[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-5]
NAVAL SURFACE FORCES READINESS: ARE NAVY REFORMS ADEQUATE?
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
MEETING JOINTLY WITH
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 26, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-338 WASHINGTON : 2019
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
ANDY KIM, New Jersey, Vice Chair AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma JOE WILSON, South Carolina
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania ROB BISHOP, Utah
JASON CROW, Colorado MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico MO BROOKS, Alabama
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
Melanie Harris, Professional Staff Member
Tom Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Megan Handal, Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
FILEMON VELA, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
California PAUL COOK, California
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
KATIE HILL, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice
Chair
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Megan Handal, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 3
Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces......... 5
WITNESSES
Aquilino, ADM John C., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
Department of the Navy......................................... 7
Grady, ADM Christopher W., USN, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
Command, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command,
Department of the Navy......................................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 39
Garamendi, Hon. John......................................... 37
Grady, ADM Christopher W., joint with ADM John C. Aquilino... 43
Lamborn, Hon. Doug........................................... 38
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mrs. Luria................................................... 55
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 55
NAVAL SURFACE FORCES READINESS: ARE NAVY REFORMS ADEQUATE?
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House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Readiness, Meeting
Jointly with the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces, Washington, DC, Tuesday,
February 26, 2019.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Garamendi
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Garamendi. Good morning. We are prepared to start here.
So welcome to all of you. I saw you down there, and I knew we
could start. Very good.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I call to order this
hearing, joint hearing of the Readiness and Seapower and
Projection Forces Subcommittees of the House Armed Services
Committee. I would like to state at the outset that we continue
to honor and remember the 17 sailors who died in the tragic
surface ship collisions of 2017. None of us on this committee,
and I am sure within the Navy itself, will forget. And we will
continue to mourn those losses that were unfortunately
avoidable. Our thoughts remain with their loved ones, with
their family and their friends.
Over the last 18 months, this committee has held numerous
hearings and meetings with Navy leadership in an attempt to
understand the causes of those devastating incidents. I
appreciate the Navy's attention to this issue and continued
willingness to engage with the committee.
I also recognize that implementing significant reforms
takes time. Often too much time. However, I am concerned that
the Navy has not sufficiently addressed several of the problems
responsible for the deadliest naval disasters in four decades.
I worry that the Navy leadership remains overly focused on
shipbuilding and is not adequately prioritizing the manning and
maintenance of its current fleet.
I am troubled by reports that the Navy's investigations
were not fully transparent about the extent to which a brutal
operational tempo, low morale, and preventable technological
challenges contributed to these disasters.
I wonder if the Navy could do more to constrain the demand
for use of the surface force. Moreover, I worry that Navy is
not thinking deeply enough about how to change its culture to
empower officers to voice concerns and install an ethic of
rigor and excellence.
I look forward to hearing the updates from our witnesses on
corrective actions the Navy has taken in the past year,
particularly those related to the numerous surface ship
provisions included in the fiscal 2019 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act]. I encourage our witnesses to candidly
discuss their efforts and any challenges they face as they work
to improve the Navy's surface readiness. I am also eager to
learn more about the degree to which the ongoing and planned
reforms will be permanently enshrined in naval policy and
doctrine.
As the memory of those tragic incidents grows more distant,
it is our shared responsibility to ensure that crews and ships
will continue to be adequately manned, trained, and maintained.
This committee stands ready to assist.
With that, I would like to turn to our ranking member,
Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado, for any remarks that he
may want to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garamendi can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is great to be
with the members of the Seapower Subcommittee as well. This
combined joint hearing is really important, so I am glad that
we are having it. And it really is based ultimately on
readiness. So thank you for having this important hearing.
I would also like to recognize the spouses of our
witnesses: Christine Grady and Laura Aquilino. We on this
subcommittee know the vitally important role our precious
military families play in the readiness and resilience of our
troops. And we appreciate your presence and support here today.
Welcome to this hearing.
We all recognized too late that Naval Surface Forces,
especially forward-deployed ships, were being run too hard.
Ship's maintenance suffered, as did crew training and
proficiency. Tragically, it took the deaths of 17 sailors to
bring the problem to light and force all of us, the Navy and
Congress alike, to pay attention.
True to form, the Navy and the Congress took decisive
action, including, particularly in this subcommittee, in last
year's National Defense Authorization Act. Now, nearly 2 years
since the fatal collisions and over a year since our last
public hearing on this topic, it is time to review the state of
Naval Surface Forces. I am concerned with three things: Have
the corrections employed made a difference? What further
actions are needed? And do any of the changes implemented need
to be reversed?
I note that our witnesses today are responsible for both
the operational control and readiness of the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets. Vesting a single official with the pressures of
both responsibilities was part of the problem in 2017, although
such vesting was at a lower level of command.
I am interested in understanding how these commanders weigh
these disparate responsibilities and whether institutional
protections are in place to prevent overuse of the fleet in the
future.
While I am confident in the abilities of our witnesses, I
want to ensure that their successors are equally equipped to
withstand the imperatives of operational pressures when they
are unsure their ships and crews are ready. I deeply respect
the military expertise that must come to bear when determining
whether a ship's crew is trained and ready to operate the
complex team operations of a modern warship, whether the ship
is mechanically ready, and whether that ship and crew can
perform the mission expected. We are eager to understand how we
assure safe deployments into the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our witnesses'
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lamborn can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. I look forward to
working with you and the committee as we go forward.
And now I would like to turn to the chairman of the
Seapower Committee, Mr. Courtney.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION
FORCES
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Lamborn. I look forward to continuing the close and ongoing
work between the two committees, Readiness and Seapower, that
we have conducted over the last year and a half on the issues
before us today.
To new members on the subcommittee, today's hearing is
about the fourth or fifth public hearing that we have had
jointly since the series of tragedies that occurred at sea, as
well as classified briefings and obviously staff meetings that
have intensively investigated those occurrences which claimed
the lives of 17 sailors in 2017.
Again, to put that into perspective, that is a number that
far surpassed the number of U.S. casualties in Iraq and Syria
in 2017. Two of those sailors came from Connecticut. One,
Dustin Doyon, was an electronics technician from Suffield,
Connecticut. His loss still is a deep wound in the community.
And I want to just again publicly thank his parents as well as
again all the families who have stayed in close contact with
both the Navy and Congress, again, to make sure that their
lives were not lost in vain and that there will be real change
to prevent those from occurring again in the future.
These hearings have given our committee and the public a
greater understanding of both the immediate and systemic issues
that contributed to this stomach-turning loss of life. The
hearings also resulted in significant statutory provisions
enacted in last year's 2019 John McCain National Defense
Authorization Bill that codified a variety of the changes to
surface fleet operations and procedures. And I mention Senator
McCain because, actually, he was the most adamant during the
conference during the 2019 NDAA to make sure that the many
recommendations actually are now a part of law and statute.
And, again, his passion was really, I think, important for
everybody in terms of the making sure that we do everything
possible to avoid this in the future.
Today's hearing is the first review by the new Congress on
how these changes are being executed. For the record, I also
want to publicly note the professional staff of the Government
Accountability Office [GAO] that has been diligently following
up and investigating the work of Surface Fleet Forces in the
Indo-Pacific Command's efforts in the last year and has
provided a thorough report card that I would encourage members
to review as a measurement of the Navy's follow-through on some
of its own recommendations.
Today's hearing also follows a new round of lengthy
investigative press articles on the collisions of USS
Fitzgerald and McCain. These articles describe in great detail
the many individual tragedies that occurred and the broader
systemic issues that contributed to these collisions. I commend
the reporters for their contributions to the public's
understanding of readiness challenges facing our fleet.
In the wake of last year's inquiries by the Navy and
Congress, there were a number of critical deficiencies
identified, including the lack of crew certifications for
critical tasks and conflicting authority for tasking and
readiness. One particular area identified that I remain
concerned about is the challenge of manning the fleet. Do we
have enough sailors on board our surface ships, and are they
qualified for the roles they are expected to take on?
The Navy and Congress have worked together to turn the
strategic requirement for the Navy's presence to long-term
shipbuilding plans, authorization bills, and funding as we
begin a drive towards a 355-ship Navy. At the same time, there
are approximately about 6,000 to 8,000 open billets across the
current Navy. And recent reporting to Congress shows that
manning issues continue to persist across the fleet.
As we continue to invest in the new construction of ships
needed to grow the fleet, we must also ensure that we are
making a concurrent investment in personnel to ensure that we
have the proper number of sailors to man these ships. We must
be prepared to plan for and make investments in the personnel
necessary to operate a growing fleet.
I will be interested to hear from the witnesses on how they
are working to address the manning shortfalls before them. And
I look forward to seeing in the fiscal year 2020 budget the
investments needed to man the growing [surface] fleet in the
coming years.
Finally, while it is clear that major mistakes were made on
individual ships, I think it is also clear that there were
broader problems that existed within our forward-deployed
forces. These issues did not exist in the vacuum of a select
few. Readiness and over-tasking concerns have been voiced at
the highest level of leadership. The American people must have
the confidence in their leaders that when the alarm bells are
rung, they will be followed up by real action. Our sailors and
our families deserve nothing less.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
I would like to now turn to Mr. Wittman, the ranking member
of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino for
attending this important hearing.
I also want to welcome their wives: Christine Grady and
Laura Aquilino. Thank you so much for joining us today. We
appreciate your sacrifice as you, too, are part of our Navy
family.
Last year, we had a hearing with Secretary Spencer and
Admiral Richardson to discuss Navy reforms and recommendations
to respond to deficient readiness highlighted by the loss of 17
sailors aboard the USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald. These
readiness reforms were codified in the Comprehensive Review and
Strategic Readiness Review.
Navy continues to make progress toward accomplishing the
goals that Navy leadership determined would be necessary to
correct deficient readiness. However, the committee has learned
much since that hearing that appears unaddressed in these
seminal documents. For example, we have learned that the
readiness deficiencies are systemic and engross the entire
fleet. We have learned that severe manning deficiencies exist
afloat because of an imbalance in the afloat and ashore
billeting and an overall deficit in afloat billets.
We have learned that Navy allows ships to begin the basic
and advanced predeployment training without the required number
of sailors. We have learned that the limited-notice INSURV
[Inspection and Survey] inspections are bearing a true
depiction of the material readiness of the fleet. The readiness
picture is not as pretty as when ships have months to prepare
and cannibalize their fellow shipmates.
