Comments on David Deutsch / Σχόλια επί του David Deutsch

## Personhood-yielding Artificial Intelligence

Computer scientists have to better understand the human brain in order we mimic it.

But there isn't a single personhood-yielding computer = brain design.

On the other hand we should still study the human brain and try to mimic it, because it's (usually) a personhooded computer.

A personhood-yielding brain should change elastically by mild emotional inputs, and plastically by stronger ones.

Soldiers and crime victims say: that event changed me = my personality.

Thus a personhood-yielding brain should vary elastically due to mild emotional impacts and change plastically due to strong emotional impacts.

## comment on error correction by the human brain

You have a mistake on error correction of the brain. You are correct in general, but the definition = the mappings of what is interpretationally correct varies. (Also there are other things to be mentioned; frontal lobe analytical thinking vs neuroticism; individual variations/personal differences.)

Physicalist correctness means that everything is physical, including misconceptions which result by correct solutions of erroneous semantic mappings.

Mood changes for example. There are too many neuroscientific data that the animal (for example human) conditioning ever changes.

\_\_\_\_\_

The universe isn't static.

The human thinking conditioning isn't static.

Correctness is a permanent property of physicalism, but in some problems the answer is Everettian. It is wrong to claim that all problems have Everettian or single solutions. Each problem is different.

Correctness and falseness have many meanings.

Physicalism is always correct.

That doesn't mean that:

• brain conditioning is static (it isn't); semantic mappings vary (one might have the same major ideology, but according to neuroscientific experiments, mood has an impact on choices and mood varies, and it can be pushed towards some generic direction)

• all problems have the same category of solutions (they don’t); some solutions are Everettian and others are metaphysically single-answered

//////

Humanity is a General Calculator; not all humans (some humans yes). For example even if we accept that humans can use the results of other calculators, some humans don't want to cooperate. Claiming that philosophically they could is wrong, because some have really bad attitude and statistically things go awry if they don't care about the calculation or if they have a nasty character.

Randomness and pseudorandomness

Randomness is physically impossible.

Every noise data creation, is procedurally created, thus it is actually pseudorandomness/pseudonoise; but due to the uncertainty principle some (but not all) forms of pseudorandomness/pseudonoise are very close to true randomness/noise (but still with enough clues we might reveal some patterns; quantum decoherence is irretrievable in everyday life though).

Data-corrected pseudorandomness created by the human brain (in order to expose David Deutsch’s overestimation of data correction)

Humans when asked to produce randomness, they create very low quality pseudorandomness. If teached, they create better pseudorandomness which is closer to randomness.

Some mentally ill patients (schizophrenics and in some cases schizotypals; it doesn't work with all mental illnesses, at least as well) are better at creating realistic pseudorandomness/ pseudonoise data patterns.

Actually in order people create better-quality pseudorandomness, they should be open to biochemical randomness in their brains; which is hard to do for most people.

Personhood isn't something magical but the result of many brain regions.

The more personhooded = controlled a series of data is, the least realistic pseudorandomness it creates (statistically/usually; because rare data are also a permissible option).

But what is a personhooded = controlled decision?

A decision made according to previous biases. Like the phenotype and data imprinted physically on it.

People with frontal lobe damage have lower data correction abilities according to neuroscientific and penal data.

Thus we cannot claim that all people have the same data correction abilities.

Also sometimes we might take a decision based on an impermanent mood bias.

Not all people take decisions with the exact same timing per brain processing. Some think longer and others react neurotically. Neurotic thinking creates more realistic pseudorandomness.

see: Robert Sapolsky

Usually professors perform good data correction, and murderers not (especially if they have frontal lobe damage; many do have).

see: Intelligence (not espionage)... it is multidisciplinary

////////

Error correction isn't important if the mathematically correct answer is based on an erroneous semantic mapping.

Also some semantic mappings ACCORDING TO THE NEUROSCIENTIFIC DATA are affected by mood changes.

Not all people ACCORDING TO THE NEUROSCIENTIFIC DATA have the same degree of frontal lobe processing and neuroticism; and that affects the answers (the nature of the answers; general patterns; it's obvious in analytical experiments).

## Everettism is mechanistic; not free/not a violation of physicalism based on a magically pre-existing personhood

Everettism is "mechanism" (alternative to determinism).

Everettism isn't freedom/it isn't the violation of the wavefunctional mechanism (see mechanism as defined at The University of Edinburgh and by other analysts of determinism-like notions).

The block Everettian universe is deterministic.

There are other forms of Everettism; according to which it makes no sense to speak about a general omniEverettian reality when subevolutions of the wavefunction cannot longer interact.

