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Falcon Intelligence has observed two different methods used to deploy BitPaymer once the domain controllers are compromised. In one instance, only the domain controllers and other critical infrastructure, like payroll servers, were targeted and PowerShell Empire was used to download and execute the BitPaymer malware directly on these servers | ['T1059.001'] |
WIRTE used documents deploying Visual Basic Script (VBS), potentially delivered through spear phishing, decoys with Arabic content, occasionally associated with Palestinian matters | ['T1059.005'] |
Emotet is one of the most widely distributed and actively developed malware families on the crimeware landscape today. Emotet began purely as a banking trojan, but over the years, has continued to evolve and more recently, has been associated with some larger-scale targeted Ryuk ransomware infections. Emotet is commonly delivered via both macro-laden office documents, as well as URL-based spam messages that lead to an eventual infection. It's not uncommon to see Emotet reuse of some of the command and control (C2) servers over more extended periods. The goal of Emotet, as is the case with crimeware-based threats, is monetary. Attackers use Emotet to deliver modular payloads it can use to monetize infections | ['T1571'] |
Once the target’s machine is compromised, the attacker first enumerates all processes running in the system and all services. Then the attacker looks for all administrator accounts on both the local machine and the network. This reflects the Poseidon Group’s familiarity with Windows network administration | ['T1057', 'T1007'] |
The downloaded Stage3 is written in C# as in Stage2, and an obfuscation tool called Eazfuscator is detected by exeinfoPE | ['T1027'] |
The IP address was also used to host the Cobalt Strike framework and shared an SSL certificate, b3038101fd0e8b11c519f739f12c7e9b60234d3b, with ColunmTK's IP address 185[.]118[.]166[.]66. According to Group-IB researchers, APT41 usually parks their domains for some time at 127.0.0.1 after their campaigns are over. The file is very similar to one used by APT41 in a different campaign described by FireEye researchers. In both cases, the files were used to establish persistence in the network. The files are very similar in the way they launch a DLL file as a service and create keys in the registry. The contents of the file "install.bat" from APT41's This is Not a Test campaign | ['T1547.001'] |
Among infostealers used by the Kimsuky group, some samples have been found that use FTP to download additional malware after logging infected targets to the C&C [14, 15 | ['T1059.007', 'T1071.002'] |
Multiple trojanzied updates were digitally signed from March - May 2020 and posted to the SolarWinds updates website, including | ['T1553.002'] |
Win32CmDll.dll first tries to inject the ManagerMain and GuardClient modules into a process with one of the following names: lsass.exe, wininit.exe or lsm.exe. If that fails, it tries to inject into one of the registered windows services processes, excluding processes named spoolsv.exe, ekrn.exe (ESET), avp.exe (Kaspersky) or dllhost.exe. As a last option, if everything else failed, it tries to use the processes taskhost.exe, taskhostw.exe or explorer.exe | ['T1055.001'] |
We have most definitely observed Kimsuky targeting specific individuals — in fact, up to the present moment — even going as far as registering Internet domains containing the individual targets' names, the PwC analyst said | ['T1583.001'] |
Sibot is a dual-purpose malware implemented in VBScript. It is designed to achieve persistence on the infected machine then download and execute a payload from a remote C2 server. The VBScript file is given a name that impersonates legitimate Windows tasks and is either stored in the registry of the compromised system or in an obfuscated format on disk | ['T1105'] |
In order to discover potential targets and locate the information it needs to authenticate against, the script passively collects data from /.ssh/config, .bash_history, /.ssh/known_hosts, and the likes. We did not identify any active scanning techniques used to identify additional targets | ['T1018'] |
The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are | ['T1059.003'] |
Along the way, HermeticWiper’s more mundane operations provide us with further IOCs to monitor for. It also modifies several registry keys, including setting the SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl CrashDumpEnabled key to 0, effectively disabling crash dumps before the abused driver’s execution starts | ['T1562.006', 'T1112'] |
APT33 sent spear phishing emails to employees whose jobs related to the aviation industry. These emails included recruitment themed lures and contained links to malicious HTML application (.hta) files. The .hta files contained job descriptions and links to legitimate job postings on popular employment websites that would be relevant to the targeted individuals | ['T1566.002', 'T1204.001'] |