And, finally, we have learned that the basic and advanced
tenets of enlisted training are perilously askew and will take
years to rebuild.
In summary, the basic elements of manning, training, and
equipping are challenged across the fleet and will take years
of leadership focus and sustained funding to correct. My fear
is that the Navy will measure their progress against the
Comprehensive Review and the Strategic Readiness Review
checklist and will miss the fundamental overhaul necessary to
right a sinking ship.
Because these systemic challenges were not adequately
addressed in the Comprehensive Review or the Strategic
Readiness Review, we will undershoot the mark and miss true
structural reform. Some pundits have indicated that the sailors
that stood the watch on the decks the USS John S. McCain and
USS Fitzgerald were at fault and cited numerous safeguards that
failed to prevent these tragic deaths.
However, I have come to an alternative conclusion. It is
apparent that senior leadership failed to put adequate systems
in place to prevent these collisions. It is apparent that
senior leadership's acceptance of unnecessary risk to meet
COCOM [combatant commander] demands led to the deaths of 17 of
our Nation's finest. It is apparent that the Navy classifies
innumerous products to hide the true depth of readiness
challenges that plague the Navy today. And it is most important
to me that if the appropriate reforms are not properly
implemented, these problems and these deaths will continue.
Last year, Dr. Holmes of the Naval War College asked, who
watches the watchers in the United States Navy?
At a hearing with Secretary Spencer and CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] Richardson on this same subject, I indicated that
we will watch the watchers. I remain committed to ensuring that
we must not forget the lives lost on the USS John S. McCain and
USS Fitzgerald.
I look forward to continuing to advocate for these fallen
sailors and ensuring real structural reforms are put in place.
[Toward] this endeavor, I think the Navy has gone a long way to
ensure minimum standards are set in place to ensure basic
safety and mission proficiency, yet we have a long ways to go.
Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Wittman.
And, Mr. Lamborn, your leadership in the past Congress
brought us a long way towards this issue, and I thank you for
your hard work in the previous Congress and look forward to
working with you as we continue this Congress. And, of course,
Mr. Courtney, your role as chairman of the committee.
It is now my pleasure to welcome to the hearing Admiral
Grady and your wife. Behind you, I think Christine is back
there somewhere. There she is. Welcome.
And also Admiral Aquilino and your wife, Laura, is back
there. So thank you so very much for joining us today.
If you will present your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADM CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
FLEET FORCES COMMAND, COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES NORTHERN
COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Grady. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman
Courtney, Ranking Members Lamborn and Wittman, and
distinguished members of both subcommittees. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify along with my Pacific Fleet colleague
and partner on the readiness of our surface forces.
As a fleet commander, I consider my duty to ensure the
welfare of the people I lead, the center of the universe, our
sailors, our government civilians and their families, to be my
first and most solemn responsibility.
While we cannot bring back the 17 heroes that we lost 18
months ago, the entire Navy is focused on never letting that
happen again. And to the Gold Star family members, you humble
us every day, and I hope you know that I am firmly committed to
giving our sailors everything they need to safely and
effectively perform their mission.
Since learning the hard lessons of 2017, your Navy has
aggressively implemented a series of actions to prevent any
such tragedy in the future. We are focused on safe operations,
increasing fleet effectiveness, and ensuring long-term
sustained readiness by establishing a culture of operational
excellence. Some examples of actions taken were included in our
joint written statement for the record. And I look forward to
discussing these and others in more detail with you this
morning.
Now, ensuring adherence to standards alone, though, while
necessary, is not enough for our Navy to win decisively in
high-end conflict. And as such, we aim to progress the Navy's
culture beyond mere compliance and toward a culture of
operational excellence, a culture where we view standards as
the absolute minimum, and then strive for peak warfighting
readiness. Our sailors, our officers, our civilian shipmates
are embracing this challenge knowing that we value their
contributions and what they do matters to the security of our
Nation.
While each fleet commander has separate authority,
responsibility, and accountability for generating and employing
ready forces, we do so to the same standard as we had laid out
in the recently published Navy Integrated Readiness
Instruction. And as the Fleet Forces Commander, I am
responsible for setting that single standard in concert with my
fellow fleet commanders. And we do this knowing that it is one
fight, one Navy.
The fleet commanders are in position to provide readiness
oversight, and together we approach this with the strongest
sense of urgency. We are currently safe to operate. We are a
more effective Navy. But the hard work has only just begun.
Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. And many thanks to both committees and to the
Congress for your continued support of your Navy. And I look
forward to your questions and our discussion.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grady and Admiral
Aquilino can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Aquilino.
STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC
FLEET, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Aquilino. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Courtney, Ranking
Members Lamborn and Wittman as well as the distinguished
members of the subcommittees, on behalf of the sailors,
civilians, and families who serve in the Pacific Fleet of the
world's finest Navy, I would first like to thank you for your
substantial readiness investments you have made in us. Armed
with your support, we continue to aggressively take action to
rebuild our readiness. That said, there is still great work to
do.
To the family members of the brave sailors we lost on
Fitzgerald and McCain, we will never forget them, and they
motivate me every day. We are implementing the recommendations
of the Comprehensive Review, Strategic Readiness Review, and
the GAO to ensure we address all those core issues identified.
We are confident that we have made/are making the changes to be
sure the fleet is operating safely, and it is certified to
execute all the missions assigned.
If the ships in the Pacific Fleet are not ready to safely
sail, they don't get underway, and that is my responsibility.
The improvements we are making are ongoing. It is also
important to note that the readiness of the fleet is fragile,
and it is also perishable.
We are committed to ensure our units are manned, trained,
and equipped to execute the Nation's calling. I want to thank
you for your continued support in providing the stable and
consistent funding needed to support our Navy. The challenges
to our Nation's interest require a Navy in the Pacific that is
always ready to fight. Ensuring our readiness is the foundation
and key to our success, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Garamendi. As is the historic practice of the
committee, we will start with the chairpersons and then the
ranking members and then go to those members who were here
first before the gavel came down. And so we will follow that
practice. And that means I get to start.
So, gentlemen, you have set in place a series of standards.
Presumably, the implementation of those standards is the
responsibility of not only you but the chain of command down to
the commander of the ship.
Can you assure us that the standards are actually being in
place at the level of the ship, the surface vessel?
Admiral Grady, if you want to start with the standards. You
might want to talk a little bit about what they are and
specifically, as said by our colleagues here, the manning, the
tempo, as well as the material readiness of the ship.
So talk about the standards, and then, Admiral Aquilino, if
you could talk about actually imposing those standards on the
operations.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Those standards are across the pillars of man, train, and
equip as we have heard today. So it starts with ensuring that
each ship in every unit has operating and functioning equipment
with the appropriate redundancy to get the mission done. And we
are very focused on that, and with your help, we are being
successful in doing that.
The training, then, is broken up and the standards are
established in three various phases. There is the basic phase,
the advanced phase, and the integrated phase of training. That
training is measured and assessed. And those standards are
maintained such that they do not advance from one phase to the
next until those standards have been met across all three
phases.
That builds on a foundation of certifications for each
individual as well. So our sailors and our officers are well
trained as well. And then we bring them together as teams
because teams are absolutely critical to what we do. And then
the manning piece is very foundational to the work that we do.
And so, as has been pointed out, we have some manning
challenges that we are working through right now. The number
specifically is 6,200 billets at sea that are not filled right
now, although the Navy, with your help, has purchased those
billets, and we will be flowing them into the fleet over time.
And the goal is to have them on the ship at the beginning of
the maintenance phase.
Now, as we work our way through that hole of 6,200 billets
and man the ships to that requirement, we do take some risk.
And so sometimes we have to take some risk in the maintenance
phase before we have all of the people onboard. But it is, I
believe, both fleet standards that no one deploys without the
full complement of people that they will have.
So it starts with the individual, the officer and the
sailor, the training that we give them. It then builds into the
team phase across three basic phases. And then the
certifications happen at the very highest end at the largest
aggregation of, say, a strike group. And then we ensure that
the ships are equipped with the appropriate gear.
I can tell you that we in the Atlantic Fleet--and I think I
speak for all the fleet commanders--we do not ask a ship nor
direct a ship to go on mission if they are not certified to do
the job. And I have made sure that that is the case. And,
indeed, there have been several occasions where I have said
that ship is not ready. We will need more time.
And that is the highest form, I think. We know what the
requirement is, and if they are not ready, they are not going.
Mr. Garamendi. So, Admiral Aquilino, you are given the
standards. How do you apply them?
Admiral Aquilino. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the question.
So Admiral Grady and I, in conjunction, we develop the
standards. He is responsible to the CNO to identify those. Our
training organizations implement those standards across the
fleet in the form of Carrier Strike Group 4, 15, and our Afloat
Training Group organizations. We have implemented a path where
those organizations actually operate across the coast with each
other to ensure that we understand the standards; we are
grading against the standards; and then those are absolutely
evaluated, assessed, and determined whether or not those units
meet the standard.
To Admiral Grady's point, we have both taken a top-down
view of what it needs to--what we need to do to execute those
standards from our levels of responsibility. And I also have
terminated two deployments for units that were not assessed to
have the appropriate level of training to deploy and execute
their missions.
Additionally, I took an entire strike group, again with the
approval of Admiral Davidson, the combatant commander, because
we meet his responsibilities. We have reduced their requirement
to remain ready longer in order to free up manning concerns and
posture those forces to be able to be ready for the next cycle
of employment, given the rest, the time they need in order to
ensure that they are ready. I could not do that without the
help of Admiral Davidson, who supported that, as he has
identified in the CR [Comprehensive Review], that the improper
balance between operations, training, and maintenance needed to
be reconciled.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you for mentioning Admiral Davidson,
who apparently said at a meeting of commanders of the ships and
admirals: If you can't take your ships to sea and accomplish
the mission with the resources you have, then we will find
someone who will.
How does that fit with what you just said?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure--I
wasn't at any meeting. I don't know what he said. I don't know
if it was accurate.
