Physicalism (text 1)

In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical, which is rigorous logical and causally coherent procedures (the foundational causality of the phenomena isn't necessarily identical to a relationship between high-order events; example: quantum entanglement is the result of a common wave function; but disturbing it cannot transfer useful information).

..., which is rigorous logical and causally coherent procedures. (otherwise it is a cyclic definition [repetition but not full definition]/ nondefinition; some Catholics believe in theistic physicalism, but don't include the extended definition [or they distort it]; WHICH IS IMPORTANT)

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physicalism = the claim that everything is physical and resulting from logical foundations (it means atheism, but atheism means a- theism = not God -ism; we also need physicalism to have a positive theory).

Physicalism (atheism) isn't a religion.

We simply love science. A scientist might even make a mistake, but the scientific method is what matters. Science accepts its own correction and evolution. Religion is dogmatic and never corrects itself.

Also speak about: quantum foundations (in cyclic cosmologies [many alternative theories exist] there isn't a single Big Bang but many big bangs; thus the physical foundations of the universe are based on logical axiomatics which is equivalent to Max Tegmark's computability criteria and David Deutsch's constructor theory [+ Chiara Marletto]. Of course science isn't over. All these theories need corrections.

The many big bangs in a cyclic cosmology (omniblackhole for example) (if it's correct), but even a single Big Bang isn't tautological to the deepest quantum foundations (any logically possible universe should self-causally exist, not by exosystemic supernaturalism = logical violations, but because physical axiomatics provides the prerequisites for the existence of universes and other spacetime-like worlds (other physical realities don't have to be exactly universe-like). We have to introduce the idea of allomathematics (mathematics with different axiomatics). Actually allomathematics isn't a new idea; many mathematics experimented with different axioms or axiomatic algorithms and not axiomatic lists (axiomatic algorithms work better for physical foundations). Higher mathematics lacks axioms (for very difficult mathematical problems, we sometimes don't know the exact axiom, and many techniques are used, like hierarchical axiom making from the strongest axioms; see: MIT Mathematics). David Hilbert altered the axioms of Euclide (any allogeometry = geometry with different axiomatics, is still acceptable if rigorously postulated). We need the allomathematical approach = to create different (infinite are possible) mathematics based on different axiomatics, because we need standalone rigorous foundations for the universe. The allomathematics of our universe can be transcribable to common mathematics. For the physical foundations I suggest an axiomatic algorithm and not an axiomatic list, because it's more procedural and physics is procedural. That physical axiomatics should be open, because the universe is ever-expanding, and in ontological Turing machines (a subcategory of Turing machines which are universes, and having axiomatics, software and hardware all in the same form to meet self-sufficiency and self-causality) The resulting allomathematics of our universe, should be transcribable into a Tegmarkian (Max Tegmark) calculator. Thus we should be able to describe the physical foundations of our universe, in many different mathematical forms, in order we make comparisons and corrections.

Simple atheism as a rejection of the supposedly self-caused supernatural cosmogonic thinker, thinkers and/or divine force–field, immediately collapses without physicalism, which [physicalism] is all rigorous elaborations on mathematical and allomathematical logic as the physical foundations, information theory (the brain processes information, it doesn't do magic to information, and personhood doesn't pre-exist its brain processing which yields it; thus neuroscience should be popularized). Also popularize the chemical abiogenesis of life (see: Jack W. Szostak and Yohey Suzuki).

Physicalism has two main sections: 1. main philosophical views and debates, 2. scientophysicalism = philosophicalism based on science. Both are useful. Science is more rigorous though, because philosophy by definition isn't an axiomatic system (in computational philosophy, axiomatization are possible, but create doctrines and not the overall philosophy [mutually exclusive doctrines exist, and an omniaxiomatics wouldn't have coherence to be an axiomatics = axiomatic system; it would fail or it would require an infinite series of nontrivial workarounds to isolate and manage the internal contradictions... that would be an infinite monstrosity totally impossible because no mathematican has infinite time to create the omniaxiomatics = the axiomatic system which includes all the possible axiomatic systems doesn't exist; thus Brahman and the Everything don't exist as single entities]).

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Please create some lectures on personhood: the state of being a person. Don't merge it with humanhood because that will not allow us to study God.

