7.  The first, second, third and fourth applicants were born in 1951, 1973, 1940 and 1978 respectively. The second and fourth applicants are the first applicant’s sons and the third applicant is his brother. The first, second and fourth applicants live in Moscow, the Russian Federation.
8.  New political forces came to power in the Ajarian Autonomous Republic (“the AAR”) in May 2004, following the so-called “Rose Revolution” which occurred in the country in November 2003 (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, §§ 11-13, ECHR 2008).
9.  On 25 August 2004 the first applicant, who had previously held the posts of Ajarian Deputy Minister of the Interior and President of the Audit Office, was charged, amongst other offences, with abuse of authority and extortion.
10.  On 26 August 2004 the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the AAR initiated proceedings before the Ajarian Supreme Court to confiscate wrongfully and inexplicably acquired property from the applicants under Article 37 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Article 21 §§ 5 and 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“CAP”); the legislative provisions in question had been adopted on 13 February 2004.
11.  The public prosecutor affirmed that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the salaries received by the first applicant in his capacity as Deputy Minister of the Interior between 1994 and 1997 and President of the Audit Office between November 1997 and May 2004 could not have sufficed to finance the acquisition of the property, which had occurred during the same time span, by himself, his sons and his brother.
12.  The prosecutor attached to his brief numerous items of evidence (twenty-three documents) which showed that, on the one hand, the first applicant had earned 1,644 and 6,023 euros (EUR) respectively in official salaries when he had occupied the above-mentioned two posts in the Ajarian Government, whilst, on the other hand, the total value of the property that he and the other applicants had acquired corresponded to some EUR 450,000 (1,053,000 Georgian laris (GEL)). The latter figure was based on the expert opinions of two independent auditors who had conducted an assessment of the disputed property on 20 August 2004.
13.  The public prosecutor therefore requested the Ajarian Supreme Court to rule that the items of property concerned, which are listed below, should be confiscated from the applicants and transferred to the State.
14.  The first applicant’s property included:
(a)  a house located at 54 Mazniashvili Street, Batumi;
(b)  a house located at 13 Griboyedov Street, Batumi;
(c)  the first floor of a house located at 60 Gorgasali Street, Batumi;
(d)  a share in the capital of the Sanapiro Hotel, Kobuleti;
(e)  a Mercedes car;
(f)  a flat located at 1 Ninoshvili Street, Kobuleti.
15.  The second applicant’s property included:
(g)  two guest houses located at 32 April 9th Street, Kobuleti.
16.  The third applicant’s property included:
(h)  a house located at 245 Aghmashenebeli Street, Kobuleti.
17.  The fourth applicant’s property included:
(i)  a flat located at 58b Gorgasali Street, Batumi;
(j)  a flat located at 4-6 Gudiashvili Street, Batumi;
(k)  a flat located at 20 H. Abashidze Street, Batumi;
(l)  a house located at 6 General A. Abashidze Close;
(m)  a house located at 186 Aghmashenebeli Street, Kobuleti.
18.  On 30 August 2004 the Ajarian Supreme Court accepted the public prosecutor’s request for an examination on the merits. It transmitted the prosecutor’s brief together with all the supporting documents to the applicants, inviting them to submit their written replies and attend an oral hearing scheduled for 7 September 2004.
19.  As attested by the relevant postal acknowledgements of receipt, the Ajarian Supreme Court’s subpoenas were duly served at all four applicants’ home addresses, but only the second applicant, represented by legal counsel, filed written comments on 6 September 2004.
20.  The second applicant submitted that the property mentioned at (b) above in fact belonged to him and not to the first applicant. To prove it he produced a contract of sale dated 2 December 1997, between himself and a certain G.V., plus a document from the Land Registry. He stated that he had purchased the property for EUR 10,174. His father-in-law, with whom the second applicant and his wife lived after they married, had helped him purchase the property. He produced a certificate from the bank stating that his father-in-law had taken out the loan, as well as statements by different witnesses.
21.  The second applicant further explained that the property mentioned at (f) above belonged to Mr N.U., who was neither a close relative nor in any way connected with the first applicant. It was therefore not subject to confiscation.
22.  As to the property mentioned at (g) above, the second applicant alleged that the first applicant had had no part in purchasing or renovating it and that he, the second applicant, was the sole owner. He had bought the property from a lady for EUR 4,069 with the help of his godfather, V.M., who had allegedly lent him 50,000 United States dollars (USD) to renovate the site.
