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The following is a conversation with Keoki Jackson. |
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He's the CTO of Lockheed Martin, |
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a company that through his long history |
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has created some of the most incredible engineering |
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marvels human beings have ever built, |
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including planes that fly fast and undetected, |
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defense systems that intersect nuclear threats that |
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can take the lives of millions, and systems that venture out |
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into space, the moon, Mars, and beyond. |
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And these days, more and more, artificial intelligence |
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has an assistive role to play in these systems. |
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I've read several books in preparation |
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for this conversation. |
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It is a difficult one, because in part, |
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Lockheed Martin builds military systems |
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that operate in a complicated world that often does not |
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have easy solutions in the gray area between good and evil. |
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I hope one day this world will rid itself of war |
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in all its forms. |
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But the path to achieving that in a world that |
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does have evil is not obvious. |
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What is obvious is good engineering |
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and artificial intelligence research |
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has a role to play on the side of good. |
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Lockheed Martin and the rest of our community |
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are hard at work at exactly this task. |
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We talk about these and other important topics |
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in this conversation. |
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Also, most certainly, both Kiyoki and I have a passion for space, |
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us humans venturing out toward the stars. |
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We talk about this exciting future as well. |
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This is the artificial intelligence podcast. |
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If you enjoy it, subscribe on YouTube, |
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give it five stars on iTunes, support it on Patreon, |
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or simply connect with me on Twitter |
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at Lex Freedman, spelled F R I D M A N. |
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And now, here's my conversation with Kiyoki Jackson. |
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I read several books on Lockheed Martin recently. |
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My favorite, in particular, is by Ben Rich, |
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called Skonkork's personal memoir. |
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It gets a little edgy at times. |
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But from that, I was reminded that the engineers of Lockheed |
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Martin have created some of the most incredible engineering |
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marvels human beings have ever built throughout the 20th century |
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and the 21st. |
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Do you remember a particular project or system at Lockheed |
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or before that at the Space Shuttle Columbia |
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that you were just in awe at the fact |
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that us humans could create something like this? |
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That's a great question. |
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There's a lot of things that I could draw on there. |
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When you look at the Skonkorks and Ben Rich's book, |
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in particular, of course, it starts off |
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with basically the start of the jet age and the P80. |
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I had the opportunity to sit next to one of the Apollo |
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astronauts, Charlie Duke, recently at dinner. |
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And I said, hey, what's your favorite aircraft? |
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And he said, well, it was by far the F104 Starfighter, which |
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was another aircraft that came out of Lockheed there. |
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What kind of? |
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It was the first Mach 2 jet fighter aircraft. |
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They called it the missile with a man in it. |
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And so those are the kinds of things |
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I grew up hearing stories about. |
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Of course, the SR 71 is incomparable |
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as kind of the epitome of speed, altitude, and just |
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the coolest looking aircraft ever. |
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So there's a reconnaissance that's |
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a plane that's a intelligence surveillance |
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and reconnaissance aircraft that was designed |
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to be able to outrun, basically go faster |
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than any air defense system. |
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But I'll tell you, I'm a space junkie. |
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That's why I came to MIT. |
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That's really what took me, ultimately, to Lockheed Martin. |
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And I grew up, and so Lockheed Martin, for example, |
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has been essentially at the heart of every planetary mission, |
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like all the Mars missions we've had a part in. |
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And we've talked a lot about the 50th anniversary of Apollo |
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here in the last couple of weeks, right? |
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But remember, 1976, July 20, again, the National Space |
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Day, so the landing of the Viking lander on the surface |
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of Mars, just a huge accomplishment. |
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And when I was a young engineer at Lockheed Martin, |
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I got to meet engineers who had designed various pieces |
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of that mission as well. |
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So that's what I grew up on is these planetary missions, |
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the start of the space shuttle era, |
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and ultimately had the opportunity |
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to see Lockheed Martin's part in what |
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we can maybe talk about some of these here, |
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but Lockheed Martin's part in all of these space journeys |
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over the years. |
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Do you dream, and I apologize for getting philosophical at times, |
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or sentimental, I do romanticize the notion |
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of space exploration. |
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So do you dream of the day when us humans colonize |
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another planet, like Mars, or a man, a woman, a human being, |
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steps on Mars? |
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Absolutely. |
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And that's a personal dream of mine. |
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I haven't given up yet on my own opportunity |
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to fly into space, but from the Lockheed Martin perspective, |
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this is something that we're working towards every day. |
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And of course, we're building the Orion spacecraft, which |
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is the most sophisticated human rated spacecraft ever built. |
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And it's really designed for these deep space journeys, |
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starting with the moon, but ultimately going to Mars. |
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And being the platform from a design perspective, |
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we call the Mars Base Camp to be able to take humans |
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to the surface, and then after a mission of a couple of weeks, |
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bring them back up safely. |
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And so that is something I want to see happen during my time |
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at Lockheed Martin. |
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So I'm pretty excited about that. |
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And I think once we prove that's possible, |
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colonization might be a little bit further out, |
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but it's something that I'd hope to see. |
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So maybe you can give a little bit |
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of an overview of, so Lockheed Martin |
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has partnered with a few years ago with Boeing |
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to work with the DoD and NASA to build launch systems |
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and rockets with the ULA. |
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What's beyond that? |
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What's Lockheed's mission, timeline, and long term |
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dream in terms of space? |
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You mentioned the moon. |
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I've heard you talk about asteroids as Mars. |
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What's the timeline? |
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What's the engineering challenges? |
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And what's the dream long term? |
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Yeah, I think the dream long term is |
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to have a permanent presence in space beyond low Earth |
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orbit, ultimately with a long term presence on the moon |
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and then to the planets to Mars. |
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And it's very interrupting that. |
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So long term presence means sustained and sustainable |
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presence in an economy, a space economy, |
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that really goes alongside that. |
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With human beings and being able to launch perhaps |
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from those, so like hop. |
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You know, there's a lot of energy |
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that goes in those hops, right? |
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So I think the first step is being |
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able to get there and to be able to establish sustained basis, |
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right, and build from there. |
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And a lot of that means getting, as you know, |
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things like the cost of launch down. |
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And you mentioned United Launch Alliance. |
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And so I don't want to speak for ULA, |
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but obviously they're working really hard |
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to, on their next generation of launch vehicles, |
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to maintain that incredible mission success record |
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that ULA has, but ultimately continue |
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to drive down the cost and make the flexibility, the speed, |
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and the access ever greater. |
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So what's the missions that are in the horizon |
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that you could talk to? |
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Is there a hope to get to the moon? |
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Absolutely, absolutely. |
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I mean, I think you know this, or you |
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may know this, there's a lot of ways |
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to accomplish some of these goals. |
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And so that's a lot of what's in discussion today. |
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But ultimately, the goal is to be |
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able to establish a base, essentially |
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in CIS lunar space that would allow for ready transfer |
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from orbit to the lunar surface and back again. |
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And so that's sort of that near term, |
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I say near term in the next decade or so vision, |
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starting off with a stated objective |
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by this administration to get back to the moon in the 2024, |
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2025 time frame, which is right around the corner here. |
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How big of an engineering challenge is that? |
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I think the big challenge is not so much to go, but to stay. |
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And so we demonstrated in the 60s |
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that you could send somebody up, do a couple of days of mission, |
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and bring them home again successfully. |
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Now we're talking about doing that, |
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I'd say more to, I don't want to say an industrial scale, |
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but a sustained scale. |
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So permanent habitation, regular reuse of vehicles, |
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the infrastructure to get things like fuel, air, consumables, |
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replacement parts, all the things that you need to sustain |
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that kind of infrastructure. |
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So those are certainly engineering challenges. |
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There are budgetary challenges. |
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And those are all things that we're |
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going to have to work through. |
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The other thing, and I shouldn't, |
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I don't want to minimize this. |
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I mean, I'm excited about human exploration, |
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but the reality is our technology |
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and where we've come over the last 40 years, essentially, |
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has changed what we can do with robotic exploration as well. |
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And to me, it's incredibly thrilling. |
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This seems like old news now, but the fact |
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that we have rovers driving around the surface of Mars |
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and sending back data is just incredible. |
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The fact that we have satellites in orbit around Mars |
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that are collecting weather, they're |
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looking at the terrain, they're mapping, |
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all these kinds of things on a continuous basis, |
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that's incredible. |
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And the fact that you got the time lag, |
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of course, going to the planets, but you can effectively |
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have virtual human presence there in a way |
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that we have never been able to do before. |
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And now, with the advent of even greater processing power, |
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better AI systems, better cognitive systems |
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and decision systems, you put that together |
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with the human piece, and we really |
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opened up the solar system in a whole different way. |
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And I'll give you an example. |
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We've got Osiris Rex, which is a mission to the asteroid Benus. |
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10:47.840 --> 10:52.000 |
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So the spacecraft is out there right now on basically a year |
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mapping activity to map the entire surface of that asteroid |
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10:57.280 --> 11:02.520 |
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in great detail, all autonomously piloted, right? |
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11:02.520 --> 11:04.840 |
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But the idea then that, and this is not too far away, |
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it's going to go in. |
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11:05.920 --> 11:09.600 |
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It's got a sort of fancy vacuum cleaner with a bucket. |
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It's going to collect the sample off the asteroid |
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and then send it back here to Earth. |
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And so we have gone from sort of those tentative steps |
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in the 70s, early landings, video of the solar system |
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to now we've sent spacecraft to Pluto. |
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We have gone to comets and brought and intercepted comets. |
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We've brought stardust, material back. |
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So we've gone far, and there's incredible opportunity |
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to go even farther. |
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So it seems quite crazy that this is even possible, |
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11:47.400 --> 11:51.400 |
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that can you talk a little bit about what |
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it means to orbit an asteroid with a bucket to try |
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to pick up some soil samples? |
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11:58.360 --> 11:59.360 |
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Yeah. |
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11:59.360 --> 12:02.400 |
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So part of it is just kind of the, |
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12:02.400 --> 12:04.840 |
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these are the same kinds of techniques |
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we use here on Earth for high speed, high accuracy imagery, |
