NTT Critique

## Preface

This page exists to catalog the issues I have and have previously had with Name The Trait written by Ask Yourself. By "Name The Trait" I do not just mean the deductive argument. I also use that term to refer to the dialogue tree and its usage. I will not critique any usage, however, but the most common and seemingly supported use by Ask Yourself.

## What is Name the Trait?

Name the Trait is a few things.

Firstly, it's a deductive syllogism. I present it here:

P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

P2) Your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value.

C) Therefore, your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

In addition to this syllogism, Name the Trait is also a *form of dialogue.* This conversation takes a Socratic style, with the vegan asking questions of the non-vegan to "Name the Trait" that gives humans the type of moral value that excludes them from animal agriculture but includes certain non-human animals. The move between the syllogism and the dialogue will be discussed.

One may also think of Name the Trait as a *rhetorical strategy.* That strategy is to challenge a non-vegan's beliefs in such a way to make veganism seem more appealing. This last part may not be explicitly endorsed by Ask Yourself but I consider it incredulous to deny.

## Nature of the Objections

I'll go over a few objections, but first, I want to give a small synopsis as to what they are.

1) Ask Yourself's word choices are all confusing. They can only be said to be proprietary usage and some of it is unclear. I will try and explain how he uses these words so that people who understand their words as they are commonly used will be able to follow.

2) The syllogism is badly written, confusing, and any common understanding of English will render it either false or incoherent. I consider this a *minor critique,* though people have taken it as though I'm making some devastating takedown. The truth of it is that with some minor edits, it's fine and that the general idea behind the syllogism is fine as well. Keep in mind that while I address other criticisms, I will be steel manning the poor writing so that I can address other critiques.

3) There are some minor writing problems and some major unsubstantiated claims within the dialogue tree.

4) There seem to be some philosophical assumptions taking place in the rhetoric that fails to be reasoned. It seems as though there is a commitment to what a moral conversation is like and how it proceeds in order for Name the Trait to have any value as a *rhetorical strategy.*

## List of Confusing Terminology

1) **Trait** - One of the important things to understand is that "trait", under AY's view, is thought to be "Anything true of X". This is a departure from common usage where "trait" is meant to be characteristics of the being in question. To give a better explanation, I'll use examples:

What normally are considered "traits" of a person: Height, Weight, Personality, Sexual Orientation, Running Speed etc etc. All these are characteristics specific to the being in question.

What is not normally considered "traits" of a person, but AY uses the term in this way: What room someone is in at a given time, what is to the left of a person, how someone else thinks about the person.

While we can say it is "true of a person" that there is an apple 5 meters to their left, it is not common usage to call that a "trait". Thus, it's important to understand that AY takes *anything true relating to a person* as what he means by "trait".

2) **Trait Stack** - A "trait stack", under AY's view, seems to be a multitude of different traits used in response to Name the Trait. It may be used as an AND or OR operator, such as "The being must have X and Y" or "The being can either have X or Y". I have no idea why the word "stack" is there or how that came to be, but that is generally how it is used. I think just generally referring to value pluralism would be easier.

3) **Absurdity** - It is quite difficult to suss out what is meant when AY says something is absurd. It is certainly not the philosophical understanding of *impossibility*. Nor does it mean illogical. It seems to mean something akin to "weird" or "objectionable" following this dictionary definition:

- arousing amusement or derision; ridiculous.

However, it's very unclear of the scope of the statement. When AY says something is absurd, he might mean "absurd to him", "Absurd to him and those who agree with him" or "Absurd to most people" and there is very little clarification which he means when the word is used. In general, if you are in a conversation with someone who uses NTT, I highly recommend demanding the scope of each usage be stated.

4) **Deductive Argument Critique** - I have a list of terms I discuss in the deductive argument critique, so you can see them below. Words such as "equalize" "retain" "given human" not only are substandard now but can only be understood why they were chosen if you understand how AY *used* to conceptualize how NTT worked. For more, see below.

5) **Dishonest, Sophist, Weasel, Dodging, Cucking etc.** - AY uses a variety of terms while running the argument that some of his follower's parrot. The problem is, there seems to be no objective way to determine what any of these terms really mean and if there were, how AY could reasonably claim them of other people. It seems he has to go purely on his intuition about others, something his interlocutors probably care very little about. My suggestion is that if these words are levied against you, you 1) Demand to have a specific definition that anyone can use and 2) Proof that their usage of the term is more than their intuition. If they cannot provide such things, I suggest dismissing it or dismissing the conversation entirely if they continue their rhetoric based on unsupported claims.

