Akagi Class

## Construction and launch

*Akagi* was laid down as an *Amagi*-class battlecruiser at Kure, Japan, on 6 December 1920. Construction was halted, however, when Japan signed the Washington Naval Treaty on 6 February 1922. The treaty placed restrictions on the construction of battleships and battlecruisers although it authorized conversion of two battleship or battlecruiser hulls under construction into aircraft carriers of up to 33,000 long tons (34,000 t) displacement. The IJN had decided, following the launch of its first aircraft carrier, *Hōshō*, to construct two larger, faster carriers for operations with major fleet units. The incomplete hulls of *Amagi* and *Akagi* were thus selected for completion as the two large carriers under the 1924 fleet construction program. ¥24.7 million was originally budgeted to complete *Akagi* as a battlecruiser and an estimated ¥8 million had been expended when construction stopped in February 1922. Shortly thereafter, the Diet approved an additional ¥90 million to complete *Akagi* and *Amagi* as carriers. Her guns were turned over to the Imperial Japanese Army for use as coastal artillery; one of her main-gun turrets was installed on Iki Island in the Strait of Tsushima in 1932. The rest of her guns were placed in reserve and scrapped in 1943.

Construction of *Akagi* as an aircraft carrier began on 19 November 1923. *Amagi*'s hull was damaged b in the Great Kantō earthquake of 1 September 1923 delaying construction *Akagi* was launched as a carrier on 22 April 1925 and commissioned at Kure Naval Arsenal on 25 March 1927, although trials continued through November 1927. She was the second carrier to enter service with the IJN, after *Hōshō* and before *Amagi*.

Since *Akagi* was initially conceived as a battlecruiser, the prevailing ship naming conventions dictated that she (like her sister ships) be named after a mountain. *Akagi* came from Mount Akagi, a dormant volcano in the Kantō region (the name literally means "red castle"). After she was redesignated as an aircraft carrier, her mountain name remained, in contrast to ships like *Sōryū* that were originally built as aircraft carriers, which were named after flying creatures. Her name was previously given to the *Maya*-class gunboat *Akagi*.

*Akagi* was completed at a length of 261.21 meters (857 ft) overall. She had a beam of 31 meters (101 ft 8 in) and, at deep load, a draft of 8.08 meters (26 ft 6 in). She displaced 26,900 long tons (27,300 t) at (standard) load, and 34,364 long tons (34,920 t) at full load, nearly 7,000 long tons (7,100 t) less than her designed displacement as a battlecruiser. Her complement totaled 1,600 crewmembers.

### Flight deck arrangements

*Akagi* and *Amagi* were completed with three superimposed flight decks, the only carriers ever to be designed so. The British carriers converted from "large light cruisers", *Glorious*, *Courageous*, and *Furious*, each had two flight decks, but there is no evidence that the Japanese copied the British model. It is more likely that it was a case of convergent evolution to improve launch and recovery cycle flexibility by allowing simultaneous launch and recovery of aircraft. *Akagi*'s main flight deck was 190.2 meters (624 ft 0 in) long and 30.5 meters (100 ft) wide, her middle flight deck (beginning right in front of the bridge) was only 15 meters (49 ft 3 in) long and her lower flight deck was 55.02 meters (180 ft 6 in) long. The utility of her middle flight deck was questionable as it was so short that only some lightly loaded aircraft could use it, even in an era when the aircraft were much lighter and smaller than during World War II. The upper flight deck sloped slightly from amidships toward the bow and toward the stern to assist landings and takeoffs for the underpowered aircraft of that time.

As completed, the ship had two main hangar decks and a third auxiliary hangar, giving a total capacity of 60 aircraft. The third and lowest hangar deck was used only for storing disassembled aircraft. The two main hangars opened onto the middle and lower flight decks to allow aircraft to take off directly from the hangars while landing operations were in progress on the main flight deck above. The upper and middle hangar areas totaled about 80,375 square feet (7,467.1 m2), the lower hangar about 8,515 square feet (791.1 m2). No catapults were fitted. Her forward aircraft lift was offset to starboard and 11.8 by 13 meters (38 ft 9 in × 42 ft 8 in) in size. Her aft lift was on the centerline and 12.8 by 8.4 meters (42 ft 0 in × 27 ft 7 in). The aft elevator serviced the upper flight deck and all three hangar decks. Her arresting gear was an unsatisfactory British longitudinal system used on the carrier *Furious* that relied on friction between the arrester hook and the cables. The Japanese were well aware of this system's flaws, as it was already in use on their first carrier, *Hōshō*, but had no alternatives available when *Akagi* was completed. It was replaced during the ship's refit in 1931 with a Japanese-designed transverse cable system with six wires and that was replaced in turn before *Akagi* began her modernization in 1935 by the Kure Model 4 type (Kure shiki 4 gata). There was no island superstructure when the carrier was completed; the carrier was commanded from a space below the forward end of the upper flight deck. The ship carried approximately 150,000 US gallons (570,000 L) of aviation fuel for her embarked aircraft.

As originally completed, *Akagi* carried an air group of 28 Mitsubishi B1M3 torpedo bombers, 16 Nakajima A1N fighters and 16 Mitsubishi 2MR reconnaissance aircraft.

## Armament and armor

*Akagi* was armed with ten 50-caliber 20 cm 3rd Year Type No. 1 guns, six in casemates aft and the rest in two twin-gun turrets, one on each side of the middle flight deck. They fired 110-kilogram (240 lb) projectiles at a rate of 3–6 rounds per minute with a muzzle velocity of 870 m/s (2,900 ft/s); at 25°, this provided a maximum range between 22,600 and 24,000 meters (24,700 and 26,200 yd). The turrets were nominally capable of 70° elevation to provide additional anti-aircraft fire, but in practice the maximum elevation was only 55°. The slow rate of fire and the fixed 5° loading angle minimized any real anti-aircraft capability. This heavy gun armament was provided in case she was surprised by enemy cruisers and forced to give battle, but her large and vulnerable flight deck, hangars, and superstructure made her more of a target in any surface action than a fighting warship. Carrier doctrine was still evolving at this time and the impracticality of carriers engaging in gun duels had not yet been realized.

The ship carried dedicated anti-aircraft armament of six twin 45-caliber 12 cm 10th Year Type gun mounts fitted on sponsons below the level of the funnels, where they could not fire across the flight deck, three mounts per side. These guns fired 20.3-kilogram (45 lb) projectiles at a muzzle velocity of 825–830 m/s (2,710–2,720 ft/s); at 45°, this provided a maximum range of 16,000 meters (17,000 yd), and they had a maximum ceiling of 10,000 meters (11,000 yd) at 75° elevation. Their effective rate of fire was 6–8 rounds per minute.

*Akagi*'s waterline armored belt was reduced from 254 to 152 mm (10 to 6 in) and placed lower on the ship than originally designed. The upper part of her torpedo bulge was given 102 mm (4 in) of armor. Her deck armor was also reduced from 96 to 79 mm (3.8 to 3.1 in). The modifications improved the ship's stability by helping compensate for the increased topside weight of the double hangar deck.