What I can tell you is deeds that he has implemented match
the guidance that he has given me. So, by him reducing some of
the operational demands in the Pacific, to me, that is a pretty
strong example of someone who understood the concerns when the
report was written and doing his part to ensure that it doesn't
happen again as well.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
Let me now turn to my colleague, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, just to sort of, I think, fill up the context in
terms of the two incidents which we talked about earlier this
morning. There are actually four at-sea incidents which took
place in 2017. In addition to the Fitzgerald and the McCain,
the USS Antietam also grounded on January 31, 2017. And the USS
Lake Champlain collided with a fishing trawler in May.
So, you know, the one sort of common thread of all four of
those incidents is they all occurred in the Pacific region in
the 7th Fleet.
And, Admiral Aquilino, as you know, I mean, there has
always been sort of a carve-out for the Pacific Command in
terms of this whole question of who decides the decision to
task a ship versus who decides in terms of whether the ship is
ready.
The Congress actually wrestled with this issue in terms of
whether or not to change that carve-out by law. And, you know,
there was a decision made to sort of give the Navy an
opportunity to sort of see if they can sort of reorganize this
whole decision-making process. You just described where you
terminated two deployments with the new arrangement.
Again, if you could just sort of talk about that a little
bit more just sort of, you know, the mechanics of how that
process, you know, gets resolved when there is a conflict
between the resource end versus the tasking end.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
So the process that we have implemented is a part of my
normal operations each day and week. I am briefed 3 days a week
on the exact readiness of the force that is deployed and if
there are manning issues, training issues, or equipment issues
on that ship. And in my role, we support those equipment issues
that need to be fixed. And, again, we execute our role.
Once a week, I talk to every one of my commanders. We talk
about the longer term view of the readiness of the force as
well as upcoming deployers to make sure they are on track. And
then, once a week, in an additional meeting, I talk about those
ships and maintenance to make sure that the ones getting ready
to go in and the ones that are in are progressing as we need
them to progress.
Now, if any of those indications show me that I have a
problem coming up or one immediately identified that we were
not aware of, I have a voice to the combatant commander. And
when I determine that ship is either not manned, trained,
equipped, unsafe, uncertified, number one, I would terminate
their ops and then have that conversation with the combatant
commander.
As you know, the world gets a vote. So, depending on what
is going on, we have had very frank conversations. And, again,
in the instances I identified, Admiral Davidson concurred with
my recommendations, and we did not deploy those ships.
Mr. Courtney. So the way that operates, is there like a
manual? Is there like a written directive that sort of, you
know, instructs the different commands, you know, in terms of
how this proceeds and who decides?
Admiral Aquilino. So the readiness instruction just signed
out identifies the responsibilities. It stops right here. But
below me my three-star subordinate commanders also are aware,
and they are responsible to also take the same review that I
have. They then speak with me.
I believe the process is structured in a way such that all
the subordinate commanders understand the responsibilities,
they understand the standards, and they know that they owe me a
voice that says, ``Hey, I am not ready to deploy,'' and that
has to come to me for decision.
Mr. Courtney. So, again, because this really, in my
opinion, really kind of goes to the heart of, you know, all the
analysis that we sort of went through over the last couple of
years, which is, you know, whether or not there is a safety
break, I think that was Admiral Richardson's term during the
hearings last Congress, to really sort of say, you know, this
deployment really just can't occur because there is lack of
certifications, there is equipment issues, et cetera. And it
sounds like, again, you worked out an arrangement that really
has changed the way that decision is made.
The question I guess that a lot of us--still sort of nags
us is just whether or not there is going to be an enduring
structure after you move on to other things and, you know, your
replacements, you know, that there is going to be something in
place because, really, when we wrestled with this in terms of
the NDAA, you know, that really was sort of the question,
whether we need something more permanent and just sort of--so
can you just sort of talk about that in terms of whether or not
you think this is just going to sort of fade away as the issue
maybe losses its public, sort of, spotlight, or whether or not
there is something more enduring?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. I think it actually is
formalized in our instructions as well as the roles and
responsibilities assigned to each of the commanders. So I
implement for the CNO on the Pacific side the title 10
responsibilities to man, train, and equip the fleet. Those
standards are set by Admiral Grady in coordination with us.
And, again, we adhere to those rigorously.
The employment responsibilities, I execute for Admiral
Davidson. So I believe they are formalized and understood. And
while Chris and I continue to work together, I am confident
that whoever comes behind us will also--they will have the same
responsibilities and roles. And it is institutionalized in a
way where I think we get away from that problem set.
And if I give Chris a chance to talk, all these were
focused on the Pacific, but we are doing the exact same thing
to the same standards fleetwide.
Admiral Grady. That is absolutely right. And, Mr. Chairman,
it is a very valid concern that we transition from--into this
persistent culture of excellence.
In this regard, then, I do believe that we have well
codified the requirements for certification and this idea that,
across all echelons, then, being able to put the firebreaks in
place to achieve that balance between maintenance, training,
and operations are in place.
Ultimately, too, though, I think it gets down to the level
of, do we feel that that commanding officer has the confidence
to speak up when he needs to speak up, and does he have the
mechanisms by which to do that? Lung [Admiral Aquilino's call
sign] described his battle rhythm of his ability to then keep
his finger and his subordinate commanders' fingers on the pulse
of the readiness of the fleet.
I have a very similar battle rhythm. I will give you one
additional example that both he and I do, and that is the phase
transitions. Remember I talked about basic, advanced, and
intermediate--or integrated phases and the maintenance phase.
We take a look at each ship and every strike group before they
transition phases to make sure that they are ready to do that.
And back down to the CO [commanding officer] level, one of
the things that I think will go a long way to codifying and
institutionalizing that beyond Chris and I here is the
requirement for COs to issue a 90-day letter to their type
commander after they take command. This is a direct feedback to
their type commander on the condition of their ship, the man,
the train, the equip, across all the pillars of readiness. And
that has been a very powerful voice for the commanding officer.
And then you build on that with these touchpoints that we
have with our commanding officers to their subordinate, to our
subordinate commanders, be it at the strike group or the type
commander level. And then having the trust that I think Lung
and I do going up the echelon to say: I am not going to send
that ship. And in my case, it was either replace it with
another one that was ready, or they are going to come 3 weeks
late because I need to finish the training. And we have had
great success in that.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral, thank you very much.
Let me now turn to Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, thank you. We have had a good discussion
on readiness and what needs to happen. I also want to talk
about procurement and funding, which is my colleague's sort of
wheelhouse. But we all have a say in what happens at the NDAA
level.
These accidents demonstrated clearly that the operational
demands on the Navy were too high. In short, the Navy has too
few ships and trained crews to perform all of the missions
requested and required.
To continue on the path to recovery, how important is the
sustained top line at the recently enacted levels? For both of
you.
Admiral Grady. I will start. Thank you for the question,
sir.
When you look at building the Navy the Nation needs and,
just as importantly, fighting with the Navy the Nation has,
knowing that 70 percent of the force that we have now we would
fight with in 2030, the consistent, stable, and predictable
funding is absolutely critical to the fleet. And we thank you
for your support in that.
Without that, we are unable to plan effectively or be
better partners with the industrial base, which I think is
absolutely critical so that we can establish that demand signal
with them and be better partners with, for instance, the
private shipyards.
So the criticality, then, of critical--a consistent,
stable, and predictable funding cannot be underestimated.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, sir.
So I think what I would say is, against the threats that
exist today, capabilities, sizes, and you could argue intent,
the Navy the Nation needs is one that is bigger, more lethal,
networked, and ready.
I think you have seen everything that has come out of the
CNO that talks about those things. But for the challenges in
the Pacific that I have, the challenges that Chris and I both
work from the Atlantic and Pacific side, that is pretty
accurate of what we believe we need in the future. So it is
critical.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And thank you for your answers.
I got another question or two. And before I go any further,
Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino, I just want to thank you
for your service, and your wives also, because they contribute.
Thank you for what you are doing and have done and will do for
our country.
Now, at current levels of funding, how long will it take
the Navy's shipbuilding program to produce enough cruisers and
destroyers to lessen the operational pressure? And with all of
the classes of ships competing for funding, I expect that
improvement will still take some considerable time.
Admiral Grady. Sir, I would agree with you. That will take
time. And so the stated goal of 355 I think is an appropriate
target. Three different studies have looked at that. So
somewhere in the nature of 355 of what it would take to meet
the challenges of great power competition that all three fleets
face. It will take time to get there and consistent and stable
funding to do that.
And it could be--it won't be next year or even within the
FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. It will be beyond that.
And so having that consistent stable funding to build to the
355 a worthy goal, which I think is borne out by the challenges
of the international environment. But it will not be overnight.
It will take time.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. Admiral Grady has it absolutely
right. But there is another component of it.
So, while we strive to get bigger, there is a critical
aspect of getting bigger just doesn't mean buying a ship,
right? There is a wholeness aspect to the Navy that is needed.
So we need to buy the ship. We need to buy the people. We need
to buy the parts. We need to buy the maintenance. And when we
have all that, then we will be on the sustainable path to be
able to maintain and employ the larger Navy that is needed. So
it is a critical aspect.
The ship by itself helps a little. But also all those other
things are absolutely needed. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So just to summarize, what I am hearing
you say is that although we had considerable funding in the
past, the last fiscal year and this fiscal year, when we had a
sizeable plus-up, you are saying that that current sustained
level needs to continue for years into the future to do the job
properly.
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. The question of how to fully fund all parts
of a 355-ship Navy is going to be part of our work as we get
into the budget in future hearings. Your question is right on.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Grady, Admiral Aquilino, thanks again for joining
us today. Thanks for your service.
I want to begin with you, Admiral Grady, and ask you a
question with regard to manning. How many sailors is the Navy
short of to perform the missions? And what is the Navy doing
right now to essentially man up?
And then a question for both of you: Is it acceptable for
you to send ships on predeployment training and predeployment
workups when they are short of the required number of sailors
for a deployment cycle?
Admiral Grady. Thanks, sir.
The number of billets that we need to be full--or in whole
for the fleet is 6,200. And I am confident that my partner over
at the CNP [Chief of Naval Personnel] has worked hard to
program and budget to that requirement. It will take some time
to get that. It takes a while to get there. And then, of
course, as we build the Navy the Nation needs, that number may
rise as new ships come in.
So that is the number. We are working hard to get there. It
won't happen overnight. Again, it takes a while to train. And
then when they do come, that is not a master. That is an
apprentice. And they have to become a journeyman, a supervisor.
So that takes time to work its way through.
