Comment to Elif Şafak or Shafak

Can you study a little bit physicalism (atheism related). Watch YouTube videos of David Deutsch, some simple popularizations if you hate physics. Ateizm Derneği in Turkey needs some support. Write about an atheist student of philosophy who is a fan of the bands Suffocation and Nile (soft metal). If you want to conceal the metal thing... say she or he listens to Tōru Takemitsu, Akio Yashiro and her/his best musical pieces are: 1. Piano Sonata No. 9 by Aleksandr Scriabin Black Mass Opus 68 and 2. Param Vir's, White Light Chorale (1999) because they are horrorish. It is very harder to compose without a musical scale. This music is modernist, but modernism has many subgenres. This music I mentioned is false atonal (pseudoatonal). Atonal music (see: atonality) is based on randomization patterns, but false atonal music is less strict and more harmonious than true atonality, but less harmonious than tonal music = scale using. These composers focus use the musical intervals to create a compositional scaffold, because they're not protected by musical scales which provide ready made answers. False atonality doesn't rely neither on scales (tonality) nor randomization rules (atonality) instead it relies on experience and sometimes on generic rules for proferred interval combinations which differ for each composer.

If the character is a metalhead she should play the 7-string guitar because it has more bass; or piano because it can play many notes in tandem (violin can play only 4 notes in tandem).

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Why physicalism isn't compatible with religion?

1. Speak about the "Everettian constructor" = combine Hugh Everett III's many-worlds interpretation with David Deutsch constructor theory (David has 2 books, but Chiara Marletto and Sabine Hossenfelder are great also)
Roger Penrose is correct that the universe is cyclic = infinite big bangs happen intervened with normal lifespan of universes. Thus there is no ex nihilo self-caused personhood = God. But Roger Penrose doesn't elaborate correctly on the phase transition before each big bang. Non-capitalized big bang refers to any big bang in the cyclic universe, and the capitalized Big Bang is the proper name of our local universe (infinite other universes exist see: Max Tegmark, Sean M. Carroll, because Alan Guth's cosmic inflation can be solved in many alternative ways = differentiations which are mathematically correct. The foundations of substantiality are necessary logical. God and soul aren't based on specific logical ontology and procedurality thus their function isn't only unteachable, but illogic = lack of logic doesn't have specific characteristics and cannot impart identity in the first place.

see: MIT before the Big Bang
Putting the “bang” in the Big Bang | MIT News | Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2. neuroscience (books and YouTube: Mark Solms and Nancy Kanwisher) versus soul

Soul doesn't create any logical connectome. Brodmann areas (see: Brodmann area) work together to meet the criteria of personhood (Mary Anne Warren's criteria of personhood).
The soul being a pure notion is a mereological simple of only one shannon (shannon: unit of information) thus it cannot convey memory of more than one data units and it cannot have procedural modes being unprocedural.

The impersonality of the physical foundations:
impersonal cosmos

God is personhooded. God necessarily has a brain. All brains are informational processing machines. Brains are personhood-yielding computers. Even idealized computers occupy some topological volume. Study what topology is. In topology specific units do not matter, but specific relationships between points inside objects do matter. Thought is temporally exhibited. All-knowingness doesn't meet the prerequisites for thought because it's structural and not procedural. Space and time = spacetime is a prerequisite for brains. When one speaks about the mind; has also to elaborate on how it's produced via neuroscience and information theory in an idealized manner. The brain and the mind aren't prerequisites for spacetime and cosmogony. Personhood-yielding computers (brains) have parts able to create personhood (see: Nancy Kanwisher, Mark Solms). Personhood isn't self-caused ex nihilo and cosmogonic.

The soul is unprocedural and a mereological simple, thus it's impossible to convey memories and procedural modes (see: Brodmann areas). The soul doesn't meet the criteria of substantiality [it means it doesn't exist] (it's not a causal connectome).

physicalist foundations of substantiality: Everettian constructor (see: many-worlds interpretation, constructor theory)

3. Chemical abiogenesis of life (YouTube: Jack W. Szostak [Harvard] and Yohey Suzuki [University of Tokyo])

There was no divine Genesis, instead there was chemical abiogenesis. see also: organic molecules in the universe, asteroids, planets etc.

4. foundations of physics:

see: Robert W. Spekkens, Perimeter Institute

Information theory (see: information theory) can be used as the physical foundations.

Also used some ideas of the late Steven Weinberg the atheist physicist (he has many books; he's not interesting as you as a writer but please help the Turks and other humans who love you evolve).

