OK for those deciding to make statements of the form "I don't want another white guy living here," but not "I don't want another black woman living here." The logic, I'm told, is that the Fair Housing Act's prohibition on discrimination only applies to socially marginalized groups. Is this so? Has a court specifically addressed whether housing discrimination against, say, white men, is also prohibited? More generally, under what circumstances do US courts apply anti-discrimination laws differently according to the complainant's race?

The fair housing act does not mention "socially marginalized groups". It says that it shall be unlawful To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. The U.S. Supreme Court just ruled on a case, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project Inc. , that covered disparate impact as a measurement of discrimination. Disparate impact raises the question of whether policies that appear to be neutral but result in a disproportionate impact on protected groups are legal. The Supreme Court, in its ruling , indicated that disparate impact claims can be brought but it also imposed significant limitations. How does this case apply to your question? The underlying situation in the referenced case is one where, from the ruling: The ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits, granting too many credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in pre-dominantly white suburban neighborhoods. The basis of the claim, which can now be heard under a disparate impact claim, is that a government organization discriminated against pre-dominantly white neighborhoods. FHA protects against racial discrimination, not against racial discrimination only against certain groups.

When are government officials protected by legislative immunity?

A legislator is being sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating a constituent's civil rights. The legislator wants to assert legislative immunity as a defense. What is the test for determining whether his actions fall within the scope of the grant of immunity? EDIT: I already understand that "absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity" ; my question is how we know whether an action is in that sphere. For the sake of example, imagine that Pat and Dan are neighbors who have always hated each other. Pat is elected the president of the school board. Pat wants to sue Dan for monetary damages based on the following actions: Voting to reduce the number of teachers at Pat Jr.'s school; Defaming Pat in an e-mail to a principal. The message is sent and received using government e-mail addresses, but its content has no connection to school district business. Refusing to let Pat Jr.'s Eagle Scout troop make a presentation to the school board. Ordering the police to arrest Pat for loudly coughing "bullshit" when Dan says he treats everyone fairly. Punching Pat in the parking lot after the meeting. Under generally applicable common-law principles, which of these claims should a court dismiss on the basis of legislative immunity , and what test should it use to decide which claims survive?

Only "legislative acts" give rise to legislative immunity. Perhaps surprisingly, being a legislator is neither necessary nor sufficient for the privilege to apply. A defendant would need to assert the act in question was essentially a legislative activity. Quoting from the Federal Judicial Center's extensive paper on section 1983 : State and local legislators enjoy absolute immunity for their legislative acts. Under the functional approach to immunity, the critical issue is whether the official was engaged in legislative activity. The determination of an act’s legislative or executive character “turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Legislative action involves the formulation of policy, whereas executive action enforces and applies the policy in particular circumstances. The primary case cited is Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) , Bogan further cites Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372, 372-376 in clarifying questions of the defendant's intent or motive are irrelevant as long as the act is part of a legislative activity. So proposing, drafting, voting or debating (for or against) a specific measure fall within the immunity, regardless of the claimed improper motive for doing them. For example, in Bogan, Scott-Harris made arguments that closing of a government department was motivated by racial animus which violated her civil rights as the only employee in the department. The high court found that closing the departmental was essentially a legislative activity regardless of claims about improper motive for the action. Officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions. Bogan also shows the privilege applied not only to the legislators, but the mayor (an executive), because his actions in drawing up a budget proposing the closing of the department, and his signing the action into law were of essentially parts of the legislative process. IMHO, the hypothetical examples now in the question, only act #1 seems to be making a policy decision similar to legislation activity.

Ideas discussed are general, do they still fall under a signed NDA/NC?

A lets B sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement/Non-Compete ("NDA/NC") and then shares its ideas. How "broad"/"general" can these ideas be to not be considered confidential? E.g. the idea that A tells B is this: "Making an app similar to x but with a better UX and simpler design." without getting into details, how it can be done more intuitive/simpler. Can this idea be protected by the NDA/NC without any details about how you could reach this goal?

NDA provisions in general are rather similar. In particular the ones covering the exceptions to the confidentiality obligations required to the receiving party. Such provisions normally have the following wording (more or less): Information shall not be treated as Confidential if: - at the time of disclosure is already in the public domain or becomes available to the public w/o breach by receiving party; - the receiving party receives it from a third party free to lawfully disclose such information; - was in the prior lawfull possession of the receiving party; - was independently developed by the receiving party; - is approved to be released by the disclosing party; or - the receiving party is required by law to disclose in response to a valid order of a court or by a government agency. Your particular case might not necessarily fall under any of this exceptions (i do not know the exact wording of the NDA you're referring to) but in any case, please note that simply telling a third party that you are discussing the development of "an app similar to x but with a better UX and simpler design", might already be considered as a breach of confidentiality. Surely the NDA is identified as being Confidential itself and it probably also contains a section saying something like: "This Agreement and its contents shall be treated as Confidential Information".

Is my understanding of the purpose of a License correct?

A license, as it applies to a professional license, drivers license, marriage license, software license is similar to the concept of a certificate, in that the purpose of such a thing is to have a great value placed on a legal concept by the licensee (the person receiving the license) so that the party issuing the license can have some control over the licensee, in that they may revoke the license and in so doing damage the reputation of the licensee in a clean and drama free manor. This appears to be similar to the concept of a certificate in an internet blocking proxy, though that is more of a concrete means of doing so, in that if the Certificate Authority revokes the certificate of a given client, it will no longer receive internet access. It seems to me licenses come into play in areas where the party issuing the license may have no other means for having power over an individual licensee, and especially in places where it really matters to have power over a licensee, for instance a doctor may lose their medical license if it is determined that some foul play was involved in the treatment of a now deceased or otherwise disabled patient. The deterrent here to the licensee is that they worked so hard, or paid so much money to get the license in the first place, and if the license is taken away they will no longer reap its benefits, to practice medicine, to drive a car, to be married, to receive security updates to software, and thus be vulnerable to something...the law, or the inability to receive security updates, should the issuing party revoke their certificate.

The legal effect of a licence is that the state has decided (through political processes) that there are some things that present such a hazard (physically, financially or otherwise) to the public that they should only be permitted to be done by people who have demonstrated to, and been certified by the state, that they are capable of doing those things safely. Driver's licences are pretty ubiquitous examples. Similarly some professions are licensed, particularly doctors, lawyers and engineers. It is also not uncommon to licence financial planners and stock brokers. Trades are often licenced, particularly plumbers, gasfitters and electricians. A licence demonstrates: this is a task that requires skill and judgement, this person has such skill and judgement.

Does a Limited company need a licence to lend money to an individual in the UK?

A limited company (one director) lent money to me as an individual (£450,000). The initial loan was secured as a first charge on a property I owned but did not live in. Interest the first 2 years was substantial and lowered the subsequent years. Should the lender have been licenced ?

It is possible that the lender should have been authorised by the financial services regulators. If they were not, but should have been, then the agreement might be unenforceable. What happens then depends on the court, which might decide it would be fair to uphold its terms anyway, or might award compensation to the borrower, or other options depending on what is "just and equitable in the circumstances" ( Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s.28(3) ). The overall picture is very complex. The official guidance about figuring out whether somebody is subject to the regulations - the Perimeter Guidance Manual - is 836 pages long. Even if somebody has authorisation, that might be subject to specified conditions, and it could be difficult to discover if the conditions were being met or not. At a very broad level, the lender should be authorised if they are acting "by way of business" and if what they did was a "regulated activity". Many activities involving mortgages and credit are indeed regulated, but the agreement in the question might escape, depending on all the details. For example, this may be a "regulated mortgage contract" (even though the borrower doesn't live in the property), but not if the borrower is acting on a commercial basis (PERG 4.4). There are many other conditions and nuances. In the same way, if the lender is not acting "by way of business" then they do not need to be authorised. The manual says (PERG 2.3): Whether or not an activity is carried on by way of business is ultimately a question of judgement that takes account of several factors (none of which is likely to be conclusive). These include the degree of continuity, the existence of a commercial element, the scale of the activity and the proportion which the activity bears to other activities carried on by the same person but which are not regulated. The nature of the particular regulated activity that is carried on will also be relevant to the factual analysis. A recent example of this law being applied is Jackson v Ayles & Ors [2021] EWHC 995 (Ch) . In that case, the applicants obtained a loan secured against their home, from an individual who was not authorised by the regulators. On examination of all the circumstances, the court concluded that the lender was acting by way of business, that the loan agreement was therefore unenforceable ( FMSA s.26 ), and that it would be unjust to enforce it because the lender ought to have known the rules. In different circumstances, say when the lender was not someone of "considerable financial acumen" (para 51) who had made many other loans to others (para 34), the outcome could have been different. Overall, I hope the summary above has given an impression of what it would look like to invite a court to make such a determination. Specifically, expert legal advice would be needed, and such advice could also include an analysis of whether this is a viable option at all, compared to other ways of tackling the issues.

Legal to verify identity using only a specific form of ID?

A liquor store verifies shoppers’ age through state-issued driver licenses. It won’t accept, for example, passports. Legal?

As far as I know, in the US it is not anywhere illegal to refuse to sell alcohol to a person, except when it falls into a enumerated category of prohibited discrimination (e.g. based on sex, religion, race etc). The ID requirement is a "defense" usable by the seller against consequences for accidentally selling to a minor: if they presented acceptable ID, you will not be prosecuted / fined for an underage sale. In Washington, a passport is one of the accepted forms of ID under WAC 314-11-025 ; it also accepted in California , idem Ohio , Florida and Wyoming . Without a law compelling an alcohol vendor to sell their goods to any of-age person with money, it is legal to decline to sell on any grounds other that demographic discrimination.

UK - Can my (hostile) landlord's (hostile) agents enter my flat to conduct viewings without my explicit permission?

A little background I'm a student renting (short hold) a studio apartment from a private landlord through an estate agent. The term of the contract ends in September of this year. I've had multiple issues with the landlord previously (failing to give proper 24 hour notice for inspections, letting himself in without permission while I was asleep after a 7 hour inspection notice, misrepresenting my legal obligations with regards to entry, threatening to charge me for fumigation because a few flies had come in the window, etc) and I have full email correspondence proving these things. The estate agents did not get heavily involved but the brief contact I had from them indicated they were very much on his side and they also misrepresented the law and the facts of the situation. This situation came to a head when I refused the landlord entry for an inspection (his notification was insufficient) and responded to his and the agents' accusations that my conduct was improper with a lengthy email to both the landlord and agents asserting my rights and detailing the various ways in which they had not been respected. Neither party responded to that email, though the landlord did acknowledge a repair request I also made within it, so I know he read it. I'm including an extract from that email in which I explicitly state my expectations moving forwards at the bottom of this message. This was a few months ago, after I sent that email I heard no more from either party and have been left in peace. I now have zero respect or tolerance for the landlord or the agents, and while I will continue to act respectfully and professionally and within the bounds of the contract and law, I fully intend to assert my rights to their fullest capacity and hold them to the law. Stop waffling, what's happening now? I just received the following email from the agents: Dear [me], Just to let you know, we have a viewing at your property tomorrow at 4:30pm. We have keys for access. This time is particularly inconvenient for me as my current sleep patterns put that in the middle of my night and I would have to do a significant amount of rearranging of my stuff before I'd be willing to have the place be seen. If I can avoid or postpone this I would very much like to, but I will abide by my contractual obligations. This email was received at 16:07 today, so they're just abiding by the 24 hours notification requirement. I understand that they may not (with the exception of emergencies) enter without my permission, but that I am required to give permission for a valid request or potentially face consequences. The actual questions Does this statement that a viewing WILL be taking place, rather than a request, constitute obtaining my permission? What happens if I do not reply to this at all, is permission implicitly granted unless explicitly denied? Does the third expectation I laid out below not count as explicitly denying them entry without obtaining explicit permission from myself? Can they be conducting viewings already when the contract is not up until September? If the agents are acting improperly here, is that grounds for me to refuse the viewing? The line about having keys for access definitely seems to fly in the face of my saying they may never let themselves in without explicit permission. The expectations I laid out to the landlord and agent You shall always give, at least, 24 hours notice before demanding entry. I would consider it courteous, as is generally customary, for you to give significantly more. Scheduled appointments shall have a reasonably short window for your arrival, I would suggest no more than 30 minutes. Merely specifying "the morning" is not sufficient. With the exception of emergencies as specified by the law, you shall never let yourself into the flat without my express permission. If I am due to be out at the time of your arrival I will let you know this and grant permission for the agreed-upon window of time. Even in these scenarios you will knock first before letting yourself in. You shall interpret those parts of the contract that are ambiguous with regards to magnitude in a reasonable manner. This is already the standard set out by the law. I feel you have exaggerated the perceived hygiene problem significantly, and to a greater degree every time you've told it. Any significant discussion regarding these matters or any others is conducted via email or text, with a preference for email. I believe that the written record helps avoid ambiguity and mis-remembering, and is generally beneficial for all parties acting in good faith. I will generally refuse to have these conversations in person for that reason. You shall not interpret the contract or the law in bad faith. The argument was made that your email was a valid notification and that I had turned you away inappropriately. Whether this was genuinely your and [AGENT]'s belief I do not know All of the above also applies to any other parties acting on your behalf, [AGENT] included.

Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law.

What are one's options, if he is incorrectly listed as defendant in civil lawsuit?

A little background: Two employees working for a competing beauty salon left it and came to us to rent out two stations. Since day one we have had landlord-tenant and not employer-employee relationship with those two persons, because: every month they pay us fixed station rent, they get to keep 100% of their profits, we also have a clause in rental contract that explains that we get to keep our already existing customers and walk-in customers, unless customers are explicitly looking for them. Few days ago we got a notice from court that this competing beauty salon is suing us along with those two former employees alleging that we have stolen their "trade secrets", which in this case is customer contact list. Obviously, the plaintiff is not aware of the fact that we are their landlord and not employer. They are suing all 3 of us for monetary damage due to lost profits. Also, to my surprise the competing beauty salon is represented by a legit lawyer registered at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/ To make it clear, I am not asking for legal advice. I am currently inquiring if our business insurance would cover legal defense and, most likely, will end up seeking professional legal defense. However, in the mean time I have 2 generic questions about court process in California to understand the process better: If someone is incorrectly listed as defendant, then what is the correct way to remove his name from lawsuit? Should one ask plaintiff to voluntarily remove him as defendant? Or is it safer for defendant to file something like "motion to dismiss"? If plaintiff's lawyer has not done due diligence and is misrepresenting relationship between listed defendants, then would that qualify as frivolous lawsuit? Would this lawyer risk sanctions imposed on him by State Bar of California? Would the plaintiff have to cover legal defense expenses for the defendant that was incorrectly listed?

The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial.

My ex keeps coming to my house uninvited

A little under a year ago I broke up with my (ex) girlfriend because she cheated on me. I told her to get out of my life and I would stay out of hers and that was the end of it. Well for some reason this semester she keeps coming to my house uninvited and will not leave or stay away no matter how much I request it. Her response is always a long the lines of "you can't tell me what to do" About the house: it's owned by the college we both attend there are 12 residents in the house, all of which say she has no reason to be here she has been over 3 times in the past 7 days she slept on the living room couch one night I have tried telling her that she is on the black list we made and cannot enter the house. How do I ensure that I can live peacefully in the privacy of my residence without her coming in whenever she pleases? We keep the doors locked but she either a) comes over with her friends who we are fine with or b) sneaks in when we have a lot of people over. Is there something I can do legally to get the point across to her that she can not be here? This is in the US

Call the police and ask them to throw her out.

Percentage of Restaurant Tables Appropriate for Wheelchairs

A local restaurant remodeled and now they have mostly high tables with stools and booths. They only have a few tables appropriate for someone in a wheelchair. If a restaurant has plenty of tables available, but none are suitable for a person in a wheelchair, are they ADA compliant?

The ADA Standards , in section 226.1 requires that: Where dining surfaces are provided for the consumption of food or drink, at least 5 percent of the seating spaces and standing spaces at the dining surfaces shall comply with 902. Where section 902 gives specifics on the requirements for accessible dining surfaces. It therefore seems that, in order to determine compliance, you would need to know how many dining spaces are available in total, and how many are wheelchair accessible. If less than 5% are accessible then the restaurant is not compliant, otherwise they appear to be OK.

What happens if a court decision maneuvers the court itself into a untenable legal position?

A long open question for the law was how responsible someone is if he sets up a link for another site and this site contains illegal stuff or changes its content to illegal stuff. For the exact purpose we assume copyright violations. The EU court finally decided (September 8th, 2016 Az. C-160/15) that sites which are operating for profit can be hold responsible for links pointing to sites violating copyright. Not only that, but even deleting the offending link the very same day may not be fast enough. This decision caused an uproar because it threatened internet commerce, especially small shops which have not the manpower to continously search for violations. Now in Germany there is a specific court which extended now the EuGH decision (Az. 310 O 402/16, November 18th, 2016) and declared exactly that site owners working for profit should inquire for each link if the linked site contains copyright violations. The court itself has a website where decisions are made public. What happens now is that some aggrieved parties decided that they will now ask the court if the court can guarantee that their website does not contain copyright violations. Not only that, but as the court itself decided in former decisions that violations are "time-critical", the parties set an short ultimatum for an answer. What exactly are the consequences if the decision of a court can be used to force it into violating the law itself ? CLARIFICATION: The problem is not that the court may have a site with content violations, the problem is that a party having a website containing content must answer to an inquiry if their site contains illegal content in a short timeframe. The court is now flooded with requests which the court cannot answer in a reasonable timespan. Because the question itself triggered inquiries for the exact implications, here some overview in German . "Operating for profit" includes advertising and self-presentation for paid services: "Da der Antragsgegner im Rahmen seines Internetauftritts im Eigenverlag vertriebenes Lehrmaterial entgeltlich anbietet, wurde die Webseite als gewerblich eingestuft". Someone operating for profit who sets a link must ask the site owner where the link is pointing if the content is legal to be on the safe side: "Für denjenigen, der mit Gewinnerzielungsabsicht handelt, [gilt] ein strengerer Verschuldensmaßstab: Ihm wird zugemutet, sich durch Nachforschungen zu vergewissern, ob der verlinkte Inhalt rechtmäßig zugänglich gemacht wurde, wobei die widerlegliche Vermutung einer Kenntnis der fehlenden Erlaubnis bestehe."

The court cannot be in violation as it is not a for-profit organisation and (presumably) its sites contains no advertising.

Issues with Foreign Executor of American Estate?