But 6,200 is the number. And we are working hard to be
fully funded to that.
Ideally, when we execute the workup cycle for a strike
group, say, the date that we wish to have everyone in place is
at the beginning of the maintenance phase. That makes absolute
sense. And as we work our way out of that hole, we do buy some
risk there in the maintenance phase and delay that date, that
kind of hard date, further into the training cycle. And with
the ultimate goal of deploying in full at the required levels
of the right number of people and the right skill sets there
that they bring to the ship. So we do buy some risk now as we
work through that 6,200, particularly in the maintenance phase.
I do believe that, when we push a ship out to do the basic
phase, that both Admiral Aquilino and I look very hard at that
risk calculus if they are not fully manned to that level. And
we would not let them go if they were not.
Additionally, if there were additional tasking, which can
happen during the workup phase, we have established a minimum
training requirements matrix that all three fleets have agreed
to such that, from a manning and a training perspective, you
will only go do those missions that you are trained and
certified to do even before the ultimate certification for
deployment. That is new, and that is an important addition to
our surface force readiness manual and how we think about
minimum training requirements for the ships.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, sir.
So is it acceptable? Again, with the risk calculus talked
about by Admiral Grady, we do it only when we understand the
risk. That said, that is why the model has identified the need
for those sailors, right?
The best ships come out when those ships are fully set up,
they do all the training together, they deploy together. That
said, the Navy rotates. We do rotate 30 percent every year. And
the structure on the ships, we train those sailors as well.
They show up trained. They continue to train in a team. So that
does happen.
But there is one thing that we have implemented to ensure
that we understand exactly the risk we accept. Before any of
those ships begin that basic phase, we have tasked them to
execute a ready-for-sea assessment. So we understand what is on
the ship. We have a team that looks at them before they begin
that basic phase for those that are not fully manned. And that
gives us a level of confidence that they are either ready or
not on top of the other things.
Admiral Grady. Just to go into a little bit further, part
of that ready-for-sea assessment includes bridge resource
management workshops. And in this, we have learned and rely
heavily upon our civilian shipmates from the Military Sealift
Command, the strategic sealift officers, to come give us an
external view of both the individuals and the teams that are
onboard. So it is a key and new element where we learn from the
best of the best on the civilian side. And that bridge resource
management workshop is a key part of the ready-for-sea
assessment.
Mr. Wittman. I think those are great points.
Let me get you to dive a little bit deeper into that. I
think what you all have done as far as training, whether it is
changes at Surface Warfare Officers School [SWOS], whether it
is in certifications for basic seamanship, for rules of the
road, are all good things. But I am still concerned about some
of the structural elements of how sailors advance in higher
skill levels there within the surface fleet.
There are some elements like lack of deck handling time for
junior officers, a generalist approach to both deck and
engineering billets, the CO/XO [commanding officer/executive
officer] fleet-up, and also, too, issues of adopting some
international watch-standing standards for officers on the deck
and people that are standing watch.
So I wanted to get an idea about what do you think should
be done in those areas of structural reforms within the Navy to
make sure that we have some certainty there with experience
levels and level of knowledge?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir. I will start with the standards of
training, certification, and watchkeeping.
Again, learning from the best of the best in the civilian
infrastructure and our civilian shipmates, we took a look at
all of the--and I will use the Surface Warfare Officers School
as an example. We took a look at all of the PQS [Personnel
Qualification Standards] there. And now nearly two-thirds of
all of our PQS there now meets STCW [International Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers]
standards. Additionally, all of the instructors at SWOS are
certified in accordance with the STCW standards.
When we look at surface warfare maritime requirements and
DC [damage controlman] requirements and measure them against
the STCW, we exceed third mate requirements. Similarly, in our
new SWO [surface warfare officer] logbook, we exceed third mate
requirements. So I think we have done the right thing and
continued to learn from the best of the best in the civilian
world.
Now, in terms of the, for instance, surface warfare officer
[SWO] training that we provide them and the SWO career path, if
you will, we have recognized that it is all about the
appropriate experience.
So, on the SWO career path, the total duration at sea for a
young division officer is now going to be 4 years. Some split
of notionally 30 months on the first ship--important that it is
30 months on the first ship because they get a chance to really
sink their teeth in, get a lot of moving water under the keel.
But the option does persist for them to stay 4 months, 4 years
if the captain so desires to give them even more time.
And from a SWO division officer training, we have increased
that training from 14 to 23 weeks, much more time in the
classroom and then in the simulators before they get a chance
to go out and really put it to work.
Across the SWO milestone careers, from ensign to captain to
full captain, we have instituted 10 milestone checks, three of
which are go/no go. You can fail this and not move on. This is
the culture of excellence at work. And to this point, 5 percent
of those folks have been asked to leave the command pipeline
because they were not ready.
And then, finally, more experience in ships. So, in the
past, we used to take a division officer and allow him or her
to, after their first 24 months, say, serve up on a staff. We
don't do that anymore. Only the best of the best will serve 4
years and then get to go to one of those staffs, similarly, for
department head training.
And on the enlisted side, we have focused on things like
quartermaster and operational specialist training that are so
critical to navigation, seamanship, and shiphandling. And
across the curriculum there to include how we use the Voyage
Management System and electronic navigation or automated
information systems and how those two teams work together, we
have significantly improved that pipeline.
I guess the last one is I believe that the complexity of a
modern Navy warship demands that we not have a topside officer
and an engineering officer. I think this is absolutely
critical.
I am going to give you a personal story, if you don't mind,
sir. I was a department head in the USS Princeton back in the
early 1990s. As many of you may recall, they suffered a mine
detonation during Operation Desert Storm. The two officers that
were on watch and responded to that were the weapons officer
and the engineering officer, both of whom so well understood
the complexity of their systems, the integration of the combat
systems, and the engineering plant, how to maneuver the ship,
that they were able to keep fighting for 72 hours by pointing
the forward deckhouse up-threat into Iraq.
I think, given the complexity, that is why you need
officers who are both engineers and topside ship drivers and
warfighters.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
We are now going to go to the clock, and we are going to
take questions from the members that arrived in order prior to
the gavel.
That would be you, Mr. Cisneros. You can start.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you both for being here today. I am a
Navy veteran, and I enjoyed my time onboard ship and look back
very fondly on it.
The thing I want to kind of dive into a little bit and when
I read about the Fitzgerald was the lack of manning and how
that cruiser had, basically, if you go back 10 years ago, was--
I think well over 350 was the manning and had been reduced to
under 300. And watches had been eliminated such as your port
and starboard lookouts.
I want to know if that situation has been corrected on all
our Navy ships.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir, it has. So some decisions were
taken, for all the right reasons, in the past to try to
leverage technology, for instance, to see whether we could get
to a minimal or optimal manning construct.
And so, in your day, you probably had a lot more sailors
onboard the ship, similarly for me when I was a young division
officer.
So those decisions were taken. And as we sailed in that
environment, we recognized that that was too few. And, indeed,
since 2012, you know, the number on a DDG [guided-missile
destroyer] was 240. In 2017, it is about 270. And we will be
funded to--back up to very close to the original size for a
guided-missile destroyer in 2023 of about 318 and 320.
So, while we had worked hard to see if we could--because
personnel is expensive, and so that did not work out well, and
now we are buying back to a larger size crew complement for a
destroyer, for example.
Admiral Aquilino. And, sir, from the Pacific side, all the
forces that are deployed right now meet the standard we have
set of 95 percent fill and 92 percent fit, which is the right
job--the right person with the right skills in the right job.
That was one of the big changes that we have absolutely pulled
up to the highest level to make sure that nobody's out there
well below a level that somebody didn't know.
Mr. Cisneros. And going back to the changes that you made
at SWOS, the Surface Warfare Officers School, now that they are
spending more time there, they got rid of the former program, I
think, where they were learning on CDs onboard the ship.
But you have a group of officers who went through that
program who may not be, as we will say, as good ship drivers as
they could be if they have gone to the programs going now.
How are we going back to correct those who may be
department heads right now to make sure that we are bringing
them up to speed?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir. That is a great point for those
officers who have not benefited from the improvements in basic
division officer training that we give them now, that started
in 2012. Those officers who are now becoming department heads
or soon-to-be captain--XOs [executive officers] and captains.
We have instituted these 10 career milestone checks where we
ensure that they are meeting the new and improved standards. We
are providing them more in-classroom time not the CD-based kind
of ``SWOS in a Box'' that you are referring to. And this
includes assessments too, so from the classroom assessment to
that which we do in the trainer, which is very, very high-
fidelity training.
So we are able to recognize that not all training is the
same. We accomplish that by their returns to SWOS. And, of
course, there is a leadership issue there too. So the COs are
now working very, very hard to train their wardrooms to the
appropriate level.
So I feel confident that, whether they are part of the--a
graduate of the new Basic Division Officer Course or not, they
will have the appropriate training. And if not and they don't
meet the requirement in one of those three touch points, then
they don't make the cut.
Admiral Aquilino. And, sir, I am encouraged, because as a
naval aviator, I have now taken a look at the training that my
surface counterparts have implemented, specifically the use of
simulation right now in the form of our LCS [littoral combat
ship] training for both officer, enlisted. There is new
technology that allows you to be more effective in your
training.
That model is going to be transitioned into the destroyer
type/model/series as well. So the way we train is getting
better. That will allow us to be able to more quickly get those
up to speed who haven't had it.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. I yield back my time.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Mr. Joe Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman John Garamendi, and
Admirals, thank you very much for your service and for your
Navy families. It is particularly impressive to me to be here
with great appreciation because I am here as the very grateful
dad of a member of the U.S. Navy, and so I just so appreciate
your service. I am also--had the opportunity sadly to visit the
USS Fitzgerald at Yokosuka, Japan, and I saw where our devoted
sailors were tragically killed. I want to thank you for every
effort to avoid such an accident ever to occur again.
And in line with that, Admiral Aquilino, the USS Fitzgerald
and the USS John McCain were forward deployed in Japan for over
20 years. This extensive overseas homeporting contributed to
deferred depot maintenance, and also overall deteriorated the
conditions of the ships. What are the Navy's plans to implement
the National Defense Authorization Act requirement that ships
return to the U.S. after 10 years overseas, and then is the
Navy considering ways to increase ship repair capabilities in
the Pacific, such as the Guam shipyard?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, thank you for the question. So the
Fitzgerald and McCain absolutely are on track, first of all, to
be able to become repaired, get the required training they
need, and then to deploy with the confidence that is required.
