7.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently detained at the Corradino Correctional Facility in Paola.
8.  By Act III of 2002 the Maltese Parliament introduced the right to legal assistance at the pre-trial stage. However, the law only came into force in 2010 by means of Legal Notice 35 of 2010. Prior to this Legal Notice Maltese law did not provide for legal assistance during pre‑trial investigations and specifically during questioning, whether by the police or by a magistrate in his investigative role. Before questioning, however, suspects would be cautioned, that is, informed of their right to remain silent and that anything they said could be taken down and produced as evidence. At the time, no inferences could be drawn by the trial courts from the silence of the accused at this stage.
9.  The applicant, at the time twenty-seven years of age, was arrested on 15 April 2003 on suspicion of importation and trafficking of drugs (heroin) in relation to two episodes in March and April 2003. On 17 April 2003 while under arrest and precisely during questioning, after being duly cautioned about his right to remain silent, the applicant, in the absence of a lawyer, gave a statement to the police, which however he refused to sign.
10.  In his statement he said that he regularly drove a white Ford Escort and that he was married to a Thai national. In reply to questioning, he stated that he did not remember his whereabouts on 3 March 2003 and that he did not know a certain N. and M. and three other Turkish nationals (K., R., and M.I.). Neither had he ever paid or received money from the aforementioned persons. He further stated that he had never made or received calls to and from Turkey. He denied having, on 4 March 2003, made contact with any foreigner in Paceville, or having received anything from M. or ever having made a phone call to two specific numbers shown to him by the police. He further denied having gone to Paceville with his wife in his car and making contact with M. on 5 March 2003; he also denied that on that day M. had given him heroin capsules in the presence of his wife. He claimed however to have gone to Paceville at 10 a.m. to look for a person who had stolen his car stereo. The applicant availed himself of the right to remain silent in respect of questions as to whether he had a drug problem, whether he had ever used heroin, and when was the last time he had done so. On being asked whether he had written the two names found on a piece of paper in his car and what was their purpose, he replied that he had himself written the two names but that he did not know the people and that he was unaware of the purpose of the paper, which had been in his car for a very long time.
11.  On the same day (17 April 2003) the applicant was arraigned before the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry (committal proceedings) and his above-mentioned statement exhibited as evidence against him. The prosecution also produced another two statements implicating the applicant, given by two prosecution witnesses (N. and M., two Turkish female drug couriers, mentioned above) who had also been arrested and investigated in connection with the same crimes, and who had also not been legally assisted during the police investigation into their case.
12.  In the meantime, on 15 April 2003 the duty magistrate (C.) had been informed that the applicant had been arrested, that a search had been carried out at his place of residence, and that certain items had been seized. Instead of proceeding herself to the spot to conduct the inquest for the purpose of the in genere inquiry (inkjesta), she appointed the police investigating officer to hold an on-site inquiry, and at the same time appointed a number of experts to assist him (see Articles 546 - 548 of the Criminal Code, relevant domestic law, paragraph 31 below). In their document of appointment, however, the experts were required to report their findings to her within three days. The following day she acceded to the Commissioner of Police’s request that she order the relevant telephone companies to give all the information requested in connection with the mobile phones seized in the course of the investigation. In the procès-verbal of 23 April 2003 no findings were reported by her, given that on 21 April 2013 the Commissioner of Police had requested the said magistrate to close the inquest since committal proceedings (kumpilazzjoni) had already started in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 9 above). All the relevant documents were attached to the procès-verbal and the record of the in genere inquiry sent to the Attorney General.
13.  The same magistrate (C.) was assigned (by lot) the case in the Court of Magistrates sitting as a Court of Criminal Inquiry. She eventually decided that there was enough evidence to put the applicant under a bill of indictment. The resulting bill of indictment was filed by the Attorney General on 14 June 2006.
14.  In consequence the applicant was tried by a jury and by a judgment of the Criminal Court of 16 January 2008 he was found guilty of importing, causing to be imported, or taking steps preparatory to the importation, of heroin between February and 15 April 2003; that between February and April 2003 he conspired with other persons to import, sell or traffic heroin, or promoted, constituted, organised or financed such a conspiracy; and that in the same period he had in his possession the drug heroin in circumstances which indicated that it was not for his exclusive use. The Criminal Court sentenced him to twenty-one years’ imprisonment and a fine of 70,000 euros (EUR). During these proceedings the applicant had objected to the statements made by N. and M. on various grounds, however these objections were withdrawn on 30 October 2006, apart from one objection concerning the inadmissibility of the results of the identification parade.