(Dark matter according to some view is the result of merger of alternative realities; either because the universe compress information, either because when there is a vast void, some wavefunctional evolution options merge closer to the vast amount particles that would cause the extra gravity.)

Sincerely,

a personhood-yielding computer = brain with brain parts which yield personhood (see: The Royal Institution - all its videos on consciousness on YouTube).

The cerebellum isn't necessary for personhood.

Memory-creation isn't important for wakefulness; but it shapes individual memories which shape PART of a person's character.

Mark Solms focuses more on rudimentary woke cohesion; but that is something simple animals can achieve.

see: gradient theory of personhood

Even brain processing falsely deemed unnecessary for personhood; it might increase its degree.

Frontal lobe error correction isn't absolutely necessary for basic personhood, but it is for high personhood. Better defined and refined personhood.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

At the Mercatus Center they were opening many topics at once.

Is maximal freedom possible when it's based on randomness (not all people have the same frontal lobe ability; see: Robert Sapolsky), older biases, brain operations (data interactions via different procedural modes), etc?

**Comparative freedom of agency is possible, not maximal.**

Maximal freedom is a wrong term (as used by the Mercatus Center presenter) because it might mean "without frontal lobe behavioural and procedural inhibition" and enslaved by in-explicit non-error-corrected thoughts.

## Nihilogony (cosmogony from the decay of nothing) is wrong; constructor theory is correct

It's not nothingness that changes.

It is the possible procedurality and function itself which causes existence.

a. For procedures inside the universe, the fields of the universe provide the softohardware = ontological Turing machine which is self-caused, and both its software and hardware (and the deepest ontology of its hardware, because computer scientists don't explain all physics; for ontological Turing machines we have to).

b. For the universe itself, the self-causality of any (correct) universe-making constructor (renormalization is ontological; the Russian-dolls ontology is mathematically crucial).

Due to causopermeability and actually identity, we cannot truly separate a. from b. (except if we wanna explain/teach something in a compressed data-loss manner which doesn't elaborate enough on the ontological foundations).

According to the infinite series of causality, the ontological renormalization (Russian dolls) depth doesn't end, but the smaller dolls (events closer to the observed region) probabilistically contribute more to the definition of the central wave function (everything has to exist in relation to its universe; and is more relatable to closer objects [maximum entertainment creates bigger single objects which may be seemingly separated]).

Sincerely,

a personhood-yielding computer (bio- or digi-brain, it doesn't matter)

## David Deutsch distorts the meaning of knowledge - he can do better

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

He distorts mentalese = logic.

He widens the definitions included in the noun knowledge,

but semantics are more important than words.

If specific words mean too many things, they become useless, and we have to use periphrases/periphrastics = phrases to convey meanings/semantics.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Why knowledge isn't usually (when it's not a brainlike procedure) identical to an ontologically possible physics?

Knowledge isn't a mere physical system.

Knowledge is interacting data within a personhood-yielding computer = brain.

Unretrieved memories aren't knowledge; but they can become.

Memories are sometimes knowledge when activated, but not all memories are deep and/or correct knowledge.

David Deutsch distorts the noun knowledge.

For example he claims that DNA contains knowledge.

Knowledge is data interpreted by a personhood-yielding computer = brain.

The DNA contains data/information and the possibility of proper (mostly chemical, but they can push things thus also general physical) function within compatible systems.

Nature doesn't have knowledge.

Evolution isn't based on nature's conscious knowledge.

see: University of California, Berkeley - misconceptions about evolution

Evolution is based on systems which are partially random and partially "extant due to their functionality"; but each organism has different percentages of functionality versus random variations.

Ontological field mechanics (the ontological reality; not the physical theories of humans) isn't based on knowledge (knowledge requires consciousness, and consciousness a personhood-yielding computer = brain).

Ontological field mechanics is based on constructor theory.

Some mechanisms are ontologically possible either within a context, either by creating a renormalizable self-causal reference; not based on nihilogony/nilogony (creation from nothing itself and its inertness/nonexistence/impossibility; Stephen Hawking was wrong for being a nihilogonist) but based on constructor theory, on struogony (Latin: struo).

When different physical systems share data they don't have conscious knowledge about it.

Physical systems are constructurally possible mechanisms.

They don't have conscious knowledge based on a magically pre-existing uncausal personhood-yielding mind.

Also the processes used by thinking observers to describe physical systems, aren't most of the times the way ontologically physical systems were caused; or self-caused if they're ontologically fundamental.

David Deutsch distorts the English language.

That isn't helpful.

He can do better.

