5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Stockholm. He is self-employed and runs a business.
6.  On 22 April 2004 the Swedish commercial television channel TV3 broadcast an episode of a television show entitled “Insider”, in which it was claimed that “shady transactions and shady characters” were revealed. The show was broadcast live with a few recorded features. In the show, the applicant, who was unknown to the broader public, appeared in pictures and was mentioned by name. He was singled out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being guilty of several counts of fraud and other economic offences. The programme was re‑broadcast on 25 April and 17 September 2004. At this time, no criminal investigation had been initiated against the applicant.
7.  The television programme was produced in Sweden by the Swedish company Strix Television AB. It was sent by satellite link from Sweden to the London-based company Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd and from there sent unaltered to a satellite which transmitted the programme to the Swedish audience. The encoded programme was viewable via a satellite receiver or a cable connection in Sweden a fraction of a second after it had been sent by satellite link. Even if it was viewable in the United Kingdom, which is doubtful, it would have been watched there by a small audience. It was presented in the Swedish language for a Swedish-speaking audience, and was sponsored by companies competing in the Swedish market. The anchorman of the show, X, a Swedish national, was a celebrity and a well-known television personality in Sweden; he was also the Chief Executive Officer of Strix Television AB. The show had a long run and was watched by many viewers.
8.  In October 2006 the applicant brought a private prosecution against X for gross defamation, claiming damages in the amount of 250,000 Swedish kronor (SEK; approximately 27,000 euros). He maintained that he had been unreservedly pointed out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being directly or indirectly responsible for a large number of serious crimes. He further alleged that X was responsible for the content of the programme since he had failed in his duty to appoint a legally responsible editor (ansvarig utgivare) for the programme and because he had been its anchor.
9.  The applicant relied on Chapters 5 and 6 of the Constitutional Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen, 1991:1469; hereafter “the Constitutional Law”), regarding freedom of expression offences and liability rules, and Chapter 5 of the Penal Code (Brottsbalken), dealing with defamation, as well as Articles 6 § 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention. In the latter respect, he argued that his appearance in the show breached his right to privacy as well as his right to be presumed innocent and that a decision to dismiss his claims would constitute a violation of his right to an effective remedy. The applicant submitted a legal opinion stating that it would be impossible, or at least not useful, to bring an action in the United Kingdom in the present case since the damage flowing from the television programme at issue had not occurred in the United Kingdom.
10.  X disputed the claim on the grounds, inter alia, that he was not the responsible editor of the show and that he enjoyed the freedom to communicate information as provided for under Chapter 10, section 2 of the Constitutional Law and as clarified by the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) in the case NJA 2005 p. 884 (see paragraphs 32 and 33 below).
11.  In a preliminary ruling on 20 May 2008 the Stockholm District Court (Stockholms tingsrätt) dismissed the claim in so far as it was based on the Constitutional Law. It referred to the Supreme Court judgment in an almost identical case, NJA 2002 p. 314 (see paragraphs 28-31 below), and held that Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable to the television programme since it could not be regarded as emanating from Sweden. This was because the programme had first been sent by satellite link to Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd, the British company responsible for the programme content, and thereafter uplinked to a satellite, which had in turn transmitted the programme to viewers in Sweden. As Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable, X could not be held responsible for the programme content under Chapter 6. The District Court further held that the applicant’s claims under the Penal Code were to be determined following the main hearing in the case. The court finally drew the parties’ attention to the Supreme Court case NJA 2005 p. 884.
12.  The applicant appealed, repeating what he had stated in his earlier submissions. He further argued that all companies involved in the case were Swedish, including the receiving company in London, allegedly named Viasat AB, with its seat in Stockholm. Although Viasat AB had acquired the right to transmit the show from the Swedish company TV3 AB, it had had no impact on or responsibility for the programme selection. Having regard to the above, the offence committed against the applicant through the programme could not be examined by United Kingdom courts. The applicant also submitted that Swedish courts were competent to examine the case under the Brussels I Regulation (see further paragraph 35 below). X contested the arguments and submitted that it was the company Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd, whose seat was in the United Kingdom, which was responsible for the programme service and decided on the final content of the programmes.
13.  On 20 March 2009 the Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) upheld the District Court’s decision. It held that the issue for it to determine was whether the general provisions in the Constitutional Law were applicable to the programme in question, that is, whether or not the broadcasting of the programme could be considered to have originated from Sweden within the meaning of Chapter 1, section 6(2) of that law. It further stated that the burden of proof concerning the applicability of the Constitutional Law rested on the applicant and that he had not, in response to X’s refutation, established that the decisions concerning the programme content were taken in Sweden. Consequently, Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable in the case. The court further held that the material before it indicated that it was possible for the applicant to bring claims before a British court.
14.  The applicant appealed and referred to his earlier submissions. In addition, he requested that a question concerning the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. According to the applicant, the regulation entitled a person claiming non-contractual damages to bring actions where the harmful event occurred. In the present case, the harmful event had occurred in Sweden and the applicant thus should have had the right to bring his action before the Swedish courts. Consequently, the position hitherto taken by the Swedish courts ran contrary to Community law.
15.  On 21 September 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s referral request and refused leave to appeal in the case. It held that, since the District Court had found itself competent to examine the applicant’s claims in so far as they were based on grounds other than the Constitutional Law, there was no reason to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.
16.  The applicant subsequently withdrew his remaining claims before the District Court since there was no practical prospect of success in a continued procedure. On 17 November 2009 the District Court struck the case out of the list and ordered the applicant to pay X’s legal costs and expenses.
17.  Criminal proceedings were taken against the applicant in regard, inter alia, to the matters described in the television programme. He was convicted of aggravated fraud as well as tax and bookkeeping offences and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The criminal proceedings were finalised by a Supreme Court decision to refuse leave to appeal on 4 October 2010. These proceedings, in particular their compliance with Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, are the subject of an application lodged with the Court on 4 April 2011 (no. 32814/11).