I will start with the Guam piece. Again, Admiral Davidson
had asked that we take look at capabilities that exist across
the theater to ensure that we are postured correctly in time of
crisis. And we are taking a look at Guam and what capabilities
might be there, how we might want to use them, again, to
increase our overall capacity. The Yokosuka repairs--again, I
believe now that we have had--we have given the operational
role to the Naval Sea Systems Command in Yokosuka, that will
certainly help make sure that we execute the right level of
maintenance when we are forward deployed, and we absolutely are
developing a plan right now to ensure we can get to the 10-year
limit that you have identified, and I am waiting to take a
brief on how we are going to do that. That will also take a
little bit of time to implement.
One of the considerations there is the ship crew members
and the families, so we don't, over the next 2 years, have to
swap five ships out, and we will work with Congress, sir, to
make sure we get that right.
Mr. Wilson. And I am grateful that you have brought up
about looking into Guam. The strategic location is absolutely
incredible. Three hours to everywhere, and the patriotic people
of Guam are just--should be so treasured, and I look forward to
seeing what response you have further on that.
Additionally, at the 2017 readiness hearing that I chaired,
I asked the Government Accountability Office about its June 13,
2017, report which identified readiness issues just 4 days
before the Fitzgerald incident. The GAO statement indicated
that the expired training certifications likely played a role
in the incidents. Please discuss the changes that the Navy has
made since the GAO report was published in 2017. Who certifies
the ships homeported within the Indo-Pacific area of
responsibility? Have reforms been instituted specifically as to
waivers?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, sir. So there are no more
waivers, unless granted by me; so any waiver or request to
operate in a manner that doesn't meet the identified standards
are my decision alone. And so from a top-down perspective, I
don't know what else we could do. To date, I have granted no
waivers.
With regard to the certs, again, my battle rhythm for
understanding, again, 3 days a week, on every ship that is out,
whether or not they have the appropriate manning, the level of
training, and the certification, is briefed to me 3 days a
week. If any of those don't meet the requirement to execute the
assigned missions then they will not be tasked.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And, Admiral Grady, in the
statement you provided, you mention the important role of
nuclear deterrence. The nuclear triad is critical to protecting
the homeland and strategic deterrence. What investment is the
Navy making to strengthen our nuclear deterrence?
Admiral Grady. Well, of course, sir, the most survivable
leg of the nuclear triad is our SSBN [ballistic missile
submarine] force. And so the maintenance and sustainability of
the current Ohio-class SSBN force is absolutely critical to the
viability of that nuclear triad.
Secondly then, is the follow-on to the Ohio-class
submarine, which is the Columbia-class submarine, and I believe
with the support of the committee and the Congress, we are
working toward achieving that.
And finally, there is the investments in the E-6 airplane
that is part of the apparatus airborne command and control
platform and all of the connectivity that allow us in a
contingency or a crisis to command and control the nuclear
deterrent. And so, across those three things, the Navy is
significantly invested in that, probably number one mission.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for
coming. I very much appreciate your time, and as we have
talked, I am the daughter and the granddaughter of Navy
officers. I have four Active Duty cousins right now, three of
whom are in the Navy, one of whom is a submariner and one is a
Navy SEAL. The third a Navy nurse. And so, I have a personal
appreciation for the impact that you all have and the impact in
operational demands have on the sailors at the individual level
and at the family level, as well.
Lack of training and resourcing at the individual level
amplified at the organization level has significant impact as
we have seen obviously. In fact, my father actually authored
something for the Navy Proceedings on this very subject. He is
a naval historian now in his retirement.
Admiral Grady, my question is for you. The October 2017
Comprehensive Review stated, quote, ``Today, proficiency in
seamanship and navigation competes for time and attention with
the expanding tactical duties of our naval professionals at
sea. Further, the operational demands for surface ships to
perform these missions continue to increase, even as the size
of the surface force in the Navy has decreased.'' So my
question for you is when you were commissioned, sir, how long
was your first course of instruction as a surface warfare
officer?
Admiral Grady. It was 4 months.
Ms. Houlahan. Four months?
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Houlahan. And how long is that same training course
today?
Admiral Grady. It is 23 weeks now.
Ms. Houlahan. And so, I also, in addition to being an
Active Duty member myself in the Air Force, was a teacher for a
time, and my question to you is when you shrink the level of
instruction that significantly, you clearly must have to
compromise something, or have you compromised something? And if
you have, sir, what do you think that you have compromised?
Admiral Grady. Well, time is always one of the more
important training commodities and resources that we attempt to
manage, but I think compromise is not a term I would use. I
think we found efficiencies, particularly in the modernized
delivery of training content, and so, to your colleague
commented on CD-based training, that was not effective; we
thought it would be, but it was not. And so now the appropriate
mix of classroom training and simulator training and practical
work has bought us the efficiencies, I think, in the new Basic
Division Officer Course at 23 weeks with the appropriate amount
of time to come very close to what I learned back in 1984.
I would tell you that in that time, it was a lot of
PowerPoint, and it was kind of seapower through memorization.
And the course that we have now is not that. It is much more
practically oriented with rigorous assessments, even in that
Basic Division Officer Course. My own son is a graduate of that
course, and he would tell you it was pretty hard. And that is
good. And that is what we need. And so I think less compromise,
but more getting better at the modernized delivery and
understanding the learning science. And I would tell you, too,
that that passes over to how we train our enlisted sailors. So
as we bring Ready, Relevant Learning online that is one of the
three lines of effort, how do you deliver modernized content,
recognizing the science of learning? And I think we have come a
long way there.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And the Comprehensive Review
identified the need for additional training and focus, and in
the initial training environment, it wasn't as extensive of a
program as it possibly currently--I am sorry, as it was. Has
the Navy considered expanding the scope of the initial surface
warfare training to include real-world and simulated seamanship
and navigation training?
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am, we have. So there is that first
23 weeks, which, again, starts with classroom training but then
spends a lot of time in the simulator. The rest of the pipeline
training for a junior officer will include two junior officer
of the deck courses, which will all be simulator-based, and
then finally, an officer of the deck, simulator-based course
with repeated touch points at our Surface Warfare Officers
School. Far beyond--particularly from the simulation and
training perspective in the simulator, far beyond what I ever
had.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And my last question is actually
kind of switching gears a little bit and talking a little bit
about the maintenance of ships. Will the modernization of our
aging public yards exacerbate the backlog that already exists,
do you feel?
Admiral Grady. It is certainly a requirement that we
modernize our public shipyards. So the Secretary's shipyard
improvement operational program, the SIOP, which is a 20-year
program for about $22 billion, is absolutely critical. So if
you walk our shipyards today, fantastic artisans and craftsmen
in each of those, masters of their trade, but they are just not
laid out well. That is one example of what we need to do with
that $22 billion over 20 years.
So we need to modernize the delivery of the maintenance,
which includes everything from getting the right capital
equipment on board to how we lay out from an efficiency
perspective each of our public yards. I would tell you, too,
that I believe that is happening in the private shipyards, too,
and I would encourage them to do that as we work to be a better
partners with them.
Ms. Houlahan. And I have no more time, but that was
actually my follow-on question, which had to do with the
privatization opportunities with shipyards, as well. I thank
you very much for your time, gentlemen. I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Ms. Houlahan, thank you for raising the
shipyard issue. We will be spending a lot of time on that in
the days ahead. Mr. Kelly, you are next.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to
thank the spouses and children, who pay such a huge price for
our Nation. I also want to recognize our senior enlisted
leaders right behind you, and as you guys know in command, you
can't exist without great senior enlisted leaders, and that is
why we are the greatest military in the world is because of our
senior enlisted leaders.
We have to fight today with what we have, especially in
your area of the world. Having traveled the Pacific Rim last
spring with Senator Inhofe, the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee in the Senate, the time and distances that are there
we have to be capable, and we have to have every ship in the
fight at the right place at the right time just to hold until
we can get the rest of our fleet there.
America is the greatest power in the world like many powers
before us, and being an Army guy, it is hard for me to admit
this, but America is a great power because of the seapower. And
we control the seas, just as Britain was and Spain and France
and Japan, and you go on and on. You have to be able to control
the seas in order to be a great power.
I am concerned right now in that region with the firepower
ratios that we have with China, who has many ground-based
systems to support their fleet. Also concerned with the
standoff that we have. Fully supportive of a 355-ship Navy,
which I think gets us to the place, but using all of our
allies, okay, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, all
those things in that area, are we capable of fighting tonight
and withholding, and are we leveraging all our ground, air, and
sea to make sure that we have the right firepower ratios at the
right time?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, thanks for that question. There has
certainly been growth in some of our principal adversaries in
the Pacific with regard to their force structure, as well as
their capabilities. I am here to tell you, I am ready tonight.
The force that we have certainly has--well, let me put it this
way: We fight the away game, as you have identified. So when
some adversaries are able to do stuff on their shores, the away
team is going to go to that fight, we have to be able to
sustain that fight, and we can do that today.
Additionally, you brought up the allies and partners. It is
critical that we work with our allies and partners. You know,
one of our asymmetric advantages is our adversaries have no
partners. That is pretty important, sir. So your observations
are absolutely accurate, but we are ready to fight tonight.
Admiral Grady. If I could, sir, your Navy is the contact,
blunt, and surge force that is written into the National
Defense Strategy, and I would love to host you down in Norfolk
to maybe have a classified session where we can talk about some
of these exchange ratios, or I am sure Lung would happy--would
be happy to have you out there. And the other element I would
mention is we have to be able to fight with the joint force, as
well, and we are doing that.
Mr. Kelly. My next question kind of goes off, and it is not
on my notes, so one of the things that keeps me awake at night,
and I hope it keeps you guys awake at night, is our inability--
the number of hospitals we have, both for soft power and hard
power, especially in that area of the world, the hospital ships
that we have, and also the icebreakers that we have that some
of our competitors are ahead of us. You know, China has a huge
number of icebreakers as does Russia in that area.
Tell me how icebreakers affect your fleets and your ability
to maneuver and do the things that you need to do in that
region?
