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This threat actor initially came to our attention in April 2018, leveraging both Western and Chinese Git repositories to deliver malware to honeypot systems vulnerable to an Apache Struts vulnerability | ['T1190'] |
The email attachment is encrypted and stored in the compressed package, and a decryption password is provided in the mail body to bypass the security detection of the email gateway | ['T1027'] |
Like any other typical PoS malware, Pillowmint iterates a list of processes and process them two at a time. it uses the API OpenProcess() using the PROCESS_VM_READ and PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION flags to obtain a handle then reads the memory’s content via ReadProcessMemory() API two chunks at a time. It then captures Track 1 and Track 2 credit card (CC) data. Depending on the Pillowmint version, it may encrypt the stolen CC data with AES encryption algorithm + Base64. Other versions may just encode the plain Credit Card Data it with Base64 | ['T1005', 'T1560'] |
Lastly, the attackers used Comodo code-signing certificates several times during the course of the campaign. Many of the above TTPs are not unique to ITG08, but collectively, and with the use of More_eggs, strengthen the link to this group | ['T1047'] |
Other interesting keys include LSMinimumSystemVersion which indicates the (malicious) application is compatible with OSX 10.7 (Lion), and NSUIElement key which tells the OS to execute the application without a dock icon nor menu (i.e | ['T1564.003'] |
The Gorgon Group Crew Breakdown Finding accessible directories, in combination with their other operational security failures, made it easy to start connecting the dots on Gorgon Group members. 360 and Tuisec already identified some Gorgon Group members. In addition to Subaat, we counted an additional four actors performing attacks as part of Gorgon Group. While it’s not known if the attackers physically reside in Pakistan, all members of Gorgon Group purport to be in Pakistan based on their online personas. fudpages One member of Gorgon Group- we're calling ‘fudpages’, was found during this campaign activity based on their utilization of shared infrastructure. One specific Microsoft document drew our attention. 446e1c80102c8b9662d66d44525cb9f519369061b02446e0d4cd30cd26d79a25) This Microsoft Word document was sent via email to several industries across the US and Switzerland. We noticed that this document pulls down additional malware from a C2 also being used in attacks by other Gorgon Group members. Additionally, this document communicates to a relatively new piece of C2 infrastructure- umarguzardijye[.]com, which is hosted on 91[.]234[.]99[.]206 | ['T1566.001'] |
After installation, a keylogging routine begins. The malware writes keystrokes and window information to a filename in the present working directory with the following filename | ['T1074.001'] |
A separate communication channel is created for each installed module. The communication protocol used is TLS over TCP. The communication is handled with the HP-Socket library. All the messages are RC4 encrypted using the hardcoded key. If the size of the message to be transferred is greater than or equal to 4KB, it is first compressed using zlib’s Deflate implementation | ['T1095'] |
This component achieves persistence through the Run registry key and has full backdoor capabilities: it can download and execute binaries, run arbitrary commands or upload files from the victim computer to the C&C server | ['T1547.001'] |
The purpose of this malware is to perform destruction of the host, leave the computer system offline, and wipe remote data. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: "Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started | ['T1529'] |
Shathak or TA551 is the name some security researchers have given to a specific distribution method that uses password-protected ZIP archives as attachments to malspam. It has used Word document templates targeting English-, Italian-, German- and Japanese-speaking recipients. Shathak/TA551 has been active at least as early as February 2019 | ['T1566.001'] |
MechaFlounder begins by entering a loop that will continuously attempt to communicate with its C2 server. The Trojan will use HTTP to send an outbound beacon to its C2 server that contains the user's account name and hostname in the URL. The code, seen in Figure 2, builds the URL by concatenating the username and hostname with two dashes "--" between the two strings. The code then creates the URL string by using the username and hostname string twice with the back-slash "\" character between the two and by appending the string "-sample.html | ['T1041'] |
The malware scans for both open TCP ports 135 (RPC) and 1433(MSSQL) against the target, be it internal or external, and probes for the credential weakness in attempt to gain unauthorized access | ['T1046'] |
