4.  The applicants were born in 1930 and 1922 respectively and have been living in Oslo, Norway. The second applicant died on 30 May 2006. On 20 October 2006 Mr Berge informed the Court that he no longer represented the first applicant.
5.  This is the fifth application brought by the applicants under the Convention in relation to the same case complex, the factual background of which is summarised in Amelia and Einar Riis against Norway (dec.)(no. 23106/02, struck out on 8 July 2004).
6.  The first applicant is the daughter of a merchant ship owner, the late Mr Kristoffer Olsen (Senior), who died in 1948, and of Mrs Dagny Marie Olsen, who died in 1970. Following her death, the parents' joint estate was subjected to public division (offentlig skifte) by the Oslo Probate Court (skifterett), as the heirs did not take over the estate's debts. The first applicant was one of three heirs to the estate, which comprised major shareholding positions in Luksefjell Ltd and, indirectly, in Dovrefjell Ltd., the family's two principal companies. These formed part of the Olsen & Ugelstad Ltd Shipping Company (founded in 1915 by the first applicant's father and by Mr Rudolf Ugelstad). One of the other heirs, the first applicant's brother, Mr Kristoffer Olsen (Junior) was, under powers delegated to him in 1951 by his mother, the only member of the Olsen family taking part in the leadership of the Shipping Company.
7.  The division of the estate involved severe and long lasting disputes between the first applicant and her brother.
8.  Under an agreement of 5 April 1974 (the so-called “Easter Agreement”) between the applicants, on the one hand, and Falkefjell Ltd. and Mr Kristoffer Olsen, on the other hand, Mrs Amelia Riis was to acquire the ship MS Sognefjell from Falkefjell Ltd by 6 May 1974. The first applicant resold the ship to an Indian purchaser, but since an export licence was not obtained until August 1974 the deal did not materialise, by which time the ship's market value had fallen. A dispute ensued as to the implementation of the Easter Agreement, which the first applicant brought before an arbitration tribunal (voldgiftsrett) in October 1974. On 2 May 1975 the tribunal delivered its judgment, finding that Falkefjell Ltd was responsible for a delay from July to October 1974 in the delivery of the ship, indicating certain amounts for compensation (between 6,000,000 and 18,900,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK)) and annulling the Easter Agreement.
9.  According an agreement between Falkefjell Ltd and Den norske Creditbank (Dnc), MS Sognefjell was pawned as security for a loan to the company and a mortgage bond was transported to the bank for this purpose on 7 June 1975. On 3 December 1975 the bond was deleted.
10.  In February 1977 the first applicant sought to have the arbitration tribunal's judgment quashed by the ordinary courts. She argued that Falkefjell Ltd had failed to inform her about its difficult financial situation and about having pawned the ship when the case was before the arbitration tribunal. Her action was rejected at first instance, then upheld at second instance, and finally rejected by the Supreme Court on 9 November 1983. Her request for reopening of the proceedings was dismissed in March 1985.
The first applicant also brought compensation proceedings against the Dnc, but her suit was rejected by the Oslo City Court (byrett, later renamed tingrett) and the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) was refused.
11.  On 6 March 1986 the first applicant instituted compensation proceedings against Falkefjell Ltd. and Mr Kristoffer Olsen. She claimed that they had carried out unlawful dispositions against her in the spring of 1975 in relation to the pawning of MS Sognefjell, of which she had not been duly informed, and that she should be compensated for the loss of value.
12.  Until 7 September 1988 written pleadings were filed from both sides, in two instances, after extensions had been granted to the first applicant.
13.  On 7 September 1988 the first applicant asked the City Court for a response to her pleadings of 9 October 1987. On 19 September 1988 the City Court explained that a delay had occurred due to the length of the written pleadings (120 pages), the volume of supporting documents (600 pages), the manner of presentation and the lack of relevance of a number of documents. The City Court gave the first applicant until 10 October 1988 to resubmit pleadings, which she did on 8 October 1988. On 22 October 1988 it rejected most of the supporting documents.
14.  Thereafter, written pleadings were exchanged between the parties until 4 September 1989, when the first applicant asked for an extension until 31 January 1990. On 26 January 1990 she submitted written pleadings, to be completed at a later stage. On 16 November 1990 she submitted further pleadings with the reservation that she had been interrupted by another case and would have to revert to the matter as soon as possible.
15.  On 25 September 1991 the City Court informed the parties that the preparation of the case was sufficient for a date to be set for the opening of the oral hearing. It appears that a preliminary hearing had been fixed for the afore-mentioned date.
On behalf of the first applicant, Mr T. Engelschiøn asked the City Court to fix a later date for the preliminary hearing, while agreeing that the preparation of the case was complete. By a communication of 14 October 1991 the City Court maintained 18 May “1991” (it presumably meant 1992) as the date for the opening of the main hearing.
16.  Subsequently, the second applicant submitted written pleadings on various dates until 5 May 1992. In the meantime, the City Court had held a preliminary hearing on 17 and 20 January 1992 and had encouraged the first applicant to appoint a lawyer. On 11 May 1992, Mr Engelschiøn informed the City Court about his appointment and asked for the postponement of the main hearing, which the City Court accepted on 14 May 1992.
