13.  The applicant was born in 1968 in Khanabad, Uzbekistan.
14.  In 2008, in the face of potential prosecution for religious extremism, he fled Uzbekistan with a forged Kyrgyz passport under an assumed name. On 19 April 2008 he entered the territory of the Russian Federation.
15.  On 6 September 2009 he obtained a Russian passport using forged documents.
16.  On 26 January 2009 and 28 September 2012 the applicant was indicted by the investigative authorities of Uzbekistan on charges of terrorism, inciting religious hatred, encroaching upon the constitutional order, illegally crossing the State border, organising a criminal group, producing and disseminating material threatening public security and order, participating in religious extremist, separatist, and fundamentalist movements, and smuggling. Since the Uzbek authorities could not locate him he was indicted in absentia.
17.  According to the Uzbek investigative authorities, in 2006 and 2007 the applicant had been actively involved in operating the terrorist organisation ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’, which has extensive ties with Al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad and Libyan Jamaat. He allegedly took part in recruiting and training terrorists, smuggling extremist material into Uzbekistan, organising gatherings where extremist material, including video and audio recordings, were viewed and distributed, fundraising for terrorist acts, training recruits in using firearms and hand-grenades, and facilitating illegal border crossings by the leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The Uzbek authorities further contended that members of the above-mentioned group had been involved in terrorist acts that had taken place in Khanabad and Andizhan on 25 and 26 May 2009.
18.  On 27 January 2009 the Andizhan Criminal Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The order was issued in absentia and the reasons given were the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the fact that he could not be located. On the same day an investigator issued an international search and arrest warrant against him.
19.  In March 2010 the Uzbek investigative authorities sent a notification to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Anti-Extremism Department in the Orenburg Region that according to their intelligence, the applicant was living in the region.
20.  On 10 March 2010 the applicant’s name and his two aliases were put in the ‘RM’ public transport search and identification system. The record mentioned his alleged association with radical and extremist organisations.
21.  On 11 June 2012 the ‘RM’ system registered the sale of a ticket for a passenger train going from Moscow to Bishkek. The ticket had been bought under the applicant’s assumed name, which he used in his Russian passport. An alert was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
22.  On 13 June 2012 at approximately 2.45 a.m. the applicant was apprehended at Orenburg railway station by officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Anti-Extremism Department and Federal Security Service (FSB). During the initial identity check, he used his Russian passport bearing an assumed name.
23.  After the applicant’s true identity had been established, an ‘express interview’ was conducted with him by Orenburg’s assistant transport prosecutor, Mr M. The applicant stated during the interview that he had fled Uzbekistan after learning that he was suspected of taking part in watching extremist material, while his prosecution was actually politically motivated. He further stated that since his entry into Russia, he had been living on various construction sites in Moscow, Tula and Orenburg.
24.  At 4.10 a.m. a record of apprehension of a person under an international search and arrest warrant was drawn up and the applicant was officially informed of his rights and the nature of the charges in Uzbekistan.
25.  On the same day at 1.40 p.m. he was once again interviewed by Mr M. During the interview, he was informed of the right not to incriminate himself and that he would be provided with an interpreter if needed. He expressed his wish to give answers in Russian. The interview record was verified and signed by him.
26.  The applicant stated during the interview that in 2008 he had decided to leave Uzbekistan because of possible prosecution for watching video material which was considered extremist by the Uzbek authorities. He further stated that he had procured a forged Kyrgyz passport under an assumed name, which he had used to enter Russia and obtain Russian citizenship. In particular, the interview record contained the following passages:
“... Until 2008 my permanent income came from exchanging currency in Khanabad and selling fruit...
In April 2008 an acquaintance [working] in law enforcement informed me that my name was on the list of people suspected of extremism. Aware that my acquaintances had been prosecuted for watching extremist material and sentenced to lengthy prison terms, I decided to evade law enforcement, since I had also watched that material...
In June 2012 I decided to return to Uzbekistan because I no longer wished to be a fugitive and it was necessary to make contact with the law enforcement bodies in Uzbekistan to resolve the situation surrounding [their] search [for me].
As to the criminal case against me I learnt of its existence from my wife during a phone conversation in 2009...I did not understand what the charges against me were, but presumed that I had been prosecuted for watching the extremist videos.
I did not commit any of the crimes I am accused of, except illegally crossing the Uzbek border. In spring 2008 I watched a documentary at home with some of my acquaintances about the killing of Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq by US soldiers – I presume they were Muslims because the majority of population in those countries are followers of Islam. We did not like the actions of the American soldiers and we discussed that. I do not think I committed any crime...
I did not request political asylum or refugee status in the Russian Federation...
I believe that my prosecution is politically motivated, because I do not like Uzbekistan’s policies on entrepreneurs; an opinion I expressed to the State institutions of Uzbekistan.”
27.  Later that day the applicant was placed in a pre-trial detention facility, SIZO-3 in Orenburg, pursuant to the detention order issued by the Andizhan Criminal Court. The Embassy of Uzbekistan in the Russian Federation was notified of the arrest.
28.  On 12 July 2012 an extradition request under the CIS Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 1993 (“the Minsk Convention”) was lodged by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Uzbekistan. Making reference to the provisions of the Minsk Convention and Uzbek legislation, the request included the following assurances:
(a)  The applicant would not be extradited to any third country or prosecuted for any crime which did not serve as the basis for his extradition without Russian authorities’ agreement. He would be free to leave Uzbekistan after the trial and serving his sentence.
(b)  The Uzbek legislation in force prohibited criminal proceedings on a discriminatory basis, the use of torture or ill-treatment, and guaranteed respect for defence rights.
(c)  He would be provided with medical assistance if necessary.
29.  On 13 July and 6 December 2012 and on 6 March 2013 the applicant’s detention was extended by the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg.
30.  On 12 November 2012 the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation examined the merits of the extradition request and authorised it in respect of the charges of terrorism, participating in an armed group, and illegally crossing the Uzbek border. The request was refused in respect of the other charges due to a lack of evidence and/or their being no comparable crimes under Russian law. The extradition authorisation did not examine any risks to which the applicant might have been exposed in Uzbekistan and merely stated that “no obstacles to extraditing Mr Mamazhonov under international law or the legislation of the Russian Federation had been established”.
