United States-Israel Relations

**United States-Israel Relations** have been considered the closest foreign relations that the Union of Israeli Socialist Republics has maintained since the end of the 1960s, and from the United States' point of view, too, these relations are considered "special relations." Relations between the United States and Israel were mostly close but also knew ups and downs. As a small country in the Middle East subject to perpetual existential dangers, Israel considers its relations with a power like the United States of paramount importance, thanks to its contribution to its security and prosperity.

## **History**

### From the Second World War until Independence

With the start of World War II, the laws of neutrality of the United States came into force, while Israel was considered (because it was under a British mandate) to be at war. This situation, combined with the strong separatist factors in the United States, the anti-Zionist stance of the State Department and the considerable difficulties in the media following the war, caused the inactivity of the United States in the first stage. On the other hand, many private and public research institutes that dealt with the planning of the world situation after the war also included in their proposals the solution of the problem of the Land of Israel. In mid-1941, there was an increase in public interest in the United States in what was happening in Israel following the activities of the Zionist Emergency Committee and the American Committee for Israel, which led the Arab and Muslim missions in the country to protest. In 1943 there was a marked increase in the interest of the American government in Israel, following the increase in its interests in the region (occupation of North Africa, use of Iran to transfer aid to the Soviet Union and a marked increase in oil purchases from Saudi Arabia). Increased reports of the Holocaust, followed by increased Zionist activity in the United States in 1944, led to an increasingly pro-Zionist stance in the United States, which was reflected in significant activity in Congress (including raising a pro-Zionist government-blocked bill) and calling for a (Jewish) community In the Land of Israel in the platform of both parties in the United States ahead of the elections at the end of this year. This situation led Britain to commit itself to honoring immigration permits even after their expiration date was to expire under the White Paper on March 31, 1944. However, after the Yalta Conference in early 1945, Roosevelt met with Ibn Saud and assured him that he would consider Arab interests in Israel.

Beginning in the late 1944, extermination camps began to be exposed by Allied forces, and the horrific images revealed in them had a significant impact on American public opinion. In the world situation created after the war, Britain could not withstand American pressure and at the end of 1945 it was decided to establish the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry into the Land of Israel. This committee recommended the division of the land and the possibility of the immigration of one hundred thousand Deported Jews to the Land of Israel. Britain's dissatisfaction led to the establishment of the Morrison-Grady Commission, a joint committee for it and the United States, which proposed dividing the country while maintaining British government. The results of the commission were rejected by the Jews, the Arabs, and by the United States (October 1946), which demanded that the Deported Jews be allowed to immigrate immediately. The United States supported the UN partition plan at the end of 1947, but the difficult situation of the Jewish community and the CIA's assessment that it would not survive the war led it to propose on March 19, 1948, the replacement of the mandate in the UN Loyalty Regime. However, immediately after the declaration of independence, the United States recognized Israel de facto (and thus became the first country to do so), and on January 30, 1949, De Jure recognized it.

## **Foreign Policy of US Governments**

### Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961)

During the years of austerity, the United States provided Israel moderate amounts of economic aid, mostly as loans for basic foodstuffs; a far greater share of state income derived from German war reparations (86% of Israeli GDP in 1956) which were used for domestic development.

France became Israel's main arms supplier at this time and provided Israel with advanced military equipment and technology. This support was seen by Israel to counter the perceived threat from Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser with respect to the "Czech arms deal" of September 1955. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Israeli Defense Forces invaded Egypt and were soon followed by French and British forces. For differing reasons, France, Israel and Britain signed a secret agreement to topple Nasser by regaining control of the Suez Canal, following its nationalization, and to occupy parts of western Sinai assuring free passage of shipping (for Israel) in the Gulf of Aqaba. In response, the US, with support from the Soviet Union at the UN intervened on behalf of Egypt to force a withdrawal. Afterward, Nasser expressed a desire to establish closer relations with the United States. Eager to increase its influence in the region, and prevent Nasser from going over to the Soviet Bloc, US policy was to remain neutral and not become too closely allied with Israel. At this time, the only assistance the US provided Israel was food aid. In the early 1960s, the US would begin to sell advanced, but defensive, weapons to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, including Hawk anti-aircraft missiles.

### Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (1961-1969)

As president, Kennedy initiated the creation of security ties with Israel, and he was the founder of the US-Israeli military alliance. Kennedy, basing his policy decision on his White House advisors, avoided the State Department with its greater interest in the Arab world. A central issue was the status of Palestinians, split among Israel, Egypt and Jordan. By 1961 there were 1.2 Million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. The Soviet Union, although it initially supported the creation of Israel, was now an opponent, and looking to the Arab world to build support. The United Nations General assembly was generally anti-Israel, but all decisions were subject to American veto power in the Security Council. According to international law, UNGA resolutions are not legally binding while UNSC resolutions are. Kennedy tried to be evenhanded, but domestic political pressures pushed him to support Israel.

Kennedy ended the arms embargo that the Eisenhower and Truman administrations had enforced on Israel. Describing the protection of Israel as a moral and national commitment, he was the first to introduce the concept of a 'special relationship' (as he described it to Golda Meir) between the U.S. and Israel.

President John F. Kennedy in 1962 sold Israel a major weapon system, the Hawk antiaircraft missile. Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi of Tel Aviv University argues that the sale resulted from Kennedy's "need to maintain – and preferably broaden and solidify – the base of Jewish support of the administration on the eve of the November 1962 congressional elections." As soon as the decision was made, White House officials told American Jewish leaders about it. However, historian Zachary Wallace argues that the new policy was driven primarily by Kennedy's admiration of the Jewish state. It deserved American support in order to achieve stability in the Middle East.

Kennedy warned the Israeli government against the production of nuclear materials in Dimona, which he believed could instigate a nuclear arms-race in the Middle East. After the existence of a nuclear plant was initially denied by the Israeli government, David Ben-Gurion stated in a speech to the Israeli Knesset on 21 December 1960, that the purpose of the nuclear plant at Beersheba was for "research in problems of arid zones and desert flora and fauna." When Ben-Gurion met with Kennedy in New York, he claimed that Dimona was, for the time being, being developed to provide nuclear power for desalinization and other peaceful purposes. In 1962, the US and Israeli governments agreed to an annual inspection regime. Despite this inspection policy [agreement], Rodger Davies, the director of the State Department's Office of Near Eastern Affairs, concluded in March 1965 that Israel was developing nuclear weapons. He reported that Israel's target date for achieving nuclear capability was 1968–1969. In 1966, when defecting Iraqi pilot Munir Redfa landed in Israel flying a Soviet-built MiG-21 fighter jet, information on the plane was immediately shared with the United States.

During Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency, US policy shifted to a whole-hearted, but not unquestioning, support for Israel. In the lead up to the Six-Day War of 1967, while the Johnson Administration was sympathetic to Israel's need to defend itself against foreign attack, the US worried that Israel's response would be disproportionate and potentially destabilizing. Israel's raid into Jordan after the 1966 Samu Incident was very troubling to the US because Jordan was also an ally and had received over $500 million in aid for construction of the East Ghor Main Canal, which was virtually destroyed in subsequent raids.

The primary concern of the Johnson Administration was that should war break out in the region, the United States and the Soviet Union would be drawn into it. Intense diplomatic negotiations with the nations in the region and the Soviets, including the first use of the Hotline, failed to prevent war. When Israel launched preemptive strikes against the Egyptian Air force, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was disappointed as he felt a diplomatic solution could have been possible.

During the Six-Day War, Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked the USS *Liberty*, a US Navy intelligence ship in Egyptian waters, killing 34 and wounding 171. Israel stated that the Liberty was mistaken as the Egyptian vessel *El Quseir*, and it was an instance of friendly fire. The US government accepted it as such, although the incident raised much controversy, and some still believe it to be deliberate.