A long-divorced parent has two adult children, one residing in same state (Idaho for example), the other living overseas. Parent dies without debts, the only asset is a small home, and they pre-paid property taxes and insurance a full year ahead. The 25-year-old will designates the overseas offspring as executor. The will further states property shall be sold and offspring are to split the proceeds. However, the will does not specifically designate who inherits the property/deed. Both offspring get along well and there aren't any fights over anything. Will there be legal or financial problems with a foreign executor? Pre-death, in the will, would it be better to designate the American resident offspring as executor? If both offspring agreed, can the overseas offspring easily transfer executorship to the American offspring, or will there be legal or financial consequences? Would there be legal or financial deed ownership issues, since neither offspring specifically inherited the property? Could a court order the property to be auctioned out from under the offspring? If a court determines the overseas executor offspring receives the property deed, the overseas executor wants to remain executor but give deed to American offspring for easier selling of the property, would the property have to go through titling and closing costs for the transfer, and then again for property sale to a third party? Edit: Would there be any resident-of-same state property tax benefit gain or loss depending on which one has their name on the deed when the property sells?

The will further states property shall be sold and offspring are to split the proceeds. However, the will does not specifically designate who inherits the property/deed. This is an instruction regarding who inherits the property. It means that the executor of the probate estate (in an official capacity), who takes title by operation of law upon appointment, is directed to sell the property rather than to distributed it in kind. Will there be legal or financial problems with a foreign executor? Not necessarily. Generally, the main issue is that a foreign executor must sign a document expressly submitting to the jurisdiction of the probate court when appointed in addition to other documents that are signed by all executors. Pre-death, in the will, would it be better to designate the American resident offspring as executor? Not necessarily. Hands on administration of the estate and dealing face to face with a local probate lawyer is easier for a resident of the state where the assets are located and the decedent resides, but in these days of telecommunications this isn't a decisive factor. The relative competencies of the prospective executors is more important. If both offspring agreed, can the overseas offspring easily transfer executorship to the American offspring, or will there be legal or financial consequences? Assuming that they are the only interested parties in the estate, they can do so. You can't be compelled to serve as an executor just because you are nominated by a will to do so. If one person declines to serve, the person with next highest priority which would likely be the other sibling, may apply to the probate court to be appointed. The main financial consequence is that typically, whoever does the job is entitled to reasonable compensation from the estate for their services. Would there be legal or financial deed ownership issues, since neither offspring specifically inherited the property? No. Could a court order the property to be auctioned out from under the offspring? If all interested parties agree, they can defy the will. The normal process, however, is for the executor to follow the will and to sell the property in a commercially reasonable manner, typically by engaging a real estate agent to handle the sale. If the executor fails to take action, and an interested party objects, it would be more common for a probate court to remove the executor and appoint another one, than to order a sale at auction, which would typically be a course of last resort. This said, under appropriate circumstances, the court of probate jurisdiction would have authority to order an auction of the house. Most commonly, a court order to sell a decedent's house at auction would arise when the decedent (i.e. the dead guy) only owned an undivided partial interest in the house (called a tenancy in common interest) and the non-deceased third party co-owner of the house (perhaps a brother or ex-wife of the decedent) declined to cooperate in selling it. If a court determines the overseas executor offspring receives the property deed, the overseas executor wants to remain executor but give deed to American offspring for easier selling of the property, would the property have to go through titling and closing costs for the transfer, and then again for property sale to a third party? This question reflects a fundamental misunderstanding about how probate works. Title to the property vests in the estate by operation of law upon the death of the decedent. The executor has authority, once appointed, to take actions such as signing a deed to a third-party buyer, on behalf of the estate. There is no intermediate closing and transfer of title to vest title to the property of the decedent in the name of the estate before it goes from the estate to the third party. The net proceeds of the sale to the third party (after costs of sale and prorations of things like property taxes and prepaid insurance) are then placed in a bank account for the estate and paid to the heirs after expenses of administration are paid. There is nothing that makes it significantly harder for an overseas executor to close than a domestic one. The title company handling the sale emails the deed (and any other paperwork that needs to be signed) to the executor. The executor prints the documents to be signed, signs the non-notarized documents, and signs the deed in the presence of his friendly neighborhood notary in the foreign country where the executor lives, who notarizes the deed. The executed deed, together with a document called an apostille proving that the notary is really a notary, is sent back to the title company (probably with a scanned copy by email and a hard paper copy following by express delivery). Coordinating time zones may be a pain depending on the location of the particular foreign country in question (but the closing does not have to happen for all parties at exact the same time), and if the overseas executor is someplace primitive and remote with no internet access or computers or printers or faxes and no notaries, that could be a problem. But there are increasingly few places like that in the world.

Roe vs Wade was decided almost 50 years ago. Do more recent federal laws protect the right to an abortion as a medical decision?

A lot has changed in our laws and statutes since the Roe vs. Wade ruling in 1973. The United States Constitution does not explicitly address a right to health care. The words "health" or "medical care" cannot be found anywhere in the text of the Constitution. The provisions listed in the Constitution are evidence that the framers were more concerned with guaranteeing freedom from government, rather than providing specific rights to procedures and services related to health care. Laws such as "The Patient Self-Determination Act" of 1991 , "The Affordable Care Act" , "The Uniform Determination of Death Act" , "Preventing Maternal Deaths Act" of 2018 , "The Unborn Victims of Violence Act" of 2004 and so many others were created and defined to protect citizens rights as they relate to the complex issue of life, death, healthcare and patient outcomes. At the time that Roe vs Wade was passed there existed few legislative statutes governing a citizens rights with regards to their health care decisions. Now there exists a multitude of federal laws and regulations to define and protect patients. Yet no one has been talking about or whether these laws would protect access to abortion as an healthcare decision even without Roe vs Wade. ** I made some edits to the original question to clarify my intent: Do existing laws, which did not exist in 1973, serve to protect the right to choose in the absence of Roe vs. Wade? *** Additional Edits In a previous version of this question I made an argument on the legal status of unborn life. It was just intended as an example but it distracted from the main purpose of the question. The core of my question is still valid. I still want to know about any laws that could protect a woman’s right to an abortion as a medical decision. Since posting the question the White House has now quoted the “Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act” as a Federal law on emergency treatment that preempts State Laws and Regulations that ban the procedure without exception. Are there others like this law that provide additional protections?

One question raised here and worth at least noting is that the Texas argument in Roe includes the following assertion from Blackmun: The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. What follows is an investigation of the question whether a fetus is a person – basically, it has not been legally (constitutionally) determined that a fetus is a person. Issues of dying, being a citizen, being alive etc. are irrelevant since the central concept that relates to right is being a "person". It is reasonably well-known that statutes forbidding abortion were originally passed in order to protect the health of women – that was the original justification. However, there is a massive disagreement over what things "protect the health of women". In some states, it has been decided that allowing abortion is a rational, indeed compelling state interest; in other states, the opposite is the case. Although the federal government does get involved in health care matters, health care is fundamentally a state interest. Federal intervention power in medicine has two sources: the Commerce Clause, and the Tax and Spend Clause (Congress, which dispenses a lot of money, gets to say how the money will be used). There is ample case law saying that Congress cannot force states to repeal their bans against abortion, under penalty of losing federal money. I have yet to see a plausible Commerce Clause argument that would override the states' right to define their "compelling interest" in health care. Health care is not a constitutionally defined federal interest and it is a state interest, so we are back to square one, when it comes to using federal power to remove state discretion.

How are MMOs with real money economies allowed to operate?

A lot of Massively Multiplayer Online games include a form of "premium" in-game economy that may be purchased with real money (cash) by the player, usually for the purposes of faster progression in the game or cosmetic upgrades. For example, there are Gems in Guild Wars 2 which are originally purchased with cash (but may then be traded in-game using the game's normal currency). Taking the example a step further, Hex: Shards of Fate (an online-only trading card game with similarities to Magic: The Gathering ) has a "platinum" currency which may only be purchased using cash via the game's store, and is the only way of purchasing new booster packs of cards in the game. The developers have expressed that they want players to feel that their collection of digital cards has real value and the in-game auction house facilitates trades of cards, the rarest of which are trading for amounts in platinum valued up to about $100 each. The terms and conditions for the game state (as many other games do), and I'm paraphrasing here, that items within the game may not be traded for outside of the game for real currency. Not only does this make monetary sense for the developers, but I assume this is also to avoid a stack of legal troubles around money laundering and gambling/gaming laws in different territories. However, Entropia Universe ( wikipedia link ) has as its key feature an in-game economy which is tied directly to US dollars, and specifically allows players to "cash out" of the game and back into real money. They have even gone so far as to produce bank cards which withdraw from the game and have now formed an actual bank to regulate trades. My question is why are there not more games which take this approach of a game economy tied directly to real money? I understand that the economy needs to be carefully designed and balanced to avoid over-inflation (in-game) or other exploits leading to in-game currency being "created" from nothing, but the bigger concern seems to me to be the legal issues this would create. Given the amount of random chance involved in the game is this not effectively gambling? If so, how does Entropia Universe allow worldwide users without kicking up a storm of trouble from different regional authorities and governments? Surely this is exactly the kind of thing which is banned in certain US states (I am not a US citizen) or other countries. Is it because the game is based in Sweden and their more permissive laws allow for it? If so, do the laws of the country in which the player resides not take precedent?

I can see at least two defenses. Game of Skill Defense . Already mentioned in the comments. Entertainment Defense . One could claim the game itself is a form of entertainment and, therefore, all funds spent while playing the game are for entertainment purposes only vis-a-vis the game itself. And not any alleged gambling within the game. Consider the fact that the gambling rewards, after all, (i.e., mining stuff) are limited to being used inside the game and have zero utility outside the game. Ergo, all payments are strictly for entertainment purposes.

Is male circumcision without consent and without medical reason legal in France?

A lot of circumcision are realized on children in France without medical reasons. Are those operations legal or illegal ?

Male circumcision is by default legal In France it requires the consent of both parents for children and the subject themselves if an adult. If performed for religious or cultural reasons the risks must be explained. If performed for medical reasons, all alternate therapies must be explained as well.

How do affinity groups (e.g., employee resource groups) not violate discrimination laws?

A lot of companies have these, Women's groups, Black groups, LGBT groups, etc. Some of these groups are open for non-identifying folks to join (e.g., as allies) but some are not. For the ones that are not, how does this not run against discrimination laws? Is there some exception (like a ministerial exception for religious institutions) here?

Why would they be against the law? Anti-discrimination law applies to protected classes in specific situations. For example, in Australia (my emphasis): it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of a number of protected attributes including age, disability, race, sex, intersex status, gender identity and sexual orientation in certain areas of public life , including education and employment. The types of organisations or collectives that you describe appear to be social and private - not public.

Display images of trademarked items in blog post product review

A lot of media, both on the web and in many other forms, offers all kind of product reviews to their readers/viewers. Obviously, they use the name of the product, which might be trademarked, to identify what they are talking about. Very often they will show images of the product, which would most likely show a logo that could also be trademarked. Assuming one is the author of the text and the images, so no copyright are infringed, but obviously doesn't own the trademark of the item that is discussed and/or displayed, what are the consequences, if any, to host a blog in Canada that would review products he likes. I know many people already do it, either commercially or as a hobby. Obviously they do not make people believe they are associated with the product in any way. Does this type of activity require any kind of permission from the trademark owner ?

From IP Australia : A trade mark is used to distinguish your goods and services from someone else's and is enforceable under IP law. If you are using the trade mark in a way that doesn't create confusion between your goods and services (product reviews) and the trade mark owner's goods and services (whatever that is) then there is no infringement. Permission is not required. For example, I can write Coke and talk about Coke and review Coke and paint pictures of Coke so long as I do not use Coke to sell beverages.

What can be the consequences of indemnification clauses in online terms of use?

A lot of online services prompt users to accept conditions of use that have clauses for indemnification that look very much like there is a chance that the user who pays for the service can possibly pay fees if a third party causes damage just because it was in some "relation" or "in connection" to the user's use of the service. On the other hand most of these conditions of use also include clauses that write that the indemnification clause will survive any termination. So my question is, what is the scope of the indemnification clause? Is it required that the service provider first prove that the user's use of the service is 'in connection' for the third party suit against the service provider or can they just say because this user uses the service he is in connection to any suit that is against the service? Also what happens if the service provider just suits himself by some third party connected to the provider and decides to use this as a way to sue its users? Also what happens several years after the user stopped using the service? If this clause survives termination are the above problems permanent? If yes, isn't using such online services (services which have both indemnification and a clause that indemnification survives termination) a risk that last one's lifetime and rises with every new service with similar terms that you ever use? Example of indemnification clauses are: You agree to indemnify and hold {service provider}, its officers, directors, employees, agents, subsidiaries and affiliates, harmless from any demands, loss, liability, claims or expenses (including attorneys’ fees), made against {service provider} by any third party due to or arising out of or in connection with your use of the Site. or other variant: You shall defend {service provider} against any claim, demand, suit or proceeding made or brought against {service provider} by a third-party alleging that Your Content, or Your use of the Service in violation of this Agreement, infringes or misappropriates the intellectual property rights of a third-party or violates applicable law, and shall indemnify {service provider} for any damages finally awarded against, and for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by, {service provider} in connection with any such claim, demand, suit or proceeding; provided, that {service provider} (a) promptly gives You written notice of the claim, demand, suit or proceeding; (b) gives You sole control of the defense and settlement of the claim, demand, suit or proceeding (provided that You may not settle any claim, demand, suit or proceeding unless the settlement unconditionally releases {service provider} of all liability); and (c) provides to You all reasonable assistance, at Your expense. For my questions I assume that the terms have also a clause that the jurisdiction is a state within the USA. For simplicity lets assume that it is state of California like the following text: K. Governing Law; Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of California, without reference to conflicts of laws principles. The parties agree that the federal and state courts in San Francisco County, California will have exclusive jurisdiction and venue under this Agreement, and the parties hereby agree to submit to such jurisdiction exclusively. Also we may assume that the user has to click on an agree button when he registers for the online service. Another assumptions is that the terms have this clause also: L. Severability. If any provision, or portion thereof, of this Agreement is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable, such determination will not impair or affect the validity, legality, or enforceability of the remaining provisions of this Agreement, and each provision, or portion thereof, is hereby declared to be separate, severable, and distinct.

The scope of the clause is the scope that the clause defines If you agree to a clause that says "You indemnify us if {circumstance}" then if {circumstance} happens they can rely on the indemnity. For example, when you buy home insurance, your insurer indemnified you for {conditions} which include (among other things) your house catching fire. If your house catches fire (subject to any exclusions like if you set it on fire deliberately), then they will indemnify you for the consequent damage. You would need to demonstrate to their satisfaction that the circumstances of the indemnity occurred and the amount of the damage. If there was a dispute over that, you may have to sue them. The same is true of these sorts of indemnity clauses. For the first example, they would need to demonstrate that there were "demands, loss, liability, claims or expenses" by a "third party" and that it was "due to or arising out of or in connection with your use of the Site." For the second example, they would need to demonstrate a "claim, demand, suit or proceeding" by "by a third-party" and that your content or use violated IP or "applicable law" but only if they a) gave you a copy of it b) allows you to defend it and c) they help you do that (at your cost). At face value, there is no reason to believe that such clauses would be unenforcable - they don't seem to be unconscionable or even unfair.

Can I obtain discount codes using disposable email addresses?

A lot of online shops offer discount codes to new customers that sign up for their newsletter. While you can use an email address only once to obtain such a code I found out that using disposable email address services allows me to create such a code for every order. Is that legal? Obviously these discount codes are an incentive for new customers so I am not sure if this is considered a fraudulent behavior.

It would depend on the terms and conditions of the offer but presuming that the offer is only extended to new customers and you were an existing customer (using any email): using the code subsequent times is fraud - obtaining financial benefit by deception. It is also breach of contract.

Does pre-trial detention exist only because of a resources constraint?

A lot of people are talking about alternatives to cash bail recently, which made me wonder, why does pre-trial detention exist in the first place? My layman's understanding of pre-trial detention is that it's a kind of "buffer" or a necessary evil. The root problem appears to me that we don't have enough judges, public defenders, etc. to get everyone to trial immediately, so we have to hang onto them until a slot opens up. Bail exists because of flight risk, so if in some world there were no need for pre-trial detention, we wouldn't need bail or any alternative. Is my understanding essentially correct? In other words, does pre-trial detention exist because of a resources constraint? Or is there some more fundamental reason why we have this intermediary step between arrest and trial? My question is coming from a US-based context, hence my lead-in about "cash bail". However, I'm curious about pre-trial detention in general, regardless of whether bail is used or what form it takes.

Even if unlimited resources were available, in order to have a fair trial, the prosecution and defense both need time to prepare their cases, research the law, conduct investigations, gather evidence, interview witnesses, seek out experts, order forensic tests, etc, etc. And there will be pretrial motions that have to be prepared, argued, and judged. You have to figure out what's going to happen to the defendant during that time, be it detention, release, bail, or some other alternative. Shortages of personnel obviously exacerbate the delays, but even without that issue, it's not like the courts could try every defendant on the spot. That would be something like the Wild West, or the Dark Ages; certainly not what the modern world considers justice.

Unable to afford a lawyer, can I go into court by myself?

A lot of people are unable to afford a public defender, so I was wondering if this is possible.

The UK does have free lawyers for those who cannot afford an attorney. In fact, it is even more liberal than the US, including representation in civil cases for the most part as well (there are a few exceptions, like libel, and from what I've read, even that is changing). Rather than the main source of free representation being called public defenders, they are referred to as Legal Aid, which is a government funded agency much like public defenders are in the United States. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that legal aid will be made available to those who lack sufficient resources, in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. In the event legal aid is too busy to accept a new client, the court will appoint a solicitor from a list of private firms/practitioners that will act in the same capacity. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. This has been interpreted as providing for a general requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual or between the parties in the case, and the overall structure of the article, as well as the case law of the Court, stresses the vital connection between the right to legal assistance and the general interest in guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. When faced with a criminal charge, the right to legal assistance is explicitly set out in Article 6 (3) (c). An entitlement to free legal aid in civil cases is available in cases where the absence of legal support would make any equality of arms impossible and would effectively deprive an applicant of access to the proceedings as such, for example, when a case can be filed to a court only if assisted by a lawyer in circumstances when an applicant cannot clearly afford one. My guess is, if your friend was denied counsel under legal aid, she has too much income or to many assets to qualify, or she is involved in a case that does not qualify. That said, the right to counsel in in the UK is a right for the indigent in most types of cases (even civil) and is becoming more and more fundamental as imposed by findings of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. Here is a link where you can at least begin to get some information. https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/overview

Are holographic wills really routinely thrown out by probate courts?

