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	<title> - [H.A.S.C. No. 116-5] Naval Surface Forces Readiness: Are Navy Reforms Adequate?</title>
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	[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




	[H.A.S.C. No. 116-5]

	NAVAL SURFACE FORCES READINESS: ARE NAVY REFORMS ADEQUATE?

	__________

	JOINT HEARING

	BEFORE THE

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

	MEETING JOINTLY WITH

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

	OF THE

	COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

	FIRST SESSION

	__________

	HEARING HELD

	FEBRUARY 26, 2019


	[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

	__________


	U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
	35-338 WASHINGTON : 2019

	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




	SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

	JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman

	TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
	ANDY KIM, New Jersey, Vice Chair AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
	KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma JOE WILSON, South Carolina
	CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania ROB BISHOP, Utah
	JASON CROW, Colorado MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
	XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico MO BROOKS, Alabama
	ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
	VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
	DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
	Melanie Harris, Professional Staff Member
	Tom Hawley, Professional Staff Member
	Megan Handal, Clerk

	------

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

	JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

	JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
	JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
	DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
	SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
	FILEMON VELA, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
	GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
	California PAUL COOK, California
	MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
	KATIE HILL, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
	JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
	ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice
	Chair
	Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
	Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
	Megan Handal, Clerk


	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page

	STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

	Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman,
	Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 3
	Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman,
	Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
	Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
	Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
	Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
	Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces......... 5

	WITNESSES

	Aquilino, ADM John C., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
	Department of the Navy......................................... 7
	Grady, ADM Christopher W., USN, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
	Command, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command,
	Department of the Navy......................................... 6

	APPENDIX

	Prepared Statements:

	Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 39
	Garamendi, Hon. John......................................... 37
	Grady, ADM Christopher W., joint with ADM John C. Aquilino... 43
	Lamborn, Hon. Doug........................................... 38
	Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 41

	Documents Submitted for the Record:

	[There were no Documents submitted.]

	Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

	[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

	Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

	Mrs. Luria................................................... 55
	Mr. Wittman.................................................. 55


	NAVAL SURFACE FORCES READINESS: ARE NAVY REFORMS ADEQUATE?

	----------

	House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
	Services, Subcommittee on Readiness, Meeting
	Jointly with the Subcommittee on Seapower and
	Projection Forces, Washington, DC, Tuesday,
	February 26, 2019.

	The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
	room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Garamendi
	(chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness) presiding.

	OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
	CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

	Mr. Garamendi. Good morning. We are prepared to start here.
	So welcome to all of you. I saw you down there, and I knew we
	could start. Very good.
	Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I call to order this
	hearing, joint hearing of the Readiness and Seapower and
	Projection Forces Subcommittees of the House Armed Services
	Committee. I would like to state at the outset that we continue
	to honor and remember the 17 sailors who died in the tragic
	surface ship collisions of 2017. None of us on this committee,
	and I am sure within the Navy itself, will forget. And we will
	continue to mourn those losses that were unfortunately
	avoidable. Our thoughts remain with their loved ones, with
	their family and their friends.
	Over the last 18 months, this committee has held numerous
	hearings and meetings with Navy leadership in an attempt to
	understand the causes of those devastating incidents. I
	appreciate the Navy's attention to this issue and continued
	willingness to engage with the committee.
	I also recognize that implementing significant reforms
	takes time. Often too much time. However, I am concerned that
	the Navy has not sufficiently addressed several of the problems
	responsible for the deadliest naval disasters in four decades.
	I worry that the Navy leadership remains overly focused on
	shipbuilding and is not adequately prioritizing the manning and
	maintenance of its current fleet.
	I am troubled by reports that the Navy's investigations
	were not fully transparent about the extent to which a brutal
	operational tempo, low morale, and preventable technological
	challenges contributed to these disasters.
	I wonder if the Navy could do more to constrain the demand
	for use of the surface force. Moreover, I worry that Navy is
	not thinking deeply enough about how to change its culture to
	empower officers to voice concerns and install an ethic of
	rigor and excellence.
	I look forward to hearing the updates from our witnesses on
	corrective actions the Navy has taken in the past year,
	particularly those related to the numerous surface ship
	provisions included in the fiscal 2019 NDAA [National Defense
	Authorization Act]. I encourage our witnesses to candidly
	discuss their efforts and any challenges they face as they work
	to improve the Navy's surface readiness. I am also eager to
	learn more about the degree to which the ongoing and planned
	reforms will be permanently enshrined in naval policy and
	doctrine.
	As the memory of those tragic incidents grows more distant,
	it is our shared responsibility to ensure that crews and ships
	will continue to be adequately manned, trained, and maintained.
	This committee stands ready to assist.
	With that, I would like to turn to our ranking member,
	Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado, for any remarks that he
	may want to make.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Garamendi can be found in
	the Appendix on page 37.]

	STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,
	RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

	Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is great to be
	with the members of the Seapower Subcommittee as well. This
	combined joint hearing is really important, so I am glad that
	we are having it. And it really is based ultimately on
	readiness. So thank you for having this important hearing.
	I would also like to recognize the spouses of our
	witnesses: Christine Grady and Laura Aquilino. We on this
	subcommittee know the vitally important role our precious
	military families play in the readiness and resilience of our
	troops. And we appreciate your presence and support here today.
	Welcome to this hearing.
	We all recognized too late that Naval Surface Forces,
	especially forward-deployed ships, were being run too hard.
	Ship's maintenance suffered, as did crew training and
	proficiency. Tragically, it took the deaths of 17 sailors to
	bring the problem to light and force all of us, the Navy and
	Congress alike, to pay attention.
	True to form, the Navy and the Congress took decisive
	action, including, particularly in this subcommittee, in last
	year's National Defense Authorization Act. Now, nearly 2 years
	since the fatal collisions and over a year since our last
	public hearing on this topic, it is time to review the state of
	Naval Surface Forces. I am concerned with three things: Have
	the corrections employed made a difference? What further
	actions are needed? And do any of the changes implemented need
	to be reversed?
	I note that our witnesses today are responsible for both
	the operational control and readiness of the Atlantic and
	Pacific Fleets. Vesting a single official with the pressures of
	both responsibilities was part of the problem in 2017, although
	such vesting was at a lower level of command.
	I am interested in understanding how these commanders weigh
	these disparate responsibilities and whether institutional
	protections are in place to prevent overuse of the fleet in the
	future.
	While I am confident in the abilities of our witnesses, I
	want to ensure that their successors are equally equipped to
	withstand the imperatives of operational pressures when they
	are unsure their ships and crews are ready. I deeply respect
	the military expertise that must come to bear when determining
	whether a ship's crew is trained and ready to operate the
	complex team operations of a modern warship, whether the ship
	is mechanically ready, and whether that ship and crew can
	perform the mission expected. We are eager to understand how we
	assure safe deployments into the future.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our witnesses'
	testimony.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Lamborn can be found in the
	Appendix on page 38.]
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. I look forward to
	working with you and the committee as we go forward.
	And now I would like to turn to the chairman of the
	Seapower Committee, Mr. Courtney.

	STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
	CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION
	FORCES

	Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
	Lamborn. I look forward to continuing the close and ongoing
	work between the two committees, Readiness and Seapower, that
	we have conducted over the last year and a half on the issues
	before us today.
	To new members on the subcommittee, today's hearing is
	about the fourth or fifth public hearing that we have had
	jointly since the series of tragedies that occurred at sea, as
	well as classified briefings and obviously staff meetings that
	have intensively investigated those occurrences which claimed
	the lives of 17 sailors in 2017.
	Again, to put that into perspective, that is a number that
	far surpassed the number of U.S. casualties in Iraq and Syria
	in 2017. Two of those sailors came from Connecticut. One,
	Dustin Doyon, was an electronics technician from Suffield,
	Connecticut. His loss still is a deep wound in the community.
	And I want to just again publicly thank his parents as well as
	again all the families who have stayed in close contact with
	both the Navy and Congress, again, to make sure that their
	lives were not lost in vain and that there will be real change
	to prevent those from occurring again in the future.
	These hearings have given our committee and the public a
	greater understanding of both the immediate and systemic issues
	that contributed to this stomach-turning loss of life. The
	hearings also resulted in significant statutory provisions
	enacted in last year's 2019 John McCain National Defense
	Authorization Bill that codified a variety of the changes to
	surface fleet operations and procedures. And I mention Senator
	McCain because, actually, he was the most adamant during the
	conference during the 2019 NDAA to make sure that the many
	recommendations actually are now a part of law and statute.
	And, again, his passion was really, I think, important for
	everybody in terms of the making sure that we do everything
	possible to avoid this in the future.
	Today's hearing is the first review by the new Congress on
	how these changes are being executed. For the record, I also
	want to publicly note the professional staff of the Government
	Accountability Office [GAO] that has been diligently following
	up and investigating the work of Surface Fleet Forces in the
	Indo-Pacific Command's efforts in the last year and has
	provided a thorough report card that I would encourage members
	to review as a measurement of the Navy's follow-through on some
	of its own recommendations.
	Today's hearing also follows a new round of lengthy
	investigative press articles on the collisions of USS
	Fitzgerald and McCain. These articles describe in great detail
	the many individual tragedies that occurred and the broader
	systemic issues that contributed to these collisions. I commend
	the reporters for their contributions to the public's
	understanding of readiness challenges facing our fleet.
	In the wake of last year's inquiries by the Navy and
	Congress, there were a number of critical deficiencies
	identified, including the lack of crew certifications for
	critical tasks and conflicting authority for tasking and
	readiness. One particular area identified that I remain
	concerned about is the challenge of manning the fleet. Do we
	have enough sailors on board our surface ships, and are they
	qualified for the roles they are expected to take on?
	The Navy and Congress have worked together to turn the
	strategic requirement for the Navy's presence to long-term
	shipbuilding plans, authorization bills, and funding as we
	begin a drive towards a 355-ship Navy. At the same time, there
	are approximately about 6,000 to 8,000 open billets across the
	current Navy. And recent reporting to Congress shows that
	manning issues continue to persist across the fleet.
	As we continue to invest in the new construction of ships
	needed to grow the fleet, we must also ensure that we are
	making a concurrent investment in personnel to ensure that we
	have the proper number of sailors to man these ships. We must
	be prepared to plan for and make investments in the personnel
	necessary to operate a growing fleet.
	I will be interested to hear from the witnesses on how they
	are working to address the manning shortfalls before them. And
	I look forward to seeing in the fiscal year 2020 budget the
	investments needed to man the growing [surface] fleet in the
	coming years.
	Finally, while it is clear that major mistakes were made on
	individual ships, I think it is also clear that there were
	broader problems that existed within our forward-deployed
	forces. These issues did not exist in the vacuum of a select
	few. Readiness and over-tasking concerns have been voiced at
	the highest level of leadership. The American people must have
	the confidence in their leaders that when the alarm bells are
	rung, they will be followed up by real action. Our sailors and
	our families deserve nothing less.
	Thank you.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
	Appendix on page 39.]
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
	I would like to now turn to Mr. Wittman, the ranking member
	of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee.

	STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
	VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
	PROJECTION FORCES

	Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I want to thank Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino for
	attending this important hearing.
	I also want to welcome their wives: Christine Grady and
	Laura Aquilino. Thank you so much for joining us today. We
	appreciate your sacrifice as you, too, are part of our Navy
	family.
	Last year, we had a hearing with Secretary Spencer and
	Admiral Richardson to discuss Navy reforms and recommendations
	to respond to deficient readiness highlighted by the loss of 17
	sailors aboard the USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald. These
	readiness reforms were codified in the Comprehensive Review and
	Strategic Readiness Review.
	Navy continues to make progress toward accomplishing the
	goals that Navy leadership determined would be necessary to
	correct deficient readiness. However, the committee has learned
	much since that hearing that appears unaddressed in these
	seminal documents. For example, we have learned that the
	readiness deficiencies are systemic and engross the entire
	fleet. We have learned that severe manning deficiencies exist
	afloat because of an imbalance in the afloat and ashore
	billeting and an overall deficit in afloat billets.
	We have learned that Navy allows ships to begin the basic
	and advanced predeployment training without the required number
	of sailors. We have learned that the limited-notice INSURV
	[Inspection and Survey] inspections are bearing a true
	depiction of the material readiness of the fleet. The readiness
	picture is not as pretty as when ships have months to prepare
	and cannibalize their fellow shipmates.
	And, finally, we have learned that the basic and advanced
	tenets of enlisted training are perilously askew and will take
	years to rebuild.
	In summary, the basic elements of manning, training, and
	equipping are challenged across the fleet and will take years
	of leadership focus and sustained funding to correct. My fear
	is that the Navy will measure their progress against the
	Comprehensive Review and the Strategic Readiness Review
	checklist and will miss the fundamental overhaul necessary to
	right a sinking ship.
	Because these systemic challenges were not adequately
	addressed in the Comprehensive Review or the Strategic
	Readiness Review, we will undershoot the mark and miss true
	structural reform. Some pundits have indicated that the sailors
	that stood the watch on the decks the USS John S. McCain and
	USS Fitzgerald were at fault and cited numerous safeguards that
	failed to prevent these tragic deaths.
	However, I have come to an alternative conclusion. It is
	apparent that senior leadership failed to put adequate systems
	in place to prevent these collisions. It is apparent that
	senior leadership's acceptance of unnecessary risk to meet
	COCOM [combatant commander] demands led to the deaths of 17 of
	our Nation's finest. It is apparent that the Navy classifies
	innumerous products to hide the true depth of readiness
	challenges that plague the Navy today. And it is most important
	to me that if the appropriate reforms are not properly
	implemented, these problems and these deaths will continue.
	Last year, Dr. Holmes of the Naval War College asked, who
	watches the watchers in the United States Navy?
	At a hearing with Secretary Spencer and CNO [Chief of Naval
	Operations] Richardson on this same subject, I indicated that
	we will watch the watchers. I remain committed to ensuring that
	we must not forget the lives lost on the USS John S. McCain and
	USS Fitzgerald.
	I look forward to continuing to advocate for these fallen
	sailors and ensuring real structural reforms are put in place.
	[Toward] this endeavor, I think the Navy has gone a long way to
	ensure minimum standards are set in place to ensure basic
	safety and mission proficiency, yet we have a long ways to go.
	Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield the balance of my time.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
	Appendix on page 41.]
	Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Wittman.
	And, Mr. Lamborn, your leadership in the past Congress
	brought us a long way towards this issue, and I thank you for
	your hard work in the previous Congress and look forward to
	working with you as we continue this Congress. And, of course,
	Mr. Courtney, your role as chairman of the committee.
	It is now my pleasure to welcome to the hearing Admiral
	Grady and your wife. Behind you, I think Christine is back
	there somewhere. There she is. Welcome.
	And also Admiral Aquilino and your wife, Laura, is back
	there. So thank you so very much for joining us today.
	If you will present your testimony.

	STATEMENT OF ADM CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
	FLEET FORCES COMMAND, COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES NORTHERN
	COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

	Admiral Grady. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman
	Courtney, Ranking Members Lamborn and Wittman, and
	distinguished members of both subcommittees. Thank you for the
	opportunity to testify along with my Pacific Fleet colleague
	and partner on the readiness of our surface forces.
	As a fleet commander, I consider my duty to ensure the
	welfare of the people I lead, the center of the universe, our
	sailors, our government civilians and their families, to be my
	first and most solemn responsibility.
	While we cannot bring back the 17 heroes that we lost 18
	months ago, the entire Navy is focused on never letting that
	happen again. And to the Gold Star family members, you humble
	us every day, and I hope you know that I am firmly committed to
	giving our sailors everything they need to safely and
	effectively perform their mission.
	Since learning the hard lessons of 2017, your Navy has
	aggressively implemented a series of actions to prevent any
	such tragedy in the future. We are focused on safe operations,
	increasing fleet effectiveness, and ensuring long-term
	sustained readiness by establishing a culture of operational
	excellence. Some examples of actions taken were included in our
	joint written statement for the record. And I look forward to
	discussing these and others in more detail with you this
	morning.
	Now, ensuring adherence to standards alone, though, while
	necessary, is not enough for our Navy to win decisively in
	high-end conflict. And as such, we aim to progress the Navy's
	culture beyond mere compliance and toward a culture of
	operational excellence, a culture where we view standards as
	the absolute minimum, and then strive for peak warfighting
	readiness. Our sailors, our officers, our civilian shipmates
	are embracing this challenge knowing that we value their
	contributions and what they do matters to the security of our
	Nation.
	While each fleet commander has separate authority,
	responsibility, and accountability for generating and employing
	ready forces, we do so to the same standard as we had laid out
	in the recently published Navy Integrated Readiness
	Instruction. And as the Fleet Forces Commander, I am
	responsible for setting that single standard in concert with my
	fellow fleet commanders. And we do this knowing that it is one
	fight, one Navy.
	The fleet commanders are in position to provide readiness
	oversight, and together we approach this with the strongest
	sense of urgency. We are currently safe to operate. We are a
	more effective Navy. But the hard work has only just begun.
	Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
	before you today. And many thanks to both committees and to the
	Congress for your continued support of your Navy. And I look
	forward to your questions and our discussion.
	Thank you.
	[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grady and Admiral
	Aquilino can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
	Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Aquilino.

	STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC
	FLEET, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