Since FoggyWeb runs in the context of the main AD FS process, it inherits the AD FS service account permissions required to access the AD FS configuration database. This contrasts with tools such as ADFSDump that must be executed under the user context of the AD FS service account | ['T1005'] |
If the scanning target is an IP address, Xbash will try to scan many TCP or UDP ports. Here are part of services they’re probing and the ports used | ['T1046'] |
Samples compiled in 2017 and 2018 were hard-coded with specific URI patterns to communicate with the C2 server via HTTP POST requests | ['T1071.001'] |
Dedicated methods resolve additional strings and API calls at runtime, rendering the PE even more difficult to analyze. Below is an example of the method responsible for resolving the .bazar domains. It loads an obfuscated string, and deobfuscates it using the first character of the domain name as a XOR key for the rest of the string | ['T1140'] |
SMOKEDHAM (127bf1d43313736c52172f8dc6513f56) is a .NET-based backdoor that supports commands, including screen capture and keystroke capture. The backdoor may also download and execute additional PowerShell commands from its command and control (C2) server | ['T1059.001'] |
EvilBunny is a multi-threaded bot with an integrated scripting engine. It incorporates a Lua engine and downloads and executes Lua scripts to reach a certain level of polymorphism. The Lua scripts can call back into the C++ code to alter the malware behavior at runtime | ['T1059.003'] |
Despite this indictment and other disclosures of COBALT DICKENS campaigns, the threat group (also known as Silent Librarian) shows no signs of stopping its activity as of this publication. CTU™ researchers have observed the threat actors using free online services as part of their operations, including free certificates, domains, and publicly available tools | ['T1608.005'] |
This function keeps receiving data from the system clipboard and then determines if it is a valid bitcoin wallet address. If yes, it overwrites the wallet address with the attacker’s | ['T1115', 'T1565.002'] |
After being extricated from the network, Dark Halo then returned a second time, exploiting a vulnerability in the organization's Microsoft Exchange Control Panel. Near the end of this incident, Volexity observed the threat actor using a novel technique to bypass Duo multi-factor authentication (MFA) to access the mailbox of a user via the organization's Outlook Web App (OWA) service. Finally, in a third incident, Dark Halo breached the organization by way of its SolarWinds Orion software in June and July 2020 | ['T1190'] |
Talos has uncovered documents that we assess with moderate confidence are associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. MuddyWater has been active since at least November 2017 and has been known to primarily target entities in the Middle East. We assess with moderate confidence that these documents were sent to victims via phishing emails. One such trojanized document was created on April 23, 2019. The "Blackwater.bas" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer. Screenshot of the stager found in the document The stager then reached out to the actor-controlled C2 server located at hxxp://38[.]132[.]99[.]167/crf.txt. The clear text version of the crf.txt file closely resembled the PowerShell agent that was previously used by the MuddyWater actors when they targeted Kurdish political groups and organizations in Turkey. rCecms=BlackWater". Notably, the trojanized document's macro was also called "BlackWater," and the value "BlackWater" was hard coded into the PowerShell script | ['T1204.002'] |
If elevated privileges are not obtained, the malware falls back to using the same Windows registry run key as the older mode variant for persistence HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. For each service, the malware attempts to take control of the service’s executable — first using icacls.exe with the /reset flag to reset the executable’s permissions, then using takeown.exe with the /F flag to take ownership of the executable | ['T1222.001'] |
Microsoft discovered these new attacker tools and capabilities in some compromised customer networks and observed them to be in use from August to September 2020. Further analysis has revealed these may have been on compromised systems as early as June 2020 | ['T1047'] |
The script itself decodes and executes a large blob of base64-encoded text and converts it into a huge byte array | ['T1140'] |
Ebury v1.4 has a fallback mechanism whereby a domain generation algorithm (DGA) is used when the attacker doesn’t connect to the infected system via the OpenSSH backdoor for three days. Under these conditions, Ebury will exfiltrate the collected data using the generated domain. Ebury v1.6 has the same mechanism, but there is a minor change to the DGA itself | ['T1568.002', 'T1008'] |