A lot of states do not permit holographic wills and specifically state in their laws that an unwitnessed will is invalid. This seems like a cruel provision to me. So, if a person writes out in their own handwriting a proper will which is signed and dated, but it is not witnessed, then the state will just throw it out? For a person having no heirs this could be disastrous because instead of the money going to the intended charities and friends, instead the money would just go to the government if the will gets thrown out. Does this actually happen? Also, any answer to this question I would hope will address the legal principle that the law "favors testacy over intestacy". In other words, there is a legal principle in common law that it is always better to follow some kind of intent of the deceased, whatever that might be, rather than treat them as completely intestate. This principle would seem to conflict with some state laws that brusquely state that wills that fail to comply with various technical provisions, such as holographic wills, are invalid.

The page "States Where Holographic Wills Are Legal" from legal zoom lists some 26 united-states states in which holographic wills are valid, plus 9 more that will recognize such wills when they are written elsewhere. Beyond that, some states consider a holographic will valid for only a limited time, such as one year, after its date. The idea seems to be that a holographic will is supposed to be for emergency situations, when there is no opportunity to have a will drafted and witnessed in the usual way. Under the common law, holographic wills were valid, if they met a few requirements, such as being entirely in the handwriting of the testator. This satisfied the legal principle that the law "favors testacy over intestacy". But such principles never prevail over specific statutes, and the states that disallow holographic wills have generally done so by statute. Holographic wills can be harder to prove, cause court contests, and can perhaps be more subject to fraud, or legislators may have thought so. In any event, they have been made invalid in many jurisdictions. My understanding is that in a state that does not recognize a holographic will, a will not properly witnessed will often be ignored in favor of the legal heirs, that is those who would inherit if there were no will. I am not at all sure about the case where there are no legal heirs, and the state would inherit in the absence of a will. Perhaps there probate judges have more discretion. Examples I could not find much caselaw or many news reports about holographic wills, and no case where there were no heirs-at-law, and the alternative was for the estate to go to the state (escheat), although some sites mention the possibility. It seems that few cases dealing with holographic wills are not only brought to court, but appealed so that published opinions on them can be found. The page "New York Holographic Will" (from a law office site) says: A holographic will is a unique type of will that will only be considered valid if it is made under certain extreme conditions. In all other circumstances, a holographic will will not be valid and will not be probated. If this happens, then your estate will be treated as if you died without leaving a will. In New York if you do not leave will your estate will be disposed of according to the laws related to intestate succession. NY EPTL § 4-1.1. ... If you die leaving only a holographic will and the court determines it to be invalid, then there is a possibility that your property will end up in the hands of New York state. If you are not survived by any relatives, then your property will escheat to the state. The page "Handwritten wills can translate into probate problems" says: In one Arizona case, a partially typed and handwritten document was invalidated. A grandmother’s wishes were tossed aside, and her granddaughter did not share in her legacy. Ther page "Holographic Will Florida" (From a lawyer's blog) says: Holographic wills are invalid in Florida and therefore your assets will pass according to the Florida Intestacy Statute. Your assets located in the State of Florida will pass by the Florida Intestacy Statute even if you validly executed your holographic will in another State that allows holographic wills and then you later move to Florida. ... Finally, if there is nobody that applies, meaning you have no family at all, the property will escheat (transfer) to the State of Florida. The *National Law Reviewe article "Court Holds That Holographic Will Was Not Valid As There Was No Signature" says: In In the Estate of Hohmann, the decedent died without leaving an executed will, but his caretaker found a hand written document wherein the decedent stated his wishes for his property. No. 04-20-00237-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 9216 (Tex. App.—San Antonio November 25, 2020, no pet. history). ... The court held that the hand-written document had not been signed and was not valid: Here, we see no evidence in the written instrument indicating that Raymond intended the phrase “R. Hohmann Estate” to serve as his signature. In the case Estate of FRANCES BURNS BLACK, Deceased. (L.A. No. 31280. Supreme Court of California. March 1, 1982.) Richardson, J. wrote: Where, as here, there is no conflict in the evidence, "'the validity of the holographic instrument must be determined entirely by reference to the applicable statutes and principles of law.' [Citations.]" (Estate of Baker (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 680, 683 [31 Cal. Rptr. 33, 381 P.2d 913].) Unanimously in Baker, we stressed that "The policy of the law is toward 'a construction favoring validity, in determining whether a will has been executed in conformity with statutory requirements' [citations]." (Ibid.) Moreover, we affirmed "'the tendency of both the courts and the Legislature ... toward greater liberality in accepting a writing as an holographic will. ...'" (Ibid.) "'Substantial compliance with the statute, and not absolute precision is all that is required. ...'" ... In construing section 53 we bear in mind the primary legislative purpose of the holographic will statute which was identified by us in Estate of Dreyfus (1917) 175 Cal. 417, 418-419 [165 P. 941], as the prevention of "fraudulent will-making and disposition of property" by virtue of the recognized difficulty of forging an entire handwritten instrument. ... As noted by Professor Osborn: "An extended holograph ... is perhaps the most effective means of proving practical execution, even more than witnesses, and the law relating to holograph wills recognizes this fact. ..." (Osborn, Questioned Documents (2d ed. 1929) p. 682 ... Our liberal statutory interpretation and emphasis on "substantial compliance" expressed in Baker has been well understood, for there have been few reported decisions subsequent thereto which have adopted the hypertechnical application of section 53 to holographic wills which we disapproved in Baker. ... No sound purpose or policy is served by invalidating a holograph where every statutorily required element of the will is concededly expressed in the testatrix' own handwriting and where her testamentary intent is clearly revealed in the words as she wrote them. Frances Black's sole mistake was her superfluous utilization of a small portion of the language of the preprinted form. Nullification of her carefully expressed testamentary purpose because of such error is unnecessary to preserve the sanctity of the statute. Moreover, rejection of the instrument as a will would have the unfortunate practical consequence of passing her estate through the laws of intestacy to the daughter of her predeceased husband by a former marriage -- in fact, a stranger to her -- thereby excluding those whom she described in the holograph as "my very dear friends" and "my adopted family" and the charity which was apparently close to her heart and which she specifically wished to benefit. In the case of Wilson v. Polite 218 So. 2d 843 (1969) JONES, Justice wrote: It was alleged in said petition that the said writing was not valid in law as a will, because it did not comply with Section 657 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (1956) in that it was not subscribed by the said Clara Thompson. ... The sole question is whether this instrument constitutes a holographic will. No person has an inherent or constitutional right to make a will disposing of his property. Such is a privilege extended to the citizens by the State. 94 C.J.S. Wills § 3, p. 680 (1956); ... It is a requisite to a valid will that it be executed as prescribed by statute. ... No matter how earnestly one may desire and intend to make a will, a paper, although fully intended by the writer to be a will, is ineffective and invalid unless its execution meets statutory requirements. The purpose of statutes prescribing formalities for the execution of wills is not for the purpose of restricting the power of testator to dispose of his property, but it is to guard against mistakes, impositions, undue influences, fraud, deception, etc., which would divert the property of the testator from those intended by him or her to inherit same. The formalities are for the testator's protection also, as well as the beneficiaries'. ... We have before us here what is claimed to be a holographic will. To be such it must be executed in accordance with the specific requirements of the statute. It must be laid on the table beside the statute to determine whether its execution is in accord therewith. If it is not executed as provided by the statute, it is not a will, regardless of the intention of the alleged testator. ... An instrument offered as a holographic will must be a complete and executed document, although absolute precision of execution is not necessary, and all that is required is a clear showing on the face of the instrument of its execution in conformity with the law. ... In summary, the court has construed the statute regarding holographic wills to mean (1) it must be signed at the end of a document, testamentary in character, which shows on its face that the testamentary purpose therein expressed is completed, (2) nothing which follows the signature may be considered, (3) if the writing does not meet the requirements of the statute the intent of the writer is immaterial. The part of the document in question which precedes the signatures thereon fails to show on its face that the testamentary purpose was completed. On the contrary the purported signatures appear in the middle of a sentence. ... No where is there a court authorized to make a will for any decedent and that is exactly what we would be doing if we said we were going to strike out those words in this instrument which keeps it from being a will. (There was a strong dissent in this case, which I omit.)

When does money become money? (When is a debt "realized"?)

A lot of taxable liabilities depend on the notion of when a monetary gain is "realized", but it is not clear to me how this is defined legally. For example, if a person sells stock, then the brokerage will credit the cash account of the client. The client does not actually have the money in the sense that the brokerage "owes" them the money, but since the brokerage can be viewed as sort of a bank, then the gain could be considered realized. So, take a different kind of debt. A gambler wins money at a casino, but just has chips. If the gambler keeps the chips, obviously the chips are not "money" so the gain cannot be said to be "realized". Now, suppose the gambler cashes the chips, but only to his account at the casino. The casino now owes the money to the gambler but has not paid it. The casino is not a bank, so the customer's balance is a commercial debt, not money. So, if you consider that to be a "realized" gain of money, does that mean any business credit is? For example, if a vendor issues a business a new credit for some reason, then is that gain "realized" as soon as the vendor notifies the business of the credit, or only when the business receives a check for the credit and actually deposits it in its bank account? For example, if I sell something to a business, they owe me the money for the good, but that is not a "realized" gain yet, until they actual pay me and the money is in my bank account. So, basically the question revolves around possession of money and whether one can be said to "possess" money owed by a bank, casino, other business, person, or whatever. One pretty obvious rule here is that only one person can possess the cash. So, either the cash belongs to me or the casino, not both, for example. If the casino is actually holding my money in a separate entitled account which is "mine", then I guess theoretically the money is "mine", but if the casino just considers my "account" to be just a ledger entry, then the cash does not really exist. It's just a debt they have to me, so it cannot be considered to be "realized".

In general, a liquid account, denominated in monetary units (dollars, pounds, euros, etc) from which the owner has the right to make a withdrawal at any time is treated legally much the same as cash. This includes a bank account and a brokerage 'cash" account. It will not include a mutual fund account denominated in shares of stock, nor a debt which is not collectable at will. When the proceeds of a transaction are depositd into such an account, I believe that the profit (if any)m has been "realized" and that a taxable event has occurred. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1001 a gain or loss is realized on the sale or other disposition, or exchange of property. Nothing is ssid about 'cash" or accounts with a signature authority. Under 26 CFR 1.1001-1 : ... the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained. in Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm. of Internal Revenue , 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) The US Supreme Court wrote: Rather than assessing tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the value of a taxpayer's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences of a gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer "realizes" the gain or loss. The realization requirement is implicit in § 1001(a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1001(a), which defines "[t]he gain [or loss] from the sale or other disposition of property" as the difference between "the amount realized" from the sale or disposition of the property and its "adjusted basis." As this Court has recognized, the concept of realization is "founded on administrative convenience." Helvering v. Horst , 311 U. S. 112, 116 (1940). ... Section 1001(a)'s language provides a straightforward test for realization: to realize a gain or loss in the value of property, the taxpayer must engage in a "sale or other disposition of [the] property." The parties agree that the exchange of participation interests in this case cannot be characterized as a "sale" under § 1001(a); the issue before us is whether the transaction constitutes a "disposition of property." ... Neither the language nor the history of the Code indicates whether and to what extent property exchanged must differ to count as a "disposition of property" under § 1001(a). Nonetheless, we readily agree with the Commissioner that an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event under § 1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are "materially different."... ... We start with the classic treatment of realization in Eisner v. Macomber , supra . In Macomber , a taxpayer who owned 2,200 shares of stock in a company received another 1,100 shares from the company as part of a *pro rata- stock dividend meant to reflect the company's growth in value. At issue was whether the stock dividend constituted taxable income. We held that it did not, because no gain was realized. ... In Phellis and Marr , we held that the transactions were realization events. We reasoned that because a company incorporated in one State has "different rights and powers" from one incorporated in a different State, the taxpayers in Phellis and Marr acquired through the transactions property that was "materially different" from what they previously had. United States v. Phellis , 257 U. S., at 169-173; ... Taken together, Phellis , Marr , and W eiss stand for the principle that properties are "different" in the sense that is "material" to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or extent. Thus, separate groups of stock are not materially different if they confer "the same proportional interest of the same character in the same corporation." Marr v. United States , 268 U. S., at 540. However, they are materially different if they are issued by different corporations, id., at 541; United States v. Phellis , supra, at 173, or if they confer "differen[t] rights and powers" in the same corporation, Marr v. United States , supra, at 541. No more demanding a standard than this is necessary in order to satisfy the administrative purposes underlying the realization requirement in § 1001(a). See Helvering v. Horst , 311 U. S., at 116. For, as long as the property entitlements are not identical, their exchange will allow both the Commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the appreciated or depreciated values of the property relative to their tax bases Thus any exchange of property for other property which is in some significant sense different, such as interests in different mortgages of similar market value, or any sale of property causes a gain or loss to be realized.It does not matter in what sort of account the proceeds are held, or even whether the proceeds are in cash as opposed to some other sort of property. The beneficial owner realizes a gain or loss, even if s/he is not the legal owner.

Can the GDPR be used to ask free race photographs?

A lot of time pictures of participants are taken during a sports event. These are often sold afterwards for e.g. 10 euro each. Some people just share the watermarked image on social media. But my question is: is it possible to use the 'right of access' to get all personal information from the photographer including the photographs. If not, how far does the 'right of access' goes?

It should be possible to obtain any Personal Data from the owner of the image (who may or may not be the photographer), but a photograph of a sporting event may or may not be considered Personal Data as defined by 2016/679 (GDPR), depending on the purpose of its processing. The UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) provides the following on page 15 of their interpretation : Example At New Year celebrations in Trafalgar Square two almost identical photographs of the revellers are taken by two separate photographers and stored in electronic form on computer. The first photographer, a photo journalist, takes a picture of the crowd scene to add to his photo library. The second photographer is a police officer taking photos of the crowd scene to identify potential troublemakers. The data in the electronic image taken by the journalist is unlikely to contain personal data about individuals in the crowd as it is not being processed to learn anything about an identifiable individual. However, the photo taken by the police officer may well contain personal data about individuals as the photo is taken for the purpose of recording the actions of individuals who the police would seek to identify, if there is any trouble, so they can take action against them. The people sharing or selling the photograph, and the owners of the medium on which they are shared, could have obligations that the photographer does not.

How risky is modifying the logos of social media sites?

A lot of websites have social media buttons, which allows users to share the page on various sites. These buttons use the logos of these sites. Most social media sites don't allow third parties to use altered logo designs, for example Facebook . But even so, I've seen many websites that use slightly modified social media logos, for example IMDb 's circular Facebook "f" logo, when the original is a rounded square. I've even seen some more artistic ones, like these or even these . Is this technically copyright infringement? How risky is it to do this? I've seen some very prominent websites use slightly altered logos. Have any ever been sued?

It's more likely a trademark problem than copyright but it's not easy to identify which legal theory the mark owner would use to enforce compliance with their rules. My first thought was initial interest confusion. But if a person sees the logo what are they going to confuse it with? It's not a typical case where an infringing competitor uses the other's trademark to confuse buyers into buying the infringer's goods. Perhaps if buyers are confused they might NOT click a link because they don't recognize it. In this case Facebook loses a click. But they don't have a right that click so that's a stretch also. The misuse they claim is probably dilution. If someone makes a particularly crappy modification it could be argued that this tarnishes the brand. No confusion is needed for dilution, all that is required is that the mark must be "famous" and used by the infringer in way that causes the dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. This is known as tarnishment. Tarnishment occurs when the plaintiff's trademark is likened to products of low quality, or is portrayed in a negative context. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). See Louis Vuitton vs Chewy Vuiton where Louis Vittuon lost when Chewy Vuiton got summary judgment. ...the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)... provides that the owner of a famous mark can enjoin "another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. But the Supreme Court has held that the dilution statute "unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution." Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003) So this requires that messing with logos actually diminishes a brand and that the company can prove it. I don't know of a case where any of these social media companies tried to enforce their rules. I came across a few blog posts about these rules indicating that the authors had contacted the companies, asking about enforcement theories; no social media company had replied to any of those bloggers.

Resident tenants fined for parking in residents' parking area

A magement company owns a block of flats and the surrounding plot of land. Flat "owners"/leaseholders take out a mortgage to lease the flats for a number of years. They sublet to tenants (with permission). Parking enforcement is put into place by the management company and contracted out. Parking permits are sent to the leaseholders, including non-resident ones. Subletters/resident tenants (who have let flats advertised with parking) are fined for parking in the residents' parking area until they get the permits. Do the tenants have a legal basis for having such fines waived or reclaiming them?

Only governments can levy fines ... don't pay them. You don't have to give people money just because they ask for it.

What, if any, was the legal basis for the powers of the regional seats of government and commissioners?

A major part of the UK’s contingency planning for nuclear war was the system of regional seats of government and regional commissioners; Wikipedia says under such plans, regional commissioners would have ‘absolute power’ in their region, implying the rule of law would be abrogated. Was there ever any legal basis in either prerogative or statute for giving dictatorial control to regional appointees if central government was hit? Or was the assumption that once nuclear war set in, law was not sustainable due to necessity?

Yes The Civil Defence Act 1948 gave the minister power to establish what became the Regional Seats of Government .

In a defamation case, can the defendant not prove statement to be true and still win the case?

A male celebrity has said to a tabloid newspaper he slept with a female celebrity when they worked in a production few years ago. The female celeb is now suing him for defamation as she says that this is false; she never slept with him. If the male celebrity decided to say he can't remember the specifics for example where and when this alleged encounter happened, is that enough of a defence for the male celebrity or does he have to provide specifics of encounter to win this case.

