10.  On 2 December 1994 the Burgomaster (Burgemeester) of Amsterdam, relying on Sections 172 and 175 of the Municipality Act (Gemeentewet) as amended on 1 January 1994, imposed a prohibition order (verwijderingsbevel) on the applicant to the effect that the latter would not be allowed for a period of fourteen days to enter a particular area, i.e. the “Ganzenhoef” area, one of the emergency areas designated by the Burgomaster. The following events were referred to in the Burgomaster’s decision as having led to this order being issued:
–  It appeared from police reports that on 9 and 12 September, 3 October, 14 and 16 November 1994 the applicant had either overtly used hard drugs, had had utensils for the use of hard drugs in his possession or had had hard drugs in his possession in the Ganzenhoef area and that on four of those occasions the applicant had been ordered to leave the area for eight hours. 
–  On 16 November 1994 the applicant had been heard by the police about his conduct and he had been told that he would either have to refrain from acts which disturbed the public order (openbare orde) or have to stay away from the area. The applicant had further been informed that if he committed such acts again in the near future, the Burgomaster would be requested to impose a prohibition order for fourteen days on him. On that occasion the applicant did not wish to state anything as to the reasons for his presence in that area.
– On 25 November 1994 the applicant had nevertheless overtly used hard drugs in the Ganzenhoef area. He had once again been ordered to leave the area for eight hours and the police had subsequently requested the Burgomaster to impose a prohibition order for fourteen days on the applicant.
11.  In the opinion of the Burgomaster the applicant would again commit acts disturbing public order within the near future. In this respect the Burgomaster took account of the kind of conduct involved, i.e. acts seriously disturbing public order, the repetition and continuity of this conduct, the statement of the applicant, the short period of time within which the acts concerned had been observed and the fact that the applicant had continued his disruptive behaviour despite the eight-hour prohibition orders imposed on him and the warning given by the police. Finally, the Burgomaster noted that neither the applicant’s home nor his place of work were situated in the area concerned.
12.  On 12 December 1994 the applicant submitted an objection (bezwaarschrift) against the prohibition order to the Burgomaster. He submitted, inter alia, that the Burgomaster had failed to take into account the fact that he was residing in the Ganzenhoef area, that he needed to be present there in person twice a week in order to collect his social security benefits and that he received social counselling there. The applicant stated that the police knew this, but had failed to mention it in the police report on the applicant’s hearing of 16 November 1994.
13.  The applicant further submitted that the prohibition order could not be considered as having a legal basis in that the emergency powers granted to the Burgomaster under the Municipality Act were intended for emergency situations. According to the applicant, the legislature had never intended structural nuisance caused by drug abusers to be considered as creating an emergency situation. Moreover, the applicant’s absence from the Ganzenhoef area would not make any difference in this respect since he was only one of many drug abusers in that area. The applicant also complained that the order was contrary to Article 6 of the Convention in that it constituted a sanction and could therefore only be imposed by a judge. He further complained that the order restricted his freedom of movement and was contrary to his right to respect for his private life, family life, home and correspondence.
14.  On 10 January 1995 a hearing took place before an advisory committee. During this hearing the representative of the Burgomaster stated that already on 19 April 1994 a prohibition order for fourteen days had been imposed on the applicant and that on 16 November 1994 the applicant had not wished to make any statement to the police as to the reasons for his presence in the Ganzenhoef area. Despite the previous orders, the applicant had continued his undesirable conduct and on this ground the imposition of a new prohibition order had been sought. The Burgomaster’s representative further stated that the address where the applicant had stated that he resided and where he collected his mail and social security benefits was in fact the address of the Streetcornerwork Foundation. It was not possible to reside at that address. This Foundation had a procedure under which social-security benefits for persons subject to a prohibition order could be collected by an authorised third party and it was possible for the applicant to avail himself of that procedure.