31.  On 28 November 2012 the applicant’s representative Mr Gladkikh lodged a complaint against this decision, alleging that the applicant was at a heightened risk of being subjected to torture if extradited to Uzbekistan. The complaint stressed that since the applicant’s asylum application had not been definitively dismissed on appeal, any extradition authorisation was unlawful.
32.  The complaint alleged that contrary to the interpretation of the law in force provided by Ruling no. 11 of 14 June 2012 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 98 below), the prosecutor had neglected his incumbent duty to consider the risk of torture in Uzbekistan, having regard to the general situation in the destination country and the applicant’s personal situation, and the fact that the text of the extradition authorisation gave no reasons in this regard.
33.  The applicant’s representative also referred directly to eleven of the Court’s judgments issued between 2008 and 2012 in which a violation under Article 3 of the Convention had been found in similar circumstances. He argued that the prosecution authorities had disregarded the Court’s conclusion that individuals accused of crimes concerning politics and religion constituted a “risk group” systematically exposed to ill-treatment in Uzbekistan. Accordingly, their extradition, just like the applicant’s, had been contrary to the Russian Federation’s obligations under the Convention.
34.  Referring to reports by the United Nations agencies, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and CIVICUS in the last nine years, the applicant’s representative alleged that the use of torture and ill-treatment was commonplace in respect of people accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes.
35.  Lastly, relying on the official position of certain Russian State institutions, Mr Gladkikh highlighted the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its note of August 2009 “On human rights in Uzbekistan” stated:
“... criminal trials are characterised by a dependence on forced confessions, and a lack of adequate legal representation... it is also noted that people convicted of anti-State, religious and politically motivated crimes are incarcerated in much stricter regimes than others...”
36.  The complaint also quoted a March 2011 letter from the head of the Third CIS Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the director of the Federal Migration Service:
“... Considering the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights, it is actually possible to state that currently the extradition, deportation or administrative removal to Uzbekistan of any person wanted by the law enforcement agencies... will constitute a violation of the Convention...”
37.  On 27 December 2012 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed the complaint. It stated that the approval of the request was lawful, properly reasoned, and took into account the assurances of the Uzbek authorities. Furthermore, it considered that the ill-treatment allegations were merely a defence strategy of the applicant, who had procured a forged Kyrgyz passport under an assumed name, illegally crossed the Russian border on 19 April 2008, obtained Russian citizenship under an assumed name, and lodged an asylum request only after his apprehension under the international search and arrest warrant. The court noted that he had been convicted in Russia on 1 October 2012 of forgery and fined 6,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (150 euros (EUR)) (see paragraphs 40-41 below). It also stated that the extradition authorisation given by the Deputy Prosecutor General did not presume an automatic transfer of the applicant to Uzbekistan, and that no extradition could take place before his asylum proceedings had finished.
38.  On 28 December 2012 the applicant’s representative Mr Gladkikh appealed to the Supreme Court against the Regional Court’s decision, relying on essentially the same arguments as presented before. In addition, he stated in his appeal that contrary to the decision of the Regional Court, the Uzbek authorities had not explicitly stated that the applicant would not be subjected to torture, but had limited their assurance to a statement that the legislation in force prohibited it (see paragraph 28 above). The representative referred the Supreme Court to the Court’s judgment in the case of Khaydarov v. Russia ( no. 21055/09, § 105, 20 May 2010), where the existence of domestic and international law provisions prohibiting ill‑treatment was not considered to be a sufficient assurance in itself.
39.  On 12 March 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision and extradition authorisation. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
“... [In his appeal] Mr Mamazhonov indicates that [the Regional Court] ignored the fact that ... he had requested asylum and thus may not be returned to Uzbekistan. The court did not examine all the circumstances and adopted a wrong decision...
The attorney Mr Gladkikh requests in the interests of Mr Mamazhonov...that extradition proceedings be terminated. The attorney believes that [the Regional Court] violated Russian and international asylum law and did not examine the fact that the applicant had requested asylum. The court also did not examine any evidence proving that Mr Mamazhonov might be subjected to torture...in Uzbekistan. In his opinion, the case file does not contain guarantees that [the applicant] would not be subjected to unlawful actions and [the decision must therefore be quashed as unreasoned]...
When the Prosecutor General’s Office decided to transfer Mr Mamazhonov to the law enforcement agencies of Uzbekistan, his asylum request was denied.
[Furthermore, the Supreme Court restated the reasons for the denial of asylum and the assurances provided by the Uzbek authorities.]
...
The arguments of Mr Mamazhonov and his counsel that in Uzbekistan he will be persecuted on religious and political grounds are unfounded, since there is no objective proof.
The material in the case file demonstrates that Mr Mamazhonov’s prosecution by the Uzbek authorities is of a general nature and is not related to the policies of that State.
Mr Mamazhonov did not submit to the court any convincing arguments giving weighty grounds to believe that the Uzbek authorities might subject him to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or that he might be persecuted on the grounds of race, religious beliefs, citizenship, ethnicity, belonging to a social group, or political convictions.
[The Supreme Court] finds no grounds to annul the decision...”
40.  On 10 July 2012 a criminal investigation was initiated by the Russian authorities in respect of the use of forged identification papers by the applicant.
41.  On 1 October 2012 the Justice of the Peace for the 8th Circuit of the Promyshlenniy District of Orenburg convicted the applicant of using of forged documents (a Russian passport) and fined him RUB 6,000 (EUR 150). During the trial, he acknowledged his guilt, but stated that the procurement of false Kyrgyz and Russian identification papers had been a necessary measure to avoid his arbitrary prosecution in Uzbekistan for the crimes he had not committed.
42.  On 3 August 2012 Mr Gladkikh applied on the applicant’s behalf for asylum, alleging that the criminal charges against him had been “fabricated” after he, a successful businessman, had refused to pay bribes and provide pay‑offs to the Uzbek authorities.
43.  On 20 August 2012 the applicant was interviewed by the immigration authorities and his answers were recorded in an asylum questionnaire.
