Datasets:

anumafzal94

/

govreport-4096

like 0

This report provides a summary and analysis of selected provisions of S. 1733 , the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act. The topics covered include electric power and incentives for the development of natural gas technologies. The report also compares those provisions with counterparts, if any, in H.R. 2454 , the American Clean Energy and Security Act. Other aspects of S. 1733 and H.R. 2454 are covered in additional CRS reports. These reports are available in the climate change section of the CRS website, located at http://crs.gov/Pages/subissue.aspx?cliid=2645&parentid=2522 . The remainder of this report is divided into the following sections: Electric Power and Natural Gas Technologies. Electric Power Transmission and Related Technologies Subtitle H of Division A has two sections dealing with the use of low carbon emitting energy technologies. Section 181, Clean Energy and Accelerated Emission Reduction Program , directs the EPA administrator to "establish a program to promote dispatchable power generation projects that can accelerate the reduction of power sector carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions" (emphasis added). The term "dispatchable" is not defined in the bill, but would normally refer to power generating units that can be run at-will by system operators. In this sense a natural gas, nuclear, or coal unit is dispatchable while a wind or solar plant is not, because wind and solar generation is dependent on weather and diurnal conditions. The EPA administrator is directed to establish rules within 90 days of enactment for providing incentives to dispatchable power projects that generate 300,000 gigawatt-hours (Gwh) of electricity annually. To put this generation target in context, a reasonably large power plant with a capacity of 500 megawatts (i.e., 0.5 gigawatts) that operates the equivalent of 85% of the time would generate 3,723 Gwh annually. Therefore it would take about 81 of these 500 Mw plants to meet the goal of generating 300,000 Gwh annually under this program. To qualify for incentives, an eligible project must produce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) that are below the 2007 average emissions per megawatt-hour (Mwh) by the United States electric power sector, according to the following schedule ( Table 1 ): The bill speaks to reductions in the emissions of all GHG released by power plants, but information is readily available only for power plant carbon dioxide emissions (CO 2 is, in any event, the predominant GHG in the electric power sector). Table 2 , below, shows average CO 2 emission per Mwh for the electric power sector as a whole in 2007, the 2007 values for several specific combustible fuel sources, and estimated emissions for new natural gas plants. These estimates, which include no carbon controls, show that only new high efficiency natural gas plants can meet the reduction targets of 25% for 2010 to 2020 and 40% for 2021 to 2025. It does not appear that any combustible fuel source can meet the 65% target which begins in 2026 without carbon controls. Nuclear power is a dispatchable option which could meet these targets since carbon emissions are essentially zero. Geothermal power has very small emissions per Mwh ( Table 2 ) and is dispatchable, but with current technology plants are limited to small installations in the western United States. Another alternative could be to link wind or solar power with electricity storage, creating a combined system which could be dispatched as needed However, current electricity storage technologies are limited by cost, technical, and environmental factors. In allocating incentives the administrator is to give priority to projects with one or more of the following characteristics: Power generation and energy storage projects intended to integrate variable renewable electricity sources, such as solar and wind power, into the grid. Power generation projects with carbon capture and sequestration that do not qualify for other aid under S. 1733 . Projects that achieve the greatest reduction in GHG emissions per dollar of incentive payment. Several features of Section 181 are unspecified or unclear. These include: The total dollar amount and form of the incentives. By what point in time projects must enter service to qualify for incentives. Whether the emission reduction target varies for a project over time. For example, assume a project enters service in 2010 and must therefore meet the 25 percent reduction in GHG emission goal ( Table 1 ). If the project is still operating in 2021 to 2025, does it have to further reduce emissions to meet the 40% reduction target that begins in that period in order to continue to receive incentives, or does the higher target only apply to new units that enter service during that period? The bill states that "Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall provide incentives for eligible projects that generate 300,000 gigawatt-hours of electricity per year." It is not clear from this language if the Administrator must make all awards within three years of enactment, or must merely begin making awards by that deadline. Section 182 of Subtitle H, Advanced Natural Gas Technologies , would establish two programs for accelerating the deployment of advanced natural gas technologies. Under one program, for "Natural Gas Electricity Generation Grants," the EPA Administrator "may provide" (but apparently is not required to provide) research and development grants "to support the deployment of low greenhouse-gas-emitting end-use technologies, including carbon capture and sequestration technologies, for natural gas electricity generation." Under the second program, for "Natural Gas Residential and Commercial Technology Grants," the Administrator is directed to establish a grant program for research, development, demonstration, and deployment of low GHG emitting end-use technologies for the commercial and residential sectors. Grants can be made to private or municipal utilities, research and development establishments, and other types of businesses. Although these programs are under the direction of the EPA, the Secretary of Energy is the official directed to report to the Congress every 180 days on the status and results achieved by these programs. There are no directly comparable provisions in H.R. 2454 . Section 175 of Subtitle H of H.R. 2454 does provide for a government program to help develop and demonstrate high efficiency natural gas burning combustion turbines, for use in combined cycle power plants. The section directs the Secretary of Energy to carry out a multiyear, multiphase program of research, development, and technology demonstration that ultimately will lead to gas turbine combined cycle efficiency of 65%. H.R. 2454 contains several provisions relating to electric power transmission that have no counterparts in S. 1733 . These provisions are briefly summarized below. For more detail see CRS Report R40643, Greenhouse Gas Legislation: Summary and Analysis of H.R. 2454 as Passed by the House of Representatives , coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Subtitle F of Title I of H.R. 2454 deals with transmission planning and permitting. The subtitle provides for the following in respect to transmission planning: Establishes a national transmission planning policy, which states that transmission planning "should facilitate the deployment of renewable and other zero-carbon and low-carbon energy sources for generating electricity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while ensuring reliability, reducing congestion, ensuring cyber-security, minimizing environmental harm, and providing for cost-effective electricity services throughout the United States…." Directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to define electric transmission planning principles, based on the national policy, which can be used by planning entities. FERC is to facilitate coordination between state, regional, and industry transmission planning entities. In respect to permitting, the bill grants FERC new federal siting and permitting authority within the Western Interconnection. This authority to supersede state permitting decisions applies only to proposed transmission projects that meet certain criteria, including interstate projects "identified as needed in significant measure to meet demand for renewable energy." H.R. 2454 includes several provisions aimed at supporting development and installation of smart grid technologies (see Title I, Subtitle E). The bill would direct the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency to identify products that could be cost-effectively equipped with smart grid capability. The legislation would also direct the Federal Trade Commission to initiate a rulemaking to determine whether smart grid information, such as potential dollar savings to the consumer, should be added to ENERGY GUIDE product labels. (ENERGY GUIDE is an existing federal program for labeling energy efficient products.) The legislation would establish requirements for electric power retailers to reduce their peak loads using smart grid and other energy efficient technologies; and would modify an energy efficiency public information program authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05) to make it into a smart grid and energy efficiency information program. H.R. 2454 would also modify an EPACT05 energy efficiency appliance rebate program to add appliances with smart grid capabilities. Additionally, H.R. 2454 would require state regulatory authorities and self-regulating power suppliers (such as municipal utilities) to consider implementing standards intended to ensure that utility smart grid systems would be compatible with plug-in electric drive vehicles. Section 152 of Subtitle F of H.R. 2454 provides for net metering of federal agencies. Net metering is a ratemaking concept intended to encourage the development of "distributed generation" (i.e., electricity generated at the customer's site, possibly, but not necessarily, using renewable energy). Net metering is intended to make distributed generation more economical by requiring the utility that supplies electricity to a facility to also take any electricity generated by that facility, such as from rooftop solar panels or an on-site diesel generator. The ultimate utility bill to the facility is reduced by the amount of electricity supplied to the power company. Section 152 amends the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to require state regulatory authorities to consider ordering utilities under their jurisdiction to implement net metering for federal facilities. It also requires non-regulated utilities (such as many municipal utilities) to make the same evaluation. The net metering standard must be adopted if it is consistent with state law and is found by the controlling regulatory authority to be "appropriate." Section 153 of Subtitle F would amend EPACT05 to provide for incentives for the development and construction of transmission lines and related facilities using currently non-commercial technology. The categories of technology include "advanced electric transmission property" (essentially high-efficiency underground transmission lines and associated equipment), "advanced electric transmission manufacturing plant" (plants that manufacture the "advanced electric transmission property"), and "high efficiency transmission property" (essentially high-efficiency overhead transmission lines and associated equipment). All three categories of technology would be added to the list of technologies qualifying for the new loan guarantee program added to EPACT05 by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Additionally, "advanced electric transmission property" and "advanced electric transmission manufacturing plant" only would be added to the original loan guarantee program included in EPACT05. This program was originally created to support the development of low carbon and other advanced energy technologies.

This report provides a summary and analysis of selected provisions of the chairman's mark of S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act. The topics covered include electric power and incentives for the development of natural gas technologies. The report also compares those provisions with H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act. In S. 1733, Subtitle H of Division A has two sections dealing with the use of low carbon emitting energy technologies. Section 181, Clean Energy and Accelerated Emission Reduction Program, directs the EPA administrator to "establish a program to promote dispatchable power generation projects that can accelerate the reduction of power sector carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions" (emphasis added). The term "dispatchable" is not defined in the bill, but would normally refer to power generating units that can be run at-will by system operators, such as natural gas, nuclear, or coal units. Several features of Section 181 are unspecified or unclear, including the total dollar amount and form of the incentives, whether the emission reduction target for a specific project would change over time, and the deadline for making incentive awards. Section 182 of Subtitle H, Advanced Natural Gas Technologies, would establish two grant programs for accelerating the development of advanced natural gas technologies in the power generation, commercial, and residential sectors. No parts of H.R. 2454 are directly comparable to sections 181 and 182 of S. 1733. Closest in intent is Section 175 of Subtitle H of H.R. 2454, which provides for a government program to help develop and demonstrate high efficiency natural gas burning combustion turbines, for use in combined cycle power plants. H.R. 2454 has several provisions relating to electric power transmission that have no counterparts in S. 1733. These provisions of H.R. 2454 involve transmission planning and permitting; development and deployment of smart grid technologies; requirements for electric utilities to reduce peak demand; net metering for federal agencies; and incentives for transmission technology development. These elements of H.R. 2454 are summarized in this report and discussed in more detail in CRS Report R40643, Greenhouse Gas Legislation: Summary and Analysis of H.R. 2454 as Passed by the House of Representatives, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Any legislative plan needs a thorough definition of the problem to be addressed and an explanation of what the appropriate solution might be. Solutions may include legislation, regulation, or media attention. A clearly defined issue makes the determination of the themes for developing the message and promoting the solution easier to explain to colleagues, supporters, opponents, constituents, and the press. Next, a time line for solving the problem should be determined. Is this a one-session, or one-Congress, or longer-term project? Is it one event or a coordinated series of events? Should the event(s) be held in the Member's district or state, in Washington, or throughout the country? Prior to beginning work on the solution, an in-depth determination of the extent of the problem needs to be undertaken. For example, is the problem limited to one district, state, or region, or is it nationwide? Should the solution address the specific issue or the policy in general? Consultation with local and state officials, community leaders, and constituents is integral at this stage. Discussions in Washington may include committee and subcommittee leaders, the party leadership, think tanks, and interest groups. One of the most important decisions is whether to conduct an "inside" or "outside" strategy, or possibly a combination of the two. Inside strategy entails work within the legislative process only, that is, legislation, hearings, committee and floor amendments, floor debate, and conference consideration. Advocates may or may not be involved in any of this activity. An outside strategy calls for advocates to generate mail, press, and office visits, often to force an inside strategy to occur. A combined strategy includes using Dear Colleague letters, coordinated one-minute or special order speeches, Member-to-Member lobbying, and group press conferences. What criteria are used to determine success? Political success? Press attention? Legislative success? Other? What is the duration of the project: one event, one session of Congress, two years, or longer? Are there other projects on this topic already underway? If so, should the Member conduct an independent project, or join forces? Does the political party or state of other Members involved influence the decision? Should it? Has the project ever been tried in the past? If yes, what Members tried it? What was the result? Is the project still needed? Are there lessons to be learned from the earlier attempt? What other Members, committees, or party leaders should be involved? What advocates should be involved? Which advocates will support, and which will actively oppose, the initiative? Is legislation the appropriate remedy for the problem? Will a free-standing measure be necessary, or is there a vehicle to which an amendment can be offered? Should the Member introduce the legislation alone or seek original cosponsors? Should those cosponsors be bipartisan? Should they be of the same "type," for example, women, philosophy, state and region, or district demographics, serving on the same committee? Should a companion measure be introduced in the other chamber? Should Dear Colleague letters be sent prior to introduction? Should they be sent periodically throughout the process identifying status? When should the legislation be introduced, for example, opening day, first or second session, a specific time of year? What should the legislation be titled? Is there a useful acronym to be found to assist in publicizing the legislation? Should a particular number be reserved, for example, H.R. or S. 2020 relating to eye care? Should a working group be created? Staff only or Members only? What role should the party leadership play? What of committee leadership? What type of coalitions should be created? If legislation is being considered on the issue (not necessarily the Member's measure), should the Member testify at hearings? Are there others the Member would recommend as witnesses? If a measure is being marked up, should the Member offer an amendment, assuming the Member serves on the committee? If not, should an ally offer an amendment on the Member's behalf? Should one-minute speeches or special order speeches be made to keep pressure on the committee or chamber and to maintain press visibility? How often and who should be included? Should a Rules Committee (House only) strategy be devised? Should opponents' strategy be monitored? If regulation is the appropriate solution, has the agency or executive branch been consulted? What is the appropriate timing? Should letters be written to the President? A Cabinet Secretary? Which advocates should be contacted? At what stage should they be included? What role should the advocates play—research, letters to Members, media appearances, briefings? Should a coalition of several groups be created? Dear Colleague letters One-minute or special order speeches Staff working group Member working group Speak on floor during consideration of related measure Press conferences News releases Op-ed pieces Syndicated columnists Editorial support, local and national TV or radio interviews Blogs Social media Determine time line for target dates for all activities Determine periodic dates to review progress and reassess strategy Meet with party campaign committees to discuss how project could help candidates. Can state or local officials be given a role in promoting the project? Action plans embody the strategies employed to achieve goals. The office's strategic plan should not only identify specific steps, but also the person(s) (including the Member) responsible for each step. It is also useful to include deadlines for completing action on each step. Periodic meetings to review progress on the plan may prove useful in keeping the project on track. Usually each person in the office, whether they have specific responsibility for parts of the plan, should be provided a copy of the plan. Identify appropriate executive branch agency(s). Meet with agency staff to review present programs and discuss legislative options. Meet with advocates to discuss problem and possible solutions. Determine if other legislation has already been introduced. Work with legislative counsel to draft legislation (or amendments). Obtain CBO cost estimate. Send out draft for comment to advocates, district and state leaders, constituents, others. Send out Dear Colleague letters. Determine appropriate Members to cosponsor legislation. Work with other chamber for companion legislation. Create staff working group after identifying other Members to be involved. Meet with committee and party leadership. Hold briefings on issue, for staff and Members. Develop local and national press strategy. Develop social media strategy. Introduce legislation after determining most advantageous time. Hold field hearing. Hold town hall meetings in district/state. Seek opportunities, in committee, on floor, in district/state, in press, to publicize initiative.

The Congressional Research Service frequently receives inquiries about legislative planning. Legislative and office action plans are often used by congressional offices for almost every significant project, from organizing an extensive conference in the district or state to introducing and guiding legislation. A major action plan requires a firm understanding of the project's goal, a research strategy, and a time line for completing the project. This report presents some of the factors usually considered in preparing an action plan. The information is provided in three sections. The first provides an overview that lays out summary considerations. The second raises questions to consider in preparing an outline for a project. The third details a sample action plan.

Congress passed the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) in 1986, with several goals. First, Congress intended to address the "unique difficulties" faced by individuals with disabilities, who often had no way to predict the extent of a given airline or flight crew's accommodation. Second, Congress intended the ACAA to overrule a Supreme Court case, Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) , in which the Court held that certain nondiscrimination regulations then in effect could not be enforced against commercial airlines. Finally, Congress also intended to balance protecting individuals with disabilities from discrimination, on one hand, and the need to ensure general passenger safety, on the other. The inquiry regarding the extent of protections under the ACAA is timely given public concern in 2007 about a man infected with XDR-TB who traveled on several passenger airplanes before he was placed in isolation and public concern in 2009 about the influenza A(H1N1) outbreak. This report discusses ACAA requirements and regulations, including regulations regarding airplane passengers with communicable diseases. It will also briefly discuss S. 2554 , 110 th Congress, and H.R. 5129 , 110 th Congress, which proposed to amend the ACAA to provide aggrieved individuals with a private right of action, attorneys' fees, expert fees, and the costs of the action. The ACAA prohibits discrimination by air carriers against "otherwise qualified individual[s]" on the basis of disability. The statutory language regarding the scope of "disability" was the same under the ACAA as under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prior to the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act on September 25, 2008. Specifically, a person is an "individual with a disability" under the ACAA if the individual (1) "has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," (2) "has a record of such an impairment," or (3) "is regarded as having such an impairment." Under the regulations, such individuals are "qualified" individuals with disabilities if they (1) take steps to avail themselves of services offered by air carriers, (2) make good faith efforts to obtain tickets for air transportation, or (3) purchase or possess valid tickets for air transportation and meet reasonable contracts of carriage. Prior to enactment of the ADA Amendments Act, courts typically found that individuals met this "qualified" requirement if they also satisfied the "individual with a disability" requirement. The ACAA's statutory language is brief, leaving implementation to the Department of Transportation (DOT). The department originally promulgated regulations to implement the ACAA on March 6, 1990. Under the regulatory framework, air carriers violate the ACAA's nondiscrimination provision if they discriminate against an individual with a disability, "by reason of such disability, in the provision of air transportation." Additionally, air carriers may not require passengers to accept special services. DOT's goal for this provision was to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not treated differently than other passengers. In Deterra v. America West Airlines , a federal district court noted that asking a person utilizing a wheelchair to advance to the front of a ticket line when he had not requested special service could constitute discriminatory conduct under the regulations. The regulations provide two major exceptions to the general nondiscrimination requirement. First, carriers may refuse to serve individuals with disabilities "on the basis of safety." Second, carriers may refuse to serve individuals with disabilities when doing so would violate "FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] or TSA [Transportation Security Administration] requirements or applicable requirements of a foreign government." If a carrier denies service to an individual with a disability under either of these exceptions, it must specify its reason in writing. The ACAA impacts nearly all air carriers that transport passengers. Air carriers are defined as "U.S. ... or foreign citizen[s] ... [that undertake], directly or indirectly, or by a lease or any other arrangement, to engage in air transportation." It is clear from the ACAA's legislative history that the ACAA applies to both government and commercial air carriers. Additionally, in Bower v. FedEx , the Sixth Circuit held that the ACAA applied to a company that routinely allowed employees to ride as passengers in its cargo planes. The original version of the ACCA exempted foreign air carriers. However, in 2000, Congress passed a law amending the ACAA such that it now applies to foreign air carriers. On May 13, 2008, the regulations were revised to include foreign air carriers, and the new provisions went into effect on May 13, 2009. Foreign air carriers now are required to comply with the ACAA for flights "that begin or end at a U.S. airport." The ACAA contains no statutory reference to communicable diseases, but the regulatory text specifically addresses them. Additionally, the regulatory definition of "individual with a disability" appears to include individuals with communicable diseases. Similarly, courts generally accept communicable diseases as falling within the scope of "disability" under the ADA if the diseases meet the same parameters that other physical or mental impairments must satisfy. Although no federal court has reached the issue, it follows that courts would likely reach similar conclusions under the ACAA. The regulations prohibit various actions by carriers against individuals with communicable diseases. Namely, a carrier may not "(1) [r]efuse to provide transportation to the passenger; (2) [d]elay the passenger's transportation ... ; (3) [i]mpose on the passenger any condition, restriction, or requirement not imposed on other passengers; or (4) [r]equire the passenger to provide a medical certificate." However, an exception applies when "the passenger's condition poses a direct threat." The regulations define "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Carriers have discretion in determining whether a given passenger poses a "direct threat." The carrier must make an "individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment ... to ascertain: (i) [t]he nature, duration, and severity of the risk; (ii) [t]he probability that the potential harm to the health and safety of others will actually occur; and (iii) [w]hether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk." However, note that within the scope of their discretion, carriers must choose the "least restrictive response" from the passenger's point of view. For example, a carrier should not "refuse transportation to the passenger if ... [it] can protect the health and safety of others by means short of a refusal." The Department of Transportation regulations require most air carriers to take specific actions in order to fulfill the ACAA's broad nondiscrimination requirement. Note that these requirements are minimum standards only. Aircraft must conform to multiple accessibility requirements under the regulations. First, "aircraft with 30 or more passenger seats on which passenger aisle seats have armrests" must be "equipped with movable aisle armrests on at least one-half of the aisle seats in rows in which passengers with mobility impairments are permitted to sit under FAA or applicable foreign government safety rules." Second, each aircraft with 100 or more passenger seats must offer priority space in its cabin for storing at least one folding wheelchair. Third, aircraft with "more than one aisle in which lavatories are provided shall include at least one accessible lavatory." Finally, aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats providing one or more accessible lavatories must provide an "on-board wheelchair" for passengers' use. Generally, air carriers may not require that an individual with a disability travel with an attendant. However, a carrier may require that an individual travel with an attendant if one of the following applies and the carrier determines that an attendant's assistance is "essential for safety": (1) the passenger will travel in a stretcher or incubator; (2) the passenger is unable to comprehend or respond appropriately to safety instructions; (3) the passenger has a "mobility impairment so severe that the person is unable to physically assist in his or her own evacuation of the aircraft"; or (4) the passenger has both severe hearing and vision impairments and "cannot establish some means of communication with carrier personnel." Air carriers must allow individuals with disabilities to travel with service animals. In addition, carriers must "permit the service animal to accompany the passenger with a disability at any seat in which the person sits, unless the animal obstructs an aisle or other area that must remain unobstructed to facilitate an emergency evacuation." Also, carriers must accept service animal identification cards, tags, and even "credible verbal assurances" from qualified individuals as proof that a given animal is a "service animal." Similarly, airlines must allow qualified individuals with disabilities to bring ventilator or respirator equipment into the airplane cabin and use those devices during flights "operated on aircraft originally designed to have a maximum passenger capacity of more than 19 seats." Additionally, airlines must permit qualified individuals to stow assistive devices "in designated priority storage areas or in overhead compartments or under seats," including "(1) [m]anual wheelchairs ... ; (2) [o]ther mobility aides, such as canes ... , crutches, and walkers; and (3) [o]ther assistive devices for stowage or use within the cabin." These devices must be "consistent with FAA, PHMSA [Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration], TSA, or applicable foreign government requirements concerning security, safety, and hazardous materials with respect to the stowage of carry-on items," and a carrier "must not count assistive devices ... toward a limit on carry-on baggage." The regulations require all carriers to assist individuals with disabilities with boarding and deplaning if either the individual has requested such service or the carrier has offered such service and the individual agreed to receive it. Also, carriers may not require individuals with disabilities to sit in particular seats or refuse to seat them in any seat on the basis of disability. However, a narrow exception applies when refusing to accommodate a passenger in a particular seat is necessary in order for the carrier to comply "with FAA or applicable foreign government safety requirements." Carriers generally may not require individuals with disabilities to provide advance notice of the fact that they are flying. However, various exceptions apply. Specifically, a carrier may require up to 48 hours of advance notice of a passenger's disability if that passenger plans to carry or utilize certain equipment on the flight or seeks certain accommodations enumerated in the regulations. The regulations require that individuals with disabilities be required to undergo no more security screening procedures than individuals without disabilities. Likewise, security personnel must conduct screening of individuals with disabilities in the same manner in which they conduct screening of individuals without disabilities. However, they may examine an assistive device that might, "in their judgment," conceal a weapon or other prohibited item. In the most recent cases, two federal circuits have held that private individuals have no ability to sue airlines for discrimination under the ACAA. Instead, those courts have suggested that the ACAA merely gives individuals the ability to complain to the Department of Transportation (DOT) and then to file petitions for review with federal circuit courts if DOT fails to investigate individual complaints. These holdings limit individuals' ability to enforce the ACAA through the federal courts. Instead, individuals often must rely on DOT to enforce complaints against air carriers. Furthermore, some experts have argued that DOT's enforcement ability is relatively weak, in part because it handles enforcement through its enforcement office rather than through its office of civil rights. DOT has indicated that it has investigated numerous ACAA complaints, sometimes seeking millions of dollars in civil penalties as a result of ACAA violations. The Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554 and H.R. 5129 , was introduced in the 110 th Congress and proposed, in part, to amend the ACAA to provide for a private right of action. As noted previously, judicial decisions under the act have held that individuals have no ability to sue the airlines individually but must rely on the DOT to enforce complaints. The bills indicated that Congress disagreed with the judicial interpretations and noted that "[t]he absence of a private right of action leaves enforcement of the ACAA solely in the hands of the Department of Transportation, which is overburdened and lacks the resources to investigate, prosecute violators for, and remediate all of the violations of the rights of travelers who are individuals with disabilities." Although both S. 2554 and H.R. 5129 were referred to committee, the 110 th Congress did not enact this legislation. As of the date of this report, the 111 th Congress has not introduced any similar legislation.

The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. § 41705, prohibits discrimination by air carriers against individuals with disabilities. Public attention regarding an airplane passenger who traveled while infected with Extensively Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in 2007 raised questions regarding the ACAA's requirements and guarantees. Additionally, public concern about the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) outbreak may increase congressional interest in air travel regulations. This report briefly discusses the ACAA's statutory provisions, accompanying regulations, relevant judicial opinions, and legislation in the 110th Congress.

94-459 -- The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 May 26, 1994 In the early twentieth century, Haiti suffered from a tumultuous political life and from chronic financial mismanagement. Eighty percent of the Haitian budget went to debt service, and U.S. government officials wereconcernedthat financial obligations to its own citizens might not be met. There was greater fear, also, that one among thewarring European countries -- especially France or Germany -- might establish a position of influence in the country,leading to naval bases that could endanger access to the newly constructed Panama Canal. These concerns wereheightened after the outbreak of World War I, when Haitian authority collapsed into bloody factional struggles inthesummer of 1915; the Administration of Woodrow Wilson determined to take action. In July 1915, Admiral WilliamB. Caperton, then embarked on the battleship Washington , was directed to land forces to establish orderandassume responsibility for administering the customhouses. With virtually no resistance, a landing party of some 330 sailors and marines took control of the capital within a few hours. (There were only two U.S. fatalities, and these may have resulted from friendly fire; Haitian fatalitieswere also minimal.) Admiral Caperton called upon additional U.S. forces to take control of other coastal areas;resistance by guerrilla bands in the more mountainous areas of the country was temporarily put down, ending withthecapture of Fort Rivière in mid-November. By the end of 1915, the marine presence was reduced to 100officers and some 1,600 enlisted men. Although the Marine Brigade was extensively deployed to help put downresurgentguerrilla activity in 1918-1920, for most of the rest of the occupation, the 1,200-1,400 marines were assignedgarrison duty, with some patrolling of the countryside. Once firmly established in the major population centers, U.S. officials quickly ensured the election by the Haitian National Assembly of an amenable president, Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, who had served as the presidentof theHaitian Senate. As a result of continuing unrest, Admiral Caperton also established censorship and promulgatedmartial law. These emergency measures were not rescinded for over ten years. In another move to ensure an orderlygovernment, the United States presented the Haitians with a treaty that permitted a U.S.-nominated official to collecttaxes and make debt repayments and other disbursements. The treaty, (1) ratified by Haiti in November 1915 andby the U.S. Senate the following February, also created a constabulary (or gendarmerie) composed of native Haitiansunder American direction to serve both as Haiti's military and police force. The treaty was to remain in force forten years and could be extended for another ten "if the purpose of this treaty has not been fully accomplished." InMarch 1917, the duration of the 1915 treaty was officially extended to twenty years. Despite the treaty, the Haitian National Assembly was uncooperative in its relationship with U.S. officials. The State Department drafted a new Haitian Constitution which would have validated the occupation and allowedforeigners to own property in Haiti. The assembly, unwilling to ratify the document, was dissolved when Lt. Col.Smedley D. Butler, a U.S. Marine officer serving with the Haitian Gendarmerie, entered the capitol in June 1917,toread a dissolution order that Dartiguenave had been pressured to sign. Unwilling to risk the election of anotherAssembly, U.S. authorities effected the approval of the new constitution by plebiscite (only 769 votes out of 100,000were negative) in June, 1918. The new constitution created a Council of State, whose members were appointed bythe Haitian president, to perform all legislative functions until an Assembly could be reconstituted at a time to bedetermined. Although the United States occupied the principal towns of the country, guerrilla bands remained in the mountainous interior of the country. Known as cacos (named after a Haitian bird of prey), these bandshad long played asignificant role in Haitian politics, fighting at times on behalf of one or more factions within the dominantfrancophone elite. Renewed attacks by guerrillas commenced in October 1918, and persisted for a number ofmonths(including a raid on Port-au-Prince in October 1919), until the marines and the Gendarmerie were able to neutralizethem by frequent patrolling, paying bounties for weapons turned in, and by eliminating their leaders. After 1920,there were only occasional outbreaks of caco violence. The Gendarmerie, whose name was changed in 1928 to the Garde d'Haiti, became an essential part of the administrative structure of the country. Officered at first by Americans -- largely enlisted marines -- who were paidboth by theU.S. Marine Corps and by Haiti, the Gendarmerie, numbering 2,000-2,600 members, was deployed throughout thecountry and became largely responsible for maintaining law and order, settling disputes, and supporting publicworksprojects. It also served as Haiti's military force. Gradually, U.S. officers were replaced by Haitians, a process thatwas accelerated after 1929. Historians, otherwise critical of the occupation, acknowledge that Haitians had moresecurity intheir persons and property than they had ever previously known and that the Gendarmerie, during the occupation,functioned as an effective and impartial agency. (After U.S. forces departed in 1934, Haitian officers would becomemuchmore involved in political activities.) Throughout the occupation, U.S. forces suffered minimal casualties, totaling 10 killed and 26 wounded (with 172 other casualties). Complaints of brutality against native Haitians led the U.S. Congress to conduct hearings onHaiti and theDominican Republic in 1922. (2) The specialcommittee rejected the more serious charges and concluded that most of the abuses occurred during the effort to putdown the caco insurrection in 1918-1919. The counterinsurgency effortresulted in the deaths, by some estimates, of over 2,000 cacos . (3) Although affirming that cruelty was not officially countenanced, the committeenoted that there were at least ten instances of illegal executions by Americans. Once the caco rebellion was suppressed, there were virtually no physical attacks by Haitians on U.S. marines or civilians. After the 1922 congressional investigation criticized lack of coordination among U.S. officials in Haiti, U.S. civilian and military authority was consolidated. The senior U.S. representative from 1922 to 1930, General JohnH. Russell,USMC, served both as the senior marine in Haiti and as the U.S. High Commissioner, responsible to the StateDepartment. Reporting to him were U.S. officials (technically appointed by the President of Haiti) dealing withfinance, publicworks, sanitation, and agriculture, as well as the chief of the Gendarmerie. General Russell, described as aconscientious and somewhat imperious officer, became the most powerful figure in the country. He was laterappointedCommandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. The onset of the Great Depression and declining markets for Haitian products, especially coffee, produced economic hardships and contributed to increased unrest among a population long denied a political role. December1929 riots inLes Cayes threatened to spread throughout the country. A detachment from the Marine Brigade in Port-au-Princewas sent to restore order, but a confrontation led to the deaths of at least 12 Haitians. Subsequent incidents wereendedwithout loss of life, but the Hoover Administration was concerned that it might become involved in hostilities thatU.S. public opinion would not support. In early 1930, President Hoover appointed a bipartisan commission headed by W. Cameron Forbes, formerly the Governor General of the Philippines, to investigate conditions in Haiti. (4) After several weeks in the country during whichtestimony was taken from all sectors of the society, the commission submitted a report that argued that the UnitedStates could not relinquish its responsibilities for ensuring the financial stability of Haiti, but made several proposalsforchanges, especially the separation of civil and military responsibilities, increasing the number of Haitians in thegovernment, and, in general, for less intervention in Haitian domestic affairs. (5) In November, General Russell was replaced bya State Department official, Dana G. Munro, who was appointed Minister rather than High Commissioner. AnExecutive Agreement was negotiated in 1932 providing for the complete Haitianization of the Garde by October1934 and forthe withdrawal of the Marine Brigade, two years prior to the expiration of the extended 1915 Treaty. Washington was nonetheless determined to pull out of Haiti at an earlier date. Arrangements were made for the election of a temporary Haitian president and the subsequent holding of national elections in October 1930 thatreturned astrongly nationalistic majority. The complete Haitianization of the Garde was completed. President FranklinRoosevelt paid an official visit to Cap-Haitien in July 1934 and the last marines departed the following month. Nonetheless, aU.S. financial adviser would remain until 1941 to oversee payments on the Haitian debt. The U.S. occupation in large measure accomplished its goals of stabilizing Haitian finances. Security for investors was a key concern of the U.S. Government and to a large extent became the justification for the occupationonce thepotential threat of European intervention disappeared with the conclusion of World War I. A $16-million U.S. loanwas negotiated in 1922 to consolidate Haiti's outstanding foreign debts. Efficient collection of duties and prompt,evenadvance, payment of debts owed to U.S. banks soon restored the country's financial standing. Eventually, some 60% of Haitian revenues were expended under U.S. supervision, the greatest percentage going to debt repayment. Some critics, including the Forbes Commission, argued that monies used for advance repaymentof debtscould have been more usefully allocated to domestic projects. There is consensus, however, that Haitian financeswere honestly handled during the occupation and that steps were taken to insure that foreign interests did not takeadvantageof the country. (6) In the 1920s, annual Haitiangovernment revenues of $8-10 million were double that of the pre-occupation period; coffee production and smallbusinesses grew significantly, but little progress was made in establishing asound permanently economic base for the country. The occupation also resulted in the completion of a significant number of public works projects, mostly after 1920. Most important was the construction of roads and bridges throughout the country (some of which wascompleted through ahighly unpopular system of forced labor or corvée ). Although most of the 800 miles of roadswere not hard-surfaced, they greatly facilitated transportation between coastal areas and the rural uplands at a timewhen automobiles and truckswere being introduced into Haiti in significant numbers. A number of port facilities were erected, lighthouses wereconstructed, and a number of harbors were dredged. Efforts to improve agricultural productivity were complicatedby thesmall size of land holdings and a lack of accurate legal titles. The United States undertook a major effort to provide access to modern health care to the mass of the Haitian population that in some cases had never come into contact with trained doctors and nurses. A National PublicHealth Servicewas created with a network of some 153 rural clinics and 11 hospitals supervised by U.S. Navy doctors, and effortswere made to provide basic medical instruction to the population. This effort was financed by the Haitiangovernment atU.S. encouragement. The United States did not assume a responsibility to "build democracy," and U.S. officials did not devote significant efforts towards the encouragement of local self-government. Prior to the occupation, the Haitiangovernment had beenlargely the province of a narrow elite consisting of about 5 percent of the population. The Haitian presidents whoserved during most of the occupation, Dartiguenave (1915-1922), Louis Borno (1922-1930), and Eugene Roy, whoserved astemporary President from May-November 1930, were elected by the Council of State at the instigation of U.S.authorities. They, in turn, appointed members of the Council of State. There were no national elections held untilOctober1930, and local elections that produced unsuitable winners were invalidated. Newspapers were censored, andoffending editors jailed. Inattention to efforts to promote democracy stemmed, in part, from a knowledge that any election might produce results hostile to U.S. interests and probably from racial attitudes that considered Haitians unsuited forself-government. Theyears of the Haitian occupation coincided with widespread racial segregation in the United States and oppositionby a majority of U.S. whites to a political role for blacks. These attitudes, brought to Haiti by the occupation, ledto social aswell as political discrimination against Haitians, even the educated and politically active elite, that was bitterlyresented and undercut well-intentioned development projects. To a large extent, U.S. racial attitudes ensured thatthere was nosignificant element of the Haitian populace that supported the U.S. presence. (7) Education was also largely neglected during the occupation. Schooling in Haiti had been traditionally divided between francophone instruction for the elite and a very few rudimentary elementary schools for others. Little effortto changethis situation was undertaken. The mass of the population remained illiterate, and the elite continued to seek aneducation that did not lead to careers in commerce and industry. Efforts to provide technical training to developtheagricultural and industrial potential of the country (the Service Technique ) were not warmly receivedand did not reach a large number of students.

In 1915, the United States undertook a military occupation of Haiti to preempt anyEuropean intervention, to establish order out of civil strife, and to stabilize Haitian finances. Duringthe nineteen-year occupation, U.S. military and civilian officials, numbering less than 2,500 for the most part,supervised the collection of taxes and the disbursement of revenues, maintained public order, and initiated a programofpublic works. The Haitian government remained in place, but was subject to U.S. guidance. The Haitian peoplebenefitted from the end of endemic political violence and from the construction of roads, bridges, and ports as wellas from improved access to health care. The U.S. occupation was, nonetheless, deeply resented throughout Haitiansociety, and many of its accomplishments did not long endure its termination in 1934.

The estate and gift tax debate focuses on issues of equity and long-term economic efficiency. Many observers opposed to the estate tax on grounds of equity suggest that taxing the assets of decedents is unfair because the decedent has already paid taxes on the assets as they accumulated value. There is also a perceived need to provide heirs of family farms and businesses a tax preference for family assets that are transferred at death. Opponents of the estate tax on economic efficiency grounds cite research that suggests the estate tax is a tax on saving and investment, which, like other taxes on capital, would tend to impede long-term economic growth. Those in favor of retaining some type of estate tax counter that many estates include assets with accumulated capital gains that have not been subject to income taxes. For example, publicly traded stock transferred at death would avoid taxation on the increased value from the time of purchase to the date of transfer. Estate tax proponents maintain that other assets, such as family business assets and family farm assets, should not be afforded special preferences in the tax code. Repeal or modification of the estate and gift tax for all estates would achieve the policy objective of tax relief for farm and small-business estates. However, farm assets and business assets represent a relatively small share of total taxable estate value, approximately 17.1% of gross taxable estate value in 2009. Thus, repeal or modification of the estate tax would benefit more estates with a variety of different asset types. Examining the asset distribution of estates that paid at least some estate tax more closely will provide some guidance for policy makers about the current impact of estate taxes on business-type assets and farms. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) annually publishes data on the distribution of assets in estate tax returns filed in a tax year. This report uses data for returns filed in 2009 and 2010. The 2009 data are more representative of the estate tax burden in 2012 than the 2010 data. The estate tax was repealed for those who died in 2010, thus the data for the returns filed in 2010 do not reflect the impact of the tax. The 2010 data are provided as an Appendix to this report. These data are from estates from decedents who died before 2010 and those estates that chose to file using the pre-EGTRRA law. Data from returns filed in 2009 include the returns of many decedents who died in 2008. The biggest difference between 2008 and 2009 is the exemption amount, which was $2 million in 2008 and rose to $3.5 million in 2009. For 2011 and 2012, the exemption amount is $5 million ($10 million for married decedents). On December 17, 2010, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ) reinstated the estate tax beginning with 2010 decedents and sunsets after 2012. Executors of estates of decedents who died in 2010, however, may also choose to file under the EGTRRA laws in place before passage of P.L. 111-312 . The new law sets the estate tax exemption level at $5 million per decedent in 2010 (indexed for inflation) and establishes a top marginal tax rate of 35%. Any unused exemption amount is transferrable to a surviving spouse, yielding an effective exemption amount of $10 million for married decedents. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the temporary estate tax modifications to reduce revenue by approximately $136.7 billion over 10 years. The number of decedents that will be affected by the estate tax will rise significantly in 2013, as the law will return to the pre-EGTRRA parameters. The estate and gift tax minimum filing requirement is $5,120,000 for deaths occurring in 2012. Generally, estates valued below the threshold are not required to file a return. Estates valued over the threshold amount calculate their tax liability based upon the entire (or gross) value of the estate inclusive of the $5,120,000. Deductions from the gross estate value, such as bequests to a surviving spouse (the marital deduction), state estate and inheritance taxes, and donations to charitable organizations, are then subtracted from the gross estate value. The tentative tax liability is determined by the progressive rate schedule provided for in the tax code. The next step in the calculation of estate tax liability, and perhaps the most important, is the applicable credit. The applicable credit is set such that an estate has the equivalent of a $5,120,000 exemption (for deaths occurring in 2012 the amount is $1,772,800, see Table 1 below). In many cases, the marital deduction combined with the deduction for charitable contributions can eliminate all estate tax liability. Before 2005, estates were allowed to claim a credit for state death taxes paid. EGTRRA, however, gradually repealed the credit for state death taxes, eliminating it in 2005 and replacing it with a deduction for taxes paid. Many states have relied on the federal credit for their estate tax and will need to modify their tax laws to continue collecting their estate and inheritance taxes. According to a January 2012 evaluation of state laws by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Some 22 states—continue to collect either an estate or inheritance tax." The data utilized in this report are from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Statistics of Income (SOI) Division. The SOI data report the assets held by estates by gross estate value classes. For this report, farm returns are defined as estates reporting farm assets. Business returns are defined as those estates that include assets typically held by businesses: "closely held stock," "limited partnerships," "real estate partnerships," and "other non-corporate business assets." Estates reporting one or more of the four assets were termed business returns. This methodology is imperfect and likely double counts many estates. As a result, the number of business estates would be significantly overstated by this estimate. Of the approximately 2.43 million deaths in 2008 of people 25 years old and over, 0.6% incurred estate and gift tax liability. Further, in 2009 only 1,846 decedents with taxable estates included farm assets (0.08% of all deaths), and 8,055 taxable estates listed assets of the type typically held by businesses (0.34% of all deaths). The primary reason for the low number of filers relative to the number of deaths in 2008 is the high gross estate value filing threshold. In tax year 2008, only estates valued at greater than $2 million were required to file an estate and gift tax return. (The 2008 decedents would likely file returns in 2009.) This makes the estate tax a relatively progressive tax source. Table 2 suggests the progressivity of the estate and gift tax in 2009. Taxable estates worth over $10 million accounted for 11.2% of the total taxable estates, yet 61.0% of all estate tax revenue. The 4,296 estates (29.2% of taxable estates) larger than $5 million generated over 81.9% of total estate tax revenue. Recall that only 0.7% of deaths generated any estate tax liability. The SOI data do not distinguish estate tax returns by detailed occupation of the decedent, such as farmer or business person. However, the data do provide significant detail on the distribution of the decedent's assets. Table 4 summarizes estate tax return asset data from the returns filed in 2009. Generally, assets that represent more of the taxable estate shoulder a greater share of the tax burden. The value of taxable estates is concentrated in the following asset categories: publicly traded stock, cash assets, state and local bonds, other real estate, and closely held stock. These five assets represent 66.2% of total taxable estate value in 2009. Thus, eliminating the estate tax will reduce the tax burden chiefly on these assets. Table 3 reports that the value of total farm assets is approximately 3.25% of total taxable gross estate value. The business assets in Table 3 represent approximately $14.1 billion of total taxable estate value (or 13.9%). The largest is closely held stock, worth approximately $7.2 billion. However, total business assets as reported do not explicitly indicate the portion of those assets held in small businesses. Though farm and business decedents may have other taxable assets—such as equities and cash—the burden on farm and business assets alone is quite small relative to other assets. Thus, removing the estate and gift tax or lowering the rates in general will have a much greater effect on non-farm and non-business assets. Table 4 presents detailed data on farm and business assets by gross estate value. Relatively large farm estates, those valued between $2 million and $3.5 million, comprise a relatively larger share of total estate value for that estate size category. Overall, however, farm estates appear to be evenly distributed across the estate size categories. Note that farm assets account for approximately 3.25% of total taxable estate value. In contrast to farm estates, assets typically associated with non-farm businesses are concentrated in estates valued over $10 million. In fact, of the $14.1 billion in total business assets in estates, over $11.0 billion (77.7%) is held in those estates valued over $10 million. As a consequence, smaller-business taxable estates, those valued at less than $10 million, contribute very little to the estate and gift tax base. In summary, repeal of the estate and gift tax would clearly achieve the policy objective of relief for estates composed of farm and small-business assets. Farm assets and business assets, however, represent a relatively small share of total taxable estate value, approximately 17.1% at the most.

This report provides data on the distribution of assets in estates as reported on estate tax returns filed in 2009 and 2010. The data for 2010 are unique, as the estate tax was repealed for those who died in calendar year 2010. Thus, the 2010 data are presented as an appendix to this report. Based on the 2009 data, this report finds that farm and business assets represent a small share of the total value of taxable estates that filed tax returns in 2009 (3.25% and 13.86%, respectively). That share is concentrated in estates valued over $10 million. For an overview of the estate tax, see CRS Report RL30600, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as new data become available.

Earmark disclosure rules in both the House and Senate were implemented with the stated intention of bringing more transparency to congressionally directed spending. The administrative responsibilities associated with these new rules vary by chamber. This report outlines the major administrative responsibilities of Senators and committees of the Senate associated with the chamber's earmark disclosure rules. Senate Rule XLIV prohibits a vote on a motion to proceed to consider a measure or a vote on adoption of a conference report, unless the chair of the committee or the majority leader (or designee) certifies that a complete list of earmarks and the name of each Senator requesting each earmark is available on a publicly accessible congressional website in a searchable form at least 48 hours before the vote. If a Senator proposes a floor amendment containing an additional earmark, those items must be printed in the Congressional Record as soon as "practicable." Rule XLIV, paragraph 5, explicitly defines congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit as follows: Congressionally directed spending item - a provision or report language included primarily at the request of a Senator providing, authorizing or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality or congressional district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula driven or competitive award process. Limited tax benefit - any revenue provision that (A) provides a federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to a particular beneficiary or limited group of beneficiaries under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and (B) contains eligibility criteria that are not uniform in application with respect to potential beneficiaries of such provision. Limited tariff benefit - a provision modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States in a manner that benefits 10 or fewer entities. If the earmark certification requirements have not been met, a point of order may lie against consideration of the measure or vote on the conference report. A point of order would not apply to floor amendments. Senate earmark disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark included in either the text of the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill, as well as the conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to items in authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to unreported measures, amendments, House bills, and conference reports. Under Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 6, a Senator requesting that a congressional earmark be included in a measure is required to provide a written statement to the chair and ranking minority member of the committee of jurisdiction that includes the Senator's name; the name and address of the intended earmark recipient (if there is no specific recipient, the location of the intended activity should be included); in the case of a limited tax or tariff benefit, identification of the individual or entities reasonably anticipated to benefit to the extent known to the Senator; the purpose of the earmark; and a certification that neither the Senator nor the Senator's immediate family has a financial interest in such an earmark. It is important to note that, when submitting earmark requests, individual committees and subcommittees often have their own additional administrative requirements beyond those required by Senate rules (e.g., prioritizing requests or submitting request forms electronically). The Senate Appropriations Committee, for example, has stated that it will require Members requesting earmarks to post information regarding their earmark requests on their personal website. This information must be posted at the time of the request and must include the purpose of the earmark and why it is a valuable use of taxpayer funds. The committees may also establish relevant policy requirements (e.g., requiring matching funds for earmark requests) or restrictions (e.g., not considering earmark requests for certain appropriations accounts or disallowing multi-year funding requests). In addition, committees and subcommittees often have deadlines, especially for earmark requests in appropriations legislation. For this reason, it is important to check with individual committees and subcommittees to learn of any supplemental earmark request requirements or restrictions. The committee of jurisdiction is responsible for identifying earmarks in the legislative text and any accompanying reports. Therefore, when it is not clear whether a senatorial request constitutes an earmark, the committee of jurisdiction may be able to provide guidance. When submitting an earmark request, it may be relevant whether the Senator wants the earmark to be included in the text of the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill. Committees may make an administrative distinction between these two categories in terms of the submission of earmark requests, and there may be policy implications of an earmark's placement in either the bill text or the committee report. For example, under Executive Order 13457, issued in January 2008, executive agencies are directed not to commit, obligate, or expend funds that were the result of an earmark included in non-statutory language, such as a committee report. If, during consideration of a measure, a Senator proposes an amendment that contains an additional earmark, the Senator shall ensure that a list of earmarks (and the name of any other Senator who submitted a request for each earmark included) is printed in the Congressional Record as soon as "practicable." Under the Senate rule, earmark disclosure responsibilities of Senate committees and conference committees fall into three major categories: (1) determining if a spending provision is an earmark; (2) compiling earmark requests for presentation, and (3) certifying that requirements under Rule XLIV have been met. Committees of jurisdiction may use their discretion to decide what constitutes an earmark. Definitions in Senate rules, as well as past earmark designations during the 110 th Congress, may provide guidance in determining if a certain provision constitutes an earmark. Senate Rule XLIV states that before consideration is in order on a measure or conference report, a list of included earmarks and their sponsors must be identified through lists, charts, or some means and made available on a publicly accessible congressional website for at least 48 hours. The Senate Appropriations Committee has stated that it will make earmark disclosure tables publicly available the same day that a subcommittee reports the bill. In the case of measures, the list of earmarks (and Senate sponsors) on the congressional website must be "searchable." Lists associated with conference reports should also be in a searchable format but only to the extent it is technically feasible. Senate rules state that a committee report containing a list of earmarks (and their sponsors) that is available online satisfies the disclosure requirement. The rule also requires the applicable committee to make the certifications of no financial interest available online. The rule does not specify how long after consideration any of these required materials must be maintained. The rule states that consideration of a measure or conference report is not in order until the applicable committee chair or the majority leader (or designee) "certifies" that the requirements stated above have been met. While the rule does not state what constitutes certification, it has been the practice of the committee chair to make a statement on the Senate floor or submit a written statement to be printed in the Congressional Record confirming compliance with Rule XLIV's disclosure requirements. An example of a certification letter is provided below.