There are a variety of reasons someone might not win a defamation case, some of which are defenses, and others of which are part of the basic prima facie case that every person pursing a claim must establish. The exact details vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The statute of limitations for bringing suit based upon the alleged statement has passed. Many jurisdictions have especially short statutes of limitations for defamation claims. For example, in Colorado, the statute of limitations for a defamation claim is just one year, while other civil claims have two to six year statutes of limitations. The quoted statement isn't actually what was said. The statement is not defamatory in nature (i.e. it doesn't tend to harm the Plaintiff's reputation). The Plaintiff's reputation is so bad that no further statement could harm it. The court lacks jurisdiction over the claim or the case is filed in the wrong venue. The statement was substantially true. Note that this is not a defense to all types of claims called defamation in all jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions prohibit certain kinds of inflammatory negative statements (e.g. about religious figures, monarchs, dead people, family members, or disabled people) without regard to their truth, in causes of action that are seen as a subset of defamation actions. For example, Germany's criminal defamation statute prohibits some kinds of speech that would be considered insulting or "fighting words", effectively imposing a standing of civility in every day contexts, that applies without regard to truth. U.S. law carefully distinguishes between remedies for fraudulent lies about someone, statements that are objectionable because they implicate privacy concerns, statements that are objectionable because a person has a contractual or particularized legal duty not to say negative things about a particular individual, and statements that are disrespectful and disorderly, but not all jurisdictions draw these careful and fine lines. In context, the statement could not reasonably have been understood to be true as opposed to puffing, hyperbole, or an opinion. Failure to prove damages in jurisdictions where this is required on claims where it is required (proof of damages is not required for libel or slander per se in some jurisdictions). Some jurisdictions allow only economic damages, others allow emotional harm damages, others allow punitive damages, some allow statutory damages, and some allow some but not all of these kinds of damages. The statement is privileged or subject to a qualified privilege (e.g. statements made to law enforcement investigators, by attorneys in litigation, in court documents, by legislators in legislative debate, etc.) The statement was false but believed in good faith and with a reasonable basis to be true at the time, and at the time of the litigation, the person making the statement acknowledges its inaccuracies or a sense in which a statement meant as true could be misunderstood. Some jurisdictions make retraction of full defense or a partial defense. Some jurisdictions even make a request for a retraction a condition precedent to bringing a defamation lawsuit in some circumstances. The person bringing the lawsuit doesn't meet their burden of proof at trial. Usually, the burden of proof is on the person making the claim, but truth is sometimes considered an affirmative defense which some jurisdictions place on the defendant to prove. The burden of proof could be quite relevant to the answer. Ultimately, if truth is an issue in a case, the finder of fact (jury or judge depending upon the jurisdiction and whether a jury is demanded) would have to decide what evidence is sufficient. There is no black and white rule that applies.

Is it rape to have sex with a man without disclosing that one is a male-to-female transgender person?

A male-to-female transgender person meets a male partner, but does not tell the partner about being transgender. Thus, the male partner believes the transgender woman is a (cis-gender) woman, and they have sex. If the transgender woman hadn't hidden this fact, the male partner would not ever have wanted to have sex. Is this considered rape? Considering the growing ratio of people going through a sex change operation, and living later hiding this fact from the society, the problem will likely become more and more common.

Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one).

Can a divorced man win a downward modification of alimony and/or child support if he were tricked into a marriage by a child that wasn't his?

A man and a woman are dating, and the woman gets pregnant. The woman pushes the man into a marriage before the birth of the child, claiming that the child was his. A year or two later, he finds out through a DNA test that the statement is false. The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. Will the man likely be able to get reduced child support and/or alimony on the claim that he was tricked into a marriage he would not otherwise have undertaken? (Suppose the man had written evidence (e.g. a letter, diary or journal), and told some friends that he was entering the marriage only on his mistaken belief in his paternity of the child.) Your answer can be for any state in the United States, but I am particularly interested in New York and California,.

Can a divorced man win a downward modification of alimony and/or child support if he were tricked into a marriage by a child that wasn't his? The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. Will the man likely be able to get reduced child support and/or alimony on the claim that he was tricked into a marriage he would not otherwise have undertaken? Generally speaking, marriages induced by fraud about anything other than the extreme case of fraud involving who someone is marrying in the act of marriage itself (i.e. someone believed they were marrying John Smith from Denver but actually was married to John Smith from Los Angeles, whom they had never met before, because the marriage ceremony was conducted with disguises and they didn't look closely at the marriage certificate), has no impact on marital rights. Evidence regarding fraud to induce a marriage wouldn't even be admissible at trial because it wouldn't be legally relevant. This has no impact on alimony. Paternity can be contested by filing a paternity suit within the statute of limitations for doing so which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (usually within two to five years of the child's birth). If the husband prevails in a timely paternity contest, child support will not be owed. Otherwise, actual genetic paternity would be irrelevant. In California, the statute of limitations to disavow paternity of a child born to one's wife is two years from the date of birth. N.B. I am making some interpretations of inexact language in the question. It says: The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. But I assume that what is really meant is that one or both of the members of the couple file for divorce and that in the course of the divorce proceeding the wife seeks alimony and child support. If the divorce proceeding is concluded without an adjudication of paternity that would usually preclude a later lawsuit to disavow paternity.

Can the mother of a child keep the father's name off of the child's birth certificate?

A man and woman have a baby but they are not married. They split up before the baby is born. After the baby is born, the mother sues the father for child support, wins and the father is ordered to pay child support. Later the mother decides to not list the father on the birth certificate, and refuses to let the baby have his last name. Does this make legal sense for the mother to do this? Would the father be able to contest any of this?

Under 28 Pa. Code 1.6 , The child of an unmarried woman may be registered with any surname requested by the mother. If no other surname is so requested, the child shall be registered with the mother’s surname Registration is the point at which there is parental discretion. Subsequently, a name change is possible by court order, however as maintained in numerous cases including in re: Niedbala , 36 Pa. D. & C. 3d 397 When the court, however, is confronted with the question of whether to amend or change the surname of a child, lacking sufficient understanding to choose for herself, then the court must not consider protectible parental interests or whether the parents are married, divorced or never married or whether they are male or female, but rather the child's best interests As stated in that ruling, the court will then consider the child's preference; the effect of the change on the preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent; how long the child has used one vs. the other name. Pennsylvania law on child support is rather long, but there is no provision whereby only a married father or mother can be held liable for support. It is probable that the father was legally established as the biological father, and that would, according to these guys , allow you to have your name put on the birth certificate and perhaps even gain custody.

How is child custody/visitation determined when there is no marriage?

A man and woman have a child in Pennsylvania. They are not married. Before the child is born, they end their relationship. Each parent finds another partner and they live separately. What are the options provided by Pennsylvania law regarding child custody and/or visitation rights? Obviously the best thing would be for the parents to work it out among themselves, but what would the law say if they cannot?

Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult.

Does the law provide for any defense or help for defense in civil family cases?

A man and woman who are not married have a baby. During the pregnancy the two split up. The woman sues the man for shared custody of the child and he is ordered to pay child support. He regularly visits the child and there are no problems or issues with that so far. The woman decides to sue the man or modify the order and is now asking for sole custody and to require the father to submit to paid, supervised visits of his daughter. If someone doesn't have many resources at their disposal to fight this action, does the law in Pennsylvania allow any 'public defender' type of help - as it does with criminal actions? Or what type of remedies does the law provide in this kind of circumstance?

The law does not, by itself provide the kind of help you're looking for. There are, however, legal services organizations that may be able to assist. The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services has links to several of them.

If a person commits assault in Mexico and not charged in Mexico, can he or she be charged here in the U.S.?

A man assaulted a woman while in Mexico. She did not press charges there and they returned to the U.S. Can she press charges against him in this country for something he did in Mexico?

Criminal cases can generally be brought only in the jurisdictions where they were committed or where they caused injury. Only the jurisdiction that has enacted the relevant criminal laws can enforce its own laws, which presumptively apply only in the territorial jurisdiction of the place enacting them. In the case of a criminal assault case, where the assault occurred and caused injury solely in Mexico, criminal charges could not be brought in the United States. Alternatives Extradition The Mexican government could seek to have the perpetrator extradited to Mexico from the U.S. through a process set forth in a treaty between the U.S. and Mexico. Civil Lawsuits This said, while criminal charges could not be brought in Mexico, the injured woman could sue the perpetrator of the assault for this act in a tort lawsuit for money damages including but not limited to compensatory economic damages, non-economic damages for pain and suffering, and exemplary or punitive damages for intentional misconduct, in the United States brought in the county where the defendant resided in the U.S. This is because U.S. courts of general jurisdiction have "general jurisdiction" over civil claims committed someone who is domiciled in its territorial jurisdiction over any legal claim wherever in the world it arose. I've personally brought a case like that for an incident arising in France. It wasn't dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but it is also very hard to prove a case like that in a U.S. courtroom because securing the presence of witnesses other than the perpetrator and victim, and securing other evidence, is very challenging. Often a U.S. court will not have subpoena power over foreign witnesses except through depositions taken with "letters rogatory" approved by the local courts where the witness is located, which is an expensive and slow process and it rests to some extent in the discretion of the local courts.

Police trusts witnesses but not the video tapes

A man called the police, claiming that he was put down to the ground by the company's staff inside a company's building. No one is directly witnessing the action but one surveillance camera, which belongs to the company. The senior manager comes out and make sure that everyone on the floor, including a few other clients, tells the police that no one put down anyone. The policemen come and asked several witnesses. Some company's members reported that the man fell down by himself. Other clients say that they were far away from the man and did not see anything. The police quickly concluded that no violence has occurred and the man fell down by himself. The man claims otherwise, asking several times that the police need to check the camera. The police refused, saying the the man cannot see the video recording. The man asked the policemen to check the camera themselves, but the policemen did not directly response to that request. The content of the recording was not on the final report. My question: is trusting the witnesses instead of camera recording legal in North America?

There's no legal requirement in Canada or US that the police do anything to investigate a crime, so there's no requirement that they do anything specific to investigate a crime. If the police officers are satisfied by the witness accounts, or have some reason to think viewing surveillance recording wouldn't be useful they don't have to, either by law or policy. Note that ordinarily, police won't consider a physical altercation between two grown men a serious enough crime to warrant charges. If there was no serious injury and there wasn't a large discrepancy between the strength of the two men, police will often decline to lay charges even when they believe the evidence would sustain them. In this case the police may have decided it wasn't worth investigating further because it wasn't worth wasting the time of an already overloaded court system. The victim here still has legal options despite the lack action by the police. He can subpoena the video evidence if he wants to bring lawsuit for damages. In Canada, it's possible even to lay your own criminal charges in a private prosecution, although this much more expensive than a civil lawsuit.

Is defending oneself from a sexual assult a defence for murder?

A man forces himself on a woman with no threats of violence, no deadly weapon and he doesn't even hit her, he simply just physically overpowers her. This occurs in the kitchen and she is able to grab a knife and stab him during the assult, killing him. Let us assume she did not fear for her life, she acted only to end the assault, would that be murder, manslaughter, or simply self defense?

colorado Short Answer This woman was engaged in legally permitted self-defense when she killed the man with a knife in the kitchen under Colorado law, and she has not committed any crime. Her conduct would also not provide a basis for a valid lawsuit for money damages against her. Long Answer Applicable Law In Colorado's state criminal code, the relevant statutory section, Colorado Revised Statutes, § 18-1-704, states, in the pertinent parts (emphasis mine): Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions. (1) . . . a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself . . . and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: . . . (b) The other person is using . . . physical force against an occupant of a dwelling . . . while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit . . . sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000. The referenced definition of burglary as relevant to this fact pattern is that: A person commits . . . burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property. Note also that it doesn't matter for purposes of the burglary statute, if this is her kitchen, or someone else's, so long as it is not his kitchen. Also he need only be "attempting to commit burglary", so even if he was trying unsuccessfully to get into the house and assaulting her from just outside a door or window, her use of deadly force to prevent burglary would be justified. On the other hand, if he was lawfully present in the home (perhaps a husband or roommate), the burglary justification for the use of deadly force would no longer be present. The referenced sexual assault statute states in the pertinent part that it is committed if: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will . . . [which includes any case in which:] The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence[.] Even if he does not "reasonably appears about to commit" sexual penetration or intrusion (which are necessary for the crime to be sexual assault for purposes of the use of deadly force law in Colorado), unlawful sexual contact is a crime against a person in an occupied dwelling, so it constitutes burglary that justifies the use of deadly force, even if it doesn't constitute sexual assault. Under these circumstances, the woman may use deadly physical force if she reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate to cause the rapist to cease committing sexual assault, and any other crime against person or property in the home. Application Of Law To Facts There is no reasonable doubt that the man is, at a minimum, in the process of committing burglary, and very likely sexual assault as well, although the language of the question is somewhat coy on this point as relevant to the Colorado definition of sexual assault. He has proven himself capable of physically overpowering her efforts to resist him with non-deadly force without success. This demonstrates that non-deadly force was inadequate. She used a knife to kill him for the legally authorized purpose of ending a burglary and probably also a sexual assault. Therefore, her use of a knife to kill him is almost certain be a use of deadly force for purposes of self-defense which is permitted by Colorado law. As a result, she would not be legally guilty of any crime for killing him with a knife in these circumstances. Incidentally, she would also have no civil liability in tort for money damages in this situation in Colorado . Application To Other U.S. States The exact wording of self-defense statutes differ from one U.S. state to another and I don't personally know every fine statutory detail of every one of them. But, Colorado's statute is quite typical. A state where her actions did not constitute legally justified in these circumstances would be an extreme outlier in U.S. law. I would be surprised if there was any U.S. state in which her actions would not constitute legally justified self-defense. Historical Note Suppose that the man in the question were the woman's husband in their own home where they were both lawfully present. Prior to the 1970s, marital rape was legal in every US state. It was partially outlawed in Michigan and Delaware in 1974, then wholly outlawed in South Dakota and Nebraska in 1975. The court case Oregon v. Rideout in 1978 was the first in which someone stood trial for raping his spouse while they lived together. By 1993 marital rape was a crime nationwide. ( Source ) Under current U.S. law in every U.S. state, the sexual assault justification analysis would be no different because there is no marital immunity for the crimes of sexual assault, although the burglary justification would no longer be present, so an intent to commit unlawful sexual contact without penetration or intrusion would not justify the use of deadly force. But, when marital immunity to sexual assault was part of the law, as it was in every U.S. state prior to 1974, and as it was in some U.S. states until 1993, she would be guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. The distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter in that case would hinge upon whether she had an intent to kill or only intended to harm (as in a case cited by Jen in her answer ). Also, she would have a good argument for manslaughter due to provocation by the victim that was not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force, even if jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she did intent to kill him. Colorado's self-defense statute (in a subsection omitted because it was not applicable to the facts in the question) also permits the grade of a criminal offense caused in the course of conduct intended as self-defense that does not meet the statutory standards for self-defense (e.g. because non-deadly force would have been sufficient) to downgrade the severity of the offense for which the person may be convicted, in a manner similar to the "heat of passion" defense. But, these facts present no plausible justification for a first degree murder, which is often a charge punishable by death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole, since it was not premeditated or committed in connection with a crime by the perpetrator. Realistically, under the circumstances of the question, if he was her husband and they were in their own home, during a time frame when there was marital immunity from sexual assault charges, she would most likely be convicted of manslaughter under these circumstances. Side Observation The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S. 407 (2008) that the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, directly and as incorporated against the states under the 14th Amendment, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a rape not resulting in death (even the rape of a child). The death penalty has been unconstitutional in cases involving the rape of an adult woman in the U.S. since U.S. Supreme Court case of Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 (1977). There are many serious felonies (including some omitted from the Colorado statute above because they were not applicable to this fact pattern) for which the use of deadly force in self-defense is authorized even though the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of the death penalty upon a conviction of that offense which does not result in someone dying.

Liability for explosive theft prevention

A man in New Orleans, USA, developed a method to prevent thieves from breaking into his car by rigging a flashbang to detonate if someone broke in. A flashbang is an explosive device that triggers a temporarily blinding flash of light and a loud noise. Such devices stun and disorient people who are nearby. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQqb2k717Sg Could this man be liable for injuries caused by the explosive device?

Yes. This sounds equivalent to the famous case of Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) . A shotgun trap was set up in an abandoned house owned by Edward and Bertha Briney. A thief broke in and was seriously injured. After the thief had served his sentance for the attempted theft he sued the homeowners and won $20,000 in actual damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.

Is this a legal use of force in the U.K.?

A man is walking on a sidewalk. A moped with two people riding swerves quickly and deliberately onto the busy sidewalk. It drives on the sidewalk for a few seconds weaving dangerously amongst the pedestrians. The man sees the oncoming moped, dances out of the way and gives a well timed kick against the moped to knock it off balance. The moped riders fall off. It this a legal use of force in the UK? If another pedestrian was injured by the now riderless moped, is the kicker criminally responsible?

Citing the same guide as your earlier question united kingdom - Is this legal use of force in the UK? In assessing the reasonableness of the force used, prosecutors should ask two questions: was the use of force necessary in the circumstances, i.e. Was there a need for any force at all? and was the force used reasonable in the circumstances? Is the kick to knock the moped riders down necessary? Is it reasonable in the circumstances for the purposes of self-defence or defence of another? Yes, you say they are ...weaving dangerously amongst the pedestrians. But would a prosecutor feel that a few seconds riding on the sidewalk really demonstrated that they are an imminent threat to pedestrians that required action on the part of the man to act in defense of others? And not to the kicker himself, since he jumped out of the way? If another pedestrian was injured by the now riderless moped, is the kicker criminally responsible? The kicker could be criminally responsible, if the prosecutor wants to argue that his actions were unnecessary given the lack of imminent threat to the pedestrians and were more of a vigilante action than an action in the interest of public safety, even if if riding a moped on the sidewalk happened to be illegal in that area. The kicker could be at least civilly responsible, if the injured find a solicitor who takes their case, as the tire kicker caused the accident. True, the moped riders were on the sidewalk, but that is really only relevant if riding a moped on the sidewalk is illegal and/or there is evidence - video, etc. - that the riding was dangerous. The moped riders, if injured, could also consider civil action against the kicker, irregardless if riding on the sidewalk happens to be illegal.

Could someone lacking a name be put on trial?

A man washes up on the shore in the middle of the night. He staggers into the nearest town, where he bumps into a woman walking home on her own - and, after a brief, confused altercation - he strangles her to death using the strap of her handbag. The police are called, and the man is eventually caught and taken into custody. He does not appear to be capable of speaking any known language, and nothing on his person can be used to identify him. I am very much a layman with respect to legal matters, but my understanding is that the opening stages of any trial include rigorous procedures to establish the identities of the parties involved. Would it be possible to put the man from the scenario above on trial for murder? Or would the trial just collapse when no identity could be affixed to the perpetrator? (P. S. I live in the UK myself, but I'd be delighted to hear how this situation would be handled in any legal system.)

Why do you think the man is unidentifiable? He's the guy standing in the dock. While a person's name is a handy shorthand for them; it's not their identity. Many people have several names and nicknames - this guy has none: he's still this guy.

Verbal Agreement To Pay Rent On A Certain Date Admissable in Court

A management company asked me to call them and tell them when I was going to pay my rent. I called and spoke with a representative from their company. She accepted my date to pay and said she was going to make a note on my account. I paid the rent on the day I said I would be saw that a legal proceeding for eviction was started the day before. Do I have an argument in court? Why would they send me a letter telling me to call them and let them know what day I can pay if when I do that and get a verbal agreement, they commence legal action against me as if I did not?

