6.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Rome.
7.  The twenty-seventh G8 Summit took place in Genoa on 19, 20 and 21 July 2001 under the chairmanship of Italy.
8.  In the run-up to the Summit a large number of non-governmental organisations had set up a coordinating group known as the Genoa Social Forum (“GSF”) with a view to organising an “anti-globalisation” Summit in Genoa during the same dates (see Final Report of the Parliamentary inquiry into the events during the Genoa G8 Summit (see “Final Rapport of the Parliamentary Inquiry”), pp. 7-18).
9.  Since the meeting of the World Trade Organisation in Seattle in November 1999, such demonstrations by the “anti-globalisation” movement have been organised during inter-State summits and meetings of international institutions on different aspects of global governance. They have sometimes been accompanied by acts of vandalism and clashes with the police (ibid.).
10.  Law No. 349 of 8 June 2000 (“Law No. 349/2000”) had assigned the task of organising the preliminary meetings and the Final Summit of the Heads of State and Government scheduled for July 2001 to a plenipotentiary body set up within the Prime Minister’s Office. Several meetings were attended by representatives of the GSF, the Head of the plenipotentiary body, the Prefect of Genoa, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and local authority representatives (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, pp. 18-21).
11.  Substantial security measures were put in place by the Italian authorities (see Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 12, ECHR 2011). Under section 4(1) of Law no. 149 of 8 June 2000, the prefect of Genoa was authorised to deploy military personnel. In addition, the part of the city where the G8 were meeting (the historic centre) was designated as a “red zone” and cordoned off by means of a metal fence. As a result, only residents and persons working in the area were allowed access. Access to the port was prohibited and the airport was closed to traffic. The red zone was contained within a yellow zone, which in turn was surrounded by a white (normal) zone.
12.  According to the information garnered by the Genoa police department up to July 2001 (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, p. 23), the various groups expected to take part in the demonstrations were broken down into various blocs depending on the danger they posed: the non-dangerous  “Pink Bloc”; the “Yellow Bloc” and the “Blue Bloc”, which were deemed to comprise persons likely to vandalise property, set up street and railway blockades and cause confrontations with the police; and lastly, the “Black Bloc”, which embraced several anarchist groups and more broadly, demonstrators dressed in black and wearing masks and balaclavas who had systematically wreaked havoc during other summits.
13.  On 19 July 2001 two demonstrations took place during the day without incident. Disorder occurred during the evening (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, p. 25).
14.  On 20 July several demonstrations had been announced for various areas of the city, and rallies were scheduled for specific squares (“piazze tematiche”) (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, pp. 25-27).
15.  On the morning of 20 July the Black Bloc sparked numerous incidents and clashes with law-enforcement officers, and ransacked banks and supermarkets (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, § 17). Marassi Prison was attacked and a number of police stations were vandalised (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, § 134, and Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, p. 26).
16.  The Black Bloc sparked similar incidents while the Tute Bianche, a group broadly belonging to the “Yellow Bloc”, were marching along Via Tolemaide. Tear gas was fired on the Tute Bianche demonstrators by carabinieri, who charged forward, making use of their truncheons and non-regulation batons. The demonstrators split up, though some of them responded to the attack by throwing hard objects at the law-enforcement officers; armoured vehicles belonging to the carabinieri drove up at high speed, knocking down the barriers erected by the demonstrators and forcing the demonstrators to leave. Clashes between demonstrators and law-enforcement officers continued in the adjacent areas (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, §§ 17-20, 126-127 and 136).
17. Similar clashes occurred at around 3 pm in Piazza Manin (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, p. 26).
18.  At around 3.20 pm, during a clash in Piazza Alimonda, Carlo Giuliani, a young demonstrator, was hit by a shot fired from a jeep of carabinieri attempting to escape the demonstrators (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, §§ 21-25).
19.  On 21 July the final anti-globalisation demonstration took place, attended by some 100,000 persons (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, § 114).
20.  The looting and unlawful damage began in the morning and continued all day throughout the city. In the early afternoon the march ran into a group of some one hundred individuals facing the security forces. Further clashes ensured, with the security forces firing tear gas and charging the crowd, also involving the orderly demonstrators (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, pp. 27-28).
21.  During the two days of incidents several hundred demonstrators and members of the security forces were injured or suffered from the effects of tear gas. Whole districts of the city of Genoa were laid waste.