44.  On 24 August 2012 the Orenburg Regional Department of the Federal Migration Service refused to consider the merits of his request, because in their opinion it had been lodged only to evade prosecution in Uzbekistan, and the applicant had failed to substantiate his alleged fear of return. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
“... In the questionnaire, Mr Mamazhonov states that the reasons for his arrival in Russia were the extortionist demands of the authorities, unlawful persecution for his business success, and fear for his life. He submitted no other reasons, and stated that he had never been a member of religious, political or non-governmental organisations.
According to the questionnaire, there were no incidents of violence against him Uzbekistan; he never complained of persecution to the law enforcement or State institutions in Uzbekistan or to human rights organisations.
He explains his unwillingness to return to the country of origin by his fear of prosecution for serious offences by the law enforcement authorities in Uzbekistan...
The fact that Mr Mamazhonov, expressing his wish to receive protection from the Russian Federation... did not lodge his asylum request at the border crossing in 2008... or attempt to legalise his status during the lengthy period thereafter, and [did so] only after his apprehension [under the warrant] for crimes committed in Uzbekistan, demonstrates that the objective reason for...his arriving in Russia was to evade prosecution for crimes committed outside of Russia...
During his stay in Russia between June 2008 and August 2012, Mr Mamazhonov had also committed an offence by [being in possession of] forged documents and unlawfully obtaining a Russian passport...
It follows that the analysis of the reasons given in the asylum questionnaire, case file and search for the applicant for the crimes committed outside of Russia... does not lead to a conclusion [that there is any risk of him being persecuted in Uzbekistan].”
45.  On 16 October 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg in reviewing the above decision, established that the applicant had illegally crossed the Russian border on 19 April 2008, procured a forged Kyrgyz passport under an assumed name, obtained Russian citizenship under that name, and lodged an asylum request only after his apprehension under the international search and arrest warrant. On that basis the court rejected his complaint against the immigration authorities’ decision.
46.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the District Court’s decision. He alleged that both the immigration authorities and District Court had failed to consider his claims that he risked ill-treatment if returned to Uzbekistan.
47.  On 11 January 2013 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision and immigration authorities’ refusal to consider the asylum request. In particular, it stated:
“Information from reputable international human rights organisations concerning the unfavourable political climate in Uzbekistan and practice of malicious persecution of those accused of crimes against the State was not proven by objective evidence within the framework of Mr Mamazhonov’s case and may not serve as a basis for the annulment of a judicial decision... Moreover, a competent State institution deciding on asylum status independently evaluates the situation in a specific country relying on its own sources, and the opinion of human rights organisations is not determinative of such a decision...”
48.  On 7 February 2013 the applicant lodged a request for temporary asylum in Russia, but it was denied by the immigration authorities on 6 March 2013.
49.  On 8 March 2013 the applicant’s representative Mrs Yermolayeva submitted to the Court a request for the application of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to stay the applicant’s extradition to Uzbekistan until further notice. The request specified that the applicant’s extradition would expose him to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. The evidence and arguments presented to the Court were essentially the same as the evidence and arguments previously presented to the national authorities.
50.  On 11 March 2013 the Acting President of the First Section indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited to Uzbekistan until further notice.
51.  By a letter of 15 May 2013 the Russian Government informed the Court that they had taken relevant steps to guarantee that the applicant would not be extradited to Uzbekistan until further notice. In particular, the Prosecutor General’s Office, departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Border Guards Service had been ordered to prevent the applicant’s extradition or removal from Russia, and other law enforcement agencies had been instructed to comply with the measure applied.
52.  On 11 June 2013 the applicant’s representative Mr Gladkikh was informed that the applicant would be released on 12 June 2013. However, since it was a public holiday in Russia the release was rescheduled to 9 a.m. the following day. Mr Gladkikh was informed in person.
53.  A decision to release the applicant dated 13 June 2013 was issued by the Prosecutor General’s Office. It restated the procedural history of the case available to the Russian authorities at that time and explicitly mentioned the application of an interim measure by the Court. In the absence of any further legal grounds for the applicant’s detention, his release was ordered.
54.  According to statements submitted to the Court by the applicant’s representative, he arrived at the detention facility on 13 June 2013 at 6 a.m. Despite his previous enquiries about the time of release, Mr Gladkikh was informed at 7.30 a.m. that the applicant had been released at 7.15 a.m. and had left in an unknown direction. According to the Government’s submissions, the release had taken place at 6.30 a.m.
55.  Later the same day Mr Gladkikh lodged a request with the Investigative Committee of the Orenburg Region. The relevant parts of the request read as follows:
“... [On 12 June 2013] officers at the checkpoint [of SIZO-3] informed me that... Mr Mamazhonov was going to be released on 13 June, no earlier than 9 a.m.
Relying on the veracity of the information provided, I arrived this morning at SIZO-3, where I was informed at 7.15 a.m. [sic] that Mr Mamazhonov had already been released and had departed in an unknown direction. I was refused information about the precise time of release [sic]. At the present moment I’m not aware of the whereabouts of my client.
I draw your attention to the fact that during a private conversation, Mr Mamazhonov asked me to be personally present during his release and to further support him until the regularisation [of his immigration status] in Russia; he strongly denied any possibility of returning to Uzbekistan voluntarily.
Having regard to these facts, and the fact that there have previously been instances of disappearances from Russia of Uzbek nationals charged with State crimes, whose extradition was being sought [by the Uzbek authorities], I have grounds to believe that Mr Mamazhonov was abducted by interested parties with a view to transferring him to Uzbekistan.
Accordingly, I request [that]:
56.  Similar requests were lodged with the Prosecutor General’s Office, Border Guards Service of the FSB, and the police.
57.  On 14 June 2013 the administration of the detention facility SIZO‑3 sent a letter to the Embassy of Uzbekistan, informing it of the applicant’s release.
58.  Following Mr Gladkikh’s request a preliminary inquiry into the applicant’s alleged disappearance was initiated by the Internal Affairs Department OP-4 in Orenburg.
59.  On 17 June 2013 the inquiry was handed over to the Investigative Committee, since the crime suspected fell under their jurisdiction. The inquiry case file reached them on 19 June 2013.