Figure 7: Dropbox-themed landing page with a lure asking users to click a button that links to the malicious document | ['T1204.001'] |
Central Command network, including computers both in the headquarters and in the combat zones.The threat involved into this incident is referred as Agent.btz. There is even a clash with another threat that is also detected as Agent.btz by another vendor – but that's a totally different threat with different functionality. All these builds exhibit common functionality.Agent.btz is a DLL file. Once a removable disk is connected to a computer infected with Agent.btz, the active malware will detect a newly recognized drive. It will drop its copy on it and it will create autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. Agent.btz file is not packed. Thus, it’s not known what kind of code could have been injected into the browser process. Agent.btz locates this resource by looking for a marker 0xAA45F6F9 in its memory map.File wmcache.nldThe second spawned thread will wait for 10 seconds. The collected network details are also saved into the log file.File winview.ocxThe second spawned thread will log threat activity into the file %system32%\winview.ocx.This file is also encrypted with the same XOR mask. Note: an attempt to run a valid thumb.db file, which is an OLE-type container has no effect.Files thumb.dd and mssysmgr.ocxAgent.btz is capable to create a binary file thumb.dd on a newly connected drive | ['T1560.003'] |
The cluster targeting Brazil used hacked websites and Google Ads to drive users to download the malicious installer. The campaign targeting other countries used spear-phishing as the delivery method | ['T1189'] |
In cases where spam attachments could be verified — once a user has opened the attachment and enabled macro functionality — a PowerShell script downloads either Emotet, Bokbot or Trickbot, with the end payload being TrickBot | ['T1566.001'] |
There are likely differences in the Skeleton Key malware documented by Dell SecureWorks and the Mimikatz skeleton key functionality. If all the DCs don’t have skeleton key configured, the master password won’t work when the client authenticates to a DC without skeleton key. Scenario: Either the attacker exploits MS14-068 or has the KRBTGT NTLM password hash and uses it to generate a Kerberos Golden Ticket to impersonate a valid Domain Admin account. Domain Controller Security Events When Implanting the Mimikatz Skeleton Key: When implanting the skeleton key remotely using Mimikatz the following events are logged on the Domain Controller. Authenticating with the Mimikatz Skeleton Key: Testing user password and user account with skeleton key password. Note that both passwords are accepted – the valid user password and the skeleton key master password. Testing Domain Admin account with password & skeleton key password. Note that both passwords are accepted – the valid user password and the skeleton key master password. Skeleton Key Mitigation: - Protect domain-level admin (DLA) accounts (Domain Admin, Administrators, etc) which reduces the risk of attackers gaining access to these credentials. Don’t let DLA accounts logon to systems at a different security level from Domain Controllers | ['T1098'] |
In the first case, attackers create two WMI event filters and two WMI event consumers. The consumers are simply command lines launching base64-encoded PowerShell commands that load a large PowerShell script stored in the Windows registry. Figure 1 shows how the persistence is established | ['T1546.003'] |
The Updater.exe program has the same program icon as CelasTradePro.exe. When run, it checks for the CheckUpdate parameter, collects the victim’s host information (System Owner/User Discovery [T1033]), encrypts the collected information with a hardcoded XOR encryption, and sends information to a C2 website (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041 | ['T1082', 'T1041'] |
running software, system name, IP address) - install additional malware onto the system - check for the presence of 29 different antivirus tools | ['T1518.001'] |
Poseidon utilizes a variety of tools. Their main infection tool has been steadily evolving since 2005, with code remnants remaining the same to this day, while others have been altered to fit the requirements of new operating systems and specific campaigns. This tool appears to be designed to operate on high-value corporate systems like Domain Controllers or IIS servers that act as repositories of valuable information, particularly for lateral movement. The Information Gathering Tool (IGT) tool is coded in Delphi and includes powershell and SQL components across a dozen different drops. This tool contains several other executable files made in different programming languages ranging from Visual Basic 6 to C#, each one performing a very clear task devised by the group when trying to obtain more information from an objective | ['T1059.001'] |