	Admiral Aquilino. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Courtney, Ranking
	Members Lamborn and Wittman as well as the distinguished
	members of the subcommittees, on behalf of the sailors,
	civilians, and families who serve in the Pacific Fleet of the
	world's finest Navy, I would first like to thank you for your
	substantial readiness investments you have made in us. Armed
	with your support, we continue to aggressively take action to
	rebuild our readiness. That said, there is still great work to
	do.
	To the family members of the brave sailors we lost on
	Fitzgerald and McCain, we will never forget them, and they
	motivate me every day. We are implementing the recommendations
	of the Comprehensive Review, Strategic Readiness Review, and
	the GAO to ensure we address all those core issues identified.
	We are confident that we have made/are making the changes to be
	sure the fleet is operating safely, and it is certified to
	execute all the missions assigned.
	If the ships in the Pacific Fleet are not ready to safely
	sail, they don't get underway, and that is my responsibility.
	The improvements we are making are ongoing. It is also
	important to note that the readiness of the fleet is fragile,
	and it is also perishable.
	We are committed to ensure our units are manned, trained,
	and equipped to execute the Nation's calling. I want to thank
	you for your continued support in providing the stable and
	consistent funding needed to support our Navy. The challenges
	to our Nation's interest require a Navy in the Pacific that is
	always ready to fight. Ensuring our readiness is the foundation
	and key to our success, and I look forward to your questions.
	Mr. Garamendi. As is the historic practice of the
	committee, we will start with the chairpersons and then the
	ranking members and then go to those members who were here
	first before the gavel came down. And so we will follow that
	practice. And that means I get to start.
	So, gentlemen, you have set in place a series of standards.
	Presumably, the implementation of those standards is the
	responsibility of not only you but the chain of command down to
	the commander of the ship.
	Can you assure us that the standards are actually being in
	place at the level of the ship, the surface vessel?
	Admiral Grady, if you want to start with the standards. You
	might want to talk a little bit about what they are and
	specifically, as said by our colleagues here, the manning, the
	tempo, as well as the material readiness of the ship.
	So talk about the standards, and then, Admiral Aquilino, if
	you could talk about actually imposing those standards on the
	operations.
	Admiral Grady. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
	Those standards are across the pillars of man, train, and
	equip as we have heard today. So it starts with ensuring that
	each ship in every unit has operating and functioning equipment
	with the appropriate redundancy to get the mission done. And we
	are very focused on that, and with your help, we are being
	successful in doing that.
	The training, then, is broken up and the standards are
	established in three various phases. There is the basic phase,
	the advanced phase, and the integrated phase of training. That
	training is measured and assessed. And those standards are
	maintained such that they do not advance from one phase to the
	next until those standards have been met across all three
	phases.
	That builds on a foundation of certifications for each
	individual as well. So our sailors and our officers are well
	trained as well. And then we bring them together as teams
	because teams are absolutely critical to what we do. And then
	the manning piece is very foundational to the work that we do.
	And so, as has been pointed out, we have some manning
	challenges that we are working through right now. The number
	specifically is 6,200 billets at sea that are not filled right
	now, although the Navy, with your help, has purchased those
	billets, and we will be flowing them into the fleet over time.
	And the goal is to have them on the ship at the beginning of
	the maintenance phase.
	Now, as we work our way through that hole of 6,200 billets
	and man the ships to that requirement, we do take some risk.
	And so sometimes we have to take some risk in the maintenance
	phase before we have all of the people onboard. But it is, I
	believe, both fleet standards that no one deploys without the
	full complement of people that they will have.
	So it starts with the individual, the officer and the
	sailor, the training that we give them. It then builds into the
	team phase across three basic phases. And then the
	certifications happen at the very highest end at the largest
	aggregation of, say, a strike group. And then we ensure that
	the ships are equipped with the appropriate gear.
	I can tell you that we in the Atlantic Fleet--and I think I
	speak for all the fleet commanders--we do not ask a ship nor
	direct a ship to go on mission if they are not certified to do
	the job. And I have made sure that that is the case. And,
	indeed, there have been several occasions where I have said
	that ship is not ready. We will need more time.
	And that is the highest form, I think. We know what the
	requirement is, and if they are not ready, they are not going.
	Mr. Garamendi. So, Admiral Aquilino, you are given the
	standards. How do you apply them?
	Admiral Aquilino. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the question.
	So Admiral Grady and I, in conjunction, we develop the
	standards. He is responsible to the CNO to identify those. Our
	training organizations implement those standards across the
	fleet in the form of Carrier Strike Group 4, 15, and our Afloat
	Training Group organizations. We have implemented a path where
	those organizations actually operate across the coast with each
	other to ensure that we understand the standards; we are
	grading against the standards; and then those are absolutely
	evaluated, assessed, and determined whether or not those units
	meet the standard.
	To Admiral Grady's point, we have both taken a top-down
	view of what it needs to--what we need to do to execute those
	standards from our levels of responsibility. And I also have
	terminated two deployments for units that were not assessed to
	have the appropriate level of training to deploy and execute
	their missions.
	Additionally, I took an entire strike group, again with the
	approval of Admiral Davidson, the combatant commander, because
	we meet his responsibilities. We have reduced their requirement
	to remain ready longer in order to free up manning concerns and
	posture those forces to be able to be ready for the next cycle
	of employment, given the rest, the time they need in order to
	ensure that they are ready. I could not do that without the
	help of Admiral Davidson, who supported that, as he has
	identified in the CR [Comprehensive Review], that the improper
	balance between operations, training, and maintenance needed to
	be reconciled.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you for mentioning Admiral Davidson,
	who apparently said at a meeting of commanders of the ships and
	admirals: If you can't take your ships to sea and accomplish
	the mission with the resources you have, then we will find
	someone who will.
	How does that fit with what you just said?
	Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure--I
	wasn't at any meeting. I don't know what he said. I don't know
	if it was accurate.
	What I can tell you is deeds that he has implemented match
	the guidance that he has given me. So, by him reducing some of
	the operational demands in the Pacific, to me, that is a pretty
	strong example of someone who understood the concerns when the
	report was written and doing his part to ensure that it doesn't
	happen again as well.
	Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
	Let me now turn to my colleague, Mr. Courtney.
	Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Again, just to sort of, I think, fill up the context in
	terms of the two incidents which we talked about earlier this
	morning. There are actually four at-sea incidents which took
	place in 2017. In addition to the Fitzgerald and the McCain,
	the USS Antietam also grounded on January 31, 2017. And the USS
	Lake Champlain collided with a fishing trawler in May.
	So, you know, the one sort of common thread of all four of
	those incidents is they all occurred in the Pacific region in
	the 7th Fleet.
	And, Admiral Aquilino, as you know, I mean, there has
	always been sort of a carve-out for the Pacific Command in
	terms of this whole question of who decides the decision to
	task a ship versus who decides in terms of whether the ship is
	ready.
	The Congress actually wrestled with this issue in terms of
	whether or not to change that carve-out by law. And, you know,
	there was a decision made to sort of give the Navy an
	opportunity to sort of see if they can sort of reorganize this
	whole decision-making process. You just described where you
	terminated two deployments with the new arrangement.
	Again, if you could just sort of talk about that a little
	bit more just sort of, you know, the mechanics of how that
	process, you know, gets resolved when there is a conflict
	between the resource end versus the tasking end.
	Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
	So the process that we have implemented is a part of my
	normal operations each day and week. I am briefed 3 days a week
	on the exact readiness of the force that is deployed and if
	there are manning issues, training issues, or equipment issues
	on that ship. And in my role, we support those equipment issues
	that need to be fixed. And, again, we execute our role.
	Once a week, I talk to every one of my commanders. We talk
	about the longer term view of the readiness of the force as
	well as upcoming deployers to make sure they are on track. And
	then, once a week, in an additional meeting, I talk about those
	ships and maintenance to make sure that the ones getting ready
	to go in and the ones that are in are progressing as we need
	them to progress.
	Now, if any of those indications show me that I have a
	problem coming up or one immediately identified that we were
	not aware of, I have a voice to the combatant commander. And
	when I determine that ship is either not manned, trained,
	equipped, unsafe, uncertified, number one, I would terminate
	their ops and then have that conversation with the combatant
	commander.
	As you know, the world gets a vote. So, depending on what
	is going on, we have had very frank conversations. And, again,
	in the instances I identified, Admiral Davidson concurred with
	my recommendations, and we did not deploy those ships.
	Mr. Courtney. So the way that operates, is there like a
	manual? Is there like a written directive that sort of, you
	know, instructs the different commands, you know, in terms of
	how this proceeds and who decides?
	Admiral Aquilino. So the readiness instruction just signed
	out identifies the responsibilities. It stops right here. But
	below me my three-star subordinate commanders also are aware,
	and they are responsible to also take the same review that I
	have. They then speak with me.
	I believe the process is structured in a way such that all
	the subordinate commanders understand the responsibilities,
	they understand the standards, and they know that they owe me a
	voice that says, ``Hey, I am not ready to deploy,'' and that
	has to come to me for decision.
	Mr. Courtney. So, again, because this really, in my
	opinion, really kind of goes to the heart of, you know, all the
	analysis that we sort of went through over the last couple of
	years, which is, you know, whether or not there is a safety
	break, I think that was Admiral Richardson's term during the
	hearings last Congress, to really sort of say, you know, this
	deployment really just can't occur because there is lack of
	certifications, there is equipment issues, et cetera. And it
	sounds like, again, you worked out an arrangement that really
	has changed the way that decision is made.
	The question I guess that a lot of us--still sort of nags
	us is just whether or not there is going to be an enduring
	structure after you move on to other things and, you know, your
	replacements, you know, that there is going to be something in
	place because, really, when we wrestled with this in terms of
	the NDAA, you know, that really was sort of the question,
	whether we need something more permanent and just sort of--so
	can you just sort of talk about that in terms of whether or not
	you think this is just going to sort of fade away as the issue
	maybe losses its public, sort of, spotlight, or whether or not
	there is something more enduring?
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. I think it actually is
	formalized in our instructions as well as the roles and
	responsibilities assigned to each of the commanders. So I
	implement for the CNO on the Pacific side the title 10
	responsibilities to man, train, and equip the fleet. Those
	standards are set by Admiral Grady in coordination with us.
	And, again, we adhere to those rigorously.
	The employment responsibilities, I execute for Admiral
	Davidson. So I believe they are formalized and understood. And
	while Chris and I continue to work together, I am confident
	that whoever comes behind us will also--they will have the same
	responsibilities and roles. And it is institutionalized in a
	way where I think we get away from that problem set.
	And if I give Chris a chance to talk, all these were
	focused on the Pacific, but we are doing the exact same thing
	to the same standards fleetwide.
	Admiral Grady. That is absolutely right. And, Mr. Chairman,
	it is a very valid concern that we transition from--into this
	persistent culture of excellence.
	In this regard, then, I do believe that we have well
	codified the requirements for certification and this idea that,
	across all echelons, then, being able to put the firebreaks in
	place to achieve that balance between maintenance, training,
	and operations are in place.
	Ultimately, too, though, I think it gets down to the level
	of, do we feel that that commanding officer has the confidence
	to speak up when he needs to speak up, and does he have the
	mechanisms by which to do that? Lung [Admiral Aquilino's call
	sign] described his battle rhythm of his ability to then keep
	his finger and his subordinate commanders' fingers on the pulse
	of the readiness of the fleet.
	I have a very similar battle rhythm. I will give you one
	additional example that both he and I do, and that is the phase
	transitions. Remember I talked about basic, advanced, and
	intermediate--or integrated phases and the maintenance phase.
	We take a look at each ship and every strike group before they
	transition phases to make sure that they are ready to do that.
	And back down to the CO [commanding officer] level, one of
	the things that I think will go a long way to codifying and
	institutionalizing that beyond Chris and I here is the
	requirement for COs to issue a 90-day letter to their type
	commander after they take command. This is a direct feedback to
	their type commander on the condition of their ship, the man,
	the train, the equip, across all the pillars of readiness. And
	that has been a very powerful voice for the commanding officer.
	And then you build on that with these touchpoints that we
	have with our commanding officers to their subordinate, to our
	subordinate commanders, be it at the strike group or the type
	commander level. And then having the trust that I think Lung
	and I do going up the echelon to say: I am not going to send
	that ship. And in my case, it was either replace it with
	another one that was ready, or they are going to come 3 weeks
	late because I need to finish the training. And we have had
	great success in that.
	Mr. Garamendi. Admiral, thank you very much.
	Let me now turn to Mr. Lamborn.
