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1401 | Members' clubs and commercial clubs | What is a commercial club? | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/members-clubs-and-commercial-clubs | A commercial club is a club which:
* is set-up for commercial gain (even if it doesn't actually make any money)
* has at least 25 members
* is not created or mainly used for gambling activities (with the exception of bridge and whist)
* is permanent.
**Example:**
Commercial clubs include snooker clubs and gyms or sports facilities, where you'd pay to become a member, but have no say in how the club is run.
However, this does not include clubs such as tennis or cricket clubs. Typically, these clubs have a membership committee and constitution. Members elect people into roles such as chairperson or treasurer and can have a say in how the club is run.
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1402 | Members' clubs and commercial clubs | Determining a genuine members' club | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/members-clubs-and-commercial-clubs | The following questions can help to determine a genuine club.
### Questions about members and organisation
Is the main purpose of the club-s activities something other than providing gaming to its members?
Are profits retained in the club for the benefit of the members? This is the key difference between a members- club and a commercial club.
Are there 25 or more members?
Are there genuine domestic (home) addresses on the register of members?
Are domestic addresses listed for every member?
Are members local to the club?
Do members participate in the activities of the club online? If so, it's less likely to be a genuine members- club.
Do guest arrangements link a member to every guest?
Do guests know the person signing them in?
Are guests attending only for the gaming?
Is the 48 hour rule between applying and becoming a member properly applied?
Are there annual accounts for more than one year? This is an indication that the club is permanent in nature.
### Questions about the constitution of the club
These include:
Who makes commercial decisions on behalf of the club and what are the governance arrangements?
Are there shareholders or members? Shareholders would indicate a business enterprise linked to a commercial club.
Is the members- club permanently established?
Can people join with annual or quarterly membership?
Are there long term membership benefits?
People joining a club to attend and take part in a ‘private- event are likely to still be members of the public, particularly if they've only gained membership status shortly before the event.
Whether or not alcohol is served does not affect the status of the club.
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1403 | Contents | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/members-clubs-and-commercial-clubs | * [Members' clubs and commercial clubs](#)
* [What is a members' club?](#what-is-a-members-club)
* [What is a commercial club?](#what-is-a-commercial-club)
* [Determining a genuine members' club](#determining-a-genuine-members-club)
[Print this guide](#) |
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1404 | 8.1.2 - Display of licensed status – B2B operators | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/8-1-2-display-of-licensed-status-b2b-operators | Applies to:
All gaming machine technical, gambling software and host licences
> [Read additional guidance on the technical requirements](/licensees-and-businesses/page/display-of-licensed-status-technical-requirements) contained within this section.
>
>
1. Licensees offering the supply of gaming machines or gambling software on websites must:
- display the following information on the first page of the website which offers gaming machines or gambling software in reliance on the licence:
1. a statement that they are licensed and regulated by the Gambling Commission;
2. their account number; and
3. a link (which will be supplied by the Commission) to their current licensed status as recorded on to the Commission-s website.- display at least the information at a above on each page of the website which offers gaming machines or gambling software in reliance on the licence; and
- where they offer on pages of, or by means of a link from, their website, the supply of gaming machines or gambling software which are not provided in reliance on their licence, clearly distinguish those products which are regulated by the Commission from those which are not.
- Such statement, account number and link must be in the format, provided by the means, and contain the information from time to time specified by the Commission in its technical standards applicable to the kind of facilities for gambling provided in accordance with this licence or otherwise notified to licensees for the purposes of this condition.
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1405 | 8.1.3 - Display of licensed status – societies and local authorities | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/8-1-3-display-of-licensed-status-societies-and-local-authorities | Applies to:
All lottery operating licences issued to non-commercial societies, local authorities and external lottery managers
> [Read additional guidance on the technical requirements](/licensees-and-businesses/page/display-of-licensed-status-technical-requirements) contained within this section.
>
>
1. Licensees offering the supply of lotteries on websites or mobile applications must display on every screen from which customers are able to access lottery products provided in reliance of this licence:
- a statement that they are licensed and regulated by the Gambling Commission;
- their account number; and
- a link (which will be supplied by the Commission) to their current licensed status as recorded on the Commission-s website.
- Such statement, account number and link must be in the format, provided by the means, and contain the information from time to time specified by the Commission.
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1406 | 2.3.1 - Technical standards | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/2-3-1-technical-standards | Applies to:
All non-remote gaming machine technical and gambling software licences and remote operating licences, including remote gaming machine technical, remote gambling software and betting ancillary remote licences, but not remote betting intermediary (trading rooms only) licences
1. Licensees must comply with the Commission-s technical standards and with requirements set by the Commission relating to the timing and procedures for testing.
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1407 | Gaming machine testing strategy | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/gaming-machine-testing-strategy | We set technical standards for gaming machines and gambling software and make arrangements for the administration of tests of compliance with those standards.
We provide for the enforcement of standards and submission to tests by attaching conditions to operating licences.
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1408 | Gaming machine testing strategy | Technical standards | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/gaming-machine-testing-strategy | As a gambling software and gaming machine technical licence holder you must comply with the technical standards and with requirements relating to the timing and procedures for testing.
The Gaming machine testing strategy sets out the testing requirements for each set of standards.
This includes who can test against the standards, what will need to be tested and the deadlines for testing. It discusses the testing strategy for assessing compliance with the machine standards for categories A, B1, B2, B3, B3A, B4, C, D, server networked and downloadable games, cashless payment machine systems, linked progressives and wireless networks.
It also covers system integration testing and commercial site testing.
We are aware that testing cannot be completed prior to release for new gaming machines coming on to the market in the first few months without causing substantial delays. This has been taken into account in this strategy. This testing strategy should be read alongside the [gaming machine technical standards](/licensees-and-businesses/page/gaming-machine-technical-standards) for each category of gaming machine, setting out the timetable for compliance.
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1409 | Gaming machine testing strategy | Files | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/gaming-machine-testing-strategy | Some files may not be accessible for users of assistive technology. If you require a copy of the file in an accessible format [contact us](/forms/formatrequest) with details of what you require. It would help us to know what technology you use and the required format.
**PDF Files** Some PDF files cannot be displayed in a browser, you will see a message saying 'Please wait...'. If you see this message, you will need to download the file and open it in [Adobe Acrobat Reader (opens in a new tab)](https://get.adobe.com/reader/) .
[Gaming-machine-testing-strategy
application/pdf PDF 84.6 kB](//assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4lfngIqTSdsaHZ7ojbzsWD/6b2715cec08df734398fef8f101b9363/Gaming-machine-testing-strategy.pdf)
---
Last updated: 20 May 2021
Show updates to this content No changes to show.
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1410 | Further guidelines from the Commission regarding Russian sanctions | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/further-guidelines-from-the-commission-regarding-russian-sanctions | 04 April 2022
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1411 | Further guidelines from the Commission regarding Russian sanctions | Do you think you have breached the UK-s financial sanctions regime? | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/further-guidelines-from-the-commission-regarding-russian-sanctions | ### Yes
* report any financial sanctions breaches to OFSI
* gambling businesses should also consider whether reporting to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) is appropriate in the circumstances (in addition to any required reporting to the OFSI).
In such circumstances, businesses should be considering whether (as a result of the financial sanctions breach) to request a Defence Against Money Laundering (DAML) or Defence against Terrorist Financing (DATF) from the UKFIU following the suspicious activity report (SAR) process, if there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, as required under [the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) (opens in a new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents) and [the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) (opens in a new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents) . Any DAML OR DATF must always be in relation to carrying out a “prohibited act” under POCA or TACT.
Following the submission of any SAR to the UKFIU, report such a submission to the Commission under [Licence Condition 15.2.1(15)](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/15-2-1-reporting-key-events) of the LCCP providing the SAR-s unique reference number (in five working days).
### No
* businesses should have systems in place to prevent sanctions breaches and to monitor and review this risk area closely (including reviewing and updating money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments if required)
* businesses have a general obligation to inform the Commission of any matters that will have a material impact on their business or their ability to conduct licensed activities compliantly and consistently with the licensing objectives under [Ordinary Code Provisions 8.1.1](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/8-1-1-information-requirements-ordinary-code) of the LCCP.
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1412 | Further guidelines from the Commission regarding Russian sanctions | Are you being investigated for a potential sanctions breach? | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/further-guidelines-from-the-commission-regarding-russian-sanctions | ### Yes
If yes:
* report this to the Commission under [Licence Condition 15.2.1(10)](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/15-2-1-reporting-key-events) of the LCCP (in five working days).
### No
If no:
* businesses should have systems in place to prevent sanctions breaches and to monitor and review this risk area closely (including reviewing and updating money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments if required)
* businesses have a general obligation to inform the Commission of any matters that will have a material impact on their business or their ability to conduct licensed activities compliantly and consistently with the licensing objectives under [Ordinary Code Provisions 8.1.1](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/8-1-1-information-requirements-ordinary-code) of the LCCP.
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1413 | HM Treasury publish updated list of high risk third jurisdictions | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/hm-treasury-publish-updated-list-of-high-risk-third-jurisdictions | 25 March 2022
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1414 | Public statement from the FATF on the situation in Ukraine | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/public-statement-from-the-fatf-on-the-situation-in-ukraine | 08 March 2022
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1415 | Important Russian sanctions update from the Gambling Commission | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/important-russian-sanctions-update-from-the-gambling-commission | 28 February 2022
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1416 | Publication of HM Treasury-s Annual Supervision Report (2019 to 2020) | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/publication-of-hm-treasurys-annual-supervision-report-2019-to-2020 | 26 November 2021
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1417 | HM Treasury-s national risk assessment of proliferation financing | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/hm-treasurys-national-risk-assessment-of-proliferation-financing | 23 September 2021
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1418 | Latest UKFIU SARs Report Booklet (August 2021) | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/latest-ukfiu-sars-report-booklet-august-2021 | 20 August 2021
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1419 | New UKFIU podcast: virtual assets | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/new-ukfiu-podcast-virtual-assets | 16 August 2021
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1420 | Guidance: OFSI webinars | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/guidance-ofsi-webinars | 06 July 2021
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1421 | Guidance: OFSI webinars | New webinar released by OFSI | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/guidance-ofsi-webinars | The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) have recently hosted a webinar on the reporting requirements that accompany an OFSI [licence (opens in new tab)](https://lnks.gd/l/eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJidWxsZXRpbl9saW5rX2lkIjoxMDAsInVyaSI6ImJwMjpjbGljayIsImJ1bGxldGluX2lkIjoiMjAyMTA2MjUuNDI0MDM4MzEiLCJ1cmwiOiJodHRwczovL3d3dy5nb3YudWsvZ3VpZGFuY2UvbGljZW5jZXMtdGhhdC1hbGxvdy1hY3Rpdml0eS1wcm9oaWJpdGVkLWJ5LWZpbmFuY2lhbC1zYW5jdGlvbnMifQ.xYoN3Ho5LgirwhfiZlOnjun2TVsEKXTLgmKY8FhSDos/s/1005812462/br/108433080809-l) .
The webinar provides information on reporting best practice and what common mistakes to avoid when reporting against an OFSI licence.
