Νους

Ο ιδανικός νους είναι όργανο πληροφοριακής επεξεργασίας ικανό να δημιουργήσει προσωπικότητα (ιδιάζοντα ατομικά χαρακτηριστικά), αλλά πρωτίστως ικανό να επιφέρει προσωποσύνη (βασικά και γενικά κριτήρια της έννοιας του προσώπου - βλ. Mary Anne Warren - the criteria of personhood).

## How to build a connectome elastic (and with intense emotions plastic) digital brain?

watch: 2021's Breakthroughs in Neuroscience and Other Biology - Quanta Magazine - YouTube
The human brain has brain regions which act as components of complex task management which requires many brain regions. That way we should build and/or programme personhood-yielding digital brains.

## Sponges have pre-minds; they meet certain computability criteria according to the gradient theory of mind

Their "pre-mind" is performed by their overall system/body.

see: gut neurotransmitters and the human brain (thus our mind mechanism is our body and the cosmos; for example quality encyclopedias and factual data from the world are part of our minds; not only our biological brain or other endosystemic information processor in the case of digital persons [digipersons])

### comment:

Pre-minds are impossible to be rigorously defined (some might be mere mechanisms without any true-mind potentiality). This is a matter of core importance because both biological and computational pre-minds may evolve (if certain criteria and conditions are met) and become minds.

## Is there an external world or is the external world we can perceive part of our mind?

It is part of our mind. As we biasedly interpret the external world, we do the same for our body. The only exosystemic worlds are the ones we haven't imagined and perceived in general.

They external world isn't fully perceived, neither our body components. No mind is complete (there is no perfect thinking machine due to fundamental limitations, not merely because of specific failed cases).

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We do not use the full brain volume for calculations; thus the fact that we don't calculate with all our informational input doesn't mean it's not part of our overlapping minds (other thinkers might share mind components, but usually not the central processor).

Fast calculation performed either by the brain or a digital calculator, doesn't require conscious awareness of the calculation. People who consciously control very well their calculations, calculate slower than people who trained better brain circuits to calculate. The top human calculatiors, leave it all to their brain circuits; in plural because each operation is performed by a different bioneuronal circuit for optimisation (in the case of biological systems it's hard to use the same circuit for all operation types).

see: Different kinds of math use different parts of brain, research finds - Deborah Halber, News Office - publication date: May 12, 1999 - MIT News

### comment:

If the external world is already part of one's mind (with good sensory data, interpretation-biases and biased responses) integrating it (brewing/calculating updates: interpretation-biases and biased responses) is faster. Imagine a primitive human, trying not to be biased, being a rigorous philosopher, in front of the open maw of a charging lion.

## mind: Mary Anne Warren's criteria of personhood [and some extras], limbic system for emotional biases and complexity

A system with Brodmann-like regions (I have an older text on the personhood-yielding thinking processor) able to meet functional states (of Mary Anne Warren's criteria of) personhood (and some extras; more rigorous subtleties), limbic system (or anything procedurally/functionally equivalent) for emotional biases and complexity are the prerequisites for personhood-bearing minds (minds; not merely information[al] processors)

Supernaturalism is ontological vagueness. A useless nondefinition of zero value. The core component of many conspiracy theories. Claims of supernaturalism would have been unethical; if ethics wasn't a mixed, relative and eclectic nonfundamental notion.

## Generic personhood-yielding mind criteria

### What are the characteristics of the personhood-yielding thinking organs?

What are the characteristics of the personhood-yielding thinking organs?

(Which substantial minds meet (or can meet) the criteria of personhood?)

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anthropocentric (biased and simplistic; erroneously hyponymously stated/put) question: Can AI have personhood?
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Here I don't focus on some hyponymic substantial mind (biological/human), but hypernymously about any substantial/executable mind.

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Agency according to neuroscience is retrospective. Decisions are made biochemically by the organ which generates personhood (the brain). The brain doesn't magically pre-exist (as Roger Penrose wishes with his microtubular consciousness; I analysed that on a different post).

