11. The applicant, born in 1953, is the father of the child M., born out of wedlock on 25 January 1981. The applicant acknowledged paternity of M.
12. The applicant and the child’s mother lived together at the time of the child’s birth. They separated in September 1986. The child’s mother prohibited any contact between the applicant and the child. The applicant still met M. several times at school until such contact was no longer possible. Subsequently the child’s mother married Mr W., the father of her child A., born in August 1985, W. being the common family name.
13. On 2 October 1990 the applicant applied to the Rostock District Court for a decision granting him a right of access to his daughter. Having heard the persons concerned, the Rostock Youth Office, in comments dated 11 April 1991, advised against a right of access. The Youth Office submitted that M. had established a close relationship with Mr. W., which would be adversely affected by contact between M. and her natural father. It also stated that M., when heard in the absence of her mother, had indicated that she was not keen to see the applicant and was suffering as a result of his continuing efforts to obtain access.
14. On 27 June 1991 M., then ten years old, was heard by a judge of the District Court. She stated that the fact that the applicant was always standing at the fence of the schoolyard disturbed her and that she did not wish to visit the applicant even if access should be ordered by the court.
15. At a court hearing on 31 July 1991, the applicant and the child’s mother declared that they would attempt to settle the question of a visiting arrangement with the assistance of the Youth Office. On 30 September 1991 the Youth Office informed the District Court that no agreement had been achieved and that M. had stated that she did not wish to see the applicant.
16. On 12 December 1991 the court ordered that a psychological expert opinion be prepared. On 9 April 1992, in one-page submissions, the psychologist of the Rostock Health Services stated that, as contact between the applicant and M. had been disrupted for six years, no diagnosis of their current relationship appeared possible. The psychologist considered that the views which the applicant and M. had expressed on the question of future contact were very different. M. was growing up in a family unit and, unlike the applicant, was not suffering from any deficits in that respect, and did not wish to have any personal contact with the applicant. He should give her the necessary time to take up contact of her own motion. The psychologist noted that she had arranged a meeting between the applicant and M. which, however, had been cancelled by M.’s stepfather.
17. On 24 June 1992 the District Court judge heard the applicant and M. in the presence of the psychological expert. M. having repeatedly stated that she did not wish to have contact with the applicant, the latter affirmed that he would withdraw his request for a right of access.
18.  The applicant withdrew his request on 1 July 1992.
19. On 13 September 1993 the applicant again applied to the District Court for a right of access to his daughter.
20. On 15 February 1994 the District Court judge heard the thirteen-year-old M., who stated that she did not wish to talk to the applicant or accept presents from him and that he should no longer bother her. She also said that she had a father whom she loved, though it was not her natural father. The court held a hearing with the applicant and the child’s mother on 26 April 1994.
21. On 1 June 1994 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s application.
22. The District Court noted the comments filed by the Rostock Youth Office on 6 January 1994 as well as the parents’ and the child’s statements in court. The Court also had regard to the comments filed by the Youth Office in April 1991 and to the statement submitted by the psychologist in April 1992, both in the context of the first set of access proceedings.
23. The District Court found that the applicant could not be granted access to the child. Referring to section 1711 of the Civil Code, the Court observed that the mother, having sole custody, determined the father’s access and the guardianship court could only decide to grant the father access if this was in the child’s best interest. In this respect, the court found as follows:
“On the basis of its extensive investigations, and especially its conversations with [M.] in 1992 and February 1994, this court has decided that, in the present case, access by the father to his child is by no means in her best interest. 
At the age of thirteen, [M.] is certainly able to make up her own mind and has clearly rejected the idea of establishing contact with her biological father. In the court’s opinion, forcing her to see him against her will cannot be justified, since this would seriously disturb her emotional and psychological balance. Such a decision would on no account be in her best interest. 
This court cannot accept the [applicant’s] sweeping statement that access is always in the child’s interest. The extent to which this is true invariably depends on circumstances. In this case, the only justifiable decision is that set out in the operative part of the judgment.
...”
24. On 17 June 1994 the Rostock Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the following grounds:
“The appeal is admissible under section 20 of the Act on Non-Contentious Proceedings, but is unfounded. The District Court was right to refuse the applicant all access to [M.], since this is not in the child’s best interest (sections 1711 and 1634 of the Civil Code). This court also takes the view that the District Court had no cause to permit exceptions for any specific area of life. It considers that the arguments advanced in the contested decision are correct. It regards it as important that the girl [M.] – who is, after all, thirteen years old – has stated clearly and for a long time that she wants no contact with her father. The applicant should accept this clearly expressed wish in his adolescent daughter’s interest and also his own. Only if he ceased to exert pressure on her might it one day be possible for them to resume contact. The court would also point out that access to [M.] on the strength of a court order could hardly be enforced against the child’s will.”
25. On 22 July 1994 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court.
26. On 19 January 1996 a panel of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the applicant’s complaint.