This licence reporting webinar, along with other recent OFSI webinars, can be accessed through [OFSI Webinars (opens in new tab)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ofsi-webinars) page on the [GOV.UK (opens in new tab)](https://www.gov.uk/) website.
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1422 | New UKFIU podcast: Fraud-Vulnerable Persons SARs | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/new-ukfiu-podcast-fraud-vulnerable-persons-sars | 29 June 2021
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1423 | What gambling operators should do if they find dye-stained bank notes | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/what-gambling-operators-should-do-if-they-find-dye-stained-bank-notes | 29 June 2021
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1424 | New UKFIU ‘SARs in Action- publication | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/new-ukfiu-sars-in-action-publication | 16 June 2021
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1425 | NCA's National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/ncas-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime | 10 June 2021
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1426 | Updated CPS guidance relating to The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/updated-cps-guidance-relating-to-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002 | 09 June 2021
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1427 | New FATF guidance for risk-based supervision | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/new-fatf-guidance-for-risk-based-supervision | 10 May 2021
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1428 | Revision to guidance for remote and non-remote casino operators | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/revision-to-guidance-for-remote-and-non-remote-casino-operators | 11 February 2021
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1429 | UK Financial Intelligence Unit podcast | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/uk-financial-intelligence-unit-podcast | 20 January 2021
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1430 | Changes to UK financial sanctions framework | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/changes-to-uk-financial-sanctions-framework | 24 December 2020
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1431 | Gambling Commission risk assessment published | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/gambling-commission-risk-assessment-published | 18 December 2020
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1432 | HM Treasury national risk assessment 2020 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/hm-treasury-national-risk-assessment-2020 | 17 December 2020
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1433 | Revision of anti-money laundering guidance and advice | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/revision-of-anti-money-laundering-guidance-and-advice | 13 November 2020
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1434 | Frozen assets reporting 2020 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/frozen-assets-reporting-2020 | 04 September 2020
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1435 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2022 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2022 | 24 June 2022
Our latest emerging risks update looks at the money laundering risks associated with operators failing to comply with data protection requests, under the [Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/contents/enacted) , from law enforcement, the addition of Gibraltar to the Financial Action Task Force-s (FATF) ‘grey list- and common operator failings, including other general risk areas.
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1436 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2022 | Failure to comply with DPA requests | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2022 | The Commission has come across instances of operators failing to comply with DPA requests from law enforcement. This includes instances where customer accounts have been closed by operators following a DPA request from the police.
Operators are reminded that such actions can significantly hinder any police investigations and can lead to a potential breach of sections 342 and 333A of the [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents) under the offences of ‘prejudicing an investigation- and ‘tipping off-.
> Such a breach is a criminal offence with a maximum imprisonment term of 5 years for the ‘prejudicing an investigation- offence and a maximum imprisonment term of 2 years for the ‘tipping off- offence.
>
>
Operators must carefully consider their actions upon receipt of a DPA request from law enforcement, consider the consequences of their actions and liaise with the law enforcement agency.
Further information can be found in Paragraphs 8.87 to 8.89 of the Gambling Commission-s [prevention of money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism guidance](/manual/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) .
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1437 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2022 | Updated FATF ‘grey list- | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2022 | Gibraltar has been added to the list of jurisdictions that are under an increased level of monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Such jurisdictions are placed on the FATF-s ‘grey list' due to strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. The current list of jurisdictions is as follows:
* Albania
* Barbados
* Burkina Faso
* Cambodia
* Cayman Islands
* Gibraltar
* Haiti
* Jamaica
* Jordan
* Mali
* Morocco
* Myanmar
* Nicaragua
* Pakistan
* Panama
* Philippines
* Senegal
* South Sudan
* Syria
* Turkey
* Uganda
* United Arab Emirates
* Yemen
Malta has been removed from the FATF's 'grey list'.
Operators are reminded to conduct robust due diligence checks in any business and customer relationships which are associated to the above jurisdictions in order to mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, including proliferation financing.
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1438 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2022 | Common operator failings | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2022 | Ongoing regulatory action against operators has shown the following failings, which carry significant money laundering risks. These include failures to:
* establish and maintain policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and effectively manage the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing identified in a risk assessment
* establish and maintain appropriate risk-sensitive policies and procedures
* appropriately scrutinise transactions throughout customer business relationships and obtain Source Of Funds (SOF) evidence in accordance with the customer-s risk profile
* establish and maintain adequate customer due diligence measures, including, but not restricted to, scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the business relationship (including, where necessary, the SOF) to ensure that the transactions were consistent with their knowledge of the customer, the customer-s business and risk profile.
Further information on regulatory action the Commission has undertaken can be found on our [public statements](/public-register/public-statements/full) page.
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1439 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2022 | General risks | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2022 | The Commission is also reminding operators of ongoing, significant risks that they should be vigilant against. This includes risks associated with money services businesses, the acceptance of e-wallet payments from customers and the risk of ‘mule accounts-.
For further information on these risk areas and how to mitigate the chance of such risks from occurring, please refer to our [money laundering and terrorist financing risks assessment of the gambling industry](/guidance/The-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-within-the-British-gambling-industry) .
[Previous page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/emerging-anti-money-laundering-risks) [Next page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from February 2022](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-february-2022)
---
Last updated: 24 June 2022
Show updates to this content No changes to show.
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1440 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from February 2022 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-february-2022 | 10 February 2022
Our latest emerging risks update covers the risks associated with having inadequate money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments in place (including policies, procedures and controls), insufficient due diligence checks on third party providers and or business relationships, along with the use of Scottish notes and pre-paid cards by customers.
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1441 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from February 2022 | Improvements needed in gambling operators- money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments (including policies, procedures and controls) | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-february-2022 | The Gambling Commission expects to see significant improvements by licensees around their money laundering and terrorist financing controls.
Licensees should:
* be aware of the mandatory requirement under [Licence Condition 12.1.1 of the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/12-1-1-anti-money-laundering-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist) (LCCP) which stipulates that gambling businesses must conduct an assessment of the risks of their business being used for money laundering and terrorist financing and have appropriate policies , procedures and controls in place to mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing
* be aware of the Commission-s guidance for [casinos](/licensees-and-businesses/page/remote-and-non-remote-casinos-aml-responsibilities) and [other gambling businesses](/licensees-and-businesses/page/for-all-other-gambling-businesses-aml-responsibilities) to assist with compliance, which sets out how to approach implementing a risk-based approach into your gambling business.
There are too many instances being identified where licensees are failing to meet the requirements of the [The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/contents/made) [1](#ref-1) and the LCCP. We would urge all licensees to review their current controls to ensure that they are fully compliant with Licence condition 12.1.1.
To assist licensees, we have published the [Raising Standards for consumers - Compliance and Enforcement Report 2020 to 2021](/report/raising-standards-for-consumers-compliance-and-enforcement-report-2020-to) . The Report highlights failings we have identified and includes some examples of good practice to consider.
We will take regulatory action (which can include suspension and revocation of licences) where we identify significant failings by licensees. Further information about the action we have taken can be found on the Commission-s [regulatory actions](/public-register/regulatory-actions) page.
1 applicable to casinos only
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1442 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from February 2022 | Due diligence checks on third party business relationships and business investors | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-february-2022 | The Commission has become aware of instances of gambling operators failing to conduct sufficient due diligence measures in their third-party business relationships (including where licensees have received third party investment or entered into white label partnerships).
White label partnerships have been noted as high risk specifically for anti-money laundering failures in the Commission-s [current money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment of Britain's gambling industry](/guidance/The-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-within-the-British-gambling-industry) .
Gambling operators are required to take account of such publications under Licence Condition 12.1.1(3) of the [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp) . Further information on white label partnerships can be found in the Commission-s publication ['Reminder to licensees regarding white label gambling websites-](/licensees-and-businesses/page/reminder-to-licensees-regarding-white-label-gambling-websites) .
The Commission-s guidance for both [casino](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) and [other gambling operators](/licensees-and-businesses/page/for-all-other-gambling-businesses-aml-responsibilities) notes the following:
‘Operators should also give due consideration to the money laundering risks posed by their business-to-business relationships, including any third parties they contract with. The assessment of these risks are based, among other things, on the risks posed to the operator by the jurisdictional location of their third-party and any relevant domestic anti-money laundering legislation they must comply with, transactions and arrangements with business associates and third-party suppliers such as payment providers and processors, including their beneficial ownership and source of funds. Effective management of third-party relationships should assure operators that the relationship is a legitimate one, and that they can evidence why their confidence is justified-.
In one case study a gambling operator failed to conduct sufficient checks on the source of funds from an investment that had originated from cryptoassets (which was then converted to Sterling when it was invested into the gambling business). This case study highlights failings with the licensed business, including: failure to establish the source of funds for the originating cryptoassets; transactional risks of asset exchange and jurisdictional risks due to the sources of funds originating from a high risk jurisdiction.
There have been repeated examples of gambling operators failing to consider jurisdictional risk in relation to these business relationships. The Commission-s guidance for both casino and other gambling operators highlights the importance of considering jurisdictional risk. These risks are heightened where gambling operators are conducting business or customer relationships with sanctioned jurisdictions as this is a breach of the [Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/13/contents/enacted) (for example) and international law. Further information can be found on the [GOV.UK (opens in new tab)](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-sanctions) website.
Please see the April and July 2020 e-bulletins for more information on the risks associated with cryptoasset payments and the importance of operators conducting robust due diligence measures in their third-party business relationships.
By failing to consider the risks associated with such relationships, operators run the risk of breaching the following:
* Licence Condition 12.1.1(1) of the LCCP which requires that operators ‘must conduct an assessment of the risks of their business being used for money laundering and terrorist financing-
* Licence Condition 12.1.1(3) which requires that operators ‘take into account any applicable learning or guidelines published by the Gambling Commission from time to time-
* Part 7 of the [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents) and Part 3 of the [Terrorism Act 2000 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents) which requires that a suspicious activity report (SAR) must be submitted to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit wherever there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing. Please refer to the May 2021 e-bulletin below which provides advice on how to submit quality SARs.
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1443 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from February 2022 | Scottish notes and pre-paid cards | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-february-2022 | The significant, potential money laundering risks associated with the use of Scottish notes and pre-paid cards have been highlighted separately in the Commission-s current money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment of Britain's gambling industry. However, there is now also an increased risk of Scottish notes being used to top up pre-paid cards.
Operators should remain curious as to the source of customer funds and conduct ongoing customer monitoring to ensure that customer spending levels align with your knowledge of their affordability to gamble. The Commission-s [Raising Standards for consumers - Compliance and Enforcement report 2019 to 2020](/report/raising-standards-for-consumers-compliance-and-enforcement-report-2019-20/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-nancing) shows the ‘good practice- techniques gambling operators should be conducting in order to ensure compliance with their legal responsibilities.
[Previous page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2022](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2022) [Next page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from May 2021](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-may-2021)
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Last updated: 15 March 2023
Show updates to this content Following an audit corrected link formatting issues only.