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stitching these scenes together, and creating essentially |
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high accuracy world maps. |
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And so that's what we're doing, obviously, |
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on a much smaller scale with an asteroid. |
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But the other thing that's really interesting, |
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you put together sort of that neat control and data |
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and imagery problem. |
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12:33.640 --> 12:36.960 |
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But the stories around how we design the collection, |
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I mean, as essentially, this is the sort of the human |
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ingenuity element, right? |
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12:41.360 --> 12:46.520 |
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That essentially had an engineer who had one day he's like, |
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12:46.520 --> 12:50.280 |
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well, starts messing around with parts, vacuum cleaner, |
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bucket, maybe we could do something like this. |
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12:53.440 --> 12:56.280 |
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And that was what led to what we call the Pogo stick |
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12:56.280 --> 12:57.000 |
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collection, right? |
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12:57.000 --> 12:59.200 |
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Where basically, I think comes down, |
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it's only there for seconds does that collection, |
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grabs the, essentially blows the regolith material |
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into the collection hopper and off it goes. |
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13:10.200 --> 13:11.880 |
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It doesn't really land almost. |
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13:11.880 --> 13:13.520 |
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It's a very short landing. |
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13:13.520 --> 13:15.440 |
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Wow, that's incredible. |
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13:15.440 --> 13:22.160 |
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So what is in those, we talk a little bit more about space. |
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13:22.160 --> 13:24.360 |
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What's the role of the human in all of this? |
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What are the challenges? |
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13:25.800 --> 13:29.040 |
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What are the opportunities for humans |
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as they pilot these vehicles in space |
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13:33.800 --> 13:41.240 |
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and for humans that may step foot on either the moon or Mars? |
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13:41.240 --> 13:44.280 |
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Yeah, it's a great question because I just |
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have been extolling the virtues of robotic and rovers, |
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autonomous systems, and those absolutely have a role. |
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I think the thing that we don't know how to replace today |
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is the ability to adapt on the fly to new information. |
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14:03.320 --> 14:07.600 |
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And I believe that will come, but we're not there yet. |
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14:07.600 --> 14:08.840 |
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There's a ways to go. |
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14:08.840 --> 14:13.600 |
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And so you think back to Apollo 13 |
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and the ingenuity of the folks on the ground and on the spacecraft |
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14:16.920 --> 14:20.120 |
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essentially cobbled together a way |
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14:20.120 --> 14:23.800 |
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to get the carbon dioxide scrubbers to work. |
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14:23.800 --> 14:28.280 |
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Those are the kinds of things that ultimately, |
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14:28.280 --> 14:31.280 |
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and I'd say not just from dealing with anomalies, |
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14:31.280 --> 14:33.640 |
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but dealing with new information. |
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14:33.640 --> 14:38.360 |
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You see something, and rather than waiting 20 minutes |
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14:38.360 --> 14:41.600 |
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or half an hour an hour to try to get information back |
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14:41.600 --> 14:44.000 |
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and forth, but be able to essentially |
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14:44.000 --> 14:47.600 |
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revect around the fly, collect different samples, |
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14:47.600 --> 14:52.680 |
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take a different approach, choose different areas to explore. |
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14:52.680 --> 14:56.680 |
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Those are the kinds of things that that human presence enables |
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14:56.680 --> 15:00.240 |
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that still weighs ahead of us on the AI side. |
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15:00.240 --> 15:02.160 |
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Yeah, there's some interesting stuff we'll talk about |
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15:02.160 --> 15:04.520 |
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on the teaming side here on Earth. |
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15:04.520 --> 15:06.400 |
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That's pretty cool to explore. |
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15:06.400 --> 15:08.800 |
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And in space, let's not leave the space piece out. |
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15:08.800 --> 15:10.320 |
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So what is teaming? |
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15:10.320 --> 15:13.880 |
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What does AI and humans working together in space look like? |
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15:13.880 --> 15:15.400 |
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Yeah, one of the things we're working on |
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15:15.400 --> 15:19.080 |
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is a system called Maya, which is, think of it, |
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15:19.080 --> 15:21.360 |
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so it's an AI assistant. |
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15:21.360 --> 15:24.160 |
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And in space, exactly. |
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15:24.160 --> 15:28.520 |
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And think of it as the Alexa in space, right? |
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15:28.520 --> 15:31.680 |
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But this goes hand in hand with a lot of other developments. |
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15:31.680 --> 15:35.120 |
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And so today's world, everything is essentially model based, |
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15:35.120 --> 15:40.880 |
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model based systems engineering to the actual digital tapestry |
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15:40.880 --> 15:43.880 |
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that goes through the design, the build, the manufacture, |
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15:43.880 --> 15:47.600 |
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the testing, and ultimately the sustainment of these systems. |
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15:47.600 --> 15:52.120 |
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And so our vision is really that when our astronauts |
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15:52.120 --> 15:55.160 |
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are there around Mars, you're going |
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15:55.160 --> 16:01.520 |
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to have that entire digital library of the spacecraft, |
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16:01.520 --> 16:05.440 |
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of its operations, all the test data, all the test data |
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16:05.440 --> 16:08.040 |
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and flight data from previous missions |
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16:08.040 --> 16:11.760 |
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to be able to look and see if there are anomalous conditions |
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16:11.760 --> 16:16.000 |
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until the humans, and potentially deal with that |
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16:16.000 --> 16:20.640 |
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before it becomes a bad situation and help |
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16:20.640 --> 16:23.160 |
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the astronauts work through those kinds of things. |
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16:23.160 --> 16:26.760 |
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And it's not just dealing with problems as they come up, |
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16:26.760 --> 16:29.160 |
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but also offering up opportunities |
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16:29.160 --> 16:32.440 |
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for additional exploration capability, for example. |
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16:32.440 --> 16:35.120 |
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So that's the vision is that these |
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16:35.120 --> 16:37.720 |
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are going to take the best of the human to respond |
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16:37.720 --> 16:43.480 |
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to changing circumstances and rely on the best AI |
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16:43.480 --> 16:48.560 |
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capabilities to monitor this almost infinite number |
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16:48.560 --> 16:51.520 |
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of data points and correlations of data points |
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16:51.520 --> 16:53.960 |
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that humans, frankly, aren't that good at. |
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16:53.960 --> 16:56.200 |
|
So how do you develop systems in space like this, |
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16:56.200 --> 17:01.560 |
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whether it's a Alexa in space or, in general, any kind |
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17:01.560 --> 17:04.880 |
|
of control systems, any kind of intelligent systems, |
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17:04.880 --> 17:08.600 |
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when you can't really test stuff too much out in space, |
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17:08.600 --> 17:10.760 |
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it's very expensive to test stuff. |
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17:10.760 --> 17:14.160 |
|
So how do you develop such systems? |
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17:14.160 --> 17:18.880 |
|
Yeah, that's the beauty of this digital twin, if you will. |
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17:18.880 --> 17:21.080 |
|
And of course, with Lockheed Martin, |
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17:21.080 --> 17:24.520 |
|
we've over the past five plus decades |
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17:24.520 --> 17:28.120 |
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been refining our knowledge of the space environment, |
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17:28.120 --> 17:33.240 |
|
of how materials behave, dynamics, the controls, |
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17:33.240 --> 17:37.160 |
|
the radiation environments, all of these kinds of things. |
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17:37.160 --> 17:39.880 |
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So we're able to create very sophisticated models. |
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17:39.880 --> 17:43.440 |
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They're not perfect, but they're very good. |
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17:43.440 --> 17:46.600 |
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And so you can actually do a lot. |
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17:46.600 --> 17:51.440 |
|
I spent part of my career simulating communication |
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17:51.440 --> 17:56.400 |
|
spacecraft, missile warning spacecraft, GPS spacecraft, |
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17:56.400 --> 17:59.280 |
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in all kinds of scenarios and all kinds of environments. |
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17:59.280 --> 18:01.880 |
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So this is really just taking that to the next level. |
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18:01.880 --> 18:04.000 |
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The interesting thing is that now you're |
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18:04.000 --> 18:07.800 |
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bringing into that loop a system, depending on how it's |
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18:07.800 --> 18:10.520 |
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developed, that may be non deterministic, |
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18:10.520 --> 18:13.160 |
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it may be learning as it goes. |
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18:13.160 --> 18:16.560 |
|
In fact, we anticipate that it will be learning as it goes. |
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18:16.560 --> 18:22.160 |
|
And so that brings a whole new level of interest, I guess, |
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18:22.160 --> 18:25.320 |
|
into how do you do verification and validation |
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18:25.320 --> 18:28.520 |
|
of these non deterministic learning systems |
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18:28.520 --> 18:32.720 |
|
in scenarios that may go out of the bounds or the envelope |
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18:32.720 --> 18:35.000 |
|
that you have initially designed them to. |
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18:35.000 --> 18:39.200 |
|
So this system in its intelligence has the same complexity, |
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18:39.200 --> 18:41.040 |
|
some of the same complexity a human does. |
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18:41.040 --> 18:43.640 |
|
And it learns over time, it's unpredictable |
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18:43.640 --> 18:46.240 |
|
in certain kinds of ways. |
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18:46.240 --> 18:50.120 |
|
So you also have to model that when you're thinking about it. |
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18:50.120 --> 18:53.440 |
|
So in your thoughts, it's possible |
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18:53.440 --> 18:57.240 |
|
to model the majority of situations, |
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18:57.240 --> 18:59.640 |
|
the important aspects of situations here on Earth |
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18:59.640 --> 19:02.280 |
|
and in space, enough to test stuff. |
|
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19:02.280 --> 19:05.560 |
|
Yeah, this is really an active area of research. |
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19:05.560 --> 19:07.440 |
|
And we're actually funding university research |
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19:07.440 --> 19:10.080 |
|
in a variety of places, including MIT. |
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19:10.080 --> 19:13.720 |
|
This is in the realm of trust and verification |
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19:13.720 --> 19:17.920 |
|
and validation of, I'd say, autonomous systems in general. |
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19:17.920 --> 19:20.920 |
|
And then as a subset of that, autonomous systems |
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19:20.920 --> 19:24.520 |
|
that incorporate artificial intelligence capabilities. |
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19:24.520 --> 19:27.880 |
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And this is not an easy problem. |
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19:27.880 --> 19:29.520 |
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We're working with startup companies. |
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19:29.520 --> 19:33.160 |
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We've got internal R&D, but our conviction |
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19:33.160 --> 19:39.200 |
|
is that autonomy and more and more AI enabled autonomy |
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19:39.200 --> 19:42.680 |
|
is going to be in everything that Lockheed Martin develops |
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19:42.680 --> 19:44.200 |
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and fields. |
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19:44.200 --> 19:48.280 |
|
And autonomy and AI are going to be |
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19:48.280 --> 19:50.080 |
|
retrofit into existing systems. |
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19:50.080 --> 19:52.400 |
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They're going to be part of the design |
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19:52.400 --> 19:54.440 |
|
for all of our future systems. |
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19:54.440 --> 19:56.680 |
|
And so maybe I should take a step back and say, |
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19:56.680 --> 19:58.600 |
|
the way we define autonomy. |
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19:58.600 --> 20:01.400 |
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So we talk about autonomy, essentially, |
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20:01.400 --> 20:08.400 |
|
a system that composes, selects, and then executes decisions |
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20:08.400 --> 20:12.400 |
|
with varying levels of human intervention. |
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20:12.400 --> 20:15.720 |
|
And so you could think of no autonomy. |
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20:15.720 --> 20:18.400 |
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So this is essentially a human doing the task. |
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20:18.400 --> 20:23.000 |
|
You can think of, effectively, partial autonomy |
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20:23.000 --> 20:25.720 |
|
where the human is in the loop. |
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20:25.720 --> 20:29.040 |
|
So making decisions in every case |
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20:29.040 --> 20:31.040 |
|
about what the autonomous system can do. |
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20:31.040 --> 20:33.120 |
|
Either in the cockpit or remotely. |
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20:33.120 --> 20:35.960 |
|
Or remotely, exactly, but still in that control loop. |
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20:35.960 --> 20:39.800 |
|
And then there's what you'd call supervisory autonomy. |
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20:39.800 --> 20:42.360 |
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So the autonomous system is doing most of the work. |
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20:42.360 --> 20:45.880 |
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The human can intervene to stop it or to change the direction. |
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20:45.880 --> 20:47.840 |
|
And then ultimately, full autonomy |
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20:47.840 --> 20:50.200 |
|
where the human is off the loop altogether. |
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20:50.200 --> 20:52.760 |
|
And for different types of missions, |
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20:52.760 --> 20:55.760 |
