5.  The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Szczytno.
6.  On 15 December 1946 the applicant’s parents’ house and farm were destroyed and burned down by the Security Office (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa) in the framework of a campaign against anti-communist resistance to which the applicant, his father and his brother belonged. Subsequently, his father and brother were convicted and prison sentences were imposed on them.
7.  In 1993 the applicant’s brother requested that the decisions given in his criminal case be declared null and void on the strength of the Law of 23 February 1991 on annulment of convictions of persons persecuted for activities aimed at achieving independence for Poland (Ustawa o uznaniu za nieważne orzeczeń wydanych wobec osób represjonowanych za działalność na rzecz niepodległego bytu Państwa Polskiego – “the 1991 Act”, see paragraphs 32 and 33 below). After six years of proceedings, a decision in the applicant’s brother’s favour was ultimately given in 1999.
8.  On 31 January 2003 the applicant and his siblings filed a civil claim against the State Treasury with the Ostrołęka Regional Court. They claimed compensation for the destruction of their parents’ farm.
9.  During the proceedings the State Treasury raised an objection of prescription against the compensation claim.
10.  On 11 February 2004 the first-instance court held that the claim against the State Treasury was time-barred and dismissed the claim. The court observed that it was not in dispute that the farm had been burned to the ground by agents of the Security Office in the circumstances described by the plaintiffs. It further accepted that it had been a Stalinist crime. It was also an event which could give rise to the State’s liability in tort. The court confirmed that the applicant’s brother and father had subsequently been imprisoned.
11.  The court went on to state that the State Liability Act (ustawa o odpowiedzialności Państwa za szkody wyrządzone przez funkcjonariuszów państwowych) adopted on 15 November 1956 (“the 1956 Act”) had had the specific purpose of creating a special legal framework making it possible for victims of Stalinist crimes to seek redress for damage they had suffered. It provided for a one-year time-limit for submitting relevant compensation claims (see paragraph 26 below). That time-limit had started to run on 28 November 1956, the date of publication of the 1956 Act.
12.  The court further referred to a resolution given by the Supreme Court (III CZP 76/96, 11 October 1997; see paragraph 35 below). The Supreme Court had acknowledged that for general political reasons it might have been impossible for the victims to vindicate compensation claims in respect of Stalinist crimes having been committed before 4 June 1989, the date on which the first partially-free elections to parliament had been held and in respect of which it has been widely accepted that it had marked the collapse of the communist regime. Before that date victims of Stalinist persecution and also victims of later persecution against the State’s political opponents could legitimately fear that bringing such cases before the courts would provoke the State’s ire. Hence, it could be accepted that the one‑year time‑limit fixed by the provisions of the 1956 Act could be said to have started to run only on 4 June 1989. However, as the applicant had brought his case to the courts in 2003, his claim was time‑barred.
13.  The court further held that the provisions of the Civil Code adopted in 1964 governing the State Treasury’s liability in tort provided for a three‑year time-limit. However, they were not applicable in the applicant’s case because compensation claims for Stalinist crimes were governed by the special liability regime created by the 1956 Act.
14.  The court further observed that it was also possible to accept that the one-year time-limit, fixed by the provisions of the 1956 Act, should be understood as having started to run only from the date on which the plaintiffs had obtained the 1999 judicial decision confirming that the applicant’s family had been the victims of political repression. It could not be excluded that it had been only after that judgment that they had realised that their attempts to seek compensation for the damage suffered in 1946 and later years were not doomed to fail. However, their civil claim had been lodged with the court more than three years later.
15.  The court further held that the State Treasury’s objection that the claim was time-barred did not amount to an abuse of rights within the meaning of Article 5 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 38 below).
16.  The applicant, represented by a legal-aid lawyer, appealed. He submitted, inter alia, that given the particular factual and historical context of the case, the court had erred in holding that the State Treasury’s objection of prescription should not be seen as an abuse of rights within the meaning of Article 5 of the Civil Code. He stressed that it was not in dispute that the applicant and his family had been victims of political repression by the totalitarian regime. The destruction of the farm by the communist secret police had not been disputed. Hence, the objection made by the State, which had resulted in the applicant’s claim failing, had to be seen as an abuse of rights incompatible with the “principles of social co-existence”. It was precisely that objection, dictated by the fiscal interests of the State, which had made it possible for the State to leave people seriously wronged in the past by its own agents without any compensation for its use of violence and for manifest and undisputed damage wrought for political reasons.
17.  The judgment was upheld on 25 November 2005 by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. That court approved the findings of fact made by the lower court as to the destruction of the applicant’s parents’ farm and the imprisonment of the applicant’s family members. However, it also accepted the lower court’s conclusion that the compensation claim was time-barred. It concurred that the events giving rise to the damage, which were not in dispute, were governed as to the issue of liability by the special regime created in respect of Stalinist crimes by the 1956 Act. It further agreed that in the conditions of a non-democratic regime the running of the time-limit could be considered to have been stayed until the collapse of communism in 1989.
The court further noted that the 1991 Act had not been applicable to the applicant’s civil case because it only concerned matters arising in connection with wrongful and politically-motivated criminal convictions handed down by the Stalinist authorities. It could only be resorted to in order to have criminal convictions declared null and void, but was not applicable in the context of civil cases and compensation claims.
18.  The court endorsed the conclusions of the lower court, relying on the same resolution of the Supreme Court. It observed that even if the time‑limit was considered as having started to run in 1989, the claim also had to be declared time-barred.
19.  The court further shared the conclusions of the lower court that the State Treasury had had the right to submit the objection of prescription and that such an objection in the applicant’s case had not amounted to a breach of Article 5 of the Civil Code, in so far as that provision prohibited abuse of one’s civil rights to the detriment of other persons.
20.  On 26 November 2005 the applicant requested the Warsaw Court of Appeal to prepare written grounds for its judgment and announced his intention to lodge a cassation appeal against it.
21.  On 29 December 2005 the applicant requested the Warsaw Court of Appeal to grant him legal aid for the purposes of lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.
22.  On 14 February 2006 the Court of Appeal served the judgment, with its written grounds on the applicant’s privately hired lawyer, who had apparently replaced the legal-aid lawyer representing the applicant earlier. On 16 February 2006 that lawyer informed the applicant that he had thirty days to lodge a cassation appeal. At that time, the relevant time‑limit was in fact sixty days (see paragraph 41 below). It was therefore due to expire on 14 April 2006.
23.  On 27 February 2006 the court allowed the applicant’s request to be granted legal aid for the purposes of the proceedings before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 21 above).
24.  On 3 March 2006 O.Z., the lawyer assigned to the applicant’s case under the legal-aid scheme, was informed that she had been assigned to the case.
25.  In her written opinion of 7 April 2006 O.Z. explained to the applicant why she considered that there were no grounds on which a cassation appeal could be based and refused to prepare such an appeal on the applicant’s behalf.