God

Can God = self-caused and cosmogonic person be proven mathematically?

1. analyze personhood, the criteria of personhood, the prerequisites for personhood

Personhood requires a personhood-yielding computer = brain.

(brains are a subcategory of computers)

Analyze all these mathematically.

2. Analyze cosmogony. Various theories of cosmogony.

But cosmogony isn't the utmost fundamental physical foundation.

Define the axiomatics of physics (I work on that)

see: David Hilbert (he was wrong; David Tong correctly knows that particle accelerator data and quantum field theory mathematics prove the "hypernymic Everettism" = alternatives exist not only at the wavefunctional level but they are required to justify the physical axiomatics (Sabine Hossenfelder with her superdeterminism, simply transfers some open questions in physics deeper in the physical axiomatics in an erroneous way that causes problems; ANY, I repeat ANY fundamental [not a Newtonian simplification] theory in physics, has axiomatic consequences, and ANY new axiomatic consequence requires more axioms; CAUSAL CLOSURE versus HYPERNYMIC EVERETTISM... Causal closure is wrong, because there is no ideal closed system, and no axiomatics = axiomatic system is ideal.

Common mathematics was created for practical calculations.
The mathematical axioms don't have a single origin; but are simply useful.

Allomathematics [allo- means different] = mathematics with different axioms are possible, have been tried and are useful = they give faster answers for particular tasks/problems.

Physics requires a single axiomatic origin, thus an axiomatic algorithm (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is a physical axiomatic trick; the expansion of the universe is a form of ontological entropy which is axiomatically necessary for our universe; different universes have different axiomatic tricks in order they workaround but never cancel the problems of axiomaticity: [incalculability], incompleteness and inconsistency [some axiomatic problems can be avoided by giving a procedural answer which isn't predetermined = quantum entertainment [Sabine Hossenfelder merely shifts the axiomatic problems deeper in the physical foundations and isn't intelligent enough, yes she isn't intelligent enough to seek the damage she personally caused/creating more problems due to your mishandling is stupid, because Sabine Hossenfelder causes problems in the physical foundations caused by her indifference to the deep physical foundations])

ontological Turing machine (a subcategory of the Turing machine):

An ontological Turing machine is its own hardware, software and axiomatics; all expressed in the same code (Everyday computers have separate hardware, software and their circuit components function according to physics. But a common computer builder doesn't describe all these major categories in the same programming code.)

Universes have to be ontological Turing machines.

Causal closure is wrong. The opposite of it is Hypernymic Everettism.

hypernym = superordinate term = wider word = more inclusive term

Axiomatically it is necessary that our universe isn't merely Everettian = wavefunctionally manyworlded; but it's also axiomatically manyworlded and open-ended.

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Please translate some issues in Ukrainian (use Patreon for funding or find other means).

Ukrainian people are people like us. They don't only eat food.

Translate some issues of the Scientific American magazine in Ukrainian.

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theism = metaphysical personocracy = dominance of personhood in all metaphysical aspects [origin of everything, space, time, identity; see: Oxford definition of metaphysics]

prerequisites for strong theism:

• self-causation/self-causality of personhood
• origin of everything from personhood = omnipersonocratic origin

(In weak theism personhood is merely involved in cosmogony but not the sole origin.
If God has other impersonal cosmogonic forces inside him then: 1. theism becomes weak because impersonal proceduralities [atheisms] become important, 2. God being a mereological complex isn't a mereological simple [see: mereology, simple in philosophy] thus isn't fundamental)

Even idealized topological (see: topology; here using topology to express neural networks/brain connectome) brains require space and time.

Topology doesn't have specific measures, but different topological theories permit specific proceduralities. Topological quantum field theory is used to analyze the physical foundations. Size starts to have a meaning because some proceduralities are allowed and others are impossible (some are very rare; see: constructor theory, David Deutsch and Chiara Marletto).

Thus even an idealized personhood-yielding computer = brain would require space.

Thought is data processing through time by a personhood-yielding computer.

The all knowing God isn't a thinker. Thought is exhibited procedurally.
Thus all-knowingness is a form of a bulk geometry, but it isn't thought; and it isn't knowledge either because it's incompatible to the personhood-yielding computer criteria which requires different parts (see: Nancy Kanwisher, Mark Solms; books and YouTube) like the Brodmann areas which combine in many ways to process information (usually Brodmann areas work as subroutines areas and not as specific procedurality centres; but that's not absolute because vision and smell have specific central regions; but their peripheral regions can be used for imagination and episodic memory; see: Nancy Kanwisher: We shouldn't simplify the brain. It is what it is. Some Brodmann areas work as subroutine areas and other Brodmann areas have more concentrated and specific abilities. We have to examine each task via neuroimaging in a case-by-case manner and not generalize simplistically what the brain does.).

Infinite brain models are possible. I don't mean merely brains of different individuals but generically different designs.

All brains have to meet the criteria of personhood/prerequisites for personhood.

All brains have to output personhood.

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Personhood is by no means a self-caused mereological simple.

Theists are supernaturalists.

The supernatural isn't analytically describable, neither scientifically guessable (with many alternatives) because it has no ontology; it is unontic/unontological/unprocedural. The supernatural has no specific ontological characteristics/no identity. It's totally impossible.

Supernaturalists mere oratorically comment on it, without causally rigorous mathematical logic.

Theists are stupid about/on their theism. There's nothing brilliant about it.

Some theists are intelligent on different fields of study other than divinity.