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1444 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from May 2021 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-may-2021 | 28 May 2021
Our latest emerging risks bulletin looks at innovations in cryptoassets, the quality of suspicious activity report (SAR) submissions, insufficient due diligence checks, the threat of organised crime and the latest podcast from the UK-s Financial Intelligence Unit.
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1445 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from May 2021 | Innovations in the cryptoasset market | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-may-2021 | The Commission is reiterating the importance of operators- responsibilities under Licence Condition 12.1.1 (1) of The [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) which requires licensees to conduct an assessment of the risks their businesses face from money laundering and terrorist financing upon the introduction of new products or technology or new methods of customer payment.
The cryptoasset market is constantly evolving due to increasing popularity and product innovations e.g., ‘non-fungible tokens- [†](#ref-†) . Licence Condition 12.1.1.(3) requires operators to take account of any applicable learning or guidelines published by the Commission on this subject. Cryptoasset payments have been rated high risk in our [current publication](/guidance/The-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-within-the-British-gambling-industry) of the money laundering and terrorist financing risks within Great Britain-s gambling industry (2020 version). Operators are also required to submit a Key Event to the Commission under Licence Condition 15.2.1(8) wherever there are changes in payment methods.
The [UK's Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (opens in new tab)](https://www.riskscreen.com/kyc360/news/uk-prosecutor-expects-crypto-scams-to-increase-but-numbers-remain-low-for-now/) expects to see an increase in the number of Bitcoin and cryptoasset related scams in the coming years and the Commission encourages operators to remain vigilant to such changes and update their money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments accordingly.
Also, to assist with implementing a risk-based approach, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental watchdog that establishes standards for anti-money laundering and know-your-customer requirements, has published both new standards for implementation of a [risk-based approach (opens in new tab)](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Risk-Based-Approach-Supervisors.pdf) and [new draft guidance (opens in new tab)](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/March%202021%20-%20VA%20Guidance%20update%20-%20Sixth%20draft%20-%20Public%20consultation.pdf) for decentralised platforms. Operators must familiarise themselves with FATF-s guidance to help combat money laundering and terrorist financing and implement such learning into their business.
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1446 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from May 2021 | Quality of suspicious activity report (SAR) submissions | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-may-2021 | The National Crime Agency (NCA) has published [guidance (opens in new tab)](https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/446-guidance-on-submitting-better-quality-sars-1/file) providing information on submitting quality SARs. The guidance acts as a useful checklist for what information should be included in a SAR to ensure the maximum impact from the information provided. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the NCA has seen an increase in SAR submissions and it is vital that operators submit a SAR to the United Kingdom-s Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) whenever there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing (as required under The [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents) (‘PoCA-) and The [Terrorism Act 2000 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents) (‘TACT-)). Failure to do so can result in committing a criminal offence.
Furthermore, operators are also reminded of the need to submit quality SARs as this will aid the UKFIU if further investigations need to be carried out i.e., with other law enforcement agencies. Operators are also reminded that failure to submit a Defence Against Money Laundering (DAML) SAR to the UKFIU (when needing to commit a prohibited act) could be a criminal offence under PoCA and TACT. Examples of prohibited acts include:
* transferring customer balances when a suspicion has been formed
* retaining customer-s account balance once a suspicion has been formed
* moving a customer-s account balance within your business to a different account, once a suspicion has been formed.
Operators are also reminded that a corresponding SAR Key Event which includes the SAR-s unique reference number (URN) must also be submitted under Licence Condition 15 of The [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) .
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1447 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from May 2021 | Insufficient due diligence measures, the threat of organised crime and customers from high risk third jurisdictions | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-may-2021 | The Commission has come across various examples of operators failing to sufficiently scrutinise the source of customer funds. It is becoming increasingly important for operators to carry out sufficient due diligence checks as the threat of serious and organised crime increases globally. Failure to conduct sufficient due diligence checks becomes even more problematic (for example) as:
* the threat from organised crime infiltrating businesses remains significant.This year-s [EU Serious Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2021 (opens in new tab)](https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment) states that trade in illegal drugs continues to ‘dominate- the world of organised crime in the EU accounting for a large portion of criminal profits, money laundering and violence linked to organised crime
* if a customer is from a high-risk third country.
The UK government has added Pakistan to the list of undesirable 21 high-risk countries with unsatisfactory money laundering and terrorist financing controls. This list of 21 countries replicates the list of countries named by FATF as high-risk or under increased monitoring.
The full list of high-risk third countries under Schedule 3ZA of [The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (High-Risk Countries) Regulations 2021 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2021/392/contents/made) (‘MLTFR 2021-) includes (in order):
* Albania
* Barbados
* Botswana
* Burkina Faso
* Cambodia
* Cayman Islands
* Democratic People-s Republic of Korea
* Ghana
* Iran
* Jamaica
* Mauritius
* Morocco
* Myanmar
* Nicaragua
* Pakistan
* Panama
* Senegal
* Syria
* Uganda
* Yemen
* Zimbabwe.
According to the UK government, the nations in this category pose a threat because of weak tax controls and lack of check and balance on terrorism financing and money laundering.
The MLTFR 2021 came into force on March 26th, 2021 after the definition of a high-risk third country identified in a new Schedule 3ZA and updates The Money Laundering Regulations 2017.
All operators are required to take a risk-based approach in order to mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Both our [casino](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) guidance and [guidance](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002) for non-casino operators makes clear that, ‘higher risk customers should be subjected to a frequency and depth of scrutiny greater than may be appropriate for lower risk customers-.
Casino businesses are also required under [The Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/contents/made) to carry out enhanced customer due diligence measures (ECDD) wherever there is a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Please refer to our comprehensive [casino guidance](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) for further information on the circumstances in which ECDD measures **must** be applied.
† The risks associated with cryptoasset payments have been previously discussed in the Commission-s April 2020 emerging risks ebulletin. Please refer to this further below for more information.
[Previous page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from February 2022](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-february-2022) [Next page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from July 2020](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-july-2020)
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Last updated: 29 March 2023
Show updates to this content Following an audit corrected link formatting issues only.
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1448 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from July 2020 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-july-2020 | 13 July 2020
Customer use of informal value transfer systems, Money Service Businesses, licensees- reliance on third parties and conducting affordability checks.
The Commission is highlighting to gambling businesses that their policies, procedures and controls must be effective in establishing customers- source of funds as well as the need to undertake sufficient ‘Know Your Customer- (KYC) checks.
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1449 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from July 2020 | Increased use of informal value transfer systems (IVTS) | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-july-2020 | IVTS are used in some parts of the world to conduct legitimate remittances (most often by individuals seeking to send money to and from family members in their country of origin). However, IVTS (also known as ‘underground banking-) are attractive for money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) purposes for some of the following reasons:
* there is no audit trail left behind of any transactions made
* availability to de-banked or unbanked customers
* senders are not required to provide identification documents
* avoidance of high banking fees.
Poor implementation of policies, procedures, and controls for KYC makes the use of IVTS easier and there is increased use of IVTS such as, ‘Hawala- (a traditional system of money lending originating in South Asia); today it is used around the world to conduct legitimate remittances outside of the banking system. Increasing evidence of the risk that gambling businesses may be accepting customer funds that have been obtained through IVTS being exploited by criminals is emerging where criminals use IVTS for the purpose of transmitting illicit finance.
Our guidance for both [casino](/manual/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) and [other operators](/manual/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002) highlight that customer monitoring is an ongoing process. Licence Condition 12 of The [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) states that, ‘licensees must conduct an assessment of the risks of their business being used for money laundering and terrorist financing-.
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1450 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from July 2020 | Money Service Businesses (MSBs) | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-july-2020 | All casinos are required to comply with [The Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/contents/made) in respect of MSBs and HMRC-s guidance for foreign currency exchange, cheque cashing and money transfer to minimise the risk of ML and TF. All casinos offering MSBs are required to have effective risk assessments, policies, procedures and controls in place to prevent ML and TF and continue to raise standards in this regard.
During COVID-19 there has been an increased use of MSBs in the wider economy and, for those online casinos offering foreign exchange and third party money transfer, awareness and compliance with The Regulations is a continued requirement.
Some of the ML and TF risks associated with MSBs are:
* MSB activities (such as foreign currency exchange) not being implemented correctly or effectively may result in overseas criminally derived funds infiltrating the UK-s financial system and businesses, potentially committing criminal offences by circumventing other jurisdictions- ML legislation and controls
* money transmitters can be used by persons not allowed to work in the UK to send the proceeds of illegal working to other countries.
The use of MSBs has been recognised as high risk in both [Her Majesty-s Treasury-s National Risk Assessment (opens in new tab)](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655198/National_risk_assessment_of_money_laundering_and_terrorist_financing_2017_pdf_web.pdf) and our [Risk Assessment (PDF)](//assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4EsaN4KJI3mZRJJaDVzcPQ/d9f472cde9a91d5f79163dd257e1ebaf/Money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risk-assessment-June-2019.pdf) of the money laundering and terrorist financing risks within the British gambling industry (2019 version). Casinos must effectively scrutinise source of funds and source of wealth, and (whilst online casinos continue to offer MSB facilities) mitigations to combat the use of MSB facilities for the acceptance, processing and transfer illicit finance remains a priority.
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1451 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from July 2020 | Reliance on third parties | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-july-2020 | Gambling businesses are ultimately responsible for compliance with the conditions of their licence. This includes ensuring sufficient customer checks are carried out and that reliance is not placed on any third parties to conduct customer checks.
This includes (for example) relying on banks or any third party payment processors to conduct ‘KYC- checks or reliance on other gambling businesses to establish source of funds (without further scrutiny) where a customer states that funds are winnings from another gambling business.
Carrying out sufficient customer checks become even more vital where there is a high risk of ML and TF in cases where (for example) a customer is from a high risk jurisdiction, as this will impact on the risk profile of the customer.
Operators should also give due consideration to the ML and TF risks posed by their business to business relations (including any third parties they contract with). Social Responsibility Code Provision 1.1.2 of The [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) state that:
> ‘Licensees must ensure that the terms on which they contract with such third parties: require the third party to conduct themselves in so far as they carry out activities on behalf of the licensee as if they were bound by the same licence conditions and subject to the same codes of practice as the licensee-.
>
>
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1452 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from July 2020 | Importance of conducting affordability checks and customers occupation | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-july-2020 | Failure to conduct sufficient customer affordability checks offers opportunities for illicit finance to infiltrate licensees- financial systems.
Licensees are reminded of the importance of assessing customer affordability when determining risk levels. Disposable income levels must be a starting point for assessing financial benchmark triggers and knowing a customer-s occupation is an important factor in determining income levels and compliments businesses ‘KYC- knowledge.
[Previous page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from May 2021](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-may-2021) [Next page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020)
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Last updated: 17 February 2022
Show updates to this content No changes to show.
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1453 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020 | 15 June 2020
Our latest emerging risks bulletin looks at the re-opening of land-based gambling businesses, the new £20 notes; new list of high-risk jurisdictions; increased levels of theft/fraud linked to gambling; vulnerable gamblers; online ID verification and Financial Action Task Force Advice.