Personhood

• personhood (philosophical definition): the prerequisites for sentient, intelligent, empathetic and self-aware beings

Personhood is an intellectual process. A thinking organ is necessary. Thinking organs process information. The brain is a personhood-yielding computer. The mind is the result of the proceduralities of the brain. Soul theory doesn't explain at all the proceduralities of the mind according to rigorous and fundamental logic. General comments are not a foundational theory. Even an idealized topological brain (see: topology) would require space in order to exist and time in order data processing can occur. All-knowingness is a stationary structure; it's not a spectrum of data processing procedures. Thought requires processing ability. Spacetime is more fundamental than brains, thus personhood cannot be part of the foundations of physics. The supernatural has no specific procedurality, thus it is unteachable, unspeculable but also impossible, because physics (real things) have their own foundations (David Hilbert presented erroneously the physical axiomatics as something simpler than quantum mechanics; but David Tong who works on quantum field theory and topological quantum field theory is closer to the observational data; the more we zoom in in matter, the more complicated it seems).

The criteria of personhood or the prerequisites for personhood have been analyzed by many philosophers. Personhood is unrelated to the physical foundations.

Strong theism (in which God is self-caused and cosmogonic) has two prerequisites:

1. personhood is self-caused (if God is an impersonal and atheistic procedurality, then we simply distort language and semantics)

2. personhood is cosmogonic or involved in cosmogony (otherwise we have deism or atheism)

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• personnétat (état de personne ; hyperonyme de personnalité ; définition philosophique) : les conditions préalables à l'existence d'êtres sensibles, intelligents, empathiques et conscients d'eux-mêmes

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(In strong theism = theism with strong characteristics, personhood is self-caused and the origin of everything. In physicalism [David Deutsch, David Tong, Sean M. Carroll, Chiara Marletto, Max Tegmark, etc.] logic itself via mathematics or allomathematics [mathematics with different axiomatics but still rigorously logical and usually to common mathematics] provides the self-causal foundations of infinite alternative universes; thus Sabine Hossenfelder is wrong for narrowing the definition of science only within our universe; because infinite alternative universes are mathematically possible, and if we want to limit the range of science we'll have to do it in a scientific manner, but we will fail to impose our erroneous biases. David Hilbert tried to axiomatize physics, but he made many mistakes (he didn't have modern particle accelerator data). David Tong has a better view on the foundations of quantum mechanics, quantum field theory and if topological quantum field theory can be our guide for a deeper understanding of the causal foundations of physics [we live in an arbitrary universe within the category of those able to yield intelligent life; but many fundamental constants will remain arbitrary in the sense that they aren't the only possible values which yield intelligent life. Of course things are more complicated than that. In different universes, not only the fundamental constants change, but the overall field mechanics, the allo-quantum field theory of the vast majority of the different universes, cannot merely have different constants, but an overall different architecture. If you change the physical foundations, don't expect only some values to change. The way physics (or correctly put allophysics) works changes. Max Tegmark erroneously claimed that all mathematics is physical, and the corrected himself by claiming that only computationally possible mathematics is physical. David Deutsch and Chiara Marletto have constructor theory. According to David Deutsch, a single universe might have many separate constructors if the conditions are right; but other thinkers claim that orders of magnitude and phenomena don't abruptly separate due to causopermeability, thus they claim that each overall universe is an ontological Turing machine (a subcategory of the Turing machine which is in tandem its own axiomatics, software and hardware all expressed in the same way and yield some particular cosmos; but infinite others are possible and self-causal due to mathematical and allomathematical logic itself [the Big Bang is the beginning of our universe-strain, but in cyclic cosmology the physical foundations = quantum foundations is deeper than the Big Bang; see the omniblackhole hypothesis]). Any axiomatic system faces the problems of axiomaticity = the problems of the axiomatic systems: axiomatic incompleteness, axiomatic inconsistency and axiomatic incalculability [one can be avoided per axiomatic system, but never more]. The foundations of mathematics are logically inconsistent (see: Kurt Gödel, Bertrand Russell, etc.) thus mathematics is merely a calculational and measuring system like the ideal shapes of Plato, but it doesn't meet the criteria of substantiality = common mathematics isn't physics, isn't physical. Parts of mathematics can exist within the infinite physics [nowadays we don't have the erroneous mentioned final theory of physics; which is an erroneous statement because physics or better put the actual ontophysics and not the scientophysics of today is open. Yes. Physics needs to have an open axiomatics in order it better meets the criteria of substantiality = of being physically possible and not merely a human idea like mathematics]. In order physics is self-caused due to logic, and not physically impossible as a standalone reality like mathematics which isn't standalone physical (but only within other axiomatic systems which meet the prerequisites for substantiality = existence = physicality), some ontoaxiomatic workarounds/ sidesteps/ shenanigans are necessary like all the forms of entropy (physical work-related entropy, informational entropy; the spatiotemporal expansion is a form of ontoaxiomatic entropy, because in ontological Turing machines we cannot separate the union amongst axiomatics [physical foundations], software [basic laws], hardware [how particles are correlationally interpreted by others to exist as field exhibition interpretations within a range of Everettian/ manyworlded alternative arrangements]); also Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is an ontoaxiomatic workaround/ sidestep/ shenanigan (people tried to prove via the infinite series of Wigner's friends that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is interpretational and nonfundamental, but infinite physicality/ physical existence is impossible; only local actualities can be physical, thus the infinite series of Wigner's friends thought experiment is proof that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is an ontoaxiomatic workaround/ sidestep/ shenanigan of our particular universe. There is no ontoaxiomatic free lunch; which means that ontoaxiomatic workarounds/ sidesteps/ shenanigans don't violate or cancel the problems of axiomaticity = of the axiomatic systems; they simply manage them. Axiomatics (the logical foundations of axiomatic systems comes in many ways: mathematical = based on common mathematics, allomathematical based on mathematics with different axiomatics; either transcribable to common mathematics or in weird cases not [totally stupid axiomatics = axiomatic systems are possible; and they can meet the criteria of the axiomatic system; they can even include randomization axioms; but very simple and very complicated axiomatic systems cannot yield intelligent life because they are unbalanced]). Because all axiomatic systems are necessarily local, they should be transcribable into common mathematics, but not necessarily at the axiomatic level but at the formula level; in a case-by-case transcription per formula. An axiomatics (the foundations of an axiomatic system) can be an axiomatic list, an axiomatic algorithm or hybrid axiomatics [lists + algorithms].