22.  On the morning of 21 July 2001 the Head of Police ordered Prefect A., Deputy Head of Police and Head of the plenipotentiary body, to assign the task of searching the Paul Klee School to Mr M.G., Head of the CID Central Operational Department (the “SCO”) (see judgment no. 1530/2010 of the Genoa Court of Appeal of 18 May 2010 (the “appeal judgment”), p. 194). Some twenty individuals were arrested following that operation, but they were immediately released by order of the prosecution or the investigating judge (see appeal judgment, p. 196).
23.  It transpires from Prefect A.’s statements to the Genoa Court that the order issued by the Head of Police was explicable by his desire to move on to a more “incisive” phase involving arrests of suspects in order to dispel any impression that the police had remained inert vis-à-vis the looting and unlawful damage perpetrated in the city. The Head of Police had wanted to set up large-scale joint patrols directed by officers from the mobile units and the SCO and coordinated by trusted officers, with a view to stopping the Black Bloc (see judgment no. 4252/08 delivered by the Genoa Court on 13 November 2008 and deposited on 11 February 2009 (the “first-instance judgment”), p. 243; see also judgment no. 38085/12 of the Court of Cassation of 5 July 2012, deposited on 2 October 2012 (the “Court of Cassation judgment”), pp. 121‑122).
24.  At 7.30 pm on 21 July M.G. ordered M.M., Head of the Genoa General Investigations and Special Operations Department (DIGOS) to second officers from his unit in order to from joint patrols with other officers from the Genoa mobile unit and the SCO (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, p. 29).
25.  The Genoa Municipal Council had provided the GSF and other bodies with access to the premises of two adjacent schools in Via Cesare Battisti in order to install a multimedia centre. In particular, the Diaz-Pascoli School (“Pascoli”) accommodated a press unit and temporary lawyers’ offices, while the Diaz-Pertini School housed an Internet access point. Following thunderstorms over the city which had hampered access to some camping sites, the Municipality had authorised the use of the Diaz-Pertini School as a night accommodation centre for demonstrators.
26.  On 20 and 21 July, residents in the area reported to the police that young people dressed in black had gone into the Diaz-Pertini School and taken materiel from the site linked to the ongoing works in the school.
27.  Early in the evening of 21 July one of the joint patrols proceeded along Via Cesare Battisti, sparking a heated verbal reaction from dozens of persons standing outside the two schools. An empty bottle was thrown at the police vehicles (see first-instance judgment, pp. 244-249, and Court of Cassation judgment, p. 122).
28.  On their return to the police station, the police officers who had headed the patrol recounted the events at a meeting called by the most senior police officials (including Prefect A., Prefect L.B., Police Commissioner C. and M.G.).
29.  Having contacted the GSF official to whom the Diaz-Pertini School had been assigned, the police decided to conduct a search of the premises in order to secure evidence and possibly arrest the Black Bloc members responsible for the unlawful damage. Having discussed and dismissed the idea of bombarding the school with tear gas, they agreed on the following modus operandi: a police unit made up essentially of officers belonging to a division specialising in anti-riot operations who had benefited from ad hoc training (the VII Nucleo antisommossa operating within the Rome mobile unit) was to “secure” the building; another unit would carry out the search; lastly, a carabinieri unit would surround the building to prevent suspects escaping. The Head of Police was also informed about the operation (see first-instance judgment, pp. 226 and 249-252, and Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, pp. 29-31).
30.  Late in the evening a large number of police officers from various units and departments left the Genoa police station for Via Cesare Battisti (see Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry, ibid.). According to the Court of Cassation judgment, the total number of officers participating in the operation was “approximately 500 police officers and carabinieri, the latter being responsible exclusively for encircling the building”. The appeal judgment (p. 204) pointed out that that figure had never been precisely substantiated.
31.  At around twelve midnight the members of the VII Nucleo antisommossa, having arrived close to both schools with helmets, shield and tonfa-type truncheons, together with other similarly equipped officers, began to run towards the premises. A journalist and a municipal councillor standing outside the schools were kicked and struck with batons (see first-instance judgment, pp. 253-261).
32.  Some of the persons occupying the Diaz-Pertini School who had been outside re-entered the building and closed the gates and entrance doors, attempting to block them with school benches and wooden planks. The police officers assembled in front of the gate, which they forced open with an armoured vehicle after unsuccessful attempts to shoulder-charge them. Finally, the aforementioned police unit broke down the entrance doors (ibid.).
