People of the Philippines vs Rolando Solar Dumbrique G.R. No. 225595. August 06, 2019

People of the Philippines vs Rolando Solar Dumbrique G.R. No. 225595. August 06, 2019

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65742

En Banc

## Issues

1. Whether the prosecution proved Rolando's guilt beyond reasonable doubt
	* In fact, relationship itself could even strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it is highly unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence to blame one who is innocent of the crime.
2. Whether the CA erred in finding that conspiracy existed between Rolando and Mark Kenneth
	* There is conspiracy if at the time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that they were animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or where the acts of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted action. xxx. Thus, the rule is well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design.
3. On the issue of sufficiency of the Information
	* Indeed, the use of the baseball bat as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the information.
	* The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings.
	* Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in *United States v. Lim San*:
	* That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named.
4. Rolando has waived his right to question the defects in the Information filed against him
	* In People v. Lopez, we held that an information which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence presented therein. Thus —[F]ailure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
	* Firstly, it behooved the accused to raise the issue of a defective information, on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, in a motion to quash said information or a motion for bill of particulars. An accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be deemed to have waived the defect in said information. The only defects in an information that are not deemed waived are where no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and double jeopardy.
5. Insufficiency of Informations that merely mention or enumerate the attending circumstances
	* First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as well enable him to make his defense; and second,

to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
 further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

1. * Allegations of "certainty to a common intent" mean that the facts must be set out in ordinary and concise language, in such a form that persons of common understanding may know what is meant.
	* Consequently, the Court holds that it is insufficient for prosecutors to indicate in an Information that the act supposedly committed by the accused was done "with treachery" or "with abuse of superior strength" or "with evident premeditation" without specifically describing the acts done by the accused that made any or all of such circumstances present.
	* To this end, prosecutors are instructed to state with sufficient particularity not just the acts complained of or the acts constituting the offense, but also the aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, as well as any other attendant circumstances, that would impact the penalty to be imposed on the accused should a verdict of conviction be reached.
	* Moreover, prosecutors are enjoined to strictly implement the mandate of, and ensure compliance with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to attach to the Informations they will be filing in courts their resolutions finding probable cause against the accused.
	* Finally, trial courts are likewise enjoined to ensure that the accused is furnished a copy of the said resolutions finding probable cause against the accused.
	* In sum, the Court, continually cognizant of its power and mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,[71] hereby lays down the following guidelines for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar:

    Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance — in which the law uses a broad term to embrace various situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — is present, must state the ultimate facts relative to such circumstance. Otherwise, the Information may be subject to a motion to quash under Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a bill of particulars under the parameters set by said Rules.

1. Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes a waiver of his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the Information, and consequently, the same may be appreciated against him if proven during trial.
2. Alternatively, prosecutors may sufficiently aver the ultimate facts relative to a qualifying or aggravating circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding probable cause against the accused, which resolution should be attached to the Information in accordance with the second guideline below.
3. Prosecutors must ensure compliance with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure that mandates the attachment to the Information the resolution finding probable cause against the accused. Trial courts must ensure that the accused is furnished a copy of this Decision prior to the arraignment.
4. Cases which have attained finality prior to the promulgation of this Decision will remain final by virtue of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
5. For cases which are still pending before the trial court, the prosecution, when still able, may file a motion to amend the Information pursuant to the prevailing Rules[72] in order to properly allege the aggravating or qualifying circumstance pursuant to this Decision.
6. For cases in which a judgment or decision has already been rendered by the trial court and is still pending appeal, the case shall be judged by the appellate court depending on whether the accused has already waived his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the Information, (i.e., whether he previously filed either a motion to quash under Section 3(e), Rule 117, or a motion for a bill of particulars) pursuant to this Decision.

## Decision

**WHEREFORE**, premises considered, the Court hereby **ADOPTS**
 the findings of fact in the attached Decision dated January 13, 2015 of
 the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05757, and finds the
accused-appellant **Rolando Solar y Dumbrique GUILTY**
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. He is thus sentenced to
suffer the penalty of *reclusion perpetua,* and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Joseph Capinig y Mato **SEVENTY-FIVE
 THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P75,000.00) as moral damages, SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) as exemplary damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
 as temperate damages.** All monetary awards shall earn interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, as
well as to the Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office, the
Philippine National Police, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the
National Bureau of Investigation, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise, the Office of
the Court Administrator is **DIRECTED** to **DISSEMINATE** copies of this Decision to all trial courts, including the Court of Appeals.

## Dissent & Concurring Opinion

Lucas Bersamin dissent Marvic Leonen joins the dissent of Chief Justice Bersamin

Estela Perlas-Bernabe concurring opinion

Alexander Gesmudo separate concurring opinion

Francis Jardeleza no part