23.  In sum, the second applicant requested that the properties mentioned at (b) and (f) and (g) above be removed from the confiscation list, and that due consideration be given to the evidence he had presented showing that the property concerned had not been wrongfully acquired.
24.  As the first, third and fourth applicants failed to submit written arguments or appear before the Ajarian Supreme Court on 7 September 2004, the latter decided to postpone the hearing until 9 September 2004. The relevant subpoenas were again duly served at those applicants’ home addresses, but none of them appeared before the court, either in person or by designating an advocate, on the second occasion either.
25.  The Ajarian Supreme Court opened a hearing on 9 September 2004 which the first, third and fourth applicants and their lawyers failed to attend, without giving reasons. It was attended by the second applicant’s lawyer, who additionally pleaded that the property mentioned at (d) above also belonged to him, but that he was giving it to the State as a gift. In response, the Ajarian Supreme Court changed the name of the defendant in that part of the case and named the second applicant as the owner of the property concerned. The second applicant further explained that in addition to the money his godfather had lent him, he had bought and renovated the property mentioned at (g) above with his salary as the director of a company in which he owned a quarter of the shares. According to the minutes of that company’s board meeting of 1 July 2004, the profit generated by its activities was EUR 17,987.
26.  On 10 September 2004 the Ajarian Supreme Court gave judgment in the absence of the first, third and fourth applicants, who had been notified twice but had failed to appear without good reason (Article 26 § 1 (2) of the CAP).
27.  Thus, the Ajarian Supreme Court ordered the confiscation of the property belonging to the first applicant listed under (a), (c) and (e), that belonging to the second applicant listed under (d) and (g), and that listed under (i) to (m) belonging to the fourth applicant. It considered in particular that the sums of EUR 1,644 and EUR 6,023 which the first applicant had earned as Deputy Minister of the Interior and President of the Audit Office respectively could not have sufficed to acquire the property in issue, and that the other applicants did not earn enough either. The salaries the first applicant earned were only enough to provide for the needs of a family of four. The court stated that the applicants, in particular the three who had failed to appear before the court, had failed to discharge their burden of proof by refuting the public prosecutor’s claim.
28.  As regards the property mentioned at (g) above, the Ajarian Supreme Court concluded that the second applicant had failed to prove the lawful origins of the money he had used to acquire the property, which had been valued by independent auditors who had assessed both the plot of land and the four guest houses situated on it at no less than EUR 94,000.
29.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ajara considered it established that the property mentioned at (b) above belonged to the second applicant and that the property mentioned at (f) belonged to a third party. The prosecutor’s case concerning these two properties was thus dismissed: concerning the first property, the court accepted the second applicant’s arguments as to its lawful origins.
30.  As regards the third applicant’s property mentioned at (h) above, it was established that this was a family home unrelated to the first applicant’s activities. However, as the property had been refurbished while the first applicant was in public office, making it worth EUR 24,418 according to an official valuation, the third applicant was ordered to pay the State compensation in the amount of EUR 10,174.
31.  All four applicants, represented by legal counsel, as well as the public prosecutor, appealed against the first-instance court’s judgment of 10 September 2004.
32.  The applicants requested that the confiscation proceedings be suspended pending the termination of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. They complained that the burden of proof had been shifted onto them in the confiscation proceedings. The first, third and fourth applicants also complained that they had not been given an opportunity to submit their arguments before the first-instance court. The first applicant additionally complained that he had been denied the right to be presumed innocent in the confiscation proceedings.
33.  On 22 October 2004 the first applicant’s wife asserted before the Supreme Court of Georgia that she and her son, the fourth applicant, were the owners of the property mentioned at (m) above. She explained that she was a Russian national and had sold the family house in the Smolensk region, with her siblings’ consent, to buy the property in Kobuleti, where her Russian relatives would spend their summer holidays.
34.  On 3 November 2004 a third party, Mr S. Tchitchinadze, applied to the Supreme Court of Georgia, stating that the decision of the Ajarian Supreme Court concerning the property mentioned at (a) above was unlawful because the property had previously belonged to him and was currently the subject of a dispute between himself and the first applicant. On 15 December 2004 Mr Tchitchinadze sent the Supreme Court of Georgia a decision of the Batumi City Court dated 14 November 2004 recognising him as the owner of the property in question. He requested that his property be removed from the confiscation list submitted by the public prosecutor (for more details, see Tchitchinadze v. Georgia, no. 18156/05, § 13, 27 May 2010).
