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Gamaredon is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been active since 2013. From late 2019 to February of this year, researchers published several reports on Gamaredon, tracking the group’s activities | ['T1140', 'T1059.005'] |
When you run the command, it sets all the required information about the AD FS to Azure AD for the federated domain. It also creates a relying party trust for the Azure AD to the local AD FS server. When a user is authenticated on AD FS, it creates a security token including claims about the user’s identity. With Azure AD, two claims are used for authentication; UserPrincipalName and ImmutabledId. Basically, the ImmutableId could be any string, as long as it matches the ImmutableId attribute of the user object in Azure AD. Typically the ImmutableId is a base 64 encoded GUID of the user object in on-premises AD (to convert GUID to immutable ID see the tools page). Converting the domain to federated also creates two claim issuance rules. For short, the rules add the UserPrincipalName and ImmutableId claims of the logged in user to the security token. When security token is delivered to Azure authentication platform, it checks the token signature, and if it matches the trust, the user is granted access | ['T1484'] |
NICKEL used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts through normal sign-ins with a browser and the legacy Exchange Web Services (EWS) protocol to review and collect victim emails. MSTIC has observed successful NICKEL sign-ins to compromised accounts through commercial VPN providers as well as from actor-controlled infrastructure | ['T1133', 'T1078.004'] |
By enabling this data connection, the user allows Excel to obtain content from the URL in the .iqy file. The contents within the releasenotes.txt file (SHA256: bf925f340920111b385078f3785f486fff1096fd0847b993892ff1ee3580fa9d) contains the following formula that Excel will save to the “A0” cell in the worksheet | ['T1204.002'] |
After the system reboots, the file “AJWrDz.exe” executes, which in turn triggers the side-loading of the malicious (and fake) DLL file “dbghelp.dll”. This malicious DLL file injects itself to Windows Media Player process — wmplayer.exe, and reflectively loads the renamed jesus.dmp file, “AJWrDz.dmp | ['T1055.001'] |
The Emissary Trojan will use this GUID value provided by the C2 server as an encryption key that it will use to encrypt data sent in subsequent network communications | ['T1027', 'T1573.001'] |
It also checks for the existence of various tools and utilities that malware analysts often run when analyzing malicious software. It also leverages Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to patch its own code. These measures are all designed to impede the analysis process and make it more expensive to identify what the malware is actually designed to do from a code execution flow perspective. Below the EAX register is stored in a variable to be reused later in order to allocate a heap memory chunk to initiate its own unpacked code. The malware also uses others techniques to make analysis significantly more difficult, like creating hundreds of case comparisons, which makes tracing code much harder. Below an example of several if conditional statements in pseudo code demonstrating this process and how it can result in impeding the ability to efficiently trace the code. In order to decrypt the malware code it's installs an exception handler, which is responsible for decrypting some memory bytes to continue it's execution. Below you can see the SEH has just been initialized: In the same routine, it performs the decryption routine for the following code. The strings are encrypted using an XOR value, however each string uses a separate XOR value preventing an easy detection mechanism. Below is some IDA Python code which can be used to decrypt strings | ['T1027'] |
There are 2 ways by which Linux/Ebury can choose a server where the DNS packets are sent. The second method uses an algorithm to generate a domain name dynamically. This domain name will be queried for its A and TXT records. The TXT record will be used to verify that it is under the control of the operators using public key cryptography. Details about the domain generation algorithm and the verification processed will be published later | ['T1568.002'] |
After the Waterbear DLL loader is executed, it searches for a hardcoded path and tries to decrypt the corresponding payload, which is a piece of encrypted shellcode. If the decrypted payload is valid, it picks a specific existing Windows Service — LanmanServer, which is run by svchost.exe — and injects the decrypted shellcode into the legitimate service | ['T1055'] |
The malware initiates its main function of capturing user keystrokes and sending them to the control server using standard Windows networking APIs | ['T1056.001', 'T1056'] |