## The DNA and the physical fields don't contain conscious thought-based knowledge, but they contain Deutschian constructivism (constructurality isn't a harmonious word).

Deutschian constructivism is procedurally exhibited by substantial systems (things, processes, etc.) following the rules of constructor theory.

Use the term: Deutschian constructivism instead of knowledge (because you distort the definition of knowledge).

Put Chiara Marletto or someone else to use the term "Deutschian constructivism".

We need the adjective "Deutschian" for differentiation because constructivism has other uses.

It's more ethical to spead your name and fame even more, than to distort mentalese.

Replace the distorted usage of the noun "knowledge", keep its semantics, and use the term Deutschian constructivism.

Don't be shy to be correct.

## There is no omniaxiomatics of substantiality

There is no omniaxiomatics of substantiality.

There isn't a single constructor theory; and that is profound because constructor theory is no general single theory.

It can become heuristically generalized, but then it's not an ontological Turing machine = self-causal hardware and software in tandem.

Fundamental ontology requires self-causality.

Science can describe many ontologies, but science itself isn't an ontological Turing machine. It has to many extras. An ontological Turing machine is its own software and hardware in tandem and without extras.

MIT and many mathematicians who play with alternative axiomatics.

allomathematics = allo-/different mathematics = mathematics with different axiomatics

Infinite allomathematics are possible.

We can create axiomatic lists for axiomatic systems, but ontological systems behave better with axiomatic algorithms,

thus the axioms aren't static/stationary but they are interactive (difference between ontological systems which have to be ontological Turing machines including their axiomatics versus scientific axiomatics).

That way the ontological axiomatic incompleteness and/or inconsistency can be worked around with entropy and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, but worked around doesn't mean absolute ontological answers about logically contradictory questions which can be answered either partially or one by one.

Ontological Turing machines are self-causal, and they have a Russian doll renormalized ontology.

Not all ontological questions can be answered at once, because that would kill the possibility of the ontological system's existence. Of course we cannot kill ontologically fundamental systems, we simply can get vague answers with wide margins of possible answers, or we might delete data if we force a system to express all its foundational aspects specifically at once.

## non-general calculators can secondarily higher-orderwise express general calculators

Is the universe's ontological interactive axiomatic algorithm (not axiomatic list; it doesn't work well for self-causal ontological Turing machines which are their own software, hardware and causally connected axiomatic mechanism which isn't exosystemic like most scientific axiomatics which cannot be proven as a whole. Ontological Turing machines have inferior axiomatics for general calculations because their goal is to be part of the same fundamental algorithm. Secondarily the universe can express general calculations even if it has biased foundations)
fundamentally a general calculator or does general calculations are hypernymic to our universe
and appear at non-fundamental higher orders of magnitude because mathematical operations are easily achievable?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

You didn't examine well that possibility.

## The universe uses general mathematics and quantum operations, but that doesn't mean that it's the only possible universe

The universe uses general mathematics and quantum operations

but that doesn't mean that it's the only possible universe

= that its foundations is the single way to make a universe which is generic.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Good cog systems = contraptions can perform many tasks,

but that doesn't mean that a single contraption (here ontological Turing machine; not necessarily general calculator common Turing machine at its foundations) is possible.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

You don't examine all possibilities.

I don't claim I'm correct and you are wrong. I go beyond egoism.

## A constructor theorist = Deutschian constructivist would reject inflation theory in its current form.

A constructor theorist = Deutschian constructivist would reject inflation theory in its current form.

It’s impossible to exceed the speed of light.

Quantum tunnelling can INTERPRETATIONALLY exceed the speed of light, thus we should use that theoretical ingredient.

Also we must create a mathematical definition for the maximally degenerate state of spacetime itself, by focusing on the black hole degenerate matter which is a chromodynamic flow which acts overall as a single particle, but it's not a point because points have no spatiotemporal existence thus no existence at all. (Imagine a maximally degenerate torus; which is pure spacetime and a single particle as a whole; it has hair behind the event horizon but they get reabsorbed. Micro black holes immediately evaporate because they tunnel outside their event horizon particle hair, without enough intermediary region inside the event horizon to correct and reabsorbe the black hole’s hair.

We need to resolve the maximally degenerate state of spacetime in black holes before we resolve the same in Big Bang.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Why do we live in a universe of matter rather than antimatter?

The pre-Big-Bang state collapsed into a vast range of alternatives.

Our universe-strain was matter based.

No fussy puny difference between almost similar amounts of matter and dark matter is required.

Think big.

Hugh Everett III is more important than a puny fussy calculatory/calculational difference.