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What are the generic attributes of the thinking machines (no matter if they are biological, programs or mixed like circuit and program based [mixed systems like that run faster with processing units specialised for specific tasks; general computers might be added for extra calculations. If we ever create artificial neural network (ANN) brains, they will have to run fast, thus both processing units of specific and generic tasks should be included. A specific task computer calculates faster than a standard CPU specific operations. What we want is a mix system with generic and specific calculatory computing units.

What are the generic attributes of the thinking machines (any type: biological, program-based, circuit-based, mix etc.).

• They have to meet Mary Anne Warren's criteria of personhood (but we can evolve/improve her elaboration).

• They have to be constructed as mereological complexes in order to be self-judgemental; thus the overall neural connectome has to have Brodmann-like denser clusters of connectivity that will act like brain regions. These brain regions can evolve naturally or with artificial neural networks in order they meet the criteria of personhood. Basic senses are easier to program (both with the usage of computer programs and biologically) than interpretational biases.

• • (this is a sub-prerequisite, because all the necessary brain regions are unavoidable) The limbic system (memoremotional system) is a common matter of debate, because its responsible in attributing emotion to interpreted events (all events are emotionally neutral - Imagine two meteorites colliding without any person around to judge the event. Events are emotionally labelled/categorised in relation to other biased memories of the personhood-bearer's thinking organ).

• • • (the prerequisite below is related to the limbic system and to regions which process memoremotional patways (memories emotionally labelled; because basic sensory processing regions/units/clusters do not change their connectome that fast [otherwise personhood-bearers = persons would perceive [more] noise)

The personhood-bearing thinking organ should have all its emotion-related regions mount on a damper/shock absorber (not a physical damper, but a rewiring/reprogramming mechanism; different for each brain genre/category [biological, program-based, etc.]).

Emotions of mild intensity should have an elastic impact on the wiring of the brain,

and intense emotions should act plastically, permanently changing the wiring of the brain/changing one's personhood and selfhood (that event changed my life... say the personhooded people [not all human beings are fully personhooded and fully emotionally able]).

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(I have worked on the topic. Now I study astronomy. Ask me to complete the text.)

### elaborately:

• elastic vs plastic emotional response different per emotional impact (the brain connectome has to change in proportion to the emotional impact of the input/experience); the personhood-bearing/yielding brain should change via sentience, emotions and consciousness (consciousness as defined in the philosophy of neuroscience; coherence of the brain; brainstem's parabrachial nuclei are responsible for rudimentary alert-coherence (rudimentary consciousness; watch: The Source of Consciousness - with Mark Solms - The Royal Institution · YouTube).

The reticular activating system is responsible for wakefulness (a rudimentary prerequisite for consciousness).
For higher consciousness the overall cerebrum is responsible (different neuroscientist propose different regions are more important. People with brain damage are the main resource). Frontal lobe damage impairs emotional control, procedural rigour, etc. (it's a component of higher consciousness but not the sole).

• not a mereological simple in order to yield self-judgement/self-comparisons for achieving higher consciousness - Initially the ANN brain should be composed of separate ANNs (artificial neural networks with complex wiring amongst each other); but in later designs a sole megaconnectome will result (via pruning, altering, changing slightly the design with different ANNs dedicated to the design of the ANN brain) with densities (brain regions) = subconnectomes which will be fuzzy (not perfectly separate as the initial desing)
• limbic system = "memoremotional system" (a system which builds personhood-yielding memories by biasing episodic memory with emotional modes; all the emotional modes [neutrality, happiness, nostalgia, sadness, mourning, terror and mixed emotional states [some are based on basic emotions, tinted with different patterns of activation and memory genre/category boosting] ] should be reproduced by ANNs) analogues (statistical analysis of its function and wiring to other regions [and what these regions calculate])

• the human brain is not the sole way a personhood-bearing substantial mind can result, but it's a system that we know it yields personhood in most cases; thus we should study neuroscience, the Brodmann areas their function and interconnection. Initially we should try to mimic the human brain's structure, and secondarily try alternative designs that meet the same criteria