These macro injection modules also have the functionality to tamper with the Microsoft Office macro security settings | ['T1562.001'] |
TClient will use SSL to connect to Tropic Trooper’s C&C server. This allows Tropic Trooper’s operators to easily change/update the C&C server and configure other values | ['T1573.002'] |
They attempted to extract all Word documents stored on a file server belonging to this division by bundling them into a RAR archive by running the following command | ['T1560.001'] |
CTU researchers assess with high confidence that IRON RITUAL's intent is long term, covert access to networks of interest for the purposes of espionage and data theft.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool | ['T1195.002'] |
A format string that defaults to “public/Publics” that modifies characteristics of the folder and hide it from the infected user | ['T1564.001'] |
Each targeted file is opened, read, encrypted in memory, and then written to a new file in the malware’s working directory using the filename format <random number>.WNCRYT. The files are then renamed to their original filename followed by the .WINCRY extension and moved to their original directory. The taskdl.exe process launched by the malware periodically deletes the remaining WINCRYT temporary files. The encryption process does not directly overwrite file data, so forensic recovery of file contents may be possible depending on the environment. The entire contents of the file are encrypted and saved with a custom header (see Figure 7 | ['T1489'] |
As you can see in Figure 1, the authentication prompt says “Connecting to <redacted>. 0utl00k[.]net”, which is a DarkHydrus C2 server. If the user enters their credentials in this dialog box and presses ‘Ok’, the credentials are sent to the C2 server via the URL https://<redacted>.0utl00k[.]net/download/template.docx. With the authentication dialog box gone, Word displays the contents of the document, which in this specific case was an empty document. While this document was empty, the authentication prompt may have made the targeted user more likely to enter their credentials, thinking it’s necessary to view the contents of the document. DarkHydrus also created their C2 domain carefully in an attempt to further trick the targeted user to enter their credentials. Also, the 0utl00k[.]net domain resembles Microsoft’s legitimate "outlook.com” domain that provides free email services, which also make the user less suspicious and more likely to enter their credentials. Some users may not even notice what domain the dialog states they are connecting to and habitually type their Windows credentials. We found two additional Word documents using the 0utl00k[.]net domain to harvest credentials, seen in Table 1. We first saw these related Word documents in September and November 2017, which suggests that DarkHydrus has been carrying out this credential harvesting campaign for almost a year | ['T1187'] |
The dropper installs the Bisonal EXE file and decoy PDF file. These files are not encrypted and the offset to the EXE and PDF file in the dropper is appended at the end of the dropper file. The file name of the decoy file is based on the dropper file name. The dropper code creates a PDF at the same directory, give the same name with itself to the decoy file, removes .exe and adds .pdf in the code. The dropper also creates two VBS scripts in the %Temp% directory with a random 4 digits hexadecimal name. The other deletes the dropper and the VBS script itself | ['T1070.004'] |
Next, BoomBox AES-encrypts the host information string above using the hardcoded encryption key “123do3y4r378o5t34onf7t3o573tfo73” and initialization vector (IV) value “1233t04p7jn3n4rg”. To masquerade the data as contents of a PDF file, BoomBox prepends and appends the magic markers for PDF to the AES-encrypted host information string above | ['T1036', 'T1027'] |
For example, Monash University, located in Australia, has been a popular Silent Librarian target. Like the overall content of their lures, the subject lines of Silent Librarian phishing emails have remained consistent over time. Phishing Pages . We have identified 127 different domains used to host Silent Librarian phishing sites since 2013. Like a growing number of phishing sites, domains registered by Silent Librarian generally use Freenom top-level domains (TLDs) (.TK, . CF, .GA, .GQ, .ML) because they are available at no cost. Some of the other recent TLDs associated with Silent Librarian domains include .IN, .IR, .INFO, .LINK, and .TOP. Legitimate American University Library Login URL (above) . Silent Librarian Phishing URL (January 2018) . The content of Silent Librarian phishing pages is almost identical to the legitimate target sites. The actors likely scrape the original HTML source code from the legitimate library login page, then edit the references to resources used to render the webpage (images, JavaScript, CSS, etc. An analysis of the Silent Librarian kits identified two email accounts that were used to receive compromised victim credentials. Similarly, the credentials stolen in the Silent Librarian phishing attacks we identified were sold on an Iranian website; however, it is not one of the sites specified in the indictment. Using a combination of technical and open source research, we identified another website, Uniaccount[.]ir, that was used to sell the credentials compromised in the Silent Librarian phishing attacks | ['T1598.003'] |