Earmark disclosure rules in both the House and the Senate establish certain administrative responsibilities that vary by chamber. Under Senate rules, a Senator requesting that an earmark be included in legislation is responsible for providing specific written information, such as the purpose and recipient of the earmark, to the committee of jurisdiction. Further, Senate committees are responsible for compiling and presenting such information in accord with Senate rules. In the Senate, disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit included in either the text of a bill or any report accompanying the measure, including a conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to earmarks in appropriations legislation, authorizing legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to measures not reported by committees, floor amendments, and conference reports. This report will be updated as needed.

Congress has been interested in the use of year-round schools for several decades. In April 1972, the House of Representatives, General Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing on the "year-round school concept." Since that time, various bills have been introduced to support the use of year-round schools. This report provides background information about year-round schools, specifically what they are, how prevalent they are today, state policies on year-round schooling, what recent research says about year-round schooling, and the arguments for and against this approach. In general, year-round schools are schools that reorganize a traditional school year without allowing for any extended breaks in instruction (e.g., 10 week summer vacation). Rather, the days usually included in summer break are redistributed to create regular breaks throughout the year. This is sometimes referred to as operating on a "balanced calendar." According to the National Association for Year-Round Education (NAYRE), schools primarily offer year-round education on a single track or multi-track. Schools using a single track approach to year-round education provide a balanced calendar for instruction in which summer vacation is shortened with additional vacation days added throughout the school year to create breaks from instruction, which are sometimes referred to as "intersessions." Intersessions may be used by the school to provide remediation or enrichment activities for students. Schools using a single track approach to year-round education often structure their school calendar in one of three ways: 1. 45-15 calendar: 45 days (9 weeks) of instruction, followed by 15 days (3 weeks) of vacation/intersession; 2. 60-20 calendar: 60 days (12 weeks) of instruction, followed by 20 days (4 weeks) of vacation/intercession; or 3. 45-10 calendar: 45 days (9 weeks) of instruction, followed by 10 days (2 weeks) of vacation/intersession. Multi-track year-round education is often used to assist schools that are dealing with capacity issues. By establishing a multi-track system, a school district may be able to avoid having to build a new school or temporary structures (e.g., portable classrooms). A multi-track system is implemented by dividing teachers and students into tracks or groups of similar sizes that each has its own schedule. Students and teachers in a given track follow the same schedule, are in school at the same time, and are on vacation at the same time. Common multi-track calendars include 4 tracks operating on a 45-15 calendar (45 days of instruction, 15 days of vacation/intersession), 60-20 calendar, or 90-30 calendar. A 60-15 calendar is generally used in schools with 5 tracks. For example, if a school that could accommodate 750 students had 1,000 students enrolled, it could divide the students into tracks or groups of 250 students (i.e., 4 tracks). The school could then have three tracks at school at any given time and one track on vacation or intersession. This could enable the school to meet student demand without necessitating expansion of the school facility. While year-round schools have existed in some form since the early 1900s, there was substantial growth in the number of year-round schools from the mid-1980s to 2000. In 1985, there were 410 year-round public schools, serving about 350,000 students. By 2000, the number of year-round public schools had grown to 3,059 schools, serving almost 2.2 million students in 45 states. The number of year-round public schools dropped to 2,936 public schools, serving 2.1 million students, by the 2006-2007 school year. Based on data available from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for the 2011-2012 school year (most recent data available), over the last several years there has again been growth in the number of public schools operating as year-round schools. During the 2011-2012 school year, there were 3,700 public schools across the nation operating on a year-round calendar cycle. This accounted for 4.1% of all public schools in the country. The highest concentration of schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle was in the South (40.5%), followed by the West (24.3%) with equal proportions of these schools in the Northeast and Midwest (16.2% in each region). The majority of schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle are traditional public schools (3,300 schools) compared with 400 charter schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle. In terms of school level, over half (57%, 2,100 schools) of all schools operating on a year-round calendar cycle are elementary schools, 900 are secondary schools, and 600 are combined elementary and secondary schools. Most schools operating on a year-round calendar schedule enroll 200 or more students. In addition, 47% of all schools operating on a year-round calendar schedule had 75% or more of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. Nearly 60% of schools operating on a year-round calendar schedule had at least 50% of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. In 2011, most states required public schools to provide 180 days of instruction each school year. The average number of instructional days per school year for schools with year-round calendar cycles was 189 days during the 2011-2012 school year. This number varied by region of the country, type of school (traditional or charter), school level, and enrollment. The most recent data on state policies on year-round schools were compiled by the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) for the 2008 school year. Of the states for which information was available, 17 states had a policy on year-round schools. In addition, 30 states reported that they had school districts in their states with year-round schools. Some states specified the number of districts within the state that had year-round schools operating. Of the states reporting a specific number of districts, most reported that five or fewer school districts had year-round schools. However, in some states, the number of school districts with year-round schools constituted a majority of the school districts in the state (e.g., Delaware). As part of their survey responses, some states provided their definitions of year-round schools. These definitions are varied as illustrated below. Arkansas: A year-round school must meet the state requirement for the minimum number of school days between July 1 and June 30 of each school year and have no vacation, including summer vacation, last more than six weeks. Oklahoma: A year-round school must offer at least 10 months of 4 weeks during which the school is in session and instruction is offered for not less than 180 days. Texas: A year-round school must operate during the "greater part" of 10 months and up to 12 calendar months of the year. The research on the extent to which year-round schools affect student achievement has generally been found to be inconclusive and lacking in methodological rigor. For example, in reviewing the literature on the effects of year-round schooling on student achievement, Cooper et al. concluded that "a truly credible study of modified calendar effects has yet to be conducted." Wu and Stone reached similar conclusions and noted that while "there is a general consensus that [year-round school] has no effect or a small positive effect on student performance, the methodology of many studies had left copious room for more rigorous verification." Their own study of whether year-round schools in California had an effect upon the outcome and growth of schools' Academic Performance Index (API) scores used more sophisticated statistical analyses than prior studies and found that year-round schools failed to affect either measure. Cooper et al. in their meta-analysis of studies on year-round school found that the "cumulative results of past studies is so close to a chance outcome that the argument that poor designs have led to random findings remain plausible." They also note, however, that there is some evidence that suggests that year-round schools may improve academic achievement for economically disadvantaged students. A second aspect of year-round education that researchers have sought to examine is whether year-round schools affect the cost of education. Based on a review of the literature conducted by the Education Commission of the States (ECS), schools operating on multi-tracks experience reduced capital expenditures (i.e., facility costs), but do not tend to achieve savings with respect to operating expenditures (e.g., personnel costs, electricity). However, the savings from capital expenditures outweigh any increases in operating expenditures. It is less clear, however, whether schools operating on a single-track experience cost savings. A more recent study of year-round schools in one setting, Clark County, NV, generally supports the conclusions noted by ECS, finding significant cost savings as a result of the implementation of multitrack year-round schools. The researchers concluded that savings were largest with respect to real estate and operations. Based on reviews of the literature conducted by Cooper et al., Wu and Stone, and ECS, as well as arguments put forth by proponents of year-round education, including NAYRE, and opponents of year-round education, including the Coalition for the Traditional School Year and Summer Matters, this section provides an overview of some of the arguments made in favor of or against year-round education. The use of year-round schools can prevent the loss of learning over the summer, which may be a particular problem for children with special educational needs (e.g., English learners) and addresses the uneven effects of the summer break on students based on socioeconomic status. Using a modified school calendar creates opportunities to provide remediation and enrichment activities to students during the school year rather than waiting to provide these activities during summer school. Proponents of year-round education often argue that the use of a balanced calendar increases student achievement, but as previously discussed, the research in this area is inconclusive. There may be cost savings realized when operating multitrack year-round schools, particularly with respect to capital expenditures. The use of a balanced calendar could help to prevent staff burnout by providing more frequent breaks for staff. In addition, teachers could choose to substitute teach during breaks to earn additional money while providing students with a teacher with greater knowledge of the curriculum than a substitute teacher that did not regularly work at the school. The initial implementation of a year-round school program may be costly due to a variety of factors including preparing a facility to serve students for more months during a calendar year. Opponents of year-round education note that while year-round schools may not have a negative effect on education, the data on its positive effects are inconclusive. Instead of changing school calendars, they argue that the focus should be on issues such as effective teaching and parent involvement. Operating on a year-round schedule may require paying more staff (e.g., administrative staff and maintenance workers) on 12-month contracts instead of 9-month contracts, thereby increasing operational costs. In addition, staff may experience burnout, particularly principals who are managing buildings that are now occupied by students for the entire calendar year. Families may find it difficult to have their children on different schedules if year-round schooling is not offered districtwide or if their children end up on different tracks in a multitrack school. There may be a lack of opportunities for older students to have summer jobs, and there may be complications related to student participation in extracurricular activities over breaks. Concerns are also raised about year-round schooling by organizations (e.g., amusement parks, campgrounds) that could potentially be adversely affected economically by a change in the school calendar. It may be difficult to conduct large maintenance projects and may require doing routine maintenance at night or on the weekends, which may incur overtime costs. Several disadvantages related specifically to multitrack year-round schools are cited, including possible difficulties in offering remediation if space is an issue, lack of convenience for teachers who may not have a regular classroom in which to keep their teaching materials, and disrupted communication and training among staff as a portion of the staff is always out of the school.

In general, year-round schools are schools that reorganize a traditional school year without allowing for any extended breaks in instruction (e.g., 10-week summer vacation). Rather, the days usually included in summer break are redistributed to create regular breaks throughout the year. While year-round schools have existed to some extent since the early 1900s, there was substantial growth in the number of year-round schools from the mid-1980s to 2000. In 1985, there were 410 year-round public schools, serving about 350,000 students. By 2000, the number of year-round public schools had grown to 3,059 schools, serving almost 2.2 million students in 45 states. During the 2011-2012 school year, there were 3,700 public schools across the nation operating on a year-round calendar cycle. The research on the extent to which year-round schools affect student achievement has generally been found to be inconclusive and lacking in methodological rigor. There is some consensus that year-round schooling has no effect or a small positive effect on student performance; however, the quality of the studies that led to these findings has been questioned. There are various pros and cons raised in relation to year-round schools. Among the arguments in favor of this calendar approach are stemming the loss of learning over the summer, creating opportunities during the school year to provide remediation and enrichment activities, and cost savings. Among the arguments against the year-round school approach are the costs associated with the initial implementation of a year-round school, the greater need to focus instead on other aspects of education (e.g., effective teaching and parent involvement), scheduling difficulties for families if year-round schools are not implemented districtwide or if their children end up on different schedules within the same school; the lack of opportunities for older students to have summer jobs; and issues related to student participation in extracurricular activities while on breaks.

RS21868 -- U.S.-Dominican Republic Free-Trade Agreement Updated January 3, 2005 On August 5, 2004, representatives of the United States, the Dominican Republic, and five Central American countries signed a regional free-trade agreement(DR-CAFTA) among their countries. The United States first had concluded a free-trade agreement with the CentralAmerican countries (CAFTA) in January2004. Later, on March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic announced that they had concludeda bilateral trade agreement that from theoutset of negotiations was intended to be integrated into (or "docked onto") CAFTA. (8) The USTR described the outcome at the time: "With its integration intothe CAFTA, the Dominican Republic has assumed the same set of obligations and commitments as Costa Rica,Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, andNicaragua. As with the Central American countries, individual market access schedules were negotiated with theDominican Republic for goods, agriculture,services, investment and government procurement." (9) Under the agreement reached with the Dominican Republic FTA, 80% of U.S. exports of non-agricultural products would become duty-free immediately, withremaining duties phased out over 10 years. (10) U.S.sectors that would have immediate duty-free access include information technology products, agriculturaland construction equipment, paper products, wood, pharmaceuticals, and medical and scientific equipment. U.S.autos and auto parts would be able to enterduty-free after five years. More than half of U.S. agricultural exports would receive duty-free treatment immediately, including corn, cotton, wheat, soybeans, many fruits and vegetables,and processed food products. Tariffs would be phased out on most agricultural products within 15 years and on allagricultural products by 20 years. Beef,pork, poultry, rice, and dairy products would become duty-free under tariff-rate quotas. Most U.S. agriculturalproducers support the agreement. For example,the U.S. Grains Council announced that, in partnership with the National Grain Sorghum Producers and the NationalCorn Growers Association, it"...applaud[s] the successful negotiations..." of the FTA. (11) An official with the Grocery Manufacturers of America said the Dominican Republic "'...is a greatmarket for food, agriculture, and beverage products,'...[and] an excellent potential market for U.S. beer, snack foods,pet food, nuts, and breakfast cereals." (12) The sugar provisions in the agreement with the Dominican Republic do not seem as controversial as those reached with the Central American countries. Thecontinuing precedent of market-opening, however, worries the U.S. sugar industry. The tariff-rate quota (TRQ) onsugar for the Dominican Republic wouldincrease by 10,000 metric tons the first year, increase by 2% annually for years 2-15, then increase by a smalleramount in perpetuity. The tariff on above-quotaimports would not change. Dale Hathaway, a senior fellow at the National Center for Food and Agriculture Policy,said the increase in the DominicanRepublic's cap on sugar was "not significant." (13) The U.S. Sugar Industry Group argued, however, that more imports from the Dominican Republic couldjeopardize the stability of domestic prices, which would help neither country. (14) Textiles and apparel from the Dominican Republic would become duty-free and quota-free immediately, if they met the agreement's rules of origin, whichinclude general rules for all signatories and specific rules for each country. As with the other CAFTA parties, theDominican Republic would be allowed to useinputs also from Mexico or Canada to meet cumulation requirements for apparel or clothing. The American TextileManufacturers Institute, which representsU.S. textile producers, said that CAFTA could lead to reduced U.S. employment in the textile industry. (15) The American Apparel and Footwear Association(AAFA), which represents the North American apparel industry and its suppliers, said however, "...because manyU.S. companies maintain production-sharingrelationships with the [Dominican Republic], swift implementation of the [FTA] will likely have a positiveeconomic impact in the United States...." (16) An unresolved issue would be apparel made under co-production arrangements with Haiti. CBTPA benefits expire the earlier of: (1) September 30, 2008; or(2) the date on which the FTAA or another FTA as specified enters into force between the United States and aCBTPA beneficiary country ( P.L. 106-200 ,Section 211). Thus, if the FTA between the Dominican Republic and the United States enters into force, articlesco-produced by Haiti and the DominicanRepublic might no longer qualify under CBTPA. The Administration said it would work with the Congress so thatHaiti could continue to be eligible underCBTPA for apparel with inputs from the Dominican Republic. (17) The Dominican Republic signed on to the principles and standards under CAFTA's chapter on intellectual property rights with its own transition periods formeeting certain obligations. In late 2003, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a coalition of tradeassociations representing copyrightindustries, called broadcast piracy in the Dominican Republic "...the worst in the entire hemisphere." (18) As part of the bilateral FTA, the DominicanRepublicsigned two side documents committing it to act against broadcast or cable piracy. U.S. industry advisors want theU.S. Government to monitor vigilantly theimplementation of the side documents and the agreement. (19) The USTR also expressed uncertainty, saying the FTA "...will require the Dominican Republic toupgrade considerably the level of intellectual property protection...." (20) On government procurement, cross-border trade in services, financial services, and investment, the Dominican Republic signed on to the general principles ofeach CAFTA chapter but negotiated its own list of specific concessions. For example, in the chapter on governmentprocurement, all signatories, including theDominican Republic, would accept general principles such as national treatment and transparency, but eachsignatory would observe these principles only withrespect to its own negotiated list of agencies and its own thresholds for contract amounts covered by the chapter. Similarly, the chapters on cross-border tradein services, financial services, and investment include general principles such as nondiscriminatory treatment, butthey have their own negotiated lists ofservices that are exempt from the general principles. The Dominican Republic acceded to almost all of the other provisions concluded in the CAFTA, including the chapters on labor and the environment. Underthose chapters, CAFTA parties agreed they would enforce their domestic labor and environmental laws but wouldretain the right to exercise discretionregarding investigations and related matters. They recognized that it is inappropriate to weaken labor andenvironmental laws to encourage trade, and agreed toensure access to judicial proceedings. The text would establish governmental labor and environmental committeesto oversee implementation, and other bodieswould do further cooperative work. The labor and environment chapters link to a dispute process under which, ifa party wins a labor or environmentalcomplaint, the losing party could be assessed monetary damages. The U.S. Trade Representative says that the FTA with the Dominican Republic "...will ensure effective enforcement of domestic labor laws, establish acooperative program to improve labor laws and enforcement, and build the capacity of the Dominican Republic tomonitor and enforce labor rights." (21) TheU.S. Department of State, however, has recognized that there have been widespread problems with putting workerrights into practice, even though theConstitution of the Dominican Republic and its 1992 Labor Code provide for broad worker rights. (22) Representatives of the AFL-CIO and theDominican laborgroup Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CNUS) have called for further reform of Dominican laws, effectiveenforcement provisions that allow for tradesanctions, and protection against trade law violations. (23) Human Rights Watch reports that women "...who become pregnant are routinely fired from jobsandshut out of employment in the Dominican Republic's export-processing sector," and such abuse of workers wouldbe allowed to continue, because CAFTAdoes not prohibit workplace discrimination. (24) Workers' groups also fear the loss of protections under current U.S. unilateral trade programs such as CBI. (25) The Dominican Republic also acceded to other chapters of CAFTA, including dispute settlement, trade remedies, electronic commerce, andtelecommunications. These chapters would establish a process for resolving disputes, set out rules for safeguards,keep transmission of digital productsduty-free, and ensure certain standards affecting suppliers of telecommunications services. There are also chapterson customs administration, technical barriersto trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and transparency of laws and regulations. The Agreement wouldestablish a Committee on Trade CapacityBuilding. In the last months of 2004, a newly passed tax in the Dominican Republic made that country's participation in the FTA tenuous. In September 2004, theDominican Republic enacted a revenue measure to meet conditions for a loan by the International Monetary Fund. The revenue measure included a 25%increase in the tax on soft drinks with high-fructose corn syrup. U.S. trade officials warned that the 25% taxthreatened the FTA that the two countries justsigned. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Grassley warned that the tax would jeopardize Senate support for theagreement. (26) Representative Rangel,Ranking Member on the House Ways and Means Committee, however, called the Administration's threat to dropthe Dominican Republic from the tradeagreement "inappropriate and unfortunate." (27) TheDominican Republic responded to the opposition by repealing the 25% tax in the last days of 2004. It is uncertain when the Administration might submit implementing legislation for DR-CAFTA to the Congress. Regardless of when legislation might beintroduced, it is expected to be controversial.

On March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic concluded a draftfree-trade agreement tointegrate the Dominican Republic into the earlier signed Central American Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Thefinal agreement (DR-CAFTA) was signed byall parties on August 5, 2004. The Dominican Republic would have its own market access provisions, but wouldaccept the rest of the CAFTA framework. Legislation to implement DR-CAFTA might be considered in the 109th Congress. This report willbe updated as developments occur.

As Congress continues to deliberate whether and how to address climate change, a key question has been the degree to which humans and natural factors have influenced observed global climate change. Members of Congress sometimes stress that policies or actions "must be based on sound science." Officials in the Trump Administration have expressed uncertainty about the human influence, and some have called for public debate on the topic. To help inform policymaking, researchers and major scientific assessment processes have analyzed the attribution of observed climate change to various possible causes. Scientific assessments of both climate change and the extent to which humans have influenced it have varied in expressed confidence over time but have achieved greater scientific consensus. The latest major U.S. assessment, the Climate Science Special Report (CSSR), was released in October 2017 by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). It stated It is extremely likely [>95% likelihood] that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20 th Century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence. This CRS report provides context for the CSSR's statement by tracing the evolution of scientific understanding and confidence regarding the drivers of recent global climate change. Climate change science can be traced back to the early 1800s. Through the 20 th century, academic institutions, federal and state agencies, foreign governments, and other entities invested significant time and billions of dollars in climate research. This investment has led to substantial advances in empirical observations, atmospheric and ocean physics and chemistry, climate and economic simulation models, statistical methods, and other achievements. As a result, scientists have increased their confidence in their detection and understanding of climate change and attribution of observed changes to their causes. There is now high scientific confidence that the global climate is warming, primarily as a result of increased human-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and other activities . This confidence has evolved from nearly two centuries of research and assessments. This report describes a chronology (in the Appendix ) of 200 years of major scientific statements, selected to represent views at each time, regarding the human and natural contributions to global climate change. The chronology demonstrates how scientific views and confidence in those views evolved over time. That GHGs, including carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), water vapor, and other gases, warm the Earth's climate is not a recent concept. The greenhouse effect, as it is sometimes called, was deduced as early as 1827 with relatively little dispute since the 19 th century among scientists about the role of GHGs: Some level of GHGs in the atmosphere is necessary for maintaining a temperate climate on Earth. Instead, the debate that unfolded involved whether the climate had been warming overall and, if so, to what the changes may be attributable (such as industrial releases of GHGs, volcanoes, solar activity, or other natural variations). (See text box, Human and Natural Influences on Climate .) As indicated by the information presented in Table A-1 , scientists have noted, dating back to early in the 19 th century, both human and natural factors potentially influencing climate. As one scholar observed, "by 1900, most of the chief theories of climate change had been proposed, if not yet fully explored." There were a number of contending theories—including changes in solar energy, the Earth's orbital geometry, volcanoes, the geography of continents, and changes in GHGs—in the late 1800s as the quotations in Table A-1 indicate. Well into the 1900s, the state of the science relating CO 2 concentrations in the atmosphere to the Earth's temperature was primarily theoretical inference. Scientists debated whether increases in CO 2 in the atmosphere due to increasing emissions from fossil fuels would lead to further warming. Since then, a number of factors—including better measurement technologies; development of physics- and empirically based simulation models; more research, review, and revision; and longer series of observations—have improved the foundations of climate science. As a result, scientists have improved quantification of the relationships between observed conditions: 1. Natural and human-related GHG emissions (the latter mostly from fossil-fuel-based energy) to the atmosphere; 2. Increasing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and changes in other influences on climate (e.g., changes in solar and volcanic activity); 3. Rising global average surface temperature; and 4. Other observed changes in the spatial and temporal patterns of climate. The magnitudes of factors, and therefore their influences on climate, vary over time. With acceleration of human population growth and industrialization since the 19 th century, the factors related to human activities have increased relative to those of natural processes. Increased scientific capacity has made climate change increasingly detectable and attributable to the varying influences over the past two centuries. In the late 1930s, Guy Callendar compiled existing data on atmospheric CO 2 concentrations and regional temperatures. Through imprecise calculations, he showed a correlation between observed increases in both over time. Some scientists considered the correlation merely coincidence. Callendar's calculations provided early quantitative indications of a climate warming as a result of human activity. At the time, however, the relative contribution of human activity compared with natural factors could not be determined. David Keeling later established more consistent and repeatable measurements of atmospheric CO 2 in the 1950s. Keeling's precise measurements provided strong evidence of a connection between increasing human-related CO 2 emissions and the increasing CO 2 concentrations in the atmosphere. The measurements established a quantitative benchmark for later studies examining the linkage between increasing CO 2 concentrations and rising global temperatures. Keeling's concentration data facilitated additional research on the global carbon cycle, the oceans, and the effects of human activities. In the middle of the 20 th century, scientists (and many in the public) recognized that a general warming of the climate had occurred ( Table A-1 ). This was followed by a 30-year period of relatively flat or decreasing global average temperatures from around 1946 to 1977 ( Figure 1 ). Arguably, the apparent change in trajectory heightened scientific uncertainty about the direction of future climate changes and any human influence on them. It coincided with concerns about "global dimming," at least in part attributed to sulfur and particulate pollution, which increased rapidly during that period before leveling off around 1980. Current assessments indicate that the mid-20 th century warming hiatus may have been due to a combination of human (GHG, pollution) and natural influences (solar variability, volcanoes). As temperatures began to rise again in the late 1970s, authoritative scientific assessments performed by various governmental and nongovernmental institutions, supported by an expanding body of peer-reviewed published research, pointed to an emerging consensus regarding a probable human contribution to climate change, primarily due to increasing GHG emissions. The relative role of human versus natural influences became more clear in the early 2000s. Longer series of improved observations (e.g., solar radiation, clouds, land cover change), statistical methods, and computational models enabled more robust analyses and comparisons of research methods and results. Major, collaborative, authoritative assessments—U.S. and international—were established to compile, debate, and consider the strengths or weaknesses of scientific analysis regarding climate change in order to inform policymakers. Table A-2 contains the relevant conclusions regarding human and natural influences on climate change from the major assessments conducted, with those of NAS beginning in 1977, IPCC beginning in 1990, and the USGCRP beginning in 2001. These inclusive assessments underpinned growing scientific confidence that human activities were likely the major cause of the observed global warming since the mid-20 th century. Many factors have contributed to increased scientific confidence in quantifying the human and natural contributions to climate change. Longer records of observational data have provided more evidence of the concordance between higher GHG levels and temperature increases. Satellites have provided important observations of temperatures; atmospheric pollution; and land, snow, and ice cover beginning in the late 1970s. Additionally, improved scientific understanding of atmospheric physics, together with vastly more powerful computers, has led to climate models that better simulate atmospheric and oceanic conditions. Uncertainties in the models remain on how they simulate the effects of clouds, for example, and the model simulations are at smaller scales of space and time. Despite these uncertainties, current climate scientific assessment states high confidence (extremely likely) that human influence is the dominant cause of the observed warming over the past half-century. While the near consensus has developed relatively recently, it has evolved based on increasing confidence through research on scientific concepts established as early as 200 years ago. Future climate outcomes depend on many additional factors, such as the future rates and character of socio-economic development and efforts to curtail the growth of GHG emissions. This appendix contains bibliographic references and quotations regarding scientific understanding of global climate change and the influence of CO 2 , other GHGs, and natural factors on observed and prospective global climate. Because the capacities and methods of science have changed markedly over the past 200 years, the references appear in two tables representing selected scientific literature and national or international scientific assessments. Table A-1 presents representative statements excerpted from key scientific literature from 1827 to 1987 regarding human-related and other contributions to climate change. Sources include selected, widely cited academic papers, government reports, and NAS reports. The table's selections largely precede the establishment of broadly inclusive scientific assessments to compile and assess the weight of scientific evidence. For the period up to 1987, CRS selected key academic scientific papers and reports that were influential to scientific contemporaries during and after their respective times. Scientific assessments began in the mid-20 th century to more systematically and inclusively evaluate the full body of scientific literature on specific topics. Table A-2 compiles the conclusions pertinent to this report from major U.S. and international scientific assessments, beginning in 1977, that address the human contribution to global climate change. The assessments have been produced by the USGCRP, NAS, and IPCC. REVISED

This CRS report provides context for the Administration's Climate Science Special Report (October 2017) by tracing the evolution of scientific understanding and confidence regarding the drivers of recent global climate change.

This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about selected campaign finance provisions in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 ; P.L. 113-235 ). The House passed the measure (219 - 206) on December 11, 2014. The Senate did so (56-40) on December 13, 2014. The President signed the bill into law on December 16. Although other provisions address topics such as contractor disclosure, increased limits for contributions to national party committees have been the subject of most debate. Those increases, particularly for individual contributions, are the subject of this brief overview. The relevant language in P.L. 113-235 increased contribution limits to national political party committees. Most prominently, these party committees include the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), Republican National Committee (RNC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC). These committees may also establish new accounts, each with separate contribution limits, to support party conventions, facilities, and recounts or other legal matters. In practice, it appears that an individual's contributions to a national party could increase from at least $97,200 annually to at least $777,600. For a two-year election cycle, an individual could give twice that amount, or more than $1.5 million. Under inflation adjustments announced in February 2015, it appears that an individual may contribute at least $801,600 to a national party committee in 2015. Although this report emphasizes increases in individual contribution limits, political action committees (PACs) may also make larger contributions to parties. For multicandidate PACs—the most common type of PAC—contributions to a national party appear to have increased from $45,000 to at least $360,000 annually. Unlike limits for individual contributions, those for PACs are not adjusted for inflation. Ultimately, the impact of the proposed language will depend on a combination of agency implementation and political practice. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is responsible for administering the increased limits. The agency's rulemaking, advisory opinions, or enforcement activities could further clarify how the provisions will affect donors and elections. On December 17, 2014, the FEC briefly stated that it was "assessing" the language and would issue guidance "as soon as practicable." Similarly, donor and party decisions will determine how or whether fundraising practices change. In particular, it is unclear how many donors have the ability or desire to make the larger contributions now permitted. As of this writing, how the FEC intends to interpret the contribution limits and how the parties intend to alter fundraising practices, if at all, remains to be seen. The report has been prepared in response to evolving questions concerning ongoing legislative debate. Some implications remain unclear at this time, and the analysis below could change with additional information. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available. Before P.L. 113-235 was enacted, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) permitted an individual to contribute $32,400 annually to national party committees (reflecting 2014 limits, subsequently increased for inflation, as discussed below). P.L. 113-235 increased the limits as discussed below. These limits apply separately to the six political committees around which the two major parties are organized. For both parties, these include a headquarters committee (e.g., the Democratic National Committee), a House campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Congressional Committee), and a Senate campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Senatorial Committee). Previously, an individual could contribute no more than $97,200 annually to a typically organized national party. In addition, an October 2014 FEC advisory opinion (AO) determined that, following the recent repeal of public funding for presidential nominating conventions, separate contribution limits apply to convention funds. Therefore, it appears that a "maxed out" donor could have contributed $129,600 to a national party when counting all three traditional committees plus a convention committee. Division N, Section 101 of P.L. 113-235 increased limits for individuals making contributions to national party committees. These provisions, which are effective "on or after" the enactment date, permitted parties to establish new, segregated accounts and accept additional funds to support party conventions, facilities, and recounts or other legal matters. Specifically, the language permitted the national parties to establish up to three additional accounts for each purpose. Overall, it appears that maximum individual contributions increased from $97,200 (or $129,600 if following the FEC AO noted above) for a typical party with three major committees to $777,600. During a two-year election cycle, it appears that an individual could, therefore, contribute up to $1,555,200 to a national party's typical committees. These limits were annual amounts for 2014—when the law was enacted. The original versions of this report showed those amounts in Table 1 below. The current version of the table reflects inflation adjustments announced in February 2015. As the table shows, the 2015 base limit for individual contributions increased to $33,400 (from $32,400 in 2014). Although this report emphasizes proposed changes to the individual contribution limits, the language also increases limits for political action committees (PACs) as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 below. Although there are differences between the increased limits for multicandidate PACs and non-multicandidate PACs, it is unclear how consequential they might be in practice. Given the higher limits for non-multicandidate PACs, it appears that there could be an advantage to a PAC not achieving multicandidate status, although such PACs are rare and it is perhaps unlikely that a committee could practically prevent itself from achieving multicandidate status. In practice, therefore, it appears that the increased limits in Table 3 will be more consequential than those in Table 2 . FECA does not permit inflation adjustments for multicandidate PAC contributions ( Table 3 ). Six committees appear to be most relevant. The two major parties each have three main national political committees that perform similar functions and are organized similarly. On the Democratic side, these include the DNC, DCCC, and DSCC. Republican counterpart committees include the RNC, NRCC, and NRSC. The new law appears to be relevant for all national party committees, including third parties. The provisions do not appear to affect other fundraising or spending provisions in elections per se. It is possible that with additional freedom to make comparatively large contributions to political parties, some donors who would have previously given money to super PACs or other "outside" groups would instead redirect those funds to parties. It is also possible that increased party-funding limits will provide another outlet for donors but not necessarily redirect existing funds. As of this writing, the FEC has not yet announced regulations or formal guidance surrounding how it plans to interpret the new limits—including how the "base" contribution amounts might interact with the limits for the three new accounts, if at all. Similarly, the parties have yet to make widespread use of the new limits. Those supporting the increased limits have reportedly suggested that the proposed contributions would be more transparent than those given to groups such as politically active tax-exempt organizations (e.g., 501(c)(4) social welfare groups), and would provide parties with more funds to compete in an environment increasingly dominated by nonparty groups. Opponents counter that the proposed changes have not been subject to substantial consideration and would represent a return to the "soft money" era that existed before Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), when parties could accept unlimited contributions for generic "party-building" activities. The precise implications of the proposed new limits remain to be seen.

This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about increased campaign contribution limits in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83; P.L. 113-235), enacted and signed into law in December 2014. The relevant language increases certain contribution limits to national political party committees. This language changes the amounts the two major parties may solicit and collect. Most notably, three units within each of the national Democratic and Republican parties could be affected. These include a headquarters committee (e.g., the Democratic National Committee), a House campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Congressional Committee), and a Senate campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Senatorial Committee). The language permits all six of these national party committees to establish additional accounts, with higher contribution limits than previously permitted. In practice, it appears that maximum individual contributions to a national party have increased from at least $97,200 (or $129,600 if following a recent Federal Election Commission (FEC) advisory opinion) annually to at least $777,600. Inflation adjustments announced in February 2015 bring the individual total to at least $801,600 for 2015. Other national parties, such as third parties, would also be eligible for larger contributions. Although this report emphasizes individual contribution limits, political action committees (PACs) may also increase their party contributions under the bill, to a total of $360,000 for multicandidate PACs—the most common form of PAC. This updated report is based on information available as of this writing. The FEC has not yet issued regulations or definitive guidance about how the limits will be interpreted. Similarly, political parties have yet to adopt widespread fundraising practices under the new limits. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available.

Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 4121 imposes an excise tax on domestically-mined coal when it is sold by the producer to the first purchaser. The producer is liable for the tax, but may pass it along to others through an increase in the coal's purchase price; thus, it is possible that the producer does not actually bear the burden of the tax. The Constitution's Export Clause states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." Nonetheless, the coal excise tax was imposed on coal destined for export. In 1998, a federal district court held that the tax on such coal clearly violated the Export Clause. In 2000, the IRS acquiesced and stopped imposing the tax on coal that was in the stream of export when sold by the producer and actually exported. The IRC provides a process by which taxpayers who paid the unconstitutional tax may file for a refund from the IRS. The claim must be made within three years from the time the excise tax return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. The producer that paid the tax has first claim to any refund. Exporters may claim refunds only "if the person who paid such tax [i.e., the producer] waives his claim to such amount." A taxpayer filing a refund claim must establish that it: (1) did not include the tax in the coal's purchase price or otherwise collect the tax from the purchaser; (2) has repaid, in the event the tax burden was shifted, the amount of tax to the ultimate purchaser; or (3) has filed the ultimate purchaser's written consent for the refund with the IRS. Taxpayers seeking a refund in court must first file a timely refund claim with the IRS and then wait six months, unless the IRS makes a determination prior to that date, before bringing suit. Some coal producers and exporters brought suits under the Export Clause seeking damages from the United States in the amount of unconstitutional coal excise taxes they paid. They brought the suits in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that it had jurisdiction to hear them under the Tucker Act. That act grants the court jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Taxpayers used these suits as a way to bypass two limitations in the IRC refund process. First, the Tucker Act has a longer statute of limitations—six years from the time the tax is paid —than the IRC. This allowed taxpayers to seek damages for taxes paid in the several years preceding the years for which they could receive IRC refunds. Second, the Tucker Act, unlike the IRC, does not give priority to producers' claims. Thus, it potentially allowed parties farther down the supply chain (e.g., exporters) to bring claims alleging they deserved damages because they bore the economic burden of the tax. A threshold issue has been whether the Court of Federal Claims could hear these suits. The Tucker Act only confers jurisdiction—it "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." Thus, the substantive right must be found in another source of law. One question has been whether the Export Clause provides a right to monetary damages when the government violates it. If the answer is yes, a related question has been whether such a claim could be made independently of an IRC refund claim. If not, then taxpayers would need to meet the IRC's more stringent requirements. In Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States , the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the jurisdictional question. The court's holding had two components. The first was that the Export Clause was a money-mandating provision, as required for Tucker Act jurisdiction. The second was that a cause of action founded in a violation of the Export Clause was self-executing. This meant the Clause provided a separate cause of action so that a taxpayer could bring a suit for damages independent of an IRC administrative refund claim. In a later case, the court clarified that the Export Clause was not a money-mandating provision for all parties seeking coal excise tax refunds. In that case, the court held that the Tucker Act did not provide jurisdiction to hear the claim of an ultimate purchaser who alleged it had paid the tax through higher coal prices but did not directly pay the tax to the government. After the Cyprus Amax decision answered the question of its jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims heard several cases brought by coal brokers and ultimate purchasers that it dismissed due to lack of constitutional standing. To have standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." The parties alleged that they were injured by the government's unconstitutional imposition of the coal excise tax because the burden of the tax was shifted to them by coal producers charging higher prices for coal. The Court of Federal Claims found the requisite causal relationship between this injury and the government's action to be lacking. This was because it was the independent actions of the producers that determined whether the parties paid any amount of the unconstitutional tax. As noted, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals also raised a barrier to claims by non-producer parties by holding there was no Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear the claim of an ultimate purchaser who did not actually pay the tax to the government. In a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co. , the Supreme Court held that taxpayers seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax must comply with the IRC refund process. The taxpayers in that case had filed administrative refund claims for the three tax years open under the IRC's statute of limitations and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking the amount of taxes paid for the three previous years that were open only under the Tucker Act's longer limitations period. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had allowed their suit and denied the government's request to reverse its Cyprus Amax holding. The appeals court said that the issue of whether taxpayers could bring suit under the Export Clause without complying with the IRC refund scheme had been "fully aired" in Cyprus Amax and it could "discern no basis for reopening this question." The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the plain language of the relevant IRC provisions, § 7422 and § 6511, clearly required that the taxpayers file a timely refund claim with the IRS before bringing suit. The Court stated that it had basically decided the issue in a 1941 case where it had reasoned that the Tucker Act's statute of limitations was simply "'an outside limit'" which Congress could shorten in situations requiring "'special considerations,'" such as tax refunds because "'suits against the United States for the recovery of taxes impeded effective administration of the revenue laws.'" The Court noted that it had explained in that case that the IRC's refund provisions would have "'no meaning whatever'" if taxpayers who did not comply with those provisions could still bring refund suits under the Tucker Act. The Court did not address whether the Export Clause provided a cause of action that could be brought under the Tucker Act, finding that the IRC refund provisions would apply regardless of the answer to that question. Noting that it was clear from its past cases that unconstitutionally-collected taxes could be subject to the same administrative requirements as other taxes, the Court rejected the taxpayers' argument that something unique about the Export Clause required different treatment. The Court explained that while the government may not impose unconstitutional taxes, it may create an administrative process to refund such taxes because of its "'exceedingly strong interest in financial stability,'" regardless of whether the tax violated the Export Clause or some other provision of the Constitution. The Court also rejected the taxpayers' claim that the IRC refund scheme could not apply to facially unconstitutional taxes, finding the plain language of IRC § 7422 clearly included such taxes. There appear to be two primary impacts of the Court's decision in Clintwood Elkhorn . The first is that taxpayers seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax must file refund claims with the IRS, subject to the IRC's limitations. Thus, taxpayers are subject to the shorter statute of limitations and non-producer parties may only seek a refund if the producer who paid the tax has waived its right to the refund. Second, the Court's analysis seems broadly applicable to refund claims in general, including those based on violations of other constitutional provisions. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 6049 , § 114 (Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008) and H.R. 7060 , § 114 (Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008), passed by the House on September 26, 2008, would provide an alternative administrative procedure for refunding the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax. In order to claim a refund, a coal producer would have to establish that it, or a related party, exported coal produced by it to a foreign country or shipped it to a U.S. possession, or caused such export or shipment, through means other than by an exporter that met the proposal's requirements to file a claim. A producer with a favorable court judgment related to the excise tax's constitutionality would be deemed to meet this requirement. An "exporter" would have to establish that it exported coal to a foreign country or shipped it to a U.S. possession, or caused such export or shipment. Additionally, the producer or exporter would need to (1) have filed a return between October 1, 1990, and the date of the act's enactment, and (2) file a claim for the refund within 30 days of the enactment. The Treasury Secretary would have to determine whether the refund requirements were met within 180 days of a claim being filed and pay any refund owed (with interest) within 180 days of that determination. Refunds to producers would equal the amount of coal excise tax paid on the exported or shipped coal (minus any amount paid pursuant to a favorable court judgment mentioned above). Refunds to exporters would equal $0.825 per ton of exported or shipped coal. Refund claims could only be made for coal exported or shipped between October 1, 1990, and the date of the act's enactment. No refund would be allowed if one had already been made to any taxpayer or there was a final settlement between the government and producer, party related to the producer, or exporter. The Senate bill states it would not give producers or exporters standing to commence or intervene in each other's judicial or administrative refund claim proceedings; the House bill does not include such a provision. It appears the bills' proposed refund process would have three significant impacts. First, taxpayers would be able to seek refunds for taxes paid in years not open under current law. The Supreme Court's holding in Clintwood Elkhorn makes clear that current law requires that a refund claim be filed within three years from the time the excise tax return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. The bills would allow refunds relating to coal exported or shipped as early as October 1990 so long as the taxpayer filed a refund claim within 30 days of the provision's enactment and met the other requirements. Second, the bills could expand the opportunity for exporters to claim refunds beyond that available under current law, so long as they are able to meet the requirements. Third, the bills would impose short time limits for the taxpayers and IRS to act on the refund claims. Thus, they would encourage quick resolution of the claims, although administrative issues could arise due to the requirement that refunds not be paid twice on the same coal and their silence on the issue of contestability.

In 1998, a U.S. district court held that the imposition of the coal excise tax, or black lung excise tax, on exported coal was unconstitutional. Refunding the tax has been controversial. This is because some coal producers and exporters attempted to bypass the limitations in the Internal Revenue Code's refund scheme by bringing suit under the Export Clause in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking damages from the United States in the amount of coal excise taxes paid. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held there was Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear some of the suits and allowed them as an alternative to the Code's refund process. However, in a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., the Supreme Court held that taxpayers must comply with the Code's refund process. Meanwhile, several bills would provide an alternative method for coal excise tax refunds, including the amended version of H.R. 6049 (Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008) that was passed by the Senate on September 23, 2008, and H.R. 7060 (Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008), which was passed by the House on September 26, 2008.

House Rule X, clause 5(c)(2), adopted in 1995 limited committee (and subcommittee) chairs to three terms of consecutive service. Service for less than a full session in a Congress is disregarded. A rules change adopted on January 7, 2003, pursuant to H.Res. 5 , exempted the Intelligence Committee chair from the limit. A rules change adopted on January 4, 2005, pursuant to H.Res. 5 , exempted the Rules Committee chair from the limit. In 2009, the Democratic majority removed term limits from House rules. The rules adopted on January 3, 2013, reinstituted term limits for all committee chairs, but continued the exemption for the Rules Committee chair. Republican Conference rules delineate procedures for the selection of standing committee chairs and ranking minority members. The Speaker, with the Republicans in the majority, has the authority to nominate the chairs of the House Administration Committee and Rules Committee. In the minority, these appointments are made by the minority leader. The Speaker's or minority leader's nominations for these two positions are submitted directly to the full Republican Conference for ratification. If the conference rejects the leader's nominee, the Speaker or minority leader has the authority to submit another name to the conference. All other standing committee chairs or ranking minority members are nominated by the Republican Steering Committee and ratified by the full Republican Conference. Pursuant to conference rules, the Member nominated to be chair or ranking minority member does not need to be the Member with the longest continuous service on the committee. In recent Congresses, the Steering Committee "interviewed" prospective candidates for chair or ranking slots. Some of the new chairs and ranking members have been the most senior members of the committee, others were not. The Steering Committee is composed of party leaders, selected committee leaders, class leaders, and regional representatives. The Steering Committee is reconstituted each Congress. Regions are restructured to reflect as closely as possible an equal number of Republican Members from each region. Each region elects its Steering Committee member. If Steering Committee members are elected from states that have four or more Republican Members, a "small state" group is triggered to also elect a member to the Steering Committee; the small state group is composed of states that have three or fewer Republican Members. On November, 19, 2015, the House Republican Conference adopted a conference resolution redesigning the composition of the Steering Committee. The chairs of the Committees on Appropriations, Budget, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Rules, and Ways and Means were removed, except when the Steering Committee is considering members for election to one of those specific committees. If, for example, a member is elected to the Ways and Means Committee, that committee's chair would join the Steering Committee to deliberate and vote on the new member. Six members are to be elected by the conference as at-large members. The Speaker has the authority to appoint one at-large designee. The Speaker, who previously had five votes, will have four votes. The conference resolution stated that elections for the at-large members would be held not later than 30 calendar days after the resolution was adopted. The six members receiving the greatest number of votes would be elected. The Republican Conference elected the six members on December 10, 2015. It is anticipated that the number of regions and the regional allocation will be reviewed in the near future. Table 1 depicts the membership of the reconstituted Republican Steering Committee as of July 1, 2017. Democratic Caucus rules address selecting committee chairs and ranking minority members. The Democratic leader nominates a chair and ranking member for the Committees on Rules and House Administration, who must be approved by the entire Democratic Caucus. The Budget Committee chair and ranking member are selected from among members choosing to run for the position. Other chair and ranking Member nominations are made by the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee and voted on by the entire Democratic Caucus. In making selections, the Steering Committee considers, pursuant to caucus rules, "merit, length of service on the committee and degree of commitment to the Democratic agenda of the nominee, and the diversity of the Caucus." The Steering Committee is reconstituted each Congress, and regions can be restructured to reflect equal Democratic representation among regions. The number of appointments made by the party leader can also change. Table 2 depicts the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee as constituted as of July 1, 2017.

House rules, Republican Conference rules, and Democratic Caucus rules each detail aspects of the procedures followed in selecting standing committee chairs and ranking minority members. The Republican Steering Committee and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee are constituted during the early organization meetings traditionally held in November and December to determine most committee chairs and ranking minority members and to make committee assignments for most committees. Their recommendations are then forwarded to the full Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus for approval. Although structured slightly differently, both the Republican Steering Committee and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee are composed of elected party leaders, regional members, class representatives, and other party officials. This report will be updated if rules or procedures change.