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• after many steps of evolution, non-human-referenced alternative digibrains will emerge

### How to create an ANN personhood-yielding brain

• Study the Brodmann areas, their function and their connectedness/wiring towards other regions. Create artificial neural networks (not one; many, because a mereological simple brain might calculate realistic results, without self-comparisons between process regions,. We want that internal comparisons. Thus each brain region, should be a different neural network (at the first state of the development, later the result will look something like that, but with a sole megaconnectome, with dense subconnectomes, but we'll have to do that later in the evolution of the personhooded ANN)

• Make the axons different/separate ANNs (at the beginning of the design; in later designs, the forementioned megaconnectome with its subconnectome (noise-looking/looking fuzzy to the eye) densities will be the end result).

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An alternative project is to study the criteria of personhood (see: Mary Anne Warren, but the prerequisites of personhood should be updated and be more rigorous).

Separate ANN will be built to yield each separate component of personhood; but that is impossible to work, because many brain regions evolved together and work together; thus that overall brain connectome will also evolve gradually as a functional whole (rudimentary processing of vision and hearing can be created as standalones and then be inserted). The rudimentary standalones will help the ANN evolve with the help of different ANNs which will generate slightly alternative connectomes, compare them and gradually evolve the brain (this brain will be built to meet the criteria of personhood; not to mimic the human brain; after we evolve enough brain designs we will see if we can combine some ideas eclectically [that doesn't always work; and it has to re-evolve to get fine tuned])

## Alan Turing's definition of the personhood-yielding mind is wrong

See my other texts on the "criteria of the personhood-yielding information processor" (which it can be a Turing Machine [a general computer] or a nongeneral computer [even good-enough but non-ideal computers can have personhood-yielding architecture).

Merely giving the correct answers isn't enough for true self-experienced personhood and sentience

"criteria of the personhood-yielding information processor":

(We should study well human neuroscience/the human brain because the average human brain is a system able to yield personhood. The human brain isn't the ideal personhood-yielding brain. There isn't a sole ideal personhood-yielding generic architecture. But we should start studying a good-enough system before we experimentally deviate.)

• Brodmann-like (functionally alike) areas are necessary in order personhood is exhibited. The thinking organ should be created as a single brain region. It should have regional densities shaped as sub-organs in order it experiences self-judgement[s; in plural for different qualities of judgment: logical, emotional, muscular pattern calculation modes, contrast pattern calculation modes, etc. Personhood isn't mere results. On the other hand lengthy self-judgement isn't healthy but mental disease yielding (nonfunctional states of information[al] processing).

•• The limbic system = the memoremotional system (its material doesn't make a functional difference [actually it makes speedwise... but that's another topic; speed and quality are interrelated in information processing; imagine waiting a tiger maul you before you react, or solving problems last every time in fast-reward groups, or keeping up with fast-changing data] but different architectures work better for different materials) = the system which ascribes emotional biases to memories has to meet the same criteria. Most humans erroneously deem the limbic system a fundamentally different system (it's not a purely separate subsystem because it involves too many brain regions).

• Informational inputs judged as emotionally not very important should have an elastic impact on the personhood-yielding thinking processor. Personality should remain relatively intact.

Informational inputs judged as emotionally important should have a plastic impact on the personhood-yielding thinking processor. Personality (the components of the personhood of the specific individual) should necessarily change (otherwise the thinking processor isn't personhood-yielding).

The personhood-yielding thinking processor should be built like a damper/shock absorber, with its subregions/component anchored on it.

Information of major emotional impact should reorganise the definition of the particular realisation of personhood = the personality.

Personhood-bearing organs (personhood-yielding thinking processors) shouldn't overreact for less important matters (danger of mental sickness).

### comment:

Alan Turing spoke about a barrier hiding the thinker, thus faking a personhood-yielding thinking processor. I don't care about faking personhood with realistic results, instead I care about generating true personhood no matter the material it generates it.

