coastalcph/lex_glue huggingface dataset:
8.  The applicant, who was born in 1942, is a judge. After the summer of 1990 he applied for membership of the Grande Oriente d’Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani. On 5 March 1991 he became a member of the Adriano Lemmi Lodge in Milan.
During the summer of 1992 the applicant read in the national press that certain State prosecutors, in particular the state prosecutor of Palmi (Reggio di Calabria), had begun inquiries, which, according to certain rumours, also concerned lodges associated with the Grande Oriente d’Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani.
In October 1992 the applicant asked to distance himself from the organisation and on 5 November 1992 he was made a “dormant member”.
9.  The Palmi public prosecutor’s office sent the National Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) a list of judges who were Freemasons. The National Council of the Judiciary then sent it to the Minister of Justice and Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation, who instituted disciplinary proceedings against the judges. The list was then made public – at least in part – by the press.
10.  In July 1993, after an inquiry had been commenced, the applicant was questioned by an inspector from the General Inspectorate for the Ministry of Justice. Subsequently, in February 1994, he was questioned by Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation.
11.  In June 1994 he was summoned to appear before the disciplinary section of the National Council of the Judiciary. He was accused of having undermined the prestige of the judiciary by committing a serious breach of his duties, and thus being unworthy of the trust that must be had in a judge.
In his address, counsel for the applicant referred to a decision of the same section, given some ten years earlier, which drew a distinction between secret associations – of which judges were forbidden from being members – and discreet associations. Counsel for the applicant also noted that the guidelines of the National Council of the Judiciary, which stated that judicial office was incompatible with membership of the Freemasons, had been adopted during the summer of 1993, which was one year after the applicant had left the organisation of his own accord.
At the end of the proceedings the disciplinary section found that the applicant had breached Article 18 of Royal Legislative Decree no. 511 of 31 May 1946 (“the 1946 decree”) and gave him a warning.
12.  The applicant appealed on points of law to the Court of Cassation, which examined the case in plenary session on 13 June 1996. It dismissed the appeal in a judgment of 10 December 1996.
13.  On 17 May 2000 the Fourth Committee of the National Council of the Judiciary indicated again (having already made a similar recommendation on an unknown date) that it was not in favour of the applicant’s promotion – for which the requisite conditions had been fulfilled since 17 October 1997 – in view of the disciplinary sanction that had been imposed on him.
7.  The applicants are Italian nationals who were born in 1959 and 1951 respectively and live in Rome.
8.  On 10 and 19 July 1997 two armed robberies were committed in the Rome area. It emerges from a report prepared by the Rome police on 23 July 1997 that there was evidence that the stolen goods had been hidden in a warehouse belonging to the company owned by the applicants. The latter were also said to have been in telephone contact with persons suspected of the offences.
9.  On 18 December 1997 the Rome public prosecutor applied for the applicants to be placed in pre-trial detention. In an order of 22 December 1997, the Rome investigating judge allowed that application.
10.  On 23 December 1997 the applicants were arrested and taken to Rome Prison. On 24 December 1997 they appealed against the order of 22 December 1997 to the division of the Rome District Court responsible for reconsidering security measures (tribunale del riesame).
11.  The hearing before the Rome District Court was held on 7 January 1998. In an order delivered the same day, filed with the registry on 10 January 1998, the court replaced the applicants’ pre-trial detention with the security measure of house arrest (arresti domiciliari). It considered, in particular, that it was reasonable to suspect that the applicants had committed the offences in issue and that it was to be feared that they might commit others of the same type. Taking the view, however, that there was no “tangible risk for the gathering of evidence” and having regard to the defendants’ clean police record, it concluded that a less restrictive measure, such as house arrest, was preferable. That measure required the applicants to stay in their home and leave only with the authorities’ prior authorisation.
12.  The order of 7 January was served on the applicants on 10 January 1998. They should therefore have been immediately escorted from Rome Prison, where they were being held, to their home. However, no police officers were available to escort them and so their transfer was delayed until 13 January 1998.
8.  On 29 November 1980 police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate arrested the applicant on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, the Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way).
9.  On 26 January 1981 the Ankara Martial-Law Court (sıkıyönetim mahkemesi) remanded the applicant in custody.
10.  On 26 February 1982 the military public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Martial-Law Court against the applicant and 722 other defendants. The public prosecutor accused the applicant of membership of an illegal armed organisation, namely the Dev-Yol, whose object was to undermine the constitutional order and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist regime. He further charged the applicant with having been involved in a number of crimes such as acting as an armed look-out for the killers of several individuals, a bomb attack on a coffee house and opening fire on a house.
