6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Gödöllő.
7.  In November 1991 the applicant took up the position of pastor in the Hungarian Calvinist Church (Magyar Református Egyház). As of December 2003, he served in the parish of Gödöllő. His rights and obligations as well as his remuneration were set out in an appointment letter (lelkészi díjlevél) issued by the parish presbyters.
8.  On 22 June 2005 the applicant was informed that disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against him for stating in a local newspaper that State subsidies had been paid unlawfully to a Calvinist boarding school. Meanwhile, on 21 June 2005 the first-instance ecclesiastical court had suspended the applicant’s service with immediate effect until a decision on the merits, for a maximum of sixty days. The applicant received a letter stating that he was entitled, under section 82(1) of Statute no. I of 2000 of the Hungarian Calvinist Church, to 50% of his service allowance during the period of his suspension.
9.  On 27 September 2005 the first-instance ecclesiastical court removed the applicant from service, as a disciplinary measure. On an unspecified date, the second-instance ecclesiastical court upheld that decision and terminated the applicant’s service with effect from 1 May 2006.
10.  On 26 June 2006 the applicant took his case to the Pest County Labour Court, seeking the payment of 50% of his service allowance and other benefits to which, in his view, he should have been entitled during the period of his suspension. Arguing that his suspension had reached its statutory maximum duration on 21 October 2005, he also sought the payment of the whole service allowance from that date until the termination of his service, that is, 30 April 2006. He argued in substance that his ecclesiastical service was analogous to employment, referring to tax rules to that effect (see paragraph 20 below).
11.  On 22 December 2006 the Labour Court discontinued (megszüntette) the proceedings, holding that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the applicant’s claim. It considered that under section 2(3) of Statute no. I of 2000 of the Hungarian Calvinist Church, pastors’ service with the Church was regulated by ecclesiastical rules, whereas laymen’s employment with the Church was governed by the State’s Labour Code. Accordingly, since the dispute before it concerned the applicant’s service as a pastor, the provisions of the Labour Code were not applicable in the case, and there existed no judicial avenue before the State courts to decide on his claims.
The Pest County Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal on 27 April 2007. The applicant did not apply for a review to the Supreme Court.
12.  On 10 September 2007 the applicant lodged a civil-law claim against the Hungarian Calvinist Church. His claim was based in the first place on sections 277(1) and 478(1) of the [old] Civil Code and on the agency contract he had allegedly concluded with the Church. He maintained that for the period from 21 October 2005 (that is, the date when the suspension allegedly became unlawful) until 30 April 2006 (that is, the date of termination of his appointment) he was entitled to a fee for his services, which corresponded to the service allowance set out in his appointment letter. He thus sought enforcement of the contract. Alternatively, he based his claim on sections 318(1) and 339(1) of the [old] Civil Code and on the breach by the Church of its contractual obligations under the agency contract. He argued that by not paying him the allowance due for the period between 21 October 2005 and 30 April 2006, the Church had failed to fulfil its contractual obligations. He thus claimed damages, amounting to the loss of service allowances to which he would have been entitled under the contract for the above-mentioned period.
13.  The Pest Central District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim on the grounds that no contractual relationship had been established between the parties under civil law. In the court’s view, the claim had no basis in civil law. It therefore did not embark on an assessment of the applicant’s secondary claims, such as liability for breach of contract or recognition of debt.
14.  The Budapest Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision on appeal, reasoning that the Hungarian Calvinist Church had no standing in the proceedings, since the applicant had been appointed by the parish of Gödöllő, a separate legal entity.
15.  The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court. By its decision of 28 May 2009, the Supreme Court quashed the final decision and discontinued (megszüntette) the proceedings. It stated as follows:
“... In order to determine the rules applicable to the agreement (megállapodás) in question and to the implementation of the rights and obligations arising from it, it is necessary to have regard to the very purpose of the agreement underlying the plaintiff’s actual claim as well as the elements thereof defining the parties’ rights and obligations. The first-instance court rightly stated in its assessment that the agreement serving as the basis of the applicant’s claim was not an agency contract regulated by civil law or concluded by and between parties enjoying personal autonomy in the marketing of [goods and services]. The plaintiff was appointed as a pastor in an ecclesiastical procedure, and the obligations of the respondent were defined in an appointment letter by the assembly of presbyters. The parties established between themselves a pastoral service relationship, regulated by ecclesiastical law.
Under section 15(1) of Act no. IV of 1990 on Freedom of Conscience and Religion and on Churches, the Church is separated from the State. Under sub-section (2), no State coercion can be used to enforce the internal laws and regulations of Churches.
Relying on the above provisions, the applicant can make a claim under the ecclesiastical law before the relevant bodies of the Calvinist Church. The fact that the agreement concluded under ecclesiastical law resembles a contractual agreement under the Civil Code does not prompt State jurisdiction or the enforceability of the claim in a judicial procedure within the meaning of section 7 of the Civil Code. (In the given case the basic elements of an agency contract and the conclusion of such a contract could not be established either.)
The labour court reached the same conclusion in the earlier proceedings when assessing the claim under the State labour law and dismissing its enforcement in judicial proceedings.
The first-instance court was right to point out that as the impugned agreement lacked a civil-law legal basis, the court could not examine the applicant’s secondary claim (compensation for breach of contract). On the basis of the reasoning above, there were no grounds to adjudicate on the claim on the merits.
The Supreme Court accordingly quashes the final judgment, including the first‑instance judgment, and discontinues the proceedings under sections 130(1) (a) and 157 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure...”
This decision was served on the applicant at some point in time after 9 July 2009.