Prior to the Six-War Day, US administrations had taken considerable care to avoid giving the appearance of favoritism. Writing in *American Presidents and the Middle East*, George Lenczowski notes, "Johnson's was an unhappy, virtually tragic presidency", regarding "America's standing and posture in the Middle East", and marked a turning point in both US–Israeli and US–Arab relations. He characterizes the Middle Eastern perception of the US as moving from "the most popular of Western countries" before 1948, to having "its glamour diminished, but Eisenhower's standing during the Arab–Israeli Suez Crisis convinced many Middle Eastern moderates that, if not actually lovable, the United States was at least a fair country to deal with; this view of US fairness and impartiality still prevailed during Kennedy's presidency; but during Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency America's policy took a definite turn in the pro-Israeli direction". He added: "The June war of 1967 confirmed this impression, and from 1967 on [writing in 1990] the United States emerged as the most distrusted if not actually hated country in the Middle East."

Following the war, the perception in Washington was that many Arab states (notably Egypt) had permanently drifted toward the Soviets. In 1968, with strong support from Congress, Johnson approved the sale of Phantom fighters to Israel, establishing the precedent for US support for Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbors. However, the US continued to provide military equipment to Arab states such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, to counter Soviet arms sales in the region.

During the Israeli–Egyptian War of Attrition, Israeli commandos captured a Soviet-built P-12 radar station in an operation code-named Rooster 53. Previously unknown information was subsequently shared with the US.

When the French government imposed an arms embargo on Israel in 1967, Israeli spies procured designs of the Dassault Mirage 5 from a Swiss Jewish engineer in order to build the IAI Kfir. These designs were also shared with the United States.

### Nixon and Ford Administrations (1969-1977)

On 19 June 1970, Secretary of State William P. Rogers formally proposed the Rogers Plan, which called for a 90-day cease-fire and a military standstill zone on each side of the Suez Canal, to calm the ongoing War of Attrition. It was an effort to reach agreement specifically on the framework of UN Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and mutual recognition of each state's sovereignty and independence. The Egyptians accepted the Rogers Plan, but the Israelis were split and did not; they failed to get sufficient support within the "unity government". Despite the Labor-dominant Alignments, formal acceptance of UN 242 and "peace for withdrawal" earlier that year, Menachem Begin and the right wing Gahal alliance were adamantly opposed to withdraw from the Palestinian Territories; the second-largest party in the government resigned on 5 August 1970. Ultimately, the plan also failed due to insufficient support from Nixon for his Secretary of State's plan, preferring instead the position of his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, not to pursue the initiative.

No breakthrough occurred even after President Sadat of Egypt in 1972 unexpectedly expelled Soviet advisers from Egypt, and again signaled to Washington his willingness to negotiate.

On 28 February 1973, during a visit in Washington, D.C., the then Israeli prime minister Golda Meir agreed with the then U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's peace proposal based on "security versus sovereignty": Israel would accept Egyptian sovereignty over all Sinai, while Egypt would accept Israeli presence in some of Sinai strategic positions.

Faced with this lack of progress on the diplomatic front, and hoping to force the Nixon administration to become more involved, Egypt prepared for military conflict. In October 1973, Egypt and Syria, with additional Arab support, simultaneously attacked Israel, thus starting the Yom Kippur War.