The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code.
11.  In a judgment of 19 July 1989 the Martial-Law Court, composed of two civilian judges, two military judges and an army officer, found the applicant guilty as charged, sentenced him to life imprisonment (in effect eighteen years assuming good conduct) for offences under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code and permanently debarred him from employment in the civil service. It took from 19 July 1989 until 1993 for the reasons for the judgment to be set down in writing.
12.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Military Court of Cassation (askeri yargıtay).
13.  On 23 July 1991 the Martial-Law Court ordered the applicant’s release pending trial.
14.  Following promulgation of the Law of 27 December 1993, which abolished the jurisdiction of the martial-law courts, the Court of Cassation (yargıtay) acquired jurisdiction over the case and the file was transmitted to it.
15.  On 27 December 1995 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant’s conviction.
8.  On 14 February 1992 the pension fund of the applicant’s employer granted the applicant a full temporary disability pension as from 1 March 1992 until 30 June 1992. Thereafter the period of full pension was prolonged several times.
9.  On 13 June 1997 the pension fund reviewed its previous decision and changed the applicant’s pension into a partial one for an indefinite period beginning on 1 June 1997. The pension fund reasoned its decision by observing that, according to the documents submitted to the pension fund, the applicant’s capability to work could no longer be considered reduced to such an extent as entitling him to a full disability pension. It was also noted that the applicant could be expected to work at least part-time.
10.  The applicant appealed to the Pension Board, which on 4 March 1998 rejected the appeal. The decision was reasoned as follows:
“An employee is entitled to a full disability pension provided that his or her ability to work has continuously been reduced by at least three fifths for a minimum of one year and that this reduction has been caused by an illness, a defect or an injury. The employee’s remaining ability to earn income by carrying out work that would be available to him or her and that he or she could reasonably be expected to perform must be taken into account when assessing the reduction in the employee’s ability to work. Furthermore, the employee’s education, previous activities, age, living conditions and other comparable factors must be taken into consideration.
According to the statements on [the applicant’s] state of health, [the applicant] suffers from depression that has become more difficult during the autumn of 1997. However, [the applicant’s] symptoms must be considered as mild. Therefore, the Pension Board finds [the applicant] still partly capable of working as from 1 June 1997.”
11.  The applicant appealed to the Insurance Court. He referred, inter alia, to several medical statements according to which he was for the time being incapable of working because of his mental illness. On 27 October 1998, the Insurance Court rejected the appeal reasoning the decision as follows:
“[The Insurance Court refers to] the reasons given in the Pension Board’s decision. The new material filed while the case was pending [before the Insurance Court] does not change the evaluation of [the applicant’s] disability.”
12.  The pension fund decided later, on 27 January 1999, to reject the applicant’s renewed application for a full disability pension instead of partial one. The Pension Board rejected the applicant’s appeal on 25 May 1999. The applicant further appealed to the Insurance Court which, on 22 June 2000, found that the applicant’s capability of working had been reduced at least by 60 percent on account of his illness as from the beginning of December 1999, and ordered the pension fund to grant the applicant a full disability pension as from 1 January 1999.
9.  On 25 October 1980 police officers from the Fatsa Security Directorate arrested the applicant on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed organisation, the Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way).
10.  On 3 January 1981 the Perşembe Criminal ordered the applicant’s detention on remand.
11.  On 10 May 1982 the Military Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Erzincan Martial Law Court against the applicant and 722 other defendants. The Public Prosecutor accused the applicant, inter alia, of membership of the Dev-Yol, whose object was to undermine the constitutional order and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist regime. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code.
12.  On 5 February 1985 the applicant was released pending trial.
13.  In a judgment of 24 August 1988 the Martial Law Court convicted the applicant on account of his involvement in the Dev-Yol. It sentenced the applicant to fifteen years’ imprisonment under Article 146 § 3 of the Turkish Criminal Code, permanently debarred him from employment in the civil service.
14.  The applicant appealed to the Military Court of Cassation.
15.  Following promulgation of the Law of 27 December 1993, which abolished the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Courts, the Court of Cassation (yargıtay) acquired jurisdiction over the case and on 26 December 1994 the case file was transmitted to it.
16.  On 4 July 1995 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction on the ground that he should have been convicted of the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court (ağır ceza mahkemesi).