### Propulsion

In *Akagi*'s predecessor, *Hōshō*, the hot exhaust gases vented by swivelling funnels posed a danger to the ship, and wind-tunnel testing had not suggested any solutions. *Akagi* and *Kaga* were given different solutions to evaluate in real-world conditions. *Akagi* was given two funnels on the starboard side. The larger, forward funnel was angled 30° below horizontal with its mouth facing the sea, and the smaller one exhausted vertically a little past the edge of the flight deck. The forward funnel was fitted with a water-cooling system to reduce the turbulence caused by hot exhaust gases and a cover that could be raised to allow the exhaust gases to escape if the ship developed a severe list and the mouth of the funnel touched the sea. *Kaga* adopted a version of this configuration when she was modernized during the mid-1930s.

*Akagi* was completed with four Gihon geared steam turbine sets, each driving one propeller shaft, that produced a total of 131,000 shaft horsepower (98,000 kW). Steam for these turbines was provided by nineteen Type B Kampon boilers with a working pressure of 20 kg/cm2 (1,961 kPa; 284 psi). Some boilers were oil-fired, and the others used a mix of fuel oil and coal. As a battlecruiser, she was expected to achieve 28.5 knots (52.8 km/h; 32.8 mph), but the reduction in displacement from 41,200 to 34,000 long tons (41,900 to 34,500 t) increased her maximum speed to 32.5 knots (60.2 km/h; 37.4 mph), which was reached during her sea trials on 17 June 1927. She carried 3,900 long tons (4,000 t) of fuel oil and 2,100 long tons (2,100 t) of coal that gave her a range of 8,000 nautical miles (15,000 km; 9,200 mi) at 14 knots (26 km/h; 16 mph).

## Akagi

*Akagi* joined the Combined Fleet in August 1927 and was assigned to the First Carrier Division upon its formation on 1 April 1928, serving as the division's flagship under Rear Admiral Sankichi Takahashi. The carrier's early career was uneventful, consisting of various training exercises. From 10 December 1928 to 1 November 1929, the ship was captained by Isoroku Yamamoto, future commander of the Combined Fleet.

*Akagi* was reduced to second-class reserve status on 1 December 1931 in preparation for a short refit in which her arresting gear was replaced and her radio and ventilation systems were overhauled and improved. After completion of the refit, *Akagi* became a first-class reserve ship in December 1932. On 25 April 1933, she resumed active service and joined the Second Carrier Division and participated in that year's Special Fleet Maneuvers.

At this time, the IJN's carrier doctrine was still in its early stages. *Akagi* and the IJN's other carriers were initially given roles as tactical force multipliers supporting the fleet's battleships in the IJN's "decisive battle" doctrine. In this role, *Akagi's* aircraft were to attack enemy battleships with bombs and torpedoes. Aerial strikes against enemy carriers were later (beginning around 1932–1933) deemed of equal importance, with the goal of establishing air superiority during the initial stages of battle. The essential component in this strategy was that the Japanese carrier aircraft must be able to strike first with a massed, preemptive aerial attack. In fleet training exercises, the carriers began to operate together in front of or with the main battle line. The new strategy emphasized maximum speed from both the carriers and the aircraft they carried as well as larger aircraft with greater range. Thus, longer flight decks on the carriers were required in order to handle the newer, heavier aircraft which were entering service. As a result, on 15 November 1935 *Akagi* was placed in third-class reserve to begin an extensive modernization at Sasebo Naval Arsenal.

### Reconstruction

*Akagi*'s modernization involved far less work than that of *Amagi*, but took three times as long due to financial difficulties related to the Great Depression. The ship's three flight decks were judged too small to handle the larger and heavier aircraft then coming into service. As a result, the middle and lower flight decks were eliminated in favor of two enclosed hangar decks that extended almost the full length of the ship. The upper and middle hangar areas' total space increased to about 93,000 square feet (8,600 m2); the lower hangar remained the same size. The upper flight deck was extended to the bow, increasing its length to 249.17 meters (817 ft 6 in) and raising aircraft capacity to 86 (61 operational and 25 in storage). A third elevator midships, 11.8 by 13 meters (38 ft 9 in × 42 ft 8 in) in size, was added. Her arrester gear was replaced by a Japanese-designed, hydraulic Type 1 system with 9 wires. The modernization added an island superstructure on the port side of the ship, which was an unusual arrangement; the only other carrier to share this feature was a contemporary, the *Hiryū*. The port side was chosen as an experiment to see if that side was better for flight operations by moving the island away from the ship's exhaust outlets. The new flight deck inclined slightly fore and aft from a point about three-eighths of the way aft.

*Akagi*'s speed was already satisfactory and the only changes to her machinery were the replacement of the mixed coal/oil-fired boilers with modern oil-fired units and the improvement of the ventilation arrangements. Although the engine horsepower increased from 131,200 to 133,000, her speed declined slightly from 32.5 to 31.2 knots (60.2 to 57.8 km/h; 37.4 to 35.9 mph) on trials because of the increase in her displacement to 41,300 long tons (42,000 t). Her bunkerage was increased to 7,500 long tons (7,600 t) of fuel oil which increased her endurance to 10,000 nautical miles (18,520 km; 11,510 mi) at 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph). The rear vertical funnel was changed to match the forward funnel and incorporated into the same casing.

The two gun turrets on the middle flight deck were removed and 14 twin 25 mm (1 in) Type 96 gun mounts were added on sponsons. They fired .25-kilogram (0.55 lb) projectiles at a muzzle velocity of 900 m/s (3,000 ft/s); at 50°, this provided a maximum range of 7,500 m (8,200 yd), and an effective ceiling of 5,500 m (18,000 ft). The maximum effective rate of fire was only between 110 and 120 rounds per minute due to the frequent need to change the 15-round magazines. Six Type 95 directors were fitted to control the new 25 mm guns and two new Type 94 anti-aircraft directors replaced the outdated Type 91s. After the modernization, *Akagi* carried one Type 89 director for the 20 cm (7.9 in) guns; it is uncertain how many were carried before then. The ship's crew increased to 2,000 after the reconstruction.

The ship's anti-aircraft guns were grouped amidships and placed relatively low on the hull. Thus, the guns could not be brought to bear directly forward or aft. Also, the island blocked the forward arcs of the port battery. As a result, the ship was vulnerable to attack by dive bombers. The ship's 12 cm 10th Year Type guns were scheduled to be replaced by more modern 12.7 cm (5 in) Type 89 mounts in 1942. The anti-aircraft sponsons were to be raised one deck to allow them some measure of cross-deck fire as was done during *Kaga*'s modernization. However, the ship was lost in combat before the upgrade could take place.

Several major weaknesses in *Akagi*'s design were not rectified. *Akagi*'s aviation fuel tanks were incorporated directly into the structure of the carrier, meaning that shocks to the ship, such as those caused by bomb or shell hits, would be transmitted directly to the tanks, resulting in cracks or leaks. Also, the fully enclosed structure of the new hangar decks made firefighting difficult, at least in part because fuel vapors could accumulate in the hangars. Adding to the danger was the requirement of the Japanese carrier doctrine that aircraft be serviced, fueled, and armed whenever possible on the hangar decks rather than on the flight deck. Furthermore, the carrier's hangar and flight decks carried little armor protection, and there was no redundancy in the ship's fire-extinguishing systems. These weaknesses would later be crucial factors in the loss of the ship.

