Είναι οι επιστημονικές θεωρίες αληθείς; (The University of Edinburgh)

# Αλήθεια / Truth

## Knowledge-like things; not useless, but not resolving deep causality

It's pointless to be wrong in order to be contented; because future generations will get it (knowledge-like things; not useless, but not resolving deep causality)

You cannot make huge philosophy with subtle excuses. And I don't blame any particular thinker. Humans are able to understand knowledge-like things but knowledge itself becomes real only if framed within the infinite causal connectome it belongs (infinite infinite causal connectomes of substantiality exist; the omnisubstantiality [the all-inclusive substantiality of all substantialities] doesn't exist instead infinite different substantialities do exist). It is a big idea to understand that death is final. It is a big idea to understand that knowledge of substantialities/physical realities cannot be properly framed to the deepest causality layer, which actually doesn't exist as a causal dead end. Big philosophers have big ideas. Of course it's easier to be small. Admit that your death is final, and that those who will remember you don't have a full copy of your neural connectome, also each neuroconnectome copy would have a separate experiencing. Also those who love you and humanity will die. Brian Greene spoke about the possibility of looping existence (after many lifespans of the universe and/or many Hubble volumes afar); but that doesn't lead to double awareness and double experiencing; thus it doesn't widen one's experiencing. Admit science isn't useless, but knowledge cannot be framed in an infinite and calculationally undecidable causal connectome.

### comment 1:

Heart anatomy doesn't justify the deep causality of quantum mechanics which creates the universe hearts do exist in. Thus we don't have the full definition of the heart (and the acceptable range of heart alterations, but that's a different issue). Heart anatomy is useful, but it's not the full ontological description of actuality. It is a magical ontology if we deem it final (the extended ‘no miracles’ argument; causal[ity] foundations gaps), except if we understand that we don't have the full ontological definition and try to resolve it (we can expand our knowledge but we cannot distort the nature of the universal substantiality in order it fits our limited theoretical ranges [if that's our bias]). Due to causopermeability/causal permeability different orders of magnitude are only theoretically separate as manageable approximations (which sometimes don't work).

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## Realism vs anti-realism vs scientific evolutionism

Realists and anti-realists collaborate (even unwittingly) in order better science is evolved. Perfect science is impossible, because ontology itself is imperfect (it is not self-caused from simplistic mereological simples/non-connectomes; the self-causality of the separate possible ontoaxiomatics is of core importance in the field of study "foundations of substantiality").

Theory choice makes a sense when the alternatives are evolved to explain deep causality, but that's rarely the case. If a theory makes wrong predictions, it has to be corrected or rejected and be replaced. If a theory makes correct predictions but without to resolve deep causality, it's not the final theory. It's impossible to select amongst causally incomplete theories with the same predictive ability.

Occam's razor isn't ontologically self-evident. Occam's razor (the simpler theory with equivalent predictive ability wins) is useful; but not a proof of correct ontological description.

The evolution of science isn't simplistic.

Max Planck didn't ontologically believe in quantum mechanics, neither Albert Einstein (entanglement results from quantum ontology).

But you don't have to believe in the ontology of your theoretical effort in order to contribute to the evolution of science.

The evolution of ideas is like a broth. It isn't necessarily a magically pre-existing consciousness of a single dominant outcome and ontological interpretation. Some ideas are proven to be very wrong (socially wrongness is comparable, but also practically; the Newtonian gravity is causally wrong, but within it range of application is well enough correct), but other ideas can keep evolving in order to be presented as semi-wrong. Is semi-wrongness possible? In a community it is. Modified gravity doesn't work in its original form, but it semi-works (but not entirely) with many alterations. No nowadays theory of gravity and dark matter resolves deep causality.

Deep causality is fundamentally (ontoaxiomatically; not due to human inability) irresolvable, because the ontoaxiomatic entropy and Heisenberg uncertainty principle are core components of existence.

We can understand bigger connectomes of truth, but we cannot discover the omniaxiomatic causal connectome (the axiomatic system of all axiomatic systems which in that case has to cause a substantiality of all substantialities) because it doesn't exist (1. ontoaxiomatics evolves, isn't static but it's entropic; 2. there is not a single generic ontoaxiomatics; many sub-substantialities are mutually incompatible; each substantiality has to be an 'ontological Turing machine' = both the computer and the programme are of the same nature without exosystemic extras; thus it's impossible to create an omniaxiomatics with a cheap trick or an algorithm [it will require a non-Turing machine; a complex machine: but if you make the trick on paper it doesn't resolve 'substantial self-causality'; ontological Turing machines are self-causal; human mixed/multinature[d] theories don't meet the criteria of self-causation]).

