Γιατί οι προσομοιωμένοι κόσμοι δεν ταυτίζονται με τους κόσμους φυσικής αξιωματικότητας; / Why simulated worlds aren't identical to worlds of natural ontoaxiomatics?

(πιο απλά/simply put/simply stated*: **Γιατί το Σύμπαν δεν είναι προσομοίωση / Why the universe isn't a simulation**)*

## Here I examine the world simulation (generic, including brains) and the brain in a vat hypotheses

The computer (it doesn't matter its type: analogue, digital, quantum, probabilistic; neither does its materialisation: digital, mechanical, quantum [actually that matters, because different materialisations have different noise patterns and physical limitations]) which generates the simulation and the world in which the brain in a vat (jar) and the simulation input exists, are not part of a seamless ontoaxiomatics.

Each substantial world (infinite different are possible thus meet the criteria of substantiality and exist; but they are physically inaccessible to incompatible worlds) is an ontologically complete Turing machine (each substantial world is: 1. it's own machine, 2. operating programme, 3. memory storage; and all are of the exact same ontoaxiomatics [same procedural nature]). Ontological Turing machines don't have to be general calculators useful for science. They merely have to be self-causal and provide their full ontoaxiomatics which is a substantiality (we cannot separate ontoaxiomatics from the physical system it causes to be; on the other hand we CAN separate the ontoaxiomatics of the simulation making and the simulated world; noise, bugs, failures are introduced and are of different nature from/to the jitters of each standalone ontoaxiomatics).

Any simulation fakes different ontoaxiomatics and generates many types of noise in the seams between the worlds (information noise, simulation bugs [some instruments might misbehave or not being correctly attached, etc].

If magic was correcting the systemic misbehaviour (see my text on why ontological unprocedurality is insubstantial) and no bug and improper noise were introduced, the interface between worlds would still not be seamless, because it would be restricted by the limitations of the degrees of freedom at the conversion interface.

A huge physical quantum computer would introduce noise [and it cannot get extremely big, because noise builds up with size and gets unmanageable; also computers dedicate some parts for operation[al] management; if we used a different computer for operation management we introduce more conversion noise, bugs, adjustment of the degrees of freedom at the interface, etc.

Someone might claim that a human in a vat might never understand she/he is tricked. Actually if many brains of scientists in vats are able to communicate and do science together, if they continue doing science for many years and if the simulator doesn't mess their scientific evolution, they will not be able to detect they are simulated, but they will notice the deviations caused at the interface and conversion zone (even non simulated nerves exhibit noise and misbehaviour). The simulated scientists in vats or in computers will gradually build scientific theories which try to get close to their worlds ontoaxiomatics. It isn't guaranteed that any civilization (including us) will be able to reach to the "correct theory of the ontoaxiomatics of their own universe", but science gradually expands its relativist/perspectival knowledge. Simulated scientists and scientists' brains in vats will introduce the behaviour of their complex ontoaxiomatics into their theories. Scientists aren't always correct and don't immediately have the final theory, but some data are safe enough, thus the simulation woulds scientists will for sure record the simulation interface and conversion noise, bugs, jitter, etc. Good scientists would see that these different type of deviation are very weird phenomena way outside their standard model (we humans don't have the correct theory of physics; because we describe the phenomena but not the nature of the substantiality connectome of our universe [see: muon g-2]; but we don't observe magical mistakes in natural procedurality. Simulation-dweller-scientists will notice the very weird deviations which are exocausal to them (not part of a sole seamless ontoaxiomatics). Thinkers have many opinions; thus few intelligent (and also randomly emerging views; that exists also) thinkers will postulate that they don't live in a seamless ontoaxiomatics, because very incoherent phenomena appear that seem to be caused by a different ontoaxiomatics. Others will try to introduce the incompatible patterns in a single scientific approximation of their experienced ontoaxiomatics.

There is no causoimperneability (causality cannot be magically stopped between open systems), thus the simulation-world scientists will record the simulation deviations. Most of them will not use the term "simulation noise bugs and conversion jitter" but they will use other terms and ontoaxiomatical approximations.

If the simulation-world scientists are unable to properly evolve their science, that's a matter of personal right violations and intellectual torture (torture can be unknown to the victim).

## dialogue 1:

• haxor 789: The simulation itself needs to be a substantial thing in the universe that is running said simulation. Thus it either has to mimic the "rules" (interactions and natural forces of the simulating world or what is known of them in that sphere) or you'd see inconsistencies as the forces of that universe would be at work regardless of what the simulation is doing.

