coastalcph/lex_glue huggingface dataset:
8.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Riga.
9.  In 1997 he decided to move from Latvia to Russia. He negotiated a real estate deal with a Moscow-based agent.
10.  On 20 March 1997 the applicant withdrew from his bank accounts 250,000 US dollars (“USD”) in cash and asked his acquaintance, B., to deliver the money to Moscow.
11.  B. arrived in the Sheremetyevo-1 airport later the same day. He failed to declare the money at the customs checkpoint and was charged with smuggling.
12.  On 13 September 2000, the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow found B. guilty of smuggling under Article 188-1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to two years' suspended imprisonment. With regard to the money, the court said in the operative part of the judgment:
“USD 250,000, deposited with the Sheremetyevo Customs Board, are to be forfeited to the Treasury as an object of smuggling.”
13.  In his appeal against the judgment, B.'s lawyer submitted that the Golovinskiy District Court had failed to indicate any legal ground for the conﬁscation order. He argued that the money had been included in the case-ﬁle as evidence and that no relevant law provided for its conﬁscation. Moreover, lawfully obtained assets were to be returned to their owners. B.'s lawyer also claimed that Article 188-1 of the Criminal Code did not provide for such a sanction as conﬁscation.
14.  On 25 October 2000, the Moscow City Court refused the appeal. With regard to the money, the court said:
“USD 250,000, which was the object of the smuggling, was rightfully forfeited to the Treasury.”
15.  On 1 July 2002 a Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged an application for supervisory review against the judgments. He claimed that the smuggled money could only be conﬁscated if proven to have been acquired criminally.
16.  On 18 July 2002 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court refused the application on the ground that a Ruling of the Plenary Supreme Court of the USSR issued in 1978 permitted the conﬁscation of smuggled goods which had been attached to case-ﬁles as exhibits.
17.  On 15 August 2002 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged another application for supervisory review claiming, among other things, that the Ruling of 1978 was inconsistent with later superseding legislation. However, on an unspeciﬁed date the Deputy President of the Supreme Court withdrew his application.
7.  The applicant company is a debt collector. In July 1999, it bought a defaulted State bond and sued the Government for the debt. After several years of litigation, on 10 April 2002 the Moscow City Commercial Court ordered the Government to pay the applicant company 100,000 American dollars (“USD”).
8.  On 5 August 2002, the Appeals Division of the Moscow City Commercial Court upheld the judgment, but speciﬁed that the debt was to be paid by the Ministry of Finance.
9.  On 6 November 2002, the ministry asked the court to stay the enforcement of the judgment until January 2003, because there were no funds in the State budget of 2002.
10.  On 19 November 2002, bailiffs opened enforcement proceedings.
11.  On 16 December 2002, the court refused to stay the enforcement because the ministry had failed to prove either that it did not have the funds, or that the funds would become available after January 2003.
12.  On 7 February 2003, the ministry asked the court to stay the enforcement of the judgment until January 2004, because there were no funds in the State budget of 2003.
13.  On 20 March 2003, the court refused to stay the enforcement because the ministry had failed to prove either that it did not have the funds, or that the funds would become available after January 2004.
14.  In August 2003, the ministry asked the appeal court to clarify how the judgment was to be enforced.
15.  On 3 September 2003, the appeal court clariﬁed that the judgment was to be enforced only once the applicant company had handed in the bond. The applicant company appealed against this decision because the general conditions of the bond’s issue did not require that it be handed in. In addition, the applicant company argued that the judgment could be enforced on the basis of a writ of enforcement alone, and that the bond was to be returned to the ministry only after the enforcement. On 25 November 2003, the Federal Commercial Court of the Moscow Circuit dismissed this appeal.
16.  On 18 February 2004, the applicant company handed in the bond to the ministry.
17.  Subsequently, the applicant company unsuccessfully sought an injunction to oblige the ministry to enforce the judgment.
4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Osijek.
5.  On 15 January 1997 the applicant was dismissed from her position at the Osijek Faculty of Agriculture (“the Faculty”). The decision had retroactive effect as of 27 November 1995.
6.  On 17 January 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings challenging the lawfulness of the Faculty's decision. She claimed to have never been reinstated, as was required by a final court decision from proceedings she had previously instituted against the Faculty, and that she could therefore not have been dismissed.
7.  On 12 July 1999 the Osijek Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Osijeku) ruled in the applicant's favour, ordering the Faculty to reinstate her.
8.  Following an appeal by the Faculty, on 28 October 1999 the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) upheld the first instance judgment.
