5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Khabarovsk.
6.  On 19 May 1997 the applicant lent the Khabarovsk Office of the Trade Counsellor of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK Trade Counsellor”) 1,500 United States dollars (USD). The money was to be repaid by 29 May 1997. A receipt of 19 May 1997 on the letterhead of the DPRK Trade Counsellor signed by Mr Chkhe Gym Cher reads as follows:
“[This] receipt is given to the President of the private company Lord BV Oleynikov to the effect that the Khabarovsk Office of the Trade Counsellor of the DPRK Embassy has borrowed 1,500 (one thousand five hundred) US dollars converted into roubles.
We undertake to repay the debt not later than 29 May [and] we pledge the Toyota Camry car, registration plate no. KhBB 1799 (ХББ 1799), engine no. 0073653, chassis no. 0062459, [together] with a complete set of documents for the car. In case of a failure to repay [the debt] within the indicated term, we shall pay 1% for each day of the delay.”
7.  After the DPRK Trade Counsellor failed to repay the debt, in 1999‑2000 the applicant sent several letters of claim which went unanswered. The applicant’s counsel also sent a letter of claim to the DPRK Trade Counsellor on 13 April 2001 and to the DPRK Embassy on 27 April 2001, which also went unanswered.
8.  On 11 September 2001 the applicant’s counsel wrote to the Russian Ministry of External Affairs asking for assistance in settling the matter.
9.  On 29 January 2002 the Ministry of External Affairs replied to the applicant that the DPRK Trade Counsellor was a constituent unit of the DPRK Embassy and, therefore, an organ of the DPRK which acted on its behalf. The DPRK Trade Counsellor thus enjoyed immunity from suit and immunity from attachment or execution in accordance with Article 435 of the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure. The Ministry of External Affairs advised the applicant that, should he decide to lodge a claim with a court, he would have to obtain consent to the examination of the case from a competent North Korean authority.
10.  On 8 July 2002 the applicant wrote to the DPRK Embassy and asked for its consent to the examination of his claim against the DPRK Trade Counsellor by the domestic courts. The letter was received by the Embassy on 19 July 2002. It appears that the applicant received no reply.
11.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a claim with the Supreme Court of Russia. On 21 February 2003 the Supreme Court returned the claim without examination on the grounds that it should have been lodged before a district court.
12.  On 9 February 2004 the applicant lodged a claim against the DPRK with the Khabarovsk Industrialniy District Court. He sought repayment of the debt with interest. He claimed, furthermore, that Russia was responsible for the actions of foreign diplomats within its territory.
13.  On 12 February 2004 the District Court returned the claim without consideration on the grounds that under Article 401 of the 2002 Code of Civil Procedure a claim against a foreign State could only be brought upon the consent of its competent authorities. The applicant appealed.
14.  On 16 March 2004 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. The court held:
“[The DPRK Trade Counsellor] is a subdivision of the trade representation of the DPRK in Russia the legal status of which is governed by the Annex to the Treaty on Trade and Navigation between the USSR and the DPRK of 22 June 1960. According to Article 2 of the Annex, the trade representation is an organ of the State (the DPRK) acting in its name. Therefore, taking into account the equality of States as a principle of international law, the trade representation as an organ of public authority of a sovereign State is entitled to judicial immunity as well as to immunity from measures of securing a suit and execution. The said immunities are based on State sovereignty, which does not allow a State to be subject to coercive measures of any kind. The principle of judicial immunity of a foreign state is enshrined in Article 401 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to which lodging a claim in a court of the Russian Federation against a foreign State, the involvement thereof in court proceedings in the capacity of a defendant or of a third party, the seizure of property belonging to a foreign State and situated within the territory of the Russian Federation, taking other measures for securing of a suit, and levying execution upon such property by means of enforcement of judicial decisions, are allowed only upon the consent of the competent agencies of the State in question, unless otherwise provided by an international treaty of the Russian Federation or by a federal law.
Therefore, [a] person may only lodge a claim against a foreign State upon the prior consent of the State. If [a] claim against a foreign State is not supported by ... documents confirming its consent to the examination of the case in court, [court] proceedings will not be instituted. As [Mr] V.B. Oleynikov failed to furnish [documents confirming] the consent of the [DPRK] to the examination of the dispute in court together with [his claim], the judge could not accept the claim because of the bar to [lodging such a claim before] a court. As the said bar is [not absolute], the judge returned the claim to [Mr] V.B. Oleynikov on valid grounds, having indicated how the circumstances that prevented the institution of the proceedings could be remedied.
[Mr] V.B. Oleynikov’s arguments that the DPRK Embassy does not wish to reply to his and his counsel’s requests [and] is evading payment of the debt, on the basis of which [he submits that] it is for the court or the judge to request the DPRK’s consent to the examination of the case, may not be considered as grounds for setting aside the [decision of the District Court], as they contravene the provisions of the international treaty between the USSR and the DPRK of 22 June 1960 and Article 401 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”