## Both Alan Turing and John Searle were wrong about the personhood-yielding thinking processor

• Alan Turing erroneously claimed that all personlike thinking processors, are genuinely personhood-yielding thinking processors. This is wrong. See my older texts.

• John Searle erroneously claimed that because neurotransmitters (it doesn't matter if the neurotransmitters are molecules or humans) don't exhibit the personhood and personality of the system they handle; personhood and personality don't exist. John Searle was wrong. Any personhood-yielding thinking processor (Alan Turing's definition on it is wrong; personlike computers aren't necessarily personhood-yielding) is truly experiencing personhood.

Both Alan Turing and John Searle were wrong. Uncausally wrong, because they didn't understand the procedurally causal depth of personal self-experiencing thinking processors.

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ironically stated: John Searle claimed that John Searle isn't a true bearer of personhood, because his neurons didn't understand semantic properties able to be understood by his (John Searle's) wider neural networks.

We can safely say that John Searle was stupid. Exactly that word "stupid", not as an expletive, but as a formal and proper description.

## Gradient theory of personhood (works for animals) & animal (spatiotemporal, mentalese, episodic, sensory, etc.) thoughts

video: Further Discussion - Week 5 - Introduction to Philosophy - University and Edinburgh - Coursera

Don't focus on what philosophers say. Bias-learning = philosophy isn't the proper way to start philosophising. See the facts of science, and popularise science without to distort it. The best philosopher tries when possibly to avoid philosophy and replace it with more rigorous methods.

• Inside the mind of an animal - Nature (it is about mind states; racism and speciesism aren't beneficial; they cause needless pain)

• Scientists think that animals think - Mar 14, 2002 - Harvard Gazette

• Gradient theory of personhood - http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu › ...PPT
personhood

An average human is more personhooded (meeting better the criteria of personhood) than an average dog. an average dog is more personhooded than a lizard, a lizard is more personhooded than a fly.

Crows are well personhooded: The Incredible Intelligence of Crows - Science View - TV | NHK WORLD-JAPAN Live & Programs - Apr 20, 2021

Sadly NHK doesn't permanently keep its archive online, but one can use heuristic phrasings (or ask for heuristic help) to find other sources.

see: brain regions, limbic system, cerebrum

## How to measure consciousness = neurological coherence, sentience, intelligence, personhood, emotional ability, etc.

1. The individual has to meet the criteria of personhood.

2. In order we are sure the individual doesn't merely mimic a personhood-yielding thinking processor we should evolve brain imaging techniques (electromagnetic, X-rays it depends on what the thinking processor is made of); we should study many brains of the same type and develop a particular neuroscience for the specific brain type; we should dissect the brain of the individual for further analysis (not all personlike thinking processors are truly personhood-yielding; for example not all humans are emotional thus according to the gradient theory of personhood not all humans have the same degree of personhood)

Neuroscience is really hard; thus without enough brains of a particular type we'll not be able to develop a proper science.

## Mood generation and mood attribution in thinking processors

Mood generation and mood attribution in thinking processors

Personhood-yielding information processors have many characteristics, but here I focus on mood generation and mood attribution (emotional biasing).

Primitive animal brains based mostly on brainstem activity, are able to reproduce primordial emotions like terror. Terror is more a bodily reaction than a proper emotions. In primitive brains the differentiation between terror, lust and hunger is not mood based but functional; based on differences in brain activation patterns and on different wirings to other brain regions linked to the conduct/behavioural generators.