15.  On 29 June 1995 the committee advised the Burgomaster to reject the objection and to maintain the prohibition order. It considered, inter alia, having regard to the fact that the applicant had, within a short period of time, regularly committed acts which had disrupted public order and that the prohibition orders for eight hours which had been issued had not prevented him from behaving in that manner, that the imposition of the prohibition order had not been unreasonable. It further found that the order was in conformity with Section 172 (3) of the Municipality Act, that therefore it was not necessary to examine the question whether or not the conditions set out in Section 175 of the Municipality Act had been fulfilled, and that the Burgomaster had not exceeded his competence under the Municipality Act. It did not agree with the applicant that the impugned measure constituted a penalty as it had been issued in order to maintain public order. The committee finally found that the interference with the applicant’s right to liberty of movement had been justified and that the prohibition order could not be regarded as disproportionate.
16.  By decision of 6 July 1995 the Burgomaster rejected the applicant’s objection, adopting as his own the reasoning applied by the advisory committee.
17.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam.
18.  By judgment of 19 January 1996, following adversarial proceedings in the course of which a hearing was held on 8 December 1995, the Regional Court declared the applicant’s appeal well-founded and quashed the prohibition order.
19.  The Regional Court accepted that the overt use of hard drugs in public places and the presence of a concentration of drug abusers and dealers disrupted public order and acknowledged the necessity to end such nuisance, in particular when this occurred continuously at specific locations in the city. The Regional Court noted that the Burgomaster availed himself of two means to that end, namely prohibition orders of either eight hours or fourteen days. It considered the procedure established as regards the imposition of prohibition orders for a duration of fourteen days and noted that this procedure had not been fully complied with in that the applicant’s prohibition order had not been sought by the competent police officer. However, as it was not established that this had harmed the applicant’s interests, it did not find that this flaw should result in the quashing of the order. It did, however, find that the order should be quashed on other grounds.
20.  The Regional Court held that, unlike the situation in which an eight‑hour prohibition order has been imposed, Section 172 (3) of the Municipality Act offered no basis for the imposition of a prohibition order for a duration of fourteen days. It held on this point that the competence established by this provision aimed to create a possibility for direct reaction to an expected disturbance of public order and might serve to prohibit someone’s presence for a limited period of time in the area where the disturbance of public order was expected. It held that the eight-hour prohibition order was such as to meet this need, but not the fourteen days prohibition order, the latter measure being disproportionate in relation to the expected disruption of public order and thus going beyond what could be considered necessary for maintaining public order.
21.  The Regional Court added that in the present case this was all the more so as the applicant had no permanent place of residence and used the address of the Streetcornerwork Foundation as his postal address. The prohibition order implied that the applicant’s freedom of movement was limited for fourteen days in a manner which prevented him from collecting his mail and from receiving his social security benefits. It rejected the argument advanced by the Burgomaster’s representative that the police would not undertake any formal action against the applicant for acting contrary to Article 184 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), i.e. the offence of failure to comply with an official order (ambtelijk bevel), when collecting his social security benefits at the address of the Streetcornerwork Foundation, considering that the applicant’s freedom of movement could not be made dependent on the willingness of the police officer on duty to tolerate intrinsically punishable conduct.
22.  The Regional Court further found that the situation at issue, i.e. nuisance caused by drug abuse, did not constitute a situation within the meaning of Section 175 of the Municipality Act and accordingly held that the Burgomaster could not have based the prohibition order on this provision. As it had already found the prohibition order to be incompatible with national law, the Regional Court did not find it necessary to determine whether or not the order was compatible with Article 6 of the Convention.
23.  On 7 February 1996, the Burgomaster lodged an appeal against the Regional Court’s judgment with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State).
24.  In its judgment of 19 December 1996, following adversarial proceedings, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 19 January 1996 and rejected the applicant’s appeal to the Regional Court as ill-founded. Its reasoning included the following:
“The prohibition order issued against Landvreugd is based on a decision of the appellant, dated 28 October 1993 and addressed to the Chief Superintendent of Police, which contains an instruction to the police relating to the preparation and issuing of a fourteen-day prohibition order. This instruction designates the Ganzenhoef area as an “emergency area” and indicates the behaviour which the appellant considers to be constitutive of serious breaches of public order, including the overt possession or use on or near the public highway of addictive substances within the meaning of Section 2 of the Opium Act.
The Regional Court held, among other things, that the appellant was not competent to act on the basis of Section 175 of the Municipality Act, because a situation within the meaning of that Section was lacking. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division does not share this opinion. Its reasons are the following.
