6.  The applicant was born in 1962 and habitually resides in Krivoj Rog (Ukraine).
7.  From 25 June 2002 until 19 September 2013 the applicant was continuously deprived of his liberty in Slovakia, mainly within the scope of detention pending trial on various charges pursued against him, partly in parallel and partly consecutively. His overall deprivation of liberty included the following periods.
8.  From 25 June 2002 until 19 May 2005 he was remanded pending trial on several charges, which included what would later be classified as the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group (see paragraphs 11 and 35 below). On the latter date the prosecution on that charge was removed to be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings.
9.  The applicant’s pre-trial detention in the subsequent period would later be set off against a four-year prison sentence imposed on him for the offence of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity. He was released from detention in connection with that offence on 13 July 2010.
10.  Immediately after his release from the last-mentioned detention, the applicant’s liberty was again restricted and it later resulted in his being remanded pending trial on the charge of murder, of which he was ultimately acquitted on 27 July 2011. In consequence, he was released from detention on that very day.
11.  Following his release on 27 July 2011, the applicant was immediately re-arrested on the same day, and later remanded pending trial on the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group (see paragraphs 8 above and 35 below). This term of detention ended with the applicant’s release on 22 February 2012.
12.  Upon his release on 22 February 2012, the applicant was immediately re-arrested on the same day, and was later remanded pending trial on another charge of murder. This term of detention ended with the applicant’s release on 17 September 2013.
13.  Upon his last-mentioned release, the applicant was immediately transferred to the detention centre for foreigners (záchytný tábor) in Medveďov, where he was detained until his expulsion to Ukraine on 19 September 2013.
14.  The applicant’s prosecution on the first charge of murder (see paragraph 10 above) commenced in 2007 while he was still deprived of his liberty within the scope of detention pending trial on the charge of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity (see paragraph 9 above).
15.  On 6 June 2010 an investigator informed the public prosecution service (“PPS”) that if the applicant’s conviction and sentence for attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity were to be upheld on appeal ‒ an appeal which was about to be heard ‒ the applicant would be eligible for release because the four-year term of his sentence would soon be fully covered by the term of his detention. It would therefore be advisable to consider lodging an application for the applicant to be detained pending trial on the murder charge, which the PPS subsequently did.
16.  Immediately after the applicant’s release from detention in connection with the charge of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity, on 13 July 2010, he was taken to the Border and Foreigners Police Department in Bratislava, where a decision was taken ordering his administrative expulsion, a ban from re-entering Slovakia for five years, and detention pending the enforcement of the expulsion order (zaistenie). The applicant was then taken to the detention centre in Medveďov to await implementation of the expulsion order.
17.  In the course of the murder trial, a public session (verejné zasadnutie) was scheduled to take place before the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) on 23 July 2010 with a view to examining questions concerning the detention of the applicant. However, in view of the circumstances described in the foregoing paragraph, on 15 July 2010 the public session was cancelled and the applicant was summoned for questioning the following day.
18.  On the morning of 16 July 2010 the applicant was seized in the detention centre in Medveďov by police officers who then brought him to the District Court for the questioning that had been ordered.
19.  Later in the day of 16 July 2010, the applicant was brought before a Chamber of the District Court for the questioning, immediately after which the District Court ordered a private session (neverejné zasadnutie) with a view to making a decision concerning the applicant’s detention.
20.  Following the private session of 16 July 2010, on the same day, the District Court remanded the applicant in detention pending trial on the murder charge.
21.  Immediately following the pronouncement of the detention order, on 16 July 2010, which was a Friday, the applicant stated on the record that he wished to lodge an interlocutory appeal and that he would submit the reasons for his appeal upon receiving the written version of the detention order with reasons. The appeal and its reasons were to be submitted to the court of appeal via the first-instance court, that is to say the District Court.
22.  On 19 July 2010, which was a Monday, the applicant submitted the reasons for his appeal in writing in the Russian language, stating that he would submit further reasons when the written version of the remand order was served on him. It appears that the applicant’s submission of 19 July 2010 was received at the District Court on 21 July 2010.
23.  On the last-mentioned date, that is to say on 21 July 2010, the written version of the detention order was served on the applicant in the Slovak language and, on the same day, the District Court transmitted the case file to the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) for determination of the applicant’s interlocutory appeal.
24.  On 26 July 2010, which again was a Monday, the applicant sent a further written submission in the Russian language, adding reasons to his appeal. It appears that this submission was received at the District Court on 28 July 2010.
25.  However, on that day, that is to say on 28 July 2010, the Regional Court determined the applicant’s interlocutory appeal by dismissing it as unfounded. The Regional Court observed at the outset that the applicant had not submitted any reasons for his appeal either orally or in writing.
26.  On 25 August 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended).
Relying inter alia on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, he contended that (i) his arrest and bringing before the District Court had been unlawful; (ii) the remand decision had been arbitrary; and (iii) the Regional Court had failed to take account of the reasons for his interlocutory appeal submitted on 19 and 26 July 2010.