All the strings used by the malware are encrypted and are decrypted by Rijndael symmetric encryption algorithm in the “<Module>.\u200E” function. This function receives a number as an input and generates three byte arrays containing input to be decrypted, key and IV (Figure 6 | ['T1140'] |
As with other adversaries that mine cryptocurrency opportunistically, Blue Mockingbird likes to move laterally and distribute mining payloads across an enterprise | ['T1021.002', 'T1053.005', 'T1021.001'] |
In our analysis we could observe how the adversary ensures persistence by delivering an LNK file into the startup folder | ['T1547.001'] |
ESET researchers have dissected some of the latest additions to the malicious toolkit of the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group known as OceanLotus, also dubbed APT32 and APT-C-00 | ['T1027'] |
Executes VBScript using Process.Start. The third-stage DLL proceeds by loading the "AdvancedRun" resource into memory, decompressing it and dropping it as "AdvancedRun.exe" into the %TEMP% directory. Drops AdvancedRun.exe using File.WriteAllBytes. AdvancedRun.exe" is a tool provided by Nirsoft to execute a program with different settings. Once the tool is dropped, the third stage DLL will leverage it to execute two commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group. The TrustedInstaller group was an addition to Windows beginning in Windows 7 with the goal of preventing accidental damage to critical system files. AdvanceRun is one of the tools that can be used to execute commands in the context of the TrustedInstaller user. This functionality is only available via CLI and requires the flag of "/RunAs 8", which is shown in the commands below. The tool will be deleted from the %TEMP% directory after executing both commands. The first command leverages the Windows service control application (sc.exe) to disable Windows Defender | ['T1562.001', 'T1078.001'] |
Stonedrill (Trojan.Stonedrill): Custom malware capable of opening a backdoor on an infected computer and downloading additional files. The malware also features a destructive component, which can wipe the master boot record of an infected computer | ['T1561.002'] |
Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under system privileges, so an adversary can also use a service to escalate privileges from Administrator to System. They can also directly start services through Service Execution. 29],[30(link is external)] - During the STOLEN PENCIL operation in May 2018, Kimsuky used the GREASE malware. 32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly | ['T1036.004'] |
The monitoring loop will retrieve the address of WTSEnumerateSessionsW and the local mac address using GetAdaptersInfo | ['T1016'] |
The QuietSieve malware family refers to a series of heavily-obfuscated .NET binaries specifically designed to steal information from the target host. If this check succeeds, a randomly-generated alphanumeric prefix is created and combined with the callback domain as a subdomain before an initial request is made over HTTPS | ['T1016.001'] |
The “Documents,” “Downloads,” “Desktop,” and “Pictures” folders of every user are checked. The DLL file also examines drives other than C | ['T1083'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. In particular, review network access for use of mobile USB modems on corporate systems | ['T1102.001'] |
The decrypted result is saved as “%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies.exe” (T1001) 6) If the file size of “%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies.exe” exceeds 4,485 bytes, it is executed | ['T1547.001'] |
Executive summary . The PROMETHIUM threat actor — active since 2012 — has been exposed multiple times over the past several years.. However, this has not deterred this actor from continuing and expanding their activities. The trojanized setup will install the malware and the legitimate application, which is a good way to disguise its activities. PROMETHIUM has been resilient over the years. We have no evidence that the websites of the real applications were compromised to host the malicious installer. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. If it is executed with the "help" parameter, it will install a service to execute itself as a service. This has a notable side effect: if rmaserv.exe is executed isolated on a sandbox (so without the parameter), the service is not created. Document search module: Mssqldbserv.xml . This module has been described before in the article here. The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp | ['T1204.002'] |