	Mr. Lamborn. Well, thank you. We have had a good discussion
	on readiness and what needs to happen. I also want to talk
	about procurement and funding, which is my colleague's sort of
	wheelhouse. But we all have a say in what happens at the NDAA
	level.
	These accidents demonstrated clearly that the operational
	demands on the Navy were too high. In short, the Navy has too
	few ships and trained crews to perform all of the missions
	requested and required.
	To continue on the path to recovery, how important is the
	sustained top line at the recently enacted levels? For both of
	you.
	Admiral Grady. I will start. Thank you for the question,
	sir.
	When you look at building the Navy the Nation needs and,
	just as importantly, fighting with the Navy the Nation has,
	knowing that 70 percent of the force that we have now we would
	fight with in 2030, the consistent, stable, and predictable
	funding is absolutely critical to the fleet. And we thank you
	for your support in that.
	Without that, we are unable to plan effectively or be
	better partners with the industrial base, which I think is
	absolutely critical so that we can establish that demand signal
	with them and be better partners with, for instance, the
	private shipyards.
	So the criticality, then, of critical--a consistent,
	stable, and predictable funding cannot be underestimated.
	Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, sir.
	So I think what I would say is, against the threats that
	exist today, capabilities, sizes, and you could argue intent,
	the Navy the Nation needs is one that is bigger, more lethal,
	networked, and ready.
	I think you have seen everything that has come out of the
	CNO that talks about those things. But for the challenges in
	the Pacific that I have, the challenges that Chris and I both
	work from the Atlantic and Pacific side, that is pretty
	accurate of what we believe we need in the future. So it is
	critical.
	Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And thank you for your answers.
	I got another question or two. And before I go any further,
	Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino, I just want to thank you
	for your service, and your wives also, because they contribute.
	Thank you for what you are doing and have done and will do for
	our country.
	Now, at current levels of funding, how long will it take
	the Navy's shipbuilding program to produce enough cruisers and
	destroyers to lessen the operational pressure? And with all of
	the classes of ships competing for funding, I expect that
	improvement will still take some considerable time.
	Admiral Grady. Sir, I would agree with you. That will take
	time. And so the stated goal of 355 I think is an appropriate
	target. Three different studies have looked at that. So
	somewhere in the nature of 355 of what it would take to meet
	the challenges of great power competition that all three fleets
	face. It will take time to get there and consistent and stable
	funding to do that.
	And it could be--it won't be next year or even within the
	FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. It will be beyond that.
	And so having that consistent stable funding to build to the
	355 a worthy goal, which I think is borne out by the challenges
	of the international environment. But it will not be overnight.
	It will take time.
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. Admiral Grady has it absolutely
	right. But there is another component of it.
	So, while we strive to get bigger, there is a critical
	aspect of getting bigger just doesn't mean buying a ship,
	right? There is a wholeness aspect to the Navy that is needed.
	So we need to buy the ship. We need to buy the people. We need
	to buy the parts. We need to buy the maintenance. And when we
	have all that, then we will be on the sustainable path to be
	able to maintain and employ the larger Navy that is needed. So
	it is a critical aspect.
	The ship by itself helps a little. But also all those other
	things are absolutely needed. Thank you, sir.
	Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So just to summarize, what I am hearing
	you say is that although we had considerable funding in the
	past, the last fiscal year and this fiscal year, when we had a
	sizeable plus-up, you are saying that that current sustained
	level needs to continue for years into the future to do the job
	properly.
	Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
	Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
	Mr. Garamendi. The question of how to fully fund all parts
	of a 355-ship Navy is going to be part of our work as we get
	into the budget in future hearings. Your question is right on.
	Mr. Wittman.
	Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Admiral Grady, Admiral Aquilino, thanks again for joining
	us today. Thanks for your service.
	I want to begin with you, Admiral Grady, and ask you a
	question with regard to manning. How many sailors is the Navy
	short of to perform the missions? And what is the Navy doing
	right now to essentially man up?
	And then a question for both of you: Is it acceptable for
	you to send ships on predeployment training and predeployment
	workups when they are short of the required number of sailors
	for a deployment cycle?
	Admiral Grady. Thanks, sir.
	The number of billets that we need to be full--or in whole
	for the fleet is 6,200. And I am confident that my partner over
	at the CNP [Chief of Naval Personnel] has worked hard to
	program and budget to that requirement. It will take some time
	to get that. It takes a while to get there. And then, of
	course, as we build the Navy the Nation needs, that number may
	rise as new ships come in.
	So that is the number. We are working hard to get there. It
	won't happen overnight. Again, it takes a while to train. And
	then when they do come, that is not a master. That is an
	apprentice. And they have to become a journeyman, a supervisor.
	So that takes time to work its way through.
	But 6,200 is the number. And we are working hard to be
	fully funded to that.
	Ideally, when we execute the workup cycle for a strike
	group, say, the date that we wish to have everyone in place is
	at the beginning of the maintenance phase. That makes absolute
	sense. And as we work our way out of that hole, we do buy some
	risk there in the maintenance phase and delay that date, that
	kind of hard date, further into the training cycle. And with
	the ultimate goal of deploying in full at the required levels
	of the right number of people and the right skill sets there
	that they bring to the ship. So we do buy some risk now as we
	work through that 6,200, particularly in the maintenance phase.
	I do believe that, when we push a ship out to do the basic
	phase, that both Admiral Aquilino and I look very hard at that
	risk calculus if they are not fully manned to that level. And
	we would not let them go if they were not.
	Additionally, if there were additional tasking, which can
	happen during the workup phase, we have established a minimum
	training requirements matrix that all three fleets have agreed
	to such that, from a manning and a training perspective, you
	will only go do those missions that you are trained and
	certified to do even before the ultimate certification for
	deployment. That is new, and that is an important addition to
	our surface force readiness manual and how we think about
	minimum training requirements for the ships.
	Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, sir.
	So is it acceptable? Again, with the risk calculus talked
	about by Admiral Grady, we do it only when we understand the
	risk. That said, that is why the model has identified the need
	for those sailors, right?
	The best ships come out when those ships are fully set up,
	they do all the training together, they deploy together. That
	said, the Navy rotates. We do rotate 30 percent every year. And
	the structure on the ships, we train those sailors as well.
	They show up trained. They continue to train in a team. So that
	does happen.
	But there is one thing that we have implemented to ensure
	that we understand exactly the risk we accept. Before any of
	those ships begin that basic phase, we have tasked them to
	execute a ready-for-sea assessment. So we understand what is on
	the ship. We have a team that looks at them before they begin
	that basic phase for those that are not fully manned. And that
	gives us a level of confidence that they are either ready or
	not on top of the other things.
	Admiral Grady. Just to go into a little bit further, part
	of that ready-for-sea assessment includes bridge resource
	management workshops. And in this, we have learned and rely
	heavily upon our civilian shipmates from the Military Sealift
	Command, the strategic sealift officers, to come give us an
	external view of both the individuals and the teams that are
	onboard. So it is a key and new element where we learn from the
	best of the best on the civilian side. And that bridge resource
	management workshop is a key part of the ready-for-sea
	assessment.
	Mr. Wittman. I think those are great points.
	Let me get you to dive a little bit deeper into that. I
	think what you all have done as far as training, whether it is
	changes at Surface Warfare Officers School [SWOS], whether it
	is in certifications for basic seamanship, for rules of the
	road, are all good things. But I am still concerned about some
	of the structural elements of how sailors advance in higher
	skill levels there within the surface fleet.
	There are some elements like lack of deck handling time for
	junior officers, a generalist approach to both deck and
	engineering billets, the CO/XO [commanding officer/executive
	officer] fleet-up, and also, too, issues of adopting some
	international watch-standing standards for officers on the deck
	and people that are standing watch.
	So I wanted to get an idea about what do you think should
	be done in those areas of structural reforms within the Navy to
	make sure that we have some certainty there with experience
	levels and level of knowledge?
	Admiral Grady. Yes, sir. I will start with the standards of
	training, certification, and watchkeeping.
	Again, learning from the best of the best in the civilian
	infrastructure and our civilian shipmates, we took a look at
	all of the--and I will use the Surface Warfare Officers School
	as an example. We took a look at all of the PQS [Personnel
	Qualification Standards] there. And now nearly two-thirds of
	all of our PQS there now meets STCW [International Standards of
	Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers]
	standards. Additionally, all of the instructors at SWOS are
	certified in accordance with the STCW standards.
	When we look at surface warfare maritime requirements and
	DC [damage controlman] requirements and measure them against
	the STCW, we exceed third mate requirements. Similarly, in our
	new SWO [surface warfare officer] logbook, we exceed third mate
	requirements. So I think we have done the right thing and
	continued to learn from the best of the best in the civilian
	world.
	Now, in terms of the, for instance, surface warfare officer
	[SWO] training that we provide them and the SWO career path, if
	you will, we have recognized that it is all about the
	appropriate experience.
	So, on the SWO career path, the total duration at sea for a
	young division officer is now going to be 4 years. Some split
	of notionally 30 months on the first ship--important that it is
	30 months on the first ship because they get a chance to really
	sink their teeth in, get a lot of moving water under the keel.
	But the option does persist for them to stay 4 months, 4 years
	if the captain so desires to give them even more time.
	And from a SWO division officer training, we have increased
	that training from 14 to 23 weeks, much more time in the
	classroom and then in the simulators before they get a chance
	to go out and really put it to work.
	Across the SWO milestone careers, from ensign to captain to
	full captain, we have instituted 10 milestone checks, three of
	which are go/no go. You can fail this and not move on. This is
	the culture of excellence at work. And to this point, 5 percent
	of those folks have been asked to leave the command pipeline
	because they were not ready.
	And then, finally, more experience in ships. So, in the
	past, we used to take a division officer and allow him or her
	to, after their first 24 months, say, serve up on a staff. We
	don't do that anymore. Only the best of the best will serve 4
	years and then get to go to one of those staffs, similarly, for
	department head training.
	And on the enlisted side, we have focused on things like
	quartermaster and operational specialist training that are so
	critical to navigation, seamanship, and shiphandling. And
	across the curriculum there to include how we use the Voyage
	Management System and electronic navigation or automated
	information systems and how those two teams work together, we
	have significantly improved that pipeline.
	I guess the last one is I believe that the complexity of a
	modern Navy warship demands that we not have a topside officer
	and an engineering officer. I think this is absolutely
	critical.
	I am going to give you a personal story, if you don't mind,
	sir. I was a department head in the USS Princeton back in the
	early 1990s. As many of you may recall, they suffered a mine
	detonation during Operation Desert Storm. The two officers that
	were on watch and responded to that were the weapons officer
	and the engineering officer, both of whom so well understood
	the complexity of their systems, the integration of the combat
	systems, and the engineering plant, how to maneuver the ship,
	that they were able to keep fighting for 72 hours by pointing
	the forward deckhouse up-threat into Iraq.
	I think, given the complexity, that is why you need
	officers who are both engineers and topside ship drivers and
	warfighters.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
	We are now going to go to the clock, and we are going to
	take questions from the members that arrived in order prior to
	the gavel.
	That would be you, Mr. Cisneros. You can start.
	Mr. Cisneros. Thank you both for being here today. I am a
	Navy veteran, and I enjoyed my time onboard ship and look back
	very fondly on it.
	The thing I want to kind of dive into a little bit and when
	I read about the Fitzgerald was the lack of manning and how
	that cruiser had, basically, if you go back 10 years ago, was--
	I think well over 350 was the manning and had been reduced to
	under 300. And watches had been eliminated such as your port
	and starboard lookouts.
	I want to know if that situation has been corrected on all
	our Navy ships.
	Admiral Grady. Yes, sir, it has. So some decisions were
	taken, for all the right reasons, in the past to try to
	leverage technology, for instance, to see whether we could get
	to a minimal or optimal manning construct.
	And so, in your day, you probably had a lot more sailors
	onboard the ship, similarly for me when I was a young division
	officer.
	So those decisions were taken. And as we sailed in that
	environment, we recognized that that was too few. And, indeed,
	since 2012, you know, the number on a DDG [guided-missile
	destroyer] was 240. In 2017, it is about 270. And we will be
	funded to--back up to very close to the original size for a
	guided-missile destroyer in 2023 of about 318 and 320.
	So, while we had worked hard to see if we could--because
	personnel is expensive, and so that did not work out well, and
	now we are buying back to a larger size crew complement for a
	destroyer, for example.
	Admiral Aquilino. And, sir, from the Pacific side, all the
	forces that are deployed right now meet the standard we have
	set of 95 percent fill and 92 percent fit, which is the right
	job--the right person with the right skills in the right job.
	That was one of the big changes that we have absolutely pulled
	up to the highest level to make sure that nobody's out there