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1454 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020 | Scheduled re-opening of land-based betting shops and arcades on 15th June and the new £20 notes | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020 | The recent government announcement of the re-opening of ‘non-essential- shops on 15th June 2020 includes land-based betting shops.
Gambling businesses are reminded of their mandatory responsibilities under The [Gambling Act 2005 (opens in new tab)](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/19/contents) , The [Licence Condition and Codes of Practice (‘LCCP-)](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) , The [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents) (‘PoCA-), The [Terrorism Act 2000 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents) (‘TACT-) and other applicable laws in order to keep crime out of gambling.
Linked to the above point (regarding the re-opening of some land-based businesses), on the 20th February 2020, the Bank of England launched the new polymer £20 note. Although the old paper £20 note continues to be accepted as legal tender, it will eventually be removed from circulation.
During the transition from the paper note to the polymer note, individuals with quantities of the paper £20 note (including notes that may be the proceeds of crime) are likely to try to exchange them before they are removed from circulation.
Where gambling businesses and their frontline staff have knowledge or suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing involving the old paper £20 note, they must submit suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the UKFIU in the normal way.
More information about the new polymer £20 note can be found on the [Bank of England-s website (opens in new tab)](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/polymer-20-pound-note) .
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1455 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020 | New list of high-risk jurisdictions available | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020 | On the 7th May 2020, the European Commission (EC) amended its list containing high risk third jurisdictions with strategic anti-money laundering deficiencies in their regime to include the following:
* The Bahamas
* Barbados
* Botswana
* Cambodia
* Ghana
* Jamaica
* Mauritius
* Mongolia
* Myanmar
* Nicaragua
* Panama
* Zimbabwe.
Customers that are associated with high risk third countries (because of citizenship, country of business or country of residence) may present a higher money laundering risk to your business. Licensees are reminded to ensure they have adequate ‘Know Your Customer- (KYC) and/or customer due diligence checks in place. Additionally, casino businesses are required to conduct mandatory enhanced due diligence (EDD) checks where a customer resides or is situated in a high risk third country. This includes undertaking source of funds and source of wealth checks on the customer as required under [The Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/contents/made) . Please see our guidance for [casino](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) and [other operators](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002) for further information regarding gambling businesses- legal duties.
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1456 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020 | Increase in card fraud/theft | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020 | There has been a reported increase in card fraud/theft which has then been used for gambling purposes which are the proceeds of crime.
Gambling businesses are reminded to be vigilant on affordability and source of funds for their customers. Where there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering (including criminal spend) or terrorist financing, a suspicious activity report (SAR) must be submitted to the United Kingdom-s Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) as required under PoCA and TACT. Also, a Key Event must be submitted to the Commission (as required under Licence Condition 15.2.1 (15) of The [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) ) referencing the SAR-s unique reference number (URN).
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1457 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020 | Vulnerable gamblers seeking to increase self-imposed gambling limits | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020 | Licensees must remain vigilant to the increased risk that vulnerable gamblers may seek to break their self-imposed gambling limits because of the current pandemic. Gambling businesses should consider affordability as a starting point for benchmarking customer interaction triggers. Licensees should be vigilant that a customer attempting to spend criminal proceeds or launder money could also be a problem gambler. Patterns of increased spending or spend inconsistent with apparent source of income could be indicative of money laundering but also equally of problem gambling, or both. Licensees are directed towards the Commission-s recently [published guidance](/licensees-and-businesses/page/the-importance-of-interacting-with-customers) for online and land-based gambling businesses which shows how they should conduct customer interaction.
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1458 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020 | Licence Condition 17 of The LCCP and Online ID Verification | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020 | Licence Condition 17 of The [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) came into effect on 7th May 2019 and covers age and verification procedures for online gambling businesses [†](#ref-†) . The change means that online gambling businesses are not permitted to allow a customer to gamble before they have verified the customer-s identity. This Licence Condition was implemented to improve industry standards by ensuring that ID checks are carried out at the start of the customer relationship and not only at a later stage. This revision is also consistent with [The Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/contents/made) which requires ongoing monitoring of customer relationships (Regulation 28(11)) and our published [guidance](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) which states that risks should be considered at all stages of the customer relationship.
The Commission is reminding online businesses that only verifying a customer-s identity at the point of withdrawal is a high risk policy from a money laundering and terrorist financing perspective and may be in breach of Licence Condition 17, as it means that CDD or EDD checks (if required and applicable only to casinos) or KYC checks (applicable to all other operators) are carried out too late in the customer journey. This poses a risk to the Licensing Objective, ‘keeping crime out of gambling- along with potential breaches of TACT (Part 3) and PoCA (Part 7) which requires that a SAR is submitted to the UKFIU where there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering (including criminal spend) or terrorist financing. Failure to do so amounts to a criminal offence carrying a maximum penalty of up to 5 years imprisonment (s.330 and s.331 PoCA).
† With the exception of low frequency or subscription lotteries, gaming machine technical, gambling software, host, ancillary remote casino and ancillary remote bingo.
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1459 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020 | Advice from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020 | FATF (the global standard-setter for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation) has published a [paper (opens in new tab)](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/covid-19-ml-tf.html) which identifies the challenges, good practices and policy responses to new money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities arising from the coronavirus crisis.
The Commission is drawing licensees- attention to this advice paper, advising (where necessary) to revise their ML/TF risk assessment, policies, procedures, and controls in order to mitigate all relevant identifiable risks within their business, as set out by FATF in this paper.
[Previous page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from July 2020](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-july-2020) [Next page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from April 2020](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-april-2020)
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Last updated: 29 March 2023
Show updates to this content Following an audit corrected link formatting issues only.
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1460 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from April 2020 | COVID-19 emerging risks bulletin - April 2020 | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-april-2020 | Our latest emerging risks bulletin looks at the impact of coronavirus, the importance of checking digital identification and increases in online scams and fraud attempts.
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1461 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from April 2020 | Reminder to all licensed operators: impact of the coronavirus pandemic, and heightened money laundering and terrorist financing risks | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-april-2020 | The Gambling Commission recognises the major impact the current unprecedented coronavirus crisis is having on affected gambling sectors, including the closure of premises, employees furloughed and loss of business. To assist you in managing the risks this presents to your business, customers and employees, we will continue to advise you about emerging risks that we identify. Businesses will need to consider whether their money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment needs updating as a result.
Operators are reminded to remain vigilant and comply with the [LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/online) , The [Gambling Act 2005 (opens in new tab)](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/19/contents) and other relevant laws, i.e. the [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents) , the [Terrorism Act 2000 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents) and the [Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/contents/made) . The Gambling Commission-s guidance to both [casino](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) and [other operators](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002) along with our latest [Risk Assessment](//assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4EsaN4KJI3mZRJJaDVzcPQ/d9f472cde9a91d5f79163dd257e1ebaf/Money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risk-assessment-June-2019.pdf) of The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing risks within the British Gambling industry (2019 version) will assist licensed operators in mitigating the emerging risks identified below.
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1462 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from April 2020 | Digital ID checks: emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risk | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-april-2020 | The associated shift to online gambling during the crisis makes it more vital for online gambling businesses to ensure they are carrying out robust digital ID checks upon customer registration. It is therefore even more essential that all operators conduct thorough ‘Know Your Customer- checks, and customer due diligence checks in the case of the casino sector, to ensure they are not dealing with illicit funds.
Operators also need to have adequate customer risk profiles in place to ensure all potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks have been considered, and that operators consider making suspicious activity reports to the National Crime Agency in the following cases:
* organised Crime Groups have sought to exploit the current situation through finding new ways to obtain money or monetary equivalents e.g. through the sale of essential healthcare equipment, the proceeds of which could be used for gambling purposes. Source of fund and ‘Know Your Customer- checks (as well as customer due diligence checks for casinos), will be vital in detecting suspicion or knowledge of money laundering or terrorist financing
* there have been reported increases in ‘illegal money lending- and fraud, with the risk that problem gamblers could resort to funding their gambling activities through these mechanisms, [making affordability](//assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4bwMDWerpO7shZGKeB7IOC/f5d087b37b2cc341518416425d4ca49a/2604-GC-Enforcement-Report-2018-19-1.pdf) and source of funds checks of paramount importance in identifying increased risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.
There is evidence suggesting gambling affiliates are exploiting the coronavirus pandemic to encourage gamblers to spend more money on gambling activities. Operators are reminded:
* to have robust social responsibility provisions in place, as problem gambling and the use of the proceeds of crime (i.e. stolen money) to gamble can in some cases be co-dependent risk factors
* to conduct due diligence checks on any third-party companies being used in reliance on an operator-s licence ( [LCCP Code Provision 1.1.2](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/1-1-2-responsibility-for-third-parties-all-licences)
* that all marketing must be undertaken in a socially responsible manner and must not encourage customers to spend more than they can afford, and therefore discourage proceeds of crime being spent by customers ( [LCCP Code Provision 5.1.6](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/5-1-6-compliance-with-advertising-codes) ).
In addition to customer checks, operators are reminded that it is important to carry out sufficiently robust background checks on employees, referred to as ‘Know Your Employee- checks.
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1463 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from April 2020 | Cryptoassets and prepaid cards: emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risk | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-april-2020 | The coronavirus crisis has seen criminals seeking to exploit the situation with an increase in cyber-attacks, along with the increased use of digital payments (such as cryptoassets and online prepaid cards, also known as vouchers). There are reports of more online scams and fraud targeting vulnerable people. This presents a high money laundering and terrorist financing risk to the gambling industry, as criminals will seek different ways to dispose of and use illicit funds from this fraudulent activity.
The current situation has also seen increased use of digital methods, such as cryptoassets and prepaid cards, as a form of customer payment. Cryptoasset transactions are attractive to criminals as they are fast, convenient and can be carried out anonymously. Evidence shows there is a high risk of ‘smurfing- with the use of prepaid cards, and there is evidence that this money has then been used for gambling.
Both methods of payment (cryptoassets and prepaid cards) are viewed as high risk from a money laundering and terrorist financing perspective, and operators are reminded of the need to conduct thorough source of funds and source of wealth checks (where applicable), in order to keep crime out of gambling. Operators are reminded that it is even more vital that they should also submit suspicious activity reports (SARs) where there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering (including criminal spend) or terrorist financing. When submitting a SAR, a Key Event should also be made to the Gambling Commission in accordance with [Licence Condition 15 of the LCCP](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/15) .
Operators are reminded of their responsibilities under [Licence Condition 12.1.1 (1)](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/12-1-1-anti-money-laundering-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist) , which requires licensees to review their money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments upon the introduction of new products or technology or new methods of customer payment.
Operators are also reminded that it is mandatory to submit a key event to the Commission under Licence Condition 15.2.1(8) where there are any changes to the methods by which, and/or the payment processors through which, the licensee accepts payment from customers using their gambling facilities. When notifying the Commission under Licence Condition 15, we expect the following information to be provided as a minimum:
* the type of payment method
* the provider
* how the payment method was assessed in the operator-s money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment.
If the payment method relates to cryptoassets:
* are cryptoassets being accepted directly or through a third party, if so who?
