Lexington Class Battlecruiser

## Backround

After the General Board's 1912 request of four battlecruisers for the 1914 Naval Building Program they asked C&R for a slightly modified version of the proposed ship. A modified version of the America Design was drawn up, but it was not built as the Naval War College felt that a fast battleship would be a more practical option.

Three years later—with the First World War raging in Europe—the political climate had changed. A tentative five-year program put together in October and supported by President Woodrow Wilson called for ten battleships, six battlecruisers and ten destroyers to be completed by 1922. This was submitted to Congress in December 1915. On 2 June 1916, the House of Representatives passed the bill in a modified form, replacing five of the battleships with battlecruisers. On 29 August 1916, the Senate also passed an altered bill, keeping the original number of ships but stipulating that the program be completed in three years (FY 1917–19). The first four ships were paid for in FY 1917, the fifth in FY 1918, and the last in FY 1919.

The *Lexington*s, along with the *Omaha* and *Wickes* classes, were intended to be part of a 35-knot (40 mph) scouting force that would support a large battle fleet, but the battlecruisers' keel laying was delayed; capital ship construction had been suspended in favor of needed merchant ships and anti-submarine warfare destroyers.

## Design development

Plans to begin construction were placed on hold in 1917. Large numbers of anti-submarine warfare vessels and merchant ships were needed to ensure the safe passage of men and materiel to Europe during Germany's U-boat campaign and were given top priority. This opened the opportunity for a massive redesign, the need for which had become apparent in light of experience gained in the Battle of Jutland, fought shortly after the initial design for the *Lexington*s had been approved and in which three British battlecruisers had been lost. The fact that the U.S. Navy misunderstood the essential points of the battle initially was shown by its ignoring the *Lexington*s staying power while increasing their main armament to eight 50-caliber 16-inch (406 mm) guns and their secondary armament to fourteen 6"/53 caliber guns. Other factors for this decision were the discovery of plans by Britain and Japan for new battlecruisers armed with 15-inch (381 mm) and 16-inch guns (respectively) and the recommendation of the Bureau of Ordnance to give these ships the ability "to inflict fatal damage on the enemy's most powerful vessels at a distance no less than that at which she can be reached by the heavy gunfire of these opponent battleships." Only 20 of a newer style of boiler were needed, few enough to fit below the armored deck, and the number of funnels was reduced to five. The armor scheme was not modified, as that would have compromised the longitudinal strength of the hull.

Around 1918, the U.S. naval staff in Great Britain became extremely impressed by the British's newest battlecruiser, HMS *Hood* of the Admiral class. Her side armor was comparable to that of previous battleships and her deck armor was the most extensive of any British capital ship. Because this ship was described as a "fast battleship" and the British Admiralty considered her a replacement for both the battleship and the battlecruiser, the staff advocated that the United States should develop a similar vessel of its own. Chief Constructor David Taylor agreed. On 8 April 1918, he told the *Lexington* design staff to plan a vessel combining the principal features of battleship and battlecruiser so that it would have the maximum possible speed, main armament and protection. Specifically, this meant arming her with the 16-inch guns planned for the *South Dakota*-class battleships, reducing armor protection 10 percent, a freeboard of at least 28 feet (8.5 m) (compared to 32 feet (9.8 m) for the 1917 battlecruiser and 29 feet (8.8 m) for the *Hood*) and a speed of at least 30 knots. Moreover, designs were to be prepared and submitted quickly.

The Royal Navy temporarily assigned a young constructor, Stanley Goodall, to C&R to assist in this task. Goodall brought a copy of the plans of *Hood* and accurate accounts of shell damage at the Battle of Jutland. In addition, a senior U.S. constructor who served on Admiral Sims's staff in London, L.C. McBride, became privy to much British experience and was able to share it with C&R. While C&R worked concurrently on the more conventional, more heavily armed and armored *South Dakota* class, it quickly adopted and incorporated ideas from *Hood* into the *Lexington* project which included a reduction of the main armor belt, the change to "sloped armor" and the addition of four above-water torpedo tubes that were added to the four underwater tubes that had been included in the original design. Other changes included a widening of the ship to allow for an adequate torpedo protection system and an increase in vertical belt armor to 7 inches (180 mm). Another improvement in boiler technology reduced the number of boilers to 16 and the number of funnels to just two, but increased the normal displacement of the ship to 43,500 tons, 300 tons more than the *South Dakota* class and 10,900 tons greater than the previous battleship class, the *Colorado* class.