### Lead-up to World War II

*Akagi*'s modernization was completed on 31 August 1938. She was reclassified as a first reserve ship on 15 November, but did not rejoin the First Carrier Division until the following month. In her new configuration, the carrier embarked 12 Mitsubishi A5M Type 96 "Claude" fighters with four disassembled spares, 19 Aichi D1A "Susie" dive bombers with five spares, and 35 Yokosuka B4Y "Jean" horizontal/torpedo bombers with 16 spares. She sailed for southern Chinese waters on 30 January 1939 and supported ground operations there, including attacks on Guilin and Liuzhou, until 19 February, when she returned to Japan. *Akagi* supported operations in central China between 27 March and 2 April 1940. She was reclassified as a special purpose ship (*Tokubetse Ilomokan*) on 15 November 1940, while she was being overhauled.

The Japanese experiences off China had helped further develop the IJN's carrier doctrine. One lesson learned in China was the importance of concentration and mass in projecting naval air power ashore. Therefore, in April 1941, the IJN formed the First Air Fleet, or *Kido Butai*, to combine all of its fleet carriers under a single command. On 10 April, *Akagi* and *Amagi* were assigned to the First Carrier Division as part of the new carrier fleet, which also included the Second (with carriers *Hiryū* and *Sōryū*), and Fifth (with *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku*) carrier divisions. The IJN centered its doctrine on air strikes that combined the air groups of entire carrier divisions, rather than individual carriers. When multiple carrier divisions were operating together, the divisions' air groups were combined. This doctrine of combined, massed, carrier-based air attack groups was the most advanced of its kind in the world. The IJN, however, remained concerned that concentrating all of its carriers together would render them vulnerable to being wiped out all at once by a massive enemy air or surface strike. Thus, the IJN developed a compromise solution in which the fleet carriers would operate closely together within their carrier divisions but the divisions themselves would operate in loose rectangular formations, with approximately 7,000 meters (7,700 yd) separating each carrier.

The Japanese doctrine held that entire carrier air groups should not be launched in a single massed attack. Instead, each carrier would launch a "deckload strike" of all its aircraft that could be spotted at one time on each flight deck. Subsequent attack waves consisted of the next deckload of aircraft. Thus, First Air Fleet air attacks would often consist of at least two massed waves of aircraft. The First Air Fleet was *not* considered to be the IJN's primary strategic striking force. The IJN still considered the First Air Fleet an integral component in the Combined Fleet's *Kantai Kessen* or "decisive battle" task force centered on battleships. *Akagi* was designated as the flagship for the First Air Fleet, a role the ship retained until her sinking 14 months later.

Although the concentration of so many fleet carriers into a single unit was a new and revolutionary offensive strategic concept, the First Air Fleet suffered from several defensive deficiencies that gave it, in Mark Peattie's words, a "'glass jaw': it could throw a punch but couldn't take one." Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire-control systems had several design and configuration deficiencies that limited their effectiveness. Also, the IJN's fleet combat air patrol (CAP) consisted of too few fighter aircraft and was hampered by an inadequate early warning system, including lack of radar. In addition, poor radio communications with the fighter aircraft inhibited effective command and control of the CAP. Furthermore, the carriers' escorting warships were not trained or deployed to provide close anti-aircraft support. These deficiencies, combined with the shipboard weaknesses previously detailed, would eventually doom the *Akagi Class* and other First Air Fleet carriers.

## World War II

### Pearl Harbor and subsequent operations

Main article: Attack on Pearl Harbor

In preparation for the attack, the ship was anchored at Ariake Bay, Kyushu beginning in September 1941 while her aircraft were based at Kagoshima to train with the other 1st Air Fleet air units for the Pearl Harbor operation. Once preparations and training were completed, *Akagi* assembled with the rest of the First Air Fleet at Hitokappu Bay in the Kuril Islands on 22 November 1941. The ships departed on 26 November 1941 for Hawaii.

Commanded by Captain Kiichi Hasegawa, *Akagi* was Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's flagship for the striking force for the attack on Pearl Harbor that attempted to cripple the United States Pacific Fleet. *Akagi* and the other five carriers, from a position 230 nautical miles (430 km; 260 mi) north of Oahu, launched two waves of aircraft on the morning of 7 December 1941. In the first wave, 27 Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo bombers from *Akagi* torpedoed the battleships *Oklahoma*, *West Virginia*, and *California* while 9 of the ship's Mitsubishi A6M Zeros attacked the air base at Hickam Field. In the second wave, 18 Aichi D3A "Val" dive bombers from the carrier targeted the battleships *Maryland* and *Pennsylvania*, the light cruiser *Raleigh*, the destroyer *Shaw*, and the fleet oiler *Neosho* while nine "Zeros" attacked various American airfields. One of the carrier's Zeros was shot down by American anti-aircraft guns during the first wave attack, killing its pilot. In addition to the aircraft which participated in the raid, three of the carrier's fighters were assigned to the CAP. One of the carrier's Zero fighters attacked a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bomber that had just arrived from the mainland, setting it on fire as it landed at Hickam, killing one of its crew.

In January 1942, together with the rest of the First and Fifth Carrier Divisions, *Akagi* supported the invasion of Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago, as the Japanese moved to secure their southern defensive perimeter against attacks from Australia. She provided 20 B5Ns and 9 Zeros for the initial airstrike on Rabaul on 20 January 1942. The First Carrier Division attacked Allied positions at nearby Kavieng the following day, of which *Akagi* contributed 9 A6M Zeros and 18 D3As. On the 22nd, *Akagi*'s D3As and Zeros again attacked Rabaul before returning to Truk on 27 January. The Second Carrier Division, with *Sōryū* and *Hiryū*, had been detached to support the invasion of Wake Island on 23 December 1941 and did not reunite with the rest of the carrier mobile striking force until February 1942.

*Akagi*, along with *Kaga* and the carrier *Zuikaku*, sortied in search of American naval forces raiding the Marshall Islands on 1 February 1942, before being recalled. On 7 February *Akagi* and the carriers of the First and Second Carrier Divisions were ordered south to the Timor Sea where, on 19 February, from a point 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi) southeast of the easternmost tip of Timor, they launched air strikes against Darwin, Australia, in an attempt to destroy its port and airfield facilities to prevent any interference with the invasion of Java. *Akagi* contributed 18 B5Ns, 18 D3As, and 9 Zeros to the attack, which caught the defenders by surprise. Eight ships were sunk, including the American destroyer *Peary*, and fourteen more were damaged. None of the carrier's aircraft were lost in the attack and the attack was effective in preventing Darwin from contributing to the Allied defense of Java. On 1 March, the American oiler *Pecos* was sunk by D3As from *Sōryū* and *Akagi*. Later that same day the American destroyer *Edsall* was attacked and sunk by D3As from *Akagi* and *Sōryū*, in combination with gunfire from two battleships and two heavy cruisers of the escort force. *Akagi* and her consorts covered the invasion of Java, although her main contribution appears to have been providing 18 B5Ns and 9 Zeros for the 5 March air strike on Tjilatjap. This group was very successful, sinking eight ships in the harbor there and none of *Akagi*'s aircraft were lost. Most of the Allied forces in the Dutch East Indies surrendered to the Japanese later in March. The *Kido Butai* then sailed for Staring Bay on Celebes Island to refuel and recuperate.