## The Dialogue Tree

Most of the major critiques will take place in the dialogue tree, so I choose to start here. You can find the updated dialogue tree here:

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1tAjU2Bv1tsGbNLA2TfJesgbIh8JKh9zc

I'll put some segments of the dialogue tree in the form of a Constructive Dilemmas. This is a logical form so I can show where exactly I'm disagreeing.

### Writing Error 1:

My first critique here is a minor writing problem:

"Do you know which trait(s) defines this point?"

While "trait(s)" is useful, there also is a need to say "point(s)". I'll give examples of why both are required.

"Trait(s)" allows us to say things like: X has moral value if it has both "Intelligence" and "Flesh".

"Point(s)" allows us to say things like: X has moral value if it has either "Intelligence" or "Flesh".

This would be an easy fix and allow for all forms of value pluralism. I don't consider this a major issue, however, as functionally, it is run with both in mind.

### Unsupported Claim 1:

I'll put my first Constructive Dilemma here.

P1) Either it is the case that you know what the trait is or it is the case that you do not know what the trait is.

P2) If you do know what the trait is, then you will be asked what that trait is.

P3) If you do not know what the trait is, then you've been reduced to

absurdity. You're uncertain of the moral status of all beings inbetwen the trait-equalization beginning and end points.

C) Either you will be asked what that trait is, or you've been reduced to

absurdity. You're uncertain of the moral status of all beings inbetwen the trait-equalization beginning and end points.

The premise that needs support here is P3. First, there is the statement of absurdity. If the claim here is that it is absurd to the person running NTT, then it's hardly a claim worth mentioning. If, however, it's absurdity to the general public, then that's an unsubstantiated empirical claim. I would go farther, however, and say that it's very likely false. It seems that someone who is okay with animal ag and not okay with human agriculture who can't really say why isn't going to get any pushback from the public at large. It's already the dominant view that these particular ethical intuitions are the case and I've never seen a desire for the general public to hear other people's normative ethics. Secondly, it says you're uncertain of all beings inbetween the trait-equalization process. This is a grammatical ambiguity, since it can be read two ways:

1) "You are uncertain of the moral status of any individual I can possibly pick out between X and Y."

or

2) "You are uncertain of the moral status of every single individual between X and Y."

The first one doesn't follow. Just because someone can't name a set of norms that classify each individual hypothetical member wouldn't mean they can't pick out a variety of particulars and tell you their intuition on them.

The second one follows, but it seems to be a sub premise supporting the idea of why it's absurd. Yet, the same criticism that I wrote above applies. There's no reason to think a person who can pick out a handful of particulars, that match with common intuitions of people, yet never the less can't name a normative structure would be considered absurd by the average individual.

If it's just "absurd to the person running NTT" just say you don't care about that particular person's opinion and move on. If it's a claim that it's absurd to the general public, ask for a convincing argument for that.

### Writing Error 2:

This is nitpicky, but he went from trait(s) to trait singular later on in the dialogue tree. Should continue to keep the plurality.

### Unsupported Claim 2:

Here we make the second Constructive Dilemma.

P1) Either you maintain "the trait is x" despite its reductio or it is not the case that you maintain "the trait is x" despite its reductio.

P2) If you maintain "the trait is x" despite its reductio, then you've been reduced to absurdity. You accept the reductio on trait x.

P3) If it is not the case that you maintain "the trait is x" despite its reductio, then you've contradicted yourself by affirming and rejecting that "the trait is x".

C) Either you've been reduced to absurdity. You accept the reductio on trait x. or you've contradicted yourself by affirming and rejecting that "the trait is x".

The problematic premise here is P2. First, I can rehash the absurdity problem. Is this a claim about absurdity to just the one running NTT? If so, just ignore it. If it is a claim about the greater public, then we move on to my next critique:

In order for P2 to be true, every possible combination of X has to be objectionable to the greater public. Not just the one's spoken or heard of so far, but *all possible* traits. This seems to go far beyond the epistemic limits that AY could possibly have. Even if all possible traits and trait combinations AY has ever heard of have absurd consequences, it still would not follow that ALL traits, therefore, have absurd consequences. It could just be the case that someone has yet to come up with them. In addition, I am yet to hear any successful reductio of my own stated position. In the next section, I'll go into the problems of the framing of the entire conversation, but just for now, my objection is that P3 is unsupported. How can you possibly know that all possible X's are absurd? This claim can be backed off by saying "probably" or something less than posing it as a necessary relationship.

