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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [To surrender any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, and any related authorizations, licences and registration certificates you possess to the Central Saanich Police Department within 24 hours of your release from custody\], : , : , : } |
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{: [it is not a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge\], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [[I]n my opinion, an unprovoked attack against a complete stranger/strangers in a public place in broad daylight followed by a bizarre suicide attempt is strongly indicative of a severe mental illness at the time of the index offences. This is further indication that Mr. Palmer would not have been aware that what he was doing was wrong or even aware of the physical nature of his actions if he was in a significantly confused state. In my opinion Mr. Palmer would have come within the terms of Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada at the material time of the index offence.\], : , : , : } |
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{: [Schizophrenia, Catatonic Type, Continuous, with prominent negative symptoms\Mr. Palmer would have come within the terms of Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada at the material time of the index offences.\], : , : , : } |
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{: [Given the unpredictability of his actions secondary to his mental illness, the severe nature of his illness, his disorganized thinking, it would be more likely than not that he would not have been able to weigh the pros and cons of his actions, exercise rational choice or know that what he was doing was morally wrong. ... It is therefore my opinion that Mr. Palmer does meet, on the balance of probabilities, the test for Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada.\], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [Should Duress Apply to All Crimes? A Comparative Appraisal of Moral Involuntariness and the Twenty Crimes Exception Under Section <mask> of the Criminal Code\], : , : , : } |
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{: [in accordance with an authorization\], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [Agent of the Province\], : , : , : } |
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{: [parties\party\party\], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [actually commit\], : , : , : } |
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{: [the Crown is limited to proving the guilt of Mr. Kelly as an aiding party, as the getaway driver, in accordance with section <mask> of the Criminal Code \], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [], : , : , : } |
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{: [any significant period of time\], : , : , : } |
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{: [the death is caused [...] while committing or attempting to commit\the [offender's] continuing illegal domination of the victim which gives continuity to the sequence of events culminating in the murder\". The victim who has been dominated in the commission of the predicate offence need not be the same victim who was murdered: R. v. Russell , 2001 SCC 53, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 804, at para. 43."], "obj_label": "231(5)", "id": "e87af18d-a13f-4bf5-b6c7-751f119e19f4", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The trial judge raised the issue of provocation. She pointed out that no one had raised it thus far in their discussions about the charge. Defence counsel pointed out that since the included offence of manslaughter was being left to the jury, provocation should be included as well because it (provocation) reduced the state of mind of the shooter. This is not so. Manslaughter committed under provocation is voluntary manslaughter, sometimes called mitigated murder. As the introductory language of section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides - \"Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder\" - the statutory partial defence of provocation has nothing to do with the fault element of murder. And whether voluntary manslaughter should be left to a jury depends on whether there is an air of reality to the defence which is unrelated to whether involuntary manslaughter - an unlawful killing unaccompanied by the fault element required for murder - should be included in the charge."], "obj_label": "232(1)", "id": "9d072132-41ee-4275-bede-efac75056786", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Araya surrendered to the police and was charged with murder. No one else has ever been charged in the shooting. In November 2011, after a four-week jury trial, Araya was found guilty of manslaughter. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, requires a mandatory minimum sentence of four years' imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the commission of manslaughter. In December 2011, the trial judge sentenced Araya to eight years' imprisonment (less 15 months for pre-sentence custody)."], "obj_label": "236(a)", "id": "e3b61454-3be3-4422-bcf1-1dbdc1909de1", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[107] Section <mask> of the Criminal Code creates the offence of attempted murder: Simpson , at p. 134. However, the subsection, in particular its phrase \"by any means\", does not \"describe\" the ways in which the offence of attempted murder may be committed: Simpson , at p. 140. The offence of attempted murder may be committed without committing an assault or causing any bodily harm whatsoever: Simpson , at p. 142. It follows that, \"as described in the enactment creating it\", attempted murder does not include any crime of assault or unlawfully causing bodily harm: Simpson , at pp. 142\u2010143."], "obj_label": "239(1)", "id": "8bae8877-6402-4a86-9987-91fec213c8d7", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[318] It is, on the other hand, a crime to cause the death of another person by means of an unlawful act. If you were to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused administered a noxious thing to his wife, then, as I have earlier explained, that would amount to an offence, contrary to section <mask> of the Criminal Code , and, by definition, as it were, an unlawful act."], "obj_label": "245", "id": "409cff3b-f422-42d5-94e3-c4f7254c9c8c", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the essential elements of the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. The provision requires consideration of all the circumstances including, but not only, those listed. What must be determined, by a consideration of all the circumstances, is whether the manner in which the person charged was operating the vehicle was dangerous to the public."], "obj_label": "249(1)(a)", "id": "45947758-3b19-43f4-b7f7-3a7fcfaeaa96", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Even if the purpose of legislation is unobjectionable, the administrative procedures created by law to bring that purpose into operation may produce unconstitutional effects, and the legislation should then be struck down.... In the present case, the appellants are complaining of the general effects of s. 251. If section <mask> of the Criminal Code does indeed breach s. 7 of the Charter through its general effects, that can be sufficient to invalidate the legislation under s. 52. [Emphasis omitted.]"], "obj_label": "251", "id": "274e4dbc-5df4-4cad-b1e2-ec6b3ab5146b", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The appellant was charged with eight Criminal Code offences related to a home break-in in which a car was stolen. The appellant was convicted at trial of four offences, including fleeing the scene of an accident without leaving his name and address. His counsel conceded his guilt on this count during final submissions. Mr. Seipp appeals this conviction on the basis that the concession amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel that caused him prejudice. He contends that the mens rea of the offence was not proved. Held: Appeal dismissed. A decision by counsel to acknowledge an accused's guilt after all the evidence has been presented is a legal decision that does not require instructions. And in this case, it caused the appellant no prejudice. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code presumes that an accused who fled the scene of an accident did so with an intent to avoid civil or criminal liability unless the accused presents evidence to the contrary. Mr. Seipp's evidence that he left the scene to avoid being arrested for driving a stolen vehicle does not amount to evidence to the contrary. It is sufficiently connected to the accident to be captured by the legislative intent of the provision."], "obj_label": "252", "id": "0a309ac6-54d9-4cda-8270-1e61af4f4570", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code creates what is commonly referred to as a \"presumption of identity\". This presumption, if applicable, relieves the Crown of the burden of proving that the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of the offence was the same as it was at the time of testing. Where this presumption is not available, the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of the offence is normally proven by evidence from a toxicologist."], "obj_label": "258(1)(c)", "id": "041b0249-c320-4463-8f43-54ed323c9abf", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["That Jeffery Brownson on or about the 28 th day of June in the year 2010 at the village of Marmora in the said Region, did operate a motor vehicle, to wit a 2006 yellow Bombardier ATV, while disqualified from doing so by reason of an order pursuant to section <mask> of the Criminal Code contrary to section 259(4)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada . [Emphasis added.]"], "obj_label": "259(1)", "id": "ec0bb81a-8d85-417d-a341-42e3b2c192f4", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Following the case of Pappajohn , the government was lobbied to make amendments to the Criminal Code to narrow the breadth of the defence of mistake of fact in cases of sexual assault. The Criminal Code was thereafter amended to provide that belief in consent would not be a defence to a charge of sexual assault if an accused's purported belief arose from intoxication, recklessness or wilful blindness or if the accused had not taken reasonable steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting (s. 273.2). Section <mask> of the Criminal Code requires a judge instructing a jury in an assault case where such a defence is advanced to instruct the jury \obj_label265(4)id72ca3457-0b97-4290-9fd3-3dea0f417196sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides: \ In this case, the indictment was particularized to permit three avenues to conviction for the offence of aggravated assault instead of four: the brothers were alleged to have wounded, maimed, and/or disfigured Mr. Miller. The indictment removes the possibility of a fourth avenue to conviction, namely, through endangerment of life.obj_label268(1)id91f4fa12-6139-4d85-99d7-a576d33b13d7sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesAlthough the test for refusing surrender on s. 7 grounds is a \ and is only met in \ cases, it is beyond debate that torture-derived evidence may not be used in legal proceedings and cannot be relied upon by a state seeking extradition or being asked to extradite. Article 15 of the Convention Against Torture -to which both Canada and France are signatories - makes this clear. It provides that parties are obliged \. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C.46, incorporates this prohibition into Canadian domestic law. To similar effect is s. 83(1.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , which excludes from evidence in deportation proceedings any information that is believed on \ to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture.obj_label269.1(4)idec8dc653-96eb-41b0-b74a-d584dce6c34csub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSubsection <mask> of the Criminal Code , as it was at the relevant time, provides that consent means the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question. Subsections 273.1(2)(b) and (d) provide that no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity or where the complainant expresses by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity. Subsection 273.1(3) provides that nothing in s. 273.1(2) shall be construed as limiting the circumstances in which no consent is obtained.obj_label273.1(1)ideb727571-302b-4bf7-a446-0c34521dce0csub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code places important limits on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, including s. 273.2(b), which states \ where \. As Moldaver J. held in R. v. Barton ,obj_label273.2idf8ff5e58-912a-4e1a-aaef-77de9cc1ebf1sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSecond, I see no basis to accept the appellant's claim that the trial judge ignored the appellant's right to make full answer and defence in balancing that right with the complainants' rights to privacy, personal security, and equality based on the factors in s. 278.5(2). The trial judge noted that he had to be \"satisfied that the records are likely relevant to an issue at trial and that production is necessary in the interest of justice\". He then said that he had \"given specific consideration to the criteria set out in sub-section <mask> of the Criminal Code and 278.3(4) of the Criminal Code \". He cited from Mills , at para. 61, which directs that the rights to be balanced include \"full answer and defence, privacy, and equality\". Finally, he discussed the \"very high\" privacy rights attaching to CAS records and concluded that, although the complainants had admitted that they lied to the CAS, \"investigating the records to determine the extent of their lies is insufficient for this Court to review the records\". The trial judge's explicit statement and his process of analysis refute the claim that he ignored the appellant's right to make full answer and defence."], "obj_label": "278.5(2)", "id": "09eee144-3ab5-46f8-9441-d014c58398d5", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the procedure for an accused to apply for a hearing to determine the admissibility at trial of evidence of other sexual activity on the part of the complainant not the subject of the charge before the court. Section 278.93(4) specifies that the presiding judge or justice may decide to hold an admissibility hearing. [2] Section 278.94 prescribes various procedural rules relating to any hearing that is ordered, including a requirement that the presiding judge or justice give reasons for the admissibility determination: s. 278.94(4). [3]"], "obj_label": "278.93", "id": "000a7258-be7d-46e0-8c34-835bc175c709", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The actus reus of the offence requires proof of: (1) a confinement, (2) the confinement is without lawful authority, and (3) a lack of consent by the complainant to the confinement. Proof of the first two elements is objective; the third, subjective. The third element, which is not referred to in s. 279(2), was the subject of discussion in R. v. Gough (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 453 (Ont. C.A.), in which the constitutionality of s. 279(3) (formerly s. 247(3)) of the Criminal Code was in issue. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code reads:"], "obj_label": "279(3)", "id": "08545650-9883-4c52-a45e-db236838a8fa", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Gholam Reza Sadeghi-Jebelli stands charged that he, sometime between and including the 30 th day of April in the year 1995 and the 1 st day of July in the year 1995, at the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, in the Toronto Region, did being a parent of Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, a person under the age of fourteen years, in contravention of the custody provisions of a custody order in relation to the said Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, made by his Honour Judge Ball of the Ontario Provincial Court, Family Division, with intent to deprive Madonna Hollett, the parent of Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli of the possession of Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, did take away the said Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code ."], "obj_label": "282(1)(a)", "id": "b0f14479-b1f6-48dc-bce1-2cd3543d5778", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["I am also satisfied that the wording of the information did not prejudice the appellant or mean that the offences were not made out. The appellant's argument is that because the information refers to the Imagenation computer software and he only stole and used the source code that was used to produce the software sold to the public, no offences were made out. The charge that makes the appellant's case clearest is the theft charge: that the appellant on or about July 22, 1996 \"did steal the IMAGENATION computer software, the property of Spicer Corporation, of a value exceeding five thousand dollars, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada\"."], "obj_label": "334(a)", "id": "9ccca27c-3211-4ead-a9db-03f77983c351", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, codifies the law of self-defence in Canada. The section also speaks of the defence of others. Mr. Khill claimed to be protecting Ms. Benko in addition to defending himself when he shot Mr. Styres. For the purposes of the appeal, however, I will focus exclusively on the self-defence component of Mr. Khill's defence. In the circumstances of this case, his defence stands or falls on his claim that he shot Mr. Styres to save his own life.obj_label34id8ef01562-8d44-489d-81b7-6b2c0c9267cbsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code does not require that the Crown prove that the issuer of the credit card could be successfully defrauded by its use before the Crown can obtain a conviction under that section. In our view, the question of whether the cards could be successfully used would be relevant to a charge of defrauding the financial institutions who issued the cards, but is not relevant to the offence created by s. 342(3).obj_label342(3)id24a6abba-a01f-4460-9bb6-090a283ae4edsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe Criminal Code does not, in fact, create an offence of armed robbery. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code creates the offence of robbery and describes the four ways in which robbery may be committed. A count that charges robbery and refers to s. 344, the punishment provision, does not specify a particular mode of committing robbery nor limit the basis upon which the Crown may prove the substantive offence of robbery.obj_label343idf11da268-ef67-4d61-b1a5-abbb4b12741dsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code enacts a statutory presumption of intent. Where evidence is introduced that a person unlawfully entered or was unlawfully present in premises, the subsection requires the trier of fact to presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the intruder was there to commit an indictable offence. In other words, from evidence of the actus reus , the trier of fact presumes the mens rea , absent evidence to the contrary.obj_label349(2)id2aab5f43-8bf5-4fe7-aa8a-792436aa0780sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[23] There is a lack of discussion within the Reasons for refusal to commit under Section <mask> of the Criminal Code by the Preliminary Inquiry Justice. The Justice states that having reviewed the definition of \ The failure to identify the description of false document and the Crown argument about Section 321(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada inescapably leads to the conclusion that the Preliminary Inquiry Justice did not assess the whole of the evidence against the correct elements of the offence of forgery. It is not clear from the Justice's reasons if he did consider the elements of Section 321(b). Had the Justice considered the elements argued by the Crown, I find it is possible he may have reached a different conclusion."], "obj_label": "366", "id": "d5a89720-b509-4e01-a668-0fec4253a163", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[2] Section <mask> of the Criminal Code was repealed by the Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act, S.C. 2012, c. 9, s. 2, which came into force on March 10, 2013. Section 35 of the Criminal Code now contains the reformulated defence of property defence, which, among other changes, does not require an individual to refrain from striking or causing bodily harm to the trespasser, but instead requires that the act committed be reasonable in the circumstances.obj_label38(1)iddd823608-5abc-4b9a-a588-8bf2fed1ebadsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe appellant was committed for extradition on the offence of \ (the \). He attacks the committal order on two main grounds. First, he argues that the extradition judge had no jurisdiction to proceed since the version of the Authority to Proceed (\) filed by the Attorney General at the extradition hearing was a photocopy, rather than the original, of the ATP. The appellant contends that a photocopy of an original ATP does not constitute a proper ATP within the meaning of the Extradition Act , S.C. 1999, c. 18 (the \).obj_label380(1)(a)id4a930fb2-39f6-49a2-8951-1fdfc58ad111sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesTHAT HE, the said KEVIN EKOW PLANGE, between August 13, 2013 and July 28, 2014, in the City of Toronto, in the Toronto Region, and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means unlawfully did defraud or attempt to defraud the Government of Canada of money in an amount greater than five thousand dollars ($5,000), by preparing and submitting false RC366 E Direct Deposit Request - GST/HST, Payroll and/or Corporation Income Tax Forms to the Canada Revenue Agency to change the direct deposit information of corporations, and as a result re-directed or attempted to re-direct Goods and Services Tax refunds and other payments properly payable to corporations, to bank accounts controlled by him, thereby committing an offence contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada , as amended.obj_label380(1)(a)idbf75a843-7b3d-4c93-ac4b-63b2a3dbc89bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code defines what constitutes possession for the purposes of the Criminal Code . Section 2(1) of the CDSA exhaustively defines \ for CDSA purposes as meaning \. And in s. 34(2) of the Interpretation Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, makes all Criminal Code provisions relating to indictable offences applicable to indictable offences created by other federal enactments, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise provides.obj_label4(3)id6b3f9664-6333-44a6-936e-0095436da46csub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides for the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime where an offender is convicted of a designated offence. Fraud over $5,000 is a designated offence: s. 462.3(1). Section 462.37 also provides for a fine in lieu of forfeiture pursuant to subsection (3) if the court is satisfied that a forfeiture order should be made in respect of any property but that property or any part of it cannot be made subject to an order. Subsection (4) requires the court to impose a term of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine, the length of the term depending on the amount of the fine.obj_label462.37id4e565b0a-52c4-4149-8a70-39cfabba6c9csub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesMs. Parker's submissions focussed on the forfeiture order relating to that portion of the seized monies exceeding the $20 \"buy money\", if indeed such an order were made. She concedes that the $20 is caught by subsection <mask> of the Criminal Code which provides for a forfeiture order where it has been established on a balance of probabilities \"that any property is the proceeds of crime and that the designated offence was committed in relation to that property\" (emphasis added)."], "obj_label": "462.37(1)", "id": "064d579a-9494-40ec-ac6b-d9c0df5c00d4", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes the Crown to seek the forfeiture of any property that is the proceeds of crime, obtained by the commission of a designated offence. The objectives of the provision are \"to deprive the offender ... of the proceeds of their crime and to deter them from committing crimes in the future\": Lavigne , at para. 16. As this court held in R. v. Schoer , 2019 ONCA 105, 371 C.C.C. (3d) 292, \"where the sentencing judge is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the property is the proceeds of crime, that the offender had possession or control of it at some point, and the designated offence was committed in relation to that property, a forfeiture order must be made\": at para. 88, citing Lavigne , at para. 14; R. v. Angelis , 2016 ONCA 675, 133 