An already public UAC bypass method is included in the binary. It doesn’t matter if the method will work or not since the process will exit. This is one more indication that the tool is still in development and there are plans to expand its capabilities | ['T1548.002'] |
Upon execution, HyperStack undergoes a similar registry key check to Turla’s RPC backdoor and updates the same registry key to determine which named pipes can be accessed anonymously. The HyperStack backdoor first copies itself to C:\ADSchemeIntegrity.exe and then installs itself with system-level privileges as the service Active Directory Scheme Integrity Service. HyperStack checks for the following registry entry and, when found, adds the name of its communication pipe (‘adschemerpc’) to the key value | ['T1112'] |
The adversaries installed the backdoor as a service on the infected machine. They attempted to operate under the radar by naming the service "Windows Time Service", like the existing Windows service | ['T1036.004'] |
The use of an initial reconnaissance document allows Inception to profile the target’s computer and potentially customize any subsequent malicious document to exploit known vulnerabilities in unpatched software on the computer | ['T1566.001'] |
The backdoor installer will drop a normal sidebar.exe file (a Windows Gadget tool, a feature already discontinued by Windows), a malicious loader (in "C:\ProgramData\Apple\Update\wab32res.dll"), and an encrypted configuration file | ['T1055.001'] |
Spear phishing, including the use of probably compromised email accounts. Lure documents using CVE-2017-11882 to drop malware. Stolen code signing certificates used to sign malware. Use of bitsadmin.exe to download additional tools. Use of PowerShell to download additional tools. Using C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories. Using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for persistence. Using Windows Shortcut files (.lnk) in the Startup folder that invoke the Windows Scripting Host (wscript.exe) to execute a Jscript backdoor for persistence | ['T1553.002'] |
After the configuration is parsed, Cardinal RAT will proceed with making attempts at connecting with the C2. Using an example request and response from a C2 server, we can see how this traffic is configured | ['T1560.002'] |
As with every communication with the C2, the script collects and sends information about the target environment including the stack of security solutions installed on the computer and are part of the following list | ['T1518.001'] |
FIN6 also moved laterally to servers in the environment using RDP and configured them as malware “distribution” servers. Mandiant identified a utility script named kill.bat that was run on systems in the environment. FIN6 automated the deployment of kill.bat and the LockerGoga ransomware using batch script files. FIN6 created a number of BAT files on the malware distribution servers with the naming convention xaa.bat, xab.bat, xac.bat, etc. FIN6 renamed the psexec service name to “mstdc” in order to masquerade as the legitimate Windows executable “msdtc. Domain administrators have complete control over Windows systems in an Active Directory environment | ['T1036.004'] |
The first stage implant that is nested in the DOTM file, is using triple base64 encoding in the Visual Basic Macro - The extracted DLL (desktop.dat) is packed with the Themida packer attempting to make analysis more difficult | ['T1027.002'] |
Once these variables are set, the malware uses the SoapHttpClientProtocol class to communicate with its C2 server, which issues an HTTP POST requests that appears as | ['T1571'] |
Use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software (Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059]) - Use scripts (e.g. VBScript and PowerShell) to speed up operational tasks, reduce the time required to gain access to critical resources, and bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system (OS) at an Application Programming Interface (API) level instead of calling other programs (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell [T1059.001], Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic [T1059.005]) - Rely upon specific user actions, such as opening a malicious email attachment (User Execution [T1204]) - Exploit software vulnerabilities to execute code on a system (Exploitation for Client Execution [T1203]) - Create new services or modify existing services to execute executables, commands, or scripts (System Services: Service Execution [T1569.002]) - Employ the Windows module loader to load Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) from arbitrary local paths or arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths and execute arbitrary code on a system (Shared Modules [T1129]) - Use the Windows API to execute arbitrary code on the victim's system (Native API [T1106]) - Use a system's graphical user interface (GUI) to search for information and execute files (Remote Services [T1021]) - Use the Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, conduct remote execution for lateral movement, gain SYSTEM privileges for privilege escalation, or run a process under the context of a specified account (Scheduled Task/Job [T1053]) - Abuse compiled Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) files (.chm), commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system, to conceal malicious code (Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File [T1218.001]) - Abuse Windows rundll32.exe to execute binaries, scripts, and Control Panel Item files (.CPL) and execute code via proxy to avoid triggering security tools (Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundl32 [T1218.001]) - Exploit cron in Linux and launchd in macOS systems to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs (Scheduled Task/Job: Cron [T1053.003], Scheduled Task/Job: Launchd [T1053.004 | ['T1106', 'T1059.005', 'T1059.001', 'T1053.003', 'T1218.011'] |
To decrypt the configuration data, the malware uses XOR with 25-character keys such as “waEHleblxiQjoxFJQaIMLdHKz” that are different for every sample. RC4 file encryption relies on the Windows 32 CryptoAPI, using the provided value’s MD5 hash as an initial vector. Among all these random keys once the word “salamati” was also used, which means “health” in Farsi | ['T1140'] |
Every time the malware runs a command using cmd.exe, the standard output (STDOUT) of the executed command is piped and written to a Google Drive account with the following filename format | ['T1059.003'] |
https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/r1ng/news/master/README.md The malware accesses the URL and decodes the characters between the string “[Rudeltaktik]” and character “!” using BASE64. Rudeltaktik]MTE1LjY4LjQ5LjE3OTo4MA==! UBoatRAT uses a custom command and control protocol to communicate with the attacker’s server. The malware places the string '488' (0x34, 0x38, 0x38 in HEX) at the top of the payload or instruction and encrypts the entire buffer with the static key 0x88 by using simple XOR cipher. Then the network payload always starts with 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB0 | ['T1027'] |
ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada: The shell script containing the main malicious routines - configureDefault.def: The word file displayed during execution | ['T1059.004'] |
shareDll, mshareDll, tshareDll Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. wormwinDll, wormDll, mwormDll, nwormDll Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. tabDll Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit. Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit | ['T1135'] |
1) The infection chain used in this attack begins with a weaponized link to a Google Drive folder, obfuscated using the goo.gl link shortening service. 2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. 3) This file requires the target to attempt to open the .lnk file, which redirects the user to a Windows Scripting Component (.wsc) file, hosted on an adversary-controlled microblogging page. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs. 4) The .lnk file uses an embedded VBScript component to retrieve a decoy PDF file and a PowerShell script from the adversary-controlled web page. 5) The PowerShell script creates a Cobalt Strike stager payload. This PowerShell script also retrieves an XOR-encoded Cobalt Strike beacon payload from an adversary-controlled domain. 6) The Cobalt Strike Beacon implant beacons to the command-and-control (C2) IP address, which is used to remotely control the implant | ['T1059.001'] |
This final payload is the ThreatNeedle loader running in memory. At this point the loader uses a different RC4 key (3D 68 D0 0A B1 0E C6 AF DD EE 18 8E F4 A1 D6 20), and the dropped malware is registered as a Windows service and launched | ['T1543.003'] |
The location of the working directory is determined by the instructions from the remote server. The directory is used as temporary storage for files containing collected data about the compromised computer | ['T1074.001'] |
The winupdate.ps1 script (SHA256: 36862f654c3356d2177b5d35a410c78ff9803d1d7d20da0b82e3d69d640e856e) is the main payload of this attack that we call RogueRobin. Its developer used the open source Invoke-Obfuscation tool to obfuscate this PowerShell script, specifically using the COMPRESS technique offered by Invoke-Obfuscation. Before carrying out any of its functionality the payload checks to see if it is executing in a sandbox. The payload uses WMI queries and checks running processes for evidence that the script may be executing within an analysis environment. The specific sandbox checks include | ['T1047', 'T1497.001', 'T1057'] |