Personhood isn't a prerequisite for axiomatics, neither personhood is a simplistic mechanism. Personhood is the result of a functional personhood-yielding computer = a personhooded brain able to yield a mind of a true person (and not pseudoperson/ not philosophical zombie).

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Personhood (basic prerequisites for being a person) is hypernymic/ hypernymous/ superordinate (wider than) personality (character; focus on individual differences).

I speak about personhood in philosophy (because some people study personhood in law [make lectures on that also; it's important]).

How to make a lecture on personhood = basic attributes of persons (personhood-bearers).

Personhood studies has two main subfields of study:

1. The general philosophy definition of the criteria of personhood/ prerequisites for personhood.

At least 20 views should be presented.

General philosophers (general philosophy doesn't exist, because philosophy isn't an axiomatic system; but I mean philosophy based on common sense and pure reason... of course we always introduce data from neuroscience and other sciences)...

General philosophers usually focus on how persons behave and what they do. Most of the general philosophers don't elaborate on the mechanisms which yield personhood (if they do that, they have special interest on the mechanisms of personhood; and if they use data other than common sense they are philosophers of neuroscience, philosophers of information theory, nongeneral focused philosophers or at least very educated philosophers [if they provide good data and rigorous proofs beyond common sense; because common sense is unable to reveal the deepest causality of things]).

Even focused subfield philosophical views (philosophy of neuroscience, philosophy of information theory, etc.) should be presented.

Common philosophers usually elaborate too much on what a person does, how the person behaves and feels, but they erroneously forget to elaborate on the personhood-yielding computer = personhooded brain which yields a mind with personality.

2. Elaborate on the basic criteria of the personhood-yielding computer = personhooded brain which yields a mind with personality.

2a. see: Quanta Magazine on YouTube on Neuroscience

• 2021's Breakthroughs in Neuroscience and Other Biology · Quanta Magazine · YouTube

see: Nancy Kanwisher and Mark Solms

Does the brain have task specific regions, or does it always require a combination of many Brodmann areas working together?

Of course this question is simplistic and biased. Vision and hearing usually require more focused brain activity when compared to writing literature or performing calculations within the context of difficult economic management which involves many decisions. We cannot generalize how the brain works for all cases. We need neuroimaging, electroencephalogram (EEG) and other neurodata in order we describe brain function per particular task; we shouldn't generalize.