The Navy previously organized itself into aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). An ARG typically included 3 amphibious ships that together were capable of embarking a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is a force of about 2,200 Marines, their ground-combat equipment, and an aircraft detachment. ARGs traditionally operated overseas in the company of CVBGs. Navy officials more recently decided that the CVBG/ARG combination offered insufficient flexibility for deploying significant naval capability in several locations around the world at the same time. They also decided that with the increasing capabilities of Navy ships, naval formations other than the large CVBG/ARG combination could now be sufficient to perform certain missions. As a result, the Navy has implemented a new Global Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that reorganized the Navy into a larger number of independently deployable, strike-capable formations. The most significant change was the conversion of ARGs into independently deployable formations called Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs). An ESG is an ARG that has been reinforced with 3 surface combatants, an attack submarine carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles, and perhaps a land-based P-3 Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft. The Global CONOPS also created independently deployable surface strike groups (SSGs), each consisting of a few surface combatants (most or all Tomahawk-armed), and independent operations by 4 Trident SSGN submarines that have been converted to carry Tomahawks and special operations forces. CVBGs under the Global CONOPS plan were redesignated Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs). Implementing the Global CONOPS changed the Navy from a fleet with 11 independently deployable CVBG/ARG formations into one with 20 major independently deployable strike groups (11 CSGs and 9 ESGs) and additional independently deployable capabilities in the form of SSGs and Trident SSGNs. The Navy's traditional means of maintaining forward-deployed presence had been the standard six-month deployment. Although the six-month limit on deployment length and the predictability of the rotational deployment schedule were considered key to the Navy's ability to maintain its forward deployments while meeting its personnel recruiting and retention goals, Navy officials concluded that the deterrent value of forward-deployed naval forces might be enhanced by making naval forward deployments more flexible and less predictable. Navy officials also concluded that orienting Navy readiness toward maintaining standard six-month deployments resulted in a fleet that offered insufficient flexibility for surging large numbers of naval forces in a short time to respond to major regional contingencies. As a result, although six-month (and now seven-month) deployments will still take place, the Navy has put more flexibility into its deployment plans by deploying some CSGs and ESGs for less than or more than six or seven months, as operational needs dictate. The Navy has implemented an initiative called the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) that is intended to increase the Navy's ability to surge multiple formations in response to emergencies. Under the FRP, CSGs and ESGs that have just returned from deployments will be kept, for a time, on alert for potential short-notice redeployment if needed, and CSGs and ESGs that are approaching their next scheduled deployment will be maintained in a higher readiness status so that they, too, could be deployed on short notice, prior to their scheduled deployment dates. Implementing the FRP with 11 CSGs, the Navy says, permits the Navy to deploy up to 6 CSGs within 30 days, and an additional CSG within another 60 days after that. For this reason, the FRP is also referred to as "6+1." A February 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated: The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. GAO's prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management approach include: defining clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The Navy has made progress in implementing FRP since GAO's prior reports. For example, it has established a goal of having three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days (referred to as 3+3+1). The Navy also has established a framework to set implementation goals for all forces, established some performance measures that are linked to the FRP phases, and begun efforts to identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other forces. In addition, the Navy has not fully developed performance measures to enable it to assess whether carrier strike groups have achieved adequate readiness levels to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. Moreover, the Navy has not fully identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. Until the Navy's management approach fully incorporates the key elements, the Navy may not be able to measure how well FRP is achieving its goals or develop budget requests based on the resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 months. GAO previously advocated that the Department of Defense adopt a risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes assessing the risks of various courses of action. However, the Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent changes because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its missions. In addition, while the Navy has developed force structure plans that include two upcoming periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10, the plans included optimistic assumptions about the length of the gaps and the availability of existing carriers and did not fully analyze how the Navy would continue to meet FRP goals with fewer carriers. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic assumptions and accurately identify the levels of risk the Navy is willing to accept during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed tradeoff decisions. Homeporting Navy ships in overseas locations, called forward homeporting, can reduce transit times between home port and operating area and thus permit the Navy to provide a larger number of ship days on station in overseas operating areas. The U.S. Navy's principal forward homeporting location is Japan, where the Navy since the early 1970s has forward homeported a CVBG (now a CSG) and an ARG (now the core of an ESG). The Navy traditionally has also forward-homeported a small number of other ships, such as fleet command ships and repair ships, in forward locations such as Italy and the U.S. territory of Guam. The Navy in recent years has forward-homeported four mine warfare ships at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and three attack submarines at Guam. Increasing the number of ships forward-homeported in the Pacific can improve the Navy's ability to respond to contingencies in locations such as the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Strait. A March 2002 CBO report presented an option for homeporting as many as 11 attack submarines at Guam. The final report of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the Navy to provide at least six aircraft carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific. The Navy is implementing these two measures, which do not necessarily require additional forward homeporting. (They can be accomplished, for example, by moving ships from Atlantic Fleet home ports to San Diego or the Puget Sound area.) The Navy in recent years has experimented with the concept of long-duration deployments with crew rotation. This concept, which the Navy calls Sea Swap, is another way to reduce the amount of time that deployed ships spend transiting to and from operating areas. Sea Swap involves deploying Navy ships overseas for periods such as 12, 18, or 24 months rather than 6 or 7 months, and rotating successive crews out to the ships for 6-month periods of duty. Sea Swap can reduce the number of ships the Navy needs to have in its inventory to maintain one such ship on station in an overseas operating area by 20% or more. Potential disadvantages of Sea Swap include extensive wear and tear on the deployed ship due to lengthy periods of time at sea, a reduced sense of crew "ownership" of a given ship (which might reduce a crew's incentive to keep the ship in good condition), and reduced opportunities for transit port calls (which have diplomatic value and are beneficial for recruiting and retention). The Navy in recent years has conducted Sea Swap experiments with surface combatants and mine warfare ships that Navy officials have characterized as successful in terms of ship days on station, total costs, ship maintenance and material condition, and crew re-enlistment rates during deployment. In 2004, it was reported that a review of the Sea Swap experiment conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses found that although Sea Swap was successful in these terms, crew members participating in the experiment who were surveyed viewed the concept negatively and indicated they would be less likely to stay in the Navy if all deployments were conducted this way. The Navy made changes in later Sea Swap experiments to address issues that led to crew dissatisfaction, including lost liberty calls and increased training and work. In 2005, Navy officials testified that applying Sea Swap somewhat widely throughout the fleet could help permit the fleet to be reduced from a then-planned range of 290 to 375 ships down to a range of 260 to 325 ships. More recently, Navy officials have expressed less enthusiasm for extending Sea Swap beyond surface combatants. A July 2006 press article reported that the Navy may limit Sea Swap in the surface fleet to smaller combatants such as patrol craft, Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and frigates. The Navy plans to use Sea Swap to keep two of its four SSGNs continuously deployed. A May 2008 GAO report stated: Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts across the department and among various types of ships.... The Navy has not assigned clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a successful transformation of its crewing culture. The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations.... The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap, the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated. The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions, the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively implement crew rotations. Another strategy for increasing the percentage of time that Navy ships can be deployed is multiple crewing, which involves maintaining an average of more than one crew for each Navy ship. Potential versions include having two crews for each ship (dual crewing), 3 crews for every 2 ships, 4 crews for every 3 ships, 5 crews for every 4 ships, or other combinations, such as 8 crews for every 5 ships. The most basic version of Sea Swap maintains an average of one crew for each ship in inventory, but Sea Swap could be combined with multiple crewing. For many years, the Navy's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been operated successfully with dual crews. The above-mentioned March 2002 CBO report presented the option of applying multiple crewing to the attack submarine fleet. Potential disadvantages of multiple crewing include the costs of recruiting, training, and retaining additional crews, the difficulty of achieving fully realistic training using land-based simulators (whose use would be more necessary because a given crew would not always have access to a ship for training), a reduced sense of crew "ownership" of a given ship, and increased wear and tear on the ship due to more intensive use of the ship at sea (which can reduce ship life). The Navy plans to use dual crewing for its first few LCSs, and then switch the LCS fleet to a "4-3-1" crewing strategy when the total number of LCSs grows to a larger number. Under the 4-3-1 plan, four crews would be used for every three LCSs to keep one of those three LCSs continuously deployed. The Navy is experimenting with a concept, first announced in 2006, called global fleet stations, or GFSs. The core of a GFS is an amphibious ship or high-speed sealift ship that is forward deployed to a region of interest. Smaller Navy ships, such as LCSs, might then operate in conjunction with this core ship to perform various missions. The Navy in 2007 is conducting six-month pilot GFS in the Caribbean built around the high-speed sealift ship Swift, and plans to follow this in late 2007 with a second, year-long, GFS in the Gulf of Guinea, off the western coast of Africa, that is to be built around an amphibious ship. The Navy states that the GFS concept offers a means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations.... From its sea base, each GFS would serve as a self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the capacity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the GFS might provide classroom space, limited medical facilities, an information fusion center, and some combat service support capability. The GFS concept provides a leveraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence in support of national objectives. Additionally, it complements more traditional CSG/ESG training and deployment cycles. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: How might the changes discussed above affected the planned size and structure of the fleet? For what kinds of ships should Navy use Sea Swap or multiple crewing? How will FRP and the forward-homeporting of additional ships affect the distribution of Navy ship overhaul and repair work? How many additional ships, of what types, should the Navy forward homeport in the Pacific, and precisely where?

The Navy has implemented new kinds of naval formations, more flexible forward-deployment schedules, and a ship readiness plan (called the Fleet Response Plan, or FRP) for surge-deploying several aircraft carriers in a short period of time to respond to contingencies. The Navy has also forward-homeported additional ships, experimented with long-duration deployments with crew rotation (which the Navy calls Sea Swap), investigated multiple-crewing of ships, and is experimenting with a new forward-deployment concept called global fleet stations, or GFSs. These actions raise several potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Since assuming office in 2001, President Bush has been a strong supporter of free trade and trade liberalization. In numerous statements, he has touted the virtues of trade expansion. As he explained: "Our goal is to ignite a new era of economic growth through a world trading system that is dramatically more open and free." The President has promoted trade liberalization on multiple fronts: globally, regionally, and bilaterally. By pursuing multiple free trade initiatives, the Administration has tried to create "competition in liberalization" and more options. As explained by Robert Zoellick, President Bush's first U.S. Trade Representative, if free trade progress becomes stalled globally, then we can move ahead regionally and bilaterally. Globally, the Administration is now working to reach an agreement in the so-called Doha Round of multilateral trade talks being held among the 148 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regionally, the administration is pursuing agreements with the countries of the Southern African Customs Union, Andean countries, and 34 countries of the Western Hemisphere to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas. Bilaterally, it is currently negotiating FTA's with Thailand, Panama, and the United Arab Emirates. The administration signed an FTA with Bahrain in 2004 and with Oman in 2005, and it is contemplating starting negotiations with a number of other countries. Possible new negotiating partners include Egypt, Malaysia, India and South Korea. The Bush Administration argues that these negotiations promote a host of U.S. domestic and foreign interests, both economic and political. At home, it views trade liberalization as providing substantial gains to American consumers and companies. Cuts in U.S. trade barriers can help American families to pay less for consumer goods and U.S. companies to lower their operating costs as a result of access to cheaper imported components. Increased competition in domestic markets also promotes innovation, increases in labor productivity, and long-term growth. Better access to foreign markets facilitates increases in U.S. exports, thereby increasing employment in sectors that may pay higher than average wages. U.S. investors can also benefit through rule changes and obligations that assure more dependable treatment by the host country. Trade liberalizing agreements, particularly FTAs, also promote the U.S. trade agenda and foreign interests in a number of ways. Some FTAs establish precedents or models that serve as catalysts for wider trade agreements. Many FTAs reward and support market reforms being undertaken by the negotiating partner. And still others help to strengthen U.S. ties with various countries and regions of the world. For example, by forging stronger economic ties with countries in the Middle East, such as Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain, the U.S. hopes to strengthen its strategic position vis-a-vis all countries in the region by promoting economic prosperity and opportunity. At the same time, trade liberalizing agreements may carry economic and political costs. Increased foreign competition can lead to plant closings and job losses concentrated in certain regions and industries. Critics note that it may contribute to increased anxiety and wage pressures, as well as rising income inequality. Some of these concerns were central to the divisive debate in Congress this year over CAFTA—an agreement that became a proxy, in part, for more generalized concerns about America's standing in an increasingly globalized world economy. While CAFTA was approved by narrow margins in both houses, it is not clear how the outcome will affect the Administration's future free trade agreement program. The CAFTA was the most controversial free trade agreement vote taken by Congress since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implementing legislation was passed in 1993. The Senate passed the CAFTA implementing legislation on June 30, 2005 by a vote of 54 to 45 and House passed the legislation on July 28, 2005 by 217 to 215. Besides being the lowest margin of victory for any modern FTA agreement, the votes, particularly in the House, were highly partisan. Over 92% of House Democrats voted against the agreement, while over 88% of House Republicans voted in favor. In both the Senate and House debates, many proponents stressed a combination of economic and political arguments. Those in favor argued that, while imports from the CAFTA countries enter the U.S. virtually duty free, the agreement will level the playing field for U.S. commercial interests by eliminating 80% of the tariffs CAFTA countries impose on U.S. exports. As a result, they maintained the U.S. goes from one-way free trade toward a more reciprocal trading relationship that will increase U.S. exports and jobs. Others emphasized that the agreement would contribute to bolstering more market-oriented and democratic governments in the region, longstanding U.S. foreign policy interests. Many lawmakers who opposed the agreement cited provisions dealing with the treatment of labor and sensitive industries (sugar and textiles). In addition, the agreement clearly triggered more generalized anxieties concerning globalization's impact on the American economy and labor force. Future congressional consideration of similar trade accords are likely to raise similar controversies and challenges, thereby prompting the administration to address these issues as part of its trade liberalizing agenda. Labor issues in the agreement were controversial and may have been a major reason the vote divided largely along party lines. Disagreement revolved around whether the CAFTA countries had laws that complied with the U.S. or International Labor Organization (ILO) similar list of five internationally recognized worker rights (e.g. the right to organize unions and bargain collectively). Such standards have not been required by CAFTA, by trade promotion authority legislation outlining requirements for trade agreements, or by any other bilateral trade agreement. However, they have been required for decades by U.S. trade preference laws, which typically prohibit preferential treatment to countries which are not affording their workers internationally recognized worker rights. Therefore, these FTAs continue to be seen by may Democrats as a step backward from longstanding U.S. trade policy. Many Republicans argue that the agreement encourages these countries to improve their laws and enforcement as well. Moreover, they argued that the administration's commitment to earmark $40 million in appropriations for capacity building and enforcement over a four-year period would go a long way in strengthening these provisions. Further exacerbating partisan tensions was a long history over this issue. Some Democrats expressed clear annoyance that their support for stronger labor provisions was characterized by Bush Administration trade officials as being "economic isolationism." At the same time, many Republicans were upset that they were given little credit by the other side for the compromises they had made over the years in accommodating Democratic concerns. Partisan tensions were further exacerbated by different views on whether the process in producing the agreement and the implementing legislation was inclusive and consistent with consultation requirements provided under the Trade Promotion Authority statute. Following the CAFTA vote, U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman has worked to narrow the gap on the divisive labor issue in both the Bahrain and Andean FTAs. House Democrats reportedly have been pleased by the Administration's efforts to obtain higher labor commitments and enforcement standards in the Bahrain agreement. But other reports suggest that the Administration and House Democrats remain far apart on how to handle the labor provisions in the Andean FTA. Thus, it remains unclear whether the FTA labor provisions will become a less divisive and partisan issue. A second contentious issue involved liberalization of U.S. restrictions in two industries—textiles and apparel, and sugar—that still benefit from protective barriers. The agreement as signed by the Bush Administration provided some small additional opening of these two still protected markets. These changes, in turn, were opposed vigorously by segments of both industries and by both Republicans and Democrats that had important constituent interests to defend. To gain support for the agreement, the Bush Administration made some commitments that, on balance, will reduce the commercial benefits of the agreement to CAFTA countries as originally negotiated. Some analysts believe that this action may send a very negative signal to future negotiating partners about U.S. willingness to negotiate reciprocal trade concessions. An underlying problem for the administration may be that the partisan divide in Congress over trade issues, particularly labor standards, provides defenders of protected industries with greater power than in previous eras. As one scholar opined, a partisan divide "renders the basic support margin narrow, making trade policy hostage to any protectionist interests that hold the decisive, marginal votes." This partisan divide could become a major hurdle for completing agreements that require the reduction and eventual removal of U.S. barriers to imports. In cases where liberalization of protected U.S. industries is necessary to get other countries to reduce their own barriers to U.S. exports, the Bush Administration may have two options. First, it can work to bridge the partisan divide that arguably provides these industries with heightened leverage. Second, it can alter the way it promotes the benefits of trade liberalization. Traditionally, trade liberalization has been pursued by focusing attention on gains associated with export expansion through a reduction of foreign trade barriers with little discussion of the gains that reduction of U.S. trade barriers can provide to U.S. companies and consumers. But by highlighting more the two-way gains from trade (both exports and imports), some analysts believe that greater political support can be built for the kinds of actions that are necessary to sustain a trade liberalization policy. The CAFTA debate in Congress also served as a proxy for public concerns and anxieties about the effects of trade and globalization on the American economy. Record U.S. trade deficits, the rise of China as a world manufacturing power, and India's growing attractiveness as a source for outsourcing of white collar jobs all raised questions about the effects of trade agreements on U.S. workers. Some Democrats, in part, may have opposed CAFTA because they believe that working class Americans suffer most from attempts to accelerate economic integration. Their opposition may have been buttressed by public opinion polls showing that more that 50% of U.S. households may oppose these trade initiatives if they are not given the tools and training to compete with workers from all around the world. To ease the anxieties of the American public on globalization and trade agreements that accelerate economic integration, some policymakers are calling for more robust programs that will help American workers obtain the skills that are necessary to compete in the global economy. While the longstanding Trade Adjustment Assistance Program provides retraining and income support for workers displaced by import competition, some argue that a more comprehensive program that would cover not only workers displaced by trade competition but also by technological change and foreign outsourcing is needed to deal with broad distributional costs of globalization and the rise of economic insecurity among American workers. Proponents argue that such a plan could include meaningful retraining, wage and health insurance, and job search aid. Two obstacles are often cited to moving in this direction—cost and ideology. One estimate of a comprehensive program that extends trade adjustment to all workers, provides a general two-year wage insurance program and adds on business tax incentives comes to $20 billion a year. While this cost could be considered modest compared to an estimated $1 trillion in benefits the U.S. economy gains from globalization (international openness) every year, it also could be considered very costly in the context of an economy experiencing record budget deficits, prompting calls for reductions in government spending. In addition, the fact that some policymakers take a dim view of the ability of these kinds of programs to achieve the intended results, combined with some sense that a growing market economy is the best antidote to adjustment, provide another hurdle. The Bush Administration is now actively negotiating a large number of trade liberalizing agreements. The broadest and most ambitious initiative being negotiated is the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations. Negotiations are also taking place with Panama, Thailand, three Andean countries (Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador), and the United Emirates. Assuming that the divisions over labor issues, industry protection, and globalization anxieties that were imbedded in the CAFTA debate persist, these potential agreements could encounter differential obstacles. An ambitious Doha agreement is the administration's highest priority. With 148 countries involved in the negotiation, this trade negotiation provides the largest potential benefits for U.S. firms, farmers, and consumers. Some analysts maintain that large gains or benefits accruing to a broad spectrum of American stakeholders are necessary to help mobilize political support to eliminate or reduce remaining U.S. restrictions on politically sensitive industries and products. This is based on a belief that an ambitious agreement would require large concessions from trading partners that open substantially new market access opportunities for U.S. companies, and that these potential gains would be too tempting for U.S. industry not to support strongly. While labor issues are not part of the Doha negotiations, any big commercial agreement would likely trigger globalization anxieties among some segments of the body politic. Whether an ambitious agreement that provides large economic benefits to the U.S. economy might provide some impetus and support for devising a comprehensive adjustment program remains problematic. In the past, implementing legislation for multilateral agreements has included the creation or expansion of adjustment programs. The FTA's being negotiated with Thailand, Panama, and the Andean countries might encounter some or all the obstacles raised in the CAFTA debate. Thailand's labor conditions and exports of import sensitive products such as sugar and rice could prove contentious. Given that Thailand is a larger trading partner than the five CAFTA countries combined, globalization anxieties could also play a role in this agreement as well. In the case of Panama and the Andean countries, their labor laws and exports of sugar could raise concerns among some Members of Congress. But given that they are both very small trading partners, globalization anxieties are less likely to play a key role. To date, CAFTA-related controversies appear to be playing a small role in the FTAs concluded with countries of the Middle East—Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Oman. These four agreements have received broad bipartisan support not only because they are viewed favorably for advancing U.S. security interests, but also because the countries in commercial terms provide little competitive threat to U.S. producers and workers.

Since taking office in January 2001, President Bush has supported trade liberalization through negotiations on multiple fronts: globally, regionally, and bilaterally. During this period, Congress has approved five free trade agreements (FTAs) that the Bush Administration has negotiated and signed. The FTAs are designed to promote broad economic and political objectives, both domestic and foreign. However, the debate in Congress over the last FTA approved—the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)—was contentious, sparking concerns about how Congress might consider future trade liberalizing agreements. This report analyses some of the challenges that became apparent in the aftermath of a divisive trade debate and how they could affect consideration of future trade agreements. This report will not be updated.

RS20837 -- Distribution of Child Support Collections Updated March 4, 2003 P.L. 104-193 , the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (enacted August 22, 1996), replaced theAid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement program with a Temporary Assistance for NeedyFamilies (TANF)block grant and made major changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program. The rules governing howchild supportcollections are distributed among families, the state, and the federal government have changed substantially. In part,CSE distributionrules were changed to acknowledge the fact that child support would be significant, if not critical, to helpingsingle-parent familiesexit welfare and maintain self-sufficiency. Since the CSE program's inception, the rules determining who actually gets the child support arrearage payments have been complex,but not nearly as complicated as they are currently. It is helpful to think of the rules in two categories. First, thereare rules in bothfederal and state law that stipulate who has a legal claim on the payments owed by the noncustodial parent. Theseare calledassignment rules. Second, there are rules that determine the order in which child support collections are paid inaccordance with theassignment rules. These are called distribution rules. When a family leaves TANF, (1) the order of distribution of any child support collection depends on (1) when the arrearages accrued(pre-assistance, during-assistance, or post-assistance); (2) when the child support was assigned to the state (beforeOctober 1997,between October 1997 and October 2000, or after October 2000); (3) how the child support arrearages werecollected (through thefederal income tax refund offset program or by some other means); (4) the amount of the unreimbursed welfarebalance; and (5) whenthe arrearages were collected (before October 1997, between October 1997 and October 2000, or after October2000). Some of thecomplexity of the distribution rules ceased on October 1, 2000 when the rules were completely phased-in, but theconfusion withregard to the six categories of arrearages (mentioned below) remains. As a condition of TANF eligibility, the custodial parent must assign to the state the right to collect both current child supportpayments and past-due child support obligations (i.e., arrearages) which accrue while the family is on the TANFrolls (these are calledpermanently-assigned arrearages (2) ). The assignmentrequirement for TANF applicants and recipients also includes arrearagepayments that accumulated before the family enrolled in TANF (these are called pre-assistancearrearages). Pre-assistance arrearagesare temporarily assigned to the state while the family is receiving TANF assistance, with the exception of thefollowing. Pre-assistance arrearages which were assigned to the state before October 1, 1997 are consideredpermanently-assigned arrearages. While the family receives TANF benefits, the state is permitted to retain any current support and any assignedarrearages it collects upto the cumulative amount of TANF benefits which has been paid to the family . Under old law (pre-1996) states were required to pass through the first $50 of current monthly child support payments collected onbehalf of an AFDC family and to disregard it as income to the family so that it did not affect the family's AFDCeligibility or benefitpayment. The remaining amount of current child support collected was divided between the state and federalgovernments accordingto the state's AFDC federal matching rate. (3) The 1996 welfare reform law repealed the required $50 pass through and gives states the choice to decide how much, if any, of thestate share (some, all, none) of child support collected on behalf of a TANF family to send the family. If a stateelects thepass-through option, it still must pay the federal share of the collection to the federal government, regardless of howmuch childsupport is passed through to the family. The state can then do what it wants with its share. It can give all, a portion,or none of itsshare to families. If a state passes through all of its share to families, it may count that as income to the family or it may disregard all or some of thechild support collection so that it does not decrease the TANF payment of the family, but instead enables that familyto increase itstotal income by the child support amount without it affecting the family's TANF eligibility status or benefit amount. Some statessend the family two checks, one reflecting the TANF benefit and another reflecting the child support paymentreceived from thenoncustodial parent. States also have the option to pass their share of arrearage collections to former TANFrecipients (if thearrearage occurred while the family was a cash welfare recipient). Under prior law, once a family went off AFDC, child support arrearage payments generally were divided between the state andfederal governments to reimburse them for AFDC; if any money remained, it was given to the family. In contrast,under P.L.104-193 , payments to families who leave TANF are more generous. Under P.L. 104-193 , arrearages are to be paidto the family first,unless they are collected through the federal income tax refund offset (in which case reimbursing the federal andstate governmentsare to be given first priority). For collections made before October 1, 1997. If a custodial parent assigned her orhis child support rights to the state before October 1, 1997, the parent had to assign all support rights for supportpayments (bothcurrent and past-due) that accrued to the family during the period of AFDC receipt, as well as payments that hadaccrued before theirapplication for AFDC benefits. Moreover, these families had to permanently assign their rights to pre-assistancearrearages to thestate. This means that once these families go off welfare, any pre-assistance arrearages that are collected on theirbehalf go to thestate (and the federal government) as reimbursement for AFDC aid paid to the family. (4) For collections made on or after October 1, 1997 and before October 1, 2000. If acustodial parent assigned her or his child support rights to the state on or after October 1, 1997 and before October1, 2000, the parenthad to assign all support rights for both current and past-due payments accrued while the family is receiving TANFbenefits. Unlikepre-1997 assignments, the TANF applicant or recipient only had to temporarily (rather than permanently) assignto the state all rightsto support that accrued to the family before it began receiving TANF benefits. This temporaryassignment lasts until October 1, 2000or the date on which the family stops receiving TANF benefits, whichever is later. These temporarily-assigned arrearages become conditionally-assigned arrearages when the family leaves the TANF rolls (or onOctober 1, 2000, whichever date is later). They are considered conditionally-assigned because if they are collectedvia the federalincome tax refund offset program they are to be paid to the state (and federal government) rather than the family. Ifconditionally-assigned arrearages are collected through a method other than the federal income tax refund offset,they belong to thefamily. Since October 1, 1997, states have been required to distribute to former TANF families current child support and child supportarrearages that accrue after the family leaves TANF (these arrearages are called never-assignedarrearages) before the state and thefederal government are reimbursed for TANF payments to families. (However, arrearages that accrued before thefamily beganreceiving TANF benefits did not have to be distributed to the family first if the pre-assistance arrearages werecollected by the CSEagency before October 1, 2000.) As mentioned above, an exception to the distribution requirement occurs when the child support is collected via the federal incometax refund offset program. In federal income tax refund offset cases, the child support arrearage payment (up to thecumulativeamount of TANF benefits which has been paid to the family) is retained by the state (and federal government) ifsuch arrearages wereassigned to the state either temporarily or conditionally. Thus, if child support arrearages are collected via thefederal income taxrefund offset program, the family does not have first claim on the arrearage payments. For collections made on or after October 1, 2000 (5). If a custodial parent assignsher or his child support rights to the state on or after October 1, 2000, the parent has to assign all support rights thataccrue while thefamily is receiving TANF benefits. In addition, the TANF applicant must temporarily assign to the state all rightsto support thataccrued to the family before it began receiving TANF benefits. This temporary assignment lasts until the familystops receivingTANF benefits. For child support collections made after October 1, 2000 (unless the sum is collected through the federal income tax offset program),the state is required to first distribute to the former welfare family the amount collected to satisfy the currentmonthly child supportobligation. If any money remains, it is to be paid to the family to satisfy never-assigned arrearages, which are childsupport arrearagesthat accrued after the family went off welfare or arrearages owed to families that never received welfare. If thereis money remaining,it is to be paid to the family to satisfy unassigned pre-assistance arrearages (i.e., all previously assignedarrearages which exceed thecumulative amount of unreimbursed assistance when the family leaves welfare and which accrued before the familybegan receivingwelfare) and conditionally-assigned arrearages (described earlier). If there is still money remaining, it is to be usedto reimburse thestate and federal government for TANF benefits paid to the family; the state shall retain its share of the amount andpay to the federalgovernment the federal share of the collection (to the extent necessary to reimburse amounts paid to the family ascash assistance (6) ). If any money remains, it is to be paid to the family. These distribution rules do not apply to child support collections obtained by intercepting federal income tax refunds. Child supportarrearages collected through the federal income tax offset program are to be paid to the state (and the state is to paythe federal shareof the collection to the federal government). The state may only retain arrearages that have been assigned to thestate and only up tothe amount necessary to reimburse amounts paid to the family as cash assistance. If the amount collected throughthe tax offset exceeds the amount retained, the state must distribute the excess to the family. To reiterate, effective October 1, 2000, the state must treat any support arrearages collected on behalf of a former welfare family,except for those collected through the federal income tax offset program, as accruing in the following order: (1)to the period after thefamily stopped receiving cash assistance, (2) to the period before the family received cash assistance, and (3) to theperiod while thefamily was receiving cash assistance. The result of these child support distribution changes is that states are nowrequired to pay ahigher fraction of child support collections on arrearages to families that have left welfare by making these paymentsto families first(before the state and federal government). (7) Custodial parents and noncustodial parents alike are dissatisfied with the current child support distribution system. Custodial parentsare frustrated because they view child support arrearages as belonging to them. They argue that they had to rely onfamily and friendsfor financial assistance during periods when the noncustodial parent failed to pay child support that occurred beforethey went onwelfare. They contend that they (and not the state) are entitled to any pre-welfare arrearage payments that arecollected on theirbehalf. Noncustodial parents are annoyed because once they start paying child support they want to see that theirmoney actuallyhelps their children; explanations that welfare benefits are in effect child support paid by taxpayers have not satisfiedthem. Moreover, advocates point out that while promising families priority in collecting arrearages owed to them as aninducement toencourage them to move off welfare as soon as possible, the states and the federal government keep for themselvescollections madevia the federal income tax refund offset program-the most lucrative form of arrearage collection. (In tax year 2001,$1.6 billion inoverdue support was collected via federal income tax refunds.) In contrast, some observers maintain that the seemingly dual mission of the CSE program, on the one hand to pay back the state forwelfare costs and on the other to keep families off welfare has contributed to the complexity of the distributionsystem which mostagree was complicated from the program's beginning in 1975. They note that the states' share of retained childsupport collectionsgenerally amount to only 10% of all states' expenditures on the TANF program, and argue that for families currentlyreceiving TANFpayments, the states should continue to retain this declining source of funding to help improve their CSE programs. (See CRS Report RL30488, Analysis of Federal State Financing of the Child Support Enforcement Program .) During the 107th Congress, many Members favored a child support distribution approach that simply paid former welfare families allthe arrearages collected on their behalf (including federal income tax refund offsets) before reimbursing the stateor federalgovernment for any owed arrearages. On May 16, 2002, the House passed H.R. 4737 (the welfarereauthorization bill),which would have provided incentives to states to distribute more child support collections to ex-welfare familiesand permitted statesto give a portion of child support collections to TANF families without having to repay the federal government itsshare of the money. In addition, H.R. 4737 would have simplified child support assignment and distribution rules, and made manyotherchanges. In the 108th Congress, H.R. 4 , a welfare reauthorization bill almost identical in substance to H.R. 4737 , wasintroduced on February 4, 2003. H.R. 4 was passed by the House on February 13, 2003. It includes childsupportassignment and distribution rules identical to those in H.R. 4737 as passed by the House in the107th Congress.

P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform law, substantively changed the rules governinghow child support collections are distributed among families, states, and the federal government. The general rulesin effect as ofOctober 1, 2000 are that child support collected during the time a family receives cash welfare belongs to the state;current childsupport and arrearages (past-due payments) that are owed to a family that is no longer receiving welfare belongsto the family; andchild support owed to a family that never received welfare belongs to the family. This is referred to as the "familiesfirst" childsupport distribution policy. (These "families first" distribution rules do not apply to child support collections madeby interceptingfederal income tax refunds.) Many policymakers contend that Congress should simplify the child supportdistribution system whichcurrently requires the tracking of six categories of arrearage payments to properly pay custodial parents. Legislationthat includedprovisions to simplify child support distribution procedures and provide more of the child support collected tocustodial parents(rather than the government) was passed by the House in the 106th and 107th Congresses, but not by the Senate. Similar legislation hasbeen reintroduced as part of the welfare reauthorization measure in the 108th Congress. This reportwill be updated as needed toreflect legislative activity.

UNRWA was established in 1949 to provide relief assistance and programs for Palestinian refugees. With the continuation of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, UNRWA's mandate has been renewed annually ever since it began operations in May 1950 and is currently extended to June 2005. In keeping with its mission, it provides relief and social services, including food, housing, clothing, and basic health and education to over 4.1 million registered Palestine refugees living mostly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Currently, UNRWA operates approximately 900 facilities. It also manages a microfinance and microenterprise program and infrastructure projects to address the living conditions of refugees. Not all UNRWA-registered refugees receive all the benefits available. Only one third of registered Palestine refugees are living in camps. UNRWA typically provides services directly to its beneficiaries in coordination with public services provided by the host authorities. While it continues to conduct emergency and relief operations, over time it has also developed a broader human development program to address the continuing needs of Palestine refugees. UNRWA's role as provider to one group of refugees over 50 years is unique and continues to be seen as important in the evolving situation in the Middle East. UNRWA is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations; its chief officer, the Commissioner General, reports directly to the General Assembly. It is governed by a 10-member Advisory Commission of which the United States is a member. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is an observer on the Commission, which also includes other representatives of the Agency's major donors and host governments. Like the other members on the Commission, the United States participates in a semi-annual review of the UNRWA program and its budget. These meetings are typically held in May and September. Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded through voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. Most of these funds are in cash; approximately 7% is made up of in-kind donations. Another 4% comes largely from the U.N. regular budget and covers international staff costs. There are also voluntary cash contributions earmarked for specific projects. UNRWA funds are distributed among various programs including, education, health, relief and social services, and operational and common services. Refugees also make contributions where appropriate or possible in the form of co-payments, self help projects, or voluntary contributions. The UNRWA's regular budget for calendar year (CY) 2003 is $344 million. More than half of its budget is spent on educational and health programs. The project budget comprises mostly non-recurrent costs specifically earmarked by donors. UNRWA has recently made internal changes to improve its management and administration of resources, for example over the last several years, it has developed a new financial system, refined its budget presentations, and expanded its auditing procedures. The Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), deals with problems of refugees worldwide, conflict victims, and populations of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Assistance includes a range of services from basic needs to community services to tolerance building and dialogue initiatives. Key programs include refugee protection (asylum issues, identification, returns, tracing activities) and quick impact, small community projects. Refugee emergencies lasting more than a year are funded from the regular Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account through PRM. The MRA includes four major components: Overseas Refugee Assistance, Refugee Admissions, Humanitarian Migrants to Israel, and Administration. UNRWA receives funding under Overseas Refugee Assistance, where aid to refugees consists almost entirely of contributions to international organizations and to private voluntary organizations working under the direction of such organizations in caring for refugees outside the United States. A small amount, approximately 3%, is provided directly to private voluntary organizations or to governments of first asylum countries. The primary international agencies include UNHCR and UNRWA. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the regular MRA account and also through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account, which is made available for refugee emergencies. The chart below summarizes these contributions for recent years. For FY2003, it is anticipated that the overall spending for UNRWA will be similar to FY2002. The State Department does not provide a line item in its MRA budget request by country or specific organization. For FY2004, the overall request for the MRA account is $760.2 million slightly less than the $787 million appropriated for FY2003. Of the total for next year, $555.95 million is requested for Overseas Refugee Assistance, and of that, $102.32 million is requested for the Near East. The U.S. contribution to UNRWA usually covers 22-25% of the UNRWA total budget. See the table below for a historical summary of U.S. contributions to UNRWA. For information about other U.S. government funding to the Palestinians, see CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians , by [author name scrubbed]. P.L. 87-510, the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, is the permanent legislative authority under which U.S. refugee relief programs operate. Annual MRA funding is authorized in Department of State authorizing bills and appropriated in the Foreign Operations Appropriations acts. Language describing UNRWA assistance appears in the State Department Budget in Brief for FY2004. In CY2001, over 50 countries contributed to UNRWA. UNRWA appeals to donor nations for additional contributions are often used to cover emergency expenses. UNRWA continues to emphasize the critical importance of consistent and growing contributions to its regular budget. According to UNRWA, a number of factors affect its current operations. The volatile situation in Gaza and the West Bank, along with the Israeli response, have placed extra demands on UNRWA's emergency and refugee assistance. The increasing intensity of violence since February 2002 has disrupted and delayed humanitarian deliveries and affected the security and movement of UNRWA staff. The escalation of hostilities has also directly resulted in damage and destruction to housing and infrastructure. The UNRWA budget, which is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions, fluctuates according to timing, amounts contributed, and exchange rates for foreign currencies. With increased use of UNRWA services, greater demands are being placed on the funding available. Deteriorating socio-economic conditions have had an enormous impact in terms of increasing unemployment and diminishing job security. A decline in the business sector has only aggravated the problem, placing extra demand on UNRWA's services. UNRWA reports that there is a mounting humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory seen in deteriorating health conditions, rising poverty, and displacement of Palestinians. As the most vulnerable element of the population, refugees have been particularly affected. There is some concern that no effort has been made to settle the refugees permanently. Some in Congress have also questioned whether refugee rolls are inflated. While UNRWA periodically updates the rolls to try to eliminate duplication, its mandate covers relief and social services, but not resettlement. Although the refugee camps were meant to be temporary to provide some relief to the Palestinians, more than fifty years later, some are asking whether the UNHCR might be better placed to provide ongoing assistance. UNHCR would likely pursue a durable, long-term solution for the refugees. However, others have maintained that approach cannot work until there is a settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis. While the Palestinians argue that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 calls for a return to their homes or compensation, the Israelis say that because they did not cause the displacement, the international community is responsible for finding a solution. At present, UNRWA is still considered by many a unique organization that is better left in place until a way forward on the peace process can be found. For many years, Congress has raised concerns about how to ensure that UNRWA funds are used for the programs it supports and not for anything inappropriate, such as terrorist activities. In the past, some in Congress have been concerned that refugee camps were being used as military training grounds. The camps are not controlled or policed by UNRWA, but by the host countries. The FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations requires that the GAO review efforts of UNRWA to ensure that its programs comply with Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and report to Congress no later than November 1, 2003. GAO responded to this mandate and was prepared to conduct a briefing by the agreed upon deadline. In addition, although not enacted into law, in the House Report on the FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations bill ( H.Rept. 107-663 ), the conference committee agreed that the Secretary of State should comply with a requirement in the House-passed legislation to report to Congress on procedures that have been put in place to ensure that section 301(c) is enforced to the fullest degree possible. Concerns have been expressed about the content of textbooks and educational materials used by UNRWA with claims that they promote anti-Semitism and exacerbate tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. The host country, not UNRWA, provides the textbooks because students must take exams in host country degree programs. In House debate, amendment 15 offered by Representative Jarold Nadler to the FY2004 Foreign Operations appropriation recommended withholding the obligation of one third of the amount made available to UNRWA by the United States until these materials and textbooks had been replaced. It also called for UNRWA to establish a refugee resettlement program. The Nadler amendment failed on a point of order.

Since 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has provided relief and social services to registered Palestine refugees living mostly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded through voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the regular Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account and also through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account. The U.S. contribution to UNRWA usually covers 22-25% of the UNRWA total budget. The current cycle of violence in the Middle East presents particular challenges to UNRWA, including security, funding, and the impact of deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Recent congressional attention has focused on the issues concerning the progress of refugee resettlement, use of UNRWA funds, and the content of educational materials. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation are often referred to with the abbreviation PAS. This report identifies, for the 112 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions. A pair of tables presents information for each agency in this report. The first table in each pair provides information on full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation as of the end of the 112 th Congress and the pay levels of those positions. The second table for each agency tracks appointment activity within the 112 th Congress by the Senate (confirmations, rejections, returns to the President, and elapsed time between nomination and confirmation) as well as further related presidential activity (including withdrawals and recess appointments). In some instances, no appointment action occurred within an agency during the 112 th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointments-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . During the 112 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted 34 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 27 were confirmed, 6 were returned to the President, and 1 was withdrawn. The President made one recess appointment during this period to a position in organizations covered in this report. Table 1 summarizes the appointment activity. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate varies widely. Some nominations are confirmed within a few days, others are not confirmed for several months, and some are never confirmed. For each nomination covered by this report and confirmed in the 112 th Congress, the report provides the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). The mean (average) number of days elapsed between nomination and confirmation was 142.7. The median number of days elapsed was 112.0. Agency profiles in this report are organized in two parts: a table listing the organization's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 112 th Congress and a table listing appointment action for vacant positions during the 112 th Congress. Data for these tables were collected from several authoritative sources. As noted, some agencies had no nomination activity during this time. In each agency profile, the first of the two tables identifies, as of the end of the 112 th Congress, each full-time PAS position in the organization and its pay level. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, the pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule, which, as of January 2013, ranged from level I ($199,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($145,700) for lower-ranked positions. The second table, the appointment action table, provides, in chronological order, information concerning each nomination. It shows the name of the nominee, position involved, date of nomination, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation. It also notes actions other than confirmation (i.e., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). The appointment action tables with more than one nominee to a position also list statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. Each nomination action table provides the average "days to confirm" in two ways: mean and median. Although the mean is a more familiar measure, it may be influenced by outliers in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. In the final two rows, the table also includes the mean and median values for the days to confirm column. Table A-2 provides summary data on the appointments identified in this report and is organized by agency type, including independent executive agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral organizations, and agencies in the legislative branch. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each agency grouping. It also includes mean and median values for the number of days taken to confirm nominations in each category. During the 112 th Congress, the Presidential Appointments Streamlining and Efficiency Act ( P.L. 112-166 ) was enacted, which eliminated the requirement for the Senate's advice and consent for 163 positions in federal agencies. A number of those positions, listed in Appendix B , have been included in previous versions of this tracking report. This report notes each agency and position affected. Appendix C provides a list of department abbreviations. Appendix A. Summary of All Nominations and Appointments to Independent and Other Agencies Appendix B. Positions Affected by P.L. 112-166 Appendix C. Agency Abbreviations

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. This report identifies all nominations that were submitted to the Senate for full-time positions in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports. Information for each agency is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each independent agency. Additional summary information across all agencies covered in the report appears in the appendix. During the 112th Congress, the President submitted 34 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 34 nominations, 27 were confirmed, 1 was withdrawn, and 6 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 142.7 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 112.0. The President made one recess appointment to a full-time position in an independent agency during the 112th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

Environmental issues have received growing attention in trade liberalization debates as trade agreements have broadened in scope, from primarily involving negotiations to reduce tariffs, to including negotiations on nontariff trade barriers. Congressional interest in addressing environmental concerns in trade agreements has extended to the debate over renewing the President's trade promotion authority (TPA). Trade promotion authority, also referred to as "fast-track" negotiating authority, provides that Congress will consider trade agreements within mandatory deadlines, with limited debate, and without amendment. To maintain its influence on the content of agreements negotiated by the President under TPA, Congress generally includes objectives in such legislation to establish priorities for negotiators and places congressional consultation requirements on the Executive Branch. Congress last provided TPA under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA, P.L. 100-418 ). In OTCA, environmental concerns were addressed only in negotiating objectives regarding trade in services and foreign direct investment. These provisions directed U.S. negotiators, in pursuing stated objectives, to take into account legitimate United States domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential security, environmental, consumer or employment opportunity interests and the law and regulations related thereto (19 U.S.C. §§ 2901(b)(9), (11)). Agreements entered into under this authority are the NAFTA and the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements which included the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although OTCA lacked specific environmental objectives, some environmental concerns were addressed in the NAFTA, its environmental side agreement, and certain Uruguay Round Agreements and Ministerial Decisions. This authority expired in 1994. Congressional consideration of the relationship between trade and environment has continued to grow. Efforts to renew TPA in the 104 th , 105 th and 106 th Congresses failed in large part because of disagreement over the inclusion of environmental and labor issues. The 107 th Congress gave unprecedented consideration to these issues, as the successful passage of TPA legislation became dependent in part on the treatment of environmental and labor issues. (For more information, see CRS Issue Brief 10084, Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107 th Congress. ) The Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 , Title XXI) renews the President's Trade Promotion Authority. The Act covers trade agreements reached by June 1, 2005, with a two-year extension possible. The law lists overall and principal objectives in trade negotiations and priorities the President must promote to maintain U.S. competitiveness. Under provisions of the Act, agreements would have to make progress in meeting the negotiating objectives, and the President would have to satisfy the consultation and assessment requirements. The Trade Act also establishes a new congressional advisory body on trade negotiations called the Congressional Oversight Group. The 2002 Trade Act contains several environmental objectives and related provisions, and, overall, gives substantially greater consideration to environmental matters than did the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, under which fast-track procedures were last approved. The environment-related negotiating objectives and priorities included in the new law are discussed below. The law includes two overall negotiating objectives on environment. The first objective is "to ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international means of doing so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources." The second overall negotiating objective is to seek provisions in agreements under which parties "strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade"(Sections 2102(a)(5) and (7)). This objective parallels language in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA (Chapter 11, Investment). Both of these trade agreements assert that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic environmental laws and generally state that a party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such measures to attract investment. NAFTA, Article 1114, further provides that a party may request consultations if it considers that another party has done so. Environmental advocates had argued for such a trade negotiating objective to deter countries from weakening their environmental standards to promote a trade advantage. They further called for making such actions subject to dispute settlement procedures. Those who opposed this proposal expressed concern that, if this approach were taken, legitimate changes in domestic environmental measures could be subject to challenge by U.S. trading partners. Under the Trade Act, the overall negotiating objectives are not subject to dispute settlement procedures. The 2002 Trade Act also includes several principal negotiating objectives on environment (Section 2102(b)(11)). In contrast to the overall negotiating objectives, the principal negotiating objectives are subject to dispute settlement procedures. Perhaps most notably, the new law states that it is a principal negotiating objective "to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the United States and that party ... ." A related objective is to recognize that parties retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities. These two negotiating objectives mirror provisions contained in the U.S.-Jordan FTA and the NAFTA environmental side agreement. However, this latter objective goes further than the U.S.-Jordan FTA to clarify the rights of a government to establish its own levels of environmental protection by adding, "no retaliation may be authorized based on the exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic labor standards and levels of environmental protection." Other principal negotiating objectives on environment contained in both bills and the final law include: (1) strengthening trading partners' capacity to protect the environment through the promotion of sustainable development; (2) reducing or eliminating government practices or policies that unduly threaten sustainable development; (3) seeking market access for U.S. environmental technologies, goods, and services; and (4) ensuring that environmental, health or safety policies or practices of the parties do not arbitrarily discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade. The 2002 Trade Act sets forth other principal negotiating objectives that have implications for environmental laws and related disputes under trade agreements. These include the objectives on dispute settlement, foreign investment, transparency, and regulatory practices. The effectiveness of trade agreement obligations is related to the strength of an agreement's dispute settlement process. Environmental interests argued that environmental obligations should be included within trade agreements and that disputes involving these obligations should be treated the same as commercial disputes, including using the same remedies. Business interests and others favored flexibility in addressing various kinds of disputes. The Act parallels the U.S.-Jordan FTA and goes beyond NAFTA by calling for the inclusion within the texts of trade agreements of an obligation for parties to enforce their environmental laws. The dispute settlement objectives (Section 2102(b)(12)) direct negotiators to seek provisions that treat all U.S. principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to the ability to resort to dispute settlement, and to have available equivalent dispute settlement procedures and remedies. Thus, the law seeks to make all disputes equally subject to dispute settlement, but it provides flexibility in procedures and remedies. Investment provisions have become an environmental issue because of the types of claims that have been brought under the NAFTA investment provisions allowing foreign investors to arbitrate disputes with NAFTA parties. In some cases, foreign investors have sought compensation for the negative impacts of government environmental regulations, claiming that the government action is a form of "indirect expropriation" or is "tantamount to expropriation." NAFTA provides that compensation must be equal to the fair market value of the expropriated investment. These NAFTA provisions and related claims have prompted concerns by states and environmental groups that this language may dampen the enforcement of environmental regulations in signatory countries, and that foreign investors may have greater rights under the NAFTA with respect to expropriations by federal, state, or local government in the United States than domestic investors have under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The new TPA provisions appear to address this concern to some degree. The principal negotiating objectives for investment (Section 2102(b)(3)) seek to reduce: trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States, and to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal principles and practice. The investment objective calls for achieving these goals by seeking the establishment of "standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice" and by "seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including the principle of due process." The Trade Act further calls for negotiators to seek to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor and a government through: mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims; procedures to enhance opportunities for public input into the formulation of government positions; and the establishment of an appellate body to "provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements." It calls for negotiators to ensure the "fullest measure of transparency" in investment disputes by: ensuring that requests for dispute settlement are made public promptly, ensuring that proceedings, submissions, findings and decisions are made public; and establishing a mechanism for accepting amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations. A provision in the Senate-passed bill, that was dropped in conference, would have directed the President to negotiate an amendment to Chapter 11 of the NAFTA to increase the transparency of Chapter 11 proceedings in specified ways, and would have required the U.S. Trade Representative to certify to the Congress within one year of enactment that the President has fulfilled these requirements. Environmental groups favored adding language in the investment objectives that would direct negotiators to seek provisions in trade agreements to limit expropriation provisions and otherwise protect legitimate environmental measures from challenge by foreign investors. Other stakeholders wanted to ensure checks are maintained against the potential for disguised or unfair barriers to foreign investment. Neither the House nor Senate bill called for negotiators to seek exceptions for environmental measures in the investment-related obligations of trade agreements. An amendment was offered in the Senate to require agreements to limit expropriation provisions, "including by ensuring that payment of compensation is not required for regulatory measures that cause a mere diminution in the value of private property" and to provide that environmental and health protection measures are generally consistent with an agreement. The failure of this and related proposals resulted in reduced support for the Trade Act by some in Congress. Various interests, including the Administration, environmental groups and others, have put a priority on increasing transparency (i.e., openness) in trade matters and increasing public access to the dispute resolution process. Environmental and business interests agree that greater openness would allow increased awareness of the possible impacts of trade decisions relevant to their concerns. The House and Senate bills contained identical provisions to increase public participation in trade matters, compared to current practice. Section 2102(b)(5) provides that a principal negotiating objective is to obtain wider application of the principle of transparency through: increased and more timely public access to information on trade issues and activities of international trade institutions; increased openness in the WTO and other trade fora, including with regard to dispute settlement and investment; and increased and more timely public access to all notifications and supporting documentation submitted by WTO parties. The law contains additional transparency provisions for the principal negotiating objective on investment. Further, with respect to transparency, the Trade Act includes a principal negotiating objective on regulatory practices, addressing the use of government practices to provide a competitive advantage for domestic producers, service providers, or investors. The goal of this provision is to lessen the use of regulations for the purpose of reducing market access for U.S. goods, services or investments. This objective calls for U.S. negotiators "to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for the participation of affected parties in the development of regulations" (Section 2102(b)(8)). Such an approach seemingly would benefit both environmental interests and U.S. business. Additionally, the objective is "to require that proposed regulations be based on sound science, cost-benefit analyses, risk assessment, or other objective evidence." The inclusion of this objective drew some criticism from environmental groups that called for language that would protect the ability of federal, state, and local governments to take precautionary measures against risks in cases where scientific or other knowledge may be suggestive but incomplete. However, proponents of the objective argued that, on the other hand, without such disciplines, regulations can too easily be used to create barriers to trade. In addition to negotiating objectives, the Trade Act requires the President to promote certain priorities "in order to address and maintain U.S. competitiveness in the global economy" (Section 2102(c)). The Senate Finance Committee report accompanying H.R. 3005 ( S.Rept. 107-139 ), explained that the priorities are not negotiating objectives themselves, but that they "should inform trade negotiations or be pursued parallel to trade negotiations." Among these priorities, the Act contains several environment-relevant provisions. Specifically, the President must: (1) seek to establish consultative mechanisms to strengthen U.S. trading partners' capacity to develop and implement standards for protecting the environment and human health based on sound science, and to report to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance; (2) conduct environmental reviews of trade and investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141, and report to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance; (3) take into account other legitimate U.S. domestic objectives including the protection of legitimate health or safety interests and related laws and regulations; and (4) continue to promote consideration of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and consult with parties to MEAs regarding the consistency of an MEA containing trade measures with existing environmental exceptions under the GATT. In general, the trade negotiating authority provided under the 2002 Trade Act addresses environmental concerns to an unprecedented degree, reflecting the evolving attention to the potential interconnections between trade liberalization and environmental quality and protection efforts. Nonetheless, the Act falls short of the environmental objectives that some Members and interest groups sought. While it is uncertain how the new environment-related objectives may inform trade negotiations during the next several years, it seems likely that the debate on how to address environmental issues in trade negotiations and TPA legislation will continue. Outcomes of investor-state disputes involving challenges to environmental measures may be particularly informative for future TPA deliberations.