Many Turks and other humans love you.

Most writers don't like stuff like the "foundations of substantiality".

You can make things more elegant, and remove the boring parts,

but please speak about "scientific physicalism" = scientophysicalism (common physicalism is philosophical, see: Physicalism on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Yale University, etc. But common philosophical physicalism merely outdebates theism. That's not enough. We need science (scientophysicalism) to understand how the universe works.

Make your scientophysicalist character a Turkish woman to have more impact.
Physicalism is deeper than lay atheism because it explains better its reasoning.

She can be a woman heroine. Why not?

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Causal closure

Causal closure

The causal closure is an old physicalist staple; Everettism and ontological (not merely calculatory) renormalization don't close the causal connectome, but attribute weights to it according to each different observer
Causal closure isn't the mainstream view in

ontological renormalization (very wide envelopes surrounding an observed wave function, include parts that most probably won't interact with the central object, and if we accept that everything in the universe belongs in the same connectome; afar objects which are not strongly entangled interact very mildly. Afar regions (from an arbitrary observational center) include many wave functions which contribute mildly to the central observed wave function; or better put have a low probability to strongly interact with the center of the Hubble volume (theoretically afar from a Hubble volume, only entanglement allows interaction [due to intermediary Hubble volumes], but entanglement is NOT useful for communicational interaction but for ontological only (entanglement can be used for quantum encryption because its fundamental but not for faster than light data transfer). Still entanglement IS important, because it holds the universe as one BUT WITH ALL ITS MANY-WORLDS (quantum entanglement is ontologically important; also partial entanglement is important; probabilistic entanglement is the claim that entanglements and partial entanglements are also probabilistically tuned, but for an observer its hard to discover them (this is a mathematical question; if we measure many particles, some are entangled and some not.... to be more accurate all particles are entangle [because overall are/comprise the universe] at a different degree. The mathematical question is what would be different in arbitrary comparisons of particles, if probabilistic entanglement were wrong.
Everettism: Everettism provides a connectome of close by actualities which allow more afar alternatives when we recede from the arbitrary central observer (same as above; with different mathematics). Actually we don't have to compare something outside our Hubble volume to find out (calculationally; as a thought experiment) that Everettism (manyworldness) is correct. For example, thermally collapsed atoms in our cells are NOT maximally collapsed (collapse has degrees), thus alternative realities DO exist (see: photosynthesis).
cyclic universe (not Roger Penrose's version, because we didn't describe correctly the adiabatic phase transition of maximal to low spatiotemporal entropy): infinite big bangs exist (according to that view), and spacetime is more fundamental than a particular universe cycle. Infinite spacetimes exist (Max Tegmark), and they're self-caused because their constructor (David Deutsch) is correct. Any correct spatiotemporal constructor necessarily exists do to its correctness. Nilogony/nihilogony/cosmogony from nothing is impossible, because the Nothing cannot exist; it isn't a potential state of the infinite somethings. Constructor self-causality cannot be avoided EVEN if God existed (then the system "spacetime" becomes "God & spacetime", but self-causality and constructor theory are unavoidable). God is a person (if God is an atheistic process, we merely distort language and falsely merge different semantics). Personhood is the result of a personhood-yielding calculator = brain. The criteria of personhood have to be met via the procedures of the personhood-yielding computer Brodmann-like areas. An idealized brain can be described as a connectome with nodes [or a could with densities and allowed data directions; like a weird fluid; many idealized brain models exist]. We can topologically describe the idealized brain. Still some volume is required (topology doesn't specify the distances; but we need topology ALSO for the foundations of quantum mechanics; thus the vagueness of distance gets meaning via limitations and rule of each particular connectome; brain or spacetime). No brain can function without a volume; and thinking requires time (otherwise it is NOT procedural thinking, but a static structure; but no static structures can exist and be procedurally perceived; static structures are NOT universe-like). Thus spacetime is more fundamental than personhood and the brain which produces it. Personhood isn't a prerequisite for spacetime, but spacetime -being fundamental - IS a prerequisite for personhood. God being nonfundamental necessarily cannot exist, because he cannot meet his definition.
Comment 1
please write about: the many-constructors interpretation
please write about: the many-constructors interpretation

many-constructors interpretation: Not merely Everettianly different universes, but with different physics. Just because it's mathematically possible = self-causal (without God or nihilogony = Stephen Hawking was wrong on the "cosmogony from nothing". David Deutsch is correct on the "cosmogony from constructor[s]/infinite ones. String theory gives a limited amount of universes (if it's correct); but universe-like worlds are infinite if they are based on geometric constructor of phase spaces and tasks/procedures which change states of interpreted field entities like particles.