33.  The officers invested all the floors of the building, many of them in complete darkness. With, in most cases, their faces concealed by scarves, they began to punch, kick and club the occupiers, shouting threats at their victims. Groups of officers even struck seated or prostrate persons. Some of those who had been awakened by the noise were struck while still in their sleeping bags, while others were assaulted while holding their hands up as a sign of capitulation or showing their identity documents. Some of the occupiers attempted to escape and hide in the school toilets or lumber-rooms, but they were caught and beaten up, and some of them were hauled out of their hiding places by the hair (see first-instance judgment, pp. 263-280, and appeal judgment, pp. 205-212).
34.  The applicant, who was sixty-two years of age at the material time, was on the ground floor. Having been awakened by the noise, when the police arrived he sat down against the wall beside a group of persons with his arms in the air (see first-instance judgment, pp. 263-265 and 313). He was mainly struck on the head, arms and legs, whereby the blows caused multiples fractures: fractures of the right ulna, the right styloid, the right fibula and several ribs. According to the applicant’s statement in the Genoa Court, the healthcare staff who arrived at the school after the violence had subsided attended to him last, despite hiss cries for help.
35.  The applicant was operated on at the Galliera hospital in Genoa, where he remained for four days, and then a few years later, at the Careggi hospital in Florence. He was granted over forty days’ unfitness for work. The aforementioned injuries left him with a permanent weakness in his right arm and leg (see first-instance judgment, pp. XVII and 345).
36.  Shortly after the storming of the Diaz-Pertini School, a police unit stormed the Pascoli School, where journalists were filming events both outside and inside the Diaz-Pertini School. A radio station was broadcasting the events live.
37.  When the police officers arrived the journalists were forced to stop filming and broadcasting. Cassettes containing the reports filmed over the three days of the Summit were seized and the GSF lawyers’ hard disks were seriously damaged (see first-instance judgment, pp. 300-310).
38.  After the storming of the Diaz-Pertini School the security forces emptied the occupiers’ rucksacks and other luggage without attempting to identify their owners or to explain the nature of the operation under way. They wrapped some of the items collected in a black flag in the school gymnasium. During that operation, some of the occupiers were taken to the gymnasium and forced to sit or lie down (see first-instance judgment, pp. 285-300).
39.  The ninety-three persons occupying the school were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit unlawful damage and destruction.
40.  Most of them were taken to hospitals in the city. Some were immediately transferred to the Bolzaneto barracks.
41.  During the night from 21 to 22 July the Head of the Italian police press unit, who was interviewed close to the schools, stated that during the search of the premises the police had found black clothing and balaclavas similar to those used by the Black Bloc. He added that the numerous bloodstains in the building had stemmed from injuries sustained by most of those occupying the Diaz-Pertini School during clashes with the police the previous day (see first-instance judgment, pp. 170-172).
42.  The next day, at the Genoa police station, the police showed the press the items seized during the search, including two Molotov cocktails. They also showed the uniform of an official who had taken part in the storming of the Diaz-Pertini School, displaying a clean cut which might have been caused by a knife (ibid.).
43.  The prosecution against the occupiers on charges of conspiracy to commit unlawful damage and destruction, serious or aggravated résistance to the police and the unlawful carrying of weapons led to the acquittal of all concerned.
44.  The Genoa public prosecutor’s office initiated an investigation to ascertain the facts underlying the decision to storm the Diaz-Pertini School and to shed light on the methodology of the operation, the alleged knife attack on one of the officers and the discovery of the Molotov cocktails, as well as the events that had occurred in the Pascoli School.
45.  In December 2004, after some three years of investigations, twenty-eight police officers and officials were committed for trial. Two further sets of proceedings concerning three other officers were subsequently joined to the initial proceedings.
46.  The applicant had claimed damages at the preliminary hearing on 3 July 2004. A total number of 119 parties claiming damages, including dozens of Italians and foreigners who had occupied both schools, as well as trade unions and other non-governmental associations, came to a.
47.  Those proceedings concerned the events in the Diaz-Pertini School, where the applicant had been accommodated (see paragraphs 31-34 above), and the events in the Pascoli School (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above). They involved hearing more than 300 individuals, both defendants and witnesses (including many foreigners), two expert opinions and the viewing of a great deal of audio-visual materiel.
