5.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Vienna.
6.  The applicant had been an employee of the embassy of the United States of America in Vienna since March 1978. From January 1981 onwards she had a contract of indefinite duration and worked as a photographer at the embassy. Following an accident in 1983 the competent authority issued a decision stating that she qualified for protection under the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act (Invaliden­einstellungs­gesetz). Following a further accident, classified as work-related, the embassy dismissed her in September 1987.
7.  Her dismissal was declared void by the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits- und Sozialgericht) on the ground that it required the prior agreement of the competent authority under the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act. The court dismissed the argument submitted by the United States that it lacked jurisdiction on account of the United States’ immunity. It found that, while foreign States enjoyed immunity with regard to acta iure imperii, they came within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts with regard to acta iure gestionis. The conclusion and performance of an employment contract fell within the latter category. The Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichthof) upheld that judgment on 21 November 1990, noting that the United States had not maintained the objection of State immunity in the further course of the proceedings.
8.  As a result of the above proceedings, the applicant continued to have a valid employment contract with the United States embassy in Vienna. However, the latter refused to make use of her services. Instead, on 31 January 1991, they applied to the Vienna Committee for Disabled Persons requesting retroactive approval of the applicant’s dismissal or, alternatively, agreement to a future dismissal. The Committee refused to grant retroactive approval for the applicant’s dismissal of September 1987 but gave its approval for a future dismissal. The competent Federal Ministry upheld that decision. On 13 September 1994 the Administrative Court, ruling on a complaint by the applicant, set aside the decision to grant approval for the applicant’s future dismissal, finding that the authorities had failed to establish relevant facts and had not duly weighed the parties’ interests. The case was referred back to the Committee. On 16 January 1996 the United States withdrew its application, stating that it had always maintained that the application of the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act to employees of the embassy interfered with the country’s sovereignty.
9.  Meanwhile, the applicant brought proceedings against the United States requesting payment of her salary. In a first set of proceedings, concerning salary payments up to June 1995, the United States unsuccessfully raised an objection of jurisdictional immunity. Subsequently, the United States paid the applicant salary arrears of 3.7 million Austrian schillings (approximately 269,000 euros (EUR)). On the occasion of the payment, the lawyer who had represented the United States in the proceedings informed the applicant by a letter dated 16 October 1996 that the payment did not imply any acceptance of the Austrian courts’ judgments and that the United States considered her employment contract to be terminated and would, if she raised any further claims, “make use of its diplomatic rights and immunities”.
10.  Further proceedings relating to the payment of salary from July 1995 to August 1996 led to a final default judgment by the Vienna Labour and Social Court. However, the United States did not pay the amount awarded to the applicant.
11.  The applicant also unsuccessfully brought proceedings against the United States claiming reimbursement of the social security contributions which she had been ordered to pay by the Austrian authorities and a part of which the employer was, under her employment contract, obliged to refund. In those proceedings the United States authorities refused to serve the summons to attend the hearing. The Austrian courts dismissed the applicant’s request for a judgment in default. Their position was upheld by the Supreme Court’s judgment of 11 June 2001 (see below, paragraph 28).
12.  On 29 December 1998 the applicant brought an action against the United States of America before the Vienna Labour and Social Court, claiming salary payments from September 1996 onwards. The court scheduled a first hearing for 20 October 1999.
13.  An attempt to serve the applicant’s action and the summons to the hearing on the United States through the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under section 11(2) of the Service Act (Zustellgesetz), failed. According to the file a staff member of the Austrian embassy in Washington handed these documents over to a staff member of the United States Department of State. However, by letter of 25 January 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Ministry of Justice, which in turn informed the Vienna Labour and Social Court, that the United States authorities had refused to serve the summons and had returned the documents at issue to the Austrian embassy in Washington. The letter was accompanied by a note from the United States Department of State informing the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the United States wished to assert its immunity in any case brought by the applicant. In a letter of 4 February 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also informed the applicant accordingly.
14.  On 18 February 2000 the Vienna Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s request for a judgment in default, noting that it had been impossible to summon the defendant. An appeal by the applicant to the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) was unsuccessful.