17.  On 24 June 1997 the Ankara Assize Court decided, under Article 102 of the Turkish Criminal Code, that the criminal proceedings against the applicant should be discontinued since the prosecution was time‑barred.
9.  On 17 November 1980 police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate arrested the applicant on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed organisation, the Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way).
10.  On 20 February 1981 the Ankara Martial Law Court (sıkıyönetim mahkemesi) ordered the applicant’s detention on remand.
11.  On 26 February 1982 the Military Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Martial Law Court against the applicant and 722 other defendants. The Public Prosecutor accused the applicant, inter alia, of membership of the Dev-Yol, whose object was to undermine the constitutional order and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist regime. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code.
12.  On 14 December 1988 the Ankara Martial Law Court ordered the applicant’s release pending trial.
13.  In a judgment of 19 July 1989 the Martial Law Court convicted the applicant of membership of the Dev-Yol. It sentenced the applicant to 16 years’ imprisonment under Article 168 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code, permanently debarred him from employment in the civil service and placed him under judicial guardianship.
14.  As the applicant’s sentence exceeded 15 years’ imprisonment, his case was automatically referred to the Military Court of Cassation (askeri yargıtay).
15.  Following promulgation of the Law of 27 December 1993, which abolished the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Courts, the Court of Cassation (yargıtay) acquired jurisdiction over the case and on 26 December 1994 the case file was transmitted to it.
16.  On 27 December 1995 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction on the ground that he should have been convicted of the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court (ağır ceza mahkemesi). The criminal proceedings are still pending before the latter court.
8. The applicant was an accountant by profession. He retired in 1998. On 2 April 1986 the Chamber of Accountants instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. Subsequently, the proceedings were adjourned having regard to criminal proceedings pending against the applicant.
9.  On 14 April 1986 the applicant was convicted of aggravated fraud by the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen), which conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) on 3 October 1988. By the end of 1990 the file relating to the criminal proceedings reached the Disciplinary Court and on 8 November 1991 the hearing date was set down for 8 May 1992.
10.  On 8 May 1992 the Disciplinary Court of the Chamber of Accountants, having regard to the applicant’s conviction, found that he had infringed the profession’s reputation and ordered the suspension of the applicant’s right to practise for one year.
11.  On 19 October 1992 the applicant appealed this decision. On 7 May 1993 the Appeals Board dismissed the appeal stating that the suspension should last for one year. This decision was served on 30 January 1995.
12.  On 15 March 1995 the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) refused to deal with the applicant’s complaint and transferred the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).
13.  On 30 March 1995 the Chamber of Accountants declared the suspension to be effective from 31 January 1995 to 30 January 1996.
14.  On 17 May 1995 the Administrative Court granted the applicant’s complaint suspensive effect. On 28 February 1997 it dismissed the complaint. The decision was served on 22 March 1997.
9.  On 12 September 1984 policemen from the Ankara Security Directorate arrested the applicant on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, the Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way).
10.  On 26 October 1984 the Ankara Martial Law Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand.
11.  On 26 December 1984 and 10 May 1985 the Military Public Prosecutor filed two bills of indictment with the Ankara Martial Law Court against the applicant. He accused the applicant of membership of the Dev-Yol, whose aim was to undermine the constitutional order and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist regime, contrary to Article 146 § 3 of the Criminal Code. The Public Prosecutor further alleged, inter alia, that the applicant had been involved in a number of crimes such as a bomb attack on a coffee house, opening fire on a house and several robberies.
12.  On 26 May 1986 the applicant was released pending trial.
13.  On 19 July 1989 the Ankara Martial Law Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 5 years’ imprisonment on account of his membership of an illegal armed organisation (Article 168 § 2). The applicant lodged an appeal with the Military Court of Cassation against this judgment.
14.  On 26 December 1994 the jurisdiction of the martial law courts was abolished and the Court of Cassation acquired jurisdiction over the case.
15.  On 27 December 1995 the Court of Cassation held that the criminal proceedings against the applicant should be discontinued on the ground that the prosecution was time‑barred.
9.  On 9 November 1994 the Braunau District Administrative Authority (Bezirks­hauptmannschaft) convicted the applicant twice under the Motor Vehicles Act (Kraftfahrgesetz) for failure to comply with the instructions of the Authority to inform them who had used his car on specific days (Lenkerauskunft), and sentenced him, on each offence, to a fine of 4,000 ATS or six days’ imprisonment in default. The Authority noted that the applicant had given information but found it to be incorrect.