27.  On 7 December 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.
It acknowledged that any tribunal ruling on matters concerning detention on remand was under a duty to examine carefully all submissions made by the person remanded, but pointed out that the applicant’s submissions of 19 and 26 July 2010 had not been available to the Regional Court when it examined his interlocutory appeal. In addition, matters concerning detention on remand generally require swift determination and courts of appeal were obliged to determine interlocutory appeals in such matters within five working days of the date when the appeal was referred to them for determination. Furthermore, in contrast to case no. II. ÚS 108/08 (see paragraph 50 below), the applicant had been heard at first instance. And lastly, he had been represented by a lawyer, but the latter had taken no steps to ensure the effective assertion of his rights.
Thus, in the circumstances, the decision to dismiss the applicant’s interlocutory appeal without examining the reasons for it could not be considered arbitrary.
The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 3 February 2011.
28.  At around 3.20 p.m. on 27 July 2011, following his acquittal of the first murder charge and release from detention in connection therewith earlier that day, the applicant was re-arrested. At 5 p.m. that day he was served with a document dated 18 June 2003 charging him with the offence of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above).
29.  On 28 July 2011 the PPS applied for an order for the applicant’s detention pending trial, referring to charges of (i) 14 December 2001 for fraud; (ii) 8 June 2002 for legalising the proceeds of criminal activities; (iii) 18 June 2003 for conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group; and (iv) 3 July 2003 on another count of legalising the proceeds of a criminal activity.
30.  On 29 July 2011 a pre-trial judge at the Specialised Criminal Court (Špecializovaný trestný súd) remanded the applicant pending trial. As regards the specific trial in question, he identified it by reference to the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Law no. 140/1961 Coll., as amended).
The judge observed that the applicant was a non-national and that, prior to his initial arrest, for more than a year he had not been living at his registered permanent residence, but rather at his girlfriend’s address. However, he had not been registered as living there. Furthermore, the applicant had often been travelling abroad.
Accordingly, the judge held that there was no guarantee that, if left at liberty, the applicant would actually continue to live at his girlfriend’s, as he had submitted he would do.
The judge also observed that the charges brought against the applicant in the other trials concerned various offences allegedly committed at various times and that even the bringing of these charges had not prevented him from allegedly committing the murder of which he stood accused in one of those trials.
In addition, the applicant had already been convicted with final effect of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity (see paragraph 9 above). Therefore, his declaration that he had sufficient means to live on was not a sufficient guarantee that he would not continue offending.
The judge concluded that there was a need to detain the applicant under Article 71 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 301/2005 Coll., as amended) in order to prevent his fleeing and continuing to engage in criminal activities.
31.  The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal (i) arguing that his arrest had been unlawful because he had not been informed of the reasons for it; (ii) contesting the charge and the reasons for detaining him; (iii) complaining that he had already been deprived of liberty for more than 9 years; and (iv) complaining that his case demonstrated a pattern of arbitrarily remanding and re-remanding him consecutively on various charges.
32.  On 8 August 2011 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal, finding that all formal and substantive requirements for detaining the applicant had been met and that all the applicable time-limits had been observed.
33.  On 19 September 2011 the applicant lodged a fresh complaint with the Constitutional Court.
Relying mainly on Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, he complained that, on his arrest, he had not been informed of the reasons for it; that the courts had ignored his argument concerning the unlawfulness of his arrest; that his detention was in general arbitrary; and, more concretely, that his case demonstrated a pattern of arbitrarily remanding and re‑remanding him consecutively on various charges.
On the last-mentioned count, he contended in particular that (i) he had been facing the charges pursued against him in the present trial for eight years; (ii) he had been constantly detained for all those eight years; (iii) throughout that period the authorities had had a sufficient time to pursue the case against him properly; (iv) his previous accumulated detention had to be seen as one matter; and (v) there were no adequate grounds for its continuation.
34.  On 18 October 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It held at the outset that it had no jurisdiction to examine any alleged violations in so far as they concerned the first-instance court because, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, such examination lay within the jurisdiction of the court of appeal.
The Constitutional Court found that the report concerning the applicant’s arrest contained references to the charges on which he had been arrested and had been signed by the applicant. There could therefore be no doubt as to his having been informed of the reasons for his arrest.
Similarly, it was apparent from the Supreme Court’s decision that it had taken note of the applicant’s arguments regarding the lawfulness of his arrest. The fact that the Supreme Court had not given a specific answer on that point was not contrary to the applicant’s rights because it had examined the arguments by implication when dealing with the overall lawfulness of the applicant’s detention.
As to the remainder of the applicant’s complaint, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the applicant’s detention had by then lasted more than nine years in total. However, in terms of the Constitutional Court’s decision, it was necessary to take into account the fact that the contested decision was neither a decision to dismiss his request for release nor a decision to extend his detention. Having taken into account the nature of the contested decision and the reasons behind it, and considering the length of the applicant’s detention in concreto in the case at hand ‒ that is to say only since 27 July 2011 ‒ the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that, at the given time, the length of the applicant’s detention had not yet reached a point of being unconstitutional.
The decision was served on the applicant on 22 November 2011.