With domain administrator privileges obtained, the threat actors then moved laterally throughout the network using SMB and RDP to deploy Cobalt Strike beacons on the domain controllers around 1 hour after the initial execution of Bazar. On the domain controllers, some additional discovery was done using the PowerShell Active Directory module. After establishing Cobalt Strike beacons on those they felt ready to proceed to their final objectives | ['T1021.002'] |
In order to encrypt network shares, BitPaymer will attempt to enumerate the sessions for each user logged onto the infected host and create a new process, using the token of each user. These new processes will first spawn a net.exe processing with the view argument to gather a list of network accessible hosts. For each host, BitPaymer spawns another net.exe process with command net view <host> using the newly discovered host as a parameter. This will return a list of network shares available to the impersonated user on the host. Once a list of all available shares has been gathered, BitPaymer attempts to mount them to be encrypted | ['T1135', 'T1134.001'] |
This hardens the encryption of the network communication, as a single RC4 key will not decrypt the entire payload. Leverages existing Windows registry key that is enabled by default in Windows 10 to store configuration data. Generates unique session keys for each connection to the C2 server. Employs polymorphic code, changing its runtime footprint during code execution to thwart memory analysis and evade signaturing. Encrypts or decrypts function blocks (code blocks) during runtime, as needed, to evade detection. Uses position independent code (PIC) to throw off static analysis tools | ['T1140'] |
Upon execution, MCMD spawns a console process (cmd.exe) with redirected standard input and output (I/O) handles. Immediately after execution, the window properties of both the MCMD and cmd.exe processes are modified to prevent them from being visible on the active user's desktop. MCMD utilizes the shared I/O handles to send and receive data between the C2 server and the command shell (see Figure 1 | ['T1059.003', 'T1564.003'] |
1) The malicious .rtf file exploits CVE-2017-11882. 3) The malware creates a child process, “mshta.exe,” which downloads a file from: hxxp://mumbai-m[.]site/b.txt. 4) b.txt contains a PowerShell command to download a dropper from: hxxp://dns-update[.]club/v.txt. The PowerShell command also renames the downloaded file from v.txt to v.vbs and executes the script | ['T1059.001', 'T1140'] |
This backdoor, known as LOWBALL, uses the legitimate Dropbox cloud-storage service to act as the CnC server. The communication occurs via HTTPS over port 443 | ['T1071.001'] |
Once settles on victim’s information systems, Egregor communicates with its Command and Control servers via HTTPS protocol so as to drop scripts or dynamic link libraries on infected hosts. You can find the list of C2 identified during investigations in section “IP Addresses | ['T1071.001'] |
OverWatch observed the threat actor retrieve three files with VBS file extensions from remote infrastructure. These files were then decoded using cscript.exe into an EXE, DLL and DAT file respectively. Based on the telemetry available, OverWatch believes these files likely constituted a reverse shell, which was loaded into memory via DLL search-order hijacking.2 | ['T1574.001'] |
These mechanisms are used to attempt installation and execution of perfc.dat on other devices to spread laterally. For systems that have not had MS17-010 applied, the EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits are leveraged to compromise systems. The exploit launched against the victim system depends on the operating system of the intended target | ['T1210'] |
Commands received from the control server are encoded DWORDs - After decoding, these DWORDs should be in the range 123459h to 123490h | ['T1132.002'] |
Basically, the shellcode’s main purpose is to launch other code stored in the registry key \REGISTRY\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM. Below is the disassembled shellcode and commentaries for interested readers | ['T1012'] |
In observed traffic these HTTP response bodies attempt to appear like benign XML related to .NET assemblies, but command data is actually spread across the many GUID and HEX strings present. Commands are extracted from HTTP response bodies by searching for HEX strings using the following regular expression: "\{[0-9a-f-]{36}\}"||"[0-9a-f]{32}"||"[0-9a-f]{16}". Command data is spread across multiple strings that are disguised as GUID and HEX strings | ['T1001.002'] |