This is an unanswerable question without knowing your jurisdiction, the details of your contract and what, precisely, was said. Of course, if you supply that, you will be asking for legal advice. However, these are the general principles. I assume you have a lease and that it requires payment of the rent on or before a given day. I assume that if you do not pay the rent on or before that day the landlord can start eviction procedures. I assume that if the landlord does start eviction procedures, subsequent payment of the rent won't stop them (local law will be very relevant here). I gather that you had not paid the rent when it was due and it was this that prompted the landlord's agent to call you and ask when you would be paying. You suggested a date. Now, what she did is absolutely critical. She said "OK, I'll make a note of that." or similar, or She said "OK, that will be fine." or similar. If it is something like the first statement she has made no indication that your proposed date is acceptable to the landlord. As such, the landlord is free to exercise any of their rights under the lease including starting eviction procedures. If its something like the second then you can make an argument that the landlord has waived their rights under the lease and is estopped from acting on your breach of contract. To be estopped there needs to have been a clear, unambiguous promise by the agent upon which you relied to your detriment. Silence is not a promise, "OK" is not a promise (its an acknowledgement that she heard you) - "that will be fine" is a promise (a promise that it will be fine). Note that your underlying lease has not been varied - variation of an existing contract requires consideration by both parties - they allow you to pay late but you offered nothing in return. Further, a waiver for one breach is not a general waiver of all similar breaches.

48 hours to sign a contract

A manager at my company cited a very vague New York law that I'm skeptical about. We can have no more or less than 48 hours to sign an employment contract. Is there any truth to this?

There is no New York law that requires you to accept a job offer at exactly 48 hours from the time that it was made, no more or no less. A private contract can give someone 48 hours to accept. There are probably many workers in New York City who are governed by industry-wide union collective bargaining agreements (which apply to almost everyone in the entertainment industry) which regulate the giving and accepting of offers to some extent. There may be a right to recission for certain kinds of contracts. But there is no law that is an exact fit to the one you describe that would apply to an employee at a web based tech company.

What kind of a legal action a man needs to take prior to having sex with a woman in order to make sure she can't accuse him of rape?

A marriage contract? I have been told the wife can claim that her husband has raped her. A signed document stating that she is having sex willingly? I have been told she can claim later that she asked the man to stop.

A woman can always accuse you of rape. In the U.S., at least theoretically, you are presumed innocent until proven guilty, so unless there is actual evidence you raped her, odds are you won't be convicted. If you are wrongly and maliciously accused, you can probably win a defamation suit as well. There is nothing you can legally do to prevent being accused - only principles which protect the innocent against conviction (e.g., presumption of innocence) and means for being made whole (e.g., civil suits).

A person related to you by blood or marriage?

A medical power of attorney form specifies that witnesses to the execution of the power of attorney may not be related by blood or marriage. Are sons in law and daughters in law included in that restriction?

The point of the restriction is to ensure that witnesses don't have an interest in the issues for which the power of attorney is being granted. A son in law or daughter in law probably has as much interest or nearly as much interest as his or her spouse, so I would think that those relationships are included in the restriction.

International Transfers to a Data Subject

A membership organisation based in the EEA receives membership applications from people based outside of the EEA, in countries which do not have an adequacy decision. During the course of the applications and membership, it needs to communicate with the individuals, including sending them personal data pertaining to themselves or others. Two questions: Would sending the data to the individual member constitute a restricted transfer? If so, how could this be done lawfully in accordance with the GDPR? The same principles would apply to an EEA business wanting to send personal data to customers or clients (who are individual data subjects) outside of the EEA in countries for which no adequacy decision had been made.

GDPR chapter 5 which discusses international transfers applies to: transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third country Since you are merely communicating with the data subject but are not exporting the data for processing, I think you can largely set the rules on international transfers aside. In any case, GDPR Art 49 contains derogations for specific situations. An international transfer is permissible e.g. if the data subject has given informed consent, or if the transfer is necessary to fulfil or prepare a contract with the data subject.

Is it legal to sell extra patties only with a full burger but not alone?

A menu lists burgers for £12 and additional "doubling up" patties for £3.50. Suppose one wants to only prefer a pattie by itself for £3.50 but not a burger. Is it fair for restaurants to restrict one's food choices in this way under fair contract terms provisions?

england-and-wales Yes it is legal. There is no law prohibiting such behaviour. A restaurant menu invites people to ask for items on the menu. People are free to make other offers too, e.g. "no cheese" or "will you add an egg?" or "will you accept £10 for the burger, it's all I have?" The customer is free to make an offer and the restauranteur is free to accept or refuse the offer. "No I don't want to sell you a burger patty on its own for £3." Unfair contract terms seem irrelevant because there is no contract at the stage when the customer asks the restauranteur for a food item.

If a minor enters a contract without the other party knowing about the age, and then the minor breaks a term, is it fraud?

A minor who signs a contract can void it at any time, which might cause damage to the other party. Let's consider this scenario: A minor signs a contract with an adult online with neither party knowing each other's age. So the adult assumes that the contract is legally binding for both. The minor knows that the contract can be voided at any time, but doesn't tell the adult. In the contract, there is a confidentiality agreement which the minor breaks, such as giving out trade secrets to others. The adult decides to file a lawsuit but only then realizes that the contract was never truly valid. In that case, will the minor face any charges? What can be done?

canada united-kingdom equity A court exercising its equitable jurisdiction may disallow a minor from impeaching the validity of a contract on the grounds of minority if the minor acted fraudulently: Wilbur v. Jones (1881), 21 N.B.R. 4 (C.A.). See also Stocks v. Wilson (1913), 2 K.B. 235 : What the Court of Equity has done in cases of this kind is to prevent the infant from retaining the benefit of what he has obtained by reason of his fraud. It has done no more than this, and this is a very different thing from making him liable to pay damages or compensation for the loss of the other party’s bargain. If the infant has obtained property by fraud he can be compelled to restore it; if he has obtained money he can be compelled to refund it. If he has not obtained either, but has only purported to bind himself by an obligation to transfer property or to pay money, neither in a Court of law nor a Court of Equity can he be compelled to make good his promise or to make satisfaction for its breach. Fraud in this context is not limited to literal misrepresentations at the time of contract formation : "support may be found for the view that the mere fact that the minor wishes to retain the property which he has obtained while at the same time pleading infancy as a defence to a claim for its value, is fradulent conduct in the requisite sense... 'for an infant to attempt to obtain something for nothing is, in effect, fraud in the eye of equity'": John D. McCamus, " Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Minors' Contract " (1979) 28 U.N.B. Law Journal 89. In the circumstances you describe, if all is believed by the court, the court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to require the infant to return any benefit they obtained from the transaction. I cannot find an example case, but it also seems open for the court to enjoin the minor to stop disclosing the secrets. Common law and equity user6726's answer focuses on the limited nature of remedies for this wrong at common law. user6726 is correct that fraudulent misrepresentation has a fairly narrow conception in common law, and it is a good answer for pointing this out. My answer is complementary in that it focuses on potential equitable remedies. This is yet another example where the distinction between common law and equity is significant : common law produces a somewhat harsh result for the wronged party, but equity may step in to return some fairness to the situation. The common law rule is that a minor is not liable to restore benefits conferred on him under a contract which is unenforceable against him, even if the contract results from his fraudulent misrepresentation of majority. Chitty on Contracts , §11-056.

Facebook contract Vs Minors

A minor's ability to contract at face-value is straight forward, any contract with a minor that is not for necessities (food, medicine, clothing, and lodging), and was not approved by the parents/guardian, can be dis-affirmed by the minor as long as its before they become the age of majority. But how does Facebook handle their agreements with minors? Facebook, a social networking site that allows minors thirteen years of age or older to use their site without parental supervision (in compliance with COPPA ); Facebook receives it's revenue from collecting personal information about its users and targeting the user with ads that might line up with their values or interests. Although Facebook is in compliance with COPPA, it still holds agreements with individuals that have not yet reached the age of majority , and uses their information for things like " testing " and " research ". Can Facebook legally conduct these "research and testing" activities with minors and their accounts if the contracts( TOS ) with Facebook's users that aren't the age of majority are considered voidable / unenforceable ? UPDATE It seems as though Google, YoutTube, and other large tech companies (e.g. tiktok) have been found in violation of COPPA, with this new information can FaceBook conduct their "research and testing" with minors information without violating COPPA.

Facebook can continue to gather and exploit data, modulo the requirements of COPPA, because it does not depend on obligating a minor to do something, such as pay money or dig a ditch. In general and because of copyright law, nobody has the right to use anything that Facebook provides unless Facebook grants the user permission. The user has no obligation to provide anything to Facebook – if it did, the minor would arguably be exempt from that obligation.

Can I claim if Customs open & damage my parcel even though contents clearly labelled & nothing was found

A model train was sent from Canada to UK & clearly marked. It took a year to make & was then sold. It has been drilled by customs from bottom to top & the buyer no longer wants it. He was charged £101 when delivered for the pleasure of having his train ruined. Can I claim compensation?

You may be entitled to compensation according to HMRC . The page gives addresses to send complaints to.

How to get current insurance information from car owner of son's hit-and-run charges

A month ago I had a hit-and-run on my property and car, and a few hours later they were found at his mother's house. Car owned by mother, driver is her adult son. Mother finally gave investigating officer an insurance card for traffic tickets. That insurance company informed me the policy expired ten months before, and mailed an official letter about it. A different officer told me the mother is also responsible for being the car owner and not having insurance. I don't know if she really has no insurance, or if she gave the old insurance to avoid a claim against her new insurance. Investigating police officer said both are uncooperative, won't answer phone calls or knocking on door. An arrest warrant was issued for son a few weeks ago. Police records won't give me information because it's an active case under investigation. I've spoken to the primary officer and prosecuting attorney office about the expired insurance, and requested they ask the mother if she has a new insurance, and if not can they charge her for not carrying insurance. They seemed to dodge the question and finally said I should fill out a restitution form or I can take them to small claims court. However, both options will take years to recoup my damage expenses whereas a current insurance policy can pay within a month. Son was finally arrested on two misdemeanors a few days ago, so a court case now exists against him, but nothing about his mother. She does not have an arrest warrant, nor a court case. Idaho law requires proof of insurance to register a vehicle. Vehicles can be registered for one or two years, but most drivers opt for one year since there's no discount for two years. I asked, but understand the DMV can't give me any insurance information they have on file for the car's VIN and owner. It's been ten months now, so there's a decent chance it's been registered with a new insurance company. My goal is to try to find current insurance, whether from the DMV, or to get them to cite/arrest mother for not carrying insurance, in which case she'll have to admit to no insurance or produce current insurance. Do I have any options to get the police or prosecuting attorney's office to do these things for me? If so, what's the quickest and most effective path?

The criminal charges against the driver and his mother are police business, not yours. You have a civil case for damages against the driver, and possibly his mother on the theory that she enabled her son's behaviour. Depending on the amount you should either sue them in the small claims court or else hire a lawyer. If you win the case and the driver was uninsured at the time of the accident then there are two outcomes: either they pay the damages or they go bankrupt. If the latter then sorry, you are out of luck. Also talk to your insurance company; if you are insured for this kind of event then they will take the case off your hands, pay you, and then litigate to recover the money themselves.

What's the next step if a debt collector doesn't respond to my debt dispute?

A month ago I received a debt collection letter about an alleged unpaid tax bill. I did not recognize the bill, and had definitely never heard of it before this, so I sent them a letter within a few days disputing the debt. I sent it certified and got the return receipt, so I know they received it, but they never responded. Yesterday I got another letter asking for the same debt, now with interest, and threatening to garnish my wages. I know they were legally required to respond to my original dispute, but I'm not sure what the next step is now that they haven't.

The first step of a non-governmental debt collector would be to sue you and obtain a money judgment (if this debt collector is legitimate, something the comments touch upon). A tax debt is different, if this is a legitimate tax debt. There is usually an internal tax collection agency process that must be exhausted, resulting in an assessment of taxes which then results in a non-judicial imposition of a tax lien, upon which what is sometimes call a distaint warrant authorizing execution against assets pursuant to the tax lien is issued by a court in Oregon. Outside Oregon, the Oregon money judgment or the distaint warrant would have to be domesticated into California as a foreign judgment, which is a basically administrative process that might be possible to do without notice to you (I'm not a California law expert on these fine matters of procedure). Once there was a money judgment domesticated into California, your wages and bank accounts could be garnished, your property could be seized pursuant to writs, and liens in your personal and real property could be perfected and foreclosed upon. Of course, if this outfit is a sham, with a fake debt, this is unlikely to happen, and they might give up, or you might sue them for violating debt collection laws or engaging in fraud, or a law enforcement agency might do that based upon your complaint. It might take a civil action of some sort to set aside in invalid judgment, if it was invalid, but the process of setting aside an invalid foreign tax debt is very complicated even for an average small firm lawyer. Lack of notice of a lawsuit is generally a strong defense to a private sector debt, but is not always such a strong defense to certain kinds of tax debts (and the process for different kinds of tax debts is quite different).

Landlord lost 60 day Notice

A month ago I went into my apartment complexes office and handed a typed 60 day notice to the person at the front desk. They lost the notice or misplaced it. When the my new landlord called my current landlord for a reference, I got a rather unhappy surprise when my new landlord was told I hadn't given notice. Now I did take a digital photo of the dated notice with my phone prior to giving it to the person at the desk of my apartment complex. The photo which is dated, has location data on it showing I took a photo in the apartments business center which is in the room next to the office. If they don't let me out of my agreement are there better avenues than court for what they have to do? Are there requirements that they have to prove they received the notice? Do they have to honor the notice or can they just continue to say we didn't get it. As this would seem unfair to tenants.

There is no law requiring a person to say nice things about you, or specifically for a landlord to give a positive recommendation. However, you can sue a person for defamation, if they have said untrue things that harmed you. You would then need to show that he said things, that they were untrue, and that you were harmed. The main issue on the first point would what exactly he said. A subjective stars rating is neither true nor false, nor is a comment "I would give negative 5 stars if it were possible". The statement "Smith abandoned his apartment without giving the required 60 day notice, thus breaching his lease" could be true or false. You would then need to provide believable evidence that the statement is false. You would need to hire an attorney versed in local defamation law and practices to know whether your evidence would be deemed sufficiently credible, but on the face of it, you have fairly good evidence (assuming that they don't have iron-clad proof that you never entered the office). Then you would have to prove that you were harmed, requiring some legal remedy. One out-there option would be to sue them for a million dollars: it is unlikely that you actually suffered a million dollars damage. On the minimal side, you reputation has been besmirched, and a letter retracting the accusation would certainly be appropriate. Your attorney would advise you of the best remedy. It is not always necessary to file a lawsuit and pursue the matter through the courts. One might get a satisfactory result by having an attorney write a letter outlining the wrong that the other party has committed, and what you want by way of remedy. Even before that, you can (for free) inform them of what actually happened and mention that you'd prefer not to have the courts resolve the matter. It is not clear whether you mean that the former landlord is suing you for breach. If so, your concern would be showing that you complied with the terms of the lease, especially that you did deliver the notice to the correct location in the correct manner in a timely fashion. Leases do not typically include onerous notice requirements (whereas legal notices may require delivery by certified mail). Again, the main factual question would be whether you did comply (and thus did not break the leash).

Can a business charge for the time it takes the business to cancel a service?

A month-by-month security contract was severed in writing on the last day of the month of May. The security business continued to charge the monthly fee on June 16 of the following month. When contacted, the security firm said the billing department received the cancelation notification June 1 and by that time, the new billing cycle had started. A refund retroactive to June 16 would be issued in July. I queried why the refund would not be retroactive to June 1 to which the response was "well that's the process". Is the compamy allowed to charge for this additional two weeks of service after the service was canceled?

If the month to month cycle starts on the 16th of the month, that may be accepted practice. When was the contract established. A month-to-month contract is not intended to be a day-to-day prorata contract. Also, normally such contracts have terms of cancellation. Where there any? So depending upon data which is lacking in the question, the provider may be justified in their actions.

Is this legal use of force in the UK?

A moped rider is stopped at an intersection. Behind him is a van. Another moped with two criminals wearing helmets rushes up from behind. One of the criminals jumps off and steals the keys from the first moped and motions for the victim to get off his bike so he can complete the theft. The victim does not get off his bike. The criminal then jumps back on his own moped as pillion presumably with the intention of returning later to steal the bike (he now has the keys). The van driver sees what is going on and rams the criminals’ moped before they can drive off. Both fall to the ground, recover themselves and drive off. Was the van driver committing a crime under UK law? If so is there anything lawful he could have done to interrupt the crime? If not, at what point does an intervention become unlawful? https://youtu.be/BoOdvvFkXaI

Almost certainly not The Crown Prosecution Service has this guide on self-defense. A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for the purposes of: self-defence, defence of another, defence of property, prevention of crime, or lawful arrest. In assessing the reasonableness of the force used, prosecutors should ask two questions: was the use of force necessary in the circumstances, i.e. Was there a need for any force at all? and was the force used reasonable in the circumstances? It is arguable that the third-party intervention was for the purpose of defence of property or prevention of crime but this is by no means certain. Notwithstanding, in the circumstances, it is not clear that any force was necessary to achieve these objectives and even if it was, the use of a motor vehicle as a weapon is clearly excessive where there is, as here, no imminent risk of physical harm to anyone.

Company retained my card details after payment completed and suffered a breach. What are my options?

A mortgage broker company had a severe systems breach. A lot of information on their clients has been divulged due to the nature of mortgage applications. After the breach, when the company was questioned about what information was actually in the breach, it was found that full card details were retained for a payment made, and not destroyed afterwards. A formal request was made as to the reason the card details were retained. A letter has been sent apologising for the delays in processing the request. It has a lot of fluff about how to stay secure, what they have done since, and apologising for a late reply due to the large number of requests (My original request was more than 30 days before the letter). It specifically doesn't answer the question of why my card details would have needed to be retained, nor does it admit explicitly that they should not have been. Instead, the letter includes an offer of £100 in "apology", and comes with a form requesting the £100 that will "be final settlement of any and all claims I have out of or in connection with the matters referred to ... [in this letter]" This to me seems a clear "get out of jail for £100" attempt, relying on the fact that next steps and severity aren't known. I am a software engineer and I know from that angle how strict GDPR is, and I also know that this mortgage broker company have been the "recommended" broker for our new housing estate of nearly 200 homes. So I am curious as to what a next step could be. It seems that taking the £100 would be foolish, knowing how strict the GDPR rules could be, but I am somewhat out of my depth on next step. Could I write to the company pointing out that they still haven't answered my query as the first step and force them to concede specifically that it was not necessarily held? Is further compensation unlikely and should I simply accept the offer?

The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.

How to get a parent to pay child support?