|
want to have different levels of autonomy. |
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20:55.760 --> 20:58.280 |
|
So now take that spectrum and this conviction |
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20:58.280 --> 21:01.120 |
|
that autonomy and more and more AI |
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21:01.120 --> 21:05.000 |
|
are in everything that we develop. |
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21:05.000 --> 21:08.960 |
|
The kinds of things that Lockheed Martin does a lot of times |
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21:08.960 --> 21:12.600 |
|
are safety of life critical kinds of missions. |
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21:12.600 --> 21:15.920 |
|
Think about aircraft, for example. |
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21:15.920 --> 21:20.040 |
|
And so we require, and our customers require, |
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21:20.040 --> 21:23.480 |
|
an extremely high level of confidence. |
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21:23.480 --> 21:26.360 |
|
One, that we're going to protect life. |
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21:26.360 --> 21:30.640 |
|
Two, that we're going to, that these systems will behave |
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21:30.640 --> 21:33.840 |
|
in ways that their operators can understand. |
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21:33.840 --> 21:36.360 |
|
And so this gets into that whole field. |
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21:36.360 --> 21:41.320 |
|
Again, being able to verify and validate |
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21:41.320 --> 21:44.920 |
|
that the systems have been, that they will operate |
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21:44.920 --> 21:48.040 |
|
the way they're designed and the way they're expected. |
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21:48.040 --> 21:50.720 |
|
And furthermore, that they will do that |
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21:50.720 --> 21:55.400 |
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in ways that can be explained and understood. |
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21:55.400 --> 21:58.800 |
|
And that is an extremely difficult challenge. |
|
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|
21:58.800 --> 22:00.760 |
|
Yeah, so here's a difficult question. |
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22:00.760 --> 22:04.360 |
|
I don't mean to bring this up, |
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22:04.360 --> 22:05.560 |
|
but I think it's a good case study |
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22:05.560 --> 22:07.840 |
|
that people are familiar with. |
|
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|
22:07.840 --> 22:11.080 |
|
Boeing 737 MAX commercial airplane |
|
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|
22:11.080 --> 22:13.360 |
|
has had two recent crashes |
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|
22:13.360 --> 22:15.920 |
|
where their flight control software system failed. |
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|
22:15.920 --> 22:19.080 |
|
And it's software, so I don't mean to speak about Boeing, |
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|
22:19.080 --> 22:21.040 |
|
but broadly speaking, we have this |
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22:21.040 --> 22:24.040 |
|
in the autonomous vehicle space too, semi autonomous. |
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When you have millions of lines of code software |
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making decisions, there is a little bit of a clash |
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of cultures because software engineers |
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don't have the same culture of safety often. |
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That people who build systems like at Lockheed Martin |
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do where it has to be exceptionally safe, |
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you have to test this on. |
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22:48.080 --> 22:49.880 |
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So how do we get this right |
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when software is making so many decisions? |
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22:53.200 --> 22:57.160 |
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Yeah, and there's a lot of things that have to happen. |
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22:57.160 --> 23:01.280 |
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And by and large, I think it starts with the culture, |
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which is not necessarily something |
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that A is taught in school, |
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or B is something that would come, |
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23:07.960 --> 23:10.840 |
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depending on what kind of software you're developing, |
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it may not be relevant if you're targeting ads |
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23:14.240 --> 23:15.760 |
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or something like that. |
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23:15.760 --> 23:20.600 |
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So, and by and large, I'd say not just Lockheed Martin, |
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but certainly the aerospace industry as a whole |
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has developed a culture that does focus on safety, |
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safety of life, operational safety, mission success. |
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But as you know, these systems |
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have gotten incredibly complex. |
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And so they're to the point where it's almost impossible, |
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state spaces become so huge that it's impossible to, |
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or very difficult to do a systematic verification |
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across the entire set of potential ways |
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that an aircraft could be flown, |
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all the conditions that could happen, |
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all the potential failure scenarios. |
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Now, maybe that's soluble one day, |
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24:01.120 --> 24:03.360 |
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maybe when we have our quantum computers |
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that our fingertips will be able to actually simulate |
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across an entire almost infinite state space. |
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But today, there's a lot of work |
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to really try to bound the system, |
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to make sure that it behaves in predictable ways, |
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and then have this culture of continuous inquiry |
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and skepticism and questioning to say, |
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24:33.160 --> 24:37.320 |
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did we really consider the right realm of possibilities, |
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have we done the right range of testing? |
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Do we really understand, in this case, |
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human and machine interactions, |
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the human decision process |
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alongside the machine processes? |
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24:49.480 --> 24:51.520 |
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And so that's that culture, |
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24:51.520 --> 24:53.520 |
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we call it the culture of mission success |
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24:53.520 --> 24:54.960 |
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at Lockheed Martin, |
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24:54.960 --> 24:56.720 |
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that really needs to be established. |
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24:56.720 --> 24:58.120 |
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And it's not something, |
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it's something that people learn by living in it. |
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And it's something that has to be promulgated, |
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and it's done from the highest level. |
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25:07.120 --> 25:10.160 |
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So I had a company of Lockheed Martin, like Lockheed Martin. |
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25:10.160 --> 25:12.480 |
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Yeah, and the same as being faced |
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at certain autonomous vehicle companies |
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where that culture is not there |
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because it started mostly by software engineers, |
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so that's what they're struggling with. |
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25:21.440 --> 25:25.720 |
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Is there lessons that you think we should learn |
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25:25.720 --> 25:27.280 |
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as an industry and a society |
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25:27.280 --> 25:30.240 |
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from the Boeing 737 MAX crashes? |
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25:30.240 --> 25:34.720 |
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These crashes, obviously, are either tremendous tragedies, |
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they're tragedies for all of the people, |
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the crew, the families, the passengers, |
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25:41.240 --> 25:43.160 |
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the people on the ground involved. |
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25:44.280 --> 25:49.080 |
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And it's also a huge business and economic setback as well. |
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25:49.080 --> 25:51.720 |
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I mean, we've seen that it's impacting, essentially, |
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25:51.720 --> 25:53.840 |
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the trade balance of the US. |
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25:53.840 --> 25:58.360 |
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So these are important questions. |
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25:58.360 --> 26:00.200 |
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And these are the kinds of, |
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26:00.200 --> 26:03.040 |
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we've seen similar kinds of questioning at times. |
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26:03.040 --> 26:06.000 |
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We go back to the Challenger accident. |
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26:06.960 --> 26:10.640 |
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And it is, I think, always important to remind ourselves |
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26:10.640 --> 26:11.960 |
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that humans are fallible, |
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26:11.960 --> 26:14.040 |
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that the systems we create, |
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26:14.040 --> 26:16.560 |
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as perfect as we strive to make them, |
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26:16.560 --> 26:18.960 |
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we can always make them better. |
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26:18.960 --> 26:21.760 |
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And so another element of that culture of mission success |
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26:21.760 --> 26:24.960 |
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is really that commitment to continuous improvement. |
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26:24.960 --> 26:27.480 |
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If there's something that goes wrong, |
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26:27.480 --> 26:31.160 |
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a real commitment to root cause |
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and true root cause understanding, |
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26:33.320 --> 26:35.080 |
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to taking the corrective actions |
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26:35.080 --> 26:38.880 |
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and to making the future systems better. |
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26:38.880 --> 26:43.880 |
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And certainly, we strive for no accidents. |
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26:45.160 --> 26:47.760 |
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And if you look at the record |
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26:47.760 --> 26:50.440 |
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of the commercial airline industry as a whole |
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26:50.440 --> 26:53.360 |
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and the commercial aircraft industry as a whole, |
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26:53.360 --> 26:57.640 |
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there's a very nice decaying exponential |
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26:57.640 --> 27:01.680 |
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to years now where we have no commercial aircraft accidents |
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27:01.680 --> 27:04.760 |
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at all, our fatal accidents at all. |
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27:04.760 --> 27:08.360 |
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So that didn't happen by accident. |
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27:08.360 --> 27:11.640 |
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It was through the regulatory agencies, FAA, |
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27:11.640 --> 27:14.400 |
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the airframe manufacturers, |
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27:14.400 --> 27:18.680 |
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really working on a system to identify root causes |
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27:18.680 --> 27:20.520 |
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and drive them out. |
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27:20.520 --> 27:23.880 |
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So maybe we can take a step back |
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27:23.880 --> 27:25.520 |
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and many people are familiar, |
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27:25.520 --> 27:28.840 |
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but Lockheed Martin broadly, |
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27:28.840 --> 27:31.240 |
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what kind of categories of systems |
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27:32.120 --> 27:34.280 |
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are you involved in building? |
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27:34.280 --> 27:36.240 |
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You know, Lockheed Martin, we think of ourselves |
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27:36.240 --> 27:39.880 |
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as a company that solves hard mission problems. |
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27:39.880 --> 27:42.080 |
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And the output of that might be an airplane |
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27:42.080 --> 27:44.640 |
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or a spacecraft or a helicopter or radar |
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27:44.640 --> 27:45.680 |
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or something like that. |
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27:45.680 --> 27:47.920 |
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But ultimately we're driven by these, |
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27:47.920 --> 27:50.240 |
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you know, like what is our customer? |
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27:50.240 --> 27:52.680 |
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What is that mission that they need to achieve? |
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27:52.680 --> 27:55.480 |
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And so that's what drove the SR 71, right? |
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27:55.480 --> 27:57.840 |
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How do you get pictures of a place |
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27:59.000 --> 28:02.160 |
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where you've got sophisticated air defense systems |
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28:02.160 --> 28:05.440 |
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that are capable of handling any aircraft |
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28:05.440 --> 28:07.440 |
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that was out there at the time, right? |
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28:07.440 --> 28:10.440 |
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So that, you know, that's what you'll do to an SR 71. |
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28:10.440 --> 28:12.480 |
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Build a nice flying camera. |
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28:12.480 --> 28:16.040 |
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Exactly, and make sure it gets out and it gets back, right? |
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28:16.040 --> 28:18.280 |
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And that led ultimately to really the start |
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28:18.280 --> 28:20.440 |
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of the space program in the US as well. |
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28:22.200 --> 28:24.920 |
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So now take a step back to Lockheed Martin of today. |
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28:24.920 --> 28:29.040 |
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And we are, you know, on the order of 105 years old now, |
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28:29.040 --> 28:32.400 |
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between Lockheed and Martin, the two big heritage companies. |
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28:32.400 --> 28:34.600 |
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Of course, we're made up of a whole bunch of other companies |
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28:34.600 --> 28:36.120 |
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that came in as well. |
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28:36.120 --> 28:39.800 |
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General Dynamics, you know, kind of go down the list. |
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28:39.800 --> 28:42.600 |
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Today we're, you can think of us |
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28:42.600 --> 28:44.840 |
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in this space of solving mission problems. |
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28:44.840 --> 28:48.440 |
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So obviously on the aircraft side, |
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28:48.440 --> 28:53.000 |
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tactical aircraft, building the most advanced fighter aircraft |
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28:53.000 --> 28:55.120 |
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that the world has ever seen, you know, |
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28:55.120 --> 28:57.880 |
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we're up to now several hundred of those delivered, |
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28:57.880 --> 29:00.080 |
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building almost a hundred a year. |
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29:00.080 --> 29:04.120 |
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And of course, working on the things that come after that. |
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29:04.120 --> 29:07.720 |
|
On the space side, we are engaged in pretty much |
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29:07.720 --> 29:12.720 |
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every venue of space utilization and exploration |
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29:13.160 --> 29:14.280 |
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you can imagine. |
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29:14.280 --> 29:18.040 |
|
So I mentioned things like navigation timing, GPS, |