15.  The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal on points of law on 5 September 2001. Referring to its judgment of 11 June 2001 in a parallel case brought by the applicant (see paragraph 28 below), it noted that the summons had not been duly served on the defendant, namely the United States Department of Justice. Consequently, the conditions for giving a judgment in default were not fulfilled.
16.  By a decision of 29 October 2001 the Vienna Labour and Social Court held that the applicant’s action and the summons to the hearing had not been served on account of the manifest refusal of the United States to comply with the request for service. It followed that further attempts to summon the defendant did not have any prospects of success.
17.  Subsequently, the applicant requested that the summons be served by means of publication under Article 121 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozeßordnung) or, alternatively, that it be served on a court-appointed representative (Curator) under Article 116 of the Code.
18.  By decision of 25 April 2002 the Vienna Labour and Social Court appointed a lawyer, Dr G., to represent the United States of America. It noted that the foreign authorities had refused to serve the summonses in any of the proceedings brought by the applicant. In the court’s view the United States had wrongly relied on its alleged immunity.
19.  On 18 November 2002 the Vienna Court of Appeal, following an appeal by Dr. G., quashed that decision. The relevant part of its decision reads as follows:
“In acting on a request for service, the State to which the request is made is exercising sovereign powers. This applies even if the court documents in question are addressed to that State and the authority responsible for acting on the request for assistance (in this instance the Department of State) refuses to forward them to the authority empowered to represent the State in private-law proceedings (in this instance the Department of Justice). This is not a case of refusal to accept service (§ 20 of the Service Act) but rather a case of refusal to comply with a request for legal assistance. Such refusal is a sovereign right of the foreign State, against which a remedy can be sought only through diplomatic channels ...
The Supreme Court endorsed this legal stance (8ObA 201/00t), stressing that, as international law currently stands, compliance or refusal to comply with a request for legal assistance is to be regarded as a sovereign act, irrespective of the subject-matter of the claim. The nature of the act is the defining factor. It is beyond doubt that the service of documents in court proceedings falls within the scope of so-called acta iure imperii and not acta iure gesionis, as a private individual cannot perform an act of this nature. Although negotiations have been in progress for some time on an international agreement concerning service of process on foreign States (which might make it sufficient for the action to be served on the country’s foreign ministry), no such agreement has to date been concluded, with the result that the issue remains unregulated by any treaty between Austria and the United States.
In a commentary on this decision, which had been published in JBl 2002, 57, Hintersteininger observed, inter alia, that, while the restrictive theory of service of process applied by the Supreme Court might be appropriate for the purposes of avoiding disagreements between States, it was not a requirement under international law. The author concluded that section 11 of the Service Act – at least as currently applied to judicial proceedings instituted in Austria against foreign States – amounted to a “self-imposed shackle” as a result of which the standard of protection of individuals’ legal interests was subordinated to international-law considerations. Unless and until the Austrian courts saw fit to apply a different interpretation of the provision in question – the fact that the Supreme Court, in its 2001 ruling, continued to apply its case-law from 1963 indicated that this was unlikely – there was an urgent need for the legislature to enact amending legislation in order to provide a practical solution to the problem of service of process.
Referring to Hintersteiniger’s international-law argument, the appellant raises the possibility of transmitting the action and an explanation of the legal circumstances, together with a translation into the country’s official language, to the US Department of State through diplomatic channels. In this case the defendant State would have no justification for returning the copy of the action at will; in the event of a refusal to accept service, it should be deemed to have received the request. This would make effective service possible and would remove the need to appoint a representative.
The objection to this line of argument is that such a procedure – which from a general international-law perspective is possible – is incompatible with the applicable legal provisions in Austria. As clarified in 8 ObA 201/00t, the action has to be served on a competent body within the Department of Justice, which is the authority representing the United States in the present employment-related proceedings. It is not sufficient for the document to have somehow reached another authority which appears to be responsible for forwarding the request for service. Accordingly, it is incorrect to speak of a refusal to accept service if the document was never transmitted to the competent authority. In this connection the Supreme Court stressed that, conversely, it would not be sufficient, in order to institute legal proceedings, for an action against the Republic of Austria to be received by the Foreign Ministry if, for whatever reason, it was not forwarded to the Attorney-General’s Office as the competent authority representing the State in such matters. The first-instance court already acknowledged that a further request for service would have little prospect of success in view of the earlier comments of the US authorities.