Ken: Here you don't speak about the necessity of ontoaxiomatics. What is the difference between scientoaxiomatics and ontoaxiomatics (see my older texts)? If the simulation isn't causally self-sufficient, good scientists of the cosmoi (plural of cosmos) it simulates will probably understand it.

• haxor 789: You seem to constrast "science" and "substantiality". Which I read as governing a code by a set of formulas (science) vs having those formulas as a consequence of interactions between things (substantiality). Where the former is what you'd use for a simulation while the latter is so complex that it almost has to be "real" as you couldn't apply the programming logic to every single particle in a meaningful way like that.

Ken: You are wrong. I don't "seem" to contrast the "nature of things" with the "effort of thinkers who live in a substantial world to mathematically describe it". I blatantly contrast it. Do you claim that the nature of the cosmos changes along with its descriptions per eon? Ontophysics (how the world is) vs physics its nowadays mathematical description.

Ken: You are totally correct in theory. An ideal simulation would produce a totally realistic world for the physicists of this world, but the simulation would have to be built on a different world. Computers make mistakes, and if we used a truly great quantum computer still these computers make many mistakes (we don't have quantum computers who can manipulate large amounts of data and for long periods without any bug to occur; quantum error correction exists but it doesn't correct all the mistakes; also it is impossible to create a quantum computer which can handle an extreme amount of qubits because some of the memory of the computer is used merely to manage the computer itself and for data correction; ask computer scientists; if you believe in magic you'll have to describe the unprocedural procedures of unprocedurality...).

• haxor 789: Edit: Or is it the other way around that the interactions that make something substantial would breed the set of axioms that describe the world that a simulation would need to create and science would be the part that investigates what axioms DO exist in that given reality?

Ken: This is connected to the above. Do you believe in magic? Do you reject computer science and why? Noise builds up. Study the architecture of ANY computer (mechanical, classical electrical, probabilistic electronic, quantum, etc.)

You are WRONG. Most of your ideas are correct but you are WRONG the way you present it. You would be correct if you compared two words of the same ontoaxiomatics (axiomatic algorithm which is causally coherent [it creates substantial universe-like interactions and not science/calculatory/calculational representations or just calculations]). You would have been correct if you compared two non-simulations but merely to sibling worlds (worlds of the same ontoaxiomatics). You reject "information theory" and you also reject Claude Shannon but without any effort at all to debunk him. You claim that "information entropy" doesn't exist (you didn't even try to claim it with that phrasing but with your texts). If you reject information theory, you reject modern science, and if you do that we will never have any tool to understand ontoaxiomatics (how the world actually works).

ANY simulation would introduce extra noise.

Also any ontoaxiomatics would have to deal with the problems of axiomaticity (incompleteness and/or inconsistency), but introducing noise to that mechanism would surely cause calculational bugs to the simulation because by no means ontoaxiomatics is an easy task to resolve (see: muon g-2 [pronounced "gee minus two"])

You reject "information theory" (information entropy), calculational limitations (computer architecture limitations; no matter if the computer is mechanical, classical electronic, probabilistic or quantum).

You promote the mythological/magical/supernatural "impermeable causation"/causoimperneability fallacy.

ANY ontoaxiomatically deeper layer (the strict causal stratification theory is wrong; the causality of substantiality is a connectome with some denser phenomena per magnitude (size, energy, speed, etc.). You falsely claim that magical/unnatural simulations are possible thus you support the mythological/magical/supernatural "impermeable causation"/causoimperneability fallacy between the calculator world and its simulation.

• haxor 789: So any simulated world will just be a simplified version of a universe and as a consequence of that will have a discrepancy between the rules of that universe and the rules of the outside universe, thus being incomplete and that would show (?)

Ken: Different possible or impossible worlds are just different. There is no law that limits the degree of complexity of simulations.

Juan Martín Maldacena doesn't mainly focus on simulations but on physics in general (actually complete physics = ontophysics, correct physics with its ontoaxiomatics). Some say that Juan Martín Maldacena is more intelligent and complex than our universe, thus it's totally impossible he will ever describe our own universe. He can describe more complex universes. (OK; that's not a rigorous argument, but it's not wrong. More complex and less complex worlds are possible. It's hard to evaluate the degree of complexity between nonparallelisable universes, but not impossible (you'll have to evaluate it's fundamental interactions).).

You deem tautological the ideal world to the physically simulated, and you are WRONG. You reject great scientists and fields of study you never bothered to rigorously debunk. Computer scientists don't mainly philosophise about noise bugs (they mathematically do though); they physically face these problems. A future magical civilization which violates procedurality... will immediately dissappear when we wake up.