60.  On 19 June 2013 the investigator examined the applicant’s cell in SIZO-3 and seized from the administration the applicant’s personal file and the available video surveillance recordings.
61.  On the same day he questioned four officers working at the detention centre who were present during the applicant’s release. They stated that the applicant (i) had been released at the expiry of the court-ordered detention, (ii) had been informed of his obligation to register with the immigration authorities, (iii) had not made any complaints or requests during his release, and (iv) had not been approached after his release by anyone in uniform, Asian-looking or anyone else.
62.  On 20 June 2013, in reply to the investigator’s request, the Federal Migration Service informed him that there was no record of the applicant in their databases, and the Border Guards Service of the FSB stated that due to the absence of any IT systems at the borders of the Orenburg Region it was not possible to provide information about a specific person.
63.  On 21 June 2013 the period of inquiry was extended by ten days to collect further evidence.
64.  On the same day, in reply to the investigator’s request, the Internal Affairs Department in Orenburg Region stated that since 13 June 2013 the applicant had not been apprehended or detained by the police.
65.  On 26 June 2013 the applicant’s cellmate in SIZO-3, Mr G., was interviewed after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. The relevant part of the interview record stated as follows:
“.... In June 2013 he was released... He did not know about his release from detention because he was woken up early in the morning and told that he was being released...he did not inform me of his future plans. I am not aware where he might be.”
66.  On 26 June 2013 an officer of the Anti-Extremism Department in the Orenburg Region, Mr Ab., who was involved in apprehending the applicant, was questioned after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. He stated, in particular, that (i) the applicant was of no interest to his agency since there was no evidence of his involvement in criminal activities in Orenburg, (ii) that he was not aware of the applicant’s possible whereabouts, and (iii) that there had been no contact or exchange of information between his agency and the Uzbek law enforcement agencies.
67.  On the same day the investigator requested from the Transport Prosecutor’s Office in Orenburg a copy of the extradition case file, in order to fully consider the possibility of the applicant’s forced removal to Uzbekistan. It was provided on 28 June 2013.
68.  On the same day, in reply to the investigator’s repeated request, the Federal Migration Service informed him that there was no record of the applicant crossing the State border after 11 June 2013.
69.  On 27 June 2013 an officer of the FSB in the Orenburg Region, Mr St., who was involved in apprehending the applicant, was questioned after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. His statements were essentially the same as those provided previously by Mr Ab., the officer of the Anti-Extremism Department in the Orenburg Region (see paragraph 66 above).
70.  On the same day the applicant’s representative Mr Gladkikh was interviewed after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. The relevant part of the interview records stated as follows:
“On 12 June 2013 I arrived at SIZO-3 in Orenburg with Mr Al. and Mr R.M., who lives in Uzbekistan but works in Moscow and who is a brother of Mr Mamazhonov... I was told [by officers of the detention facility] that the client’s release would not take place that day, since the papers were not ready... [I was told to return the next day by 9 a.m.]
... While Mr Mamazhonov was detained in SIZO-3 I frequently visited him, but he never informed me of any visits from law enforcement agents or anyone else [or] the use of unlawful investigative measures or torture. If something like that had happened to him, he would have told me about it. I personally have also never been contacted about Mr Mamazhonov by agents of the State or other services of Russia or Uzbekistan; from what I know the same applies to his relatives...
... [O]n 13 June 2013 I arrived at SIZO-3 at around 6 a.m. The officer on duty refused to provide me with any information on Mr Mamazhonov... [she] told me that at 7.15 a.m. he was being released... At 9 a.m. I called SIZO-3 and was informed that Mr Mamazhonov had been released at 8 a.m. To date I have not been aware of his whereabouts, his relatives do not have this information either, as he did not make any contact. I am saying that his Russian passport has been seized and his Uzbek passport has been lost. Before his release Mr Mamazhonov did not inform me of an intention to move somewhere after his release; on the contrary, he wanted to regularise his status in Russia. I personally believe that certain parties from Uzbekistan interested in his return are implicated in [his] disappearance. There have been similar cases in Russia in the past.”
71.  Later that day, in reply to the investigator’s request, the Transport Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Orenburg stated that there was no record of the applicant buying train or plane tickets between 13 and 27 June 2013.
72.  On 27 June 2013, relying on the results of the preliminary inquiry, the Investigative Committee initiated criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s disappearance and suspected murder. The investigation was assigned to a group of investigators from the Investigative Committee, the FSB, and the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs.
73.  On 1 July 2013 a detailed plan of the investigation was adopted by the group of investigators, presided by Mr L. The plan contained several dozen investigative measures each assigned to specific investigators. The measures were aimed at detecting the current whereabouts of the applicant, discovering information and evidence, and verifying five existing theories about the applicant’s disappearance. The theories adopted were that:
(a)  the applicant was alive, but was voluntarily avoiding contact to evade the law enforcement agencies;
(b)  the applicant was alive, but could not contact anyone due to serious illness;
(c)  the applicant had left Russia to further engage in terrorist activities in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and other countries;
(d)  the applicant had died and his death had been caused by an illness, accident or other non-criminal circumstances; or
(e)  the applicant had become the victim of a crime (murder or kidnapping).
74.  Later that day an investigator examined the area around SIZO-3 and established that there had been no outside video surveillance cameras placed there.
75.  On 8 July 2013 the applicant’s representative Mr Gladkikh challenged the opening of an investigation into his client’s disappearance and suspected murder, arguing that the investigation should be based on his suspected abduction. On 27 July 2013 he was informed by the investigator that there was no evidence to substantiate the suspected abduction.
76.  Later that day the applicant’s representative Mr Gladkikh was once again interviewed after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. His statement was essentially the same as his previous one (see paragraph 70 above).
77.  On 9 July 2013 the release officer of SIZO-3, Mrs L.S., was questioned after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. The relevant parts of the interview records read as follows:
“... [The prosecutor’s decision to release Mr Mamazhonov on 13 June 2013 due to expiry of the maximum period for his detention] arrived at SIZO-3 on 11 June 2013 at around 5.30 p.m. ...