35.  At the hearing the four applicants’ legal counsel contended that the case concerning the first, third and fourth applicants should be remitted for fresh examination because the three men had not been able to participate in the proceedings at first instance. He further complained that the evidence presented by the second applicant had not been given due consideration.
36.  On 17 January 2005 the Supreme Court of Georgia set aside the first-instance decision only in so far as it concerned the property mentioned at (a) above, the house located at 54 Mazniashvili Street in Batumi, acknowledging that the estate was the property of Mr S. Tchitchinadze (for further details see Tchitchinadze, cited above, §§ 16-17). For the remainder, it followed the reasoning of the Ajarian Supreme Court, namely that the first applicant’s income was not sufficient for him and his family members to have acquired the properties in issue, whilst the other applicants’ income was also insufficient. Concerning the arguments of the first applicant’s wife, the Supreme Court of Georgia noted that the land register named only the fourth applicant as the owner of the property mentioned at (m) above.
37.  On 6 December 2004 the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He argued that Article 37 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Article 21 §§ 5 and 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”), adopted on 13 February 2004, were contrary to the following constitutional provisions – Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), Article 21 (protection of property), Article 40 (presumption of innocence) and Article 42 §§ 2 and 5 (no criminal punishment without law and prohibition of retroactive application of criminal law) of the Constitution of Georgia.
38.  In his constitutional complaint the first applicant mostly reiterated the arguments that he had previously submitted before the Supreme Court of Georgia. In particular, he complained that the confiscation of his property and that of his family members amounted to a criminal punishment being imposed on him in the absence of a final conviction establishing his guilt, and that he should not have been made to bear the burden of proving his innocence, that is, the lawfulness of the disputed property. He also complained that the confiscation of the property in such circumstances was in breach of his right to be presumed innocent of the corruption charges. The first applicant also stated that he and his family had acquired the property in question well before the amendments of 13 February 2004 were enacted and that, consequently, the retroactive extension of those provisions to their situation was unconstitutional. For those reasons, he argued that the confiscation procedure provided for by the impugned provisions of the CCP and CAP had been arbitrary and amounted to a violation of the constitutional guarantee of protection of his private property.
39.  By a judgment of 13 July 2005 the Constitutional Court, after having heard the parties’ arguments and evidence from a number of legal experts and witnesses, dismissed the first applicant’s complaint as ill-founded on the basis of the following reasoning.
40.  First, drawing an analogy with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Constitutional Court stated that the Georgian constitutional provision protecting the right to property (Article 21 of the Constitution) likewise did not exclude the possibility of deprivation of property if such a measure was lawful, pursued a public interest and satisfied the proportionality test. The court then went on to emphasise that only lawfully obtained property enjoyed full constitutional protection; in the first applicant’s case there had been a legitimate suspicion as to the lawful origins of the property, a suspicion which he and his family members had been unable to refute in the course of the relevant judicial proceedings.
41.  The Constitutional Court further stated that the administrative confiscation proceedings provided for in Article 37 § 1 (1) of the CCP and Article 21 §§ 5 and 6 of the CAP, could in no way be equated with criminal proceedings, as no determination of a criminal charge was at stake; on the contrary, such proceedings were a classic example of a civil dispute between the State, represented by the public prosecutor, and private individuals. Given the “civil” nature of the proceedings in question, it was acceptable that the burden of proof in the proceedings should be shifted onto the respondent, the second applicant. Referring to its own comparative legal research and the Court’s judgments in the cases of Raimondo v. Italy (22 February 1994, §§ 16-20, Series A no. 281‑A) and AGOSI v. the United Kingdom (24 October 1986, §§ 33-42, Series A no. 108), the Constitutional Court added that such civil mechanisms, involving the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime or otherwise unlawfully obtained or unexplained property, were not unknown in a number of Western democracies, including Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
42.  As to the issue of the alleged retroactivity of the application of the amendment of 13 February 2004 introducing the administrative confiscation procedure, and the second applicant’s presumption of innocence, the Constitutional Court ruled that since the proceedings in question had been “civil” and not “criminal”, the above-mentioned criminal-law guarantees could not apply. Furthermore, the amendment of 13 February 2004 had not introduced any new concept but rather had regulated anew, in a more efficient manner, the existing measures aimed at the prevention and eradication of corruption in the public service. In particular, the Constitutional Court referred to the 1997 Act on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in the Public Service, which had required all public officials not only to declare their own property and that of their family and close relatives, but also to show that the declared property had been acquired lawfully.
