5.  The applicants’ names, dates of birth and places of residence may be found in the Annex.
6.  From the 1950s/60s to early 2000, the applicants in applications nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11 were full-time employees at the Malta Drydocks Corporation (the MDC), a state-owned enterprise (1968-2003). The applicants in application no. 62338/11 are the wife and children of Mr Attard, who also worked at Malta Drydocks during the same period (having started in 1959) but left in 1974 to take up managerial duties with the Malta Trade Fair Corporation, where he was no longer exposed to asbestos.
7.  According to the applicants, the applicants in applications nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11 and Mr Attard had been constantly and intensively exposed to asbestos during their employment. Asbestos in its various forms was one of the substances kept in stock in Malta Drydocks’ storerooms and ships incorporating asbestos as part of their structure regularly entered the docks (or ship repair yard) and were repaired there by workers. Repairs included breaking apart the asbestos casing that was used for insulation purposes, thereby releasing the particles into the surrounding air. Once a machine was repaired, it had to be reinsulated using asbestos retrieved from the store-rooms. Such repairs were carried out both on the ships themselves and in the MDC’s workshops.
8.  The applicants contended that asbestos particles would settle on the workers’ clothing and be carried around in this way, with the result that it could also affect the lives of their family members, creating further anguish and affecting their private and family life.
9.  In the 1960s, Malta became a member of the International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) (see “Relevant domestic law and international standards” below) and of the World Health Organisation (“WHO”), both organisations having been raising awareness regarding the dangers of asbestos since the 1950s. At the time, however, the employees of MDC had been neither informed about nor protected from the dangers of asbestos in any way. The Government disagreed with the applicants’ assertion that international organisations had raised awareness of the dangers of asbestos in the 1960s, noting that the ILO Asbestos Convention had been concluded in 1986 and that the WHO had issued its guidelines much later than the 1960s.
10.  The first publicly available – though not publicly disseminated – information concerning the fatal consequences of asbestos at MDC appears to be the judicial acts and judgment relating to a lawsuit brought in the names of Mary Pellicano proprio et nomine vs Francis Spiteri nomine, concerning the deceased Paul Pellicano (erroneously referred to by the parties as Joseph Pellicano) who died from asbestosis in 1979. In that case, in a judgment of 30 August 1989, the then Commercial Court established MDC’s responsibility for the death of Paul Pellicano and awarded (in a separate decision of 27 June 1990) damages under Maltese law consisting of lucrum cessans and damnum emergens (see also “Relevant domestic law” below).
11.  No action was taken following that judgment save that employees were assured that adequate ventilation and the wearing of fabric masks would protect them from asbestos.
12.  Mr Attard died in 2006, aged sixty-one, as a result of a malignant cancer linked to exposure to asbestos (mesothelioma).  Following the death of a number of their colleagues, the applicants in applications nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11 underwent medical tests, which were performed again in 2012 in the context of proceedings before the Court. With the exception of the case of Mr Dyer, most of the X-rays revealed bilateral pleural plaques (extensive in some cases) compatible with asbestos exposure. The X-rays of some of the applicants also revealed pleural thickening, reticulo-nodular interstitial parenchymal texture in the lungs, and in some cases also pulmonary fibrosis, all of which are consistent with asbestosis. The results suggested that there was a strong probability of the presence of asbestos fibres in their stomach lining, as well as in other digestive organs. Moreover, apart from the physical difficulties such as exercise intolerance that were mainly related to respiratory problems, the presence of asbestos in their bodies made them prone to malignant mesothelioma, as was the case with Mr Attard, abovementioned. From the medical data it was also apparent that the applicants had no pleural effusions and that their lungs were clear, with no filtrates or nodules, and their hearts, hila and upper mediastina were also normal. Most of the applicants are non‑smokers.
13.  In particular, Mr John Mary Abela has been confined to bed for years as a result of his acute respiratory problems and can only breathe via oxygen cylinders that further reduce his mobility. Mr Dyer’s medical results did not show evidence of asbestos-related disease.