During the past decade, environmental issues have received increased attention in trade liberalization negotiations, and the question of how to address such concerns in trade agreements became a key issue in the debate over renewing the President's trade promotion authority (TPA). Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider trade agreements using expedited procedures and to vote up or down, with no amendments. With the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), Congress renewed the President's trade promotion authority. The Act includes more environment-related provisions than previous TPA legislation, and generally follows language contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), its environmental side agreement, and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. The Act includes negotiating objectives that call for negotiators to ensure that parties do not fail to effectively enforce their environmental laws in a manner affecting trade, and to make such failures subject to dispute settlement. Another objective seeks language in trade agreements committing parties not to weaken environmental laws to attract trade. The Act also calls for greater openness in proceedings related to trade disputes. It does not include an objective to protect environmental measures from challenge by foreign investors, and consequently, the Act lost some support in Congress and from environmental groups. This report discusses the environment-related provisions of the new law. It will be updated as events warrant.

Representative Frederick Richmond reportedly began forming what became the Congressional Arts Caucus in response to proposals by the Reagan Administration to eliminate funding for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and the defeat of other prominent arts advocates in Congress. Within days, 77 Members of the House of Representatives had joined the caucus, and by the start of the 98 th Congress (January 1983), House membership had grown to 166 Members—reportedly one of the largest caucuses on Capitol Hill at that time. Representative Richmond served as the first chairman and Representative Jim Jeffords as the first vice-chairman. (See Table C-1 for a list of the chairs.) In July 1981, on behalf of the Congressional Arts Caucus, Representative Richmond proposed to the Speaker of the House, Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., a program for encouraging nationwide artistic creativity by high school students through art exhibits in the tunnels connecting the Capitol to the House Office Buildings. In October 1981, Speaker O'Neill, in his role as chair of the House Office Building Commission, indicated no objection to an exhibit as long as it was conducted at no expense to the government. The Speaker further required that the Arts Caucus work with the House Office Building Commission and the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) on the details and to ensure that a jury of qualified people approves the final selection of student art for the exhibit. A detailed proposal for the manner of display of the artwork was also requested. (See Figure A-1 , letter from Speaker O'Neill to Representative Richmond.) In February 1982, the AOC sent a letter to the chairman of the House Office Building Commission in which he submitted the proposal for the National Art Competition program as prepared by the Arts Caucus. In the letter, the AOC expressed his approval and recommended that the House Office Building Commission do the same. (See Figure A-2 , letter from AOC George M. White to Chairman O'Neill.) The letter includes the signatures of all three of the House Office Building Commission members. Subsequently, on February 9, 1982, Speaker O'Neill and several members of the Arts Caucus announced the first annual Congressional Art Competition. Representative Richmond said, about the competition, that "members of Congress would conduct the contest among high school students in their districts. The winning art will line a corridor in the Capitol." No legislation has been introduced to authorize, sanction, or otherwise make permanent the Congressional Art Competition. On July 23, 1991, H.Res. 201 (102 nd Congress, first session) was introduced by the Congressional Art Competition co-chair, Representative Ted Weiss, to recognize the 10 th anniversary of the competition. On November 18, 1991, the resolution was agreed to by voice vote. The only other piece of legislation was H.Res. 1453 (111 th Congress, second session) introduced by the Congressional Art Competition co-chair, Representative Steve Driehaus, to celebrate the 29 th anniversary of the competition. This resolution was introduced on June 17, 2010, and referred to the Committee on House Administration with no further action. Throughout the competition's history, reportedly, a few submitted artworks have been removed as part of a controversy or otherwise. In 2012, an entry submitted to the Illinois Fourth Congressional District for the Congressional Art Competition was the subject of a controversy before being selected as the district winner. A Chicago high school student entered a city-wide competition to determine the next city vehicle sticker. Days before the city was to print 1.2 million new stickers, allegations surfaced on a number of police blogs claiming the design displayed gang signs and other symbols of the Maniac Latin Disciples street gang. The city decided not to use the artwork. It was subsequently entered into the Congressional Art Competition for the IL-04 congressional district. The artwork won the district competition and hung in the Cannon Tunnel for a full year without objection. Prior to the 2016-2017 Congressional Art Competition, the federal government, in a court filing, identified only one other occasion when a piece of art was removed after it was put on display as part of the competition; the work appeared to be a copy of a photograph that had appeared that year in Vogue magazine. In two other identified instances prior to the 2016-2017 competition, when suitability questions arose and the AOC reached out to the sponsoring Member of Congress, the Member agreed to submit another piece. During the 2016-2017 competition, an AOC-convened panel reviewed submissions and identified two works that raised suitability concerns, one titled "Recollection," which depicts a young man with apparent bullet holes in his back, and the other depicting marijuana use by Bob Marley. Consistent with its usual practice, AOC staff contacted the sponsoring Member'' offices regarding these works, and the Members indicated they supported the works' display. Both of these works were displayed. . Artwork for the 2016 Congressional Art Competition went on public exhibit in May 2016. In early December 2016, letters from Members of Congress and the Capitol Police requesting the removal of the winning entry from Missouri's 1 st Congressional District were sent to Speaker Paul Ryan and AOC Stephen T. Ayres. The artwork was viewed by some as violating suitability guidelines in the rules for the competition, as it depicted law enforcement officers as animals abusing protesters. Subsequently, the artwork was repeatedly removed and re-hung in the Cannon Tunnel to the Capitol by various Members of Congress. An administrative decision to prohibit the painting was made by Architect Ayers, which triggered the filing of an injunction in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of the artist, claiming violation of First Amendment rights. In April 2017, a judge in the District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs' injunction, ruling that due to the public location of the artwork in a tunnel connecting the U.S. Capitol to a House office building, the art was government speech and that Members of Congress who objected to the content had a right to remove it. The artwork continued to be banned from display until May 2017 when all artwork from that competition year was removed. The House Ethics Manual addresses the issue of the appropriateness of congressional involvement in the Art Competition in the section on "Official and Outside Organizations." House ethics rules generally prohibit endeavors jointly supported by a combination of private resources and official funds. For example, House Rule 24 prohibits the use of private resources for the operation of both congressional Member organizations (CMOs) and Member advisory groups. Yet, the House Ethics Manual goes on to explain that, "Nevertheless, the giving of advice by informal advisory groups to a Member does not constitute the type of private contribution of funds, goods, or in-kind services to the support of congressional operations that is prohibited by House Rule 24." Later the Ethics Manual specifically addresses the Congressional Art Competition in the following: "One instance when cooperation with private groups has been explicitly recognized is the annual competition among high school students in each congressional district to select a work of art to hang in the Capitol, referred to as the Congressional Art Competition. Members may announce their support for the competition in official letters and news releases, staff may provide administrative assistance, a local arts organization or ad hoc committee may select the winner, and a corporation may underwrite costs such as prizes and flying the winner to Washington, D.C. Private involvement with the Congressional Art Competition in this manner is not viewed as a subsidy of normal operations of the congressional office. Members may not solicit on behalf of the arts competition in their district without Standards Committee [now Committee on Ethics] permission unless the organization to which the donation will be directed is qualified under § 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code." The general guidelines concerning Member solicitations is stated in the Ethics Manual , and solicitation guidelines as related to the Art Competition are addressed in the " Ethics Guidance " document for the 2018 Congressional Art Competition. In their earliest years, the Congressional Arts Caucus and Congressional Art Competition were financially supported by a $300 contribution from the allowances of members of the caucus. The funds were used to pay the salaries of two full-time staff and other operational costs. During the period 1982 to 1994, the caucus used its staff and interns to manage administrative duties related to the competition, such as announcements, guidelines, deadlines, the receipt of completed forms and art, and recordkeeping. These individuals also coordinated the art competition's awards program and reception to honor the winning artists. After 1995, many administrative tasks were undertaken by two Member offices—typically the offices of the co-chairs of the Arts Caucus. From the competition's inception, the AOC curator and the House superintendent have assisted with the moving, arranging, labeling, and hanging of the art works, as well as returning the art to participating Members' offices at the end of a competition—this is done in May of each year just prior to the commencement of a new competition. The curator also arranges the winning artwork alphabetically by state, maintains a tracking system, works with the House carpenters to have the artwork hung in the Cannon House Office Building tunnel, and prepares and attaches the accompanying descriptive labels. In 2005, General Motors, which had provided financial and logistical support to the Art Competition since 1982, asked the Public Governance Institute to assist with logistical support. In 2009, the Congressional Institute, Inc. took over from the Public Governance Institute, providing both advice and logistical support for the competition. According to its website, the Congressional Institute was founded in 1987 and "is a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to helping Members of Congress better serve their constituents and helping their constituents better understand the operations of the national legislature." Currently, each participating House Member solicits entries from high school students for the event and establishes his or her own method of judging the submissions. There is no entry fee for the competition and previous entrants (including winners) may re-enter as long as they are high school students. The winning artwork must conform to strict guidelines and meet all deadlines. By mid-February of each year, the Art Competition guidelines and forms to accompany the submitted art are available to the public on the House of Representatives website at https://www.house.gov/content/educate/art_competition . It is the prerogative of the co-chairs, the House Office Building Commission, the AOC curator, or the Congressional Institute, Inc., to modify the guidelines from year to year. Two sets of guidelines are available: The "2018 Rules and Regulations for Congressional Offices" (shown as Figure B-1 , unavailable electronically). The "2018 Rules and Regulations for Students and Teachers" can be found on the House of Representatives public website at https://www.house.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/2018Rulesfor StudentsandTeachers.pdf (s hown as Figure B-2 ) . The "Student Information & Release Form" is available at https://www.house.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/2018StudentReleaseForm.pdf (shown as Figure B-3 ), and a "2018 Art Submission Checklist" is shown as Figure B-4 (unavailable electronically) . Since 2009, the Congressional Institute, Inc. has assisted and advised Member offices on how to run the competition. The institute responds to questions from participants, collects district winner information, prepares the list of winners, organizes the receipt of the artwork, and shares coordination of the reception honoring the district winners. The institute also photographs the artwork and provides a digital record of each annual competition to the House of Representatives for posting on its public website. It has been the practice for the Congressional Institute to mail the invitations, print the programs, and provide food for the annual reception. The reception, transportation, name tags, T-shirts, photography, event website, and program printing have always been privately sponsored. Recent corporate sponsors have included General Motors and Southwest Airlines. Members of Congress may also obtain the services of local sponsors to assist with transportation and local awards. At the culmination of the annual Art Competition, the winning entries from participating congressional districts are available on the House of Representatives website. The names of the 2018 winners and their artwork are available at https://www.conginst.org/art-competition/?compYear=2018&state=all . The Congressional Art Competition co-chairs generally invite an artist from their respective congressional districts to address the student winners at the reception. Since it began in 1982, "over 650,000 high school students nationwide have been involved with the nation-wide competition." There are no required procedures for selecting the winning entries for participating congressional districts. Any entry that conforms to the general specifications stated in the "Guidelines for Students and Teachers" is eligible to represent a congressional district. Members of Congress may have local art teachers, art gallery owners, civic leaders, local businesses, or Member office staff assist with the judging to select their district winner. Members of Congress may also enlist the participation of businesses in the congressional district to donate plaques, savings bonds, and other prizes, or to sponsor a reception or event to announce the competition's district winner. For example, since 2004, the Savannah College of Art and Design (SCAD) in Savannah, GA, has offered scholarship opportunities to the first-place winners of the district competitions as long as funding is available, according to school sources. The $3,000 scholarship may be renewed annually. Other scholarships are targeted for winning entrants from a specific congressional district. In recent years, these have included scholarships to the High School Summer Institute at Chicago's Columbia College and the Art Institute of Phoenix. Georgia's 13 th congressional district winner may receive a scholarship to the Art Institute of Atlanta, in Pennsylvania, the 15 th congressional district winner is eligible for a full-year scholarship to the Baum School of Art in Allentown, and Tennessee 3 rd congressional district participants are eligible for a $3,000 scholarship to Tennessee Wesleyan University in Athens, TN. Additional prizes that have been awarded include roundtrip airfare to Washington, DC, for the opening of the annual exhibition, gift certificates to local art supply stores, family memberships for a year to an art museum, and cash. Although no congressional or taxpayer funds may be used for prizes or scholarships, corporate sponsorship is allowed. As in past years, Southwest Airlines is providing two roundtrip tickets to winning entrants from any city with scheduled Southwest service to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport or Baltimore-Washington's Thurgood Marshall International Airport (BWI). Tickets will be issued to a parent or guardian as ePasses and are to be used within the period of two weeks before and two weeks after the Washington, DC, Congressional Art Competition ceremony. Southwest Airlines does not provide hotel accommodations or hotel discounts. Appendix A. Letters Establishing the Congressional Art Competition Appendix B. Congressional Art Competition Sample Forms Appendix C. Congressional Art Competition Leadership

Sponsored by the Congressional Arts Caucus, and known in recent years as "An Artistic Discovery," the Congressional Art Competition is open to high school students nationwide. Begun in 1982, the competition, based in congressional districts, provides the opportunity for Members of Congress to encourage and recognize the artistic talents of their young constituents. Since its inception, more than 650,000 high school students nationwide have been involved in the program. Each year, the art of one student per participating congressional district is selected to represent the district. The culmination of the competition is the yearlong display of winning artwork in the Cannon House Office Building tunnel as well as on the House of Representatives' website. This report provides a brief history of the Congressional Arts Caucus and the Congressional Art Competition. It also provides a history of sponsorship and support for the caucus and the annual competition. The report includes copies of the original correspondence establishing the competition, a sample competition announcement, sample guidelines and required forms for the competition, and a chronological list of congressional co-chairs.

Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, insurance regulation is generally left to the individual states. For several years prior to the recent financial crisis, some Members of Congress had introduced legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, although none of this legislation reached the committee markup stage. Various other pieces of legislation have also been introduced to reform insurance regulation in more narrow ways. The debate around federal involvement in insurance regulation had traditionally focused on the negative and positive aspects of the state-centered approach compared to increased federal government involvement. The recent financial crisis, particularly the involvement of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the debate around insurance regulation. The crisis grew largely from sectors of the financial industry that had previously been perceived as presenting little systemic risk. Many see the crisis as resulting from failures or gaps in the financial regulatory structure, particularly a lack of oversight for the system as a whole and a lack of coordinated oversight for the largest actors in the system. This increased urgency in calls for overall regulatory changes, such as the implementation of increased systemic risk regulation and federal oversight of insurance, particularly of larger insurance firms. Generally good performance of insurers through the crisis, however, has also provided additional arguments for those seeking to retain the state-based insurance system. Although insurers in general appear to have weathered the financial crisis reasonably well, the insurance industry saw two significant failures, one general and one specific. The first failure involved financial guarantee or "monoline" bond insurers. Before the crisis, there were only about a dozen bond insurers in total, with four large insurers dominating the business. This type of insurance originated in the 1970s to cover municipal bonds, but the insurers expanded their businesses since the 1990s to include significant amounts of mortgage-backed securities. In late 2007 and early 2008, strains appeared due to exposure to mortgage-backed securities. Ultimately some smaller bond insurers failed and the larger insurers saw their previously triple-A credit ratings downgraded significantly. These downgrades rippled throughout the municipal bond markets, causing unexpected difficulties for both individual investors and municipalities who might have thought they were relatively insulated from problems stemming from rising mortgage defaults. The second failure in the insurance industry was that of a specific company, AIG. AIG had been a global giant of the industry, but it essentially failed in mid-September 2008. To avoid bankruptcy in September and October 2008, AIG was forced to seek more than $100 billion in assistance from, and give 79.9% of the equity in the company to, the Federal Reserve. Multiple restructurings of the assistance have followed, including up to $69.8 billion through the U.S. Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). AIG is currently in the process of selling off parts of its business to pay back assistance that it has received from the government; how much value will be left in the 79.9% government stake in the company at the end of the process remains an open question. The near collapse of the bond insurers and AIG could be construed as regulatory failures. One of the responsibilities of an insurance regulator is to ensure that insurers remain solvent and are able to pay future claims. Because the states are the primary insurance regulators, some may go further and argue that these cases specifically demonstrate the need for increased federal involvement in insurance. The case of AIG, however, is complicated. AIG was primarily made up of state-chartered insurance subsidiaries, but the state insurance regulators did not oversee the entire company. At the holding company level, AIG was a federally regulated thrift holding company and thus overseen by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The immediate losses that caused AIG's failure came from both derivatives operations overseen by OTS and from securities lending operations that originated with securities from state-chartered insurance companies. OTS claimed that it had sufficient regulatory authority and competence to oversee a complicated holding company such as AIG. Others, particularly the Federal Reserve, disputed this claim and argued that a single body is needed to oversee systemic risk and large financial holding companies. The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in the House on June 30, 2010, by vote of 237-192, and in the Senate, on July 15, 2010, by a vote of 60-39. President Obama signed the legislation, now P.L. 111-203 , on July 21, 2010. Title V, Subtitle A of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside of the Department of the Treasury. A similar office was previously proposed in a 2008 Treasury "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure," in H.R. 5840 in the 110 th Congress, and in H.R. 2609 in the 111 th Congress. FIO is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It has the authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. This preemption authority is somewhat limited. It can only apply when the state measure (1) results in less favorable treatment of a non-U.S. insurer compared with a U.S. insurer, and (2) is inconsistent with a written international agreement regarding prudential measures. Such an agreement must achieve a level of consumer protection that is "substantially equivalent" to the level afforded under state law. FIO preemption authority does not extend to state measures governing rates, premiums, underwriting, or sales practices, nor does it apply to state coverage requirements or state antitrust laws. FIO preemption decisions are also subject to de novo judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. The monitoring function of FIO includes information gathering from both public and private sources. This is backed by subpoena power if the director issues a written finding that the information being sought is necessary and that the office has coordinated with other state or federal regulators that may have the information. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection within the Federal Reserve. This bureau enjoys significant budgetary independence, and the director is to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Consumer protection issues relating to the business of insurance, however, do not fall under the oversight of the bureau, but would remain within the purview of the states. Consumer protection issues that relate to insurance products that are also considered securities continue to be addressed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although insurance products are generally under state regulation, there are some products, particularly variable annuities, that are considered securities products under federal law and jointly overseen by the SEC. In 2008, the SEC adopted new rules, generally known as "Rule 151A," that would have expanded SEC oversight to include some fixed indexed annuities that previously had solely been overseen by the states as insurance products. This rule provoked controversy, with Representative Gregory Meeks and Senator Benjamin Nelson introducing the Fixed Indexed Annuities and Insurance Products Classification Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2733 / S. 1389 ) to overturn Rule 151A. H.R. 4173 included no provisions addressing Rule 151A as it moved through consideration in the House, and neither did S. 3217 in the Senate. Senator Tom Harkin proposed S.Amdt. 3920 , which would have added the text of H.R. 2733 / S. 1389 to S. 3217 ; but the amendment was not considered on the floor of the Senate. The conference committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Harkin, contained in Section 989J of the act, that did not insert the previous language specifically nullifying Rule 151A, but is broadly aimed at returning indexed annuities solely to state oversight. The exemption from SEC oversight in Section 989J depends in part on either the states or the companies meeting certain consumer protection standards. Depending on future regulatory action by the SEC, this exemption language may require court action before the full impact of Section 989J is known. In addition to the language on annuities, Section 913 of the act may affect some insurance producers who also sell security products. This section authorizes the SEC to establish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers who give personalized investment advice. SEC-registered investment advisers are already subject to a fiduciary duty, which requires them to act in their customers' best interests. Broker-dealer recommendations, on the other hand, must be suitable for customers; the act directs the SEC to harmonize the standards applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers. This provision is of interest to the insurance industry because agents who sell securities products, such as mutual funds or variable annuities, have been required to register as broker-dealers, but not generally as investment advisers. If the SEC issues rules creating a fiduciary duty, such agents will have to meet the best-interests standard that applies to advisers. The Dodd-Frank Act provides for systemic risk provisions that affect the insurance industry primarily through oversight of firms deemed systemically significant and through specific financial resolution authority. Financial companies, including insurers, judged to be systemically significant by the Financial Stability Oversight Council are to be subject to Federal Reserve oversight and higher prudential standards. The council includes a presidential appointee who is to be familiar with insurance issues, a state insurance commissioner, and the director of the Federal Insurance Office with the latter two being non-voting members. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes restrictions on proprietary trading by banking entities, a provision commonly known as the "Volcker Rule." Insurers that have banking subsidiaries or who are under a holding company structure with other banking subsidiaries would be subject to these restrictions, potentially affecting the investment strategies of these insurers. The language, however, includes an exemption for trading done "by a regulated insurance company directly engaged in the business of insurance for the general account of the company by any affiliate of such regulated insurance company, provided that such activities by any affiliate are solely for the general account of the regulated insurance company." The transactions must also comply with applicable law, regulation, or guidance; and there must be no determination by the regulators that a relevant law, regulation, or guidance is insufficient to protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity or the financial stability of the United States. A financial company could be subject to the act's special resolution regime based on a finding that its failure would cause systemic risk. Any insurance subsidiaries of such a financial company, however, would not be subject to this regime. Instead, the resolution of insurance companies would continue to be conducted in accordance with the applicable state insurance resolution system. With regard to funding for the resolution of systemically significant financial firms, there is no pre-funded resolution mechanism under the act. Instead, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is to impose assessments on financial companies with more than $50 billion in assets, as well as other financial firms that are overseen by the Federal Reserve, to fund the resolution of a systemically significant firm in the event the assets of the failed firm are insufficient to do so. The FDIC is to impose such assessments on a risk-adjusted basis. When imposing such assessments on an insurance company, the FDIC is to take into account the insurers' contributions to the state insurance resolution regimes. Title V, Subtitle B of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 and includes essentially the same language as H.R. 2571 / S. 1361 . Similarly titled bills were introduced in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses and passed the House, but were not considered by the Senate. This language addresses a relatively narrow set of insurance regulatory issues pre-dating the financial crisis. In the area of nonadmitted (or "surplus lines") insurance, the act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of this insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. Those taxes that would be collected may be distributed according to a future interstate compact, but absent such a compact their distribution would be within the authority of the home state. It also preempts any state laws on surplus lines eligibility that conflict with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model law and implements "streamlined" federal standards allowing a commercial purchaser to access surplus lines insurance. For reinsurance transactions, it vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer.

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, broad financial regulatory reform legislation was advanced by the Obama Administration and by various Members of Congress. Ultimately Congress passed, and the President signed, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). The Dodd-Frank Act largely responded to the financial crisis that peaked in September 2008, but other efforts at revising the state-based system of insurance regulation also pre-date this crisis. Members of Congress previously introduced both broad legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, as well as more narrowly tailored bills addressing specific perceived flaws in the state-based system. The financial crisis, particularly the role of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the existing debate around insurance regulation, with increased emphasis on the systemic importance of some insurance companies. Although it could be argued that insurer involvement in the financial crisis suggested a need for full-scale federal regulation of insurance, the Dodd-Frank Act did not implement such a federal regulatory system for insurance. Title V of the Dodd-Frank Act addressed specifically insurance, with a subtitle creating a Federal Insurance Office (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2609) and a subtitle streamlining the existing state regulation of surplus lines and reinsurance (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2572/S. 1363). The Federal Insurance Office is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It also has limited authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. The act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of surplus lines insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. For reinsurance transactions, the act vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer. In addition to Title V's specific insurance provisions, various other parts of the act may affect insurers and the insurance industry, including provisions addressing systemic risk, consumer protection, investor protection, and securities regulation. This report explains how insurance markets were affected by the financial crisis and summarizes the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that pertain to insurance. It will not be updated.

By some estimates there are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, of which 60% live in Asia. Only 15% of Muslims are Arab, while almost one third live in South Asia. The four nations with the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia (194 million), India (150 million), Pakistan (145 million), and Bangladesh (130 million), are in Asia. China also has a population of 39 million Muslims. Despite this, the Muslims of Asia are perceived to be on the periphery of the Islamic core based in the Arab Middle East. Muslims are a majority in Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in South Asia and Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. (See map below) There are also significant minority populations in Khazakstan, India, Thailand, and the Philippines. Sizable Muslim communities are also found in Sri Lanka, China, Burma, and Singapore. Islam is by some estimates the world's fastest growing religion. Mecca, in Saudi Arabia, is the spiritual center of Islam because Mohammad founded the religion there in 610. In 2002, Muslims constituted approximately 19% of the world's population as compared to 30% that were Christian. These percentages are projected by some to shift to 25% Christian and 30% Muslim by the year 2025. Islam in Southeast Asia is relatively more moderate in character than in much of the Middle East. This moderation stems in part from the way Islam evolved in Southeast Asia. Islam came to Southeast Asia with traders rather than through military conquest as it did in much of South Asia and the Arab Middle East. Islam also was overlaid on animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions in Indonesia, which are said to give it a more syncretic aspect. Islam spread throughout much of Southeast Asia by the end of the seventeenth century. Islam in Asia is more politically diverse than in the Middle East. Islam has been undergoing a revival in Asia. RAND analyst Angel Rabasa points to several factors that contribute to this Islamic resurgence in Asia. These include both domestic and external factors. Internally, the forces of globalization and the impact of Western culture have played a role, especially the effect of rapid industrialization and resulting urbanization. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 resulted in the overthrow of the authoritarian Suharto regime and created political space for Islamists in Indonesia. Muslim separatist insurgents have continued their struggle in the Philippines and Thailand while the Parti Islam se Malaysia has worked through the political system to promote an Islamist agenda while in opposition in Malaysia. External factors include the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the export of Saudi-backed Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the Afghan war against the Soviets. The majority of Muslims are of the Sunni tradition, while 10-15% are Shiite. This difference stems from disagreement over the succession to the prophet Mohammad. In South and Southeast Asia, Shiites are a significant portion of the population in only Afghanistan and Pakistan. The puritanical Sunni sect of Wahhabism has played an important role in the resurgence of Islam in Asia. It stems from a 18 th Century movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab that preached a literal interpretation of the Quran and an orthodox practice of Islam. Historically there has been a close relationship between Wahhabism and the Saudi dynasty. Sufism is another more "mystical" variant of Islam, though its presence in Asia is small except for parts of South Asia. The decline of Islamic power in the wake of European colonial expansion provoked two key schools of thought within Islam that continue to have relevance today. The traditionalist school believed that the cause for the decline of Islam could be traced to "moral laxity and departure from the true path of Islam." As a result, their response was to call for an Islamic revival. Others, known as reformers, felt that the decline was due to "a chronic failure to modernize their societies and institutions." The path of the reformers presents the question of whether it is possible to modernize without Westernizing. At its core this is a struggle over values: "... how to protect a society's cultural heritage and traditional practices in an age of globalization and how to develop a creative coexistence between modernization and traditionalism without Westernization." It is thought by some analysts that if the United States and the West seek to make common cause with moderate elements within the Islamic world against violent extremists they would be well advised to do so in a way that is not perceived to be a threat to the Islamic world. The United States, through its association with globalization and a globalizing culture, is perceived as a threat by many leaders of the Islamic world who are seeking to preserve, or restore, traditional culture even as segments of the populations they lead are drawn to American culture. The disconnect between Muslim elites and their people in Asia can also be seen in the decreasing popularity of United States's foreign policy even as regional leaders seek to maintain close ties. Some analysts believe that as long as the Muslim world views the U.S.-led war against terror as a war against Islam there will be significant limits on the extent to which Muslim states will be able to cooperate with the United States in the war against terror. The problem is exacerbated by widespread Muslim opposition to United States policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Islamic revival is changing the face of political Islam in Asia. The distinction to be drawn is between revivalists, who see religious change as an end in itself, and political Islam, or Islamists, who seek the Islamic revival as a means to the end of transforming the state. A further distinction is to be drawn between those who would work through the political process and those who would use violence to achieve their ends. The Islamic revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in Asia. While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process of revivalist change in some segments of society. The resurgence is in part inspired by links to the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Some Southeast Asians returning from Islamic religious schools in the Middle East and Pakistan have returned with a new, radical, militant, Islamist, and extremist form of Islam that is more likely to be anti-American or anti-Western in character. There is also a significant number of violent extremists of returned Southeast Asians, and a larger number of South Asians, who had participated in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Some of the South and Southeast Asians who have been radicalized through these experiences have gone on to spread extremist ideology, particularly by linking with local Muslim extremist groups who tend to have more nationally or regionally defined goals and who are largely opposed to local moderate Muslims. From one perspective "the most effective policies towards Muslim Asia will be those that contain extremism while working with, rather than against, the Muslim majority's aspirations for social and economic improvement." Connections between Islamic extremism and terrorist organizations in South Asia appear to be more extensive than they are in Southeast Asia. This stems in large part from closer interaction with the Middle East, strengthened recently by the presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also a function of long term conflict in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. The extremist Taliban regime gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda until it was crushed. Since that time remnant Al Qaeda forces have linked up with other Sunni extremist groups in South Asia including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Pakistan has also experienced Sunni-Shiite conflict. An extensive array of Islamic schools known as madrassas , including some that teach a militant anti-Western and anti-Hindu perspective, operate in Pakistan. A coalition of Islamist political parties controls approximately 20% of the seats in Pakistan's legislature, as well as the Northwest Frontier Province. They also lead a coalition in Baluchistan. It has been reported that Al Qaeda fighters escaped to Bangladesh after the fall of Afghanistan to American and Afghan Northern Alliance forces and that Bangladesh veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan have played a role in establishing radical madrassas in Bangladesh. In India, while there exists significant inter-communal strife between Hindus and Muslims it is largely domestically focused with the exception of Pakistani based groups operating in Kashmir. There are a number of Islamist groups in Southeast Asia that have linkages, either direct or indirect, to terrorist organizations. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf are examples of groups in the Philippines where Islamist ideology, secessionism, criminality, and linkages to international terrorist networks are evident. The terrorist Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, which seeks to establish an Islamic Khalifate across much of Southeast Asia and establish Islamic law, has ties to Al Qaeda. In Indonesia, the now reportedly disbanded Lashkar Jihad incited inter-communal strife between Muslims and Christians in Sulawezi and the Moluccas that created a struggle that can be exploited by terrorist groups such as JI. Lashkar Jundullah is another group that has been involved in inter-communal violence in the Moluccas and Sulawezi. The extremist Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) is an example of an organization in Southeast Asia established by veterans of the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Thailand, separatists have mounted an insurrection in the Muslim southern provinces. The relatively few Muslims of Northeast Asia are found in China for the most part. China is home to an estimated 17.5 to 36 million Muslims. The largest, most concentrated group is the Uighurs of Xinjiang Province in western China. The Uighur minority has experienced unrest of an Islamic character in recent years. Many Uighurs seek autonomy within China. Demographic trends arising from Han-Chinese in-migration are projected to make the Uighurs a minority in their home province. The scope of the Islamic revival in Asia, and the extent to which increased religious fervor will translate into extremist positions or political power that will express itself in violent ways towards the West, is debated. Some see this phenomenon manifesting itself more in terms of increased piety among individuals within society without necessarily expressing itself politically. Karen Armstrong, author of Islam: A Short History , believes that because fear feeds extremism the war against terror should include a better appreciation of Islam in the West. It has been observed that U.S. counter-terrorism policy "tends to conflate political Islam and terrorism worldwide." A key distinction for some in this debate is the distinction between cultural or religious identity and political identity. An Islamic revival that finds its expression through cultural or religious means is not necessarily a threat, even as some in the Islamic world would manipulate it to their anti-American or anti-Western ends. An examination of recent developments with political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia illustrate this point. Radical Islamist or extremist parties have not demonstrated broad appeal among Indonesian or Malaysian voters in recent elections even as some segments of these societies have experienced a resurgence of Islamic belief. The Islamist Parti Islam se Malaysia experienced significant electoral setbacks in the 2004 elections to the relatively more secular Barisan National Coalition of Prime Minister Badawi, who is himself regarded as a respected Islamic scholar. In Indonesia, Islamist parties, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), made small gains based not on their Islamist agenda but on their anti-corruption and good governance policies. Secular and nationalist parties clearly are preferred by voters in Indonesia and Malaysia even as Islam remains a core value of the people. There are also fundamentalists in Southeast Asia that would introduce strict Islamic law but would not advocate the use of violence to do so. There is also a distinction to be made between those who would focus primarily on sub-national, national and regional objectives, such as secession for a Muslim province, rather than focus on the international agenda advocated by Al Qaeda. Alienation and humiliation appear to be key concepts for understanding the Islamic resurgence in Asia and for understanding why individuals are drawn to terrorist groups. In discussing madrassas and pesantren in Indonesia, from which extremists have been recruited, Zachary Abuza has taken the position that the "radical fringe (of Islam) will continue to grow, as modernization leaves people more isolated and the political process leaves people more disenfranchised. The Islamists and their supporters will continue to gain in power unless the more secular Muslim community again provides a successful model of tolerant and modernist Islam that it has done fairly successfully for forty years." In this way, some analysts believe frustration from diminished expectations driven by economic malaise, the lack of effective political participation, and a sense of humiliation are at the core of why many Asian Muslims have become radicalized. It is thought by some that U.S. policies can help best by assisting moderate elements in Asia to "respond to mainstream Muslims' hopes for economic improvement and political participation ... education, balanced development, participatory governance, and civil peace" that will give hope to alienated individuals who might otherwise drift towards radicalism. Some observers feel that diminishing the ranks of alienated Asian Muslims will in turn restrict room for maneuver by extremists and terrorists by limiting active or passive support from the societies within which they operate.

There exists much diversity within the Islamic world. This is particularly evident in Asia. This diversity is to be found in the different ethnic backgrounds and in the different practices of Islam. The Muslim world of Asia has been experiencing an Islamic revival. This has had an effect on moderate as well as radical Muslims. An understanding of the dynamics of Islam in Asia should help inform United States' policy to develop respect between America and Muslim peoples, to foster economic policies to encourage development of open societies, to support education in Muslim states, and to identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries in order to pursue more effectively the war against terror. This report will be updated.

Parking privileges for individuals with disabilities is distinct from the subject of physical accessibility of parking spaces or structures. The federal role in ensuring physical parking space accessibility is significant: under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a broad nondiscrimination statute, government entities, private businesses, and others must adhere to the ADA Standards for Accessible Design when re-striping existing or building new parking lots. The ADA standards mandate specific percentages of van-accessible parking spaces per parking facility and require accessible aisles between certain spaces. However, the ADA Standards for Accessible Design do not require governments or other entities to reserve accessible parking spaces or issue special license plates or placards for individuals with disabilities; nor does any other ADA regulation mandate the provision of such parking privileges. Therefore, any federal action on parking privileges occurs separately from federal rules on physical parking space accessibility. Congress first considered federal action on parking privileges for individuals with disabilities in the mid-1980s in response to complaints that some states did not honor parking placards for individuals with disabilities from other states. The first bills introduced during that period would have created federal guidelines and authorized penalties for states that failed to comply with those guidelines. Specifically, the initial bills proposed federal sanctions in the form of reduced highway apportionments for states that failed to recognize parking placards issued by other states or failed to implement federal rules. However, those early proposals were not reported out of their respective committees. Since that time, the federal government has created guidelines for parking privileges. In 1988, Congress enacted legislation requiring the Department of Transportation to create a "uniform system" of parking privileges for people with disabilities. Accordingly, the Department of Transportation promulgated the "Uniform System for Parking for Persons with Disabilities." However, Congress has never required states to comply with the Uniform System, nor has it authorized penalties for non-complying states. Rather, the enacted law and resulting federal guidelines are merely hortatory. The legislation required the department to "encourage adoption of such system by all the states," but it did not require states to adopt the federal guidelines. Thus, although the federal government has a strong advisory role, states have the ultimate responsibility for the development of parking privileges. The stated purpose of the Department of Transportation's Uniform System for Parking for Persons with Disabilities is to provide "guidelines to States for the establishment of a uniform system." Thus, the Uniform System provides model definitions and rules regarding eligibility, application procedures, and issuance of special license plates and placards. It also contains information to aid states in developing reciprocal systems of parking privileges, including sample placards and a model rule regarding reciprocity. The Uniform System is brief. It does not contain model rules regarding enforcement, nor does it provide model rules specifying lengths of time after which special plates or placards must be renewed or addressing whether eligible individuals must be primary users of vehicles with special license plates. Instead, it contains basic definitions and samples that the department encourages states to utilize as part of their own, more detailed, parking privilege systems. One key provision in the Uniform System is the model definition of eligible individuals. Unlike the ADA, which protects every individual with a "disability," the Uniform System extends parking privileges only to "persons with disabilities which impair or limit the ability to walk." This definition includes people who (1) "[c]annot walk 200 feet without stopping to rest"; (2) cannot walk without the aid of another person or certain assistive devices; (3) have respiratory volumes of less than a certain amount due to lung disease; (4) "[u]se portable oxygen"; (5) have cardiac conditions of a specified severity; or (6) "[a]re severely limited in their ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." Under the Uniform System, individuals' fit within any of these categories must be "determined by a licensed physician." If an individual qualifies as a person with a disability which impairs or limits his or her ability to walk, then under the Uniform System's model rules, he or she may submit an application for special license plates or a windshield placard, which entitle the individual to park in specially reserved parking spaces. A certification from a licensed physician must accompany an initial application for such plates and placards. Under the Uniform System guidelines, states may not charge a higher fee for special license plates than they charge for regular license plates. Together with special license plates, placards "shall be the only recognized means of identifying vehicles permitted to utilize parking spaces reserved for persons with disabilities which limit or impair the ability to walk" under the Uniform System. The system delineates two types of windshield placards: removable windshield placards and temporary removable windshield placards. Removable windshield placards are appropriate for individuals who will qualify as persons with disabilities which impair or limit the ability to walk permanently or for at least six months. Temporary removable windshield placards are most appropriate for individuals who will have such an impairment or limitation for less than six months. The Uniform System provides samples of each type of windshield placard. The sample placards display the "International Symbol of Access," which was adopted by the disability rights organization Rehabilitation International in 1969. The symbol is a commonly recognized image of a wheelchair and is best known as a white chair on a blue background. The samples also include spaces in which to display names of issuing authorities and expiration dates for the placards. In addition to sample placards, which aid efforts for reciprocity among states indirectly by providing a commonly recognized symbol, the Uniform System includes a model rule that directly addresses reciprocity. It provides that states "shall recognize removable windshield placards, temporary removable windshield placards and special license plates which have been issued by issuing authorities of other States and countries." All states have laws governing parking privileges for individuals with disabilities, and nearly all states have adopted at least some portion of the Department of Transportation's Uniform System. Most states extend privileges to visitors with placards issued by other states. Also, most states issue placards closely resembling the Uniform System's sample placard. However, other aspects of the state systems vary greatly. Regarding eligibility, some states have incorporated the Uniform System's definition of an individual with a disability which limits or impairs the ability to walk word-for-word into their eligibility criteria. Other states' eligibility criteria are entirely distinct from the Uniform System definition. Between these two options, most states have incorporated the Uniform System's definition in their statutes but have modified or expanded it. For example, some states have added a category for blindness to the Uniform System definition. Most states extend parking privileges to individuals with special license plates or placards issued by other states. Many states even extend privileges to people with placards issued by other countries. The language in these reciprocity provisions differs from state to state. Some states codified most or all of the Uniform System's reciprocity provision. Other states adopted little or no language from the Uniform System but recognize out-of-state placards nonetheless. A few states extend conditional privileges to out-of-state visitors; for example, North Dakota extends privileges only to people from states that also extend privileges to traveling North Dakotans. However, even states that extend parking privileges to out-of-state visitors have rules that out-of-state visitors might not know to follow. For example, Iowa requires that placards be displayed only when individuals with disabilities are actually utilizing reserved parking spaces. The state laws are fairly similar regarding some application procedures and criteria for which the Uniform System provides model rules. For example, most states require eligible individuals to apply for both special license plates and either temporary or more permanent windshield placards. Likewise, most states issue special license plates or placards after receipt of an application containing certification by a physician, as the Uniform System suggests. In contrast, states' laws are relatively different regarding administrative aspects of parking privileges that the Uniform System does not address. For example, state rules regarding the duration for which removable windshield placards will be valid—an aspect the Uniform System does not address—vary from just two years to indefinitely. In sum, the Department of Transportation's Uniform System has increased uniformity in the state laws. Many states utilize uniform sample placards and have enacted statutes requiring reciprocal privileges for individuals bearing placards issued by other states. Nonetheless, the state systems differ in many aspects of parking privilege administration.

State law generally governs parking privileges for people with disabilities. However, federal regulations offer a uniform system of parking privileges, which includes model definitions and rules regarding license plates and placards, parking and parking space design, and interstate reciprocity. The federal government encourages states to adopt this uniform system. As a result, most states have incorporated at least some aspects of the uniform regulations into their handicapped parking laws. This report describes the federal role in parking privileges law, outlines the uniform system's model rules, and briefly discusses state responses to the model federal rules.

