Causal closure

The causal closure is an old physicalist staple; Everettism and ontological (not merely calculatory) renormalization don't close the causal connectome, but attribute weights to it according to each different observer

Causal closure isn't the mainstream view in

* ontological renormalization (very wide envelopes surrounding an observed wave function, include parts that most probably won't interact with the central object, and if we accept that everything in the universe belongs in the same connectome; afar objects which are not strongly entangled interact very mildly. Afar regions (from an arbitrary observational center) include many wave functions which contribute mildly to the central observed wave function; or better put have a low probability to strongly interact with the center of the Hubble volume (theoretically afar from a Hubble volume, only entanglement allows interaction [due to intermediary Hubble volumes], but entanglement is NOT useful for communicational interaction but for ontological only (entanglement can be used for quantum encryption because its fundamental but not for faster than light data transfer). Still entanglement IS important, because it holds the universe as one BUT WITH ALL ITS MANY-WORLDS (quantum entanglement is ontologically important; also partial entanglement is important; probabilistic entanglement is the claim that entanglements and partial entanglements are also probabilistically tuned, but for an observer its hard to discover them (this is a mathematical question; if we measure many particles, some are entangled and some not.... to be more accurate all particles are entangle [because overall are/comprise the universe] at a different degree. The mathematical question is what would be different in arbitrary comparisons of particles, if probabilistic entanglement were wrong.

* Everettism: Everettism provides a connectome of close by actualities which allow more afar alternatives when we recede from the arbitrary central observer (same as above; with different mathematics). Actually we don't have to compare something outside our Hubble volume to find out (calculationally; as a thought experiment) that Everettism (manyworldness) is correct. For example, thermally collapsed atoms in our cells are NOT maximally collapsed (collapse has degrees), thus alternative realities DO exist (see: photosynthesis).

* cyclic universe (not Roger Penrose's version, because we didn't describe correctly the adiabatic phase transition of maximal to low spatiotemporal entropy): infinite big bangs exist (according to that view), and spacetime is more fundamental than a particular universe cycle. Infinite spacetimes exist (Max Tegmark), and they're self-caused because their constructor (David Deutsch) is correct. Any correct spatiotemporal constructor necessarily exists do to its correctness. Nilogony/nihilogony/cosmogony from nothing is impossible, because the Nothing cannot exist; it isn't a potential state of the infinite somethings. Constructor self-causality cannot be avoided EVEN if God existed (then the system "spacetime" becomes "God & spacetime", but self-causality and constructor theory are unavoidable). God is a person (if God is an atheistic process, we merely distort language and falsely merge different semantics). Personhood is the result of a personhood-yielding calculator = brain. The criteria of personhood have to be met via the procedures of the personhood-yielding computer Brodmann-like areas. An idealized brain can be described as a connectome with nodes [or a could with densities and allowed data directions; like a weird fluid; many idealized brain models exist]. We can topologically describe the idealized brain. Still some volume is required (topology doesn't specify the distances; but we need topology ALSO for the foundations of quantum mechanics; thus the vagueness of distance gets meaning via limitations and rule of each particular connectome; brain or spacetime). No brain can function without a volume; and thinking requires time (otherwise it is NOT procedural thinking, but a static structure; but no static structures can exist and be procedurally perceived; static structures are NOT universe-like). Thus spacetime is more fundamental than personhood and the brain which produces it. Personhood isn't a prerequisite for spacetime, but spacetime -being fundamental - IS a prerequisite for personhood. God being nonfundamental necessarily cannot exist, because he cannot meet his definition.

## Comment 1

### please write about: the many-constructors interpretation

please write about: the many-constructors interpretation

many-constructors interpretation: Not merely Everettianly different universes,
but with different physics. Just because it's mathematically possible = self-causal (without God or nihilogony = Stephen Hawking was wrong on the "cosmogony from nothing". David Deutsch is correct on the "cosmogony from constructor[s]/infinite ones. String theory gives a limited amount of universes (if it's correct); but universe-like worlds are infinite if they are based on geometric constructor of phase spaces and tasks/procedures which change states of interpreted field entities like particles.