Some people say: But you cannot prejudge the evolution of science being so specific. That's a huge problem. How to deal with the problem of the rules of substantiality without being specific at all? There isn't a common ontoaxiomatics, but at least we should work on the field of study: Foundations of Substantiality, in order we understand how ontophysics (ontophysics: how the universe [and other possible universe-like substantiality operational worlds] actually works without to avoid elaborating on [about] its causal connectome) works.

We cannot evaluate amongst different theories when they are deep causality incomplete and have the same predictive ability.

That's why scientoevolutionism (the evolution of science) matters. We try to improve science in many fronts, including by improving theories we might not support ontologically, because our goal isn't to win a case as a lawyer who simply wants oratorical victory. In science we have to help our ideological enemies because our goal is to understand nature; not to win arguments merely because we are able to trick others.

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## Can science be true / describe the truth?

### comment 1:

Some theories are truish (without e as in truly), but any correspondence between different fields of rigorous axiomatics is incomplete because there is no single axiomatics of all axiomatics (omniaxiomatics).

Any substantiality results from a causal connectome, thus it's relation-based. Truth makes sense within a particular causal connectome, but there isn't a sole generic causal connectome. Truth cannot be guaranteed and has no fundamental justification if it cannot be categorised within a common causal framework (but ontoaxiomatics and scientoaxiomatics aren't identical/aren't tautological). Truishness is good enough and causally deep enough if our queries aren't seeking the hypernymic/superordinate omnitruth which doesn't exist (ontologically, not merely interpretationally).

On the other hand we cannot claim that no overlapping axioms exist. Some scientific descriptions are rigorous enough, even if their scientoaxiomatics isn't identical to ontoaxiomatics.

Thus the truishness of science is achievable. Truth cannot be axiomatically complete, because: 1. no axiomatics is complete, 2. the omniaxiomatics doesn't exist (scientoaxiomatics and ontoaxiomatics aren't identical).

In close (ideal) classical (nonquantum) systems truth is easily achievable by an internal observer. But no physical system can be a closed system. Truishness can be achieved if we can describe systems which are nearly closed, or if we can wellish describe the entropic behaviour of particular open systems.

see: Everettianism (manyworldedness/many-worlds interpretation)

Truth itself is multifurcating and causally endorelative.

see: ontological renormalisation (renormalisation not merely used for calculations but as the substantiality foundation/deep causal connectome)

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## Can we transcribe one axiomatic system into another? (No)

We cannot rigorously transcribe one axiomatic system into another because there is no omniaxiomatics (axiomatics of all axiomatics). If we can mutually transcribe two axiomatic systems it means we made a mistake because these supposedly two axiomatic systems are actually one.

We can symbolise specific relations and create notes and comments for specific cases.

Mathematics and geometry aren't compatible for every case, but we can use geometric shapes as symbols to represent mathematical ideas. Thus we cannot fully transcribe mathematics into geometry (not all mathematics is transcribable into other axiomatic systems), but we can use symbolism and notes (for example geometric symbolism of mathematical notions and geometric symbolism used for further explanations for specific cases). Thus if we represent mathematics with geometric shapes and figures (like line segments) we actually don't do geometry; we deliver mathematics with geometric shapes and figures via symbolism (axiomatic symbolism or non-axiomatic descriptions; mere descriptions and notes are preferable, because if we create an axiomatic system dedicated to the transcription of mathematics into geometry: 1. it will misbehave (it will have the characteristics of its own axiomatic mathogeometry; being not identical/tautological to the axiomatics of mathematics and the axiomatics of geometry [Euclidean or other geometric rules; there isn't a single geometry thus we have to be specific], 2. some mathematical problems and formulas will not be representable in the non-symbolic and truly axiomatic [having a self-causal foundations of its own] mathogeometry).

Science doesn't fully transcribe one axiomatic system into another (for some axioms of different axiomatic systems that is possible, but by no means for all their axioms).

Science partly transcribes the transcribable axiomatics, and partly uses symbolism and comments which are explanatory but not part of the omniaxiomatics which doesn't exist. Thus science is rigourish because absolute rigour being impossible cannot be magically enforced.

## Can we make all fields of science axiomatic/axiomatically based? (No)

(Oxford Languages prefers the undotted Dr version)

Dr Michela Massimi wrote:

But from a philosophical point of view, what matters for our purposes is that
Galileo defended the method of the physicist against the method of the
astronomer, to use Pierre Duhem’s terminology. He replaced the view that
science has to save the appearances, with the view that science should in fact
tell us a true story about nature. It was only a matter of time and an open and
infinite universe was bound to replace the sphere of fixed stars of ancient Greek
astronomy.

me:

Nowadays we have astrophysics. Astronomy and physics have the same axiomatics. We have to differentiate between human inabilities and fundamental/axiomatic limitations.

