8.  The first and the second applicant, Lomaseita Oy and CPT Data Oy, are limited liability companies. The third applicant, Mrs Kaisaleena Laaksonen was born in 1947 and lives in Espoo.
9.  In 1987, the third applicant founded a company called CPT Informations Systems Oy (“CPT IS” hereinafter) together with two others. On 20 October 1993 the company was ordered to be wound-up.
10.  The official receiver of the estate of CPT IS, P., a lawyer practising in Helsinki and a member of the Finnish Bar Association, instituted civil proceedings against the third applicant and the applicant companies, which are at least partly owned by the third applicant. In the proceedings before the District Court of Espoo (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten), P. requested that assets allegedly transferred from CPT IS to the applicants before the winding-up order was issued be returned to its estate.
11.  On 31 January 1996, the District Court found partly in favour of the estate insofar as the first and second applicants were concerned and as a whole in favour of the estate in so far as the third applicant was concerned.
12.  All the parties to the proceedings appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) and subsequently submitted their observations in reply. After the relevant time-limit for appeal had elapsed, the estate on two occasions in August 1997 submitted additional documentary material to the Court of Appeal, requesting that it be taken into account.
13.  By its judgment of 23 December 1997 the Court of Appeal found in favour of the estate. Insofar as the additional material submitted by the estate after the time-limit for appeal had elapsed was concerned, the Court of Appeal stated as follows:
“The Court of Appeal has not found any such particular reason as prescribed by chapter 26, section 5 (1) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken) to take into account the additional submissions with enclosures submitted by the estate after the relevant time-limit set for the appeal had elapsed. Therefore, they are not taken into account and, accordingly, the [estate’s] request for an oral hearing is rejected.”
14.  On 18 June 1998 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal.
15.  Having received the Supreme Court’s decision, the applicants’ representative at the time requested copies of all the relevant documents from the Court of Appeal. He found out that, despite what was said in the Court of Appeal’s judgment about the additional submissions by the estate after the relevant time-limit for appeal had elapsed, the judicial secretary (hovioikeudenviskaali, hovrättsfiskal) of the Court of Appeal had made 71 remarks to the submissions in question and as many as 161 remarks to an enclosure, an inspection report drafted by the National Bureau of Investigation (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen).
16.  On 30 November 1998, the applicants requested that the Supreme Court reopen the proceedings, claiming that they had been denied a fair trial before the Court of Appeal as the estate’s submissions, which had clearly been relevant and which had been taken into account even though there was a statement to the contrary in the Court of Appeal’s judgment, had not been communicated to them. They also noted that it appeared from the invoice concerning the estate’s legal costs included in the court file, that P. had consulted the Court of Appeal’s judicial secretary several times during the proceedings. In this respect, the applicants complained that they had not been informed of any such discussions.
17.  By its decision of 31 January 2001 the Supreme Court refused to reopen the proceedings. Insofar as the second applicant was concerned, the Supreme Court gave the following reasons:
“In the present case, the Court of Appeal decided not to take the new submissions into account. Under the provisions of law cited above [chapter 26, sections 5 and 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure], the Court of Appeal did not therefore need to inform the other parties of the said submissions. The new submissions in question were, however, of such relevance for the issue at stake that, although there were no mandatory provisions of law to that effect, it might have been appropriate in those circumstances to communicate the submissions to the adverse parties.
The decision-making before the Court of Appeal depended on both judicial argumentation and evaluation of evidence. The Court of Appeal reached its conclusions on the basis of the material submitted to the District Court and the material in the appeal documents and the observations in reply. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal gave an account of the grounds on which it reached its conclusions. Neither the judgment nor the other documents in the file give any reason to conclude that the additional submissions by the estate after the time-limit for appeal had elapsed have de facto, and contrary to the wording of the judgment, affected the outcome of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, as alleged by the company. Thus, there is no proof of such a procedural error as could be assumed to have affected the outcome of the proceedings and as would make it necessary or possible to annul the judgment under chapter 31, section 1 (4) of the Code of Judicial Procedure. ...”
18.  The Supreme Court also rejected the annulment requests by the first and third applicants on the ground that the said police inspection report had been submitted to the Court of Appeal only in support of the estate’s appeal in respect of the second applicant. Nothing indicated that the inspection report had de facto affected the outcome of the judgment.
19.  However, the decision of the Supreme Court was not unanimous, as one of the judges in his dissenting opinion stated the following:
“One of the basic principles of court proceedings is that all relevant material submitted to the court and which may have a bearing on the outcome of the case, shall be communicated to the parties (Supreme Court’s decision No. 1995:95). According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, Werner v. Austria, Kuopila v. Finland) it is up to each party to decide whether the material is such that it may affect the case and, whether it calls for the party to comment on it. A court’s view that a submission or a statement has no bearing on the outcome of the case does not therefore automatically justify the non-communication of such material to a party. Such a justification cannot be drawn from chapter 26, section 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, which concerns requesting written observations.
The estate of CPT Information Systems Oy submitted to the Court of Appeal, after the time-limit for appeal had elapsed, a supplementary police report, drafted by the Economic Offences Department of the police, together with an additional legal submission. The estate considered the material to be relevant to the case, requesting that it be taken into account in the decision-making. In the alternative, it requested that an oral hearing be held in order to call as a witness the person who had drafted the report. It is clear from the case-file that the official receiver and the judicial secretary of the Court of Appeal several times discussed over the telephone the submission of the additional material and apparently about the timetable of the proceedings. The occurrence of numerous remarks in the police report and the submission indicate that the material was at least not regarded as manifestly irrelevant. Based on general experience, economic reports, which have been drafted in an official capacity, are usually of relevance in cases concerning recovery of assets. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal revoked the District Court’s judgment, accepting the essential parts of the estate’s claims.
Under these circumstances, a fair trial would have required that the parties be informed, during the proceedings, of the additional material submitted by the estate as well as of the discussions concerning the schedule of the proceedings. I find that the Court of Appeal proceedings, in which one of the essential legal principles was disregarded, amounts to a procedural error within the meaning of chapter 31, section 1 (4) of the Code of Judicial Procedure. Therefore, the judgment must be annulled and the case returned to the Court of Appeal for re-examination. Having regard to the contents of the supplementary police report, this has to be done in respect of all three applicants. ...”
20.  Meanwhile on 13 December 1999, the first and third applicants complained to the Chancellor of Justice (oikeuskansleri, justitiekanslern) about the conduct of the official receiver, P., as he had allegedly knowingly given incorrect information to the Court of Appeal in a submission on behalf of the estate during the above-mentioned proceedings. The Chancellor of Justice transferred the complaint to the Finnish Bar Association. On 23 February 2001, the Bar Association Disciplinary Board admonished P. The Disciplinary Board found, inter alia, that P. had not corrected a piece of information he had submitted to the Court of Appeal on 24 April 1996, even though he had subsequently learned, on 29 August 1997, that the information was not true.