	well below a level that somebody didn't know.
	Mr. Cisneros. And going back to the changes that you made
	at SWOS, the Surface Warfare Officers School, now that they are
	spending more time there, they got rid of the former program, I
	think, where they were learning on CDs onboard the ship.
	But you have a group of officers who went through that
	program who may not be, as we will say, as good ship drivers as
	they could be if they have gone to the programs going now.
	How are we going back to correct those who may be
	department heads right now to make sure that we are bringing
	them up to speed?
	Admiral Grady. Yes, sir. That is a great point for those
	officers who have not benefited from the improvements in basic
	division officer training that we give them now, that started
	in 2012. Those officers who are now becoming department heads
	or soon-to-be captain--XOs [executive officers] and captains.
	We have instituted these 10 career milestone checks where we
	ensure that they are meeting the new and improved standards. We
	are providing them more in-classroom time not the CD-based kind
	of ``SWOS in a Box'' that you are referring to. And this
	includes assessments too, so from the classroom assessment to
	that which we do in the trainer, which is very, very high-
	fidelity training.
	So we are able to recognize that not all training is the
	same. We accomplish that by their returns to SWOS. And, of
	course, there is a leadership issue there too. So the COs are
	now working very, very hard to train their wardrooms to the
	appropriate level.
	So I feel confident that, whether they are part of the--a
	graduate of the new Basic Division Officer Course or not, they
	will have the appropriate training. And if not and they don't
	meet the requirement in one of those three touch points, then
	they don't make the cut.
	Admiral Aquilino. And, sir, I am encouraged, because as a
	naval aviator, I have now taken a look at the training that my
	surface counterparts have implemented, specifically the use of
	simulation right now in the form of our LCS [littoral combat
	ship] training for both officer, enlisted. There is new
	technology that allows you to be more effective in your
	training.
	That model is going to be transitioned into the destroyer
	type/model/series as well. So the way we train is getting
	better. That will allow us to be able to more quickly get those
	up to speed who haven't had it.
	Mr. Cisneros. All right. I yield back my time.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Mr. Joe Wilson.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman John Garamendi, and
	Admirals, thank you very much for your service and for your
	Navy families. It is particularly impressive to me to be here
	with great appreciation because I am here as the very grateful
	dad of a member of the U.S. Navy, and so I just so appreciate
	your service. I am also--had the opportunity sadly to visit the
	USS Fitzgerald at Yokosuka, Japan, and I saw where our devoted
	sailors were tragically killed. I want to thank you for every
	effort to avoid such an accident ever to occur again.
	And in line with that, Admiral Aquilino, the USS Fitzgerald
	and the USS John McCain were forward deployed in Japan for over
	20 years. This extensive overseas homeporting contributed to
	deferred depot maintenance, and also overall deteriorated the
	conditions of the ships. What are the Navy's plans to implement
	the National Defense Authorization Act requirement that ships
	return to the U.S. after 10 years overseas, and then is the
	Navy considering ways to increase ship repair capabilities in
	the Pacific, such as the Guam shipyard?
	Admiral Aquilino. Sir, thank you for the question. So the
	Fitzgerald and McCain absolutely are on track, first of all, to
	be able to become repaired, get the required training they
	need, and then to deploy with the confidence that is required.
	I will start with the Guam piece. Again, Admiral Davidson
	had asked that we take look at capabilities that exist across
	the theater to ensure that we are postured correctly in time of
	crisis. And we are taking a look at Guam and what capabilities
	might be there, how we might want to use them, again, to
	increase our overall capacity. The Yokosuka repairs--again, I
	believe now that we have had--we have given the operational
	role to the Naval Sea Systems Command in Yokosuka, that will
	certainly help make sure that we execute the right level of
	maintenance when we are forward deployed, and we absolutely are
	developing a plan right now to ensure we can get to the 10-year
	limit that you have identified, and I am waiting to take a
	brief on how we are going to do that. That will also take a
	little bit of time to implement.
	One of the considerations there is the ship crew members
	and the families, so we don't, over the next 2 years, have to
	swap five ships out, and we will work with Congress, sir, to
	make sure we get that right.
	Mr. Wilson. And I am grateful that you have brought up
	about looking into Guam. The strategic location is absolutely
	incredible. Three hours to everywhere, and the patriotic people
	of Guam are just--should be so treasured, and I look forward to
	seeing what response you have further on that.
	Additionally, at the 2017 readiness hearing that I chaired,
	I asked the Government Accountability Office about its June 13,
	2017, report which identified readiness issues just 4 days
	before the Fitzgerald incident. The GAO statement indicated
	that the expired training certifications likely played a role
	in the incidents. Please discuss the changes that the Navy has
	made since the GAO report was published in 2017. Who certifies
	the ships homeported within the Indo-Pacific area of
	responsibility? Have reforms been instituted specifically as to
	waivers?
	Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, sir. So there are no more
	waivers, unless granted by me; so any waiver or request to
	operate in a manner that doesn't meet the identified standards
	are my decision alone. And so from a top-down perspective, I
	don't know what else we could do. To date, I have granted no
	waivers.
	With regard to the certs, again, my battle rhythm for
	understanding, again, 3 days a week, on every ship that is out,
	whether or not they have the appropriate manning, the level of
	training, and the certification, is briefed to me 3 days a
	week. If any of those don't meet the requirement to execute the
	assigned missions then they will not be tasked.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And, Admiral Grady, in the
	statement you provided, you mention the important role of
	nuclear deterrence. The nuclear triad is critical to protecting
	the homeland and strategic deterrence. What investment is the
	Navy making to strengthen our nuclear deterrence?
	Admiral Grady. Well, of course, sir, the most survivable
	leg of the nuclear triad is our SSBN [ballistic missile
	submarine] force. And so the maintenance and sustainability of
	the current Ohio-class SSBN force is absolutely critical to the
	viability of that nuclear triad.
	Secondly then, is the follow-on to the Ohio-class
	submarine, which is the Columbia-class submarine, and I believe
	with the support of the committee and the Congress, we are
	working toward achieving that.
	And finally, there is the investments in the E-6 airplane
	that is part of the apparatus airborne command and control
	platform and all of the connectivity that allow us in a
	contingency or a crisis to command and control the nuclear
	deterrent. And so, across those three things, the Navy is
	significantly invested in that, probably number one mission.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, sir.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Ms. Houlahan.
	Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for
	coming. I very much appreciate your time, and as we have
	talked, I am the daughter and the granddaughter of Navy
	officers. I have four Active Duty cousins right now, three of
	whom are in the Navy, one of whom is a submariner and one is a
	Navy SEAL. The third a Navy nurse. And so, I have a personal
	appreciation for the impact that you all have and the impact in
	operational demands have on the sailors at the individual level
	and at the family level, as well.
	Lack of training and resourcing at the individual level
	amplified at the organization level has significant impact as
	we have seen obviously. In fact, my father actually authored
	something for the Navy Proceedings on this very subject. He is
	a naval historian now in his retirement.
	Admiral Grady, my question is for you. The October 2017
	Comprehensive Review stated, quote, ``Today, proficiency in
	seamanship and navigation competes for time and attention with
	the expanding tactical duties of our naval professionals at
	sea. Further, the operational demands for surface ships to
	perform these missions continue to increase, even as the size
	of the surface force in the Navy has decreased.'' So my
	question for you is when you were commissioned, sir, how long
	was your first course of instruction as a surface warfare
	officer?
	Admiral Grady. It was 4 months.
	Ms. Houlahan. Four months?
	Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
	Ms. Houlahan. And how long is that same training course
	today?
	Admiral Grady. It is 23 weeks now.
	Ms. Houlahan. And so, I also, in addition to being an
	Active Duty member myself in the Air Force, was a teacher for a
	time, and my question to you is when you shrink the level of
	instruction that significantly, you clearly must have to
	compromise something, or have you compromised something? And if
	you have, sir, what do you think that you have compromised?
	Admiral Grady. Well, time is always one of the more
	important training commodities and resources that we attempt to
	manage, but I think compromise is not a term I would use. I
	think we found efficiencies, particularly in the modernized
	delivery of training content, and so, to your colleague
	commented on CD-based training, that was not effective; we
	thought it would be, but it was not. And so now the appropriate
	mix of classroom training and simulator training and practical
	work has bought us the efficiencies, I think, in the new Basic
	Division Officer Course at 23 weeks with the appropriate amount
	of time to come very close to what I learned back in 1984.
	I would tell you that in that time, it was a lot of
	PowerPoint, and it was kind of seapower through memorization.
	And the course that we have now is not that. It is much more
	practically oriented with rigorous assessments, even in that
	Basic Division Officer Course. My own son is a graduate of that
	course, and he would tell you it was pretty hard. And that is
	good. And that is what we need. And so I think less compromise,
	but more getting better at the modernized delivery and
	understanding the learning science. And I would tell you, too,
	that that passes over to how we train our enlisted sailors. So
	as we bring Ready, Relevant Learning online that is one of the
	three lines of effort, how do you deliver modernized content,
	recognizing the science of learning? And I think we have come a
	long way there.
	Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And the Comprehensive Review
	identified the need for additional training and focus, and in
	the initial training environment, it wasn't as extensive of a
	program as it possibly currently--I am sorry, as it was. Has
	the Navy considered expanding the scope of the initial surface
	warfare training to include real-world and simulated seamanship
	and navigation training?
	Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am, we have. So there is that first
	23 weeks, which, again, starts with classroom training but then
	spends a lot of time in the simulator. The rest of the pipeline
	training for a junior officer will include two junior officer
	of the deck courses, which will all be simulator-based, and
	then finally, an officer of the deck, simulator-based course
	with repeated touch points at our Surface Warfare Officers
	School. Far beyond--particularly from the simulation and
	training perspective in the simulator, far beyond what I ever
	had.
	Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And my last question is actually
	kind of switching gears a little bit and talking a little bit
	about the maintenance of ships. Will the modernization of our
	aging public yards exacerbate the backlog that already exists,
	do you feel?
	Admiral Grady. It is certainly a requirement that we
	modernize our public shipyards. So the Secretary's shipyard
	improvement operational program, the SIOP, which is a 20-year
	program for about $22 billion, is absolutely critical. So if
	you walk our shipyards today, fantastic artisans and craftsmen
	in each of those, masters of their trade, but they are just not
	laid out well. That is one example of what we need to do with
	that $22 billion over 20 years.
	So we need to modernize the delivery of the maintenance,
	which includes everything from getting the right capital
	equipment on board to how we lay out from an efficiency
	perspective each of our public yards. I would tell you, too,
	that I believe that is happening in the private shipyards, too,
	and I would encourage them to do that as we work to be a better
	partners with them.
	Ms. Houlahan. And I have no more time, but that was
	actually my follow-on question, which had to do with the
	privatization opportunities with shipyards, as well. I thank
	you very much for your time, gentlemen. I yield back.
	Mr. Garamendi. Ms. Houlahan, thank you for raising the
	shipyard issue. We will be spending a lot of time on that in
	the days ahead. Mr. Kelly, you are next.
	Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to
	thank the spouses and children, who pay such a huge price for
	our Nation. I also want to recognize our senior enlisted
	leaders right behind you, and as you guys know in command, you
	can't exist without great senior enlisted leaders, and that is
	why we are the greatest military in the world is because of our
	senior enlisted leaders.
	We have to fight today with what we have, especially in
	your area of the world. Having traveled the Pacific Rim last
	spring with Senator Inhofe, the chairman of the Armed Services
	Committee in the Senate, the time and distances that are there
	we have to be capable, and we have to have every ship in the
	fight at the right place at the right time just to hold until
	we can get the rest of our fleet there.
	America is the greatest power in the world like many powers
	before us, and being an Army guy, it is hard for me to admit
	this, but America is a great power because of the seapower. And
	we control the seas, just as Britain was and Spain and France
	and Japan, and you go on and on. You have to be able to control
	the seas in order to be a great power.
	I am concerned right now in that region with the firepower
	ratios that we have with China, who has many ground-based
	systems to support their fleet. Also concerned with the
	standoff that we have. Fully supportive of a 355-ship Navy,
	which I think gets us to the place, but using all of our
	allies, okay, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, all
	those things in that area, are we capable of fighting tonight
	and withholding, and are we leveraging all our ground, air, and
	sea to make sure that we have the right firepower ratios at the
	right time?
	Admiral Aquilino. Sir, thanks for that question. There has
	certainly been growth in some of our principal adversaries in
	the Pacific with regard to their force structure, as well as
	their capabilities. I am here to tell you, I am ready tonight.
	The force that we have certainly has--well, let me put it this
	way: We fight the away game, as you have identified. So when
	some adversaries are able to do stuff on their shores, the away
	team is going to go to that fight, we have to be able to
