Είναι η κβαντική μηχανική κομμάτι της τελικής θεωρίας του τοπικού μας σύμπαντος; / Is quantum mechanics part of the final theory of our local universe?

Quantum mechanics won't go away even if we improve it. Causally entangled (most with partial entanglements) particles form the local substantiality. An absolute magically specific theory would be based on an uncausal and unprocedural = supernatural first cause. The renormalization group/Russian doll of ever hypernymic wider substantiality is necessary to provide the ontological framework. The wider a grouping becomes (especially if measured in Hubble volumes), the less it probabilistically contributes to a particular small-sized ontology in the center which is one in too many alternatives.

Any axiomatic system is either incomplete and/or inconsistent. Axiomatic algorithms work better than axiomatic lists as ontological foundations, because ontological Turing machines are their own software and hardware without extras; algorithms can create causally justified axioms coherent to particular ontologies. Quantum mechanics meets the criteria of ontoaxiomatics. Even if we improve it, quantum mechanics won't be wrong. A magical absolute theory wouldn't be able to work around the axiomatic limitations/the problems of axiomaticity (incompleteness and/or inconsistency). Ontoaxiomatics can only manage the axiomatic problems; they never go away. The expansion of the universe is ontological entropy and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle isn't merely phenomenological but it is ontological. It isn't merely phenomenological because via thought experiments we may imagine wider and wider substantialities, which still are subregions of even wider groupings of spatiotemporal microstates. Extremely hypernymic substantialities (many Hubble volumes wide) contribute weakly to the ontological definition of the specific state of a small central microstate observer (too many alternatives are possible; too many microstates are justified to exist as alternative realities); but the hypernymic substantiality is ontologically necessary because it locks its macrostates to a particular universe. Each different universe has its own ontoaxiomatics and it can never exhibit ontologically incompatible local states. David Deutsch asked why don't we observe any ontologically possible local state. The answer is that ontological objects don't exhibit themselves in nothingness (nothingness doesn't exist, it doesn't decay into universes [nilogony/nihilogony is a fallacy]). Mathematically compatible ontological objects, are grouped as field oscillations, and that way they shape a wider particular substantiality. There is no omnisubstantiality/omniontoaxiomatics. Incompatible states can never be expressed in the wrong universe. Ontology is perspectival. Nothingness doesn't exist, thus it doesn't provide the unbiased but uncausal field of action. Each mathematically rigorous ontoaxiomatics, is self-causal by definition; particular events inside particular ontoaxiomatical universes have beginnings, but each overall ontoaxiomatics is perpetual if it is mathematically sound = if it meets the ontoaxiomatic criteria of substantiality.

## comment 1:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2019/04/25/this-is-why-quantum-field-theory-is-more-fundamental-than-quantum-mechanics/