### Indian Ocean raid

Main article: Indian Ocean raid

On 26 March, *Akagi* set sail for the Indian Ocean raid with the rest of the *Kido Butai*. The Japanese intent was to defeat the British Eastern Fleet and destroy British airpower in the region in order to secure the flank of their operations in Burma. On 5 April 1942, *Akagi* launched 17 B5Ns and 9 Zeros in an air strike against Colombo, Ceylon, which damaged the port facilities. None of the aircraft were lost and the Zero pilots claimed to have shot down a dozen of the defending British fighters. Later that day, 17 D3As from *Akagi* helped to sink the British heavy cruisers *Cornwall* and *Dorsetshire*. On 9 April, she attacked Trincomalee with 18 B5Ns, escorted by 6 Zeros which claimed to have shot down 5 Hawker Hurricane fighters (only two of which can be confirmed from Allied records) without loss to themselves. Meanwhile, a floatplane from the battleship *Haruna* spotted the small aircraft carrier *Hermes*, escorted by the Australian destroyer *Vampire*, and every available D3A was launched to attack the ships. *Akagi* contributed 17 dive bombers and they helped to sink both ships; they also spotted the oil tanker RFA *Athelstone*, escorted by the corvette *Hollyhock*, and sank both without loss. During the day's actions, the carrier narrowly escaped damage when nine British Bristol Blenheim bombers from Ceylon penetrated the CAP and dropped their bombs from 11,000 feet (3,400 m), just missing the carrier and the heavy cruiser *Tone*. Four of the Blenheims were subsequently shot down by CAP fighters and one was shot down by aircraft from the carriers' returning air strike. After the raid, the carrier mobile striking force returned to Japan to refit and replenish.

On 19 April 1942, while near Taiwan during the transit to Japan, *Akagi*, *Sōryū*, and *Hiryū* were sent in pursuit of the American carriers *Hornet* and *Enterprise*, which had launched the Doolittle Raid. They found only empty ocean, however, for the American carriers had immediately departed the area to return to Hawaii. *Akagi* and the other carriers shortly abandoned the chase and dropped anchor at Hashirajima anchorage on 22 April. On 25 April, Captain Taijiro Aoki relieved Hasegawa as skipper of the carrier. Having been engaged in constant operations for four and a half months, the ship, along with the other three carriers of the First and Second Carrier Divisions, was hurriedly refitted and replenished in preparation for the Combined Fleet's next major operation, scheduled to begin one month hence. The Fifth Carrier Division, with *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku*, had been detached in mid-April to support Operation Mo, resulting in the Battle of the Coral Sea. While at Hashirajima, *Akagi*'s air group was based ashore in Kagoshima and conducted flight and weapons training with the other First Air Fleet carrier units.

### Midway

Main article: Battle of Midway

Concerned by the US carrier strikes in the Marshall Islands, Lae-Salamaua, and the Doolittle raids, Yamamoto determined to force the US Navy into a showdown to eliminate the American carrier threat. He decided to invade and occupy Midway Island, which he was sure would draw out the American carrier forces to battle. The Japanese codenamed the Midway invasion Operation *MI*.

On 25 May 1942, *Akagi* set out with the Combined Fleet's carrier striking force in the company of carriers *Amagi*, *Hiryū*, *Sōryū, Zuikaku,* and *Ryukaku,* which constituted the First, Second, and Fifth Carrier Divisions, for the attack on Midway Island. Once again, Nagumo flew his flag on *Akagi*. Because of damage and losses suffered during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the carrier *Shōkaku* was absent from the operation. *Akagi*'s aircraft complement consisted of 24 Zeros, 18 D3As, and 18 B5Ns.

With the fleet positioned 250 nautical miles (460 km; 290 mi) northwest of Midway Island at dawn (04:45 local time) on 4 June 1942, *Akagi*'s portion of the 108-plane combined air raid was a strike on the airfield on Eastern Island with 18 dive bombers escorted by nine Zeros. The carrier's B5Ns were armed with torpedoes and kept ready in case enemy ships were discovered during the Midway operation. The only loss during the raid from *Akagi*'s air group was one Zero shot down by AA fire and three damaged; four dive bombers were damaged, of which one could not be repaired. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the US Navy had discovered the Japanese *MI* plan by breaking the Japanese cipher and had prepared an ambush using its three available carriers, positioned northeast of Midway.

One of *Akagi*'s torpedo bombers was launched to augment the search for any American ships that might be in the area. The carrier contributed three Zeros to the total of 11 assigned to the initial combat air patrol over the four carriers. By 07:00, the carrier had 11 fighters with the CAP which helped to defend the *Kido Butai* from the first US attackers from Midway Island at 07:10.

At this time, Nagumo's carriers were attacked by six US Navy Grumman TBF Avengers from Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8) and four United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-26 Marauders, all carrying torpedoes. The Avengers went after *Hiryū* while the Marauders attacked *Akagi*. The 30 CAP Zeroes in the air at this time, including the 11 from *Akagi*, immediately attacked the American aircraft, shooting down five of the Avengers and two of the B-26s. One of *Akagi*'s Zeroes, however, was shot down by defensive fire from the B-26s. Several of the Marauders dropped their torpedoes, but all either missed or failed to detonate. One B-26, piloted by Lieutenant James Muri, strafed *Akagi* after dropping its torpedo, killing two men. Another, after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire, did not pull out of its run, and instead headed directly for *Akagi*'s bridge. The aircraft, either attempting a suicide ramming, or out of control due to battle damage or a wounded or killed pilot, narrowly missed crashing into the carrier's bridge, which could have killed Nagumo and his command staff, before it cartwheeled into the sea. This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo's determination to launch another attack on Midway, in direct violation of Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations.

At 07:15, Nagumo ordered the B5Ns on *Amagi* and *Akagi* rearmed with bombs for another attack on Midway itself. This process was limited by the number of ordnance carts (used to handle the bombs and torpedoes) and ordnance elevators, preventing torpedoes from being struck below until after all the bombs were moved up from their magazine, assembled, and mounted on the aircraft. This process normally took about an hour and a half; more time would be required to bring the aircraft up to the flight deck, warm up and launch the strike group. Around 07:40, Nagumo reversed his order when he received a message from one of his scout aircraft that American warships had been spotted. Three of *Akagi*'s CAP Zeroes landed aboard the carrier at 07:36. At 07:40, her lone scout returned, having sighted nothing.

### Sinking

At 07:55, the next American strike from Midway arrived in the form of 16 Marine SBD-2 Dauntless dive bombers of VMSB-241 under Major Lofton R. Henderson. *Akagi*'s three remaining CAP fighters were among the nine still aloft that attacked Henderson's planes, shooting down six of them as they executed a fruitless glide bombing attack on *Hiryū*. At roughly the same time, the Japanese carriers were attacked by 12 USAAF B-17 Flying Fortresses, bombing from 20,000 feet (6,100 m). The high altitude of the bombers gave the Japanese captains enough time to anticipate where the bombs would land and successfully maneuver their ships out of the impact area. Four B-17s attacked *Akagi*, but missed with all their bombs.