A mother (now on probation for a financial felony) has not paid child support for years. The state child support agency checked and said she has no employment income, but she drives a new car. What are the possible steps to enforce child support payments? (This is in the state of Georgia, USA.) I prefer approaches that do not involve paying an attorney, since that fast becomes expensive and counterproductive.

What are the possible steps to enforce child support payments? (This is in the state of Georgia, USA.) I prefer approaches that do not involve paying an attorney, since that fast becomes expensive and counterproductive. Child support generally either is, or can be reduced to, by court process, a money judgment. The money judgment can then be enforced by writ of execution and levy attaching tangible personal property of a debtor, to the extent that the asset is not exempt from creditors claims. The money judgment can also be used to garnish bank accounts. If someone has a manifest ability to pay child support, but has willfully failed to do so, a court can incarcerate the child support debtor for contempt of court until such time as the child support debt voluntarily turns over the assets that the debtor has an ability to pay the child support debt with. In theory, however, an inability to pay child support is a full defense to a contempt of court proceeding. All of these kinds of legal child support collection proceedings are technical, and it would be very challenging to accomplish these goals through the court process without a lawyer. The going rate for contingent fee collection of child support debts is usually 50% of the gross amount recovered, plus out of pocket costs for filing fees and process servers out of your half, if you can find an attorney willing to take on a child support collection case at all. Sometimes collection agencies will agree to collect child support for a similar fee. Collection agencies can make negative credit reports, and nag the child support debtor regularly, but otherwise have the same remedies available to them as a lawyer. Many states have procedures for the state child support collection agency to seize tax refunds, to revoke occupational and professional licenses, and to revoke driver's licenses if child support is not paid. Usually, state child support collection agencies either exclusively serve, or prioritize, cases where child support is owed to someone who has received state welfare benefits, and it applies some or all of the proceeds received to the welfare payments made to the child support beneficiary. Not paying child support might be a probation violation that could be reported to the child support debtor's probation officer. But, causing the child support debtor to be incarcerated for failing to observe probation terms doesn't naturally or easily translate into providing the child support creditor with money. Ultimately, you can't get blood out of a turnip. If someone doesn't have an ability to pay child support, they won't. A new car is suspicious and probably indicates that there was some under the table work done. But, by the time it is seized, it is a used car, and its fair market value at auction may be quite modest. Whether or not it is cost effective is for you to decide. I once tried to collect a money judgment of about $100,000 from a drug dealer which presented similar problems. It wasn't easy. It rarely is. There is no quick, inexpensive way of doing it.

Mother living with felonious ex-convicts; precedent for removal of children

A mother decides to move into a house owned and occupied by people with a criminal background including felony convictions for drugs and violent crimes. What precedent is there in law to have the children removed from her care as a result? Clarifying facts: The petitioner is the father. The felon is not on parole.

None, particularly if the felon is their father. In most jurisdictions, removal of children from their parents is a last ditch intervention where the children are at serious risk of imminent harm. The criminal record, particularly for discharged offences is irrelevant. Of course, if the person is a sex offender different criteria apply.

Which state has jurisdiction in a case of a murder in an airplane?

A murder happened in an airplane flying from country A to country B when crossing above country C. Who will have jurisdiction? Bonus question: What if countries A, B and C are members of the European Union?

It depends. International aviation law is tricky. One effort to set some standards down was the Tokyo Convention , also known as the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft . Here are some excerpts: ARTICLE 3 The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offences and acts committed on board. . . . ARTICLE 4 A Contracting State which is not the State of registration may not interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on board except in the following cases: a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State; b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent resident of such State; c) the offence is against the security of such State; d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State; e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such State under a multilateral international agreement. The commander of the aircraft is also given some powers to restrain the perpetrator or any other person that poses a danger to the aircraft and/or its occupants. S/he is given some other options, such as the choice of where to deliver the offender (though this by no means implies that the person will be prosecuted by that State). The Convention (and related documents) was ratified by numerous nations . As for the bonus question, there doesn't appear to be any special EU law regarding this. The EASA does not cover these sort of offenses , though it would be the closest to a Europe-wide regulatory body that would be relevant here.

Licensing an image and artwork

A musician asked me to create his latest album cover off one of my photographs. He's not famous and will only publish his work on a few music websites, so he will use the artwork as a digital file only. I want to grant him the sole rights to do this. In other words he would become the only owner of the photograph and the album artwork created. If, one day, his album would be physically published, ie. as a vinyl, or if he would want to sell products derived from it, we would then discuss a separate license and fee. Do I need separate licenses, 1 for the photograph and 1 for the artwork? What license type would be acceptable for such a use case? Let me know if anything needs to be clarified.

Do I need separate licenses, 1 for the photograph and 1 for the artwork? You don’t “need” 2 licences but given that you haven’t agreed the terms of physical publication it might be more practical. What license type would be acceptable for such a use case? One that sets out the rights and obligations of each party in sufficient detail that disputes are unlikely. On that point, a dispute resolution clause might also be a good idea.

Why are state income taxes not a violation of Section 9 of the Constitution?

A naive reading of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution would seem to suggest that income taxes, which is the same thing as a "captitation" tax, a tax on a person, are not allowed: No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken The XVI Ammendment created an exception to this rule, but only for Congress , not for the several states. How is it that states can legally impose income taxes?

First, Article I, Section 9 is exclusively a set of limits on the federal government. The Constitution is designed to establish the federal government; except when it explicitly says so, it is understood to not be describing the powers of the states. States had their own constitutions with their own rules. That's why section 10, which does limit the powers of the states, says "no state shall" do various things. The ban on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws is found in both sections, which is a clear indication that the ban in section 9 doesn't restrict the states. Second, income taxes are not the same thing as capitations. A capitation (also known as a poll tax) is a head count tax. The tax is something like "$20 tax per person." Income taxes are generally excise taxes, which don't have to be apportioned based on the census. The one other kind of tax that's been ruled to be a direct tax is property tax, and the only kind of income tax that has been considered a direct tax is a tax on income derived from property (e.g. rent). That's why the 16th Amendment says Congress can tax income derived from any source -- even if the source results in something the courts consider a direct tax, it doesn't have to be apportioned. Lastly, even if state income tax did fall under section 9 and was a direct tax, it would probably comply with the requirement of apportionment. Section 9 doesn't say "no direct taxes can be imposed," it says "direct taxes must be proportional to census population." In other words, states must pay a total tax in proportion to their population. A state can't levy taxes on other states, so "in proportion" should mean 100% of the taxes are on the state itself. State income tax is only paid by state residents and by nonresidents who earned income in the state, so 100% of a state income tax is in fact levied on the state itself.

Can I block an ADU that blocks my ocean view, invades my privacy, and casts a shadow on my solar panels?

A neighbor intends to construct an ADU that will completely block my ocean view and invade my privacy by inviting residents to congregate directly in front of my living room windows. Also, at 16 feet in height it will cast a shadow on my existing solar panels. Can he do that?

It depends on the location and the nature of the structure. In Seattle , for example, it requires a permit. Usually, any such structure does require a building permit, which means that the government has to approve the plans w.r.t. offset requirement, height requirements and so on. There may be a view ordinance, or not; you may have a view easement, or not. Whatever the case may be, you should not assume that the government agency in charge will vigorously work to protect your interests over the neighbor's interest. You own attorney is the one who will vigorously and professionally defend exclusively your interests (likewise, the neighbor's attorney). Your description doesn't explain how this would "invite residents to congregate directly in front of my living room windows", which seems unlikely for a dwelling. If for instance this is really a bar and not a dwelling, then zoning issues about businesses arise.

Can I sue my neighbor if he fired a gun and a bullet goes through my wall and almost kills me?

A neighbor two units down from me discharged a firearm inside the unit and the bullet went through both of our units and ended up in mine. If either of us had been using the bathroom we may have been killed. Is there any legal action that we can take or anything that we can pursue?

Yes. You can file a police report. You can also sue for cost of repairing any damaged property.

Is surveillance video discoverable in an invasion of privacy case in New Jersey?

A neighbor was doing some work near the border between two properties so a security camera was put up to monitor for any trespass or damage which had been a problem in the past with this person. Because the lots are small and close other parts of nearby houses and backyards can be seen. The footage was used as evidence in a lawsuit. The person who put up the camera was not a party to this lawsuit but is now being sued for invasion of privacy. A discovery request was made for all available footage from this camera. Does this need to be provided? Would the defendant's attorney need to review the footage before objecting to the discovery request? Even if you believe that there is nothing incriminating on the footage it seems like a bad idea to just have something over that could be used against you. Isn't the burden of proof up to the plaintiff?

You can’t tamper with evidence People have this strange idea that court cases proceed on the basis of “gotchas” and “ah-ha” moments - it doesn’t work that way. Everyone gets to see everything well before the case goes to trial - that’s the purpose of discovery . You can ask for (and get) anything that seems that it could reasonably lead to admissible (that is, relevant, among other things) evidence. If a party thinks another party is overreaching they can object and ask the judge to rule on it. Sometimes the judge might even agree but probably not - judges don’t like surprises. The reason for this is simple - if everyone knows everything then it’s more likely the likely loser will realize they are likely to lose. Then they might settle and avoid the cost of a trial. TL;DR Give them the footage and deal with what is shows in your case.

Landlord required to divulge tenant identity

A new law requires landlords to provide the following information about their tenants: Name Who is "head of household" Phone number Age (approximate) Then the tenant is required to go to the town office and provide a state-issued id to confirm their identity. I would like to know if this violates tenant privacy (or some existing law). If the lease has no tenant privacy statement, does that mean that no information can be disclosed by the landlord? Or does it mean that any information can be disclosed? If the lease has a privacy statement, does that prevent the disclosure of this information? Or does the new law over-ride what is written in the lease? On several websites is says that landlords must not give out "private" information, but it is not clear to me if that means revealing the identity of a tenant. The stated purpose of the new law is so that police and fire department will know who resides if they are called to a dwelling In case it matters, this is in Pennsylvania.

I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania , a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP) : Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland , 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson , 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here ), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article . Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner.

Municipal judge says arguments without merit are not allowed in New trial ordered after appeal

A new trial was ordered by the appeal court and ordered to allow previously denied discovery video into evidence. Along with requesting supplemental evidence, I also argued to acquit for the traffic violations, but the appeal opinion only said arguments for acquittal to be without merit. It didn't explain why the arguments were wrong. The municipal judge says the new trial can only be about the the discovery video and that arguments made in the original can not be repeated because the appeal court said the arguments were without merit. The municipal judge asked if I understood and I said no. The judge didn't explain when I tried to ask him what is allowed in a new trial. He got upset and told me to leave. What is a new trial? Can't I try to argue my case better in a new trial? Does a new trial have to be limited to only new evidence? It sounds like the officer witness from the original trial doesn't have to testify again. What does the appeal court mean when my arguments were without merit? I thought it meant I just didn't support it well in the appeal brief, so they don't explain why the argument was wrong, but I get to argue again at the new trial.

An argument is without merit if it is not based on correct ideas about law (sometimes characterized as absurd or frivolous claims). For instance if I were to argue for acquittal of evasion of income tax on the grounds that I have a God-given right to not pay income tax, that would be without merit, and it is completely established that I am compelled to pay income tax. There would be no rational basis on which my claim could succeed, so I would not be allowed to make the argument. A court can reject a meritless argument, and is not obligated to explain why the argument is meritless, though often in the written opinion there is some brief indication pointing to case law. It appears then that whatever arguments were given previously were based on patently false legal premises, but there is at least some legal merit to the video, so arguments can be made on that point (though there is always the risk that they too would be found to be without merit, which you can discover after the fact). You cannot try to "argue better", except to the extent that the argument rests on the discovery video.

Is an individual liable for administrative costs when backing out of an employment contract accepted via email?

A non-EU citizen accepted an offer of employment in writing via email for a company based in the Netherlands. They sent their passport and other documentation to the company to begin the process of acquiring the necessary company-sponsored visa for their employment, as well as internal HR processes. Days later, with no communication in the interim, the individual changed their mind and decided against taking the offer. They once again informed the company via email. Representatives of the company wrote to the individual to notifiy them that, whilst no contract of employment had been signed, the individual was in breach of contract (implicitly affirming the acceptance via email constituted a contract). On this basis, they sent an invoice itemising 1. Administrative Actions , 2. Application permit , and 3. Starting a new recruiting and selection procedure as costs incurred. There are two primary questions stemming from this scenario. Does the email constitute a contract under Dutch or EU law, and is the individual in breach of it? If (1), what liability does the individual have, if any, for the costs incurred by the company and what is the legal basis for this? A related question is to do with the enforceability of this given that the individual does not belong to a the Dutch or indeed any European jurisdiction.

Does the email constitute a contract under Dutch or EU law, and is the individual in breach of it? This is absolutely a contract: an offer was made and accepted. As to whether the individual is in breach of it: probably not. An employment contract can always be ended by the employee: indentured servitude being illegal in Holland, and, indeed, everywhere. If you have had the job for less than one month (which you have, 0 days bring less than one month), there is no notice period required by the employee. what liability does the individual have, if any, for the costs incurred by the company and what is the legal basis for this? Since the employee has not breached the contract, there is no basis for contract damages. If the employment contract explicitly states that such costs are chargeable and under wha circumstances then the employee may be liable if the circumstances are met.

What do you own when you buy an NFT?

A non-fungible token (NFT) is a unique smart contract stored on a blockchain that can be created by anyone and then transferred to others with a record of the transfer being recorded on the blockchain. Legally, what does owning an NFT get you?

The NFT You buy a token, you become the owner of it (and hence any current dollar equivalent attached to it i.e. whatever the market is ready to pay for it). This is no different from buying/owning an amount of cryptocurrency — you own the token(s), no more no less.

Non-Profit Forced Donation

A non-profit is holding a fundraising luncheon. They added a "required" donation amount on top of the price of the luncheon. Is this legal?

Yes it's legal How would it not be? It's literally a fundraiser.

What if a board can't agree on a slate to propose for election at its annual membership meeting?

A nonprofit (New York State 501c3) that I'm involved with has a Board of Directors that has recently erupted in conflict. The annual membership meeting is coming up and it appears that no majority of board directors will be able to agree on a board slate to be presented to the membership for election. This is the first membership meeting for the organization and given the recent conflict, nobody knows how to handle the board election. How is this situation typically handled or how does it typically play out? Could members propose individual director candidates and could there be a separate round of voting for each of these candidates? Where can I find documents regarding this scenario?

The first place to look is the corporation's bylaws. These should set the conditions for nominating candidates, and the voting procedure to be used to elect them. The second place would be the New York State law under which the corporation is chartered. This specifies the framework within which the bylaws are to be interpreted. The law might render some provisions of the bylaws invalid, or it might make certain provisions where the bylaws are silent. Slates of candidates are usually somewhat like political parties (which, it may be noted, are nowhere mentioned in the US Constitution), for example: a bunch of people put themselves forward as a package, with a common platform. But votes are usually cast for individuals. In the absence of a slate, the nomination and election of individuals is still controlled by the same set of rules.

What are the contours of communication INTERCEPTION?

A nuanced understanding is sought with regards to the bright-lines + contours of what it means to intercept as it pertains to Florida communications state law . A Google search of interception returns: the action or fact of receiving electronic transmissions before they reach the intended recipient. "the clandestine interception of other people's telephone calls" As a concrete example: Bob is invited to a meeting conducted through Zoom or a telephone call. As an invitee, Bob is entitled to engage the communication system and presumably would not be "intercepting" as he has standing to receive communications. Bob's memory is not particularly good and takes notes as best he can. Given that Bob has not intercepted the communication and he has: Engaged an electronic transcription computer program to document the decisions Recorded the audio to confirm the transcription Questions: Based on said rules and that Bob has not 'intercepted' communications, as he is the intended recipient: What if any of said rules does Bob risk running afoul? Is there any scenario where invited Bob could 'intercept' said communication? Bonus round: new context Assume that Bob has standing to attend the virtual meeting and the state indicates that Bob "may tape record or videotape the meeting". Again the same questions: What if any of said rules does Bob risk running afoul? Is there any scenario where invited Bob could 'intercept' said communication?

The somewhat irritating feature of Florida law on the topic is that you also have to read the definitions in §934.02 , because there is a concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy" that attenuates the necessity to get permission. Here are some definitions with emphasis added. “Oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication. Whereas, “Wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception including the use of such connection in a switching station furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of intrastate, interstate, or foreign communications or communications affecting intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce. A Zoom meeting is a wireless communication. It is generally illegal to "intercept" communications, and then there is a long list of exceptions, such as "with a court order". §934.03(2)a.3(d) is a crucial exception: It is lawful under this section and ss. 934.04-934.09 for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception. So, no consent is necessary if we are dealing with an oral communication and there is no reasonable expectation of privacy (a town hall meeting for example). There are stronger prohibitions against interception when it comes to wire communication: all-party consent is required. Now we have to scrutinize what it means to intercept: “Intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. The ordinary language meaning of words tells you that getting a Zoom stream is through the use of an electronic device, that in connecting to a meeting you are acquiring the content of the communication, therefore you need the consent of all parties to the communication. Obviously this is a bit tricky since you might be technically able to get into a meeting without even the host's permission, and there is certainly no "polling" period where already-connected persons are asked whether to let Bob in. I assume (based on negligible data) that your presence at a meeting in knowable, though details of who you are may be unavailable. The way this is generally handled is via the notion of implied consent (having access to the fact that B now intercepts the communication, and not then shutting up / leaving / objecting). As far as "interception" is concerned, pretty much anything between the computer sound output device and the listener's brain would be interception. It would include hearing aids, but there is a specific exception for hearing aids (by limiting the definition of “Electronic, mechanical, or other device”, so that telephones are not such things (obviously they are electronic devices), and hearing aids are not such devices, as long as it is A hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal (In other words, not something that allows you to hear background stuff that requires technological intervention to amplify). If the Florida courts follow the "implied consent" pattern for Zoom meetings, as seems most likely, then you have implicit permission to listen, and to record. There is the possibility that you will run afoul of copyright law, by copying protected material: it depends on whether e.g. there is a canned text being read. The point is, Florida law doesn't have complex exceptions regarding "interception", it has complications regarding when it is forbidden, and whether something is a "communication" of the relevant type.

Is it legal to use services of a foreign recruiter in the US?

A number of job recruiters who call me seem to be calling over a bad connection and have a pretty thick accent. This, in itself, is not an indication that they are calling from abroad, but is there a general requirement on a person working with a recruiter to make sure that the recruiter is authorized to work in the US? Specifically, if they are hiring individuals who are US citizens on US soil and they are hiring for work at employers' US locations. It seems like these recruiters are out of the reach of the US law and yet they are making decisions which are fairly heavily regulated in the US (such as employment decisions). The Labor Department cannot regulate their actions, either (if their entire organization is abroad). Could I be on the hook for conspiring to go around the US law if I go along with them without first ensuring that they can legally work in the US?