Process hollowing is a code injection technique that involves spawning a new instance of legitimate process (in this case c:\windows\syswow64\explorer.exe) and then replacing the legitimate code with malware | ['T1055.012'] |
The January 2022 version of PlugX malware utilizes RC4 encryption along with a hardcoded key that is built dynamically. For communications, the data is compressed then encrypted before sending to the command and control (C2) server and the same process in reverse is implemented for data received from the C2 server. Below shows the RC4 key "sV. During the January 2022 campaigns, the delivered PlugX malware samples communicated with the C2 server 92.118.188[.]78 over port 187. In the February 2022 campaign, Proofpoint researchers observed a variation in which PlugX malware used an RC4 key that was sent to the bot in the first HTTP response which was then used to encrypt data going to the C2 server | ['T1573.001'] |
A series of xor 0x28 loops decrypt the contents of a self-deletion batch file, which is then written to disk and executed. Later in the execution, a more complex rc4 loop decrypts the download url and other strings and imports | ['T1140'] |
FALLCHILL is the primary component of a C2 infrastructure that uses multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic between HIDDEN COBRA actors and a victim’s system. According to trusted third-party reporting, communication flows from the victim’s system to HIDDEN COBRA actors using a series of proxies as shown in figure 1 | ['T1090.002'] |
Ferocious Kitten is an APT group that since at least 2015 has been targeting Persian-speaking individuals who appear to be based in Iran. Although it has been active for a long time, the group has mostly operated under the radar and has not been covered by security researchers to the best of our knowledge. It is only recently that it drew attention when a lure document was uploaded to VirusTotal and went public thanks to researchers on Twitter. Since then, one of its implants has been analyzed by a Chinese threat intelligence firm | ['T1566.001'] |
The malware encrypts user files, demanding a fee of either $300 or $600 worth of bitcoins to an address specified in the instructions displayed after infection | ['T1486'] |
In addition to the encrypted strings table, BitPaymer replaces the remaining strings in the binary with hashes and uses an algorithm to match these hashes with strings that exist on the host. This hash is combined with a DWORD using a simple XOR. This string hashing algorithm is identical to the hashing algorithm used in other Dridex modules | ['T1012'] |
Much of the code inside the script is from the library “js-cookie” version 2.2.1. However, the attackers modified it and integrated a credit card skimmer into the original script. The skimmer binds at the events “mousedown” and “touchstart” of the payment submit button | ['T1119'] |
From the attacks observed by Volexity, what is most notable is that Patchwork has pivoted its targeting and has launched attacks directly against US-based think tanks. Volexity has also found that, in addition to sending malware lures, the Patchwork threat actors are leveraging unique tracking links in their e-mails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened their e-mail messages. If the exploit is successful, the threat actors will attempt to drop and execute QuasarRAT. While the use of e-mail recipient tracking, a linked RTF document, and a final payload (QuasarRAT variant) remained the same, certain elements differed across campaigns observed. Exploitation and Malware Execution . Upon opening the above attachments, the recipient will be presented with a document that is a direct copy of a blog post or report released by the think tank organization being impersonated. When the malicious RTF document is opened, two things happen that allow the attacker malware to run. Its called the "packager trick" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious "scriptlet" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial "qrat.exe" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory. The Patchwork threat actors also appear to have adopted a technique seen from other APT groups where they are now tracking the effectiveness of their campaigns by recording which recipients have opened the phishing message | ['T1203'] |
In addition to this, as reported by our peers at ESET last week, the group has also begun using a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) rootkit known as Lojax. Because the rootkit resides within a computer’s flash memory, it allows the attackers to maintain a persistent presence on a compromised machine even if the hard drive is replaced or the operating system is reinstalled | ['T1014'] |
f) Hadoop YARN ResourceManager – Command Execution (exploit) g) CVE-2016-3088: Apache ActiveMQ Fileserver File Upload Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ['T1203', 'T1203', 'T1105'] |