O.R. (3d) 575, at para. 35, leave to appeal refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 484."], "obj_label": "462.37(1)", "id": "3f2c6086-f750-4384-b07d-80a75c63e40a", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["As much as it would be appropriate in the circumstances of this case, I cannot see that the provisions of sections 462.37(1), (3) and (4) of the Criminal Code relating to forfeiture of proceeds of crime are practical. If I were to impose a fine in lieu of of forfeiture, that fine must be $207,700 [ R. v. Lavigne , 2006 SCC 10, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 392], and as much as I believe that the defendant still has much of that money, section <mask> of the Criminal Code would necessitate that a two to three year jail sentence be imposed in default of payment of the fine."], "obj_label": "462.37(4)(v)", "id": "cc4cb81a-4a68-439f-b846-f18713c326c7", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Between the 1 st of June, 2004 and the 30 th of September, 2004 at or near the cities of Burnaby and Vancouver, British Columbia and elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia and in Toronto, Ontario and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario did unlawfully conspire together, the one with the other or others of them and with Casey WELLS, Liaqat KHAN, Amaran TYAB, Clint FARRELL, Ernest POLONI, Micro PASTRO and Robert FRIEDMAN and with a person or with persons unknown, to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance, to wit: Cocaine contrary to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada ."], "obj_label": "465(1)", "id": "14171578-5bd9-47df-8683-e4fc5dc27af9", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Between the 1 st of June, 2004 and the 30 th of September, 2004 at or near the cities of Burnaby and Vancouver, British Columbia and elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia and in Toronto, Ontario and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario did unlawfully conspire together, the one with the other or others of them, and with Casey WELLS, Liaqat KHAN, Amaran TYAB, Clint FARRELL, Ernest POLONI, Micro PASTRO and Robert FRIEDMAN and with a person or with persons unknown, to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance, to wit: Cocaine contrary to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada ."], "obj_label": "465(1)", "id": "a51d582b-8d16-47fc-b7bc-b02c158feac8", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[90] In my view, the evidence has established that Kwok, Ng and Lau fit squarely within the definition of criminal organization set out in Section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is not a requirement that it be proven for the purposes of sentencing and s. 467.1(1) and s. [718.2(a)(iv)], that each member of a criminal organization be cognizant of every aspect of that criminal organization's activities, or that any single member know the full extent of the organization. This aggravating factor applies to these accused.obj_label467.1(1)id9154ad99-6cb7-4f03-a96c-4944f193b1aasub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[90] In my view, the evidence has established that Kwok, Ng and Lau fit squarely within the definition of criminal organization set out in Section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is not a requirement that it be proven for the purposes of sentencing and s. 467.1(1) and s. 718.2(8)(iv), that each member of a criminal organization be cognizant of every aspect of that criminal organization's activities, or that any single member know the full extent of the organization. This aggravating factor applies to these accused."], "obj_label": "467.1(1)", "id": "0c0c5be3-fd78-4e24-a51d-2437661eb01d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Count 54 alleges the defendants participated in a criminal organization. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code criminalizes the knowing participation or contribution to a criminal organization's legal or illicit activities. It does not require a criminal act itself and the accused do not need to be a member of the organization. In R. v. Atkins et al. , 2010 ONCJ 262 (CanLII) , it was held that:obj_label467.11(1)idc2deb312-97c4-4fe2-88e1-4d196c4e1843sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe phrase \ in section 686(1)(b)(iv) refers to the classes of offences described in sections 468, 469, and 785 of the Criminal Code . The offence with which we are concerned here - murder - is an offence listed in section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is an offence within the exclusive trial jurisdiction of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction: R. v. Esseghaier , 2021 SCC 9, at paras. 42, 47, 48.obj_label469id297a8cd0-b744-4705-85c6-51cdb2e58881sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe presumptive mode of trial in cases of first degree murder is trial by jury: Criminal Code , s. 471. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code expressly permits an allegation of murder, an offence listed in s. 469(a)(vii) of the Criminal Code , to be tried without a jury, provided both the accused and the Attorney General consent to this alternative mode of trial.obj_label473(1)id47ca1e32-aacf-466f-b462-97c88981b35dsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThis discussion leaves for resolution the last question, whether there is a statutory foundation for Rule 7 of the British Columbia Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal Rules, 1986 , S.I./86-137, B.C. Reg. 145/86. That rule requires the filing and delivery of \ unless otherwise ordered by a justice or the court. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code gives every Canadian Court of Appeal the power to make rules for the conduct of criminal proceedings \. Section 482(3) indicates that rule-making power is sufficiently broad to authorize the making of Rule 7.obj_label482(1)iddda33087-bd35-481d-ad98-b8a9dfe94710sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesJudge shopping strikes at the core of our judicial system. The concept undermines the high level of confidence that is placed in our judicial system, where the decision of a judicial officer is final and binding unless and until it has been overturned by a higher court. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a \ may issue a warrant. The Criminal Code defines a \ as a Justice of the Peace or a judge of the provincial court. Therefore, [the justice at the Ontario Court of Justice] cannot be considered a higher court than [the] Justice of the Peace By applying for successive warrants on the same information to a different judge of the same court, the police committed impermissible judge-shopping . [Emphasis added.]obj_label487(2)id322f47e7-6914-4447-9eaa-c027ec7e20dcsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe search occurred after 9:00 p.m. and was by definition in the Criminal Code a nighttime search. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that search warrants must be executed by day unless the justice is satisfied, based on grounds set out in the affidavit in support of the warrant, that there are reasonable grounds to execute the warrant at night. The terms of the warrant authorized its execution after 9:00 p.m., but there were no grounds set out in the affidavit to support executing the warrant at night. The motion judge held that the failure to comply with s. 488 rendered the warrant invalid and the subsequent search of the apartment both warrantless and unreasonable. [1] The Crown does not challenge this finding.obj_label488idf6824e2f-2e43-4074-8125-c1a0988cc5c5sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesStorrey was decided under the former s. 450(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, when the provision read as \. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, removed the reference to \, changing the wording to: \. As noted in Baron v. R., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, at p. 446, the word \ adds nothing additional to the requirement of reasonableness.obj_label495(1)(a)id157ee965-d80b-47f4-aa94-9ea3a7207b6bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes a peace officer to arrest without warrant a person who \ the officer believes has committed an indictable offence. The language focuses on the officer's state of mind and the reasonableness of the officer's belief, rather than the actual state of affairs. Reasonable grounds can be based on a reasonable belief that certain facts exist even if it turns out that the belief is mistaken: see Eccles v. Bourque , [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739, at pp. 744-45 ; R. v. Herritt , 2015 NBCA 33 , 325 C.C.C. (3d) 325, at para. 21.obj_label495(1)(a)idad3c1b03-8be8-4cbf-8265-173f5a5ff6acsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe appellant submits that the trial judge erred in failing to consider whether his arrest and detention was arbitrary apart from a failure to comply with section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is not clear that this argument was advanced to the trial judge. There is no basis in the record to conclude that the conduct of the officer was arbitrary in the sense described in R. v. Cayer , [1988] O.J. No. 1120 (C.A.), \.obj_label495(2)id53d300cf-7cdf-49c5-aae3-c69f320de82dsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesrequires that offences charged in separate informations be capable of being joined in a single information before a single trial on those separate informations may be conducted. This is not possible here. Each information is laid under a different statute. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits joinder of Criminal Code offences in the same information but not provincial offences. And Criminal Code offences cannot be included in an information laid under the POA because they are not offences created by an \ as s. 25(5) of the POA requires.obj_label504id1a94759a-f755-4a54-b469-8449b8c82d29sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code permits a justice, before or at any time during the course of a judicial interim release hearing, on application by the prosecutor or accused, to adjourn the proceedings and remand the accused in custody in prison. Where the adjournment exceeds three clear days, the consent of the accused is required. It necessarily follows that an adjournment that is not more than three clear days - as was the adjournment in this case - does not require any consent on the part of the accused.obj_label516(1)id7abd51da-c4f2-42fd-a3ba-d828825276e1sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesOnce the prosecution establishes that the statutory preconditions are met, the presiding justice must cancel the existing release and the accused is detained. The effect of a revocation of bail is immediate - no further order of the Court is required for the accused to be detained. This is because the revocation of bail under section 524(8), by itself, also reverses the onus and creates a presumption that the accused remain in custody. Unless and until the accused makes a successful application, he is detained under section <mask> of the Criminal Code . At any point after the revocation of the prior release, the accused may be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why his or her detention is not justified. The common practice of \ to remand in these circumstances is only the deferral of the right, which may be exercised at any time, to show cause. Upon cause being shown, the presiding justice may make a further order under section 524(8) of the Criminal Code to detain the accused or release him under suitable conditions. Section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code excludes from a person \ under section 524(8) and not \ under the section.obj_label524(8)id103710d6-ac2a-4d0a-8f43-11f4e5fe30e1sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a custodial institution shall apply to a judge to fix a date for a hearing to determine whether or not an accused should be released from custody if the trial has not commenced within 90 days from the date the accused is initially taken before a justice under s. 503, or where there has been a previous detention review order or order detaining the accused, the date of the latter decision. The section stipulates that the person having custody of the detained adult shall make the application immediately after the expiry of the ninety days.obj_label525id438fe56e-f90c-4e83-a9a4-0b3da688a622sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code imposes \ on the attorney general and the courts ( R. v. Bujold , 2011 NBCA 24, 276 C.C.C. (3d) 442, at para. 5). This is based on the observation by the Supreme Court that \ ( Beaulac , at para. 20 (emphasis added)). In the context of a bilingual preliminary inquiry in which there are accused using each of the official languages, this duty is to ensure that the two languages are treated equally: in other words, that there is no \, with the other language merely being \ Equality must be the norm and not the exception, and must be achieved without creating conflict.obj_label530id93e74f30-e619-4f9b-bb85-7d6a078103casub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an accused has the right to a preliminary hearing in his or her official language. The Supreme Court of Canada has explained that language rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing in one's language, \"must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada\": R. v. Beaulac , [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, at para. 25 (emphasis in the original)."], "obj_label": "530", "id": "9f7f05b6-f3a6-40f3-98c0-fc8a2bdb98a9", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The bright line approach that I consider myself compelled to follow does not enable the defence to manufacture a s. 11(b) delay by re-electing into a shorter presumptive period of delay. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code requires Crown consent before the accused can re-elect to a trial by a provincial court judge. Where re-election would create the risk of s. 11(b) problems, the Crown has the authority to, and should, refuse consent, absent a s. 11(b) waiver."], "obj_label": "561(1)", "id": "58418908-9aa1-4e0a-bec0-dd09fa24fdaa", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits a provincial court judge acting under Part XIX to adjourn a trial from time to time until the trial is finally terminated. Like other adjournment provisions in the Criminal Code , such as ss. 537(1)(a) and 645(2), s. 571 contains no exhaustive or illustrative list of factors the judge is required or entitled to consider in determining whether to grant or refuse an adjournment."], "obj_label": "571", "id": "96b8a039-351d-4176-be0f-5ea3e95c10c6", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[1] Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that the proceedings stayed may be recommenced within the limited time frame of \"one year after the entry of the stay of proceedings, or before the expiration of the time within which the proceedings could have been commenced, whichever is the earlier\", without laying a new information. Since this was a summary conviction matter, the time within which the proceedings could have been commenced is six months. Unless the Crown gives notice that it is going to recommence proceedings within that time frame, \"the proceedings shall be deemed never to have been commenced.\" Although the Crown could have reinstituted proceedings within six months, that time has now elapsed."], "obj_label": "579(2)", "id": "526b132d-922a-4e85-a4cb-907e192b1096", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code enacts a rule of criminal pleading. As a general rule, each count in an indictment must refer to a single transaction. The term \"transaction\" is not synonymous with \"incident\", \"occurrence\" or \"event\". A single transaction may include separate acts that are successive and cumulative and which comprise a continuous series of acts forming one transaction: R. v. Hulan , [1970] 1 C.C.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 45; R. v. Selles (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 435 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 444."], "obj_label": "581(1)", "id": "7c705166-22ff-4f3c-ad00-5091c3da0d62", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Second, the appellant's argument is really one of notice. The charges, including the theft charge gave the appellant sufficient notice of the offences with which he was charged so that he could defend himself. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an information is not insufficient by reason only that \.obj_label583(g)ide3b6b861-096a-4e34-bef0-afa923414d88sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code is a rule of pleading that does not, in express terms, authorize joinder of summary conviction and indictable offences together in the same indictment. Equally, s. 591(1) does not prohibit such joinder; it uses the undifferentiated or generic term \: R. v. Clunas , [1992] 1 S.C.R. 595, at pp. 611-612. In the result, indictable and summary conviction offences may be joined together in the same indictment or information: Clunas , at pp. 611-612. But where the mode of trial for the indictable offences is trial by a court composed of a judge and jury, the indictable and summary conviction counts may not be tried together: Clunas , at p. 612.obj_label591(1)id62b65bac-cbc7-47f9-9f3e-ef753e2c82ffsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe legal context for analyzing this main ground of appeal is well established and uncontroversial. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the test for severance: the court may order that two accused be tried separately \. This provision confers broad discretion on a trial judge. In exercising that discretion, the trial judge must take account of the interest of each accused and of the public, represented by the Crown: see R. v. Suzack (2000), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 85, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 583.obj_label591(3)idbef30dc2-8a45-4d71-98e7-592b56a82cf8sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code grants trial judges a broad discretion to sever counts in the \. The decision attracts considerable deference. Appellate interference is only warranted when the decision is unjudicial or resulted in an injustice: R. v. Litchfield , [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333, at pp. 353-354; and R. v. Last , 2009 SCC 45, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 146, at paras. 14-18.obj_label591(3)(a)id3e9b5425-3862-4829-895f-30d4e79ae08asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code contains the statutory power to amend an information or indictment. While s. 601 specifically refers to amending \, s. 2 of the Criminal Code defines an \ as including an \. Further, s. 601(10) says that where the term \ is used within the provision, it is to be understood as including a judge acting in summary conviction proceedings. Consequently, the s. 601 power to amend an indictment applies with equal force to informations in summary conviction proceedings. As the focus of this appeal is on amendments to an information, I will use that terminology.obj_label601id8d28e907-a8b1-408c-9ba3-7bd57e9d7829sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a court shall, at any stage of the proceedings, amend the indictment where it appears that the indictment fails to state or states defectively anything that is requisite to constitute the offence, or is in any way defective in substance, and the matters to be alleged in the proposed amendment are disclosed by the evidence taken on the trial. In deciding whether to grant the amendment, as per s. 601(4) of the Criminal Code , the court must consider the following:obj_label601(3)(b)id00b22a4b-a5e4-4749-a3b8-42e94f743d94sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes pre-hearing conferences to be held before trial or other proceedings (for example, a preliminary inquiry) \. Where a case is set to be tried by a court composed of a judge and jury, a pre-hearing conference \ is mandatory under s. 625.1(2).obj_label625.1(1)id0aae297c-b4c5-4404-bb76-7c08bd7a1215sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSecond, the substitution of the presiding judge as the trier of the truth of the challenge does not compromise the impartiality of the jury. Prospective jurors found not to be impartial by the judge must not be empanelled as jurors for the trial. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code makes this clear. And those found impartial may yet be subject to excusal or being stood aside by the trial judge. To preserve impartiality, various in-trial mechanisms serve as antidotes to counter bias, especially the ability to provide jurors with instructions throughout and at the end of the trial.obj_label640(1)id4af05ec4-6bff-4ccc-8933-360e4584f9easub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe circumstances that may prompt an inquiry into the suitability of a juror to continue are myriad. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 , entitles a trial judge to discharge a juror for illness or other reasonable cause. The subsection is unrevealing about the threshold for conducting an inquiry, the factors to be considered in making that determination, or the procedure to be followed on any inquiry that is conducted. It would seem logically to follow that the decision about whether to conduct an inquiry falls within the discretion of the trial judge in much the same way as the discretion to determine the procedure to be followed on any inquiry that is held: Durant , at para. 140. See also, R. v. Giroux (2006), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 512 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 211.obj_label644(1)idf52fdeb5-c89b-41b4-a31c-866476e6856bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code creates a summary conviction offence that prohibits jurors from disclosing information about what took place in the jury room while the jury was absent from the courtroom that was not later disclosed in open court. The prohibition is not restricted to information disclosed during deliberations and is subject to an exception for an investigation of and testimony about an alleged offence under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code in relation to a juror.obj_label649(1)idca61a021-0878-4dc9-81a1-b72ecdddce6esub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code gives the appellant the right to be present in court during the whole of his trial subject to exceptions that do not apply in this case. Closing arguments are part of an accused's trial, and thus are subject to the requirement that the accused be present. This right gives effect to the principle of fairness and openness that are fundamental values in our criminal justice system. Presence gives the offender the opportunity of acquiring first-hand knowledge of the proceedings leading to the eventual result. The denial of that opportunity may well leave the offender with a justifiable sense of injustice, which is the \"implicit and overriding principle underlying\" the right to be present: see R. v. Hertrich (1982), 67 CCC (2d) 510, at para. 81 ."], "obj_label": "650", "id": "ce695dcf-51ec-41e4-88db-25ffb834d8e5", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The email communications and requests by the trial judge would seem to have been a deliberate choice of a method of communication other than that required by section <mask> of the Criminal Code . Perhaps the trial judge was concerned about ensuring adherence to a schedule provided to the jury about the concluding aspects of the trial. Certainty is desirable. The progress of a trial in its waning moments should not be unduly delayed. But the solution is not to ignore mandatory statutory requirements such as section 650(1) of the Criminal Code . There is no email exception."], "obj_label": "650(1)", "id": "1c5bab41-0b08-4b63-bf9e-0f0616c491ab", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an accused must be \"present in court during the whole of his ... trial\". In the context of s. 650(1), \"trial\" carries a broad meaning, although generally the trial proper does not commence until after a plea is entered. Martin J.A. explained the broad interpretation of \"trial\" for s. 650(1) purposes at para. 50 of R. v. Hertrich (1982), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 510 (Ont. C.A.):"], "obj_label": "650(1)", "id": "e523f0d1-04a9-47bf-ad9f-d3459977d983", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Procedural incidents of the trial process, such as pre-charge conferences, are part of an accused's trial. It follows from the statutory requirement of section <mask> of the Criminal Code , as well as every accused person's constitutional entitlement to be present at their trial, that the appellant was entitled to be present for the pre-charge conference. The entire pre-charge conference when the availability of the statutory partial defence of provocation was discussed. No statutory exception permitted his exclusion when the subject of the availability of provocation was discussed and decided. Exclusion of the appellant from this discussion contravened section 650(1) of the Criminal Code ."], "obj_label": "650(1)", "id": "610b813b-2728-4c6f-9ff6-6e924af8c474", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["See, E. (F.E.) , at para. 30. Provided the conditions precedent to the operation of the section have been met, the section may save harmless a breach of section <mask> of the Criminal Code : Simon , at para. 122; E. (F.E.) , at para. 31. See also, R. v. Cloutier (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 35 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 49, leave to appeal refused, [1989] S.C.C.A. No. 194."], "obj_label": "650(1)", "id": "49bc81ad-3baf-4394-9d86-56db788adcc2", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["This is not the first case in which an appellant has challenged the use of email to conduct substantive discussions about the contents of the charge to the jury. In prior decisions we have indicated that the use of email to provide counsel with copies of proposed jury instructions does not offend section <mask> of the Criminal Code . In those same decisions, we have made it equally clear that discussions about the content of those draft instructions are not to take place by email. These discussions, whether they solicit or offer submissions about charge content, affect and involve the vital interests of the accused and must take place in the actual presence of the accused. Section 650(1) requires it: Simon , at para. 137; Hassanzada , at paras. 