Θεμελίωση της υποστατότητας / foundations of substantiality

## incipit/mini intro:

allomathematics: mathematics with different axiomatics; axiomatic algorithms work better than lists for universe-like substantialities

Some allomathematics is the ontomathematics = ontophysics of our particular universe. There's no omniontoaxiomatics. Correct ontoaxiomatic solutions cannot exist in incompatible universes; they have to be compatible with their own spacetime. There is no omnimultiverse; the vast majority of universes are nonparallelisable = ontoaxiomatically incompatible.

## introduction

Supernaturalism is ontologically unstructured, thus it is not only epistemologically impossible to describe but also ontologically impossible.

Absolute empiricism is wrong (empiricism + coherent mathematical proofs is correct) because that way we'll never reach the foundational theory of our universe and its basic criteria which wouldn't necessarily emerge as a single substantiality.

Are there general criteria for how to make universes? Axiomatic systems are necessary to generate rigorous science (mathematics and geometry are axiomatically based, but the axioms of science don't usually emerge from a single algorithm; if ontologically substantial systems have an axiomatic foundation [ontoaxiomatics], it would have to be an ontological Turing machine [not necessarily a general calculator] but the ontological Turing machine would have to be in tandem its own software and hardware.

There is no omniaxiomatics = there is no axiomatic system of all axiomatic systems. Thus there is no omniontoaxiomatics = there is no single common axiomatic system for all possible substantialities. On the other hand we can describe some ontoaxiomatic criteria, mechanisms and approaches. For example ontoaxiomatics works better with ontoaxiomatical algorithms than with stationary lists, because algorithms can: 1. be 'ontological Turing machines' of software–hardware tautology which resolves the self-causality connectome and the common axiomatic origin (scientoaxiomatics = the axioms of scientific fields, don't necessarily have a common causality thus they don't meet the 'ontological Turing machine' criteria), 2. 'ontological Turing machines' (they're identical/tautological to their ontoaxiomatics) which are algorithms can better work around the axiomatic incompleteness and/or inconsistency.

An 'ontological Turing machine' would have to overcome the problems of axiomaticity (of axiomatic systems) like incompleteness and/or inconsistency, in our universe dealt with ontological entropy (the universal expansion due to dark energy is ontological entropy/substantiality entropy) and with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (the Heisenberg uncertainty principle plays an ontological role in the axiomatics of the universe by working around the axiomatic incompleteness and/or inconsistency; but in order we describe the whole universe we'll have to describe all Everettian (see: many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics) alternative outcomes.

Superdeterminism cannot be the final theory because it doesn't resolve its first cause. Also different superdeterministic wavefunctional evolutions might be included as subcases within Everettism (manyworldness). Superdeterminism pushes the question of the initial conditions in an unresolved past, which can be Everettianly replaced (all possible wavefunctional alternative outcomes exist in multifurcating universe-strains).

'Perspectival substantiality' or 'perspectival ontology' means that infinite ontology isn't possible as a unity. Infinite is a process and it cannot be tautological to unity. Thus anything that exists, exists in relation to a surrounding causal connectome (Russian doll hypernymization of substantiality [renormalization group] with the most afar and hypernymous/superordinate substantialities contributing less to the central observer. Anything exists within a causal connectome [renormalization group] and not as a standalone reality; otherwise its self-causality or its self-causal origin would be impossible to be derived (or we would need a magical God, but still this claim doesn't mathematically resolve the first cause which can be replaced with an ontologically perspectival causal connectome).

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About the creation of a new faculty named: foundations of substantiality (hypernymic/superordinate to quantum foundations).

Robert W. Spekkens at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics (and many others) work on quantum foundations, but quantum mechanics is the mechanism of our own universe.

We need to understand how physics is created in the first place. We have to separate scientophysics (the science of mathematically describing our world [which isn't the Everything... keep that for later) vs ontophysics (how the universe actually works, without any theoretical gap [science is not tautological/identical to substantiality = how things actually are; also science didn't resolve the quantum foundations [actually the ontological axiomatics = ontoaxiomatics aren't necessarily a dead static list, but most probably the ontoaxiomatics (like the quantum foundations, but it doesn't seem that only one physics is possible) is an algorithm, trying to manage the problems of axiomaticity: axiomatic incompleteness and/or axiomatic inconsistency with ontoaxiomatical = physical entropy (the fact that the universe expands is entropic;... and other entropic phenomena have to be mentioned) and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (the uncertainty principle is of ontological importance because it deals with axiomatic problems).

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David Deutsch’s constructor theory is a "foundations of substantiality" theory, but Harvard University should create a new generic faculty on the subject, not merely focusing on a single professor.

"Foundations of substantiality" deserves its own faculty. It's not hyponymic to the "history of science". It can be included in the "history of science", but before that it has to properly evolve as a field.

Harvard University is precious for being able to evolve ideas for long. Scientists are human beings and sometimes focus too much on subtheories. Harvard University is not a mortal, thus it keeps evolving particular fields of science in a manner that becomes unbiased after many generations of professors.

I have texts on (about) the foundations of substantiality, ontoaxiomatics, allomathematics. Allomathematics means mathematics based on different axioms. For example substantial worlds (here hyponymic to our universe) are necessarily procedural (magic has no ontological definition; it doesn't meet the substantiality criteria [we have to define them]). But substantial worlds don't have to be science, thus the ontological foundations of substantiality might be based on allomathematics, still logically rigorous and causality maintaining, but not based on axioms useful for general calculations.

Harvard University must necessarily create a faculty (initially small and gradually bigger) titled: Foundations of Substantiality (hypernymic field of study to the quantum foundations; because we need to know the general rules of how to make an ontophysics... but there's no general axiomatics, neither an omniaxiomatics = list of axioms common for all universes and universe-like worlds).

Max Tegmark is brilliant, but acts like an enemy of the "foundations of substantiality" because he rejects David Deutsch’s view on the difference between physics and mathematics.

Mathematics isn't identical/tautological to physics.

Mathematical formulas have to create a phase space with enough degrees of freedom in order they create a universe-like world. Not all mathematics meets the criteria of self-causality, because mathematical formulas will have to work together to create by themselves their universe-like substantiality. Max Tegmark’s view is magically (= without explanations) generic, because he deems any mathematical formula immediately physical. I do not reject Max Tegmark. He's work is precious, but he has to work more on the "criteria of substantiality".

## Texts in Greek:

βιβλία:

Chiara Marletto Books The Science of Can and Can't: A Physicist's Journey Through the Land of Counterfactuals 2021

Το Μαθηματικό Σύμπαν Μας - Max Tegmark

Η Chiara Marletto υποστηρίζει την constructor theory (θεωρία κατασκευαστή) του David Deutsch που παρουσιάζει καλύτερα τα κριτήρια υποστατότητας.

Οι David Deutsch και Max Tegmark δεν είναι θεοί. Γι' αυτό πρέπει η σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία να εστιάσει στην θεμελίωση της υποστατότητας/foundations of substantiality (γενικά, όχι βάσει ενός στοχαστή αλλά ως πεδίο μελέτης υπερώνυμο της quantum foundations of our local universe/κβαντικής θεμελίωσης του τοπικού μας σύμπαντος).