## NTT as a Rhetorical Strategy

NTT, regardless of any explicit statement, is used to show the absurdity of non-vegan positions thus elevating the status of the vegan position. However, this seems to run on a particular framing of moral conversations that can be objected to.

First, the idea that people should have a normative ethic that guides their life is quite a bold claim. In fact, ethicists who study ethics struggle coming up with comprehensive normative ethics all the time, and most if not all normative ethics are considered either incomplete or having problematic issues. It seems quite bizarre to me that Joe Schmo off the street should be able to have a comprehensive normative ethic for what counts as a moral patient while ethicists struggle with the question. It seems that a fair amount of uncertainty is to be expected. If someone was more aware of ethical conversations in general, they would not feel under pressure to have an answer for NTT.

Secondly, a failure to come up with a consistent normative ethic for non-veganism does not equal success for the normative ethics of veganism. One of the problems with those who advocate for the usage of NTT is that they *offer nothing as a replacement.* It seems to be that merely taking down the non-vegan position is a job well done. I am yet to hear any consistent or good normative ethic of veganism. Any expressed vegan position seems to have a host of its own unfavorable reductios.

The only thing I've heard from AY is "Threshold Deontology" which uses a combination of utilitarianism and deontology. The only problem is they have stated no deontological rules nor define this threshold. Therefore, it does nothing to inform your actions. How is vaguity supposed to be a replacement? Is consistency found in being vague? The non-vegan can utilize this same strategy and say "I use deontology to separate animals and humans."

Given two equally vague or bad normative options shouldn't sway anyone to any position. If you have intuitions about the particulars of NTT such as "I don't feel like it's immoral to farm animals but I do feel like it's immoral to farm humans" will be enough to settle the discussion until veganism proves itself.

Veganism can attempt to claim a default position in the absence of a good normative ethic on either side, but for my response to that please see the Normative Burden of Proof. Veganism is both a position telling you to NOT do something and goes against the standard view of today. Thus, it must put in the work to be convincing. It would therefore make sense to say: "Look, I don't have a good understanding of why I do what I do, but unless you give me a good reason to not do what I do, I'll just continue on."

The other issue I take with the framing of NTT is that it is far too cognitive and normative an approach to ethics. As a metaethical descriptivist, I take a larger issue with these sorts of moral conversations in general. While I could go in a lot of detail as to what I mean here, the general thrust is that I object to the idea that coming up with a normative ethical account, spoken or written down in language, which we then follow for guidance is a sensible account for morality. As a brief analogy to why I would object to that, think of a normative account of beautiful paintings. Before you go look at paintings, you will decide what qualities will make a painting beautiful and which will not, and when you confront a painting you will look at your list of qualities to see whether you find it beautiful or not. If that sounds utterly bizarre to you, that is how I see much of ethical conversations.

## Deductive Argument Criticism

The main contention of the current version of Name the Trait version 5 rests on the conditional statement from P1:

P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

The objection explores the possibilities of the meanings of trait-equalization, how they could be structured, while also including a concept of retaining moral value as
well as the following "then statements" assertion that the only way to deny the non-human animal is through contradiction. It shows that there is no coherent or true
framing that contains all these concepts at once.

1) A trait is to mean all possible propositions one could say about an object, including one's own disposition towards that objection, as has been previously stated. If
this is in any way denied and made into a subset of possibilities, then contradiction will not be the only possible way to deny moral value, as the remaining propositions can instead be a substituted objection.

2) Equalization is to make 2 (or more) objects the same. This is taken as distinct from differentiation, which we take distinct objects and judge comparatively. It is possible that NTT could be formulated to be sound and coherent with such concepts as differentiation and nothing being equalized. But since equalization is a pivotal part of the argument and that there are supporting statements from AY explaining what equalization is, as well as an animated gif, we shall make all objections take these supporting explanations into account.