The malware used in a DUBNIUM attack is committed to disguising itself as Secure Shell (SSH) tool. The file descriptions and other properties of the malware look convincingly legitimate at first glance | ['T1036.005'] |
The malware next sets out to prevent the victim from stopping the ongoing infection. First, the machine is removed from the Active Directory domain by using WinAPI or WMI. This makes it harder to remotely push any remediation tools to the infected machines | ['T1106'] |
After defining several variables, some of which contain ActiveX objects for file execution and manipulation later, the script uses a function to “roll” a random number | ['T1218.001'] |
A macro is executed by the Office document: The macro inflates and creates a ZIP file on the targeted system and executes a Lua script in this archive. The archive contains the Lua payload and luajit, a Lua interpreter for Windows. Here is the script: This script downloads and executes an additional payload | ['T1059'] |
In some previous phishing email campaigns, attackers leveraged SendGrid to distribute the initial emails to hide the Google Drive links in the documents behind a SendGrid URL as a way to bypass traditional defences | ['T1204.001'] |
Open malspam with password-protected ZIP attachment. On June 30 and July 1, 2020, we saw indications there may also have been a link to download a ZIP archive instead of an attachment. Extract Microsoft Word document from the password-protected ZIP archive using a unique password from the message text | ['T1566.001'] |
This said macro executes a command to download the first stage payload using msiexec.exe, a Microsoft Installer tool that can download and run a Windows Installer file. The first stage payload is an MSI Installer that was created using an EXE to MSI converter | ['T1218.007'] |
The variable $HL39fjh contains the base64-encoded PowerShell command shown in Figure 2. It reads the Windows Registry key where the encrypted payload is stored, and contains the password and the salt needed to decrypt the payload | ['T1027'] |
Posted on . May 23, 2017 . (May 2, 2022) . by Raphael Mudge . Cobalt Strike 3.8 is now available. This release also gives the operator control over the script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its attacks and workflows. This release of Cobalt Strike pushes back on this technique with the ppid command. These commands offer means to spawn a payload, in another desktop session, without remote process injection. As detection of remote process injection becomes more common, it’s important to have other ways to achieve our goals without this offensive technique. The Resource Kit . Cobalt Strike 3.8’s Resource Kit finally gives you a way to change Cobalt Strike’s built-in script templates. The Resource Kit is a collection of Cobalt Strike’s default script templates and a sample Aggressor Script to bring these into Cobalt Strike. Go to Help -> Arsenal from a licensed copy of Cobalt Strike to download the Resource Kit. The Resource Kit benefits from new Aggressor Script hooks to provide the PowerShell, Python, and VBA script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its workflows. A 21-day Cobalt Strike trial is also available | ['T1059.001'] |
Looking into the arguments shows that the process plugin comes from the received packet to execute functions such as collecting process information, running a new process, and terminating a running one. The process information collected includes the username, user ID, group ID, and process parent ID of the target process | ['T1057', 'T1057'] |
In some cases, the backdoor is packaged together with the CVE-2013-5065 EoP exploit and heavily obfuscated. This makes the analysis more difficult | ['T1027'] |
In my opinion enumeration is not an attack technique that blue teamers should focus their defense efforts on. The best way to prevent unauthorized users from accessing this information is by having strict conditional access policies which govern how and from where users are allowed to use their Azure AD credentials. That being said, there is a setting in the deprecated MSOnline PowerShell module which prevents enumeration using the Azure AD graph, which is documented here. I haven’t personally looked into bypassing this or if other functionality in Azure breaks if you enable this | ['T1078.004'] |
The bot shows a number of similarities to Dyre but appears to have been rewritten. This assumption is made based on old Dyre code, which would primarily use built-in functions for doing things such as AES and SHA256 hashing. In the recent samples identifying themselves as TrickBot, the code appears to be based on that old code but rewritten to use things such as Microsoft CryptoAPI and COM | ['T1571'] |
