Η αναγκαιότητα της αυταιτιότητας στην οντοαξιωματικότητα / The necessity of self-causality in ontoaxiomatics

οντοαξιωματική αυταιτιότητα / ontoaxiomatic[al] self-causation/self-causality

## The necessity of self-causality in ontoaxiomatics

No universe-like world can exist without causal foundations.

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Claiming that the universe was created by a magical person because personhood is self-caused without any proof or theory on that, simply because we ourselves are persons, is a soothing biased thought unrelated to science and philosophy.

Personhood isn't a mereological simple. Personhood is the result of personhood-yielding computers (specifically brains) which generate minds which meet the criteria of personhood (see my texts on the personhood-yielding mind).

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What are the causal foundations of substantiality/substantial universe-like worlds? Do they have specific causal foundations, or due to causopermeability, ontoaxiomatic systems = universe-like worlds have to be taken as wholes? Answer: The different ontoaxiomatic systems (there is no omniontoaxiomatics) have to be taken as wholes; but on the other hand we can parse/analyse the most important ontoaxiomatic characteristics (oratorically, because there is no omniontoaxiomatics neither omniaxiomatics; but axiomatic families do exist and axiomatic system categorisation is possible but it is incalculable as whole [we'll never know all the axiomatic families categorised with specific rules; also no general categorisation rules for axiomatic systems is possible] [most ontoaxiomatics is algorithmic and not stable-list-based).

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One other problem is "wholeness". The wholeness of the universe doesn't exist within a narrow spatiotemporal range. Due to the causopermeability (causal permeability amongst different orders of magnitude; which is a semierroneous term because it conceals the same ontological foundations [idemfoundationality/idemfoundations Latin: idem (same)] of all sub-substantialities within a specific cosmos/universe-like world) and the idemfoundationality of the components of a specific substantiality/universe-like world.

Can we describe the universe without to describe it as a whole? We should start speaking about our local universe: our causally coherent subluminally expanding Hubble volume, with its other infinite overlapping Hubble volumes which fade out in strength of probabilistic contribution (because other Everettian alterations are introduced) in relation to our specific sub-reality (main Hubble volume).

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Axiomatic problems:

No axiomatic system can be both complete and coherent. Most ontoaxiomatic systems are algorithmic and not constant lists, because that way they can better fulfill the axiomatic criteria of substantiality (ontoaxiomatics) in a manner which allows them to work around axiomatic incompleteness (the fact that our universe expands is ontologically entropic [its ontology is entropic]; the Heisenberg uncertainty principle isn't a mere phenomenon, it plays an ontological role and it's a way our universe can work around axiomatic incompleteness and/or inconsistency but it [the Heisenberg uncertainty principle] has to be Everettianly expressed as any possible wavefunctional outcome when we describe wider/hypernymic/hypernymous/superordinate substantialities [it is incalculable to define the full universe; but describing wider ranges of universe-strains is possible]). There is no omniontoaxiomatics, thus there is no single way to create the causal foundations of substantialities/universes, but at least we can describe some ontoaxiomatic mechanisms of substantiality.

Ontological Turing machine:

Mathematics isn't tautological to ontophysics (true physics regardless of knowledge about it). Mathematics and/or allomathematics (mathematics with different axioms, not necessarily useful for general calculations) is ontomathematics, when it can be exhibited in a universe-like world (a phase space based on a mathematical theory which allows it to perform certain tasks which meet the ontological criteria; one of which is self-causality due to mathematical logic itself [self-existence from mathematical and allomathematical logic and not creation ex nihilo/not magically created from the unprocedural nothing]).