48.  The charges relating to the events in the Diaz-Pertini School were as follows: giving false information for inclusion in a document, simple and aggravated slander, misfeasance in public office (particularly on account of the unlawful arrest of the persons occupying the buildings), simple and aggravated bodily harm and unlawful carrying of weapons of war.
a)  Trial at first instance
49.  By judgment no. 4252/08 of 13 November 2008, deposited on 11 February 2009, the Genoa Court found twelve of the accused guilty of providing false information (one accused), simple slander (two accused) and aggravated slander (one accused), simple and aggravated bodily harm (ten accused) and the unlawful carrying of weapons of war (two accused). The court sentenced them to between two and four imprisonment, a prohibition of holding public office for the period of the main sentence and, jointly and severally with the Ministry of the Interior, payment of costs and expenses and of damages to the parties claiming the latter, to whom the court awarded advances of between 2,500 and 50,000 euros (EUR).
The applicant, in particular, was awarded an advance of EUR 35,000, which was paid in July 2009 following an attachment.
50.  In determining the main sentences the court had regard to the mitigating circumstances that the perpetrators of the offences had no criminal records and that they had acted in a state of stress and fatigue. One of the convicted persons was granted a conditional suspension of sentence, whereby the court ordered that the conviction should not appear on his criminal record. Furthermore, pursuant to Law No. 241 of 29 July 2006 laying down the conditions for remission of sentence (indulto), ten of the convicted persons were granted total remission of the main sentences, and one of them, who had been given a four-year prison sentence, was granted a three-year remission.
51.  In the reasons for the judgment (373 pages of a total of 527), the court first of all rejected the argument that the operation had been planned from the outset as a punitive expedition against the demonstrators. It accepted that the security forces might reasonably have thought, in the light of the events preceding the storming of the buildings (particularly the information provided by local residents and the attack on the patrol during the afternoon of 21 July – see paragraphs 26-27 above), that there were also members of the Black Bloc in the Diaz-Pertini School. It held, however, that the events at issue constituted a clear violation of the law, “of human dignity and of respect for the individual” (di ogni principio di umanità e di rispetto delle persone). The court considered that even in confronting members of the Black Bloc, the security forces were allowed to force inasmuch as the latter was necessary in order to overcome violent resistance from the persons occupying the buildings, subject to proportionality between the resistance encountered and the means used. According to the court neither the applicant nor, for instance, a slightly built young woman who had also been present could have put up such resistance as to justify the blows which they had received, causing bruising and fractures.
52.  The court also emphasised that the prosecution had not requested the committal for trial of the actual perpetrators of the violence on account of the difficulty of identifying them, and that the police had not cooperated effectively. It noted in that connection that the prosecution had been provided with old photographs of the officers accused and that it had taken seven years to identify one particularly violent officer – filmed during the storming of the buildings – even though he had been easily recognisable by his hairstyle.
53.  In its assessment of the individual responsibility of the accused, the court held that having regard to the circumstances of the case, the perpetrators had acted in the conviction that their superiors tolerated their acts. The fact that some officers and officials who had been in situ right from the beginning of the operation had not stepped in immediately to halt the violence had encouraged the officers of the VII Nucleo antisommossa and the other members of the security forces in their actions. The Court therefore took the view that only those senior officials could be considered guilty of aiding and abetting the offence of causing bodily harm.
54.  The court then considered the prosecution argument that the security forces had produced false evidence and recounted fictitious events with a view to justifying, a posteriori, both the search of the premises and the acts of violence.
55.  As regards the behaviour of the persons occupying the buildings before the police stormed them, the court observed that the video recordings added to the case file had not shown them throwing any large objects from the building, but that it might be considered, according to the statements of a witness and the attitude of the police officers, who had been filmed with their shields raised above their heads, that a number of small objects (coins, bolts, etc.) had probably been thrown at the officers while they had been attempting to break down the entrance door to the school.
56.  As regards the alleged knife attack on an officer, the court, drawing on the results of the expert opinion prepared on that officer’s behaviour and the evidence at its disposal, observed that it could neither find that that attack had actually taken place nor preclude the possibility that it had in fact occurred.
57.  Moreover, the court noted that the two Molotov cocktails shown to the press on 22 July had been found by the police in the city during the afternoon of 21 July and subsequently brought, at the behest of the Deputy Police Commissioner of Genoa, to the schoolyard towards the end of the search of the premises, and that they had ended up, under obscure circumstances, mingled with the items that had been gathered together in the gymnasium.