It may be that someone hiring a recruiter has to make sure some legalities are fulfilled. YOU are not hiring that recruiter. It doesn't matter to you. The company gives you a job, or they don't give you a job, that's all that matters to you. If the recruiter were put into jail for working illegally, or the company was given a millon dollar fine for hiring an illegal recruiter, that wouldn't affect you.

Are Congressional calls for Barr to resign tantamount to obstruction of justice?

A number of members of the US Congress have stated the opinion that the fact that President Trump twitted his opinion of Muller's investigation, before it concluded, amounted to an obstruction of justice. The purported basis for this was that he was a potential future subject of the investigation. Attorney General Barr stated, during a previous Congressional testimony, that he intended to pursue an investigation of the genesis of the collusion allegation against the President. After yesterday's Congressional testimony, a number of Congressmen twitted that Barr should resign. As potential subjects of Barr's investigation into the origins of the genesis of the collusion allegation, did these Congressmen not commit obstruction of justice with their twits? Specifically, " Whoever knowingly uses intimidation ,... or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to hinder , delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge...of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense shall be fined under this title or imprisoned... " It seems to me that either both Trump and anyone demanding that Barr resign committed obstruction or none of them did. Am I missing something? Or this outside of the purview of the law and the discussion is completely political?

No "Obstruction of Justice" is defined in Title 18, Part I, Chapter 73 of the US Code and consist of 22 separate offences. Without going into the details, the actions described do not meet the criteria for any of them. For example, § 1503. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally , requires: ... corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any ... This is a high bar - it requires offering bribes (corruptly) or threats. Saying someone is unfit for their job and should resign doesn't meet that bar. This is entirely political hyperbole.

Can I pay sales taxes directly to the state instead of paying them to merchants?

A number of news reports have indicated that merchants who collect state sales taxes delay paying them for an indefinite amount of time and often pay them out of the following months' revenues. This in itself seems shady. They collect these taxes on behalf of the state. And while I do understand that they act as reluctant agents of the state when they do that, they don't seem to act as good-faith agents when they delay paying those taxes. Is there a process in practice , rather than in theory, to (1) record each transaction formally and formally inform each merchant that I will be paying those taxes to the state directly and (2) formally make a payment for each such transaction directly? Are there forms one has to fill out for each such occurrence? Or this process unorthodox enough that it would require a lawyer-drafted template both for recording and for making such payments?

wisconsin I think you may be misinformed on how businesses report/pay sales taxes. For sales tax, depending on the type of business you are and your expected taxable sales, you may be required to report your taxable sales quarterly, biannually, or annually. Tax is due when the report is due much like income tax, but these cannot be delayed like income tax filings. If you fail to make a report, the State will estimate your taxes and send you a bill. This bill will include late fees and charges. There is no incentive for business owners to delay these filings and payments. In fact, not filing and not paying may result in your sales and use tax certificate being revoked , effectively putting you out of business. A business is also not required to set aside any certain amount from a single transaction and pay that to the State. They don't have to take $5 of your $100 transaction and put it in a "sales tax" envelope to send to the State. At the end of the period they have to calculate, $X in taxable sales * Y% tax rate = Total Tax bill, and pay that amount. They could pay it all from the last sale, or set aside a separate account, or a sub-account, etc. So businesses don't have to pay immediately, they pay on a set schedule. The funds that they collect will most likely be deposited into a general account and the taxes paid out of that account at a later date. Yes, this may include revenue from the following month, but who cares ? The point is that the tax is paid on time and in the amount required. But to the question at hand... No, you cannot file a form or inform the business that you will pay tax directly. The business is required by law to collect those taxes at the time of the sale (unless you have a reseller certificate and they make those kinds of sales). They are not allowed to say "sure, take the X% off the price and pay the state, we trust you". They have to report taxable sales and pay the tax on those sales. Since your sale is "taxable", they are required to pay the tax on that, regardless of them collecting it from you or not.

What allows the Connecticut legislature to exonerate previous witch convictions?

A number of news services have report on the Connecticut legislature voting to "exonerate" witch convictions from the 17th century. For example, this article from wtnh.com news: With distant family members looking on, Connecticut senators voted Thursday to absolve the 12 women and men convicted of witchcraft — 11 of whom were executed — more than 370 years ago and apologize for the “miscarriage of justice” that occurred over a dark 15-year-period of the state’s colonial history. The Senate voted 33-1 in favor of a resolution that officially proclaimed their innocence. ... Some of the descendants recently learned through genealogy testing that they were related to the accused witches and have since lobbied the state’s General Assembly to officially clear their names. I'm not familiar with the Connecticut constitution, but it seems that most states in the United States tend to follow the general format of the U.S. Consitution. What part of the Connecticut constitution allows the legislature to do this? That would seem to violate separation of powers for the legislature to void a court decision. I can understand a pardon from the governor, since that tends to be an enumerated power. But the legislature ? Article XVIII of the Connecticut constitution mentions the separation of powers: The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy.... And article FIVE section 1 says that "The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law." But from my lay person understanding, allowing the legislature to define the "powers and jurisdiction" of the courts wouldn't allow the legislature to grant the power to themselves . It looks like the Connecticut constitution doesn't enumerate legislative powers the way the U.S. Constitution does. And that sort of makes sense since "police powers" are granted to the states, and their legislatures can pretty much do anything that they want, as long as it isn't specifically prohibited by the state or U.S. Constitution. But since Article FIVE says specifically that "powers of government shall be divided ..." [emphasis added], it seems to my lay-person reasoning that the legislature couldn't intrude into court decision unless specifically authorized elsewhere in the Connecticut constitution. The news article linked above mentions "Because it’s a resolution, it does not require the governor’s signature." Does that mean it's all for show? That it doesn't truly exonerate the victims?

The resolution in Connecticut is a statement that has been agreed by the state's legislature, but is not a law. If it were, it would indeed need to be signed by the Governor, by virtue of Article 4, Section 15 of the state Constitution. It exonerates the victims insofar as it expresses the current legislature's disapproval of the witchcraft trials of the past, and apologizes to living relatives. All of the victims are long dead, whether they were executed by the state or not, so even if this were a legally-effective pardon, it would have no other practical consequences. That said, a state legislature could enact pardons for named individuals, or a class of people. It would be unlawful to criminalize a named person (that's a "bill of attainder") or to punish someone for an act that wasn't a crime at the time (an "ex post facto law"). But the opposite, which reduces or eliminates a punishment, is not covered by the federal or state constitutional bans on such laws. That was explained by Samuel Chase in Calder v Bull , 3 U.S. 386 , a Supreme Court decision of 1798 dealing with actions of the Connecticut legislature ordering a retrial in a probate case (with my emphasis): Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive, and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement, as statutes of oblivion or of pardon . They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate the crime or increase the punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time or to save time from the statute of limitations or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful and the making an innocent action criminal and punishing it as a crime. At the time, Connecticut's system for pardons made it so that an offender would always have to petition the legislature to pass a bill to that specific effect. That model predated the U.S. Constitution, and continued to operate after its ratification. The Governor only had the power to grant temporary reprieves, when the legislature was out of session - in fact, he still does (Article 4, Section 13 of the Constitution of Connecticut). Presently, the state has instituted a permanent system of a Board of Pardons and Paroles, but in principle they could enact some other model. The contemporaneous A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut by Zephaniah Smith (1795) says in Book 5, Chapter 26 : The power of granting pardon to criminals sentenced to death, or to any other punishment, is vested by law in the legislature. This carries forward a practice from the British legislatures, which also often passed acts to pardon or indemnify certain offenders. There was therefore quite a long history for Chase to allude to, even though he was writing not long after the revolution, in terms of this being part of the standard panoply of things a state legislature can generally do.

Can Biden force the presidential transition to start?

A number of news sources have reported that Emily Murphy of the General Services Administration has failed to sign the document that triggers the presidential transition process. Can the Biden team get a court order forcing her to sign it?

Perhaps. The relevant law is assembled into notes on 3 USC 102 . The original act of 1963 defines President-elect in this manner: (c) The terms 'President-elect' and 'Vice-President-elect' as used in this Act shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the office of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained by the Administrator following the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. There is no specific statutory provision directing the Administrator of the GSA to ascertain who is that President-Elect. The administration is apparently taking a position similar to that taken by the Clinton administration, that states determine who has been elected, and the states have not officially determined who has been elected: nor has a candidate conceded. If a court orders the Administrator to make the ascertainment, I expect that the administration would appeal the ruling up to the Supreme Court. This letter , addressed to the Administrator, gives the legal rationale.

Is abortion still legal in all 50 states?

A number of states have recently passed, or are about to pass, laws prohibiting abortion. As I understand it, they intend these laws to be contested, and eventually appealed to the Supreme Court, in the hopes that the current Court will overturn Roe v. Wade. I heard part of a radio program last night, where the doctors on the panel repeatedly reminded listeners that these new laws don't really have any effect, and until and unless SCOTUS so rules, legality of abortion in the first two trimesters is still the law of the land. But if abortion is still legal, how could there be a case that gets appealed? Doesn't someone have to be arrested under one of the new laws, and then the judgement in that case gets appealed? What prevents numerous people from being arrested during this period of confusion? And even after SCOTUS rules, what prevents a state from continuing to enforce the statute, repeatedly appealing them? Also, what could be the justification for appealing a ruling that the new law is unconstitutional, because of Roe v. Wade? A lower court is forced to uphold this precedent, right? The appelant would have to find some procedural reason why this ruling was incorrect, they can't appeal just because they don't like the ruling and think SCOTUS might agree with them, can they?

Is abortion still legal in all 50 states? Yes But if abortion is still legal, how could there be a case that gets appealed? By arresting someone who is involved in the allegedly illegal abortion and pressing charges. The case will be dismissed by the court of first instance as being contrary to Roe v. Wade . The State will appeal the dismissal. The appeal court will uphold the dismissal. The State will eventually request an appeal to the Supreme Court. Appeals to the Supreme Court are at the discretion of the Court (they hear them if they want to hear them) . If the choose not to hear it that's the end of the matter. If they choose to hear it then they will hear evidence and decide if they will uphould or overturn the precedent they set in Roe v. Wade . Doesn't someone have to be arrested under one of the new laws, and then the judgement in that case gets appealed? Yes What prevents numerous people from being arrested during this period of confusion? Politics. Such draconian measures are likely to be counterproductive to the state's objectives. It is far more likely they will wait for a slam-dunk, open-and-shut case where a conviction on state law would be guaranteed but for Roe v Wade . They will then run that one as the test case. And even after SCOTUS rules, what prevents a state from continuing to enforce the statute, repeatedly appealing them? Arrest by the FBI. A person who knowingly and repeatedly flaunts the authority of the Supreme Court will soon find themselves facing a Federal warrant for contempt. Also, what could be the justification for appealing a ruling that the new law is unconstitutional, because of Roe v. Wade ? The state will argue that Roe v Wade was wrongly determined - that the court in 1973 misunderstood or misapplied the Constitution. There are certainly arguments that could be made on that basis and most of them are contained in the dissenting judgement - the case was decided 7-2. A lower court is forced to uphold this precedent, right? Yes The appelant [sic] would have to find some procedural reason why this ruling was incorrect, they can't appeal just because they don't like the ruling and think SCOTUS might agree with them, can they? Appeals are made for an error of law. These are often procedural but they can also be an argument that a particular decision was wrong because the court that set the precedent got the law wrong. So yes, they can appeal based on the argument that SCOTUS in 1972 was wrong about Roee v Wade and that SCOTUS in 2019 (or, more realistically, 2021-23) will agree with their interpretation of the law.

Why aren't Cabinet meeting records released after 20 years?

A page on the National Archives' website states the following : Records of cabinet meetings are confidential documents and only transferred to The National Archives after 30 years - the 30-year rule. Wikipedia mentions a "Thirty-year rule" , though claims that this has now been changed to 20 years. Why doesn't that apply in this case?

They are Well, almost. They are in the process of reducing the time from 30 to 20 years by doing 2 years at a time between 2013 and 2022 - right now it’s a 23 year rule. I guess you found a webpage that hasn’t been updated.

What is the definition of an "involved party" as used by the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission?

A page on the website of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC) states One of the most important characteristics of the Commission is that it may conduct an investigation only with the consent of the parties involved. Let's say that Country A recognizes the IHFFC and asks it to investigate a conflict between Country A and Country B, which has also recognized the IHFFC and declared so accordingly. If any other parties are involved, they must give their consent to any investigation. However, what is the definition of "involved"? If Country C lent arms to Country B that were used in the action under investigation, is it counted as "involved", or would it have to take direct military action for it to be considered "involved"?

Parties means parties to the conflict. The circumstances of providing weapons to one of the belligerents would not make you a party, providing intelligence, targeting or advice might. Worth noting that in nearly 25 years of existence the commission has never conducted an investigation. Possibly because of an inability to get the required consent.

Found mis-delivered parcel after receiving refund - must I tell the store?

A parcel ordered through a store was meant to be delivered to me on Saturday 30th. It wasn't. Going through the delivery firm's customer service, they couldn't determine where it had been delivered to and considered it a missing parcel. This led to the store submitting a refund to me and a fine to the delivery firm. I have now canvassed the places it could have been miss-delivered to and found the parcel. Do I have to notify the store? If I do, do I have to agree to them cancelling the refund?

If you have received the item, and continue to let the store believe you haven't, then you are obtaining money under false pretenses, which is pretty much the definition of fraud.

Can a judgment from a parent that is deceased be transferred to a family member?

A parent (plaintiff) received a judgement in California (Superior Court) and is now deceased. Is it possible to transfer this judgement to the family of the plaintiff or a member of the plaintiff's family? If so, how would this be done? Evidently, the defendant stopped making monthly payments once the plaintiff was deceased.

The judgement is an asset of the estate The executor can approach the court to have it enforced until the estate is would up. As an asset, it must be dealt with in accordance with the will and bequeathed as instructed. This will involve approaching the court and having the judgement debt transferred to the relevant beneficiaries or keeping the estate active until the debt has run its course.

Asset protect trust and final expensers

A parent dies and leaves all his/her money to his/her adult child into an asset protection trust. The adult child wants to see as much money as possible in the trust. Hence he personally pays for the final expenses. Does this create any negative consequences such as ruining the asset protection offered by the trust? Would it be considered a gift and therefore if it was over the annual exclusion create a gift tax issue?

Payment of the final expenses of an estate does not make one a settlor of a testamentary trust, and thus, it would not impair its asset protection effect of the testamentary trust. (Incidentally, a disclaimer of (i.e. formal refusal to accept) a bequest or devise or inheritance is also not a gift for this purpose or for gift and estate tax purposes.) A payment of the final expenses of a decedent is not an annual exclusion gift under the federal gift and estate tax in the United States. Only gifts of present interests in property to natural persons qualify for the annual exclusion, although, if a natural person was the creditor, I suppose it could be an annual exclusion gift from the person making the payment to the creditor. Whether or not the payment of the final expenses like funeral costs and final illness expenses of a decedent constitutes a gift at all, within the meaning of the federal gift and estate tax in the United States, is not entirely clear. There may be case law or tax authority on that point that I haven't researched. But, I've never seen that question litigated. Estates of persons dying in 2023 can exclude $12.92 million from gift and estate taxation per lifetime (including any lifetime gifts not exempt from gift taxation), plus any unused gift and estate tax exclusion inherited from a predeceased spouse. So, it is rare that payment of the final expenses of a decedent would materially impact the amount of gift and estate taxes due in an estate.

PTSD and custody

A parent is awarded joint physical and legal custody of their children. This parent is subsequently diagnosed with PTSD . Assuming there are no allegations of abuse verbally or physically or other new issues with the parent, how likely would it be that the custody ruling would be changed? This is in the state of Mississippi.

Generally speaking, custody orders can't be disturbed without a material change in circumstances. A mere diagnosis would not itself be a material change in circumstances and would also usually not be admissible evidence because of the doctor-patient privilege and related privileges for mental health professionals. A diagnosis changes the way people interpret a situation, but it isn't actually something involving or impacting the parent-child relationship in the life the parent and the children that has changed. Instead, there would need to be some event or circumstance that was not known or contemplated at the time of the hearing giving rise to the original custody order which would undermine the factual basis or reasoning of the original custody order. Assuming there are no allegations of abuse verbally or physically or other new issues with the parent, how likely would it be that the custody ruling would be changed? The answer is never "zero" because judges in custody cases are inherently unpredictable. But the likelihood of a change is low. Also, even if there was a prima facie showing of some change in circumstances, e.g. the parent with PTSD is fired from a job for having an outburst at work that a reasonable person would not have made but for PTSD, the diagnosis isn't necessary a negative. A diagnosis followed by repeated incidents after which the parents makes no effort to prevent incidents like that from happening again might be a negative. But often a diagnosis is followed immediately by a treatment plan or the development of strategies to reduce the impact of the condition diagnosis that is informed by the diagnosis and hence likely to be more reliable and effective than efforts to deal with an undiagnosed condition. If the parent is diagnosed with PTSD and then undergoes a treatment plan targeted towards advancing the best interests of the children, in ways that the same parent had not considered at the time of the original hearing, the diagnosis could actually be a plus. The existence of a treatment plan could reduce the significance of pre-diagnosis incidents that happened before a treatment plan was in place. Indeed, probably the more common fact pattern would be for parenting to have been initially restricted based upon incidents which in hindsight were caused by PTSD. Then, the parent is diagnosed, starts a treatment plan, and shows that incidents like the ones that previously caused the court to limit custody are now no longer happening regularly. A court could treat the reduced frequency of incidents and the circumstance of treatment that suggests that the reduced frequency of incidents is not just a fluke, as a change in circumstances justifying less limited parenting time.

Who are the "inferior officers" of the federal government?

A part of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States says this: He [the President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. News reports recently suggest that the director of the FBI, although "inferior" to the attorney general, is not one of those "inferior officers" who do not need to get confirmed by the Senate. I suspect maybe the head of the Federal Aviation Administration or the Postmaster General or the Director of the Census is one of those. (For some decades before the late '60s -- maybe the Nixon administration -- the Postmaster General was a member of the Cabinet.) If I'm not mistaken, all members of the Cabinet and all ambassadors and all federal judges need to get confirmed by the Senate. What is the current list of those officers who need to get confirmed by the Senate and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by the President without the need for confirmation, and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by department heads, and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by the judiciary? Would this list be on the web somewhere?