Four proposed redesigns were submitted to the General Board on 3 June 1918, along with a letter that requested a formal reconsideration by the Navy that the *Lexington*s be armored to protect them only against fire of guns six inches and smaller. The Board, concerned about the delay incorporating any of the redesigns would have on not just the *Lexington*s but the 1916 building program in general and the subsequent cost, declined all four designs. The Board also feared that producing heavily armored fast battleships such as *Hood* would make the U.S. Navy's Standard type battleships obsolete, just as HMS *Dreadnought* made the Royal Navy's pre-dreadnought battleships obsolescent and negated its advantage in numbers over other navies. This did not stop the U.S. Commander in Chief in European waters, Admiral William S. Sims, to argue for the redesigned vessels by pointing out that *Hood* had already brought about the very revolution that the Board wished to suppress. Debate continued while the project remained suspended until May 1919, when the Board decided that the battlecruisers should be built as planned, except for a slightly slower version of Design B from C&R with increased protection for turrets, conning towers, magazines and communications. This amended version, labeled B3, was the final version of the *Lexington* battlecruiser design.

## Design

### General Characteristics

The *Lexington*-class ships had an overall length of 874 feet (266.4 m), a beam of 105 feet 4 inches (32.1 m), and a draft of 31 feet (9.4 m). They displaced 43,500 long tons (44,200 t) at normal load and 44,638 long tons (45,354 t) at deep load. Because the demand for extreme speed necessitated a long hull with maximum freeboard, the forecastle was extended down 75 percent of the total length of the hull. For this class, Rear Admiral David W. Taylor, who served as Chief Constructor for the Bureau of Construction and Repair, used a relatively new kind of bow called the bulbous bow or Taylor bow. The result of a series of towing tests begun in 1910, this bow reduced water resistance by an average of six percent, supported the forecastle and reduced bending stress on the hull. At speeds of more than 25 knots, test results were highly favorable. A disadvantage was the formation of a heavy layer of water which would creep up along the outer plating of the forecastle at higher speeds. However, this tendency could be reduced to some degree by careful design of the frames. Taylor first introduced this bow, also known as a bulbous forefoot, in his design of USS *Delaware*, which entered service in 1910.

### Propulsion

Turbo-electric propulsion was selected for the battlecruisers despite the fact it needed more room than geared turbines to allow for better underwater protection that wartime experience showed was essential. First used in the *New Mexico*-class battleships, it also had several other advantages. The turbines could run at their optimum speed, without regard to propeller speed, which was economical on fuel and the machinery could be easily sub-divided which increased the ships' ability to withstand torpedo hits. The substitution of flexible electric cables for bulky steam-lines meant that the motors could be mounted further to the rear of the ship, which reduced both vibration and weight by shortening the propeller shafts. Also, the ship could go astern at full power simply by reversing the electrical polarity of the motors. Despite these factors and the fact that American companies would have struggled to produce the very large geared steam turbines needed for such big ships, the Curtis Company tried unsuccessfully to convince the Navy to reverse this decision. The Navy countered that doing so would mean a complete rearrangement of machinery spaces and a reduction in underwater protection.

Each propeller was 14 feet 9 inches (4.50 m) in diameter and each of the four propeller shafts was powered by two 22,500-shaft-horsepower (16,800 kW) electric motors acting in tandem. These motors were about five times the size of any earlier electric motor. Four General Electric turbo generators powered each propeller shaft and each was rated at 35,200 kilowatts (47,200 hp), 5000 volts and 4620 amps of direct current (DC). Each of the four AC alternators produced 40,000 KVA. Sixteen water-tube boilers, each in their own individual compartment, provided steam for the generators at a working pressure of 295 psi (2,034 kPa; 21 kgf/cm2) and a temperature of 460 °F (238 °C). The turbo-electric machinery of the *Lexington*-class ships was designed to produce a total of 180,000 shaft horsepower (130,000 kW) and propel the ships at 33.25 knots (61.58 km/h; 38.26 mph), but each ship reached over 202,000 shp (151,000 kW) and 34.5 knots (63.9 km/h; 39.7 mph) during sea trials in 1928. Six 750-kilowatt (1,010 hp) DC turbo generators were installed in the upper levels of the two main turbine compartments.

The estimated range would have been 10,000 nautical miles (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) at a speed of 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph).