43.  The Constitutional Court concluded that the amendments of 13 February 2004 undoubtedly served the public interest of intensifying the fight against corruption and that the test of proportionality had also been duly satisfied during the confiscation proceedings, which had been conducted fairly before the domestic courts.
44.  On 17 October 1997 the Act on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in the Public Service, the first major piece of legislation in independent Georgia’s history setting out the principles and methods for preventing and eradicating corruption in the public service, was adopted by the Parliament of Georgia.
45.  Section 1 of the Act proclaimed that its main objective was to prevent, uncover and put an end to instances of corruption, and to hold corrupt public officials liable.
46.  Section 3 of the Act defined the notion of “corruption in the public service” as the use by a public official of his or her public post or of the influence associated with that post for the purposes of undue enrichment. The same provision defined the term of “a corruption offence” as an act which contained the elements of “corruption in the public service” and which could be subject to disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability. Section 4 explained what exactly should be understood by a public official’s “family members” and “close relatives”, a definition which included such categories as siblings, children and parents.
47.  Chapter IV of the Act (sections 14 and 19) imposed upon public officials an obligation to declare their property each year (between 1 and 30 April). The declaration had to contain not only a list of the assets owned by the public official personally and by his or her “family members” and “close relatives”, and the property’s actual market value, but also information accounting for the origins of the property in question. The declarations submitted annually by public officials were public documents.
48.  According to section 20(1) and (2) of the Act, a corruption offence or another breach of the requirements laid down by the Act gave rise to liability under the rules laid down for that specific purpose either by the criminal or the administrative legislation. If neither criminal nor administrative liability arose, disciplinary action, such as dismissal from the post, was to be taken.
49.  On 13 February 2004 two major legislative amendments aimed at bolstering efforts to combat criminality, with a particular emphasis on economic offences and those committed in the public service, were adopted. One of those amendments introduced plea bargaining into the Code of Criminal Procedure (see Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia, no. 9043/05, § 49, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), whilst the second one, which concerned both the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Administrative Procedure, regulated the mechanism for the forfeiture of wrongfully acquired property.
50.  As a result of that second amendment of 13 February 2004, Georgian law provided for two procedures for the forfeiture of property: “criminal confiscation” and “administrative confiscation”. Criminal confiscation was of a general nature and dealt with deprivation of the objects of an offence and the instrumentalities of and proceeds from crime, imposed as part of the sentencing proceedings following a final conviction establishing the person’s guilt. Meanwhile, the latter procedure, which was governed by Article 37 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Articles 21 §§ 4 to 11 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”), was specifically aimed at recovering wrongfully acquired property and unexplained wealth from a public official, as well as from the latter’s family members, close relatives and so-called “connected persons”, even without the prior criminal conviction of the official concerned.
51.  Although a criminal conviction was not a necessary precondition, administrative confiscation could only be initiated if an official had first been charged with offences (including corruption) committed during his or her term in office against the interests of the public service, the enterprise or organisation concerned, or of one of the following offences: money laundering, extortion, misappropriation, embezzlement, tax evasion or violations of custom regulations, regardless of whether the official in question was still in office or not.
52.  Thus, if the public official in question was accused of one or more of the above-mentioned offences, and the public prosecutor in charge of the investigation had a reasonable suspicion that the property in the possession of that public official and/or of his or her family members, close persons and “connected persons” might have been acquired wrongfully, the prosecutor could file “a civil action” (სარჩელი) with the court under Article 37 § 1 CCP, demanding the confiscation of the “ill-gotten” property and unexplained wealth.
53.  Once a public prosecutor had filed a civil action for confiscation, which had to be substantiated with sufficient documentary evidence, the burden of proof would then shift onto the respondent. If the latter failed to refute the public prosecutor’s claim by producing documents proving that the property (or the financial resources for the purchase of the property) had been lawfully acquired or that taxes on the property had been duly paid, the court, after having ensured that the prosecutor’s claim was properly substantiated, would order the confiscation of the property in question (Article 21 § 6 of the CAP).