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29:18.040 --> 29:22.400 |
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communication satellites, missile warning satellites. |
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29:22.400 --> 29:24.760 |
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We've built commercial surveillance satellites. |
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29:24.760 --> 29:27.640 |
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We've built commercial communication satellites. |
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29:27.640 --> 29:29.200 |
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We do civil space. |
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29:29.200 --> 29:32.320 |
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So everything from human exploration |
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29:32.320 --> 29:35.000 |
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to the robotic exploration of the outer planets. |
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29:36.000 --> 29:39.080 |
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And keep going on the space front. |
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29:39.080 --> 29:40.640 |
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But I don't, you know, a couple of other areas |
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29:40.640 --> 29:44.520 |
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I'd like to put out, we're heavily engaged |
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29:44.520 --> 29:47.360 |
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in building critical defensive systems. |
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29:47.360 --> 29:51.640 |
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And so a couple that I'll mention, the Aegis Combat System, |
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29:51.640 --> 29:55.680 |
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this is basically the integrated air and missile defense system |
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29:55.680 --> 29:58.640 |
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for the US and allied fleets. |
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29:58.640 --> 30:02.840 |
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And so protects, you know, carrier strike groups, |
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30:02.840 --> 30:06.560 |
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for example, from incoming ballistic missile threats, |
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30:06.560 --> 30:08.480 |
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aircraft threats, cruise missile threats, |
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30:08.480 --> 30:10.080 |
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and kind of go down the list. |
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30:10.080 --> 30:13.240 |
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So the carriers, the fleet itself |
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30:13.240 --> 30:15.280 |
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is the thing that is being protected. |
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30:15.280 --> 30:18.120 |
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The carriers aren't serving as a protection |
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30:18.120 --> 30:19.360 |
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for something else. |
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30:19.360 --> 30:21.840 |
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Well, that's a little bit of a different application. |
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30:21.840 --> 30:24.360 |
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We've actually built the version called Aegis Assure, |
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30:24.360 --> 30:27.960 |
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which is now deployed in a couple of places around the world. |
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30:27.960 --> 30:31.000 |
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So that same technology, I mean, basically, |
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30:31.000 --> 30:35.360 |
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can be used to protect either an ocean going fleet |
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30:35.360 --> 30:37.840 |
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or a land based activity. |
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30:37.840 --> 30:39.680 |
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Another one, the THAAD program. |
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30:41.040 --> 30:44.720 |
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So THAAD, this is the Theater High Altitude Area Defense. |
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30:44.720 --> 30:49.120 |
|
This is to protect, you know, relatively broad areas |
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30:49.120 --> 30:53.400 |
|
against sophisticated ballistic missile threats. |
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30:53.400 --> 30:57.760 |
|
And so now, you know, it's deployed |
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30:57.760 --> 30:59.880 |
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with a lot of US capabilities. |
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30:59.880 --> 31:01.960 |
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And now we have international customers |
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31:01.960 --> 31:04.520 |
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that are looking to buy that capability as well. |
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31:04.520 --> 31:07.000 |
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And so these are systems that defend, |
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31:07.000 --> 31:10.080 |
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not just defend militaries and military capabilities, |
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31:10.080 --> 31:12.400 |
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but defend population areas. |
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31:12.400 --> 31:16.320 |
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And we saw, you know, maybe the first public use of these |
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31:16.320 --> 31:20.200 |
|
back in the first Gulf War with the Patriot systems. |
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31:21.200 --> 31:23.120 |
|
And these are the kinds of things |
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31:23.120 --> 31:25.960 |
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that Lockheed Martin delivers. |
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31:25.960 --> 31:27.960 |
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And there's a lot of stuff that goes with it. |
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31:27.960 --> 31:31.520 |
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So think about the radar systems and the sensing systems |
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31:31.520 --> 31:35.200 |
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that cue these, the command and control systems |
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31:35.200 --> 31:39.560 |
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that decide how you pair a weapon against an incoming threat. |
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31:39.560 --> 31:42.600 |
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And then all the human and machine interfaces |
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31:42.600 --> 31:45.400 |
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to make sure that they can be operated successfully |
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31:45.400 --> 31:48.040 |
|
in very strenuous environments. |
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31:48.040 --> 31:51.840 |
|
Yeah, there's some incredible engineering |
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31:51.840 --> 31:54.440 |
|
that I'd ever find, like you said. |
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31:54.440 --> 32:00.440 |
|
So maybe if we just take a look at Lockheed history broadly, |
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32:00.720 --> 32:02.960 |
|
maybe even looking at Skunk Works. |
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|
32:04.200 --> 32:07.240 |
|
What are the biggest, most impressive, |
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|
32:07.240 --> 32:11.160 |
|
biggest, most impressive milestones of innovation? |
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|
32:11.160 --> 32:13.560 |
|
So if you look at stealth, |
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32:13.560 --> 32:15.200 |
|
I would have called you crazy if you said |
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32:15.200 --> 32:16.760 |
|
that's possible at the time. |
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32:17.880 --> 32:21.280 |
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And supersonic and hypersonic. |
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32:21.280 --> 32:24.000 |
|
So traveling at, first of all, |
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32:24.000 --> 32:27.280 |
|
traveling at the speed of sound is pretty damn fast. |
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32:27.280 --> 32:29.680 |
|
And supersonic and hypersonic, |
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32:29.680 --> 32:32.160 |
|
three, four, five times the speed of sound, |
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32:32.160 --> 32:34.360 |
|
that seems, I would also call you crazy |
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32:34.360 --> 32:35.760 |
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if you say you can do that. |
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32:35.760 --> 32:38.080 |
|
So can you tell me how it's possible |
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32:38.080 --> 32:39.560 |
|
to do these kinds of things? |
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32:39.560 --> 32:41.080 |
|
And is there other milestones |
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32:41.080 --> 32:45.040 |
|
and innovation that's going on that you can talk about? |
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32:45.040 --> 32:49.000 |
|
Yeah, well, let me start on the Skunk Works saga. |
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32:49.000 --> 32:51.520 |
|
And you kind of alluded to it in the beginning. |
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32:51.520 --> 32:54.920 |
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I mean, Skunk Works is as much an idea as a place. |
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32:54.920 --> 32:59.520 |
|
And so it's driven really by Kelly Johnson's 14 principles. |
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32:59.520 --> 33:02.000 |
|
And I'm not gonna list all 14 of them off, |
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33:02.000 --> 33:04.480 |
|
but the idea, and this I'm sure will resonate |
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33:04.480 --> 33:06.240 |
|
with any engineer who's worked |
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33:06.240 --> 33:09.440 |
|
on a highly motivated small team before. |
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33:09.440 --> 33:13.400 |
|
The idea that if you can essentially have a small team |
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33:13.400 --> 33:17.280 |
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of very capable people who wanna work |
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33:17.280 --> 33:20.520 |
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on really hard problems, you can do almost anything. |
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33:20.520 --> 33:23.280 |
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Especially if you kind of shield them |
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33:23.280 --> 33:26.680 |
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from bureaucratic influences, |
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33:26.680 --> 33:30.680 |
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if you create very tight relationships with your customer |
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33:30.680 --> 33:34.360 |
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so that you have that team and shared vision |
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33:34.360 --> 33:38.280 |
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with the customer, those are the kinds of things |
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33:38.280 --> 33:43.040 |
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that enable the Skunk Works to do these incredible things. |
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33:43.040 --> 33:46.360 |
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And we listed off a number that you brought up stealth. |
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33:46.360 --> 33:50.520 |
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And I mean, this whole, I wish I could have seen Ben Rich |
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33:50.520 --> 33:53.880 |
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with a ball bearing rolling across the desk |
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33:53.880 --> 33:55.880 |
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to a general officer and saying, |
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33:55.880 --> 33:58.400 |
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would you like to have an aircraft |
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33:58.400 --> 34:01.800 |
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that has the radar cross section of this ball bearing? |
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34:01.800 --> 34:04.280 |
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Probably one of the least expensive |
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34:04.280 --> 34:06.320 |
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and most effective marketing campaigns |
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34:06.320 --> 34:08.440 |
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in the history of the industry. |
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34:08.440 --> 34:10.680 |
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So just for people not familiar, |
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34:10.680 --> 34:12.800 |
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I mean, the way you detect aircraft, |
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34:12.800 --> 34:14.680 |
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so I mean, I'm sure there's a lot of ways, |
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34:14.680 --> 34:17.360 |
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but radar for the longest time, |
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34:17.360 --> 34:20.680 |
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there's a big blob that appears in the radar. |
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34:20.680 --> 34:22.360 |
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How do you make a plane disappear |
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34:22.360 --> 34:26.200 |
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so it looks as big as a ball bearing? |
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34:26.200 --> 34:28.040 |
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What's involved in technology wise there? |
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34:28.040 --> 34:32.480 |
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What's broadly sort of the stuff you can speak about? |
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34:32.480 --> 34:34.680 |
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I'll stick to what's in Ben Rich's book, |
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34:34.680 --> 34:39.000 |
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but obviously the geometry of how radar gets reflected |
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34:39.000 --> 34:42.400 |
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and the kinds of materials that either reflect or absorb |
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34:42.400 --> 34:46.480 |
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are kind of the couple of the critical elements there. |
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34:46.480 --> 34:48.080 |
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I mean, it's a cat and mouse game, right? |
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34:48.080 --> 34:52.960 |
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I mean, radars get better, stealth capabilities get better. |
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34:52.960 --> 34:57.680 |
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And so it's a really game of continuous improvement |
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34:57.680 --> 34:58.520 |
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and innovation there. |
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34:58.520 --> 35:00.160 |
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I'll leave it at that. |
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35:00.160 --> 35:04.720 |
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Yeah, so the idea that something is essentially invisible |
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35:04.720 --> 35:06.440 |
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is quite fascinating. |
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35:06.440 --> 35:08.920 |
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But the other one is flying fast. |
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35:08.920 --> 35:13.240 |
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So speed of sound is 750, 60 miles an hour. |
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35:15.360 --> 35:18.480 |
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So supersonic is three, Mach three, |
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35:18.480 --> 35:19.320 |
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something like that. |
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35:19.320 --> 35:21.640 |
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Yeah, we talk about the supersonic obviously |
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35:21.640 --> 35:24.120 |
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and we kind of talk about that as that realm |
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35:24.120 --> 35:26.720 |
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from Mach one up through about Mach five. |
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35:26.720 --> 35:31.720 |
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And then hypersonic, so high supersonic speeds |
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35:32.040 --> 35:34.800 |
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would be past Mach five. |
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35:34.800 --> 35:37.160 |
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And you got to remember Lockheed, Martin, |
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35:37.160 --> 35:39.080 |
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and actually other companies have been involved |
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35:39.080 --> 35:42.240 |
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in hypersonic development since the late 60s. |
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35:42.240 --> 35:45.360 |
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You think of everything from the X 15 |
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35:45.360 --> 35:48.040 |
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to the space shuttle as examples of that. |
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35:50.080 --> 35:54.360 |
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I think the difference now is if you look around the world, |
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35:54.360 --> 35:57.360 |
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particularly the threat environment that we're in today, |
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35:57.360 --> 36:02.360 |
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you're starting to see publicly folks like the Russians |
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36:02.520 --> 36:07.520 |
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and the Chinese saying they have hypersonic weapons |
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36:07.560 --> 36:12.560 |
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capability that could threaten US and allied capabilities. |
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36:14.280 --> 36:18.840 |
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And also basically the claims are these could get around |
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36:18.840 --> 36:21.840 |
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defensive systems that are out there today. |
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36:21.840 --> 36:24.520 |
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And so there's a real sense of urgency. |
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36:24.520 --> 36:28.160 |
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You hear it from folks like the undersecretary of defense |
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36:28.160 --> 36:30.800 |
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for research and engineering, Dr. Mike Griffin |
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36:30.800 --> 36:32.800 |
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and others in the Department of Defense |
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36:32.800 --> 36:37.200 |
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that hypersonics is something that's really important |
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36:37.200 --> 36:41.040 |
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to the nation in terms of both parity |
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36:41.040 --> 36:43.120 |
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but also defensive capabilities. |
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36:43.120 --> 36:46.200 |
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And so that's something that we're pleased. |
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36:46.200 --> 36:49.240 |