### Armament

#### Main Guns

The original design of the *Lexington* class called for ten 14"/50 caliber guns of either the Mark 4, 5, or 6 variety to be mounted in four turrets (two triple superfiring over two double turrets) for the main armament. Designed in 1916 and put into service by 1918, these guns were installed on the *Tennessee*- and *New Mexico*-class battleships. The guns were capable of firing a 1,400 pounds (640 kg) armor-piercing (AP) projectile at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (853 mps) to a range of 24,000 yards (22 km) at a maximum angle of 15 degrees.

Later designs called for eight 16"/50 caliber Mark 2 gun, also slated to be used on the *South Dakota*-class battleship of 1920. Like the 14"/50 caliber gun, the 16" gun was designed in 1916. Basically an extended version of the 16"/45 caliber Mark 1 gun used on the *Colorado* class, it fired the same 2,100-pound (950 kg) shell as the Mark 1 at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (853 mps) and rate of two rounds per minute to a range of 44,500 yards (40,700 m) at an elevation of 45 degrees.

#### Secondary Guns

The original design called for eighteen 5"/51 caliber guns. These guns were originally mounted on the *Florida*- and *Wyoming*-class battleships, but they found their way into the secondary armament of every U.S. battleship that was built prior to the Washington Naval Treaty. Also, many of the destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries that were built during this time mounted this gun as their main gun. They fired a 50-pound (23 kg) shell at a muzzle velocity of 3,150 fps (960 mps) and a rate of eight or nine rounds per minute to a range of 18,880 yards (17,260 m) at an elevation of 25 degrees.

The secondary armament was later upped to fourteen 6"/53 caliber guns in Mark 13 casemate mountings during one of the redesigns. Designed in 1920 and in service by 1923, these guns became the main armament on the *Omaha*-class light cruisers, *Narwhal*, *Nautilus*, and *Argonaut* submarines, and they were intended as secondary armament on the *South Dakota*-class battleships. They fired a 105-pound (48 kg) shell at a muzzle velocity of 3,000 fps (914 mps) and a rate of six or seven rounds per minute to a range of 25,300 yards (23,100 m) at an elevation of 30 degrees.

#### Anti-aircraft guns

Four 3"/23 caliber Mark 11 anti-aircraft guns were planned for the original and first redesigned versions of the *Lexington*s. This was increased to eight guns in the final version. These could depress to −10 degrees and elevate to 85 degrees. They fired a 13-pound (5.9 kg) shell at a muzzle velocity of 1,650 fps (503 mps) and rate of between eight and nine rounds per minute to a range of 8,800 yards (8,000 m) and a height of 18,000 feet (5,500 m).

#### Torpedo tubes

Eight 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes were to be carried. Four of these would be mounted inside the hull below the waterline, two at either side of the bow; the others would be above the waterline at the stern, two at either side.

### Armor

he waterline belt of the *Lexington*-class ships tapered 7–5 inches (178–127 mm) in thickness from top to bottom and was angled 11° outwards at the top to increase the armor's relative thickness to horizontal, close-range fire (a concept taken from HMS *Hood*). The downside to this practice was a reduction of the relative height of the belt, which increased the chance of plunging shellfire going over or under it. The belt covered the middle 530 feet (161.5 m) of the ships. Forward, the belt ended in a bulkhead also tapered from seven to five inches in thickness. Aft, it terminated at a seven-inch bulkhead. This belt had a height of 9 feet 4 inches (2.8 m). The upper deck was 2.25 inches (57 mm) thick in two layers. The third deck over the ships' machinery and magazine was armored with two layers of Special treatment steel (STS) totaling 2 inches (51 mm) in thickness. The steering gear, however, was protected by two layers of STS that totaled 3 inches (76 mm) on the slope and 4.5 inches (114 mm) on the slope.

The turret faces were 11 inches (279 mm) thick while their sides were 6 inches (152 mm) in thickness, and the roof was five inches thick. The barbettes had a maximum of 9 inches (229 mm) of armor, but were reduced in thickness in stages below decks to a minimum thickness of five inches. The conning tower armor was 12 inches (305 mm) thick, and it had a communications tube with 10 inches (254 mm) sides ran from the conning tower down to the lower conning position on the 1st platform deck. The torpedo defense system of the *Lexington*-class ships consisted of three to six medium steel protective bulkheads that ranged from .375 to .75 inches (10 to 19 mm) in thickness. The spaces between them could be left empty or used as fuel tanks to absorb the detonation of a torpedo's warhead.

