Why compatibilism (συμβατισμός/the compatibility of) amongst determinism and ethical responsibility is small philosophy of excuses?

## Why compatibilism (the compatibility of) amongst determinism and ethical responsibility is small philosophy of excuses?

Why compatibilism (the compatibility of) amongst determinism and ethical responsibility is small philosophy of excuses?

The universe is procedural because unprocedurality is (ontologically) impossible.

Procedural ontological algorithms could be deterministic (nowadays Everettism/manyworldness/the many-worlds interpretation of quantum seems more possible; according to Everettism our universe-strain/version is probabilistic but the wider-than-us universe is deterministic (the full-universe is a different matter of debate, because according to the infinite Russian doll hypernymisation/normalisation group, for any hypernymic order of universal observation [an impossible thought experiment not trivial though for the substantiality of the universe; the observer becomes larger and larger and observes or mathematically describes wider ranges of spacetime, including different big-bang-cycles] there will be at least one [but practically infinite] more).

In Everettism different universe-strains cannot interact (except in some dark matter theories, according to which different timeliness of spatiotemporal evolution can merge - when some conditions are met - and the death of probabilities cannot kill the energy of the lost paths which are transformed into extra gravity [nowadays this is not the mainstream dark matter theory... actually we don't have the official theory yet]). Different universe-stains behave as standalone universes (though their deep causal roots aren't causally standalone) which rebranch ad infinitum.

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The I-don't-care-Everettism is the acceptance of Everettism, but the claim that if I cannot interact with past universal branches/universe-strains, I don't care about them. This is a probabilistic view, but it's a trivial view, because they Everettian causal mechanism remains BOTH deterministic (as a whole wavefunction; but the infinite renormalisation makes it complicated/incalculable) and probabilistic (our universe-strain).

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The "unknown theory of single solutions which isn't Everettian" cannot be "hidden variable based". Hidden variables are trivial. No hidden complexity is ontologically important to be ontoaxiomatically fundamental. This approach is compatible to superdeterminism; but a huge number of superdeterministic subcases/alterations/universe-strains, can be included in Everettism = the wavefunction being the deepest ontology. The deepest ontological axiomatic algorithm (lists don't work well with universe-like worlds/substantialities), the deepest ontoaxiomatics cannot be complete (that would lead to causal inconsistencies and/or to a statue universe = statue universes are not actually universes because they don't meet the criteria of substantiality [they are theoretical components or failed universes]), but it cannot also be trivially incomplete. Trivial ontoaxiomatic incompleteness is the claim that hidden variables are the deepest ontological cause of the universe. Significant ontoaxiomatic incompleteness is the entropic mechanism of dark energy (spatiotemporal expansion) and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

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The brain procedurally functions and generates the mind.

The mind isn't separate from the universe. The mind is part of the ontoaxiomatics of the universe.

Both the mind and the universe ARE the ontoaxiomatics (due to causopermeability there is no separation).

Ontoaxiomatics functions according to mathematical and/or allomathematical logic.

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allo- means different

allomathematics: mathematics with different axioms but still rigorously logical and procedural; but allomathematics don't have to be handy or useful for general calculations; infinite allomathematics are possible; most ontoaxiomatics is allomathematically based (not based on scientific mathematics).

Allomathematics can be compatible with mathematics, but usually not as a whole. Specific problems can be redefined and transcribed into common mathematics as used in science/scientomathematics (there is no general rule about all the different allomathematics because there is no omniaxiomatics = the axiomatic system of all axiomatic systems).

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No mind is hypernymic/hyponymous/superordinate to mathematical logic.

The mind is calculator with an algorithmic (non-static/non-stationary) architecture able to generate consciousness (as defined in the philosophy of neuroscience) and individual personhood = personality which meets the criteria of personhood.

Even minds or hypernymously/hypernymically/superordinately put/expressed calculatiors (the term calculator is hypernymic to mind) which make mistakes due to operational malfunction/connectome malformation/false input data/mismapped semantics (corrupted semantic maps)/noise/etc. [they] don't violate mathematical (or allomathematical) logic. They simply produce wrong results/output because of miscalculations. Miscalculation has many causes (I mentioned many) but by no means is supernatural.

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Why compatibilism (the compatibility of) of determinism and ethical responsibility is small philosophy of excuses?

Because mathematical and/or allomathematical logic is hypernymic/hyponymous/superordinate to mind.

Any substantial mind is necessarily procedural and part of the ontoaxiomatics of its universe-like world.

Personhood/consciousness (as defined in the philosophy of neuroscience) doesn't (supernaturally/magically/unprocedurally/based on a divine immaterial something/etc.) pre-exist its procedurality.

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Why studying philosophy shouldn't make us criminals or lazy if mathematical and/or allomathematical logic is hypernymic/hypernymous/superordinate to any procedural ontoaxiomatics (ontoaxiomatics = foundations of some substantiality; there is no omniaxiomatics/omnisubstantiality)?

Answer: If you wanna act stupid, blame it on you. Not on philosophy. If studying philosophy makes one stupid she/he must quit studying it. People have any possible opinion about/on philosophical issues. That's no excuse to be unethical or lazy.

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We shouldn't kill philosophy in order we biasedly present that: 1. ethics (which is ethological biases deemed beneficial within specific contexts) and 2. metaphysical personocracy (the fallacy of deeming personhood an ontoaxiomatic prerequisite) are hypernymic/hyponymous/superordinate to mathematical and allomathematical logic.

## comment 1:

- ethical practicalist who erroneously self-identifies as an ethical compatibilist for incompatible excuses: Yes, but excuses.

- ethical practicalist: No excuse is hypernymic/hypernymous/superordinate to mathematical and allomathematical logic.

I am an ethical practicalist.

It isn't compatible to erroneously deem someone hypernymic to mathematical and/or allomathematical logic which is the foundation of any possible ontology (unmathmatical ontologies are impossible and so unstable that they don't describe something specific and don't become specific substantialities [why supernaturalism/unprocedurality/religion/immaterial things/divine forces are impossible/ontologically impossible/unsubstantial]).

For society to work people have to take responsibility for their actions.

Ethics is ethological biases deemed beneficial within a context.

If a society/nonsociety/group is comprised of only one member, and if that member doesn't carry ethical biases from a larger group of people, it is ethical for her to do everything to survive. Of course the human brain isn't a neutral connectome at birth. Some structural biases that lead to empathy, but also the arbitrary percentage of neural activity might lead to deviations. Thus even a single person who doesn't carry any ethical bias of a different cohort, if she has an average brain (well functioning; brain lesions cause deviations) she will develop an ethics for her condition and degree of knowledge. Primitive ethics is ethological patterns deemed beneficial for a particular condition. Because these patterns are shaped gradually as biases they are not irrelevant case-by-case calculations of the most beneficial behaviour. Ethics is inertial (personal opinions and societal views evolve gradually). But the brain works according to ontophysics (biochemistry, but not only) which [ontophysics] is based on the allomathematical logic of our substantiality/universe. Ascribing moral responsibility to hyponymic results of mathematical logic, doesn't express a compatibility but it is mistake. Claiming that a hypernym is cohyponym is wrong.

For practical reasons we should be 'ethical practicalists' (it usually works better, but it's not an ethoaxiomatic[al] deep truth [there is no ethoaxiomatics because brains and conditions vary wildly]). Ethics is a relative term thus it cannot convey a wished meaning of a specific person or cohort as its general definition. Most theoretical anarchists are ethical when they commit crimes because according to them they obey their own rules.