5.  The applicant was born in 1924 and died on 27 February 2011, while his application was pending before the Court. His son, Mr Panayotis Zolotas, stated that he wished to continue the proceedings.
6.  On 11 July 1974 the applicant, who at that time was a practising lawyer, opened a bank account with the General Bank of Greece, into which he paid the sum of 660,000 drachmas (1,936.90 euros (EUR)). From the second half of 1981 until 2003, he did not perform any transactions on the account (cash withdrawals or deposits or entering of interest in the booklet provided for that purpose). As both he and his wife had severe and disabling health problems, the applicant was obliged to live abroad for many years. On 6 February 2003 he requested the bank to inform him of the status of his account. The bank replied that, because there had been no transactions on the account since the second half of 1981, all his claims in respect of the account had become time-barred. However, it informed the applicant that it still kept an up-to-date file concerning him in its records, in which it entered the interest accruing on the account.
7.  On 3 June 2003 the applicant brought an action against the bank in the civil courts, claiming the sum he had deposited with the bank, plus interest, giving a total amount of EUR 30,550.74. In judgment no. 1481/2005 of 21 April 2005 the Athens Court of First Instance dismissed his action, finding that the applicant’s claims were barred by the twenty-year limitation period laid down in respect of claims arising out of an agreement on the deposit of fungible goods (Ανώμαλη παρακαταθήκη) within the meaning of Article 830 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 18 and 19 below). In particular, the court stated as follows:
“... [The applicant] relies on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ... and on the Paris Protocol of 20 March 1952 concerning protection of property; these are not applicable in the present case since the institution of statutory limitation under domestic law prevails over them. This statutory limitation [provided for by Article 247 of the Civil Code] is independent of the fact that, in accordance with Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 1195/1942, cash deposits with national banks and the corresponding interest are transferred permanently to the State where they have not been claimed by the account holder for a period of twenty years for the deposits and a period of five years for the interest ...”
8.  The applicant appealed against that judgment, basing his arguments on the relevant provisions of domestic law and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He submitted that the limitation period had been suspended by force majeure or had stopped running in accordance with Article 260 of the Civil Code, since the bank had updated his file every six months, entering the interest that had accrued.
9.  By judgment no. 2452/2006 of 6 April 2006 the Athens Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, taking the view that the twenty-year limitation period applicable to agreements on the deposit of fungible goods had been justified by an aim in the public interest, namely that of terminating, in the interests of the community (Κοινωνική οικονομία), legal relationships that had been created so long before that their existence had become uncertain. The fact that the bank had continued to enter the interest accruing on the applicant’s account did not, in the Court of Appeal’s view, amount to a recognition of the applicant’s claims capable of stopping the running of the twenty-year limitation period. In the case of bank deposits, the running of that period could be interrupted only by a new deposit or withdrawal, by a transfer of funds or by the payment of interest. The Court of Appeal also based its decision on Legislative Decree no. 1195/1942, according to which sums of money in bank accounts that had remained dormant for twenty years were transferred to the State on expiry of that period.
10.  The Court of Appeal also rejected the objection raised by the applicant to the effect that the limitation period had been suspended by force majeure (his and his wife’s health problems). The court considered that there had been no force majeure in the case before it since the applicant and his wife had not been continuously ill throughout the limitation period, and particularly during the last six months of the period, with the result that it had not been impossible for the applicant to withdraw the sum deposited and the corresponding interest, either in person or via a representative.
11.  The applicant appealed on points of law, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
12.  On 12 January 2009 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal as unfounded, on the ground that the application of the legislation in question had not infringed the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as defined by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (judgment no. 50/2009). More specifically, the Court of Cassation found as follows:
“... [O]wing to the fact that the above-mentioned limitation period, like any statutory limitation period, is laid down in the public interest, which requires the regularisation of relationships that lie in the past and have therefore become uncertain, and is also dictated by the interest of the community, the impugned provisions are not contrary [to Protocol No. 1].”
13.  That judgment was finalised and certified as authentic on 9 June 2009.