17.  Between 7 October 1992 and 1 July 1993 the parties submitted written pleadings and on 5 July 1993 the City Court decided to divide the main hearing.
18.  On 11 November 1993 the first applicant's lawyer filed additional pleadings. On 18 November 1993, he asked for the hearing, then scheduled for 7 February 1994, to be postponed. On 18 November 1993 the City Court informed that a postponement would mean that the hearing could not be held until the autumn of 1994 and that any objections thereto should be received by 25 November 1993. There is no record of the court's subsequent rescheduling decision, which may have been communicated orally.
19.  During 1994 there was no activity in the case.
20.  On 4 January 1995 the adversary party filed additional pleadings. On 16 February 1995 the first applicant's lawyer again asked for postponement of the main hearing, suggesting that it be held in the autumn. The City Court responded on 2 March 1995:
“... The case has now been postponed a number of times. These repeated postponements are a considerable problem for the court with regard both to the progress of the case and to the court's and the co-judges' work schedule.
Not without considerable doubt, and provided that the defendant has no objections, the court once again finds reason for accepting a postponement. The dates of the main hearing are therefore set to 10 a.m. on Tuesday 10 October to Thursday, 19 October 1995. Please notify immediately and within one week if these dates are not convenient. The date of the hearing is otherwise deemed to be set. Further rescheduling may not be expected. ...”
21.  After yet a further postponement, of which there is no record, and additional written pleadings by both parties on 19 September and 1 December 1995, the City Court held a main hearing from 5 to 8 December 1995.
22.  By a judgment of 28 December 1995 the City Court rejected the first applicant's action and ordered her to reimburse the respondents' legal costs.
23.  The first applicant appealed against the City Court's judgment to the High Court.
24.  Between 29 April 1996 and 8 March 1998 the first applicant insisted that she should be represented by a layman, Mr H. Elvebakk, despite several decisions by the High Court, upheld by the Supreme Court, rejecting her repeated requests to this effect. Not until 23 December 1998 was the High Court informed that the first applicant had appointed a lawyer, Mr Aabø‑Evensen.
25.  In the meantime, on 12 May 1997, the High Court decided to go ahead with the preparation of the case and made an attempt on 4 August 1997 to define the scope of the case, inviting the first applicant to observe this. Moreover, she requested that Mr Justice Gussgaard be disqualified from taking part in the case. The matter was left to be decided by the Supreme Court (Høyesterett), which by a decision of 20 November 1997 rejected the first applicant's claim. In addition, the applicants asked the High Court to order the opposing party to present documents specified in 65 claims and to extend the case to several other parties, which requests were in large part refused. They also requested several extensions, notably from May to December 1998, pending the appointment of a lawyer.
26.  After announcing his appointment on 23 December 1998, Mr Aabø‑Evensen asked for several extensions, until 30 July 1999. On the latter date, he filed written pleadings, which were transmitted to the respondent party on 27 September 1999, with a delay due to misunderstandings and change of personnel in the High Court.
27.  In October 1999 both parties stated their wishes as to the duration of the oral hearing to be held.
28.  Between 15 November 1999 and 13 April 2000 the High Court and the Supreme Court respectively rejected and accepted in part a request by the applicant's lawyer to accept the filing of additional documentary evidence and to hear certain witnesses.
29.  Between 20 June 2000 and 30 January 2001, the High Court and the Supreme Court dealt with requests by the applicants' lawyer that the adversary party be ordered to produce a number of documents, which requests were granted in part.
30.  On 27 January 2001 the High Court informed the parties that the preparation of the case had been completed and consulted them about the duration of the oral hearing.
31.  On 16 March 2001 the applicant's lawyer submitted new documents and asked the High Court to order the adversary party to produce additional documents, pointing out that the preparation of the case needed to continue and that three weeks were needed for the hearing. On 1 June 2001 the High Court refused the filing of several documents and ordered the opposing party to produce some of the documents requested. An appeal by the applicant's lawyer of 5 July 2001 was dismissed on 3 September 2001.
32.  On 14 September 2001, the High Court decided to reserve four weeks for the oral hearing. Subsequently, on 30 May 2002, it decided that the hearing would open on 1 October 2002.
33.  The High Court hearing took place between 1 and 23 October 2002. The High Court took oral evidence from the first applicant and from Mr R. Ugelstad, who represented Falkefjell Ltd, as President of its Governing Board. Mr Kristoffer Olsen was absent due to illness. The High Court also heard five witnesses, including the second applicant.
34.  On 25 November 2002 the High Court upheld the City Court's judgment and ordered the first applicant to pay mortgage interests on the defendants' costs and to pay them an additional NOK 1,028,085 for their costs before the High Court.
35.  The first applicant appealed against the High Court's judgment, both on procedural grounds and regarding the outcome of the case.
36.  On 14 August 2003 the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court (Høysteretts kjæremålsutvalg) refused the first applicant leave to appeal and ordered her to pay within two weeks NOK 100,000, plus default interest for any delays in payment, for the defendants' legal costs at this stage. The decision was notified on 19 September 2003.
COMPLAINTS
37.  The applicants complained that in the compensation case against Falkefjell Ltd. and Mr Kristoffer Olsen they had not been afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal, as required by Article 6 of the Convention. They had moreover been denied an effective remedy, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.