FORCE GENERATION

(1977-1978)- PROJECTION FORCE REQUIREMENTS: BUILDING UPON THE DEMANDS OF THE "FULL WAR" FOR PROJECTION FORCES

The overall projection force levels are, however, determined by the requirements of both the full and half wars. The Congress must, therefore, consider the demands of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict before choosing between alternative force level options and budgets; the requirement for projection forces in the major conflict must be added to projection force requirements for a half war. While the primary combat theater in a European conflict would likely be NATO's Central Region, projection forces would probably more likely be used in that war on NATO's Northern Flank. Projection forces, notably the ground force divisions, would not be as capable as armored divisions along much of the Central Front, where terrain favors armored maneuver units. On the other hand, terrain in the areas of Schleswig-Holstein/Jutland and Norway, which constitute the Northern Flank, facilitates the operations of units such as the Army airborne and airmobile divisions and the Marine ground forces.

RECONFIGURATION OF GROUND FORCES: CREATING A "HEAVY" MARINE DIVISION

A policy option derives from optimistic assumptions about a half war. USMC forces that might have been retired could be retained as a "strategic reserve" for all contingencies. Funds saved from retiring the artillery, Crisis Response Forces and some infantry battalions might be utilized to stand-up the tank battalions for one Marine division to become a Heavy-Marine Division, in order to use it more effectively in Europe's Central Region or South Korea/Taiwan if it is felt that additional forces and firepower are needed there. The Marine air wing could also be preserved to supplement the division's capabilities. These units would also be available for non-NATO contingencies, thereby lowering the risk of U.S failure in any given scenario.

THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO BRING BACK THE "TWO & A HALF WAR SCENARIO" FORCE STRUCTURE:

During most of the 1960s, the United States nominally had planned forces for a two-and-one-half war strategy, the two major wars being one in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and one between the United States and Chinese-supported forces in Asia. The 1969 shift in U.S. strategy derived from new perceptions about both the competition between the Soviet Union and China and relations between the United States and each of them, and from the inadequacy of U.S. forces for conducting two major wars at the same time. (HALF WAR refers to a contingency operation I.E a anti-terrorism operations in a foreign country).

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/05-10-restructurearmy.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/24908

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/55180-ArmyAviation.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2018-12/54657-AirForceAviationFunding.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/108th-congress-2003-2004/reports/05-03-armyobasing.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/10-05-05-iraqletter.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/11-30-recruitment.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/11-30-helicopters.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/06-01-armytransformation.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/08-02-army.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/106th-congress-1999-2000/reports/peaceops.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/1997doc06-entire.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/95th-congress-1977-1978/reports/1977\_06\_asia.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/army-21c.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/95th-congress-1977-1978/reports/78-cbo-004.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/102nd-congress-1991-1992/reports/09-1992-structuringusforces.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/101st-congress-1989-1990/reports/90-cbo-005.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/94th-congress-1975-1976/reports/1976\_12\_procurement.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/99th-congress-1985-1986/reports/85-cbo-020.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/96th-congress-1979-1980/reports/80doc15.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/102nd-congress-1991-1992/reports/1991\_12\_fiscalimplicationsofadmin.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/100th-congress-1987-1988/reports/doc01b-entire.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/104th-congress-1995-1996/reports/helicopt.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/98th-congress-1983-1984/reports/doc07a\_2.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/12-19-2013-nuclearforces.pdf

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53211-nuclearforces.pdf

## Division Designations

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Most army units retain their ww1 & ww2 designations for the sake of history than actual functional designations.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y\_yYCIf8p2g&t=484s