### Aircraft

None of the designs made provision for aircraft. However, the Navy planned to adapt the poop deck of these vessels to accommodate aircraft at a later date.

### Modifications

#### Wartime Modifications

The class began modernization on the 1st of February 1940 when the *USS Constellation* began refit at Mare Island Naval Shipyard. She was followed a day later by her sister *Constitution*. While the two remaining ships underwent modernization at Newport News Naval Shipyard. *Constellation* and *Constitution* emerged from their refits on January 22nd 1942. While *Chesapeake* and *Congress* finished theirs in May 1942

## Service History

### Lexington

Laid down on 8 January, 1921, at Fore River Shipyard, in Quincy, Massachusetts. Converted to Aircraft Carrier.

### Constellation

#### World War II

##### Battle of the Coral Sea

She emerged from their refits on January 22nd 1942. After finishing sea trials on March 25th she sailed for Pearl Harbor. At Pearl Harbor she was attached to Task Force 11 as an escort to the carrier *Lexington*. Task Force 11 left Pearl Harbor on 15 April, with *Lexington* carrying 14 Buffalos of VMF-211 to be flown off at Palmyra Atoll. After flying off the Marine fighters, the task force was ordered to train with the battleships of Task Force 1 in the vicinity of Palmyra and Christmas Island. Late on 18 April, the training was cancelled as Allied codebreakers had figured out that the Japanese intended to invade and occupy Port Moresby and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands (Operation Mo).

*Constellation* refueled from the oiler *Tippecanoe* on May 1st. On May 6th Task Force 11 was absorbed into Task Force 17. Consideration was given on to whether *Constellation* should be sent to intercept the invasion force but this was vetoed as she provided valuable AA defense. On 8th May *Constellation* detecetd approaching Japanese planes on radar. During the battle she shot down 2 Zeros and 1 Dive bomber who attempted an attack run. Her valiant effort failed to prevent the loss of the Lexington to enemy aircraft. She left the Coral Sea on 9th May with the rest of Task Force 17.

##### Battle of Midway

On 27th May, Task Force 17 arrived at Pearl Harbor. While *Yorktown* underwent frantic repairs, the task force was bolstered by the arrival of the *USS Saratoga* and new *USS Essex* on the 29th. The task force left Pearl Harbor the next day. During the battle four Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk with two others sent limping home heavily damaged. In return the Japanese sunk the *Yorktown*, and inflicted light & medium damage on the *Saratoga*, and *Essex*. Constellation shot down 11 planes during the battle. The task force left the area on June 10th..

#### Guadalcanal Campaign

On 7 July, Task Force 11 departed Pearl for the Southwest Pacific; it consisted of *Saratoga*, *Essex,* *Constellation*, four heavy cruisers, *Astoria*, *New Orleans*, *Minneapolis* and *Vincennes*, and an escort of seven destroyers. Also assigned were three replenishment oilers and four fast transports converted from old four-stack destroyers. TF 11 and TF 18, centered around the carriers *Wasp* and *Yorktown*, rendezvoused south of Tongatapu on 24 July and they met the remaining forces, including *Enterprise*'s TF 16, assigned to Operation Watchtower three days later south of the Fiji Islands. The entire force of 88 ships was organized as Task Force 61 and commanded by Fletcher. Task force 61 comprised of 6 fleet carriers, 2 battlecruisers, 1 fast battleship, 17 cruisers, and 18 destroyers.

The Allied force successfully reached the Solomon Islands without being detected by the Japanese because of thick fog and haze. After conducting air strikes on Guadacanal, the carriers provided a combat air patrol (CAP) over the transports and themselves while their other aircraft provided air support for the Marines as needed.

