4.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Leeds.
5.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.
6.  The applicant arrived in the United Kingdom on 26 January 2001 and thereafter lived illegally at an address in Bedford.
7.  Whilst living in the United Kingdom the applicant successfully applied for three jobs using a false French passport. Between April 2003 and November 2004 he was employed by a recruitment agency. Between August 2004 and January 2006 he was employed in a cash and carry business and between January 2006 and February 2007 he was employed as a forklift truck driver.
8.  The applicant had used the false passport to support his assertion that he was entitled to work in the United Kingdom. All of his employers subsequently stated that they would not have employed him had they known of his true immigration status. Between April 2003 and February 2007 the applicant earned a total gross salary of 73,293.17 pounds sterling (GBP) from his employment. At the end of this period he had total savings of GBP 21,649.60.
9.  In January 2007 the applicant applied to the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency for a provisional driving licence. The application was accompanied by the same false French passport that the applicant had used to obtain employment in the United Kingdom. When the falsity of the passport was discovered, the police were informed.
10.  On 4 June 2007 the applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Luton to three counts of dishonestly obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception (counts one, two and three on the indictment). He also pleaded guilty to one count of having a false identity document with intent (count four), one count of driving whilst disqualified (count five) and one count of driving a motor vehicle without insurance (count six). On 29 June 2007 the applicant was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen months’ imprisonment for the first four counts together with a consecutive sentence of two months’ imprisonment for the offence of driving whilst disqualified. No separate sentence was imposed for driving without insurance. The trial judge also recommended the applicant for deportation.
11.  In addition to the custodial sentence and the recommendation for deportation, the prosecution sought a confiscation order under section 6 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in respect of the applicant’s earnings (see relevant domestic law and practice below). The trial judge accepted that the applicant had paid all the tax and national insurance due on his earnings and that the money he had made from his employment had been truly earned. After deducting tax and national insurance payments, it was calculated that the benefit the applicant received from his earnings was GBP 50,000. It was agreed that of the GBP 50,000 the applicant still had assets of GBP 21,949.60. On this basis, on 29 June 2007 the trial judge imposed a confiscation order in the sum of GBP 21,949.60 upon the applicant, with a consecutive sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment to be served in default of payment. Thus, the confiscation order had the effect of depriving the applicant of all of the savings that he had accumulated during the four years of employment.
12.  On 8 April 2008 the applicant sought an extension of time within which to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the imposition of the confiscation order. In his grounds of appeal, he contended that the grant of the confiscation order had not respected “European law”. That application was refused on 13 June 2008. The Single Judge noted that the applicant had failed to establish good reason for the extension of time sought and that he had no arguable grounds of appeal because he had benefited from the use of the false passport to the extent that it had enabled him to work and earn money and there had been no breach of his rights under the Convention.
13.  The applicant renewed his application before the Court of Appeal which, on 14 November 2008, granted him an extension of time and leave to appeal. Leading counsel was appointed on his behalf. Counsel initially argued first; that the applicant’s earnings were not a relevant benefit from criminal conduct within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and secondly, that the prosecutor’s decision to seek a confiscation order in this case constituted an abuse of process.
14.  The Court of Appeal heard part of the appeal on 18 February 2009. However, it decided to adjourn the appeal pending the publication by the Department of Public Prosecution (“the DPP”) of guidance for prosecutors on the circumstances under which a confiscation order could be sought.
15.  In a supplementary skeleton argument dated 5 June 2008, counsel for the applicant accepted that in light of the decision in R v. Carter and Others [2006] EWCA Crim 416 (see relevant domestic law and practice below), the court was bound to reject the first ground of appeal, namely that the applicant’s earnings were not a relevant “benefit”. He therefore accepted that the issue on appeal was whether it was oppressive and therefore an abuse of process for the Crown to seek and the court to impose a confiscation order for what amounted to the applicant’s entire savings over nearly four years of genuine work. In this regard, counsel submitted that there would be an abuse of process where, on a correct application of the law to the facts, the resulting “benefit” figure yielded a disproportionate or oppressive result. He further noted that Parliament has intended the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to be applied in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Convention. Therefore, in light of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in order to remain proportionate the application of the confiscation regime had to remain rationally connected to the public interest aims pursued and go no further than necessary to achieve them. It was therefore submitted that to seek the imposition of a confiscation order on the basis of a benefit figure which far exceeded the value of the defendant’s crimes could properly be described as disproportionate – either in the traditional sense used in criminal sentencing (“not fitting the punishment to the crime”) or in the language of the Convention – and was therefore an abusive exercise of jurisdiction.