Turla has many names in the information security industry — it is also known as Snake, Venomous Bear, Uroburos and WhiteBear. Turla likes to use compromised web servers and hijacked satellite connections for their command and control (C2) infrastructure. Instead, they use a compromised system inside the targeted network as a proxy, which forwards the traffic to the real C2 server. Well-known malware like Crutch or Kazuar are attributed to Turla. Lately, we have also seen research that has shown potential links between the Sunburst backdoor and Turla. Not every campaign run by Turla can clearly be attributed to them | ['T1090.001'] |
The C2 server will respond to the HTTP requests to the “bat&m=d” URL with a batch script that update.vbs will save to the “dn” folder and execute. The output of the downloaded batch script is saved to a text file in the “up” folder and uploaded to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request to the following URL | ['T1074.001'] |
We saw a Waterbear loader named "ociw32.dll" inside one of the folders in the %PATH% environmental variable. This DLL name is hardcoded inside "mtxoci.dll" which is loaded by the MSDTC service during boot-up. mtxoci.dll” first tries to query the registry key "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI" to see if the value "OracleOciLib" exists. If so, it retrieves the data inside it and loads the corresponding library. If the value doesn't exist, “mtxoci.dll” tries to load "ociw32.dll" instead. During our investigation, we noticed that the value "OracleOciLib" was deleted from the victim's machine, as shown in Figure 2. Hence, the malicious loader "ociw32.dll" was loaded and successfully executed on the host | ['T1112'] |
This final cluster appears to serve as the C2 infrastructure for a custom remote administration tool called Pteranodon. Gamaredon has used, maintained and updated development of this code for years. Its code contains anti-detection functions specifically designed to identify sandbox environments in order to thwart antivirus detection attempts | ['T1497'] |
Archive files that contain a legitimate executable and a malicious DLL, to be used in a DLL hijacking technique, taking advantage of legitimate executables such as Outlook and Avast proxy, to load a malicious DLL | ['T1574.002'] |
Embedded Trojan This Trojan loaded by the first payload contains several embedded executables that it uses to ultimately download and execute a secondary payload, as well as downloading and opening a decoy document. Upon execution, this Trojan checks to see if it was configured with "BINDERON" to determine if it should extract an embedded payload from a resource named "B", save it to %TEMP%\%BIND1%, and create a new process with the embedded payload. While the Trojan was configured to carry out this activity, the actor did not embed a payload within the "B" resource, so this functionality does not carry out any activities, rather it just causes an exception and continues running. Another configuration option encountered by this Trojan is a check for '%STARTUPON%'. This sample was not configured to execute with this option enabled, however, should this option be enabled, the Trojan would attempt to install itself to the system at a specific location by writing its contents in base64-encoded format to the following file | ['T1140'] |
On November 9, 2018, we observed a relatively small email campaign (thousands of messages) delivering a new malware family that we call “ServHelper” based on file names associated with infection. The campaign primarily targeted financial institutions and was attributed to the threat actor TA505. The messages (Figure 1) contained Microsoft Word or Publisher attachments with macros that, when enabled, downloaded and executed the malware. This campaign used the “tunnel” variant of ServHelper, described in the “Malware Analysis” section | ['T1204.001', 'T1204.002'] |
VALUEVAULT is a Golang compiled version of the “Windows Vault Password Dumper” browser credential theft tool from Massimiliano Montoro, the developer of Cain & Abel | ['T1555.004'] |
Contains two DLL function exports: start and ss2 - Not dropped to the disk - Responsible for terminating processes and stopping/disabling services related to endpoint security - Responsible for file encryption - Responsible for creating multiple worker threads for encryption - Responsible for creating the ransom notes - No longer uses the process rundll32.exe as a loader, but instead uses the MegaCortex binary as the DLL loader - Responsible for deleting volume shadow copies using vssadmin.exe and wiping deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe | ['T1561.001'] |
The TerraLoader code performs several integrity checks before dropping the payload. These checks implement anti-debugging techniques and try to identify anomalies to prevent execution in sandboxed environments. Some of these techniques range from detecting incorrect parameters, filenames and extensions, to detecting hardware breakpoints or identifying specific modules loaded into the subject process. Should these checks all pass, the actual payload is decrypted and executed | ['T1497.001'] |
