5.  The applicant, Mr Matthew O’Donnell, is an Irish national who was born in 1980. He is currently detained at HMP Maghaberry.
6.  The applicant has an I.Q. of 62, which is within the bottom 1% of the general population. He has an understanding of spoken English equivalent to that of a six year-old child.
7.  On the morning of 13 October 2004, the body of Mr Williamson was found on the banks of the Blackwater River in County Tyrone.
8.  The applicant had spent most of the previous day drinking in public with the deceased and a third man, Mr Samuel Houston. There was evidence from witnesses that both Mr Houston and the applicant had been threatening and aggressive towards a number of individuals including the deceased. One witness also stated that, when Mr Houston produced a knife and said he was going to kill the deceased, the applicant encouraged him to “just kill him”. There was also evidence that the applicant and Mr Houston asked the deceased to come out to fight with them after they had been refused admission to a public house.
9.  The deceased was last seen alive at around 1:30 a.m. on 13 October 2004 when he, Mr Houston and the applicant were seen making their way to a park area beside the Blackwater River. A post-mortem examination of the deceased revealed that he had been extensively beaten before his death and that he had sustained a number of knife wounds including a severance of the carotid artery.
10.  The police searched the flat where the applicant was staying and found two sets of clothes which were heavily stained with the blood of the deceased (two sets of sweatshirts, a pair of blue jeans and pair of beige and navy tracksuit bottoms). The fact that two sets of clothes were found was material to the prosecution’s case that Mr Williamson was killed by two men. One of the items of clothing, namely the beige and navy tracksuit bottoms, had the applicant’s name tag ironed on to the back of the garment. A plastic bag containing a knife was also found at the applicant’s premises. The plastic bag and the knife contained blood which matched the blood of the deceased. Medical evidence indicated that the knife was one that could have been used to inflict the wounds sustained by the deceased.
11.  Mr Houston admitted the manslaughter of Mr Williamson and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.
12.  The applicant was arrested in the Republic of Ireland. He was interviewed by Irish police officers about the death of Mr Williamson. Those interviews were videotaped. He was subsequently extradited to Northern Ireland in April 2007.
13.  At the applicant’s trial, the prosecution sought to rely on the interviews which had been conducted in the Republic of Ireland. The applicant challenged the admissibility of those interviews, inter alia on the ground that the proper procedures for interviewing a suspect with a mental handicap had not been followed. A voir dire (that is to say, a hearing to determine the admissibility of the contested evidence) was held, in the course of which evidence was led from clinical psychologists and psychiatrists who had examined the applicant and watched the interview tapes. At the conclusion of the voir dire, the trial judge decided to exclude the interviews from evidence.
14.  At the close of the prosecution case, the trial judge rejected a defence submission that there was no case to answer.
15.  The defence then applied to the trial judge for a ruling that the applicant’s mental condition made it undesirable for him to be called to give evidence. The effect of a favourable ruling would have been that the jury would not be permitted to draw an adverse inference from any failure of the applicant to give evidence in his own defence (see 28 below). In the course of the trial judge’s consideration of that application, a second voir dire was held, in which further evidence was given by one of the clinical psychologists, Dr Davies. The trial judge refused to allow Dr Davies to give evidence concerning the conclusions he had reached from watching the interview tapes. The trial judge reasoned that, once the interview tapes were excluded from evidence, they were excluded from evidence for all purposes. The trial judge did, however, hear evidence from Dr Davies as to his concern that the applicant’s low I.Q. would place him in considerable difficulty if he were to give evidence in his defence. In Dr Davies’ view, the applicant would be highly suggestible, he would have problems understanding questions and would find it difficult to give coherent responses.
16.  In considering the defence application, the trial judge referred to the evidence of Dr Kennedy, consultant psychiatrist. The trial judge read out three passages of her report, the last which was the following:
“He [the applicant] reports having had difficulty in comprehending court proceedings in the past as long words are used and people talk at speed. However, if account is taken of his need to have material simply phrased and to allow for adequate consultation with others to ascertain his understanding and clarify where necessary, it is my opinion that he should be capable of following proceedings and actively contributing to them.”