shareDll, mshareDll, tshareDll Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. wormwinDll, wormDll, mwormDll, nwormDll Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. It uses the EternalBlue exploit. Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. It uses the EternalBlue exploit. tabDll Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit. Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit | ['T1210'] |
The s.exe (SHA256: 04f48ed27a83a57a971e73072ac5c769709306f2714022770fb364fd575fd462) uploaded to the error2.aspx webshell is a self-extracting 7-zip archive that is an example of the HyperBro backdoor. According to Kaspersky and SecureWorks research, HyperBro is a custom backdoor developed and used by Emissary Panda in their attack campaigns. This sample of HyperBro is similar to the sample discussed in Kaspersky’s research, specifically using a legitimate pcAnywhere application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress and run a payload embedded within a file named ‘thumb.db’. Table 5 shows the three files associated with this HyperBro sample, which have the same file names as the self-extracting 7zip archives mentioned in Kaspersky’s blog (SHA256 hashes: 34a542356ac8a3f6e367c6827b728e18e905c71574b3813f163e043f70aa3bfa and 2144aa68c7b2a6e3511e482d6759895210cf60c67f14b9485a0236af925d8233 | ['T1574.002'] |
The dropper has its encrypted payload embedded as an overlay of a PE file as extra data that will never be used in normal execution steps | ['T1027'] |
COMSysApp service is first configured to autostart and the binpath of the service is set to svchost.exe. COMSysApp service is added under the “SvcHost” key as a preliminary step to its execution in the context of svchost.exe. The malicious DLL is added as a service DLL of COMSysApp. COMSysApp service is restarted | ['T1546.015'] |
One, called "frown.py," is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143 | ['T1571'] |
Currently, Agent Tesla continues to be utilized in various stages of attacks. Agent Tesla is now able to harvest configuration data and credentials from a number of common VPN clients, FTP and Email clients, and Web Browsers. The malware has the ability to extract credentials from the registry as well as related configuration or support files. Our analysis of a swatch of current Agent Tesla samples reveals the following list of targeted software | ['T1552.002', 'T1552.001'] |
Next, BoomBox downloads an encrypted file from Dropbox. For demonstration purposes, an example HTTP(s) POST request used to download the encrypted file from Dropbox is shown below | ['T1071.001'] |
Along with the JavaScript RAT, DarkWatchman features a C# keylogger. The keylogger is distributed as obfuscated C# source code that is processed and stored in the registry as a Base64-encoded PowerShell command. When the RAT is launched, it executes this PowerShell script which, in turn, compiles the keylogger (using CSC) and executes it. The keylogger itself does not communicate with the C2 or write to disk. Instead, it writes it’s keylog to a registry key that it uses as a buffer. During its operation, the RAT scrapes and clears this buffer before transmitting the logged keystrokes to the C2 server | ['T1132.001'] |
The algorithm used by Dyre for generating the AES and IV from the first 48 bytes of data based on a rehashing scheme was commonly referred to as Dyre’s derive_key function, this function was slightly changed in the new bot | ['T1573.001'] |
Figure 1 – The wrapper DLL poses as a legitimate mpr.dll library, both by its name and version info | ['T1036.005'] |
For this analysis, we looked at version 2.14.845, which has a configuration that differs from the others Dreambot versions in that the domain generation algorithm (DGA) is not used: therefore, the DGA variables and parameters are missing | ['T1568.002'] |
Along with the JavaScript RAT, DarkWatchman features a C# keylogger. The keylogger is distributed as obfuscated C# source code that is processed and stored in the registry as a Base64-encoded PowerShell command. When the RAT is launched, it executes this PowerShell script which, in turn, compiles the keylogger (using CSC) and executes it. Instead, it writes it’s keylog to a registry key that it uses as a buffer | ['T1027', 'T1059.001'] |
As part of its initialization, the implant gathers basic system information and sends it to its hardcoded control server 203.131.222.83 using SSL over port 443 | ['T1124'] |
As described in other blog posts, Remcos appears to be developed in C++. As the release notes show, it is actively maintained. 17, 2017 Remcos has the functionalities that are typical of a RAT. It is capable of hiding in the system and using malware techniques that make it difficult for the typical user to detect the existence of Remcos. A good example is the anti-analysis section: It is checking for an outdated artifact, the 'SbieDll.dll'. In our opinion, there are not many analysts using Sandboxie these days anymore. Below you can see the Remcos VMware detection code: The following is a code sample from aldeid.com: The blog referenced above has already described several functions of Remcos features in detail. We would like to focus on Remcos' cryptographic implementation. It uses RC4 pretty much everywhere when there is a need to decode or encode any data. Examples are registry entries, C2 server network communication or file paths shown below: The exepath registry data is base64-encoded, RC4-encrypted data. This can be converted into the typical RC4 pseudo code | ['T1027'] |