58.  Finally, the court considered that the police report on the operation contained a misleading description of the facts, because it stated that all those occupying the school had resisted violently and glossed over the fact that most of them had been injured by the security forces.
b)  The appeal judgment
59.  The accused, the prosecutor’s office with the Genoa Court, the Principal State Prosecutor, the Ministry of the Interior (which was civilly liable) and most of the victims, including the applicant, all appealed to the Genoa Court of Appeal against the first-instance judgment. By judgment no. 1530/10 of 18 May 2010, filed on 31 July 2010, the court of appeal altered the challenged judgment.
60.  The Court of Appeal found the accused guilty of the following offences: providing false information (seventeen accused), aggravated bodily harm (nine accused) and the unlawful carrying of weapons of war (one accused). It imposed prison sentences on them of between three years and eight months and five years and prohibited them from holding public office for five years. Pursuant to Law No. 241 of 29 July 2006, all those convicted were given the benefit of a three-year remission of sentence.
61.  Since the limitation period for offences of aggravated slander (in the case of fourteen accused), abuse of public authority on account of the unlawful arrest of the persons occupying the Diaz-Pertini School (twelve accused) and simple bodily harm (nine accused) had elapsed, the Court of Appeal discontinued proceedings against them. The proceedings against the Head of the VII Nucleo antisommossa, who had been convicted at first instance for causing aggravated bodily harm, were also discontinued on account of mitigating circumstances. Finally, the Court of Appeal acquitted a person accused of simple slander and unlawful carrying of a weapon of war and another person accused of simple slander.
62.  Most of the sentences involving payment of damages and costs and expenses as passed at first instance were upheld in substance, and, at the appeal level, the accused persons who had been convicted for the first time were also held civilly liable.
63.  In the reasons for the judgment (120 pages of a total of 313), the Court of Appeal firstly pointed out that even if the suspicions concerning weapons used by the Black Bloc members during their looting could, in principle, have justified searching the schools, there was nevertheless scant evidence that all the persons occupying the two schools were armed and could be considered as belonging to the Black Bloc.
64.  The Court of Appeal further stated that several factors demonstrated that the operation had in no way been geared to identifying the members of the Black Bloc and had been quite different in nature.
65.  First of all, right from the planning stages of the “search” the senior police officials had allegedly specified that the VII Nucleo antisommossa and other heavily armed officers would be in the front line of the security forces; those units had not been given any precise instructions concerning the use of force against those occupying the school, their sole task being to “secure” (mettere in sicurezza) the building.
66.  Secondly, even those individuals who had been outside the Diaz-Pertini School and had not put up the least resistance had been immediately attacked by the security forces.
67.  Thirdly, the security forces had launched their assault by breaking down the doors without attempting to negotiate with the occupiers, explaining that a “non-violent search” was to be carried out, or to induce them voluntarily to open the door, which, according to the Court of Appeal, they had justifiably closed. On entry into the building the officers had systematically beaten those inside in a cruel and sadistic manner, inter alia using non-regulation batons. According to the Court of Appeal, the traces of blood to be seen on the photographs taken during the inspection of the premises had been fresh and could only have stemmed from the above-mentioned violence, contrary to the “shameful contention” (vergognosa tesi) that they had been the result of injuries sustained during the clashes which had occurred over the previous days.
68.  In the light of those factors the Court of Appeal concluded that the aim of the whole operation had been to carry out a large number of arrests, even in the absence of any judicial purpose, the main thing being to remedy a media image of a powerless police force. The most senior officials of the security forces had therefore surrounded the VII Nucleo antisommossa with a heavily armed unit equipped with tonfa-type truncheons capable of dealing lethal blows, and that unit have been exclusively instructed to neutralise the persons occupying the Diaz-Pertini School, stigmatising them as dangerous troublemakers who had caused all the unlawful damage of the previous few days. The violent and coordinated action of all the officers who had participated in the operation had been the logical consequence of the instructions given.
69.  Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, all the most senior officials of the VII Nucleo antisommossa, as a minimum, had been guilty of causing the injuries inflicted on the persons occupying the buildings. As regards the higher-ranking police officers, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the decision not to request their committal for trial had impeded proper assessment of their criminal responsibility.
70.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeal held that once the decision to storm the building and make the arrests had been taken, the security forces had attempted to justify their action a posteriori.