16.  The applicant further submitted that a confiscation order could be described as oppressive where it did not pursue any of the legitimate aims of the confiscation regime and/or did not further the Parliamentary intent of stripping defendants of the proceeds of crime. He reiterated that Parliament had intended the legislation to be compatible with the Convention.
17.  On 28 July 2009, after the DPP guidance had been promulgated (see relevant domestic law and practice below), the Court of Appeal held that the decision to seek a confiscation order against the applicant did not constitute an abuse of process. The court therefore dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the order. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal said that the guidance represented a fair analysis of the effect of previous Court of Appeal and House of Lords decisions on the confiscation order regime.
18.  The court stated:
“Abuses of the confiscation process may occur and, when they do, the appropriate remedy will normally be a stay of proceedings. However an abuse of process cannot be founded on the basis that the consequences of the proper application of the legislative structure may produce an ‘oppressive’ result with which the judge may be unhappy. Although the court may, of its own initiative, invoke the confiscation process, the responsibility for deciding whether properly to seek a confiscation order is effectively vested in the Crown. When it does so, the court lacks any corresponding discretion to interfere with that decision if it has been made in accordance with the statute. The just result of these proceedings is the result produced by the proper application of the statutory provisions as interpreted in the House of Lords and in this court. However to conclude that proceedings properly taken in accordance with statutory provisions constitute an abuse of process is tantamount to asserting a power in the court to dispense with the statute.
As a matter of principle, that is impermissible, and this court has said so. This, in R v. Shabir [2009] 1 CAR (S) 497, it was observed:
‘This jurisdiction must be exercised with considerable caution, indeed sparingly. It               must be confined to cases of true oppression. In particular, it cannot be exercised               simply on the grounds that the judge disagrees with the decision of the Crown to               pursue confiscation, or with the way it puts its case on that topic.’
We repeat what was said at an earlier hearing involving Paulet.
‘The abuse of process jurisdiction is one which needs to be exercised with great               circumspection. The jurisdiction cannot be converted on a case by case basis into a               structure which involves, on proper analysis, something like wholesale               undermining of the statutory provisions. It is not easy to conclude that it is an               abuse of process for those responsible for enforcing legislation to see that it is               indeed properly enforced.’”
19.  The Court of Appeal found that applicant’s case could not be distinguished from its previous ruling in R v Carter and Others (see relevant domestic law and practice, paragraph 31 below). It concluded:
“The reality is that throughout the period of his employment [the applicant] was relying on a continuing dishonest representation to three different employers. He deceived them into thinking that he was entitled to obtain employment with them. That was a crucial element of his criminality. His earnings, of course, reflected the fact that he had done the necessary work, as we shall assume, to the satisfaction of his various employers. But the opportunity for him to do so, that is the pecuniary advantage, was unlawfully obtained. If the employee worked to his employer’s satisfaction, and he paid his tax and National Insurance contributions on his earnings, and his deception either lacked any significant wider public interest, or, perhaps because of the passage of time, but for whatever reason, had ceased to have any meaningful effect on his employers’ decision to continue his employment, the resolution of the issue might well be different. As it is there was here a wider public interest. The appellant was deliberately circumventing the prohibition against him seeking remunerative employment in this country in any capacity. No basis for interfering with the order made in the Crown Court has been shown. In our judgment the appropriate link between the appellant’s earnings and his criminal offences, in the context of the wider public interest, was plainly established. The appeal therefore fails.”
20.  On 27 October 2009 the Court of Appeal refused to certify a point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.
21.  Enforcement proceedings have since been instigated against the applicant.
22.  On 28 June 2007 the applicant applied for asylum in the United Kingdom, alleging that his father had been killed in a land dispute between the Dioula and Bete community and that he would be at risk in Ivory Coast owing to his Dioula ethnicity. On 4 October 2007 his application was refused by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who found no objective evidence that the Dioula were targeted solely on account of their ethnicity, and that the delay in claiming asylum had adversely affected the credibility of the rest of the applicant’s claim. A deportation order made by the Secretary of State was served on the applicant on 19 November 2007. On 24 April 2008 the applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the refusal of asylum and the decision to make a deportation order. This application was refused by the High Court on 16 May 2008 as the application had been lodged out of time and, in any event, the applicant had failed to avail himself of his statutory appeal rights by applying to the then Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. His renewed application for judicial review was rejected by the High Court on 27 June 2008. However, it appears that on 3 April 2008 the applicant submitted a notice of appeal to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. This was rejected by the Tribunal on 29 April 2008 as out of time.