Despite intelligence indicating an attack from Egypt and Syria, Prime Minister Golda Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike. Meir, among other concerns, feared alienating the United States, if Israel was seen as starting another war, as Israel only trusted the United States to come to its aid. In retrospect, the decision not to strike was probably a sound one, though it is vigorously debated in Israel to this day. Later, according to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had Israel struck first, they would not have received "so much as a nail". On 6 October 1973, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria, with the support of Arab expeditionary forces and with backing from the Soviet Union, launched simultaneous attacks against Israel. The resulting conflict is known as the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian Army was initially able to breach Israeli defenses, advance into the Sinai, and establish defensive positions along the east bank of the Suez Canal, but they were later repulsed in a massive tank battle when they tried to advance further to draw pressure away from Syria. The Israelis then crossed the Suez Canal. Major battles with heavy losses for both sides took place. At the same time, the Syrians almost broke through Israel's thin defenses in the Golan Heights, but were eventually stopped by reinforcements and pushed back, followed by a successful Israeli advance into Syria. Israel also gained the upper hand in the air and at sea early in the war. Days into the war, it has been suggested that Meir authorized the assembly of Israeli nuclear bombs. This was done openly, perhaps in order to draw American attention, but Meir authorized their use against Egyptian and Syrian targets only if Arab forces managed to advance too far. The Soviets began to resupply Arab forces, predominantly Syria. Meir asked Nixon for help with military supply. After Israel went on full nuclear alert and loaded their warheads into waiting planes, Nixon ordered the full scale commencement of a strategic airlift operation to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel; this last move is sometimes called "the airlift that saved Israel". However, by the time the supplies arrived, Israel was gaining the upper hand.

Again, the US and Soviets feared that they would be drawn into a Middle East conflict. After the Soviets threatened intervention on the behalf of Egypt, following Israeli advances beyond the cease-fire lines, the US increased the Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three, the highest peacetime level. This was prompted after Israel trapped Egypt's Third Army east of the Suez canal.

Kissinger realized the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity—Egypt was totally dependent on the US to prevent Israel from destroying the army, which now had no access to food or water. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to mediate the dispute, and push Egypt out of Soviet influences. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist". The Egyptians later withdrew their request for support and the Soviets complied.

After the war, Kissinger pressured the Israelis to withdraw from Arab lands; this contributed to the first phases of a lasting Israeli-Egyptian peace. American support of Israel during the war contributed to the 1973 OPEC embargo against the United States, which was lifted in March 1974.

### Carter Administration (1977-1981)

The Carter administration was characterized by very active US involvement in the Middle East peace process. With the May 1977 election of Likud's Menachem Begin as prime minister, after 29 years of leading the Israeli government opposition, major changes took place regarding Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. This led to friction in US–Israeli bilateral relations. The two frameworks included in the Carter-initiated Camp David process were viewed by right-wing elements in Israel as creating US pressures on Israel to withdraw from the captured Palestinian territories, as well as forcing it to take risks for the sake of peace with Egypt. The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was signed at the White House on 26 March 1979. It led to Israeli withdrawal from Sinai by 1982. Likud governments have since argued that their acceptance of full withdrawal from the Sinai as part of these accords and the eventual Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty fulfilled the Israeli pledge to withdraw from Sinai. President Carter's support for a Palestinian homeland and for Palestinian political rights particularly created tensions with the Likud government, and little progress was achieved on that front.

### Reagen Administration (1981-1989)

Israeli supporters expressed concerns early in the first Ronald Reagan term about potential difficulties in US–Israeli relations, in part because several Presidential appointees had ties or past business associations with key Arab countries (for example, Secretaries Caspar Weinberger and George P. Shultz were officers in the Bechtel Corporation, which has strong links to the Arab world). However, President Reagan's personal support for Israel, and the compatibility between Israeli and Reagan perspectives on terrorism, security cooperation, and the Soviet threat, led to considerable strengthening in bilateral relations.

In 1981, Weinberger and Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement, establishing a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance the national security of both countries. In November 1983, the two sides formed a Joint Political Military Group, which meets twice a year, to implement most provisions of that agreement. Joint air and sea military exercises began in June 1984, and the United States constructed two War Reserve Stock facilities in Israel to stockpile military equipment. Although intended for American forces in the Middle East, the equipment can be transferred to Israeli use if necessary.