	sustain that fight, and we can do that today.
	Additionally, you brought up the allies and partners. It is
	critical that we work with our allies and partners. You know,
	one of our asymmetric advantages is our adversaries have no
	partners. That is pretty important, sir. So your observations
	are absolutely accurate, but we are ready to fight tonight.
	Admiral Grady. If I could, sir, your Navy is the contact,
	blunt, and surge force that is written into the National
	Defense Strategy, and I would love to host you down in Norfolk
	to maybe have a classified session where we can talk about some
	of these exchange ratios, or I am sure Lung would happy--would
	be happy to have you out there. And the other element I would
	mention is we have to be able to fight with the joint force, as
	well, and we are doing that.
	Mr. Kelly. My next question kind of goes off, and it is not
	on my notes, so one of the things that keeps me awake at night,
	and I hope it keeps you guys awake at night, is our inability--
	the number of hospitals we have, both for soft power and hard
	power, especially in that area of the world, the hospital ships
	that we have, and also the icebreakers that we have that some
	of our competitors are ahead of us. You know, China has a huge
	number of icebreakers as does Russia in that area.
	Tell me how icebreakers affect your fleets and your ability
	to maneuver and do the things that you need to do in that
	region?
	Admiral Aquilino. If you don't mind, sir, I will start with
	the specific question on the hospital ships. So each year, we
	do an operation called Pacific Partnership, where we take a
	hospital ship or one of our other ships with deployed medical
	teams that go out and do humanitarian missions across the
	region. We do that every year. That is the soft power you are
	talking about. And before I give it to Chris to talk about
	icebreakers, I would just like to say, you know, my goal is to
	sleep well every night. I would like my counterpart to not
	sleep well at all.
	Mr. Kelly. I am with you on that.
	Admiral Grady. I guess I would add that the idea and the
	issue of combat medicine is really important for the Navy to
	get a hold of, and so in Lung's AOR [area of responsibility],
	that idea of a golden hour is not going to be there, and we
	have to be ready to think innovatively on how we are going to
	do that. So adaptive force packaging on smaller ships in
	addition to the two hospital ships that we have that provide
	that soft power we need to--creative thinking on that, and rest
	assured that we are both doing that with our fleet counterpart
	in Europe.
	Now to the icebreaker question, it is clearly evident that
	the Arctic is a new frontier. And so, a lot of folks flowing
	into the Arctic for a host of various reasons from the demand
	for fish stocks and proteins to what is on the bottom to our
	adversaries perhaps trying--or at least one adversary trying to
	create a bastion up there.
	So icebreakers will enable us to fight more effectively in
	that environment. And so, we support the--our fellow sea
	service, the Coast Guard, in their initiatives to get more
	icebreakers into their force. And, again, we will fight
	together with them as we push into the Arctic and the more
	cold.
	Mr. Kelly. And my time is expired. I yield back.
	Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Kelly. I have been waiting
	for this next questioner. She comes with some experience as an
	executive officer on a cruiser, Mrs. Luria.
	Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, Admirals, for being here
	today. And in advance of the hearing, I reviewed the
	Comprehensive Review. I went back and reviewed the Balisle
	report, several GAO reports, and numerous other examples where
	over time, we identify problems, we implement corrective
	actions, but we fail to sufficiently assess and follow through
	with these before we find ourselves back here again at yet
	another hearing to take more corrective actions, and, you know,
	find ourselves with more avoidable mishaps.
	And as we have acknowledged, we are here today because of
	the tragic loss of 17 lives of our sailors because we continue
	to be incapable of properly manning, training, and equipping
	our surface forces, in my mind, to perform the most basic
	functions of seamanship and navigation.
	And for nearly two decades, we prioritized efficiency over
	effectiveness as is clearly delineated in the Balisle report,
	and you have touched on the fit and the fill and where we are
	getting, you know, closer to the manning we need, but just as a
	comment, I would urge that we look back at what we did with the
	Top Six Roll-Down, and that we have actually rolled back up to
	the right skill sets to fill those numbers in the future.
	And, you know, in the Comprehensive Review, I feel that we
	face, yet again, another damning report that shows we
	prioritize breadth over depth of experience and expertise and
	proficiency in our surface forces, and due to the limitations
	of time, I have a few yes-no questions, and I would ask that
	you keep it to that just so that we can move on.
	And, Admiral Aquilino, did you find this report, the
	Comprehensive Review, to be a fair critique of our surface
	navigation training at the time?
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am.
	Mrs. Luria. And my problem, and from my own personal
	experience in having gone through this entire career pipeline
	and then served as a division officer, department head, XO,
	dealt with the junior officers who had, you know, only learned
	through ``SWOS in a Box,'' is that our corrective actions
	overwhelmingly required the same people through OJT [on-the-job
	training] who have gone through the same ineffective training
	that you have described as inadequate, to fix the problem.
	And it is encouraging that you mention that we have
	enlisted the force of our civilian mariners through, you know,
	a more robust BRM [bridge resource management] course, but
	again, that is probably only several days, and I just have a
	feeling that we continue to use OJT to train ourselves with the
	same people who don't have the right proficiencies. And, you
	know, I just tried to put it in the context for you, Admiral
	Aquilino, thinking that you are an aviator, and if we had a
	similar report that found that aviators weren't able to fly
	planes safely. So you had a plane crash, you had 17 people die
	in this plane crash and you did an investigation and found out
	that that pilot did not know how to fly his plane. And then we
	did another report and we found out that most of our pilots did
	not know how to fly planes, do you feel that we are really
	putting that same sense of urgency into the corrective actions
	in our surface force as an example such as that?
	Admiral Aquilino. So the differences are--I don't know if
	it is very easy to make that similar analogy, but your point is
	absolutely valid. I think we did focus on efficiency back in a
	time when there was clearly very extreme pressures on funding
	pieces.
	Mrs. Luria. They are only going to give me 5 minutes, so
	the question is do you feel the sense of urgency? When you are
	implementing these actions, do you feel that it has the
	appropriate sense of urgency, and do you have the resources to
	apply the sense of urgency that this deserves?
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, so I believe we are taking the right
	actions, yes, ma'am.
	Mrs. Luria. Okay. And to further amplify that, you know, as
	the commander of the Pacific Fleet, your theater has really the
	most complex and challenging environment, you know, with the
	BMD [ballistic missile defense] threat, tension on the Korean
	peninsula, near-peer adversaries, increasing naval activity
	from China and Russia and, you know, each of these require the
	highest competency and the highest skills to conduct major
	combat operations in your theater. And, you know, does the
	status of our simple basic navigation and seamanship training
	that raises concerns about competency of our surface forces
	give you confidence that our surface forces can fight at the
	highest level against our adversaries in the Pacific?
	Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, with one comment. So that is
	not just a question for the Pacific. Your Navy will surge to
	wherever--as you know, wherever the fight is. So if the fight
	starts in the Pacific, my belief is I will get a lot of Admiral
	Grady's forces and vice versa if it starts in the Atlantic. So
	we trained the skill sets and we are ready to operate wherever
	crisis breaks out.
	Mrs. Luria. Okay. And my last comment, you know, and I
	thought a lot about this in reading through the Balisle report
	specifically, is that we have moved away from training to
	fundamentals. We learned relative motion with a popsicle stick
	and a grease pencil on a SPA-25 radar repeater, and we knew
	with the rigor of, you know, every 3 minutes putting this on a
	MOBOARD [Basic Maneuvering Board] and looking out the window,
	we understood what we were looking at around us. And I feel
	that, you know, we have advances in technology that are very
	important and are very critical tools, but just from my
	personal experience, my observation is that we have moved away
	from the absolute fundamentals behind the technology that we
	use, and have we restored a foundation in those fundamentals in
	the training before we go to the simulation and the ARPA
	[Automatic Radar Plotting Aid] and all of the tools that are
	out there to be used today.
	Admiral Grady. I am confident the answer to that is yes,
	and to your earlier comment about OJT, we have broken the chain
	of that, so what we have put in place has broken the chain of
	unqualified people training unqualified people. I would be
	delighted to host you up at SWOS to show you the improvements
	that have been made, or at the fleet concentration centers for
	Basic Division Officer Course and the Advanced Division Officer
	Course, the two JOOD [Junior Officer of the Deck] Courses, the
	OOD [Officer of the Deck] Course. I think you would be
	impressed and come away with greater confidence.
	Mrs. Luria. I appreciate that, and I will look forward to
	that as well, and you know, my experience as SWOS as a division
	officer is they crammed 3 weeks of training into 6 months, and
	it was not rigorous at all, and no one failed, so I hope we
	have turned that paradigm around. And thank you again for your
	time.
	Mr. Garamendi. Gotta love it. One of the attributes of the
	Readiness Committee is the freshmen that have joined the
	committee. They come with an extraordinary set of experiences
	and able to not only ask questions, but understand answers that
	many of us wouldn't know. I look forward to a second round, and
	you gentlemen could, too. Let's see. We are going to Mr. Waltz,
	you are next.
	Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
	for being here today. I want to echo the gratitude to your
	families. I tell people all the time, yes, of course, thank
	your veteran, but take an extra step and thank spouses,
	parents, children, it truly is a team effort for our All-
	Volunteer Force, so thank you all for being here.
	I grew up the son and grandson of Navy enlisted chiefs in
	Jacksonville, Florida, and then defected and spent 23 years in
	the Army, so bear with me.
	I want to go back to the 6,200-sailor shortage and just ask
	you a few questions on that. How long, and forgive me if I
	missed it, but how long in the timeline to fill that shortage?
	What percentage of the overall, you know, of the overall force
	does that represent? And then just some detail on is that
	across the board? Is that certain types of ships? Is that older
	versus newer where technology is filling in in certain types of
	systems? Subsurface, surface? Can you just kind of flesh that
	out for me for a minute?
	Admiral Aquilino. I will have to get back to you on the
	percentage. So I can tell of my--between 140 and 150,000
	sailors in the Pacific, 6,200, you know, if we take 60 percent
	of that, it is mine. So that is the applicability. It is
	balanced across all of the forces and----
	Mr. Waltz. Okay.
	Admiral Aquilino [continuing]. Different ships have
	different sizes, so it is kind of difficult--we don't just say,
	Hey----
	Mr. Waltz. Forgive me, Admiral. What I want to get at is
	there a certain rating, is there a certain kind of low-density/
	high-demand type of rating that you are having a hard time
	with, or is it kind of spread across the force?
	Admiral Aquilino. I would say it is spread evenly. There is
	critical NECs [Navy Enlisted Classifications] or capabilities
	that each of the ship needs. One of those that was called out
	in the report was quartermasters, that there is not enough at
	sea, that there is too many ashore, so we review all that. When
	we put ships out, they must have the correct amount of those
	critical capabilities on board or they don't go.
	Mr. Waltz. How long has the shortage persisted? Has this
	been for decades? Has it been for years? Was it a result, just
	to be candid, of sequestration and shortfalls in the last 10
	years? Like what is, just very quickly, on the nucleus of the
	problem?
	Admiral Aquilino. I would say the history is the shortfalls
	persisted for a number of years, but I will tell you in the
	past 4 or 5, we are working, as Admiral Grady identified, in
	the correct direction. So back in 2000 and I think it was 12
	[2012], the number was 260 on a DDG. And today that number, the
	requirement is up at 315. So it has persisted for a while. We
	continue to get there. We thank you for your support. We have
	added 7,500 alone last year in the budget that we couldn't have
	done that without the teamwork that you provide. So on the
	right track. I think we get there in 2023 to get to 100
	percent.
	Mr. Waltz. If we don't continue the current level of
	funding obviously, you know, then that is going to change that
	trajectory?
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
	Admiral Grady. You are helping us buy our way out of that
	hole, but then the new ships will be coming, so we will have to
	continue to man the fleet for the new ships, as well.
	Mr. Waltz. Okay. Admiral, you mention--well, let me--you
	mentioned that you had actually stopped some deployments, ships
	weren't ready, fleets weren't ready. Operationally what
	couldn't you do when that happens, what risks did you take in
	your AOR [area of responsibility] when that doesn't happen?
	Admiral Aquilino. We took risk in the form of a single
	deployment to the Western Pacific in support of the--or
	deployment to the South Pacific Islands that we were supporting
	in conjunction with our Coast Guard partners. That is one. I
	reduced a ship that was supposed to go to the Rim of the
	Pacific exercise, and then we took risk with regard to surge
	forces that if crisis were to have broken out, they would have
	needed additional training before they could have gone. That is
	the risk.
	Admiral Davidson also reduced one of the missions that was
	previously in my job jar based on the current environment. He
	removed that again for now. The enemy gets a vote, so those
	could easily come back if the times were different.
	Mr. Waltz. So I just want to get in my remaining time, it
	is my understanding U.S. PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] sets
	the requirement, but then also sets the fill. And that is a
	carve-out. Is that still the case? I know some other members,
	my colleagues have gotten at that, but is that--is that
	basically the plan going forward? I just find that coming from
	my background to be odd, to be candid.
	Admiral Aquilino. That is actually not accurate.
	Mr. Waltz. Okay.
	Admiral Aquilino. So PACOM sets the requirement. This is
	what I need to do the missions that the President has assigned
	to him.
	Mr. Waltz. Right.
	Admiral Aquilino. When each year the Navy produces a
	sourcing solution or here are the forces that we will deploy in
	the next year, what we have pushed forward now over the past
