Personhood: philosophical versus systemic materialization description

Personhood is the result of a thinking individual within a personhood-engendering context. Persons don't only have minds (they have physical bodies, friends, groups; if we deplete the environment, we deplete the degrees of personhood [see: gradience of personhood]), but the mind plays a central role. The question "what is a personhood-yielding mind" is very important in personhood studies. Philosophers overestimate some prerequisites, underestimate others, and often don't care to describe the main personhood-yielding organ, the personhood-yielding computer (brain; biological, digital, etc.). The thinking ability is a basic prerequisite for personhood both in general philosophy and in the philosophy of neuroscience. Brains are information processors able to produce personhood; a brain is a personhood-yielding computer which isn't a mere philosophical zombie which yields personhood-like results without endosystemic (intrasystemic) awareness, good data filtering, biased belief in self-agency (personhood doesn't magically preexist; it's a procedural outcome; belief in self-agency is necessary for the better endosystemic coherence of the true persons [non-philosophical-zombies]), overall coherence and emotional labeling of each informational element. Not only biological "personhood-yielding computers" (brains) are possible; there is no information theory limitation or proven superiority of the cellular/neural thinking. Which are the systemic prerequisites of the personhood-yielding computer (brain)? Enough Brodmann-like regions, good connectivity, task-order and coherence control centers to orchestrate the procedures, and consciousness centers (see: Mark Solms) which produce a generic awareness of the main procedures. The human brain is a personhood-yielding computer we do and can study, thus neuroscience is very important on understanding the procedural materialization of personhood. Many human brain principles (not necessarily all) might be general characteristics of any other possible allobrain (brain of different/allo- design but still personhood-yielding). The personhood of God cannot escape procedurality (a complicated but specific pattern of procedures within a specific data-processing personhood-yielding system). God's fundamental ontology isn't only unknowable, but it's impossible to scientifically hypothesize because the supernatural cannot be a rigorous logical axiomatic system because it would be an alternative physics; a logically based substantiality. That's why rigorous analyses on the personhood-yielding mechanism are incompatible to God who doesn't obey rigorous mathematical or allomathematical (allomathematics means axiomatic system based on different axiomatics from those of the common mathematics; the axioms can be a list, an algorithm or hybrid) axiomatics (see: axiomatization of physics; David Hilbert didn't have enough particle accelerator data and made many mistakes; David Tong has a better view on the quantum foundations; any alternative physics of some different reality would still have to be logically rigorous in order it has a specific identity and causal foundations or physical axiomatics; that's why the supernatural is physically impossible, but it can be expressed as a mistake of distorted semantics but only within physical worlds).