Σε ένα φυσιοκρατικό Σύμπαν, υπάρχει ελεύθερη θέληση; / Can there be free will in a physical universe?

Even if Everettism (manyworldness/many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics) is wrong (but that opens the door to magic [but see my texts on why supernaturalism is ontologically impossible]; we don’t have other alternatives able to create ontoaxiomatics = maximal causal explanation), causal paths are not caused by violating physics.

Even if the many-worlds interpretation (Everettism) is wrong, and some other unknown physical mechanism is what happens, still personhood doesn't magically/unphysically pre-exist the physical mechanism it causes it. Physics isn't defined by humans. Humans are part of the omniaxiomatics due to causopermeability, but they don't have control over the axiomatic rules (or they have within a framework in which mathematical and allomathematical [allomathematics means different than the mainstream mathematics, with different axiomatic foundations, but still logical - Allomathematics don't have to be handy for general calculations. They might also have too many limitations for general calculations. But they can be useful for ontoaxiomatics. Infinite different allomathematics and ontoaxiomatics being possible exist = the main doctrine of the foundations of substantiality; but the axiomatic lists should be replaced with axiomatic algorithms because they create universe-like worlds more easily, and can better deal with axiomatic incompleteness and/or inconsistency with entropy [the expansion of the universe is a result of ontological entropy] and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle [it plays an ontological role, not a mere phenomenological, but its ontological description should include all Everettian alternative paths and not the worldview of a single observer]] logic).

The path integral in quantum mechanics is useful for general predictions, but it doesn't reveal the exact path of the 'worldview universe' of a single specific observer (who is not herself/theirself/himself the universe).

Even if Everettism is wrong and something other happens, no human or other thinker is the first cause of mathematical or allomathematical logic. (Due to causopermeability thinkers and any other calculator are parts of the ontoaxiomatics = substantiality of the universe; but by no means cause mathematical and allomathematical logic). Supernaturalism (causality violations/mythology/magic/unprocedurality/the divine immaterial something which isn't nothing/etc.) doesn't provide any causally coherent connectome for substantiality thus it's ontologically impossible.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Question: What should we do with criminals?

Answer: We should jail dangerous people.

If philosophy makes one sillier, she/he should stop philosophising.

Because you philosophised something doesn't mean that you immediately have to do something else before you philosophise on it specifically.

Also not only fisherpeople and philosophers exist.

It's great for a fisherwoman to philosophise, but during a very difficult process she has to be focused on being a fisherwoman otherwise she might be injured by heavy machinery. It's great to mix different fields of science, but there is no omni-science (the science of all sciences) because there is no omniaxiomatics (thus there is no omniscientoaxiomatics = the common axiomatics of all sciences). Law isn't axiomatically based; it's axioms are oratorical and not scientifically rigorous (based on mathematical or allomathematical logic). At some point we have to compromise with a well-enough functional approach in the case we don't have a common axiomatics for the fields of study we manage.