I conclude (contrary to an earlier expression) that there is no such list, nor can there be, because the term "officer" is not well enough defined. The inferior officers are those officers who are not principal officers (as specified in the Constitution, e.g. ambassadors, cabinet members, judges), since there are only two kinds of officers. There is no constitutional or statutory definition of "Officer of the United States", so we have to figure it out from case law. As noted in Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 The line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn. Officers of the US cannot be appointed by Congress ( Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so that narrows down the possibilities – if in fact an appointment can be made by Congress, that is not an inferior office (since Congress has no such authority). That court also said that We think that the term "Officers of the United States," as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States, " and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. To take a specific example, "special trial judges", authorized in 26 USC 7443a are an example of an officer. We know they are officers, because Freytag v. Commissioner 501 U.S. 868 says so (since they read Buckley): A special trial judge is an "inferior Office[r]" whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause. Such a judge acts as an inferior officer who exercises independent authority in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The fact that in subsection (b)(4) cases he performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status. The Dept. of Justice offers an analysis of "Officer of the United States". The main elements in their opinion are that the position must possess delegated sovereign authority of the Federal government, and the position must be continuing. There are other criteria possibly applicable (things that were invokes at some time) including method of appointment, having been established by law, taking an oath of office, an emolument (not a volunteer), and receiving a commission. Still, Congress authorizes (by law) the hiring of federal employees, and not all employees are "officers". An earlier memorandum on the topic is here . Footnote 54 notes that It is at least arguable, however, that the authority exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees. Warrant officers and non-commisioned officers would likewise have quite limited authority. Since the definition of "Officer of the United States" is up for grabs, there can't be a complete list of inferior officers, especially if all military officers are included. There is a long list of civilian officers under the executive branch published in United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions , after each presidential election. The so-called Plum Book is on a government web page here in the 2012 version, and here for 2016. However, you will not find special trial judges of the tax court in the Plum Book, which were held in Freytag to be officers, and are civilians in the executive branch. The special trial judges are apparently listed here , as are the sitting judges (who are also not in the Plum book).

Would I be violating copyright by transcribing music that was written over 100 years ago, but published in 1992?

A particular set of piano rolls were recorded before 1913, but to my knowledge were not published until 1989. The recordings are piano transcriptions of symphonic works, performed by their composer/arranger. The symphonic works in question were published well before 1910 and are currently in public domain. I am interested in transcribing the rolls to study the arrangement techniques of the composer. I would be using this information to reconstruct his arrangements of other works, and am interested in publishing my findings as it's for a thesis project. If I were to refrain from publishing the direct transcriptions, and considering that the symphonic works are in public domain, would I be violating copyright by transcribing the rolls for study? Is it possible that the rolls could be considered public domain as they are arrangements of public domain works published postmortem?

First: the real answer to your questions is "consult your academic library staff." If this is for a thesis project, then you're presumably affiliated with a college or university, and the librarians at such institutions are used to helping sort out copyright claims and helping researchers obtain the necessary clearances. There are two questions you're asking, really. Are these works in the public domain? Possibly, but not for the reasons you think. In the US, copyright in unpublished works lasts for the life of the creator + 70 years. After that, they pass into the public domain. This means that if the composer/arranger died before 1919, then the works passed into the public domain before the formal publication in 1989, and they are still in the public domain now. However, if the creator died after 1919, then their 1989 publication effectively "resets the clock" on the copyright, and they will not come into the public domain until (according to the above link) 70 years after the death of the creator or 2048, whichever comes later. What doesn't matter is that the original symphonic works were in the public domain. Even if the 1812 Overture is in the public domain, I could write an arrangement of it for accordion quintet and I would have the exclusive right to publish it and profit from that arrangement for the standard term. In your case, if the work really is a straight transcription, it might not have a copyright; but if the work required some amount of creativity and artistic decision-making (which a piano transcription of a symphony certainly would) then the arrangement gets its own copyright when it's published. Can I make transcriptions of them if I don't publish them? Probably, but you should really consult your librarians. It's entirely possible that your proposed copying would fall under "fair use"; it would be for scholarship & research and you're not planning to include the transcriptions in your final published work. On the other hand, you're talking about effectively copying a substantial portion of a creative work that is still in print, which argues against fair use. Fair use rules are notoriously flexible/vague, and so it would be worthwhile to consult with an expert on the subject (i.e., your school's library staff.)

Is the drafter of a contract that knowingly incorporated the terms of the offer in an inconsistent manner liable for damages?

A party accepts an offer-to-lease (OTL) with negotiated specific terms for a commercial lease to startup its business. It included a 4-year rent abatement through a sub-lease back to the landlord. Landlord incorporates terms inconsistently into the Lease in spite of a term of the OTL and disregards other party's legal counsel's feedback. Both sign. Can the other party sue the Landlord for inducement/fraudulent misrepresentation or otherwise for damages through loss of rent abatement?

The tenant is almost certainly bound by the document signed If you sign something the law can (will) presume that you read, understood and agreed to it. During negotiations the parties will take and express many different positions and put forward and receive, verbally and in writing, many offers and counter offers. Consequently, what is legally accepted as definitive of the agreement is the document(s) that were signed or, if nothing was signed, the last document(s) exchanged. The parole evidence rule prevents a party from even introducing evidence of the negotiations if the signed contract is complete enough to form a whole contract. Extrinsic evidence can only be used where the contract is silent or ambiguous on a matter, where the contract addresses it and is sufficiently clear, it is definitive. One exception is where the party signed the document believing that it was something else, for example (and I've seen this happen) the parties read through the contract together and agreed that it reflected the agreement, one party copied it and (deliberately or accidentally) substituted different pages in the photocopy, both parties then signed the doctored contract: such a contract would be void for fraud.

Can I transport jello shots?

A party is coming up and I wanted to make jello shots for it. I was then worried about open container laws. If I transport jello shots in a sealed Tupperware container in my trunk, could I get in trouble for an "open container" if I am 100% sober? I am in Indiana, USA if that makes a difference.

Indiana's open container law is in Section 9-30-15-3 (b) of the Indiana Code. (b) A person in a motor vehicle who, while the motor vehicle is in operation or while the motor vehicle is located on the right-of-way of a public highway, possesses a container: (1) that has been opened; (2) that has a broken seal;  or (3) from which some of the contents have been removed; in the passenger compartment of the motor vehicle commits a Class C infraction. The trunk of a car is not part of the passenger compartment, so alcohol in the trunk will not violate this law. Paragraph (a) of the law gives some other exceptions and clarifications, for situations like RVs, limos, and vehicles that don't have a trunk.

Do pastebin sites have to delete content on request?

A pastebin site, hosted in the US, allows users to post data anonymously. However, its intended purpose is for sharing information about one's computer, including the username (which is sometimes PII). Under GDPR, is the site owner required to allow users to delete posts, even though there's no way to verify who posted? What if all posts are automatically deleted after one day or some other period of time?

Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people.

Lab work and laws regarding price-gouging

A patient goes to doctor. Doctor orders two tests, TestA and TestB. The insurance company only covers one. The EOB shows that the two tests were billed at $500 each. TestA is not covered, TestB is covered and EOB shows that insurance company paid out $100 for TestB. How much can a lab company bill out a test for. Could they bill out TestA and TestB at $1000 or $10000, even though majority of insurance companies will, if covered, only reimburse TestB and TestA at $100? Are there any Federal or State(NY,CT,NJ) laws that limit how much an insurance company can demand for a specific test from a patient? e.g. Usual and customary price for a lab test? Note: This questions assumes patient is responsible party for ensuring TestA and TestB are reimbursed. If this is not the case, please explain why.

A company can charge whatever they like for their goods and services Except for regulated industries (e.g. utilities), or specific circumstances (e.g. during an emergency), a business is free to set their prices as they like. Such restrictions as they are are usually on preventing prices being set too low as a means of eliminating competitors, so-called predatory pricing. In practice, limitations on pricing are economic, not legal: if you consistently sell lower than your costs, you go broke and if you constantly sell for higher than your direct competition, you also go broke. So, for your contract with the lab, they can charge you whatever they like and they don’t have to consider what you would like to pay or whatever you might get from an insurer. You can (and should) ask the price before you agree to the test and compare prices with other providers. You can even try to negotiate lower prices. It’s your health and your money and you have to decide what represents best value for money. Your contract with your insurer is completely independent of your contract with the lab. Again, you can (and should) decide how much you are willing to pay for your insurance - pay more in premiums and you generally get more coverage. You can also check how much you will get back on any given procedure before you agree to it and that can inform your decision on whether to undertake it. However, where you have agreed to the procedures without checking the price, you have also agreed to pay what they ask.

Can a medical professional be liable for not completing a procedure as claimed?

A patient in the United States goes to the dentist for a routine extraction of both bottom wisdom teeth (as explained to him beforehand by the dentist). The patient is put under general anesthesia, wakes up with some gauze in their mouth and are given a prescription for painkillers. The dentist tells the patient that the procedure went exactly as planned, and the patient heals over the next 10 days with no complications. It can be assumed that the dentist bills the patient (and/or their health insurer) for the procedure as it was described to the patient. Some time later, the patient visits a different dentist complaining of tooth pain in the back of the mouth, and the new dentist discovers that only one of the wisdom teeth was removed. Are there any legal grounds for the patient to file suit against their former dentist in this situation?

This seems to be a case of breach of contract. The doctor promised to remove both wisdom teeth, and only removed one. While I believe a patient would succeed in suing the doctor for breach of contract, I am not sure what remedy would be awarded. A court forcing the doctor to finish the operation doesn't sound likely, perhaps damages would be awarded in the form of giving the patient back half of what he paid for the operation

UK law and time limits

A patient with a history of mental health problems goes to his/her GP claiming depression. However, because the patient does not appear to act in the expected manner, the GP refuses time off. This is contrary to the Mental Capacity Act of 2005 that requires (3) A lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to— (a) a person’s age or appearance, or (b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about his capacity. It turns out that the patient does have some serious problems and suffers at work. Can the patient take the GP to court because the GP broke the 2005 Act and, if so, is there a time limit that must be observed? If not, what recourse to action would he/she have?

How is the Mental Health Act relevant? It sets out the law relating to removing a person’s decision making ability over their own life and placing it in the hands of a guardian and, possibly, confine them to an institution against their will. The question is not whether a person is mentally ill, it’s whether that illness prevents them from making decisions about their life.

Contract Law and Tort Law

A person (H) visits a building being interested to have it on lease. H is on a wheel chair, the building roof start falling and H is killed instantly by heavy tile. H's friend (M) saw her being killed. M goes into deep shock and remains in deep shock and become unable to work for a year. I want to consider whether the owner or occupier is liable for M's shock and aftermaths?

Easy part first, there is no contract between the owners and M so there is no action possible under contract law. For tort law, the only one I can see is the tort of negligence. To succeed, M would need to demonstrate: The owners owed M a duty of care They failed in that duty As a result of that failure M suffered harm that was reasonably foreseeable to the owners. Ultimately this is a matter of evidence but there are difficult problems for M on all these steps. Do the owners of a building have a duty to someone who did not enter that building? Was the roof collapse the fault of the owners or was it beyond their control (e.g. Earthquake)? Even if there were no external factors was the poor state of the roof something the owners could or should have known? It is highly likely that even if the first 2 are proven, that damage to M would not be reasonably foreseeable in a legal sense. If M had witnessed the friend die in a car accident without being an occupant of an involved vehicle the negligent driver would not be responsible for M's damage: same principle here.

What should police do in case a stolen item is evidently in suspect's house

A person (woman) says that B person (man) had stolen an item (laptop), because she has seen B doing that, being few meters away from the location, watching how he has done it (watching her items which were visually identifiable easily with the unique colors and stickers on her laptop). Then also GPS signal was coming from the B 's home, and when she called the messenger, the ringtone come from B 's home (device was still connected to the WIFI). When she called a police, they couldnt do anything and said that they have wait for a court order (search warrant) and even it was dubious if they would get search warrant at all. After weeks, the search warrant was issued, but no need to guess any joke out of it, there was already no trace of existence of the item in thief's home. Similar situations happened quite many times around me, people being robbed quickly, and police being unable to do anything, and all such cases closed without any success. Des the police act correctly? What should the owner do in such a case, when the owner still knows the item's location exactly and immediate action is needed, but the police is not helping? (p.s. Maybe jurisdiction doesn't much matter here, let's consider a typical civil country).

united-states In the US, the default rule is that your home is your castle. In general, nobody, not even the police, can enter your home without your permission. The main exception to this rule is that police do not need your permission if they have a search warrant to search your home. To get a warrant, the police must convince a magistrate that they have good reason (ie, "probable cause"), such as a gps track, to believe they will find evidence of a crime if they search the house. The police in your hypothetical are in a similar situation to police who are tracking the gps signal from a " bait car /bike/phone/tablet/package." (A bait car is a car/etc that has been fitted with a camera and gps tracker, and left out as bait for thieves.) As long as the car is in public view, the police do not need a warrant to search it and arrest the person driving it. However, once the bait car is out of public view, where the police can no longer see it, they need a warrant to go in and recover it, even if they can see it on the tracker. (See, for example, the instructions for bait car programs from the Eugene and Reno Police Departments.) (For phones, which may not be in "plain view" even if the thief is, the police use ring programs to make the phone ring. Hearing a phone respond to a ring program gives them probable cause under the "hearing" version of the "plain view" doctrine.) Bottom line: In the US, the police need a search warrant. Since search warrants take time and effort, police may be unwilling to get a warrant for something as low valued as a phone. If the police can't or won't help, there are various options for privately enforcing one's rights. These range from the legal -- knocking on the door and confronting the thief -- to the illegal -- left to your imagination.

New York Convention contract

A person A from country M meets a person B from country N. The meeting takes place in a country O. All the three countries M, N, O are a member of the New York Convention. Can people A and B sign a contract that is normally not allowed to sign according to the local laws of the country O, however such a contract is possible to sign according to the New York Convention? Thank you.

Can people A and B sign a contract It occurs to me that you are actually asking whether the signed contract will be enforceable . As for signing , people can sign whatever — a wall, a piece of toilet paper, an ass etc. It will surely be enforceable in countries M and N. Where it was signed — in O, in outer space or on Mars — does not matter. not allowed to sign according to the local laws of the country O It will then not be enforceable in O. Moreover, depending on those local laws and what the contract is, A and B might go to jail by revealing they have signed such a contract. The New York Convention won't help then.

Can involvement of third party be a factor lowering culpability and leading to non-prosecution decision?

A person I know (she lives in Maryland) was a victim of a minor assault where she was pushed around and her face grasped. Thankfully she did not suffer bodily harm. The two assailants admitted the assault but eventually after being held the maximum time without prosecution they were released. Apparently there was some urging by a character who did not care for my acquintance, at least about going to "see" her. I don't think this person was found to be guilty of instigation, but her involvement was deemed to be something close to it - though not worthy of arrest. According to my acquintance the assailants were in the end released because of three reasons: 1) first time offenders 2) they expressed deep remorse during their extended arrest 3) "will of third party" was involved I know 1 & 2 can play role in deeming long containment a sufficient punishment - but can 3 also influence non-prosecution decision? Or is she misunderstanding something? I've not heard of this before.

In the US at least, the decisions made by a prosecutor to prosecute - or not - or to level charges that involve less of a punishment are entirely up to the prosecutor. You can always ask the prosecutor the reasons for the lack of charges and release for "time served"; he/she may or may not tell you, depending on disclosure laws, age of defendants, or other legal reasons. The prosecutor's job is to be objective and weigh the evidence, the involvement of all parties, remorse, previous offenses, evidence, possible pleas, the cooperation of the offenders, letters of support and character witnesses, media exposure, etc., all things that lead to what they feel is the likelihood of conviction (or a plea bargain) and some sort of sense of justice for the victim. Prosecutors must also try to be aware of conflicts of interest with those charged, and ideally must avoid the pitfalls of corruption and political pressure to charge (or not charge) criminals. But prosecutors may also not charge people because of having too much work to do with other more serious cases, lack of funding for investigations, lack of staff in the office, or even having a bad day; they're human. Prosecutors arguably have a lot of power when it comes to justice; they can decline to prosecute and little can be done about it.

Can an employer force an employee to have a social media account and put their current employment information on the profile?

A person I know recently received some new rules from their employer regarding expected social media behavior, which they need to sign. Before signing, I started reading it, and the last point mentioned was that the employee must have at least one social media account with the job title and description information on their profile, or the could face disciplinary action.What if the employee does not have a social media account, or simply does not want/care to put their employment information on social media? Can an employer force an employee to do this?

I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.

Is brute forcing the password of an encrypted file legal?

A person I know sent me an encrypted .zip archive and I do not know what data is inside. Is it legal to break the password and open the archive, for example, by using a brute force algorithm? The algorithm may need a long time, but it will reveal the password that was used for the encryption. The file was sent directly to me and I know that I am meant to be the recipient. I assume that the file was protected by accident. Would the answer be different if I am not the intended recipient and someone sent me the file by accident? We both live in Germany.

If you aren’t the intended recipient of the password-protected file: StGB § 202a makes it illegal to access this file StGB § 202c makes it illegal to obtain (e.g., by brute forcing) the password for this file, if you intend to access the file that way (in the sense of § 202a) (this is the so-called hacker paragraph ) If you are the intended recipient, this law doesn’t seem to apply, and it shouldn’t be illegal to brute-force the password.

Is lying in an application for a job at a private company, signed under penalty of perjury, prosecutable as perjury?

A person applies for a job at the XYZ company. The XYZ company is a private company. As part of applying he fills out an application and signs it under penalty of perjury. The application has several lies in it. Can he be criminal prosecuted for perjury? If his signature had been notarized after he signed it, would that effect the answer?

united-states A "penalty of perjury" statement includes not just the warning about penalty of perjury, the person signing avows that the statements are true to the best of their knowledge. If you lie on such a statement, and if the "penalty of perjury" statement is legally allowed (typically, mandated), then the person can be prosecuted. However, XYZ cannot arbitrarily inject the risk of perjury, that requires some legal authorization. An example would be if XYZ is employing the person under a Defense Department contract that requires a sworn statement. The federal perjury statute characterises this as being when "a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered". The only effect of notarization is that it decreases the probability that the person could effectively argue "I never even signed this statement, that's a forgery".

Confessing for a crime which has not been committed

A person confessed to a lawyer over phone for a blackmailing (his lover)crime which he didn't commit. Will he able to file a complaint against that person only with his confession? But such crime has not occured and the lawyer doesn't know any other details

The person who is blackmailed can file a criminal complaint. A random person who thinks there was a crime cannot. A person's lawyer especially cannot even anonymously tip off the police about bad past act of the client.