During the afternoon of 11 June 2013, the lawyer Mr Gladkikh...called me to inquire about the date of release... [Mrs L.S. informed him that it would be 13 June 2013]...
Around 10 a.m. on 12 June 2013 I was informed by officers at the checkpoint that Mr Gladkikh had visited [SIZO-3 to inquire about Mr Mamazhonov’s release]...
On 13 June 2013 I arrived at work at around 6.30 a.m. at the request of the head of SIZO-3, Mr L.A.... [and immediately took part in Mr Mamazhonov’s release]...
During the release, Mr Mamazhonov asked me whether his lawyer was waiting for him, but I could not tell [him] because I did not know...”
78.  On the same day the head of SIZO-3, Mr L.A., was questioned after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. The relevant parts of the interview records read as follows:
“... During Mr Mamazhonov’s detention in SIZO-3 and after the prosecutor’s decision to release him, I was made aware of [his] concerns for his safety after release.
Accordingly, in order to ensure his safety I made the decision to release [him] before regular working hours...
I took part in [his] release...as an officer in charge of supervising the release procedure...
[After release] Mr Mamazhonov left the premises of SIZO-3. He left the area and passed the guards alone...
I am not aware if anyone was meeting him...”
79.  On 15 July 2013 three security guards of SIZO-3 who were present during the applicant’s release were questioned after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. They all stated that the release had taken place at around 6.30 a.m. and were not aware if anyone had been expecting the applicant, since they could not leave their duty stations in the building.
80.  On 12 July 2013, in reply to the request of 8 July 2013, the administration of SIZO-3 informed the investigation that while there were video surveillance cameras covering the building and adjacent area, the recordings of 13 June 2013 were no longer available due to the expiry of their storage period. However, the recording from the camera at the checkpoint of the detention facility covering the period between 5 and 6.57 a.m. that day was available (see paragraphs 91-95 below), since a local copy had been saved following a request in the course of the preliminary inquiry.
81.  On 17 and 20 July 2013 the FSB in the Orenburg Region informed the chief investigator that they had complied with the investigative tasks assigned to them. They stated that they had contacted the National Security Service of Uzbekistan in order to obtain information about the applicant’s possible whereabouts, establish a list of his relatives, and procure the necessary background information. They further stated that according to their sources, the applicant might have been assisted in illegally crossing the Russian border by Mr Al., with whom he had previously collaborated extensively in illegal activities.
82.  On 1 August 2013 the applicant’s cellmate in SIZO-3, Mr G., was repeatedly questioned after being cautioned about criminal liability for perjury. He mostly confirmed his previous statements, supplementing them with the following relevant passages:
“... Mr Mamazhonov told me that in Uzbekistan he had been prosecuted for terrorism. He told me that in Uzbekistan he might have been sentenced to 18 to 19 years’ imprisonment...
[He] also told me that in the summer of 2012 he had decided to travel to Uzbekistan by train, because he was worried about his two or three wives and seven children...
... He had only learnt of the international search warrant after his apprehension...
[He] did not want to return to Uzbekistan, because he would have been sentenced to lengthy imprisonment there...
[He] also mentioned that if there was no possibility of him staying in Russia, he would travel to Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, where he had acquaintances...
[A day before his release he was informed of it]
Mr Mamazhonov told me that his lawyer was going to inform his friends and relatives of the day of release and that they were going to come and meet him...
[He was convinced that his friends and relatives] were going to help him relocate to another country if he was not able to stay in Russia, because he did not want to return to Uzbekistan...”
83.  On 5 August 2013 Mr R.M., the applicant’s brother, was officially recognised as a victim by the investigative authorities.
84.  On the same day the investigator sent a request for legal cooperation to the Uzbek authorities. The competent authorities were requested to inform Mr R.M. of his status in the investigation conducted in Russia and question him according to a non-exhaustive list of approximately thirty questions concerning the applicant’s background, state of health and mind, social and family ties, political and religious affiliations, and questions in respect of the events of 12 and 13 June 2013. Lastly, the Uzbek authorities were requested to collect a saliva sample from him for his DNA, in the event of a future need for identification.
85.  On 7 August 2013, in reply to the request of 5 August 2013, the Federal Migration Service informed the investigation that there was no record of Mr Mamazhonov crossing the Russian border.
86.  According to the material in the Court’s possession, other investigative activities between June and August 2013 included a screening of the applicant’s possible contacts, a search for possible witnesses, monitoring of the sale of train and airline tickets, putting the applicant on the list of missing persons, and sending legal cooperation requests to neighbouring regions.
87.  The applicant’s representatives’ submissions of 20 December 2013 addressed to the Court were accompanied by an undated letter by Mr Gladkikh (the applicant’s second representative). The relevant parts of the letter stated:
“... in the beginning of September 2013 I received a phone call on my mobile from a man identifying himself as a relative of my client, Mr Mamazhonov. The man told me [the applicant] was being held in custody in Andizhan and that the criminal case would be sent to trial soon. Due to fears for his safety, he refused to provide me with detailed information on the case...or to state his full name.
Furthermore, from a private conversation with an investigator, Mr L., I have learnt that he (the investigator) is preparing to go on a mission to Uzbekistan in order to get statements from Mr Mamazhonov himself concerning the circumstances of the criminal case opened following his disappearance. He further informed me that the statements...would be obtained by officials of the Uzbek law enforcement agencies, and that just he himself would be present during the interview.”
88.  On 21 April 2014 the applicant’s representatives informed the Court of the recent developments in the case. In particular, the letter stated:
“... The applicant’s lawyer Mr Gladkikh recently received a call from an unknown person...[who stated] that the applicant was currently being detained in Khanabad (Uzbekistan) and that the criminal case against him was about to be handed over to the court. The man also informed me that the applicant’s brother (who was acknowledged as a victim of the crime in the criminal investigation into the applicant’s abduction in Russia) was also currently being detained in Uzbekistan...
The applicant’s representatives also pointed out that the initial authorities’ intention to conduct certain investigative measures in Uzbekistan was not realised for unknown reasons. The intention to visit Uzbekistan confirms in itself that the applicant was in Uzbekistan...