Conficker will copy itself with a random name into the system directory %systemroot%\system32 and register itself as a service. The remote computer will then download the worm from the URL given and then start to infect other machines as well. Therefore, there is no centralized point of download. Upon successful infection, it will also patch the hole to prevent other worms to infect the machine" (Racicot | ['T1105'] |
HyperStack sets the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA\Restrict Anonymous value to 0 so anonymous logon users (i.e. null session connections) can list all account names and enumerate all shared resources on a remote share. The implant can then use the WNetAddConnection2 API call to connect to another remote device's IPC$ share. IPC$ is a share that facilitates inter-process communication (IPC) by exposing named pipes to write to or read from | ['T1087.001'] |
That executes the perl script, puts it to sleep for two seconds and deletes the file to remove any evidence | ['T1070.004'] |
Stop the service COMSysApp - Configure the service to autostart (to set up persistence on the system) - Modify registry keys to launch the DLL unser svchost.exe - Specify the malicious DLL path to be loaded into the svchost process. Immediately restart the service - Remove the batch files to reduce the fingerprint on the system | ['T1569.002', 'T1055', 'T1547.001', 'T1070.004', 'T1112'] |
The response to this request is hidden in the source code of following Flickr lookalike page | ['T1001'] |
Upon execution, the malware first decrypts its C2 IP address using a xor-incremental encryption and then creates a mutant, using its C2 IP address as the mutant’s name | ['T1140'] |
The wiper module (SHA256: 391e7b90bf3f0bfeb2c2602cc65aa6be4dd1c01374b89c4a48425f2d22fe231c) that the dropper writes to the system is responsible for overwriting the data within the MBR, partitions, and files on the system. The wiper carries out this wiping using a legitimate hard disk driver called RawDisk by ElDos. The wiper contains the ElDos RawDisk driver in a resource named 'e' that it extracts by skipping to offset 1984 and reading 27792 bytes from that offset. It then decrypts the data using aa 247-byte key and saves it to ‘%WINDOWS%\system32\hdv_725x.sys’. The wiper then creates a service named ‘hdv_725x’ for this driver using the following command line command and runs it with "sc start hdv_725x | ['T1485'] |
Their next move was to list any remote shared drives and then attempt to access remote shares owned by the specific government office they were targeting, again attempting to extract all Word documents | ['T1135'] |
While Diavol is not packed nor has any anti-disassembly tricks, it does use an interesting anti-analysis technique to obfuscate its code. Its main routines are kept in bitmap images, which are stored in the PE resource section. Before calling each routine, it copies the bytes from the bitmap to a global buffer that has execute permissions | ['T1106', 'T1027.003'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. After a few minutes, execute the malicious file on the system. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity | ['T1080'] |
When accessing the Pastebin URL, an encrypted blob is downloaded that requires a corresponding RSA private key from the configuration file. The configuration file analyzed did not contain the RSA private key and therefore we were unable to decrypt the contents of the Pastebin link. We assess the decrypted blob was likely a task for the Carbon instance | ['T1140'] |
If the user clicks on the link, he will be prompted to download a RAR file that contains the stage 1 malware/lure, which he will execute afterwards | ['T1204.002', 'T1105'] |
The newer versions of Valak download two payloads in the first stage. The first payload is Valak’s plugin management component (“pluginhost.exe”), and the second is the second stage JavaScript payload of Valak. In earlier versions, Valak did not include the “pluginhost” payload | ['T1105'] |
As seen in Figure 2, the VBA code builds the email body and attaches the malicious document to the email. We’ve seen both .docx and .lnk files being used as attachments. These are very similar to the content of the malicious attachments used in Gamaredon’s initial spearphishing campaigns. Figure 3 shows an email generated by this malicious component | ['T1566.001'] |
Unit 42 has discovered activity involving threat actors responsible for the OilRig campaign with a potential link to a threat group known as GreenBug. Symantec first reported on this group back in January 2017, detailing their operations and using a custom information stealing Trojan called ISMDoor | ['T1059.003', 'T1059.003'] |
spwebmember was written in Microsoft .NET and includes hardcoded values for client project names for data extraction | ['T1114.002'] |
The infection process is rather interesting, as it involves multiple layers of .NET assemblies that will eventually download the NanoCore remote administration tool (RAT) from a remote server and inject it into another process. In some instances, we have also seen the RemcosRAT malware family delivered as the final payload. The infection process not only downloads and executes a payload, but it also downloads and opens a decoy document to lower the recipient's suspicions of the entire process | ['T1055.002'] |