The script is executed by the scheduled task used to maintain persistence, with its main goal being | ['T1053.005'] |
Despite the notion that modern cybersecurity protocols have stopped email-based attacks, email continues to be one of the primary attack vectors for malicious actors — both for widespread and targeted operations. Recently, Cisco Talos has observed numerous email-based attacks that are spreading malware to users at both a large and small scale. In this blog post, we analyze several of those campaigns and their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). These campaigns were all observed between mid-May and early July of this year, and can likely be attributed to one, or possibly two, groups. Other researchers have attributed these attacks to a group known as the Cobalt Gang, which has continued its activities even after the arrest of its alleged leader in Spain this year. Simple campaigns typically use a single technique and often embed the final executable payload into the exploit document. The malicious emails display a strong command of the English language, and their content may have been taken from legitimate emails relevant to the business of the targeted organization. The emails either contain a URL pointing to one of the three document types or have initial attack stages attached outright | ['T1559.002'] |
If I open up the WebCacheV01.dat file in ESEDatabaseView or BrowsingHistoryView, I see browsing history leading up to my testing. Initially, I thought it was grabbing a copy of the file from a previous Volume Shadow Copy (VSC) but that isn’t the case. Esentutl.exe is able to use the Volume Shadow Copy service to make a backup of a locked file | ['T1003.003'] |
1) These lure documents attempt to exploit the Microsoft Office Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) protocol in order to gain access to victim machines. 2) Once the Gallmaker attackers gain access to a device, they execute various tools, including | ['T1204.002', 'T1559.002'] |
The GoldMax malware was discovered persisting on networks as a scheduled task impersonating systems management software. In the instances it was encountered, the scheduled task was named after software that existed in the environment, and pointed to a subfolder in ProgramData named after that software, with a similar executable name. The executable, however, was the GoldMax implant | ['T1036.004', 'T1036.005'] |
Prior to execution of any recon command to gather information from the target machine, the default codepage of the console is changed to “65001” (utf-8 | ['T1082'] |
The malware cleans the system event logs using OpenEventLog/ClearEventLog APIs, and then terminates the setup procedure with a call to StartService to run the stage 4 malware | ['T1070.001'] |
APT40 uses a mix of custom and publicly available credential harvesting tools to escalate privileges and dump password hashes | ['T1003', 'T1003.001'] |
Discovery of a Stealthy New Malware: “CSPY Downloader” is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads | ['T1105'] |
The payload is embedded in the macro as Base64 code. It uses the certutil program to decode the Base64 into a PE file which is then executed | ['T1140'] |
Scheduled tasks enable administrators to run tasks or “jobs” at designated times rather than every time the system is booted or the user logs in. This feature can be implemented via the Windows COM API, which the first versions of Ramsay have tailored. Based on the high ratio of similarity with Carberp’s implementation, it’s highly probable that Ramsay’s implementation was adapted from Carberp’s publicly available source code | ['T1559.001', 'T1053.005'] |
48b9e25491e088a35105274cae0b9e67 MD5 hash of the current timestamp calculated during execution. MD5 hash of the current timestamp calculated during execution. 5-15 Lower/upper limits used to randomly generate sleep times as SUNSHUTTLE executes - Lower/upper limits used to randomly generate sleep times as SUNSHUTTLE executes - 0 0 or 1 — Utilize “blend-in” traffic requests. Internally called “false_requesting” - 0 Activate execution timestamp (0 by default) — execution "activates" or continues if current time is greater than the value in the configuration - Activate execution timestamp (0 by default) — execution "activates" or continues if current time is greater than the value in the configuration - - Base64-encoded User-agent used in HTTPS requests | ['T1124'] |
MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks | ['T1020'] |