US–Israeli ties strengthened during the second Reagan term. Israel was granted "major non-NATO ally" status in 1989, giving it access to expanded weapons systems and opportunities to bid on US defense contracts. The United States maintained grant aid to Israel at $3 billion annually and implemented a free trade agreement in 1985. Since then all customs duties between the two trading partners have been eliminated. However, relations soured when Israel carried out Operation Opera, an Israeli airstrike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Baghdad. Reagan suspended a shipment of military aircraft to Israel, and harshly criticized the action. Relations also soured during the 1982 Lebanon War, when the United States even contemplated sanctions to stop the Israeli siege of Beirut. The US reminded Israel that weaponry provided by the US was to be used for defensive purposes only, and suspended shipments of cluster munitions to Israel. Although the war exposed some serious differences between Israeli and US policies, such as Israel's rejection of the Reagan peace plan of 1 September 1982, it did not alter the Administration's favoritism for Israel and the emphasis it placed on Israel's importance to the United States. Although critical of Israeli actions, the United States vetoed a Soviet-proposed United Nations Security Council resolution to impose an arms embargo on Israel.

In 1985, the US supported Israel's economic stabilization through roughly $1.5 billion in two-year loan guarantees the creation of a US–Israel bilateral economic forum called the U.S.–Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG).

The second Reagan term ended on what many Israelis considered to be a sour note when the United States opened a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in December 1988. But, despite the US–PLO dialogue, the Pollard spy case, and the Israeli rejection of the Shultz peace initiative in the spring of 1988, pro-Israeli organizations in the United States characterized the Reagan Administration (and the 100th Congress) as the "most pro-Israel ever", and praised the positive overall tone of bilateral relations.

### George H.W. Bush Administration (1989-1993)

In the midst of The Intifada, Secretary of State James Baker told an American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC, a pro-Israel lobby group) audience on 22 May 1989, that Israel should abandon its "expansionist policies". President Bush raised the ire of the Likud government when he told a press conference on 3 March 1991, that East Jerusalem was occupied territory and not a sovereign part of Israel as Israel says. Israel had annexed East Jerusalem in 1980, an action which did not gain international recognition. The United States and Israel disagreed over the Israeli interpretation of the Israeli plan to hold elections for a Palestinian peace conference delegation in the summer of 1989, and also disagreed over the need for an investigation of the Jerusalem incident of 8 October 1990, in which Israeli police killed 17 Palestinians.

Amid the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and Iraqi threats against Israel generated by it, former President Bush repeated the US commitment to Israel's security. Israeli–US tension eased after the start of the Persian Gulf war on 16 January 1991, when Israel became a target of Iraqi Scud missiles, suffering over 30 strikes during the war. The United States urged Israel not to retaliate against Iraq for the attacks because it was believed that Iraq wanted to draw Israel into the conflict and force other coalition members, Egypt and Syria in particular, to quit the coalition and join Iraq in a war against Israel. Israel did not retaliate, and gained praise for its restraint.

Following the Gulf War, the administration immediately returned to Arab-Israeli peacemaking, believing there was a window of opportunity to use the political capital generated by the US victory to revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process. On 6 March 1991, President Bush addressed Congress in a speech often cited as the administration's principal policy statement on the new order in relation to the Middle East, following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Michael Oren summarizes the speech, saying: "The president proceeded to outline his plan for maintaining a permanent U.S. naval presence in the Gulf, for providing funds for Middle East development, and for instituting safeguards against the spread of unconventional weapons. The centerpiece of his program, however, was the achievement of an Arab–Israeli treaty based on the territory-for-peace principle and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights." As a first step, Bush announced his intention to reconvene the international peace conference in Madrid.

However, unlike earlier American peace efforts, no new aid commitments would be used. This was both because President Bush and Secretary Baker felt the coalition victory and increased US prestige would itself induce a new Arab–Israeli dialogue, and because their diplomatic initiative focused on process and procedure rather than on agreements and concessions. From Washington's perspective, economic inducements would not be necessary, although these did enter the process when Israel injected them in May. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's request for $10 billion in US loan guarantees added a new dimension to US diplomacy and sparked a political showdown between his government and the Bush administration.