71.  In that connection the Court of Appeal noted that during the investigation the persons occupying the school had been attributed responsibility for offences which they had not committed: the investigation had in no way shown that the occupiers had resisted the security forces or that they had thrown objects at them while standing in the schoolyard, whereby some of the officers had probably raised their shields merely as a precaution; and above all, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the alleged knife attack on an officer during the storming of the building had proven to be a “bare-faced lie”.
72.  The Court of Appeal further noted that the most senior officials in the security forces who were present in situ, had decided to place both the Molotov cocktails that had been found elsewhere during the afternoon among the items collected during the search, with a view to justifying the decision to conduct the search and to arrest the persons occupying the school. The Court of Appel took the view that since the arrests had been devoid of any factual or legal basis, they had been unlawful.
73.  In determining the appropriate sentences, the Court of Appeal found that apart from the Head of the VII Nucleo antisommossa, who had attempted to limit the violence and had finally admitted the offences during the proceedings, no mitigating circumstances could be acknowledged in respect of the other accused. Having regard to the applicant’s statements, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the members of the security forces had turned into “violent thugs” indifferent to any physical vulnerability bound up with sex and age and to any sign of capitulation, even on the part of persons who had just been abruptly awakened by the noise of the attack. Moreover, the officers had compounded the violence with threats and insults. In doing so they had discredited Italy in the eyes of the international community. Moreover, once the violence had been perpetrated, the security forces advanced a whole series of fabricated “facts” implicating the occupiers.
In the Court of Appeal’s opinion, the systematic and coordinated nature of the act of violence committed by the police officers and the aforementioned attempts to justify them a posteriori constituted a deliberate, concerted effort rather than a state of stress and fatigue.
74.  Nevertheless, having regard to the fact the whole impugned operation had originated in the instruction from the Head of Police to carry out arrests and that the accused had therefore clearly acted under the psychological pressure of that instruction, the Court of Appeal determined the sentences on the basis of the minimum penalty laid down in criminal law for each of the offences in question.
c)  Court of Cassation Judgment
75.  The accused, the State Prosecutor with the Genoa Court of Appeal, the Ministry of the Interior (which was civilly liable) and some of the victims, appealed on points of law against the appeal judgment; the applicant and other victims claimed civil damages in those proceedings.
76.  By judgment no. 38085/12 of 5 July 2012, deposited on 2 October 2012, the Court of Cassation essentially upheld the impugned judgment, although it declared the offence of aggravated bodily harm for which ten of the accused had been convicted at first instance and nine at second instance (see paragraphs 49 and 60 above).
77.  In its grounds of judgment (71 pages of a total of 186), the Court of Cassation first of all examined the objection as to the constitutionality of Article 157 of the Criminal Code on statute-barring of criminal offences as submitted by the State Prosecutor under Article 3 of the Convention and, secondarily, under Article 117 § 1 of the Constitution. It observed that – as the first- and second-instance decisions had noted, in a finding which had never in fact been contested – “the violence perpetrated by the police during their storming of the Diaz-Pertini school [had been] egregious”. The “utmost gravity” of the police conduct stemmed from the fact that the widespread violent acts committed throughout the school premises had been unleashed against individuals who were obviously unarmed, sleeping or sitting with their hands up; it was therefore a case of “unjustified violence [which], as rightly pointed out by the State Prosecutor, [was carried out] for punitive purposes, for retribution, geared to causing humiliation and physical and mental suffering on the part of the victims”. According to the Court of Cassation, the violence might have qualified as “torture” under the terms of the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment or else as “inhuman or degrading treatment” under Article 3 of the Convention.
78.  The Court of Cassation noted that in the absence of an explicit criminal offence within the Italian legal system, the impugned violent acts had been prosecuted on the basis of simple or aggravated bodily harm, which offences, pursuant to Article 157 of the Criminal Code, had been the subject of a discontinuance decision on the ground that the limitation period had expired during the proceedings. It noted that that had been why the State Prosecutor had complained of the contradiction between the regulations on the statute-barring of the criminal offences laid down in Article 157 of the Criminal Code – inasmuch as that provision did not include ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention among the offences not subject to limitation – and in Article 3 of the Convention, which, in accordance with the Court’s well-established case-law, required the imposition of appropriate penalties on ill-treatment and therefore impeded the limitation of offences or criminal proceedings in cases of ill-treatment.
Nevertheless, the Court of Cassation considered that a change in the rules on limitation as envisaged by the State Prosecutor lay outside the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court because, under Article 25 of the Italian Constitution, only the law could establish offence and criminal penalties.