9.  The Faculty subsequently filed a request for revision on points of law (revizija). On 3 May 2000, the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) reversed the first and second instance judgments and dismissed the applicant's claim. The Supreme Court found that the Faculty was under no obligation to reinstate the applicant and that therefore its decision was in line with the applicable law.
10.  On 28 August 2000 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). She claimed that the Supreme Court's judgment was in breach of her constitutional right to work, of the rule of law and of the requirement that the courts adjudicate on the basis of laws and the Constitution.
11.  On 24 March 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed her complaint finding no violation of the alleged constitutional rights.
6.  The applicant was born in 1931. He died on 19 June 2003. In letters received by the Court on 12 December 2003 and 27 September 2004, the applicant’s daughter Ms T.A. Shvayko informed the Court that she wished to pursue the application.
7.  The applicant was a former employee of the “Donetskaya” State Mine (the “DSM”). During his work at the DSM, he contracted an occupational disease. In 1995 a medical commission examined the applicant’s state of health, and he was recognised as falling within the second group of disabled persons, i.e. people with an 80% loss of ability to work.
8.  Following his examination by the medical commission, the DSM decided to pay the applicant disability compensation in the amount of UAH 5,573[1]. They also ordered monthly allowances for the applicant, but failed to pay them.
9.  In March 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings against the DSM seeking compensation for unpaid monthly disability allowances. On 26 February 2001 the Torez City Court ordered the DSM to pay the applicant UAH 17,037.19[2] in compensation for the delayed payment of disability benefits.
10.  On 28 March 2001 the writ of execution no. 2-932 dated 26 February 2001 issued by the Torez City Court was presented to the Bailiffs’ Service of the Torez City Department of Justice for enforcement.
11.  On 30 March 2001 the bailiff issued a resolution instituting the enforcement proceedings in the case.
12.  On 18 April 2001 the bailiff attached the DSM’s current bank account and, on 17 May 2001, its property.
13.  On 6 May 2001 the Torez Execution Service informed the applicant that the judgment could not be executed immediately due to the DSM’s lack of funds.
14.  On 10 October 2002 the applicant informed the court that the execution proceedings were still pending.
15.  On 16 May 2003 the necessary funds were made available and, on 19 May 2003, the State Treasury in Shakhtarsk of the Donetsk Region paid the outstanding amount of the debt to the applicant.
16.  In accordance with the information provided by the applicant’s representative, he received the full amount of compensation awarded by the Torez City Court on 25 May 2003.
7.  Mr Tomáš Bzdúšek was born in 1926 and lives in Brezová pod Bradlom. Mr Ján Bzdúšek was born in 1952 and lives in Nitra. Mr Svetozár Bzdúšek was born in 1957 and lives in Myjava.
8.  By decisions delivered by the Senica District Court on 20 January 1959 and by the Bratislava Regional Court on 13 February 1959 the father of Mr Tomáš Bzdúšek and the grandfather of the two other applicants was convicted of two offences and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment as well as to confiscation of movable property which included, inter alia, gold and silver coins of numismatic value, bank notes and savings books.
9.  On 3 October 1991 the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic quashed, in the context of judicial rehabilitation provided for by the Judicial Rehabilitation Act of 1990, the above decisions of 1959 including all consequential decisions on the ground that the conviction had been unlawful. Subsequently the District Court in Prievidza delivered a judgment, on 30 March 1992, by which it acquitted the accused.
10.  On 30 April 1993 the applicants filed an action claiming the restitution of the movable property which had been confiscated from their relative.
11.  On 19 January 1994 the Bratislava I District Court, with which the applicants had filed the action, found that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. On 17 May 1994 the Bratislava City Court quashed this decision as being erroneous.
12.  On 6 February 1995 the Bratislava I District Court discontinued the proceedings. On 31 May 1995 the Bratislava City Court quashed this decision and instructed the District Court to proceed with the case.
13.  On 7 October 1997 the Bratislava I District Court dismissed the action after having taken extensive evidence. The applicants appealed. On 13 May 1998 the Bratislava Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment.
14.  In the meantime, on 27 January 1998, the Constitutional Court found, upon a petition submitted by the applicants pursuant to Article 130(3) of the Constitution, that the Bratislava I District Court had violated their constitutional right to a hearing without undue delays. The Constitutional Court held, in particular, that the case was not complex and that the applicants had not contributed to the length of the proceedings by their behaviour. The case had not been proceeded with effectively between 30 April 1993 and 31 May 1995, and undue delays had arisen as a result of the fact that the judge dealing with the case had been changed three times.