The detention of the applicant’s brother, Mr R.M. (whose name was mentioned in the request for cooperation of 08.08.2013...) illustrates the reluctance of the Uzbek authorities to provide the Russian investigative authorities with an opportunity to get an independent statement from [him]...”
89.  No other information is available to the Court regarding the progress of the criminal investigation.
90.  The applicant’s whereabouts are currently unknown.
91.  The Government submitted as evidence to the Court a recording from the video surveillance camera placed inside SIZO-3 in Orenburg facing the checkpoint of the detention facility, opposite the only entrance to the building. The recording covers the period between 6.13 and 7 a.m. on 13 June 2013, the day of the applicant’s release.
92.   On the recording, at 6.17 a.m. a person identifying himself as Mr Ikromzhon Makhkamovich Mamazhonov is brought before an officer responsible for releasing detainees. He gives the same date and place of birth as those indicated (in paragraph 13) above, and gives an address in Orenburg as his place of residence. He is provided with an identity certificate, and after receiving it at 6.19 a.m. leaves, presumably after being released from the detention centre.
93.  The recording of the next forty minutes shows several people approach and pass the checkpoint.
94.  At 6.26 a.m. the following fragments of a conversation are audible:
“Woman: Permission to enter.
...
Man [over the phone]: Where are you? The exit? Alone? ...
Woman: ... civilians...
Man: Civilians?
Woman: No... [he] is in uniform and two civilians...”
95.  At 6.43 a.m. a senior officer approaches the checkpoint, presumably from outside the building:
“Officer at the checkpoint: Good morning, Sir!
Senior officer: Hello! Have you seen anything?
Officer at the checkpoint: ...
Senior officer: I am asking you if you have seen anything.
Officer at the checkpoint: No.
Senior officer: OK. I am asking just in case.”
96.  On 10 July 2013 the Ministers’ Deputies at the 1176th meeting, having considered the information and documents made available to them by the applicant’s representatives and the Court (see paragraph 11 above), adopted the following decision concerning the applicant’s disappearance:
“The Deputies,
Recalling the decisions adopted at their 1164th meeting (5-7 March 2013) (DH) and 1172nd meeting (4-6 June 2013) (DH) in the Garabayev group of cases against the Russian Federation, 1.  noted with grave concern that a further incident involving allegations of kidnapping and illegal transfer of an applicant protected by an interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 has been reported, this time in the context of the Mamazhonov case; 3.  consequently insisted again on the pressing need to adopt as of now measures to ensure an immediate and effective protection of the applicants in a similar situation against kidnappings and irregular removals from the national territory; 4.  recalled in this context the letter sent by the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; 5.  agreed that a draft interim resolution will be considered in the light of progress that would have been made, including the updated action plan submitted by the Russian authorities; this text will be circulated in the draft revised order of business of their 1179th meeting (24-26 September 2013) (DH).”
97.  The Code of Criminal Procedure 2002 regulates proceedings concerning extradition to other States. A summary of the relevant provisions has been previously provided by the Court in the case of Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia (no. 71386/10, §§ 70-75, ECHR 2013).
98.  Providing guidance to the national courts on dealing with extradition requests, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation indicated in its Ruling no. 11 of 14 June 2012, with reference to Article 3 of the Convention, that extradition should be refused if there are serious reasons to believe that the person may be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting country. Extradition may also be refused if exceptional circumstances disclose that it may entail a danger to the person’s life and health on account of, among other things, his or her age or physical condition. Russian authorities dealing with an extradition case should examine whether there are reasons to believe that the person concerned may be sentenced to the death penalty, subjected to ill-treatment or persecuted because of his race, religious beliefs, nationality, ethnic or social origin or political opinions. The Supreme Court further stated that the courts should assess both the general situation in the requesting country and the personal circumstances of a person whose extradition is being sought. They should take into account the testimony of the person concerned and that of any witnesses, any assurances given by the requesting country, and information about the country provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, competent United Nations agencies and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
99.  The relevant provisions of domestic and international law concerning the status of refugees have been previously provided by the Court in Savriddin Dzhurayev (ibid., § 92-99).
100.  On 4 March 2013 the provisions of Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2002, which regulates preliminary inquiries into the reports of a crime, were significantly amended. Every report of a crime must be accepted, verified and decided upon within three days (extended to ten or thirty days under certain circumstances) by an inquiry officer, inquiry agency, investigator or prosecutor.
101.  Prior to the amendments, Article 144 § 1 had provided that the investigative authorities could proceed with their inquiry, with expert assistance or on their own, to carry out documentary verifications, checks, and the examination of documents, objects or dead bodies, and could issue compulsory orders for operational search activities. The amendments introduced in 2013 significantly broadened these powers, essentially equalising them with the powers afforded by a criminal investigation. The new inquiry methods include collecting statements and samples for comparative examinations, requesting documents and objects, seizing them, and ordering forensic expert examinations.
102.  Newly introduced paragraph 1.1 of the Article essentially equalised the legal status, rights and obligations of people involved in a preliminary inquiry with those of people involved in a criminal investigation. The provision specifically mentions the right of a person not to incriminate himself, his spouse or close relatives, the right to be represented by legal counsel, and the right to appeal against the actions (or inaction) of investigative authorities. These people may be requested to respect the confidentiality of the proceedings, and their safety may be ensured in the manner prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
103.  New Section 1.2 of the Article states that the results of a preliminary inquiry may be used as evidence if they comply with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is specifically mentioned that after a criminal investigation has been formally initiated, the defence has a right to request an additional or repeat forensic expert examination, and that such a request must be granted.
104.  A criminal investigation may be initiated by an investigator or prosecutor following a complaint by an individual or on the investigating authorities’ own initiative, where there are reasons to believe that a crime has been committed (Articles 146 and 147).
105.  Decisions by an investigator or prosecutor refusing to institute criminal proceedings or terminating a case, and other orders and acts or omissions which may infringe the constitutional rights and freedoms of the parties to criminal proceedings or to restrict access to justice, may be appealed against to a district court, which is empowered to check the lawfulness and grounds of the impugned decisions (Article 125).