• haxor 789: I've no idea how the blockchain comes into that, other than that if you'd simulate a universe you'd then have the whole world occupy one state of existence that stays consistent with itself, which becomes more complicated the longer it runs. Because while "real existing" entities just happen and interact without having that connection with everything else in the universe (or at least don't have to think about that), a simulated universe can't go without that unless your cheating and only simulate a small part which again would show as you couldn't keep up the consistency between all the different events that happen and influence each other.

Ken: The observable universe is bigger than the Hubble volume. We may only interact with objects inside our Hubble volume. Outside the Hubble volume the universe seems to continue; thus a simulation would have to mimic that continuation by faking it. Particles at the Hubble volume surface will have to act the way physical particles do.

What is the size of the universe? I have a poster on that with analytical texts (here it becomes obvious that a simulated world would be extremely hard to mimic a standalone substantiality; because mimicking it theoretically is possible, but it's a new input for unwanted noise (noise is beneficial if it seems natural; but that isn't the case with calculation noise).

The universe is Everettianly/manyworldedly (see: Hugh Everett III, many-worlds interpretation, Sean M. Carroll) infinite. The closer things are to you, the less they vary at the quantum level. Afar Hubble volumes can microscopically vary, but due to the infinite overlapping Hubble volumes, the universe remains an Everettian whole (see: CERN and Fermilab factual data; protons are comprised of a particular harmony of three main quarks which interact with gluons, but the exact number of the quarks varies in relation to the interaction entanglement (simple people call it measurement); a forceful interaction entanglement event (simple people call it measurement) generates more quarks inside a proton, neutron, meson, etc.).

• haxor 789: So you'd almost be forced to have a quantized time unit or at least a universal one, because without a fixed time without blocks you'd already have a multiverse as for chaotic system such a small deviation could already lead to massively different results.

Ken: Analogue computers do exist and by no means are useless. Some people [still] work on the field.

Is the universe quantum or analogue (see: Sean M. Carroll)?

Both.

The universe is analogue most of its time, but particular probabilistic events (particles [particles are probabilistic field events] and their attributes, spin, excitation level, charge, etc.) change states in a quantised manner.

Sabine Hossenfelder promotes (nowadays I wrote the comment reply; but she's stubborn, she like to be permanently wrong on that) quantum gravity which is wrong in its present form because it doesn't take into account the transient nature of the phenomenon of gravity which provides almost all of its substantiality.

Sean M. Carroll has a better physical mind, but he's not a brilliant mathematician like Sabine Hossenfelder; so humanity will have to wait.

If we deeply care about gravity we should create groups working on different theories, but that will require billions of dollars (we will have to pay great students from China, Japan and all over the world; but people need a good life, housing, food in order they are free to do their math).

## comment 1:

About causopermeability = causal interactions between different magnitudes of the ontoaxiomatic connectome of substantiality = a universe-like world

Small phenomena create bigger phenomena with different characteristics.

science: endouniversal [inside a universe] observer's approximate theories of natural procedurality predictions

1. Sometimes it's more useful to create approximate theories for different scales of magnitude; but ontoaxiomatics isn't identical to scientoaxiomatics (also most sciences don't have proper axiomatics; thus they are weak sciences because the job of science is to explain the causes; of course approximate theories are more useful in everyday life, because we focus on specific problems, but non-axiomatic theories cannot reveal the full causal connectome of substantiality).

The natural world is a causal connectome. The phenomena become denser/more frequent in particular magnitudes which are usually dealt separately by approximate (particle, state of matter, etc.) theories, but that doesn't mean that causality is fragmented per order of magnitude.

2. There is no causoimperneability. Small events (see: the butterfly phenomenon [erroneously some people focus on the initial conditions, but quantum jittering, decoherence and random events build up the deviations constantly] do cause changes at different orders of magnitude, and this process is cumulative. Thus not only different orders of substantiality magnitude causally contribute to each other (see: Leonard Susskind - Closer to Truth), but also limited-range approximate theories fail to include the omnimagnitudinous (including all orders of magnitude; this is a serious problem... because high energies are restricted by the Plankian size; energy isn't lost but it has to materialise within most probable options) causal interactions. It's impossible to calculate the exact positions of all particles and all the Everettian multifurcations of the wave function of the universe. (If Hugh Everett III was wrong, we need a theory which proves how alternative wavefunctional evolutions die off, but that fallacy doesn't exist theoretically and rigorously. Also rejecting manyworldedness/Everettianism is a rejection of ontoaxiomatics itself [it will loose it's programme-like nature and also it's ability to manage its axiomatic incompleteness and/or inconsistency with entropy [for example spatiotemporal expansion in our universe; but our universe's mechanism isn't the sole ontoaxiomatics] and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle [which is an ontological component of substantiality]).