3) Moral value can be thought of as an ontological property of an object or as a disposition of the person in question towards an object. In no meaningful sense can it
be said something "retained" moral value if I was presented 3 objects and I valued them all the same. In order for any coherent sense of "retainment" to be the case, we
must be talking about the same thing multiple times, not separate things I am judging individually, even if those judgments are the same. It would make as much to provide me with 3 objects that are 40lbs and say "they have retained weight". It is not that weight has been "kept", but instead presented 3 different distinct times in 3 different distinct ways. Moral retainment makes sense in the context of a single trackable object, again supported by the supporting statements of AY and the documentation. If the argument is changed to mean "Making a set of distinct objects between A and B", then equalization and retainment are incorrect word choices. Objections will be made with this in mind.

4) Any situation that allows any distinction what so ever, any propositional statement that could exist and rightfully make a distinction to one's propositional attitude
or an ontological difference between objects will render the conditional false. Contradiction can stand as the "Only denial" if there remains no differences what-so-ever. Any allowed distinction will be a basis upon which the conclusion can be said to be false.

5) My attitude towards objects can be affected on the basis of watching and remembering an object change (This shall be later referred to as "The history") and value can be assigned on this basis. It is an acceptable trait as it is a possible true propositional statement. A denial of this is to only allow a subset of traits, rendering
the conclusion false. (As per 4).

If the above is true, this leaves us with 3 possible understandings of the premise:

1) Everything is equalized except for the identities and the histories. This is coherent but due to (4), renders the conditional to not follow. This is not an acceptable way to frame the argument.

2) Everything is equalized, including the identities and the histories are merged. Moral value could be said to have been retained. This would render an object that is both A and not A, as the histories report that it was always A and was also not A, breaking the law of identity and making the argument incoherent. This is not an acceptable way to frame the argument.

3) Everything is equalized by destroying the history of one of the objects (As it is framed in the argument, it is the "Given Human" that is edited to be the same as the "Given non-human") thus denying the trait-equalization ever occurred. This would mean that "moral retainment" as a concept no longer works, as we have denied the object's existence that could have retained moral value, thus making my denial of moral value to the "given non-human" not a contradiction with anything I had previously done. This is not an acceptable way to frame the argument.

STEELMANNING NTT

1) By not using words like "equalization" or "moral retainment" and instead, replacing them with "trait differentiation" and "equal moral value judgments", we can
construct a similar argument with the same basic point and the same conclusion. If equal moral value judgments are too strict (Perhaps we want to allow for minor changes to moral judgments, such as losing out on consequential considerations) then we can specifically state "Equal moral value judgements disallowing the object to be killed and eaten within a given context". (Obviously, we don't want desert island survival situations to be the context).

2) Specific equal moral value judgments have distinct advantages over "moral retainment" as a concept. One, it doesn't need to attach to an identity to make sense. Two, one cannot agree to all premises and say "It's not okay to eat the human, but it is okay to eat the cow" on the basis that, while they both kept moral value, the nature of that value changed. (This, of course, could be countered by making it a "Specific moral retainment", but this would only deal with 1 of the 2 issues)

3) Trait differentiation could be thought of as a set of objects in between A and B. This can be formulated one of two ways:

One, the trait differentiation process Takes A, makes a set of different identities and moves it towards B in similarity, stopping at history as the last remaining trait before the next object is B. If you affirm that all identities do in fact have equal specific moral values, then truly you would be in contradiction by denying equal specific moral values.

Two, the trait differentiation process just presents a list of objects all at once between A and B in similarity. Retainment doesn't need to exist so nothing needs to be tracked. The same as above occurs. Both of these would be sound and coherent.

Since writing this, it appears that AY has been describing the "Trait Equalization Process" a lot like the steelmanned version I have written. Note that I wrote this when both his verbal description was "Take two objects and a list of traits of both of them. Swap them one at a time until they are both the same" and a visual representation of two circles named A and B, making them the same, and saying there was no difference between them. All of the objections above pertained to that.

Given that those were the initial descriptions, as well as the fact that "equalization" and "retainment" are now misnomers leftover from those descriptions, the new description of the process is a post-hoc attempt to fix the argument. (Perhaps discarding hilarious other excuses like "nowhere in the argument does it say it accepts the identity of indiscernibles." Apparently rules regarding logic are supposed to be written into every syllogism now.) I consider it a concession to use my method of steelmanning and abandoning his old description, but still think the argument is incorrectly written and should fix its misnomers.