The Word document has a malicious macro in it and, when opened by the victim, it will drop and execute a file in a specific folder | ['T1204.002'] |
This time, APT15 opted for a DNS based backdoor: RoyalDNS. The persistence mechanism used by RoyalDNS was achieved through a service called ‘Nwsapagent | ['T1543.003'] |
To gain access to victim environments, the threat actor began by targeting handpicked employees using LinkedIn messaging and email, advertising fake jobs to lure recipients into checking into the supposed offers. In one case, we uncovered evidence indicating that the attacker had established communication with a victim via email and convinced them to click on a Google Drive URL purporting to contain an attractive job advert. Once clicked, the URL displayed the message, “Online preview is not available,” then presented a second URL leading to a compromised or rogue domain, where the victim could download the payload under the guise of a job description | ['T1566.003'] |
TajMahal’ is a previously unknown and technically sophisticated APT framework discovered by Kaspersky Lab in the autumn of 2018. We discovered up to 80 malicious modules stored in its encrypted Virtual File System, one of the highest numbers of plugins we’ve ever seen for an APT toolset | ['T1027'] |
When loaded, the FoggyWeb backdoor (originally named Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.dll by its developer) functions as a passive and persistent backdoor that allows abuse of the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) token. The backdoor configures HTTP listeners for actor-defined URIs that mimic the structure of the legitimate URIs used by the target’s AD FS deployment. The custom listeners passively monitor all incoming HTTP GET and POST requests sent to the AD FS server from the intranet/internet and intercept HTTP requests that match the custom URI patterns defined by the actor. This version of FoggyWeb configures listeners for the following hardcoded URI patterns (which might vary per target | ['T1550', 'T1040'] |
After completing this wiping functionality, the sample will reboot the system using the following command line, which will render it unusable when the system reboots as the important system locations and files have been overwritten with random data | ['T1529'] |
Typical lateral movement methods were employed, using Windows commands. First, a network connection with a remote host was established using the command “net use | ['T1049'] |
1) Loads the image resource with name `T__6541957882` into memory. 3) Adds `0xEE` to the bytes to decode the DLL. 4) Reflectively loads decoded DLL into memory and executes it | ['T1620'] |
Kimsuky has also used a Mac OS Python implant that gathers data from Mac OS systems and sends it to a C2 server (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python [T1059.006]). The Python program downloads various implants based on C2 options specified after the filedown.php (see figure 4 | ['T1071.003', 'T1059.006'] |
PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that was used to run commands to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance | ['T1059.001'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. Source: Secureworks) - Screen Capture Tool— This tool can capture the desktop of a victim's system (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity | ['T1132.001'] |
1) Right after midnight, the attackers connected to a machine on the targeted network most probably via RDP. 3) The attacker used psexec.exe to execute “Cobalt.Client.exe”, which is the Pay2Key ransomware itself, on different machines within the organization | ['T1090', 'T1090.001'] |
If the system is a 64-bit version of Windows, it downloads and executes a specific 64-bit version of the malware thanks to a powershell script | ['T1059.001'] |
Remote templates are a feature of Microsoft Word which allow a document to load a template to be used in a document – this template can be externally hosted, either on a file share, or on the internet. The template is then loaded when the document is opened. The Inception attackers use this feature in a malicious context as shown in Figure 1 below | ['T1221'] |
Collect document files with the suffixes ".txt", ".doc" and ".xls" in the Internet cache directory of the IE browser | ['T1005'] |
If the user does not have permissions to add a service, the installation routine attempts to add persistence by creating the following registry key that will run the functional code within Emissary via an exported function named "DllRegister | ['T1547.001'] |