15.  The applicant appealed, claiming an incorrect application of the law (unrelated to legal assistance), a wrong assessment of the facts, and a disproportionate punishment.
16.  During the appeal proceedings the applicant requested the Court of Criminal Appeal to refer the case to the constitutional courts on constitutional grounds (different from those raised below). On 20 November 2008 the Court of Criminal Appeal found his claims to be frivolous and vexatious and rejected his request.
17.  By a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal of 19 May 2011 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed and the first-instance judgment confirmed (apart from a slight change in respect of the timing of the third charge).
18.  In so far as is relevant, the Court noted that the jury had had the advantage of seeing and hearing all the witnesses, and that the jurors had arrived at the conclusion that they should not rely on the version of events given by the applicant in his statement. The first issue which the jury had to decide was whether the two couriers (N. and M.) had made contact with the applicant in March 2003. In his statement to the police the applicant denied knowing the two women and other people mentioned by them, and also denied that he had made and received calls to and from Turkey. However, the two women identified the applicant as being the person they made contact with in March 2003, namely as the person who had given N. food, gloves, disinfectant and a laxative, and to whom M. had given the capsules they had carried in their stomachs. A number of factors gave credibility to the women’s identification of the applicant: (i) the circumstances of the meetings they had with him at which time he was using a white four-door car and was in the company of an Asian woman; (ii) the applicant’s statement that he habitually made use of a white four-door Ford Escort and that he was married to a Thai woman; (iii) the fact that when arrested N. and M. had separately identified the applicant in photographs; (iv) moreover, the two women had separately identified the applicant in identification parades supervised by a duty magistrate; and they did the same without hesitation when they testified, both during the committal stage and before the jury. In the light of all those factors the jurors could reasonably conclude that the person N. and M. had met in March 2003 and to whom they had delivered the capsules was the applicant.
19.  This having been established, the jury had to determine what the capsules delivered to the applicant contained and whether the applicant was connected to the delivery of April 2003 intercepted by the police. The experts had stated that the capsules contained heroin. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that the delivery of March 2003 concerned cannabis, given that studies showed that drug couriers were used in connection with heroin and cocaine and sometimes ecstasy, and that Turkey was considered a key transit route to Europe for heroin.
20.  It appeared from the evidence given by the two women that they had imported heroin in April 2003, which was the second time they had come to Malta. They had been forced to return in April since, in March, M. had lost most of the capsules she was carrying when vomiting on board the flight. The court considered that a recipient would expect to receive the full delivery, and that therefore it was logical for the supplier to force the courier to deliver what had been missing because of her fault. It followed that, from their testimony, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that what N. and M. had carried in March 2003 was also heroin. The court considered that this was the only possible conclusion to be arrived at. Neither was it conjecture to conclude that the drug being carried in April was destined for the applicant. Indeed during the trial by jury M. had indicated the applicant as the recipient. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that he could not be the recipient because the women had referred to someone whose father had passed away, which was not the case for the applicant. It considered the relevant part of the statement by the women as hearsay evidence and in any event it was a statement which referred to a third person and not the applicant.
21.  The court further noted that on 15 April 2003, when the delivery was meant to take place, the police had seen the applicant drive around the area (at least three times) in his white Ford Escort, a short time before M. was arrested. Indeed the jurors had not believed the applicant’s version that he had gone to Paceville to look for someone who had stolen his car stereo. Moreover, the jurors could not have ignored that in his statement the applicant had denied any connection with Turkey, despite the fact that he could not explain the Turkish names written on a piece of paper which was found in his car and which he admitted he had written himself, and that N. had testified that the applicant had spoken to a Turkish person on the telephone.
22.  The Court of Appeal decided that in the light of the above considerations and all the evidence produced, the jurors could legally and reasonably conclude that the applicant was guilty of the first and second charge, but only partly as to the third charge, since he had never received the delivery of April 2003.