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It's something Lockheed, Martin's had a heritage in. |
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36:49.240 --> 36:53.800 |
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We've invested R&D dollars on our side for many years. |
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36:53.800 --> 36:56.240 |
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And we have a number of things going on |
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36:56.240 --> 36:59.760 |
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with various US government customers in that field today |
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36:59.760 --> 37:01.520 |
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that we're very excited about. |
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37:01.520 --> 37:04.520 |
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So I would anticipate we'll be hearing more about that |
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37:04.520 --> 37:06.240 |
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in the future from our customers. |
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37:06.240 --> 37:08.880 |
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And I've actually haven't read much about this. |
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37:08.880 --> 37:10.840 |
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Probably you can't talk about much of it at all, |
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37:10.840 --> 37:12.760 |
|
but on the defensive side, |
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37:12.760 --> 37:15.600 |
|
it's a fascinating problem of perception |
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37:15.600 --> 37:18.360 |
|
of trying to detect things that are really hard to see. |
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37:18.360 --> 37:21.560 |
|
Can you comment on how hard that problem is |
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37:21.560 --> 37:26.560 |
|
and how hard is it to stay ahead, |
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37:26.680 --> 37:29.200 |
|
even if we're going back a few decades, |
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37:29.200 --> 37:30.480 |
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stay ahead of the competition? |
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37:30.480 --> 37:33.680 |
|
Well, maybe I, again, you gotta think of these |
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37:33.680 --> 37:36.480 |
|
as ongoing capability development. |
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37:36.480 --> 37:40.720 |
|
And so think back to the early phase of missile defense. |
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37:40.720 --> 37:44.120 |
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So this would be in the 80s, the SDI program. |
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37:44.120 --> 37:46.440 |
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And in that timeframe, we proved, |
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37:46.440 --> 37:48.920 |
|
and Lockheed Martin proved that you could hit a bullet |
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37:48.920 --> 37:50.320 |
|
with a bullet, essentially, |
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37:50.320 --> 37:53.240 |
|
and which is something that had never been done before |
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37:53.240 --> 37:56.200 |
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to take out an incoming ballistic missile. |
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37:56.200 --> 37:58.760 |
|
And so that's led to these incredible |
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37:58.760 --> 38:01.880 |
|
hit to kill kinds of capabilities, PAC 3. |
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38:03.160 --> 38:07.040 |
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That's the Patriot Advanced Capability Model 3 |
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38:07.040 --> 38:08.160 |
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that Lockheed Martin builds, |
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38:08.160 --> 38:10.740 |
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the THAAD system that I talked about. |
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38:12.120 --> 38:13.880 |
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So now hypersonics, |
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38:13.880 --> 38:17.560 |
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you know, they're different from ballistic systems. |
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38:17.560 --> 38:19.520 |
|
And so we gotta take the next step |
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38:19.520 --> 38:21.160 |
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in defensive capability. |
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38:22.680 --> 38:25.520 |
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I can, I'll leave that there, but I can only imagine. |
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38:26.520 --> 38:29.160 |
|
Now, let me just comment, sort of as an engineer, |
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38:29.160 --> 38:33.440 |
|
it's sad to know that so much that Lockheed has done |
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38:33.440 --> 38:37.640 |
|
in the past is classified, |
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38:37.640 --> 38:40.960 |
|
or today, you know, and it's shrouded in secrecy. |
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38:40.960 --> 38:44.720 |
|
It has to be by the nature of the application. |
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38:46.200 --> 38:49.200 |
|
So like what I do, so what we do here at MIT, |
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38:49.200 --> 38:53.920 |
|
we'd like to inspire young engineers, young scientists, |
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38:53.920 --> 38:56.480 |
|
and yet in the Lockheed case, |
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38:56.480 --> 38:59.720 |
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some of that engineer has to stay quiet. |
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38:59.720 --> 39:00.920 |
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How do you think about that? |
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39:00.920 --> 39:02.120 |
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How does that make you feel? |
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39:02.120 --> 39:07.120 |
|
Is there a future where more can be shown, |
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39:07.120 --> 39:10.600 |
|
or is it just the nature, the nature of this world |
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39:10.600 --> 39:12.760 |
|
that it has to remain secret? |
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39:12.760 --> 39:14.920 |
|
It's a good question. |
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39:14.920 --> 39:19.920 |
|
I think the public can see enough of, |
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39:21.160 --> 39:24.960 |
|
including students who may be in grade school, |
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39:24.960 --> 39:27.160 |
|
high school, college today, |
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39:28.160 --> 39:31.760 |
|
to understand the kinds of really hard problems |
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39:31.760 --> 39:33.360 |
|
that we work on. |
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39:33.360 --> 39:36.160 |
|
And I mean, look at the F35, right? |
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39:36.160 --> 39:40.640 |
|
And obviously a lot of the detailed performance levels |
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39:40.640 --> 39:43.160 |
|
are sensitive and controlled. |
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39:43.160 --> 39:48.160 |
|
But we can talk about what an incredible aircraft this is. |
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39:48.160 --> 39:50.480 |
|
It's a supersonic, super cruise kind of a fighter, |
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39:50.480 --> 39:54.560 |
|
a stealth capabilities. |
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39:54.560 --> 39:57.920 |
|
It's a flying information system in the sky |
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39:57.920 --> 40:01.480 |
|
with data fusion, sensor fusion capabilities |
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40:01.480 --> 40:03.200 |
|
that have never been seen before. |
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40:03.200 --> 40:05.280 |
|
So these are the kinds of things that I believe, |
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40:05.280 --> 40:08.000 |
|
these are the kinds of things that got me excited |
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40:08.000 --> 40:08.960 |
|
when I was a student. |
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40:08.960 --> 40:12.240 |
|
I think these still inspire students today. |
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40:12.240 --> 40:17.040 |
|
And the other thing, I mean, people are inspired by space. |
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40:17.040 --> 40:20.200 |
|
People are inspired by aircraft. |
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40:22.000 --> 40:25.360 |
|
Our employees are also inspired by that sense of mission. |
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40:25.360 --> 40:27.560 |
|
And I'll just give you an example. |
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40:27.560 --> 40:32.640 |
|
I had the privilege to work and lead our GPS programs |
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40:32.640 --> 40:34.400 |
|
for some time. |
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40:34.400 --> 40:37.800 |
|
And that was a case where I actually |
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40:37.800 --> 40:41.040 |
|
worked on a program that touches billions of people |
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40:41.040 --> 40:41.680 |
|
every day. |
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40:41.680 --> 40:43.480 |
|
And so when I said I worked on GPS, |
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40:43.480 --> 40:45.240 |
|
everybody knew what I was talking about, |
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40:45.240 --> 40:47.800 |
|
even though they didn't maybe appreciate the technical |
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40:47.800 --> 40:51.320 |
|
challenges that went into that. |
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40:51.320 --> 40:54.960 |
|
But I'll tell you, I got a briefing one time |
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40:54.960 --> 40:57.400 |
|
from a major in the Air Force. |
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40:57.400 --> 41:01.640 |
|
And he said, I go by call sign GIMP. |
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41:01.640 --> 41:04.320 |
|
GPS is my passion. |
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41:04.320 --> 41:05.720 |
|
I love GPS. |
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41:05.720 --> 41:08.960 |
|
And he was involved in the operational test of the system. |
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41:08.960 --> 41:11.680 |
|
He said, I was out in Iraq. |
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41:11.680 --> 41:17.280 |
|
And I was on a helicopter, Black Hawk helicopter. |
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41:17.280 --> 41:21.440 |
|
And I was bringing back a sergeant and a handful of troops |
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41:21.440 --> 41:23.800 |
|
from a deployed location. |
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41:23.800 --> 41:26.600 |
|
And he said, my job is GPS. |
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41:26.600 --> 41:27.800 |
|
So I asked that sergeant. |
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41:27.800 --> 41:31.360 |
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And he's beaten down and half asleep. |
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41:31.360 --> 41:34.080 |
|
And I said, what do you think about GPS? |
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41:34.080 --> 41:35.120 |
|
And he brightened up. |
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41:35.120 --> 41:35.920 |
|
His eyes lit up. |
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41:35.920 --> 41:39.240 |
|
And he said, well, GPS, that brings me and my troops home |
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41:39.240 --> 41:39.960 |
|
every day. |
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41:39.960 --> 41:41.080 |
|
I love GPS. |
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41:41.080 --> 41:43.760 |
|
And that's the kind of story where it's like, OK, |
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41:43.760 --> 41:46.440 |
|
I'm really making a difference here in the kind of work. |
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41:46.440 --> 41:48.920 |
|
So that mission piece is really important. |
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|
41:48.920 --> 41:51.720 |
|
The last thing I'll say is, and this |
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41:51.720 --> 41:54.840 |
|
gets to some of these questions around advanced |
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41:54.840 --> 41:59.560 |
|
technologies, they're not just airplanes and spacecraft |
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41:59.560 --> 41:59.960 |
|
anymore. |
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|
41:59.960 --> 42:02.760 |
|
For people who are excited about advanced software |
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|
42:02.760 --> 42:06.040 |
|
capabilities, about AI, about bringing machine learning, |
|
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|
42:06.040 --> 42:10.120 |
|
these are the things that we're doing to exponentially |
|
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42:10.120 --> 42:13.120 |
|
increase the mission capabilities that |
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42:13.120 --> 42:14.280 |
|
go on those platforms. |
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42:14.280 --> 42:15.920 |
|
And those are the kinds of things I think |
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42:15.920 --> 42:18.400 |
|
are more and more visible to the public. |
|
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|
42:18.400 --> 42:21.440 |
|
Yeah, I think autonomy, especially in flight, |
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42:21.440 --> 42:23.880 |
|
is super exciting. |
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|
42:23.880 --> 42:28.040 |
|
Do you see a day, here we go, back into philosophy, |
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|
42:28.040 --> 42:35.120 |
|
a future when most fighter jets will be highly autonomous |
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42:35.120 --> 42:37.720 |
|
to a degree where a human doesn't need |
|
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|
42:37.720 --> 42:40.640 |
|
to be in the cockpit in almost all cases? |
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|
42:40.640 --> 42:43.520 |
|
Well, I mean, that's a world that to a certain extent, |
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42:43.520 --> 42:44.240 |
|
we're in today. |
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42:44.240 --> 42:47.800 |
|
Now, these are remotely piloted aircraft, to be sure. |
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|
42:47.800 --> 42:53.920 |
|
But we have hundreds of thousands of flight hours a year now |
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|
42:53.920 --> 42:56.240 |
|
in remotely piloted aircraft. |
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42:56.240 --> 43:00.720 |
|
And then if you take the F 35, I mean, |
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|
43:00.720 --> 43:04.640 |
|
there are huge layers, I guess, in levels of autonomy |
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|
43:04.640 --> 43:10.040 |
|
built into that aircraft so that the pilot is essentially |
|
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|
43:10.040 --> 43:13.280 |
|
more of a mission manager rather than doing |
|
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|
43:13.280 --> 43:16.560 |
|
the data, the second to second elements of flying |
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|
43:16.560 --> 43:17.160 |
|
the aircraft. |
|
|
|
43:17.160 --> 43:19.920 |
|
So in some ways, it's the easiest aircraft in the world |
|
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|
43:19.920 --> 43:20.840 |
|
to fly. |
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|
|
43:20.840 --> 43:22.480 |
|
I'm kind of a funny story on that. |
|
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|
43:22.480 --> 43:27.280 |
|
So I don't know if you know how aircraft carrier landings work. |
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|
43:27.280 --> 43:30.760 |
|
But basically, there's what's called a tail hook, |
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|
43:30.760 --> 43:33.760 |
|
and it catches wires on the deck of the carrier. |
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|
43:33.760 --> 43:39.360 |
|
And that's what brings the aircraft to a screeching halt. |
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|
43:39.360 --> 43:41.800 |
|
And there's typically three of these wires. |
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|
43:41.800 --> 43:43.480 |
|
So if you miss the first, the second one, |
|
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|
43:43.480 --> 43:45.920 |
|
you catch the next one, right? |
|
|
|
43:45.920 --> 43:49.280 |
|
And we got a little criticism. |
|
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|
43:49.280 --> 43:50.880 |
|
I don't know how true this story is, |
|
|
|
43:50.880 --> 43:52.360 |
|
but we got a little criticism. |
|
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|
43:52.360 --> 43:56.200 |
|
The F 35 is so perfect, it always gets the second wires. |
|
|
|
43:56.200 --> 44:00.880 |
|
We're wearing out the wire because it always hits that one. |
|
|
|
44:00.880 --> 44:04.600 |
|
But that's the kind of autonomy that just makes these, |
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44:04.600 --> 44:06.880 |
|
essentially up levels what the human is doing |
|
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|
44:06.880 --> 44:08.520 |
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to more of that mission manager. |
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44:08.520 --> 44:12.040 |
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So much of that landing by the F 35 is autonomous. |
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44:12.040 --> 44:14.000 |
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Well, it's just the control systems |
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44:14.000 --> 44:17.960 |
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are such that you really have dialed out the variability |
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44:17.960 --> 44:19.720 |
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that comes with all the environmental conditions. |
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44:19.720 --> 44:20.800 |
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You're wearing it out. |
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44:20.800 --> 44:24.320 |
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So my point is, to a certain extent, |
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44:24.320 --> 44:27.320 |
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that world is here today. |
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44:27.320 --> 44:30.000 |
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Do I think that we're going to see a day anytime soon |
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44:30.000 --> 44:31.840 |
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when there are no humans in the cockpit? |
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44:31.840 --> 44:33.320 |
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I don't believe that. |
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44:33.320 --> 44:36.680 |
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But I do think we're going to see much more human machine |
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44:36.680 --> 44:38.760 |
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teaming, and we're going to see that much more |
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44:38.760 --> 44:40.480 |
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at the tactical edge. |
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44:40.480 --> 44:41.480 |
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And we did a demo. |
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44:41.480 --> 44:43.760 |
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You asked about what the Skunkworks is doing these days. |
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44:43.760 --> 44:46.200 |
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And so this is something I can talk about. |
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44:46.200 --> 44:51.200 |
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But we did a demo with the Air Force Research Laboratory. |
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44:51.200 --> 44:52.600 |
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We called it HAV Raider. |
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44:52.600 --> 44:59.760 |
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And so using an F 16 as an autonomous wingman, |
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44:59.760 --> 45:02.480 |
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and we demonstrated all kinds of maneuvers |
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45:02.480 --> 45:06.280 |
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and various mission scenarios with the autonomous F 16 |
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45:06.280 --> 45:09.640 |
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being that so called loyal or trusted wingman. |
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45:09.640 --> 45:11.320 |
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And so those are the kinds of things |
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45:11.320 --> 45:15.400 |
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that we've shown what is possible now, |
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45:15.400 --> 45:18.960 |
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given that you've upleveled that pilot to be a mission manager. |
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45:18.960 --> 45:22.280 |
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Now they can control multiple other aircraft, |