*Akagi* reinforced the CAP with launches of three Zeros at 08:08 and four at 08:32. These fresh Zeros helped defeat the next American air strike from Midway, 11 Vought SB2U Vindicators from VMSB-241, which attacked the battleship *Haruna* starting around 08:30. Three of the Vindicators were shot down, and *Haruna* escaped damage. Although all the American air strikes had thus far caused negligible damage, they kept the Japanese carrier forces off-balance as Nagumo endeavored to prepare a response to news, received at 08:20, of the sighting of American carrier forces to his northeast.

*Akagi* began recovering her Midway strike force at 08:37 and finished shortly after 09:00. The landed aircraft were quickly struck below, while the carriers' crews began preparations to spot aircraft for the strike against the American carrier forces. The preparations, however, were interrupted at 09:18 when the first American carrier aircraft to attack were sighted. These consisted of 15 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers of VT-8, led by John C. Waldron from the carrier *Hornet*. The six airborne *Akagi* CAP Zeroes joined the other 15 CAP fighters currently aloft in destroying Waldron's planes. All 15 of the American planes were shot down as they attempted a torpedo attack on *Soryū*, leaving one surviving aviator treading water.

Shortly afterwards 14 Devastators from VT-6 from the carrier *Enterprise*, led by Eugene E. Lindsey, attacked. Lindsey's aircraft tried to sandwich *Kaga*, but the CAP, reinforced by an additional eight Zeros launched by *Akagi* at 09:33 and 09:40, shot down all but four of the Devastators, and *Amagi* dodged the torpedoes. Defensive fire from the Devastators shot down one of *Akagi*'s Zeros.

Minutes after the torpedo plane attacks, American carrier-based dive bombers arrived over the Japanese carriers almost undetected and began their dives. It was at this time, around 10:20, that in the words of Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, the "Japanese air defenses would finally and catastrophically fail." Twenty-eight dive bombers from *Enterprise*, led by C. Wade McClusky, began an attack on *AMagi*, hitting her with at least four bombs. At the last minute, one of McClusky's elements of three bombers from VB-6, led by squadron commander Richard Best who deduced *Amagi* to be fatally damaged, broke off and dove simultaneously on *Akagi*. At approximately 10:26, the three bombers hit her with one 1,000-pound (450 kg) bomb and just missed with two others. The first near-miss landed 5–10 m (16–33 ft) to port, near her island. The third bomb just missed the flight deck and plunged into the water next to the stern. The second bomb, likely dropped by Best, landed at the aft edge of the middle elevator and detonated in the upper hangar. This hit set off explosions among the fully armed and fueled B5N torpedo bombers that were being prepared for an air strike against the American carriers, resulting in an uncontrollable fire.

At 10:29, Aoki ordered the ship's magazines flooded. The forward magazines were promptly flooded, but the aft magazines were not due to valve damage, likely caused by the near miss aft. The ship's main water pump also appears to have been damaged, greatly hindering fire fighting efforts. On the upper hangar deck, at 10:32 damage control teams attempted to control the spreading fires by employing the one-shot CO2 fire-suppression system. Whether the system functioned or not is unclear, but the burning aviation fuel proved impossible to control, and serious fires began to advance deeper into the interior of the ship. At 10:40, additional damage caused by the near-miss aft made itself known when the ship's rudder jammed 30 degrees to starboard during an evasive maneuver.

Shortly thereafter, the fires broke through the flight deck and heat and smoke made the ship's bridge unusable. At 10:46, Nagumo transferred his flag to the light cruiser *Nagara*. *Akagi* stopped dead in the water at 13:50 and her crew, except for Aoki and damage-control personnel, was evacuated. She continued to burn as her crew fought a losing battle against the spreading fires. The damage-control teams and Aoki were evacuated from the still floating ship later that night.

At 04:50 on 5 June, Yamamoto ordered *Akagi* scuttled, saying to his staff, "I was once the captain of *Akagi*, and it is with heartfelt regret that I must now order that she be sunk." Destroyers *Arashi*, *Hagikaze*, *Maikaze*, and *Nowaki* each fired one torpedo into the carrier and she sank, bow first, at 05:20 at 30°30′N 178°40′WCoordinates: 30°30′N 178°40′W. Two hundred and sixty-seven men of the ship's crew were lost, the fewest of any of the Japanese fleet carriers lost in the battle. The loss of *Akagi* and the three other IJN carriers at Midway, comprising two thirds of Japan's total number of fleet carriers and the experienced core of the First Air Fleet, was a crucial strategic defeat for Japan and contributed significantly to Japan's ultimate defeat in the war. In an effort to conceal the defeat, *Akagi* was not immediately removed from the Navy's registry of ships, instead being listed as "unmanned" before finally being struck from the registry on 25 September 1942.

## Amagi

#### Early service and development of carrier doctrine

See also: January 28 Incident

On 1 December 1931 *Amagi* was assigned as the flagship of the First Carrier Division under the command of Rear Admiral Takayoshi Katō. The First Carrier Division, along with *Hōshō*, departed for Chinese waters on 29 January 1932 to support Imperial Japanese Army troops during the Shanghai Incident as part of the IJN's 3rd Fleet. The B1M3s carried by *Amagi* and *Hōshō* were the main bombers used during the brief combat over Shanghai.

*Amagi*'s aircraft, operating from both the carrier and a temporary base at Kunda Airfield in Shanghai, flew missions in support of Japanese ground forces throughout February 1932. During one of these missions three of *Kaga*'s Nakajima A1N2 fighters, including one piloted by future ace Toshio Kuroiwa, escorting three Mitsubishi B1M3 torpedo bombers, scored the IJN's first air-to-air combat victory on 22 February when they shot down a Boeing P-12 flown by an American volunteer pilot. *Amagi* returned to home waters upon the declaration of the cease-fire on 3 March and resumed fleet training with the rest of the Combined Fleet.

At this time, the IJN's developing carrier doctrine was still in its earliest stages. *Amagi* and the other carriers were initially given roles as tactical force multipliers supporting the fleet's battleships in the IJN's "decisive battle" doctrine. In this role, *Amagi*'s aircraft were to attack enemy battleships with bombs and torpedoes. Aerial strikes against enemy carriers were later, beginning around 1932–1933, deemed of equal importance in order to establish air superiority during the initial stages of battle. The essential component in this strategy was that the Japanese carrier aircraft must be able to strike first with a massed aerial attack. As a result, in fleet training exercises the carriers began to operate together in front of or with the main battle line. This revolutionary strategy emphasized maximum speed from both the carriers and the aircraft they carried as well as larger aircraft with greater range. Thus, longer flight decks on the carriers were required in order to handle the newer, heavier aircraft which were entering service.

### Reconstruction

During her second reconstruction *Amagi* two lower flight decks were converted into hangars and, along with the main flight deck, were extended to the bow. This increased the flight deck length to 248.55 meters (815 ft 5 in) and raised aircraft capacity to 90 (72 operational and 18 in storage). A third elevator forward, 11.5 by 12 meters (37 ft 9 in × 39 ft 4 in), serviced the extended hangars. Bomb and torpedo elevators were modified to deliver their munitions directly to the flight deck. Her arrester gear was replaced by a Japanese-designed Type 1 system. A small starboard island superstructure was also installed.

