Charos United Nations Constitution Draft

work in process. bold and underline insertions and anything that you take issue with

-relation to other UNs

-fanfic facist mention?, machine god

-genocide cool or nah? (1 city minimum rule?)

-peacekeeping force mention, levy?

--chillpill issuence

-weapons inspections

-wang therapy

-slavery cool or nah?

-human rights - do we care?

-Any law passed by the UNGA is legally binding in UN member states

-UNHQ

-CUNGA CONGA

"In the event that a law is considered to be too vague then the UNEC shall discuss how the law should be enforced. All UNEC councillors will have to discuss the matter before a decision is made.”

-suspension mechanism and timing

-wiki page required for membership

-nominal membership, the 'toast' countries?

-country suspension when in UNEC

-UNAT governance

-WTO?

-fleg

## 1. Founding and Principles

1.1 The Charosi United Nations (CUN)

*1.2 Some principle stuff*

1.2.1. The CUN will observe the Treaty of Toastervision

1.2.2. Cheese Pressing is forbidden

**1.2.3. Nukes are haram**

1.3

## 2. Membership

2.1. All state representing a nation with unique vibes will be allowed a membership, no two groups with the same vibe are allowed to participate simultaneously.

2.1.1. If two applicants attempt to join with the same vibes the CUNGA must vote on which should be accepted

2.2. A state meeting the requirements in 2.1 can not arbitrarily be refused membership upon its initial attempt to join, however should it leave or be kicked out for violation of BUN constitution then the CUNGA may refuse membership **under 3.2.3.**

2.2.1. A rejoining member also requires the blessing of the UNEC **or ICJ** if it was previously kicked out for violating international law or the constitution

2.3. A member state is entitled to 1 voting representative in the CUNGA, 1 vote for the CNEC elections and **1 vote in the election of the supreme judge.**

2.4. Nominal membership may be given to nations with weak unique vibes or shared vibes, these will be permitted observing representatives in the CUNGA but will not have a right to vote there.

2.5. To force entry into a member state's territory that is not already **suspended** or in conflict with the UN **requires a warrant to have been issued from the supreme judge**, this must be with a specific objective in mind as part of enforcing a specific international law. In addition **the UNEC decision must be unanimous in order to do this.**

2.6 The CUN Constitution and law passed by the CUNGA is legally binding in all UN member states

**<contribution stuff>**

## 3. General Assembly and International Law

3.1. Provided it works within the constitution, the Charosi United Nations General Assembly (CUNGA) has supremacy within the UN in decision making and law making.

3.2. Laws, repealments  and actions may be proposed by both voting and observing representatives, as well as by the UNEC, **ICJ** and any parties delegated this power by the CUNGA. **A proposal must be made before Wednesday of  a vote cycle**.

3.3.1 The CUNGA has the power and duty to accept or reject proposals for laws, repealments and actions at the conclusion of each **session** (**On Saturday**). **An absolute minimum of 2 votes is required** in addition to the following requirements. Each voting representative/ambassador may vote **Yay** to support a proposal, **Nay** to vote against a proposal or **Meh** to absatain as per 3.7.

3.3.2 An absolute majority (>50% of all full members) is required for a law to be passed at the conclusion of a **session**

3.3.3. A law with a simple majority from all present (>50% of countries voting on the proposal) may be passed on the conclusion of its **second session**

3.3.4. The CUNGA can not vote to remove a law-abiding member **and can not refuse an initial application as per 2.2. A repeat application may be refused by a CUNGA vote**

3.3.5. The reverse of 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. applies in that a proposal is rejected on the first cycle if an absolute majority of members vote against the proposal, and that a simple majority can reject on conclusion of the second cycle.

3.4. Extra Majority Requirements.

Some types of proposal may require an absolute extra majority to pass, 2/3rds of all entitled members, as defined below. At the conclusion of a **second session** this can be an extra-majority of all members voting on the proposal.

**3.4.1. Those related to Religion and Language within the UN structure**

**3.4.2. For a law to have universal jurisdiction (i.e: beyond UN members)**

**3.4.4. Accepting donated territory as full UNAT status or giving away territory with this status. This excludes any seat of the CUN itself such as the CUNGA which would be a constitutional issue (see 3.4).**

3.5. The CUNGA may also propose and vote on constitutional ammendments. **These require an absolute supermajoirty of 75%. In other words 3/4 of all members with the right to vote must approve a constitutional change before it can be enacted.**

3.6. Repealment

Repealment of a previously approved law requires both an absolute majority and more votes in favour of its repealment than there were votes approving it into law originally.

3.6.1. If a proposal to repeal has an absolute majority for 2 vote cycles but does not meet the second requirement of having more votes to repeal than votes that approved it into law then mark the numerical difference between the votes, with each successive **session** take 1 from that number until that number is negative.