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God is an exo-cause of the universe (not a self-cause); but still God is a self-cause for the system God—universe; thus any cosmogonic theory requires self-causation (or self-causality). God is necessarily a person; if God were a physicalist procedure then we simply distort language by merging semantics. God is a personhooded thinker, thus he requires a personhood-yielding computer (aka brain; but immaterial and not necessarily similar to ours). The idealized brain can be described topologically as a connectome with nodes (infinite brain models are possible; like a cloud of different densities and different permitted directions of informational flow). Topology doesn't have to do with specific distances (but relationships; with many of them you may get interpreted distances by observers made of the same topological stuff), but specific topological connectomes create distance-like rules (for example topology is used in the foundations of quantum mechanics; theoretically it has nothing to do with specific distances, but procedural restrictions create relative distances amongst objects created by the same rules). Thus even an idealized immaterial brain, would topologically require volume in order it doesn't merge its nodes; and thinking requires time (thinking is procedural; otherwise it would be static structure; but static structure isn't universe-like; it doesn't meet the criteria of spacetime, and it cannot be procedurally perceived if in that reality everything is static). Thus spacetime is more fundamental than brains; and God is impossible being not the utmost fundamental. God cannot resolve the causal closure by failing to being the utmost fundamental existence; thus by failing to exist (thinking requires a connectome, and God requires causal closure to be possible at the fundamental level, without Everettian alternatives).

## Comment 2

Unprocedurality and lack of ontological definition lead to no identity, thus nonexistential nonphenomena cannot be attributed to specific entities. Without causal connectome there is no existence. Many antiphysicalists deem personhood and consciousness supernaturally self-caused and reject neuroscience (but they claim they don't reject it). Antiphysicalists don't have an analytical theory of the procedurality and immaterial ontological substance of the soul. They simplify neuroscience. They don't accept that weights of connectome activity, being pre-thoughts (biases: memories, phenotypical, hormonal, cell-component randomness [pre-consciousness before consciousness doesn't exist; not all motions inside cells are controlled perfectly]) result to thoughts. David Deutsch speaks about inexplicit thoughts (see: What is the 'Fun Criterion'? – David Deutsch – behind the scenes - YouTube). Artificial neural network small duration patterns and small duration bio-neural patterns are examples of pre-thoughts (not even inexplicit), but they make no sense as mere data activity if we don't know their particular connectome.

## Comment 3

The causal closure or better stated the "Everettian causal connectome" is related to the arrow of time because fundamental descriptions of nature are quantum, not classical. The principle of least action is usually simple in classical physics (some Newtonian problems with alternative curved paths give more than one or infinite solutions), but in quantum mechanics it leads to many solutions (Everettian view). In everyday life it's intuitively (but erroneously) believed that a single past existed; but the wave function also creates multiple pasts (as it creates multiple futures). Reality is a connectome of events; and events further in the future and in the past or locally very afar from us (or not fully observationally entangled), exist in a bouquet of alternative realities in relationship to us. If you didn't permanently record absolutely everything in the past (quantum physics restricts the amount of information we can extract from a system), you cannot claim a single past existed in relationship to you; without to build that relationship in an absolute manner.

## Comment 4

Is causal closure Everettianly open-ended (space regions afar [from the observed] in time, space, or less entangled connectome of events)?
That's one possibility. The correct one according to pure Everettism; but very afar realities contribute lesser and lesser to the arbitrary center of observation (ontological renormalization approach).

## Comment 5

Quantum entanglement (complete or partial) is extremely important, because it cannot convey telecommunication information (useful data) but it can convey wavefunctional (ontological) information. Hubble volumes afar from ours cannot transmit useful information, but are part of the same universe due to the infinite overlapping Hubble volumes. That's why open-ended wavefunctional causality matters for the description of the observed wave function in relation to afar in space, time and entanglement strength wave functions. Probabilistically all particles are entangled to some distant others (due to random coincidence [usually that entanglement is partial; very weak; it includes alternative outcomes]) and that keeps the universe as a whole; but practically afar space regions wavefunctionally (ontologically) are weakly entangled. The further apart two Hubble volumes are, the least entangled they are; but zero entanglement is impossible due to random coincidence entanglement and due to the infinite intermediary Hubble volumes.