17.  Turning to Dr Davies’ evidence, the trial judge noted that Dr Davies had entered a significant reservation in relation to the applicant’s ability to give evidence. Dr Davies had expressed doubts as to whether even in circumstances such as those referred to by Dr Kennedy the applicant could give a coherent account.
18.  The trial judge refused the defence application, finding that he could control the manner in which questions would be asked and could ensure that no unfairness would result. In the event that the applicant chose not to give evidence the judge informed the parties that he would give an adverse inference direction to the jury.
19.  The applicant elected not to testify but Dr Davies was permitted to give evidence to the jury as to the applicant’s vulnerability and the difficulties he would have faced.
20.  The prosecution invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the applicant’s failure to give evidence. The trial judge’s summing up contained the following direction to the jury:
“I have said to you that the defendant has not given evidence and that is his right. He is entitled not to give evidence, to remain silent and to make the prosecution prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Two matters arise from his not giving evidence. The first is that you try this case according to the evidence. You will appreciate that the defendant has not given evidence at this trial to undermine, contradict or explain the evidence put before you by the prosecution. The second matter, as you heard him being told when I addressed Mr McGrory [counsel for the applicant], is that the law is that you may draw such inferences as appear proper from his failure to give evidence. It is for you to decide whether it is proper to hold the defendant’s failure to give evidence against him when deciding whether he is guilty. On the basis of the evidence of Dr Davies, Mr McGrory invites you not to hold it against the defendant that he has not given evidence before you. Dr Davies’s contradicted evidence is that the defendant has an IQ of 62 and therefore is a person of very limited intellectual ability who should be regarded as mentally handicapped. He has the ability of a six year-old to understand spoken English. Dr Davies said that mentally handicapped people find giving evidence very challenging and his ability to provide a coherent and consistent account and to understand the implications of his replies is limited. Dr Davies said that he seems to have difficulty in functioning as an average person and has difficulty in maintaining relationships, keeping a job and performing everyday tasks such as looking after money.
Dr Davies’s evidence about the accused and the abilities of mentally handicapped people in general about which I have just reminded you is an important factor to bear in mind, but there are others that you should bear in mind and consider as well. There is no evidence that the defendant is not fit to stand his trial; in other words, it has not been suggested that he cannot understand questions, nor has it been suggested that he cannot instruct his legal advisers as to the nature of his case. It has not been suggested that he is unable to remember what happened that night, indeed, Dr Davies did not ask him to recall the events of that night, so you do not know from what Dr Davies has said to what extent the defendant can explain what he did or where he went, indeed, when he was charged with Mr Williamson’s death he replied, ‘I didn’t go near him’, not, ‘I don’t know anything about it’, or, ‘I didn’t have anything to do with it.’ You have to consider along with many other questions you have to consider whether the answer he gave is not merely a denial of guilt, which it plainly is, but whether it implies that he knows something about the circumstances of Mr Williamson’s death.
You should also consider whether the defendant, despite his undoubted handicaps, his low IQ and limited comprehension of English, could have answered questions in the witness box. I say that because Mr McGrory said in his closing remarks to you, ‘What chance would a man like that have in proceedings like this?’ I must tell you that the defence were well aware that had the defendant given evidence the court would have ensured he was treated fairly and given every chance to put his case and in particular that questions were simply phrased and put in such a way that they did not suggest the answer to him. It is not enough that a person would find it difficult to give evidence to excuse them from giving evidence. Many people have to give evidence and find it difficult - even children as young as six. Fortunately, we do not have that very often but it does happen sometimes. Every effort is made to simplify the proceedings and the form of questions to ensure that people like that can give evidence. If you think that because of the evidence of Dr Davies you should not hold it against the defendant that he has not given evidence do not hold it against him, but if you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence he relies on, that is, the evidence of Dr Davies, presents no adequate explanation for his absence from the witness box then you may hold his failure to give evidence against him.