If cryptoassets are being accepted directly:
* how fluctuations compared to fiat currency will be dealt with (with regards to responsible gambling tools, AML triggers, etc)
* what information has been provided to consumers to ensure they are aware of the risks associated with using cryptoassets as a payment method
* how the [funds will be treated](/public-and-players/guide/how-gambling-companies-protect-your-money) in the event of insolvency and how customers will be informed of this.
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1464 | Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from April 2020 | ‘Money mules-: emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risk | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-risks-from-april-2020 | An increase in online scams and fraud targeting vulnerable people has seen illicit funds being transferred through third party bank accounts (‘mule- accounts), to break the audit trail of transactions and complicate any investigation. There is evidence that ‘mule- accounts have been used for gambling purposes by money mules, with mainly vulnerable individuals targeted.
Operators are reminded to be alert to this. A red flag indicator for this activity is the opening of a gambling account with a minimal deposit initially, which is soon followed by several larger deposits and withdrawn to an increased amount of accounts. This makes it even more vital for operators to conduct thorough source of funds and source of wealth checks (where applicable), as well as customer ID checks upon customer registration, as required under [Licence Condition 17](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/17) (applicable to remote operators only).
Where appropriate, licensees should consider obtaining their own legal advice regarding the emerging risks discussed here.
For any further assistance please [contact us](/contact-us) .
[Previous page
Emerging money laundering and terrorist financing risks from June 2020](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/emerging-aml-and-terrorist-financing-risks-from-june-2020)
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Last updated: 15 March 2023
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1465 | How to submit Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/how-to-submit-suspicious-activity-reports-sars | Submitting a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) protects individuals, organisations and UK financial institutions from the risk of laundering the proceeds of crime. Find out more about SARs, including how they're used, on the [National Crime Agency website (opens in new tab)](https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/money-laundering-and-illicit-finance/suspicious-activity-reports?highlight=WyJzYXIiLCJzYXJzIl0=) .
All operators are required to make a report where they know or where they suspect that a person is engaged in money laundering, including criminal spend. Operators must ensure they are compliant with the following obligations.
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1466 | How to submit Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) | Requirements for casino businesses | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/how-to-submit-suspicious-activity-reports-sars | Operators and employees working in remote and non-remote casinos are required to submit a SAR in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering or terrorist financing. This is required under [Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/part/7) and the [Terrorism Act 2000 (opens in new tab)](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents) . Casino operators should [follow our guidance to ensure they meet their responsibilities for the regulated sector](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism) .
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1467 | How to submit Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) | Requirements for all other gambling businesses | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/how-to-submit-suspicious-activity-reports-sars | All gambling businesses have requirements to report suspicious activity as part of their duties under the [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA)](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002) . Operators should follow our guidance to ensure they meet their [duties and responsibilities under POCA](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002/poca-part-2-6-duties-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002) .
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1468 | How to submit Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) | Before you submit | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/how-to-submit-suspicious-activity-reports-sars | We would strongly recommend following the relevant guidance to avoid encountering any unnecessary delays in the reporting process.
### Watch our video guides
These include:
* [How to submit better quality Suspicious Activity Reports](/licensees-and-businesses/page/video-how-to-submit-better-quality-suspicious-activity-reports)
* [Why quality Suspicious Activity Reports matter](/licensees-and-businesses/page/video-why-quality-suspicious-activity-reports-matter) .
### UK Financial Intelligence Unit guidance
We would encourage operators to consult the [UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) SARs guidance (PDF) (opens in new tab)](https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/446-guidance-on-submitting-better-quality-sars-1/file) and their guidance on [SAR glossary codes and reporting routes (PDF) (opens in new tab).](https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/597-sar-glossary-codes-and-reporting-routes-june-2022/file)
Operators can also listen to the [UKFIU podcast (opens in new tab)](https://ukfiu.podbean.com/) . Episodes cover topics including frequently asked questions for SARs submissions.
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1469 | How to submit Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) | Submitting a report | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/how-to-submit-suspicious-activity-reports-sars | Reports must be submitted to the National Crime Agency (NCA).
Operators can submit by using:
* the online SAR system
* paper forms
* encrypted bulk data exchange.
> See our guidance for more information on [submitting a report to the NCA.](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism/prevention-of-ml-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism-part-8-8-Submission-of-suspicious-activity-reports)
>
>
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1470 | How to submit Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) | Requesting a defence | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/how-to-submit-suspicious-activity-reports-sars | If operators handle any proceeds of crime they may commit one of the principal money laundering offences in POCA. However, if the operator submits a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the National Crime Agency this can provide a defence.
### Casino businesses
Operators should follow our guidance for casinos on [requesting a defence from the NCA](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism/prevention-of-ml-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism-part-8-9-Requesting-a-defence) . This also includes [what nominated officers will need to consider](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism/prevention-of-ml-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism-part-8-9-Requesting-a-defence#nominated-officers-need-to-consider-how-they-will-approach-their-reporting-obligations-and-consider) as part of their reporting obligations.
### All other gambling businesses
See our guidance on [requesting a defence from the NCA](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002/poca-part-2-6-duties-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002#requesting-a-defence) under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT). This also includes what information is needed when [applying for a defence.](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002/poca-part-2-6-duties-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002#applying-for-a-defence)
### Watch our video guide
We would encourage operators to follow our guidance on [submitting a defence against money laundering](/licensees-and-businesses/page/video-submitting-a-defence-against-money-laundering) , which was produced in partnership with the National Crime Agency.
### Remote operators based outside of Great Britain
We have issued [guidance on reporting suspicious activity for remote operators based overseas.](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002/poca-part-2-6-duties-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002#suspicious-activity-reporting) This is to help remote operators decide which Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to report money laundering activity to and when to seek appropriate content.
We have produced specific guidance on [suspicious activity reporting requirements for remote casinos](/guidance/the-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism/prevention-of-ml-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism-part-8-11-Suspicious-activity-reporting-requirements-for-remote-casinos) .
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1471 | How to submit Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) | After a report has been made | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/how-to-submit-suspicious-activity-reports-sars | The UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) will receive the report and send them to the appropriate organisations for investigation.
When an enquiry is under investigation, the investigating officer may contact the operator to ensure that they have all the relevant information which supports the original SAR. Read more about what happens [after a report has been made](/guidance/duties-and-responsibilities-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002/poca-part-2-8-after-a-report-has-been-made) .
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Last updated: 13 March 2023
Show updates to this content Following an audit corrected link formatting issues only.
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1472 | Digital and virtual currencies | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/digital-and-virtual-currencies | Digital currencies are established forms of crypto-logically secured currencies that are traded, and recognised by institutions like the Financial Conduct Authority and HMRC. Bitcoin is the most well-known.
Virtual currencies are unregulated and generally issued and controlled by developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community, for instance within a video game or social casino. Where they can be exchanged for cash or traded for items of value they are considered money or money-s worth.
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1473 | Digital and virtual currencies | Digital currencies | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/digital-and-virtual-currencies | ### Points to consider:
* The degree of anonymity associated with digital currencies may be attractive to individuals who want to conceal their identity and, or as well as, the source of their funds
* There is no central authority that supports the value of digital currency, for example, Bitcoin has a history of large price fluctuations
* There is a history of hacking, theft and other criminal activity associated with digital currencies.
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1474 | Digital and virtual currencies | Virtual currencies | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/digital-and-virtual-currencies | In our view, the ability to convert any in-game items into cash, or to trade them (for other items of value) means they attain a real world value and become articles of money or money-s worth.
Where facilities for gambling are offered using such items a licence is required in exactly the same manner as would be expected in circumstances where somebody uses or receives casino chips as a method of payment for gambling which can later be exchanged for cash.
> See our [position paper on virtual currencies, eSports and social casino gaming (PDF)](//assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/4A644HIpG1g2ymq11HdPOT/ca6272c45f1b2874d09eabe39515a527/Virtual-currencies-eSports-and-social-casino-gaming.pdf)
>
>
> See our [discussion paper on virtual currencies, eSports and social gaming (PDF)](//assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/5KSPqqMxzZnmuK87nIjvP0/16b402e60ab5531829514e61e03c566e/Virtual-currencies-eSports-and-social-gaming-discussion-paper-August-2016.pdf)
>
>
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1475 | Digital and virtual currencies | Your responsibilities | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/digital-and-virtual-currencies | If you want to accept digital currency as a means of payment (either directly or through a payment processor which accepts digital currencies) you must satisfy yourself and us that you can meet your obligations in relation to anti-money laundering and that you are acting in a socially responsible way.
[Previous page
Digital technologies and anti-money laundering](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/digital-technologies-and-aml) [Next page
Blockchain technology and crypto-assets](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/blockchain-technology-and-crypto-assets)
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Last updated: 5 July 2021
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1476 | Blockchain technology and crypto-assets | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/blockchain-technology-and-crypto-assets | We have received interest from stakeholders about the use of crypto-assets, such as Bitcoin, Ether or blockchain technology, whether this is as a currency to be used for gambling as a way to fund a gambling business, both new and existing, or as a means to deliver gambling products.
To address some common queries, we are releasing the following information as well as providing updated guidance on our expectations of key event reporting.
The Treasury Committee published a [Crypto-assets report (PDF)](//assets.ctfassets.net/j16ev64qyf6l/13XCZFMmH0oOSB5v5b03kK/2200e3acddc7dfefc817be50e649522b/Treasury_Committee_Crypto-assets.pdf) in which it concluded that cryptocurrencies are more accurately referred to as crypto-assets as they are not performing the functions generally associated with a currency. The rest of this information will use crypto-assets in place of cryptocurrencies.
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1477 | Blockchain technology and crypto-assets | Licence applications using crypto-assets | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/blockchain-technology-and-crypto-assets | The Commission has received several licence applications over recent times where the applicant has declared that the business will be funded through profits from investment in crypto-assets. For example, through the launch of initial coin offerings (ICO). We have noticed that applicants are having difficulty evidencing the source of funds when crypto-assets are included in their application.
We will assess the funding of a business in line with our [Licensing, compliance and enforcement under the Gambling Act 2005 policy statement](/policy/licensing-compliance-and-enforcement-under-the-gambling-act-2005) and our [Statement of principles for licensing and regulation](/policy/statement-of-principles-for-licensing-and-regulation) .
Our approach to assessing source of funds (SoF) is to ensure that we can determine the source of funding and be assured the business is not being funded by the proceeds of crime. For example, if funds from the sale of a property are to be used, we will need to see evidence of the property sale and those funds being present in the bank account of a relevant person.
We need the same level of assurance for all applications. The anonymity afforded by some crypto-assets, along with any weaknesses in the process of obtaining them, have consistently caused problems for applicants, as in our experience they are unable to provide complete and satisfactory evidence to answer the questions we ask to determine applications.
If you are considering using crypto-assets to fund a gambling business, we recommend that unless you are able to provide a full and complete history of SoF with your application, do not submit as we will not consider Operating Licence applications with a crypto funding element without this evidence provided in full at application stage. This is consistent with the Treasury position on crypto funding and we commit to keeping this under review.
Should an application be submitted with the fee paid and it is rejected due to the above reasons you will not receive a refund for the fee.