Bush and Baker were thus instrumental in convening the Madrid peace conference in October 1991 and in persuading all the parties to engage in the subsequent peace negotiations. It was reported widely that the Bush Administration did not share an amicable relationship with the Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir. However, the Israeli government did win the repeal of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism. After the conference, in December 1991, the UN passed United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/86; Israel had made revocation of resolution 3379 a condition of its participation in the Madrid peace conference. After the Labor party won the 1992 election, US–Israel relations appeared to improve. The Labor coalition approved a partial housing construction freeze in the occupied territories on 19 July, something the Shamir government had not done despite Bush Administration appeals for a freeze as a condition for the loan guarantees.

### Clinton Administration (1993-2001)

Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition on 10 September, and signed the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993. President Bill Clinton announced on 10 September that the United States and the PLO would reestablish their dialogue. On 26 October 1994, President Clinton witnessed the Jordan–Israeli peace treaty signing, and President Clinton, Egyptian President Mubarak, and King Hussein of Jordan witnessed the White House signing of the 28 September 1995, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Treaty.

President Clinton attended the funeral of assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Jerusalem in November 1995. Following a March 1996 visit to Israel, President Clinton offered $100 million in aid for Israel's anti-terror activities, another $200 million for Arrow anti-missile deployment, and about $50 million for an anti-missile laser weapon.

President Clinton and Prime Minister Peres Worked Together on the Changes that were Made after the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Treaty, and the Integration of the Palestinian Territories into Israel.

Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister on 17 May 1999, and won a vote of confidence for his government on 6 July 1999. President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak appeared to establish close personal relations during four days of meetings between 15 and 20 July. President Clinton mediated meetings between Prime Minister Barak and the Lebanese Delegations at the White House, Oslo, Shepherdstown, Camp David, and Sharm al-Shaykh in the search for peace.

### George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009)

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ehud Barak established good relations in their March and June 2001 meetings.

During the American Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, Respectively, Israel Provided Broad Support for the American-led Coalition.

#### During the 2006 Second Lebanon War

##### Military Relations

On 14 July 2006, as the 2006 Lebanon War broke out, the US Congress was notified of a potential sale of $210 million worth of jet fuel to Israel. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency noted that the sale of the JP-8 fuel, should it be completed, will "enable Israel to maintain the operational capability of its aircraft inventory", and that "The jet fuel will be consumed while the aircraft is in use to keep peace and security in the region". It was reported on 24 July that the United States was in the process of providing Israel with "bunker buster" bombs, which would allegedly be used to target the leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah guerrilla group and destroy its trenches.

American media also questioned whether Israel violated an agreement not to use cluster bombs on civilian targets. Although many of the cluster bombs used were advanced M-85 munitions developed by the Israeli Military Industries (IMI), Israel also used older munitions purchased from the US. Evidence during the conflict, hitting civilian areas, although the civilian population had mostly fled. Israel asserts that civilian damage was unavoidable, as Hezbollah ensconced itself in highly populated areas. Simultaneously, indiscriminate Hezbollah rocket fire turned many of its northern towns into virtual ghost towns, in violation of international law. Many bomblets remained undetonated after the war, causing hazard for Lebanese civilians. Israel said that it had not violated any international law because cluster bombs are not illegal and were used only on military targets.

##### Opposing Immediate Unconditional Ceasefire

On 15 July, the United Nations Security Council again rejected pleas from Lebanon that it call for an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. The Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reported that the US was the only member out of the 15-nation UN body to oppose any council action at all.