RS21815 -- Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 (S. 2290, 108th Congress) Updated January 21, 2005 "Any individual [or, if he is deceased, his personal representative] who has suffered from a[n eligible] disease or condition . . . may file a claim with the Office for an award with respectto such injury" (� 113(a)). The claimant would have to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffersfrom an eligible disease or condition" (� 111(2)). He would not haveto prove that his injury "resulted from the negligence or other fault of any person" (� 112). The statute of limitations would be four years from the date the claimant first "received a medical diagnosis of an eligible disease or condition," or "discovered facts that would have leda reasonable person to obtain a medical diagnosis with respect to an eligible disease or condition" (� 113(b)(1)). If,however, a claimant had filed a timely claim that was pending infederal or state court on the date of enactment of the bill, such claim would have to be dismissed, and the statuteof limitations to file a claim under the bill would be four years from thedate of enactment of the bill (� 113(b)(2)). "Not later than 90 days after the filing of a claim, the Administrator shall provide to the claimant (and the claimant's representative) a proposed decision accepting or rejecting the claimin whole or in part and specifying the amount of the proposed award, if any" (� 114(b)). Any claimant not satisfiedwith the proposed decision of the Administrator would be entitled, onwritten request made within 90 days, to a hearing or to a review of the written record, by a representative of theAdministrator" (� 114(c)). After a hearing or review, or if no hearing orreview is requested within 90 days, the Administrator would issue a final decision (� 114(d)). A claimant wouldthen have 90 days to petition for judicial review of the final decision (�302(a)). Review would be by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the claimant resides at the time ofthe issuance of the final order (� 302(b)). The court would uphold thedecision unless it determined "that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, is contrary to law, or is notin accordance with procedure required by law" (� 302(c)). The Administrator would "establish a comprehensive asbestos claimant assistance program" (� 104(a)), including a "legal assistance program" (� 104(d)). Attorneys could charge nomore than 2 percent of the amount of the award for filing an initial claim, and "10 percent with respect to any claimunder appellate review" (� 104(e)). The term "appellate review" isnot defined, so it is not clear whether it would include both the hearing or review by the representative of theAdministrator, and judicial review. The amount of an award under S. 2290 would be determined pursuant to the benefit table in section 131(b), which prescribes different amounts for different medicalconditions, and, in cases of lung cancer, different amounts for smokers, nonsmokers, and ex-smokers, as it definesthose terms. (5) Beginning in 2006, awards would beincreasedannually by a cost-of-living adjustment (� 131(b)(5)). Awards "shall be reduced by the amount of collateral source compensation" (� 134(a)). But the term "collateral source compensation" would refer only to "the compensation that theclaimant received, or is entitled to receive, from a defendant or an insurer of that defendant, or compensation trustas a result of a judgment or settlement for an asbestos-related injurythat is the subject of a claim filed under section 113" (� 3(6)). S. 2290 provides explicitly that collateralsource compensation would not include workers' compensation orveterans benefits (� 134(b)), but it would apparently also not include any other compensation, such as disability orhealth insurance payments, or medicare or medicaid, that was not paidby "a defendant or an insurer of that defendant, or compensation trust." A claimant, in other words, could receiveall these amounts in addition to his award from the Asbestos InjuryClaims Resolution Fund. Asbestos claimants would not receive lump-sum awards, but "should receive the amount of the award through structured payments from the Fund, made over a period of three years, andin no event more than four years after the date of final adjudication of the claim" (� 133(a)(1)). The Asbestos Resolution Claims Fund would be paid for by "defendant participants" and "insurer participants." Defendant participants would apparently be companies that have beensued for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos, and insurer participants would be the insurers of suchcompanies. (6) Subject to a "contingent call formandatory additional payments"(�204(m)), "the total payments required of all defendant participants over the life of the Fund shall not exceed" $57.5billion (�202(a)(2)). "[T]he aggregate annual payments of defendantparticipants" would be at least $2.5 billion for the first 23 years of the Fund, unless the $57.5 billion is receivedsooner (� 204(h)(1)). After the $57.5 billion has been paid, theAdministrator could, if necessary, issue a contingent call for mandatory additional payments of up to an aggregatemaximum of $10 billion. The Administrator would first, however,have to publish a notice in the Federal Register and consider comments from defendant participants on the necessityof additional payments (� 204(m)). "The total payment required of all insurer participants over the life of the Fund shall be equal to $46,025,000,000" (� 212(a)(2)(A)). Insurer participants would pay prescribed amountsfor 27 years (� 212(a)(3)(C)). The United States government would not be liable for any asbestos claims, even ifthe Fund is inadequate to pay them (� 406(b)). The Administrator would be authorized to sue any participant for failure to pay any liability imposed under the bill. In addition to the amount due, the Administrator could seek punitivedamages, the costs of the suit, "including reasonable fees incurred for collection, expert witnesses, and attorney'sfees," and "a fine equal to the total amount of the liability that has notbeen collected" (� 223(c)). "At any time after seven years following the date on which the Administrator begins processing claims, if the Administrator determines that . . . the Fund will not have sufficientresources," then the Fund would sunset (� 405(f)). If the Fund sunsets, then claimants could again file or pursuelawsuits. "[T]he applicable statute of limitations" would be deemedtolled for the time during which a claim had been pursued against the Fund, and "the applicable statute of limitationswould apply, except that claimants who filed a claim against theFund" before sunset would have two years after sunset to file a claim (� 405(f)(6)). Claims would have to be filedin federal district court, and "Federal common law" would govern,"except that where national uniformity is not required the court must utilize otherwise applicable state law . . ." (�405(g)). Defendant participants. "Defendant participants shall be liable for payments to the Fund . . . based on tiers and subtiers assigned to[them]" (� 202(a)(1)). "Tier I shall include all debtors that . . . have prior asbestos expenditures greater than$1,000,000" (� 202(b)). A "debtor" would be defined as a company,including its subsidiaries, that has filed in bankruptcy within a year preceding enactment of the bill, but a "debtor"would not include a company whose bankruptcy had been finallyadjudicated (� 201(3)). Tiers II through VI would include "persons or affiliated groups . . . according to the priorasbestos expenditures" they paid, ranging from $75 million or greaterfor Tier II, down to $1 million to less than $5 million for Tier VI (� 202(d)). An "affiliated group" would be definedas "an ultimate parent and any person [defined in � 3(12) asindividual or business] whose entire beneficial interest is directly or indirectly owned by that ultimate parent (�201(1)), and an "ultimate parent" would be defined as a person "thatowned, as of December 31, 2002, the entire beneficial interest, directly or indirectly, of at least 1 other person; and. . . whose own entire beneficial interest was not owned on December31, 2002, directly or indirectly, by any other single person (other than a natural person)" (� 201(9)). The term "prior asbestos expenditures" -- the amount of which would determine the amount that a defendant participant would have to contribute to the Fund -- would be defined as"the gross total amount paid . . . before December 31, 2002, in settlement, judgment, defense, or indemnity costsrelated to all asbestos claims against" the defendant, and would includepayments made by insurance carriers, but would not include payments made "by persons who are or were commoncarriers by railroads for asbestos claims" brought under the FederalEmployers' Liability Act (� 201(7)). (7) "A person or affiliated group that is a small business concern (as defined under section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632)), on December 31, 2002, is exempt from anypayment requirement under this subtitle" (� 204(b)). "[A] defendant participant may seek adjustment of the amountof its payment obligation based on severe financial hardship ordemonstrated inequity" (� 204(d)(1)). Insurer participants. S. 2290 would establish the Asbestos Insurers Commission, which would be composed of fivemembers, appointed for the life of the Commission, by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate (�211). "The Commission shall determine the amount that each insurerparticipant will be required to pay into the Fund" (� 212(a)(1)(B)). "Insurers that have paid, or been assessed by a legal judgment or settlement, at least $1,000,000 in defense and indemnity costs before the date of enactment of this act in response toclaims for compensation for asbestos injuries . . . shall be insurer participants in the Fund" (� 212(a)(3)(A)). "TheCommission shall establish payment obligations of individual insurerparticipants to reflect, on an equitable basis, the relative tort system liability of the participating insurers in theabsence of this act . . . ." (� 212(a)(3)(B)(i)). (8) Judicial review. Defendant participants and insurer participants would be able to seek judicial review, in the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the District of Columbia, of a final determination by the Administrator or the Asbestos Insurers Commission(� 303(a)). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia wouldhave exclusive jurisdiction over any action for declaratory or injunctive relief challenging any provision of the bill(� 304). Title V of S. 2290 would add a section to the Toxic Substances Control Act that would require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to issueregulations that "prohibit persons, [sic] from manufacturing, processing, or distributing in commerce asbestoscontaining products." The Administrator would be permitted to grant anexemption if he determines that it "would not result in an unreasonable risk of injury to public health or theenvironment," and the person seeking the exemption "has made good faithefforts to develop, but has been unable to develop, a substance, or identify a mineral that does not present anunreasonable risk of injury to public health or the environment and may besubstituted for an asbestos containing product." The Administrator would also be able to grant exemptions to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration if "necessary to thecritical functions" of the Defense Department or NASA, "no reasonable alternatives" exist, and "use of asbestoscontaining products will not result in an unreasonable risk to health orthe environment." Finally, Title V would exempt the following two items from the prohibition: "(A) Asbestos diaphragms for use in the manufacture of chlor-alkali and the products and derivative [sic]therefrom. (B) Roofing cements, coatings and mastics utilizing asbestos that is totally encapsulated with asphalt,subject to a determination by the Administrator of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency . . . ."

This report provides an overview of S. 2290, 108th Congress, theFairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 (or FAIRAct of 2004), as introduced by Senator Hatch on April 7, 2004 and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. S.2290 was a revised version of S. 1125, 108thCongress, as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (S.Rept. 108-188). (1) A cloture vote failed on April 22, 2004, and S. 2290 was never votedon. S. 2290 would have created the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation, within the Department of Labor,to award damages to asbestos claimants on a no-fault basis. Damages would have been paid by the Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund, which would have been fundedby companies that have previously been sued for asbestos-relatedinjuries, and by insurers of such companies. Asbestos claims could no longer have been filed or pursued under statelaw, except for the enforcement of judgments no longer subject toany appeal or judicial review before the date of enactment of the bill. For background information on the history of asbestos litigation and on other proposals to address the situation,see CRS Report RL32286, Asbestos Litigation: Prospects for LegislativeResolution, by Edward Rappaport.

On February 25, 2009, the House passed H.R. 1105 , Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, which would provide funding for 9 of the 12 regular appropriations acts, including Labor-HHS-Education appropriations. Subsequently, the Senate passed H.R. 1105 without amendment on March 10, 2009. H.R. 1105 , which became P.L. 111-8 on March 11, 2009, provides $5.31 billion for programs authorized under Title I of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). On February 13, 2009, both the House and the Senate passed the conference version of H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (hereafter referred to as "the ARRA"); subsequently, H.R. 1 was signed by the President and became P.L. 111-5 on February 17, 2009. The House had previously passed its version of H.R. 1 (hereafter referred to as the "House bill") on January 28, 2009, while the Senate passed S.Amdt. 570 , an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1 (hereafter referred to as the "Senate bill"), on February 10, 2009. Under the ARRA, funds were provided to several existing workforce development programs administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), including programs authorized by Title I of WIA. The ARRA provides $4.2 billion in funding for these WIA Title I workforce development programs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) provides job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals. WIA programs are administered by the DOL, primarily through its Employment and Training Administration (ETA). State and local WIA training and employment activities are provided through a system of One-Stop Career Centers. WIA programs operate on a program year (PY) of July 1 to June 30 (e.g., FY2009 appropriations fund programs from July 1, 2009, until June 30, 2010). Although WIA authorized funding through September 30, 2003, WIA programs continue to be funded through annual appropriations. Title I of WIA authorizes numerous job training programs, including: state formula grants for Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training activities; Job Corps; and national programs, including Native American programs, Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker programs, Veterans' Workforce Investment programs, the YouthBuild program, National Emergency Grants, and demonstration and pilot projects. In FY2009, programs and activities authorized under Title I of WIA were funded at $5.3 billion, including $3.0 billion for state formula grants for youth, adult, and dislocated worker training and employment activities. This report briefly summarizes each WIA Title I program, provides a recent funding history of Title I programs, and summarizes funding for WIA programs in the ARRA. Except for Job Corps and the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program, all WIA programs are administered by the Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration (ETA). The administration of Job Corps and Veterans' Workforce Investment is discussed below. The three formula grant programs for youth, adults, and dislocated workers provide funding for employment and training activities provided by the national system of One-Stop Career Centers. Funds are distributed to states by statutory formulas based on measures of unemployment and poverty status for youth and adult allocations and unemployment measures only for dislocated worker allocations. States in turn distribute funds to local workforce investment boards. This program provides training and related services to low-income youth ages 14-21 through formula grants allocated to states, which, in turn allocate funds to local entities. Programs funded under the youth activities chapter of WIA provide 10 "program elements" that consist of strategies to complete secondary school, alternative secondary school services, summer employment, work experience, occupational skill training, leadership development opportunities, supportive services, adult mentoring, follow-up services, and comprehensive guidance and counseling. In FY2009, funding for state grants for youth activities is $924 million. This program provides training and related services to individuals ages 18 and older through formula grants allocated to states, which in turn, allocate funds to local entities. Participation in the adult program is based on a "sequential service" strategy that consists of three levels of services. Any individual may receive "core" services (e.g., job search assistance). To receive "intensive" services (e.g. individual career planning and job training), an individual must have received core services and need intensive services to become employed or to obtain or retain employment that allows for self-sufficiency. To receive training services (e.g. occupational skills training), an individual must have received intensive and need training services to become employed or to obtain or retain employment that allows for self-sufficiency. In FY2009, funding for state grants for adult activities is $862 million. A majority of WIA dislocated worker funds are allocated by formula grants to states (which in turn allocate funds to local entities) to provide training and related services to individuals who have lost their jobs and are unlikely to return to those jobs or similar jobs in the same industry. The remainder of the appropriation is reserved by DOL for a National Reserve account, which in part provides for National Emergency Grants to states or local entities (as specified under Section 173). In FY2009, funding is $1.184 billion for state grants for dislocated worker training activities and is $283 million for the National Reserve. Job Corps is primarily a residential job training program first established in 1964 that provides educational and career services to low-income individuals ages 16 to 24, primarily through contracts administered by DOL with corporations and nonprofit organizations. Most participants in the Job Corps program work toward attaining a high school diploma or a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, with a subset also receiving career technical training. Currently, there are 122 Job Corps centers in 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. In FY2009, total funding for Job Corps is $1.68 billion, including $1.54 billion for operations, $115 million for construction, and $29 million for administration. In addition to state formula grants, WIA establishes a number of competitive grant-based programs to provide employment and training services to special populations. This competitive grant program provides training and related services to low-income Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians through grants to Indian tribes and reservations and other Native American groups. In FY2009, funding for the Native Americans programs was $52.8 million. This competitive grant program, which is also referred to as the National Farmworker Jobs Program, provides training and related services, including technical assistance, to disadvantaged migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their dependents through discretionary grants awarded to public, private, and nonprofit organizations. The program was first authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This program is funded in FY2009 at $82.6 million. This program provides training and related services to veterans through competitive grants to states and nonprofit organizations. It has been administered by DOL's Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS) since FY2001. In FY2009, funding for the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program is $7.6 million. The purpose of pilot and demonstration programs is to develop and evaluate innovative approaches to providing employment and training services. In recent years, two programs have been specified in appropriations language and funded under the authority of Section 171. Each is described below. This competitive grant program combines two previous demonstration projects, the Prisoner Reentry Initiative (PRI) and the Responsible Reintegration of Youthful Offenders (RRYO). PRI, which was first funded in FY2005, funds faith-based and community organizations that help recently released prisoners find work when they return to their communities. RRYO, first funded in FY2000, supports projects that serve young offenders and youth at risk of becoming involved in the juvenile justice system. In FY2008, the Reintegration of Ex-Offenders program combined the PRI and RRYO into a single funding stream. In FY2009, funding for this single program is $108.5 million. This competitive grant program, also known as the Community College Initiative, funds entities to strengthen the capacity of community colleges to train workers in the skills required to succeed in high-growth, high-demand industries. CBJT grants were first funded in FY2005, with funds drawn from the Dislocated Worker National Reserve. In FY2009, funding for CBJT is $125 million. This competitive grant program funds projects that provide education and construction skills training for disadvantaged youth. Since its inception in 1992, the program was administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but was moved to DOL by the YouthBuild Transfer Act ( P.L. 109-281 ), effective FY2007. Participating youth work primarily through mentorship and apprenticeship programs to rehabilitate and construct housing for homeless and low-income families. Funding in FY2009 for YouthBuild is $70 million. Table 1 shows appropriations for the FY2008 and FY2009. Amounts include all WIA programs described above, plus technical assistance; pilots, demonstrations and research; and evaluation. In FY2009, aggregate funding for WIA programs is $5.314 billion, an increase of 2.5% compared to the FY2008 funding level of $5.186 billion. The three state formula grant programs—youth, adult, and dislocated worker training—comprise $2.97 billion, or 56%, of WIA Title I funding. Job Corps, funded at $1.68 billion in FY2009, makes up just under 32% of Title I funding. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ), Congress rescinded $250 million from the unexpended balances for FY2005 and FY2006 that had been appropriated for state formula grants for the Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker programs authorized under Title I of WIA. On February 13, 2009, both the House and the Senate passed the conference version of H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; subsequently, H.R. 1 was signed by the President and became P.L. 111-5 on February 17, 2009. Under the ARRA, funds were provided to several existing workforce development programs administered by the DOL, including programs authorized by Title I of WIA. The ARRA provides $4.2 billion in funding for these WIA Title I workforce development programs. The ARRA provides funding for a number of existing workforce development programs, including the three state formula grant programs that provide funding for youth, adults, and dislocated workers—Title I-B of the WIA. Other programs authorized by the WIA also received funding: National Reserve (WIA Title I-D, Section 173), YouthBuild (WIA Title I-D, Section 173A), and Pilot and Demonstration Programs (WIA Title I-D, Section 171). Table 2 shows details of funding for Title I programs in the ARRA.

This report tracks recent appropriations and related legislation for Title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) (P.L. 105-220). Following a brief summary of each WIA program, the report presents information on WIA funding for FY2008 and FY2009 and the provisions for WIA Title I programs in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which was signed into law on February 17, 2009 (P.L. 111-5). WIA provides, in general, job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals. WIA programs are administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), primarily through DOL's Employment and Training Administration (ETA). State and local WIA training and employment activities are provided through a system of One-Stop Career Centers. Authorization of appropriations under WIA expired in FY2003 but is annually extended through appropriations acts. Reauthorization legislation was considered in the 108th and 109th Congresses. WIA authorizes several job training programs: state formula grants for Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training Activities; Job Corps; and other national programs, including the Native American Program, the Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Program, the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program, Responsible Reintegration for Young Offenders, the Prisoner Reentry Program, and Community-Based Job Training Grants (also known as the Community College Initiative). An additional national program, YouthBuild, formerly in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was made a part of WIA on September 22, 2006, by the YouthBuild Transfer Act (P.L. 109-281). Appropriations for WIA are made through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). In FY2009, aggregate funding for WIA Title I programs is $5.31 billion, an increase of 2.5% compared to the FY2008 funding level of $5.19 billion. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), Congress rescinded $250 million from the unexpended balances for FY2005 and FY2006 that had been appropriated for state formula grants for the Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker programs authorized under Title I of WIA. Funding of $4.2 billion for WIA Title I programs was provided through the ARRA and is in addition to the FY2009 appropriations. This report will be updated as major legislative developments occur.

Since FY1989, Congress has appropriated just under $271 billion (constant 2008 dollars) for disaster assistance in 34 appropriations measures, primarily supplemental appropriations acts, after significant catastrophes occurred in the United States. The median annual funding during the 20-year period FY1989 through the present was $2.7 billion; the mean annual funding was $12 billion ($241 billion/20)—both in current dollars. The mean funding in current dollars for all 34 enacted emergency supplemental bills was $7 billion ($241 billion/34). The median annual funding in constant dollars during the 20 year period FY1989 through the present was $3.8 billion; the mean annual funding in constant dollars was $13.6 billion. The mean funding in constant dollars for all 34 enacted emergency supplemental bills was $8 billion ($271 billion/34). Disasters during 2001 and 2005 were especially costly. In FY2001 and FY2002, supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance exceeded $26 billion, most of which went toward recovery following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In FY2005 and FY2006, after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck in 2005, supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance have reached an all-time high. From FY2005 through FY2008, Congress appropriated over $130 billion, almost 60% of the total appropriated since FY1989. Since the start of the 110 th Congress, the President has signed into law four measures ( P.L. 110-28 , P.L. 110-116 , P.L. 110-252 , and P.L. 110-329 ). These four statutes together provided roughly $41 billion in supplemental appropriations for disaster relief and recovery. P.L. 110-28 , signed on May 25, 2007, included an appropriation of $7.6 billion for disaster assistance, $3.4 billion of which was classified as "Hurricane Katrina Recovery." P.L. 110-116 , signed into law on November 13, 2007, provided a total of $6.355 billion for continued recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and for other declared major disasters or emergencies. This total includes $500 million for firefighting expenses related to 2007 California wildfires. P.L. 110-252 , signed into law June 30, 2008, provided $7 billion in disaster assistance, most of which was directed at continuing recovering needs resulting from the 2005 hurricane season. P.L. 110-329 , signed into law on September 30, 2008, included an appropriation for emergency and disaster relief of $21.4 billion. Of this amount, roughly $2 billion is continued disaster relief for the 2005 hurricane season. The majority of the funding (just over $8.8 billion) in the law is for disasters occurring in 2008 which included Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, wildfires, and flooding. One of the largest components funding in P.L. 110-329 is for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Fund, which received $6.5 billion specifically for disaster relief, long-term recovery, and economic revitalization in areas affected by disasters that occurred in 2008. Other funding in the law includes $135 million for wildfire suppression, and a $100 million direct appropriation for the American Red Cross for reimbursement of disaster relief and recovery expenditures associated with emergencies and disasters that have also taken place in 2008. This report provides summary information on emergency supplemental appropriations legislation enacted since 1989 after significant catastrophes. It includes funds appropriated to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as funds appropriated to other departments and agencies. This report uses a broad concept of what constitutes emergency disaster assistance. The funds cited in this report include appropriations for disaster relief, repair of federal facilities, and hazard mitigation activities directed at reducing the impact of future disasters. DRF appropriations are obligated for all major disasters and emergencies issued under the Stafford Act, not only those significant events that lead to supplemental appropriations. Counterterrorism, law enforcement, and national security appropriations are not included in this compilation. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not take into account rescissions approved by Congress after funds have been appropriated for disaster assistance. As reflected in Table 1 below, supplemental appropriations have been enacted as stand-alone legislation. However, in some instances, emergency disaster relief funding has been enacted as part of regular appropriations measures, continuing appropriations acts (continuing resolutions), or in omnibus appropriations legislation. Requested funding levels noted in the third column of Table 1 reflect House Appropriations Committee data on total requested funding for the entire enacted bill. Where possible, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data taken from correspondence to Congress requesting emergency supplemental funding are used to identify dates of Administration requests for supplemental funding. In response to the widespread destruction caused by three catastrophic hurricanes at the end of the summer of 2005, the 109 th Congress enacted four emergency supplemental appropriations bills. Two of the statutes were enacted as FY2005 supplementals after Hurricane Katrina devastated parts of Florida and Alabama and resulted in presidential major disaster declarations for all jurisdictions in Louisiana and Mississippi. The two supplementals ( P.L. 109-61 and P.L. 109-62 ) together provided $62.3 billion for emergency response and recovery needs; most of the funding in these two bills was provided for the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by FEMA. After Hurricanes Rita and Wilma struck, the 109 th Congress enacted two other supplementals; the costs of both were offset by rescissions. The FY2006 appropriations legislation for the Department of Defense ( P.L. 109-148 ) rescinded roughly $34 billion in funds previously appropriated (almost 70% of which was taken from funds previously appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security) and appropriated $29 billion to other accounts primarily to pay for the restoration of federal facilities damaged by the hurricanes. Also in FY2006, Congress agreed to an Administration request for further funding—$19.3 billion was appropriated in supplemental legislation ( P.L. 109-234 ) for recovery assistance, with roughly $64 million rescinded from two accounts ($15 million from flood control, Corps of Engineers, and $49.5 million from Navy Reserve construction, Department of Defense). On May 25, 2007, the President signed into law P.L. 110-28 , which appropriated $120 billion in emergency supplemental funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other matters, including $6.9 billion for continued Gulf Coast relief. The measure was a successor to previous emergency supplemental legislation in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 1591 , vetoed by the President on May 1, 2007. This was the fifth supplemental measure enacted containing disaster assistance specifically provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The sixth supplemental measure enacted as part of P.L. 110-116 on November 13, 2007, provided an additional $5.9 billion for emergency assistance, most, but not all of which, can be attributed to the Gulf Coast recovery. The $3 billion appropriated for Department of Housing and Urban Development—Community Planning and Development Fund can only be used for the Louisiana Road Home program. However, the $2.9 billion appropriated for the Disaster Relief Fund can be used not only for the Gulf Coast but for other declared disasters as well. As a result, after enactment of P.L. 110-252 , the total amount appropriated by Congress in supplemental funding after the 2005 hurricanes surpassed the $130 billion mark. Table 2 provides information on the appropriations made in the six supplementals enacted after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Table 3 identifies the departments and agencies from which funds were rescinded in P.L. 109-148 . In addition to these rescissions and appropriations, Congress enacted other funding changes by transferring $712 million from FEMA to the Small Business Administration for disaster loans ( P.L. 109-174 ). On June 30, 2008, the 110 th Congress enacted the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-252 ). Some of the funding from P.L. 110-252 includes $100 million for the Economic Development Administration's economic development assistance programs, $73 million for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Road Home Program and $300 million for HUD's Community Development fund. The majority of disaster assistance funding (over $4 billion) in P.L. 110-252 is directed at the Corps of Engineers for projects aimed at repairing damages incurred from the 2005 hurricane season, as well as programs designed to mitigate against future hurricanes. Another supplemental, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 was passed three months later on September 30, 2008 ( P.L. 110-329 ). P.L. 110-329 includes ongoing disaster relief for destruction resulting from the 2005 hurricane season, including $85 million for the Disaster Housing Assistance program administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The program enables families to settle in areas across the United States that were not affected by hurricane Katrina, Rita, or Wilma. The amount provided in the statute for disaster relief as a result of the 2005 hurricane season is roughly $1.3 billion. CRS Report RL33330, Community Development Block Grant Funds in Disaster Relief and Recovery , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL34711, Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329): An Overview , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33999, Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL34451, FY2008 Spring Supplemental Appropriations and FY2009 Bridge Appropriations for Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes (P.L. 110-252) , by [author name scrubbed] et al.

This report provides summary information on emergency supplemental appropriations enacted after major disasters since 1989. During the 20-year span from FY1989 through the present, Congress appropriated almost $271 billion in constant 2008 dollars. Most of the appropriations were preceded by a presidential request for supplemental funding. In 2008 a number of major natural disasters took place including Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, the California wildfires, and the Midwest floods. To date however, the most costly disasters occurred in the summer of 2005 when Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma made landfall in Gulf Coast states. Since Hurricane Katrina struck in August of 2005, more than $151 billion has been appropriated for supplemental disaster funding, most of it needed for the recovery from the 2005 hurricanes. Portions of the appropriations were offset by rescinding more than $34 billion in previously appropriated funds, explained in the section titled "Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma." Prior to FY2005 and the hurricanes, only the terrorist attacks of 2001 led to supplemental appropriations legislation that exceeded $20 billion. Congress appropriated a total of more than $26 billion for disaster assistance in response to the attacks. Other supplemental appropriations legislation enacted after catastrophic disasters (or several significant disasters that occurred in short time intervals) range from almost $366 million in FY2001 before the terrorist attacks (largely due to the Nisqually earthquake in the summer of 2001) to more than $12 billion for the Midwest floods of 1993 and the Northridge earthquake of 1994. At times, the supplementals enacted by Congress have included only disaster funding. The supplementals enacted after Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, in addition to the first two enacted after Hurricane Katrina, serve as examples. On other occasions, however, disaster funding has been part of larger pieces of legislation that appropriated funds for purposes other than disaster assistance. The most recent supplemental disaster assistance appropriation occurred on September 30, 2008 when the President signed into law H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The statute, P.L. 110-329, provides $21.3 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for relief and recovery from hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters. This report will be updated as events warrant.

This report discusses proposals to raise the cigarette tax to help pay for reauthorization of the State Children's Health Insurance Program. This report describes current taxes, discusses potential revenue gains, and discusses some of the basic issues surrounding a tax increase. It also briefly discusses the tax increase on cigars. H.R. 2 passed the House on January 14, 2009 and it included the same cigarette tax as proposed in the 110 th Congress, an increase of 61 cents per pack, raising the tax from 39 cents to $1. The estimated revenues in the House bill were $64.7 billion for FY2009-FY2018, with $57.3 billion of the total from cigarettes. The Senate version and the final legislation, P.L. 111-3 includes taxes similar to H.R. 2 (very slightly higher across the board, with a 61.66 cents increase in cigarette taxes). The vast majority of tobacco taxes are on cigarettes, which account for 94% of tobacco sales (totaling $75 billion in 2007). Federal cigarette taxes are $0.39 per pack, accounting for 94% of federal tobacco tax revenue. There is a 4 cent tax on a package of small cigars. Large cigars carry a tax of 20.719% of sales price, not to exceed $48.75 per 1,000 units, leading to a maximum tax of almost 5 cents per cigar. Per ounce, the tax is 7 cents on pipe tobacco; 1 cent on chewing tobacco; 4 cents on snuff; and 7 cents on pipe and roll-your-own tobacco. There are also taxes on cigarette paper and cigarette tubes. The 61-cent cigarette tax increase would lead to a tax about 2.5 times the current tax.; these same proportions are proposed for snuff, chewing, tobacco and pipe tobacco. Roll your own tobacco's tax increases about eight fold and seven fold and the relatively small taxes on small cigars are increased to those on cigarettes. Large cigars are the only tobacco product with a tax based on price, but they also have a cap; the price-based tax rises in proportionally, but the cap increases by much more, from 5 cents per cigar to $0.40 in the House bill ($0.4026 in the Senate Finance bill and the final legislation). Tobacco tax receipts in the United States in FY2007 included $7.5 billion in federal tax, $16.2 billion in state and local taxes, and $8 billion in payments from the Master Tobacco Settlement. State and local taxes, therefore, were roughly 88 cents per pack and the tobacco settlement payment is approximately the same as the federal tax, 43 cents per pack. Although the tobacco settlement payments resulted from negotiations between the tobacco companies and the states to settle state lawsuits, the payments function as if they were a national tobacco excise tax that is allocated to the states, and any changes that alter consumption would affect these payments. Some of the states have securitized their payments (exchanged the stream of payment for a fixed up-front amount). According to estimates, about a quarter of payments are made to private investors, rather than to state and local governments. As a percentage of sales revenues, the federal, state and local, and tobacco settlement payments are respectively 10.0%, 21.6% and 10.7%, for a total of 42.2%. The Joint Committee on Taxation projected an FY2010 revenue gain of $6.4 billion from the 61 cent increase. CRS estimates suggest there will be a loss of revenue to the states approaching $1.5 billion. There are many alternative sources of revenue (or offsetting spending) for funding the child health program. Are tobacco taxes the most desirable source of revenue? Compared to other taxes, the incentive effects may be desirable. At the same time, the burden falls heavily on lower income people, which may be of concern. Thus, there is a trade-off between the objective of discouraging smoking, and particularly discouraging youth smoking, and the distributional effects of the tax. The remaining issue involves an economic efficiency question relating to arguments that have been made that additional taxes are appropriate to cover costs smokers impose on others. A number of economic studies have questioned that proposition. The following sections discuss these issues. A large body of literature has suggested that increases in the price of tobacco reduce smoking. However, this response is not very large (in economists' parlance, the response is relatively "inelastic"). Most of the evidence has found the price elasticity to be between 0.3 and 0.5 in absolute value, meaning that a 10% increase in price would cause a 3% to 5% decrease in the number of cigarettes smoked. For older adult smokers, about half of this effect was due to fewer smokers (a participation response) and about half due a reduction in smoking (a quantity response). For younger smokers, the participation response was more important. There is some evidence that the response declines with age and that it rises with income, and that it is higher for women, African-Americans, and Hispanics. A recent study, however, found no variation with income. Some recent studies suggest that the response may be less, or that the benefits of reducing smoking may be less. There is some evidence that the response has been declining, an unsurprising outcome since, given a decline in smoking, the remaining smokers are more resistant to price signals. In addition, there is evidence that elasticities might be overstated in studies that compare state smoking levels because states with higher taxes may also have populations more hostile to smoking. Also, recent studies found that smokers may respond to price increases by increasing the intensity of smoking by buying cigarettes with more nicotine and tar, inhaling more deeply and smoking closer to the filter, which could have deleterious effects since more intensive smoking can be more harmful. Due to the limited effects on adult smoking, some arguments have been made that the increased taxes on adults are necessary over the interim to discourage teenage smoking. Evidence has suggested that teenage smoking is more responsive to price; the original responses were estimated at elasticities over one, but subsequent analysis led to an estimate of around 0.7 and a number of recent studies have confirmed this general range. Other studies have found smaller responses, or a very small response by younger teenagers. One recent study replicated the 0.7 elasticity using one statistical approach, but in using another the authors consider superior, they found essentially no response of the initiation of smoking to price. Another paper found a weak and insignificant effect after controlling for anti-smoking sentiment. While much evidence suggests that teenagers are more responsive to prices, these recent studies raise some questions about the effectiveness of tax increases on teenage smoking, especially among young teenagers. The evidence on smoking indicates that higher prices will decrease smoking participation and quantity. It is possible, however, that other types of interventions, such as stricter regulations on sales to teenagers, counseling, education, and assistance with smoking cessation might be more effective. It is generally recognized that cigarette taxes are one of the most regressive taxes, that is, a tax that falls more heavily on lower income individuals as a percentage of income. Indeed, it is probably the most regressive of the federal taxes. Smokers tend to smoke a fixed amount of cigarettes, so that they pay a fixed amount of tax. (Since the tax is a fixed amount per pack, lower income individuals who buy cheaper brands still pay the same amount of tax.) In addition, smoking is more prevalent among lower income individuals. To illustrate, in 1998 the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that a 76 cent tax increase (brought about through a proposed federal tobacco settlement) would raise the effective tax rate on average by 0.3% of income, but would increase the burden of those with incomes below $10,000 by 2% of income and the burden of those in the $10,000-$20,000 income by 0.6% of income. Since this rate applies to all families, those families with smokers would pay more. For example, a family with one smoker who smokes 1.5 packs a day would pay, with a 76 cent tax, an additional $417 in taxes, which is 4.2% of a $10,000 income and 8.4% of a $5,000 income. To the extent the burden of the tax falls on low-income families and the individuals in those families continue to smoke, low-income children in some families could be harmed even though the child health care provision helps low-income children in general. A final issue that may arise relevant to cigarette taxes is the argument that higher taxes should be imposed on smokers because they impose costs on others largely through higher health care costs paid for through government and private insurance plans, lost days at work, and some other costs. Some economists have questioned this argument, however, because smokers' premature deaths, while harmful to smokers and their families, reduce costs of certain government programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. These calculations do not account for more subjective effects such as irritation to others, although such problems might be better addressed through private market mechanisms (provision of smoking and non-smoking commercial establishments) and regulation. Some disputes about the magnitude of environmental tobacco smoke remain. If smokers are not imposing costs on others, or imposing costs that are less than existing taxes, and if they are making rational decisions to engage in an activity which, while damaging to their health, is nevertheless pleasurable, then an additional tax would not increase economic efficiency. It is not clear, however, whether young smokers, where smoking is generally initiated, are able to fully assess the costs of smoking. Although taxes on other products are a small part of total tobacco taxes, there has been some controversy about the increases for cigars in 110 th Congress proposals and their potential disruption of the industry , as reported in the media. Small cigar taxes increase by a factor of 27. They are apparently viewed by some as substitute for cigarettes who argue they should bear the same tax. Small cigars constitute less than 1/10 of 1% of cigarette sales. For large cigar taxes, which are currently a maximum of 5 cents, the tax could rise to as much as $10 in the original Senate Finance Committee proposal in the 110 th Congress. The ceiling was lowered to $3 on the Senate floor in the 2007 legislation and the ceiling in the House bill was $1 in 2007. H.R. 2 has a ceiling of $0.40, which although much lower is eight times the previous maximum. According to tax data, large cigar sales above the current 5 cents cap (premium cigars) account for about half the total. According to the Cigar Association of America, the average manufacturer's price is about $1.90 for these premium cigars; the average tax on these cigars would be almost a dollar (0.5313 times $1.90 minus $.05) in the original 110 th Congress Senate proposal, but much smaller in the House bill because of lower rate and cap and smaller in the final proposal. Most state cigar taxes are based on value and would apply to the federal tax; they are estimated by the Cigar Association of America at about 30%. If retail prices are twice the manufacturer's price the price of large cigars under the cap in the original Senate proposal would have risen by 20.8% and the price of large cigars over the cap, while varying considerably, would have averaged a 33% increase. Prices would rise more if there is also a retailers markup on the tax. The ceiling of $0.4026 would result in much more modest effects. There is less information on the effects of other tobacco products on health or the behavioral response. If the purpose of the tax on cigars is to account for health costs, a per unit rather than a price based tax would seem appropriate. Cigars may differ from cigarettes in that a larger share may be likely to be smoked only occasionally and would therefore be less harmful to health. They may also be less concentrated at lower incomes. The occasional usage (lack of addictiveness) may mean a larger price response, but the usage by higher income consumers may mean a smaller response.

On January 15, the House passed H.R. 2, a bill which included increased tobacco taxes to finance State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). This legislation was similar to that passed in the 110th Congress (H.R. 976 and H.R. 3162) although the initial House proposal had smaller tax increases.. H.R. 2 increases cigarette taxes, the primary source of tobacco tax revenues from 39 cents to $1.00. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the cigarette tax will raise $6.4 billion in federal revenues in FY2010 with all federal tobacco taxes increases raising $7.1 billion. A similar tax increase was contained in the Senate bill, and in the final proposal, P.L. 111-3 (although in both case the tax was increased by an additional two thirds of a cent, to $1.0066.) The analysis suggests that state and local governments will lose about $1 billion in cigarette tax revenues and up to $0.5 billion in lost revenues from the tobacco settlement payments. The legislation is now being considered in the Senate. A justification is to discourage teenage smoking, but this effect is probably small; a reservation is that the burden falls heavily on low-income individuals. Taxes on other tobacco products are also increased, although cigarette taxes account for most tobacco revenues. In the 110th Congress, the President vetoed the 110th Congress SCHIP proposal on October 3, 2008, the House failed to override the veto and a new bill, H.R. 3963 passed the House and Senate, with no changes in the cigarette tax, but changes in spending rules, and the President vetoed that version on December 12, 2008.

Only federal employees hired before 1984 participate in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). The CSRS is closed to new entrants and will expire with the death of the last CSRS annuitant sometime around the year 2075. Civilian federal employees who were hired in 1984 or later participate in the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), as do employees who voluntarily switched from CSRS to FERS during "open seasons" that were held in 1987 and 1998. The FERS program began operating on January 1, 1987. Cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for CSRS annuities are based on the average monthly percentage change in the CPI-W in the third quarter (July to September) of the current calendar year compared with the third quarter of the base year, which is the year in which the last COLA was applied. The base year for determining the COLA effective in December 2018 (paid out in 2019) is 2017. Adjustments are effective on the first day of the month preceding the month in which they are first paid. COLAs for benefits paid under FERS also are based on the percentage change in the CPI-W from third quarter to third quarter, but payment of COLAs under FERS is limited according to the eligibility category of the beneficiary and th e rate of inflation. COLAs are not paid to nondisabled FERS retirees as long as they are under the age of 62. COLAs are paid to survivors and disabled FERS retirees of any age after the first year of disability. All COLAs paid under FERS are limited if the rate of inflation exceeds 2.0%, according to the following formula: From the third quarter of 2017 (the current base year) to the third quarter of 2018, the CPI-W increased by 2.8%. Therefore, paid out beginning January 2019, the CSRS COLA is 2.8% and the FERS COLA is 2.0%. P.L. 87-793 (enacted in 1962) was the first law that provided for automatic adjustments in civil service retirement and disability benefits whenever the CPI in the current year exceeded the CPI in the base year (the year in which the last adjustment occurred) by 3.0% or more. In 1965, this was changed to require an adjustment in benefits whenever the CPI for a given month was at least 3.0% higher than in the month when the last adjustment was made, and remained at that level or higher for three consecutive months. P.L. 91-93 (enacted in 1969) added one percentage point to COLAs in addition to the percentage change in the CPI to offset the erosion of benefits that had occurred as a result of the time lag in the adjustment formula. (P.L. 91-179 did the same for COLAs paid to military retirees.) P.L. 94-440 (enacted in October 1976) repealed the one percentage point addition to COLAs. In addition, this law provided for automatic semiannual adjustments in benefits based on the change in the CPI from June to December (effective the following March 1) and December to June (effective the following September 1). P.L. 97-35 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981) replaced semiannual COLAs with annual COLAs based on the December-to-December change in the CPI, payable in March of the following year. P.L. 97-253 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982) delayed the implementation of COLAs by one month in FY1983, FY1984, and FY1985. The FY1983 COLA was effective April 1 rather than March 1. The FY1984 COLA was scheduled for May 1 and the FY1985 COLA was scheduled for June 1. This law also mandated that nondisabled retirees under the age of 62 would receive 50% of the projected CPI plus the full difference in the actual CPI over these projections. The law specified that the projected CPI was 6.6% for 1983, 7.2% for 1984, and 6.6% for 1985. This provision was repealed by the supplemental appropriations law that was passed in August 1984. COLAs for January 1985 and thereafter were to be the full amount for all retirees. P.L. 97-253 limited COLAs in certain cases. Under the restriction, an annuity could not be increased by a COLA to an amount that exceeded the greater of the maximum pay for a GS-15 federal employee or the final pay of the employee (or high-3 average pay, if greater), increased by the average annual percentage change (compounded) in rates of pay of the General Schedule for the period beginning on the retiree's annuity starting date and ending on the effective date of the adjustment. P.L. 98-270 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1983, enacted April 1984) delayed the COLA scheduled for May 1984 until December (payable in January 1985). Thereafter, all COLAs were to be effective in December and payable in January and were to be based on the change in the average monthly CPI-W from third-quarter to third-quarter. This formula and schedule are the same as those used to calculate COLAs in the Social Security program, as required by P.L. 98-21 (Social Security Amendments of 1983). P.L. 98-369 (Deficit Reduction Act of 1984) specified that civilian and military retirement COLAs are to be paid in checks issued on the first business day of the month following the month in which they are effective. (COLAs that are effective in December are to be paid in checks issued in January.) P.L. 99-177 (Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1981 [Gramm-Rudman-Hollings]). This law suspended all civil service retirement COLAs for FY1986 and for all subsequent years in which the specified deficit reduction targets for the year would not otherwise be met. P.L. 99-509 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986). This law reinstated COLAs for programs in which they were subject to suspension under P.L. 99-177 for FY1987-FY1991. P.L. 100-119 (Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987). This law permanently exempted the programs subject to suspension of COLAs under P.L. 99-177 from the suspensions required by that law. P.L. 103-66 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993). This law postponed the effective date of COLAs from December to March for FY1994-FY1996. The CPI measurement period was not changed.

Cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) are based on the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). COLAs for both CSRS and FERS are determined by the average monthly CPI-W during the third quarter (July to September) of the current calendar year and the third quarter of the base year, which is the last previous year in which a COLA was applied. The "effective date" for COLAs is December, but they first appear in the benefits issued during the following January. All CSRS retirees and survivors receive COLAs. Under FERS, however, nondisabled retirees under the age of 62 do not receive COLAs. Survivors and disabled retirees are eligible for COLAs under FERS regardless of age. CSRS pays a COLA that is equal to the percentage change in the CPI-W during the measurement period, but COLAs under FERS are limited if the rate of inflation is greater than 2.0%. If the rate of inflation during the measurement period is between 2.0% and 3.0%, the COLA under FERS is 2.0%. If inflation is greater than 3.0%, then the COLA for FERS benefits is equal to the CPI-W minus one percentage point. Congress passed the first law requiring automatic COLAs for federal civil service retirement benefits in 1962, and it has adjusted either the formula by which they are calculated or the date on which they take effect more than a dozen times since then. If consumer prices as measured by the CPI-W do not increase from the third quarter of the base year to the third quarter of the current calendar year, there is no COLA for annuities paid under CSRS or FERS. For example, from the third quarter of 2014 to the third quarter of 2015, the CPI-W fell by 0.4%. Therefore, no COLA was paid under either CSRS or FERS beginning January 2016. From the third quarter of 2017 to the third quarter of 2018, the CPI-W increased by 2.8%. Therefore, beginning in January 2019, the CSRS COLA is 2.8% and the FERS COLA is 2.0%.

Abused, neglected, or abandoned children who also lack authorization under immigration law to reside in the United States (i.e., unauthorized aliens) raise complex immigration and child welfare concerns. In 1990, Congress created an avenue for unauthorized children who become dependents of the state juvenile court to remain in the United States legally and permanently as lawful permanent residents (LPR) under the Immigrant and Nationality Act (INA). If an LPR meets the naturalization requirements set in the INA, he or she can become a U.S. citizen. The Special Immigrant Juvenile was originally conceived for a small number of children of unauthorized alien parents who were declared dependent by state juvenile courts. Although the unauthorized alien resident population in the United States has grown substantially since 1990, the number of SIJs who became LPRs remained under 1,000 per year until FY2008. In that year, Congress enacted provisions in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 that altered the eligibility criteria for SIJ status as part of a package of amendments pertaining to unaccompanied alien children. Now, the recent increase in unaccompanied alien children arriving in the United States has cast a spotlight on SIJ status because these unaccompanied children may apply for, and some may obtain, LPR status through this provision. This report provides a brief explanation of the statutory basis of SIJ status and how it has evolved. It also presents statistics on the number of children who have applied for and received SIJ status since FY2005. The report concludes with a discussion of the applicability of SIJ status for unaccompanied alien children. Children of unauthorized aliens who had been abused, neglected, or abandoned have long posed complex immigration and child welfare concerns. Prior to the statutory provisions added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1990, unauthorized minors who were declared dependent on the state juvenile courts were akin to stateless individuals in that there was no home where they could return. They were perceived as a particularly vulnerable group within the child welfare system, given the unique difficulties they faced as they transitioned into adulthood. For example, because they were not legally present in the United States, they could not be employed when they reached a legal working age. They would be subject to removal proceedings and deportation to a country where they might have little attachment or familiarity. The Immigration Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-649 ) added the SIJ provision (among other major revisions) to the INA in response to growing concerns over foreign children in the United States who were homeless, orphans, or victims of abusive family situations. The provision enabled unauthorized alien children who become dependents of the state juvenile courts to remain in the United States legally and permanently. As originally enacted in 1990, the language establishing SIJ status was fairly simple. To be eligible for SIJ, the foreign national was an individual (i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States and has been deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care, and (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence. It was a small provision included in a major overhaul of immigration law with little fanfare. Seven years later, in response to a perception that some unauthorized aliens might have been relinquishing parental rights so that their children could become SIJs, Congress added language amending the INA to ensure that the SIJ benefit was not "sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment." The 1997 act expressly amended the definition of a "special immigrant juvenile" to include only those juveniles deemed eligible for long-term foster care based on abuse, neglect, or abandonment . In addition, provisions in the 1997 act required that a juvenile who was in the custody of the federal government obtain specific consent from the Department of Justice to permit a juvenile court, which otherwise would have no custody jurisdiction over the juvenile alien, to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of a dependency determination. In 2008, Congress amended the SIJ provisions in the INA to broaden their applicability. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA, P.L. 110-457 ), among other things, amended the SIJ eligibility provisions to (1) remove the requirement that a juvenile court deem a juvenile eligible for long-term foster care and (2) replace it with a requirement that the juvenile court find reunification with one or both parents not viable. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) legal guidance issued in 2009, an eligible SIJ would include the following. [An unauthorized child] who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court; whom a juvenile court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State; or who has been placed under the custody of an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court. Accordingly, petitions that include juvenile court orders legally committing a juvenile to or placing a juvenile under the custody of an individual or entity appointed by a juvenile court are now eligible. The TVPRA of 2008 also revised the "specific consent" provisions in the INA, transferring the authority from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the federal department that also has custody of unaccompanied alien children. Subsequently, USCIS field guidance required that juveniles in the custody of HHS obtain "specific consent from HHS to juvenile court jurisdiction where the juvenile court order determines or alters the juvenile's custody status or placement." The process of becoming an SIJ and ultimately an LPR includes multiple steps, as the child petitions for SIJ status after the juvenile court decision and then applies to adjust to LPR status. In response to concerns that the process was taking too long, the law requires USCIS to adjudicate SIJ petitions within 180 days of filing. The law also states that the foreign national may not be denied SIJ status if he or she "ages out" because the determination is based upon the individual's age when the petition was filed. To promote efficiency, the otherwise mandatory personal interview may be waived for juveniles under 14 years of age who are seeking SIJ status , or when it is determined that an interview is unnecessary. A juvenile seeking SIJ status must demonstrate that an administrative or judicial proceeding has resulted in a determination that it would not be in the juvenile's best interest to be returned to the child's or the parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence. To pre-empt USCIS adjudicators from reconsidering the court's determination of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, t he field guidance states that the adjudicators "should f ocus on eligibility for adjustment of status and should avoid questioning a child about the details of the abuse, abandonment or neglect suffered." The law makes clear that a juvenile seeking SIJ status , at any stage of the SIJ process, cannot be required to contact the individual (or family members of the individual) who allegedly abused, abandoned, or neglected the juvenile. USCIS also must complete background checks, including biometric information clearances and name-checks of the juvenile . Juveniles seeking SIJ status are exempted from many of the inadmissibility grounds of the INA. Generally, foreign nationals in the United States without authorization, including unauthorized children, are barred from most federal public assistance benefits and programs. The exceptions are a narrow set of specified emergency services and programs, which include Medicaid for an emergency medical condition, immunizations and testing for and treatment of symptoms of communicable diseases, emergency disaster relief, and services or assistance such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelters. Only LPRs with a substantial work history or military connection are eligible for the full range of programs, as are asylees, refugees, and other humanitarian cases (for at least five to seven years after entry). Those unauthorized juveniles who qualify as "unaccompanied alien children" are placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Unaccompanied alien children are defined as those who lack lawful immigration status in the United States, are under the age of 18, and are either without a parent or legal guardian in the United States or no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody. The unaccompanied alien children are cared for through a network of state-licensed ORR-funded care providers that provide classroom education, mental and medical health services, case management, and socialization and recreation. In May 2014, ORR reported that ultimately about 85% of the unaccompanied children in their custody are reunited with their families and that the average time in ORR care is about 35 days. The TVPRA of 2008 makes those juveniles granted SIJ status who had been in the custody of HHS or already receiving certain services provided by the ORR eligible for the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors' (URM) Program in ORR. Subject to the availability of appropriations, ORR is required to reimburse the state where the SIJ child resides for the state's foster care expenditures on behalf of the child. Children who receive SIJ status are not eligible for federal foster care through Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. Figure 1 shows a tenfold increase in the number of children filing I-360 petitions requesting SIJ status, spanning from 311 in FY2005 to 3,994 in FY2013. In terms of the number of I-360 petitions approved, the numbers have increased from 73 in FY2005 to 3,432 in FY2013. Data on the subsequent adjustments from SIJ status to LPR status typically lag, but they also show similar trends. Partial I-360 data for FY2014 (through May 2014) indicate that the upward trend is continuing. The LPR visa category of "Special Immigrants" encompasses several other subcategories and is statutorily limited to 7% of 140,000 (i.e., 9,800 foreign nationals) annually. Thus far, the total number of Special Immigrants admitted or adjusted each year has not reached the numerical limit. The natural or prior adoptive parents of the SIJ are not eligible for any immigrant benefits that LPRs and naturalized citizens may otherwise seek for their immediate relatives. As noted at the onset, the surge in unaccompanied alien children arriving at the Southwest border of the United States has heightened congressional interest in SIJ status. While the data presented in Figure 1 do not differentiate among those unauthorized children who arrived unaccompanied by their parents and those who were removed from their parents because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, many observers point to the similarity in the spiking trends of both categories. An emerging issue is whether the increase in unaccompanied alien children since FY2008 is resulting in an increase in SIJ requests since FY2008. A recent survey of unaccompanied alien children found "abuse in the home" reported as one of the main reasons they fled. In addition, the Vera Institute of Justice conducted screenings of 11,719 unaccompanied children in ORR custody in FY2012 and found 3,724 children who might have been eligible for SIJ status. That an unaccompanied alien child is reunited with at least one parent or family member in the United States, some argue, does not prevent the child from seeking SIJ status based upon the abuse, neglect, or abandonment of the other parent. Some immigration and child welfare advocates assert that the number of children receiving SIJ status barely "scratches the surface of potentially eligible children," basing their conclusion on the assessment that many of the unaccompanied alien children arriving in the United States are eligible for SIJ status. While some call for giving unaccompanied alien children generous access to the SIJ process, others assert that such a practice would be an unintended consequence of the 2008 TVPRA changes to SIJ status. This conclusion is based upon the opinion that the 2008 TVPRA amendments were not intended to provide SIJ status to unauthorized alien children reuniting with family in the United States. As noted above, ORR reports that ultimately about 85% of the unaccompanied children in their custody are reunited with their families, an outcome that some argue makes the reunited children ineligible for long-term foster care as well as SIJ status. Some advocating for lower immigration and increased restrictions on immigration are also calling for legislation to revise the SIJ criteria so reunification with either or both parents is not viable.