Nevertheless, the (definitive) refusal of the US Department of State to forward court documents concerning the appellant to the Department of Justice does not justify the appointment of a representative for the defendant in accordance with Article 116 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the appellate court explained in detail in its decision 8 Ra 23/00t, cited above, service of process on a foreign State is (also) based on section 11(2) of the Service Act. Hence, for the purpose of performing it, recourse is to be had in any event to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the basis of this provision, which takes precedence, service via any means other than the diplomatic channels to which it refers – for instance, on a court-appointed representative – is ruled out. In view of the principle whereby a remedy against a refusal to comply with a request for legal assistance, which flows from the sovereign power of the foreign State, can be sought only through diplomatic channels (see SZ 36/26, EvBl 1963/210; for a critical perspective, see Schreuer, Die Durchsetzung zivilrechtlicher Ansprüche gegen ausländische Staaten, ÖJZ 1991, 41 et seq. [49]), the impugned decision lacks any legal basis.”
20.  On 7 May 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. It started by referring to its decision of 11 June 2001 (see paragraph 28 below) in a previous case brought by the applicant against the United States. It followed from that decision that the action brought by the applicant had to be served through diplomatic channels. It held that Article 121 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, although it concerned the service of summonses abroad, was not applicable in a case like the present one in which the person or legal entity to be summoned relied on their immunity. The applicant’s interpretation of the provision in question would undermine the concept of immunity.
21.  Only section 11(2) of the Service Act was applicable. The applicant did not contest the fact that foreign States came within the scope of that provision as they enjoyed “privileges and immunities” under international law. In that context the Supreme Court went on to state as follows:
“No agreement exists between Austria and the defendant concerning service of process from the perspective of State immunity from jurisdiction. In the absence of such agreement the generally recognised rules of international law (Article 9 of the Federal Constitution), together with section IX of the Introductory Act to the Austrian Jurisdictional Statute (EGJN) and the principles developed in this connection by the case-law and by legal commentators, must apply. On that basis it is unanimously agreed that foreign States enjoy immunity in the exercise of their sovereign powers and are to that extent exempt from the jurisdiction of the domestic courts (see, among other authorities, SZ 23/143; Herndl, JBl 1962, 15; JBl 1962, 43; Heß, JBl 1989, 285; ZfRV 1990, 300 [Seidl-Hohenveldern]; Schreuer, ÖJZ 1991, 41; Fischer, NZ 1991, 154; DRdA 1991/53 [Simotta]; Neuhold/Hummer/Schreuer, Österreichisches Handbuch des Völkerrechts Bd 1³ para. 834, 837; Seidl-Hohenveldern, Völkerrecht 9 paras. 1462 et seq.; Matscher, loc. cit, Art IX EGJN para. 2, 115 et seq., 196 et seq.; Mayr in Rechberger, ZPO² Art IX EGJN para. 3 et seq.). The service of process abroad, as a sovereign act, amounts – in the absence of an agreement between the States concerned governing the relevant procedure – to interference with the sovereign rights of the foreign State in question. For that reason it is a requirement in such cases to have recourse to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which maintains close contact with the milieu concerned and is competent to take account of the relevant international-law considerations (RV 162 BlgNR XV.GP 10), as the appellant correctly points out. However, contrary to her assertion, exclusive recourse to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not merely recommended, but is required by statute (the mandatory “shall” in section 32(3) of the Jurisdictional Statute and section 11(2) of the Service Act). The service of documents by any other means would be in breach of the law (Walter/Mayer, op. cit., section 11 Service Act, footnote 15).
Although Hintersteininger, in her commentary on 8 ObA 201/00t (JBl 2002, 57) concludes that the “restrictive theory of service of process” is appropriate for the purpose of avoiding international disagreements, she nevertheless calls on the legislature to amend section 11 of the Service Act, as she sees evidence of a “self-imposed shackling” at least in the way in which that provision is applied. The legislature has not taken any action to date. It should further be observed that the strict approach to diplomatic immunity can be traced back to the Jurisdictional Statute, according to which the violation of immunity renders the proceedings in question null and void, in a manner which cannot be remedied even by the parties (except by a waiver of immunity) (§ 42 JN; Ballon, op. cit., § 42 JN para. 3, 14 et seq.; Mayr, op. cit., § 42 JN para. 2, 7).
Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, her request for the action to be served on the defendant by publication or by the appointment of a representative does not fall in the present case within the “classic scenario” under Article 121(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is governed by the exception thereto and undermines the defendant’s claim to diplomatic immunity. Accordingly it is not possible, precisely in this case, to proceed on the basis of that provision. On the contrary – in so far as the proceedings against the defendant in Austria are concerned – exclusive recourse must be had to diplomatic channels, as reasoned by the Supreme Court in case 8 ObA 201/00t.”
22.  The Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 3 July 2003.
23.  In April 2002 the applicant reached pensionable age. She gave the United States embassy in Vienna notice of her intention to terminate her employment contract and applied to the competent Pensions Insurance Office for an old-age pension from 1 May 2002.
24.  Subsequently, the applicant extended her claim in the above-mentioned proceedings to salary payments from September 1996 to April 2002. She requested again that the defendant be summoned to a hearing. In that context she referred to the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (see paragraphs 30 to 34 below), and argued that, according to Article 22, transmission of the documents to the United States Department of State through diplomatic channels would be sufficient to effect service. The summons was handed over to a staff member of the United States Department of State but was again returned to the Austrian embassy in Washington with the remark that the United States wished to assert its immunity in any case brought by the applicant.
25.  On 17 July 2006 the Vienna Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision refusing to give a default judgment. Referring to the Supreme Court’s case-law, it held that the refusal to serve a summons was an act of sovereign power. It noted, inter alia, that the Convention relied on by the applicant did not apply to proceedings which had been initiated before its entry into force and added that there were no rules of customary international law to indicate that States could not rely on immunity in the context of the service of a summons. No further appeal on points of law lay against this decision.
26.  Section 11 of the Service Act (Zustellgesetz) deals with the service of official documents abroad and the service of official documents on foreign nationals and foreign States or international organisations enjoying privileges and immunities under international law. It provides as follows:
“1.  Service of process abroad shall be effected in accordance with existing international agreements or as provided for by the laws or other legal provisions of the State in which service is to be effected or by international custom, if necessary with the cooperation of the Austrian diplomatic authorities. 2.  Service of process on foreign nationals or international organisations which enjoy international privileges and immunities shall be effected through the intermediary of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, irrespective of where their place of residence or headquarters is located.”
27.  The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozeßordnung) read as follows:
Article 116
“In the case of persons on whom process can only be served by publication because their address is unknown, the court shall appoint a representative (Article 9), on application or of its own motion, if the persons concerned would have to perform a step in the proceedings as a result of being served with the documents, and in particular if the documents to be served contain a summons.”
Article 121
“1.  In the case of service on persons outside the country who do not fall into the categories of recipients referred to in section 11(2) and (3) of the Service Act, the Federal Minister of Justice, in agreement with the Federal Chancellor, may order service to be effected by post, using the system of advice of receipt customarily used for international postal deliveries, to countries in which service in accordance with section 11(1) of the Service Act is not possible or gives rise to difficulties. 2.  If no confirmation is received within a reasonable time that process has been served on an individual outside the country, the applicant party may request, depending on the circumstances, that service be effected by publication (section 25 of the Service Act) or by the appointment of a representative under Article 116. This shall also apply in cases where an unsuccessful attempt has been made to serve process abroad or where the request for service has no prospect of success owing to a manifest refusal by the authorities of the foreign State to comply with the request for legal assistance.”
28. In a judgment of 11 June 2001 (8ObA 201/00) in a related case concerning claims for reimbursement of social security contributions brought by the applicant against the United States (see paragraph 11 above), the Supreme Court held as follows:
“The appellate court was correct in taking the view that, as international law currently stands, the decision to comply with or refuse a request for legal assistance is a sovereign act, irrespective of the subject-matter of the request. The nature of the act is the defining factor. It is beyond doubt that the service of documents in court proceedings falls within the scope of acta iure imperii and not acta iure gesionis, as a private individual cannot perform an act of this nature (Seidl-Hohenfeldern, Völkerrecht 317 et seq., esp. paras. 1472-79; Neuhold/Hummer/Schreuer, Öster­reichisches Handbuch des Völkerrechts3, para. 837).