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45:22.280 --> 45:25.000 |
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they can almost as extensions of your own aircraft |
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45:25.000 --> 45:27.160 |
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flying alongside with you. |
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45:27.160 --> 45:30.240 |
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So that's another example of how this is really |
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45:30.240 --> 45:31.560 |
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coming to fruition. |
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45:31.560 --> 45:35.120 |
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And then I mentioned the landings, |
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45:35.120 --> 45:38.080 |
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but think about just the implications |
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45:38.080 --> 45:39.800 |
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for humans and flight safety. |
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45:39.800 --> 45:41.800 |
|
And this goes a little bit back to the discussion |
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45:41.800 --> 45:45.720 |
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we were having about how do you continuously improve |
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45:45.720 --> 45:48.920 |
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the level of safety through automation |
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45:48.920 --> 45:52.120 |
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while working through the complexities that automation |
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45:52.120 --> 45:53.320 |
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introduces. |
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45:53.320 --> 45:55.520 |
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So one of the challenges that you have in high performance |
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45:55.520 --> 45:57.480 |
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fighter aircraft is what's called Glock. |
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45:57.480 --> 45:59.960 |
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So this is G induced loss of consciousness. |
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45:59.960 --> 46:02.800 |
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So you pull 9Gs, you're wearing a pressure suit, |
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46:02.800 --> 46:05.760 |
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that's not enough to keep the blood going to your brain, |
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46:05.760 --> 46:07.760 |
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you black out. |
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46:07.760 --> 46:12.320 |
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And of course, that's bad if you happen to be flying low, |
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46:12.320 --> 46:17.520 |
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near the deck, and in an obstacle or terrain environment. |
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46:17.520 --> 46:22.400 |
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And so we developed a system in our aeronautics division |
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46:22.400 --> 46:26.040 |
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called Auto GCAS, so Autonomous Ground Collision Avoidance |
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46:26.040 --> 46:27.400 |
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System. |
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46:27.400 --> 46:30.080 |
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And we built that into the F16. |
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46:30.080 --> 46:33.000 |
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It's actually saved seven aircraft, eight pilots already. |
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46:33.000 --> 46:35.840 |
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And the relatively short time it's been deployed, |
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46:35.840 --> 46:39.320 |
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it was so successful that the Air Force said, |
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46:39.320 --> 46:41.480 |
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hey, we need to have this in the F35 right away. |
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46:41.480 --> 46:46.400 |
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So we've actually done testing of that now in the F35. |
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46:46.400 --> 46:50.200 |
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And we've also integrated an autonomous air collision |
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46:50.200 --> 46:51.000 |
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avoidance system. |
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46:51.000 --> 46:53.000 |
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So I think the air to air problem. |
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46:53.000 --> 46:56.000 |
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So now it's the integrated collision avoidance system. |
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46:56.000 --> 46:58.760 |
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But these are the kinds of capabilities. |
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46:58.760 --> 46:59.920 |
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I wouldn't call them AI. |
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46:59.920 --> 47:04.040 |
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I mean, they're very sophisticated models |
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47:04.040 --> 47:08.080 |
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of the aircraft's dynamics coupled with the terrain models |
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47:08.080 --> 47:12.240 |
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to be able to predict when essentially the pilot is |
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47:12.240 --> 47:14.840 |
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doing something that is going to take the aircraft into, |
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47:14.840 --> 47:18.120 |
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or the pilot's not doing something in this case. |
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47:18.120 --> 47:23.280 |
|
But it just gives you an example of how autonomy can be really |
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47:23.280 --> 47:25.960 |
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a lifesaver in today's world. |
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47:25.960 --> 47:29.160 |
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It's like an autonomous automated emergency |
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47:29.160 --> 47:30.520 |
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braking in cars. |
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47:30.520 --> 47:35.080 |
|
But is there any exploration of perception of, for example, |
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47:35.080 --> 47:39.640 |
|
detecting a Glock that the pilot is out, |
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47:39.640 --> 47:42.960 |
|
so as opposed to perceiving the external environment |
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47:42.960 --> 47:46.000 |
|
to infer that the pilot is out, but actually perceiving |
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47:46.000 --> 47:47.320 |
|
the pilot directly? |
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47:47.320 --> 47:48.880 |
|
Yeah, this is one of those cases where |
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47:48.880 --> 47:52.040 |
|
you'd like to not take action if you think the pilot's there. |
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47:52.040 --> 47:54.160 |
|
And it's almost like systems that try |
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47:54.160 --> 47:56.880 |
|
to detect if a driver is falling asleep on the road, |
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47:56.880 --> 48:00.000 |
|
right, with limited success. |
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48:00.000 --> 48:03.400 |
|
So I mean, this is what I call the system of last resort, |
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48:03.400 --> 48:06.880 |
|
right, where if the aircraft has determined |
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48:06.880 --> 48:10.880 |
|
that it's going into the terrain, get it out of there. |
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48:10.880 --> 48:12.960 |
|
And this is not something that we're just |
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48:12.960 --> 48:15.680 |
|
doing in the aircraft world. |
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48:15.680 --> 48:18.600 |
|
And I wanted to highlight, we have a technology we call Matrix, |
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48:18.600 --> 48:21.960 |
|
but this is developed at Sikorsky Innovations. |
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48:21.960 --> 48:26.080 |
|
The whole idea there is what we call optimal piloting, |
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48:26.080 --> 48:30.560 |
|
so not optional piloting or unpiloted, |
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48:30.560 --> 48:32.240 |
|
but optimal piloting. |
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48:32.240 --> 48:35.880 |
|
So an FAA certified system, so you |
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48:35.880 --> 48:37.400 |
|
have a high degree of confidence. |
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48:37.400 --> 48:40.560 |
|
It's generally pretty deterministic, |
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48:40.560 --> 48:43.880 |
|
so we know that it'll do in different situations, |
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48:43.880 --> 48:49.240 |
|
but effectively be able to fly a mission with two pilots, |
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48:49.240 --> 48:51.560 |
|
one pilot, no pilots. |
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48:51.560 --> 48:56.720 |
|
And you can think of it almost as like a dial of the level |
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48:56.720 --> 48:59.480 |
|
of autonomy that you want, so it's |
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48:59.480 --> 49:01.320 |
|
running in the background at all times |
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49:01.320 --> 49:04.040 |
|
and able to pick up tasks, whether it's |
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49:04.040 --> 49:10.160 |
|
sort of autopilot kinds of tasks or more sophisticated path |
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49:10.160 --> 49:12.040 |
|
planning kinds of activities. |
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49:12.040 --> 49:15.200 |
|
To be able to do things like, for example, land on an oil |
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49:15.200 --> 49:19.480 |
|
rig in the North Sea in bad weather, zero, zero conditions. |
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49:19.480 --> 49:20.880 |
|
And you can imagine, of course, there's |
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49:20.880 --> 49:24.560 |
|
a lot of military utility to capability like that. |
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49:24.560 --> 49:26.480 |
|
You could have an aircraft that you |
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49:26.480 --> 49:28.280 |
|
want to send out for a crewed mission, |
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49:28.280 --> 49:31.880 |
|
but then at night, if you want to use it to deliver supplies |
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49:31.880 --> 49:35.600 |
|
in an unmanned mode, that could be done as well. |
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49:35.600 --> 49:39.960 |
|
And so there's clear advantages there. |
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49:39.960 --> 49:41.840 |
|
But think about on the commercial side, |
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49:41.840 --> 49:44.560 |
|
if you're an aircraft taken, you're |
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49:44.560 --> 49:46.080 |
|
going to fly out to this oil rig. |
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49:46.080 --> 49:48.000 |
|
If you get out there and you can't land, |
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49:48.000 --> 49:51.200 |
|
then you've got to bring all those people back, reschedule |
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49:51.200 --> 49:53.080 |
|
another flight, pay the overtime for the crew |
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49:53.080 --> 49:55.280 |
|
that you just brought back because they didn't get what |
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49:55.280 --> 49:57.240 |
|
they were going to pay for the overtime for the folks that |
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49:57.240 --> 49:58.640 |
|
are out there on the oil rig. |
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49:58.640 --> 50:00.680 |
|
This is real economic. |
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50:00.680 --> 50:03.480 |
|
These are dollars and cents kinds of advantages |
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50:03.480 --> 50:06.000 |
|
that we're bringing in the commercial world as well. |
|
|
|
50:06.000 --> 50:09.120 |
|
So this is a difficult question from the AI space |
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50:09.120 --> 50:11.600 |
|
that I would love it if we were able to comment. |
|
|
|
50:11.600 --> 50:15.360 |
|
So a lot of this autonomy in AI you've mentioned just now |
|
|
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50:15.360 --> 50:17.040 |
|
has this empowering effect. |
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50:17.040 --> 50:20.400 |
|
One is the last resort, it keeps you safe. |
|
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50:20.400 --> 50:25.200 |
|
The other is there's with the teaming and in general, |
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50:25.200 --> 50:29.120 |
|
assistive AI. |
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50:29.120 --> 50:33.160 |
|
And I think there's always a race. |
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50:33.160 --> 50:36.960 |
|
So the world is full of the world is complex. |
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50:36.960 --> 50:41.160 |
|
It's full of bad actors. |
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50:41.160 --> 50:43.600 |
|
So there's often a race to make sure |
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50:43.600 --> 50:48.960 |
|
that we keep this country safe. |
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|
50:48.960 --> 50:52.120 |
|
But with AI, there is a concern that it's |
|
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|
50:52.120 --> 50:55.080 |
|
a slightly different race. |
|
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|
50:55.080 --> 50:56.760 |
|
There's a lot of people in the AI space |
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|
50:56.760 --> 50:59.600 |
|
that are concerned about the AI arms race. |
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|
50:59.600 --> 51:02.280 |
|
That as opposed to the United States |
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51:02.280 --> 51:05.400 |
|
becoming having the best technology |
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51:05.400 --> 51:09.160 |
|
and therefore keeping us safe, even we lose ability |
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51:09.160 --> 51:11.520 |
|
to keep control of it. |
|
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|
51:11.520 --> 51:16.800 |
|
So the AI arms race getting away from all of us humans. |
|
|
|
51:16.800 --> 51:19.440 |
|
So do you share this worry? |
|
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|
51:19.440 --> 51:21.080 |
|
Do you share this concern when we're |
|
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|
51:21.080 --> 51:23.400 |
|
talking about military applications |
|
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|
51:23.400 --> 51:26.520 |
|
that too much control and decision making |
|
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|
51:26.520 --> 51:31.640 |
|
capabilities giving to software or AI? |
|
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|
51:31.640 --> 51:34.120 |
|
Well, I don't see it happening today. |
|
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|
51:34.120 --> 51:38.040 |
|
And in fact, this is something from a policy perspective. |
|
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|
51:38.040 --> 51:39.920 |
|
It's obviously a very dynamic space. |
|
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|
51:39.920 --> 51:42.800 |
|
But the Department of Defense has put quite a bit of thought |
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51:42.800 --> 51:44.280 |
|
into that. |
|
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|
51:44.280 --> 51:46.560 |
|
And maybe before talking about the policy, |
|
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|
51:46.560 --> 51:48.920 |
|
I'll just talk about some of the why. |
|
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|
51:48.920 --> 51:52.640 |
|
And you alluded to it being sort of a complicated and a little |
|
|
|
51:52.640 --> 51:54.040 |
|
bit scary world out there. |
|
|
|
51:54.040 --> 51:57.280 |
|
But there's some big things happening today. |
|
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|
51:57.280 --> 52:00.600 |
|
You hear a lot of talk now about a return to great powers |
|
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|
52:00.600 --> 52:05.400 |
|
competition, particularly around China and Russia with the US. |
|
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|
52:05.400 --> 52:09.400 |
|
But there are some other big players out there as well. |
|
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|
52:09.400 --> 52:13.400 |
|
And what we've seen is the deployment |
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|
52:13.400 --> 52:20.480 |
|
of some very, I'd say, concerning new weapons systems, |
|
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|
52:20.480 --> 52:24.520 |
|
particularly with Russia and breaching some of the IRBM, |
|
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|
52:24.520 --> 52:26.040 |
|
intermediate range ballistic missile |
|
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|
52:26.040 --> 52:29.480 |
|
treaties that's been in the news a lot. |
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|
52:29.480 --> 52:33.640 |
|
The building of islands, artificial islands in the South |
|
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|
52:33.640 --> 52:38.720 |
|
China Sea by the Chinese, and then arming those islands. |
|
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|
52:38.720 --> 52:42.880 |
|
The annexation of Crimea by Russia, |
|
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|
52:42.880 --> 52:44.800 |
|
the invasion of Ukraine. |
|
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|
52:44.800 --> 52:47.160 |
|
So there's some pretty scary things. |
|
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|
52:47.160 --> 52:51.640 |
|
And then you add on top of that, the North Korean threat has |
|
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|
52:51.640 --> 52:52.960 |
|
certainly not gone away. |
|
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|
52:52.960 --> 52:56.680 |
|
There's a lot going on in the Middle East with Iran in particular. |
|
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|
52:56.680 --> 53:02.360 |
|
And we see this global terrorism threat has not abated, right? |
|
|
|
53:02.360 --> 53:06.080 |
|
So there are a lot of reasons to look for technology |
|
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|
53:06.080 --> 53:08.160 |
|
to assist with those problems, whether it's |
|
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|
53:08.160 --> 53:11.240 |
|
AI or other technologies like hypersonage, which |
|
|
|
53:11.240 --> 53:13.000 |
|
was which we discussed. |
|
|
|
53:13.000 --> 53:17.280 |
|
So now, let me give just a couple of hypotheticals. |
|
|
|
53:17.280 --> 53:22.320 |
|
So people react sort of in the second time frame, right? |
|
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|
53:22.320 --> 53:27.760 |
|
You're photon hitting your eye to a movement |
|
|
|
53:27.760 --> 53:30.600 |
|
is on the order of a few tenths of a second |
|
|
|
53:30.600 --> 53:34.440 |
|
kinds of processing times. |
|
|
|
53:34.440 --> 53:38.240 |
|
Roughly speaking, computers are operating |
|
|
|
53:38.240 --> 53:41.560 |
|
in the nanosecond time scale, right? |
|
|
|
53:41.560 --> 53:44.640 |
|
So just to bring home what that means, |
|
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|
53:44.640 --> 53:50.640 |
|
a nanosecond to a second is like a second to 32 years. |
|
|
|
53:50.640 --> 53:53.920 |
|
So seconds on the battlefield, in that sense, |
|
|
|
53:53.920 --> 53:56.600 |
|
literally are lifetimes. |
|
|
|
53:56.600 --> 54:01.920 |
|
And so if you can bring an autonomous or AI enabled |
|
|
|
54:01.920 --> 54:05.480 |
|
capability that will enable the human to shrink, |
|
|
|
54:05.480 --> 54:07.480 |
|
maybe you've heard the term the OODA loop. |
|
|
|
54:07.480 --> 54:12.120 |
|
So this whole idea that a typical battlefield decision |
|
|
|
54:12.120 --> 54:15.800 |
|
is characterized by observe. |
|
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|
54:15.800 --> 54:19.040 |
|
So information comes in, orient. |
|
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|
54:19.040 --> 54:21.240 |
|
What does that mean in the context? |
|
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|
54:21.240 --> 54:23.040 |
|
Decide, what do I do about it? |
|
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|
54:23.040 --> 54:25.160 |
|
And then act, take that action. |
|
|
|
54:25.160 --> 54:27.320 |
|
If you can use these capabilities |
|
|
|
54:27.320 --> 54:30.400 |
|
to compress that OODA loop to stay |
|
|
|
54:30.400 --> 54:32.200 |
|
inside what your adversary is doing, |
|
|
|
54:32.200 --> 54:37.640 |
|
that's an incredible, powerful force on the battlefield. |
|
|
|
54:37.640 --> 54:39.120 |
|
That's a really nice way to put it, |
|
|
|
54:39.120 --> 54:41.680 |
|
that the role of AI in computing in general |
|
|
|
54:41.680 --> 54:46.000 |
|
has a lot to benefit from just decreasing from 32 years |
|
|
|
54:46.000 --> 54:49.680 |
|
to one second, as opposed to on the scale of seconds |
|
|
|
54:49.680 --> 54:51.480 |
|
and minutes and hours making decisions |
|
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|
54:51.480 --> 54:53.400 |
|