Interestingly, the server mapped to kneeexercises[.]net listens for incoming HTTPS connections on several ports and uses common names seen on other C2 domains. For example, ports 2083 and 8443 had CN firstohiobank[.]com, and TCP port 2087 had a TLS certificate with the common name dentalmatrix[.]net. We observed use of these non-standard ports during some of the older intrusions, while the newer ones mostly use port 443 | ['T1571'] |
The Avaddon ransomware executable is not packed. However, its strings appear Base64 encoded using a custom alphabet. The Avaddon ransomware uses the Windows crypto API to generate an AES key, with which it then (presumably) encrypts the data. The generated AES key is then exported and encrypted via a previously from the ransomware binary imported key | ['T1106'] |
The malware sample contains some interesting static artifacts including self-signed digital certificates used to sign the executable purporting to be software from the Foxit Software Incorporated company based in California. It is not known why the actors picked this company -- and others listed in Table 1 below -- to impersonate but, as previously mentioned, their use of filenames and URLs makes their payloads appear benign and trustworthy | ['T1587.002'] |
persistence: Somewhat interestingly, OSX/Dok persists in two phases. First as a Login Item, then as Launch Agents. When Dok is (naively) launched by the user, it will executed logic to persist as a Login Item. As their name implies, Login Items will execute an application when the user logs in. Apple describes how to create a Login Item both manually and programmatically | ['T1059.002'] |
The NOKKI payload is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process. Persistence is achieved by writing the file path to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svstartup registry key | ['T1547.001'] |
Prior to privilege escalation, Egregor proceeds to Active Directory reconnaissance using tools such as Sharphound or AdFind. These tools are used to gather information about users, groups, computers, and so on | ['T1033', 'T1069.002'] |
The following command line is a service created by CobaltStrike and can be found in Windows Event Logs (event id 7045). It runs an encoded powershell command | ['T1059.001'] |
When a victim opens the document, Microsoft Word asks to enable/disable macros. It reveals that a macro is embedded in the document | ['T1059.005'] |
From my analyses, I was able to identify http://mdzz2019.noip[.]cn:19931 as its main C2 url. This is a dynamic DNS, meaning the actual IP changes quite frequently. Additionally, on that same url, http://mdzz2019.noip[.]cn:3654/ is used to distribute more versions of this Gh0stRAT sample, along with a .zip file containing ASPXSpy, a web shell | ['T1568.001'] |
The plugin proceeds to iterate through all connected drives on the system, looking for removable drives | ['T1120'] |
Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. The payload is dropped with a .jpg extension that's been renamed to ".exe. Here is an example decoy document: The purpose of the VisualBasic script is to execute the payload. Although the malicious part of the binary is only 2MB, the final file is more than 120MB in size, padded out with random data. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019 | ['T1036'] |
This is an interesting technique used by Lazarus to run its malicious DLL using the Windows Update Client to bypass security detection mechanisms | ['T1547.001'] |
The code then uses the identified functions to add persistency through registry and add next stages file names identifier through the following locations | ['T1037.001'] |
As happens so many times, it contains a Visual Basic script that will execute the malicious activities. This ZIP file contains a Python interpreter and Python script that is actually the RAT. The Word macro will unzip and execute the main script called "launcher.py. The launcher script is responsible for checking the environment that the doc is currently being opened in. It assumes that all sandboxes will have hard drives smaller than 62GB. If it's in a sandbox environment, it will overwrite the malware scripts with the contents of the file "License.txt" and exit, thus deleting itself. Anti-sandbox code If it determines that it is not running in a sandbox environment, it will generate a unique ID, that is then replaced directly with the Python source code of the main scripts before executing it | ['T1070.004'] |
Listing the C:/ drive contents using cd C:/; ls; - Listing the specific Wi-Fi profile details using netsh wlan show profiles name='<Name>' key=clear; - Listing the drives using Get-PSDrive | ['T1083', 'T1049'] |
1) Use of zip file that contains a “.lnk” (Windows Shortcut) file. 2) Utilization of double extension trick (sample.doc.lnk) to convince users to open the file. 3) HTA (HTML Application) with VBScript embedded in the “.lnk” file 4) VBScript drops payloads and opens a decoy document or PDF to the user | ['T1059.005'] |