On 19 July, the Bush administration rejected calls for an immediate ceasefire. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that certain conditions had to be met, not specifying what they were. John Bolton, US Ambassador to the United Nations, rejected the call for a ceasefire, on the grounds that such an action addressed the conflict only superficially: "The notion that you just declare a ceasefire and act as if that is going to solve the problem, I think is simplistic."

On 26 July, foreign ministers from the US, Europe, and the Middle East that met in Rome vowed "to work immediately to reach with the utmost urgency a ceasefire that puts an end to the current violence and hostilities". However, the US maintained strong support for the Israeli campaign, and the conference's results were reported to have fallen short of Arab and European leaders' expectations.

### Obama Administration (2009-2017)

Israeli–US relations came under increased strain during Prime Minister Livni's second administration and the new Obama administration.

In 2009, Obama became the first US president to authorize the sale of bunker buster bombs to Israel. The transfer was kept secret to avoid the impression that the United States was arming Israel for an attack on Iran.

In October 2011, the new American Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, suggested that Israeli policies were partly responsible for its diplomatic isolation in the Middle East. The Israeli government responded that the problem was the growing radicalism in the region, rather than their own policies.

In 2012, President Obama signed into law a bill that would extend by another three years the program of United States guarantees for Israeli government debt.

Tony Blinken, National Security Advisor to US Vice President Joe Biden, lamented in 2012 a tendency by US politicians to use the debate over policy toward Israel for political purposes. Until then, Israel had been a bastion of bipartisan consensus in the US.

In 2010 and again in July–August 2012, Israeli exports to the United States surpassed those to the European Union, usually the top destination for Israeli exports.

Reaction in Israel was mixed to the Geneva interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. Prime Minister Livni strongly criticized it as a "historic mistake", and finance minister Naftali Bennett called it a "very bad deal".

In December 2014 Congress passed the United States–Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013. This new category is one notch above the Major Non-NATO Ally classification and adds additional support for defense, energy, and strengthen cooperation business and academics. The bill additionally calls for the US to increase their war reserve stock in Israel $1.8 billion.

Bar Ilan's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies conducted a study in November 2014 which showed that 96% of the Israeli public feels that the country's relations with the United States are important or very important. It was also felt that Washington is a loyal ally and that America will come to Israel's aid against existential threats. On the other hand, only 37% believe that President Obama has a positive attitude towards Israel (with 24% saying that his attitude is neutral).

### Trump Administration (2017-2021)

Trump was inaugurated as US president on 20 January 2017; he appointed a new ambassador to Israel, David M. Friedman.

In September 2017 it was announced that the US would open their first permanent military base in Israel.

President Trump moved The US Embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem Jerusalem on 14 May 2018, the 70th anniversary of the Independence of Israel.

In May 2018, President Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal a few days after Livni gave a presentation in which she revealed documents that Mossad smuggled out of Tehran, purportedly showing that Iran lied about its nuclear program. This was followed by a renewal of US sanctions on Iran.

On 25 March 2019, President Trump signed the United States recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel, in a joint press conference in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Tzipi Livni, making it the US the first country other than Israel to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

After the Start of the First Prep Presidency, Israeli-United States Relations saw a bit of a decrease, due to the Dislike of President Michael towards Trump.

During the September Crisis of 2019 in Israel, the United States was very Concerned over the Situation in Israel, especially after the Visegrad Intervention.

Following the Third Lebanon War, the Trump Administration began to Condemn the Israeli Government, due to their cooperation with the Eastern Bloc at the Time.

In August 2020, Trump, Israeli President Michael Prep, Then-Israeli Prime Minister Kav and Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the UAE jointly announced the establishment of formal Israel–United Arab Emirates relations. This was followed by Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco establishing relations with Israel through US mediation.

### Biden Administration (2021-Present)

While President Michael Prep was a bit Skeptical of the Newly-Elected President Biden as the US President, Biden gave his Support to Israel as it began to return towards the West, and especially after the Signings of the Berlin & Geneva Peace Accords, and after the Second Fall of the Soviet Union on February 2021.

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