The Japanese struck back quickly and launched 27 Mitsubishi G4M ("Betty") medium bombers, escorted by 17 Mitsubishi A6M Zero ("Zeke") fighters, against the Allied forces. Among the escorting pilots were several aces such as Junichi Sasai, Toshio Ota, Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, and Saburō Sakai. Failing to spot the carriers, the bombers attacked the transports and their escorts, defended by eight Wildcats from *Saratoga*'s VF-5. The Zeros shot down five Wildcats without losing any of their own, but the Americans shot down at least one G4M and damaged a number of others. The bombers failed to hit any Allied ships. About an hour later, nine Aichi D3A ("Val") dive bombers attacked the transport groups. Also based in Rabaul, they were on a one-way mission with a minimal payload of two small 60-kilogram (132 lb) bombs each because the distance to Guadalcanal exceeded their combat range; the pilots were expected to ditch at Shortland Island on the return leg where a Japanese seaplane tender could pick them up. By the time they arrived, the American CAP had been reinforced to 15 Wildcats from VF-5 and VF-6. Realizing that they had been spotted and that they could not reach the vulnerable transports before they were intercepted by the defending fighters, the Japanese attacked two of the escorting destroyers. They lightly damaged one destroyer with a direct hit, but the Americans shot down five of the attackers without loss to themselves.

The Japanese attacked the transports again the following day. Concerned about his declining fuel reserves and worried about air and submarine attacks after losing 20% of his fighters, Fletcher requested permission from Ghormley to withdraw one day early to refuel. This was granted and Fletcher's carriers were mostly out of range by the morning of 9 August. This meant that they were out of strike range after a Japanese cruiser force sank four Allied cruisers that night. The transports still lacked air cover, but the only Japanese airstrike of the day specifically targeted the carriers and ignored the transports entirely. Fletcher loitered southeast of the Solomons, waiting for the Japanese carriers that signals intelligence told him were en route to be spotted. He rendezvoused with the aircraft transport *Long Island* on 19 August and covered her approach to Guadalcanal. The ship was carrying Marine aircraft for Henderson Field and successfully flew them off the next day. Fletcher returned to the Solomons on 21 August after escorting *Long Island* to safety and remained in the vicinity for the next several days to provide cover for two transports resupplying the Marines. American aircraft shot down several Japanese reconnaissance aircraft during this time and the Japanese concluded that one or more American carriers were operating southeast of Guadalcanal.

##### Battle of the Eastern Solomons

The presence of American carriers nearby firmed up Japanese plans to land troops on Guadalcanal on 24 August, covered by the fleet carriers *Shōkaku*, *Zuikaku, Ryukaku,* and the light carrier *Ryūjō*. A force of Japanese troop transports was detected on the morning of 23 August some 300 nautical miles (560 km; 350 mi) north of Guadalcanal. Fletcher was not originally inclined to attack them until another force of two transports was spotted at Faisi later that morning. He changed his mind and ordered *Saratoga* to launch her airstrike of 31 Dauntlesses and six Avengers in the early afternoon at very long range. They could not locate the Japanese convoy in poor visibility because it had reversed course shortly after spotting the American reconnaissance aircraft. The aircraft lacked the range to return to their carrier and they were ordered to land at Henderson Field and return the following morning.

The Japanese failed to locate the American carriers during the day and Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, commander of the First Carrier Division, ordered *Ryūjō*, escorted by the heavy cruiser *Tone* and two destroyers, to attack Henderson Field, as per Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's orders. American aircraft located the *Ryūjō* task force the following morning as it approached within aircraft range of Guadalcanal, as well as other enemy ships, but failed to spot the fleet carriers. Fletcher delayed his attack until further reconnaissance aircraft failed to find the other Japanese carriers and his own aircraft returned from Henderson Field. In the meantime, *Ryūjō* had launched her own airstrike against Henderson Field, although they inflicted little damage while losing seven out of 21 aircraft during the attack.

At 14:25 the US carrier force was spotted by scout aircraft from the cruiser *Chikuma*. Although the aircraft was shot down, its report was transmitted in time, and Nagumo immediately ordered his strike force launched from *Shōkaku*, *Zuikaku,* and *Ryukaku*. The first wave of aircraft, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Mamoru Seki, was in the air by 14:50 and on its way toward Task Force 61. About this same time, two U.S. scout aircraft finally sighted the main Japanese force, but because of communication problems these sighting reports never reached Fletcher. Before leaving the area, the two U.S. scout aircraft attacked *Shōkaku*, causing negligible damage but forcing five of the first-wave Zeros to give chase, thus aborting their mission. At 16:00 a second wave, under the command of Lieutenant Sadamu Takahashi, was launched by the Japanese carriers and headed south toward the U.S. carriers. Abe's "Vanguard" force also surged ahead in anticipation of meeting the U.S. ships in a surface action after nightfall.