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1478 | Blockchain technology and crypto-assets | Responsibility for third parties | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/blockchain-technology-and-crypto-assets | Social responsibility code 1.1.2 makes clear that licensees must take responsibility for their third parties with whom they contract. In the case of white label arrangements this includes conducting adequate due diligence including, but not limited to, how marketing partners raise finance used in connection with the gambling business.
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1479 | Blockchain technology and crypto-assets | Key events | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/blockchain-technology-and-crypto-assets | ### Key event 8
Licensees are required to inform the Commission about any change in their arrangements as to the methods by which, and/or the payment processors through which, the licensee accepts payment from customers using their gambling facilities. [Licence condition 12.1.1](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/12-1-1-anti-money-laundering-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist) also requires licensees to review their AML risk assessment upon the introduction of new methods of payment by customers.
When notifying under key event 8, we expect the following information to be provided, as a minimum:
* the type of payment method
* the provider
* how the payment method was assessed in the AML risk assessment.
If the payment method is crypto-assets, are crypto-assets being accepted directly or through a third party, if so who?
If crypto-assets are being accepted directly:
* how fluctuations compared to fiat currency will be dealt with (with regards to responsible gambling tools, AML triggers etc)?
* how the [funds will be treated](/public-and-players/guide/how-gambling-companies-protect-your-money) in the event of insolvency and how customers will be informed of this?
* what information has been provided to consumers to ensure they are aware of the risks associated with using crypto-assets as a payment method?
Where appropriate licensees should consider obtaining legal or specialist advice.
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1480 | Blockchain technology and crypto-assets | Additional risk if the payment method is crypto-assets | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/blockchain-technology-and-crypto-assets | Crypto-assets present additional risks compared with fiat currency (government backed currencies such as £ sterling), such as fluctuations against fiat values and challenges around customer identification.
Whether a business receives fiat currency which has been converted from crypto-assets via a third party, or directly accepts crypto-assets makes a difference to the risks and challenges faced. Where crypto-assets are knowingly accepted via a third-party provider, licensees should consider how they will receive sufficient information to satisfy their regulatory requirements.
Where crypto-assets are accepted directly, some of the risks we have noted include, but are not limited to:
* adequately assessing the source of the funds
* fluctuations compared with fiat value (and how this would affect deposit limits and AML triggers)
* scalability
* the cost of fees
* the security of the funds held.
The exact risks depend on the implementation of the business model and the type of crypto-asset. We need to be satisfied that any licensee considering accepting such payment methods has considered and implemented steps to reduce any risk to the licensing objectives to the same level that we would expect from other payment methods.
[Previous page
Digital and virtual currencies](/licensees-and-businesses/guide/page/digital-and-virtual-currencies)
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Last updated: 28 March 2023
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1481 | Video: Why quality Suspicious Activity Reports matter | Transcript | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/video-why-quality-suspicious-activity-reports-matter | **Claire Wilson (CW):** I-m Claire Wilson. I lead on the anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing strategy for the Gambling Commission. I worked for the Commission for 11 years and prior to that I worked in the gambling industry for 15 years.
These videos are being jointly made with our partners at the National Crime Agency. Let me introduce my co-host, Tony Fitzpatrick from the National Crime Agency who will in a moment explain the wider benefits to the UK as a result of enhancing the quality of your SAR reporting.
**Tony Fitzpatrick (TF):** Hi everybody. My name is Tony Fitzpatrick, I-m from the UKFIU, the National Crime Agency and I-ll go into discussing with you shortly why getting the quality right in SARs is so important.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. So, this video continues the series we will be releasing throughout September 2018 and focuses on why getting the quality of SARs submitted is important, and we-ll show to you why the Commission wants to raise standards across the gambling industry.
Operators are already submitting good quality SARs and we want to maintain that quality and improve where we can.
So, Tony why is it so important to get the quality of SARs submission right?
**TF:** Getting the quality right is very important. It helps data matching so that SARs can be fast-tracked to the right people, it saves time and money to everybody involved.
Getting the right quality SAR has a big impact in helping criminal investigations. It helps get the money back off the bad guys, and where possible, getting money back to the victims.
Good quality SARs prevent all sorts of serious crime, including money laundering and terrorist financing.
I-ll deal firstly with data matching and I want to dispel the myth that SARs go into a black hole, they don-t. Every single SAR is data washed against a number of other databases.
To exploit the information in a SAR, it is washed or matches against a number of other databases and this also helps drive the SAR aging process.
For example, the information within a SAR, if it-s correct, helps us manage quickly and swiftly defence against money laundering, helps us process those DAMLs, defence against money laundering requests very quickly. That process is reliant on having basic standards of information.
It-s very important that we-re able to confirm exact matches of people. Such things are normally done though things that we would call personal identifiers, such as the name or names of a person, the date of birth. The address is also very crucial, and all these things should be put in a SAR, if it-s known to the reporter.
In most cases, through your due diligence and know your customer requirements, most of these factors, these identifiers, should be known and you should put them in a SAR. Quality SARs help with our prioritisation, they help us fast-track and help us conduct a range of analysis to identify new trends, new emergent threats.
A good description of the reasons for suspicion with a glossary code is very important. If we can all continue to improve the quality of SARs, then we in the UKFIU can deal with them more quickly and succinctly.
Overall, a good quality SAR helps detect and prevent crime. Some gambling sector SARs play a significant role in helping law enforcement start investigations and help bring about the prosecution of organised crime groups who abuse industry systems.
Organised crime groups not only traffic drugs and people, they enforce their criminal activities by using violence, by using guns and knife crime. The criminal gangs therefore cause considerable harm and misery to numerous local communities.
Gambling sector SARs help combat the impact of this criminal behaviour and also help protect vulnerable people. An example of a gambling sector SAR was where it helped combat an organised crime group.
The SAR was submitted and a result of the information a number of individuals who identified as being involved in trafficking cannabis, and also through the gambling SAR, it was also identified that these individuals had no legitimate means of income, and in the head of this crime group had deposited about £1.8 million into a casino account over four years.
As a result of that gambling sector SAR 9 people were arrested and convicted and received custodial prison sentences. Also, a number of confiscation hearings took place where considerable amounts of money was recovered, and some of that would have been returned to victims.
Another example of when a gambling sector SAR helped detect an offence of crime was one relation, one relating to a romance fraud where there was a number of vulnerable people exploited.
A number of SARs was put in about a particular individual, but one particular SAR from the gambling sector was the last piece in the jigsaw and it identified an individual involved in a number of fraudulent credits. This individual was placing significant amounts of money in and out of gambling accounts.
The suspect was eventually arrested for dishonestly making false representation and he was found to have benefited by about £1 million, when he had tricked a number of females. He befriended them and convinced them that he needed certain amounts of money to avoid being attacked by other people and also as a way of getting money from getting money dishonestly.
It was found that he drained every single penny he could from one victim before he moved on to the next victim. That gambling sector SAR helped arrest that person and prevented him from hurting other individuals in the future.
Some gambling sector SARs are crucial in identifying professional enablers. The gambling sector has a very robust and comprehensive level of vigilance concerning assessments of customer lifestyles.
The overlapping of the occupational status and the visible lifestyle helps identify criminal activity. It helps identify those corrupt professionals who abuse their clients or help facilitate money laundering using their specialist knowledge.
It is always helpful to clearly state the occupation of subjects in your SARS and where known, what type of professional service they provide or what trade body they belong to. An example would be:
“we know the subject is solicitor who is providing legal advice for buying or selling houses”
or another example might be:
“we know this person is an accountant who-s registered as a chartered accountant and he deals with importing and exporting account”.
Another example exists were such was these SARs that really help law enforcement arrest and detect people that are using their professional skills for dishonest purposes.
A gambling sector SAR relating to a solicitor who was using client funds for gambling activity. The SAR was referred to the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, who took action and closed down the firm. So, it-s not always about arresting and charging people, it-s also about disrupting them from their normal activities.
SARs may not always instigate a new investigation, but every SAR matters and your SAR could be the final piece in the jigsaw.
There are SARs out there in the past that identified people that have been involved in all sorts of horrible crimes. Things like organ trafficking, also human trafficking, modern slavery. Also, SARs in the past have helped to identify people responsible for rapes and murders, not only in the UK, but also abroad.
A good quality SAR helps law enforcement improve and get a richer intelligence picture for their criminal network analysis, and to be honest, helps in all sorts of serious crimes.
A good example would be, last year there were a number of instances in the UK in relation to terrorist attacks. SARs from all sectors including the gambling sector helped police investigate those terrorist investigations.
Also, we-ve had a number of nasty, horrible instances take place where SARs also helped out in a different way, for example; when we had that horrible fire at Grenville tower in London a number of SAR and SAR reporters helped sift through information to identify some of the victims and relatives involved in that fire.
So, to sum up I-ll outline the benefit of good quality SARs.Good quality SARs, as I said right at the beginning of this presentation, help data matching and criminal network analysis. They help prevent and detect money laundering and other serious crimes.
If we get it right the first time everybody saves time and resource. They help UKFIU and law enforcement prioritise and exploit the information. They help in particular UKFIU to have a fastest response possible for their defence against money laundering processes. They help analysis, they help identify new trends, they help identify patterns and typologies.
All these typologies and all these patterns and trends can be fed back to you, the reporter, and help you with red flags, help you through your risk assessments and help you with your risk profiles. So overall, the SARs have a number of benefits and if we get it right first time, as I said, we will all save time and money.
I can vouch for the SARs; I can vouch for their benefits. I was a police officer for 30 years and I investigated a number of murders and rapes, financial intelligence with SARs helped me solve those crimes.
I worked in C-OP – child exploitation and child abuse and again financial intelligence from your SARs, helped me save and rescue children from being abused. I used to head Human Trafficking Centre for its operations in the UK and abroad.
A number of SARs had vital information that helped me rescue a number of victims from human trafficking and modern slavery, and more recently now, I can see from working UKFIU for the last 5 years, your SARs are making a real impact and making a big difference. And that-s why we need to make sure that every SAR we put in is the best quality possible.
**CW:** Ok, thanks Tony. So, thank you for watching this video and make sure you look out for the next instalment in September, where we will focus on getting the right quality in your general SAR reporting.
And don-t forgot to go and take the survey on the Commission-s website around your understanding of the SARs reporting system.
Thank you for tuning in.
**TF:** Thank you, bye bye.
---
Last updated: 23 November 2020
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1482 | Video: Submitting a defence against money laundering | Transcript | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/page/video-submitting-a-defence-against-money-laundering | **Claire Wilson (CW):** I-m Claire Wilson. I lead on the anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing strategy for the Gambling Commission. I worked for the Commission for 11 years and prior to that I worked in the gambling industry for 15 years.
This video is being jointly made with our partners at the National Crime Agency. Our hope is to make available to you, a collection of videos that signposts of good anti-money laundering guidance and share with you some practical tips to help you with your SAR reporting and AML training.
The Commission recognises that operators submit good quality SARs and we want to maintain that quality and improvement where we can.
The video box set will be released throughout September 2018 and each video will have specific themes.