130-131."], "obj_label": "650(1)", "id": "0da3fe22-341b-466e-91b4-249712d50ea0", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that, subject to certain exceptions (that are not material here), the accused \"shall be present in court during the whole of his or her trial.\" Section 650(1) protects the interest in allowing the accused to \"hear the case made out against him and, having heard it, have the opportunity of answering it\" and the interest in fairness and openness, which is advanced by allowing the accused \"the opportunity of acquiring first-hand knowledge of the proceedings leading to the eventual result of the trial\": R. v. Hertrich (1982), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 510 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 81. In light of these interests, the words - \"the whole of his or her trial\" - in s. 650(1) should be given an expansive reading: R. v. Barrow , [1987] 2 S.C.R. 694, at para. 14. A proceeding will be characterized as a part of the trial for the purposes of s. 650(1) where the accused's absence would \ or would violate \: R. v. Hertrich, at para. 82.obj_label650(1)ide4c57f0d-d4c9-4ce9-9016-03886ea6265bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesAs we have said in the past and reiterate today, no breach of section <mask> of the Criminal Code occurs by email transmission to counsel of drafts of proposed jury instructions. But as we have also said in the past and repeat today with emphasis, initiating and receiving by email submissions about the subject-matter contained in or omitted from final instructions does offend section 650(1) of the Criminal Code . The reason is simple. Pre-charge conferences under section 650.1 of the Criminal Code , indeed any discussions about what should be explained to the jury and the choice of instructions to be given, affect an accused's vital interests, thus are part of the accused's trial. Section 650(1) is engaged. The accused must be present unless an applicable exception applies. Use of email is not an exception. The message is in the medium. Open court. On the record. In the presence of the accused.obj_label650(1)idb9e855cb-2c67-4b0d-a475-f72ff72550a9sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe respondent begins with a submission that any email communications occurred within permissible limits. For the most part, the email exchanges involved providing counsel with successive drafts of the proposed instructions, pointing out changes made and explaining that each version would serve as the working copy for their in-court discussions. The preliminary nature of these discussions did not offend section <mask> of the Criminal Code and, in any event, did not cause or contribute to a miscarriage of justice.obj_label650(1)id6ebd2edd-d86d-4af5-885e-903b6bb9299esub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesFor the most part, admissions are made by the party against whom they are offered in evidence. But they may also be made by an agent within the scope of their authority: R. v. Strand Electric Ltd ., [1969] 2 C.C.C. 264 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 268; Metro Conference Centre Inc. v. Hunter , 2016 ABCA 83, at para. 42. Counsel acting for an accused may also make admissions on behalf of the accused: English v. Richmond , [1956] S.C.R. 383, at paras. 4-5. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code expressly authorizes counsel to \.obj_label655id0098e103-43a2-4064-98d5-5491fc256bfasub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code permits conviction of an accused of an offence included in the indictable offence charged where the evidence fails to prove the principal offence, but does prove the included offence. The included offence of which the accused may be convicted may be punishable on summary conviction. Once again, however, it is the nature of the proceedings, not the nature of the conviction that determines appellate rights.obj_label662(1)iddcf9939a-fc63-409e-856e-620558d0d973sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code required the Hospital to notify the Board that it had, for a period exceeding seven days, significantly increased the restrictions on Mr. Chaudry's liberty. The Hospital failed to give the Board the required notice. According to Dr. Ward, this failure was due to inadvertence on the Hospital's part when a key member of its staff was away on holidays.obj_label672.56(2)(b)id08523893-c6cd-4fa9-a827-9908d372102bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that where a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment on a dual status offender, \ The scheme therefore prioritizes the most recent custodial order, presumably on the basis that the most recent order best reflects the offender's current state of psychiatric health. Where the criminal conduct was found to have been committed wilfully and resulted in a conviction, it is more likely that the offender's mental disorder was not acute at that time.obj_label672.67(1)id511f0a9c-3e9c-4be0-beb3-5d1bae5b4ecesub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an appeal against a disposition order shall be \ In R. v. Owens , 2003 SCC 33, the court indicated that fresh evidence concerning events that postdate the disposition order may be admitted \ (paras. 48-61 and 71). The fresh evidence is not limited to the appellant. All parties may proffer fresh evidence: see R. v. Furlan , 2014 ONCA 740, at paras. 8-10.obj_label672.73ida7723a8f-c838-4918-ba45-df0f8e1c5da0sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an appeal against a disposition order shall be \. Fresh evidence concerning events that postdate the disposition order may be admitted where the evidence \: Owen , at paras. 48-61, 71.obj_label672.73idea06ee19-e73b-4a34-83cc-2a66a86b8d0bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a court of appeal may set aside a Board disposition if it is, inter alia , \. In R. v. Owen , 2003 SCC 33, at para. 33, the court said that this standard means that the Board's reasons must be able to withstand a \"somewhat probing examination\" to determine whether the decision is justifiable, transparent and intelligible."], "obj_label": "672.78", "id": "6ba32607-1447-4a32-844e-1b9ee793cd9a", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["We agree with the submission of all counsel, including the Crown, that the Board erred in its interpretation of this court's July 20, 2010 order. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code gives this court the power to refer a matter back to the review board for a rehearing \. The July 20, 2010 order was made pursuant to that power. The Board erred by, in effect, reviewing that order by purporting to engage in a full scale review of the appellant's situation. The Board's action was not only contrary to the order made by this court; it also denied procedural fairness to the appellant who was not on notice that such a hearing would be held. Moreover the Board's insistence that the appellant's annual review be postponed to July 2011 denied the appellant the right to a mandatory annual review pursuant to s. 672. 81 of the Criminal Code .obj_label672.78(1)id956c24e3-c3b8-48d0-af68-1fcbe35079c0sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesIn a case such as this, where the trial judge has already entered a conviction, one institutional concern is the fact that Parliament has established a generous appeal process that is primarily responsible for reviewing criminal adjudications. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46 gives an accused convicted of an indictable offence a right of appeal on questions of law alone and, with leave, on questions of mixed fact and law or fact alone, or on any other sufficient ground of appeal. A defendant convicted of a summary conviction offence has similarly broad rights of appeal. As the Supreme Court of Canada said, albeit in a different context, in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 79:obj_label675idf6d10351-e88c-403b-8cb5-15a67bfb3c8dsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe circumstances under which this court can intervene to overturn an acquittal are narrow. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code restricts the Crown's right of appeal from an acquittal of an indictable offence to \"any ground of appeal that involves a question of law alone.\" So long as the trial judge took a legally correct approach to the evidence, the Crown cannot argue that the verdict is unreasonable: R. v. Rudge , 2011 ONCA 791, 108 O.R. (3d) 161 , at para. 35 , leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 64; R. v. Curry, 2014 ONCA 174, 317 O.A.C. 329, leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 185, at para. 37. As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 33: \"[T]he concept of 'unreasonable acquittal' is incompatible with the presumption of innocence and the burden which rests on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.\""], "obj_label": "676(1)(a)", "id": "866431b6-4185-4b93-8cc3-b547e9746f86", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Subsection <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, provides that the Crown's right of appeal against acquittals is restricted to questions of law alone. Jurisprudence establishes that such questions include the following: misinterpretation or misapplication of salient legal standards, including the elements of the offences; assessing evidence based on erroneous legal principles; making findings of fact not based on the evidence; failing to give legal effect to findings of fact or of undisputed facts; failing to consider all the evidence bearing on guilt or innocence; failing to properly admit evidence; and, failing to provide adequate reasons: R. v. Fitton ,obj_label676(1)(a)id9d66dbb5-158f-4fce-885e-b1763ff2b250sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes a panel or judge of a court of appeal to extend the time within which notice of an application for leave to appeal may be given. Rule 7 of the Criminal Appeal Rules , SI/93-169, permits an extension to be granted before or after the expiration of the 30-day period prescribed by r. 4(2). Neither the Criminal Code nor the Criminal Appeal Rules frames a test to be applied or describes any factors to be considered in deciding whether the extension should be granted.obj_label678(2)id22c9a760-fda9-48d3-a7b3-96a83ce30a4fsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides, in my opinion, a clear standard against which the correctness of any decision granting or denying bail pending appeal can be reviewed. The concerns reflecting public interest, as expressed in the case-law, relate both to the protection and safety of the public and to the need to maintain a balance between the competing dictates of enforceability and reviewability. It is the need to maintain that balance which is expressed by reference to the public image of the criminal law, or the public confidence in the administration of justice. The \ criterion in s. 679(3)(c) of the Code requires a judicial assessment of the need to review the conviction leading to imprisonment, in which case execution of the sentence may have to be temporarily suspended, and the need to respect the general rule of immediate enforceability of judgments.obj_label679(3)(c)id8c6f4315-0893-406b-ba84-3034fbd2c5ecsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a bail review is to be conducted by a panel of this court where directed by the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice. A review is warranted where it is arguable that the judge committed material errors of fact or an error of law in arriving at the decision, or that the decision was clearly unwarranted in the circumstances: R. v. Oland , 2017 SCC 17,obj_label680id326a80e0-eb1f-432c-8220-8f7bc0a79a14sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code requires a trial judge, at the request of the Court of Appeal, to report on \ The form letter sent to the sentencing judge in this case asked whether there were any rulings that appeared relevant to the appeal, and if so, to attach any relevant and available transcripts.obj_label682(1)id8f3b65ca-d955-4c98-a8f4-7538a29ad5efsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSubsection <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes this Court to receive fresh evidence where it is in the interests of justice to do so. Pursuant to the test articulated in Palmer v. The Queen , [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, in addition to the requirement that fresh evidence comply with general rules of evidence, the relevant criteria considered on an application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal are as follows (at 775):obj_label683(1)idac457caa-49a2-4c81-b1a7-dd7e24a1c8fesub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code accords appellate courts a broad discretion to receive fresh evidence when the court considers it in the interests of justice to do so. When fresh evidence is proposed for admission on appeal the court must undertake a context-sensitive inquiry, taking cognizance of all the circumstances of the case. This encompasses not only the appellant's interests in fully pursuing his appellate remedies, but also the broader, long-term interests of the administration of justice: R. v. T.S., 2012 ONCA 289, 284 C.C.C. (3d) 394, at para. 114; Snyder , at para. 44; Truscott (2007), at para. 81."], "obj_label": "683(1)", "id": "a78343de-c7df-41a6-bdf5-c84805438cc6", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits, but does not require, appellate courts to receive the evidence, if tendered, of any witness, including an appellant, if the court considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so. The ubiquitous phrase, \"in the interests of justice\", is unconfined in the sense that the provision furnishes no list of factors, whether illustrative or exclusive, to inform its application."], "obj_label": "683(1)(d)", "id": "87c2a051-a5ea-4d02-8161-591d7cfc2561", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Robinson also rejected the American jurisprudence on which the appellant relies. The accused seeks to distinguish Robinson on the basis that \"[t]he Alberta Court of Appeal did not address the conflict raised here between the express language of section 10(b) with section <mask> of the Criminal Code .\" I disagree that Robinson can be distinguished on this basis. The accused in Robinson initially sought the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1), and the issue before the court was whether, when ss. 7, 10(b), 11(d) and 15 of the Charter are considered, s. 684(1) is unconstitutional. That is precisely the question before this court."], "obj_label": "684", "id": "f2405b5d-2b6c-49a9-bbba-cac500f14562", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["DEWITT-VAN OOSTEN J.A. : Shaun Costello applies for the appointment of legal counsel to represent him on an appeal from sentence for aggravated assault. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C\u201046 authorizes an appointment of counsel where doing so is \"desirable in the interests of justice\" and the appellant does not have \"sufficient means\" to obtain the assistance of a lawyer."], "obj_label": "684(1)", "id": "afddf31e-0dba-4be9-8872-6b70110e2023", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, permits a court of appeal to allow an appeal from conviction if the court is satisfied that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence received at trial. The question, as framed by the enabling provision, is whether the verdict is unreasonable on the evidence admitted at trial, not whether it is unjustified on that same evidence: R. v. Corbett , [1975] 2 S.C.R. 275, at p. 282. See also, R. v. Yebes , [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at pp. 185-186."], "obj_label": "686(1)(a)(i)", "id": "21ebd172-c3b8-4cb4-b20b-b5b111bf7d1f", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code bestows a duty on an appellate court to set aside a verdict \"that is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence.\" A conviction is reasonable if the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury or judge could reasonably have rendered: Corbett v. The Queen , [1975] 2 S.C.R. 275, at p. 282; R. v. Yebes , [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 185; R. v. Biniaris , 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 37. In applying that test, a \"[c]ourt must re-examine and to some extent reweigh and consider the effect of the evidence\": R. v. Sheppard , [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, 2002 SCC 26, at para. 34 (citing Yebes , at p. 186)."], "obj_label": "686(1)(a)(i)", "id": "155d7d1a-5977-42a6-b4d4-c0195419c146", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code empowers this court to allow an appeal against a conviction when it is of the opinion that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. When the verdict is delivered by a jury, this power is to be exercised within markedly narrow confines. A court of appeal is required to examine the whole of the evidence to determine whether the verdict could have been reasonably rendered by a properly instructed jury acting judicially. Although the court cannot simply substitute its own view of the facts, the task does require it to re-examine and re-weigh the evidence within the limits of appellate disadvantage: R. v. Yebes , [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168 at p. 186; R. v. Biniaris ,"], "obj_label": "686(1)(a)(i)", "id": "66729318-bfdb-436a-a5d1-a3c91477a76b", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Finally, there remains the matter of remedy. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code gives this court the jurisdiction to set aside a conviction and find the appellant not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder. Indeed when the NCRMD defence is raised for the first time on appeal this, rather than a new trial, would appear to be the presumptive course. Major J. said this at para. 65 of Warsing :"], "obj_label": "686(1)(d)", "id": "b93238d5-cbad-444a-9773-e5899059a95d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["We start with the powers of a court on appeal. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46 provides that when the court allows an appeal from conviction, it shall quash the conviction and either order a new trial or direct a judgment or verdict of acquittal to be entered. Section 686(8) provides that when the court exercises any of the powers conferred by s. 686(2), it may make any order, in addition, that justice requires."], "obj_label": "686(2)", "id": "b3e7c3b0-9b1c-4992-af47-8954b2b4fb06", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that where a court of appeal allows an appeal from conviction, it may direct an acquittal or order a new trial. Where a conviction is set aside on the ground that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence, the court of appeal, absent legal errors in respect of the admissibility of evidence, will usually enter an acquittal. As noted by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Harvey (2001), 160 C.C.C. (3d) 52 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 30, \"[a]n acquittal is the appropriate order because it would be unfair to order a new trial and give the Crown a second opportunity to present a case on which a reasonable trier of fact could convict.\""], "obj_label": "686(2)", "id": "1ff4df33-c4fc-4877-b93b-b8f95dc18312", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["On appeals against sentences passed by trial courts in proceedings on indictment, courts of appeal hear submissions from the parties about the fitness of the sentence imposed at trial. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code requires a court of appeal to consider the fitness of the sentence against which the appeal is taken and permits the court to dismiss the appeal or to vary the sentence within the limits prescribed by law for the offence of which the accused has been convicted."], "obj_label": "687(1)", "id": "c8d20ba8-0b01-4820-a295-8167ca0fc7bf", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Crown counsel places fresh evidence before the court, arguing that it assists with demonstrating the danger that the appellant continues to pose for the future. The fresh evidence consists of a two-page police affidavit and a Parole Board decision, revoking the appellant's day parole. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code allows the court on a sentence appeal to receive evidence it thinks \. The well-known criteria for admitting fresh evidence on a conviction appeal also apply on sentencing: Lacasse , at paras. 115-16; R. v. Palmer , [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759.obj_label687(1)id0410c59f-28c6-4b7c-ace4-25dd2f620dc8sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe complainant first disclosed conduct by the appellant, her uncle, to her mother as a result of her mother asking whether anything inappropriate had ever happened between the two of them. After that initial disclosure, the complainant gave a video-taped statement to the police. This statement, which was given when she was almost ten years old, related to incidents that had occurred when she was in grade one, up to four years earlier. The video was played before the jury, adopted by the complainant as the truth, and admitted as evidence in the trial on consent pursuant to section <mask> of the Criminal Code . The complainant also testified at trial. This was essentially the evidence led by the Crown.obj_label715.1id6ca239d5-2349-4256-af09-f8b80315c4fcsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, applies specifically to victims and witnesses under 18 who have given a video statement within a reasonable time after an alleged offence. Unless the judge is of the opinion that admission of the video statement in evidence would interfere with the proper administration of justice, the recording is admissible in evidence as part of the child's testimony in chief if, while testifying, the child adopts the contents of the video recording."], "obj_label": "715.1", "id": "1aa61c1f-5394-4cb3-b7ca-2de6a5574397", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[66] In my view, he was entitled to consider these matters on sentencing. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out two of the purposes of sentencing to be to denounce unlawful conduct and to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences, and s. 718.1 requires that the sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender."], "obj_label": "718", "id": "010f8485-c74d-454e-8ed2-1b6a2f9b8a5d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["More importantly, the sentencing judge correctly identified deterrence, denunciation, and the appellant's Aboriginal background (addressed below) as \ principles informing sentence in this case. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code instructs sentencing judges that \ In R. v. D.obj_label718.01idb962ffda-c01a-4f76-bd54-3da597afca00sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code codifies proportionality as the fundamental principle of sentencing in the adult context. Collateral consequences are not to be applied in a manner that undermines that principle. As the Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized, collateral consequences \: R. v. Suter , 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496,obj_label718.1id550b33ef-7227-4403-b999-0337bfe95115sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Typically, the assessment of the seriousness of an offence and an offender's conduct involves findings of fact that attract a standard of deference: R. v. Gerk , 2016 ABCA 162, 130 W.C.B. (2d) 374, at para. 26; R. v. McLean , 2016 SKCA 93, 132 W.C.B. (2d) 96, at para. 34. A legal error may exist where the trial judge's assessment of the conduct is contrary to, or not supported by, the evidence.obj_label718.1idb0485904-ad33-423b-9293-faa3244bdeefsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe longest prison term previously imposed on the appellant was for two years less a day. A \ to six years is too much, having regard to the nature of the offences and the Gladue factors. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code mandates that a sentence must be proportionate both to the gravity of the offence and the degree of blameworthiness of the offender. In other words, a sentence must not \: Ipeelee , at para. 37.obj_label718.1id7cb28c68-e30e-4d6c-8dbb-8ee14a7425ddsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesAs indicated above, the main issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in his application of the principle of totality. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that, \. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. M.(C.A.) , [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at para. 42 discussed the totality principle as follows:obj_label718.2idb20c7be7-76b3-4e36-81bf-52c38fd3d614sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe parity principle requires, to the extent possible, consistency in sentencing offenders in comparable circumstances. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. It is a fundamental principle of justice that like cases be treated alike: R. Cross, Punishment, Prison and the Public (London: Colin Steven and Sons, 1971), at p. 167.obj_label718.2(b)idc4091f66-f5f7-4a8a-87c6-3196d7e9bc08sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code requires a sentencing judge to take into account the principle that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. This principle is one of parity, not of equivalence. It does not require equivalent sentences. Nor does it forbid disparate sanctions for persons involved in the same offence. Were that so, it would run afoul with the fundamental principle of sentencing in s. 718.1, that of proportionality.obj_label718.2(b)ideccbd455-8e13-44c3-844f-fca3571c8217sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that where, as here, consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh. The principles of totality and proportionality require a sentencing judge to ensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender; the cumulative sentence may offend the totality principle if the aggregate sentence is substantially above the sentence for the most serious of the offences or if its effect is crushing: R. v. M. (C.A.) ,obj_label718.2(c)id2a988bc1-b228-4fe1-9085-270c4c0b0913sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code draws no distinction between these two types of scenario, and this Court and others have recognized that the totality principle applies where the offender is serving the remainder of a previous sentence: R. v. Cathcart , [1976] O.J. No. 1225 (C.A.); R. v. Gorham (1987), 22 O.A.C. 237; R. v. Bond , [2005] O.J. No. 108 (C.A.); R. v. Reid , [2003] O.J. No. 3255 (C.A.); R. v. Evans (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 91 (C.A.);obj_label718.2(c)id6b7149e1-b47a-4f41-968a-2a4f6d21f274sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code directs sentencing judges to give particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders when considering \. Given that public protection is the primary objective of the dangerous offender scheme, and the available sanctions are limited to sentences of imprisonment as set out in s. 753(4), this court has noted that the application of Gladue factors in this context may be limited:obj_label718.2(e)id588f6b1c-c008-42e9-ab63-e49d93acee13sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. As a general matter, this appeal raises the issue of whether a non-custodial sentence is reasonable, to use the language of s. 718.2(e), in circumstances where the paramount sentencing objectives are denunciation and deterrence . More specifically, this appeal must determine whether the trial judge properly applied s. 718.2(e) when sentencing the appellant. [Emphasis added.]obj_label718.2(e)id12112f42-2c6b-4e98-8cf5-f45d040dbfb3sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesIn Gladue , the Supreme Court stated, at para. 67, that \. These conditions, together with bias and systemic racism, have contributed to what the Court described, at para. 64, as a \ in Canada's criminal justice system: the grossly disproportionate incidence of crime and incarceration amongst Aboriginal peoples. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code, which directs sentencing judges to consider alternatives to imprisonment for all offenders but \"with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders\", was interpreted in Gladue , at para. 33, as a \"direction to sentencing judges to undertake the process of sentencing aboriginal offenders differently\". The Court held that a different approach was required to meet what it had described in R. v. Williams , [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 58, as widespread bias against aboriginal people within Canada and \"evidence that this widespread racism has translated into systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system\". In Gladue , the Supreme Court"], "obj_label": "718.2(e)", "id": "9cf96bf1-e628-424f-af15-291a8ca04173", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered by a sentencing judge, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. This provision encourages the consideration and application of restorative justice principles in sentencing, and has at its core a remedial purpose: Gladue , at para. 48; Wells, at para. 36."], "obj_label": "718.2(e)", "id": "b9ae1503-3487-49c2-95ee-8b46dc842795", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["(b) Section <mask> of the Criminal Code allows for the imposition of a term of imprisonment that is more than the maximum term of imprisonment provided for the offence in circumstances involving repeat intimate partner violence. In specific, s. 718.3(8)(c) allows for a maximum term of 10 years imprisonment to be increased to 14 years imprisonment in circumstances involving repetitive conduct as defined in that provision. The CLA argues that any accused who is given informal notice of the Crown's intention to invoke s. 718.3(8)(c) at the sentencing stage of the proceedings, should a conviction flow, should also be entitled to a preliminary inquiry .obj_label718.3(8)idab7f4270-b7a7-4e7f-9134-c114975aee8asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, gives a court discretion to consider pre-sentence custody in determining the sentence. Section 719(3.2) requires the court to give reasons for any credit granted for pre-sentence custody, while s. 719(3.3) requires the court to state the amount of time spent in custody, the term of imprisonment that would have been imposed before any credit was granted, the amount of time credited, if any, and the sentence imposed. The Supreme Court has stated that this is \: R. v. Summers , 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, at para. 74. This same obligation to give reasons applies when the sentencing judge refuses to give credit for pre-sentence custody: see R. v. Evans , 2019 ONCA 715, 147 O.R. (3d) 577, at para. 290.obj_label719(3)idde6995c6-fd24-4d47-b033-e0c34d9ce86esub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that before determining the sentence, the court \ give the prosecutor and the offender the opportunity to make submissions with respect to any facts relevant to the sentence imposed, and \ hear any relevant evidence presented by the prosecutor and the offender. Further, s. 726.1 provides that in determining the sentence, a court \ consider any relevant evidence placed before it. Nevertheless, in my view, a trial judge at sentencing should exclude otherwise relevant evidence proffered by the Crown where the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.obj_label723id2194be7c-08ed-4283-a91c-ad991f3b9e57sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSecond, the appellant's submission that the sentencing judge failed to review the evidence adduced at trial and to make relevant findings of fact essential for sentencing purposes falls on barren ground. In jury trials, s. 724(2)(a) requires the sentencing judge to accept as proven all facts, express or implied, essential to the jury's guilty verdict. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits , but does not require, a sentencing judge to find any other relevant facts proven on the basis of evidence adduced at trial or presented by either party on the sentencing hearing. The language of s. 724(2)(a) is mandatory; that of s. 724(2)(b), permissive.obj_label724(2)(b)id60805483-4ed2-4cf7-93ef-226fb2e6559asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesFurthermore, the Criminal Code makes clear that, if it is possible and appropriate, sentencing judges ought to impose a sentence on each count as opposed to simply imposing one global sentence. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code states that a court \obj_label725(1)(a)idf0907fae-4305-430a-b59c-cfc48052840esub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe sentencing hearing took place on October 30, 2015, shortly after certain amendments to the Criminal Code were brought into force by the Victims Bill of Rights Act , S.C. 2015, c. 13. These amendments included adding section <mask> of the Criminal Code, governing how restitution requests can be made and creating Forms 34.1 (\) and 34.2 (\) in Part XXVIII of the Criminal Code . Section 737.1(4) provides that, for purposes of restitution, the court may use Form 34.1 or \ Section 737.1(5) further provides that if a victim seeks restitution, and the court does not make a restitution order, it shall include in the record its reasons for not doing so.obj_label737.1id65846198-7290-4c39-80ff-7e65eebb6d2fsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesFINCH C.J.B.C. : The Crown appeals a sentence ordering a custodial sentence and a conditional sentenced to be served concurrently, because the order did not conform to the provisions of Section <mask> of the Criminal Code which says that a conditional sentence, if imposed in conjunction with a sentence for another offence, must be suspended until any period of imprisonment for the other offence has been served. The sentence as pronounced was not lawful.obj_label742.7 (1)id27c25130-9bce-4a67-935d-d7c89ed4eb83sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a judge may increase parole ineligibility above the normal ten-year period for an offender convicted of second degree murder up to 25 years, having regard to: the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the recommendation of the jury, if any. To justify such an order, the court may consider the future dangerousness of the offender and denunciation, as well as deterrence: R. v. Shropshire , [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227.obj_label745.4idb7a5cf58-d3ff-4e47-902c-dcef8086a9ebsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesFrom an institutional perspective, we think the parole board exercising its jurisdiction under section <mask> of the Criminal Code is in a much better position than a trial court to make the necessary assessments. There would be many problems associated with a new dangerous offender hearing so many years after the relevant events, not the least of which would be the possibility of re-traumatizing all of the victims through the need to appear and testify at a new hearing.obj_label761ida1d32b1d-cd0a-4ee5-a86c-2e3f73f12624sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe position of the OPS is straightforward. It was a party before the motion judge, a third party record-holder entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial judge to make the order by pursuing the extraordinary remedy of certiorari . The motion was dismissed. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. c-46, authorizes an appeal from a decision refusing the relief sought in proceedings by way of certiorari . Case closed.obj_label784(1)idf7afad63-7177-4d8d-8ce0-3244f18b92b4sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesNot so with third parties who can invoke two procedural avenues to appeal court orders affecting them before the end of the trial: L.L.A. v. A.B. , [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536, at para. 23. Where the order is that of a provincial court judge, a third party may challenge it through an enlarged writ or an order in lieu of certiorari . Further appeals to the provincial appellate court and Supreme Court of Canada follow the regular channels of our judicial system: L.L.A. v. A.B. , at para. 24. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes an appeal to this court \.obj_label784(1)idca387902-236b-48ce-9f09-b3e83bce8235sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe summary conviction appeal judge found that the trial judge erred by amending the counts. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code governs summary conviction proceedings and reads: \ The summary conviction appeal judge reasoned that the amendments had the effect of instituting new proceedings and were, therefore, statute barred by virtue of s. 786(2). He set aside the convictions and entered acquittals.obj_label786(2)id9530469e-b0ec-4355-a420-fc08f42107desub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesFirst, the offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty after the Crown's re-election to proceed summarily were summary conviction offences. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code requires that summary conviction proceedings be tried, determined and adjudged by a summary conviction court. Section 785 exhaustively defines \"summary conviction court\". Neither the \"superior court of criminal jurisdiction\", as defined in s. 2, nor a judge of that court is included in the definition of \"summary conviction court\" in s. 785 of the Criminal Code ."], "obj_label": "798", "id": "a22c4e60-a555-4462-a5d0-d5e65eef3b13", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code ensures that this discretion remains intact, despite the enactment of the Criminal Code , at least to the extent that it is not altered, varied, modified or affected by the Criminal Code or other federal enactment. But this discretion or inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked as authority for any order that contravenes a specific Criminal Code requirement: Noureddine , at para. 38; Murray , at para. 47; Swite , at para. 28; R. v. V. (W.), 2007 ONCA 546, at para. 22, leave to appeal refused, 386 N.R. 391 (note)."], "obj_label": "8(2)", "id": "bcfc8ac6-7337-40f3-a9c8-2f302199d67d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code allows the Crown to appeal the trial judge's decision to the summary conviction appeal court upon questions of law alone, questions of mixed fact and law, or questions of fact: R. v. Labadie, 2011 ONCA 227, 275 C.C.C. (3d) 75, at para. 50. Despite the breadth of the statutory appeal, deference is owed to the findings of fact of a trial judge. Here, the appeal judge relied on errors in the trial judge's analysis in interfering with her conclusion the appellant had not created a realistic risk of danger."], "obj_label": "813(b)(i)", "id": "996ae7bd-8304-4285-9ae9-6684f715ae08", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["While the trial judge described \"the exact same factual foundation\" as forming the basis for liability on each count, this simply recognized that proof of the same factual circumstances, the same series of events, supported Mr. Ahmed's conviction for both offences. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code mandates consecutive sentences, for offences \, where otherwise consideration would have been given to the imposition of concurrent sentences. Concurrent sentences are typically imposed where the multiple charges are part of the same event or transaction, and are appropriate where the charges have a sufficiently close nexus, or where \ is the same: Wozny , at para. 21. Here Parliament has directed that concurrent sentences are not available for terrorism offences arising out of the same events.obj_label83.26id775915eb-bffd-4a78-88b3-f62a22e46df6sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an appeal against a decision of a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge may, with leave of this court, be taken on any ground that involves a question of law alone. Leave is, however, granted sparingly. The court may grant leave: 1) where the merits of the proposed question of law are arguable and it has significance to the administration of justice beyond the specifics of the case; or 2) where there appears to be a clear error of law and the interests of justice require that this court review the decision: R. v. R.R. , 2008 ONCA 497, 90 O.R. (3d) 641 .obj_label839id874ad992-1397-438f-9fdf-b93fac9b2b65sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, provides that a decision of the SCAC may, with leave of this court, be appealed on any ground that involves a question of law alone. In R. v. R.R. , 2008 ONCA 497, 90 O.R. (3d) 641, this court said, at para. 32, that leave may be granted in two different categories of case. First, where the merits of the proposed question of law are arguable, even if not strong, and the question of law has significance to the administration of justice beyond the particular case. Second, where there appears to be a clear error, even if that error does not have significance beyond the specific case.obj_label839(1)id40e0c6cb-10ad-4f6b-8f45-8e627cc2670csub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code limits appeals to this court from decisions of summary conviction appeal courts to grounds involving questions of law alone and requires that leave to appeal be granted by this court. This second level of appeal in summary conviction proceedings is an appeal from the decision of the summary conviction appeal court, not a second appeal from the decision of the trial court. The appeal is limited to questions of law alone and does not extend to questions of fact alone or of mixed fact and law, as do appeals to the summary conviction appeal court from decisions made at trial. Second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are the exception, not the rule: R. v. R.(R) , 2008 ONCA 497, 90 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 25.obj_label839(1)ide2a99bec-ee43-4686-87b9-0dc698f51586sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides an exhaustive definition of \ for the purposes of Part III of the Criminal Code (Firearms and Other Weapons) . For those purposes, the term means \. Sophisticated firearms importing schemes succeed because of the different roles played by various participants in the scheme. A definition of importing that would exclude some because their actions are not sufficiently linked to the event of border-crossing would fail to address the practical heart of the offence. Those who have the mens rea for the offence and whose actions are part of the process of moving the contraband to the intended recipient are properly convicted of importing. This is so regardless of the time of their involvement or the role they played concerning border-crossing arrangements.obj_label84(1)idef5cc418-6788-4156-b9e0-bfd7a693adacsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe role of a justice commissioning an oath comes into play only by virtue of the wording of Form 1. Section 32 of the Interpretation Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, provides that \ Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits forms in the Criminal Code to be \. That is what has happened in this case. Form 1 has been amended in the Kitchener area (as it has been amended in other regions in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada) to permit commissioners of oaths to commission ITOs. This is entirely appropriate and does not alter the essential point of s. 487(1), namely, that a justice must consider and issue the search warrant based on sworn evidence.obj_label849id93bdc246-da78-4feb-b21f-9658dbe1c868sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesNorman Monty Porter, between the 16 th day of May, 2002 and the 4 th day of November, 2002, inclusive, at or near Central Saanich, in the Province of British Columbia, did contravene a regulation made under paragraph 117(h) of the Firearms Act, respecting the storage of non-restricted firearms in that they were not stored in a manner that rendered them inoperable or stored in a container, receptacle, or room that is kept securely locked and that is constructed so that it cannot readily be broken into and had readily accessible ammunition, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code.obj_label86(2)id89ec1046-77c9-4d36-8e08-08d39d08c39esub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesNorman Monty PORTER between the 16 th day of May, 2002 and the 4 th day of November, 2002, inclusive, at or near Central Saanich, in the Province of British Columbia, did contravene a regulation made under paragraph 117 (h) of the Firearms Act, respecting the storage of restricted firearms in that they were not stored in a manner that rendered them inoperable or stored in a container, receptacle, or room that is kept securely locked and that is constructed so that it cannot readily be broken into and had readily accessible ammunition, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code.obj_label86(2)id6e1e5a40-40b1-47e7-8652-064fd58a9818sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesNorman Monty PORTER, between the 16 th day of May, 2002 and the 4 th day of November, 2002, inclusive, at or near Central Saanich, in the Province of British Columbia, did possess a prohibited device, a cartridge magazine that is capable of containing more than 10 cartridges of the type for which the magazine was originally designed and that is designed or manufactured for use in a semi-automatic handgun that is commonly available in Canada, while not being the holder of a licence under which he may possess it, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code.obj_label91(2)id69923a26-3014-4fc3-8915-fc901078ec43sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesI differ from my colleague in one other respect. He would balance the mitigating factors against two significant aggravating factors: (1) the appellant was on bail for an unspecified charge at the time of the shooting and the terms of his bail prohibited him from possessing any firearm; and (2) the shooting was part of a course of conduct during which the appellant displayed a blatant disregard for the safety of those around him. The trial judge adverted to what in my view is a third significant aggravating factor: the firearm was a prohibited weapon. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides for a three year minimum sentence merely for possessing a loaded prohibited firearm. This case is very different than one involving an accident with a hunting rifle.obj_label95idf43793c1-5f44-4079-859e-da0a74465034sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(1) Everyone who procures a person to offer or provide sexual services for consideration or, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under <mask>section 286.1(1), recruits, holds, conceals or harbours a person who offers or provides sexual services for consideration, or exercises control, direction or influence over the movements of that person, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years.obj_labelsubide3fb1a51-c048-431f-b0b7-26ece6120847sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(iii) an offence under <mask>section 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code , chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; orobj_labelsubid05da1136-5e4a-486c-956f-d87098700827sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesJames Albert Stanley FISHER, between the 3rd day of December, 2015 and the 6th day of December, 2015, inclusive, at or near Burnaby, in the Province of British Columbia, being an official, did, in connection with the duties of his office, commit a breach of trust by kissing [B], [B] being a witness in a prior criminal prosecution, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code.obj_label122idce466d7e-2cef-42e2-96ef-dba818d78cdesub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesJames Albert Stanley FISHER, between the 22nd day of August, 2015 and the 7th day of December, 2015, inclusive, at or near Vancouver and Surrey, in the Province of British Columbia, being an official, did, in connection with the duties of his office, commit a breach of trust by kissing [A] for a sexual purpose, [A] being a witness in a criminal prosecution, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code.obj_label122id98535994-23da-4c61-9b4a-d96dce32a335sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[21] Additionally, I have some concern as to whether or not the court has jurisdiction under the Family Relations Act to in fact vary the agreement. In my view this is an unfortunate quirk of the Family Relations Act . The Family Relations Act only allows the Supreme Court to enforce the terms of an agreement filed pursuant section <mask>, not in fact vary it.obj_label122id942feb7e-6774-45b4-b358-bfb47e0788c1sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesI do not accept this submission. Section <mask> of the CYFSA is clear that, subject to ss. 122(4) and (5), which address deemed and court-ordered extensions, \ (emphasis added) that results in a child being in the care and custody of a society for more than 12 months, if the child is younger than six on the day the court makes the order. The 12-month time limit for an order under s. 122(1)(a) is plain on the face of the provision. The unfortunate practical reality that children do sometimes remain in interim society care for longer than this does not render the statutory time limit optional. Courts at all levels have stressed \: Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. M. (C.) , [1994] 2 S.C.R. 165, at p. 206; see also Children's Aid Society of Oxford County v. W.T.C. , 2014 ONCA 540, 46 R.F.L. (7th) 290, at para. 10; Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. C.J.W. , 2017 ONCJ 212, at para. 90."], "obj_label": "122(1)(a)", "id": "597e3754-f15f-4083-bba6-627f9a621c24", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Norman Monty PORTER, on or about the 17 th day of May, 2002, at or near Central Saanich, in the Province of British Columbia, being at large on a recognizance entered into before a Justice or a Judge and being bound to comply with a condition of that recognizance as directed by a Justice or a Judge, did fail without lawful excuse to comply with the following condition or direction: \"To surrender any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, and any related authorizations, licences and registration certificates you possess to the Central Saanich Police Department within 24 hours of your release from custody\", contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code."], "obj_label": "145(3)", "id": "37224cff-66dc-4ed7-82cb-bd22d670eefc", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> is inherently linked to s. 515(10). It is duty-based and risk- based. It promotes the proper functioning of the bail system by providing an enforcement mechanism. At interest is not only protection of the public and maintaining confidence in the administration of justice but also enabling a court to control its own process thereby maintaining dignity, respect, and integrity of the justice system: R. v. Patko , 2005 BCCA 183 at para. 23. The purpose of the section is to mitigate the risks of releasing an accused person into the community by imposing a minimum uniform standard of conduct having regard to societal interests rather than personal standards of conduct. A failure to comply with court-imposed conditions of release, which under s. 515 (10) must be minimal, reasonable, and necessary, thwarts or defeats the bail system and public confidence in the administration of justice."], "obj_label": "145(3)", "id": "a9be074e-93b5-4f0f-ab6b-73cc9462f834", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["First, the duty-based offences discussed in A.D.H. ----ss. 215, 216, 217, and 217.1---expressly include the word \"duty\". Section <mask> does not, and the omission is a significant one. In A.D.H. the majority concluded that s. 218 (child abandonment) imported a subjective standard and was distinguishable from the other objective fault offences noted above because s. 218 was not defined in terms of failure to perform specified legal duties: at paras. 66, 68. That was found to be so despite the nature of the offence which could be described as imposing a duty on caregivers to behave in a particular way -- just as persons released on bail have a duty to comply with the conditions of their release."], "obj_label": "145(3)", "id": "6315e7d5-e142-46de-9d8d-2bed7c4901ea", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["A continuing relationship can be preserved where the society applies for an openness order under s. 145.9(1) of the CFSA . Subsection <mask> of the CFSA provides that the court may make an openness order in respect of a child if the court is satisfied of the following: that it is in the best interests of the child; that the openness order will permit the continuation of a relationship with a person that is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and that the society, the person who will be permitted to communicate with or have a relationship with the child if the order is made, and the person with whom the society has placed or plans to place the child for adoption, have all consented."], "obj_label": "145.1(3)", "id": "4a090edb-6ec8-4b4d-8092-907a97b62fe4", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Second, the Divisional Court concluded the Tribunal erred in law by taking a limited view of its remedial jurisdiction. The Divisional Court focused on the Tribunal's remark that it was \ The Divisional Court said this statement was plainly wrong because it is clearly contradicted by the express wording of s. 145.2.1(4)(c). Section <mask> authorizes the Tribunal to \obj_label145.2.1(4)(c)id03867015-ad91-4247-ab87-5178b5c55bbasub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(3) If an accused is charged with an offence under section <mask>, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 212, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02 or 279.03 and the prosecutor or the accused applies for an order under subsection (1), the judge or justice shall, if no such order is made, state, by reference to the circumstances of the case, the reason for not making an order. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 486; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 203, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 14, c. 23 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1992, c. 1, s. 60(F), c. 21, s. 9;1993, c. 45, s. 7;1997, c. 16, s. 6;1999, c. 25, s. 2(Preamble); 2001, c. 32, s. 29, c. 41, ss. 16, 34, 133;2002, c. 13, s. 20;2005, c. 32, s. 15, c. 43, ss. 4, 8;2010, c. 3, s. 4;2012, c. 1, s. 28.obj_label151id2e8c98ea-560b-421f-9c6b-448d75af6822sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesOne of the grounds for making an order under section <mask> appears to require nothing more than the existence of an investigation order, or the intention to issue one. However, a freeze order generally has far more serious and immediate consequences than an investigation order. Property of the alleged wrongdoers is immediately affected and the property of innocent third parties can be captured in the freeze. The Commission must therefore consider the seriousness of the allegations and the evidence supporting them so it can weigh the threat to the public interest against the potential consequences of the order.obj_label151id30b5b083-eed6-4ea9-b6c6-0a9a4f4186f6sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences7. (4.1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act, every one who, outside Canada, commits an act or omission that if committed in Canada would be an offence against section <mask>, 152, 153, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3), section 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172.1, 172.2 or 173 or subsection 286.1(2) shall be deemed to commit that act or omission in Canada if the person who commits the act or omission is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act .obj_label151id8ac50c30-82bd-456f-a868-eb52e2eeb9ebsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[M.R.H.], from the 28th day of October, 2006 to the 28th day of October, 2011, inclusive, at or near Surrey and Harrison Hot Springs, in the Province of British Columbia, did, for a sexual purpose, touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of his body or with an object, the body of J.S. , a person under the age of fourteen years, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code.obj_label151id66e4d6e3-9c99-4e1a-abf5-c2c0c3cbdaf3sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(3) If an accused is charged with an offence under section <mask>, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 163.1, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 212, 271, 272 or 273 and the prosecutor or the accused applies for an order under subsection (1), the judge or justice shall, if no such order is made, state, reference to the circumstances of the case, the reason for not making an order. R.S., c. C-34, s. 442; 174-75-76, c. 93, s. 44; 1980-81-82-83, c. 110, s. 74, c. 125, s. 25; R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 14; c. 23 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1992, c. 21, s. 9; 1993, c. 45, s. 7; 1997, c. 16, s. 6; 1999, c. 25, s. 2; 2001, c. 32, s. 29; 2001, c. 41, s. 16, 34 and 133(13), (14); 2002, c. 13, s. 20; 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, ss. 4 and 8(3)(a).obj_label151id231ca198-f873-4a2f-a8cf-3fd47da6eea4sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences150.1 (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (2.2), when an accused is charged with an offence under section <mask> or 152 or subsection 153(1), 160(3) or 173(2) or is charged with an offence under section 271, 272 or 273 in respect of a complainant under the age of 16 years, it is not a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge.obj_label151ide46c786d-a4a8-403a-93e4-d3c646a190d6sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences( b ) (3) If an accused is charged with an offence under section <mask>, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 212, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02 or 279.03 and the prosecutor or the accused applies for an order under subsection (1), the judge or justice shall, if no such order is made, state, by reference to the circumstances of the case, the reason for not making an order. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 486; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 203, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 14, c. 23 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1992, c. 1, s. 60(F), c. 21, s. 9;1993, c. 45, s. 7;1997, c. 16, s. 6;1999, c. 25, s. 2(Preamble); 2001, c. 32, s. 29, c. 41, ss. 16, 34, 133;2002, c. 13, s. 20;2005, c. 32, s. 15, c. 43, ss. 4, 8;2010, c. 3, s. 4;2012, c. 1, s. 28.obj_label151id225186e7-5fce-42fe-ab48-035aee4f9bd0sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[M.R.H.], from the 28th day of October, 2006 to the 28th day of October, 2011, inclusive, at or near Surrey and Harrison Hot Springs, in the Province of British Columbia, did, for a sexual purpose, touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of his body or with an object, the body of J.S., a person under the age of fourteen years, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code.obj_label151idb2cf5616-d9cc-4f61-a67d-f3c2273ad381sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(3) If an accused is charged with an offence under section <mask>, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 163.1, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 286.1, 286.2 or 286.3 and the prosecutor or the accused applies for an order under subsection (1), the judge or justice shall, if no such order is made, state, by reference to the circumstances of the case, the reason for not making an order.obj_label151ida27ae180-e73b-432e-b33f-fa098cdc725csub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(1) Subject to subsections (2) to (2.2), when an accused is charged with an offence under section <mask> or 152 or subsection 153(1), 160(3) or 173(2) or is charged with an offence under section 271, 272 or 273 in respect of a complainant under the age of 16 years, it is not a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge.obj_label151id48b3c595-4656-415f-a781-fc7aa921fdaesub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences276 (1) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section <mask>, 152, 153, 153.1 or 155, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 or 273, evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainantobj_label151id9fe7a308-8744-4ec8-8e5a-9ee17ed2593asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesIn approaching the issue of reasonable hypotheticals, I note that Parliament contemplates that the s. 151 offence can be committed in various ways, some of which are punishable by a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days' imprisonment. Section <mask> provides for such a sentence where the Crown proceeds summarily (even though the elements of the offence are exactly the same as proceeding by indictment)."], "obj_label": "151(b)", "id": "3d4ef350-e6e5-4d91-8262-e054eb2eb35d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["An examination of s. 152 and its relationship to s. 150.1(4) reveals none of the features driving the interpretation of s. 172.1(1) in cases in which it is alleged the accused was speaking with someone he believed to be underage. Section <mask>, unlike s. 172.1(1), does not criminalize conduct well preliminary to the achievement of any ultimate harmful criminal object. Section 152 prohibits conduct of an overtly sexual nature directed at persons under 16. An invitation or incitement to engage in sexual activity, which the person who is the subject of the invitation is incapable of consenting to on account of their age, is inherently harmful conduct."], "obj_label": "152", "id": "eebf855f-4b72-46fe-8ec6-c9ee91868958", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The legislative history also assists in understanding the interaction of s. 152 and s. 150.1(4). Both sections were introduced in the same amendments to the Criminal Code : see An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act , S.C. 1987, c. 24. Section <mask>, along with several other sections, criminalized various kinds of sexual activity with persons under the prescribed age. Prior to these amendments, apart from a provision criminalizing sexual intercourse with females under 14 (s. 146), there were very few offences specifically targeting sexual activity with children. Section 146 was repealed in the same legislation that enacted s. 152."], "obj_label": "152", "id": "6bf2f4a3-a61a-4472-8211-e229e1196061", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The \"reasonable belief\" standard set out in certain provisions of s. 156(1) also governs the provincial officer's authority to issue contravention orders under s. 157 of the EPA . Section <mask> provides that a provincial officer may, among other things, issue an order to any person that he or she \ is contravening the provisions of the Act or regulations, or another order made under the Act. The order may require the person to comply with any directions related to achieving compliance with the Act or regulations.obj_label157id62fae0bd-81fd-4646-a530-a32ac2b89357sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences... However, I would add that even if I had come to the conclusion that there was encroachment, I would have come to the conclusion that section <mask> of the Canada Shipping Act only touches a very limited aspect of the relationship between seamen and captain, being the signature of a contract of engagement. Sections 163 and 165 contain no substantive clause relating to work conditions and does not frame in any manner the bargaining of work conditions for seamen. In this regard, the encroachment is, to say the least, modest and touches no fundamental aspect of the power of the provinces in relation to property and civil rights (92(13) Constitution Act, 1867 ).obj_label163ide50ff695-337b-432c-be33-7ae1e49c0eaasub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences171 If the commission, the executive director or a designated organization considers that to do so would not be prejudicial to the public interest, the commission, executive director or designated organization, as the case may be, may make an order revoking in whole or in part or varying a decision the commission, the executive director or the designated organization, as the case may be, has made under this Act, another enactment or a former enactment, whether or not the decision has been filed under section <mask>.obj_label163id054e1fa1-4fe3-4aac-ba7c-2dda1134ddf9sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section <mask>, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.obj_label163.1id5d0146be-c23f-4fa8-b81e-9f62dbcc7128sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section <mask>, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way .obj_label163.1ide48a1bcd-2e1e-4be7-bfa0-d24a5e621760sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(3)In proceedings in respect of an offence under section <mask>, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.obj_label163.1id3e197092-c60f-4e77-9795-bf63244c14aasub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out a range of punishment for offenders on indictment to be a minimum of 12 months to a maximum of 10 years imprisonment for accessing child pornography. The Criminal Code also sets out that conditional sentences are not available for offenses under this section. I have reviewed the jurisprudence provided by counsel, all the relevant post- Friesen jurisprudence, and the amendments to the Criminal Code , in the result, I cannot entertain a conditional sentence here.obj_label163.1 (4)(a)id316ab0ce-21de-44de-9d4e-e6f23f4cd912sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesAn excluded driver is defined at s. 224(1) of the Act as \ Section 249 provides that an insured \ In this context, s. 227(1) provides that an insurer shall not use a form for an endorsement unless the form is approved by the Superintendent.obj_label249ida4099921-7dec-44c1-9561-4231c4294c7dsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> uses the term \ to make clear that the expressed illustrations are not exhaustive. Both the natural meaning of the phrase, \, and the purpose of the provision of criminalizing dangerous driving, capture any circumstances that enhance the dangerousness to the public of the manner of driving. We see no error in the trial judge's finding that Mr. Bradley drove in \"a manner dangerous to the public\" when he engaged in the pattern of driving that he did, with unbuckled passengers."], "obj_label": "249(1)", "id": "45b71245-6959-4621-ab35-8c88c94b0ee5", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the essential elements of the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. The provision requires consideration of all the circumstances including, but not only, those listed. What must be determined, by a consideration of all the circumstances, is whether the manner in which the person charged was operating the vehicle was dangerous to the public."], "obj_label": "249(1)(a)", "id": "5bfa1d0a-91a3-427f-becc-f3c5888c6ab5", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["(3) Where a peace officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that a person is committing, or at any time within the preceding three hours has committed, as a result of the consumption of alcohol, an offence under section <mask> [impaired operation of a motor vehicle], the peace officer may, by demand made to that person forthwith or as soon as practicable, require that person to provide then or as soon thereafter as is practicable"], "obj_label": "253", "id": "fdd57418-4153-4951-b03e-e9f4e45a15cb", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), no person shall use, disclose or allow the disclosure of the results of physical coordination tests under paragraph 254(2)(a), the results of an evaluation under subsection <mask>(3.1), the results of the analysis of a bodily substance taken under paragraph 254(2)(b), subsection 254(3), (3.3) or (3.4) or section 256 or with the consent of the person from whom it was taken after a request by a peace officer, or the results of the analysis of medical samples that are provided by consent and subsequently seized under a warrant, except"], "obj_label": "254", "id": "7602ee03-dc1a-4f49-827a-71cf28acfbbd", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["In Lemieux , supra , at 328 O.A.C., the court agreed with the Crown's submission that \: see also McCauley , supra . It is the failure or refusal to comply with the demand to provide the breath sample that is at the core of the infraction, not the failure or refusal to provide the breath sample \. The word \ in subsection <mask> does not define the substance of the offence. Rather, it imposes on the person to whom the demand is made an obligation to comply in a timely fashion, and on the authorities an obligation to conduct the test in a timely fashion once the request is honoured in order that the detainee's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter are minimally impaired. [Emphasis added.]"], "obj_label": "254(2)", "id": "48788a6c-58eb-4fd9-b10b-f8e760adf583", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["A timely demand is validly made pursuant to subsection <mask>, in my opinion, where (a) the individual to whom the demand is made has been operating a motor vehicle, or has care or control of that vehicle, (b) the peace officer who makes the demand reasonably suspects that the individual to whom the demand is being made has alcohol in his or her body, and (c) the police officer is ultimately in a position to require that the breath sample be provided before there is any realistic opportunity to consult counsel. Where, as here, there has been an outright refusal to provide a breath sample, it is not a prerequisite to such a demand that the Crown establish the approved screening device was present at the scene, tested and ready to accept a sample, or that the police officer presented the device to the driver and explained the purpose of the test and the consequences of a failure to provide a sample."], "obj_label": "254(2)", "id": "a39a73b9-596f-4d18-8029-9b65ab80b198", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), no person shall use, disclose or allow the disclosure of the results of physical coordination tests under paragraph 254(2)(a), the results of an evaluation under paragraph 254(3.1)(a), the results of the analysis of a bodily substance taken under paragraph 254(2)(b) or (c), subsection <mask>, (3.3) or (3.4) or section 256 or with the consent of the person from whom it was taken after a request by a peace officer, or the results of the analysis of medical samples that are provided by consent and subsequently seized under a warrant, except"], "obj_label": "254(3)", "id": "97838a73-d4f6-496f-ba41-9320e8048399", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The Crown appellant submits that in Alex , the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the \"plain meaning\" approach to the common opening words in former ss. 258(1)(c) and (g): \"where samples of the breath of the accused have been taken pursuant to a demand made under subsection <mask>, ...