Abused, neglected, or abandoned children who also lack authorization under immigration law to reside in the United States (i.e., unauthorized aliens) raise complex immigration and child welfare concerns. In 1990, Congress created an avenue for unauthorized alien children who become dependents of the state juvenile courts to remain in the United States legally and permanently. Any child or youth under the age of 21 who was born in a foreign country; lives without legal authorization in the United States; has experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and meets other specified eligibility criteria may be eligible for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status. Otherwise, unauthorized residents who are minors are subject to removal proceedings and deportation, as are all other unauthorized foreign nationals. The SIJ classification enables unauthorized juveniles who become dependents of the state juvenile court to become lawful permanent residents (LPR) under the Immigrant and Nationality Act (INA). If an LPR meets the naturalization requirements set in the INA, he or she can become a U.S. citizen. When Congress enacted provisions in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, it altered the eligibility criteria for SIJ status as part of a package of amendments pertaining to unaccompanied alien children. Now, the recent increase in unaccompanied alien children arriving in the United States has cast a spotlight on SIJ status because these unaccompanied children may apply for, and some may obtain, LPR status through this provision. There has been a tenfold increase in the number of children requesting SIJ status between FY2005 and FY2013. In terms of approvals, the numbers have gone from 73 in FY2005 to 3,432 in FY2013. While the data do not differentiate among those unauthorized children who arrived unaccompanied by their parents and those who were removed from their parents because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, many observers point to the similarity in the spiking trends of both categories. This report provides a brief explanation of the statutory basis of SIJ status and how it has evolved. It also presents statistics on the number of children who have applied for and received SIJ status since FY2005. The report concludes with a discussion of the applicability of SIJ status for unaccompanied alien children.

On April 12, 2006, U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Peruvian Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism Alfredo Ferrero Diez Canseco signed the proposed U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA). The labor chapter of the PTPA includes enforceable International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards in addition to specific obligations on domestic labor law enforcement and a labor cooperation and capacity building mechanism. Despite the June 30, 2007 expiration of presidential "fast track" or "trade promotion authority" (provided by the Trade Act of 2002 , P.L. 107 - 210 ) to negotiate agreements that Congress then considers on an expedited basis—without amendment and under limited debate—Congress passed PTPA implementing legislation, the President signed it, and it became law as P.L. 110 - 138 on December 14, 2007. It went into effect February 1, 2009. On May 10, 2007, after much negotiation, Congress and the Administration announced a "New Trade Policy for America." Pending U.S. trade agreements would be amended to incorporate "key Democratic priorities" relating to such issues as labor, the environment, access to medicine, port security, and government procurement that would "spread the benefits of globalization here and abroad by raising standards." The release also announced that "this policy clears the way for broad, bipartisan congressional support" for pending FTAs . Key concepts in the new trade-labor policy include, for FTAs, fully enforceable provisions: (1) incorporating ILO core labor standards as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (henceforth referred to as the ILO Declaration ); and (2) prohibiting FTA countries from weakening laws relating to ILO core labor standards in order to attract trade or investment. They also include (3) new limitations on "prosecutorial" and "enforcement" discretion, so that FTA countries cannot defend failure to enforce laws related to the ILO core labor standards on the basis of resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement issues; and (4) the same mechanisms/penalties for settling labor, environment, and all other FTA obligations. The Administration released the "final text" of the Peru FTA incorporating these concepts on June 25, 2007. On June 27, 2007, Peru's congress approved the FTA-related amendments. Other FTA language previously agreed to by both countries also includes procedural guarantees to help ensure that workers and employers would have fair, equitable, and transparent access to labor tribunals. Both parties would ensure that (1) workers have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of each party's labor laws; (2) the proceedings before such tribunals are fair, equitable, and transparent; (3) the tribunals' final decisions are in writing and made publicly available; (4) parties to the proceedings have the right to seek review and possible correction of final decisions; (5) tribunals conducting or reviewing the proceedings are impartial and independent; (6) parties to the proceedings could seek remedies such as penalties or temporary workplace closures to ensure the enforcement of their rights under labor laws; and (7) public awareness of domestic labor laws is promoted through public availability of information and encouraging public education regarding labor laws. In addition, the agreement would require that the United States and Peru establish a Labor Affairs Council (Labor Council) comprised of cabinet-level or equivalent representatives to oversee implementation of the labor obligations, including the activities of the Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism. The Labor Council would meet within the first year after the date of entry into force of the agreement and as often as necessary thereafter. Government representatives of the two countries would work together to establish priorities in specific cooperative and capacity-building activities. The Labor Council would establish guidelines, prepare reports, provide public communication, and be responsible for cooperating with the parties' points of contact. Finally, the two parties agreed that cooperation on labor issues plays an important role in advancing labor commitments, including those embodied in the 1998 ILO Declaration and a 1999 ILO convention on the worst forms of child labor (including child trafficking, or the use of children in armed conflict, drug trafficking, or pornography). They would establish a Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism to develop and pursue bilateral or regional cooperation activities on labor-related issues. Such initiatives would be aimed at establishing and strengthening alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for labor disputes. Peruvian President Alan Garcia took office for a five-year term at the end of July 2006, replacing outgoing president, Alejandro Toledo. President Toledo presided over a period in which Peru was one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America, largely due to growth in the mining and export sectors. In spite of the recent economic growth, over half of Peruvians live in poverty and a large portion of the population is underemployed. Unemployment and underemployment levels total 64.5% nationwide. Peru's labor market is relatively small compared with that of the United States. In 2005, the labor force of Peru comprised nine million workers, compared to 151 million workers in the United States. Recorded unemployment in Peru was 7.2% and labor cost per hour was $1.48 in 2005. In comparison, the United States had a recorded unemployment rate of 4.7% and an hourly labor cost of $24.42. The economic sector in Peru with the highest employment is wholesale/retail trade and repair services, followed by manufacturing. During the regime of former President Alberto Fujimori (1990 to 2000), the government implemented a radical economic reform program to control hyperinflation and bring economic stability to the country. Part of the program included a wide-ranging privatization plan and a relaxation of foreign investment restrictions to help increase foreign investment. Existing labor laws were relaxed significantly during this time. In recent years, however, Peru has made much progress in strengthening labor protections by implementing labor law reform and protecting workers' rights. In 2002, Peru ratified the two ILO conventions on the abolition of child labor. In 2003, the government reduced the number of workers needed to establish a union, eliminated prohibitions on workers that kept them from joining unions during their probationary period, and limited the power of the labor authority to cancel a union's registration. In July 2004, the government published regulations to strengthen labor inspections and broaden labor inspectors' powers to allow easier access to firms, improved inspectors' ability to impose sanctions, and increase the levels of fines. Peru has ratified 71 ILO conventions, including all eight core conventions on workers' rights. The ILO has stated that Peru has satisfactorily amended its laws to improve labor standards in certain areas related to freedom of association and protection of the right to organize. However, some critics argue that Peru has had some problems in the observance of the ILO core labor standards and that improvements must be made in Peru's legislation on collective bargaining. The proposed PTPA was negotiated under the trade promotion authority in the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107 - 210 ) as were seven other trade agreements approved by Congress: the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), plus agreements with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman; and several agreements that are still pending (Colombia, Panama, and South Korea.) While many provisions of the free trade agreements (FTAs) are similar, the Peru TPA was the first to incorporate provisions reflecting the new congressional-administration trade policy. In addition, each of the eight agreements has some unique provisions. For the PTPA, unique labor provisions include some new reporting requirements and cooperative and trade-capacity building activities. Proponents and opponents typically cite the following strengths and weaknesses of the labor provisions of the PTPA. Supporters argue that the PTPA reinforces Peru's labor reforms in 2003, 2004, and 2005. In addition, enforceable ILO core labor standards in the body of the agreement overlay and reinforce Peru's long-term ratification of 71 ILO labor conventions including all eight ILO core labor standards—two in each of the following categories: (1) the right to organize and bargain collectively (ILO Convention (C) 87 in 1960 and C98 in 1964); (2) freedom from forced or compulsory labor (C29 and C105, both in 1960); (3) prohibitions against child labor (C138 and C182, both in 2002); and (4) prohibitions against employment discrimination (C100 in 1960 and C111 in 1970). Proponents point out that "key Democratic priorities" include fully enforceable ILO core labor standards and the same dispute resolution procedures that were available for commercial disputes. The PTPA would go beyond protections afforded Peru under the Andean Trade Preference Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA, P.L. 107 - 210 ) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP, P.L. 98 - 573 , as amended), which set, for benefits eligibility, the lower standard of " providing or taking steps to provide " workers "internationally recognized worker rights." Critics argue that, with enforceable ILO core labor standards in the language of the agreement, the main issues at this point are Peru's adoption of new labor laws and enforceability. They argue that recent Peruvian labor reforms have not reversed the weakening of labor laws during the Fujimori administration, and that both ILO reports and the 2005 State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices document the failure of Peru's compliance with U.S. internationally recognized worker rights and ILO core labor standards. Such "failures" include (1) the lack of basic protection of the right to organize for (a) large numbers of workers "casually" employed as temporary or contract workers (and therefore not permitted to join labor unions of permanent workers) and (b) the 60% of all Peruvian workers in the largely unregulated informal sector; (2) reports of forced or compulsory labor practices, particularly involving indigenous families in remote areas, in violation of Peru's laws; (3) violations of child labor laws—an estimated one-fourth of all children between 6 and 17 years of age are employed, mostly in the informal sector including some in prostitution and narcotics production; and (4) non-compliance with minimum wage guideline s, in that roughly half the workforce earned the minimum wage or below, many of them in the informal sector. Before the new PTPA language was released, some observers noted that the United States has ratified only two ILO conventions, while Peru has ratified all eight. In addition, the United States has some laws that may not totally conform with language of ILO conventions. A possible example is some state laws that permit employment-without-pay for prisoners. Consequently, they express concern that including enforceable ILO core labor standards into trade agreements could subject the entire U.S. labor code to challenges by trading partners. This issue is addressed by language in the PTPA that (a) restricts the application of the PTPA provisions to trade-related matters and (b) incorporates only the principles of the four basic ILO rights listed in the ILO Declaration and quoted on p. 4, footnote 2, rather than the detailed language of the specific eight conventions. The proposed PTPA is unlikely to impact the aggregate employment level in the United States: U.S.-Peru trade accounts for only 0.3% of total U.S. merchandise trade (2005). However, it could impact jobs in specific industries. According to a report by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), the largest U.S. employment gain (1%) is projected in wheat production. Declines are projected in metals (gold, copper, and aluminum), rice production, and miscellaneous crops (cut flowers, live plants, and seeds) which could "lose" up to 0.2% of their employment, displaced by imports. For Peru, various estimates of job "gains" range from less than 20,000 to 700,000. On the other hand, some labor groups argue that U.S. exports of basic grains could adversely affect the livelihoods of subsistence farmers in Peru, where agriculture is the main source of jobs. The Peruvian Congress voted 79-14 to approve the PTPA in June 2006 and it approved a set of amendments tied to the FTA on June 27, 2007. Gaining passage of a PTPA was a high priority for the government of Peru. Peruvian President Alan García Perez met with President Bush on October 10, 2006, and again on April 23, 2007, to discuss the free trade agreement. After the April 2007 meeting, President García said about the agreement, "It is vital for our country. It is fundamental to continue this path of growth and social redistribution that we have started in my country." House Democratic leaders had indicated they would not take up implementing legislation until after Peru changed its laws to comply with new labor (and other) provisions added to the PTPA. Peru is implementing its new labor obligations under the agreement through a series of "supreme decrees" issued by President Garcia. Peru had agreed to issue supreme decrees covering five areas: time-limited contracts, subcontracting, the right to strike, anti-union discrimination, and safeguarding the right to strike. The House passed the Peru TPA implementing legislation, H.R. 3688 , on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; the Senate passed it on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and President Bush signed it into law as P.L. 110 - 138 on December 14, 2007. Issues included how a PTPA might affect workers in both countries, and Peru's commitments to reforms, alleviating poverty, and enforcement. Some Peruvian policymakers believe that maintaining confidence in the bilateral trade environment with the United States is the key to the long-term stability of the region. While the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable strongly supported the Peru TPA, the AFL-CIO neither supported nor opposed it because the AFL-CIO has labor unions on both sides of the issue. Change To Win labor coalition, comprised of labor unions that formerly belonged to the AFL, urged Congress to oppose the PTPA.

On April 12, 2006, the United States and Peru signed the proposed U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA). On June 25, 2007, the Administration released a revised text with new labor, environment, and other provisions. This "final text" language reflected a Congress-Administration "New Trade Policy for America" announced on May 10 that incorporated key Democratic priorities. Supporters of the agreement argue that Peru has ratified all eight International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and that the PTPA would reinforce Peru's labor reform measures of recent years. Critics are concerned about the potential for enforcement of the standards. Peru PTA implementing legislation (H.R. 3688) passed the House on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; passed the Senate on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and was signed by President Bush on December 14 (P.L. 110-138). It went into effect on February 1, 2009. See also CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33864, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor Standards Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

A "Dear Colleague" letter is official correspondence that is sent by a Member, committee, or officer of the House of Representatives or Senate and that is widely distributed to other congressional offices. A "Dear Colleague" letter may be circulated in paper through internal mail, distributed on a chamber floor, or sent electronically. "Dear Colleague" letters are often used to encourage others to cosponsor, support, or oppose a bill. "Dear Colleague" letters concerning a bill or resolution generally include a description of the legislation or other subject matter along with a reason or reasons for support or opposition. Additionally, "Dear Colleague" letters are used to inform Members and their offices about events connected to congressional business or modifications to House or Senate operations. The Committee on House Administration and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, for example, routinely circulate "Dear Colleague" letters to Members concerning matters that affect House or Senate operations, such as House changes to computer password policies or a reminder about Senate restrictions on mass mailings prior to elections. These letters frequently begin with the salutation "Dear Colleague." The length of such correspondence varies, with a typical "Dear Colleague" running one to two pages. Member-to-Member correspondence has long been used in Congress. For example, since early House rules required measures to be introduced only in a manner involving the "explicit approval of the full chamber," Representatives needed permission from other Members to introduce legislation. A common communication medium for soliciting support for this action was a letter to colleagues. For example, Representative Abraham Lincoln, in 1849, formally notified his colleagues in writing that he intended to seek their authorization to introduce a bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. The use of the phrase "Dear Colleague" has been used to refer to a widely distributed letter among Members at least since early in the 20 th century. In 1913, the New York Times included the text of a "Dear Colleague" letter written by Representative Finley H. Gray to Representative Robert N. Page in which Gray outlined his "conceptions of a fit and proper manner" in which Members of the House should "show their respect for the President" and "express their well wishes" to the first family. In 1916, the Washington Post included the text of a "Dear Colleague" letter written by Representative William P. Borland and distributed to colleagues on the House floor. The letter provided an explanation of an amendment he had offered to a House bill. Congress has since expanded its use of the Internet and electronic devices to facilitate distribution of legislative documents. Electronic "Dear Colleague" letters can be disseminated via internal networks in the House and Senate, supplementing or supplanting paper forms of the letters. Such electronic communication has increased the speed and facilitated the process of distributing "Dear Colleague" letters. In the contemporary Congress, Members use both printed copy distribution and electronic delivery for sending "Dear Colleague" letters. In the House, Members may choose to send "Dear Colleague" letters through internal mail, through the electronic e -"Dear Colleague" system, or both. Regardless of distribution method, House "Dear Colleague" letters are required to address official business and must be signed by a Member or officer of Congress. Members of the House often send out "Dear Colleague" letters to recruit cosponsors for their measures. The practice of recruiting cosponsors has become more important since the passage of H.Res. 42 in the 90 th Congress (1967-1968). H.Res. 42 amended House rules to permit bill cosponsors, but limited the number to 25. In 1978, the House agreed to H.Res. 86 , which further amended House rules to permit unlimited numbers of cosponsors. "Dear Colleague" letters sent through internal mail must be written on official letterhead, address official business, and be signed by a Member or officer of Congress. A cover letter must accompany the "Dear Colleague" letter, addressed to the director of the House customer solution center, with specific distribution instructions and authorization as to the number to be distributed. These materials must be submitted by 9:45 a.m. for morning distribution and 1:45 p.m. for afternoon mail delivery. The current number of paper copies needed for distribution of a "Dear Colleague" letter in the House is 475 for all Members only (including leadership); 525 for all Members (including leadership and full committees); 625 for Members, full committees, and subcommittees; 300 for Republican Members, leadership, and full Republican committees; 275 for all Republican Members and leadership only; 250 for Democratic Members, leadership, and full Democratic committees; 200 for all Democratic Members and leadership only; and 700 for all House mail stops. For distribution to the Senate, House "Dear Colleague" letters must have a separate cover letter addressed to the deputy chief administrative officer of the House for customer solutions, adhere to the same standards as House "Dear Colleague" letters, and follow the current distribution numbers of 110 for Senators only, and 135 for Senators and committees. When using the paper system, congressional offices create and photocopy their "Dear Colleague" letters and deliver them to either the First Call Customer Service Center or to the House Postal Operations Office. When the House Postal Operations Office is closed, letters may be deposited in a drop box located in the vending area of the Longworth cafeteria. A copy of the "Dear Colleague" letter is delivered to offices as requested. On August 12, 2008, the House introduced a web-based e -"Dear Colleague" distribution system. The e -"Dear Colleague" system replaced the email-based system. Under the e -"Dear Colleague" system, then-chair of the Committee on House Administration, Representative Robert Brady, wrote that Members and staff "will be able to compose e -Dear Colleagues online, and associate them with up to three issue areas. Members and staff will be able to independently manage their subscription to various issue areas and receive e -Dear Colleagues according to individual interest." Pursuant to the House Members' Congressional Handbook , the rules regulating a paper "Dear Colleague" letter sent via internal mail are also applicable to a letter sent electronically. House Members and staff who want to use the e -Dear Colleague system can subscribe and send letters at http://e-dearcolleague.house.gov . During the registration process, they may choose up to 32 issue areas for which they wish to receive "Dear Colleague" letters. The website also allows them to sign up for either the Republican or Democratic "Dear Colleague" distribution lists. Additionally, the website enables individuals "to search all e -Dear Colleagues by session, date, issue area, and keyword or bill number." The e -Dear Colleague system did not alter the process for the delivery of paper "Dear Colleague" letters. To send an e-"D ear Colleague" letter, an individual staff member views http://e-dearcolleague.house.gov and clicks on send. This action brings up the send screen, where the staff member takes the following actions: enters his or her email address, the type of office the staff member works in (i.e., Member, leadership, committee, or other), and the Member's, committee's, or office's name; types in a letter title, selects whether it is a letter to be sent to either the Republican or Democratic distribution lists, and chooses up to three issues to associate with the letter; types, or cuts and pastes, the letter into the text editor on the webpage, including uploading any graphics or attachments; associates the letter with a particular bill or resolution number (optional); and reviews the letter before sending. Following the completion of this process, staff members receive an email asking them to confirm that they are sending the "Dear Colleague" letter. A final opportunity to edit the letter is also provided. Once the letter is completed, it is sent to all individuals who have selected to receive "Dear Colleague" letters in issue areas associated with the letter. Electronic versions of "Dear Colleague" letters sent prior to August 12, 2008, are stored in a Microsoft Exchange public folder that is accessible to all House Members and staff. Electronic versions of "Dear Colleague" letters sent on or after August 12, 2008, are archived on the House e -"Dear Colleague" website. Similar to the House paper system, "Dear Colleague" letters in the Senate are written on official letterhead and address official business, but there is not a central distribution policy. In general, when using the paper system, Senators and chamber officers create their own "Dear Colleague" letters and have them reproduced at the Senate Printing Graphics and Direct Mail Division. Once reproduced, paper copies of the "Dear Colleague" letters are delivered to the Senate Mailroom by the sending office, accompanied by a distribution form or cover letter with specific distribution instructions. As prescribed by the Senate, current distribution numbers for "Dear Colleague" letters in the Senate are 100 for all Senators; 20 for standing, select, and special committees; 5 for the joint leadership; and 1 each for the officers of the Senate (total of 7). The choice to send "Dear Colleague" letters electronically is at the discretion of the individual Senate office. There is no central distribution system for electronic Senate "Dear Colleague" letters.

"Dear Colleague" letters are correspondence signed by Members of Congress and distributed to their colleagues. Such correspondence is often used by one or more Members to persuade others to cosponsor, support, or oppose a bill. "Dear Colleague" letters also inform Members about new or modified congressional operations or about events connected to congressional business. A Member or group of Members might send a "Dear Colleague" letter to all of their colleagues in a chamber, to Members of the other chamber, or to a subset of Members, such as all Democrats or Republicans. The use of the phrase "Dear Colleague" to refer to a widely distributed letter among Members dates at least to the start of the 20th century, and refers to the generic salutation of these letters. New technologies and expanded use of the Internet have increased the speed and facilitated the process of distributing "Dear Colleague" letters.

Airships and aerostats have been used historically for military surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. Unlike fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, aerostats and airships are "lighter-than-air (LTA)"; typically using helium to stay aloft. Airships are traditionally manned, and use engines to fly. Aerostats are tethered to the ground, by a cable that also provides power. As many as 32 companies are involved in the design or manufacture of more than 100 commercially available airships and aerostats in Europe, Asia, and North America. The Navy disbanded its last airship unit in 1962, and since then, military use of lighter-than-air platforms has been limited to Air Force custodianship of a dozen aerostats. However, a number of developments have combined to draw increased attention toward LTA platforms. First, U.S. aerospace dominance in military conflicts since 1991 has been overwhelming, making threats to LTA platforms appear to be very low by historical standards. Second, the military's demand for "persistent surveillance," a function for which aerostats appear to be well suited, is growing. Network-centric warfare approaches, increased emphasis on homeland security, and growing force protection demands in urban environments all call for "dominant battlespace awareness." Third, DOD's growing orientation toward expeditionary operations has spawned studies on using airships as heavy lift vehicles. Fourth, growing budget pressures have encouraged the study of potential solutions to military problems that may reduce both procurement and operations and maintenance spending. LTA platforms may fit into this category. Finally, recent advances in unmanned aerial vehicles suggests that future airships may also be remotely piloted, or fly autonomously. The most well established LTA platform today is the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) that has been operating since 1980 along the southern U.S. border and in the Caribbean. Currently, TARS' primary mission is surveillance for drug interdiction. Each aerostat can lift 2,200 lbs of sensors to a height of 12,000 feet, and can detect targets out to 230 miles. The aerostat can stay aloft for months. In response to ongoing threats to U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has deployed small aerostats, equipped with ground surveillance sensors, to those countries. The Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform (REAP) was jointly developed by the Navy and the Army. This 25-foot long aerostat is much smaller than TARS, and operates at 300 feet above the battlefield. It is designed for rapid deployment and carries daytime and night vision cameras. The Army has also deployed a Rapid Aerostat Initial Development (RAID) system to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. This aerostat is approximately twice the size of REAP and operates at approximately 1,000 feet. It also carries a suite of day and night cameras for force protection. The Marine Corps has begun training with RAID, which is a spinoff of a the Army's Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) program. The Army is leading this joint program. JLENS seeks to use advanced sensor and networking technologies to conduct cruise missile defense. The initial JLENS system fielded (Block 1) will include two separate tethered aerostats. One will elevate a radar to conduct persistent surveillance of the battlespace. The second aerostat will elevate a radar to precisely track the cruise missile and guide an intercepting weapon. JLENS Block 2 will field two un-tethered lighter than air platform, and Block 3 will attempt to field both radars on a single un-tethered lighter than air platform. Approximately $432 million in R&D funds have been appropriated for the JLENS program from FY1996 to FY2006. DOD's FY2007 budget requests $264.5 million for JLENS RDT&E. The JLENS program projects $1.8 billion in spending through FY2011. JLENS is seen by some to be an important part of DOD's network-centric warfare approach, because it is the centerpiece of a larger attempt to seamlessly link together numerous sensors across services to build a "single integrated air picture" that will enable effective cruise missile defense. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is funding an effort to investigate the feasibility of a high altitude airship (HAA) for homeland defense. Like JLENS, HAA would be unmanned, and provide over-the-horizon surveillance. However, it would not provide fire control-quality tracks, and unlike an aerostat, HAA could move to avoid weather or change radar coverage. The HAA would operate at high altitudes and has been likened to a low flying, and relatively inexpensive satellite. This altitude might enable a small number of airships to surveill the entire United States. The HAA program seeks to demonstrate a prototype by 2010 that could fly for 30 days at a time. Goals are for $50 million airships capable of flying for one year at a time. A total $150.8 million has been provided thus far for HAA. For FY2007, House appropriators (Report 109-504, H.R. 5631 ) cut $20 million from MDA's $40.6 million HAA request (PE 0603175C), and senate appropriators cut $25 million (Report 109-232, H.R. 5631 ). Integrated Sensor is Structure (ISIS) .The goal of this Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) program is to develop a stratospheric airship-based sensor that can remain airborne for years. It is hoped to detect both air and ground targets at long range. The ISIS program will develop technologies to enable large and lightweight radar antennas to be integrated into an airship platform. This approach exploits the platform's size and complies with the platform's weight and power limitations. Major technical challenges include developing ultra-lightweight antennas, antenna calibration technologies, power systems, and airships that support extremely large antennas. House appropriators fully funded ISIS' $16.3 million FY2007 funding request (PE0603287E), while Senate appropriators recommended cancelling the program. Until cancelled by congressional appropriators in FY2006, this DARPA program was developing a hybrid airship capable of transporting up to 1,000 tons across international distances. Unlike traditional, cigar-shaped airships, a hybrid airship is shaped more like an aircraft's wing, to generate lift through aerodynamic forces. Advocates hope that such airships may potentially be capable of carrying a complete Army brigade directly from "the fort to the fight," overcoming logistic choke points and mitigating the effects of limited forward basing. Airships and hybrids may be able to land on water, which could prove valuable to the Navy's sea basing concept. Independently funded hybrid airship programs exist, but with the demise of Walrus, their future is uncertain. Generally at issue is whether the operational need for airships and aerostats, and their ability to satisfy this need, outweigh the costs of developing and fielding them. The debate is perhaps most effectively engaged by dividing lighter-than-air platforms into three distinct categories: aerostats, high-altitude airships, heavy lift airships. The operational need for aerostats and their ability to satisfy this need appears the most mature of the three distinct lighter-than-air platforms. These systems are currently fielded and their capabilities and limitations appear well-documented. The role that they appear most suited for is persistent surveillance. Aerostats' primary advantages over other platforms capable of providing elevated, persistent surveillance (manned aircraft and UAVs) appear to be low life cycle cost and long dwell time. The primary operational concerns with employing aerostats appear to be vulnerability to weather and enemy ground fire. U.S. and foreign aerostats have been lost to severe weather, as have manned aircraft and UAVs. Aerostats tend not to fail in benign weather, however, while aircraft and UAVs, which are more complex and dynamic systems, suffer accidents caused by factors such as human error and mechanical failure. The vulnerability of aerostats to enemy ground fire is debated. Opponents argue that aerostats are big targets within range of many enemy weapons. Proponents argue that despite their large size, aerostats are survivable because of a low radar cross section and their ability to endure numerous punctures before gradually losing altitude. Low flying aircraft and UAVs are also vulnerable to enemy ground fire. For land-based applications, technology issues related to surveillance aerostats appear to pertain more to networking and exploiting their sensors than to the balloon itself. One non-traditional aerostat application that may warrant study is replacing, or augmenting, Navy E-2C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft with aerostats. Replacing a carrier air wing's 3-4 E-2Cs with a single or pair of aerostats could potentially improve surveillance by providing 24-hour coverage of the battle group, and could increase the wing's striking power by making room on the carrier for 6-8 more fighter aircraft. The operational need and utility of HAAs is less well understood than it is for aerostats. DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies are likely to need considerable time and study to determine exactly what these platforms can do, how they might be exploited, and whether these concepts offer new capabilities. Long-range aerial surveillance, communications relay, Internet services relay, and laser weapon relay for missile defense, and forest fire warning are just some of the roles that HAA advocates would like examined. The HAA's potential operational environment and long endurance goals present technological challenges for HAAs that appear much greater than those experienced by aerostats. Because the atmosphere is very thin at 70,000 feet, it will require a very large volume of helium to sustain even modest payloads. It is estimated that the HAA ACTD's goal of a 500 lb payload will require an airship over 500 feet long and capable of holding over 5 million cubic feet of helium. This airship would be the largest of its kind attempted in the last 60 years. This payload constraint is likely to be a limiting factor for military applications. Some hope, for example, that HAA's could deploy very large sensor arrays that could use low frequency radar to detect small targets, like cruise missiles. However, large radars tend to be heavy. The radar that was being developed for the Air Force's now cancelled E-10A surveillance aircraft, for example, weighs 11,000 lbs. While producing 500 foot long airships is achievable, their handling characteristics may be challenging. Operating at high altitudes may be an "atmospheric sweet spot" for these large aerostats, but they still must successfully ascend and descend through relatively stormy altitudes. Operating these large airships for months or even years at a time may also prove a technological challenge. Many potential power sources, such as microwaves, are in their infancy, and weight and longevity will be at a premium. Equipment will have to be light, and energy efficient. Further, all systems on an HAA will require uncommon levels of reliability if they are to operate for months or years at a time with no maintenance. This high level of reliability will likely come at increased cost. A final issue pertains to schedule. MDA hopes to field a prototype by 2006 have already slipped to 2010, confirming the belief of many that this program's schedule is too aggressive. In February 2006, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board also cast doubt on this schedule when it reported that long-endurance, fixed wing UAVs offer more promise than lighter-than-air vehicles in conducting surveillance from near-space altitudes. The Republic of Korea initiated a HAA program that spans 10 years of research and development. Considering this experience, has DOD established realistic timelines, milestones and budgets to solve technological challenges, mitigate risk, and field a useful HAA platform? Alternatively, has MDA established partnerships or other relationships with researchers in Korea and Japan which have been working on HAA concepts for over six years? Heavy lift airships may raise some questions regarding need and feasibility. Heavy lift airship advocates believe that these platforms can fill a void between sea lift ships that carry very large payloads slowly, and aircraft, which carry smaller loads quickly. Skeptics may argue that there may not be a void to be filled by airships, because the "transport momentum" (payload x speed x annual utilization) of both sealift ships and airlift aircraft are very effective, and these transport media complement each other well. Another claim by advocates that might invite study, is that heavy lift airships would require much less infrastructure than airlift aircraft. This may be true for conventional Airships, which don't need long runways, and can moor to simple and inexpensive structures. Because hybrid airships use aerodynamic lift, however, they will take-off and land much like conventional aircraft. Some estimate that 1,000 ton-class hybrid aircraft will require 5,000 foot-long runways. Along with loading, offloading equipment and facilities, these runways appear to constitute infrastructures like those required by conventional aircraft. An attendant issue for hybrid airships is one of safety. What happens when a 1,000 ton semi-rigid airship has an engine failure during takeoff? While the take off speed may not be great, the inertial forces of such a mass would be prodigious. When a conventional aircraft suffers from a mishap, it is towed from the runway and flight operations resume. It appears unlikely that a disabled 1,000 ton airship could be moved quickly, and the airstrip could be blocked indefinitely. Another issue that must be studied is how compatible 1,000 ton airships would be with DOD's distributed and "just in time" logistical concepts. Delivering a brigade-sized payload directly to a theater of conflict sounds attractive from a conventional wisdom point of view. But, large payloads take longer to consolidate, load, and unload than smaller payloads, and the their delivery must be tightly scheduled. Also, DOD operates on an all weather, day or night, 24/7 timetable. Airships will be more vulnerable to the effects of weather than are conventional aircraft. How severe, or how manageable is this shortcoming? How will an airship capable of lifting 1,000 tons of payload return to the United States once its cargo is offloaded? Would it require a very large ballast or a means of suppressing its buoyancy to be able to fly home? Vulnerability to attacks is another issue that may warrant study. Airships would fly at an altitude within reach of many surface-to-air weapons. LTA proponents say that airships have a small radar cross section and degrade gracefully if hit. This may be true for the balloon, but a brigade-worth of equipment would have a large radar cross section. Also, while the United States is relatively unchallenged in air-to-air combat, a 1,000 ton airship with a brigade-worth of equipment could constitute a very "high value" target for enemy aircraft. It is likely that DOD would find it prudent to protect these airships with fighters. How many fighters would be required and what would be the costs? A final issue that pertains to all of the LTA concepts addressed above is cost and budget. The life cycle costs for many unmanned LTA concepts could be notably less than manned aircraft, and satellites, and potentially UAVs. But can DOD find room in its budget for another procurement program? According to some, "a perennial issue in defense policy is whether future defense budgets will be large enough to finance all the weapon acquisition programs that are in the pipeline." This budget pressure, coupled with competition from a well established constituency for conventional aircraft, represent challenges to fielding LTA programs.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has a history of using lighter-than-air (LTA) platforms. Aerostats have recently been fielded to protect deployed U.S. troops. Contemporary interest is growing in using airships for numerous missions. This report examines the various concepts being considered and describes the issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Congressional efforts to establish standards for House districts have a long history. Congress first passed federal redistricting standards in 1842, when it added a requirement to the apportionment act of that year that Representatives " should be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of Representatives to which each said state shall be entitled, no one district electing more than one Representative ." (5 Stat. 491.) The Apportionment Act of 1872 added another requirement to those first set out in 1842, stating that districts should contain " as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. " (17 Stat. 492.) A further requirement of "compact territory" was added when the Apportionment Act of 1901 was adopted stating that districts must be made up of " contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. " (26 Stat. 736.) Although these standards were never enforced if the states failed to meet them, this language was repeated in the 1911 Apportionment Act and remained in effect until 1929, with the adoption of the Permanent Apportionment Act, which did not include any districting standards. (46 Stat. 21.) After 1929, there were no congressionally imposed standards governing congressional districting; in 1941, however, Congress enacted a law providing for various districting contingencies if states failed to redistrict after a census—including at-large representation. (55 Stat 761.) In 1967, Congress reimposed the requirement that Representatives must run from single-member districts, rather than running at large. (81 Stat. 581.) Both the 1941 and 1967 laws are still in effect. The 1967 law, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c, requiring single-member districts, appears to conflict with the 1941 law, codified a 2 U.S.C § 2a(c), which provides options for at-large representation if a state fails to create new districts after the reapportionment of seats following a census. The apparent contradictions may be explained by the somewhat confusing legislative history of P.L. 90-196 (2 U.S.C. § 2c), prohibiting at-large elections. The legislative history of the 1967 law, mandating single-member districts (P.L. 90-196), is unusual. The portion of the bill that became 2 U.S.C. § 2c was a Senate amendment to a House-passed private immigration act—H.R. 2275, 90 th Congress, "an act for the relief of Dr. Ricardo Vallejo Samala, and to provide for congressional redistricting." No hearings were held or reports issued on the at-large election prohibition that became 2 U.S.C. § 2c, "Number of Congressional Districts; number of Representatives from each District": In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at large may elect its Representatives at large to the Ninety-first Congress). H.R. 2275 was enacted after another bill (H.R. 2508, also 90 th Congress) that included similar language pertaining to at-large representation failed final passage after two conferences—the first was recommitted in the House and the second was defeated in the Senate. H.R. 2508 also included additional provisions regarding population equality plus geographical compactness and contiguousness. H.R. 2508 would have deleted subsection (c) of section 22 of the Apportionment Act of 1929, as amended, (codified as 2 U.S.C. §2a(c)) and substituted the bill's redistricting standards that also included a ban on at-large elections. Section 2a(c) of Title 2 currently provides: Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment, the Representatives to which such State is entitled under such apportionment shall be elected in the following manner: (1) If there is no change in the number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State, and if any of them are elected from the State at large they shall continue to be so elected; (2) if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; (3) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such State is equal to such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; (4) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such State is less than such number of Representatives, the number of Representatives by which such number of districts is exceeded shall be elected from the State at large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; or (5) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives and the number of districts in such State exceeds such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the State at large. It is clear from committee report language and both the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2508 that 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) would have been superseded by new language had it been enacted and approved by the President. H.R. 2275 ( P.L. 90-196), which was enacted after the second conference report on H.R. 2508 was defeated in the Senate, did not amend 2a(c). Thus, Public Law 90-196 was codified in a separate part of the U.S. Code (2 U.S.C. § 2c), rather than as replacement language for 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c). These apparently contradictory provisions raise questions about how Section 2(a)c, which provides for at-large House elections under certain circumstances, can be reconciled with Section 2c, which prohibits them. Section 2a(c) of Title 2 could be invoked if a state that had gained or lost Representatives after a census failed to complete the redistricting process before the first election following the reapportionment of seats among the states. One could argue, contrarily, that since Section 2a(c) was enacted in 1941 and Section 2c was enacted in 1967, the prohibition of at-large and multi-member districts in Section 2c implicitly repeals the contingencies for running at large provided in 2a(c), thus making Section 2a(c) a dead letter. Further buttressing the dead letter theory is the 40-year history of active court involvement in redistricting. When Section 2a(c) was enacted in 1941, courts were constrained by years of precedent limiting their entrance into the "political thicket" of redistricting. After the Supreme Court established the "one person, one vote" principle beginning with its 1962 landmark decision in Baker v. Carr , and Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, courts have intervened numerous times in the state redistricting process. In Branch v. Smith , decided on March 31, 2003, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of how these two statutory provisions can be reconciled. In the reapportionment following the 2000 census, Mississippi's delegation size was reduced from five Representatives to four. When it appeared that the legislature would not be able to pass a redistricting plan in time for candidates to file to run for office, both the Mississippi state court and a three-judge federal court drafted redistricting plans. The federal district court, however, decided that its plan would only be used if the Mississippi state court plan was not precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice, pursuant to the Voting Rights Act, in time for the March 1 filing deadline for state and federal candidates. As the Justice Department did not preclear the state court plan by the deadline, the district court plan was used for the 2002 elections. After finding that the federal district court had properly enjoined the enforcement of the state court plan, the Supreme Court turned to the issue of whether Section 2a(c) requires courts to order at-large elections if a state redistricting plan is not in place prior to court action. The original state plaintiffs and the United States as amicus curiae, had argued that the district court was required to draw single-member districts in crafting a congressional plan, while the original federal plaintiffs had contended that the district court was required to order at-large elections. Rejecting the original federal plaintiffs' argument, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the lower court was required to fashion a plan with single-member districts. However, writing two separate concurring opinions, a majority of the Court did not reach consensus as to the rationale behind its holding, thereby leaving the reconciliation of Sections 2a(c) and 2c unsettled. In the first concurrence (written by Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg), a plurality of the Court interpreted the at-large option in Section 2a(c)(5) as merely a "last-resort remedy," being applicable only in those cases where time constraints prevent a single-member plan from being drawn in time for an election. According to the Scalia concurrence: §2a(c) is inapplicable unless the state legislature and state and federal courts, have all failed to redistrict pursuant to §2c. How long is a court to await that redistricting before determining that §2a(c) governs a forthcoming election? Until, we think, the election is so imminent that no entity competent to complete redistricting pursuant to state law (including the mandate of §2c) is able to do so without disrupting the election process. Only then may §2a(c)'s stopgap provisions be invoked. Thus, §2a(c) cannot be properly applied—neither by a legislature nor a court—as long as it is feasible for federal courts to effect the redistricting mandated by §2c. So interpreted §2a(c) continues to function as it always has, as a last-resort remedy to be applied when, on the eve of a congressional election, no constitutional redistricting plan exists and there is no time for either the State's legislature or the courts to develop one. On the other hand, in a second concurrence (written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer), a separate plurality of the Court, while agreeing that the district court properly enjoined enforcement of the state court's plan and drew its own single-member plan under 2 U.S.C. § 2c, concluded that Section 2c "impliedly repealed" Section 2a(c). In a dissent, Justice O'Connor, (joined by Justice Thomas), found that when federal courts are asked to redistrict states that have lost representation after a reapportionment, and the existing plan has more districts than the new allocation permits and no new plan has been promulgated with the correct number of districts, the courts are required to order at-large elections in accordance with 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c). It could be argued that at-large elections will not be needed in the post-1960s era because the courts now intervene when the states reach impasse and fail to redistrict following the decennial census. Nevertheless, since the issue of whether federal law permits at-large congressional representation appears unsettled, if a House delegation were elected at large, it appears that their seating could be challenged in the House of Representatives on the grounds that their election violates Section 2c, which prohibits at-large elections. A challenged delegation might raise the defense that since Congress did not expressly repeal the contingencies enumerated in Section 2a(c) when it enacted Section 2c, it has therefore recognized the possibility of an at-large delegation, which should be seated, despite having been elected in violation of Section 2c. Perhaps the best argument that the single-member district requirement might be ignored by the House in certain circumstances stems from 19 th century House precedent. As noted in footnote 1 supra, at-large delegations were seated after they were prohibited in 1842. Moreover, a challenged delegation could argue that refusing to seat them would deprive an entire state of representation in the House. Thus, one would expect that the 19 th century precedent would be followed today, although such precedent might be less compelling if the organization of the House were at stake. One could also argue that the contingencies set forth in 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) still serve as a useful insurance policy to provide representation for a state that cannot, following the release of census numbers, complete the post-census redistricting process in time for the first congressional election. In 1967 Congress could have repealed Section 2a(c), as provided in the more far-reaching redistricting standards bill (H.R. 2508). Instead, Congress adopted P.L. 90-196, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c, which prohibits multi-member districts, leaving Section 2a(c) in place, which permits them. On January 28, 2003, Representative Hastings introduced H.R. 415 (108 th Cong.), a bill to establish a commission to make recommendations on the appropriate size of membership of the House of Representatives and the method by which Members are elected. Section 3(2) of H.R. 415 requires the commission to "examine alternatives to the current method by which Representatives are elected (including cumulative voting and proportional representation) to determine if such alternatives would make the House of Representatives a more representative body." Such recommendations, if ultimately enacted, could affect current federal statutory provisions governing single-member and at-large representation in the House of Representatives. H.R. 415 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and no further action has been taken to date.

Section 2c of Title 2 of the U.S. Code requires members of the House of Representatives to be elected from single-member districts, however, Section 2a(c) requires Representatives to be elected at large if a state fails to create new districts after the reapportionment of seats following a decennial census. These apparently contradictory provisions raise questions about whether and under what circumstances federal law permits at-large representation in the House of Representatives. The legislative history of 2 U.S.C. § 2c is sparse because it was adopted as a Senate floor amendment to a House-passed private bill. In 1967, the same year that Section 2c was adopted, Congress had contemplated, but failed to pass, a more comprehensive bill that would have repealed Section 2a(c), thereby removing the apparent statutory inconsistencies. Addressing the tension between Section 2a(c) and Section 2c, as applied to a Mississippi redistricting plan, the Supreme Court in Branch v. Smith held that a federal district court was required to craft single-member districts. Although the issue remains unsettled, it appears that Section 2a(c) could provide options to the House of Representatives to seat an at-large delegation. H.R. 415 (108th Cong.), would establish a commission to make recommendations on the method by which Members of the House are elected, including examining alternatives to the current method. Such recommendations, if ultimately enacted, could affect current federal statutory provisions governing single-member and at-large representation in the House of Representatives.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission Report asserted: Americans should not be exempt from carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling their identities to be securely verified when they enter the United States; nor should Canadians or Mexicans. Currently U.S. persons are exempt from carrying passports when returning from Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. The current system enables non-U.S. citizens to gain entry by showing minimal identification. The 9/11 experience shows that terrorists study and exploit America's vulnerabilities. Following the Commission's advice, Congress initiated the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) to fulfill a mandate by Congress in the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004 (Division B of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458 , Section 7209, signed December 17, 2004). The measure requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to develop and implement a plan as expeditiously as possible to require a passport or other document, or combination of documents, "deemed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to be sufficient to denote identity and citizenship," for all travelers entering the United States. On January 31, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security again tightened travel regulations with border states by requiring that all U.S. and Canadian citizens, 19 or older, present both a government-issued proof of identity (such as a driver's license) and proof of citizenship (such as a birth certificate) to cross a border by land or sea into the United States. For Americans and Canadians under the age of 18, only proof of citizenship (such as a birth certificate) is necessary. For U.S. citizens, U.S. government-issued passports and passport cards also are acceptable. Canadians can also use a government-issued passport. Both Americans and Canadians can present a valid NEXUS, SENTRI, or FAST card. Non-citizens can present a permanent residency card. Travelers from Bermuda can enter the United States by presenting a passport issued by the government of Bermuda or the United Kingdom. For Mexican citizens, including Mexican children, a passport and visa or border crossing card are required to enter the United States by land, sea, or air. As of February 1, 2008, the State Department increased passport fees by $3.00. The total cost of applying for a U.S. passport for those over 16 is $100—a $75 application fee and $25 execution fee. The total cost for children under 16 is $85—a $60 application fee and $25 execution fee. An additional $60 per application is required if expedited service is requested. Fees for a passport card are $20 for adults and $10 for children under 16, with an additional $25 execution fee for each when applying in person. Execution fees are not charged for passport or card applications submitted by mail. Since January 23, 2007, all people, including children, traveling by air between the United States and Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean have been required to present a passport or other valid travel document to enter the United States. A passport is not required for U.S. citizens traveling to or from a U.S. territory, such as the U.S. Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico. The 2007 change was poorly communicated to the American public, causing much confusion. Many Americans did not differentiate air from land and sea travel in the Western Hemisphere, resulting in many applying for passports who did not need them immediately. Furthermore, the change in passport requirements coincided with passport demands for spring break and families' summer travel plans. Based on work done for the Department of State by Bearingpoint, a private contractor that greatly underestimated passport demand, the Department was caught off guard in meeting the unprecedented numbers of passport applications throughout 2007, causing months of delays in many cases. Because of the backlog of passports, the Department of State hired large numbers of contractors. According to State Department officials, 60% of the 4,400 passport employees were from private contractor firms. Passport issuance in 2008 and 2009, reportedly, has been back to the usual four-to-six-week time frame for receiving passports. The Department of State fully implemented the final phase of passport requirements for travelers entering the United States by land and sea on June 1, 2009. Land crossing requirements were originally to take effect by December 31, 2007, but were delayed by Congress, especially because of concerns of some who represent states bordering with Canada and Mexico, as well as some with concerns about the effects on the tourism/cruise industry. Legislation changed the date for WHTI implementation at all ports of entry to either June 1, 2009, or when the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of State have certified compliance with specified requirements (Section B of that Act), whichever is later. As of June 1, 2009, travelers must have passports for all air, land, and sea crossings. U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 16, however, are allowed to present an original or copy of their birth certificate or other proof of citizenship. Groups of U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 19, when traveling in church, school, or social groups, or sports teams, and when entering under adult supervision, also can present birth certificates or other proof of citizenship, rather than a passport. The passport confusion that arose in 2007 resulted in straining the Department of State's ability to issue passports in a timely manner. Prior to 2007, standard passport wait times had been four to six weeks, but this lengthened to three or four months that year from the time of application to receipt of the passport. Following are tips to assist Americans with getting passports: For general information on how to apply or renew a passport and to download a passport application form, go to the State Department's website: http://travel.state.gov/passport/passport_1738.html . For checking the status of a passport application, go to http://travel.state.gov/passport/get/status/status_2567.html . For information on passport post office locations, call 1-800-275-8777 or go to the U.S. Postal Service website, http://www.usps.com/passport , to download a passport application form and to obtain passport costs. The National Passport Information Center's phone number is 1-877-487-2778. It is open from 6:00 a.m. to midnight (EST) Monday through Friday, and from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Saturday and Sunday. For information on WHTI passport policy from the Department of Homeland Security, go to http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/crossingborders/ . For information on implementation of passport policy at the border, see the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, website at http://www.cbp.gov . Both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) have distinct roles in passport policy. DHS is responsible for determining passport policies and regulations, whereas the State Department is responsible for implementing them. Some observers question whether having two departments involved is the most effective way to handle passport policy. Furthermore, some wonder if this dual-department approach to passport regulations and issuance may have contributed to the past-year's confusion and may create new confusion on passport changes in the future. Others believe that border security is of utmost importance to national security, and that having two agencies with passport responsibilities provides a dual layer of protection. Now that most Americans will need passports if they have any possibility of crossing any U.S. border, the cost of passports has become a concern to some. With the $3 increase in fees, bringing the total passport application cost for an adult to $100 and for children $85, a typical family of four would have to pay $370 to simply cross the United States border after June 1, 2009. Some who follow passport issues are concerned that this expense would be burdensome for many American families. The Department of State says that the current costs reflect the cost of doing background checks and expensive technology involved in securing identities. Accessibility to passport offices is a concern of many Americans in trying to get a passport. While there are many passport offices on the East and West coasts, they are much fewer in number with more distance between in the middle of the country. According to the Department of State, Passport Services opened a Tucson Passport Center in Arizona in 2008 and a Detroit Passport Agency in March 2009. Businesses that are involved with cross-border trade or travel (such as cruise lines) involving the United States, Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Bermuda are concerned that recent passport requirements will hinder their profits. Some Members of Congress sought to postpone passport requirements in order to delay businesses from being hurt and give them time to prepare. Senator Leahy stated, "With concerns about a recession on the way, the timing for clamping down on billions of dollars in trade and travel could not be worse." On the other hand, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, asserted, "It's time to grow up and recognize that if we're serious about this [terrorist] threat, we've got to take reasonable, measured, but nevertheless determined steps to getting better security."