Even complex cerebral information processing is based on function, neural activation patterns and wiring network; but certain patterns are relatively easier to be defined as moods and emotions. In small (and not only) lizards, emotional attribution is usually a human bias; lizards can feel uncomfortable, hurt, have bad memories about a datum (smell, place, individual, object, food, etc.) but they lack the ability to experience full emotions/proper emotions. Proto-moods do arise in small lizards (a perceived bad day due to no food, bad weather and nasty visitors) but animals without fully evolved cerebrums or cerebrum-like processors, are unable to transcribe the proto-emotional reactions to proper moods/sad thoughts (the initial reactions exist, but they cannot be expressed as fully fledged mood biasing; that requires a better evolved limbic system [in order it better internalises painful, joyful and other amygdaloid reactions based on brain activation patterns which elicit fully fledged emotions by the way they manage the activation of other brain regions [a standalone amygdala experiences nothing; it merely acts as a mood controller on other task dedicated connectome densities = brain regions [that's why a personhood-yielding information processor should have different regions and self-interact / performe self-judgement [a brain which tends to be a mereological simple might generate realistic personlike behaviour, but it cannot self-experience true personhood/selfhood/sentience, etc.]).

It's not only the limbic system which generates fully fledged emotions, but it's a good emotional biasing system to be studied analytically.

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Why many black metal bands are stupid (not all of them; Gorgoroth for example cannot deeply differentiate negative emotions; sadness and terror; Mayhem can differentiate emotions better) and why Tōru Takemitsu and Akio Yashiro were brilliant (they were better self-trained to control emotional intervallological connotations)?

Many (not all) black metal bands confuse and merge different negative emotions (see: psychoacoustics).

• horror - terror: immediate danger of death; terror is the most primitive emotion; its more of a bodily reaction than a fully fledged true emotion - Terror/horror is more intensely experienced by average architectured human brains than any other emotion. Not all humans have average-architecture brains with proper-reaction abilities/biases/patterning.

semitonal intervals (separately mentioned, not in series): 1 (and -1), 13 (an octave up), 11, to a lesser extent 6 semitones (other intervals are horrorish also, but they have other dominant characteristics)
• melancholy: thinking about something sad (not a slayer in front of you); memory isn't a mere reaction

semitonal intervals: 2, 10, 3, 9 (3, 9 semitonal intervals elicit more sorrow [awareness of deep permanent sadness like the one elicited by the death of a loved one] than sadness

Melancholy is harmoniously approached in Western music, and it's approached by a combination of intervals used under music theory rules.

• mystery: Sensation that something terrifying might happen, but it does not at the moment or its not scary enough (as experienced by average architectured brain with typical neurotransmitter percentages and performance)

4 semitones

• happiness: 5 semitones, and in general using music theory and major scales - Playful patterns / compositional stepping boost the mood. It's not one musical interval which make one happy, but harmonious ones combine using music theory, major scales and compositional techniques.

• nostalgia: nostalgia in music is approached as a mixed emotion between sadness and happiness (a happy memory which now belongs to the past)

Common nostalgia is by no means the most mixed emotion.

In psychoacoustics its factually know that people differentiate wildly about the interpretation of very complex moods like the ones in jazz or modern serious music/experimental, horrorish modernist and false atonal classical.

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Do the aliens perceive horror music and bullets on their flesh as something bad? Yes; the non-masochists.

Perform that experiment:

Buy 6000 speakers (the same model).

Separate them in two groups.

Both groups should play co-soundings and chords at the same volume and with similarly ranged frequency combination.

If the first group of speakers plays a harmonious co-sounding (a co-sounding is a very simple chord; it can have less notes than a proper chord), like the 7 semitone interval (perfect fifth)

and the second group of speakers plays a disharmonious co-sounding like 1 semitone interval (minor second),

the group of the disharmony producing speaker will have more damaged speakers in the same period of performance at the same volume and with relatively similar frequency characteristics.

Thus harmony and disharmony are factually different.

Disharmony causes more relaxations and densities in the way work causes displacement. Disharmonious displacements collect energy and thrust it suddenly in a destructive manner. The harmonious work transfer is more constant.

Even different harmonious melodies are factually and mathematically describably different.

Sadness is factually different from happiness as intervallologically (from intervallum) approached because sad melodies have different work [as defined in physics] exertion statistics; different patterns. ANNs (artificial neural networks) and other programs can test that (psychoacoustics, psychointervallology, mathematical [unbiased; just the mathematical differences] intervallology, etc.)