	couple of years is a supply-based model. So there are many
	requirements as set by Admiral Davidson and the other combatant
	commanders that we currently are not filling. The Secretary of
	Defense adjudicates those differences between what is needed by
	the combatant commander and what has been put forward by the
	services. So that is really the accurate model and the way it
	works.
	Mr. Waltz. Would you be able to provide--would you be able
	to provide for the record what isn't being filled then, I mean,
	what the gaps are going forward in that supply-based model?
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
	[The information referred to was not available at the time
	of printing.]
	Mr. Waltz. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. I yield back.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. And I will now turn to Mr.
	Golden.
	Mr. Golden. Thank you very much, sir. Just a couple of
	quick thoughts for the subcommittee as a whole, because I want
	to say as a Marine Corps infantryman, I am not the subject
	matter expert on sailing around in naval ships. Thankfully, I
	have got Congresswoman Luria sitting next to me to drill into
	the weeds on that. But the extent of my experience really is
	riding around out in the Atlantic and taking a splash in an AAV
	[amphibious assault vehicle] to invade Virginia, which I will
	say as a native New Englander, I enjoyed. But, you know, I just
	wanted to point out to the committee, and I think that this is
	a great hearing and one that is necessary, that my
	understanding of what Congress' role should be in regards to
	oversight really lies in the world of dictating to the Navy who
	it is that we fight or compete with and why. And I really
	looked to you all in the Navy to come before these committees
	and talk about the where do we fight and where do we compete
	with them, and more importantly, what do we need to do it, to
	win and to do it as safely as possible.
	It is a dangerous job, but we ought to give you all the
	equipment, ships, and personnel necessary to accomplish that
	mission with the least amount of lives lost and put at risk as
	possible.
	So I just want to encourage you. In this subcommittee, I
	suspect that we are going to be looking to work together to get
	you what you need. So don't hesitate to tell us what that is.
	And, you know, I recognize this in you as officers, and I want
	to thank you and tell you I respect very much that you sat up
	there with your opening statements and took full responsibility
	for these incidences, which is what good officers and good
	leaders do, and I appreciate that very much. You did not offer
	any excuses. You probably could have pointed a finger right
	back at Congress as we look, I think, to maintain operational
	tempo while also talking about your need to shift to address
	threats from Russia and increasing competition from China.
	It would make sense to this Marine, you might have to take
	a step back in order to prepare for that mission and achieve
	that high level of readiness. Yet, we are asking you just to
	hit the accelerator button, and so, with that I think comes a
	great responsibility to talk about how we are going to free up
	additional resources, because if we are not going to, you know,
	decrease the requirements, then I think we are going to have to
	give you more ships and more Navy personnel down the road.
	So, you know, I would just share from you from the enlisted
	perspective I have been on deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq
	in a Marine infantry unit, and people--you know, we lose
	people, people get injured, people get hurt, and as those
	numbers go down, you increase the amount of time that you are
	standing post out on patrol really no down time whatsoever. And
	we train for operating tired, but none of us are perfect, and
	ultimately, you push people too hard, and that is where
	mistakes happen, and I am sure that had something to do with
	this.
	And I know you keep that in mind, but, you know, the very
	best sailors in the world, you push them too hard, they get
	overtired, mistakes will happen, and that gets back to you all
	coming in here and telling us what you need to make sure that
	they don't have to be in that position. So thank you very much,
	and I look forward to working with everyone on the committee.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. Your comments are well
	taken. Mr. Bergman.
	Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
	of you in the room today, especially those of you wearing the
	uniform--wearing the uniform, and those who will bring the next
	generations into uniform. I would like to, maybe, take a little
	different take on the keeping our adversaries awake at night. I
	would like for our potential adversaries to sleep very well at
	night, knowing they have made the very wise decision not to
	challenge us, because if this world had some more good sleep
	time in it we would probably make some better decisions across
	the globe. And when it comes to rest for your crews, whether,
	you know, off watch that down time is essential for your
	commanders, your watch officers, your engineering officers,
	whoever has the watch to make the best decisions at the time.
	You know, it is great to have a fellow naval aviator. I
	will keep my hands down. I won't talk with my hands, okay, but
	the idea is that readiness is an honest assessment of the
	effectiveness of a training curriculum. Back in the early
	2000s, then CNO Vern Clark spent, I think, $11 billion in the
	New Center at Great Lakes when they closed Orlando, moved all
	the operations there because in chatting with him back in that
	timeframe he realized that these young men and women who were
	in boot camp to become effective members of a team were going
	to have to have different kinds of training experiences and
	that involved the extensive simulation that they have there in
	Great Lakes.
	And for anyone who has never seen it, a tour there would
	be, I think, greatly beneficial to a lot of our members who
	have not under--had the opportunity to excel under the rigors
	of training like they have at Great Lakes.
	Now having said that, any schoolhouse left unattended tends
	to set its own standards, fall in love with its own curriculum
	sometimes. So to what extent has the Navy had to overcome what
	we might call the schoolhouse mentality in which the
	schoolhouse being reluctant to change, but yet, you know as the
	leadership in the Navy, you have to change. Would you care to
	make a comment on how you have made strides going forward with
	that bringing the schoolhouse along with you?
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir, I will jump in there. So the
	feedback mechanism that we have implemented across the Navy
	with regard to the lessons learned that we take out of conflict
	that we are in today whether it be Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan,
	each deployment that the units are on those feedback loops plug
	directly back into our training mechanisms in the form of
	Strike Group Four, Strike Group 15, Top Gun, and SMWDC [Surface
	and Mine Warfighting Development Center], so that the crews and
	the teams that go through our training are identified and
	trained to the latest threats that exist. And in a closed
	session, I can give you some of those critical things that we
	learned and that we quickly implemented with regard to adjusted
	training, such that the next team out the door would be the
	most up to speed for the threats they might see.
	Admiral Grady. And I would add that this is the central
	concept of the Navy's Ready, Relevant Learning program. This
	idea that stasis is bad and that you have to have the virtuous
	feedback loops to say are we on plan with the training we are
	provided. And so from a Ready, Relevant Learning perspective,
	three lines of effort for that: What is the career continuum?
	When is the right time and right type of training to deliver to
	a sailor throughout their career path? Secondly is that
	modernized delivery that we talked about before recognizing the
	advances in the science of learning and how our young people
	learn.
	And then the third, to your point, sir, the third line of
	effort is one that we call integrated content development. And
	that is the virtuous feedback loop that our type commanders--
	the surface boss, the aviation boss, the submarine boss--they
	are the ones that own the appropriate training, build a
	feedback mechanism into the schoolhouse to say this we need to
	add, we don't need more of that, we need more of this, and that
	is what Ready, Relevant Learning is going to bring us in that
	third line of effort.
	Mr. Bergman. Is the attitude that it is okay to fail, in
	fact, training is--you are supposed to fail in training because
	if you haven't, if the training is perfect, if everybody gets
	100 on every exam, obviously your standards probably aren't
	stringent enough, is the attitude there that it is okay to
	fail, just don't fail twice at the same thing?
	Admiral Grady. Well, I think failure breeds great learning.
	Of course, back to the surface warfare officer pipeline, if you
	fail in one of those three check points, then we are not going
	let you command a ship. But to your point, failure helps
	learning and so test a little, learn a lot.
	Mr. Bergman. Thank you, and I see my time has expired. Just
	one closing quick one. Rising--we hear a lot that rising tides
	lift all boats. Rising standards lift all performance. Thank
	you very much.
	Mr. Garamendi. Thank you Mr. Bergman. Mr. Gallagher.
	Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify
	something you said earlier, Admiral Grady, was that the initial
	SWO training went from 4 months to 23 weeks, right?
	Admiral Grady. No, sir. It went from 4 months back when I
	was----
	Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
	Admiral Grady [continuing]. To nothing----
	Mr. Gallagher. To nothing.
	Admiral Grady [continuing]. To SWOS that was administered
	as OJT with computer-based training CD-ROMs, to 17 weeks of
	reestablishing the basic division or accession course, to now
	23 weeks plus three additional courses as part of their junior
	officer training.
	Mr. Gallagher. Got it. That is helpful. Last summer,
	Defense News reported there was a widespread shortfall in basic
	seamanship across the surface fleet, so out of 164 randomly
	selected newly qualified first tour division officers at SWO
	school, a review found at least some concerns with the
	shiphandling skills of nearly 85 percent of the group. How did
	littoral combat ship officers fare relative to the rest of the
	fleet?
	Admiral Grady. They fared quite well. You are referring to
	one of the immediate and controlling actions we took following
	the tragic loss of our 17 shipmates, and that was OOD
	competency checks. So we went around the fleet and sampled, and
	this is what we found. The train to qualify, train to certify
	model that the littoral combat ship uses, as Admiral Aquilino
	said, is amazingly effective and I believe you will see it
	brought to the rest of the fleet over time. And what we are
	finding with the--those that are trained in those simulators,
	both in Jacksonville or Mayport and in San Diego, is that those
	officers are very, very advanced in their ability to drive the
	ship when it is really moving water under the keel.
	Mr. Gallagher. I mean, I think it is fair to say, I think
	you would agree, based on what we just said, that the live
	virtual constructive training environment is a distinguishing
	aspect of LCS and also has been positively correlated with
	their superior performance in that sample size.
	Admiral Grady. Absolutely.
	Mr. Gallagher. So, I guess with that in mind, does the Navy
	have any plans or what plans does the Navy have to bring that
	sort of LCS-style simulation training to other platforms across
	the surface fleet, and what are the associated timelines with
	those plans if they exist?
	Admiral Grady. Well, it starts with the build-out of our
	Navy seamanship and shiphandling trainers in all of the fleet
	concentration areas, and by 2019, by the end of 2019, we will
	have these high-fidelity simulators built out in all of the
	fleet concentration areas, but this is just an interim
	solution.
	The goodness in these is the fidelity of the trainer plus
	the teamwork that comes in. So it is not just the bridge, it is
	not just the combat information center, and one of the things
	we learned from the tragedies is the ability to work together.
	So the interim solution is the build-out of the NSST
	[navigation, seamanship, and shiphandling trainer] trainers in
	all of the fleet concentration areas. After that we are working
	to build maritime shiphandling training centers in both Norfolk
	and San Diego that will fully inculcate this idea of high-
	fidelity simulators for bridge, CIC [combat information
	center], and the team, and that is to the tune of about $240
	million or so, and that will be done in the early 2020s.
	Admiral Aquilino. Sir, there is one point highlighting with
	regard to the simulation capability. There is another aspect of
	the training that I believe has been embraced by my surface
	counterparts. It is a part of Naval Aviation culture, and
	that's the vigorous self-assessment. And if you go to the LCS
	trainer, and you see a commander going through the program
	being trained by a lieutenant who is a weapons and tactics
	instructor telling the commander, Hey, you did that wrong, that
	vigorous self-assessment with the no-holds-barred, or gloves
	off, no retribution, has been easily as effective as the
	simulation itself for us to get better and to work towards that
	culture of excellence.
	Admiral Grady. And I would add, it is the simulation that
	enables that, because we can play it back and show them what
	they did wrong. And additionally, we have identified 14 high-
	stress scenarios that we can do over and over again to help
	them learn. You can't really do that underway on a ship all the
	time because of other operational requirements, but we can put
	this plan, brief, execute, and debrief process to work because
	of the high-fidelity simulation and really learn much faster.
	High-velocity learning.
	Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield the balance of
	my time.
	Mr. Garamendi. Just a quick follow-up. The use of
	simulators you said 20--in the early 2020s to get this advanced
	simulation program underway?
	Admiral Grady. So the interim--the interim capability that
	we have, which will approach the full build-out, will be this
	year. We will finish this year. But then the larger build-out
	in both the two major fleet concentration areas will conclude
	in the 2022 timeframe.
	Mr. Garamendi. Very good. We spent a lot of time at this
	hearing on training. There are the other pieces of this puzzle
	need to be more fully explored, particularly the readiness of
	the ship itself, the equipment, maintenance, and the like. We
	will pick that up at a later time. I think we have run through
	all of the witnesses. I see Mr. Courtney has returned. So I
	think we have finished the hearing. Without further questions
	from the members, we will adjourn the hearing.
	Before I adjourn, I want to thank Admiral Grady, Admiral
	Aquilino, and your spouses for joining us today and for the
	rest of the support. We will continue this--the focus of this
	hearing was principally on the Pacific. We know that is not the
	only place the Navy operates, and we will spend a little more
	time next time we go through this, probably in maybe 6 months
	from now, come back and review the progress along the way.
	Keeping in mind what Mr. Wittman said, he suggested that we
	take the responsibility to be the oversight, and we will. So
	with that the hearing is adjourned.
	Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
	Admiral Grady. Thank you, sir.
	[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittees were
	adjourned.]