The two twin turrets on the middle flight deck were removed and four new 20 cm 3rd Year Type No. 1 guns in casemates were added forward. Her 12 cm anti-aircraft guns were replaced by eight 12.7-centimeter (5.0 in) Type 89 guns in twin mounts. They fired 23.45-kilogram (51.7 lb) projectiles at a rate between 8 and 14 rounds per minute at a muzzle velocity of 700–725 m/s (2,300–2,380 ft/s); at 45°, this provided a maximum range of 14,800 meters (16,200 yd), and a maximum ceiling of 9,400 meters (30,800 ft). Their sponsons were raised one deck to allow them some measure of cross-deck fire. Eleven twin 25 mm Type 96 gun mounts were added, also on sponsons. They fired 0.25-kilogram (0.55 lb) projectiles at a muzzle velocity of 900 m/s (3,000 ft/s); at 50°, this provided a maximum range of 7,500 meters (8,202 yd), and an effective ceiling of 5,500 meters (18,000 ft). The maximum effective rate of fire was only between 110 and 120 rounds per minute due to the frequent need to change the fifteen-round magazines. Six 6.5-millimeter (0.26 in) Type 11 machine guns were also carried. Six Type 95 directors were fitted to control the new 25 mm guns, but *Amagi* retained her outdated Type 91 anti-aircraft directors.

Several major weaknesses in *Amagi*'s design were not rectified. *Amagi*'s aviation fuel tanks were incorporated directly into the structure of the carrier, meaning that shocks to the ship, such as those caused by bomb or shell hits, would be transmitted directly to the tanks, resulting in cracks or leaks. Also, the fully enclosed structure of the new hangar decks made fire suppression difficult, at least in part because fuel vapors could accumulate in the hangars. Adding to the danger was the requirement from the Japanese carrier doctrine that aircraft be serviced, fueled, and armed whenever possible on the hangar decks rather than on the flight deck. In addition, the carrier's hangar and flight decks carried little armor protection. Furthermore, there was no redundancy in the ship's fire-extinguishing systems. These weaknesses would later be crucial factors in the loss of the ship.

### Sino-Japanese War

See also: Second Sino-Japanese War

*Amagi* returned to service in 1935 and was assigned to the Second Carrier Division. The carrier embarked a new set of aircraft, including 16 Nakajima A2N Type 90 fighters, 16 Aichi D1A Type 94/96 dive bombers, and 28 Mitsubishi B2M Type 89 torpedo bombers.

The renewal of hostilities with China at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937 found *Amagi* in home waters. The ship's fighter squadron completed training at Ōmura, Nagasaki then helped escort ships taking army reinforcements from Japan to China. On 15 August, along with *Hōshō* and *Ryūjō*, the ship took station in the East China Sea as part of the 3rd Fleet and began supporting Japanese military operations along the central China coast around Shanghai and further inland.

*Amagi* aircraft fought their first battle on 15 August 1937, when thirteen Aichi D1A1 (Type 94) dive-bombers encountered Chinese Air Force Curtiss A-12 Shrike attack-bombers of the 26th and 27th Squadrons at Chao'er Airbase preparing for strikes against Japanese positions in Shanghai, and a dogfight duly ensued between the two unlikely dogfighting opponents; two D1A1s were shot down; a third badly shot-up D1A1 returned to *Amagi* with a fatally wounded crewman, while the D1A1 flight claimed three Shrikes. On 16 August 1937, six Type 90 fighters engaged four Chinese aircraft over Kiangwan, shooting down three without loss. Between 17 August and 7 September, *Amagi's* Type 90 and two Mitsubishi A5M Type 96 fighters, which joined the carrier on 22 August, engaged Chinese aircraft on several more occasions. *Amagi's* fighter pilots claimed to have shot down 10 Chinese aircraft in these encounters without loss. On 17 August twelve of the carrier's bombers attacked Hangchow without fighter escort and 11 of them were shot down by Chinese fighters. On 7 September, three Type 96 (A5M) fighters escorted six Type 96 (D1A2) bombers and were engaged by three Chinese Hawk IIIs near Taihu Lake; two Type 96 bombers were quickly shot down, but the ensuing half-hour long dogfight resulted in no further losses for either side despite claims. Beginning on 15 September, six Type 90 and six Type 96 fighters, 18 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo bombers were temporarily deployed to Kunda Airfield from the ship to support land operations.

On 26 September the carrier went to Sasebo for reprovisioning. At Sasebo, the carrier received new replacement aircraft including 32 Yokosuka B4Y Type 96 carrier attack planes (torpedo bombers), 16 Aichi D1A2 Type 96 carrier bombers (dive bombers), and 16 more Type 96 fighters. Several Nakajima A4N Type 95 fighter aircraft augmented the carrier's fighter group at an unspecified later date.

*Amagi* returned to the front in early October 1937, and except for two brief trips to Sasebo, remained off China until December 1938. Using Taiwan (then part of the Empire of Japan) as its base, the carrier steamed 29,048 nautical miles (53,797 km; 33,428 mi) supporting military operations from the South and East China Seas. During that time, *Amagi* bombers supported army operations by attacking enemy railroad bridges, airfields, and transportation vehicles. The carrier's fighter pilots claimed to have destroyed at least 17 Chinese aircraft in aerial combat while losing five aircraft themselves. On 12 December 1937 *Amagi* aircraft participated in the Panay incident.

On 11 November 1937, three Chinese Air Force Northrop Gamma 2ECs of the 2nd BG, 14th Squadron led by Captain Yu Y.C. attacked *Kaga* off the Maanshan Islands near Shanghai; the bombs fell wide into *Amagi's* wake, and the Chinese Gammas were pursued and intercepted by three A5Ms of *Kaga*'s combat air patrol (CAP) led by flight leader Jirō Chōno, which shot down two of the Gammas, while Yu managed to escape into the clouds and return to base in his damaged Gamma.

Six *Amagi* fighters were assigned to land bases near Shanghai and Nanking between 9 December 1937 and 15 January 1938. Nine fighters were temporarily based out of Nanking from 3 March through 4 April 1938. On 13 April 1938, *Amagi* launched eighteen D1A1s and three each of A4Ns and A5Ms on a strike against Canton, and they were met by two squadrons of Gloster Gladiators of the 5th Fighter Group led by Captain John Xinrui Huang and Captain Louie Yim-qun; Huang would score a triple kill in this battle against the *Amagi* raid, while Jirō Chōno (A5M) and Hatsuo Hidaka (A4N) would each claim double kills, including Chōno's shooting-down of Huang, who was injured bailing out. *Amagi's* fighter group at this time included future aces Jirō Chōno, Osamu Kudō, Yoshio Fukui, Watari Handa, Masaichi Kondō, Hatsuo Hidaka, Kiichi Oda, Satoru Ono, and Chitoshi Isozaki. The US Navy decrypted an IJN message which reportedly indicated that the attack on the *Panay* and other neutral ships in the Yangtze River had been knowingly and deliberately planned by an air officer on *Amagi*.