54.  According to Article 21 § 8 of the CAP, the purpose of administrative confiscation was to restore the situation which had existed prior to acquisition of the impugned property by the public official through wrongful means. In particular, the property confiscated in those administrative proceedings was then to be restored to its legitimate owner(s), which could be a private individual or a legal entity, after the legal claims on the property of all other third parties had been satisfied. If the legitimate owner could not be determined during the confiscation proceedings, the property was forfeited in favour of the State (Article 21 § 8 (1) of the CAP). Value confiscation was also possible under Article 21 § 8 (3) of the CAP, which stated that if the property subject to forfeiture could not be transferred to the State in its original form, the respondent should pay monetary compensation corresponding to the value of the property.
55.  The 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption was ratified and entered into force in respect of Georgia on 8 November 2008.
56.  Articles 31 and 54 § 1 (c) of this Convention, which set forth the principle of universal recognition of confiscation of property linked to corruption, or proceeds of crime derived from corruption offences, read as follows:
Article 31: Freezing, seizure and confiscation
“1. Each State Party shall take, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of:
(a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences established in accordance with this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds; ... 4. If such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part or in full, into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds. 5. If such proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds. 6. Income or other benefits derived from such proceeds of crime, from property into which such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which such proceeds of crime have been intermingled shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds of crime. ... 8. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of such alleged proceeds of crime or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the fundamental principles of their domestic law and with the nature of judicial and other proceedings. 9. The provisions of this article shall not be so construed as to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties. ...”
Article 54. Mechanisms for recovery of property through international cooperation in confiscation
“1. Each State Party, ... , shall, in accordance with its domestic law: ...
(c) consider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow confiscation of such property without a criminal conviction in cases in which the offender cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or absence or in other appropriate cases.”
57.  The relevant excerpts from the Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption further clarified a number of key legal notions relating to the confiscation of proceeds of crime related to corruption offences:
“IV. What to consider as proceeds of crime for purposes of confiscation
Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of article 31 outline the minimum scope of measures to implement the article.
Paragraph 4
This refers to the situation in which proceeds have been transformed or converted into other property. In this case, States Parties are required to subject to confiscation the property transformed or converted, instead of the direct proceeds.
Given that offenders will part as soon as they can with the primary proceeds of crime in order to obstruct investigative efforts to trace such property, the provision is of major relevance when applying an object-based model of confiscation, in order to avoid conflicts with potential bona fide third parties and facilitate investigative and prosecutorial activity. The provision reflects the same theory that lies behind a value-based model of confiscation: what matters is not to allow the offender to enrich him or herself by illegal means.
The provision follows the so-called theory of “tainted property,” whereby, as tainted property is exchanged for “clean property”, the latter becomes tainted. While this may raise issues about receipt in good faith, countries have developed requirements, whereby legislation gives primacy to the irrevocability of the “taint” irrespective of the iterations of transfer, receipt and conversion.
Paragraph 5
This refers to the situation where proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property from legitimate sources. States Parties are required to subject to confiscation any such property up to the assessed value of the proceeds. As stated above, both situations may pose a problem when the confiscation system operates under an object confiscation system, which requires a determination of property obtained through the offence. When operating a value confiscation system these situations do not pose any problem.
Paragraph 6
This requires States Parties to subject to confiscation not only primary but also secondary proceeds of crime. Primary proceeds are those assets directly obtained through the commission of the offence – e.g., a bribe of $100,000. The secondary proceeds, by contrast, refer to benefits derived from the original proceeds, like bank interest or the amount increased as a consequence of investment. In this regard, the Convention requires States Parties to provide mandatory confiscation for both the primary and secondary proceeds.
Though the definition of the proceeds of crime given in article 2 (g) includes property “obtained through a crime” and property “derived from a crime,” the paragraph explicitly refers to “[I]ncome or other benefits” derived from the proceeds of crime and applies to benefits coming from any of the situations referred into paragraphs 4 and 5 – property transformed or converted and intermingled property. In other words, any appreciation in value of the proceeds of crime, even when not attributable to any criminal activity must also be liable to confiscation. ...
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8 recommends that States Parties consider the possibility of shifting the burden of proof in regard to the origin of the alleged proceeds of crime. ...
[I]n addition to the sui generis procedures that accept non-criminal standards of evidence after the conviction is reached, a number of jurisdictions have also adopted civil procedures of confiscation that operate in rem and are governed by a standard of the preponderance of evidence.