Malicious obfuscated VBA code is executed when the macro is first enabled. In some cases, the malicious macro is also executed when the user activates a fake text box | ['T1204.002'] |
This group uses spear-phishing emails to deliver both malicious Word and PDF documents, and attempts to social engineer the victim into an infection rather than trying to exploit a software vulnerability | ['T1566.001'] |
The APT actor has been observed using Cisco AnyConnect Secure Socket Layer (SSL) virtual private network (VPN) connections to enable remote logins on at least one victim network, possibly enabled by an Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) vulnerability (CVE 2019-10149) (External Remote Services [T1133]). More recently, the APT actor enumerated and exploited a Fortinet VPN vulnerability (CVE-2018-13379) for Initial Access [TA0001] and a Windows Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory (AD) servers for Privilege Escalation [TA0004] within the network (Valid Accounts [T1078]). These vulnerabilities can also be leveraged to compromise other devices on the network (Lateral Movement [TA0008]) and to maintain Persistence [TA0003 | ['T1133', 'T1210'] |
UnionCryptoUpdater.exe does not immediately download the stage 2 malware but instead downloads it after a time specified by the C2 server. This delay could be implemented to prevent researchers from directly obtaining the stage 2 malware | ['T1497.003'] |
It registers as a system service to ensure its automatic execution at every system startup by adding the following registry keys | ['T1547.001'] |
After an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it retrieves and executes commands, called “Jobs”, that include the ability to transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machine, and disable system services | ['T1497.003'] |
Once the malware starts it tries to reach a hardcoded C2. The communication takes place using the unmodified HTTP-based protocol, the request and response body are RC4-encrypted, and the encryption key is also hardcoded into the sample | ['T1573.001'] |
From October 2012 to May 2014, FireEye observed APT12 utilizing RIPTIDE, a proxy-aware backdoor that communicates via HTTP to a hard-coded command and control (C2) server. RIPTIDE’s first communication with its C2 server fetches an encryption key, and the RC4 encryption key is used to encrypt all further communication | ['T1573.001'] |
Persistence was established via a crontab entry for a non-root user. With the binary named to masquerade as a legitimate file on the system and placed in a hidden directory, a crontab entry was created with a @reboot line so the GoldMax binary would execute again upon system reboot. Additionally, the threat actor used the nohup command to ignore any hangup signals, and the process will continue to run even if the terminal session was terminated | ['T1053.003'] |
In analyzing FinFisher, the first obfuscation problem that requires a solution is the removal of junk instructions and “spaghetti code”, which is a technique that aims to confuse disassembly programs. Spaghetti code makes the program flow hard to read by adding continuous code jumps, hence the name. An example of FinFisher’s spaghetti code is shown below | ['T1027.001', 'T1027'] |
In April 2018 we discovered a new Octopus sample pretending to be Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface. We couldn´t find any legitimate software that this malware appears to be impersonating; in fact, we don´t believe it exists. Kaspersky Lab products detect the Octopus Trojan as Trojan.Win32.Octopus.gen | ['T1036'] |
Later, the malware enters in a big block of trash code that also includes some elements to decrypt strings and important information for later | ['T1027'] |
The DNS resolution is performed using DNS over HTTPS (DoH). The malware sends an HTTP POST request to a Google DNS Server (8.8.8.8) using the following headers | ['T1572'] |
While Cobalt Gang 1.0 uses ThreadKit extensively, Cobalt 2.0 adds sophistication to its delivery method, borrowing some of the network infrastructures used by both APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) and MuddyWater. One of the Cobalt 2.0 Group’s latest campaigns, an attack that leads to a Cobalt Strike beacon and to JavaScript backdoor, was investigated and presented by the Talos research team. Cobalt Group Technical Details . Stage 1 - Word Macro + Whitelisting Bypass . As with many other campaigns, the victim received a document with malicious macro visual basic code. In our case the attacker abused cmstp to execute JavaScript scriptlet (XML with JS) that is downloaded from the e-dropbox[.]biz site. Although some security solutions will block all PureBasic programs (wrong move – there are plenty of legitimate PureBasic programs in use today), it’s a smart move made by the attacker group. The right side of the pair is the name of the JavaScript in the next stage (stage 4) , while the left side of the pair represents the file that will be downloaded as part of stage 5. Such a combination of registry manipulation was reported a year ago as part of an attack campaign executed by the Cobalt Group against Ukrainian banks. As part of the last execution step of the dll, the malicious code writes a JavaScript scriptlet into the Roaming directory and then it executes CreateProcess on the regsvr32 as described by the UserInitMprLogonScript. Stage 5 - JavaScript Backdoor . The last stage JavaScript is downloaded from hxxps://server.vestacp[.]kz/robots.txt. Organizations should expect to see much more coming from all Cobalt Group factions during the next year | ['T1105'] |