In each video we will share with your answers to questions raised at the Gambling Commission anti-money laundering forums and more recently in surveys has been introduced on the Gambling Commission website.
The main focus of this video about making good quality defence against money laundering SARs. Defence against money laundering SARs tend to be called DAMLs.
I am pleased to introduce Tony Fitzpatrick from the National Crime Agency who last year was the DAML team leader and has first-hand experience in dealing with a wide variety of DAML type SARs.
**Tony Fitzpatrick (TF):** Yeah, hello everybody. My name is Tony Fitzpatrick and I work for the National Crime Agency.
Just one key caveat I-d ask you to keep in view, anything said in this video is meant to be helpful and it-s based on sharing experiences of what is seen in the SARs and described by some experienced Money Laundering Reporting Officers or Anti Money Laundering consultants.
Any comments made during this video should not be treated as legal advice. If in doubt, the key recommendation I-ll give you is that seek independent legal advice.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. Let-s start with some definitions. So, what is a DAML?
**TF:** A defence against money laundering (a DAML) can be requested from the NCA where a reporter has a suspicion that property they intend to deal with is in some way criminal and that by dealing with it, they put themselves at risk for committing one principle money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The NCA is empowered by the United Kingdom legislation to provide defences under section 335 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, so a person by submitting a DAML to the NCA can receive appropriate consent.
It is common for these to be called a grant letter within the NCA. It means that the NCA, based on information provided, has been able to make a decision and grant a person a defence against money laundering offence.
It must be remembered it is only a defence to money laundering and a defence for the prudent acts described by the DAML reporter. It does not give a carte blanche defence to any other crimes, for example corruption, bribery, fraud, etc. The appropriate consent is granted by the NCA is only for money laundering.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. So, what are the money laundering offences this defence is for?
**TF:** The elements and the details for each for each offence is fully defined in sections 327 to 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, but in summary the money laundering offences relate to most of the activities you could be involved with when dealing with criminal property, and this includes a number of things.
It could be to do with concealing, disguising, converting, transferring, or remoting criminal property from England and Wales, or from Scotland, or from Northern Ireland.
It could include arranging when someone-s involved in an arrangement to assist in money laundering.
It also includes becoming concerned in an arrangement in which someone knowingly suspects or facilitates the acquisition, retention, use, or control of criminal property by or on behalf of a person.
And finally, it also includes acquiring, using, or possessing criminal property.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. So, if someone decides to put in a DAML to the NCA what happens to the DAML once it-s submitted?
**TF:** Well Claire, a considerable amount of effort is put in by the NCA and every single DAML is read and analysed. A sophisticated triage system is used and in simple terms, the DAML team will prioritise a DAML using phrases or codes, for example it might relate to a vulnerable person, in some cases it could involve child abuse or human trafficking, where risks are present for a number of victims. It might be a DAML in relation to millions of pounds in the country to a place where we may never get it back.
The DAML team will check to ensure that a DAML matches the required criteria. Without the correct criteria the DAML officer is not able to make a decision. The DAML officer will also consult and can share the information with a number of law enforcement agencies including the police and HMRC.
The DAML officer must therefore ensure that the sufficient information about the subject of the DAML is present, for example that it includes full names, date of birth, addresses, occupation, etc. That-s why it-s very important to get into a DAML because the DAML is cross-checked against a number of databases.
In law enforcement they call this washing the data, by washing the data against a range of databases they search for matches against intelligence in other law enforcement databases. This DAML might actually be a crucial piece of information for an existing investigation or may provoke a new investigation.
So, for this reason the NCA may request additional information from the reporter in order to make an informed decision. This will usually happen via email.
So, the point I-m trying to make is that DAML does not into a black hole. It goes through a number of processes requiring a lot of analysis for cross matching, both by the NCA and law enforcement.
So, to summarise when a DAML comes in, it is received and checked to confirm it matches DAML criteria. It is coded so that urgent DAMLs can be fast-tracked and then checked so that they can be washed against law enforcement databases.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. What is the DAML criteria, what sort of information is normally required by the NCA in order to make an informed decision on these DAML requests?
**TF:** Currently there is three main criteria requirements for DAML to go swiftly through the process. A DAML needs to show clearly why you suspect it is money laundering you-re dealing with.
It needs a clear description of the property that you know, suspect, or believe to be criminal property.
It needs a clear description of the prohibited act for which you seek a defence. By prohibited act, the NCA means the proposed activity that you the reporter, is seeking a defence to undertake.
To be explicit, you must put these three things, these three criteria, into your DAMLs. It-s crucial because the NCA officer dealing with them are not able to interpret, assume or imply or infer anything in disclosures. It has to be written there in black and white for them to read and to make their assessment.
If a DAML SAR is particularly deficient in any of the above criteria, any of the criteria I-ve mentioned, it will be closed without further notice.
In some cases, for minor omissions the NCA will make contact usually by email to ask you to clarify your information. A response to such clarification requests for information is usually required within 48 hours. If a response is not received within the stated timeframe that case may be closed down.
**CW:** Thank you Tony. We are often asked what constitutes suspicion. So, what is the threshold for suspicion?
**TF:** Well the first point I-d like to make is that it-s always a matter for a reporter to decide if they have sufficient suspicion to make a SAR. Some SAR reporters seek independent legal advice on a case-by-case basis relating to actual threshold for their suspicion.
It must be made clear that the National Crime Agency are unable to provide any advice as to when a reporter should submit a SAR or DAML beyond what the Proceeds of Crime Act and the Money Laundering Regulations dictate.
Unfortunately, suspicion is not defined in legislation. Some reporters reflect upon the stated case R v Da Silva. Here the appeal court give a good definition of suspicion of money laundering and they said it was a possibility, which is more than fanciful.
They stated a vague feeling of unease would not be enough for raising suspicion. It also suggested that there does not have to be any substantial evidence.
Some reporters interpret this as meaning there is no requirement for a physical evidence such as DNA or fingerprints, or direct witness testimony. The circumstances can speak for themselves and a number of unusual facts or behaviours could add up to form reasonable suspicion.
Some SAR reporters feel the threshold for suspicion under the Proceeds of Crime Act is genuinely considered to be low.
Some commentators suggest the test of reasonable grounds is an objective test, so the test in simple terms is would an average person seeing these circumstances suspect money laundering is taking place? If yes, they might conclude a SAR is therefore required.
I am aware one court case when a court indicated the threshold had been passed. It-s a stated case R v Griffiths and Pattison in 2006 and this is where a conveyer solicitor was found guilty of failing to make a SAR under section 330. The prosecution argued that a conveyer solicitor closed his eyes to the obvious. The solicitor was convicted and sentenced to 15 months imprisonment.
What he had done was that he had significantly undervalued the purchase of a property. He purchased a purchased a property valued at more than £150,000 and he bought it for £43,000. In other words, he bought it for a third of the actual real value.
At the appeal court, they said that all professionals involved in financial transactions had an absolute obligation to observe scrupulously legislation and they will face the inevitable penalty if they don-t follow those regulations and legislation to the book. So, this case in 2006 makes it clear that there are big risks to reporters if they do not submit SARs or DAMLs.
**CW:** Thanks for that explanation Tony. So, what is meant by the term criminal property?
**TF:** Criminal property – this is any property which derives from a criminal act if the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit. Criminal property must already be in existence at the time of your disclosure in order for a DAML to be considered.
**CW:** Ok so, what is meant by the term prohibited act?
**TF:** Claire, the prohibited act is the most poorly understood elements required by the National Crime Agency to make an informed decision. When discussing a prohibited act, the NCA refers to the proposed activity that you, the reporter, are seeking a defence to undertake. The NCA cannot ordinarily consider prohibited acts which are to the future and specified.
**CW:** Ok so, what is meant by the term prohibited act?
**TF:** Claire, the prohibited act is the most poorly understood elements required by the National Crime Agency to make an informed decision. When discussing a prohibited act, the NCA refers to the proposed activity that you, the reporter, are seeking a defence to undertake. The NCA cannot ordinarily consider prohibited acts which are to the future and specified.
This is shown as an example from the following phrase, initially stated your DAML:
“I seek a defence to transfer the closing balance of £5,000 of the customer-s casino accounts to the bank accounts of high street, bank account number, sort code, etc.”
Here that-s clearly showing that could be that that-s a good example. Here the transfer of funds is actually prohibited act that should taken out by reporter.
In requesting details of the prohibited act, the NCA does not mean its suspected criminality being undertaken by the subject, sometimes that-s called the predicate offence, it doesn-t mean that. It doesn-t mean a particular section under POCA for which the reporter is seeking a defence.
You have got to say in words what is it you want to do, what is you actually want to do. A general statement such as “the prohibited act for which we seek a defence is money laundering” is what you need to put.
So, put in your DAMLs “we wish to carry out the following act” and then state exactly what it is you want to do. I-ll put some examples of in a slide and you-ll be able to see them explicitly.
**CW:** Thanks Tony, I think those examples make it clear what the NCA are looking for regarding the prohibited act, moving on to some other definitions now. What is meant by the notice period and the moratorium period?
**TF:** The Notice Period is the statutory seven working day period in which the NCA has time to make a decision. The day the disclosure is submitted is considered to be day 0. Should your request for a DAML be refused the NCA will notify you via phone call and email.
The moratorium period then begins with a day of a notification of refusal being issued between day 1 of the moratorium period.
The moratorium period extends to 31 calendar days following the notice of refusal. During this time law enforcement will be working to take positive enforcement action against a criminal property you have identified.
Please note there has been some recent changes in the Criminal Finance Act 2017 that also allow law enforcement to apply to a Crown Court for an extension to the moratorium period beyond 31 days.
I suggest you consult lawyers, independent legal advice, or industry specific advisors for guidance on how to manage the Criminal Finance Act 2017. You-ll be able to get full details on how to manage that situation from those advisors.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. So, the reporter gets a defence from the NCA, a grant letter, what does that mean? Does a DAML constitute clearance or permission so that the reporter can continue acting or to proceed in general?
**TF:** Claire, in capital letters no, a big no. It solely provides a defence to a principle money laundering offence should you decide to carry out the planned activity.
Other factors such as wider legal restorations, regulations, regulatory situations, and ethical obligations might also be considered when you decide whether or not you continue with that activity.
A DAML does not provide any form of clearance, permission or authority to undertake the specific activity, and it-s important, a DAML being granted does not oblige or mandate the reporter to proceed with the proposed activity or imply legitimacy of the funds in question.
It is not for the NCA to advise whether a reporter should continue acting for a client; this is a business decision for a reporter to make based on their own risk appetite.
**CW:** Thank you Tony, moving on now. Can a reporter seek a DAML for activity where they believe that a property will become criminal once the activity, they are requesting a defence for has actually taken place?
**TF:** Again no. Technically it-s criminal property at the time of DAML disclosure, so this would be seeking a defence to carry out criminal conduct. There is no provision to permit this under the Proceeds of Crime Act. Any such conduct would, by its nature, likely be criminal and a reporter should refuse to act.
This is made clear in a particular stated case R v Geary where it was confirmed that the criminal property must exist at the time of the disclosure in order for the NCA to make and consider a decision.
