German intelligence

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#: 497291 S7/JFK Debate  [POLITICS]
   03-Mar-96  11:35:33
Sb: Prouty Critique 6
Fm: D.T. FUHRMANN 71301,527
To: ALL

Prouty takes up (page 25-26) the US recruitment of German intelligence
officer Reinhard Gehlen, a highly respected specialist on the Soviet Union.
Prouty states that the men who arranged the details of Gehlen's
surrender and flight to the US, in Eisenhower's own VIP aircraft
according to Prouty, were Ike's Chief of Staff Walter Bedell Smith
(subsequently US Ambassador to Moscow and later head of the CIA) and Col
William Quinn, later to head the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Obviously a matter of some distress to Mr. Prouty, he describes these
events as follows:

"It is important to note the active role of these US Army officials in this
unprecendented move of Hitler's own intelligence chief, Gehlen, directly
into the US Army as an officer by a special act of Congress.  This was
not a casual incident.  The move, PLANNED BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR WITH
GERMANY [emphasis added...dtf] and directed from the top, was a classic
example of the work of the power elite."

Prouty does offer a source for this: Leonard Mosley's "Dulles," Dial Press,
1978. No page number though.  Sorry I don't have this book handy or I'd
check to see what else Mosley wrote.

But here is how Gehlen's recruitment is described in John Ranelagh's "The
Agency," a well-regarded history of the CIA:

"Toward the end of May 1945, ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER THE GERMAN SURRENDER
[emphasis added....dtf], Gehlen gave himself up to the U.S. Army in Bavaria
and, to his consternation, was described as "just another nazi."
[footnote in source text] A month later Brigadier General Edwin L.
Sibert, G-2 of the U.S. twelfth army in Germany, came across Gehlen's
name in the prisoner roster.  Realizing that he might have useful
information, he personally debriefed him.  During their sessions together
Sibert was more and more impressed by the German, particularly by his
forecasts oif Soviet policy in postwar Europe. According to gehlen,
Stalin would keep Poland in the Soviet fold, and Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania would become Soviet satellite states.
Unless the Western Allies were clearly resolute in their determination to
see a free Germany, Gehlen warned, the Soviet union would even risk war
to secure control of the whole country. Gehlen told Sibert that he would
be willing to give the Americans a hoard of corroborating FHO documents,
which he had hidden away, in return for freedom for himself and members
of his staff in various POW camps. On his own authority Sibert agreed and
established Gehlen at the headquarters of US forces in Germany in
Weisbaden.  Gehlen then led Sibert to his hidden documents in the
Bavarian Alps.  "Here," he said, touching one of several steel cases,
"are the secrets of the Kremlin.  If you use them properly, Stalin is
doomed." [footnote in source text]

"Gehlen produced a summary of his Kremlin secrets, including a list of
OSS men who, he claimed, were members of the US Communist Party.  He also
included profiles of the Soviet leadership and items of Kremlin gossip,
strongly hinting that he had a source high in the Russian administration.
His most useful information, in fact, was the Soviet order of battle at
the time of the German collapse.  At this point Sibert decided he had
enough evidence to convince his superiors to go along with Gehlen, and he
informed General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAFE), of his contact."

After convincing his superiors of Gehlen's importance, Donovan and
Dulles were notified, and all agreed on his value as a source of
information and intelligence on the Soviet Union. As Ranelagh notes,
however, "[w]hen Gehlen's car was ambushed and hit by a bullet, they
realized the importance of his information. Shortly afterward Gehlen and
three members of his staff were secretly flown on Bedell Smith's plane to
Washington..." [SOURCE: John Ranelagh, "The Agency: The Rise and Decline
of the CIA," pp 91-92]

Well, Prouty did get Walter Bedell Smith's name right.  But no evidence or
substantive references that would support his contention that this was
"planned before the end of the war from Germany" and "directed from the
top." On the contrary, the evidence would seem to indicate otherwise.
Perhaps this is why Prouty offers no sources?  You make the call.

So Chapter II is pretty much more of what we got in Chapter I, except
some of the assertions are becoming more definitive, as if repeating them
enough times makes them self-documenting.  Is it well researched?  There
are a total of 3 footnotes, none of which are relevant to the meat of his
assertions, all three of which reference only peripheral items: one, a
quote by Dulles, another an out-of-context quote which MIGHT have been
from an OSS study written in April 1945, which Prouty claims Truman was
not aware of---a claim for which he offers no evidence and no background,
only his assertion; and the last a passing reference to the notorious
"assassination manual" provided to the Nicaraguan Contras by the Reagan
Administration---which he offers as evidence of how evil the CIA really
is). Good scholarship?  Well-documented? You make the call.

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