LookBack malware is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that relies on a proxy communication tool to relay data from the infected host to a command and control IP | ['T1070.004'] |
Network activity started with an HTTPS URL to namecha[.]in, which is an alternative namecoin block explorer. Namecoin is a cryptocurrency system that can be used for decentralized DNS. That proves to be the case here, since the URL returned an IP address used for subsequent post-infection traffic as shown in Figure 10 | ['T1568'] |
There are multiple ways for the operators to reach a Kobalos-infected machine. The method we’ve seen the most is where Kobalos is embedded in the OpenSSH server executable (sshd) and will trigger the backdoor code if the connection is coming from a specific TCP source port. These variants either connect to a C&C server that will act as a middleman, or wait for an inbound connection on a given TCP port | ['T1205'] |
The backdoor component, POWRUNER, is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. POWRUNER is executed every minute by the Task Scheduler. Figure 5 contains an excerpt of the POWRUNER backdoor | ['T1053.005'] |
The following network activity observed from msiexec.exe illustrates how the malware leveraged a signed and verified certification from Sectigo RSA Code Signing CA to propagate | ['T1553.002'] |
Config.json" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. This configuration file contains the same actor pool and wallet information as the first. Lowerv2.sh" and "rootv2.sh" are similar shell scripts that attempt to download and execute the mining malware components "bashf" and "bashg," hosted on 118[.]24[.]150[.]172. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called "XbashY" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. The sample grabs the config file "xmr.txt," which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. Intriguingly, this file appears to share some similarities with Cobalt Strike, the popular penetration testing software, which would allow the attacker to have greater control over the infected system. So, while we can asses with high confidence that the payloads share some code base, we are still unsure of the exact relationship between Rocke and Iron Cybercrime Group | ['T1564.001'] |
The resulting executable acts as another loader for yet another embedded file. However, this loader uses the hostname of the current system to decrypt the embedded payload. Therefore, if it is run on any system other than the one intended, the malware will fail to execute. This trait illustrates that the malware is customized; it was created specifically for the exact victim system on which it was discovered | ['T1480.001'] |
Hello, I got kinsing on my main development box (ubuntu 20 lamp stack). NO docker NO redis NO phpunit How it got in, is a mystery. All I can tell is it came in via apache (kinsing was running as www-data and main kinsing executable in /tmp was owned by www-data). I am using Laravel 7.2.0 not sure are there any loop in the laravel | ['T1133'] |
This module intercepts HWP documents on an infected computer. The HWP file format is similar to Microsoft Word documents, but supported by Hangul, a South Korean word processing application from the Hancom Office bundle. Hancom Office is widely used in South Korea. The account is hardcoded in the module along with the master’s e-mail to which it sends intercepted documents. It is interesting that the module does not search for all the HWP files on infected computer, but reacts only to those that are opened by the user and steals them. This behavior is very unusual for a document-stealing component and we do not see it in other malicious toolkits | ['T1566.001'] |
RAR archiving – files are transferred to staging servers before exfiltration. Certutil – a command-line utility that can be exploited and used for various malicious purposes, such as to decode information, to download files, and to install browser root certificates. Adfind – a command-line tool that can be used to perform Active Directory queries. Csvde – can be used to extract Active Directory files and data. Ntdsutil – can be used as a credential-dumping tool. WMIExec – can be used for lateral movement and to execute commands remotely. It can be used to find information and execute code, and is frequently abused by malicious actors | ['T1119'] |
LaZagne (SecurityRisk.LaZagne): A login/password retrieval tool - Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz): Tool designed to steal credentials - Gpppassword: Tool used to obtain and decrypt Group Policy Preferences (GPP) passwords - SniffPass (SniffPass): Tool designed to steal passwords by sniffing network traffic | ['T1040'] |
As is evident here, the SSH server will accept connections on port number 6789. By running SSH on the server in a compromised network, attackers can come back to the network whenever they want | ['T1571'] |
