6.  The applicants, United Kingdom nationals and husband and wife, were born in 1972 and 1976 respectively, and live in Oldham.
7.  The applicants had a daughter M. born on 24 July 1998.
8.  On 26 September 1998, M. screamed with pain when picked up by the maternal grandmother. The parents and grandmother took M. to the hospital. The triage nurse made a note of information given by the family. That note stated that the mother, rather than the grandmother, had “yanked” M.
9.  An X-ray showed a displaced slightly-comminuted fracture of the midshaft of the femur. While it was noted that there was no history of metabolic bone disease in the family, it was not noted that the parents were first cousins, an incident relevant to a possible genetic condition. Neither the mother nor grandmother spoke much English; no Pushtu interpreter was provided. A consultant paediatrician, Dr Blumenthal, interviewed the parents and grandmother early in the morning the next day, again without an interpreter. He noted that none of them appeared to know how the injury had occurred. He concluded that it was an inflicted injury and told the parents this.
10.  The police were informed. The parents were interviewed on 27 September 1998 by a social worker. He was unable to communicate with the mother due to language difficulties.
11.  On 28 September 1998 the health visitor for the family was interviewed and stated that she had had no concerns about the family.
12.  On 29 September 1998 the police interviewed the parents with an interpreter present.
13.  On 30 September 1998, a social worker interviewed the family again and indicated that medical opinion was clear that M. could not have been injured by being picked up in the manner described by the grandmother. She warned that without a convincing explanation for the injury a child protection conference would have to be called.
14.  On 14 October 1998, in light of the doctor’s conclusion of non-accidental injury (NAI), the Child Protection Conference decided to seek a second opinion but that meanwhile an interim care order should be obtained. Such care order was issued and parental responsibility given to the local authority on 16 October 1998.
15.  On 23 October 1998, M. was discharged from hospital into the care of her aunt. The parents were allowed supervised contact.
16.  The parents obtained legal advice and jointly instructed an expert, with M.’s guardian, inter alia, to clarify whether tests had been carried out to exclude brittle bone disease. However no further tests were carried out at this stage.
17.  On 23 December 1998, the County Court judge found that the mother and grandmother were liars and knew more about the injury than they were prepared to reveal (they had given evidence through an interpreter which they allege was suspect) and that as the father was convinced of the innocence of his wife, he was disqualified as a person capable of protecting M. He ordered M. to be placed in care. M. remained with her aunt who lived a few hundred yards from the family home.
18.  On 29 March 1999, M. sustained a second injury in her aunt’s care. Bilateral femoral fractures were found and following further tests she was diagnosed with osteogenesis imperfecta (“OI”, commonly known as brittle bone disease). Professor Carty and Dr Paterson were consulted at this time by Dr Blumenthal and inter alia did not find any ground for reaching a diagnosis of OI in preference to a non-accidental injury at the time of the first injury.
19.  After discharge from hospital, M. returned home in April 1999.
20.  On 17 June 1999, the care order was discharged and M. returned to her parents. In her report to the court dated 14 June 1999, M.’s guardian ad litem noted, inter alia, that this had been a particularly perplexing case, in which a diagnosis of non-accidental injury in respect of the first injury had appeared to be the most likely explanation while not fitting with the other information, essentially positive, which had emerged about the family. She also noted that all the experts agreed that medical evidence available to the court at the time of the interim care order was as complete as it could be at that time and that a diagnosis of bone disorder could not have been made at the time of the first injury.
21.  The entire local community were aware that the family had been suspected of harming M. and the family had been extremely shocked and shamed. Rumours had spread to Pakistan that the mother had been put in prison. The parents’ relationship with M. and with the grandmother were severely affected and disrupted as a result of events.
22.  On 24 September 2001 the parents brought claims for negligence and breach of their Article 8 rights against the hospital trust and the consultant paediatrician.
23.  On 4 December 2002, the High Court found no duty of care was owed to the parents and that the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA 1998”) did not apply to events before it came into force on 2 October 2000. The parents appealed.
24.  Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted. Two other cases raising similar issues were considered at the same time.
25.  On 31 July 2003, concerning the parents’ claims in the three cases, the Court of Appeal held as regards allegations under Article 6 that no violation of this provision was involved, referring to Strasbourg judgments (Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 29392/95, ECHR 2001‑V and T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 28945/95, ECHR 2001‑V). It found that while domestic law now recognised that there was a duty of care in relation to children, whose best interests were always paramount, there was a potential conflict of interest between the child and the parents, as it would always be in the parents’ best interests for the child not to be removed. Where consideration was being given to whether child abuse justified measures, a duty of care could be owed to the child but not to the parents. It upheld the rulings of the various County Court judges as a result.