6.  The applicant was born in 1935 and currently resides in Torez, the Donetsk Region.
7.  On 30 November 2000 the applicant was dismissed from her position in the State Holding Company “Torezantratsit” (the “SHC”).
8.  In July 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Torez City Court against the SHC seeking to recover salary owed to her.
9.  On 7 August 2000 the Torez City Court allowed her claims and ordered the SHC to pay the applicant UAH 2,379.76[1] in compensation.
10.  On 14 June 2001 the Torez Execution Service informed the applicant that the judgment of 7 August 2000 could not be executed due to the SHC’s lack of funds.
11.  On 10 October 2002 the applicant informed the Court that the judgment of 7 August 2000 had still not been executed.
12.  The Government stated that between 9 November 2000 and 15 April 2003 the bailiffs conducted 8 inspections of the company’s accounts and found that there were no funds available to enforce the judgment. They also stated that the bailiffs were enforcing 92 writs of execution against the company, with a total debt of UAH 213,526[2].
13.  On 2 July 2003 the applicant received UAH 2,379.76[3] in execution of the judgment of 7 August 2000.
14.  On 3 July 2003 the enforcement proceedings on the applicant’s writ of execution were discontinued as the amount awarded by the judgment had been paid.
8.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Budapest.
9.  Criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on a charge of misappropriation. On 23 May 2001 the National Police Department ordered his 72-hour arrest. In the ensuing proceedings he was assisted by defence counsel of his choice.
10.  On 24 May 2001 the Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning his arrest and lodged with the Pest Central District Court a motion for the applicant’s detention on remand. On 25 May 2001 the District Court heard the applicant and, as confirmed by the Budapest Regional Court on 1 June 2001, ordered his detention on remand until 25 June 2001. The District Court held that there was a risk of collusion by the applicant.
11.  On 19 June 2001 the District Court, as confirmed by the Regional Court on 3 July 2001, prolonged the applicant’s detention until 25 August 2001. On 7 August and 16 October 2001 the Regional Court, as confirmed by an appeal panel of the same court on 27 August and 12 November 2001, prolonged his detention on remand until 25 October and 25 December 2001, respectively. In these proceedings the courts reached their decisions with reference to motions submitted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, all of which were based on the risk of collusion. Neither the applicant nor his defence counsel had been notified of these motions before the decisions were taken. In its decision of 12 November 2001 the Regional Court pointed out that notification was not prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and was a matter for the public prosecutor in the exercise of his discretion. The Regional Court was satisfied that this practice was in accordance with the principle of ‘equality of arms’.
12.  On 27 November 2001 the applicant’s lawyer filed a request for release. This motion did not reach the Supreme Court, which by that stage was responsible for deciding on the applicant’s detention.
On 18 December 2001 the Supreme Court decided in camera to prolong the applicant’s detention until 25 April 2002. The Supreme Court held that – given the seriousness of the charges against him – there was a risk that the applicant would abscond.
13.  On 1 March 2002 the Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered the applicant’s release.
4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Vienna. He is a tax accountant by profession.
5.  In December 1989 the applicant, in the course of an inspection of his tax accountant office by tax inspectors (Betriebsprüfung) filed reports (Selbstanzeigen) in which he incriminated himself. He informed the Vienna Tax Authority for the 3rd and 11th District that he had made false statements in his income tax forms when he declared losses resulting from participation in the W. and G. company.
6.  On 11 May 1994 the Salzburg-Land Tax Office (Finanzamt) instituted administrative criminal proceedings on suspicion of tax evasion against the applicant. The applicant's objection was of no avail.
7.  Having held hearings on 2 June, 3 November and 4 December 1995, the Trial Board (Spruchsenat) at the Salzburg-Land Tax Office convicted the applicant on the latter date under Section 34 § 1 of the Tax Offences Act (Finanzstrafgesetz) of negligent tax evasion and sentenced him to a fine of ATS 700,000 (approximately 50,900 euros). It further ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings. The applicant and the Public Prosecutor (Amtsbeauftragter) filed an appeal.
8. On 27 June 1996 the Appeals Board (Berufungssenat) at the Salzburg Regional Directorate of Finance (Finanzlandesdirektion), having held a hearing on the same day, granted the Public Prosecutor's appeal and convicted the applicant of intentional tax evasion under Section 33 § 1 of the Tax Offences Act. The sentence remained unchanged.
9.  Subsequently, on 20 September 1996, the applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court and requested an oral hearing. He complained inter alia that the Salzburg-Land Tax Office's had lacked jurisdiction in the proceedings at issue and that in the hearing before the Appeal's Board he had not been questioned.