Admiral Aquilino. If you don't mind, sir, I will start with
the specific question on the hospital ships. So each year, we
do an operation called Pacific Partnership, where we take a
hospital ship or one of our other ships with deployed medical
teams that go out and do humanitarian missions across the
region. We do that every year. That is the soft power you are
talking about. And before I give it to Chris to talk about
icebreakers, I would just like to say, you know, my goal is to
sleep well every night. I would like my counterpart to not
sleep well at all.
Mr. Kelly. I am with you on that.
Admiral Grady. I guess I would add that the idea and the
issue of combat medicine is really important for the Navy to
get a hold of, and so in Lung's AOR [area of responsibility],
that idea of a golden hour is not going to be there, and we
have to be ready to think innovatively on how we are going to
do that. So adaptive force packaging on smaller ships in
addition to the two hospital ships that we have that provide
that soft power we need to--creative thinking on that, and rest
assured that we are both doing that with our fleet counterpart
in Europe.
Now to the icebreaker question, it is clearly evident that
the Arctic is a new frontier. And so, a lot of folks flowing
into the Arctic for a host of various reasons from the demand
for fish stocks and proteins to what is on the bottom to our
adversaries perhaps trying--or at least one adversary trying to
create a bastion up there.
So icebreakers will enable us to fight more effectively in
that environment. And so, we support the--our fellow sea
service, the Coast Guard, in their initiatives to get more
icebreakers into their force. And, again, we will fight
together with them as we push into the Arctic and the more
cold.
Mr. Kelly. And my time is expired. I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Kelly. I have been waiting
for this next questioner. She comes with some experience as an
executive officer on a cruiser, Mrs. Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, Admirals, for being here
today. And in advance of the hearing, I reviewed the
Comprehensive Review. I went back and reviewed the Balisle
report, several GAO reports, and numerous other examples where
over time, we identify problems, we implement corrective
actions, but we fail to sufficiently assess and follow through
with these before we find ourselves back here again at yet
another hearing to take more corrective actions, and, you know,
find ourselves with more avoidable mishaps.
And as we have acknowledged, we are here today because of
the tragic loss of 17 lives of our sailors because we continue
to be incapable of properly manning, training, and equipping
our surface forces, in my mind, to perform the most basic
functions of seamanship and navigation.
And for nearly two decades, we prioritized efficiency over
effectiveness as is clearly delineated in the Balisle report,
and you have touched on the fit and the fill and where we are
getting, you know, closer to the manning we need, but just as a
comment, I would urge that we look back at what we did with the
Top Six Roll-Down, and that we have actually rolled back up to
the right skill sets to fill those numbers in the future.
And, you know, in the Comprehensive Review, I feel that we
face, yet again, another damning report that shows we
prioritize breadth over depth of experience and expertise and
proficiency in our surface forces, and due to the limitations
of time, I have a few yes-no questions, and I would ask that
you keep it to that just so that we can move on.
And, Admiral Aquilino, did you find this report, the
Comprehensive Review, to be a fair critique of our surface
navigation training at the time?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Luria. And my problem, and from my own personal
experience in having gone through this entire career pipeline
and then served as a division officer, department head, XO,
dealt with the junior officers who had, you know, only learned
through ``SWOS in a Box,'' is that our corrective actions
overwhelmingly required the same people through OJT [on-the-job
training] who have gone through the same ineffective training
that you have described as inadequate, to fix the problem.
And it is encouraging that you mention that we have
enlisted the force of our civilian mariners through, you know,
a more robust BRM [bridge resource management] course, but
again, that is probably only several days, and I just have a
feeling that we continue to use OJT to train ourselves with the
same people who don't have the right proficiencies. And, you
know, I just tried to put it in the context for you, Admiral
Aquilino, thinking that you are an aviator, and if we had a
similar report that found that aviators weren't able to fly
planes safely. So you had a plane crash, you had 17 people die
in this plane crash and you did an investigation and found out
that that pilot did not know how to fly his plane. And then we
did another report and we found out that most of our pilots did
not know how to fly planes, do you feel that we are really
putting that same sense of urgency into the corrective actions
in our surface force as an example such as that?
Admiral Aquilino. So the differences are--I don't know if
it is very easy to make that similar analogy, but your point is
absolutely valid. I think we did focus on efficiency back in a
time when there was clearly very extreme pressures on funding
pieces.
Mrs. Luria. They are only going to give me 5 minutes, so
the question is do you feel the sense of urgency? When you are
implementing these actions, do you feel that it has the
appropriate sense of urgency, and do you have the resources to
apply the sense of urgency that this deserves?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, so I believe we are taking the right
actions, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Luria. Okay. And to further amplify that, you know, as
the commander of the Pacific Fleet, your theater has really the
most complex and challenging environment, you know, with the
BMD [ballistic missile defense] threat, tension on the Korean
peninsula, near-peer adversaries, increasing naval activity
from China and Russia and, you know, each of these require the
highest competency and the highest skills to conduct major
combat operations in your theater. And, you know, does the
status of our simple basic navigation and seamanship training
that raises concerns about competency of our surface forces
give you confidence that our surface forces can fight at the
highest level against our adversaries in the Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, with one comment. So that is
not just a question for the Pacific. Your Navy will surge to
wherever--as you know, wherever the fight is. So if the fight
starts in the Pacific, my belief is I will get a lot of Admiral
Grady's forces and vice versa if it starts in the Atlantic. So
we trained the skill sets and we are ready to operate wherever
crisis breaks out.
Mrs. Luria. Okay. And my last comment, you know, and I
thought a lot about this in reading through the Balisle report
specifically, is that we have moved away from training to
fundamentals. We learned relative motion with a popsicle stick
and a grease pencil on a SPA-25 radar repeater, and we knew
with the rigor of, you know, every 3 minutes putting this on a
MOBOARD [Basic Maneuvering Board] and looking out the window,
we understood what we were looking at around us. And I feel
that, you know, we have advances in technology that are very
important and are very critical tools, but just from my
personal experience, my observation is that we have moved away
from the absolute fundamentals behind the technology that we
use, and have we restored a foundation in those fundamentals in
the training before we go to the simulation and the ARPA
[Automatic Radar Plotting Aid] and all of the tools that are
out there to be used today.
Admiral Grady. I am confident the answer to that is yes,
and to your earlier comment about OJT, we have broken the chain
of that, so what we have put in place has broken the chain of
unqualified people training unqualified people. I would be
delighted to host you up at SWOS to show you the improvements
that have been made, or at the fleet concentration centers for
Basic Division Officer Course and the Advanced Division Officer
Course, the two JOOD [Junior Officer of the Deck] Courses, the
OOD [Officer of the Deck] Course. I think you would be
impressed and come away with greater confidence.
Mrs. Luria. I appreciate that, and I will look forward to
that as well, and you know, my experience as SWOS as a division
officer is they crammed 3 weeks of training into 6 months, and
it was not rigorous at all, and no one failed, so I hope we
have turned that paradigm around. And thank you again for your
time.
Mr. Garamendi. Gotta love it. One of the attributes of the
Readiness Committee is the freshmen that have joined the
committee. They come with an extraordinary set of experiences
and able to not only ask questions, but understand answers that
many of us wouldn't know. I look forward to a second round, and
you gentlemen could, too. Let's see. We are going to Mr. Waltz,
you are next.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here today. I want to echo the gratitude to your
families. I tell people all the time, yes, of course, thank
your veteran, but take an extra step and thank spouses,
parents, children, it truly is a team effort for our All-
Volunteer Force, so thank you all for being here.
I grew up the son and grandson of Navy enlisted chiefs in
Jacksonville, Florida, and then defected and spent 23 years in
the Army, so bear with me.
I want to go back to the 6,200-sailor shortage and just ask
you a few questions on that. How long, and forgive me if I
missed it, but how long in the timeline to fill that shortage?
What percentage of the overall, you know, of the overall force
does that represent? And then just some detail on is that
across the board? Is that certain types of ships? Is that older
versus newer where technology is filling in in certain types of
systems? Subsurface, surface? Can you just kind of flesh that
out for me for a minute?
Admiral Aquilino. I will have to get back to you on the
percentage. So I can tell of my--between 140 and 150,000
sailors in the Pacific, 6,200, you know, if we take 60 percent
of that, it is mine. So that is the applicability. It is
balanced across all of the forces and----
Mr. Waltz. Okay.
Admiral Aquilino [continuing]. Different ships have
different sizes, so it is kind of difficult--we don't just say,
Hey----
Mr. Waltz. Forgive me, Admiral. What I want to get at is
there a certain rating, is there a certain kind of low-density/
high-demand type of rating that you are having a hard time
with, or is it kind of spread across the force?
Admiral Aquilino. I would say it is spread evenly. There is
critical NECs [Navy Enlisted Classifications] or capabilities
that each of the ship needs. One of those that was called out
in the report was quartermasters, that there is not enough at
sea, that there is too many ashore, so we review all that. When
we put ships out, they must have the correct amount of those
critical capabilities on board or they don't go.
Mr. Waltz. How long has the shortage persisted? Has this
been for decades? Has it been for years? Was it a result, just
to be candid, of sequestration and shortfalls in the last 10
years? Like what is, just very quickly, on the nucleus of the
problem?
Admiral Aquilino. I would say the history is the shortfalls
persisted for a number of years, but I will tell you in the
past 4 or 5, we are working, as Admiral Grady identified, in
the correct direction. So back in 2000 and I think it was 12
[2012], the number was 260 on a DDG. And today that number, the
requirement is up at 315. So it has persisted for a while. We
continue to get there. We thank you for your support. We have
added 7,500 alone last year in the budget that we couldn't have
done that without the teamwork that you provide. So on the
right track. I think we get there in 2023 to get to 100
percent.
Mr. Waltz. If we don't continue the current level of
funding obviously, you know, then that is going to change that
trajectory?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Admiral Grady. You are helping us buy our way out of that
hole, but then the new ships will be coming, so we will have to
continue to man the fleet for the new ships, as well.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Admiral, you mention--well, let me--you
mentioned that you had actually stopped some deployments, ships
weren't ready, fleets weren't ready. Operationally what
couldn't you do when that happens, what risks did you take in
your AOR [area of responsibility] when that doesn't happen?
Admiral Aquilino. We took risk in the form of a single
deployment to the Western Pacific in support of the--or
deployment to the South Pacific Islands that we were supporting
in conjunction with our Coast Guard partners. That is one. I
reduced a ship that was supposed to go to the Rim of the
Pacific exercise, and then we took risk with regard to surge
forces that if crisis were to have broken out, they would have
needed additional training before they could have gone. That is
the risk.
