Γιατί η θεωρία του προσομοιωμένου κόσμου είναι εσφαλμένη; / Why the simulation hypothesis is wrong?

Why the simulation hypothesis is wrong?

1. The "infinite simulation series" = simulated words built on simulated worlds, is impossible. A first true world is an unavoidable origin/basis. Thus the world is real, even if it has some "extras". Calculations are real. With the "infinite series of simulation" hypothesis we don't answer cosmogony = first birth of the cosmos. According to ontoaxiomatics = ontological axiomatics (David Deutsch’s, Max Tegmark's, etc. foundations of substantiality, particular cosmogonies are events, and generic cyclic universe parameters are eternal and deeper reality ingredients; of course I differentiated their ideas here).

2. Bigness: The universe is a causal entanglement connectome, so complex, that only a real quantum world is possible to ontologize = to provide the mechanical/processes ontological = causal foundations of it.

3. Mistakes: ANY physical computer deviates from its ideal function. Due to causopermeability (or identity/tautology but identity/tautology is stronger) we can understand that the "fake" computer simulation, deviates from ideal function, due bugs on a deeper processing world layer of the infinite series simulation, or the particles of the original true natural/ontofoundational world. No data correction is perfect, especially in complex calculations.

## About the simulation hypothesis

The simulation hypothesis is the claim that some ontophysics (not mere scientophysics but an actual substantiality mechanism) is based on some other or an infinite series of other ontophysics = layers of reality.

Due to causopermeability or more strongly put identity/tautology (all ontological layers belong to the same hyperontology), the ontophysical layers cannot be strictly separate. Even if we wish to separate them, some probabilistic errors are interacting amongst different layers. Error correction cannot correct all the mistakes. Still it might be hard to understand the complete physics of the deeper layers as a higher-level observer.

If the fist layer of the simulation is a "true world", then the simulation hypothesis is trivial, because we simply have "natural foundations" (ontological foundations of substantiality; an evolved version of constructor theory for universe-like words) with some extra layers which are causopermeable due to jitterings and systemic bugs which cannot be corrected, or which require long corrections which create more mistakes due to buffering limitations. If our system is ideal (without mistakes), then it's supernatural, without ontological foundations, thus impossible.

If we have an infinite series of simulations, we have a renormalization group ontology, so dense and multilayered, that most probably it is the natural world itself and not an infinite artificial contraption. Some physicists erroneously believe that an infinite block universe can exist, and others correctly claim that reality is a wavefunctional connectome around arbitrary central observers, which fades into more and more Everettian alternative realities the further we recede from the central observer. Thus no single observer has access to the overall block universe. The block universe is not a single substantiality. It cannot exist as a whole. Different realities = substantialities are causally separate. We'll need that for the foundations of substantiality (constructor theory for universe-like worlds).