About (on) John Searle's Chinese room argument / κριτική για το Κινέζικο Δωμάτιο του John Searle

## About (on) John Searle's Chinese room argument

The Chinese room argument is mostly word based. Biological brains don't use words but 1. data chunks, like neurotransmitter secretion patterns and spike patterns (the human brain is very noisy but also noise tolerant; few spikes and neurotransmitters usually don't make a big difference; the information is in the patterns), and these data chunks are happening within a 2. neural connectome, which hold previous biases which are elastic or plastic according to the intensity of new inputs.

watch on YouTube about the human brain regions: 2021's Breakthroughs in Neuroscience and Other Biology - Quanta Magazine

Human brain regions act as components of particular behaviours and abilities. Usually they are not dedicated controllers (except in basic perception like seeing, hearing, touch; at least at the first steps of the input's integration; see: Nancy Kanwisher). But each brain region has a different connectome with different axonal/connective [-ity] weights.

Nancy Kanwisher correctly puts it/express it (the words are mine): we cannot say something generic about all brain regions. We cannot lie that hearing regions are not dedicated, at least the main input integration regions. Also we cannot lie that the frontal lobe works alone by inhibiting and controlling only itself without to interact with other regions.

It is what it is. Our job is to describe reality and not to present a simplified lie.

Thus the old idea that all brain regions perform particular final tasks is wrong. But also claiming that the different brain regions aren't creating data flow[s] and calculational (data changing) patterns which are the components of complete hypernymic thinking, is still wrong.

watch on YouTube about understanding what artificial neural networks do for each particular case (should we export the processing labels after the calculation or should we insert pre-labels during the data processing [we cannot insert the final labels during the data processing, it doesn't work]): 2021's Biggest Breakthroughs in Math and Computer Science - Quanta Magazine

We can extract "some" procedural artificial neural network information and group it, but not necessarily in real time and some data extraction might be really hard or might make no sense if we don't have access to the full neural connectome and the environmental input.

Designing a procedural labelling artificial neural network will change data processing (it will make it slower if we introduce pre-labels, or not slower if the pre-labels are not revealing enough specifics about the data procedure).

We cannot avoid calculations in order to interpret artificial neural network procedural specifics (what's the calculation about; it's easy to understand the generics, but hard to mathematically elaborate on the specifics).

We have to build brain ourselves. When you know how to build something, you know it better. That's an extra reason we have to work hard on artificial neural networks (human and animal experiments are possible but legally difficult and with many restrictions).

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John Searle's Chinese room argument was very (but not necessarily absolute) word based. Also his mechanism was not at all described, thus some human–person machine rooms would exhibit emotions, and others not. Not all calculators have the equivalent of the limbic system (also not only the limbic system is responsible for emotion, but it plays a crucial role).

We can replace 1. neurotransmitter secretion, spike patterns with words and 2. a word management machine which forms an elastic and/or plastic connectome (according to the interpreted intensity of the data/word input).

We can represent a 'personhood-yielding Turing machine' (not a general computer; that's not necessary) with words being the data chunks, but they will have informational value (not human language value), and the exports could be in human language[s] via a converter or via true brain knowledge of the overall 'brain room'.

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conclusion:

John Searle's Chinese room is very vaguely presented.
Data-procedural specifics do matter.

Human knowledge is calculations permeated with emotions. Emotions are spatiotemporal data-processing patterns of particular tasks performed within a connectome (many types of data processing are possible, like hearing, seeing, touch, feeling emotions, etc.).

Some Chinese room brains could be true persons (emotion-able[d] personhood-yielding brains) and others not, according to their particular design.

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You cannot describe something by not describing it.
John Searle isn't rigorous enough on personhood-yielding information processing and network evolution.

The human brain IS a Chinese room according to functionalists, and it is procedurally personhooded.

John Searle by promoting magic claims that a personhood-yielding Chinese room brain can never be (not a single design of it) fully personhooded (a true person with emotions). John Searle is 100% wrong. John Searle believes in magic, because he believes without proof (observational and/or mathematical) that personhood-yielding isn't procedural. Of course because he believes in a fallacy, he isn't able to rigorously debunk himself (if he did he would have a different opinion).

## comment 1:

It is not practical to use a single human in a Chinese room (manipulating words on paper with drawers and card-order rules) to create a personhood-yielding brain (personhood and emotion would be experienced at a very slow pace by the Chinese room when compared to a human), but with many appropriate designs (there is no single personhood-yielding brain design) the Chinese room can be personhooded/a true person with genuine emotions.

## comment 2:

Some might say that a single operator inside the Chinese room cannot make it personhooded (some people falsely believe that only parallel computing can yield emotional ability/abledness and personhood; [but parallel computing can be linearly represented/executed, also not only parallel computing exists), but the double slit experiment works also with single electrons.

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Some erroneously claim that personhooded minds originate from a single ontoaxiomatics and not a mixed ontoaxiomatics. Response: 1. The ontoaxiomatics has nothing to do with personhooded minds. If a mind meets the criteria of personhood it is personhooded (we might have to write more rigorous criteria than Mary Anne Warren), 2. The ontoaxiomatics is the foundations of some substantiality (there is no single substantiality/omnisubstantiality/omniaxiomatics). The fact that the Chinese room is a complex system doesn't mean it has a mixed ontoaxiomatics. Its mathematocausal = logical & causal foundations are the ones of our universe.

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Some erroneously claim that only a quantum calculator can become a personhooded mind system. Quantum computers are better for a range of calculations, but not all. Quantum computers and mixed quantoclassical computers can yield a different range of personhooded mind designs than non-quantum computers, because they would easily reach some mental states classical computer would require ages to reach (or they would never reach, because one cannot maintain a single mind state without any bug that would terminate the process if the process lasts many times the age of the universe [see: computerphile on the duration of calculations]). Compare a quantum mind versus a mixed quantoclassical mind versus a classical/nonquantum mind. Which one is superior? No category of mind realisations is superior. Just each category reaches easier some mind states (mental states); and practically in the physical world some mental states are unreachable by certain mind designs because if a process has to last many times the age of the universe, it is guaranteed that the mind will die before the process ends, and the personality yielded by the mind (both are identical/tautological) would change that very long state to some different state more manageable for its connectome.

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Question: Is the brain = personhooded calculator tautological/identical to the mind according to physicalism?

Answer: No. Because the brain calculator has supportive units and extras not responsible for immediately yielding the mind (the thinking of the mind), but (these non-minded extras WHICH AREN'T CLEARLY SEPARABLE due to causopermeability / causal permeability [these extras unwittingly do affect the mind]) due to causopermeability these extras contribute to the mind to a lesser degree (gradient view).