that humans are better at making. |
|
|
|
54:53.400 --> 54:54.960 |
|
And it actually goes the other way, too. |
|
|
|
54:54.960 --> 54:57.160 |
|
So that's on the short time scale. |
|
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So humans kind of work in the one second, two seconds |
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to eight hours. |
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After eight hours, you get tired. |
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You got to go to the bathroom, whatever the case might be. |
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So there's this whole range of other things. |
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Think about surveillance and guarding facilities. |
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Think about moving material, logistics, sustainment. |
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A lot of these what they call dull, dirty, and dangerous |
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things that you need to have sustained activity, |
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but it's sort of beyond the length of time |
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that a human can practically do as well. |
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So there's this range of things that |
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are critical in military and defense applications |
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that AI and autonomy are particularly well suited to. |
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Now, the interesting question that you brought up |
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is, OK, how do you make sure that stays within human control? |
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So that was the context for the policy. |
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And so there is a DOD directive called 3,000.09, |
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because that's the way we name stuff in this world. |
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And I'd say it's well worth reading. |
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56:04.240 --> 56:07.240 |
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It's only a couple pages long, but it makes some key points. |
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And it's really around making sure |
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that there's human agency and control over use |
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of semi autonomous and autonomous weapons systems, |
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making sure that these systems are tested, verified, |
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and evaluated in realistic, real world type scenarios, |
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making sure that the people are actually |
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trained on how to use them, making sure |
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that the systems have human machine interfaces that |
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can show what state they're in and what kinds of decisions |
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they're making, making sure that you |
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establish doctrine and tactics and techniques and procedures |
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for the use of these kinds of systems. |
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And so, and by the way, I mean, none of this is easy, |
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but I'm just trying to lay kind of the picture of how |
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the US has said, this is the way we're |
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going to treat AI and autonomous systems, |
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that it's not a free for all. |
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57:04.600 --> 57:08.120 |
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And like there are rules of war and rules of engagement |
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with other kinds of systems, think chemical weapons, |
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biological weapons, we need to think |
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57:13.080 --> 57:15.760 |
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about the same sorts of implications. |
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57:15.760 --> 57:17.920 |
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And this is something that's really important for Lockheed |
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57:17.920 --> 57:20.680 |
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Martin, I mean, obviously we are 100% |
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complying with our customer and the policies and regulations. |
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57:26.400 --> 57:30.760 |
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But I mean, AI is an incredible enabler, say, |
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57:30.760 --> 57:32.360 |
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within the walls of Lockheed Martin |
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in terms of improving production efficiency, |
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helping engineers doing generative design, |
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improving logistics, driving down energy costs. |
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I mean, there's so many applications. |
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But we're also very interested in some |
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of the elements of ethical application |
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within Lockheed Martin. |
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57:51.800 --> 57:56.720 |
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So we need to make sure that things like privacy is taken care |
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57:56.720 --> 57:59.240 |
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of, that we do everything we can to drive out |
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bias in AI enabled kinds of systems, |
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that we make sure that humans are involved in decisions |
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58:06.280 --> 58:10.600 |
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that we're not just delegating accountability to algorithms. |
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58:10.600 --> 58:14.480 |
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And so for us, I talked about culture before, |
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58:14.480 --> 58:17.840 |
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and it comes back to sort of the Lockheed Martin culture |
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and our core values. |
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58:19.200 --> 58:21.680 |
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And so it's pretty simple for us to do what's right, |
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respect others, perform with excellence. |
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58:24.200 --> 58:27.880 |
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And now how do we tie that back to the ethical principles |
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58:27.880 --> 58:31.960 |
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that will govern how AI is used within Lockheed Martin? |
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58:31.960 --> 58:35.520 |
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And we actually have a world, so you might not know this, |
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58:35.520 --> 58:37.680 |
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but they're actually awards for ethics programs. |
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Lockheed Martin's had a recognized ethics program |
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58:41.400 --> 58:43.600 |
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for many years, and this is one of the things |
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58:43.600 --> 58:47.760 |
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that our ethics team is working with our engineering team on. |
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58:47.760 --> 58:51.240 |
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One of the miracles to me, perhaps a layman, |
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58:51.240 --> 58:53.680 |
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again, I was born in the Soviet Union, |
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58:53.680 --> 58:58.400 |
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so I have echoes, at least in my family history of World War |
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58:58.400 --> 59:02.080 |
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II and the Cold War, do you have a sense |
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59:02.080 --> 59:06.120 |
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of why human civilization has not destroyed itself |
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59:06.120 --> 59:09.120 |
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through nuclear war, so nuclear deterrence? |
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59:09.120 --> 59:12.760 |
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And thinking about the future, this technology |
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59:12.760 --> 59:15.080 |
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of our role to play here, and what |
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59:15.080 --> 59:20.440 |
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is the long term future of nuclear deterrence look like? |
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59:20.440 --> 59:25.760 |
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Yeah, this is one of those hard, hard questions. |
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59:25.760 --> 59:28.960 |
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And I should note that Lockheed Martin is both proud |
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59:28.960 --> 59:31.480 |
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and privileged to play a part in multiple legs |
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59:31.480 --> 59:35.880 |
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of our nuclear and strategic deterrent systems |
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59:35.880 --> 59:41.800 |
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like the Trident submarine launch ballistic missiles. |
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59:41.800 --> 59:47.320 |
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You talk about, is there still a possibility |
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59:47.320 --> 59:49.080 |
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that human race could destroy itself? |
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59:49.080 --> 59:54.520 |
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I'd say that possibility is real, but interestingly, |
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59:54.520 --> 59:58.600 |
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in some sense, I think the strategic deterrence |
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59:58.600 --> 1:00:03.400 |
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have prevented the kinds of incredibly destructive world |
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1:00:03.400 --> 1:00:07.280 |
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wars that we saw in the first half of the 20th century. |
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1:00:07.280 --> 1:00:10.880 |
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Now, things have gotten more complicated since that time |
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1:00:10.880 --> 1:00:12.280 |
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and since the Cold War. |
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1:00:12.280 --> 1:00:16.560 |
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It is more of a multipolar, great powers world today. |
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1:00:16.560 --> 1:00:19.000 |
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Just to give you an example, back then, |
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1:00:19.000 --> 1:00:21.840 |
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there were in the Cold War timeframe |
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1:00:21.840 --> 1:00:24.160 |
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just a handful of nations that had ballistic missile |
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1:00:24.160 --> 1:00:25.960 |
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capability. |
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1:00:25.960 --> 1:00:28.200 |
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By last count, and this is a few years old, |
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1:00:28.200 --> 1:00:31.200 |
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there's over 70 nations today that have that, |
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1:00:31.200 --> 1:00:38.000 |
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similar kinds of numbers in terms of space based capabilities. |
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1:00:38.000 --> 1:00:42.520 |
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So the world has gotten more complex and more challenging |
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1:00:42.520 --> 1:00:46.040 |
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and the threats, I think, have proliferated in ways |
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1:00:46.040 --> 1:00:49.480 |
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that we didn't expect. |
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1:00:49.480 --> 1:00:51.920 |
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The nation today is in the middle |
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1:00:51.920 --> 1:00:55.280 |
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of a recapitalization of our strategic deterrent. |
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1:00:55.280 --> 1:00:58.680 |
|
I look at that as one of the most important things |
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1:00:58.680 --> 1:01:00.240 |
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that our nation can do. |
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1:01:00.240 --> 1:01:01.840 |
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What is involved in deterrence? |
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1:01:01.840 --> 1:01:08.000 |
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Is it being ready to attack? |
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1:01:08.000 --> 1:01:11.520 |
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Or is it the defensive systems that catch attacks? |
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1:01:11.520 --> 1:01:13.120 |
|
A little bit of both, and so it's |
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1:01:13.120 --> 1:01:16.600 |
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a complicated game theoretical kind of program. |
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1:01:16.600 --> 1:01:23.280 |
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But ultimately, we are trying to prevent the use |
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1:01:23.280 --> 1:01:24.880 |
|
of any of these weapons. |
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1:01:24.880 --> 1:01:28.000 |
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And the theory behind prevention is |
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1:01:28.000 --> 1:01:33.280 |
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that even if an adversary uses a weapon against you, |
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1:01:33.280 --> 1:01:37.600 |
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you have the capability to essentially strike back |
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1:01:37.600 --> 1:01:40.800 |
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and do harm to them that's unacceptable. |
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1:01:40.800 --> 1:01:44.880 |
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And so that will deter them from making use |
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1:01:44.880 --> 1:01:48.000 |
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of these weapons systems. |
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1:01:48.000 --> 1:01:50.760 |
|
The deterrence calculus has changed, of course, |
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1:01:50.760 --> 1:01:56.320 |
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with more nations now having these kinds of weapons. |
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1:01:56.320 --> 1:01:59.120 |
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But I think from my perspective, it's |
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1:01:59.120 --> 1:02:05.000 |
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very important to maintain a strategic deterrent. |
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1:02:05.000 --> 1:02:08.760 |
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You have to have systems that you will know will work |
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1:02:08.760 --> 1:02:10.920 |
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when they're required to work. |
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1:02:10.920 --> 1:02:12.640 |
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And you know that they have to be |
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1:02:12.640 --> 1:02:16.440 |
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adaptable to a variety of different scenarios |
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1:02:16.440 --> 1:02:17.680 |
|
in today's world. |
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1:02:17.680 --> 1:02:20.320 |
|
And so that's what this recapitalization of systems |
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1:02:20.320 --> 1:02:23.200 |
|
that were built over previous decades, |
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1:02:23.200 --> 1:02:26.640 |
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making sure that they are appropriate not just for today, |
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1:02:26.640 --> 1:02:29.080 |
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but for the decades to come. |
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1:02:29.080 --> 1:02:32.160 |
|
So the other thing I'd really like to note |
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1:02:32.160 --> 1:02:40.120 |
|
is strategic deterrence has a very different character today. |
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1:02:40.120 --> 1:02:42.360 |
|
We used to think of weapons of mass destruction |
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1:02:42.360 --> 1:02:45.720 |
|
in terms of nuclear, chemical, biological. |
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1:02:45.720 --> 1:02:48.640 |
|
And today we have a cyber threat. |
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1:02:48.640 --> 1:02:54.320 |
|
We've seen examples of the use of cyber weaponry. |
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1:02:54.320 --> 1:02:58.520 |
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And if you think about the possibilities |
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1:02:58.520 --> 1:03:03.880 |
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of using cyber capabilities or an adversary attacking the US |
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1:03:03.880 --> 1:03:07.560 |
|
to take out things like critical infrastructure, |
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1:03:07.560 --> 1:03:12.840 |
|
electrical grids, water systems, those |
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1:03:12.840 --> 1:03:16.280 |
|
are scenarios that are strategic in nature |
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1:03:16.280 --> 1:03:19.040 |
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to the survival of a nation as well. |
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1:03:19.040 --> 1:03:23.000 |
|
So that is the kind of world that we live in today. |
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1:03:23.000 --> 1:03:26.640 |
|
And part of my hope on this is one |
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1:03:26.640 --> 1:03:30.840 |
|
that we can also develop technological systems, |
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1:03:30.840 --> 1:03:33.640 |
|
perhaps enabled by AI and autonomy, |
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1:03:33.640 --> 1:03:38.600 |
|
that will allow us to contain and to fight back |
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1:03:38.600 --> 1:03:42.840 |
|
against these kinds of new threats that were not |
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1:03:42.840 --> 1:03:46.280 |
|
conceived when we first developed our strategic deterrence. |
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1:03:46.280 --> 1:03:48.360 |
|
Yeah, I know that Lockheed is involved in cyber. |
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1:03:48.360 --> 1:03:52.040 |
|
So I saw that you mentioned that. |
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1:03:52.040 --> 1:03:54.440 |
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It's an incredibly change. |
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1:03:54.440 --> 1:03:57.360 |
|
Nuclear almost seems easier than cyber, |
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1:03:57.360 --> 1:03:58.680 |
|
because there's so many attack. |
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1:03:58.680 --> 1:04:01.720 |
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There's so many ways that cyber can evolve |
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1:04:01.720 --> 1:04:03.400 |
|
in such an uncertain future. |
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1:04:03.400 --> 1:04:05.800 |
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But talking about engineering with a mission, |
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1:04:05.800 --> 1:04:09.680 |
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I mean, in this case, your engineering systems |
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1:04:09.680 --> 1:04:13.880 |