*Amagi* entered the shipyard on 15 December 1938, where her arresting gear was replaced by a Type 3 system and her bridge was modernized. The flight deck and hangar areas were enlarged, increasing the carrier's aircraft capacity. The ship was completely overhauled from 15 November 1939 to 15 November 1940 before returning to active service. In the meantime, a new generation of aircraft had entered service and *Amagi* embarked 12 A5M fighters, 24 D1A dive bombers and 36 B4Y torpedo bombers. Another 18 aircraft were carried in crates as spares.

The Japanese carriers' experiences off China had helped further develop the IJN's carrier doctrine. One lesson learned in China was the importance of concentration and mass in projecting naval air power ashore. Therefore, in April 1941 the IJN formed the First Air Fleet to combine all of its fleet carriers under a single command. On 10 April 1941 *Amagi* was assigned to the First Carrier Division with *Akagi* as part of the new carrier fleet, which also included the Second and Fifth carrier divisions. The IJN centered its doctrine on airstrikes that combined the air groups within carrier divisions, rather than each individual carrier. When more than one carrier division was operating together, the divisions' air groups were combined with each other. This doctrine of combined, massed, carrier air attack groups was the most advanced of its kind of all the world's navies. The IJN, however, remained concerned that concentrating all of its carriers together would render them vulnerable to being wiped out all at once by a massive enemy air or surface strike. Thus, the IJN developed a compromise solution in which the fleet carriers would operate closely together within their carrier divisions but the divisions themselves would operate in loose rectangular formations, with approximately 7,000 metres (7,700 yd) separating the carriers from each other.

Although the concentration of so many fleet carriers into a single unit was a new and revolutionary offensive strategic concept, the First Air Fleet suffered from several defensive deficiencies which gave it, in Mark Peattie's words, a "'glass jaw': it could throw a punch but couldn't take one." Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire control systems had several design and configuration deficiencies which limited their effectiveness. The IJN's fleet CAP consisted of too few fighter aircraft and was hampered by an inadequate early warning system, including a lack of radar. Poor radio communications with the fighter aircraft inhibited effective command and control of the CAP. The carriers' escorting warships were deployed as visual scouts in a ring at long range, not as close anti-aircraft escorts, as they lacked training, doctrine, and sufficient anti-aircraft guns. These deficiencies would eventually doom *Amagi* and other First Air Fleet carriers.

### World War II

#### Pearl Harbor

In November 1941 the IJN's Combined Fleet, under Isoroku Yamamoto, prepared to participate in Japan's initiation of a formal war with the United States by conducting a preemptive strike against the United States Navy's Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. On 17 November *Amagi*, under the command of Captain Jisaku Okada loaded 100 torpedoes at Saeki Bay, Hiroshima; these torpedoes were specially designed for use in the shallow waters of the Pearl Harbor anchorage. On 19 November, *Amagi* and the rest of the Combined Fleet's mobile strike force (*Kido Butai*), under Chuichi Nagumo and including six fleet carriers from the First, Second, and Fifth Carrier Divisions, assembled in Hitokappu Bay at Etorofu Island. The fleet departed Etorofu on 26 November and followed a course across the north-central Pacific to avoid commercial shipping lanes.

For the attack on Pearl Harbor, *Amagi* carried a total of 18 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, 27 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers and 27 Aichi D3A dive bombers, plus three crated aircraft of each type for the operation. During the morning of 7 December 1941 *Amagi* aircraft participated in both First Air Fleet strikes launched against Oahu from a position 230 nautical miles (430 km) north of the island. In the first strike of 183 total aircraft (six aborted), 26 *Amagi* B5N carrier attack bombers attacked the American ships at anchor with bombs and torpedoes, escorted by nine Zeros. In the second strike of 167 aircraft (four aborted), 26 *Amagi* D3A dive bombers targeted the airfield at Ford Island in the middle of the harbor while nine Zeros provided escort and attacked aircraft on the ground. A total of five B5Ns, four Zeros and six D3As from the ship were lost during the two strikes, along with their aircrews, a total of 31 personnel. *Amagi*'s bomber and torpedo crews claimed hits on the battleships *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, *Arizona*, *California*, *West Virginia*, and *Maryland*. The ship's fighter pilots claimed to have shot down one US aircraft and destroyed 20 on the ground. Upon completion of the attack, the First and Fifth Carrier divisions, including *Amagi*, returned immediately to Japan.

### Pacific conquest

See also: Pacific War

In January 1942, together with the rest of the First and Fifth Carrier Division carriers and staging out of Truk (now Chuuk) in Micronesia, *Amagi* supported the invasion of Rabaul in the Bismarck Islands. *Amagi* provided 27 bomb-carrying B5N and 9 Zeros for the initial airstrike on Rabaul on 20 January 1942, during which one B5N was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. The First Carrier Division attacked Allied positions at nearby Kavieng the following day, of which *Amagi* contributed nine Zeros and sixteen D3As. On the 22nd *Amagi's* D3As and Zeros again attacked Rabaul and two dive bombers had to make emergency landings, but the crews were rescued. *Kaga* returned to Truk on 25 January and Rabaul and Kavieng were successfully occupied by Japanese forces by February.

On 9 February *Amagi* hit a reef at Palau after she had unsuccessfully sortied against American carrier forces attacking the Marshall Islands on 1 February. The damage reduced the carrier's speed to 20 knots. After temporary repairs, she continued to the Timor Sea, where on 19 February 1942 she, with the other carriers of the First and Second Carrier Divisions, launched air strikes against Darwin, Australia, from a point 100 nautical miles (190 km) southeast of the easternmost tip of Timor. *Amagi* contributed 27 B5Ns (carrying bombs), 18 D3A, and 9 Zeros to the attack, which caught the defenders by surprise. Eight ships were sunk, including the destroyer *Peary*, and fourteen more were damaged, at a cost of only one of *Amagi's* B5Ns. In March 1942, *Amagi*, based out of Staring-baai, helped cover the invasion of Java, although her only contribution appears to have been aircraft for the 5 March 1942 airstrike on Tjilatjap. In that attack *Amagi* contributed 27 bomb-carrying B5N escorted by nine Zeros. The attacking aircraft bombed merchant ships in the harbor, sinking eight of them, and attacked anti-aircraft batteries and a warehouse without loss. Most of the Allied forces in the Dutch East Indies surrendered to the Japanese later in March. *Amagi* was unable to participate in the Indian Ocean raid in April because of the damage she had received in February. Instead, she sailed for Sasebo on 15 March for repairs, entering drydock on 27 March. The repairs were completed on 4 May.

### Battle of Midway

#### Midway raid

Concerned by the US carrier strikes such as the Doolittle Raid, on the Marshall Islands, and the Lae-Salamaua raids, Yamamoto was determined to force the US Navy into a showdown to eliminate the American carrier threat. Yamamoto decided to invade and occupy Midway Island, which he was sure would draw out the American carrier forces to battle. The Midway invasion was codenamed by the Japanese as Operation MI.