Some other examples she (Dr Michela Massimi) gives is about human inabilities. I don't reject her work (I don't claim she never mentions fundamental/axiomatic limitations) and I don't focus on individuals but on concepts. I simply claim that we should focus a bit more on fundamental/axiomatic incompatibilities which are manageable with symbolic representations, comments (not necessarily based on words), notes, etc. (but not causally deep generic facts; in some cases that [a wider, more inclusive axiomatics] is impossible).

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Can we make all fields of science axiomatically based?

Certainly not, because some fields of science include many sciences which don't share a single common axiomatics. Also some fields haven't yet developed a thorough axiomatics and some interdisciplinary fields cannot.

## Is hash-axiomatics reachable for every science? Would it guarantee ontological truth?

Is hash-axiomatics reachable for every science? (Certainly not. There's no omniaxiomatics for the interdisciplinary sciences, and achieving a relatively good understanding of some of the different infinite ontoaxiomatics is difficult in general.) Would it guarantee ontological truth (complete and accurate ontological description)?

Can we make every science hash-axiomatic (hash-tree/Merkle-tree/blockchain-like/causal-connectome-made)? Would that guarantee truth (would we reach that way the actual ontoaxiomatics)?

Physics (the science, not the actual ontophysics) isn't based on a complete axiomatics. Quantum mechanics has too many open questions. Any axiomatic system is incomplete, but the problem with physics isn't the incompleteness of its axiomatics but its near absence. Quantum mechanics leaves many open questions; it is an axiomatic framework, but humanity didn't reach the fundamental axiomatic limits. We cannot blame humanity for the nature of reality; for not changing the incompleteness of any axiomatic system; but we can blame the Earthlings for not working hard to reach the axiomatic limit of some logigal rigorous substantiality like the universe (there isn't a sole logically rigorous substantiality, because the omniaxiomatics doesn't exist). (OK, we shouldn't blame the Earthlings. We should intellectually help them (I am corporeally human, but do I have to be ideologically also? I'm not ideologically human. I need many strong reasons to ideologically ascribe to anything.).

Some claim that the physics of our particular universe isn't hierarchically the deepest layer in the causal connectome, thus we will never reach the ontoaxiomatic depths. They are wrong, because actuality is layer-like but not in an absolute manner (large quantum systems behave classically) but not causaltight (causalproof; see Leonard Susskind, the connectome of substantiality isn't causo[im]perviously/causo[im]permeably stratified). Actuality is actually connectome-like. Thus the depths of causal hierarchy being non absolutely stratified are themselves entangled with all the systemic magnitudes. Thus quantum mechanics (the foundations of quantum mechanics) is part of the ontoaxiomatic framework of ontophysics (ontophysics is the actual physics of the universe; not its scientific description).

But is any (because they are infinite) ontoaxiomatics (ontoaxiomatic system) reachable to science? It cannot be reachable via absolute empiricism. Absolute empiricism is wrong because with it we will never understand how ontophysics and ontoaxiomatics are formed in general according to mathematical logic and alternative mathematical axiomatics (infinite are possible).

Answer: We cannot guarantee that humanity will reach enough of the ontoaxiomatics of our universe (the complete ontoaxiomatics doesn't exist in the first place; it would [actually not] create statue-worlds/nonentropic worlds/nonworlds/nonuniverses/nonverses/impossible cosmoi which cannot exist in the first place because they don't meet the substantiality criteria/prerequisites (no axiomatics can be complete; the ontoaxiomatic entropy itself is cosmogonic; ontoaxiomatics is necessarily hash-tree-like [hash-tree/Merkle-tree/blockchain-like/causal-connectome-made] and not a collection of causally unlinked axioms which are calculatory useful as in scientoaxiomatics. Ontoaxiomatics [in plural, because infinite worlds are possible] must necessarily be causally connected in the same substantiality, even if they produce hard to handle science; because their role is to provide logically self-caused connectomes of some of the infinite possible existent cosmoi.

But we cannot claim that humanity's science is totally untrue. Science can be truish within specific connectomes of causal analysis (in science causality is interpreted and not ontological/nature-based; but even the ontological substantiality is connectome-based - Science isn't totally otiose/useless. Some relative truths are safe, or safe enough.).

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About Euclidean axiomatics

The Euclidean axiomatics is science-based (eclectic because it creates useful and handy science) but not hash-tree-based ontological-true-nature substantiality-based.

### a mocking comment:

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And what if substantiality is totally fragmented without any causal coherence, cohesive connectome and possibility of existence? Because those who confuse causal fragmentation with causal coherence claim that causal coherence isn't necessary for causal coherence. But they don't even cohesively present their thoughts.