10.  On 29 November 1994 the applicant filed an appeal against this decision with the Upper Austrian Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat). He complained that the District Administrative Authority had incorrectly applied the law and failed to sufficiently assess the evidence before it or clarify why the information he had given was untrue. The applicant did not request a hearing, nor did he expressly waive this right. No oral hearing was held.
11.  On 2 January 1995 the Independent Administrative Panel dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the sentence.
12.  On 28 February 1995 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). He complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Independent Administrative Panel had failed to hold a hearing. Such a hearing would have been necessary because his appeal was not limited to points of law. He had also criticised the District Administrative Authority’s assessment of evidence. Therefore an oral hearing would have been necessary. In such a hearing the Independent Administrative Panel could have properly assessed this evidence, which had already been obtained at first instance, as well as fresh evidence.
13.  On 13 July 1995 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint on the ground that it did not have sufficient prospects of success. Upon a request filed by the applicant on 10 August 1995, the Constitutional Court transferred the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).
14.  On 23 February 1996 the Administrative Court, relying on Section 33a of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz), declined to deal with the applicant’s case, finding that it did not raise important legal issues. On 10 May 1996 this decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer.
8.  On 5 July 1990 the applicant's mother filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against the Municipality of Črnomerec, Zagreb (Općina Črnomerec) concerning her property rights to a part of an apartment building situated within the area of the above municipality.
9.  At the preliminary hearing on 17 January 1991 the defendant disputed the plaintiff’s allegations. On 15 February 1991 the defendant submitted its reply to the plaintiff’s claim. The next hearing took place on 2 February 1993.
10.  By decision of 9 November 1994 the Zagreb Municipal Court decided that it had no jurisdiction in the case. On 6 December 1994 the plaintiff appealed against that decision. On 25 September 1996 the case file was transmitted to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Gradu Zagrebu) as the appellate court.
11.  On 15 September 1997 the applicant's mother died and the applicant was proclaimed her only heir. He continued the proceedings instituted by his mother.
12.  On 12 May 1998 the Zagreb County Court quashed the first instance decision and remitted the case to the Zagreb Municipal Court. The case was received at that court on 10 June 1998 and was assigned to a judge on 1 January 1999.
13.  The next hearing before the Zagreb Municipal Court took place on 21 September 1999. The parties repeated their claims. According to the applicant on 27 October 1999 and 20 January 2000 he requested the court to speed up the proceedings.
14.  As the law regulating ownership had been changed, on 2 May 2000 the court invited the applicant to adjust his claim to the changes in law.
15.  At the hearing on 19 May 2000 the applicant's counsel submitted the adjusted claim. The court invited the Zagreb Housing Council (Gradsko stambeno komunalno gospodarstvo Zagreb) to submit a list of the flats in the building, the names of the owners and occupiers as well as the legal position of the occupiers and the flats.
16.  The next hearing scheduled for 27 June 2000 was adjourned. The court repeated its request to the Zagreb Housing Council.
17.  At the next hearing on 12 September 2000 the court invited the parties to file their observations concerning the Zagreb Housing Council’s submissions. The next hearing was scheduled for 6 November 2001. The proceedings are pending before the first instance court.
7.  On 3 June 1994 an action in defamation (üble Nachrede) was brought against the applicant. He was suspected of having abused another person in the course of an altercation. Trial hearings were held on 8 November 1994, 8 May 1995 and 3 October 1995 before the Herzogenburg District Court (Bezirksgericht). On the latter date the applicant was convicted of defamation and sentenced to a fine.
8.  On 4 March 1996, following the applicant’s appeal, the St. Pölten Regional Court quashed the sentence because of errors of procedure and law, and referred the case back to the District Court. It found, inter alia, that the District Court had relied on evidence that had been precluded.
9.  On 17 February 1997, after hearings on that date and 10 January 1997, the District Court convicted the applicant again, qualifying the incriminated behaviour this time as an insult (Beleidigung).
10.  On 8 January 1998, following the applicant’s appeal, the St. Pölten Regional Court quashed the sentence again and referred the case back to the District Court. The Court of Appeal found that the District Court had failed to take evidence concerning the applicant’s intentions.
11.  On 18 May 1998 the District Court again convicted the applicant of insult. On 25 January 1999 the St. Pölten Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The decision was served on 27 April 1999.