26.  After a hearing on 31 January and 1 and 2 February 2005, the House of Lords gave judgment on 21 April 2005. They affirmed the orders made by the first-instance judges and Court of Appeal. Lord Nicholls, in his judgment with which the majority agreed, found inter alia:
"70. There are two cardinal features in these cases. One feature is that a parent was suspected of having deliberately harmed his or her own child or having fabricated the child’s medical condition. The other feature, which is to be assumed, is that the ensuing investigation by the doctors was conducted negligently. In consequence, the suspected parent’s life was disrupted, to a greater or lesser extent, and the suspected parent suffered psychiatric injury. 71. It is the combination of these features which creates the difficult problem now before the House. In the ordinary course the interests of parent and child are congruent. This is not so where a parent wilfully harms his child. Then the parent is knowingly acting directly contrary to his parental responsibilities and to the best interests of his child. So the liability of doctors and social workers in these cases calls into consideration two countervailing interests, each of high social importance: the need to safeguard children from abuse by their own parents, and the need to protect parents from unnecessary interference with their family life. 72. The first of these interests involves protection of children as the victims of crime. Child abuse is criminal conduct of a particularly reprehensible character: children are highly vulnerable members of society. Child abuse is also a form of criminal conduct peculiarly hard to combat, because its existence is difficult to discover. Babies and young children are unable to complain, older children too frightened. If the source of the abuse is the parent, the child is at risk from his primary and natural protector within the privacy of his home. This both increases the risk of abuse and means that investigation necessitates intrusion into highly sensitive areas of family life, with the added complication that the parent who is responsible for the abuse will give a false account of the child’s history. 73. The other, countervailing interest is the deep interest of the parent in his or her family life. ... Interference with family life requires cogent justification, for the sake of children and parents alike. So public authorities, should, so far as possible, cooperate with the parents when making decisions about their children. Public authorities should disclose matters relied upon by them as justifying interference with family life. Parents should be involved in the decision-making process to whatever extent is appropriate to protect their interests adequately. 74. The question raised by these appeals is how these countervailing interests are best balanced when a parent is wrongly suspected of having abused his child. Public confidence in the child protection system can only be maintained if a proper balance is struck, avoiding unnecessary intrusion in families while protecting children at risk of significant harm... Clearly health professionals must act in good faith. They must not act recklessly, that is without caring whether an allegation of abuse is well-founded or not. Acting recklessly is not acting in good faith. But are health professionals liable to the suspected parents if they fall short of the standard of skill and care expected of any reasonable professional in the circumstances? Are they exposed to claims by the parents for professional negligence? ... 75. In considering these questions the starting point is to note that in each of these three cases... the doctors acted properly in considering whether the claimant parents had deliberately inflicted injury on the child in question. The doctors were entitled, indeed bound to consider this possibility. Further, having become suspicious, the doctors rightly communicated their suspicions to the statutory services responsible for child protection. That is the essential next step in child protection... 76. In each case the suspected parent was eventually cleared of suspicion. In one case this was after ten days, in the other cases after much longer periods. The second point to note is that, essentially, the parents’ complaints related to the periods for which they remained under suspicion. In each case the parent’s complaint concerns the conduct of the clinical investigation during these periods; the investigation, it is said, was unnecessarily protracted. The doctors failed to carry out the necessary tests with appropriate expedition. Had due care and skill been realised from the outset, the doctors’ suspicions would have been allayed at once or much more speedily than occurred, and, in consequence, the parents would have been spared the trauma to which they were subjected. Thus the essence of the claims is that the health professionals responsible for protecting a suspected child victim owe a person suspected of having committed a crime against the child a duty to investigate their suspicions, a duty sounding in damages if they act in good faith but carelessly. 77. Stated in this broad form, this is a surprising proposition. In this area of the law, concerned with the reporting and investigation of suspected crime, the balancing point between the public interest and the interest of a suspected individual has long been the presence or absence of good faith... 78. This background accords ill with the submission that those responsible for the protection of a child against criminal conduct owe suspected perpetrators the duty suggested. The existence of such a duty would fundamentally alter the balance in this area of the law. It would mean that if a parent suspected that a babysitter or a teacher at a nursery or school might have been responsible for abusing her child, the doctor would owe a duty of care to the suspect... 79... <Counsel> did not contend for such a broad proposition... His submission was more restricted.... That the health professionals’ duty to exercise due professional skill and care is owed only to the child’s primary carers, usually the parents, as well as the child himself. ... 80. My initial difficulty... is that the distinction between primary carers, to whom the duty would be owed, and other suspects to whom it would not, is not altogether convincing. It is difficult to see why, if a health professional owes no duty to a childminder or teacher suspected of abuse, he should nonetheless owe such a duty to a parent suspected of abuse. An erroneous suspicion that a childminder or school teacher had been abusing a child in his or her care can be very damaging to him or her. ... 81. There is, however, one major difference between parents and childminders or school teachers,. In the case of a parent suspicion may disrupt the parent’s family life. ... So the crucial question ... is whether this potential disruption of family life tilts the balance in favour of imposing liability in negligence where abuse by a parent is erroneously suspected...
... 85. In my view the Court of Appeal reached the right conclusion on the issue... Ultimately the factor which persuaded me that, at common law, interference with family life does not justify according a suspected parent a higher level of protection than other suspected perpetrators is the factor conveniently labelled ‘conflict of interest’. A doctor is obliged to act in the best interests of his patient. In these cases the child is his patient. The doctor is charged with the protection of the child, not with the protection of the parent. The best interests of a child and his parent normally march hand-in-hand. But when considering whether something does not feel ‘quite right’, a doctor must be able to act single-mindedly in the interests of the child. He ought not have to have at the back of his mind an awareness that if his doubts about intentional injury or sexual abuse prove unfounded he may be exposed to claims by a distressed parent. 86. ... the seriousness of child abuse as a social problem demands that health professionals, acting in good faith in what they believe are the best interests of the child, should not be subject to potentially conflicting duties when deciding whether a child may have been abused, or when deciding whether their doubts should be communicated to others, or when deciding what further investigatory or protective steps should be taken. The duty to the child in making these decisions should not be clouded by imposing a conflicting duty in favour of parents or others suspected of having abused the child. ..."