III.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE TEXTS ON THE DUTY TO COOPERATE WITH THE COURT, THE RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL PETITION AND INTERIM MEASURES
106.  Subsequent to the resolutions adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly and Committee of Ministers on the duty to cooperate with the Court, the right to individual petition and interim measures, as presented in Savriddin Dzhurayev (cited above, §§ 108-20), three further relevant documents were adopted by the Council of Europe bodies.
107.  The Committee of Ministers’ Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2013)200, concerning execution of the Court’s judgments in the Garabayev group of cases against the Russian Federation, was adopted on 26 September 2013 at the 1179th meeting of Ministers’ Deputies. It reads as follows:
“The Committee of Ministers...
Considering the cases decided by the Court, in which the latter found violations by the Russian Federation due to the applicants’ abductions and irregular transfers from the Russian Federation to States where the applicants face a real risk of torture and ill‑treatment, and in breach of an interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of its Rules of Procedure;
Recalling that given the number of communications received, including from the Court, relating to alleged similar incidents that have been reported, revealing an alarming and unprecedented situation, the Committee has been calling upon the Russian authorities to adopt as a matter of urgency special protective measures for applicants exposed to a risk of kidnapping and irregular transfer;
Noting that the Russian authorities have taken a number of general measures to prevent abductions and illegal transfers from the Russian territory of persons in whose respect extradition requests were filed and the Court has indicated an interim measure under Rule 39 of its Rules;
Deeply regretting that these measures do not appear to have been sufficient to address the need for urgent adoption of special preventive and protective measures that are effective;
Deploring that to date, no reply has been received to the letter sent on 5 April 2013 by the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers to his Russian counterpart conveying the Committee’s serious concerns in view of the persistence of this situation and its repeated calls for the urgent adoption of such protective measures;
Underlining that in its judgment in the Abdulkhakov case, the Court noted that “any extra-judicial transfer or extraordinary rendition, by its deliberate circumvention of due process, is an absolute negation of the rule of law and the values protected by the Convention”;
Stressing that this situation has the most serious implications for the Russian domestic legal order, the effectiveness of the Convention system and the authority of the Court,
CALLS UPON the Russian authorities to take further action to ensure compliance with the rule of law and with the obligations they have undertaken as a State party to the Convention,
EXHORTS accordingly the authorities to further develop without further delay an appropriate mechanism tasked with both preventive and protective functions to ensure that applicants, in particular in respect of whom the Court has indicated an interim measure, benefit (following their release from detention) from immediate and effective protection against unlawful or irregular removal from the territory of Russia and the jurisdiction of the Russian courts.”
108.  The Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolution 1991 (2014), entitled “Urgent need to deal with new failures to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights”, was adopted on 10 April 2014. It reads as follows:
“Parliamentary Assembly 1.  Recalling its Resolution 1571 (2007) on member States’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights and Resolution 1788 (2011) “Preventing harm to refugees and migrants in extradition and expulsion cases: Rule 39 indications by the European Court of Human Rights”, the Parliamentary Assembly stresses the importance of the right of individual application to the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”). The protection of this right is the purpose of individual measures indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of its Rules of Court, which are designed to prevent the creation of a fait accompli. 2.  The Assembly considers any disrespect of legally binding measures ordered by the Court, such as interim measures indicated under Rule 39, as a clear disregard for the European system of protection of human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”). 3.  The Assembly therefore calls on all States Parties to the Convention to respect interim measures indicated by the Court and to provide it with all the information and evidence it requests. 4.  The Assembly strongly condemns instances of outright violations by several States Parties to the Convention (Italy, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic and Turkey) of the Court’s interim measures aimed at protecting applicants from extradition or deportation to countries where they would be at risk of, in particular, torture, as well as of the interim measures in relation to Russia’s military actions in Georgia (see Georgia v. Russia II). 5.  The Assembly insists that international co-operation between law-enforcement bodies based on regional agreements, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or on long-standing relations, must not violate a State Party’s binding commitments under the Convention. 6.  The Assembly is therefore particularly concerned about the recent phenomenon, observed in the Russian Federation, of the temporary disappearance of applicants protected by interim measures and their subsequent reappearance in the country which had requested extradition. The clandestine methods used indicate that the authorities had to be aware of the illegality of such actions, which can be likened to the practice of “extraordinary renditions” repeatedly condemned by the Assembly. 7.  The Assembly welcomes the increasing use, by the Court, of factual presumptions and the reversal of the burden of proof in dealing with refusals of States Parties to co-operate with it, which consist in their failure to provide full, frank and fair disclosure in response to requests by the Court for further information or evidence.”
109.  Recommendation 2043 (2014) was adopted on 10 April 2014 by the Parliamentary Assembly on the basis of the above Resolution. It reads:
“Parliamentary Assembly 1.  The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 1991 (2014) on the urgent need to deal with new failures to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights, to Resolution CM/Res(2010)25 of the Committee of Ministers on member States’ duty to respect and protect the right of individual application to the European Court of Human Rights, adopted as a response to Assembly Resolution 1571 (2007) on member States’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights, and to the Committee of Ministers’ decision regarding kidnappings and irregular removals from the national territory taken at its 1176th meeting on 10 July 2013. 2.  The Assembly commends the Committee of Ministers for following up on a regular basis cases of non-respect of the interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights. 3.  The Assembly invites the Committee of Ministers to continue insisting on the effective investigation of any violations of the Court’s interim measures, in particular irregular removals from the national territory, and to require the States Parties concerned to hold to account the perpetrators of any illegal acts.”