It is laid down in Section 175, first paragraph, of the Municipality Act that in case of a riotous movement, of other serious disorders or of calamities, as well as in case of a well-founded fear of the development thereof, the Burgomaster is empowered to issue all orders which he deems necessary for the maintenance of public order or the limitation of general danger. In doing so he may deviate from rules other than those of the Constitution.
The Administrative Jurisdiction Division notes at the outset that giving orders in the situations described in Section 175 of the Municipality Act is not contrary to the right to freedom of movement as guaranteed by Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, since provision has been made for the possibility to limit this right by law – which also includes an order given by the Burgomaster pursuant to the law – for the protection of public order.
Section 175 of the Municipality Act replaced Section 219 of the Municipality Act which was repealed as of 1 January 1994. As did Section 219, Section 175 grants the Burgomaster emergency powers which should only be used in exceptional situations. Thus provision has been made by law for circumstances in which ordinary means are insufficient to restore and maintain public order. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division notes in this connection that the wording of Section 175 does not lead to the conclusion that that provision, as compared with Section 219, is intended to introduce any changes as regards the circumstances in which emergency powers may be used. Its drafting history does not justify holding otherwise.
In the opinion of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, ordinary means may be considered insufficient in the present case and there was, at the time of the decision on the objection, an exceptional situation of the kind referred to above. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division finds in this regard that the facts relating to the situation in the Ganzenhoef area, based on which the appellant decided to issue the fourteen-day prohibition order, are established. In light of the decision of 28 October 1993 the situation there was characterised by the presence of a large number of drug addicts and the attendant nuisance, inconvenience, insecurity and threats to other citizens. This factual situation is so serious that the personnel and means available to the appellant were insufficient to counter the disruptions of public order thereby caused.
It is important to note in this context that at the time the objection was decided on, it was not possible to solve the problem there by means of a regulation adopted by the municipality (gemeentelijke regeling). At that time there was no relevant provision in any municipality bye-law, nor were any other adequate administrative-law means available. Given that the decision dismissing the objection was given before the Administrative Jurisdiction Division delivered its decision of 14 May 1996 ..., the absence of such a provision cannot be held against the appellant. Apart from that, by a decision of 26 June 1996, Section 2.6 A has been added to the General Municipal Bye-law of Amsterdam, which contains a regulation governing prohibition orders in relation to hard drugs. Against this background, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division is of the opinion that it cannot be maintained that the appellant was not entitled to use the powers granted him by Section 175 of the Municipality Act.
Moreover, nothing brought forward by Landvreugd constitutes a ground to find that the appellant could not reasonably decide, in the light of the circumstances of the case, to issue a fourteen-day prohibition order.
... The position taken by the appellant, that the risk of repetition of behaviour constituting a breach of the peace was so great that a fourteen-day prohibition order was necessary, is not unreasonable.
The Administrative Jurisdiction Division further notes that Landvreugd is not resident in the Ganzenhoef area, is not dependent on that area for work, and that he was offered the possibility to collect his social-security benefits from the Streetcornerwork Foundation.”
25.  Apart from the proceedings described above, the applicant was arrested and placed in detention on 4 December 1994 for failure to comply with the prohibition order of 2 December 1994. On 20 December 1994 the single-judge chamber (politierechter) of the Amsterdam Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) suspended the applicant’s pre-trial detention in order to allow the applicant to be admitted to the Crisis Observation and Detoxification Department of the J. clinic and adjourned the criminal proceedings against the applicant sine die.
26.  By judgment of 22 May 1995, the single-judge chamber of the Regional Court convicted the applicant of having failed to respect a prohibition order on two occasions and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment with deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of Amsterdam.
27.  In its judgment of 4 February 1997, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 22 May 1995 and convicted the applicant of having failed to respect a prohibition order on one occasion. However, as the applicant had also amassed other convictions which the law required to be taken into account for sentencing purposes, the Court of Appeal was prevented from imposing any sentence as the maximum aggregate penalty had already been attained. The applicant’s subsequent appeal on points of law was rejected on 16 June 1998 by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).
28.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant do not form part of the case before the Court.