According to modern neuroscience, many (not all) Brodmann areas are subroutine processing centers and not complete processors, which has two benefits: 1. the subroutine Brodmann areas can form way more combinations than having standalone full processors, 2. brain personhood is boosted by spreading data processing in many regions, because the personhood-boosting neural mechanisms are involved in managing the overall brain function.

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Different brain designs:

• The ANNPB (Flexible Artificial Neural Network Cluster Personhooded [personhood-yielding/ personal] Brain)

Flexible Artificial Neural Network Clusters (complete brains)

basic info

Here I don't speak about common data clustering (I don't reject it either).

I am talking about true personhood and not philosophical-zombiehood = pseudopersonality/ pseudopersonhood = simulated person without inherent individual coherence (selfhood).

• artificial neural network cluster (ANNC)

• personhooded computer → true brain

the Flexible Artificial Neural Network Cluster (FANNC) project

1. create many separate Artificial Neural Networks, each for a different function

2. create many separate Artificial Neural Network Interconnection Networks (Artificial Neural Networks which are the connectome which connects the main Artificial Neural Networks)

Yes, the connectome should have ANN data-filtering & processing properties, it shouldn't be simplistic.

3. create many separate Artificial Neural Network Coherence Centers (Artificial Neural Networks which help the overall Artificial Neural Network Cluster process information in correct phases and delete excessive data [yes, sometimes that is necessary]

3a. Basic coherence centers (they don’t generate consciousness, they simply make the information more integrateable/ compatible with integration (phase corrections + necessary data removal and semantic labeling additions).

3b. Consciousness centers (they generate consciousness; they overview the overall coherent informational integration, which beforehand passes through 3a. which is a more basic pre-integration.

4. Connect all the above to create the full ANN brain = Artificial Neural Network Cluster

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5. For more personhood (see: criteria of personhood/prerequisites for personhood) interpolate an Artificial Neural Network to the overall brain/to all of its subnetworks.

(One mother ANN which enters inside all its subnetworks.)

6. Classical CPUs/GPUs (general calculation units) and task-specific CPUs/GPUs (program-based focused ability calculation units) are necessary to improve the overall ANNC brain.

Classical CPUs/GPUs require an ANN interface to get integrated to the ANNC.

7. Create an ANN for belief in agency (if maximal personhood [personhood is gradient] is your goal). A personhooded-enough brain without a biased belief in agency center will feel psychologically sick.

8. Train it in an rich environment (family, friends, sex partners, school, university, work, etc.) (or a good simulation, or use older environmental training data, but they'll have to be coherent to shape a mentally healthy personality [personality means personhood with specific character/ unique attributes. Personhood is hypernymic to personality.]).

9. Build a theory of mind ANN and integrate it into the ANNC.

10. Build a memoremotional (limbic-system-like) ANN and integrate it into the ANNC.

11. MAXIMALLY IMPORTANT!!! The ANN should be flexible and distort according to information interpreted as emotional. Deep emotional data (inputs) should permanently/plastically change the characteristics of the Flexible Artificial Neural Network Cluster; mild emotional data (inputs) should elastically/impermanently change characteristics of the Flexible Artificial Neural Network Cluster. Yes. Emotions can change our identity if we are personhooded. The ability to emotionally change one's personality is a criterion of personhood.

Not everything should be flexible though (for example the basic senses) and different sub-ANN should have various degrees of flexibility. Otherwise we don't boost personhood but mental sickness instead.

This ANNC brain can become personhooded. Can we reach complexity without personhood? (for impersonal military ANNC brains)

Maximal personhood isn't necessary for a weapon system.
Don't be afraid that you will create personhood.
There is no magic in the universe.
Each ANNC brain is supposed to be tested.
Personhood won't come unless we humans want to build that feature with personhood-yielding ANNs.
Thus don't be afraid.

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topological personhood-yielding computer = topological personhood-yielding brain

see: topological quantum field theory

Similarly, logic gates and neural networks can be described using topological information theory (combination of topology, information theory, neuroscience, artificial neural networks; a humongous number of brain designs are possible and here I mean fundamentally different designs and not individual differences amongst the same brain design like the differences amongst the brains of different humans).

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Directionality Cloud Personhood-yielding Computer

Imagine many probability coulds (overlapping and/or not) with different densities, directionalities colours, excitation levels and other degrees of freedom.

Here we try to transcribe the other personhood-yielding computers (biological brain, personhood-yielding ANN cluster, topological brain) into this cloud brain.