Also at this time, the *Saratoga* strike force arrived and attacked *Ryūjō*, hitting and heavily damaging her with three to five bombs and perhaps one torpedo, and killing 120 of her crew. Also during this time, several U.S. B-17 heavy bombers attacked the crippled *Ryūjō* but caused no additional damage. The crew abandoned the heavily damaged Japanese carrier at nightfall, and she sank soon after. *Amatsukaze* and *Tokitsukaze* rescued *Ryūjō*'s survivors and the aircrews from her returning strike force, who ditched their aircraft in the ocean nearby. After the rescue operations were complete, both Japanese destroyers and *Tone* rejoined Nagumo's main force.

At 16:02, still waiting for a definitive report on the location of the Japanese fleet carriers, the U.S. carriers' radar detected the first incoming wave of Japanese strike aircraft. F4F-4 Wildcat fighters from the U.S. carriers were directed by radar control towards the attackers. Communication problems, limitations of the aircraft identification capabilities of the radar, primitive control procedures, and effective screening of the Japanese dive bombers by their escorting Zeros, prevented all but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the D3A dive bombers before they began their attacks on the U.S. carriers. The *Constellation* moved to put herself inbetween the carriers and the oncoming aircraft. Just before the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks, *Enterprise*, *Saratoga, Essex,* and *Yorktown* cleared their decks for the impending action by launching the aircraft that they had been holding ready in case the Japanese fleet carriers were sighted. These aircraft were told to fly north and attack anything they could find, or else to circle outside the battle zone, until it was safe to return.

At 16:29, the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks. Although several attempted to set up to attack *Saratoga* and *Essex*, they quickly shifted back to the nearer carrier, *Enterprise*. Thus, *Enterprise* was the target of almost the entire Japanese air attack. In a desperate attempt to disrupt their attacks, several Wildcats followed the D3A dive bombers into their attack dives, despite the intense anti-aircraft artillery fire from *Enterprise* and her screening warships. As many as four Wildcats were shot down by U.S. anti-aircraft fire, as well as several D3A dive bombers.

Because of the effective anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships, plus evasive maneuvers, the bombs from the first nine D3A dive bombers missed *Enterprise*. The second division, which was led by Lieutenant Keiichi Arima, managed to score three hits. Seven D3A dive bombers—three from *Shokaku* and four from *Zuikaku*—then broke off from the attack on *Enterprise* to attack the *Constellation*, but all were shot down by anti-aircraft fire or U.S. fighters. The attack was over at 16:48, and the surviving Japanese aircraft reassembled in small groups and returned to their ships.

Believing that two U.S. carriers had been taken out of action with heavy damage, Tanaka's reinforcement convoy again headed toward Guadalcanal, and by 08:00 on 25 August they were within 150 nmi (170 mi; 280 km) of their destination. At this time, Tanaka's convoy was joined by five destroyers which had shelled Henderson Field the night before, causing slight damage. At 08:05, 18 U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field attacked Tanaka's convoy, causing heavy damage to *Jintsu*, killing 24 crewmen, and knocking Tanaka unconscious. The troop transport *Kinryu Maru* was also hit and eventually sank. Just as the destroyer *Mutsuki* pulled alongside *Kinryu Maru* to rescue her crew and embarked troops, she was attacked by four U.S. B-17s from Espiritu Santo, which landed five bombs on or around *Mutsuki*, sinking her immediately. An uninjured but shaken Tanaka transferred to the destroyer *Kagerō*, sent *Jintsu* back to Truk, and took the convoy to the Japanese base in the Shortland Islands.

Both the Japanese and the U.S. elected to completely withdraw their warships from the area, ending the battle.

##### Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

On 13 November, after learning that a major Japanese attack was approaching, Halsey detached *Constellation*, *Constitution*, *South Dakota*, *Indiana*, *Washington*, the heavy cruisers *Baltimore*, *Boston*, and ten of the destroyers as Task Group 16.3, under the command of Admiral Willis A. Lee. The ships of TG 16.3 were to block an anticipated Japanese bombardment group in the waters off Guadalcanal. The task force was reinforced by the surviviors of the previous nights battle comprising of the undamaged light cruiser *Helena* and the battlecruiser *Alaska*. The task force was divided into two groups a cruiser force comprising of Alaska, Baltimore, Boston, and Helena and a Main force comprising of *Constellation*, *Constitution*, *South Dakota*, *Indiana*, and *Washington.*