23.  The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, claiming a breach of his right to a fair trial (Article 6 § 3 (c)) on account of the lack of legal assistance during the investigation and interrogation, both in his respect and in respect of the witnesses who had also been under investigation, their statements having repercussions on his trial. He further complained that the same magistrate who had conducted the in genere inquiry was also the magistrate who had conducted the compilation of evidence in the committal proceedings. He requested a remedy including, but not limited to, a declaration that the criminal proceedings be cancelled and compensation paid.
24.  By a judgment of 4 June 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicant’s claim.
25.  In respect of the statement made by the applicant on 17 April 2003 the court noted as follows: (i) the applicant had not raised the issue before his criminal proceedings came to an end, and the judgment was now res judicata; (ii) neither had he raised the issue in his referral request pending the criminal proceedings before the Court of Criminal Appeal; (iii) the applicant’s statement was not determinant to finding him guilty: in his statement he had not admitted to trafficking in drugs or that he knew N. and M., and he had chosen to remain silent when questioned about drug use; (iv) while it was true that the Court of Criminal Appeal had referred to extracts from his statement, this was not the basis of his conviction, which was based on the evidence given in court by M. and N. and on the results of the previous identification parades – indeed he had said nothing relevant in his statement.
26.  The court concluded that the proceedings having ended it had to look at the entirety of the proceedings, and it was not for it to substitute the findings of the jury. During the trial the applicant was represented by a lawyer and had ample opportunity to submit evidence and contest any evidence brought against him, and the fact that he did not have legal assistance during questioning did not have an irreparable effect on his right to defend himself.
27.  The court rejected the second complaint in relation to legal assistance for the witnesses, in so far as the applicant had no standing in that respect. Moreover, their statements had remained unchanged; the applicant could have challenged them during the trial but had opted not to do so.
28.  Lastly, in relation to the third complaint it held that the magistrate conducting the in genere inquiry was independent of the police, did not act as a prosecutor, and in the present case did not express an opinion as to whether there was sufficient evidence for the police to institute proceedings in respect of the applicant. The applicant’s case was also tried by a jury and then reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Furthermore, the applicant had not raised the issue in the committal proceedings in 2003 - indeed a comment somewhat related to the issue had been explicitly withdrawn on 30 October 2006 before the Criminal Court - and he should not therefore be allowed to benefit from his own passivity.
29.  By a judgment of 25 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the first-instance judgment, with costs against the applicant. It noted that a correct interpretation of Salduz v. Turkey [GC] (no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008) had to be made in view of the circumstances of that case, where indeed Mr Salduz had been in a vulnerable position when he had made his statement. The rationale of the right was precisely that, and not to allow guilty persons to be let off scot‑free because of a formality which had no real or serious consequences. In the present case the applicant did not claim that he was forced to make the statement, or that he was in any other way vulnerable when he made his statement. The right to a lawyer was aimed at avoiding abuses, which in fact did not happen in the applicant’s case. Thus, while there was no procedural obstacle for the applicant to complain at this stage, namely before the constitutional jurisdictions, despite the fact that he had not raised the issue in the criminal proceedings, the element of vulnerability was missing in the applicant’s case, and thus there could be no violation of his rights. The Constitutional Court held that even if the statement had been determinant for the finding of guilt, that finding was not necessarily tainted unless the statement had been obtained under duress, which was not so in the present case. Nevertheless, in the instant case the statement was of no relevance whatsoever, as the applicant had not admitted to anything and the Court of Criminal Appeal had only referred to the statement in saying that the jury had not believed the applicant’s version. It had been other evidence that had led to his finding of guilt. Lastly, the Constitutional Court noted that it could not agree to a general view that the moment a statement was made without legal assistance it became ipso facto invalid and brought about a breach of Article 6.
30.  As to the complaint related to the witnesses, the court did not rule out the applicant’s locus standi, which could come into play if their statements had been made under duress. However, it was not so in the present case, where the witnesses had reiterated their statements even before the trial courts. It followed that those statements were also admissible. Lastly it confirmed the reasoning of the first-instance court relating to the impartiality of the magistrate, finding the applicant’s argument opportunistic.