Complex emotions are nearly impossible to get correctly labelled by listeners because the thinker's biases are less ambiguous and prevail.

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Is mood in music important in personhood analysis?

Recognition of mood and emotions by higher brains is a very important way to examine aspects of personhood-yielding thinking processors.

Sheep's are have mammalian brains and according to the gradient theory of personhood meet many criteria of personhood to a good extent. Sheep factually prefer some series of sounds (happy childish pop) in relation to others (horrorish synthless death metal).

Spiders meet weakly the criteria of personhood. They still don't like distorted sounds and factually disharmonious music can cause bodily stress due to the way work [as defined in physics] is administered onto their bodies. Spiders will certainly feel anxious if the correlate a sound to a stressor. But the spider lacks the equivalent degree of evolution the limbic system and the cerebrum have achieved in order to produce higher emotions.

Sadness requires thinking; it's not a terrified reaction. A spider cannot feel sadness; it lacks the necessary pattern generators, wiring and properly evolve brain regions. But spiders are evolvable; they are capable of proto-emotions (negative, positive and neutral judgements about informational input; but that isn't enough for experiencing fully fledged emotions [gradient theory of emotional ability]).

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• Most humans (and other mammals) ascribe mood biases to information to a high degree. Bad philosophers cannot express the mechanisms of emotional production and give fallacious definitions; this is a procedural issue (when more rigorous approaches exist philosophy should be avoided; a good philosopher doesn't act like a philosopher at random).

• Belief in [self-]agency is produced in the brain. Many bad philosophers (nonsophers) reject neuroscience not because they have a deeper explanation but merely are lazy to study facts or don't properly evaluate their importance.

## Identity theory is correct as a concept but practically impossible amongst complex brains (in complex brain comparisons)

It's not brain patterns that only matter (they cannot practically be tautological in different complex networks) but also the brain regions which become actived (with various modes) do matter (if we both are happyish: 1. happyishness has a degenerate degree of variation [see: degenerate states; without degeneracy variation grows exponentially and real-world systems are unpredictable when we seek exact predictions and not generic patters/conduct/behaviour [simple predictions don't work; our system might become partially damaged or few new neurons might emerge]], 2. we do have different memories and brain regions with different attributes; thus the overall experience is very different; except if we have quantum computer brains comprised of few quibit; but something like that doesn't meet the prerequisites for personhood-yielding information processor, and initial conditions cause huge variations in small fractions of a second [see: chaos theory]). Self-experience isn't only based on generic neural (or other informational) activation patterns. The specific activated networks do matter. It is nearly impossible for complex networks to exhibit the exact same patterns, and also activate the exact same biases.

I deeply understand based on recorded proof (books) that many philosophers make an effort to destroy the correspondence between words and meanings, but it doesn't matter how many bad thinkers are, because rigorous logic doesn't prevail with large numbers.

Similarity theory is a more accurate term.

Single moments aren't causally possible; only spatiotemporal ranges of existence are possible because they do have a causal connectome which is ontologically necessary.

If we had two perfect complex clones (not single particles, harmoniously oscillating bars, time crystals, etc. ) with similar initial conditions (or tautological, but in quantum mechanics we cannot simultaneously measure all the attributes of single particle; and full-brain absolute measurement would require the energy of a huge thermonuclear nuclear bomb) they would evolve in different states (evolving in the same state isn't prohibited but it's practically impossible and antientropic; see: wave function, many worlds interpretation). Even if we neglect the antientopic nature of having two complex systems on a complex framework (human brains provide a complex framework, because metallic bar can exhibit complex states but their framework is prone if appropriately prepared to easily yield simple states), even if we accept the identical initial conditions, it is nearly impossible for complex systems to evolve in the identical state.

Similar states are possible.

Similarity is more common than identity.

By destroying the semantics of important terms we actually harm philosophy; but not all thinkers are willing to be unrigorous.

