Frontiers - September/October 2018

**Cognition**:

Yamaguchi, M., Clarke,
E. L., & Egan, D. L. (2018). Is Your Color My Color? Dividing the Labor of
the Stroop Task Between Co-actors. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*,

Pairs
were given a Stroop task in which each person was assigned a target color. The
purpose of this study was to see if actors would integrate their partner’s task
color and therefore show a Stroop effect for the color they aren’t assigned
(monitor their partner’s actions and thus increasing their workload), or divide
the labor and show a smaller/no Stroop effect for their partner’s assigned
color (be able to focus their attention to only their color and reduce the
workload). In the first experiment, there was larger Stroop effect in the joint
than in the individual task, and a larger Stroop effect for non-target and
partner’s colors in the joint task, but the differences were not significant
(when looking at reaction time). The reason for the larger Stroop in the joint
task is likely due to the requirement of additional withholding responses (do
not respond to partner’s colors or the nontarget colors). Experiment 2
eliminated any non-target colors that weren’t assigned to either actor. As far
as reaction time, there was still no difference between the actor’s own colors
and partner’s colors. When looking at percentage error, there was a larger
Stroop effect for own target than partner’s target colors, consistent with a
division of labor. However, with the inconsistencies between reaction time and
percentage error data the authors were hesitant to conclude a division of labor
strategy and discuss the possibility of different processes that give rise to
Stroop effects as an explanation for these inconsistencies.

Constable, M. D., Pratt,
J., & Welsh, T. N. (2018). “Two Minds Don’t Blink Alike”: The Attentional
Blink Does Not Occur in a Joint Context. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*,

In
another task that was conducted in individual and joint conditions, the
researchers were asking whether a joint attentional blink would occur if
partners were monitoring each other responses/goals. In individual conditions,
participants had to identify both T1 and T2, whereas in the joint task each
participant only had to respond to either T1 OR T2.  In the second experiment the participants were
instructed to monitor their partner’s responses and were given global feedback
on whether they as a pair were correct or incorrect. However, there was only
attentional blink observed for the individual conditions across both
experiments. Authors suggest that participants likely did co-represent/simulate
partner’s task, but posit that 1) co-representation and attentional blink are
results of different processes, 2) lack of conceptual overlap between the
different tasks of the two partners, and 3) the social nature of the joint task
diffusing attentional state as reasons for why there was no joint attentional
blink observed.

Lewis, M. B., & Hills, P. J. (2018). Perceived
Race Affects Configural Processing but Not Holistic Processing in the
Composite-Face Task. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*, 1456.

This one might interest me more than others, but here they
were looking at whether own-race bias operates on only configural processing or
holistic processing as well. The composite face effect is commonly used for assessing
holistic face processing – as it is easier for us to match identical top-halves
of faces when they are misaligned from bottom halves than when they are aligned.
In this study, experiment 1 found this effect for both face races (racially
Black or White). For aligned faces, participants performed better in the
congruent than incongruent condition (either the eye or mouth position
shifted). Further, there was a race-by-congruence interaction, suggesting that
race could have an effect on holistic/configural processing. Experiment 2
shifted attention to the bottom halves of faces. Typically, the top half is
where we naturally attend to and focus on, so by shifting towards discrimination
on the bottom half, the authors hypothesized that this would reduce the
race-by-congruence interaction because both races will now be processed
atypically. There was still a composite effect regardless of race
(congruence-by-alignment interaction) but no race-by-congruence interaction.
Overall, these results suggest that the composite effect is not affected by
race, whereas the effect of congruence on aligned trials is affected by race. A
possible reason for this is stronger configural processing for own-race than
other-race faces. Therefore, the own-race bias could operate more on configural
than holistic processing.

Wang, Q., Liu, M., Shi,
W., & Kang, J. (2018). Mechanism of the SNARC Effect in Numerical
Magnitude, Time Sequence, and Spatial Sequence Tasks: Involvement of LTM and
WM. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*, 1558.