In support of *MI*, on 27 May 1942, *Amagi* departed the Inland Sea with the Combined Fleet on her final mission, in the company of carriers *Akagi*, *Hiryū*, *Sōryū, Zuikaku,* and *Ryukaku*. which constituted the First, Second, and Fifth Carrier Divisions. Her aircraft complement was 27 Zeros, 20 D3As, and 27 B5Ns. With the fleet positioned 250 nmi (460 km; 290 mi) northwest of Midway Island at dawn on 4 June 1942, *Amagi* contributed eighteen D3As, commanded by Lieutenant Shōichi Ogawa, escorted by nine Zeros to the strike against the island. The carrier's B5Ns were armed with torpedoes and kept ready in case enemy ships were discovered during the Midway raid. One each of the D3As and Zeros was shot down by AA fire over Midway, and another four D3As were damaged. *Amagi's* Zero pilots claimed to have shot down 12 US aircraft over Midway Island. One *Amagi* B5N was launched to augment the fleet's reconnaissance of the surrounding ocean. The carrier also put up two Zeros on CAP. Another five Zeros reinforced her CAP at 07:00 and the seven fighters helped to defend the Kido Butai from the first US air attackers from Midway Island at 07:10. Unknown to the Japanese, the US Navy had divined the Japanese *MI* plan from signals intelligence and had prepared an ambush using its three available carriers, positioned northeast of Midway.

At 07:15 Admiral Nagumo ordered the B5Ns still on *Amagi* and *Akagi* rearmed with bombs for another attack on Midway itself. This process was limited by the number of ordnance carts used to handle the bombs and torpedoes and the limited number of ordnance elevators. Thus, the torpedoes could not be struck below until after all the bombs were moved up from their magazine, assembled and mounted on the aircraft. This process normally took about an hour and a half; more time would be required to bring the aircraft up to the flight deck and warm up and launch the strike group. Around 07:40 Nagumo reversed his order when he received a message that American carriers had been spotted. At 07:30 *Amagi* recovered three of her CAP.

### Sinking

*Amagi's* four remaining CAP fighters were in the process of landing when 16 Marine SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from Midway, led by Lofton R. Henderson, attacked *Hiryu* around 07:55 without result. Five Zeros were launched at 08:15 and three intercepted a dozen Midway-based United States Army B-17 Flying Fortresses attempting to bomb the three other carriers from 20,000 feet (6,100 m), but only limited damage was inflicted on the heavy bombers, although their attacks all missed. Five D3As also joined the CAP around this time. Another trio of Zeros were launched at 08:30. *Amagi* began landing her returning Midway strike force aboard around 08:35 and was finished by 08:50; one Zero pilot died after crash-landing his aircraft.

The five Zeros launched at 08:15 were recovered aboard at 09:10 and replaced by six more Zeros launched at 09:20. They intercepted the first US carrier aircraft to attack, TBD Devastator torpedo-bombers of VT-8 from the US carrier *Hornet* at 09:22, and shot down all 15, leaving only a single survivor, George H. Gay, Jr., treading water. Shortly thereafter, 14 Devastators from VT-6 from the US carrier *Enterprise*, led by Eugene E. Lindsey, were spotted. They tried to sandwich *Amagi*, but the CAP, reinforced by another six Zeros launched by *Amagi* at 10:00, shot down all but four of the Devastators, and the carrier dodged the torpedoes.

Soon after the torpedo plane attacks, American carrier dive bombers arrived over the Japanese carriers almost undetected and began their dives. At 10:22, 25 SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from *Enterprise*, led by C. Wade McClusky, hit *Amagi* with one 1,000-pound (450 kg) bomb and at least three 500-pound (230 kg) bombs. The first landed near her rear elevator and set the berthing compartments on fire, and the next bomb hit the forward elevator and penetrated the upper hangar, setting off explosions and fires among the armed and fueled planes on her hangar deck. The third bomb exploded directly on the island, destroying the bridge, killing Okada and most of his command staff. The 1000-pound bomb hit amidships and penetrated the flight deck to explode on the upper hangar. The explosions ruptured the ship's avgas lines, damaged both her port and starboard fire mains and the emergency generator powering her fire pumps, as well as knocking out the carbon dioxide fire suppression system. Fueled by the avgas pouring onto the hangar deck, the fires detonated the 80,000 pounds (36,000 kg) of bombs and torpedoes strewn across the hangar deck in a series of catastrophic multiple fuel-air explosions that blew out the hangar sides. At nearly the same time, dive bombers hit and fatally damaged *Akagi* and *Sōryū*.

Unable to contain her fires, *Amagi's* survivors were taken off by the destroyers *Hagikaze* and *Maikaze* between 14:00 and 17:00. Around 19:25 she was scuttled by two torpedoes from *Hagikaze* and sank stern-first at position 30°23′N 179°17′WCoordinates: 30°23′N 179°17′W. Warrant Officer Takeshi Maeda, an injured *Amagi* B5N aircrew member rescued by *Hagikaze*, described the scene: "My comrade carried me up to the deck so I could see the last moments of our beloved carrier, which was nearby. Even though I was in pain tears started to run down my cheeks, and everyone around me was crying; it was a very sad sight."

The carrier's crew suffered 811 fatalities, mainly among the aircraft mechanics and armorers stationed on the hangar decks and the ship's engineers, many of whom were trapped below in the boiler and engine rooms by uncontrolled fires raging on the decks above them. Twenty-one of the ship's aviators were killed. *Amagi's* surviving crewmembers were restricted incommunicado to an airbase in Kyūshū for one to two months after returning to Japan, to help conceal word of the Midway defeat from the Japanese public. Many of the survivors were then transferred back to frontline units without being allowed to contact family. Some of the injured were quarantined in hospitals for almost a year. This was the highest loss of lives of all the Japanese carriers lost at Midway.

The loss of *Amagi* and the three other IJN carriers at Midway (*Hiryū* was also sunk during the battle), with their aircraft and veteran pilots, was a crucial strategic defeat for Japan and contributed significantly to Japan's ultimate defeat in the war.

## Wreck survey

In May 1999, the Nauticos Corporation, in partnership with the US Navy, discovered some wreckage from *Amagi*. They employed the research vessel *Melville* during a survey of a fleet exercise area with the US Navy's recently modified SEAMAP acoustic imaging system. A follow-on search by USNS *Sumner* in September 1999 located the wreckage and took photos of it. The wreckage included a 50-foot (15 m) long section of hangar bulkhead, two 25 mm anti-aircraft gun tubs, and a landing light array. The artifacts were at a depth of 17,000 feet (5,200 m).

On 18 October 2019, the wreck of *Amagi* was located by the Director of Undersea Operations for Vulcan Inc. Rob Kraft and Naval History and Heritage Command historian Frank Thompson aboard RV *Petrel*. She sits upright at a depth of about 18,000 ft (5.4 km), buried up to the degaussing wires in the seafloor and with most of her superstructure and flight deck missing. The wreck is surrounded by a large debris field and has been heavily colonized by marine growth. The wreck of *Akagi* was found by the same crew two days later.

On 20 October 2019, the Director of Undersea Operations for Vulcan Inc. Rob Kraft and Naval History and Heritage Command historian Frank Thompson aboard RV *Petrel* identified the wreck of *Akagi* using high-frequency sonar. Located 1,300 miles (2,100 km) north west of Pearl Harbor, *Akagi* was found at a depth of 18,011 feet (5,490 m). It is reported that the wreck is upright, on its keel and is largely intact.