5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Riga.
6.  On 5 November 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with large-scale smuggling of oil products and on 27 September 2005 the applicant was declared a suspect. On the latter date he appointed O.S. as his defence counsel.
7.  On 8 June 2006 charges were brought against the applicant and on 22 March 2007 he was issued with a full copy of his criminal case file. It consisted of more than 100 volumes and included – in volumes nos. 33 (64 pages) and 58 (194 pages) – transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with several individuals and also with O.S. (see paragraph 10 below).
8.  On 27 March 2007 the case material was sent for adjudication to the first‑instance court. On 9 June 2008 the first-instance court convicted the applicant of large-scale smuggling of oil products, aggravated forgery and money laundering in an organised group and sentenced him to imprisonment of five years and one month. The parties disagree as to whether or not the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with O.S. were used as evidence against him.
9.  On 23 September 2013 the appellate court quashed the first-instance court’s ruling and acquitted the applicant on all counts. In a final decision of 23 April 2014 the Supreme Court refused to institute proceedings on points of law.
10.  Over a period of time, the Constitution Protection Bureau (Satversmes aizsardzības birojs), which is one of the Latvian intelligence services, intercepted the applicant’s telephone conversations with several individuals, including O.S. Telephone conversations with the latter were recorded on 8 April, 22 and 27 May, 7 October 2005. Four pages of transcripts of those recordings were subsequently included in the evidence in the criminal case material against the applicant (see paragraph 7 above).
11.  The parties disagree as to when the applicant learned about those recordings. They also disagree as to whether O.S. was the applicant’s lawyer at the time of those recordings. According to the applicant, O.S. was his lawyer with effect from 8 February 2005. According to the Government, O.S. was the applicant’s acquaintance; he had become his lawyer only with effect from 27 September 2005, when the applicant appointed him as his defence counsel.
12.  According to a document (uzziņa) prepared by the Supreme Court on 27 June 2012 and addressed to the Government, on 26 November 2004 an operational measure – the interception of the applicant’s telephone conversations – had been authorised until 26 January 2005. The document was based on “the Supreme Court’s register of special proceedings (lietvedība) relating to classified State secrets for the year 2004, Volume 11, entry no 2‑4249s of 26 November 2004”. That document also contained further similar entries relating to subsequent authorisations on 25 January, 31 March, 1 June, 22 July, 20 September and 16 November 2005.
13.  On 27 June 2006 a prosecutor examined the applicant’s inquiry concerning the recording of his telephone conversations, referring to section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities (Operatīvās darbības likums). She informed him that a Supreme Court judge had authorised the measure in accordance with section 7(3) and 7(4) and section 17 of the Law on Operational Activities. She explained the legal regulation pertaining to the use of such recordings in criminal proceedings. She also referred to Article 8 of the Convention and the permissible limitations contained therein.
14.  On 13 October 2006 the same prosecutor examined a further complaint from the applicant concerning the lawfulness of the recordings. She stated that the interception had been carried out by the Constitutional Protection Bureau from December 2004 to January 2006. It had been done in accordance with domestic law on suspicion of large-scale tax evasion. Transcripts of the telephone conversations that had been of relevance for the criminal proceedings had been sent to the relevant authority (procesa virzītājs) and would be assessed in the context of those criminal proceedings.
15.  On 13 November 2006 the same prosecutor refused the applicant’s request to have sight of the decisions authorising the interception of his telephone conversations as they constituted classified information.
16.  On 21 December 2007 the applicant lodged another complaint with the prosecutor’s office concerning the fact that his telephone conversations with his lawyer had been intercepted and that the recordings of those conversations had been played back at a court hearing. The applicant argued that the investigating prosecutor, I.K., had been aware that these were conversations between him and his lawyer and that he had therefore violated domestic law. The applicant asked that the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s actions be examined and that it be decided whether he was suitable for his position. The applicant also called for criminal proceedings to be instituted against I.K.
17.  On 3 January 2008 a different prosecutor decided to refuse the institution of criminal proceedings against I.K.
18.  On 15 January 2008 the applicant appealed against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings and also complained that the reply of 3 January 2008 had not provided an answer to his request for evaluation of the lawfulness of I.K.’s actions and his suitability for the position of prosecutor. He relied on the relevant provisions of domestic law and Article 8 of the Convention.
19.  On 21 January 2008 a higher-ranking prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint. She argued that the applicant had not authorised O.S. to represent him in those criminal proceedings until 27 September 2005 and that the intercepted conversations prior to that date had therefore taken place between the applicant and O.S. as a citizen, not as a practising lawyer. As to the conversation of 7 October 2005, she pointed out that it was not the telephone conversations of O.S. that had been intercepted but those of the applicant, which had been duly authorised by a Supreme Court judge. A reference was made to the fact that the applicant’s complaint concerning the playing back of his telephone conversations at a court hearing had been examined by the first-instance court. Lastly, in rejecting the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, she referred to that Article and the permissible limitations contained therein. That decision included a note that it was final.