IV.  COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS’ DECISIONS UNDER ARTICLE 46 ON RELATED CASES CONCERNING RUSSIA
110.  In addition to the Committee of Ministers’ decisions under Article 46 in cases concerning Russia cited in Savriddin Dzhurayev (cited above, § 121-126) and their decision on the applicant’s disappearance (see paragraph 96 above), the Minister’s Deputies adopted the following decision on 4-6 March 2014 during their 1193rd meeting:
“The Deputies 1.  expressed serious concern that, according to the Court, the repetitive nature of the violations established suggests that certain authorities developed a practice in breach of their obligations under Russian law and the Convention; 2.  also expressed serious concern that, notwithstanding their interim resolution of September 2013 and the measures already adopted by the Russian authorities, the Committee has been seized of a new incident concerning Mr Azimov, reported to have been abducted on 3 December 2013 from a temporary accommodation centre under the authority of the Federal Migration Service; 3.  further expressed serious concern that the current whereabouts of Mr Azimov have not yet been established and therefore urged the Russian authorities to reinforce their investigation efforts and to continue to keep the Committee informed of all developments; 4.  noted with interest the recent diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Russian authorities with respect to other applicants who were allegedly abducted and subsequently reappeared in detention in other countries and strongly encouraged them to continue their efforts with a view to ensuring that these applicants are not subjected to treatment in breach of the Convention; 5.  concerning general measures, recalled the letter of 5 April 2013 by the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and their interim resolution of September 2013; while noting the updated action plan subsequently submitted by the Russian authorities, regretted the slow progress to date and therefore strongly urged the Russian authorities to:
provide information promptly on how they will ensure the practical implementation of the required protective and preventive mechanism (notably, as regards the application of protection measures available to victims and witnesses in criminal proceedings; the improvement of security guarantees in temporary accommodation centres; and providing assistance in the resettlement to third countries where there is no risk of treatment contrary to the European Convention);
transmit further details on the measures aimed at improving the efficiency of investigations, in particular how they will ensure close scrutiny of these investigations at an appropriate official level as well as on the recent initiative of the Prosecutor General’s Office to put under special control the rapid reaction of prosecutors in the face of detected attempts of abductions from the territory of the Russian Federation;
111.  On 5 June 2014 during the 1201st meeting of the Minister’s Deputies, the following decision was adopted:
“The Deputies 1.  noted with grave concern that yet another applicant in this group of cases, Mr Yakubov, had allegedly been abducted in Moscow in April 2014 despite the repeated calls by the Committee of Ministers on the Russian authorities to take the necessary measures to prevent such incidents (see, in particular, Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2013)200); 2.  urged the Russian authorities to continue their investigation into Mr Yakubov’s disappearance in order to shed light on the circumstances of this incident, taking into account the findings of the European Court of Human Rights as regards the involvement of the State authorities in other cases, notably in the case of Savriddin Dzhurayev; 3.  noted, with concern, that this incident casts doubts on the soundness of the preventive and protective arrangements set up by the Russian authorities in response to the Committee’s call in September 2013, and requested, in this context, the Russian authorities to ensure that relevant individuals are informed of the protective measures available; 4.  further noted, with concern, that no information about any progress in the investigations into similar previous incidents in this group of cases has been provided; 5.  invited the Russian authorities to provide information on the different issues raised in this group of cases in good time for their 1208th meeting (September 2014) (DH).”
112.  The relevant reports by the UN agencies and international NGOs on the situation in Uzbekistan during the period 2002 to 2011 are summarised in the case of Zokhidov v. Russia (no. 67286/10, §§ 107-13, 5 February 2013).
113.  In January 2013 Human Rights Watch released its annual World Report for 2013. The chapter entitled “Uzbekistan”, in so far as relevant, reads:
“Criminal Justice, Torture, and Ill-Treatment
Torture remains rampant and continues to occur with near-total impunity. Detainees’ rights are violated at each stage of investigations and trials, despite habeas corpus amendments passed in 2008. The government has failed to meaningfully implement recommendations to combat torture made by the UN special rapporteur in 2003 and other international bodies. Suspects are not permitted access to lawyers, a critical safeguard against torture in pre-trial detention. Police coerce confessions from detainees using torture, including beatings with batons and plastic bottles, hanging by the wrists and ankles, rape, and sexual humiliation. Authorities routinely refuse to investigate allegations of abuse ... Human Rights Watch continues to receive regular and credible reports of torture, including suspicious deaths in custody in pre-trial and post-conviction detention.
Freedom of Religion
Although Uzbekistan’s Constitution ensures freedom of religion, authorities continued their multi-year campaign of arbitrary detention, arrest, and torture of Muslims who practice their faith outside state controls. Over 200 were arrested or convicted in 2012 on charges related to religious extremism.”
114.  The chapter on Uzbekistan in Amnesty International’s 2013 annual report released in May 2013 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“Torture and other ill-treatment
Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners by security forces and prison personnel continued to be routine. Scores of reports of torture and other ill‑treatment emerged during the year, especially from men and women suspected or convicted of belonging to Islamic movements and Islamist groups and parties or other religious groups, banned in Uzbekistan. As in previous years, the authorities failed to conduct prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into such reports and into complaints lodged with the Prosecutor General’s Office...
Counter-terror and security
The authorities continued to seek the extradition of suspected members of Islamic movements and Islamist groups and parties banned in Uzbekistan in the name of security and the fight against terrorism. They also requested the extradition of political opponents, government critics and wealthy individuals out of favour with the regime. Many of these extradition requests were based on fabricated or unreliable evidence. The government offered diplomatic assurances to sending states to secure the returns, pledging free access to detention centres for independent monitors and diplomats. In practice, they did not honour these guarantees. Those forcibly returned to Uzbekistan faced incommunicado detention, torture and other ill-treatment and, after unfair trials, long prison sentences in cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions. The authorities were also accused of attempting assassinations of political opponents living abroad.”
115.  In its 2013 report “Return to Torture: Extradition, Forcible Returns and Removals to Central Asia”, Amnesty International stated as follows:
“Over the past two decades thousands of people across the region have alleged that they have been arbitrarily detained and tortured or ill-treated in custody in order to extract a forced confession or money from relatives. In this period, piecemeal reforms have been introduced in most Central Asia countries with the aim of strengthening the accountability of law enforcement agencies and improving the protection available in the criminal justice system. Nowhere, however, have they had any significant success in eliminating the practices of torture and other ill‑treatment that are often used in relation to people suspected of ordinary crimes, and routinely used in relation to political opponents and individuals suspected of involvement in extremism and terrorism-related activities or in banned religious groups.
...
... Detainees are often tortured and ill-treated while being held incommunicado for initial interrogations. Those detained in closed detention facilities run by National Security Services on charges related to national security or ‘religious extremism’ are at particular risk of torture and other ill-treatment.”