VII. Protection of bona fide third parties
Paragraph 9 requires States Parties not to construct any of the provisions of that article as to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties. The Convention does not, however, specify to what extent third parties should be provided with effective legal remedies in order to preserve their rights. Thus, in implementing this provision, States Parties may wish to take into account that some jurisdictions have opted to establish a specific procedure for third parties claiming ownership over seized property, in which the prosecution evaluates whether the claimant(s):
• Have acted with the purpose of concealing the predicate offence, or are implicated in any of the ancillary offences;
• Have legal interest in the property;
• Acted diligently according to the law and commercial practice;
• If the property requires a public registration of the transaction or any administrative procedure, such information has conducted (e.g., real estate, or vehicles);
• If the transaction was onerous, whether it followed real market values.”
58.  The 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141), which entered into force in respect of Georgia on 1 September 2004, proclaimed that one of the “modern and effective methods” in the “fight against serious crime ... consists in depriving criminals of the proceeds from crime” (see the Preamble to the Convention).
59.  The Convention called upon the Signatory Parties to “adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds” (see Article 2). At the same time, the term “confiscation” was defined as “a penalty or a measure, ordered by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or criminal offences resulting in the final deprivation of property” (see Article 1).
60.  The Explanatory Report to the 1999 Convention further clarified the relevant legal terms:
“15. ... The experts were also able to identify considerable differences in respect of the procedural organisation of the taking of decisions to confiscate (decisions taken by criminal courts, administrative courts, separate judicial authorities, in civil or criminal proceedings totally separate from those in which the guilt of the offender is determined (these proceedings are referred to in the text of the Convention as ‘proceedings for the purpose of confiscation’ and in the explanatory report sometimes as ‘in rem proceedings’). It was also possible to distinguish differences in respect of the procedural framework of such decisions (presumptions of illicitly acquired property, time-limits, etc.) ... 23. The committee discussed whether it was necessary to define ‘confiscation’ or ‘confiscation order’ under the Convention. ... The definition of ‘confiscation’ was drafted in order to make it clear that, on the one hand, the Convention only deals with criminal activities or acts connected therewith, such as acts related to civil in rem actions and, on the other hand, that differences in the organisation of the judicial systems and the rules of procedure do not exclude the application of the Convention. For instance, the fact that confiscation in some States is not considered as a penal sanction but as a security or other measure is irrelevant to the extent that the confiscation is related to criminal activity. It is also irrelevant that confiscation might sometimes be ordered by a judge who is, strictly speaking, not a criminal judge, as long as the decision was taken by a judge. The term ‘court’ has the same meaning as in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The experts agreed that purely administrative confiscation was not included in the scope of application of the Convention.” 2.  The 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism
61.  In 2005 the Council of Europe adopted another, more comprehensive, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (ETS No. 198). It entered into force in respect of Georgia on 1 May 2014.
62. Articles 3 and 5 of the 2005 Convention, in so far as relevant, state as follows:
Article 3 – Confiscation measures
“4. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to require that, in respect of a serious offence or offences as defined by national law, an offender demonstrates the origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of its domestic law.”
Article 5 – Freezing, seizure and confiscation
“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the measures to freeze, seize and confiscate also encompass:
(a) the property into which the proceeds have been transformed or converted;
(b) property acquired from legitimate sources, if proceeds have been intermingled, in whole or in part, with such property, up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds;
(c) income or other benefits derived from proceeds, from property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled, up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds.”
63.  The Explanatory Report to the Convention of 2005 reaffirmed that:
“39. The definition of ‘confiscation’ was drafted in order to make it clear that, on the one hand, the 1990 Convention only deals with criminal activities or acts connected therewith, such as acts related to civil in rem actions and, on the other hand, that differences in the organisation of the judicial systems and the rules of procedure do not exclude the application of the 1990 Convention and this Convention. For instance, the fact that confiscation in some states is not considered as a penal sanction but as a security or other measure is irrelevant to the extent that the confiscation is related to criminal activity. It is also irrelevant that confiscation might sometimes be ordered by a judge who is, strictly speaking, not a criminal judge, as long as the decision was taken by a judge.”
64.  The Explanatory Report further stated that:
“71. Paragraph 4 of Article 3 requires Parties to provide the possibility for the burden of proof to be reversed regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation in serious offences. ... 76. This provision underlines in particular the need to apply such measures also to proceeds which have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources or which has been otherwise transformed or converted.”