David Deutsch’s constructor theory is an ontomathematical approach. Other ideas do exist but aren't well postulated. Humanity will continue working on the field of study of the 'foundations of substantiality'. We should consciously work on the 'foundations of substantiality'.
Max Tegmark has good ideas, but didn't develop criteria for mathematical substantiality = ontomathematics (according to Max Tegmark mathematics is identical/tautological to physics; but he doesn't support his claim well enough, also he doesn't elaborate on antiexamples (counter examples) like mathematical formulas which might be ascribed to other formulas and describe universe-like worlds which are able to exhibit spatiotemporal-like activity, but as standalones some formulas aren't able to describe a self-causal harmony of spatiotemporal-like activity. Max Tegmark’s contribution is very important on ontoaxiomatics (the foundations of substantiality), but others should improve his ideas.

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Any universe-like world is a Turing machine, but it doesn't have to be a general computer/calculator.

(watch Matt O'Dowd elaborating on YouTube [PBS Space Time] why our universe is an ontological Turing machine/ its own self-computer [this is crucial for the foundations of substantiality], and not a simulation [Matt O'Dowd doesn't use my exact vocabulary])

Any substantial universe-like world/cosmos has to be its own software and hardware. Also it has to be self-caused, otherwise we didn't describe its full substantiality but a sub-substantiality. Full substantialities = full ontoaxiomatics are incalculable, but at least we can elaborate on specific ontoaxiomatic mechanisms/techniques.

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self-causality:

Imagine a universe not being self-caused, but caused by magic which we don't know its ontological nature, but the only thing we know is that this source of magic (junky ideas like God) isn't mathematical and/or allomathematical logic. If something has no mathematical and/or allomathematical foundations, it cannot have a specific nature, because ontological nondefinitions (not merely epistemological/experimental nondefinitions): 1. don't create any causofoundational connectome of substantiality, 2. nondefinitions aren't ascribeable; God cannot have character nor existence.

Thus we cannot claim that a universe can be caused by the supernatural (magic/divine force/immaterial something/unprocedurality/discausality/etc.).

We can claim that a universe is caused by another (or that a civilization is caused by another), but then we still have to elaborate on the overall multiverse.

In the infinite-causal-series/infinite Russian dolls/renormalisation group hypothesis, we have to describe the generic ontofoundational/ontoaxiomatic characteristics of the system.

The self-causality/self-causation of substantiality is ontomathematically based; thus we should better study ontomathematics.

Some universe-like worlds are trivial or at least incapable for life. Extremely symmetric[al] worlds would kill complex life which tries to reach free-will-like data processing (free will doesn't exist, but complex reasoning is possible; an extremely symmetric[al] world
would filter out asymmetric causal connectomes, thus limiting the degrees of information processing freedom). Some words are very repetitive; if they are closely repetitive without exhibiting enough variation, they will not be able to include galaxy-like formations and complex life. Some other worlds are (are for sure; because infinite ontoaxiomatics are possible) non-entropic/statue-like thus chemical-life and physical evolution is impossible in them. Some worlds have very few components (for example very few particles; particles are field events which can have an identity-like nature if certain conditions are met), thus they are unable to meet the prerequisites for life.

Not all universe-like worlds are life-capable.
The vast majority of them (proportionally almost all of them) are incapable for producing life.

## Why the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is ontologically fundamental?

There is a fundamental limit to the precision with which position and momentum can be known simultaneously (Wildcat at physics.stackexchange.com).

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(Scientists evade the Heisenberg uncertainty principle - sciencedaily.com)

OK, but can we ONTOLOGICALLY (in relation to ontological/ontoaxiomatic foundations) evade the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (not practically just to make good clocks)?

No. We cannot ONTOLOGICALLY evade the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

Wave functions exist in overall causal connectomes of fully fledged substantialities. No standalone wave function can ever exist (it's hypernymised ad infinitum: wider nearby substantialities do exist; substantiality [causal connectomes] is relational and probabilistic).

Also the wave function cannot exist/be substantial if it doesn't materialise (or at least without having the potential to be materialised; because transitions are possible before the materialisation of specific wave functions). Thus we cannot ontologically evade the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

Atomic clockmakers don't evade the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. They narrow down the dynamic range of uncertainty with various techniques.