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## Should we only improve the scientific theories we believe they have a chance to be correct? (No for quantum mechanics)

### Testing theories we deem correct and incorrect, seeking ontological truth

Galileo Galilei was correct for seeking truth, but his method (solely testing correct-looking theories) was totally wrong (particularly for other fields of science; Max Planck initially didn't truly/ontologically/nature-wise believe in his model). See: Sabine Hossenfelder (I don't agree with all her ideas but she's brilliantly important). We have to test many theories: 1. theories which we think they are ontologically correct, 2. theories which we believe they are wrong, but we push them to the limits to see if they work or fail, 3. we should test evolvable theories which aren't correct but we deem them improveable [correctable], 4. we should play with nasty theories that lead to dead ends; maybe we were wrong in the first place and they're correctable. Of course we don't have infinite time. We select certain theories to play with, but many scientists exist thus many approaches are tested. We should be playful. We should try to find the solution (or even try to be semi-lazy to test if that will work... It usually doesn't, except if we relax to see things from a different perspective.).

(We should test even erroneously seeming theories because: a. they might lead us to a different correct theory, b. we might evolve new useful mathematics. I mostly speak about physics here but this is generalisable. Humans are mortals, thus one should be responsible about time spending. Even if we test something weird usually we have some goal; but if the path we take is too narrow we might miss something important.)

## Isaac Newton never elaborated on the deep causal specifics, and didn't finalise physics (his model wasn't complete)

If Isaac Newton's formulas were the full description of ontoaxiomatics (deepest possible causality), then the universe would have been magical, because he never elaborated on the specific mechanisms of the specific substantial particles he didn't know. It is a blatant lie that Isaac Newton asked all the possible questions about causality. He never claimed he did so. He never claimed he finalised physics. And he wasn't God even if he did claim something wrong.

## Πώς επιλέγεται η οντολογικώς αληθής θεωρία;

### Theory choice requires a hypernymic framework of ontoaxiomatics which doesn't exist

Thus theory choice cannot be rigorous. It's just art, bias and not a true ontological evaluation.

#### comment 1:

Uneducated people claim we totally invalidated Isaac Newton, but they are wrong. We limited the range of his gravitational theory, and we understood it was an approximation. Gravity doesn't act very differently within the Newtonian range of magnitudes. Future generations will not annihilate themselves in self-inflicted superluminal travel and teleportation. Future generations will invent false theories, but the majority of their scientists will not support a magical omniaxiomatics or an impossible heuristic algorithm for unknown unknowns.

#### comment 2:

We can create eclectic axiomatics to evaluate some ontoaxiomatics (one of them, families of them [mathematically related] and different ontoaxiomatics), but our conclusions will never be final and safe, because: a. eclectic axiomatics are interpretational but do not share a rigorous causality connectome and b. any axiomatic system is incomplete.

If we evaluate without an axiomatic system, our evaluation will be even shallower/more unrigorous.

#### comment 3: Was Newton's theory of gravity a magical theory? (it falsely predicted the supposedly immediate transfer of gravitational information)

see: Astro 101: Black Holes Week 10 10.03 – Gravitational Radiation (Was Newton's theory of gravity a magical theory? Is modern quantum mechanics a magical theory before we totally resolve it? This way of separating magic from substantiality is too black and white; because substantiality isn't dead and static (as Jim Al-Khalili wishes sometimes but he uses better words which still follow the same fallacy); but there are other ways to separate magic from substantiality by elaborating on ontoaxiomatics and allomathematical procedurality (based on mathematics with different axiomatics than the standard mathematics; of which we can transcribe specific problems, but usually not all formulas with a generic mechanism [ontoaxiomatics [which is hypernymic to the quantum foundations of our universe] is based on allomathematics which focus on meeting the criteria of substantiality and not general calculations]. This is a very important question: Can mathematics based on different axioms = allomathematics, be transcribed into other allomathematics and/or the standard mathematics? Answer: Specific problems are (usually) transcribable but not all allomathematics are compatible with a generic operational conversion. This is EXTREMELY important, because even if we were the Ideal Magical Physicists, if we had a problem of mathematical compatibility between actuality and the type[s] of mathematics we use, we would stuck at some point. Things are not depressing... but we cannot have a generic compatibility between the allomathematics of the substantiality of the universe and the mathematical axiomatics we use (then we would understand core notions of our particular universe/substantiality, which by no means is the Everything/any possible universe-like cosmos). We try to mathematically describe the universe, not with the exact allomathematics of our universe; and when we ask truly deep questions (see: open questions in physics) that DEEPLY matters, not because our mathematics is bad, but we don't have immediate access to the deep nature of our universe. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Some atheist philosophers, by acting too fast to dispel supernaturalism (religion, soul, magically beneficial unprocedurality, non-logic, causal[ity] gaps, etc.), they kill the universe by promoting a static/non-entropic substantiality which doesn't originate from a procedural, probabilistic and Everettian/manywolded causal connectome.