5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Vienna.
6.  M.K., the applicant’s son born in 1981, was taken to the Otto Wagner Hospital on 19 March 2010 suffering from an acute episode of paranoid schizophrenia. The Otto Wagner Hospital is a public institution of the City of Vienna specialising in neurology, orthopaedics, psychiatry and pulmonology. It is situated on a vast area outside the city center in the west of the green-belt of Vienna, consisting of some 26 hospital buildings with annexes, a church, a museum, a theatre and a large park.
7.  In a decision of 7 April 2010, the Fünfhaus District Court (Bezirksgericht) ordered M.K.’s involuntary placement in the psychiatric unit of that hospital pursuant to section 8 of the Hospitalisation Act (Unterbringungsgesetz).
8.  On 12 May 2010 M.K. failed to return from an authorised walk in the hospital grounds. He had escaped from the premises and died after jumping in front of a subway train.
9.  Subsequently, in August 2010 the applicant brought a civil action in the Vienna Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen) under the Official Liability Act (Amtshaftungsgesetz) against the City of Vienna (Stadt Wien) as the authority responsible for the hospital, seeking compensation of 20,000 euros (EUR) plus interest in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
10.  She stated that in 2006 and 2007 her son had already undergone inpatient treatment for paranoid schizophrenia at the Otto Wagner Hospital and the Vienna General Hospital (Allgemeines Krankenhaus Wien). Hospitalisation had been ordered on 19 March 2010 because M.K. had posed a danger both to himself and others. He had attacked a chewing gum dispenser with a sledgehammer and appeared to be utterly confused when the police arrived on the scene. The expert Dr P., who was called to assess M.K.’s mental state, diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia. Because of M.K.’s delusional behaviour, there was a risk that he would harm himself or others. The expert concluded that M.K.’s mental state required him to be placed in a closed psychiatric institution.
11.  However, on 25 and 29 March 2010 M.K. managed to escape from the closed ward of the Otto Wagner Hospital and was found and brought back only after a search conducted by the police and the hospital staff. On 12 May 2010 he escaped from the open ward to which he had been transferred in the meantime, and committed suicide by jumping in front of a subway train.
12.  The applicant claimed that she had suffered a massive shock as a result of her son’s death. Before his involuntary placement in the hospital, M.K. had lived with her in the same household and they had had a very close relationship. The applicant claimed that as a result of his death she had suffered from depression and insomnia and had been seeing a psychotherapist since June 2010. Nonetheless, her mental state had not improved since.
13.  The fact that her son had been able to escape from the hospital premises led the applicant to conclude that the hospital staff had acted negligently in the performance of their duties. Because M.K.’s behaviour had been unpredictable, he should have been under strict supervision. In the circumstances, and especially because he had managed to escape twice before, restriction of his freedom of movement within a closed ward was proportionate, necessary and adequate. Furthermore, such restriction should have included a degree of supervision by the hospital staff. The contract for M.K.’s treatment had included duties of protection and care. There had been signs of suicidal thoughts on the patient’s part, and the hospital staff should therefore have prevented him from leaving the ward. However, the necessary diligence had not been exercised. For these reasons, the applicant claimed that the City of Vienna had been at fault and was therefore responsible for the non-pecuniary damage she sustained.