## The personhood tribes experiment

Create two tribes, one with human-like (but not necessarily human) regional densities (different brain regions which judge each other and do not create a brain design trying to become a mereological simple [trying because it's impossible, but it may mimic the monolithic/mereological simple experience]), with a limbic system and amygdalae able to create mood patterns (other systems can elicit mood biasing but the limbic system is an easy way to start with]).

The second tribe should have a brain trying to become a mereological simple. A true mereological simple brain is impossible to build because it has many subregions, but try to merge different functions in the same processors and also try to avoid all self-judgement mechanisms. The limbic system shouldn't have its full wiring but a smaller program should calculate merely when its realistic to produce tears, happy muscle expressions and other realistic behavioural results but not at all internalised. The second tribe should have brains without genuine personhood but any calculatory mechanism able to calculate realistic behaviours (the lesser the brain regions used the better, because we do not want self-judgement but monolithic realistic results).

Then you hire very good anatomists (common humans or aliens from other tribes in order to keep the experiment fair). These anatomists are supposed to be very well educated and are able to discern the difference between tribe 1 and tribe 2. According to the gradient theory of personhood, and because functionalism isn't ideal in nature for practical reasons, some of the members of tribe 1 will have differentiations if the tribe is big enough (theory of large numbers, but complex systems fail often in very small numbers) and will exhibit decreased personhood, also for the same variation reasons some members of the tribe 2 will exhibit more degrees of true personhood than the nominal factory value (they might have slightly bigger brains or developed self-judgement techniques similar [not identical in so complex systems] to neural functions of self-judgement. Practically all of these persons will exhibit some degree of personhood if their brain is complex enough, but the tribe 2 will have to get updated with programs which cause a. self-judgement and b. emotional pattern activation [of many brain regions which will innately behave in order they reproduce true personhood].

Without the necessary personhood-yielding update, tribe 2 will never [self-]experience true personhood.

### comment:

• It is easier to damage a personhood-yielding architectured brain than randomly causing regionality, self-judgement / self-feedback and emotional pattern activation by amygdala-like organs/controllers which handle/manage other processing subunits in order they yield [self-]experienced emotions (not mere realistic emotionlike body movement initiation).

• Self-feedback for emotional bias-labelling is very important in personhood-yielding information processors (as I mentioned earlier). Emotional bias labelling is entropic (some calculatory energy is lost in order emotions are produced, but some of the emotions act as calculatory input for non-emotional subroutines).

All calculations are entropic (energy is lost which doesn't contribute to the calculation); but emotional calculations are more entropic (they require wider wiring, activation patterns and data diffusion to many brain regions). Emotionally biased thoughts (information[al] flow/data flow) are good for fast but inaccurate responses.

## Artificial neural network personocratic/personhood-yielding improvements

We may try to create artificial neural networks with variant activation functions and even evolving/changing during the training of each neuron

benefits:

• With a huge variety of activation functions a big circuit could significantly shrink without losing computational ability.

undesirable results:

• diminished redundancy: The now smaller circuit if damaged it might not be repairable.

• insanity/too many degrees of freedom: Expanding the degrees of freedom is beneficial only if they can be controlled to properly behave (to yield sensical mental states).

How to achieve it?

Each ANN neuron should be able to vary in a limited way (one attribute in a limited range of change) its morphable predetermined activation function and by training pick the one which works better by gradient testing.

Is it useful to use morphable activation functions?

Not for calculatory ANNs (this approach will be less manageable), but for personhood-yielding self-experiencing we might need more degrees of freedom to deepen the degree of personhood.

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Still individual neural degrees of freedom isn't the most important attribute for personhood-yielding information processors; see my older texts on the overall personhooded brain architecture.

### comment 1:

Different brain regions and types of neurons could have different wiring rules and activation functions. That approach creates equivalent denser (connectomewise) brains than trying to achieve similar functions (in complex systems we say similar; identity its nearly impossible even if we used the same ingredients twice [noise, quantum fluctuations, particle behaviour, etc.]) with one or very few neural types. Some deem this complexity redundant, but it's worth trying because different types of neurons when properly combined (not insanity-yielding) beneficially increase the degrees of freedom of the personhood-yielding information processor.