The criticism of the current legal situation raised by the appellant, relying on Schreuer (ÖJZ 1991, 41 et seq. [esp. 48 et seq.], does not alter the fact that, although negotiations have been in progress for some time on an international agreement concerning service of process on foreign States (which might make it sufficient for the action to be served on the country’s foreign ministry), no such agreement has to date been concluded, with the result that the issue remains unregulated by any treaty between Austria and the United States. It is not disputed that, under American Federal law, the United States is represented by the Department of Justice in matters which are to be regarded as acta iure gestionis (compare 9 ObA 244/90 = SZ 63/206 with further references concerning the employment contract between the claimant and the defendant). The action must therefore be served – as correctly requested by the appellant herself – on a body within that authority. It is not sufficient – as the appellant has claimed in the appeal proceedings – for the document to have somehow reached another authority which is meant to be responsible for forwarding the request for service (the Department of State (Foreign Ministry)). Conversely, it would not be sufficient, in order to institute legal proceedings, for an action against the Republic of Austria to be received by the Foreign Ministry if, for whatever reason, it was not forwarded to the Attorney-General’s Office, which is the competent authority in such matters.”
29.  The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity (“the Basle Convention”) entered into force on 11 June 1976 after its ratification by three States. It has been ratified by eight States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kindgom) and signed by one State (Portugal). On 11 June 1976 it entered into force in respect of Austria, which had ratified it on 10 July 1974. The relevant provisions read as follows:
Article 5
“1.  A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a contract of employment between the State and an individual where the work has to be performed on the territory of the State of the forum. 2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:
a)  the individual is a national of the employing State at the time when the proceedings are brought;
b)  at the time when the contract was entered into the individual was neither a national of the State of the forum nor habitually resident in that State; or
c)  the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing, unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the forum, the courts of that State have exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter. ... ”
Article 16
“1.  In proceedings against a Contracting State in a court of another Contracting State, the following rules shall apply. 2.  The competent authorities of the State of the forum shall transmit
 the original or a copy of the document by which the proceedings are instituted;
 a copy of any judgment given by default against a State which was defendant in the proceedings,
through the diplomatic channel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the defendant State, for onward transmission, where appropriate, to the competent authority. These documents shall be accompanied, if necessary, by a translation into the official language, or one of the official languages, of the defendant State. 3.  Service of the documents referred to in paragraph 2 is deemed to have been effected by their receipt by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ...”
30.  State immunity from jurisdiction is governed by customary international law, the codification of which is enshrined in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property of 2 December 2004 (“the 2004 Convention”). The principle is based on the distinction between acts of sovereignty or authority (acta jure imperii) and acts of commerce and administration (acta jure gestionis) (see Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], no. 34869/05, §§ 18-23, 29 June 2011; see also Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], no. 15869/02, §§ 25-33, ECHR 2010).
31.  The Convention was opened for signature on 17 January 2005 and has not yet entered into force. Austria signed the Convention on 17 January 2005 and ratified it on 14 September 2006. The United States has not ratified the 2004 Convention, but did not vote against it when it was adopted in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
32.  The draft text of the Convention was prepared by the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) which, in 1979, was given the task of codifying and gradually developing international law in matters of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. It produced a number of drafts that were submitted to States for comment. The Draft Articles that were used as the basis for the text adopted in 2004 dated back to 1991. They were subsequently further revised by the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. States were again given an opportunity to comment.
33.  Article 11 (contracts of employment) of the 2004 Convention reads as follows:
“1.  Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of that other State. 2.  Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a)  the employee has been recruited to perform particular functions in the exercise of governmental authority;
(b)  the employee is:
(i)  a diplomatic agent, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;
(ii)  a consular officer, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963;
(iii)  a member of the diplomatic staff of a permanent mission to an international organization or of a special mission, or is recruited to represent a State at an international conference; or
(iv)  any other person enjoying diplomatic immunity;
(c)  the subject-matter of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual;
(d)  the subject-matter of the proceeding is the dismissal or termination of employment of an individual and, as determined by the head of State, the head of Government or the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the employer State, such a proceeding would interfere with the security interests of that State;
(e)  the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has the permanent residence in the State of the forum; or
(f)  the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter of the proceeding.”