The NCA will therefore be unable to make a decision on cases where there is not, is not, currently existing criminal property for the purposes of Proceeds of Crime Act. In such cases I-d advise that the reporter should seek independent legal advice if they are unsure on this point of law.
**CW:** Ok, thank you Tony. Can reporters seek a DAML for an act they have already undertaken, or can they seek a DAML retrospectively?
**TF:** In general no. The NCA is only normally able to consider a decision on specified activity which is yet to occur. Retrospective defences are not normally given. The reporter should seek legal advice if they are unsure on part of law.
**CW:** Tony, should reporters submit a DAML to report a crime or to report about potential vulnerable people?
**TF:** I-ll be clear on this point Claire; you cannot report or register a crime by using a SAR. A SAR is reporting suspicions of money laundering and terrorist financing only. You have to report crimes alongside the SAR.
My advice in these circumstances would be to seek guidance for some of the reports we-ve got on our NCA website. There-s a good report there called “SARs activity report, glossary code and reporting routes”. It was published on 16th of January 2017. This can be found on the NCA website and gives you all the relevant information.
But to sort of paraphrase the guidance today if you suspect money laundering or terrorist financing you must submit a SAR to the NCA. If at the same time you think you are dealing with a life-threatening situation or a situation where you think would normally ring 999 then make the call and report that crime or incidence.
Contacting 999 or contacting the appropriate agency by other means has to be your first priority. If you are in any doubt, should I ring 999, think “what would an average person and what would an average person think necessary?”
If the answer is, they would probably ring 999, then ring 999 or the appropriate agency. Keep a record of the officer or person you spoke to and then record that in your SAR.
There are some good examples of this in the guidance document on the NCA website, again it is called “SARs activity report, glossary code and reporting routes”. It was made on the 16th of January 2017.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. So, can reporters decide to withdraw a DAML request?
**TF:** Yes, they can, only within the notice period where the funds subject to disclosure remain under the control of the reporter and prior to any decision being communicated by the NCA. For instance, if the planned activity is no longer to go ahead. However, the SAR itself will not be removed from the system.
If a reporter no longer wishes the NCA to consider it-s request for a DAML then a request can be made but it must be made in writing and it must be put in email, and the email address is [daml@nca.xgsi.gov.uk](mailto:daml@nca.xgsi.gov.uk) . So, you must put it in writing, and you must put it in an email. The NCA will retain the information and it might be used for intelligence purposes.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. Next question we have; can reports discuss the submission of their SAR with anyone?
**TF:** Simply put you should not discuss the fact of making a SAR with anyone if that risks prejudice of any investigation.
Once a SAR has been submitted, all reporters should be mindful of the offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act and they all relate to a phrase called “tipping off”, and they are section 333a and section 342. It-s all about whether or not you are going to prejudice an investigation.
There are however some exceptions to this rule. I suggest you get legal advice on this matter and if you look under section 33b or section 33c or 33d, the Proceeds of Crime Act you will see what those exceptions are, but I must stress I-d always advice seek independent legal advice on point.
**CW:** Ok. So, a reporter receives a DAML from the NC, can they proceed?
**TF:** It-s a matter of each reporter to determine whether or not they should proceed, taking into account what I mentioned earlier on regarding the ethical, legal, and regulatory obligations, as well as other commercial considerations.
You should consider your next steps carefully and should not take the NCA-s granted letter as a ‘permission to proceed-. You have a defence to specific offences in Proceeds of Crime Act but not to any other criminal offences, for example you-ve got no defence to anything in relation to fraud, or in relation to bribery, or in relation to the Money Laundering Regulations 2017.
**CW:** Thanks Tony. So, moving on, a DAML has been refused; what should the reporter do now?
**TF:** Well that-s when the moratorium kicks in. The Moratorium Period now starts and during this period, a bit similar to the Notice Period, you should not carry out the act that is the subject of your DAML request.
It is likely that you will be contacted by a law enforcement investigation team who may wish to obtain further information to inform any action they may take.
Please keep the NCA informed if refusal to provide a DAML causes serious issues, such as any threat of litigation or any significant financial loss, or any significant threat to life.
**CW:** I see, ok thank you Tony. From an administration point of view and getting correct information to the right people, obviously it is important to get a refusal DAML to the right person as soon as possible.
I guess the reporters correct contact details are imperative, how can reporters update their contact details?
**TF:** That-s a very good point Claire, and I must stress it-s very important that the NCA has an up-to-date contact list for the firms disclosing SARs. If a simple contact update is required, then contact SAR Online team and they will be able to assist.
A full change in Money Laundering Reporting Officer details will require the reporter to re-register via the SAR Online, so if it is a significant change, you must re-register via SAR Online.
Again, a link on how you can do this can be found on the NCA website.
**CW:** Thanks for that Tony. So, can reports talk to police or other law enforcement regarding their DAML disclosures?
**TF:** That-s a good question and we get that asked quite a lot. The NCA may refer your SAR or DAML to the police or other law enforcement bodies as part of the natural DAML process.
Such law enforcement agencies may contact you for further information or discuss the circumstances of your disclosure in more detail.
If you are contacted by the police or other law enforcement we recommend that firstly you verify they are and that you make sure they are the people that you can talk to, for instance you might consider ringing them back via the force or agency switchboard.
SAR intelligence can only be shared with certain accredited individuals within law enforcement, normally financial investigators, or financial intelligence officers and so the individuals contacting you should hold one of those accreditations.
You should not assume that all law enforcement officers should be privy to your SAR information.
**CW:** Ok so to sum up Tony, where can the viewers of this video get written guidance on DAMLs?
**TF:** Well there-s lots of information on the NCA website, and if you go to the NCA website there-s a lot of documents you can use with hyperlinks and useful contact numbers.
One important document that I-d recommend that you read is a document called the “DAML FAQ” which we published in May 2018. If you google “DAML FAQ” it will take you straight to that document.
In relation to making DAMLs that-s very, very good but I-ll leave some contact numbers and some signposts of useful websites in a slide at the end of this presentation.
**CW:** Ok thanks Tony. So, to conclude, thank you very much for watching this video today about how to submit DAML SARs.
---
Last updated: 23 November 2020
Show updates to this content No changes to show.
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1483 | 1. Qualified persons and personal licences | 1.1. Qualified persons | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/1 | 1. [1.1.1. Qualified persons – qualifying position](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/1-1-1-qualified-persons-qualifying-position)
2. [1.1.2. Qualified persons – tracks](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/1-1-2-qualified-persons-tracks)
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1484 | 1. Qualified persons and personal licences | 1.2. Personal licences | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/1 | 1. [1.2.1. Specified management offices – personal management licences](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/1-2-1-specified-management-offices-personal-management-licences)
2. [1.2.2. Specified management offices – casino personal functional licences](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/1-2-2-specified-management-offices-casino-personal-functional-licences)
3. [1.2.3. Specified management offices – lottery personal management licences](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/1-2-3-specified-management-offices-lottery-personal-management-licences)
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1485 | 2. Technical standards, equipment specifications, remote gambling equipment and gambling software | 2.1. Key equipment | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/2 | 1. [2.1.1. Access to (and provision of data from) key equipment](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/2-1-1-access-to-and-provision-of-data-from-key-equipment)
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1486 | 2. Technical standards, equipment specifications, remote gambling equipment and gambling software | 2.2. Gambling software | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/2 | 1. [2.2.1. Gambling software](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/2-2-1-gambling-software)
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1487 | 2. Technical standards, equipment specifications, remote gambling equipment and gambling software | 2.3. Technical standards and equipment specifications | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/2 | 1. [2.3.1. Technical standards](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/2-3-1-technical-standards)
2. [2.3.2. Bingo equipment specifications](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/2-3-2-bingo-equipment-specifications)
3. [2.3.3. Casino equipment specifications](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/2-3-3-casino-equipment-specifications)
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1488 | 3. Peer to peer gaming, other networks and hosting | 3.1. Peer to peer gaming, other networks and hosting | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/3 | 1. [3.1.1. Peer to peer gaming](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/3-1-1-peer-to-peer-gaming)
2. [3.1.2. Other networks](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/3-1-2-other-networks)
3. [3.1.3. Hosting](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/3-1-3-hosting)
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1489 | 4. Protection of customer funds | 4.1. Segregation of funds | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/4 | 1. [4.1.1. Segregation of funds](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/4-1-1-segregation-of-funds)
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1490 | 4. Protection of customer funds | 4.2. Disclosure to customers | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/4 | 1. [4.2.1. Disclosure to customers](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/4-2-1-disclosure-to-customers)
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1491 | 5. Payment | 5.1. Cash and cash equivalents, payment methods and services | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/5 | 1. [5.1.1. Cash and cash equivalents](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/5-1-1-cash-and-cash-equivalents)
2. [5.1.2. Payment methods services](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/5-1-2-payment-methods-services)
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1492 | 6. Provision of credit by licensees and the use of credit cards | 6.1 . Provision of credit by licensees and the use of credit cards | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/6 | 1. [6.1.1. Provision of credit](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/6-1-1-provision-of-credit)
2. [6.1.2. Use of credit cards](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/6-1-2-use-of-credit-cards)
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1493 | 7. General ‘fair and open- provisions | 7.1. Fair and transparent terms and practices | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/7 | 1. [7.1.1. Fair and transparent terms and practices](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/7-1-1-fair-and-transparent-terms-and-practices)
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1494 | 9. Types and rules of casino and other games | 9.1. Casino and bingo games | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/9 | 1. [9.1.1 . Rules of casino games](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/9-1-1-rules-of-casino-games)
2. [9.1.2. Prohibited bingo prize games](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/9-1-2-prohibited-bingo-prize-games)
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1495 | 10. Tipping of casino employees | 10.1 . Tipping of casino employees | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/10 | 1. [10.1.1. Tipping – personal licence holders](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/10-1-1-tipping-personal-licence-holders)
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1496 | 11. Lotteries | 1.1 . Lotteries – societies and local authorities | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/11 | 1. [11.1.1. Lotteries – societies and local authorities](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/11-1-1-lotteries-societies-and-local-authorities)
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1497 | 11. Lotteries | 11.2. Lotteries – managers | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/11 | 1. [11.2.1. Lotteries – managers](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/11-2-1-lotteries-managers)
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1498 | 12. Anti-money laundering | 12.1 . Prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/12 | 1. [12.1.1. Anti-money laundering - Prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/12-1-1-anti-money-laundering-prevention-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist)
2. [12.1.2. Anti-money laundering - Measures for operators based in foreign jurisdictions](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/12-1-2-anti-money-laundering-measures-for-operators-based-in-foreign)
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1499 | 13. Pool betting | 13.1. Pool betting | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/13 | 1. [13.1.1. Pool betting](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/13-1-1-pool-betting)
2. [13.1.2. Pool betting – football pools](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/13-1-2-pool-betting-football-pools)
3. [13.1.3. Pool betting – annual accounts](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/13-1-3-pool-betting-annual-accounts)
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1500 | 14. Access to premises | 14.1. Access to premises | https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/1/14 | 1. [14.1.1. Access to premises](/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/14-1-1-access-to-premises)
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