### comment 2:

Neurons are logic gates. Neurons with complex wiring and complex activation functions act like circuits of logic gates. Using different types of neuronal wiring and activation functions can create equivalent to single-neurontype (mononeur[on]al) data processors, but with a smaller circuit.

But controlling the process requires different control modes. Also the different types of neurons are supposed to work within the limitations of their design. Very complex neuron categorisation can lead to mental illness/dysfunctional processing. For example humans have a large variety of neuron types, and subtypes. Human neurons are genetically and epigenetically controlled. Huge functional control systems fail easily and its hard to perform generic rebooting/reverting to system to normal function. Also a programmed information processor, might experience something like "tin pest", with the sick neurons irretrievably damaging nearby neurons.

The most dangerous "tin-pest-like" connectome syndromes might permanently kill a digital brain in milliseconds; thus backups are necessary. But full-personality backups should be properly managed, because digital persons (digipersons) in the future will aquire legal rights if they meet the criteria of personhood and if they follow certain rules. Imagine a political party of digipersons (and biopersons who support digipersonhood/digital true personhood) cloning true persons (which are digital; the prototype simply has to meet the criteria of personhood; bio- or digi- doesn't matter) a billion times in order it wins the elections. The cloning machine might cause intentional/deliberate differentiations of character (knowledge, talents, hobbies, secondary opinions, self-ascription of unique full name, etc.) to make these persons unique, but still supporters of a single political party.

### references:

see:

• A computational paradigm for dynamic logic-gates in neuronal activity - NCBI - Amir Goldental, Shoshana Guberman, [...], and Ido Kanter - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

• Not All Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Are Created Equal https://www.hhmi.org/news/not-all-embryonic-stem-cell-lines-are-created-equal

## Balance between definition and systemic realisation

It's both important to define notions, but also to understand or even create (in some cases; "total death" is a bad example) the mechanism[s] which generates the notion.

Personhood is a great example.

It's necessary to define the prerequisites for personhood and the ways it can be exhibited (a limited environment wouldn't allow personhood to be expressed and even occur in the first place).

But we shouldn't overdefine or subdefine notions. Each substantial (not a misinterpretation) phenomenon is based on deeper causes. We should differentiate if possible which parts of the definition are fundamental prerequisites, and which are secondary results if the prerequisites are met (that's hard or impossible in some cases; to define the constituents of something, with properly labelled roles in causal hierarchy [in some cases there isn't a single causal hierarchy for some of the constituents of something]).

Defining "personhooded minds" / personhood-yielding information[al] processors isn't tautological to defining personhood (there isn't a sole rigorous definition of personhood, neither a sole ideal personhood-yielding information[al] processor architecture [by architecture I mean generic construction rules no matter the material and the microarchitectural realisation]).

In order to create a personhood-yielding brain, one has to make a machine which meets the prerequisites for personhood; but that is approached indirectly, via capacities/abilities, functions, regional differentiation, hypernymic controllers, pattern-generation-activation controllers, etc.

Overdefinitions and subdefinitions of the goal notion will hinder the construction of the personhooded mind (or anything else we want to create). And without proper causal-hierarchy labelling hindering parts [bug-machines or misprogramming] might be created, some parts might miss and some parts of the neural wiring might be wrong.

Also our personhood-yielding thinking machine might work correctly but nonoptimally, and in real-world situations that might cause the personhood-bearing individual to perform worse than others or even die (for example due to slow reactions/slow estimations).

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From neuroscience we know that defining the prerequisites for personhood and having a system able to yield personhood are related subjects but by no means identical.

What should we do?

We should gradually evolve ideal theories and ways to put the theories in practice; for example personhood definitions and personhood-yielding information processors (not a single ideal rigorous [mathematical] definition of personhood exists, neither a sole realisation [and that's the case for most other things]).

A step by step parallel evolution of ideas and systems is the best way to go. This happens in practice, but we have to be consciously aware of that approach in order we streamline our efforts.