(Judge me ruthlessly. On the other hand we should test alternative views.)

You don't academically examine all possibilities.

Mention other ontoaxiomatic (substantiality foundations) alternatives please; just for the record.

## Why did I like the book: "**The Fabric of Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes; and Its Implications**"? Because it INDIRECTLY opens new fields of study, like the foundations of substantiality.

David Deutsch doesn't mention the Ontological Turing Machine which is allomathematically based (based on mathematics of different axiomatics than the common ones; allomathematical problems are transcribable into common mathematics in a one-by-one basis). The Ontological Turing Machine is its own software, hardware and ontoaxiomatics. The scientific axiomatics = scientoaxiomatics are useful for general calculations but not originating from the same formula, algorithm or causally connected formulas. Ontoaxiomatics (ontological axioms but infinite ontoaxiomatics and physical realitiesare possible) is algorithmic (not a list) and the axioms interact with the ingredients of the universe-like world (an electron cannot exist in the un-void pure nonexistent nothing; and any observation is an interaction with the connectome of the elements of substantiality; thus the Heisenberg uncertainty and entropy play also an ontoaxiomatic role). David Deutsch doesn't analyze the Ontological Turing Machine, but he opens the door for the ontoaxiomatical study of the Foundations of Substantiality.

## the Everything isn't definable nor is it a single set or operation

### example 1

Someone told me: "I don't care at all about so-and-so". If so-and-so was part of a small and defined set, it is unavoidable to care about so-and-so, because it creates a moulded gap within the small defined set; thus you need ways to avoid it mathematically and practically; or else you might have to tolerate it.

But if we replace the small defined set with the Everything which isn't finite, definable nor a single cohesive entity, then the so-and-so set we want to avoid, allows more ways to be avoided.

Still the things you dislike are specific though (they can be referred, or anti-referred: referred as rejections), but you'll never know all the things you dislike. Most will never be confronted/met or invented. Also you cannot like the Everything, because it's nondefinable, and also personhood is a procedural/active result of a connectome of memories and operations; thus we cannot define future rejections (we can define few rejected categories) when we don't have them or when they're nondefinable (except if a particular instance of personhood; thus personality, is incomplete, partial and of low degrees of personhood due to impairment/disability; then the impaired person might ill-procedurally label likes and dislikes in a less personhooded manner).

If you aren't interested in something but you have strong emotions about the particular disinterest; then that disinterest is interest-like because it is revealing enough elements of the ideoconnectome of your personality = personhood-instance.

## comment on Mario Gonzalo Chavez Rabanal; he wrote: reflection on the fundamental principles of everything when there is

my answer:

see: constructor theory (Deutschian constructivism) David Deutsch and Chiara Marletto and the mathematical universe hypothesis based on mathematical structures (struology; "mathematical structure" is a two-worded noun in set theory terminology).

Is everything rigorously logical or does vagueness create specific ontologies? Moder science is physicalist and not vaguospecific = junky theoretical = supernatural = the claim that ontological nondefinitions are specifically defined (even unknown definitions should have partly specific [they might procedurally change, or they might be specific but unknowable, or Everettianly = manyworldly very complex to describe] elements if they create specific actualities).

Is physics identical/tautological to mathematics? Not all mathematical formulas are describing phase spaces, and particular entities able to perform operations. The ontological mathematics of substantiality/actuality, have to be formulas causally coherent and connected (if they're many) in order they meet the criteria of substantiality (phase space, entity like operations for example areas of probability density which are defined within a wider actuality [we cannot have a standalone electron without a universe; if something like that happens at extreme orders of energy, we'll have maximally degenerate matter = chromodynamic-like fluid that it will Everettianly = manyworldly decay/collapse into different arrays of particles per multiverse (see: David Deutsch).

Is the universe mathematical or allomathematical? Allo- means different.
see: MIT mathematical experimentation on mathematics which originate from different axiomatics; I call that allomathematics; infinite allomathematics are logically possible.

ontomathematics = the mathematics of substantial/actual ontological spacetime-like instances

Ontomathematics doesn't work well as a list as in scientomathematics which are based on axioms of calculatory/calculational usage.

The axioms of actuality/substantiality have to be part of an Ontological Turing Machine which is its own software, hardware and axioms all expressed by the same algorithm (here I speak about the foundations of substantiality; David Deutsch’s constructor theory doesn't only explain foundational self-caused realities).