3.7. Abstention from a vote

As well as being able to vote 'yay' in approval or 'nay' in rejection of a proposal, a nation's representative may also vote 'meh' in abstention. This abstention for the purposes of the proposal's ballot calculus means that the total number of voting members is considered to be one less (and therefore less required for any absolute majority).

3.8. Secretarial Duties of the CUNEC

Archiving information is a collective duty which the CUNEC is primarily responsible of.

3.8.1. To satisfy some of the above requirements proposals should be made with a date or election cycle number, the number of election cycles the proposal has gone through.

3.8.2. If passed, a proposal must keep these details recorded along with the number of votes Yay/Meh/Nay/absent. Rejected proposals may be recorded but there is no obligation

**3.9.The CUNGA is not able to vote to attack a country unless it is in explicit violation of international law**

## 4. Leadership of the Executive Council

4.1 The Charosi United Nations Executive Council (CUNEC) has the responsibility and powers of enforcing UN law and constitution and is made up of 3 Councillors. **<TERM LIMIT STUFF ETC GO HERE>.** Councillors are sworn into office with the ceremonial dance of the CUNGA CONGA in which CUNGA representatives participate. **It is permissible to hokey cokey instead as was custom on Arsinos and Barvos.**

4.2 Election of the CUNEC.

Each member state gets one vote and may vote for its own candidate, the 3 candidates with the most support are elected to the council. The next CUNEC may be voted for without the election being formally called allowing the current CUNEC to continue indefinitely with their replacements known. **The candidates may not also hold the role of supreme judge simultaneously.**

4.2.1. Ties

In the event of a tie in the voting, a candidate representing a state that was on the previous council looses. If there is still a tie as both do or both do not meet this condition then repeat this step but with successful voters for the previous CUNEC. If there is *still* a tie then apply the above two steps to the CUNEC before the previous one. If all previous CUNEC data is exhausted and a tie still exists or there is ambiguity then the candidates must engage in a dance off. If two candidates consent they can go straight to a dance off without the above tiebreaker method.

**4.3. Decision making of the CUNEC**

**For decisions to be immediate the councillors must be unanimous. Otherwise if there is a majority they must act the following day with any exceptions being listed below:**

**4.3.1. Declaring War: If the CUNEC has a law or action they wish to enforce with the CUNAF 2 councillors must wait a voting cycle after the vote to attack.**

**4.3.2. Raising CUNAF forces from constituent members as per 2.5.1. requires a non-unanimous majority to wait half a voting cycle (wednesday).**

4.4. Powers and responsibilities.

The CUNEC has responsibility as CUNGA secretary and High Command of the CUNAF as well as internal and external diplomatic representatives of the UN.

4.4.1. The CUNEC is responsible for UNATs unless law states otherwise, **though can not accept or give them away and may not make changes to areas seating the UN (see 3.3.5.)**

4**.4.1.1. The CUNEC may do what it likes with UNTH land if the CUNGA makes no move to claim it after 2 vote cycles.**

4.4.2. The CUNEC may delegate responsibilities to other individuals from UN member states (This may be highly practical for the High Command role for example). **Unanimity is required to do this**.

4.4.3. The CUNEC may persue and arrest violators of international law which includes the UN constitution, **and may hand them over to the ICJ**

**4.4.4. The CUNEC may suspend a member for violating inter national law, they may also revoke membership entirely if they are unanimous and receive approval from the supreme judge.**

**4.4.5. The CUNEC may revoke membership for violation of the constitution if they are unanimous, or if they vote a majority and have approval from the supreme judge.**

4.4.6. The CUNEC may use military force, sanctions and diplomatic pressure to enforce international law as is appropriate

**4.5. Removing a BUNEC**

**An Absolute BUNGA majority is required to remove a BUNEC before the minimum election cycle, if an extra-majority (2/3) is not reached it also requires approval of the supreme judge.**

**4.5.1. Removal of an individual Councillor requires a extra-majority (2/3) and approval of the Supreme Judge**

**4.5.2. Removal of an entire BUNEC mandates an immediate election, the Supreme judge may delegate interim responsibility to 3 previous Councillors from different constituent states. These Councillors will not be able to make new decisions unless unanimous and may not initiate a war. Delegated powers may continue with the supreme Judge's blessing.**

**4.6. Replacing a Councillor after their Resignation, Suspension, Incapacitation or Removal.**

**If an individual councillor is removed or resigned for whatever reason, such as their state being suspended from the UN, the replacement councillor will be selected by random sortition of all states that did not vote for the other 2 councillors. In an emergency the supreme judge may appoint a councillor provided they do not have the same vibes as the other two councillors.**

## 5. International Court of Justice

-purpose

-trial by combat