To confound detection, its operators recently started using PowerShell scripts that provide direct, in-memory loading and execution of malware executables and libraries. We will also present various payloads, including an RPC-based backdoor and a backdoor leveraging OneDrive as its Command and Control (C&C) server. Then, it calls VirtualProtect to allow writing at the retrieved address. Patching of AmsiScanBuffer function . Payloads . The PowerShell scripts we have presented are generic components used to load various payloads, such as an RPC Backdoor and a PowerShell backdoor. RPC backdoor . Turla has developed a whole set of backdoors relying on the RPC protocol. OneDrive credentials in PowerStallion script . It is interesting to note that Turla operators used the free email provider GMX again, as in the Outlook Backdoor and in LightNeuron. Then it uses a net use command to connect to the network drive. It then checks, in a loop, as shown in Figure 12, if a command is available. Modification of MAC times of the local log file . We believe this backdoor is a recovery access tool in case the main Turla backdoors, such as Carbon or Gazer, are cleaned and operators can no longer access the compromised computers. We have seen operators use this backdoor for the following purposes: Conclusion . In a 2018 blogpost, we predicted that Turla would use more and more generic tools | ['T1106'] |
Gain access to the victim’s network by logging into a public-facing system via Secure Shell (SSH) using a local account <user sftp> acquired during previous credential theft activities. Use port forwarding capabilities built into SSH on the public-facing system to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session to an internal server (Server 1) using a domain service account. From Server 1, establish another RDP session to a different internal server (Server 2) using a domain administrator’s account | ['T1021.001', 'T1090.001'] |
Following initial access, GRIM SPIDER focuses on collecting credentials from the compromised hosts and uses existing RDP in an attempt to get a domain administrator account and access to the Windows Domain Controller. This process can take several iterations of harvesting credentials, connecting to new systems and establishing persistence | ['T1078'] |
All versions generate a list of files to encrypt by parsing the available drives and directories, but will avoid adding files that are of relevance to the malware | ['T1083'] |
BOOM.exe, tracked by Microsoft as “BoomBox”, can be best described as a malicious downloader. The downloader is responsible for downloading and executing the next-stage components of the infection. These components are downloaded from Dropbox (using a hardcoded Dropbox Bearer/Access token | ['T1105', 'T1102'] |
There doesn’t appear to be anything unique when it comes to the Word Document and its standard ploy of pushing recipients to “enable content” and run a malicious macro. An analysis of the link from the phishing e-mail contains a base64-encoded string representing the recipient’s address. Using that string, attackers insert the recipient’s name into the filename of the World document | ['T1140'] |
The downloader collects basic system information and sends it via an HTTP POST request to a hardcoded command and control (C&C) server (Figure 10 | ['T1071.001'] |
The C2 domain name for the DNS communication is hardcoded and obfuscated using XOR. The backdoor will generate a subdomain using a custom domain generation algorithm (DGA) and try to send an initial beacon to the C2 via DNS tunneling | ['T1568.002'] |
However, the subsequent Diskcoder.C outbreak suggests that the attackers had access to the update server of the legitimate software. Using access to this server, attackers pushed a malicious update that was applied automatically without user interaction | ['T1195.002'] |
The VPNpro trojanized application uses an AutoRun registry key, as mentioned in the publication released before July 2019. After that, it will check if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping the malware. If they are installed, nothing will be dropped. We'll now break down the 5kplayer trojanized installer | ['T1518.001'] |