This study looks at the SNARC effect using a paradigm
that simultaneously induces time and spatial sequences. In the first
experiment, subjects where shown a sequence of numbers (with “5” always being
in the middle of the sequence) and then asked to respond to a probe number as
being presented “before” or “after” five. Subjects responded to smaller numbers
faster with the left key and numbers presented “before” five were responded to
faster with the left key and vice versa. In general, this experiment replicated
the SNARC effect for numerical magnitude and serial order. Experiments 2 and 3
investigated whether SNARC would occur in the processing of numerical
magnitude, time sequence, and spatial sequence simultaneously when participants
were judging the probe number based on either time sequence or spatial
sequence, respectively. Experiment 2 concluded that the SNARC could not
simultaneously coexist amongst these three but did in magnitude and spatial
sequence when making a the “before or after five” judgement.  Similar results in Experiment 3. Curious to
see if any of the SNARC experts have comments about this one. I got a little
bit lost in this one.

Korovkin, S.,
Vladimirov, I., Chistopolskaya, A., & Savinova, A. (2018). How Working
Memory Provides Representational Change During Insight Problem Solving. *Frontiers*
in Psychology*,* 9*, 1864.*

The dynamics of working memory load under different types of
problem-solving tasks is assessed. Non-insight problems appear to be more
demanding in terms of working memory load and relies more on the control system
of working memory. Insight problem solving is more demanding of working memory
storage systems.

**Developmental**
Psych:

Bock, A. M., Cartwright,
K. B., McKnight, P. E., Patterson, A. B., Shriver, A. G., Leaf, B. M., …
Pasnak, R. (2018). Patterning, Reading, and Executive Functions. *Frontiers*
in Psychology*,* 9*, 1802.*

Here is one from Frontiers in Developmental Psych that may
interest some - looking at the role that executive functions have in patterning
ability/pattern comprehension. Cognitive flexibility correlates with
performance on object size patterns whereas working memory correlates with
performance on symmetrical and growing number patterns.

Tiego, J., Testa, R., Bellgrove, M. A., Pantelis, C.,
& Whittle, S. (2018). A Hierarchical Model of Inhibitory Control. *Frontiers*
in Psychology*,* 9*, 1339. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01339*

Finally, one that might interest a few of you is a modeling
paper on inhibitory control. Response inhibition and attentional inhibition are
often suggested as being closely related. This model controls for differences
in WMC as a way to account for the overlap in response and attentional
inhibition. The authors used measures of performance on vernal memory span,
response inhibition (stop signal and go/no go and Simon), and attentional
inhibition (Stroop, flanker, and shape matching) tasks to show that response
and attentional inhibition factors were independent constructs after their
shared statistic dependence on WMC was accounted for.

**Cognitive Science:**

Ren, M., Zhong, B., Fan,
W., Dai, H., Yang, B., Zhang, W., … Zhan, Y. (2018). The Influence of
Self-Control and Social Status on Self-Deception. *Frontiers in Psychology*,
*9*, 1256.

Participants were given a questionnaire where
they were either given answer hints or not. They predicted scores to be higher
under the condition with hints than without. Next, individuals with high and
low self-control traits and different perceptions of social status complete the
questionnaires. Individuals with low self-control have greater differences in
in predicted scores on a questionnaire when they are given hints than when they
are not, but only for low social status perception. Therefore, low self-control
individuals produced more self-deception, but high social status perception can
restrict this influence.

**Comparative Psych:**

Wang, M.-Y., Chittka, L., & Ings, T. C. (2018).
Bumblebees Express Consistent, but Flexible, Speed-Accuracy Tactics Under
Different Levels of Predation Threat. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*,

Looking at whether decision-speed or decision-accuracy is
flexible in bumblebees under different levels of predation. The bees remained
relatively consistent depending on whether they made faster or more accurate
decisions regardless of predation level. However, there was some flexibility in
these patterns. Bees became less accurate at color discrimination under
predation. Predator detectability and level of risk associated with an
incorrect response also influenced decision speed and accuracy.