The Frost Report

## **Assessing the Decentralised Management of the Pemblish Commonwealth’s Railway Network (working title)**

This Report aims to examine the current, decentralised nature of the Commonwealth of Pem’s railway network and address the shortfalls of the current system in relation to public and national requirements. This report will also use benchmarks such international comparisons

## **Preamble**

The ownership and control of Pem’s railway network and rolling stock is fragmented across a number of different parties. The current structure has a historical and financial basis stemming back to the original construction and ownership of various network components. With the exception of Centrelands Railways in the past half-a-century, the efficient or optimal operation and maintenance of the network as a whole has never been taken into consideration.

A number of different private companies (along with state-owned Centrelands Railway) control various different aspects of the CoP railway network, such as infrastructure upkeep and management, timetable management and rolling stock management. This system has grown increasingly complex and cumbersome as the use and size of the network has increased. Recent efforts by the relatively new Worshipful Company of Railway Workers (WCRW) has created a degree of unification in maintenance and access rights, but has highlighted and often exacerbated duplication in the administration process.

The economic inefficiency and layers of bureaucracy of the existing railway structure has led to rising costs for both passengers and freight traffic. The decentralisation and duplication of administration has led to an unagile and cumbersome network, with excessive layers of bureaucracy causing delays to scheduled trains, extended lead times to network-upgrade and maintenance projects and extended delays to access rights requests.

These factors have decreased the attractiveness of railways to commuters, tourists and businesses who would otherwise benefit from use of the railways. Despite these inefficiencies and increased costs, no network-wide review has ever been undertaken by a central authority and reviews by individual railway companies have been limited to a specific geographical region or section of track. The most comprehensive reviews produced since the inception of the network have been made by major freight transporters, but these have been focused on freight traffic and access rights for their specific industries.

The Ministry of Public Works, under the guidance of the Lord Protector, have commissioned this report to review the current state of the railways, explain the issues and benefits with the current system, and make recommendations for any improvements or changes to the system.

## **Historical context**

The background to this state of affairs has its roots in the first railway routes established in Pem, which were undertaken by guilds and private companies.

The very first railway line, from the site of Pemblecross Station to Walden, was devised by the Guild of Miners (GoM) as part of a vision for a wider freight-rail infrastructure project, which later became the Grand Trunk Railway. The GoM sought funding from a wide variety of sources in order to finance the venture; to this end they reached out to private institutions, such as Merchant & Public and the Woleseat Stone Company. The GoM planned to compensate investors through profit sharing agreements, but this prospective private funding fell through due to the perceived risk that investors saw in the project. The Walden Line was ultimately funded directly by the Undercourt, albeit with much political wrangling and under limiting conditions. However, the success of the Walden railway proved the profitability of rail freight and transport and made railways an attractive investment prospect to private financial institutions. As a result, future projects preferences  direct government financing became increasingly rare in future projects as private sources

The advent of the current railway system came with the construction of the Eastern Blue Railway Line. When Malcolm Tavistock sought to build a railway line from Pembleton to Coltar he looked to the Walden Line as a template for his own efforts. Tavistock had experienced the GoM’s private-finance attempts first hand during his time at Merchant & Public and had favoured the Walden Line venture, determining that a profit sharing agreement would be lucrative. By the time he set out to build the railway in 80H.S, the Walden Line and the fledgling Grand Trunk Line had proved that railways had real profit potential.

At the time, the GoM believed that railways fell under the guild privilege and Tavistock’s intention to build a railway line independently directly contradicted their dejure rights. This dispute lead to the ‘Smokepipe’ Affair (UC vs Guild of Miners 81 H.S.), in which the Undercourt ruled that the Eastern Blue Rail Company (EBRC) was permitted to build and operate their own privately-funded line. This removed the pretext of guild monopoly and established the precedent by which railways were therefore the domain of private enterprise.

Private finance offered a simple and profit-driven approach, whilst government support generally came at greater cost and with additional caveats. As a result, direct state funding became a rare exception, rather than the rule, for the proceeding three centuries. The GoM’s initial efforts to raise funds privately through arrangements such as profit sharing laid the framework for future private financing of railway projects.

Contemporary lines such as the Perpendicular Line or the Red Line were primarily constructed by private companies. As a result, the Undercourt has had little influence on the design, specifications or ongoing investment & development of these railway lines. Despite this, technological considerations have resulted in a degree of standardisation across the network, such as a standardised gauge. Furthermore, the purview of the WCRW as a regulatory body in recent decades (?) has resulted in surface level changes to railway standards and operations. Nevertheless,

## **Reasons for The Report**

### **1.1 Decentralised Ownership**

THIS IS A SEPARATE POINT ABOUT PROFIT VS REQUIREMENT. Government funding became the exception rather than the rule for the proceeding two centuries; the early railways demonstrated how economically transformative and profitable railways could be and many railway ventures have since benefitted from investment from a wide variety of financial sources seeking investment dividends. **The dependency of the railways**

Private companies such as the EBRC, Port and Provincial (P&P) and Perpendicular Line Company (PLC).  From this foundation of private conception and funding built on a foundation of chartered, private and Private-Public Partnership (PPP) infrastructure and rolling stock.