If you consider that there is no excuse for his not giving evidence what proper inferences - in other words, what conclusions - can you draw from the defendant’s decision not to give evidence before you? You may think that the defendant would have gone into the witness box to give you an explanation or answer to the case against him. If the only sensible explanation for his decision not to give evidence is that he has no answer to the case against him, or none that could have stood up to cross-examination, then it would be open to you to hold against him his failure to give evidence. It is for you to decide whether it is fair to hold that failure against him. In considering that it might be useful for you to consider what sort of questions might the defendant have had to face if he had given evidence.”
21.  The trial judge went on to give examples of questions that might have been asked of the defendant had he given evidence before emphasising that the jury should not find him guilty only or mainly because he had not given evidence, but that they might take it into account as some additional support for the prosecution’s case and in deciding whether or not the case made on his behalf was or might be true.
22.  The applicant was convicted by the jury and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twelve years. He appealed against his conviction on three grounds: (i) that the trial judge had erred in not allowing Dr Davies to give evidence concerning the conclusions he had reached from watching the interview tapes; (ii) that the trial judge had erred in rejecting the applicant’s submission that it was undesirable for him to be called to give evidence; and (iii) that the trial judge had failed to direct the jury that they should not draw adverse inferences unless they were satisfied that there was case to answer.
23.  On 28 January 2009 an application for leave to appeal was refused by a single judge of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. A renewed application was dismissed by the full court on 15 January 2010.
24.  In respect of the first ground of appeal, namely the exclusion of the video evidence, the Court of Appeal accepted that the videotapes were admissible to demonstrate how the applicant expressed himself and to demonstrate that he was suggestible. However, the portion of the videotape on which the applicant had intended to rely did not in fact touch on suggestibility and, in any event, the applicant’s suggestibility was not in dispute between the experts who had testified for the prosecution and defence. Therefore, the omission of the evidence would not have had any material effect on the trial judge’s decision.
25.  In respect of the second ground of appeal, namely the ruling under Article 4(1)(b) of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, the Court of Appeal considered that the trial judge had reached his conclusion in a proper and balanced manner and his conclusion was not unreasonable. The Court of Appeal noted that there was competing expert evidence in the case. On the one hand, there was the evidence of Dr Kennedy, a consultant psychiatrist, whose opinion was that the applicant “should be capable of following proceedings and actively contributing to them” if account were taken of his need to have material simply phrased and if he was allowed adequate consultation with others to ascertain his understanding and clarify matters where necessary. On the other, Dr Davies, a clinical psychologist, entered a significant reservation in relation to the applicant’s ability to give evidence. He did not know whether even where the procedures were simplified and the questions simply phrased, the applicant could give a coherent account of events. The Court of Appeal found that there was nothing unreasonable about the manner in which the trial judge preferred the evidence of the consultant psychiatrist over that of the clinical psychologist.
26.  For the third ground, which related to the trial judge’s direction on a case to answer, the Court of Appeal recognised that, in England and Wales, trial judges were required to direct juries that they, the jury, had to find that there was a case to answer on the prosecution evidence before drawing an adverse inference (see paragraph 28 below). By contrast, in Northern Ireland, it was left to the judge in each case to decide whether to direct the jury in this manner, depending on the strength of the prosecution case. The Court of Appeal considered that, in the applicant’s case, the absence of such a direction to the jury reflected the trial judge’s view that this was not a case where the evidence was so weak as to require such a direction. The substantial body of evidence against the applicant supported that view. The trial was not, therefore, unfair. The Court of Appeal nonetheless recommended that the specimen direction in Northern Ireland should be amended to follow the approach taken in England and Wales, by adding a direction that the jury should not draw an adverse inference unless they consider that the prosecution case is such that it clearly calls for an answer.
27.  The applicant asked the court to certify questions of general public importance for the consideration of the Supreme Court. It refused to do so in a decision handed down on 29 January 2010.