14.  The City of Vienna asked the Vienna Regional Civil Court to dismiss the applicant’s claim. It argued that M.K.’s involuntary placement in the psychiatric institution on 19 March 2010 had been necessary as he had not been aware of his mental illness and had refused to be treated. At the time, he had been utterly confused and it had not been possible to reason with him. Because of the threat he posed to himself and others, he had repeatedly had his freedom of movement restricted whilst in hospital and had had to be medicated parenterally. On 25 March 2010 he had left the acute station without permission and went to his parents’ place. When the police and the ambulance brought him back to the hospital, he had had to be sedated intravenously because of the highly psychotic state he was in. On 29 March 2010, only four days later, he escaped again from the acute station, but was apprehended by the hospital’s security staff on the premises of the hospital. However, from 2 April 2010, M.K.’s attitude changed and he became willing to take oral medication. From that day on, his freedom of movement was no longer restricted. He had appeared well-adjusted and friendly. In view of the progress in his treatment, and as he appeared more reasonable and able to abide by agreements, he had been transferred from the acute station to the subacute ward on 20 April 2010. However, he had then succumbed to so‑called “dynamic exhaustion” (dynamische Entleerung), which manifested itself in a noticeable loss of drive and the desire for a quiet environment. The hospital staff had therefore tried to animate M.K. through occupational therapy and recreational walks in the hospital grounds, which − on the basis of a well-documented medical order − he had been allowed to take on his own as of 21 April 2010. This medical order had taken into account the fact that M.K. had twice before escaped from his ward. Thereafter, however, M.K. had continued to receive treatment for over three weeks and there had been a considerable improvement in his condition. Moreover, he had been made aware that he was not allowed to leave the hospital premises and had to notify the staff before going out for a walk and again upon his return. He had also been permitted to leave the building to smoke a cigarette. The hospital had maintained detailed documentary records of his medical treatment and progress. There had been no indication of suicidal thoughts. However, on 12 May 2010 at 5.15pm the doctor on duty was informed by the hospital staff that the applicant’s son had not returned from an authorised walk in the hospital grounds and had apparently taken his personal clothing with him. A search operation had immediately been initiated on the premises and at the same time the police had been asked to search for him. At approximately 9pm the police informed the hospital that M.K. had been killed in a subway train accident at around 4 pm.
15.  The City of Vienna submitted that under the provisions of the Hospitalisation Act and in keeping with current practice in the treatment of mentally ill patients, “open” psychiatry was the norm and restriction of a patient’s freedom of movement was permissible only in cases of absolute necessity and within the bounds of proportionality. In the present case, by 12 May 2010 restriction of the physical movement of the applicant’s son (known as “fixation”), and/or the spatial restriction of his movement to the confines of a psychiatric bed, or his permanent supervision, were no longer medically indicated, nor would such measures have been reasonable or adequate. On the contrary, the lack of any indication of suicidal thoughts on the part of M.K. would have rendered any further restriction of his freedom of movement unlawful under the Hospitalisation Act.
16.  During the oral hearing of 3 September 2012 the applicant reduced her claim to 15,000 EUR plus 4% interest per annum.
17.  On 30 November 2012 the Vienna Regional Civil Court granted the claim. It found that even shortly before his death on 12 May 2010, it could be assumed that M.K. still posed a threat to himself and others, in particular because he still suffered from the delusional idea that he was a different person and did not recognise his parents as his own. Self-harming behaviour could occur outside the hospital environment, due to overstimulation, even in patients who had shown progress after a psychosis. It was no longer possible to determine whether the applicant’s son had jumped in front of the subway train in order to deliberately commit suicide, or whether he followed a spontaneous impulse or a delusional thought to that end. In any event the hospital should have made sure that he was not able to leave the hospital grounds, even if therapeutic walks were medically indicated and permissible in the circumstances.
18.  From a legal perspective, the Regional Civil Court affirmed that, as the authority responsible for the Otto Wagner Hospital, the City of Vienna could be held accountable for any culpable action or omission by its organs or officials, pursuant to section 1 of the Official Liability Act. At the material time, the applicant’s son had been lawfully hospitalised by a decision of the Fünfhaus District Court of 7 April 2010, which remained valid until 21 May 2010. Sections 3 and 33 of the Hospitalisation Act in force at the time provided that, in cases where hospitalisation had been ordered, it was also necessary to guard against threats potentially posed by the patient. Accordingly, the hospital was obliged to ensure restriction of the patient’s freedom of movement in order to protect against potential damage. In the instant case, M.K. was allowed to take walks on the hospital premises because such walks were medically indicated. However, no measures were taken to ensure that he respected the restrictions on his freedom of movement. There was no effective supervision of his walks or their duration. By disregarding its duty of supervision, the hospital had implemented the Hospitalisation Act incorrectly. It was immaterial that the applicant’s son had not shown any signs of suicidal tendencies because the hospitalisation was originally effected because of the danger he posed to himself and to others. Therefore, even if he did not pose a threat to himself anymore, the requirement for hospitalisation was still valid because of the threat he posed to others. In the instant case, the lack of supervision of M.K. resulted in the applicant having to suffer the shock of the death of her son. The court concluded that the civil claim was justified and granted the applicant EUR 15,000 plus interest by way of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
19.  The City of Vienna appealed, claiming that the court had wrongly assessed the evidence, that its finding of facts was incorrect, and that it had wrongly interpreted the law.