As Lee's task group approached Guadalcanal, his Japanese counterpart Admiral Nobutake Kondō steamed to meet him with his main bombardment force, consisting of the fast battleships *Nagato*, *Mutsu*, *Kongo*, *Kirishima*, the battlecruisers *Azuma*, *Ishizuchi*, *Iwate*, the heavy cruisers *Takao* and *Atago*, *Mogami*, *Minami*, *Tone* and a destroyer screen. While en route, TG 16.3 was re-designated as TF 64 on 14 November; the ships passed to the south of Guadalcanal and then rounded the western end of the island to block Kondō's expected route. Japanese aircraft reported sighting Lee's formation, but identification of the ships ranged from a group of cruisers and destroyers to aircraft carriers, causing confusion among the Japanese commanders. That evening, American reconnaissance aircraft spotted Japanese warships off Savo Island, prompting Lee to order his ships to general quarters.

At around 23:00 on 14 November, the leading Japanese destroyers in a screening force commanded by Shintarō Hashimoto sent ahead of Kondō's main force spotted Lee's ships and turned about to warn Kondō, while *Constellation's* search radar picked up a Japanese cruiser and a destroyer at about the same time. The ships' fire control radars then began tracking the Japanese vessels and Lee ordered his battleships and battlecruisers to open fire when ready. *Contellation* fired first with her main battery at 23:17 at a range of 18,000 yd (16,000 m) while her secondary guns fired star shells to illuminate the targets, followed shortly by *Washington*.

At 23:35, *Constellation*'s SG radar detected Kondō's main force and tracked them for the next twenty minutes. At 23:58, *South Dakota*'s radar picked up the Japanese ships less than 3 nautical miles (5.6 km; 3.5 mi) ahead. Two minutes later, the leading Japanese ship, *Atago*, illuminated *South Dakota* with her search lights and the Japanese line promptly opened fire, scoring twenty-seven hits. The other capital ships, still undetected, opened fire, *Constellation* straddled *Ishizuchi* with 16 Inch shells, while the rest battered *Kirishima*. *Kirishima* suffered probably twelve 16-inch hits and as many as forty 5-inch hits, inflicting grievous damage. *Kirishima* was badly holed below the waterline, her forward two turrets were knocked out, and her rudder was jammed, forcing her to steer in a circle to port with an increasing starboard list.

The capital ships then shifted fire to *Mutsu and Ishizuchi*, bombarding them with numerous salvos of 16 inch shells. A salvo from *Constellation* succeeded in detonating *Mutsu's* forward 16 inch magazine. The exposion illuminated *Kondo's* cruisers for the cruiser force's gunners and while shells straddled the former, they failed to score any significant hits; the barrage nevertheless convinced both cruisers to turn off their search lights and reverse course in an attempt to launch torpedoes. At 00:13, the two cruisers fired a spread of sixteen Long Lance torpedoes at *Constellation*, then about 4,000 yards (3,700 m) away, though they all missed. Meanwhile Ishizuchi struggling to stay afloat as hordes of 16 inch shells crashed down upon the ship. At 00:17 A salvo from *Indiana* detonated her fore 14 inch magazine, spliting the ship in two. At 00:20, Lee ordered the Cruiser Force to close with Kondō's cruisers. *Atago* and *Takao* briefly engaged with their main batteries and the former launched three more torpedoes, all of which missed. The Mogami Class Heavy Cruiser *Minami* suffered grevious damage at the hands of the cruiser force. *Alaska* petling the ship with over 47 12 Inch shells. Eventually one of *Alaska's* salvos caused an explosion in the torpedo stowage room, crippling the ship and resulting in it sinking at 02:35. Kondō then ordered the light forces of his reconnaissance screen to make a torpedo attack, but Hashimoto's ships were far out of position and were unable to comply. Rear Admiral Raizō Tanaka, who was escorting a supply convoy to Guadalcanal and had thus far not participated in the action, detached two destroyers to aid Kondō. When these ships arrived on the scene, Lee ordered *Alaska* to turn to reverse course at 00:33 to avoid a possible torpedo attack from the destroyers.