79.  As regards the convictions for offence of bodily harm, the Court of Cassation, having reiterated the events preceding the impugned police storming of the school (see paragraphs 25-30 above), considered logical the Court of Appeal’s finding that the instruction from the Head of Police to carry out arrests had, right from the outset, “militarised” the search operation which the police was to conduct in the school. The Court of Cassation held that the very large number of officers and the lack of instructions regarding alternatives to a tear-gas assault on the school (see paragraph 29 above) and regarding the use of force against the occupiers, among other factors, showed that that operation had not been designed as a peaceful search of the premises. The operational methods used had caused virtually all the persons occupying the school to be beaten up, which explained the Court of Cassation’s upholding of the responsibility, inter alia, of the officials heading the VII Nucleo antisommossa. First of all, the latter had given no instructions on how the building was to be “secured” and had at no stage informed the officers of the possible presence of harmless individuals; secondly, they had not prevented the attacks on persons standing outside the building, the violent storming of the school and the assault on the persons occupying the premises. In conclusion, as the Court of Appeal had rightly found, those officials had been aware that violence was inherent in that type of operation.
The Court of Cassation noted, however, that even the offences of aggravated bodily harm had become statute-barred on 3 August 2010 by dint of scheduling, the calculation criteria and the interruptions of proceedings provided for in Articles 157 et seq. of the Criminal Code as amended by Law No. 251 of 5 December 2005.
80.  The Court of Cassation also upheld the findings of the appeal judgment as regards the offences of providing false information, slander and unlawful carrying of weapons of war perpetrated in the framework of a “disgraceful whitewashing operation” in order to justify a posteriori the violence perpetrated in the school and the arrest of those occupying it. The Court of Cassation noted that the persons occupying the school had not put up any résistance either before the entrance door had been broken down or inside the premises, and also that the occupiers had not been in possession of Molotov cocktails, which had been brought into the school from the outside by the police. Therefore, the Court of Cassation declared mendacious the police reports to the contrary and slanderous the conspiracy charges levelled against the occupiers. As regards the conclusions of the appeal judgment concerning the alleged knife attack on an officer, the Court of Cassation merely specified the sentence passed on two officers convicted of providing this false information (three years and five months, as indicated in the reasons given for the appeal judgment, rather than three years and eight months as indicated in the operative part). Finally, it passed a sentence of three years and three months on one of the convicted officers for providing false information, on account of the limitation on the offence of aggravated bodily harm and the resultant inapplicability of the calculation criterion laid down in Article 81 of the Criminal Code because of the continuous nature of the offences.
81.  The charges levelled against officers for the events in the Pascoli School concerned arbitrary search and damage to property.
82.  By judgment no. 4252/08 (see paragraph 49 above), the Genoa Court held that the storming by the police officers of the Pascoli School had been the result of a mistake in identifying the building to be searched. It also found that no clear evidence had been provided to conclude that the accused had actually caused the damage complained of in the Pascoli School.
83.  On the other hand, by judgment no. 1530/10 (see paragraph 59 above), the Genoa Court of Appeal found that there had been no mistake or misunderstanding behind the police storming of the Pascoli School. According to the Court of Appeal, the security forces had tried to destroy all film evidence of the storming of the neighbouring Diaz-Pertini School and had deliberately damaged the lawyers’ computers. It nevertheless decided to discontinue proceedings against the police officer charged because the impugned offences had become statute-barred.
84.  By judgment no. 38085/12 (see paragraph 76 above) the Court of Cassation upheld that decision. It emphasised that the Court of Appeal had fully justified its conclusions by noting that the police had carried out an arbitrary search of the Pascoli School geared to seeking out and destroying audio-visual material and all other documentation concerning the events in the Diaz-Pertini School.
85.  On 2 August 2001 the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate decided to order an inquiry (indagine conoscitiva) into the events during the Genoa G8 Summit by the Constitutional Affairs Committees of both chambers of Parliament. For that purpose it set up a commission comprising eighteen Deputes and eighteen Senators.
86.  On 20 September 2001 the commission submitted a report setting out the conclusions of the majority of its members, entitled “Final Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry into the events during the Genoa G8 Summit”. According to the Report the search of the Diaz-Pertini School “could probably be seen as the most significant example of the organisational shortcomings and operational dysfunctions”.