34.  Article 22 (Service of process) of the 2004 Convention reads as follows:
“1.  Service of process or writ or other document instituting a proceeding against a State shall be effected:
(a)  in accordance with any applicable international convention binding on the State of the forum and the State concerned; or
(b)  in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the claimant and the State concerned, if not precluded by the law of the State of forum; or
(c)  in the absence of such a convention or special arrangement:
(i)  by transmission through diplomatic channels to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State concerned; or
(ii)  by any other means accepted by the State concerned, if not precluded by the law of the State of forum. 2.  Service of process referred to in paragraph (1) (c) (i) is deemed to have been effected by receipt of the documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.  These documents shall be accompanied, if necessary, by a translation into the official language, or one of the official languages, of the State concerned. 4.  Any State that enters an appearance on the merits in a proceeding instituted against it may not thereafter assert that service of process did not comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3.”
35.  In the Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-third session in 1991, and submitted to the General Assembly at that session, Article 11 read as follows:
“1.  Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of that other State. 2.  Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a)  the employee has been recruited to perform functions closely related to the exercise of governmental authority;
(b)  the subject of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual;
(c)  the employee was neither a national nor a habitual resident of the State of the forum at the time when the contract of employment was concluded;
(d)  the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted; or
(e)  the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter of the proceeding.”
36.  In the commentary on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles of 1991, it was stated that the rules formulated in Article 11 appeared to be consistent with the trend in legislative and treaty practice in a growing number of States (ILC Yearbook, 1991, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 44, § 14).
37.  In the Draft Articles of 1991, Article 20 (service of process) read as follows:
“1.  Service of process or writ or other document instituting a proceeding against a State shall be effected:
(a)  in accordance with any applicable international convention binding on the State of the forum and the State concerned; or
(b)  in the absence of such a convention:
(i)  by transmission through diplomatic channels to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State concerned; or
(ii)  by any other means accepted by the State concerned, if not precluded by the law of the State of forum. 2.  Service of process referred to in paragraph 1 (b) (i) is deemed to have been effected by receipt of the documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.  These documents shall be accompanied, if necessary, by a translation into the official language, or one of the official languages, of the State concerned. 4.  Any State that enters an appearance on the merits in a proceeding instituted against it may not thereafter assert that service of process did not comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3.”
38. The International Law Commission’s commentary on that Article (ILC Yearbook, 1991, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 60, §§ 1-3), in so far as relevant in the present context, stated as follows:
“(1)  Article 20 relates to a large extent to the domestic rules of civil procedure of States. It takes into account the difficulties involved if States are called upon to modify their domestic rules on civil procedure. At the same time, it does not provide too liberal or generous a regime of service of process, which could result in an excessive number of judgments in default of appearance by the defendant State. The article therefore proposes a middle ground so as to protect the interests of the defendant State and those of the individual plaintiff.
Paragraph 1
(2)  Paragraph 1 is designed to indicate the normal ways in which service of process can be effected when a proceeding is instituted against a State. Three categories of means by which service of process is effected are provided: first, if an applicable international convention binding upon the State of the forum and the State concerned exists, service of process shall be effected in accordance with the procedures provided for in the convention. Then, in the absence of such a convention, service of process shall be effected either (a) by transmission through diplomatic channels or (b) by any other means accepted by the State concerned. Thus, among the three categories of the means of service of process provided under paragraph 1, an international convention binding both States is given priority over the other two categories. The variety of means available ensures the widest possible flexibility, while protecting the interests of the parties concerned.
Paragraphs 2 and 3
(3)  Since the time of service of process is decisive for practical purposes, it is further provided in paragraph 2 that, in the case of transmission through diplomatic channels or by registered mail, service of process is deemed to have been effected on the day of receipt of the documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Paragraph 3 further requires that the documents be accompanied, if necessary, by a translation into the official language, or one of the official languages of the State concerned. ...”
In respect of Article 20 § 1 the commentary also gives numerous examples of relevant provisions in national legislation. In addition it refers to Article 16 §§ 1-3 of the European Convention on State Immunity.
39.  During the drafting process the United States commented on Article 20 of the 1991 Draft Articles (which became Article 22 of the 2004 Convention). It did not object to the rules enshrined in Article 22 (1) (c) (i) and Article 22 (2).