10.  The Salzburg Regional Directorate of Finance filed comments on the applicant's complaint on 12 November 1996.
11.  On 10 December 1996 the Administrative Court granted suspensive effect to the applicant's complaint.
12.  On 22 September 2000 the Administrative Court, without having held a hearing, dismissed the applicant's complaint and ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings before it. Referring to its case-law, it stated that the Salzburg-Land Tax Office had been competent to conduct the proceedings at issue. Regarding the applicant's complaint that he had not been questioned in the hearing before the Appeal's Board, it noted inter alia that the applicant had not submitted that he had been prevented from presenting his arguments on his own motion in the hearing before the Appeal's Board.
The judgment was served on the applicant's counsel on 20 October 2000.
4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Kostroma.
5.  In 1998, after 23 years of military service, the applicant was dismissed due to a structural reorganisation. He became eligible for being granted social housing and was placed on a waiting list.
6.  In 2001 he sued the Kostroma Town Administration, seeking to obtain social accommodation by the State. He invoked his statutory entitlement to receive a flat within three months of the placement on the waiting list.
7.  On 29 August 2001 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Kostroma granted his claim and held that the Kostroma Town Administration was to provide the applicant with a flat in accordance with applicable housing standards. The judgment expressly referred to the three-month statutory time-limit for granting the accommodation.
8.  The Kostroma Town Administration requested to stay the enforcement of the judgment for six months. On 10 January 2002 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Kostroma dismissed their request and held that the time-limit fixed for the enforcement of the judgment was compulsory.
9.  On 10 June 2003 the Kostroma Town Administration issued the applicant with an occupancy voucher in respect of a flat in Kostroma measuring 70.77 m2.
6.  The applicants were born in 1932 and 1958, respectively, and live in Hrgovljani, Croatia.
7.  On 12 February 1992 the applicants' house in Hrgovljani was blown up by unknown perpetrators.
8.  On 9 February 1995 the applicants instituted civil proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu), seeking damages for their destroyed property from the State.
9.  On 17 January 1996 Parliament introduced an amendment to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) which provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation. The new legislation was to be enacted within six months.
10.  On 5 February 1996 the Zagreb Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the above legislation.
11.  On 14 July 2003 Parliament introduced the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the 2003 Liability Act”).
12.  On 23 September 2003 the Zagreb Municipal Court resumed the proceedings.
13.  On 5 May 2004 the court dismissed the applicants' claim finding that it no longer had jurisdiction in the matter.
14.  On 18 June 2004 the applicants appealed against the above decision. It appears that the proceedings are still pending before the second instance court.
8.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zagreb.
9.  On 10 July 1991 M.T. and H.T. (“the plaintiffs”) brought an action in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against the applicant seeking damages for breach of contract.
10.  From 27 November 1991 until 27 January 1992 the plaintiffs were represented by their legal counsel, M.V. and thereafter by his daughter, S.T., who took over her father's law practice.
11.  The plaintiffs, but not M.V., attended the first hearing in the case that was held on 11 December 1991. M.V.'s activity in the proceedings was thus limited to filing one set of submissions with the court on 2 December 1991 in which he responded to the applicant's arguments.
12.  At the next hearing held on 27 January 1992 S.T. replaced her father as the plaintiffs' counsel.
13.  On 28 April 1992 the Municipal Court gave judgment for the plaintiffs. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 9 February 1993 the Zagreb County Court (Okružni sud Zagreb) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court.
14.  In the resumed proceedings, on 6 July 1993 the Zagreb Municipal Court again gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The applicant appealed.
15.  On 27 September 1994 the Zagreb County Court reversed the first-instance judgment, only accepting part of the plaintiffs' claim.
16.  The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) in which he argued, inter alia, that he had been unable to present his case properly in the Municipal Court.
17.  On 8 December 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law.
18.  On 28 July 2000 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske).
19.  Following the service of the Supreme Court's decision, on 24 August 2000 S.T. informed the Zagreb Municipal Court that she had ceased to act for the plaintiffs some four years earlier and that the decision should have been served on the plaintiffs directly.
20.  On 18 December 2000 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It found that the articles of the Constitution on which the applicant sought to rely did not contain any substantive provisions enshrining human rights or fundamental freedoms.
Judge M.V. was a member of the panel of five judges which delivered that decision. The panel was presided over by another judge. The applicant became aware of the composition of the panel when he received the Constitutional Court's decision.