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	A P P E N D I X

	February 26, 2019

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	PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

	February 26, 2019

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	[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

	February 26, 2019

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	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

	Mr. Wittman. Admirals, in testimony before this committee last
	year, Secretary Spencer and CNO Richardson indicated their support to
	strike an appropriation limitation, otherwise known as the Inouye
	amendment. Specifically, CNO Richardson indicated ``this Inouye
	amendment . . . is an artificial seam that inhibits [Navy] from
	establishing a single standard.'' Do you agree with the Secretary and
	CNO that the Inouye amendment and other forms of arbitrary
	congressional direction to Navy should be eliminated?
	Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino. We agree with the Secretary and
	the CNO that Sec. 8056 of Public Law 115-141 and other similar
	congressional directives that limit Navy's flexibility should be
	eliminated. The generation of combat ready forces across the Navy is
	executed to one standard that is governed by the Integrated Readiness
	Instruction (OPNAVINST 3000.16) signed by the CNO 15 Feb 2019. These
	standards guide readiness policies and certifications of all Navy
	forces regardless of their geographic location.
	Mr. Wittman. Admirals, in response to a continuing concern as to
	material readiness, Congress required Navy to adopt a limited notice
	INSURV inspection program. Compared with the previous INSURV strategy,
	what have been the fleet impacts to this limited notice INSURV strategy
	and what are the results?
	Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino. NDAA-19 directed INSURV to
	conduct minimal notice inspections by 1 January 2020. INSURV has
	developed a plan to conduct 24 ``pilot'' inspections to determine the
	best method to implement our understanding of minimal notice and is on
	track to execute no notice material inspections on all ships and
	submarines by 1 October 2019. As of 1 Apr 2019, INSURV has conducted
	six minimal notice ``pilot'' inspections with no significant adverse
	impacts on ship schedules and scores have been 5 to 10 percent lower
	than previous averages for DDGs and CGs.
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
	Mrs. Luria. Admiral Grady, the IMO has established requirements for
	the safe navigation of merchant vessels through the standards of
	training, certification, and watchkeeping (STCW) for seafarers. Why is
	the Navy so hesitant to require the same standards for its officers and
	why do our accession sources not require a similar level of sea time
	and subsequently actual at-sea time gaining proficiency in performing
	your job before advancing to the next level?
	Before they take command submariners have a comprehensive
	evaluation through the Submarine Commanders Course, which requires
	proficiency in navigation and warfighting, yet no similar requirement
	exists or is recommended in your corrective actions. Should I take from
	that that warfighting on the surface is not as important as warfighting
	on the subsurface?
	Before a strike group deploys, the culmination of their training is
	the Joint Taskforce Exercise, which is where you as the fleet commander
	certify a ship for deployment. How many strike groups in the last 10
	years have failed the JTFEX?
	This report has identified that Surface Warfare Officers and crews
	lack basic navigation fundamentals, which has not come to light in the
	culminating training event. So is this culminating event in which you
	certify the ship for deployment adequate since it has never identified
	any of these problems?
	Admiral Grady. (a) As outlined within the recent NDAA Section 334
	Report to Congress, the Surface Navy is not hesitant to require the
	same standards for its officers, and has adopted significant portions
	of the STCW requirements where they align with those of Surface
	Warfare. We have completed a side-by-side comparison of the IMO STCW/
	3rd Mate and SWO qualification requirements and extracted those
	applicable to the U.S. Navy. Some portions of STCW bear minimal or no
	application to Surface Warfare requirements. As such, wholesale
	adoption is not practical. Surface Warfare training includes both
	Navigation, Seamanship, and Shiphandling (NSS) requirements and a
	breadth of maritime warfighting skills. With respect to effectively
	navigating and handling ships, Surface Warfare NSS requirements are
	comparable to those of the USCG and the Merchant Marine, as shown
	below. Areas in which Surface Warfare Mariner's Skills training bears
	full STCW/USCG accreditation include Bridge Resource Management (BRM)
	and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) training.
	Some areas in which Surface Warfare Mariner's Skills requirements are
	comparable to STCW/USCG requirements, and for which accrediting is
	forthcoming, include Automated Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) set up and
	employment, to be fielded in 2021 in conjunction with the standup of
	OOD Phase I and the Maritime Skills Training Centers (MSTCs). Some
	requirements in SWO mariner skills training that are aligned with STCW/
	USCG requirements, but for which USCG accreditation has not been
	granted credit or for which additional Surface Community training
	modifications are required include conducting celestial navigation,
	maintaining an anchor watch, or use of IMO Standard Marine
	Communication Phrases (SMCP). Areas in which STCW/USCG requirements
	have little or no application to Surface Warfare requirements include
	cargo handling and stowage, operating life-saving appliances, or
	applying medical first aid.
	(b) No. Maritime Warfighting is a long-standing Surface Warfare
	core competency. The Surface Warfare Officer Requirements Document
	(SWORD) outlines specific career milestone expectations for:
	Navigation, Seamanship, & Shiphandling (``Drive the Ship''), Maritime
	Warfare (``Fight the Ship''), Program & Material Management (``Manage
	the Ship''), and Leadership (``Command the Ship''). Since its
	inception, one-half of the 6-month Surface Warfare Officer Department
	Head Course is devoted to Maritime Warfare and developing the most
	proficient Tactical Action Officers (TAOs). Additionally, approximately
	4 months of additional tactical and maritime warfare training (as
	determined by billet and combat systems baseline) is received via
	Division Officer and/or Department Head Billet Specialty Training
	(BST). Key Navy training commands such as: Naval Surface & Mine Warfare
	Development Command (NSMWDC), Tactical Training Groups Atlantic &
	Pacific (TACTRAGRULANT/PAC), Expeditionary Warfare Training Command
	(EWTGLANT/PAC), Carrier Strike Groups FOUR & FIFTEEN (CSG-4/CSG-15),
	the Surface Warfare Officer's School (SWOS), and the Center for Ship's
	Combat systems (CSCS) ensure robust maritime warfighting training to
	the Surface Force, provide critical maritime warfare training/
	assessment at individual and team levels, and bear significant SWO
	staff representation.
	(c) The Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) is the
	culminating event for deployment certification, and is not focused
	exclusively on specific or discrete navigation skills. Instead,
	COMPTUEX is an integrated, multi-warfare event that tests command &
	control, offensive/defensive capabilities, and supported/supporting
	commander missions and roles within a Joint environment. The exercise
	stresses the integrations of Naval, Joint, and Coalition forces
	executing combined missions within a multi-threat environment.
	Mrs. Luria. Admiral Aqualino, did you find this report to be a fair
	critique of surface navigation training? Yes or no?
	Yet your corrective actions require the same people who have gone
	through the same ineffective training--which you have described as
	inadequate--to fix the problem.
	We have marginalized the stringency for establishing similar high
	standards on our surface ships that we require in our aircraft and
	submarines.
	If a similar report found that aviators were not able to fly and
	navigate airplanes safely--if you had an aircraft crash and kill 17
	people and you did an investigation and found out that the pilot didn't
	know how to fly the airplane--and then you did a comprehensive report
	and you found out that the majority of your pilots didn't know how to
	fly--Do the corrective actions in this report have a similar sense of
	urgency (as in my example) that is needed to fix this problem in the
	surface force? Yes or no?
	As the Commander of Pacific Fleet your theater has some of the most
	pressing challenges that exist in the Navy today: BMD threat Tension on
	the Korean Peninsula Increasing naval threat from China & Russia Each
	of these requires the highest competency to conduct major combat
	operations in your theater. Does this report--which raises concerns
	about competency in the most basic navigation skills--give you
	confidence that surface forces can conduct these major combat
	operations if required? Yes or no?
	Sailors know that the work that they do is dangerous. Flight
	operations are dangerous. Underway replenishments are dangerous.
	Boarding vessels is dangerous. Combat operations are dangerous. But
	navigating through a shipping channel on a routine basis should not be
	dangerous. We owe it to these sailors, to their families and loved
	ones, to get it right this time.
	Admiral Aquilino. Yes, I believe these reports to be fair critiques
	of surface navigation training at the time the reports were released.
	Yes, we are treating these reports and taking actions with a similar
	sense of urgency as you describe. Yes, I have confidence that the ships
	I have deployed and the ones that we are deploying have been certified
	on the prerequisite skills to not only navigate safely but are ready to
	execute major combat operations.

	[all]
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