Normative Burden of Proof

In this article, I hope to demonstrate that the Burden of Proof in normative ethical dialogue reasonably falls on the person stating that an action is *morally impermissible* rather than a person stating an action is *morally permissible.*

This article will then offer a definition of *justification* which is reasonably usable between participants of conflicting moral dialogue.

## Permissible vs Impermissible

In moral dialogue, participants may come to a particular action (or set of consequences leading from actions) where there is a disagreement in permissibility or impermissibility. Simply said, one participant thinks the action is fine to do and the other believes the action is not fine to do. If moral dialogue is to continue between these two participants, further explanatory reasons must be explored and analyzed. (Note, I am not saying that further moral dialogue MUST continue, but only that IF it is to continue, simply asserting the same position at each other will not count as progress.)

Moral dialogue can then only continue by giving either *reasons in favor of doing the action(permissibility)* and *reasons in favor of not doing the action(impermissibility)*.

## Burden of Proof

In arguments of epistemology, the Burden of Proof is the argument that the person making the positive claim has the burden to prove the reasonability of a knowledge claim. Let's take the token example, arguments in favor of God.

The contemporary atheist position is to take the stance that they shall not believe in a God until such time it is shown to be reasonable to do so and to have no such burden to offer such positive arguments that *prove God doesn't exist*. It is accepted by those that accept this Burden of Proof that the argument "I have no reason to believe God exists" is a *strong reason to not believe in God*. Likewise, it is accepted that "I have no reason to believe God *doesn't exist*" is a weak reason to believe in God.

What sort of evidence can one offer in favor of God's non-existence that simply doesn't equate to "I have no reason to believe God exists." Reasons such as "I don't see him", "I don't feel him", "I don't hear him" and "Nothing about the claim God exists is predictable in observations" seem to be equivalent to "I have no reason to believe God exists." Unless something about God claims directly conflicts some such statement about reality, there isn't much to say.

## The Moral Analogy to The Epistemological Point

Here I argue that a moral conversation has the same analogical point as the above epistemological point.

Both participants have the capability to claim Burden of Proof is on the other. What I wish, however, is to prove by example that it is only sensible that it lies on the participant claiming *impermissibility.* I will show that those arguing for *permissibility* are only actually arguing for a *lack of impermissibility.*

Let's take a completely erroneous accepted amoral action. Going for a walk.

Two questions may arise from this action:

1) What makes this action *impermissible?*

2) What makes this action *permissible?*

How would we go about answering the first question? Let's see some candidate answers:

Going for a walk may cause harm to ants. Going for a walk is a waste of energy/time that can be spent doing something else. Going for a walk damages the sidewalk.

Let's say we even accept these premises, as weak as they are. What happens if I remove them one by one? "Well, as turns out, there are no ants in these areas or any bugs whatsoever. Also, there is nothing else to be done at the moment, walking in fact is the only option. Also, the sidewalks in this area are undamagable by human footsteps." What becomes the result when all impermissible reasons are shown to be false? Would we then accept that the action is permissible? That seems reasonable.

Let us, by comparison, see how it is to answer the second question. Let's look at candidate answers:

Going for a walk is good exercise. My neighbor likes seeing me walk and it makes her happy. Going for a walk causes endorphins to release, putting me in a better mood.

Let's say we accept these as good reasons. What happens if I remove *these* one by one. "According to the latest scientific analysis, walking is the poorest form of exercise. Also, your neighbor moved yesterday. Also, there's been a release of a chemical that stops endorphins to release while walking." Let's say all those are true. Is the end result that you *can no longer go for a walk?* If we run out of justifying reasons, does the action become *impermissible*? It doesn't seem like it, it just seems like an amoral action. And amoral actions seem *permissible.*

Here we see an asymmetry. Running out of *impermissible reasons* has caused going for a walk *permissible.* Yet running out of *permissible reasons* still ends in the action of going for a walk *permissible still.*

 Let's take some *permissibility reasons* that are offered seriously. "It doesn't harm anyone", "No one cares", "The object will remain undamaged." Etc etc. However, these reasons seem exactly equivalent to the epistemological case against God. "I don't see him", "I don't feel him", "I don't hear him" etc. Just as the epistemological cases against God are tantamount to "I have no good reasons to believe in him", the moral arguments are tantamount to "I have no reasons to think this action is *impermissible.*"

If this is the case, that analogically, it only makes sense that the Burden of Proof for moral arguments are given by those who state the action is impermissible. It follows the same format. Who cares if I run out of permissible reasons? The action still seems permissible. The only *good* permissibility reason is "It doesn't seem impermissible." Thus, the argumentation must come from the *impermissibility* participant.

## Justification

What then comes of a word like Justification? What does it mean to *give justification* if all moral reasoning starts by giving *impermissible reasons?* Here I offer my definition of justification:

**Justification:** Permissibility reasons that can override actions generally considered impermissible.

Thus, once an action has been established with *imper*m*issibility reasons* and is generally considered impermissible, a justification gives reasons/circumstances that override those reasons.

The token example here is Self-Defense. The action "Killing someone" is taken to be grounded in *impermissibility reasons.* The action becomes *justified* by stating the circumstance of survival as an overriding factor. Here, we find the only time *permissibility reasons* are relevant and that is when they are given in favor of overriding already established impermissibility reasons.