|
that basically save the world. |
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1:04:13.880 --> 1:04:18.040 |
|
Well, like I said, we're privileged to work |
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1:04:18.040 --> 1:04:20.000 |
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on some very challenging problems |
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1:04:20.000 --> 1:04:23.360 |
|
for very critical customers here in the US |
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1:04:23.360 --> 1:04:26.920 |
|
and with our allies abroad as well. |
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1:04:26.920 --> 1:04:30.800 |
|
Lockheed builds both military and nonmilitary systems. |
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1:04:30.800 --> 1:04:32.960 |
|
And perhaps the future of Lockheed |
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1:04:32.960 --> 1:04:35.360 |
|
may be more in nonmilitary applications |
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1:04:35.360 --> 1:04:38.320 |
|
if you talk about space and beyond. |
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1:04:38.320 --> 1:04:41.480 |
|
I say that as a preface to a difficult question. |
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1:04:41.480 --> 1:04:46.200 |
|
So President Eisenhower in 1961 in his farewell address |
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1:04:46.200 --> 1:04:49.080 |
|
talked about the military industrial complex |
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1:04:49.080 --> 1:04:52.800 |
|
and that it shouldn't grow beyond what is needed. |
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1:04:52.800 --> 1:04:55.880 |
|
So what are your thoughts on those words |
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1:04:55.880 --> 1:04:58.800 |
|
on the military industrial complex, |
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1:04:58.800 --> 1:05:04.080 |
|
on the concern of growth of their developments |
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1:05:04.080 --> 1:05:07.120 |
|
beyond what may be needed? |
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1:05:07.120 --> 1:05:12.400 |
|
That what may be needed is a critical phrase, of course. |
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1:05:12.400 --> 1:05:14.960 |
|
And I think it is worth pointing out, as you noted, |
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1:05:14.960 --> 1:05:19.360 |
|
that Lockheed Martin, we're in a number of commercial businesses |
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1:05:19.360 --> 1:05:23.960 |
|
from energy to space to commercial aircraft. |
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1:05:23.960 --> 1:05:28.640 |
|
And so I wouldn't neglect the importance |
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1:05:28.640 --> 1:05:32.160 |
|
of those parts of our business as well. |
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1:05:32.160 --> 1:05:34.480 |
|
I think the world is dynamic. |
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1:05:34.480 --> 1:05:38.880 |
|
And there was a time, it doesn't seem that long ago to me, |
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1:05:38.880 --> 1:05:41.840 |
|
was I was a graduate student here at MIT |
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1:05:41.840 --> 1:05:43.320 |
|
and we were talking about the peace |
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1:05:43.320 --> 1:05:45.760 |
|
dividend at the end of the Cold War. |
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1:05:45.760 --> 1:05:49.200 |
|
If you look at expenditure on military systems |
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1:05:49.200 --> 1:05:55.640 |
|
as a fraction of GDP, we're far below peak levels of the past. |
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1:05:55.640 --> 1:05:59.120 |
|
And to me, at least, it looks like a time |
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1:05:59.120 --> 1:06:02.920 |
|
where you're seeing global threats changing in a way that |
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1:06:02.920 --> 1:06:06.920 |
|
would warrant relevant investments |
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|
1:06:06.920 --> 1:06:10.920 |
|
in defensive capabilities. |
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1:06:10.920 --> 1:06:18.520 |
|
The other thing I'd note, for military and defensive systems, |
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|
1:06:18.520 --> 1:06:21.440 |
|
it's not quite a free market, right? |
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1:06:21.440 --> 1:06:25.720 |
|
We don't sell to people on the street. |
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1:06:25.720 --> 1:06:29.440 |
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And that warrants a very close partnership |
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1:06:29.440 --> 1:06:34.280 |
|
between, I'd say, the customers and the people that design, |
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1:06:34.280 --> 1:06:39.200 |
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build, and maintain these systems because |
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of the very unique nature, the very difficult requirements, |
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the very great importance on safety |
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and on operating the way they're intended every time. |
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And so that does create, and it's frankly |
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1:06:57.680 --> 1:06:59.560 |
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one of Lockheed Martin's great strengths |
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is that we have this expertise built up |
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over many years in partnership with our customers |
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to be able to design and build these systems that |
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meet these very unique mission needs. |
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Yeah, because building those systems very costly, |
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1:07:14.400 --> 1:07:16.120 |
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there's very little room for mistake. |
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I mean, it's just Ben Rich's book and so on |
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just tells the story. |
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1:07:20.360 --> 1:07:22.440 |
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It's nowhere I can just reading it. |
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1:07:22.440 --> 1:07:24.400 |
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If you're an engineer, it reads like a thriller. |
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1:07:24.400 --> 1:07:30.680 |
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OK, let's go back to space for a second. |
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1:07:30.680 --> 1:07:33.080 |
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I'm always happy to go back to space. |
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1:07:33.080 --> 1:07:38.320 |
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So a few quick, maybe out there, maybe fun questions, |
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1:07:38.320 --> 1:07:40.520 |
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maybe a little provocative. |
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What are your thoughts on the efforts of the new folks, |
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SpaceX and Elon Musk? |
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1:07:48.840 --> 1:07:50.880 |
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What are your thoughts about what Elon is doing? |
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Do you see him as competition, do you enjoy competition? |
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1:07:55.320 --> 1:07:56.440 |
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What are your thoughts? |
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1:07:56.440 --> 1:08:00.160 |
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First of all, certainly Elon, I'd |
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say SpaceX and some of his other ventures |
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1:08:03.200 --> 1:08:08.160 |
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are definitely a competitive force in the space industry. |
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1:08:08.160 --> 1:08:09.880 |
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And do we like competition? |
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1:08:09.880 --> 1:08:11.520 |
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Yeah, we do. |
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1:08:11.520 --> 1:08:15.480 |
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And we think we're very strong competitors. |
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1:08:15.480 --> 1:08:20.800 |
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I think competition is what the US is founded on |
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in a lot of ways and always coming up with a better way. |
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1:08:24.680 --> 1:08:29.480 |
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And I think it's really important to continue |
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to have fresh eyes coming in, new innovation. |
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1:08:33.000 --> 1:08:35.480 |
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I do think it's important to have level playing fields. |
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And so you want to make sure that you're not |
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giving different requirements to different players. |
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1:08:42.800 --> 1:08:47.560 |
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But I tell people, I spent a lot of time at places like MIT. |
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1:08:47.560 --> 1:08:50.600 |
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I'm going to be at the MIT Beaver Works Summer Institute |
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over the weekend here. |
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1:08:52.120 --> 1:08:55.040 |
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And I tell people, this is the most exciting time |
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to be in the space business in my entire life. |
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1:08:58.400 --> 1:09:02.960 |
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And it is this explosion of new capabilities |
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that have been driven by things like the massive increase |
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1:09:06.960 --> 1:09:10.920 |
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in computing power, things like the massive increase |
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in comms capabilities, advanced and additive manufacturing, |
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are really bringing down the barriers to entry |
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in this field and it's driving just incredible innovation. |
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1:09:21.880 --> 1:09:23.600 |
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It's happening at startups, but it's also |
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happening at Lockheed Martin. |
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1:09:25.400 --> 1:09:27.600 |
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I did not realize this, but Lockheed Martin, working |
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with Stanford, actually built the first cubes that |
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1:09:31.360 --> 1:09:35.120 |
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was launched here out of the US that was called Quakesat. |
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1:09:35.120 --> 1:09:37.440 |
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And we did that with Stellar Solutions. |
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This was right around just after 2000, I guess. |
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1:09:41.640 --> 1:09:45.480 |
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And so we've been in that from the very beginning. |
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1:09:45.480 --> 1:09:50.080 |
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And I talked about some of these like Maya and Orion, |
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1:09:50.080 --> 1:09:54.760 |
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but we're in the middle of what we call smartsats and software |
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1:09:54.760 --> 1:09:58.800 |
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to find satellites that can essentially restructure and remap |
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their purpose, their mission on orbit |
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to give you almost unlimited flexibility for these satellites |
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1:10:06.520 --> 1:10:08.000 |
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over their lifetimes. |
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1:10:08.000 --> 1:10:10.200 |
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So those are just a couple of examples, |
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1:10:10.200 --> 1:10:13.440 |
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but yeah, this is a great time to be in space. |
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1:10:13.440 --> 1:10:14.360 |
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Absolutely. |
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1:10:14.360 --> 1:10:20.160 |
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So Wright Brothers flew for the first time 116 years ago. |
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So now we have supersonic stealth planes |
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1:10:23.040 --> 1:10:25.440 |
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and all the technology we've talked about. |
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1:10:25.440 --> 1:10:29.280 |
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What innovations, obviously you can't predict the future, |
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1:10:29.280 --> 1:10:32.440 |
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but do you see Lockheed in the next 100 years? |
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1:10:32.440 --> 1:10:36.800 |
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If you take that same leap, how will the world of technology |
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1:10:36.800 --> 1:10:37.840 |
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and engineering change? |
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1:10:37.840 --> 1:10:39.320 |
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I know it's an impossible question, |
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1:10:39.320 --> 1:10:42.920 |
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but nobody could have predicted that we could even |
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fly 120 years ago. |
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1:10:45.800 --> 1:10:50.640 |
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So what do you think is the edge of possibility |
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1:10:50.640 --> 1:10:52.680 |
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that we're going to be exploring in the next 100 years? |
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1:10:52.680 --> 1:10:55.440 |
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I don't know that there is an edge. |
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1:10:55.440 --> 1:11:00.760 |
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We've been around for almost that entire time, right? |
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1:11:00.760 --> 1:11:03.840 |
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The Lockheed Brothers and Glenn L. Martin |
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1:11:03.840 --> 1:11:07.960 |
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starting their companies in the basement of a church |
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1:11:07.960 --> 1:11:11.840 |
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and an old service station. |
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1:11:11.840 --> 1:11:14.240 |
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We're very different companies today |
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1:11:14.240 --> 1:11:15.720 |
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than we were back then, right? |
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1:11:15.720 --> 1:11:17.680 |
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And that's because we've continuously |
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1:11:17.680 --> 1:11:21.680 |
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reinvented ourselves over all of those decades. |
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1:11:21.680 --> 1:11:24.320 |
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I think it's fair to say, I know this for sure, |
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1:11:24.320 --> 1:11:27.840 |
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the world of the future, it's going to move faster, |
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1:11:27.840 --> 1:11:29.320 |
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it's going to be more connected, |
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1:11:29.320 --> 1:11:31.640 |
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it's going to be more autonomous, |
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1:11:31.640 --> 1:11:36.160 |
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and it's going to be more complex than it is today. |
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1:11:36.160 --> 1:11:39.680 |
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And so this is the world as a CTO of Lockheed Martin |
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1:11:39.680 --> 1:11:41.560 |
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that I think about, what are the technologies |
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1:11:41.560 --> 1:11:42.720 |
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that we have to invest in? |
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1:11:42.720 --> 1:11:45.480 |
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Whether it's things like AI and autonomy, |
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1:11:45.480 --> 1:11:47.280 |
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you can think about quantum computing, |
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1:11:47.280 --> 1:11:49.120 |
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which is an area that we've invested in |
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1:11:49.120 --> 1:11:53.520 |
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to try to stay ahead of these technological changes |
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1:11:53.520 --> 1:11:56.280 |
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and frankly, some of the threats that are out there. |
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1:11:56.280 --> 1:11:58.360 |
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And I believe that we're going to be out there |
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1:11:58.360 --> 1:12:00.840 |
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in the solar system, that we're going to be defending |
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1:12:00.840 --> 1:12:04.960 |
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and defending well against probably military threats |
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1:12:04.960 --> 1:12:08.120 |
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that nobody has even thought about today. |
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1:12:08.120 --> 1:12:12.400 |
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We are going to be, we're going to use these capabilities |
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1:12:12.400 --> 1:12:15.720 |
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to have far greater knowledge of our own planet, |
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1:12:15.720 --> 1:12:19.320 |
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the depths of the oceans, all the way to the upper reaches |
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1:12:19.320 --> 1:12:21.400 |
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of the atmosphere and everything out to the sun |
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1:12:21.400 --> 1:12:23.440 |
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and to the edge of the solar system. |
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1:12:23.440 --> 1:12:26.760 |
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So that's what I look forward to. |
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1:12:26.760 --> 1:12:30.840 |
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And I'm excited, I mean, just looking ahead |
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1:12:30.840 --> 1:12:33.360 |
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in the next decade or so to the steps |
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1:12:33.360 --> 1:12:35.320 |
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that I see ahead of us in that time. |
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1:12:35.320 --> 1:12:38.240 |
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I don't think there's a better place to end. |
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1:12:38.240 --> 1:12:39.600 |
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Okay, thank you so much. |
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1:12:39.600 --> 1:12:41.800 |
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Lex, it's been a real pleasure and sorry, |
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1:12:41.800 --> 1:12:43.400 |
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it took so long to get up here, |
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1:12:43.400 --> 1:13:05.680 |
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but glad we were able to make it happen. |
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