Prior to 2007, little or no documentation was required to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, or the Caribbean. In December 2004, with the 9/11 Commission recommending tighter borders to help prevent another terrorist attack, Congress passed the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which now requires passports for anyone entering the United States. As of mid-2009, approximately 30% of American citizens hold a passport. After the January 2007 implementation of phase I of the new passport regulations (requiring passports when entering by air ), the Department of State was deluged with passport applications. The time necessary to get a passport expanded from the typical four to six weeks to several months, ruining many Americans' travel plans. On January 31, 2008, another change occurred. Government-issued proof of identity and citizenship documents are required to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean, according to the Department of Homeland Security. People under the age of 18, however, are allowed to present only proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate. Phase II, implemented on June 1, 2009, adds to the existing requirements that travelers have passports for all land and sea crossings. U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 16, however, are allowed to present an original or copy of their birth certificate or other proof of citizenship. Groups of U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 19, when traveling in church or school groups, social groups, or sports teams, and when entering under adult supervision, also can present birth certificates or other proof of citizenship, rather than a passport. This report will be updated as events warrant.

In 2001, lighting accounted for 8.8 % (101 billion kilowatt hours) of U.S. household electricity use. Incandescent lamps, which are commonly found in households, are highly inefficient sources of light because about 90% of the energy they use is lost as heat. For that reason, lighting has been one focus of efforts to increase the efficiency of household electricity consumption. Lighting manufacturers are now producing products that are significantly more energy-efficient than incandescent bulbs. Such lighting includes fluorescent bulbs. Long considered a more economical choice for commercial and industrial lighting, compact fluorescent light bulbs are becoming more attractive to household consumers. The primary difference between a compact fluorescent light bulb (CFL) and a fluorescent tube is the size. Unlike tubes, CFLs are made to fit into products that can be plugged into standard household light sockets like table lamps and ceiling fixtures. Compared to incandescent bulbs that use a heated filament to produce light, CFLs contain a gas that produces invisible ultraviolet (UV) light when the gas is excited by electricity. UV light hits a white coating inside the fluorescent bulb, which alters the light into light visible to a human eye. Because fluorescent bulbs do not use heat to create light, they are far more energy-efficient than regular incandescent bulbs. In the past, complaints about the high cost, harsh light quality, and the inability to use with a dimmer made CFLs less attractive to some consumers. However, improvements in technology have resulted in less expensive CFLs that illuminate more softly, emitting light similar to light from an incandescent bulb, that are capable of dimming. CFL sales have increased significantly in the past two years. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 290 million Energy Star-qualified CFLs were sold in 2007. That is nearly double the number sold in 2006 (the year that CFL market share increased from a steady 5% to 11%), and represents almost 20% of the U.S. light bulb market. The primary factors contributing to the rise in popularity of CFLs are their energy efficiency and longer life. According to the Department of Energy (DOE), CFLs use about 75% less energy than standard incandescent bulbs and last up to 10 times longer. Further, according to EPA, the increase in sales is due in part to increases in consumer education and promotion by Energy Star retail partners such as Wal-Mart, Lowe's, Home Depot, Costco, Ace Hardware, and Sam's Club. Another factor that may further increase the use of CFLs is the development of energy efficiency standards for lighting. Sections 321 and 322 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 , enacted December 12, 2007; referred to hereafter as the Energy Act) established energy efficiency standards for certain types of incandescent lamps, incandescent reflector lamps, and fluorescent lamps. The standards specify the maximum wattage that can be used to power lights within a range of lumens (a measure of the perceived power of light). For example, a standard North American incandescent light bulb that emits approximately 1,700 lumens uses 100 watts of power. A CFL emitting comparable lumens uses approximately 23 watts. The new standard would require incandescent lamps emitting comparable lumens to use no more than 72 watts. The deadlines for meeting the new standard fall between January 1, 2012, to January 1, 2014, depending on the range of lumens emitted by various bulbs. CFLs already meet the Energy Act's energy standard. The Energy Act has been interpreted by some as a prohibition on the sale or production of incandescent bulbs, or as a mandatory requirement to use CFLs. Neither is true. The Energy Act only establishes standards that incandescent bulbs must meet—it does not prohibit their use, nor does it mandate the use of CFLs. Mercury is a highly volatile, naturally occurring element. It conducts electricity, is liquid at room temperature, combines easily with other metals, and expands and contracts evenly with temperature change. These properties make mercury useful in a variety of household, medical, and industrial products and processes. Mercury is also a potent neurotoxin that can, at certain exposure levels, cause brain, lung, and kidney damage. Mercury is an essential component of CFLs that allows a bulb to be an efficient light source. Fluorescent bulbs, unlike many other mercury-containing consumer products, are among the few products for which non-mercury substitutes do not exist. Still, over the past 20 years, the mercury content in fluorescent tubes and bulbs has declined steadily. A CFL generally contains 2 to 6 milligrams (mg) of mercury (an amount that poses virtually no risk of harm ). By comparison, mercury has been present for decades in the following household products: watch batteries (25 mg), dental amalgams (500 mg), thermometers (500 mg to 2 grams (g)), thermostats (3 g), electrical switches and relays (3.5 g), and standard fluorescent tubes (up to 40 mg; lighting manufacturers now produce low-mercury fluorescent tubes that generally contain less than 9 mg of mercury). Increased use of CFLs has generated concern among some over the potential danger the bulbs may pose if broken in the home during use or after disposal. The amount of mercury that may be released by a CFL depends on a variety of factors, including a bulb's age at the time of disposal. As the bulb ages, the mercury content becomes bound to the glass, where it is not readily available for release into the environment unless it is burned (i.e., disposed of in an incinerator). Therefore, it is possible to essentially eliminate potential mercury releases from CFLs if they are not broken, particularly when new, or incinerated. Mercury is not released from CFLs during normal use. Consumers would be exposed to mercury only if a bulb were to break. At room temperature, some of a bulb's metallic mercury will evaporate and form mercury vapors; however, the danger posed from exposure to the amount of mercury in an individual CFL is minimal. Although the potential risk of harm associated with CFL use is relatively low, certain precautions are recommended to avoid spreading of mercury vapor. Several federal and state agencies have published cleanup and disposal recommendations for CFLs. Guidance from the different agencies varies slightly, but generally recommends the following steps: open a window and leave the room for 15 minutes, and keep pregnant women, children, and pets away from the area until it is cleaned up; gather glass fragments and powder—on hard surfaces, use stiff paper or cardboard (do not vacuum), and on carpet, pick up large pieces wearing disposable gloves; use sticky tape, such as duct tape, to pick up any remaining small glass fragments and powder; wipe the area clean with damp paper towels or disposable wet wipes; and place all waste and cleaning materials in a glass jar with a metal lid or in a sealed plastic bag, and immediately place all materials outdoors and check with local or state government about disposal requirements. In guidance provided by the Energy Star program, it has been noted that the use of CFLs in place of incandescent bulbs could actually reduce the amount of mercury emissions to the environment. Coal-fired power plants currently account for 40% of mercury emissions in the United States. During a five-year span, by some estimates, a coal-fired power plant emits 9.3 mg of mercury in the course of producing the same amount of electricity needed to power an incandescent bulb, compared to 2.3 mg of mercury emissions from a CFL over the same period. The use of CFLs in place of incandescent bulbs could also lead to comparable decreases in carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide emissions—all pollutants emitted from coal-fired power plants. Any additional mercury emissions associated with CFLs could be minimized if bulbs are kept out of the waste stream (i.e., recycled rather than discarded) when spent. Products containing mercury may meet the federal regulatory definition of hazardous waste. Pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), EPA has established regulations regarding the transport, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. However, households are essentially exempt from RCRA. This means that household hazardous waste (e.g., paint, batteries, thermostats, certain cleaning fluids, and pesticides) may be disposed of in municipal solid waste landfills or incinerators. The mercury levels in CFLs would potentially cause them to be deemed household hazardous waste. As such, EPA suggests that the bulbs not be discarded in household garbage "if better disposal options exist." EPA recommends that household consumers contact their state or local environmental regulatory agency for information about proper disposal options. If household garbage disposal is the only option, EPA recommends that certain precautions be taken. Since CFLs discarded in the trash will likely break and release mercury, EPA recommends that bulbs be put in two plastic bags and sealed before placement in outdoor trash or a protected outdoor location. Since virtually all components of a fluorescent bulb can be recycled, EPA recommends recycling as the preferred method to manage spent CFLs. The scope of programs to recycle CFLs varies from state to state. For example, a recycling program operating in Minnesota allows residents to leave CFLs at any of hundreds of retail stores across the state. A program in Indiana accepts CFLs at certain Sears stores. Also, regional groups have formed to develop recycling options. For example, the Northwest Compact Fluorescent Lamp Recycling Project is in the process of designing a pilot project to recycle CFLs in Oregon and Washington. Another possibility is that more retailers will begin to accept CFLs for proper disposal—IKEA currently accepts spent CFLs, and Home Depot has begun to accept them at stores in Canada (but, not yet in the United States). Generally, recycling is not widely available for waste products that are not generated in sufficient amounts to make it economically feasible for recyclers. It is anticipated that, as more spent CFLs enter the waste stream, recycling opportunities will increase. Further, EPA is currently working with CFL manufacturers and U.S. retailers to expand disposal options. Finally, under § 321(h) of the Energy Act, EPA is directed to submit to Congress a report describing recommendations relating to the means by which the federal government may reduce or prevent the release of mercury during the manufacture, transport, storage, and disposal of light bulbs. A perceived danger posed by the use of CFLs has been fed, at least in part, by some media reports claiming hidden costs and dangers associated their use. These reports escalated after an incident involving a broken CFL in a home in Prospect, Maine, on March 14, 2007. After contacting various sources, the homeowner sought cleanup advice from the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). A DEP representative advised the homeowner to contact an environmental remediation company to remove any residual mercury from the home. The homeowner was given a $2,000 cleanup estimate. The Maine DEP later acknowledged that because CFLs were relatively new to the market, department personnel had been unfamiliar with proper cleanup and disposal requirements for the bulbs. The agency subsequently posted cleanup guidance on its website, along with an account titled the "History and facts on CFL breakage in Prospect, Maine." The initial incident was repeated by various media outlets, some of which exaggerated the potential danger and cost associated with CFL use and disposal. For example, one journal stated, in part, [T]here is no problem disposing of incandescents when their life is over. You can throw them in the trash can and they won't hurt the garbage collector. They won't leech deadly compounds into the air or water. They won't kill people working in the landfills. The same cannot be said about the mercury-containing CFLs. As noted previously, significantly higher levels of mercury have been present for decades in several other consumer products. There have been no reports of landfill worker fatalities related to mercury exposure. Additional elements of the incident in Maine have been widely repeated, particularly the claim that it will cost a consumer $2,000 to clean up a broken CFL at home. Even though many of the original details and claims have been refuted, the Maine incident is often cited in online news stories and Web logs, particularly when the potential dangers associated with CFLs are discussed.

Compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs), a smaller version of fluorescent tubes, are produced with technology that allows them to fit into standard lighting products such as lamps and ceiling fixtures. The bulbs use one-fifth to one-quarter the energy and can last 10 times longer than traditional incandescent light bulbs. These factors have led to a significant increase in the sales of CFLs. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CFL sales doubled in 2007 and now represent 20% of the U.S. light bulb market. Sales may be expected to increase with the implementation of new energy efficiency standards for lighting specified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, enacted December 19, 2007). Those standards require certain light bulbs to use 25% to 30% less energy than today's products beginning in 2012. CFLs already meet the standards. The increased use of CFLs has led to concern among some groups over the presence in the bulbs of mercury, a potent neurotoxin. By way of example, EPA has likened the amount of mercury in individual bulbs to that which could fit on the tip of a ballpoint pen—ranging from 2 to 6 milligrams (mg). At these levels, mercury is virtually harmless to consumers. Still, EPA recommends that caution be taken in cleaning up broken CFLs to minimize potential mercury exposure. EPA also recommends that spent bulbs be recycled, instead of disposed of with household garbage, in areas where CFL recycling is available. (Federal regulations that apply to the disposal of mercury-containing products (e.g., lighting, switches, thermometers) do not apply to households.) Further, EPA has noted that increased CFL use may actually reduce overall mercury emissions to the environment by potentially reducing power use—coal-fired power plants are the greatest individual source of mercury emissions in the United States. This report discusses reasons why CFL sales have increased dramatically in the past two years, concerns that have arisen regarding their use and disposal, and some media reports that have exaggerated the potential danger associated with the mercury in CFLs.

Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) to provide statutory protection for employees against religious discrimination by certain employers. Among other things, Title VII generally prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their religious beliefs and requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious practices. However, certain religious organizations may be exempt from some of the prohibitions of Title VII. Title VII is considered a model for other employment nondiscrimination legislation, and Congress may choose to incorporate protections offered by Title VII into new civil rights bills. This report analyzes the scope of Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination, exemptions for religious organizations, and requirements for accommodations. The CRA established protections for civil rights across a wide spectrum, including, for example, education, federally funded programs, and employment. Title VII of the CRA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees, including the federal government and state and local governments. Individuals who believe they are victims of employment discrimination may file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is responsible for enforcing individual Title VII claims against private employers. The Department of Justice enforces Title VII against state and local governments but may do so only after the EEOC has conducted an initial investigation. Section 701 of Title VII defines religion to include all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to [sic] an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. This definition of religion forms the basis of requirements for employers under Title VII. Under the statutory definition, employers cannot use an employee's (or applicant's) religious observance or religious practice against the employee if the employer can reasonably accommodate the observance or practice without undue hardship on the business. If an employer discriminates based on a religious observance or practice that can be reasonably accommodated, the employer may be in violation of Title VII's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion. Sometimes whether a particular observance or practice is "religious" may be disputed. Religious practices and observances are generally considered "to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views." The belief does not need to be accepted by any religious group and does not need to be accepted by the religious group to which the individual belongs in order to qualify as religious under Title VII. Courts have upheld this understanding that a religious belief does not need to meet objective tests of reasonableness, but instead must be a sincerely held belief of the individual regardless of its broader acceptance. While Title VII and its regulations provide a broad prohibition on discrimination based on religion as it is defined alone, Section 703 of Title VII more specifically defines unlawful employment practices under the CRA. This section prohibits employers from using religion as a basis for hiring or discharging any individual. It further prohibits employers from discriminating "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of the individual's religion. It also prohibits employers from limiting or separating employees or applicants "in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee...." Title VII generally prohibits employers from treating employees of one religion differently from the way they treat employees of another religion. Employers cannot consider religion when scoring results of employment-related tests; cannot use religion as a motivating factor for any action, even if other factors also motivated the action; cannot retaliate against any individual who opposed an employer's action that is unlawful under Title VII or participated in the investigation of the unlawful action; and cannot publish or advertise any preference based on religion, unless that preference is based on a bona fide occupational qualification. The discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes harassment that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Furthermore, an employee cannot be required to participate in any religious activity as part of his or her employment. Title VII does not apply to all employers, particularly with respect to religious discrimination. In addition to exempting employers with fewer than 15 employees, Title VII includes exceptions that allow certain employers to consider religion in employment decisions. Specifically, Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination does not apply to "a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment [i.e., hiring and retention] of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities." However, the statute does not define "religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society." There is no definitive judicial standard to determine whether an organization qualifies for the exemption. In an example of the varied understanding of the scope of the exemption, a three-judge panel from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9 th Circuit issued three opinions, each applying a different standard. The court later amended its decision and issued a majority opinion adopting four criteria that a religious organization must satisfy to qualify for the exemption. The court's standard requires that an entity is not subject to Title VII "if it is organized for a religious purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying out that religious purpose, holds itself out to the public as an entity for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not engage primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts." The Supreme Court declined to review the case, leaving lower courts without a uniform standard to apply. However, lower court decisions generally have appeared to agree upon several factors relevant to deciding whether an organization qualifies for the exemption. Courts have considered (1) the purpose or mission of the organization; (2) the ownership, affiliation, or source of financial support of the organization; (3) requirements placed upon staff and members of the organization (faculty and students if the organization is a school); and (4) the extent of religious practices in or the religious nature of products and services offered by the organization. Title VII also provides two more specific exemptions. One separate, but similar, exemption applies specifically to religious educational institutions. That exemption allows such institutions "to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if [the institution] is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular [organization], or if the curriculum of [the institution] is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion." The other exemption provided in Title VII allows employers to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if those factors are "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." This exemption based on bona fide occupational qualifications has been construed narrowly. Accordingly, courts have deemed valid discriminatory qualifications to arise only in situations where religion plays an extremely significant part of the work environment, including, for example, jobs where employee safety is threatened because of the employee's religious affiliation. Exemptions for religious organizations in the context of Title VII are not absolute. Once an organization qualifies as an entity eligible for Title VII exemption, it is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion in its employment decisions. However, the exemption does not allow qualifying organizations to discriminate on any other basis forbidden by Title VII. Thus, although a religious organization may consider an employee or applicant's religion without violating Title VII, the organization may still violate Title VII if it considers the individual's race, color, national origin, or sex. Furthermore, the exemptions in Title VII appear to apply only with respect to employment decisions regarding hiring and firing of employees based on religion. Once an organization makes a decision to employ an individual, the organization may not discriminate on the basis of religion regarding the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, privileges, etc. In other words, religious organizations that decide to hire individuals with other religious beliefs cannot later choose to discriminate against those individuals with regard to wages or other benefits that the organization provides to employees. It is important to note one more exemption relevant to Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimination. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects religious organizations' right to choose spiritual leaders. Even before Title VII granted a statutory exemption to religious organizations' hiring decisions generally, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the "freedom to select the clergy" has "federal constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state interference." Title VII's nondiscrimination requirements (e.g., prohibitions on discrimination based on sex) may interfere with this constitutional freedom specific to clergy. This constitutional "ministerial exception" reconciles Title VII with the First Amendment by allowing religious organizations to select clergy without regard to any of Title VII's restrictions yet requiring that employment decisions made regarding other positions within the organization comply with Title VII's requirements or exemptions. Prior to the Supreme Court's recognition of the ministerial exception in 2012, each of the circuit courts also recognized the exception. However, the circuit courts differed on the scope of the exemption, particularly which employees qualified as ministerial employees. The Supreme Court declined to "adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister," deciding only the status of the employee in the case before it. Although the Court did not identify a definitive standard, it considered four factors that may be relevant to determining whether an employee is ministerial: (1) the formal title given to the employee by the religious institution; (2) the substantive actions reflected by the title (i.e., the qualifications required to be granted such a title); (3) the employee's understanding and use of the title; and (4) the important religious functions performed by employees holding that title. Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from acting on the basis of employees' observances and practices only if they can be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship on the employer's business. In other words, the employer may discriminate on the basis of observances and practices that cannot be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship. EEOC regulations provide guidelines for what constitutes reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Once an employee requests religious accommodation, the employer must consider whether the requested accommodation is reasonable or what reasonable alternatives might be provided. If more than one accommodation is possible without causing undue hardship, the EEOC determines the reasonableness of the chosen accommodation by examining the alternatives considered by the employer and the alternatives actually offered to the employee. If more than one manner of accommodation would not cause undue hardship, "the employer ... must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities." Employee requests for accommodation arise most often because religious practices conflict with work schedules. EEOC guidelines suggest three possible accommodation alternatives in such situations. First, the employer may permit a voluntary substitute policy under which employees can find substitutes to cover their tasks during the conflict. Second, employers may create a flexible work schedule, including flexible arrival and departure times, floating holidays, flexible breaks, use of lunch time for early departure, and staggered work hours. Third, the employer may consider a lateral transfer for individuals whose religious practices cannot be accommodated in their current position. Another common scenario in which employees request accommodations arises under a provision in collective bargaining agreements requiring employees to join a labor organization or pay an amount equivalent to dues to that organization. When an employee objects to this requirement on religious grounds, the EEOC recommends that the organization make an exception for that employee or allow the employee to donate the equivalent of the amount due to a charitable organization. Requests for accommodation may also arise when an employee's religious beliefs conflict with a work requirement, such as performing abortions, treating gay patients, or complying with dress codes. In order for these accommodations to be appropriate under Title VII, they must not cause undue hardship to the employer. Employers cannot claim undue hardship on "a mere assumption that many more people ... may also need accommodation." The regulations provide two general bases that may justify undue hardship: cost and seniority rights. An employer may refuse to accommodate an employee's religious practice if "the accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost." The EEOC determines whether an accommodation exceeds a de minimis cost by evaluating the cost incurred to the particular employer and the number of employees that will need the accommodation. Generally, administrative costs of rescheduling are considered de minimis costs. An employer may also refuse to accommodate because the accommodation would interfere with the preference guaranteed by a seniority system. Because seniority systems create "a neutral way of minimizing the number of occasions when an employee must work on a day that he would prefer to have off," Title VII does not require that seniority systems "must give way when necessary to accommodate religious observances."

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. It prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their religious beliefs and requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious practices. Title VII defines religion broadly and relies on an individual's subjective understanding of his or her beliefs, which may result in broad protections for employees with sincerely held beliefs. Congress has recognized that restrictions on employment decisions by religious employers may interfere with the employer's religious practice. As a result, Title VII includes exemptions for religious entities, allowing qualifying employers to consider religion in hiring decisions. Such an exemption allows the religious organization to hire individuals who share the same beliefs as the employer. However, Congress did not define which organizations would qualify for exemption from Title VII and courts have not established a definitive standard. If an organization does qualify for exemption and therefore is allowed to consider religion in employment decisions, it is not permitted to base employment decisions on other prohibited factors under Title VII. In addition to prohibiting discrimination in employment decisions, Title VII requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for current employees' religious practices. Reasonable accommodations may include scheduling adjustments or reassignment to other comparable positions that would not interfere with the employee's religious exercise. The employer is not required to make such an accommodation, however, if doing so would pose an undue hardship on the employer's business or operations. This report reviews the scope of Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination and its exemptions for religious organizations. It analyzes which organizations may qualify for exemption and also explains the related constitutional protection known as the ministerial exception that often arises in the context of Title VII claims. Finally, the report examines Title VII's accommodations requirement, noting what accommodations may be required and which may be declined as an undue hardship to the employer.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1996 called on the Department of Defense (DOD) to embark upon an initiative to develop cruise missile defense (CMD) programs emphasizing operational efficiency and affordability. Advanced cruise missiles (CMs)—those designed with stealthy capabilities to evade detection—were noted as a prominent threat prompting the need for effective CMD. This CMD initiative was to be coordinated with other air defense efforts; that is, with "cruise missile defense programs ... and ballistic missile defense programs ... mutually supporting" each other. Three years later, in conjunction with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1999, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted: "[T]he committee does not believe that the Department of Defense has adequately integrated its various cruise missile defense programs into a coherent architecture and development plan." DOD has indicated a commitment to developing CMD capabilities—within its larger strategy of air defense requirements—that demonstrate operational effectiveness. Unlike past approaches to CMD that critics assert were "stovepiped"—individually driven by the Services' respective objectives—current and future programs are meant to emphasize effectiveness based on inter-Service synergy, or jointness. Whether or not the Pentagon will be able to integrate CMD plans to a point of effective interoperability is an important question. Many analysts believe that no mission area will rely more on jointness than detection and intercept of advanced CMs. An examination of CMD development, therefore, offers some insight into the progress DOD is making in terms of increased joint warfighting capability. CMD today is primarily an issue of force protection for U.S. troops deployed in a theater of conflict. The CM threat to the United States appears lower than the theater CM threat, but it also seems likely to grow. Given ongoing proliferation challenges, there is general consensus that CM technology will continue to spread. Many claim that the United States' dominance of manned military aviation will drive many countries to adopt CMs as the "poor man's air force." By 2015, the CIA estimates that up to two dozen nations will be able to pose a serious CM threat—primarily in theater but also through forward-deployed weapons platforms. Also, the U.S. failure to detect several Iraqi CMs launched against American assets during Operation Iraqi Freedom has led some in DOD to now deem CMD a "critical mission area." CMs present many operational challenges. Effective CMD requires rapid and accurate performance of a series of military tasks collectively known as the "kill chain." First, surveillance radars must detect manned and unmanned aircraft; including CMs. The second major step involves continuously tracking the aircraft along its course, a process complicated by what may be an elusive flight path. Next, the aircraft must be identified. It must be concretely determined whether the airborne object is a CM, or a friendly or neutral aircraft. This process, called combat identification, is vital to lowering the chances that a friendly or neutral aircraft might be erroneously identified as a threat, and attacked—a scenario that unfortunately played out several times during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Once a CM threat is identified, a decision on how to engage the CM must be made: Which defense assets—naval, ground, or airborne platforms—will be used to try to intercept the CM? The final step of the kill chain involves actually intercepting or neutralizing the CM with weapons—missiles and gunfire being the only two current options. Other technologies, such as directed energy weapons, are being studied. The U.S. military has historically fielded Service-oriented CMD systems—independent land-, air-, and sea-based weapons platforms with CMD applications. Although this strategy has yielded fairly effective point defense capabilities against conventional airborne threats, most analysts agree that an advanced CM threat will require more effective defenses. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), for example, is attempting to augment its sensor coverage capabilities, and link with Service weapons systems for target engagement of low flying CMs. Efforts are also underway to marry military sensors and radars employed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to provide comprehensive air surveillance of the United States. Increased effectiveness against advanced CMs will require improved joint surveillance, tracking and combat identification capabilities, and increased weapons range. The Pentagon's efforts to improve CMD capabilities are addressed through multiple offices and strategies. Some of the most prominent ones are described below. JTAMDO was established in 1997 to ensure the coordination of CMD and ballistic missile defense programs as well as to integrate DOD's theater air and missile defense requirements. As a result of restructuring under the Unified Command Plan of 2002, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) took responsibility of global missile defense and JTAMDO was tasked with a support role to STRATCOM. JTAMDO's current mission is to develop joint capabilities and structures for an air and missile defense family of systems. JTAMDO's current activities also include force protection, homeland air security, assessing ballistic missile defense architectures, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense requirements. SIAP Joint Program Office (JPO) is tasked with leading efforts to develop a SIAP—the integration of the Services' air defense technologies into a total, shared environmental awareness. Presently, the platforms of any one Service are only able to provide a partial picture of the total threat environment. A SIAP is intended to detect and continuously track all airborne objects and ensure that all allies within a theater have the same tracking data. Within a theater, where a myriad of assets—friendly, hostile, and neutral—may be concurrently airborne, a SIAP would be central to timely decision-making regarding threat responses. The level of awareness offered by a SIAP will be most dependent upon newer data linkages, and the ability to track every object with one clear signature. SIAP JPO has conducted technical assessments to develop an integrated architecture for data sharing. The technology is primarily aimed at accelerating the interoperability of those systems designed for airborne threat detection and those designed for intercept—commonly known as the "sensor to shooter" linkage. JSSEO projects fielding this technology in September 2005. It estimates SIAP development costs to be around $160 million from FY2004 to FY2009, and the Services will need to spend $600 million to incorporate SIAP technology into their existing weapons platforms. DOD hopes for a SAIP initial operational capability (IOC) by 2012. JCIET was deactivated in February 2005. When active, JCIET assessed issues associated with combat identification and finding doctrinal, technological, and procedural solutions to reduce the incidence of fratricide. JCIET coordinated joint exercises in which multiple Service platforms are tested for performance in detection, tracking, and identification of airborne threats—CMs being among them. The data collection and evaluation from these exercises aids in determining how to address the advanced CM threat. JCIET efforts aided combat identification capabilities and can therefore contribute to a clearer air picture. IFC attempts to decouple Service-specific and platform-specific fire control radars from their weapons to create over-the-horizon and joint CMD intercept capabilities. Presently, fire control radars control specific weapons. The Navy, for example, can intercept a CM with a surface-to-air missile guided by the ship's Aegis radar. A Patriot missile can intercept CMs based on its radar's information, and an F-15's radar would guide its air-to-air missiles to intercept a CM. IFC would enable an airborne surveillance platform such as an E-2C Hawkeye, E-3 AWACS, or the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) to relay CM tracking information to either ground- or air-based assets for engagement. Furthermore, once ground-based weapons, for example, have been sent to intercept the CM, radars external to the launch platform will be able to direct the weapons towards the CM. These objectives of IFC would remove the horizon or line-of-sight limitations that currently exist for CMD, thus increasing the time and distance for intercept. Decoupling the fire control radar from the weapon could improve capabilities against stealthy CMs by providing numerous and supporting surveillance perspectives. Combined with the goals of a single integrated air picture, IFC would create a much wider and more defensible area of coverage against advanced CMs. IFC efforts for missile defense are now being undertaken within the Army's Integrated Fire Control Product Office and the Navy's IFC counter air program office. Generally at issue is whether or not DOD has adequately responded to congressional directives on CMD. This question is best addressed by examining the three main parts of the 1996 congressional CMD initiative: a suitable coordination of CMD with ballistic missile defense (BMD) efforts, the development of CMD for near-term as well as advanced CM threats, and affordability and operational effectiveness for all CMD efforts. Congress directed DOD to undertake BMD and CMD efforts in a mutually supportive fashion. Some argue that Pentagon efforts on CMD have taken a back seat to BMD efforts. In terms of resource allocation, much more focus has been placed on ballistic missile defense than on CMD. In its budget request for FY2005, for example, DOD sought $9.2 billion for the Missile Defense Agency—the office tasked with BMD—and asked for $239 million toward the development of CMD. On the one hand, it can be argued that BMD must remain paramount given the known ballistic missile threat—nuclear missiles are already targeted at the United States and enemy ballistic missiles have already taken a toll on U.S. troops during wartime. On the other hand, some contend that the current level of prioritization may be too lopsided. As noted by the Defense Science Board, the CM threat is highly unpredictable and advanced CMs could emerge quickly and unexpectedly. In relation to the congressional directive to address near-term and future airborne threats, DOD has stressed effective theater and air missile defense as a prime objective. In addition to upgrading many of the Services' individual CMD weapons platforms, DOD is working toward many of the strategies relevant to future CMD—a single integrated air picture, better combat identification, and integrated fire control among them. DOD anticipates that such building blocks will enable the employment of a joint engagement zone (JEZ) for theater war fighting between 2015 and 2020. Currently, theater commanders try to reduce the chance of fratricide by separating CMD forces into distinct zones: missile engagement zones and fighter engagement zones. This separation, however, also reduces effectiveness. A JEZ is intended to enable interoperability among the Services' sensors and weapons systems for offensive and defensive operations. Will the CMD challenges inherent to creating a JEZ really be overcome by 2010? To do so would require adequate investments of time and effort by the Pentagon. However, JTAMDO, for example, estimates that as little as 20% of its time and manpower is currently going toward CMD efforts. At the same time, it estimates that upwards of 40% of its resources are being put toward support of the initial defensive operations of BMD. Moreover, JTAMDO resources are being expended toward homeland air security coordination, force protection, and WMD defense requirements. Although some measure of action toward addressing the CM threat is being taken, the level of urgency remains an issue—as DOD may now deem other defense activities more pressing. Congress noted that CMD measures should be undertaken with operational effectiveness as a core criterion. Since interoperability of resources remains the paramount feature in the Pentagon's activities to develop effective CMD, consequences associated with jointness are a key factor to monitor. Further, several CMD objectives will likely enable other mission areas. An effective SIAP, for example, not only will offer CMD applications but also will enable counter-air operations and battlefield interdiction efforts. Increased jointness associated with CMD efforts may also create some level of organizational friction, and Congress may come under pressure to provide oversight to resolve Service "turf battles." As CMD efforts become more integrated, Service control over traditionally clear boundaries may get cloudier. With enhanced IFC, for example, Air Force or Navy assets may be able to direct ground-based weapons that are currently under Army control. It is possible that narrow Service interests may hinder the implementation of—and thus effectiveness of—future joint CMD capabilities. Moreover, will the Services' CMD operational overlap lead to a reorganization of which Services control—and are funded by Congress for—certain weapons systems and programs? The congressional directive to develop affordable CMD measures is an important issue in terms of procurement. Current cost-exchange ratios associated with CMs favor attackers over defenders; cruise missiles can be cheap and defenses are costly. For example, Patriot missiles, bought at roughly $2.5 million apiece, can be effective interceptors for incoming CMs, but those CMs may be simple designs costing only a couple hundred thousand dollars apiece. Moreover, intercept costs are only one of many kill chain expenditures that can make CMD forces much more expensive than the CM threat. On the whole, the Pentagon seems to have promoted the pursuit of advanced CMD programs to combat sophisticated CM attacks. In terms of simple CM threats, however, more resources may be needed to produce less costly but nonetheless effective defenses. DOD's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has a low-cost cruise missile defense program that focuses on countering low-tech CMs by reducing the cost of interceptors. DARPA hopes to develop CMD interceptors that would cost as little as $40,000. Even cheaper intercept technologies may be required for cost-effective CMD, especially if faced with large-scale attacks by cheap CMs. Inexpensive but proven "jamming" technology (e.g., high-power microwaves) that can disrupt CM guidance systems might be a potentially useful approach. Also, point defense weapons, such as radar-guided machine guns with high rates of fire, could be employed against less sophisticated CMs. A final consideration pertains to the deactivation of JCIET. Combat identification remains, and is likely to remain one of the most challenging aspects of CMD. Overseers of DOD's activities may wish to ask why the department deactivated the only organization dedicated specifically to improving joint CMD combat identification capabilities. It is not evident that other organizations, such as JTAMDO, have increased their work on CMD combat identification issues to make up for JCIET's demise. Nor is it clear that improvement in other facets of CMD will make up for ineffective combat identification. If a friendly or neutral manned aircraft is inadvertently shot down by U.S. CMD platforms in the future, DOD's decision to deactivate JCIET may come under intense scrutiny.

Congress has expressed interest in cruise missile defense for years. Cruise missiles (CMs) are essentially unmanned attack aircraft—vehicles composed of an airframe, propulsion system, guidance system, and weapons payload. They may possess highly complex navigation and targeting systems and thus have the capability to sustain low, terrain-hugging flight paths as well as strike with great accuracy. CMs can be launched from numerous platforms—air-, land-, or sea-based—and they can be outfitted with either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Department of Defense is pursuing several initiatives that seek to improve capabilities against an unpredictable cruise missile threat. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a part of the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information technology issues and policies. Among its objectives, it has a mandate to provide greater access for all Americans to telecommunications services; to provide support for U.S. attempts to open foreign telecommunications and information markets; to advise the Secretary of Commerce, the President, and Vice President and the executive branch in international telecommunications and information negotiations; to fund research grants for new technologies and their applications; and to assist non-profit organizations in converting to digital transmission in the 21 st century. Generally, congressional policymakers have supported the NTIA's mandate and objectives through the appropriations process. The recent history of the NTIA budget, FY2000-FY2007, is as follows (appropriations for FY2008 will be included once the final bill has been passed): It should be noted that in FY2001, the Clinton Administration requested additional funding for digitizing existing public broadcasting transmissions and construction of new public digital broadcasting facilities. While the final appropriations did not match the Clinton Administration's request of $423 million, it represented a substantial increase in NTIA's historical budget. Congress has generally maintained consistent funding for NTIA in its appropriations, regardless of the request. For FY2009 , the Bush Administration has proposed a continued reduction in the NTIA budget, primarily reflected in eliminating NTIA's program to construct and maintain public telecommunications facilities. The Administration also sees NTIA having a larger role in national emergency planning (see below). Until FY2004, the NTIA budget had three major components: salaries and expenses; information infrastructure grants programs; and public telecommunications facilities, planning and construction. However, the infrastructure grants program was eliminated in FY2005. In both FY2006 and FY2007, the Bush Administration requested ending funding for the public telecommunications facilities, planning and construction program. This portion of the NTIA budget includes funding to maintain ongoing programs for domestic and international policy development, federal spectrum and related research. For FY2009, the Bush Administration has requested $19.2 million. According to the Administration, this would sustain current efforts to provide basic research, analytical, and management topics of interest to the U.S. telecommunications and information sectors of the economy. Other administrative and policy responsibilities that fall to NTIA but are not separate program functions include domestic and international telecommunications policymaking. The NTIA advises the President, Vice President and Secretary of Commerce on international telecommunications treaties and represents U.S. positions and policies at international conferences, such as the World Radio Conference held by the International Telecommunication Union. The NTIA also advises the executive branch on ways to implement the 1996 Telecommunications Act ( P.L. 104-104 ), further competition in telecommunications and develop "technology neutral" telecommunications policies. At the same time, it has produced a series of reports on the "digital divide" in America—who comprises this divide and what policies may help close the divide. The NTIA also is overseeing the transition of the management of the Internet domain name system to the private sector. Spectrum Policy. Among the many administrative functions that also fall under salaries and expenses is management of the U.S. spectrum for federal use. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has the primary role of managing the non-federal portion of the spectrum, which not only includes private sector use, but state and local government use of the spectrum as well. The NTIA also advises the President and executive branch on national spectrum policy, manages the federal portion of the spectrum for public safety use, and encourages policies that provide greater private sector use of existing broadcast spectrum. Domain Names. The Department of Commerce, through NTIA, maintains formal oversight over the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the private, non-profit corporation which serves as the technical coordinator of the domain name system. ICANN's authority is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Commerce and NTIA. The MOU was intended to provide the transition of the management of the domain name system to the private sector, with the United States and other governments participating as minority stakeholders. The NTIA is currently the accredited U.S. government's representative to ICANN's Government Advisory Committee (GAC). Digital Transition. The third NTIA program that the Bush Administration has requested funding for comes out of the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act. That law—and new NTIA program—called for the creation of a Digital Transition and Safety Public Fund, which offset receipts from the auction of licenses to use electromagnetic spectrum recovered from discontinued analog television signals. The Bush Administration began setting these reimbursable funds at $45 million in FY2007. The receipts would fund the following programmatic functions at NTIA: a digital-analog converter box program to assist consumers in meeting the 2009 deadline for receiving television broadcasts in digital format; public safety interoperable communications grants, which will be made to ensure that public safety agencies have a standardized format for sharing voice and data signals on the radio spectrum; New York City 9/11 digital transition funding, until the planned Freedom Tower is built; assistance to low-power television stations, for conversion from analog to digital transition; a national alert and tsunami warning program; and funding to enhance a national alert system as stated in the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004. The PTFPC program in NTIA assists public broadcasting stations, state and local governments, Indian tribes, and non-profit organizations construct facilities to bring educational and cultural programs to the U.S. public using broadcast and non-broadcast telecommunications and information technologies. The program provides competitive grants to public broadcasting organizations to plan, buy and employ new broadcast equipment and services nationwide. The public broadcast system had a mandate to convert all of its television broadcasts to digital by May 31, 2003. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting has reported that most, but not all, of its public broadcast members have me that goal. For FY2009, the Bush Administration has requested zero funding, to close out existing digital construction and conversion projects and to end NTIA's role in this area. The Bush Administration is seeking to place all funding for construction of public broadcasting facilities and conversion of analog broadcast to digital in the federal funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, so it can expedite digital conversion. In FY2005 , the Bush Administration requested the termination of NTIA's information infrastructure grants program, called the Technology Opportunity Program (TOP). Congress agreed with this request and eliminated funding for this program. TOP was a competitive, merit-based matching grant program that was started in FY1994 to provide emerging telecommunications and information technologies to grant recipients in new and innovative ways. The Bush Administration and Congress agreed that this program had successfully served its purpose of creating new pilot programs in areas not served or underserved by telecommunications and Internet technologies. While some policymakers have called for new funding for this program, no new legislation authorizing appropriations has been introduced to date. Policymakers continue to examine the proper role of NTIA in supporting its programs and policies, as well as the overall budget for NTIA to support its mission. According to some, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 set into law a de-regulatory environment that requires less, not more, federal direction of telecommunications and information technology use. The explosive growth of the Internet since the mid-1990s has reached nearly every part of America, and Internet access is virtually ubiquitous. Therefore, beyond budget issues, the role of NTIA has changed in some policy areas. Two important issues facing NTIA's administration of public telecommunications policy are domain name registration and use of spectrum. Regarding domain names, the expiration of the Department of Commerce/NTIA MOU with ICANN on September 30, 2006, has led to speculation over whether, and how, the MOU might be renewed. IT also has raised concerns over the extent to which (if at all) NTIA might ultimately relinquish control over ICANN and the domain name system. Second, some are concerned that NTIA is seeking to develop a larger and broader policy role in spectrum management as a result of losing funding in other program areas, such as the TOP program and perhaps eventually the PTFPC program. Because spectrum and its use is an important alternative to terrestrial communications transmission and reception, federal policy regarding its use and applications is an important national issue. Some question whether NTIA's evolving role in spectrum management is being fully coordinated with other federal institutions, such as that of the Federal Communications Commission. A second important issue is the role of NTIA in the auction and management of spectrum. The third NTIA program that is administered by NTIA but not directly funded by appropriated money comes out of the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act. That law ( P.L. 109-171 ) called for the creation of a Digital Transition and Safety Public Fund, which would provide funding for further use of the electromagnetic spectrum, by offsetting receipts received from the auction of licenses to use the older analog spectrum for other purposes. The initial auction was held on January 24, 2008. The receipts from the auction will fund the following programmatic functions at NTIA, perhaps the most notable (and receiving the most public attention) is a digital-analog converter box program to assist consumers in meeting the February 2009 deadline for receiving television broadcasts in digital format. Congress is watching this transition period, and NTIA's role in it, very closely. Concerns about changes in NTIA's mission and objectives also has been raised regarding the Bush Administration's elimination of funding for the TOP program and reducing funding for the PTFPC program. The Administration contends that the efforts of the former will be picked up by the private sector, and the latter by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Some still contend that it is not clear whether all of the possible areas of information infrastructure development have been saturated through the TOP program; or if not yet saturated, whether industry will find it profitable to provide the "last mile" of telecommunications and Internet connections in areas not yet served. For public telecommunications and facilities planning and construction, an issue may arise as to whether the Corporation for Public Broadcasting has the resources to administer a facilities construction program. The ultimate question may be whether this change will fundamentally affect the pace at which national broadcasting is converted to digital transmission.

For FY2009, the Bush Administration has proposed a budget of $19.2 million for NTIA, with this money going towards administrative functions. There would be no funding under another NTIA program, which supports public telecommunications facilities planning and construction. Under the FY2008 enacted appropriation ( P.L. 110-161 ) NTIA is funded at $36.3 million, which was $3.3 million below the FY2007 enacted and $17.7 million above the President's request. There are two major components to the NTIA appropriated budget (a third program, which is a revolving fund based on spectrum auctions, is discussed below). The first is Salaries and Expenses. For FY2008, the Bush Administration recommended $18.6 million; Congress approved $17.5 million for FY2008. In the past, a large part of this program has been for the management of various information and telecommunications policies both domestically and internationally. For the second NTIA component, the Public Telecommunications and Facilities Program (PTFPC), the Bush Administration has requested that this program's funding be eliminated, arguing that most of the construction and refurbishing of public telecommunications facilities has already been done, and that any remaining support that is needed should come from local public broadcasting entities. However, for FY2008, Congress disagreed, citing the ongoing need for upgrading of public broadcasting facilities, particularly as the deadline of converting all analog broadcasts to digital in 2009 approaches. For FY2008, Congress funded this program at $18.8 million. Under at third program, NTIA operates a revolving fund which uses offset receipts from the auction of licenses recovered from discontinued analog signals. An important part of this program is to fund a digital-analog converter box program to assist consumers in meeting the February 2009 deadline for receiving television broadcasts in digital format.