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God is an exo-cause of the universe (not a self-cause); but still God is a self-cause for the system God—universe; thus any cosmogonic theory requires self-causation (or self-causality). God is necessarily a person; if God were a physicalist procedure then we simply distort language by merging semantics. God is a personhooded thinker, thus he requires a personhood-yielding computer (aka brain; but immaterial and not necessarily similar to ours). The idealized brain can be described topologically as a connectome with nodes (infinite brain models are possible; like a cloud of different densities and different permitted directions of informational flow). Topology doesn't have to do with specific distances (but relationships; with many of them you may get interpreted distances by observers made of the same topological stuff), but specific topological connectomes create distance-like rules (for example topology is used in the foundations of quantum mechanics; theoretically it has nothing to do with specific distances, but procedural restrictions create relative distances amongst objects created by the same rules). Thus even an idealized immaterial brain, would topologically require volume in order it doesn't merge its nodes; and thinking requires time (thinking is procedural; otherwise it would be static structure; but static structure isn't universe-like; it doesn't meet the criteria of spacetime, and it cannot be procedurally perceived if in that reality everything is static). Thus spacetime is more fundamental than brains; and God is impossible being not the utmost fundamental. God cannot resolve the causal closure by failing to being the utmost fundamental existence; thus by failing to exist (thinking requires a connectome, and God requires causal closure to be possible at the fundamental level, without Everettian alternatives).

Comment 2
Unprocedurality and lack of ontological definition lead to no identity, thus nonexistential nonphenomena cannot be attributed to specific entities. Without causal connectome there is no existence. Many antiphysicalists deem personhood and consciousness supernaturally self-caused and reject neuroscience (but they claim they don't reject it). Antiphysicalists don't have an analytical theory of the procedurality and immaterial ontological substance of the soul. They simplify neuroscience. They don't accept that weights of connectome activity, being pre-thoughts (biases: memories, phenotypical, hormonal, cell-component randomness [pre-consciousness before consciousness doesn't exist; not all motions inside cells are controlled perfectly]) result to thoughts. David Deutsch speaks about inexplicit thoughts (see: What is the 'Fun Criterion'? – David Deutsch – behind the scenes - YouTube). Artificial neural network small duration patterns and small duration bio-neural patterns are examples of pre-thoughts (not even inexplicit), but they make no sense as mere data activity if we don't know their particular connectome.

Comment 3
The causal closure or better stated the "Everettian causal connectome" is related to the arrow of time because fundamental descriptions of nature are quantum, not classical. The principle of least action is usually simple in classical physics (some Newtonian problems with alternative curved paths give more than one or infinite solutions), but in quantum mechanics it leads to many solutions (Everettian view). In everyday life it's intuitively (but erroneously) believed that a single past existed; but the wave function also creates multiple pasts (as it creates multiple futures). Reality is a connectome of events; and events further in the future and in the past or locally very afar from us (or not fully observationally entangled), exist in a bouquet of alternative realities in relationship to us. If you didn't permanently record absolutely everything in the past (quantum physics restricts the amount of information we can extract from a system), you cannot claim a single past existed in relationship to you; without to build that relationship in an absolute manner.

Comment 4
Is causal closure Everettianly open-ended (space regions afar [from the observed] in time, space, or less entangled connectome of events)? That's one possibility. The correct one according to pure Everettism; but very afar realities contribute lesser and lesser to the arbitrary center of observation (ontological renormalization approach).

Comment 5
Quantum entanglement (complete or partial) is extremely important, because it cannot convey telecommunication information (useful data) but it can convey wavefunctional (ontological) information. Hubble volumes afar from ours cannot transmit useful information, but are part of the same universe due to the infinite overlapping Hubble volumes. That's why open-ended wavefunctional causality matters for the description of the observed wave function in relation to afar in space, time and entanglement strength wave functions. Probabilistically all particles are entangled to some distant others (due to random coincidence [usually that entanglement is partial; very weak; it includes alternative outcomes]) and that keeps the universe as a whole; but practically afar space regions wavefunctionally (ontologically) are weakly entangled. The further apart two Hubble volumes are, the least entangled they are; but zero entanglement is impossible due to random coincidence entanglement and due to the infinite intermediary Hubble volumes.