14.  On 7 May 2009 these applicants instituted separate constitutional redress proceedings, complaining of a violation of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention in that the State had failed to protect them from unnecessary risks to their health, which also constituted inhuman treatment and an interference with their private and family life. They asked the court to quantify a fair amount of compensation for the breach of the aforementioned rights, to liquidate that amount, and to order that this pecuniary redress be paid individually to the applicants (“Tikwantifika kumpens xieraq bħala rimedju għal ksur tad-drittijiet fuq indikati jew mil-liema minnhom, tillikwida dan l-ammont, u tordna li dan ir-rimedju pekunjarju jithallas individwalment lir-rikorenti”).
15.  In reply to the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of ordinary domestic remedies in the domestic proceedings the applicants in question maintained that under Maltese law the ordinary civil remedies available did not apply to non-pecuniary damage (known in the domestic system as “moral damage”), but solely to pecuniary damage; they claimed that these types of damage were independent of each other.
16.  In four separate but almost identical judgments of 30 November 2010 the first-instance constitutional jurisdiction – namely, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction – declined to exercise its powers under the Constitution and under the European Convention Act and discharged the defendants ab observantia iudicii thereby in effect dismissing the applications on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary domestic remedies. That court held that the applicants should have instituted a civil action for damages arising out of tort or contractual liability. It considered that according to the Court’s case-law, namely Zavoloka v. Latvia (no. 58447/00, § 40, 7 July 2009), there was no general or absolute obligation on States to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage in such cases.
17.  By four judgments of 11 April 2011 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance decisions. It considered that the Government, as an employer, could be sued under civil law for their failings. It held in effect that the fact that such failings were also of a constitutional nature did not in itself mean that they could not be pursued through ordinary civil proceedings. It also held that a person could not allow the time within which to bring an ordinary civil action to expire and then resort to constitutional proceedings as a remedy in extremis. The court considered that constitutional redress proceedings could be instituted only after the applicants had instituted civil proceedings and if, after a final judgment, they still felt that the breaches of their rights had not been adequately redressed. It held that given that neither the Convention nor national law provided for compensation for non-pecuniary damage in such cases, the ordinary remedy would have been effective. In any event, according to the court, in their constitutional application, the applicants made no specific mention of non-pecuniary or moral damage, having claimed compensation for pecuniary damage only.
18.  On 19 April 2010 these applicants, who are the heirs of the deceased Mr Attard, also instituted proceedings, complaining of a violation of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention.
19.  In reply to the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of ordinary domestic remedies in the domestic proceedings, the applicants submitted that under Maltese law the ordinary civil remedies available did not provide for non-pecuniary damage but only for pecuniary damage; they claimed that these types of damage were independent of each other.
20.  By a judgment of 30 September 2010 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction declined to exercise its powers under the Constitution and under the European Convention Act and discharged the defendants ab observantia iudicii, thereby in effect dismissing the claims of the applicants on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In its analysis of the principles governing the exercise of the above-mentioned powers under the Constitution and the European Convention Act, the court noted, inter alia, that the failure to pursue ordinary remedies by an applicant was not in itself a sufficient reason for a court of constitutional jurisdiction to decline to exercise its powers if it could be shown that the ordinary means could not provide a complete remedy. It also held that the decision to decline or otherwise to exercise such powers was to be exercised with prudence, so that where it appears that there is a serious violation of fundamental human rights or even where there is likely to be the violation of such rights, then the court should lean towards exercising its powers. Nevertheless, it considered that what the applicants were ultimately requesting was a sum of money by way of damages. Given that ordinary remedies under the Civil Code could have resulted in an award of monetary compensation, the applicants should have pursued those remedies before instituting constitutional redress proceedings.
21.  In a judgment of 11 April 2011 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance decision for substantially the same reason indicated in paragraph 17 above.