Admiral Davidson also reduced one of the missions that was
previously in my job jar based on the current environment. He
removed that again for now. The enemy gets a vote, so those
could easily come back if the times were different.
Mr. Waltz. So I just want to get in my remaining time, it
is my understanding U.S. PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] sets
the requirement, but then also sets the fill. And that is a
carve-out. Is that still the case? I know some other members,
my colleagues have gotten at that, but is that--is that
basically the plan going forward? I just find that coming from
my background to be odd, to be candid.
Admiral Aquilino. That is actually not accurate.
Mr. Waltz. Okay.
Admiral Aquilino. So PACOM sets the requirement. This is
what I need to do the missions that the President has assigned
to him.
Mr. Waltz. Right.
Admiral Aquilino. When each year the Navy produces a
sourcing solution or here are the forces that we will deploy in
the next year, what we have pushed forward now over the past
couple of years is a supply-based model. So there are many
requirements as set by Admiral Davidson and the other combatant
commanders that we currently are not filling. The Secretary of
Defense adjudicates those differences between what is needed by
the combatant commander and what has been put forward by the
services. So that is really the accurate model and the way it
works.
Mr. Waltz. Would you be able to provide--would you be able
to provide for the record what isn't being filled then, I mean,
what the gaps are going forward in that supply-based model?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. And I will now turn to Mr.
Golden.
Mr. Golden. Thank you very much, sir. Just a couple of
quick thoughts for the subcommittee as a whole, because I want
to say as a Marine Corps infantryman, I am not the subject
matter expert on sailing around in naval ships. Thankfully, I
have got Congresswoman Luria sitting next to me to drill into
the weeds on that. But the extent of my experience really is
riding around out in the Atlantic and taking a splash in an AAV
[amphibious assault vehicle] to invade Virginia, which I will
say as a native New Englander, I enjoyed. But, you know, I just
wanted to point out to the committee, and I think that this is
a great hearing and one that is necessary, that my
understanding of what Congress' role should be in regards to
oversight really lies in the world of dictating to the Navy who
it is that we fight or compete with and why. And I really
looked to you all in the Navy to come before these committees
and talk about the where do we fight and where do we compete
with them, and more importantly, what do we need to do it, to
win and to do it as safely as possible.
It is a dangerous job, but we ought to give you all the
equipment, ships, and personnel necessary to accomplish that
mission with the least amount of lives lost and put at risk as
possible.
So I just want to encourage you. In this subcommittee, I
suspect that we are going to be looking to work together to get
you what you need. So don't hesitate to tell us what that is.
And, you know, I recognize this in you as officers, and I want
to thank you and tell you I respect very much that you sat up
there with your opening statements and took full responsibility
for these incidences, which is what good officers and good
leaders do, and I appreciate that very much. You did not offer
any excuses. You probably could have pointed a finger right
back at Congress as we look, I think, to maintain operational
tempo while also talking about your need to shift to address
threats from Russia and increasing competition from China.
It would make sense to this Marine, you might have to take
a step back in order to prepare for that mission and achieve
that high level of readiness. Yet, we are asking you just to
hit the accelerator button, and so, with that I think comes a
great responsibility to talk about how we are going to free up
additional resources, because if we are not going to, you know,
decrease the requirements, then I think we are going to have to
give you more ships and more Navy personnel down the road.
So, you know, I would just share from you from the enlisted
perspective I have been on deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq
in a Marine infantry unit, and people--you know, we lose
people, people get injured, people get hurt, and as those
numbers go down, you increase the amount of time that you are
standing post out on patrol really no down time whatsoever. And
we train for operating tired, but none of us are perfect, and
ultimately, you push people too hard, and that is where
mistakes happen, and I am sure that had something to do with
this.
And I know you keep that in mind, but, you know, the very
best sailors in the world, you push them too hard, they get
overtired, mistakes will happen, and that gets back to you all
coming in here and telling us what you need to make sure that
they don't have to be in that position. So thank you very much,
and I look forward to working with everyone on the committee.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. Your comments are well
taken. Mr. Bergman.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
of you in the room today, especially those of you wearing the
uniform--wearing the uniform, and those who will bring the next
generations into uniform. I would like to, maybe, take a little
different take on the keeping our adversaries awake at night. I
would like for our potential adversaries to sleep very well at
night, knowing they have made the very wise decision not to
challenge us, because if this world had some more good sleep
time in it we would probably make some better decisions across
the globe. And when it comes to rest for your crews, whether,
you know, off watch that down time is essential for your
commanders, your watch officers, your engineering officers,
whoever has the watch to make the best decisions at the time.
You know, it is great to have a fellow naval aviator. I
will keep my hands down. I won't talk with my hands, okay, but
the idea is that readiness is an honest assessment of the
effectiveness of a training curriculum. Back in the early
2000s, then CNO Vern Clark spent, I think, $11 billion in the
New Center at Great Lakes when they closed Orlando, moved all
the operations there because in chatting with him back in that
timeframe he realized that these young men and women who were
in boot camp to become effective members of a team were going
to have to have different kinds of training experiences and
that involved the extensive simulation that they have there in
Great Lakes.
And for anyone who has never seen it, a tour there would
be, I think, greatly beneficial to a lot of our members who
have not under--had the opportunity to excel under the rigors
of training like they have at Great Lakes.
Now having said that, any schoolhouse left unattended tends
to set its own standards, fall in love with its own curriculum
sometimes. So to what extent has the Navy had to overcome what
we might call the schoolhouse mentality in which the
schoolhouse being reluctant to change, but yet, you know as the
leadership in the Navy, you have to change. Would you care to
make a comment on how you have made strides going forward with
that bringing the schoolhouse along with you?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir, I will jump in there. So the
feedback mechanism that we have implemented across the Navy
with regard to the lessons learned that we take out of conflict
that we are in today whether it be Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan,
each deployment that the units are on those feedback loops plug
directly back into our training mechanisms in the form of
Strike Group Four, Strike Group 15, Top Gun, and SMWDC [Surface
and Mine Warfighting Development Center], so that the crews and
the teams that go through our training are identified and
trained to the latest threats that exist. And in a closed
session, I can give you some of those critical things that we
learned and that we quickly implemented with regard to adjusted
training, such that the next team out the door would be the
most up to speed for the threats they might see.
Admiral Grady. And I would add that this is the central
concept of the Navy's Ready, Relevant Learning program. This
idea that stasis is bad and that you have to have the virtuous
feedback loops to say are we on plan with the training we are
provided. And so from a Ready, Relevant Learning perspective,
three lines of effort for that: What is the career continuum?
When is the right time and right type of training to deliver to
a sailor throughout their career path? Secondly is that
modernized delivery that we talked about before recognizing the
advances in the science of learning and how our young people
learn.
And then the third, to your point, sir, the third line of
effort is one that we call integrated content development. And
that is the virtuous feedback loop that our type commanders--
the surface boss, the aviation boss, the submarine boss--they
are the ones that own the appropriate training, build a
feedback mechanism into the schoolhouse to say this we need to
add, we don't need more of that, we need more of this, and that
is what Ready, Relevant Learning is going to bring us in that
third line of effort.
Mr. Bergman. Is the attitude that it is okay to fail, in
fact, training is--you are supposed to fail in training because
if you haven't, if the training is perfect, if everybody gets
100 on every exam, obviously your standards probably aren't
stringent enough, is the attitude there that it is okay to
fail, just don't fail twice at the same thing?
Admiral Grady. Well, I think failure breeds great learning.
Of course, back to the surface warfare officer pipeline, if you
fail in one of those three check points, then we are not going
let you command a ship. But to your point, failure helps
learning and so test a little, learn a lot.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, and I see my time has expired. Just
one closing quick one. Rising--we hear a lot that rising tides
lift all boats. Rising standards lift all performance. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you Mr. Bergman. Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify
something you said earlier, Admiral Grady, was that the initial
SWO training went from 4 months to 23 weeks, right?
Admiral Grady. No, sir. It went from 4 months back when I
was----
Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
Admiral Grady [continuing]. To nothing----
Mr. Gallagher. To nothing.
Admiral Grady [continuing]. To SWOS that was administered
as OJT with computer-based training CD-ROMs, to 17 weeks of
reestablishing the basic division or accession course, to now
23 weeks plus three additional courses as part of their junior
officer training.
Mr. Gallagher. Got it. That is helpful. Last summer,
Defense News reported there was a widespread shortfall in basic
seamanship across the surface fleet, so out of 164 randomly
selected newly qualified first tour division officers at SWO
school, a review found at least some concerns with the
shiphandling skills of nearly 85 percent of the group. How did
littoral combat ship officers fare relative to the rest of the
fleet?
Admiral Grady. They fared quite well. You are referring to
one of the immediate and controlling actions we took following
the tragic loss of our 17 shipmates, and that was OOD
competency checks. So we went around the fleet and sampled, and
this is what we found. The train to qualify, train to certify
model that the littoral combat ship uses, as Admiral Aquilino
said, is amazingly effective and I believe you will see it
brought to the rest of the fleet over time. And what we are
finding with the--those that are trained in those simulators,
both in Jacksonville or Mayport and in San Diego, is that those
officers are very, very advanced in their ability to drive the
ship when it is really moving water under the keel.
Mr. Gallagher. I mean, I think it is fair to say, I think
you would agree, based on what we just said, that the live
virtual constructive training environment is a distinguishing
aspect of LCS and also has been positively correlated with
their superior performance in that sample size.
Admiral Grady. Absolutely.
Mr. Gallagher. So, I guess with that in mind, does the Navy
have any plans or what plans does the Navy have to bring that
sort of LCS-style simulation training to other platforms across
the surface fleet, and what are the associated timelines with
those plans if they exist?
Admiral Grady. Well, it starts with the build-out of our
Navy seamanship and shiphandling trainers in all of the fleet
concentration areas, and by 2019, by the end of 2019, we will
have these high-fidelity simulators built out in all of the
fleet concentration areas, but this is just an interim
solution.
The goodness in these is the fidelity of the trainer plus
the teamwork that comes in. So it is not just the bridge, it is
not just the combat information center, and one of the things
we learned from the tragedies is the ability to work together.