65.  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in July 1989 as an inter-governmental group by a Group of Seven (G-7) Summit in Paris. It has since been globally recognised as an authoritative body setting universal standards and developing policies for combating, amongst other, money laundering. In 2003 it issued a specific recommendation, which was endorsed by Georgia, calling for confiscation even in the absence of a prior criminal conviction (known as Recommendation no. 3):
“Provisional measures and confiscation 3. ... Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction, or which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law.”
66.  In its First Evaluation Report on Georgia, which concerned a visit to the country by a team of examiners between 23 and 26 October 2000, MONEYVAL observed and recommended the following:
“2. The main areas generating illegal proceeds and seriously jeopardising the economic development of Georgia are corruption, fraud and tax evasion as well as smuggling in goods. ... 6. The examiners consider that the seizure and confiscation regime should be reviewed and brought up to internationally accepted standards. ...In the view of the examiners, the confiscation procedure should conform to the requirements of the Strasbourg Convention – with the introduction of the possibility of confiscating instrumentalities and proceeds, and if they have been altered into another kind of property, the corresponding value may be confiscated.”
67.  In the context of a second evaluation visit to Georgia by a MONEYVAL team of examiners, which took place between 21 and 23 May 2003, the Second Round Evaluation Report again criticised the domestic authorities for lacunae in the legal framework concerning the confiscation of proceeds of crime:
“8. ... [V]alue confiscation was not regulated in Georgian legislation at the time of the on-site visit. Indeed, the absence of a real measure of confiscation was given as one of the prime reasons for the lack of money laundering investigations or prosecutions. There needs to be a completion of the legal framework to create an enabling legal structure to support confiscation in respect of all criminal proceeds (both direct and indirect), and equivalent value based confiscation should be introduced. It is advised that elements of practice which have proved of value elsewhere, including the reversal of the onus of proof regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds, should be considered in particular serious proceeds-generating offences.”
68.  After its visit to Georgia between 23 and 29 April 2006, MONEYVAL made a number of positive comments in its Third Round Detailed Assessment Report about the administrative confiscation scheme introduced on 13 February 2004:
“18. The Georgian legal framework covering ... confiscation has been significantly developed and now there is a basic legal structure in place for ... forfeiture of objects, instrumentalities and criminally acquired assets (proceeds). ... 19. There are also some innovative administrative forfeiture provisions in place in special cases involving public officials and organised crime groups – which incorporates elements of civil standard of proof, which are very welcome developments. ... 239. The procedure for confiscating from third parties property which has been transferred to defeat confiscation orders were first addressed by administrative provisions dealing with family members and close relatives of officials where officials are subject of prosecution. ... These provisions (and the associated changes to the burden of proof for forfeiture in these cases) are very welcome, and should cover many third parties into whose hands illegal assets fall in sensitive cases. 240. ... Clearly the new administrative provisions for confiscation in respect of cases being brought against officials have been successful. ...”
69.  In its Second Evaluation Report on Georgia, adopted at its 31st Plenary Meeting held from 4 to 8 December 2006 in Strasbourg, GRECO observed and recommended the following:
“31. In the past few years Georgia has adopted a vast array of new legislation, among other things on seizure and confiscation of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, including corruption and the laundering of these proceeds. The introduction of an administrative confiscation scheme in 2004, specifically directed at illegally acquired property and unexplained wealth of officials, gave law enforcement authorities an effective tool to deprive officials as well as their relatives and so-called connected persons, of the benefits of their crimes.
Administrative confiscation requires no prior conviction, it explicitly allows for confiscation from third parties as well as of assets of equivalent value and requires a relatively low standard of proof, by providing that once the prosecutor has presented his/her claim to the court that the defendant’s property is illegal or cannot be explained the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that this property (or the financial resources required for acquiring the property) has been legally obtained.
The GET [the Group’s Evaluation Team] was told that so far property with a value of more than €40 million had been reclaimed which illustrates the commitment of the Georgian authorities not to let officials benefit from crimes committed during their term in office. However, the GET also heard that there have been some concerns about the arbitrariness of the administrative confiscation regime, in that allegedly, only proponents of the previous administration were being targeted.
There was also concern about the lack of transparency in the destination of confiscated property in that it was unclear to whom this property was being transferred (in case of existence of a legitimate owner of the property) or sold (in case of transfer to the State) and as to whether anyone other than the State stood to benefit from it. The Georgian authorities however informed the GET after the visit that the perceived lack of transparency in the destination of the confiscated property had been addressed, inter alia by abolishing the special state fund to which this property was allegedly transferred and that the value of the property confiscated was reflected in the State budget.
