Ο εβερεττιανός ντετερμινισμός εναντίον του νευτώνειου ντετερμινισμού / Everettian determinism vs Newtonian determinism

## Everettian determinism vs Newtonian determinism

You don't mention modern physics and the modern physical philosophy (David Deutsch, Sean M. Carroll, Hugh Everett III).

Everettian (manyworlded; the many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics) determinism is the claim that all possible alternative wavefunctional outcomes become actualised in different universe-strains (which usually don't interact after they deviate but in rare theories they might interact).

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The Professor (Elinor Mason) speaks about Newtonian determinism, not Everettian. It's not a self-evident differentiation neither trivial. Some people don't understand it immediately if it's not properly explained. We know from experiments and astronomical observations that the ontology of the universe is quantum and not Newtonian (gravity information travels at the speed of light and it's not ontologically Newtonian = spontaneous). The lecture is easily fixable to include Everettian determinism. The full spectrum of wavefunctional alternative deterministic outcomes can be expressed with few extra words.

Why Everettian determinism isn't trivial? For many reasons:

1. It's more compatible with modern physics; Newtonian determinism is wrong.

2. Some people argue against Everettian determinism usually via hidden variables superdeterminism (which pushes back the initial conditions but doesn't resolve them in an axiomatic manner; thus Everettism can prevail because it can include many superdeterministic alternatives as wavefunctional alternative evolutions, which is an axiomatic answer whilst superdeterminism doesn't provide any axiomatic answer about its hidden variables. Can we argue against Everettism with some probabilistic procedurality other than superdeterminism and hidden variables? Nowadays we don't have a mathematically rigorous alternative.

3. Some rare (extremely few) Everettists ( people who believe in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics) believe in Everettian probabilism, according to which we shouldn't care about the outcomes that didn't occur in our universe-strain. Everettian probabilism might be seen as

3a. an identitical ontology to Everettian determinism but only differently interpreted;

3a subcase: 'Probabilistic die-off'/Probabilisity is based on deterministic foundations (the wave function), but it produces a substantiality in which the wavefunctional outcomes of the different universe-strains die off in relation to our universe-strain.

It is NOT a form of indeterminism (see the definitions of both determinism and indeterminism) because still all events are wholly determined by antecedent causes; but Everettianly multifurcate according to the wave function.

3b. A multifurcating substantiality which "holds as a whole" is the main premise in 3b.

Everettian probabilism can be deemed ontologically different from Everettian determinism if Everettian determinism is a multifurcating substantiality which "holds as a whole" and might allow interactions amongst different universe-strains (the interactions amongst different universe-strains is a rare view; most don't agree, but all views should be mentioned).

Can a wider hypernymic substantiality "hold as a whole" without interactions? It can hold as a whole as an axiomatically based history, but without interactions and/or the possibility of interactions it is NOT a common substantiality. Substantiality isn't identical to its causal foundations; due to causopermeability they are historically linked, but substantiality is only relevant to specific local phenomena. The claim that ontoaxiomatics is a block universe of all universe-strains, if mathematically presented as such it would kill the self-causality criterion of substantiality which is necessarily procedural and not block-universe-natured. Also infinite ontological descriptions cannot be presented; they are incalculable, except in the case of highly symmetric universes incapable for life. [This is a very important and controversial topic.]

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## comment 1:

I don't attack the Professor. The lecture is fixable with few extra words. Everettian determinism is not trivial being a major topic for debate. Modern science is closer to the ontology of substantiality/nature/the nature of nature.