In the case of the observed exploit, specifically when handling Microsoft PowerPoint files, the packagers allows a Package OLE object to reference arbitrary external files, such as INF files, from untrusted sources. This will cause the referenced files to be downloaded in the case of INF files, to be executed with specific commands - An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code but will need a specifically crafted file and use social engineering methods (observed in this campaign) to convince a user to open it | ['T1203'] |
The directory is used as temporary storage for files containing collected data about the compromised computer. Such files share a common naming convention, encryption algorithm and structure. They are encrypted by a simple variation of the XOR cipher which is used across the malware components. The type of the file can be derived from the 4-byte control sequences placed at the beginning of the file | ['T1560.003'] |
The key descriptor’s string contains Bayren_Munchen which seems likely to refer to the German soccer team FC Bayern Munich. Regardless, it is not the content of the key descriptor – but its length – that matters, with that length used to retrieve the XOR key used to encrypt the payload | ['T1140'] |
The older “mode” variant of BitPaymer uses the Windows registry for persistence, while the newer service variant will attempt to install itself as a service | ['T1543.003'] |
A while loop is used to join a series of data blobs into the allocated buffer, and the contents of this buffer are then decrypted with an XOR based algorithm. Once decrypted, the crypter jumps into the data blob which turns out to be a shellcode responsible for decrypting the actual payload. The shellcode copies the encrypted payload into another buffer allocated by calling the VirtualAlloc API, and then decrypts this with an XOR based algorithm in a similar way to that described above. To execute the payload, the shellcode replaces the crypter’s code in memory with the code of the payload just decrypted, and jumps to its entry point | ['T1140'] |
TA453, an Iranian-state aligned actor, masqueraded as British scholars to covertly target individuals of intelligence interest to the Iranian government in what Proofpoint has dubbed Operation SpoofedScholars. The email conversations were benign until TA453 provided a link to a compromised website hosting a credential harvesting page. The use of a legitimate but actor-compromised website is an increase in sophistication compared to TA453’s historical Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of using actor-controlled credential phishing websites. Proofpoint has worked with the appropriate authorities to conduct victim notification | ['T1584.001'] |
Gather the names of all services running on the system. Gather a list of the names of all processes running on the endpoint. Gather the list of all files names listed in the Recent Items folder i.e. Appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent". - Gather all names of files listed in the Desktop folder of the current user. Gather names of all files and programs listed in the Taskbar i.e. The instrumentor script also enables all macros for Office by setting the VBAWarnings registry value to 0x1 at: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<OfficeVersionNumber>.0\Word\Security\VBAWarnings = 0x1 | ['T1057'] |
The code injected into an msiexec.exe sends a beacon signal to the CnC server and awaits commands | ['T1218.007'] |
Run commands on Windows system remotely using Winexe: Winexe is a GNU/Linux-based application that allows users to execute commands remotely on WindowsNT/2000/XP/2003/Vista/7/8 systems. It installs a service on the remote system, executes the command, and uninstalls the service. Winexe allows execution of most of the windows shell commands | ['T1569.002'] |
As with campaigns attributed to BlackEnergy group the attackers used spearphishing emails with Microsoft Excel documents attached that contain malicious macros as an initial infection vector. This time malicious documents don’t have any content with social engineering directing potential victims to click an Enable Content button. It seems that the attackers are depending on the victims to decide entirely on their own whether to click it or not | ['T1204.002'] |
TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. Next it checks that HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF exists, decodes an embedded payload using a custom rolling XOR algorithm and manually loads into memory an embedded payload using a custom PE-like file format. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware | ['T1012'] |
Stage2.exe is a downloader for a malicious file corrupter malware. Upon execution, stage2.exe downloads the next-stage malware hosted on a Discord channel, with the download link hardcoded in the downloader. The next-stage malware can best be described as a malicious file corrupter. Once executed in memory, the corrupter locates files in certain directories on the system with one of the following hardcoded file extensions | ['T1083'] |