\". The provisions of ss. 258(1)(c) and (g) are evidentiary shortcuts. They are intended to streamline proceedings in alcohol-driving cases by dispensing with the need to call two extra witnesses - the qualified technician and a forensic toxicologist - in every prosecution for offences involving excess blood alcohol concentration. The only preconditions to be met to invoke these presumptions are those concerned with the reliability of the test results and relating those results to the blood-alcohol concentration of the accused at the time of the offence. A valid breath demand has nothing to do with these scientific criteria and reliability guarantors."], "obj_label": "254(3)", "id": "cf52bc1b-b389-4158-b143-9ef97a309773", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["To obtain a conviction for first degree murder under s. 231(6) of the Code , the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the underlying offence of criminal harassment under s. 264, and the added mental element under s. 231(6). Section <mask> has two branches: the Crown had to show that the appellant engaged in harassing conduct by repeatedly following or communicating with Eugena, or watching her or engaging in threatening conduct towards her; and that this harassing conduct caused her to fear for her safety. Section 231(6) required the Crown to show that the appellant intended to cause Eugena to fear for her safety."], "obj_label": "264", "id": "836c98e3-30c3-4398-a263-0c04108e606d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Counsel's complaint, as I understand it, is that the trial judge \ six months of time served on two of the criminal harassment counts (three months on count 17 and three months on count 44); this time served would otherwise have been available to credit against other counts properly considered by the trial judge. There is little, if any, merit in this submission. Section <mask> of the Code sets out the elements of criminal harassment, including \. It was open to the trial judge, having thoroughly reviewed the evidence, to find that the elements of criminal harassment were satisfied. I also note that the credit at issue was effectively credit of 3-to-1, a product of the trial judge having been 'very generous'. In my view, his focus was on the global sentence, so that even if there were no criminal harassment convictions, there would not have been any impact on the overall sentence.obj_label264idc83c7a63-8506-4e61-90ba-da3670a50ff2sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesFirst, Sim's submission is inconsistent with s. 264(1) of the Code and thus is contrary to Parliament's express intent. Subsection <mask> specifies that the mens rea component of criminal harassment can be met by an accused's knowledge or recklessness. To suggest that the actus reus of threatening conduct requires a specific intent to instil fear is contrary to the plain language of s. 264(1)."], "obj_label": "264(1)", "id": "7633f067-802d-44a2-a59e-e06e2d76d315", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["With respect to the second element, in R. v. LeBlanc , [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1583, the Supreme Court approved the trial judge's ruling that whether the threatener intends to carry out the threat is irrelevant to determining if a conviction can be maintained. It is the element of fear instilled in the victim by the issuer of the threat at which the criminal sanction is aimed. Section <mask> provides that the threat must be knowingly uttered or conveyed by the accused. Thus the Crown is required to establish that the accused intended to threaten the victim with death.obj_label264.1idc6c663ef-e3e2-4a96-be16-8776d717d096sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesAssault causing bodily harm in s. 267(b) is distinguished from aggravated assault by virtue of the type of harm caused. Section <mask> must be read in conjunction with s. 2 of the Criminal Code , a provision of general application, which defines \ as \obj_label267(b)id41374d9c-511e-4f74-a7ea-15facdc68830sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> was designed to reduce insurance costs and the cost of doing business for leasing and rental companies in the automotive arena - an industry of significant importance in Ontario - and hence those of the consumer. This was the legislative context. The legislative objective was clearly expressed in s. 267.12 by the introduction of the cap on liability available to a lessor or lessors.obj_label267.12id54206ac8-315c-4f54-8557-7e607fd7b7e2sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesUnder s. 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act , a lessee's policy is required to respond first and if that policy provides coverage of $1 million or more, access to the lessor's policy is precluded if s. 267.12 of the Insurance Act is applicable. McEwen J. determined that s. 267.12 did apply and did not permit an unnamed insured access to the lessor's excess coverage. Section <mask> commenced with the phrase \"[Despite] any other provision in this Part\". This language reflected both the primacy of the section and legislative intent."], "obj_label": "267.12(1)", "id": "bf9465a5-c14f-4d43-9ca5-0d6f3ad195c5", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The appellant appeals from the dismissal of his application for a declaration that two provisions of the Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, relating to automobile accident claims - ss. 267.5(1) and 280 - violate ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and that s. 280 contravenes s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 . Section <mask> places limits on the recovery of pre-trial income loss and s. 280 confers jurisdiction over statutory accident benefits disputes to an administrative tribunal."], "obj_label": "267.5(1)", "id": "6ace052b-30b1-4253-84cf-3718fb98fb40", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The appellant begins his argument on this ground of appeal by pointing out that neither the CJA nor the Rules provide for interest to be applied to anything other than the judgment as issued and entered. He then points to s. 267.5(9) of the Act and says there is nothing in it that creates an entitlement to notional pre-judgment interest. Section <mask> reads as follows:"], "obj_label": "267.5(9)", "id": "1c1836f3-f7ca-4e2c-ab06-49911ffc234f", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The plaintiffs, respondents on appeal, brought a motion before trial to determine whether their action was statute barred by s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8. Section <mask> provides that a person is not entitled to recover damages for bodily injury or death arising from the use or operation of an automobile if, at the time of the incident, the person was operating an uninsured motor vehicle on a highway contrary to section 2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.25."], "obj_label": "267.6(1)", "id": "b7258386-b587-4741-93be-acea65083f3d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["These two forms of compensation \u2014 SABs and tort damages \u2014 are independent of one another. It is inevitable, however, that there will be overlap between the compensation provided to an accident victim by no-fault SABs and the award of damages to that person in a civil tort action. Section <mask> of the Insurance Act contains provisions designed to address this overlap and to prevent double recovery. It reflects the principle that victims should be fairly compensated, but not over-compensated. Automobile insurers, who provide first-party benefits through SABs insurance, should not be required, when wearing their fault based liability insurer hats, to compensate an accident victim twice for the same losses. In preventing double recovery, the statutory regime modifies the common law \"collateral source\" rule \u2014 that insurance or other benefits available to the injured plaintiff do not reduce the amount for which the tortfeasor is liable: see Boarelli v. Flannigan , [1973] 3 O.R. 69 (C.A.)."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "61daeb6b-734a-4341-98ba-71c7a7870d68", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Insurance Act , provides that pecuniary damages awarded in a tort action \"shall be reduced\" by payments that the plaintiff received as collateral benefits, such as statutory accident benefits including payments for health care expenses and other pecuniary losses. Since the defendant would benefit, the onus is on the defence to show whether and how the reductions should be made: Bannon v. McNeely (1998) , 38 O.R. (3d) 659, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 223 (C.A.), at para. 74."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "78c9ba9b-cb6c-436d-80df-dc532e763656", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["In our view, these considerations apply equally in assignment cases. Section <mask> is integrated in the sense that, together, its provisions are meant to ensure fair compensation and prevent double recovery. There is no principled or technical reason why a different matching regime should apply to SABs received after trial. While Bannon can be distinguished as being based on a prior statutory regime, and the result in Gilbert was based on its unique facts, to the extent that both cases support a strict matching approach under the current statutory scheme, they should be overruled in light of Gurniak . The silo approach is to be applied to s. 267.8 as a whole."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "69b3fd0e-8068-4d2d-9cd5-142838398edf", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> also incorporates the principle that the plaintiff\u2019s damages reflect the liability of all responsible parties involved in the incident. Subsection 267.8(20), specifically provides that \"[f]or the purposes of subsections (1), (3), (4) and (6), the damages payable by a person who is a party to the action shall be determined as though all persons wholly or partially responsible for the damages were parties to the action even though any of those persons is not actually a party\" (emphasis added). The purpose of this subsection is to ensure that the liability of a defendant, for the purpose of calculating its entitlement to deduct SABs from the judgment against it, is based on its proportionate liability, regardless of whether other defendants, protected or not, are parties to the proceeding and regardless of whether other defendants have settled with the plaintiff or on what basis. To construe the words \"damages to which a plaintiff is entitled\" as net several damages after apportionment between tortfeasors fails to give effect to that explicit direction by ignoring the settling defendant\u2019s proportionate responsibility for the loss."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "63086b19-8218-468b-81fb-6d34268463f1", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["It is well established that the legislative purpose of s. 267.8 is to promote fair compensation to injured plaintiffs and prevent double recovery. As this court observed in Cadieux v. Cloutier, 2018 ONCA 903, 429 D.L.R. (4th) 468, leave to appeal refused [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 63 , at para. 17: \" Section <mask> of the Insurance Act contains provisions designed to address [the overlap between tort damages and collateral benefits] and to prevent double recovery. It reflects the principle that victims should be fairly compensated, but not over-compensated.\""], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "9dadf4ae-a72b-4b51-83b7-020e0d6a1eb5", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Insurance Act codifies the common-law principle that a plaintiff should not recover twice for the same kind of loss arising from the same incident. The particular benefits that are to be deducted, held in trust or assigned are described in the legislation only in broad categories. For example, s. 267.8(1) requires that benefits for income loss and loss of earning capacity be deducted from damages for income loss and loss of earning capacity. Likewise, s. 267.8(4) requires that health care expense payments be deducted from damages for health care costs. While the Insurance Act does not, on its face, further distinguish particular statutory benefits on a qualitative or temporal basis, several cases have imposed those requirements by requiring strict matching between common-law heads of damage and the specific type of SABs benefit received."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "08515d9f-f2ad-4401-a784-215e3fc120df", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["In Carroll and Cadieux , companion appeals, a five-member panel of this court adopted the \"silo\" approach to the treatment and matching of SABs to tort damages under section <mask> of the Insurance Act . The panel held that the \"strict matching\" approach, developed in Bannon v. McNeely (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 659 (C.A.), was no longer to be followed. One of the stated benefits of the silo approach was that it would promote greater efficiency in motor vehicle accident litigation."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "23d1fe8a-de85-4bae-8e1b-76782d2f3cc5", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Insurance Act modified the common law on the deductibility of benefits from tort awards. I begin with a brief review of the common law principles. I do so to show that the CPP and HOOP benefits Ms. Demers receives would not be deductible at common law. Their non-deductibility at common law provides the context for assessing the impact of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act ."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "efb89fab-6478-4c27-9c69-a2f80ce4512d", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Mr. El-Khodr took the position that the matching approach should be followed and that \"[t]he trial judge granted the assignments which she was able to match with the jury verdict, and denied those which she could not match for each collateral benefit listed in Section <mask> of the Insurance Act \". This was in accordance with the approach adopted by this court in Bannon v. McNeely ."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "34d9ecfa-e47c-4d2c-abef-b909b6ac1fd2", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["As noted in Basandra v. Sforza , 2016 ONCA 251 , 130 O.R. (3d) 466, at para. 21, affirmed in Cadieux , the statutory scheme sets up benefits silos: \" Section <mask> of the Insurance Act creates several categories of statutory accident benefits to be taken into account as possible reductions in a jury award: [the first silo is] income loss and loss of earning capacity (s. 267.8(1)); [the second silo is] health care expenses, which includes attendant care costs by definition under s. 224(1) of the Act (s. 267.8(4)); and [the third silo is] other pecuniary losses such as housekeeping costs (s. 267.8(6)).\" The tort award is to be reduced by the amount of statutory accident benefits received by the plaintiff on the basis of these three silos."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "ff842513-69b8-481a-a664-90580628e5fa", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Insurance Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, therefore provides that tort awards must be reduced by corresponding categories of SABs received. This is accomplished by deducting those SABs received before trial from the damages awarded and by either holding in trust those SABs received after trial or by assigning the SABs benefits payable after trial to the tortfeasor or his insurer."], "obj_label": "267.8", "id": "c46fff02-6ccd-4ddb-86be-5e8d02081bc3", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The parties brought a motion on an agreed statement of facts and on consent under rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure , R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, to determine whether as a matter of law the CPP and HOOP disability benefits would be deductible under s. 267.8(1)2 of the Insurance Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. I-8, from any award for loss of income or loss of earning capacity, and if so, whether the deduction should be gross or net of income tax. Section <mask>2 provides:"], "obj_label": "267.8(1)", "id": "dcb63272-2057-4f0e-b3e3-e7dd3e71906b", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Under s. 267.8(9)(ii), prior to any assignment under ss. 267.8(12)(a)(ii), a successful plaintiff must hold \" payments in respect of the incident that the plaintiff receives after the trial of the action for income loss or loss of earning capacity ... under an income continuation benefit plan\" in trust (emphasis added). Subsection <mask> requires the plaintiff who holds money in trust under subsection (9) to \"pay the money to the persons from whom damages were recovered in the action, in the proportions that those persons paid the damages\"."], "obj_label": "267.8(10)", "id": "9b6f2622-6b61-481a-be36-3ddee27d30b1", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["In my view, the language of s. 267.8(12) does no more than clarify the mechanism of the assignment of the appellant's rights to the payments within the scheme of s. 267.8. This means that by virtue and for the term of the assignment, the respondent's insurer has all the appellant's rights and is subject to all the provisions under the plan, including, subject to the plan [2] , the ability to deal directly with Sun Life and to contest the deduction of income taxes from the payments. But, while s. 267.8(12)(a) refers to \ rather than \, as was the case in Bapoo , it does not entitle the respondent's insurer to receive payments greater than those the appellant receives. Subsection <mask> does not refer to payments \"received\", because the focus of this provision is not on the entitlement to payments , but rather on the broader entitlement to the plaintiff's underlying rights , which includes a right to payment, among others.obj_label267.8(12)id327c412f-03da-4592-82a2-e551ce630fcesub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSubsection <mask> empowers this court to impose conditions on assignment orders. We would do so in this case to prevent the unsuccessful appeal of the conditional assignment order from defeating the benefit of that order. We would impose an additional condition on the assignment order requiring Ms. Carroll to disclose to Aviva the amount that she has received by way of SABs payments in respect of medical and rehabilitation benefits and attendant care benefitsobj_label267.8(12)id39a456e0-6a51-4c9f-855e-37f59c61e492sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Insurance Act recognizes that an award may include damages \. It provides that the sum of those awards must be reduced by the amount of payments \. The plaintiff's entitlement to future, that is, post-trial, collateral benefits for health care is addressed in ss. 267.8 (9) - (13) of the Insurance Act ."], "obj_label": "267.8(4)", "id": "70761e03-2527-48b8-aeed-2c5726a761a7", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Insurance Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, provides that a plaintiff who recovers damages for loss of income or for expenses that will be incurred for health care shall hold in trust for the defendants \"[a]ll payments in respect of the incident that the plaintiff receives after the trial of the action\" for loss of income under the laws of any jurisdiction or under any income continuation benefit plan and for statutory accident benefits in respect of expenses for health care."], "obj_label": "267.8(9)", "id": "a4bb5618-fb54-408d-a4f2-ca9e6a0e15b1", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["In Cadieux , we noted that the language of the deduction provisions which directs that \"all payments\" within each of the described silos will reduce a tort award, is inconsistent with offsetting some SABs payments within the designated silos against damages, but not others. Like those provisions, s. 267.8(12) requires the assignment of all rights in respect of all payments with respect to the enumerated categories of SABs. Subsection <mask>, which requires the payment of SABs to be held in trust, also specifically includes this \"all payments\" language."], "obj_label": "267.8(9)", "id": "b8b7879c-3185-4234-b46b-84684b49358e", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["If optional statutory accident benefits are purchased and are applicable to a person ... and the person claims SABS under this policy ... and agrees not to make a claim for SABS under another policy, we agree that we will not deny the claim, for both mandatory and optional statutory accident benefits coverage purchased, on the basis that the priority of payment rules in Section <mask> of the Insurance Act may require that the person claim SABS under another insurance policy."], "obj_label": "268", "id": "fb955966-38e4-409f-9873-3e8d46d76a19", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask>(5.2) does not apply to the facts of this case. It stipulates that if a person is a named insured under more than one policy and was, at the time of the incident, an occupant of an automobile in respect of which the person is a named insured (or the spouse or a dependant of the named insured), the person must claim SABS against the insurer of the automobile in which the person was an occupant. As noted, Mr. Ekstein was a pedestrian, or \"non-occupant\", when struck by the pick-up truck."], "obj_label": "268", "id": "fefa6e59-717b-4ce1-8e0a-4359941405fe", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The OPCF 47 provides that if optional accident benefits are purchased and are \" applicable \" to a person under the policy, the insurer will permit the insured person to claim both mandatory accident benefits and optional accident benefits under that policy . The insurer will not deny benefits on the basis that the priority of payment rules set out in section <mask> of the Act provide that another insurer is liable to pay the mandatory accident benefits."], "obj_label": "268", "id": "a0525d9e-6c26-4716-af4d-2cc01af99fe0", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the Insurance Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. I-8, deals with statutory accident benefits in motor vehicle liability policies. Section 268(1) provides that every such policy \"shall be deemed to provide for...statutory accident benefits\". For cases where an individual might seek benefits under more than one policy, s. 268(2) sets out priority rules. As the Claimants were occupants of a vehicle at the time of the accident, the following rules apply:"], "obj_label": "268", "id": "02ec78cc-f088-4f84-8de1-0a2689377e6a", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[T]he net result is that the obligation for the mandatory benefits ultimately rests with the insurer having the highest ranking under section <mask> of the Insurance Act . This is entirely appropriate. It supports the legislative intention of making optional benefits available at reasonable cost. Any other interpretation would have the effect of unduly loading costs onto the optional benefit insurers and would discourage individuals from purchasing that coverage for their protection. [Emphasis added.]"], "obj_label": "268", "id": "ee9a9d2c-7331-489d-bec6-7bd9feacbcbf", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["On or about the 5 th day of May in the year 2010 at the City of Ottawa in the East/De L'Est Region did, in committing an assault on Cst. Earl COOK, wound, maim, disfigure, or endanger the life of the said Cst. Earl COOK by using a weapon, namely a knife, and thereby commit an aggravated assault, contrary to section <mask>, subsection (2) of the Criminal Code of Canada .obj_label268id82d72d22-037e-4065-b14b-939fb792ce73sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesIf optional statutory accident benefits are purchased and are applicable to a person under this policy, and the person claims SABS under this policy as a result of an accident and agrees not to make a claim for SABS under another policy, we agree that we will not deny the claim, for both mandatory and optional statutory accident benefits coverage purchased, on the basis that the priority of payment rules in Section <mask> of the Insurance Act may require that the person claim SABS under another insurance policy.obj_label268idd60f579f-1f7e-4a54-b883-048dafb16c67sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Insurance Act , R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8. (the \) sets out priority of payment rules specifying the insurer against which a SABS claimant may have recourse for SABS in particular circumstances. Under ss. 268(5) and (5.2) of the Act, if a SABS claimant is a \ under more than one policy, the SABS claimant may decide from which insurer to claim SABS .obj_label268iddf7b3f94-b9ee-4ac5-be95-458b89670393sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThis endorsement is part of your policy. It has been made because persons who are entitled to receive optional statutory accident benefits under this policy may, by the priority of payment rules in Section <mask> of the Insurance Act , be required to claim under another policy that does not provide them with the optional statutory accident benefits that have purchased under this policy. This endorsement allows these persons to claim Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS) under this policy, including the optional statutory accident benefits provided by this policy, provided they do not make a claim for SABS under another policy.obj_label268idfd75f313-578c-406b-866f-5b4087e928e4sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(1) The insurer responsible under subsection <mask> for the payment of statutory accident benefits to such classes of persons as may be named in the regulations is entitled, subject to such terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits as may be prescribed, to indemnification in relation to such benefits paid by it from the insurers of such class or classes of automobiles as may be named in the regulations involved in the incident from which the responsibility to pay the statutory accident benefits arose.obj_label268 (2)id3d2e20ce-9d0a-4403-869e-f988ceb4b120sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences275. (1) The insurer responsible under subsection <mask> for the payment of statutory accident benefits to such classes of persons as may be named in the regulations is entitled , subject to such terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits as may be prescribed, to indemnification in relation to such benefits paid by it from the insurers of such class or classes of automobiles as may be named in the regulations involved in the incident from which the responsibility to pay the statutory accident benefits arose. [Emphasis added.]obj_label268 (2)id27e79107-9427-4e8a-a57e-6c1e13b5f6b8sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe insurer responsible under subsection <mask> for the payment of statutory accident benefits to such classes of persons as may be named in the regulations is entitled, subject to such terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits as may be prescribed, to indemnification in relation to such benefits paid by it from the insurers of such class or classes of automobiles as may be named in the regulations involved in the incident from which responsibility to pay the statutory accident benefits arose. [Emphasis added.]obj_label268 (2)id6f0201ef-1018-4046-bc24-feda1fb4eaacsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences275. (1) The insurer responsible under subsection <mask> for the payment of statutory accident benefits to such classes of persons as may be named in the regulations is entitled, subject to such terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits as may be prescribed, to indemnification in relation to such benefits paid by it from the insurers of such class or classes of automobiles as may be named in the regulations involved in the incident from which the responsibility to pay the statutory accident benefits arose. 