Tanaka's two destroyers closed to launch their torpedoes while *Alaska* was disengaging, prompting her to take evasive maneuvers. While withdrawing to the south, Lee kept *Alaska* far west of the damaged American warships so that any Japanese vessels pursuing him would not be drawn onto the damaged vessels. An hour later, Kondō cancelled the bombardment and attempted to contact *Kirishima*, but after failing to receive a response, sent destroyers to investigate the crippled battleship. She was found burning furiously, still turning slowly to port as progressively worsening flooding disabled her boilers. At 03:25, she capsized and sank; by this time, *Ayanami* had also been abandoned and sank as a result of the damage inflicted by *Washington*. By 09:00, the cruiser force had joined back up with the main force to withdraw from the area. In addition to blocking Kondō's planned bombardment, Lee had delayed Tanaka's convoy late enough that the transports could not unload under cover of darkness, and so they were forced to beach themselves on the island, where they were repeatedly attacked and badly damaged by aircraft from *Enterprise* and Henderson Field, field artillery, and the destroyer *Meade* later that morning.

##### Later Operations

*Constellation* returned to screening the carriers of TF 16 while *South Dakota,* and *Constitution* departed for repairs. By late November, Lee's command was reinforced by the return *North Carolina*, followed later by the battlecruiser *Constitution*. These capital ships were grouped together as TF 64, still under Lee's command, and they covered convoys to support the fighting in the Solomons into the next year. These operations included covering a group of seven transports carrying elements of the 25th Infantry Division to Guadalcanal from 1 to 4 January 1943. During another of these convoy operations later that month, Lee's battleforce was too far south to be able to reach the American cruiser force during the Battle of Rennell Island.

By May, *Constellation* was reassigned as escort to the *Saratoga*. Task Force 14, as *Saratoga's* group was now known, was reinforced by the anti-aircraft cruiser *San Diego* on 3 May and by Australian Carrier *Endevour* on 17 May. At this time Task Force 14 was intended to provide distant cover for the impending landings on New Georgia and to prevent intervention by any Japanese carriers. Fortunately, Ramsey never got a chance to test his reorganization as the Japanese carriers made no effort to attack the American transports. Ramsey was relieved on 26 July and replaced by Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman. *Endevour* sailed on 31 July for home and left eleven Avengers behind as reserves for *Saratoga*.

Carrier Air Group 12 was assigned to *Saratoga* in lieu of Carrier Air Group 3 and flew aboard on 1 August. It was composed of VF-12, VB-12 and VT-12; the fighter and dive bomber squadrons each had 36 aircraft and the torpedo bomber squadron had half that number. Grumman F6F Hellcats replaced the Wildcats formerly used. The task force was redesignated as Task Force 38 on 4 August and Captain John H. Cassady relieved Mullinix on 22 August after the latter was promoted. The ship was based at Havannah Harbor, Efate and Espiritu Santo from August through November. While refueling at sea on the night of 12 October, *Saratoga* collided with the oiler *Atascosa*, damaging three of her 20-millimeter guns on her port side. On 22 October, she was joined by the light aircraft carrier *Princeton*.

On 27 October, Task Force 38 provided air cover for the invasion of the Treasury Islands, part of the preliminary operations for the invasion of Bougainville Island scheduled a few days later. On the morning of 1 November, Task Force 38's aircraft neutralized Japanese airfields at the northern end of the island and on Buka Island. They destroyed 15 Japanese aircraft while losing three Hellcats, one Dauntless, and two Avengers to all causes. While the task force was refuelling on 3–4 November, reconnaissance aircraft discovered Japanese cruisers massing at Rabaul and Admiral Halsey ordered Task Force 38 to attack them with maximal force before they could engage the transports at Bougainville. This translated into an attack group of 23 Avengers and 22 Dauntlesses, escorted by every available fighter on board the two carriers on 5 November; CAP over the carriers was provided by fighters flying from New Georgia. The attack caught the Japanese by surprise and badly damaged four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer for the loss of only nine aircraft to all causes.

Task Force 38 attacked Rabaul again on 11 November in conjunction with three carriers of Task Group 50.3. They attacked first, but inflicted little damage due to poor visibility; the other carriers were more successful and further damaged the ships at Rabaul. Task Force 38 returned to Espiritu Santo on 14 November. *Constellation* sailed for Pearl Harbor on the 15th arriving on the 22nd. She underwent a refit during which her radars were replaced and her 5 Inch/38s were replaced with experimental 5 Inch/54s. *Constellation* was the first ship to recieve 5 Inch/54s and she served as the tesbed for their trial by fire. She emerged from refit on December 2nd and joined the Fast Carrier Task Force.

### Saratoga

Laid down on 23 June, 1921, at New York Shipbuilding, in Camden, New Jersey. Converted to Aircraft Carrier.