20.  On 26 March 2013 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted the defendant’s appeal and dismissed the applicant’s claim. In its view, there had been no causal link between the wholly unexpected suicide of the applicant’s son and the alleged dereliction of the hospital’s duty of supervision under the Hospitalisation Act. Although it was stated in the hospital admission report that there was a danger of M.K.’s putting himself and others at risk due to his disoriented state, it was also explicitly mentioned that he had no suicidal thoughts. According to the expert opinion by Dr P of 25 May 2012, the continuation of M.K.’s hospitalisation on 12 May 2010 was indicated only because of the threat he posed to others, in particular to his mother, but no longer to himself. This was the reason why his freedom of movement at that point had been restricted to the hospital premises rather than just the closed ward. The court found that in the light of the improvement in his symptoms, it was not unusual that he had been allowed to take walks for therapeutic purposes, even if it might have been advisable to allow these walks only when accompanied by hospital staff.
21.  The Court of Appeal further affirmed that there had been no indication of self-harm during M.K.’s entire stay at the hospital. He had not voiced suicidal thoughts or undertaken any actions of a suicidal nature. It could not be established whether his jumping in front of the subway train was a suicide which he had planned even before he left the hospital premises, or whether it had been a spontaneous act of self-harm resulting from his psychosis. Naturally, M.K. would not have been able to commit suicide if he had been prevented from leaving the hospital grounds. Even with patients whose psychotic symptoms had improved, the phenomenon of overstimulation could occur if they left the therapeutic environment, whereas such a situation was much less likely to occur within the confines of a hospital. Section 3 § 1 of the Hospitalisation Act referred, as its purpose, only to the protection of the life and limb of the mental patient himself and third parties. The behaviour of M.K. had not been foreseeable because there had no longer been any indication of possible self-harm at the material time and his action was therefore not attributable to the hospital. The fact that the risk of self-harm could never be entirely excluded in the case of psychotic patients did not change this assessment.
22.  The applicant appealed, arguing that at the time when M.K. had committed suicide, the initial decision by the Fünfhaus District Court on his hospitalisation had still been valid and was based on the assessment that he posed a danger to himself and others because of his paranoid schizophrenia. No new expert opinion had been obtained, and the hospital had not informed the guardianship court (Pflegschaftsgericht) that the threat of self‑harm had ceased to exist. Consequently, the medical indication would still have been a restriction of M.K.’s freedom of movement. By failing to restrict his movement, the hospital had acted contrary to the court decision ordering his hospitalisation.
23.  On 18 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, upholding the legal and factual findings of the Court of Appeal. It added that a lawful implementation of the Hospitalisation Act was possible both inside and outside a closed ward. M.K.’s hospitalisation had therefore not been unlawful, even though he had been placed in the open ward from 20 April 2010. Contrary to the applicant’s line of argumentation, the Otto Wagner Hospital had not had a duty to implement the Fünfhaus District Court’s decision on M.K.’s hospitalisation in a manner which compelled it to restrict his movement. This followed from section 32 of the Hospitalisation Act – according to which a hospitalisation order could be lifted at any time by the head of the institution – and section 33, which stated that restriction of movement was permissible in limited cases only. The District Court’s decision had not defined the extent or duration of any specific restriction of movement. Section 33 of the Hospitalisation Act provided that a restriction of freedom of movement might only be used as an exceptional measure and “last resort”. Also, Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention restricted the permissibility of isolating mentally ill patients. Even within a closed ward, mentally ill patients had to have the widest possible amount of freedom of movement. Only the more restrictive measures under section 33 of the Hospitalisation Act were subject to judicial review.
24.  The Supreme Court also stated that from a therapeutic perspective M.K. had been allowed to take unaccompanied walks because of the improvement in his condition. Moreover, from the time he had been authorised to take these walks, he had always returned without problems. This measure, which had been ordered by the psychiatrist treating him, had therefore been proportionate and necessary pursuant to section 33 of the Hospitalisation Act. In conclusion, the hospital had not acted culpably, for which reason the applicant’s claim under the Official Liability Act was not justified.