1993, c. 10, s. 1.obj_label268 (2)ide1bd6d7d-d15d-43ae-8ca0-75fdd4b0d512sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences(4) If a dispute involves a statutory accident benefit that the insurer is required to pay under subsection <mask> and no step authorized by subsection (1) has been taken within 45 days after the day mediation failed, the insurer shall pay the insured in accordance with the last offer made by the insurer before the failure until otherwise agreed by the parties or until otherwise ordered by a court, by an arbitrator acting under this Act or theobj_label268 (8)id6c0c2301-36bb-4b54-af79-628447091680sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesBut the priority rules stipulated by s. 268 only apply if both insurers are subject to those rules. Section <mask> provides that it applies to: \ To understand what this means, one must turn to the definition of \ in s. 224(1). That section refers to Ontario policies (s. 224(1)(a)), and to policies issued extra-provincially by insurers who file an undertaking in Ontario (s. 224(1)(b)). The extent to which extra-provincial policies are caught by s. 224(1)(b) is generally limited by s. 226.1 to situations where the vehicle that is registered and insured extra-provincially is actually operated in Ontario. [2]obj_label268(1)ida17bf2eb-9ecc-4048-8f8f-a057b3b4f39asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the Criminal Code provides: \ In this case, the indictment was particularized to permit three avenues to conviction for the offence of aggravated assault instead of four: the brothers were alleged to have wounded, maimed, and/or disfigured Mr. Miller. The indictment removes the possibility of a fourth avenue to conviction, namely, through endangerment of life.obj_label268(1)id8d071bc5-9c52-4496-9350-97f37ff5a4bdsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe insurer responsible under subsection <mask> for the payment of statutory accident benefits to such classes of persons as may be named in the regulations is entitled, subject to such terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits as may be prescribed, to indemnification in relation to such benefits paid by it from the insurers of such class or classes of automobiles as may be named in the regulations involved in the incident from which responsibility to pay the statutory accident benefits arose. [Emphasis added].obj_label268(2)idcd216fa7-db48-41cd-9a36-a169ea96b6f3sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe insurer responsible under subsection <mask> for the payment of statutory accident benefits to such classes of persons as may be named in the regulations is entitled, subject to such terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits as may be prescribed, to indemnification in relation to such benefits paid by it from the insurers of such class or classes of automobiles as may be named in the regulations involved in the incident from which the responsibility to pay the statutory accident benefits arose.obj_label268(2)ide3471007-ae9e-41d4-aa31-107632be88ecsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesI am mindful that Mr. [H.] went on to add that what [J.] had told the police was not true. [Defence counsel] asked him, \ Mr. [H.] replied, \. This was an entirely different answer than Mr. [H.] had given just seconds before. In my view, and notwithstanding the response given my - by Mr. [H.] to [defence counsel's] question in reply, that horse was already out of the barn. If Mr. [H.] had not done the act complained of, then there could only be one answer to the question posed by [Crown counsel], a question which Mr. [H.] confirmed he understood. That answer is, and should have been, an, an emphatic \"no\". Instead, Mr. [H.] paused and answered that he didn't know. Well, certainly only Mr. [H.] could know the answer to this question. Accordingly, whatever doubt existed up until that point in the evidence was erased by Mr. [H.]'s answer to that question posed by [Crown counsel] and as a result, the court is left with no reasonable doubt and accordingly a conviction will register in relation to the count of sexual assault contrary to section <mask>. The other charge will be stayed. [Emphasis added]."], "obj_label": "271", "id": "f88fbce4-19b4-48ef-959e-0ba4aeee1972", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[1] The SABS-2010 also provides the insurer with other safeguards. For example, pursuant to s. 46.2(1), an insurer may also request a person who submits an invoice for payment for attendant care to provide any information required to assist the insurer, acting reasonably, to determine its liability for payment. And pursuant to s. 53, an insurer may terminate payment of benefits if the insured person has wilfully misrepresented material facts with respect to the application for the benefit and the insured has been provided with notice setting out the reasons for the termination. It should also be noted that pursuant to the Act, the insurer can refer disputes in respect of an insured person's entitlement to statutory accident benefits or in respect of the amount of statutory accident benefits to which an insured person is entitled to mediation. Subsection <mask> of the Act provides that such disputes shall be resolved in accordance with ss. 280 to 283 of the Act and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule . Pursuant to those sections of the Act, either the insured or the insurer may refer the issue in dispute to a mediator and, if the mediation fails, the parties jointly or the mediator may refer the issue in dispute to a person appointed by the Director for an evaluation of the probable outcome. If the issue is not thereby resolved, the insured may then bring a court proceeding, refer the issue to an arbitrator under s. 282, or the insured and the insurer may agree to submit the matter in dispute to any person for arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1991 , S.O. 1991, c. 17.obj_label279(1)id76e17860-453a-4cd2-aad4-926c82483a47sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe actus reus of the offence requires proof of: (1) a confinement, (2) the confinement is without lawful authority, and (3) a lack of consent by the complainant to the confinement. Proof of the first two elements is objective; the third, subjective. The third element, which is not referred to in s. 279(2), was the subject of discussion in R. v. Gough (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 453 (Ont. C.A.), in which the constitutionality of s. 279(3) (formerly s. 247(3)) of the Criminal Code was in issue. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code reads:obj_label279(3)idbab0d8b1-6062-4c43-875e-b4ed93c9bab3sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[183] The word exploitation in section <mask>1 does not possess its general or common definition, which would simply be to use someone in an unjust manner. If that was the definition to be applied there is no doubt A.A. exploited G.M.S. but in section 279.011 the word has two very specific legal definitions: one for providing labour or a service and one for organ or tissue removal. It is of course the first one that we are concerned with in this case. The labour or service involved is dancing in the clubs.obj_label279.01idcd05af04-d4c3-4b44-969c-82cd7916d316sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> instructs us that one person exploits another if they cause that other person to provide labour by doing something that, in all the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause the other person to believe that their safety or the safety of a person known to them would be threatened if they failed to provide the labour. On a straight-up reading of this definition of exploitation, three conclusions emerge:obj_label279.04id56193f84-0b50-4443-beba-d44a1f3d9ca6sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe indictment charged the appellant in the following language: that Michael Manley \. The count on the second robbery was framed in the same terms.obj_label344id582d3d18-7fa1-44e7-af0a-546e81faeef5sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe mandatory minimum in issue does not apply to all frauds over $5,000. Subsection <mask>(1.1) provides that when a person is convicted of fraud, the court shall \ The \ refers to the amount of the loss or risk of loss suffered by the victim.obj_label380idde0dda63-2a11-4847-9a4e-e442a9061affsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe policy reasons for restricting the circumstances in which municipal tax sales might be challenged (certainty, finality and the integrity of the sale process, including interests of third parties) are not engaged when dealing with the surplus under s. 380. [7] The taxpayer is not challenging the sale process, but asserting a claim to the surplus. Section <mask> operates after the municipality has recovered its tax arrears and its costs, at a time when its claim against the property is spent, and without affecting the rights or interests of third party purchasers. At issue under s. 380 is entitlement to the surplus, not the property itself. As such, there is no prospect of interfering with or undermining the municipal tax sale process.obj_label380id59100acb-a2b3-4a8d-9bcf-235fec3e39ecsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[7] While the Municipality in its factum raises concerns about certainty, in particular as to how the treasurer should proceed in the face of a late application and whether and to whom additional notice would be required, these concerns are misplaced. Section <mask> requires payment into court of the surplus and from that point on, any determinations of entitlement, forfeiture and relief from forfeiture, are for the court.obj_label380idd6db3906-c9ce-4ff6-887c-b59b059890f0sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe appellant was committed for extradition on the offence of \ (the \). He attacks the committal order on two main grounds. First, he argues that the extradition judge had no jurisdiction to proceed since the version of the Authority to Proceed (\) filed by the Attorney General at the extradition hearing was a photocopy, rather than the original, of the ATP. The appellant contends that a photocopy of an original ATP does not constitute a proper ATP within the meaning of the Extradition Act , S.C. 1999, c. 18 (the \).obj_label380(1)(a)id7d8a4b9e-9ab7-45a1-899b-7c31c8ec8ddasub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesTHAT HE, the said KEVIN EKOW PLANGE, between August 13, 2013 and July 28, 2014, in the City of Toronto, in the Toronto Region, and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means unlawfully did defraud or attempt to defraud the Government of Canada of money in an amount greater than five thousand dollars ($5,000), by preparing and submitting false RC366 E Direct Deposit Request - GST/HST, Payroll and/or Corporation Income Tax Forms to the Canada Revenue Agency to change the direct deposit information of corporations, and as a result re-directed or attempted to re-direct Goods and Services Tax refunds and other payments properly payable to corporations, to bank accounts controlled by him, thereby committing an offence contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada , as amended.obj_label380(1)(a)id49166128-3e40-4a6b-aaf1-3b7d01cc06fcsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesAt the commencement of the offence in 2003, the maximum penalty for fraud pursuant to s. 380 of the Criminal Code was ten years. On September 15, 2004, the legislation was amended and the maximum penalty increased to 14 years. At the same time, s. 380.1 came into force, which codified aggravating circumstances for the purpose of sentencing in fraud cases. Section <mask> was amended again on November 1, 2011, adding more aggravating circumstances, one of which was relied on by the sentencing judge and is set out below:obj_label380.1id11305a7f-f41b-4a44-850c-e3e86f628667sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> creates the offence of intentionally or recklessly causing damage to property by fire. The provision creates a pure property offence that contains no additional mens rea requirement. The section does not require proof that anyone was harmed or endangered by the fire. Section 434 does not, however, apply if the person causing the damage by fire wholly owns the damaged property. A person who intentionally or recklessly causes damage by fire to property that he wholly owns does not commit an offence under s. 434. [1]obj_label434idbdba7e0c-7bdb-4a2d-bcfa-f97c8414be48sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> applies to an accused who intentionally causes damage by fire to their own property, or to someone else's property, if that fire seriously threatens the health, safety, or property of another person. For example, in this case, count two alleged a breach of s. 434.1. The Crown relied on the evidence of the threat to the safety and property of the other residents in the townhouse complex to establish the appellant's liability under s. 434.1. The threat posed to the police and firefighters who responded to the fire could also justify a conviction under s. 434.1.obj_label434.1id295d91f7-6081-4b43-bf38-4facbefffc9fsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> seeks to deter offenders from using firearms in the commission of crimes and to protect the public's life, liberty and security interests from the modern scourge of gun-related violence. It does so by creating a new offence of \"use of a firearm\" and by imposing a more severe form of punishment on those who commit indictable offences that may - but do not necessarily - involve the use of a firearm when they are committed in the more aggravated fashion. Section 265(1)(c) is designed to prevent interference with a person's liberty and security interests by creating the offence of assault where that goal is accomplished by accosting or impeding the person with a weapon - not necessarily a firearm - present but not necessarily used. As Doherty J.A. observed in R.K. , at para. 39:obj_label85idb44568a3-b1f4-4da8-9786-74941746e499sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesOn October 30, 2007, the applicant brought a motion before a provincial judge to extend the time in which to appeal his first three convictions, pursuant to section <mask> of the Provincial Offences Act . It is not clear from the record why the applicant did not bring this motion with respect to all four convictions, but this dishevelled approach seems to be consistent with his mental state. The applicant's motion was dismissed."], "obj_label": "85", "id": "8871838e-a378-487d-b104-c2e1b4c60326", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The Commission investigators set forth their apprehensions that the information outlined in the Memoranda raised significant concerns that [Mr. Z] may have been acting as an unreported de facto director of Yco and, if so, Yco had failed to comply with section <mask> of the Act and [Mr. Z] had failed to file insider trading reports for the trading in securities of Yco that the Applicant and Xco had made. Furthermore, if [Mr. Z] were a de facto director of Yco, given [Mr. Z]'s involvement with Yco summarized above, Yco's public filings may have contained misrepresentations. [At paras. 15-16; emphasis added.]"], "obj_label": "85", "id": "48aae745-29e8-4bde-a6ad-0fced47197e1", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The Commission investigators set forth their apprehensions that the information outlined in the Memoranda raised significant concerns that [Mr. Z] may have been acting as an unreported de facto director of Yco and, if so, Yco had failed to comply with section <mask> of the Act and [Mr. Z] had failed to file insider trading reports for the trading in securities of Yco that the Applicant and Xco had made. Furthermore, if [Mr. Z] were a de facto director of Yco, given [Mr. Z]'s involvement with Yco summarized above, Yco's public filings may have contained misrepresentations. [At para. 16.]"], "obj_label": "85", "id": "950c0a06-b145-4e09-85d5-b9644f8ebf9a", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask>, and its predecessor s. 83, have survived a number of constitutional attacks, although none has focussed specifically on the identical issue we face here - the constitutionality of the mandatory one-year minimum sentence imposed by s. 85(3)(a). The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the validity of the overall licensing and registration provisions of the Firearms Act , S.C. 1995, c. 39, in Reference re Firearms Act (Can.) , 2000 SCC 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783. In three cases, the s. 85(4) requirement (previously the s. 83(2) requirement) that the mandatory minimum sentence be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for the underlying offence has been held not to violate s. 12 of the Charter : see R. v. Brown , [1994] 3 S.C.R. 749; R. v. Spark, [1986] O.J. No. 1001 (C.A.); R. v. Wheatle , [1993] O.J. No. 2747 (C.A.); and R.K. ."], "obj_label": "85", "id": "ac5a5ac2-845c-4843-9efe-e73ed68f328c", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the FLA defines excluded property not subject to division as (a) \"property acquired by a spouse before the relationship between the spouses began\". Section 84(1)(a) identifies \"family property\" as, on the date of separation, (i) \"property that is owned by at least one spouse\", or (ii) \"a beneficial interest of at least one spouse in property\". Pursuant to s. 84(2)(g), family property includes \"the amount by which the value of excluded property has increased since the later of the date (i) the relationship between the spouses began, or (ii) the excluded property was acquired.\""], "obj_label": "85(1)", "id": "637d30d9-b2e2-49c2-9249-fdbf269fb2de", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["I agree with this interpretation. The use of the plural \"liens\" in s. 85(3)(a), which provides that registration of a lien essentially consolidates all of the corporation's liens against the unit that have not expired, indicates that a corporation can have multiple liens against the same unit. The wording of s. 85(1) provides that an unregistered lien arises upon default automatically. In my view, the proper reading of s. 85 is that a corporation has a lien that arises upon each default. This accords with the wording of s. 85(1) and, otherwise, there is no explanation for the use of the plural in s. 85(3)(a). Subsection <mask> provides that the lien expires three months after the default that gave rise to it unless it is registered. It follows that registration consolidates only those liens that arose in the three months before registration. Delayed registration does not invalidate all liens, just those that arose from defaults that occurred more than three months before the registration.obj_label85(2)ide6cfa2b4-ca17-493b-9d83-fa8bb80431edsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe second issue was whether a conviction for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace can constitute the predicate offence necessary for a conviction under s. 85(2) of the Code . Section <mask> provides that it is an offence to use an imitation firearm \. Pursuant to s. 85(4), the sentence for a conviction under s. 85 is to be served consecutively to the sentence for the predicate indictable offence.obj_label85(2)(a)idb174d622-4561-406c-aff4-47a13f16dd28sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesParliament's intention that Kienapple should not apply to preclude multiple convictions in these circumstances is also reinforced by its decision to impose heavier penalties for aggravated forms of committing the predicate indictable offence through ss. 85(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code . Section <mask> provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment for a first conviction under s. 85, and three years for a second or subsequent conviction. Section 85(4) provides that a sentence imposed on a conviction under subsections 85(1) or (2) is to be served consecutively to any other punishment imposed for an offence arising out of the same event or series of events and to any other sentence to which the person convicted is subject at the time the sentence is imposed for those convictions.obj_label85(3)ida30a4acf-c7bc-4724-a99e-6738466bea4asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesReleased: \ October 30, 2012 \ \ \ Appendix A Health Professions Procedural Code , being Schedule 2 to the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 , S.O. 1991, c. 18 Investigators 75. (1) The Registrar may appoint one or more investigators to determine whether a member has committed an act of professional misconduct or is incompetent if, (a) the Registrar believes on reasonable and probable grounds that the member has committed an act of professional misconduct or is incompetent and the Executive Committee approves of the appointment; (b) the Executive Committee has received a report from the Quality Assurance Committee with respect to the member and has requested the Registrar to conduct an investigation; or (c) the Executive Committee has received a written complaint about the member and has requested the Registrar to conduct an investigation. Appendix B Regulated Health Professions Act , 1991 , S.O. 1991, c. 18 Confidentiality 36. (1) Every person employed, retained or appointed for the purpose of the administration of this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act and every member of a Council or committee of a College shall preserve secrecy with respect to all information that comes to his or her knowledge in the course of his or her duties and shall not communicate any information to any other person except, (a) to the extent that the information is available to the public under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act ; (b) in connection with the administration of this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act , including, without limiting the generality of this, in connection with anything relating to the registration of members, complaints about members, allegations of members' incapacity, incompetence or acts of professional misconduct or the governing of the profession; (c) to a body that governs a health profession in a jurisdiction other than Ontario; (d) as may be required for the administration of the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act, the Healing Arts Radiation Protection Act, the Health Insurance Act, the Independent Health Facilities Act, the Laboratory and Specimen Collection Centre Licensing Act, the Ontario Drug Benefit Act, the Narcotic Control Act (Canada) and the Food and Drugs Act (Canada); (d.1) to a police officer to aid an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result; (e) to the counsel of the person who is required to preserve secrecy; or (f) with the written consent of the person to whom the information relates. Reports required under Code (1.1) Clauses (1) (c) and (d) do not apply with respect to reports required under section <mask> or 85.2 of the Code. Definition (1.2) In clause (1) (d.1), \"law enforcement proceeding\" means a proceeding in a court or tribunal that could result in a penalty or sanction being imposed. Limitation (1.3) No person or member described in subsection (1) shall disclose, under clause (1) (d.1), any information with respect to a person other than a member. No requirement (1.4) Nothing in clause (1) (d.1) shall require a person described in subsection (1) to disclose information to a police officer unless the information is required to be produced under a warrant. Not compellable (2) No person or member described in subsection (1) shall be compelled to give testimony in a civil proceeding with regard to matters that come to his or her knowledge in the course of his or her duties. Evidence in civil proceedings (3) No record of a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act, no report, document or thing prepared for or statement given at such a proceeding and no order or decision made in such a proceeding is admissible in a civil proceeding other than a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act."], "obj_label": "85.1", "id": "20db6752-9260-4d2e-8c32-bac1f6dbde45", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["He also accepted the respondents' position that the Code, which is a schedule under the Act, provides a complete code to Pouget's claims except for wrongful dismissal. In particular, he noted that SEHC was mandated under s. 85.5(1) of the Code to report Pouget's termination, and s. 85.6 of the Code provides immunity for reports made in good faith: \ The motion judge observed that under s. 26(4) of the Code, a panel can choose not to proceed with a complaint if it is found to be frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith or otherwise an abuse of process. Section 53 of the Code authorizes the panel to order the College to pay all or part of a member's legal costs if it is of the opinion that the commencement of proceedings was unwarranted."], "obj_label": "85.1", "id": "b312e7ad-81ef-4e2c-b094-92796164e132", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> of the CYFSA applies to hearings held under Part V of the Act dealing with child protection. Section 87(8) states that \"[n]o person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.