35.  The applicant’s release on 22 February 2012 (see paragraph 10 above) had been ordered by the Supreme Court on that very day. In its decision, it observed that at the initial stage of the proceedings (see paragraph 8 above), the applicant had been prosecuted for and detained pending trial on various charges, which had then been removed to be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings on 19 May 2005 and that, in the subsequent period, he had been remanded pending trial partly on the same charges. In this connection, it referred in the following terms to the Constitutional Court’s judgment (nález) in unrelated case no. II. US 55/98:
“... the removal of one of several prosecuted offences to a separate set of proceedings is not, as such, contrary to the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty of the person facing the charges. Such a course of action on the part of the prosecuting authorities would, however, conflict [with those constitutional guarantees] ... if there were no well-founded reasons for it or if it manifestly served to obtain an extension of the detention beyond the statutory timescale of its duration, or if it otherwise entailed as a consequence the arbitrary keeping of a person in detention.”
36.  As regards the present case, the Supreme Court went on to observe:
“In the case at hand it is not disputed that there are well-founded reasons for continuing the detention of [the applicant] .... However, on the other hand, it must be observed that in the given case doubts may not be completely dispelled that the keeping of the applicant ... in detention for ten years might appear to be an arbitrary and above all self-serving deprivation of liberty in order to obtain his conviction for serious offences, especially since he has been portrayed as the leader of an illegal mafia-type grouping.
Thus, if the duration of the above-mentioned [initial] detention is added to the period of the applicant’s detention after 27 July 201[1] (almost seven months), it becomes apparent that the maximum permissible duration of his detention for [two of the charges] has already been exceeded. At the same time, it must be observed that [the applicant] is being prosecuted for four offences which may not be detached from one another because it is one criminal matter for which he is detained.”
37.  The Supreme Court went on to observe that the applicant’s detention after 27 July 2011 resulted from his prosecution for the same offences
“for which he had already been detained from 25 July 2002 at least until 19 May 2005, when that matter had been removed to be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings. Within that period and in that matter, [the applicant] was detained for two years and 329 days ... [He] is at present detained in the same matter, which is still at pre-trial stage, (the [statutory maximum duration]) of such detention having been significantly exceeded.
However, at the same time, the [statutory maximum duration] of the whole detention has also been exceeded.”
38.  Moreover, in the closing part of its decision, the Supreme Court observed that:
“The status of the examined matter is even more complicated, however: after the removal to a separate set of proceedings of a part of [the charges against the applicant], no decision has been identified as having regulated the scope of the applicant’s detention. From later decisions it may be understood that the applicant’s detention was linked to his prosecution for the offence classified as murder, which had earlier been a part of the previously joined proceedings. This status must be accepted as reality; if the detention of [the applicant] were linked to his prosecution for the offences which now form the subject-matter of the present proceedings, the maximum duration of [his detention] would have run out substantially earlier.”
39.  In a judgment of 19 April 2011 (case no. II. US 93/11), the Constitutional Court found a violation of the “speediness” requirement under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the procedure for the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention in the first murder trial. However, his just satisfaction claim was rejected on the ground that he had failed to substantiate it.
40.  On 22 August 2012 (case no. I. US 281/2012), the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s Article 5 rights in the context of the dismissal of his request for release from detention pending trial on the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group. The grounds were essentially the same as those established by the Supreme Court in its decision of 22 February 2012 (see paragraphs 35 et seq. above).
41.  In a judgment of 5 June 2013 (case no. I. US 47/2013), the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s Article 5 rights in the context of the dismissal of his request for release from detention pending trial on the second murder charge (see paragraph 12 above). It observed that he had been remanded in detention pending trial on that charge as well as on the previous charge immediately after having been released from the previous detention, which had amounted to a recurring pattern. It was noteworthy that the alleged murder had taken place in 1999, although the applicant had not been charged with it until 2012, despite having been detained as early as 2002.
The applicant had been prosecuted for various offences both in parallel and consecutively. The respective statutory provisions concerning the maximum duration of detention could not be interpreted as authorising detention pending trial for the maximum period in relation to each individual charge. Otherwise, as had occurred in the applicant’s case, a person could be detained for the maximum permissible period repeatedly for consecutively levelled charges ad infinitum, which was not justified by any public interest.
The Constitutional Court nevertheless dismissed the applicant’s just satisfaction claim considering that, “in view of the circumstances of the case”, an award was “neither expedient nor appropriate” (účelné ani vhodné).
The written version of the Constitutional Court’s judgment was served on the Trnava Regional Court on 11 September 2013. It was against that court that the complaint was directed and, following the Constitutional Court’s judgment, it eventually ordered the applicant’s release on 17 September 2013 (see paragraph 12 above).
42.  The Constitutional Court also found a violation of the applicant’s Article 5 rights in the context of his detention pending trial on the second murder charge ‒ not only on the same grounds as those mentioned above but also on others ‒ in three further judgments of 6 and 7 March 2014 (case nos. IV. US 494/13, IV. US 495/13 and IV. US 561/13).
However, noting that the applicant had been released in the meantime, it also cited and endorsed its previous position that it was “neither expedient nor appropriate” to award him any just satisfaction.