So the interim solution is the build-out of the NSST
[navigation, seamanship, and shiphandling trainer] trainers in
all of the fleet concentration areas. After that we are working
to build maritime shiphandling training centers in both Norfolk
and San Diego that will fully inculcate this idea of high-
fidelity simulators for bridge, CIC [combat information
center], and the team, and that is to the tune of about $240
million or so, and that will be done in the early 2020s.
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, there is one point highlighting with
regard to the simulation capability. There is another aspect of
the training that I believe has been embraced by my surface
counterparts. It is a part of Naval Aviation culture, and
that's the vigorous self-assessment. And if you go to the LCS
trainer, and you see a commander going through the program
being trained by a lieutenant who is a weapons and tactics
instructor telling the commander, Hey, you did that wrong, that
vigorous self-assessment with the no-holds-barred, or gloves
off, no retribution, has been easily as effective as the
simulation itself for us to get better and to work towards that
culture of excellence.
Admiral Grady. And I would add, it is the simulation that
enables that, because we can play it back and show them what
they did wrong. And additionally, we have identified 14 high-
stress scenarios that we can do over and over again to help
them learn. You can't really do that underway on a ship all the
time because of other operational requirements, but we can put
this plan, brief, execute, and debrief process to work because
of the high-fidelity simulation and really learn much faster.
High-velocity learning.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield the balance of
my time.
Mr. Garamendi. Just a quick follow-up. The use of
simulators you said 20--in the early 2020s to get this advanced
simulation program underway?
Admiral Grady. So the interim--the interim capability that
we have, which will approach the full build-out, will be this
year. We will finish this year. But then the larger build-out
in both the two major fleet concentration areas will conclude
in the 2022 timeframe.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good. We spent a lot of time at this
hearing on training. There are the other pieces of this puzzle
need to be more fully explored, particularly the readiness of
the ship itself, the equipment, maintenance, and the like. We
will pick that up at a later time. I think we have run through
all of the witnesses. I see Mr. Courtney has returned. So I
think we have finished the hearing. Without further questions
from the members, we will adjourn the hearing.
Before I adjourn, I want to thank Admiral Grady, Admiral
Aquilino, and your spouses for joining us today and for the
rest of the support. We will continue this--the focus of this
hearing was principally on the Pacific. We know that is not the
only place the Navy operates, and we will spend a little more
time next time we go through this, probably in maybe 6 months
from now, come back and review the progress along the way.
Keeping in mind what Mr. Wittman said, he suggested that we
take the responsibility to be the oversight, and we will. So
with that the hearing is adjourned.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Grady. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 26, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 26, 2019
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 26, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. Admirals, in testimony before this committee last
year, Secretary Spencer and CNO Richardson indicated their support to
strike an appropriation limitation, otherwise known as the Inouye
amendment. Specifically, CNO Richardson indicated ``this Inouye
amendment . . . is an artificial seam that inhibits [Navy] from
establishing a single standard.'' Do you agree with the Secretary and
CNO that the Inouye amendment and other forms of arbitrary
congressional direction to Navy should be eliminated?
Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino. We agree with the Secretary and
the CNO that Sec. 8056 of Public Law 115-141 and other similar
congressional directives that limit Navy's flexibility should be
eliminated. The generation of combat ready forces across the Navy is
executed to one standard that is governed by the Integrated Readiness
Instruction (OPNAVINST 3000.16) signed by the CNO 15 Feb 2019. These
standards guide readiness policies and certifications of all Navy
forces regardless of their geographic location.
Mr. Wittman. Admirals, in response to a continuing concern as to
material readiness, Congress required Navy to adopt a limited notice
INSURV inspection program. Compared with the previous INSURV strategy,
what have been the fleet impacts to this limited notice INSURV strategy
and what are the results?
Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino. NDAA-19 directed INSURV to
conduct minimal notice inspections by 1 January 2020. INSURV has
developed a plan to conduct 24 ``pilot'' inspections to determine the
best method to implement our understanding of minimal notice and is on
track to execute no notice material inspections on all ships and
submarines by 1 October 2019. As of 1 Apr 2019, INSURV has conducted
six minimal notice ``pilot'' inspections with no significant adverse
impacts on ship schedules and scores have been 5 to 10 percent lower
than previous averages for DDGs and CGs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
Mrs. Luria. Admiral Grady, the IMO has established requirements for
the safe navigation of merchant vessels through the standards of
training, certification, and watchkeeping (STCW) for seafarers. Why is
the Navy so hesitant to require the same standards for its officers and
why do our accession sources not require a similar level of sea time
and subsequently actual at-sea time gaining proficiency in performing
your job before advancing to the next level?
Before they take command submariners have a comprehensive
evaluation through the Submarine Commanders Course, which requires
proficiency in navigation and warfighting, yet no similar requirement
exists or is recommended in your corrective actions. Should I take from
that that warfighting on the surface is not as important as warfighting
on the subsurface?
Before a strike group deploys, the culmination of their training is
the Joint Taskforce Exercise, which is where you as the fleet commander
certify a ship for deployment. How many strike groups in the last 10
years have failed the JTFEX?
This report has identified that Surface Warfare Officers and crews
lack basic navigation fundamentals, which has not come to light in the
culminating training event. So is this culminating event in which you
certify the ship for deployment adequate since it has never identified
any of these problems?
Admiral Grady. (a) As outlined within the recent NDAA Section 334
Report to Congress, the Surface Navy is not hesitant to require the
same standards for its officers, and has adopted significant portions
of the STCW requirements where they align with those of Surface
Warfare. We have completed a side-by-side comparison of the IMO STCW/
3rd Mate and SWO qualification requirements and extracted those
applicable to the U.S. Navy. Some portions of STCW bear minimal or no
application to Surface Warfare requirements. As such, wholesale
adoption is not practical. Surface Warfare training includes both
Navigation, Seamanship, and Shiphandling (NSS) requirements and a
breadth of maritime warfighting skills. With respect to effectively
navigating and handling ships, Surface Warfare NSS requirements are
comparable to those of the USCG and the Merchant Marine, as shown
below. Areas in which Surface Warfare Mariner's Skills training bears
full STCW/USCG accreditation include Bridge Resource Management (BRM)
and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) training.
Some areas in which Surface Warfare Mariner's Skills requirements are
comparable to STCW/USCG requirements, and for which accrediting is
forthcoming, include Automated Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) set up and
employment, to be fielded in 2021 in conjunction with the standup of
OOD Phase I and the Maritime Skills Training Centers (MSTCs). Some
requirements in SWO mariner skills training that are aligned with STCW/
USCG requirements, but for which USCG accreditation has not been
granted credit or for which additional Surface Community training
modifications are required include conducting celestial navigation,
maintaining an anchor watch, or use of IMO Standard Marine
Communication Phrases (SMCP). Areas in which STCW/USCG requirements
have little or no application to Surface Warfare requirements include
cargo handling and stowage, operating life-saving appliances, or
applying medical first aid.
(b) No. Maritime Warfighting is a long-standing Surface Warfare
core competency. The Surface Warfare Officer Requirements Document
(SWORD) outlines specific career milestone expectations for:
Navigation, Seamanship, & Shiphandling (``Drive the Ship''), Maritime
Warfare (``Fight the Ship''), Program & Material Management (``Manage
the Ship''), and Leadership (``Command the Ship''). Since its
inception, one-half of the 6-month Surface Warfare Officer Department
Head Course is devoted to Maritime Warfare and developing the most
proficient Tactical Action Officers (TAOs). Additionally, approximately
4 months of additional tactical and maritime warfare training (as
determined by billet and combat systems baseline) is received via
Division Officer and/or Department Head Billet Specialty Training
(BST). Key Navy training commands such as: Naval Surface & Mine Warfare
Development Command (NSMWDC), Tactical Training Groups Atlantic &
Pacific (TACTRAGRULANT/PAC), Expeditionary Warfare Training Command
(EWTGLANT/PAC), Carrier Strike Groups FOUR & FIFTEEN (CSG-4/CSG-15),
the Surface Warfare Officer's School (SWOS), and the Center for Ship's
Combat systems (CSCS) ensure robust maritime warfighting training to
the Surface Force, provide critical maritime warfare training/
assessment at individual and team levels, and bear significant SWO
staff representation.
(c) The Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) is the
culminating event for deployment certification, and is not focused
exclusively on specific or discrete navigation skills. Instead,
COMPTUEX is an integrated, multi-warfare event that tests command &
control, offensive/defensive capabilities, and supported/supporting
commander missions and roles within a Joint environment. The exercise
stresses the integrations of Naval, Joint, and Coalition forces
executing combined missions within a multi-threat environment.
Mrs. Luria. Admiral Aqualino, did you find this report to be a fair
critique of surface navigation training? Yes or no?
Yet your corrective actions require the same people who have gone
through the same ineffective training--which you have described as
inadequate--to fix the problem.
We have marginalized the stringency for establishing similar high
standards on our surface ships that we require in our aircraft and
submarines.
If a similar report found that aviators were not able to fly and
navigate airplanes safely--if you had an aircraft crash and kill 17
people and you did an investigation and found out that the pilot didn't
know how to fly the airplane--and then you did a comprehensive report
and you found out that the majority of your pilots didn't know how to
fly--Do the corrective actions in this report have a similar sense of
urgency (as in my example) that is needed to fix this problem in the
surface force? Yes or no?
As the Commander of Pacific Fleet your theater has some of the most
pressing challenges that exist in the Navy today: BMD threat Tension on
the Korean Peninsula Increasing naval threat from China & Russia Each
of these requires the highest competency to conduct major combat
operations in your theater. Does this report--which raises concerns
about competency in the most basic navigation skills--give you
confidence that surface forces can conduct these major combat
operations if required? Yes or no?
Sailors know that the work that they do is dangerous. Flight
operations are dangerous. Underway replenishments are dangerous.
Boarding vessels is dangerous. Combat operations are dangerous. But
navigating through a shipping channel on a routine basis should not be
dangerous. We owe it to these sailors, to their families and loved
ones, to get it right this time.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, I believe these reports to be fair critiques
of surface navigation training at the time the reports were released.
Yes, we are treating these reports and taking actions with a similar
sense of urgency as you describe. Yes, I have confidence that the ships
I have deployed and the ones that we are deploying have been certified
on the prerequisite skills to not only navigate safely but are ready to
execute major combat operations.
[all]