\""], "obj_label": "87", "id": "0b7d320c-f91f-4993-a3f5-c44ff1b1280e", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The Legislation Act, 2006 , by its terms, does not apply to municipal by-laws. The Legislation Act, 2006 applies to \"Acts and regulations\". A municipal by-law is not an Act and the definition of \"regulation\" under the Legislation Act, 2006 specifically excludes municipal by-laws. Section <mask> defines \"regulation\" as \"a regulation that is filed under Part III (Regulations)\". In Part III, s. 17(a) provides that \"regulation\" does not include \"a by-law of a municipality\". Section 49 extends the definition of certain provisions of the Act to \"every document that is made under an Act but is not a regulation\". However, none of those provisions assist Burlington in the context of this case."], "obj_label": "87", "id": "653840e1-adaf-4aed-8b09-0c43a40a69f0", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["I find no error in the judge's reasons with respect to the issue of child support. Section <mask> of the Family Relations Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 provides that \ The chambers judge recognized that the daughter required at least a brief transition period after leaving school in order to be capable of obtaining the necessaries of life on her own. In my view, the period of two months that the chambers judge applied was a transition period that was not unreasonable on the evidence in this case. I find no error on the part of the judge in choosing that period.obj_label87id64186404-7dc2-473a-b520-f808de2cdebesub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesA person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134 (11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87 (7) (c) or subsection 87 (9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.obj_label87 (8)id32b5673b-23d9-4ec4-bd18-e2db85c6f60bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences142(3) A person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134 (11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87 (7) (c) or subsection 87 (9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.obj_label87 (8)id80f7c3da-53d8-4bf1-93bf-5d3a2398ae7esub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences142 (3) A person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134 (11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87 (7) (c) or subsection 87 (9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.obj_label87 (8)idcfbe6b87-be22-46b2-9506-e5ebb1ff1a93sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the CYFSA sets out that a hearing shall be held in the absence of the public, subject to subsection (5), unless the court orders that the hearing be held in public after considering both the wishes and interests of the parties; and whether the presence of the public would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding. Section 87(8) of the CYFSA sets out that no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.obj_label87(4)idb02da489-a9f4-4522-a724-4b737d351bd3sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences-- A person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)( c ) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.obj_label87(8)ida5afe3d8-ff2f-4433-927e-a2b9ca794ec1sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences142(3) Offences re publication -- A person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to bo th.obj_label87(8)id4d94c140-0bd2-439a-9de3-fd76d22f9b44sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesUsing actual names will always present a much higher risk of offending subsection <mask> [of the CYFSA ]. Once the names of the parties are revealed in a court decision, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the court to know what additional facts included in the judgment may still point to or identify the persons protected by subsection 87(8). Even the use of initials is potentially compromising, particularly where it can be discovered that the full names of the same parties have been used in another related proceeding.obj_label87(8)id3b47e392-876a-4987-868f-ed97795d21f0sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences142 (3) Offences re publication -- A person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both .obj_label87(8)idd6e050fb-26a3-4867-a931-a9bb66583b74sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences- A person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)( c ) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.obj_label87(8)id8d59216f-5d91-452d-bb0e-8594e1eaffadsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences142 (3) Offences re publication -- A person who contravenes subsection <mask> or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)( c ) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.obj_label87(8)id499522fe-4514-44e7-9e24-98de84e3da6asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> of the FLA provides that the net value of the family property (here the increase in value of the excluded property less the family debt) must be based on its fair market value as of the date of an agreement between the parties or the hearing before the court on the division of property. In this case, there was no agreement and therefore the relevant date for the valuation of the net family property was the date of hearing.obj_label87(a)id03e87bd4-9653-4d22-95ca-3101990ed717sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe respondent submits that this does not matter because, in effect, the Administrative Judge should be considered a provincial court judge. The CJA provides that her qualifications and compensation for the position are the same as a provincial court judge. Section <mask> provides that the Administrative Judge must meet \, which are the qualifications for a provincial court judge. Section 87.2(7) of the CJA provides that the Administrative Judge is \ for purposes of compensation:obj_label87.2(1)id17951918-b359-48a3-ae78-97d6c9d094f1sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> was meant to be a cost- efficient mechanism to deter contraventions of the Act. A review of the debates prior to enactment suggests there were serious concerns about non-compliance and the costs and delays of enforcing the Act. Legislators discussed expensive and time-consuming proceedings that left electors with unsatisfactory results sometimes years later after considerable sums in legal fees had been incurred.obj_label88.23idabd13ffe-a7fa-4c3d-9812-2678afdcaef0sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesIn a prosecution under s. 92, if the judge finds that the candidate, acting in good faith, committed the offence inadvertently or simply made an error in judgment (together referred to as \), the penalties described in subsection <mask> do not apply: s. 92(2). The good faith exception affords additional protection in circumstances where a candidate faces greater jeopardy from penalties that can be imposed upon conviction for a s. 92 Act offence.obj_label88.23(2)id37f1b638-d3c4-484a-8bc1-79ffa55d42dbsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe words in s. 88.23 are clear: \obj_label88.25id382fcafb-1401-4c28-a02e-5ed541895daasub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesIn the cross-appeal, the City urges the court to draw a distinction between the deliberative component of the proceedings of the Audit Committee and the Standards Committee, and other aspects of their processes. Given the finding that neither is a \, that distinction is unnecessary. We also note that on April 1, 2018, the Municipal Elections Modernization Act , 2016, s. 65 came into force and repealed subsection <mask> of the Municipal Elections Act . The new provision, which applies to the Audit Committee, reads:obj_label88.34idea919865-68ed-46ee-8d82-5c9122121e22sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentences[3] Section <mask> is one of four offences presently found in the Criminal Code with respect to which the Crown has an election and for which there is a mandatory minimum if the Crown proceeds by indictment, but no mandatory minimum if the Crown proceeds summarily: see s. 96 (possession of weapon obtained by commission of offence), s. 102 (making an automatic handgun) and s. 333.1 (theft of a motor vehicle). None of those offences have a \ between the mandatory minimum if the Crown proceeds by indictment and the maximum penalty if the Crown proceeds summarily.obj_label95id15d8a018-0469-41f4-8ba2-0a96c39a7efbsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> does not depend on the commission of a predicate offence or the breach of any statutory or other order. Section 95, like the importing offence in Smith , prohibits a broad range of conduct. Upon reflection, I am satisfied that it would be no more appropriate to consider the constitutionality of s. 95 by reference only to the more egregious form of conduct captured by s. 95 than it would have been in Smith to consider the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum by reference only to the crime of importing the more harmful narcotics such as cocaine into Canada.obj_label95id07b61693-a910-4b64-8f6c-c1f733ede27csub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> differs from other firearm possession offences that carry a minimum penalty in another respect. Unlike, for example, the offences created by ss. 85, 96, 100, and 279, there is no requirement in s. 95 that the Crown prove that the possession of the firearm was connected to some other unlawful activity or intended unlawful activity. Possession is criminal under s. 95 even if it is entirely untainted by any other unlawful activity.obj_label95id617aa1dc-481e-478e-bb5c-5a03f943179esub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask>, the section in issue, came into force in December 1998: S.C. 1995, c. 39, s. 139. It prohibits the possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm, or the possession of an unloaded prohibited or restricted firearm \. The offence applies to anyone in possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm who does not have an authorization or a licence to possess the firearm at the specific place in issue and a registration certificate for the firearm.obj_label95id01abecec-c7eb-4fdc-b722-882bb0a86b43sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesIn this case, the information particularized the offence as possession of a \. As I have indicated, the evidence showed that the firearm was not in fact loaded but that the ammunition was found alongside it in the same tennis racquet case. At trial, the Crown chose not to seek an amendment of the information to conform to the evidence.obj_label95id1a3c580a-06e8-4068-b93d-fb30e8d7b839sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesI differ from my colleague in one other respect. He would balance the mitigating factors against two significant aggravating factors: (1) the appellant was on bail for an unspecified charge at the time of the shooting and the terms of his bail prohibited him from possessing any firearm; and (2) the shooting was part of a course of conduct during which the appellant displayed a blatant disregard for the safety of those around him. The trial judge adverted to what in my view is a third significant aggravating factor: the firearm was a prohibited weapon. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides for a three year minimum sentence merely for possessing a loaded prohibited firearm. This case is very different than one involving an accident with a hunting rifle.obj_label95id14984e1b-7784-4cec-b308-abef0361df97sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesI have, however, concluded that the Crown and the Attorney General for Canada's approach of considering all potential applications of s. 95 is correct. Section <mask> is a different kind of offence than the offences considered in Goltz and Brown . In those cases, the offence that carried the minimum penalty depended on the commission of a predicate offence or the breach of some other statutory provision or order. The seriousness of the offence attracting the minimum penalty depended to some degree on the nature of the predicate offence, or the nature of the conduct giving rise to the prior order."], "obj_label": "95", "id": "75e55294-7aa7-4ede-8a6f-97699cf8342b", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The reality that the vast majority of s. 95 offenders will be engaged in conduct that would be classified as dangerous and criminal under any definition does not alter the reach of the section as drawn by Parliament. Section <mask> applies not only to offenders like the appellant, whose conduct poses an immediate and serious risk to the public, but also to persons whose conduct cannot be said to pose any real risk to the public. The potential application of the mandatory minimum to persons at what I have called the regulatory end of the s. 95 spectrum figures prominently in the s. 12 analysis."], "obj_label": "95", "id": "ec18ea33-74b3-4d72-979a-bcdb74b8577e", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["Section <mask> criminalizes a broad range of conduct. Mr. Morris's actions fall at the \ end of the spectrum of the conduct prohibited by s. 95. As this court and, more importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada have indicated, crimes like those committed by Mr. Morris call for denunciatory sentences. In most cases, penitentiary terms will be required. In some situations, where there are strong mitigating factors, sentences at or near the maximum reformatory sentence (two years, less a day), may be imposed: see Smickle , at para. 30; Nur (ONCA) , at paras. 6, 17-23 and 206; and Nur (SCC) , at para. 82.obj_label95id7d20994c-f2d0-4da8-b5e4-3af63beb2988sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThere is considerable force to counsel's submissions. However, the scheme of s. 95 compels me to reject that argument. Section <mask> creates a hybrid offence. The Crown may proceed by indictment or summarily. If the Crown proceeds summarily, there is no minimum penalty and the accused may receive a non-custodial sentence or even an absolute discharge: e.g. see Snobelen . The essential elements of the offence are, of course, the same whether the Crown proceeds by indictment or summarily. By making s. 95 a hybrid offence, Parliament has acknowledged that the appropriate penal response for the criminal conduct prohibited by s. 95 runs the full gamut of sentencing options from an absolute discharge to 10 years in the penitentiary. That sentencing range tells me that Parliament must have anticipated prosecutions under s. 95 at what I have referred to as the regulatory end of the spectrum. The reasonable hypothetical I have constructed is consistent with that view of the offence."], "obj_label": "95", "id": "9d6d6e6c-6b94-44b8-a7d9-79ebdbb15c4b", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["The level of moral blameworthiness, however, as with the blameworthiness that knowledge of the possession of a narcotic imputes, depends on a number of variables, all of which fall within the broad scope of the offence as defined in s. 95. Knowledge that one has an unloaded restricted firearm safely stored in one's cottage with useable ammunition readily accessible in the next room, coupled with the knowledge that under the terms of one's licence, the firearm should be kept in one's dwelling, attracts a very different level of moral blameworthiness than does the knowledge of the person standing on the street corner with a loaded gun in his back pocket for which he knows he has no kind of authorization and which he intends to use as he sees fit. Section <mask> is written so broadly as to capture offenders with both levels of moral blameworthiness. My reasonable hypothetical focuses on the less blameworthy category of potential offender.obj_label95id85363180-5b6d-430f-94b0-b628ab8df177sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> seeks to protect the public by criminalizing the possession of potentially dangerous firearms in circumstances that increase the danger posed to the public by the possession of those firearms. By criminalizing possession simpliciter , the criminal law can intercede before someone is actually harmed and before criminal activity, so often associated with the possession of these kinds of firearms, actually occurs or is attempted.obj_label95idceec877e-fcbb-4bb9-96f8-f9d56a26af67sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesA departure from the presumptive date for valuation of family property is effectively a reapportionment or unequal division of the family property, which can only be done under s. 95 of the FLA. Section <mask> expressly provides for the reapportionment of net family property if an equal division would be \ Under the former FRA, a change in the valuation date from the date of hearing was determined to be an effective reapportionment of the family assets. See Martelli v. Martelli (1981), 33 B.C.L.R. 145 at para. 28 (C.A.); Toth v. Toth (1995), 13 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 at para. 55 (C.A.); McPhee v. McPhee (1996), 22 R.F.L. (4 th ) 302 at paras. 10-13 (B.C.C.A.); and Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 BCCA 567 at para. 61. The same reasoning, in my opinion, should be applied to the comparable provisions of the FLA. Any departure from the presumptive equal division of net family property under s. 81 of the FLA must therefore be made pursuant to s. 95(1) of the FLA , which imposes a threshold finding that an equal division of the net family property would be \ before any reapportionment of the net family property can be ordered.obj_label95id7b999acf-a006-4e4c-abb6-3ff5c19a6a6asub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> is a hybrid offence punishable by a maximum of 10 years if the Crown proceeds by indictment. Initially, the offence carried a one-year minimum sentence if the Crown proceeded by indictment and a one-year maximum penalty if the Crown proceeded summarily. In May 2008, the minimum sentence was increased to three years for a first offence and five years for a subsequent offence if the Crown proceeded by indictment: S.C. 2008, c. 6, s. 8. The one- year maximum if the Crown proceeded summarily was not changed.obj_label95idf79061bb-1450-44d0-8744-8a9e5bac6c9bsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> casts a \: MacDonald , at para. 47. Unlike some firearm offences that carry a substantial minimum penalty ( e.g. manslaughter, at s. 236(a), and criminal negligence causing death, at s. 220(a)), s. 95 does not require proof of any harm, or even any risk of harm, to any other person as a result of the possession of the firearm. Nor, unlike other sections carrying a mandatory minimum ( e.g. discharging a firearm at a person with intent to wound, at s. 244(2)), does s. 95 require proof of an intention to cause any harm, recklessness as to the potential for harm flowing from the possession, or even criminally negligent behaviour relating to the firearm. It is irrelevant to a charge under s. 95 that the accused took all necessary precautions to ensure the safety of others.obj_label95idb9b8ec8f-48b5-4b6d-b5f1-ca3dc364a8d0sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesAccording to s.120(1) of the RTA , \ [emphasis added] subject to certain inapplicable exceptions. The guideline is established by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing each calendar year and shall not be more than 2.5%. Under s.119, a landlord may only increase the rent once every 12 months.obj_label95id9ff9d864-6def-4e95-8d45-9e8df41c9dc6sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesThe respondent submits that, as a matter of logic and common sense, if a prohibited firearm is loaded with ammunition then that person possesses a firearm \. Section <mask> describes two ways of committing one offence. It is an offence to possess a loaded prohibited firearm or an unloaded prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition. Both modes of committing the offence are found within the same subsection of the Criminal Code with the latter mode being an included offence in the first.obj_label95(1)idef4e88b7-d8e3-47e5-b915-9147165e3ef6sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesPersons, like the appellant, convicted under s. 95(1) are subject to minimum penalties. In the case of a first offence, the minimum penalty is three years, and in the case of second or subsequent offences, the minimum penalty is five years: s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code . An offence is a \ if within the 10 years prior to the conviction for which the accused is being sentenced, he or she was convicted of any of the offences enumerated in s. 84(5). Section <mask> is one of the enumerated offences. Consequently, and setting aside the YCJA provisions for the moment, the appellant's conviction under s. 95(1) in November 2007 made this conviction on a s. 95(1) charge a \"second or subsequent offence\" and triggered the five-year minimum penalty in s. 95(2)."], "obj_label": "95(1)", "id": "0d5731a6-8c7c-4f91-846b-0c93f2b7ffd3", "sub_label": "Canadian"} |
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{"masked_sentences": ["[43] The determination of whether an equal division would be significantly unfair is also guided by a more precise identification of relevant factors than was found in the FRA . Importantly, the Legislature did not include in s. 95(2) the principle of relative contribution found in s. 65(1)(f) of the FRA . Under s. 65(1)(f), a court could consider circumstances relating to the acquisition, preservation, maintenance, improvement or use of property. Section <mask>, by comparison, refers rather narrowly to career contributions (95(2)(c)) and to post-separation increases in value beyond market trends caused by one spouse (95(2)(f)). I agree with the judge's view that if relative contribution to the acquisition, preservation, maintenance or improvement of family property during the relationship was intended to be a significant factor or one frequently relied on in justifying the conclusion that the equal division of family property is significantly unfair, the Legislature would have said so. Allowing relative contribution to become a regular consideration in the context of s. 95 would likely create uncertainty and complexity. This would be contrary to the legislative objectives discussed earlier that underlie the FLA division of property regime.obj_label95(2)idc9a20686-c635-4817-8942-fb60b04b87dfsub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask>(ii) of the Code provides that, upon conviction for possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm and where the Crown proceeds by indictment, the offender faces a five-year minimum sentence of imprisonment where the conviction is a \. Under s. 84(5) of the Code , an offence under s. 117.01(1) - possession of a weapon contrary to a weapons prohibition order - constitutes a \ for the purpose of s. 95(2)(a)(ii).obj_label95(2)(a)ida47d10b2-1289-4945-914c-f9d273172910sub_labelCanadian |
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masked_sentencesSection <mask> is a general term, allowing consideration of \ As a general term preceded by a list of specific items, the rule of statutory interpretation known as ejusdem generis (\), or the limited class rule, may apply. In National Bank of Greece (Canada) v. Katsikonouris , [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1029, La Forest J. explained the rule thusly at 1040:obj_label95(2)(i)idaedbd15f-6c4d-4734-a81f-ea4862518a95sub_labelCanadian |
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