### **1.2 Track management and concessions**

Concessions would conform to the current division of railways under the ownership of their operators, with minor adjustments for improved efficiency of traffic. Under the new system, operators would not take any commercial risk, but would  although there are usually penalties and rewards specified in the contract for large variations in performance.

In addition, secondary operators for freight, long distance and overnight services would continue to be operated through the purchase of access rights, albeit through a significantly reduced system.

This system would replace the complex, archaic and costly system of access rights trading currently operated directly through the WCRW. The current system operates at a significant loss to both operators and the WCRW, with an average loss of £5.2m per annum per operator. Currently, every rail operator currently in existence employs their own officials for the management of access, with an additional WCRW office at its Pembleton headquarters for the coordination of the system.

Furthermore, as well as being significantly inefficient a drain on operator funds which might otherwise have been better invested by operators, the current system of access rights has also been responsible for many delays on networks due to miscommunications leading to timetabling conflicts.

### **1.3 Track management and rail investment**

One of the priorities of this report is to anatomise and address the issues that have arisen from the lack of a centralised administration for investments into required infrastructure across the network.

At the present time, the Pemblish rail network suffers from patchwork investment which differs significantly by operator. Although the WCRW has played an admirable role in ensuring that infrastructure standards (signalling, gauge, engineering frameworks) across the entirety of the network remain compatible, in practice it has meant that the investment made is entirely dependent on the concerns of individual operators.

In addition to improving the coordination of services across the network, this report concludes that the creation of this new track authority would go some way to addressing the poor condition of some existing rail infrastructure, as well as improving the planning and execution of new development.

Currently, lines in the southern freeholds as well as some branch lines nationwide were noted to suffer from significant rail deterioration (corrugation, corrosion), including on the eastern Port and Provincial railway between Waysouth and Crossing Point, as well as the Walden branch line and those in the Sawdus Freehold. In addition, the same lines frequently suffered from deterioration to other infrastructure, including around 5400 rotten sleepers and outdated track technology including the worrying continued use of cast iron, unflanged fishbelly rail in rail yards and sidings in the Southern Freehold.

Although such lines may struggle to be profitable in many cases (indeed the report found that in many cases lack of profitability was a primary motivator for their neglect) the importance of such lines cannot be understated for the significant roles they play in the communities they serve, being a primary transportation link for both passengers and freight. Many, though by no means all branch lines therefore serve as an indirect yet significant economic boon to the nation.

In addition, the neglect to the Port and Provincial line is of some additional concern due to the strategic value of the line due to its potential for the transportation of soldiers. Given our currently heightened political relationship with Alleuria, it cannot be emphasised enough just how important the ability to rapidly transport troops to the frontier is.

Much is often said about the wonders of modern technologies such as flight upon their ability to revolutionise the field of warfare, however such technologies are yet to match the significant speed and troop-carrying capacity which rail offers. Furthermore, the lack of waterways in the region places further emphasis on the route’s significance.

### **2.1 Recommended improvements**

It must now be re-emphasised that the purpose of this report is to recommend what is required to ensure that the Pemblish rail network is fit for requirement in the modern age. Presently, the national network faces several significant challenges

It is therefore recommended by this report that the ownership and management of all track infrastructure should be transferred from the operators to a new authority formed in association with, but operationally independent from both the WCRW, rail operators and the Government.

The network will instead operate primary services under a concessionary format, whereby concession holders are paid a fee to run the service, which is usually tightly specified by the awarding authority.

the necessity for a centralised administration for investments into required infrastructure across the network, i.e an independent track manager which can take a ‘whole picture’ approach to investment.

## Reasons for The Report

### Decentralised Ownership

As noted in the preamble of this report, the structure of the Railways of Pem has always had a fragmented one. The background to this state of affairs has its roots in the first railway routes established in Pem, which were undertakings spearheaded by private companies, individuals and guilds (namely the Miners Guild and, later, Steamworkers Guild). The very first line, from the site of Pemblecross Station to Walden, was envisioned by the Guild of Miners and sought funding from a wide variety of sources. Although it was ultimately funded directly by the Undercourt, this source of funds became the exception rather than the rule for the proceeding two centuries. Nevertheless, the line was devised, pushed

Indeed, the Undercourt was only approached due to a lack of interest from private investors, a

somewhat distant

their historical foundation in both chartered (guild and worshipful company) and private

built on a foundation of chartered, private and PPP (Private-Public Partnership) infrastructure and rolling stock.

## Analytical Overview

### Overview of State Income Soures

###

## Breakdown of Traffic Types

### Passenger Services

#### Metro Services

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### Freight Services

#### Inter-network Freight

Coltar - Pembleton Platform

Transmarch platform (out of remit)

access from coltar to waysouth/cross point

Pemblecross red line platform

underinvestment in ruby line (out of remit)

Woleseat /woleseat north capacity. Not suitable for passengers. low freight capacity

beaconsfield interchange?

rail route from woleseat to the lumber yard

upgrading capacity to cross ing point and going into aleuria

caernbrae

international gauge

Classified:

military access from harryhausen to CP, Checkers/Coltar and Ridgely