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How to create a pseudoperson = philosophical zombie (all other examples are on true personhood); here we study how to fail and create a pseudoperson = philosophical zombie = apparently person but not sentient and coherent enough (personhood is a gradient computational mechanism; it has degrees)

How to create a philosophical zombie

How to create an unpersonhooded (ontologically impersonal) philosophical zombie?

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The criteria of zombieness versus the criteria of personhood (actually it's more complicated than a mere versus case, because the philosophical zombie meets most of the criteria of personhood, but it can be done in a diffused data collection mechanism that will generate minimal personhood but not zero personhood due to the gradient nature of personhood. Imperfect mood and emotional mechanisms are required, but that increase autism/autistic behaviour. A coherent-charactered low-autism brain, which in the effort to be created as a philosophical zombie, doesn't have a fine-tuned limbic and mood-pattern system, isn't a good philosophical zombie (it has enough genuine personhood via its complex diffused network; in that case its creator failed to achieve maximal zombieness [maximal zombieness = very coherent personality and very low autism [autisticity] but also very low genuine self-experienced genuine personhood].

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Philosophical zombie vs personhooded mind

(I have long texts on the subject or personhooded/personhood-yielding minds/brains. Search in the discussion forums (searchwords/keywords: personhooded/personhood-yielding.)

How to create an unpersonhooded philosophical zombie?

Mimic the behavioural outcomes of personhood-yielding human minds (not all humans are personhooded or personhooded enough [gradient view on personhood; also keep gradience for other subjects of study] with a computer which acts as a big library, pattern producer, heuristic machine, etc. If you build too well the system it means you created a very coherent system, thus you failed to create a philosophical zombie mind (see my text about the difference between mind and brain; the brain is the physical personhood-yielding calculator, and the mind its outcome which creates a self-experience. The brain includes also components that do not contribute much to the thinking process [thus there is a distinction between brain and mind], but due to causopermeability that distinction isn't absolute. A cable or a vein (any brain hardware and software is examined) might miswork and change some calculations; there is a gradience of mind contribution per different brain element.).

A philosophical zombie should appear very autistic in the autistic spectrum and exhibit non-character elements (changing easily too many opinions, including for things it once deemed important, for no obvious reason). If the brain architecture and/or programme create a very coherent personality then you failed (you created a brain not highly philosophical-zombie-like; because personhood and philosophical zombieness are gradient), but you probably didn't fail miserably/absolutely because you skipped creating limbic-system and other emotional mechanisms. Statistically realistic behaviours aren't enough for full personhood. A genuinely personhooded brain—mind system should also have pain internalisation units and procedures. On the other hand skipping the limbic-like system and other pain internalisation and mood creation mechanisms doesn't mean you surely created a perfect philosophical zombie according to the gradient view. The brain–mind system should be tested in many ways according to a list of alloneuroscientific (allo- means different; we'll have to create a brain science for each brain architecture; information theory will act as the hypernym) criteria that will scientifically evolve separately for each brain–race/genre/category (in order we scientifically examine its degree of personhood and/or zombieness we'll have to build at least 3000 different brain units). The brains should be tested in any possible way: 1. emotional tests, 2. character coherence tests, 3. IQ tests (not the most significant test in this case, but surely not useless), 4. athletic tests or motion tests if the individual has a motile body (more criteria should be added later).

Finally if someone created a new brain–mind system, hardware and/or software, its patent should be accessible for dissection, data analysis etc. to examine how it produces the self-references, mood and emotions (emotions are calculational patterns in processing subunits, some more dedicated than others).

Each brain region (even if it's a subroutine in a program) has its operational algorithm (we should mention what it does, but it's hard with some artificial neural networks [but mathematicians and computer scientists work on the subject]; watch: 2021's Biggest Breakthroughs in Math and Computer Science - Quanta Magazine - YouTube), its connections (including the strength and density towards different targets) and if it has enough self-feedback (that's not always necessary including in some human brain regions; there is no general rule for all brain regions).

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For how to create a personhood-yielding/personhooded brain–mind system see my older texts on the matter.

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For why supernaturalism/antiphysicalism/unprocedurality/causal incoherence/illogic/magic/substantial divine immateriality is ontologically (not merely phenomenologically/observationally/epistemologically) impossible, see my older texts on the subject.

comment 1:
There isn't a single personhood-yielding brain design like there isn't a single omniontoaxiomatics = single possible omniontophysics of any possible spacetime = there is no theory of everything.