Most of CARBANAK’s strings are encrypted in order to make analysis more difficult. We have observed that the key and the cipher texts for all the encrypted strings are changed for each sample that we have encountered, even amongst samples with the same compile time | ['T1027'] |
The Bazar backdoor is a new stealthy malware, part of the TrickBot group’s toolkit arsenal and leveraged for high-value targets. The Bazar loader is used to download and execute the Bazar backdoor on the target system. The goal of this backdoor is to execute binaries, scripts, modules, kill processes, and then remove itself from the compromised machine. The samples used in this campaign heavily rely on control flow obfuscation | ['T1104'] |
To evade protections, Egregor create a Group Policy Object to disable Windows Defender and try to takedown any anti-virus console prior to ransomware execution | ['T1562.001'] |
Adds persistence on the system by creating a shortcut in the user’s Startup folder with the correct cmdline arguments | ['T1547.001', 'T1547.009'] |
The malware contains 1 function, the purpose is to open the drive of the infected system (\\.\PhysicalDrive0) and write the following data to the MBR: You can see the "Are you Happy. After writing to the MBR, the malware reboots the machine with the following command: c:\windows\system32\shutdown /r /t 1 After the reboot, the MBR displays the following string to the user: The link to the other campaigns was the following PDB path | ['T1529'] |
The figure below shows the example of two of several possible command codes. Both create one thread, and each thread is responsible for either downloading and executing the file or running a command line program in the terminal | ['T1105'] |
The macro finishes by running the dropped VBScript "AppPool.vbs" file by running "wscript C:\ProgramData\WindowsAppPool\AppPool.vbs". When first executed, the "AppPool.vbs" file will create the following scheduled task to execute every minute, which provides BONDUPDATER persistence and the ability to continually run on the system as the Trojan does not have a main loop to carry out its functionality | ['T1053.005'] |
Starting from August 2020, Pawn Storm has sent several spear phishing emails with a malicious RAR attachment. Among the earliest samples we received were two almost identical RAR files that contained a file called info.exe | ['T1566.001'] |
At periodic offsets, the bootloader overwrites sectors of an infected host’s entire hard drive, with a message similar to the ransom note, padded with additional bytes (Figure 2 | ['T1561.001'] |
Ryuk attempts to encrypt all mounted drives and hosts that have Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) entries (IP addresses) and it enumerates all mounted drives by calling GetLogicalDrives. For each mounted drive, Ryuk calls GetDriveTypeW to determine the drive’s type. If the drive type is not a CD-ROM, files on the drive are encrypted. To retrieve IP addresses that have ARP entries, Ryuk calls GetIpNetTable. It iterates through all entries and then tries to enumerate files and folders on the remote host and encrypt the files | ['T1083', 'T1082', 'T1016'] |
It’s located on the hard drive and contains code that can display current volume shadow copy backups and all installed shadow copy writers and providers. Responsible for wiping deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe (cipher.exe is a built-in command-line tool in the Windows operating system that can be used to display or alter the encryption of directories and files on NTFS volumes. It’s located on the hard drive and contains code that can display current volume shadow copy backups and all installed shadow copy writers and providers. 9) Responsible for wiping deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe (cipher.exe is a built-in command-line tool in the Windows operating system that can be used to display or alter the encryption of directories and files on NTFS volumes | ['T1490'] |
After the Waterbear DLL loader is executed, it searches for a hardcoded path and tries to decrypt the corresponding payload, which is a piece of encrypted shellcode. The decryption algorithm is RC4, which takes the hardcoded path to form the decryption key. If the decrypted payload is valid, it picks a specific existing Windows Service — LanmanServer, which is run by svchost.exe — and injects the decrypted shellcode into the legitimate service. In most cases, the payload is a first-stage backdoor, and its main purpose is to retrieve second-stage payloads — either by connecting to a C&C server or opening a port to wait for external connections and load incoming executables | ['T1140'] |
Wiping all available methods of recovery shows this attacker had no intention of leaving the machine useable. The purpose of this malware is to perform destruction of the host, leave the computer system offline, and wipe remote data. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: "Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started | ['T1135'] |