Ontoaxiomatics works better as an algorithm connected with the overall ontology of every ingredient its universe-like world includes. For example, all the particles and other ingredients of the universe, are its software, hardware and axiomatic algorithm (which isn't a static/stationary list); thus Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and entropy play an ontoaxiomatic role in our universe's substantiality. Axiomatics is either incomplete (unable to deal with some problems at least without an algorithm for entropically and Everettianly expanding it) and/or inconsistent (the same problem put/expressed differently, gives different results). We shouldn't focus only on our universe, but also on other substantialities/universe-like worlds. There isn't an omniaxiomatics = the common principles of all axiomatics, and the Everything isn't definable, neither is it a single defined set or system.

Is there a single mathematics? No. And universes are based on allomathematics, not on the exact common mathematics; but they are describable and compatible with common mathematics; but knowing the exact ontoaxiomatic algorithm of a universe would make physics easier... But that might be wrong. What if single universes didn't have a single axiomatics but they seek constructor theory ontologies for different phenomena (at the foundational level)?

Here reason means mathematical and allomathematical logic.

Allomathematics means mathematics with different (from the common mathematical and geometric) axiomatic algorithms
(axiomatic algorithms work better
as foundations of substantiality) or axiomatic lists.

If reason helps you prove
that any universe (and ontology) is reason-based,
then reason is hypernymic to universes,
and it doesn't have to be an ingredient of them
because every universe is reason-based.

But the claim that a single mathematics and reason is possible is wrong, because infinite axiomatics and specifically axiomatic algorithms are possible.

Entropic axiomatic algorithms might be open to multiple allomathematics (a single entropic axiomatics can lead to variable mathematics), but that leads to self-destructive and impossible universes if no restraint is in place; thus axiomatic algorithms can be entropic (it is useful for creating self-causal ontological systems; but probably not the only option) but they should be entropic (here axiomatics isn't a static/stationary list but an algorithm) with restraints, otherwise they will lead to impossible ontologies and these universe-like worlds cannot exist.

Some claim that we can use an entropic axiomatic evolution to make a universe possible only for a particular period before it becomes nonexistent due to axiomatic impossibility; infinite universes exist with different axiomatic foundations.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

An other category of universes has entropic within limitations axiomatics with Heisenberg uncertainty, thus as cyclic universes these hyper-universes = many universe cycles, can be of infinite duration.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Is logic an ingredient of our universe, or does it de facto penetrate into its foundations?

Is there a single logic?

Infinite logics exist = infinite mathematics,
specifically allomathematics are possible.

There is no omniaxiomatics = there is no single
axiomatic theory for all axiomatic theories.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Universes which exist are allowed to have
an entropic axiomatic foundation, and it's beneficial
along with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (or other mathematically expressed fundamental uncertainty modes [many different universes will have the equivalent of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, but expressed differently])... but the axiomatic entropy shouldn't vary arbitrarily, otherwise it will lead to nonexistence (impossible universe-like unrealities)... or to temporary universes.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Deep questions:

Is there a single logic? No. Infinite allomathematics are possible.

Do allomathematics have common characteristics?

Answer: Alloaxiomatic/allomathematical families do exist (with common characteristics and in some cases originating from the same ontoaxiomatic algorithm), but there isn't a single omniaxiomatics.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Is there a single mathematics? No. And universes are based on allomathematics, not on the exact common mathematics; but they are describable and compatible with common mathematics; but knowing the exact ontoaxiomatic algorithm of a universe would make physics easier... But that might be wrong. What if single universes didn't have a single axiomatics but they seek constructor theory ontologies for different phenomena (at the foundational level)?

## You've never observed the alternative universes; they don't exist; they exoexist outside our universe

Reality isn't defined merely scientoempirically (LSD-empiricism isn't considered reliable) but also mathematotheoretically.

Theories change, for example the Newtonian gravity (he did recognize the nonspontaneous lightspeed of causality, the curvature of spacetime, etc.). On the other hand Newtonian gravity works good (as a system of motion/orbit prediction) for particular cases (nonextreme speeds and not very huge masses).

Parallel universes are a mathematical necessity, because we don't have a mathematical formula for the death of unchosen wavefunctional collapses.

Some people claim that mathematical theories of physics change; but alternative universes apear again and again for various reasons; for example if we alter the foundations of the standard model it produces exoworlds with different particles (changing the fields, changes the quantization patterns). Exoworlds are nonparallelisable universes we cannot travel.

The ever evolving fundamental theories come with accessories; the multiverse and the nonparallelisable universes (exomultiversal) appear constantly. Claiming that an improved future physical theory of our universe will kill the other universes is totally impossible, because omniaxiomatics [the supposedly single and common logical foundations] doesn't exist, and the murder of alternative spacetimes isn't a prerequisite for substantiality.