Additionally, once infected, the malware cycles through a large list of command and control (C&C) servers embedded within the malware. It appears while the list is extensive, not all of the C&Cs are active and continue to beacon until a successful connection is established. Despite modifying a small part of itself while copying itself across the network as a means to evade detection, the operators have made no effort to change the C&C communication protocol since its first inception | ['T1049', 'T1008'] |
After exfiltrating the files, the threat actor used web shell access on the staging server to delete the staged RAR archives and detach their network shares, likely to avoid detection. Figure 5 shows the commands used to perform these activities on a RAR archive renamed with a *.jpg extension | ['T1070.004'] |
The threat actor conducts mass-scanning and uses tools, such as Nmap, to identify open ports. Once the open ports are identified, the threat actor exploits CVEs related to VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to a targeted network. CISA and the FBI have observed the threat actor exploiting multiple CVEs, including CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2019-11539, CVE-2019-19781, and CVE-2020-5902 | ['T1046'] |
This final payload is the ThreatNeedle loader running in memory. In addition, the malware saves the configuration data as a registry key encrypted in RC4 | ['T1112'] |
Containers that are created during the attack are configured to bind /tmpXXXXXX directory to the root directory of the hosting server. This means every file on the server’s filesystem can be accessed and even modified, with the correct user permissions, from within the container | ['T1611'] |
Several files are created by Carbon to keep logs, tasks to execute and configuration that will modify the malware’s behavior. The contents of the majority of these files are encrypted with the CAST-128 algorithm [4 | ['T1027'] |
Upon ejection from the network, APT15 managed to regain access a couple of weeks later via the corporate VPN solution with a stolen VPN certificate, which they had extracted from a compromised host | ['T1133'] |
On a different system, operators dropped a legitimate copy of credwize.exe, the Microsoft Credential Backup and Restore Wizard, on disk and used it to execute the malicious library New.dll, another Turian variant | ['T1055.001'] |
While the IronPython scripts are only the first part of the tool, the main task of loading malware is done by an embedded process injector. We dubbed this toolchain IronNetInjector, the blend of IronPython and the injector’s internal project name NetInjector. In this blog, we describe the IronPython scripts and how they’re used to load one or more payloads with the help of an injector | ['T1059.006', 'T1059.006'] |
IAT hooking and inline hooking are generally known as userland rootkits. IAT hooking is a technique that malware uses to change the import address table. In contrast, with inline hooking, malware modifies the API function itself. In Figure 11, the malware FinFisher, performs IAT hooking by modifying where the CreateWindowEx points | ['T1056.004'] |
Our dynamic analysis showed Lokibot’s behavior, including the benefits and drawbacks of several unpacking methods. Lokibot also used an infected system machine global unique identifier (GUID) value to generate a mutex (an MD5 hash) that acted as a flag to prevent itself from infecting the same machine again. The subject lines of the campaign messages usually started with or included the term “proforma. The malicious attachment was a DOCX, with a file name that also included “proforma” in its pattern. TLP: WHITE https://www.us-cert.gov/tlpCharacteristicsLokibot is an information stealer; the main functionality of its binary is to collect system and application credentials, and user information to send back to the attacker. We then conducted a static analysis to examine Lokibot’s techniques and targets. It starts from the tenth byte in the data section of the initial TCP POST request. We also noticed that the value of the sub key is the path to the file that Lokibot created after its initial execution. The binary’s hardcoded strings provided data about the binary’s characteristics, behavior, and main functionality.Section HeadersFrom the section headers and distribution of each section, the binary appears to be fairly normal. Figure 9Hollow Process; Manually Unpacking the First Stage BinaryWe tried to follow the binary with a debugger to determine where it unpacked itself in the memory, but Lokibot used a hollow process technique to obscure some of this activity | ['T1555.003'] |
The payload decrypted at the previous step is a PowerShell reflective loader. It is based on the script Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 from the same PowerSploit framework. The executable is hardcoded in the script and is loaded directly into the memory of a randomly chosen process that is already running on the system | ['T1055'] |