Although the GET was not in a position to assess whether the aforementioned concerns are still prevalent, it considers that any doubt about the legitimate use of administrative confiscation must be avoided. The GET therefore observes that the Georgian authorities should ensure the utmost transparency in the use of administrative confiscation to avoid any impression that this mechanism is being misused.”
70.  On 21 January 2004 the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies (“the ACN”) issued the following recommendation, referred to as “Recommendation no. 9”, to the Georgian authorities:
“9. [to] consider amending the Criminal Code to ensure that the confiscation of proceeds applies mandatory to all corruption and corruption-related offences. Ensure that the confiscation regime allowed for confiscation of proceeds of corruption, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds or monetary sanctions of comparable effect, and that confiscation from third persons is possible. Review the provisional measures to make the procedure for identification and seizure of proceeds from corruption in the criminal investigation and prosecution phases efficient and operational. Explore the possibilities to check and, if necessary, to seize unexplained wealth.”
71.  In June 2004 the ACN had already commended the Georgian authorities for having promptly undertaken a number of anti‑corruption measures, including on the legislative level. The relevant excerpt from the Addendum to the Summary Assessment and Recommendations, which was endorsed on 17 June 2004, reads as follows:
“Despite a very short time since the January review, Georgian updated report informs of a number of important changes in the national legislation, some of which are related to the January recommendations. The main changes are summarised below: ...
• Confiscation: adoption of legal provisions for the investigation of illegal or unjustified property, introduction of the institution of withdrawal of illegal property;
• Efficiency of investigation and prosecution: introducing plea-bargaining in the criminal procedure; enhancing the possibilities to apply special investigative means in collection of evidence;
• Confiscation of proceeds from crime: Georgia has adopted a new law, which provides legal basis for confiscation of unjustified property, and addresses January recommendation 9 concerning the confiscation of proceeds of corruption; additionally new measures are being introduced outside criminal process to enable confiscation of unexplained wealth (through the reversal of burden of proof) ...”
72.  Subsequently, in its First Monitoring Report on Georgia, which was adopted on 13 June 2006, the ACN concluded that the authorities had largely complied with its previous Recommendation no. 9 (compare with paragraph 70 above):
“The legislation of Georgia is compatible with the appropriate requirements of the international legislation, in particular with the relevant Council of Europe Convention, in providing for confiscation not only within a criminal procedure, but also through other means. Thus the Georgian Administrative Code empowers the prosecutor to claim the illegal property and unexplained wealth, the notion of which is described in the Law on Conflict of Interests. There are measures provided by the Criminal Procedure Code, such as the power to make civil claims in relation to the criminal offence. Georgia also supplied information regarding the application of these norms that substantiate the claims for effectiveness. It seems that the procedure for identification and seizure of proceeds of corruption exist and it is efficient and operational.”
73.  In its Third Monitoring Report on Georgia, which was adopted on 25 September 2013, the ACN made the following observations concerning the results of the anti-corruption measures undertaken in the country:
“Corruption in Georgia has been a significant obstacle to economic development since the country gained independence. Its pervasive nature and high visibility had seriously undermined the credibility of the government. However, the new Georgian government in 2004, which came to power after the ‘Rose Revolution’, committed to tackle corruption and achieved impressive results in eradicating administrative corruption.
Georgia’s Transparency International Corruption Perception Index score increased from 1.8 in 2003 to 5.2 in 2012; Georgia is ranked 51st out of 174 countries (leader in the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia). This is by far the most significant increase for all Istanbul Action Plan countries. Georgia is now ranking higher than a number of EU member countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania). While all studies confirm that corruption has been widely eradicated from the citizens’ daily life, many civil society representatives and representatives of international organisations believed that high‑level corruption persisted. It is considered to be one of the reasons for the previous governing party’s loss at the October 2012 parliamentary elections.
Progress in anti-corruption efforts has made the most significant impact on investment and business climate. In the latest World Bank’s Doing Business report (2013) Georgia moved up to 9th spot globally (from 112th in 2006) with the nearest country from the region being Armenia (32nd) and average regional rank of 73. Georgia was the top improving country since 2005 both in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia and globally with 35 institutional and regulatory reforms carried out.”