By the end of 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had the world's largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and are intended to "enhance people's cultural taste" and "strengthen spiritual civilization." The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting "cyber dissidents" and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling (e.g., mobile payments)—and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. During the 2017 Communist Party Congress, censors took steps to "restrict with one hand and disseminate with the other." Censors using a variety of tools sought to eliminate certain words and expressions from appearing on social media (e.g., attempts to protest or ridicule senior political figures), while disseminating information supportive of the government and its leaders. In its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the "world's biggest prison for journalists" and warned that the country "continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers." China ranks 176 th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in restrictions on press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison. This report describes the current state of internet freedom in China, U.S. government and private sector activity to support internet freedom around the world, and related issues of congressional interest. The U.S. government continues to advocate policies to promote internet freedom in China's increasingly restrictive environment and to mitigate the global impact of Chinese government censorship. The Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and Congress have taken an active role in fighting global internet censorship. Since 2008, the Department of State has invested over $145 million in global internet freedom programs. These programs support digital safety, policy advocacy, technology, and research to help global internet users overcome barriers to accessing the internet. The State Department's Internet Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor leads U.S. government policy and engagement on internet freedom issues. Efforts include the following: raising concerns about internet restrictions with foreign governments; collaborating with like-minded governments to advance internet freedom, including in multilateral fora such as the United Nations Human Rights Council, the G-7, and the G-20; working with interagency partners and civil society stakeholders to advance internet freedom, including at the annual Internet Governance Forum, an international multistakeholder venue for addressing global internet governance; convening discussions on emerging and critical internet freedom challenges; and building awareness within the U.S. government by conducting training on internet freedom issues for federal officials. The State Department was also a founding member and is an ongoing participant in the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), a group of governments collaborating to advance human rights online. Examples of FOC work include building cross-regional support for internet freedom language in key international documents and joint statements on issues of concern to help shape global norms on human rights online. The Digital Defenders Partnership is a project of the Freedom Online Coalition. The partnership, established in 2012, provides emergency support for internet users who are under threat for peacefully exercising their rights online. It awards grants around the world for a number of purposes, including establishing new internet connections when existing connections have been cut off or are being restricted; developing methods to protect bloggers and digital activists; developing tools needed to respond to emergencies; developing decentralized, mobile internet applications that can link computers as an independent network; supporting digital activists with secure hosting and distributed denial of service mitigation; and building emergency response capacity. In 2016, the BBG created the Office of Internet Freedom (OIF) to oversee the efforts of BBG-funded internet freedom projects, including the work carried out by the Open Technology Fund, a joint endeavor managed by BBG and Radio Free Asia. OIF manages and supports the research, development, deployment, and use of BBG-funded internet freedom (IF) technologies. OIF provides anticensorship technologies and services to citizens and journalists living in repressive environments. OIF also supports global education and awareness of IF matters, to enhance users' ability to safely access and share digital news and information without fear of repressive censorship or surveillance. The FY2018 budget for the OIF is included in the State Department's appropriation for satellite transmissions. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, provides that "in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, up to $34,508,000 of the amount appropriated under this heading may remain available until expended for satellite transmissions and internet freedom programs, of which not less than $13,800,000 shall be for internet freedom programs." Internet freedom programs are also funded through grants by the Open Technology Fund. There has been one hearing in the 115 th Congress about Internet Freedom in China by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). In 2000, Congress created the CECC to monitor China's compliance with international human rights standards, to encourage the development of the rule of law in the PRC, and to establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China. On April 26, 2018, the CECC held a hearing on "digital authoritarianism and the global threat to free speech." The Commission heard from three witnesses about aspects of China's restrictions to free speech: Sarah Cook Senior Research Analyst for East Asia and Editor, China Media Bulletin, Freedom House Clive Hamilton Professor of Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australia, and author, Silent Invasion, China 's Influence in Australia Katrina Lantos Swett President, Lantos Foundation The hearing explored issues such as China's desire to control the internet, such as through the shutdown of popular social media apps that do not meet the country's standards of "core socialist values." The hearing also examined U.S. policies promoting internet freedom and firewall circumvention, and the global impact of Chinese government censorship and efforts to "export" its system and values. No legislation has been introduced in the 115 th Congress related to global internet freedom in authoritarian regimes. In response to criticism, particularly of their operations in China, a group of U.S. information and communications technology (ICT) companies, along with nongovernmental organizations, investors, and universities, formed the Global Network Initiative (GNI) in 2008. The GNI aims to promote best practices related to the conduct of U.S. companies in countries with poor internet freedom records. The GNI uses a self-regulatory approach to promote due diligence and awareness regarding human rights. For example, GNI has adopted a set of principles and supporting mechanisms to provide guidance to the ICT industry and its stakeholders on how to protect and advance freedom of expression and the right to privacy when faced with pressures from governments to take actions that infringe upon these rights. Participating companies voluntarily agree to undergo third-party assessments of their compliance with GNI principles. While some human rights groups have criticized the GNI's guidelines for being weak or too broad, GNI's supporters argue that the initiative sets realistic goals and creates real incentives for companies to uphold free expression and privacy. In May 2018, the GNI continued its participation in RightsCon, a yearly summit that explores issues affecting free expression and protection of global journalism, gender diversity and digital inclusion, encryption and cybersecurity, and other topics related to internet freedom. For many years, the development of the internet and its use in China have raised U.S. congressional concerns, including those related to human rights, trade and investment, and cybersecurity. Congressional interest in the internet in China has been tied to human rights concerns in a number of ways, including the use of the internet as a U.S. tool for promoting freedom of expression and other rights in China; the use of the internet by political dissidents in the PRC, and the political repression that such use often provokes; and the role of U.S. internet companies in both spreading freedom in China and complying with or enhancing PRC censorship and social control efforts. Congress has funded a variety of activities to support global internet freedom, including censorship circumvention technology development, internet and mobile communications security training, media and advocacy skills, and public policy. China and Iran have been the primary targets of such efforts, particularly circumvention and secure communications programs. In past years, U.S. congressional committees and commissions have held hearings on the internet and China, including the roles of U.S. internet companies in China's censorship regime, cybersecurity, free trade in internet services, and the protection of intellectual property rights. Freedom on the Net 2017 : Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy Freedom House November 2017 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017 How to Circumvent Online Censorship Electronic Frontier Foundation Updated August 10, 2017 https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-circumvent-online-censorship The Impact of Media Censorship: Evidence from a Field Experiment in China Yuyu Chen David Y. Yang January 4, 2018 https://stanford.edu/~dyang1/pdfs/1984bravenewworld_draft.pdf China's G reat F irewall I s R ising: How H igh W ill I t G o? The Economist January 4, 2018 https://www.economist.com/news/china/21734029-how-high-will-it-go-chinas-great-firewall-rising Online C ensorship: W ho A re the G atekeepers of O ur D igital L ives? Engineering and Technology Magazine The Institution of Engineering October 11, 2017 https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2017/10/online-censorship-who-are-the-gatekeepers-of-our-digital-lives/

By the end of 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had the world's largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and intended to protect and strengthen Chinese culture. However, in its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the "world's biggest prison for journalists" and warned that the country "continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers." China ranks 176th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in the lack of press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison. The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting "cyber dissidents" and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling, such as mobile payments, and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. While WeChat users have recently begun to question how their WeChat data is being shared with the Chinese government, there is little indication that any new protections will be offered in the future. The U.S. government continues to advocate policies to promote internet freedom in China's increasingly restrictive environment and to mitigate the global impact of Chinese government censorship. The Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and Congress have taken an active role in fighting global internet censorship: Since 2008, the State Department has created programs that support digital safety, policy advocacy, technology, and research to help global internet users overcome barriers to accessing the internet, including the Freedom Online Coalition. In 2016, the BBG created the Office of Internet Freedom to oversee the efforts of BBG-funded internet freedom projects, including the research, development, deployment, and use of BBG-funded internet freedom technologies. In 2000, Congress created the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) to monitor China's compliance with international human rights standards, to encourage the development of the rule of law in the PRC, and to establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China. Additionally, the U.S. information and communications technology (ICT) industry has taken steps to advance internet freedom. In 2008, a group of U.S. ICT companies, along with nongovernmental organizations, investors, and universities, formed the Global Network Initiative (GNI). The GNI aims to promote best practices related to the conduct of U.S. companies in countries with poor internet freedom records. In the 115th Congress, the CECC held a hearing on April 26, 2018, on "digital authoritarianism and the global threat to free speech." No legislation has been introduced in the 115th Congress related to global internet freedom in authoritarian regimes.

TANF law lists 12 categories of work activities that recipients of assistance may engage in and be counted toward its work participation standards. The 12 listed categories are (1) unsubsidized employment; (2) subsidized private sector employment; (3) subsidized public sector employment; (4) work experience; (5) on-the-job training; (6) job search and job readiness assistance; (7) community services programs; (8) vocational educational training; (9) job skills training directly related to employment; (10) education directly related to employment (for those without a high school degree or equivalent); (11) satisfactory attendance at a secondary school; and (12) provision of child care to a participant of a community service program. Under prior HHS regulations, states were allowed to define the specific activities included in each of these federal categories. However, DRA required HHS to issue regulations by June 30, 2006, to define TANF work activities to ensure consistent measurement of work. The regulations, published as interim final regulations on June 29, 2006, provide definitions for each of 12 federal categories of work activities listed in the law, with the explanatory preamble providing specific examples of activities that can or cannot be counted within these categories. This report pulls together the official definition of each of the 12 categories (as stated in the regulatory text) with the information in the preamble that provides a more detailed description of what activities may, and what activities may not, be counted within each of the categories. " Unsubsidized employment means full- or part-time employment in the public or private sector that is not subsidized by TANF or any other public program." Employment not directly subsidized by TANF or other public funds counts. However, it includes employment where employers claim a tax credit for hiring disadvantaged workers. It also includes self-employment. If a recipient is in a job where the employer receives a "direct subsidy" from public funds (other than tax credits, discussed above), the recipient is considered in subsidized employment. " Subsidized Private Sector Employment means employment in the private sector for which the employer receives a subsidy from TANF or other public funds to offset some or all of the wages and costs of employing a recipient." Participation on a job where the employer receives a subsidy and the participant is paid wages and receives the same benefits as unsubsidized employees who perform similar work. Examples include a job where (1) TANF funds that would otherwise be paid as benefits instead reimburse some or all of the employer's costs for wages, benefits, taxes, and insurance; and (2) a third-party (e.g., nonprofit organization) acts as a temporary staffing agency and is paid a fee from TANF to cover the participant's salary and support services. It also includes "supported employment" programs under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for individuals with disabilities. Employer's receipt of subsidies through the tax code does not make a job "subsidized employment." Such jobs should be counted as "unsubsidized employment." " Subsidized Public Sector Employment means employment in the public sector for which the employer receives a subsidy from TANF or other public funds to offset some or all of the wages and costs of employing a recipient." See the discussion of " Subsidized Private Sector Employment ," above. See the discussion of " Subsidized Private Sector Employment ," above. " Work experience (including work associated with the refurbishing of publicly assisted housing) if sufficient private sector employment is not available means a work activity, performed in return for welfare, that provides an individual with an opportunity to acquire the general skills, training, knowledge, and work habits necessary to obtain employment. The purpose of work experience is to improve the employability of those who cannot find unsubsidized employment. The activity must be supervised by an employer, work site sponsor, or other responsible party on an ongoing basis and no less frequently than daily." Activity is sometimes called "workfare" because the activity is performed in return for the TANF grant and employees do not receive wages or compensation. Activities such as job search, job readiness activities, and vocational education. " On the job training means training in the public or private sector that is given to a paid employee while he or she is engaged in productive work and that provides knowledge and skills essential to the full and adequate performance of the job. On the job training must be supervised by an employer, work site sponsor, or other responsible party on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." For this activity, states subsidize the costs of training (as opposed to wages and benefits) provided to the participant, and there is an expectation that the participant will become a regular, unsubsidized employee. For individuals with disabilities who are in "supported employment," the activity may be considered on-the-job training if it includes significant on-site training. "Supported employment" that does not include significant on-site training should be counted as "subsidized employment" rather than on-the-job training. " Job search and job readiness means the act of seeking or obtaining employment, preparation to seek or obtain employment, including life skills training, and substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, or rehabilitation activities for those who are otherwise employable. Such treatment or therapy must be determined to be necessary and certified by a qualified medical or mental health professional. Job search and job readiness assistance activities must be supervised by the TANF agency or other responsible party on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." Note: Participation in this activity may be counted for six weeks (12 weeks in certain circumstances) in a fiscal year. Job search includes making contacts with employers (in person, via telephone, etc.) to learn of suitable job openings, applying for vacancies, and interviewing for jobs. Job readiness basically comprises two types of activities: (1) preparation necessary to begin a job search, such as preparing a resume or job application, training in interviewing skills, and training in workplace expectation and life skills; and (2) activities to remove barriers to employment, such as substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, or rehabilitation activities. Activities that do not involve seeking or preparing for work—such as activities associated with children's dental checkups, immunization, and school attendance—do not count; parenting skills training or participation in Head Start (though being a Head Start volunteer may be considered community service; see below); recovery periods from illness; and activities to promote a healthier lifestyle, such as smoking cessation. English as a Second Language (ESL) is not countable as job readiness, but counts as either job skills training or education directly related to employment (see below). " Community service programs means structured programs and embedded activities in which TANF recipients perform work for the direct benefit of the community under the auspices of public or nonprofit organizations. Community service programs must be limited to projects that serve a useful community purpose in fields such as health, social service, environmental protection, education, urban and rural redevelopment, welfare, recreation, public facilities, public safety, and child care. Community service programs are designed to improve the employability of recipients not otherwise able to obtain employment, and must be supervised on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily. A State agency shall take into account, to the extent possible, the prior training, experience, and skills of a recipient in making appropriate community service assignments." Examples include work in a school, such as serving as a teacher's aide; helping as a parent volunteer in a Head Start program; work performed in a church, such as preparing meals for the needy; and participation in Americorps, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), or private volunteer organizations. Community service does not include participation in educational activities, substance abuse treatment programs, mental health and family violence counseling, life skills classes, job readiness instruction, or caring for a disabled family member; nor does community service include unstructured or unsupervised activities such as shoveling a neighbor's sidewalk or helping with errands, or serving as a foster parent. " Vocational educational training (not to exceed 12 months with respect to any individual) means organized educational programs that are directly related to the preparation of individuals for employment in current or emerging occupations requiring training other than a baccalaureate or advanced degree. Vocational educational training must be supervised on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." Programs that prepare an individual for a specific trade, occupation, or vocation count. These may be provided by educational or training organizations, including vocational-technical schools, community colleges, post-secondary institutions, nonprofit organizations, and secondary schools that offer vocational education. Hours in monitored study sessions structured by the state count as vocational educational training. Programs leading to a baccalaureate (four-year) degree or advanced degree. Also not countable are general basic skills programs and language training (except as mentioned above), substance abuse counseling and treatment, mental health services, and other rehabilitative activities. Programs leading to a high school degree should be counted instead under satisfactory attendance at a secondary school (see below). Unstructured and supervised homework and study time do not count as hours in vocational educational training. " Job skills training directly related to employment means training or education for job skills required by an employer to provide an individual with the ability to obtain employment or to advance or adapt to the changing demands of the workplace. Job skills training directly related to employment must be supervised on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." Customized training to meet the skills of a specific employer or general training that prepares an individual for employment. This includes literacy and language instruction if the training is explicitly focused on skills needed for employment, or if the instruction is combined with job training. Barrier removal activities like substance abuse counseling or treatment, mental health services, and rehabilitative services count. " Education directly related to employment, in the case of a recipient who has not received a high school diploma or a certificate of high school equivalency means education related to a specific occupation, job, or job offer. Education directly related to employment must be supervised on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." Examples include adult basic education, ESL, and, where needed for employment by employers or occupations, programs leading to a General Educational Development (GED) or High School Equivalency diploma. Hours in monitored study sessions in the course of these programs would count as education directly related to employment. Education unrelated to specific occupations and unsupervised hours of homework do not count. " Satisfactory attendance at secondary school or in a course of study leading to a certificate of general equivalence, in the case of a recipient who has not completed secondary school or received such a certificate means regular attendance, in accordance with the requirements of the secondary school or course of study, at a secondary school or in a course of study leading to a certificate of general equivalence, in the case of a recipient who has not completed secondary school or received such a certificate. This activity must be supervised on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." Regular attendance at a secondary school (an activity primarily targeted to minor parents) or GED programs counts. This activity is not restricted to education needed for employment. Hours in monitored study count. Unsupervised hours of homework. " Providing child care services to an individual who is participating in a community service program means providing child care to enable another TANF recipient to participate in a community services program. This activity must be supervised on an ongoing basis no less frequently than daily." No further examples are offered. Providing child care to a TANF recipient who participates in activities other than community service does not count.

The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) included changes to work participation standards under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant that seek to increase the share of the cash welfare caseload engaged in work or job preparation activities. The law also required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations defining TANF work activities to ensure a consistent measurement of work activity across states. Highlights of the regulations (published June 29, 2006) include requiring all activities to be supervised (many on a daily basis); disallowing four-year or advanced college degrees to count as vocational educational training; and explicitly allowing treatment for the removal of certain barriers to employment, such as substance abuse and mental or physical disability to count toward the participation standards, though for a limited period each year as a "job readiness" activity. It also allows "supported employment" for individuals with disabilities to count. Additionally, the definition of job skills training directly related to employment appears to allow a wide range of training and educational activities. This report will be updated as warranted.

I n general, the Senate's presiding officer does not take the initiative in enforcing Senate rules and precedents. Instead, a Senator may raise a point of order if he or she believes the Senate is taking (or is about to take) an action that violates the rules. In most circumstances, the presiding officer rules on the point of order on advice of the Parliamentarian; that ruling is typically subject to an appeal on which the Senate votes (unless the appeal is tabled or withdrawn). Pursuant to Rule XX, however, in certain circumstances a point of order is not ruled on by the presiding officer but is instead submitted to the Senate for its decision. A point of order that a pending matter (a bill or amendment, for example) violates the U.S. Constitution presents one such circumstance. This report explains Senate rules, precedents, and practices in regard to these constitutional points of order, including an analysis of recent cases in which such a point of order has been raised. This report will be updated as events warrant. The process for raising a constitutional point of order against a pending question does not differ from that for raising other points of order. A Senator seeking to raise a constitutional point of order would simply address the presiding officer at a time when no one else holds the floor. The Senator might say, "Mr. President, I rise to point of order" or simply "Point of order, Mr. President" and then proceed to state and explain the way in which the pending matter violates the Constitution. Raising a constitutional point of order (or any point of order) confers no special recognition rights—unless a unanimous consent (UC) agreement has provided for it being raised, or considered as raised, at a certain time. No Senator can interrupt another Senator without his or her consent for the purposes of raising a point of order. In addition, a Senator loses the floor after he or she has raised the point of order, though the Senator could again seek recognition from the presiding officer once the point of order is submitted. A UC agreement may affect the availability of any point of order when the agreement includes language that prohibits all or certain points of order. In addition, if a UC agreement specifies that a vote on a matter would occur "at a time certain without any intervening action," it would preclude a point of order being raised. Further, if a UC agreement limits the time for debate of a matter, then the point of order can be raised against it only after the debate time has been used or yielded back—except by unanimous consent. This is because if a matter has been guaranteed—by UC—a certain amount of debate or a vote at a time certain, then a new UC agreement is required to allow a point of order before that debate is complete, since the disposition of the point of order could have the effect of making the matter fall. Under current practice and precedents relating to Rule XX, a point of order that a pending matter is unconstitutional is submitted to the Senate for decision rather than ruled upon by the presiding officer. The logic behind the relevant precedents is that while the presiding officer has authority to interpret Senate rules, he or she does not have the authority to interpret the Constitution. While the Senate, in its earliest history, similarly disposed of constitutional points of order through a vote of the body, there were some intervening periods during which practice varied. For an approximately 40-year period in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, these points of order were not submitted for disposition, but instead the proceedings resembled the current practice in the House of Representatives, under which Members are expected to implicitly express their opinion on the constitutionality of a measure by their vote for or against the measure itself. However, the Senate has generally followed its current practice of submitting constitutional points of order since establishing a relevant precedent in 1924. Sustaining the submitted point of order requires an affirmative vote of a majority of Senators voting, assuming a quorum is present. A point of order submitted to the Senate for decision is debatable except when the Senate is operating under cloture. Under most circumstances, accordingly, a cloture process could theoretically be used to end extended debate and force a vote on the point of order. Under some circumstances, statutory provisions may limit debate on points of order; these debate limits would apply equally to a submitted constitutional point of order. While a submitted point of order is generally subject to extended debate, it is also subject to a non-debatable motion to table. The tabling motion could be made at any time after the point of order has been raised unless the Senate had agreed by UC to provide a specific amount of time for debate on the point of order, in which case the tabling motion could not be made until the time has expired or been yielded back. Agreeing to a tabling motion requires a majority of those voting (assuming a quorum is present). If the motion is agreed to, it adversely and permanently disposes of the point of order. Thus, if a Senator makes a motion to table the point of order, a majority of Senators could dispose of the point of order by agreeing to the motion to table. This disposition would have the effect of determining the constitutional point of order not to be well taken. A unanimous consent agreement may affect the debatability of a submitted point of order. For example, if a UC agreement sets a time certain for a vote on the matter on which a point of order is contemplated, then a submitted point of order raised against that matter would be subject to debate only until that time expires. Other language in a UC agreement (e.g., that establishes a specific amount of debate time on a pending amendment and provides for another action immediately upon the disposition of that amendment) may also preclude extended debate on a constitutional point of order raised against that amendment. Constitutional points of order are not common, relative to many other points of order that are more routinely made (e.g., that an amendment violates the Congressional Budget Act or that an amendment to an appropriations bill constitutes legislation). Table 1 presents data on constitutional points of order in the Senate made since 1989 (the start of the 101 st Congress) on which the Senate voted, as identified in the Legislative Information System (LIS) and the Daily Digest . (An examination of references to constitutional points of order in the full text of the Congressional Record for the Congresses in question did not produce any additional examples.) The table does not include any constitutional points of order that were raised but then withdrawn before a Senate vote or those that may have been rendered moot because the underlying matter was withdrawn or otherwise negatively disposed of. Of the cases identified, more than half (11 of 17) were disposed of negatively, either through a direct vote on the point of order or via a successful motion to table; the remaining six points of order were sustained. Five of the six sustained points of order were in relation to an alleged violation of the Origination Clause (Article 1, Section 7, clause 1, which provides that only the House may originate revenue measures). Of the 11 points of order that were not well taken, 10 were raised in relation to other constitutional provisions. The table makes clear that constitutional points of order raised in the 106 th and 107 th Congresses were raised exclusively on the grounds that the pending matter would violate the Origination Clause. In the most recent Congresses (111 th and 113 th ) in which constitutional points of order were raised, however, they were raised only in relation to other provisions of the Constitution. This dominance of points of order on the grounds of other (non-Origination Clause) constitutional provisions is also evident in the Congresses spanning the 1990s. This recent ebb and flow in the constitutional grounds on which such points of order are raised is similar to the historical variation that characterizes previous periods. While the Origination Clause was the primary constitutional provision invoked prior to the 1960s, other constitutional provisions were referenced with almost equal frequency in the subsequent decades. For example, from the 1960s to 1980s, points of order were raised on constitutional grounds such as the ability of the Senate to make its own rules, the process for proposing constitutional amendments, representation and apportionment issues, the line item veto, and the Equal Protection Clause. As noted in the table above, the two most recent decades included points of order raised in relation to the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, questions of congressional apportionment and representation, and the powers afforded to Congress (and reserved to the states), among others.

In general, the Senate's presiding officer does not take the initiative in enforcing Senate rules and precedents. Instead, a Senator may raise a point of order if he or she believes the Senate is taking (or is about to take) an action that violates the rules. In most circumstances, the presiding officer rules on the point of order on advice of the Parliamentarian; that ruling is typically subject to an appeal on which the Senate votes (unless the appeal is tabled or withdrawn). Pursuant to Rule XX, however, in certain circumstances a point of order is not ruled on by the presiding officer but is instead submitted to the Senate for its decision. A point of order that a pending matter (a bill or amendment, for example) violates the U.S. Constitution presents one such circumstance. This report explains Senate rules, precedents, and practices in regard to these constitutional points of order, including an analysis of recent cases in which such a point of order has been raised, and will be updated as events warrant. A Senator can raise a constitutional point of order against any pending matter unless a unanimous consent agreement prohibits points of order or provides for a vote on the pending matter without any intervening action. A unanimous consent agreement may also affect the time at which it is in order to raise a point of order. If a specific amount of debate has been agreed to for the pending matter, the point of order cannot be raised until the time has expired or been yielded back. While past practice has varied, the Senate's rules and precedents currently require a constitutional point of order to be submitted to the Senate for disposition, with a majority of those voting (a quorum being present) required to sustain the point of order. The point of order is debatable, though the time for debate may be subject to limitations under a unanimous consent agreement or under cloture, in some circumstances, pursuant to statutory provisions. The submitted point of order is, however, subject to a non-debatable motion to table. This report identifies 17 constitutional points of order that have been raised and received a Senate vote since 1989. Eleven of these cases were disposed of negatively.

In every war fought by the United States, civilian ships have supported military operations by transporting supplies and personnel. The civilians that have served on these vessels historically have worked in varying capacities either for private shipping companies under contract with the federal government or for the government itself. These civilians are collectively referred to as merchant mariners . In World War II, an estimated 8,500 merchant mariners were killed and 11,000 were wounded. During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it is estimated that 63% of the military cargo shipped to the Middle East and Afghanistan was delivered by U.S.-flagged commercial vessels crewed by merchant mariners and an additional 35% of military cargo was transported by government-owned vessels crewed by civilian federal employees and federal contractors. Although merchant mariners have always played an important role in support of U.S. war efforts, they generally have not been considered veterans for the purposes of federal benefits. Currently, only limited groups of World War II-era merchant mariners are eligible for benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). After World War II, merchant mariners sought through legislation to gain recognition as veterans. Legislation was introduced either to provide benefits to merchant mariners comparable to those provided under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (P.L. 78-346), commonly known as the GI Bill, or to expand the employee benefits merchant mariners were receiving at that time. During hearings in late 1945, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries heard testimony on four bills that would have provided some benefits to merchant seamen. One of these bills, H.R. 2346, would have provided benefits to merchant mariners comparable to those of other World War II veterans. Testimony in favor of H.R. 2346 was heard from a number of former merchant seamen and the Merchant Marine Veterans Association. Testimony in opposition to H.R. 2346 came from various agencies, including the War Department, the Veterans Administration, and the American Legion. Opponents to granting veteran status to merchant mariners generally focused on the freedom of a merchant mariner to make decisions about whether or not to take a particular voyage or leave service. They also focused on the higher earnings of merchant mariners relative to uniformed Navy personnel. H.R. 476, introduced in 1947, would have expanded the existing benefits for merchant seamen related to health care and disability and introduced an education benefit. Ultimately, no legislation was enacted in the immediate aftermath of World War II to grant veteran status to merchant mariners or to provide additional benefits to merchant mariners related to health care, disability, or education. Section 401 of the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 ( P.L. 95-202 ) granted veterans' benefit eligibility to civilians who served as Women's Air Forces Service Pilots (WASPS) during World War II. In addition, Section 401 of P.L. 95-202 provided the Secretary of Defense the authority to extend "active duty" status for the purpose of eligibility for federal veterans' benefits to other groups of civilian federal employees or contractors who rendered service to the Armed Forces and were "similarly situated" to the WASPS. Regulations implementing P.L. 95-202 , issued as Department of Defense Directive 1000.20, delegated the authority to grant active duty status to civilian groups to the Secretary of the Air Force. In addition, Directive 1000.20 established the Department of Defense Civilian/Military Service Review Board to review each application for active duty status. The factors to be used in reviewing such applications included the uniqueness of service rendered by the group and whether or not the group was subject to military control, discipline, and justice. A complete list of groups granted active duty status for the purpose of eligibility for veterans' benefits pursuant to P.L. 95-202 is provided in regulation. In 1982, the Secretary of the Air Force rejected the application for active duty status for oceangoing merchant mariners who served during World War II. In 1985, the Secretary rejected the applications of merchant mariners who served in contested waters in World War II, merchant mariners involved in any military invasion during World War II, and all merchant mariners involved in Operation Mulberry during World War II. These rejections were recommended by the Civilian/Military Service Review Board. The rejection of the oceangoing merchant mariners was based on the Secretary of the Air Force's decision that these groups received only limited military training; did not render service exclusively for the Armed Forces; were not subject exclusively to military discipline; were not subject to "pervasive" military control; had no reasonable expectation of "active military service" status, and were not part of a wartime organization formed for or because of a wartime need. In recommending the rejection of the application of the Operation Mulberry group, the Civilian/Military Service Review Board stated that this group "was too broad and diverse to make an adequate determination as to the roles played by the multitude of subgroups and members that made up Operation Mulberry." However, although the application of all merchant mariners that participated in Operation Mulberry was rejected, the application of those who served only on blockships during this operation was approved. In recommending the approval of the blockship group's application, the Civilian/Military Review Board stated that [t]hese merchant marines performed a uniquely military mission in a combat zone that would not normally be considered a mission of the Merchant Marine. The merchant crews were not tasked with delivering a cargo, per se, but were asked to be a part of a team to create an artificial harbor a beachhead mission normally associated with military engineers for a military operation. This is not a mission that the Merchant Marine historically perform. This group, then, was a creation of World War II for that specific time and place, i.e., the Invasion of Normandy. Following the 1985 rejections of applications of merchant mariners for active duty status, a lawsuit was filed challenging the denial of active duty status for World War II oceangoing merchant mariners and those who participated in World War II invasions. The plaintiffs argued that the merchant mariners included in these applications satisfied the established criteria to a greater extent than many of the previously approved groups and argued that the denials were inconsistent with the Secretary of the Air Force's prior decisions. The Secretary of the Air Force responded that the plaintiffs misunderstood the designation criteria and outlined characteristics that the approved groups shared. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Secretary of the Air Force erred in rejecting the applications of the oceangoing merchant mariners and those that participated in World War II invasions. The court remanded these individuals' applications back to the Secretary of the Air Force for reconsideration. In 1988, following the Schumacher decision, the Secretary of the Air Force granted active duty status for the purpose of eligibility for veterans' benefits to World War II-era merchant mariners who served on vessels engaged in oceangoing service from December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945. Section 402 of the Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1988 ( P.L. 105-368 ) extended veterans' burial benefits and the right to interment in national cemeteries to merchant mariners who served on vessels engaged in oceangoing service from August 16, 1945, to December 31, 1946. In 1999, the Secretary of the Air Force determined that the service of oceangoing merchant marines during the period from August 15, 1945, to December 31, 1946 (those covered by P.L. 105-368 ) is not considered active duty under the provisions of P.L. 95-202 for the purposes of other benefits administered by the VA. Under current law and regulations, only the following groups of merchant mariners are considered to have served on active duty or are otherwise eligible for veterans' benefits. No other merchant mariners are eligible for any veterans' benefits administered by the VA. United States merchant seamen who served on blockships in support of Operation Mulberry. American merchant marine in oceangoing service during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, and who meet the following qualifications: was employed by the War Shipping Administration or Office of Defense Transportation (or their agents) as a merchant seaman documented by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Department of Commerce (Merchant Mariner's Document/Certificate of Service) or as a civil servant employed by the U.S. Army Transport Service (later redesignated U.S. Army Transportation Corps, Water Division) or the Naval Transportation Service; and served satisfactorily as a crew member during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, aboard merchant vessels in oceangoing—that is, foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise—service (per 46 U.S.C. §§10301 and 10501) and further to include near foreign voyages between the United States and Canada, Mexico, or the West Indies via ocean routes, or public vessels in oceangoing service or foreign waters. Served between August 16, 1945, and December 31, 1946, as a member of the United States merchant marine (including the Army Transport Service and the Naval Transport Service) serving as a crewmember of a vessel that was operated by the War Shipping Administration or the Office of Defense Transportation (or an agent of either); operated in waters other than inland waters, the Great Lakes, and other lakes, bays, and harbors of the United States; under contract or charter to, or property of, the government of the United States; and serving the Armed Forces; and while so serving, was licensed or otherwise documented for service as a crewmember of such a vessel by an officer or employee of the United States authorized to license or document the person for such service. Although some World War II-era merchant mariners were granted eligibility for veterans' benefits in 1985 and 1988, the passage of time between their service and the granting of this eligibility may have made it impossible for them to fully access these benefits. For example, when these former merchant mariners were of typical college age after the war, they were not eligible for benefits under the GI Bill. In addition, those with service-connected disabilities or medical conditions may have lost out on nearly 40 years of VA disability compensation or medical benefits. H.R. 154 , the Honoring Our WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2017, would provide compensation to former World War II-era merchant mariners to account for the benefits they were not able to access before being granted veterans' benefit eligibility in the 1980s. Similar legislation has been introduced in each Congress since the 108 th Congress. Specifically, this legislation would provide a one-time payment of $25,000 to any merchant mariner who served between December 7, 1941, and December 31, 1946, and who otherwise meets the definition of service provided for burial benefits and interment eligibility in P.L. 105-368 . Eligible persons would have one year from the date of enactment of the legislation to apply for benefits. A total of $125 million would be authorized to be appropriated in FY2017 for these benefits, to be available until expended. Although the benefits created by this legislation would partially compensate former merchant mariners for lost benefits, H.R. 154 would place the former merchant mariners in a unique position compared to other civilians who served in World War II and other veterans. Active duty status for the purposes of eligibility for veterans' benefits has been extended under the provisions of P.L. 95-202 to 33 groups of civilians who served during World Wars I and II, all of whom can claim to have missed the opportunity to claim certain benefits during the period between their service and the granting of active duty status. However, if H.R. 154 were to be enacted, only the two merchant mariner groups would be eligible for any form of compensation to account for these lost benefits. In addition, merchant mariners would join Medal of Honor winners as the only groups eligible for cash compensation from the VA without having to demonstrate a financial hardship (for VA pension benefits) or a service-connected disability (for VA disability compensation).

Although merchant mariners have supported the Armed Forces in every war fought by the United States, they generally are not considered veterans for the purpose of eligibility for federal benefits. Pursuant to legislation enacted in 1977 (P.L. 95-202) and 1988 (P.L. 105-368) and to decisions made by the Secretary of the Air Force in 1985 and 1988, the following groups of World War II-era merchant mariners are the only merchant mariners eligible for veterans' benefits. Eligible for all veterans' benefits: United States merchant seamen who served on blockships in support of Operation Mulberry. American merchant marine in oceangoing service during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, and who meet the following qualifications: employed by the War Shipping Administration or Office of Defense Transportation (or their agents) as a merchant seaman documented by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Department of Commerce (Merchant Mariner's Document/Certificate of Service) or as a civil servant employed by the U.S. Army Transport Service (later redesignated U.S. Army Transportation Corps, Water Division) or the Naval Transportation Service; and served satisfactorily as a crew member during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, aboard merchant vessels in oceangoing—that is, foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise—service (per 46 U.S.C. §§10301 and 10501) and further to include near foreign voyages between the United States and Canada, Mexico, or the West Indies via ocean routes, or public vessels in oceangoing service or foreign waters. Eligible for burial benefit and national cemetery interment only: Served between August 16, 1945, and December 31, 1946, as a member of the United States merchant marine (including the Army Transport Service and the Naval Transport Service), serving as a crewmember of a vessel that was operated by the War Shipping Administration or the Office of Defense Transportation (or an agent of either); operated in waters other than inland waters, the Great Lakes, and other lakes, bays, and harbors of the United States; under contract or charter to, or property of, the government of the United States; and serving the Armed Forces; and while so serving, was licensed or otherwise documented for service as a crewmember of such a vessel by an officer or employee of the United States authorized to license or document the person for such service. H.R. 154, the Honoring Our WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2017, would provide one-time compensation of $25,000 to World War-II merchant mariners to account for benefits they were not able to access before being granted veterans' benefit eligibility.

The Modified Waters Deliveries Project (Mod Waters) is being implemented by the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in southern Florida. (See Figure 1 .) For FY2007, the Administration has requested a total of $48 million for the project: $35 million through the Corps and $13.3 million through the DOI. The House-passed Interior and Energy and Water appropriations bills, and the Senate-reported Interior appropriations bill, provide the requested amount of funding for Mod Waters for FY2007. The Senate-reported Energy and Water bill, however, provides no funding for Mod Waters (for the Corps) for FY2007 and limits funds to $35 million for the Corps to construct this project. The Senate Appropriations Committee report on the Energy and Water bill ( S.Rept. 109-274 ) states that Mod Waters should be solely funded by the DOI since it benefits Everglades National Park. DOI and the Corps jointly funded Mod Waters in FY2007. Previously, DOI had solely funded the project. Joint funding of Mod Waters has generated controversy and raised the question of whether the Corps is authorized to receive appropriations to work on the project. The Administration's position appeared to be for the Corps to pay for roughly two-thirds of the remaining $146 million required to complete the project from FY2007 to FY2009. For FY2006, $25 million was appropriated to the DOI, and $35 million to the Corps for this project. A provision in the Interior Appropriations Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-54 ) conditions funding for Mod Waters on meeting state water quality standards. This provision cites provisions in the FY2004 Interior Appropriations Act, which states that funds appropriated for Mod Waters will be provided unless the Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of the Army, Administrator of the EPA, and Attorney General indicate in a joint report (to be filed annually until December 31, 2006) that water entering the A.R.M. Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and Everglades National Park does not meet state water quality standards, and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations respond in writing disapproving the further expenditure of funds. The FY2007 Administration request did not contain this condition; however, the House-passed Interior Appropriations bill and Senate-reported bill both contain this provision. The Modified Water Deliveries Project was authorized by the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 ( P.L. 101-229 ; 16 U.S.C. §§410r-5, etc.) to improve water deliveries to Everglades National Park (ENP) and, to the extent possible, restore the natural hydrological conditions within the park. The completion of Mod Waters is expected to be significant step towards the implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP; Title VI, P.L. 106-541 , the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 [WRDA 2000]). Indeed, Mod Waters must be completed before appropriations can be made to construct other restoration projects in the east Everglades (§601(b)(2)(D)(iv) of WRDA 2000). Mod Waters is expected to consist of structural modifications and additions to the Central and Southern Florida Project (C&SF Project) to improve the timing, distribution, and quantity of water flow to the Northeast Shark River Slough. Increased water flow to the Northeast Shark River Slough will increase water supplies in the ENP and is expected to improve the natural habitat and hydrology of a portion of the Everglades ecosystem. There are four components to Mod Waters: 8.5 SMA flood mitigation, Tamiami Trail modifications, conveyance and seepage control features, and Combined Structural and Operational Plan (CSOP). The 8.5 SMA flood mitigation and Tamiami Trail modifications are discussed below. Mod Waters is expected to flood some residential and agricultural areas adjacent to the park. Legislation authorizing this project instructs the Secretary of the Army to determine if residential and agricultural areas within or adjacent to the 8.5 SMA will be flooded from the hydrological changes of Mod Waters (§104(a)). If these areas are under threat of flooding, the law mandates that a flood protection system must be developed for the area (§104(b)). To prevent flooding, several mitigation features have been developed. One of these features is called Alternative 6D, which is a plan for protecting residents in the 8.5 SMA from flood waters resulting from the project. The purpose of the Tamiami Trail modification is to identify alterations to the highway that would improve water flows for Northeast Shark River Slough and Everglades National Park. A general reevaluation report and environmental impact statement have been prepared for this project. These reports include a recommended alternative calling for two bridges that would allow water flows to pass across the highway. Construction is expected to begin in 2007. Three issues are being debated about the implementation of Mod Waters, including its estimated funding level, project delays, and the controversy surrounding land acquisition in the 8.5 SMA. The question of whether the Corps is authorized to fund Mod Waters was an issue during the deliberation over the FY2006 Energy and Water Appropriations. Arguments used to support the proposition that the Corps could be authorized to directly fund Mod Waters cite §102(f) of the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 ( P.L. 101-229 ), which is the only section that authorizes funding and authorizes such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the act. This provision would include §104, which authorizes Mod Waters, though it primarily authorizes activities carried out by the Corps. Arguments used to argue against Corps authorization to fund Mod Waters could cite the long history of transfers from the NPS to the Corps, which could be argued to establish a strong precedent for the lack of Corps authority. Due to these conflicting arguments and the lack of clear legislative intent, the authority for the Corps to directly fund Mod Waters might still remain debatable. In the FY2007 Energy and Water Appropriations debate, the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Committee has not provided funds to the Corps for Mod Waters. Rising project costs for Mod Waters has led some critics to question its viability. The original cost of completing Mod Waters was estimated at $81.3 million in 1990. The current estimated cost for completing the project is $398 million. To date, approximately $252 million has been appropriated for constructing and implementing Mod Waters, and $146 million more is estimated to be needed to finish the project (i.e., FY2007-FY2009). Some contend that changes in the implementation plan, the rising cost of land acquisition, and flood mitigation requirements have led to higher costs. This was reflected, according to some, in the changes in the 1992 General Design Memorandum, which were derived from updated modeling data and the project's need to be compatible with CERP. Mod Waters was originally estimated to be completed by 1997, yet now some argue it is unclear as to when or even whether the project will be completed. The FY2006 Administration request indicates that funding will be requested through FY2009. Some contend that delays are due to the undefined roles of DOI and the Corps in implementing the project, a lack of a unified approach to restoration, redesigning the project, and litigation regarding the 8.5 SMA and Tamiami Trail portion of the project. Some argue that the delay in implementing Mod Waters jeopardizes implementation of CERP projects, causes further degradation within Everglades National Park, and will set a precedent for delays and deliberation regarding land acquisition activities when CERP projects are being implemented. Some proponents of the project contend that ongoing land acquisition in the 8.5 SMA will minimize any future delays. Implementation of Mod Waters is dependent on acquiring land in the 8.5 SMA. Land acquisition in this area is controversial because there are several unwilling sellers and the Corps is exercising eminent domain in some cases to acquire necessary lands. The 8.5 SMA is a region adjacent to ENP of approximately 5,600 acres. Due to its low topography and lack of drainage, parts of the 8.5 SMA frequently flood for several months during the year. With the implementation of Mod Waters, the Corps expects that most of the 8.5 SMA would flood. The Corps developed a flood mitigation plan in 1992 to provide flood mitigation for residents in the 8.5 SMA and allow for the implementation of Mod Waters. However, the 1992 Plan was later deemed "unworkable" by the superintendent of Everglades National Park, who claimed that it would not provide full flood protection for current and future residents in the 8.5 SMA. The Corps began to devise a new plan for Mod Waters and the 8.5 SMA in 1999, which considered several alternative plans, including the complete buyout of the 8.5 SMA. A new plan, referred to as Alternative 6D, was proposed by the Corps in 2000. This plan includes a perimeter levee, seepage canal, pump station, and storm water drainage for flood protection in the 8.5 SMA. Instead of a complete buyout of the 8.5 SMA, this plan proposed the acquisition of approximately 2,500 acres in the 8.5 SMA (39% of the total area) and the acquisition of 77 residential tracts (24 tenant-occupied tracts and 53 owner-occupied tracts) in the 8.5 SMA (13% of the total number of "residential areas" in the 8.5 SMA). Some residents who were unwilling to sell their land in the 8.5 SMA filed suit against the Corps in 2001. They asserted that the Corps does not have the authority to implement a plan that does not protect the entire 8.5 SMA from flooding, and that the Corps does not have the authority to exercise eminent domain or spend money to acquire their land through condemnation. On July 5, 2002, a district judge restricted the Corps from veering from its original mandate to protect the entire community from flooding, and prevented the Corps from acquiring land in the 8.5 SMA. The Corps later appealed this decision and are now acquiring lands in the area. To help implement Mod Waters, Congress included a provision in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for FY2003 (Division F, Title I, §157 of P.L. 108-7 ) that authorizes the Corps to implement a flood protection plan (Alternative 6D) for the 8.5 SMA as part of Mod Waters. Three conditions are specified in the section authorizing implementation of Alternative 6D: (1) the Corps may acquire residential property needed to carry out Alternative 6D if the owners are first offered comparable property in the 8.5 SMA that will be provided with flood protection; (2) the Corps is authorized to acquire land from willing sellers in the flood-protected portion of the 8.5 SMA to carry out the first condition; and (3) the Corps and the nonfederal sponsor may carry out these provisions with funds provided under the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 ( P.L. 101-229 ; 16 U.S.C. §410r-8) and funds provided by the DOI for land acquisition for restoring the Everglades. Some critics of land acquisition in the 8.5 SMA base their arguments on the same principles used to criticize the acquisition of the entire 8.5 SMA—that the federal government should not exercise eminent domain to remove unwilling sellers and that the federal government is obligated to protect all residential areas from floods under P.L. 101-229 . Some critics also argue that there are several unwilling sellers in the area and that if condemnations proceed, delays due to litigation will be inevitable and will eventually harm the ecosystem. The Corps asserts that there are several willing sellers in the 8.5 SMA. Approximately 78% of the 843 needed tracts have been acquired, and of the remaining 189 tracts, 57% are in negotiations for acquisition and 43% are expected to be condemned.

The Modified Water Deliveries Project (Mod Waters) is a controversial ecological restoration project in south Florida designed to improve water delivery to Everglades National Park. The implementation schedule of Mod Waters is of interest to Congress partly because its completion is required before the implementation of portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. Concerns have been raised in hearings on the Administration's FY2007 budget request regarding the cost of implementing the project, project delays, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' role in funding the project. Currently, the project is eight years behind schedule and will cost an estimated $400 million to build. Part of the delay is due to extended efforts to acquire land from private and state owners. Federal agencies have used eminent domain to acquire some lands, a process that has been contentious. Further, funding for the project in Interior appropriations acts (FY2004-FY2006) is being conditioned on the State of Florida meeting water quality standards by reducing excessive phosphorus, among other things. This report provides background on Mod Waters and discusses issues relating to its current status, funding, and land acquisition needs. This report will be updated as warranted.

On July 16, 1787, the 55 Founding Fathers at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia reached what is commonly called the "Great Compromise." The compromise emerged after a struggle between the large and small states over the system of representation for the House and Senate. The Framers readily accepted the principle of bicameralism—a two-house national legislature. After all, the British Parliament was bicameral as were most state legislatures. However, the Framers encountered sharp divisions in grappling with these two questions: should representation (the number of Members) in both chambers be apportioned according to each state's population, or, instead, should representation in the House be determined by population and in the Senate on state equality? Under the first approach, the large states would dominate both chambers; under the second plan, the large states would be advantaged in the House while all states, regardless of their population, would be represented equally in the Senate. This clash between proportional versus equal representation provoked the most contentious debate at the Constitutional Convention and nearly led to its end. Delegate Luther Martin of Maryland wrote that differences over the issue "nearly terminated in a dissolution of the Convention." George Washington wrote to Alexander Hamilton that he "almost despaired" that the small and large states would ever resolve their differences. In the end, the Great Compromise granted each side in the dispute a chamber where their interests could be protected and guaranteed. House seats would be apportioned among the states based on population, with each state guaranteed at least one Member; Representatives would be directly elected by the people. By contrast, the Senate would be composed of two senators per state—regardless of population—indirectly elected by the state legislatures. As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 39 , "The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America .... The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and co-equal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate." The principle of two Senators from each state was further guaranteed by Article V of the Constitution: "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of equal Suffrage in the Senate." Decisions made at the Constitutional Convention about the Senate still shape its organization and operation today, and make it one of the most distinctive legislative institutions in the world. As William E. Gladstone, four-time British Prime Minister during the 19 th century, said about the American Senate, it is a "remarkable body, the most remarkable of all the inventions of modern politics." Plainly, the Framers did not want the Senate to be another House of Representatives. The institutional uniqueness of the Senate flows directly from many of the decisions made at the Constitutional Convention. Several of these features merit discussion, because they highlight important and enduring features of the Senate. These features include constituency, size, term of office, and special prerogatives. The one modification to the plan not foreseen by the Framers was the direct election of Senators. The "one state-two Senator" formula means that most senators represent constituencies that are more heterogeneous than the districts represented by most House members. One result is that Senators must accommodate a larger diversity of interests and voices in their representational roles. For example, a House member might represent a district that is overwhelmingly agriculture in character. The Senators from that state focus on agriculture, too, but they must also be responsive to a wider array and diversity of interests. The bottom line is that Senators represent an entire state, not a part of it. Because the votes of Senators are equal, balloting power in the Senate is not apportioned by population. As various scholars have pointed out: "The nine largest states are home to 51 percent of the population but elect only 18 percent of the Senate; the twenty-six smallest states control 52 percent of the Senate but hold only 18 percent of the population." The disparity in the voting strength of Senators from lightly versus heavily populated states prompted the late Senator Daniel Moynihan, D-N.Y., to predict that sometime "in the twenty-first century the United States is going to have to address the question of apportionment in the Senate." From the outset the Senate's membership was relatively small compared to the House. When the Senate first convened in 1789, there were twenty-two Senators. North Carolina and Rhode Island soon entered the Union to increase the number to twenty-six. As new states entered the Union, the Senate's size expanded to the 100 that it is today. The Senate's size significantly shapes how it works. For example, it operates in a generally informal manner, often relying on the unanimous consent of all 100 senators to function. There is large deference to minority views—either those of the minority party, a small group of lawmakers, or a single senator. The Senate's formal rules and precedents are less comprehensive than the many detailed rules and voluminous precedents of the larger House of Representatives. Viewed as "ambassadors" from the several states, the seed was planted early that senators should have few restraints placed on their parliamentary rights. For example, in 1789, the Senate informally "adopted a policy of keeping formal rules to a minimum," agreeing to twenty short rules. Further, in framing its rules, the Senate "quite naturally put a great premium on ease and dignity of speech." The Senate grants every Member two parliamentary freedoms that, so far as is known, no other lawmaker worldwide possesses. These two freedoms are unlimited debate and an unlimited opportunity to offer amendments, including non-relevant amendments. Both prerogatives are, of course, subject to certain constraints. As two Senate parliamentarians wrote, "Whereas Senate Rules permit virtually unlimited debate, and very few restrictions on the right to offer amendments, these [unanimous consent] agreements usually limit debate and the right of Senators to offer amendments." Unanimous consent agreements establish a tailor-made procedure for considering virtually any kind of business that the Senate takes up. They are commonly drafted by the parties' floor leaders and managers and, to be implemented, must be agreed to by the entire Senate membership (that is, not objected to by any senator.) Two fundamental objectives of these accords are to limit debate and to structure the amendment process. It was the smaller size of the Senate that no doubt encouraged these parliamentary traditions to emerge and flourish. Not until 1917 did the Senate even adopt a method for ending extended debate (called a "filibuster" if employed for dilatory purposes.) It was called cloture (closure of debate) and its procedural requirements are spelled out in Senate Rule XXII. So from 1789 to 1917 there was no way for the Senate to terminate extended debates except by unanimous consent, compromise, or exhaustion. A key goal of the Framers, as noted earlier, was to create a Senate differently constituted from the other chamber so that it could check the popular passions that might overly influence legislation emanating from the directly elected House. To foster values such as deliberation, reflection, and continuity, the Framers made three important decisions. First, they set the senatorial term of office at six years even though the duration of a Congress is two years. The Senate is a "continuing body" with only one-third of its membership up for election at any one time. As Article I, section 3, states: "Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes." Consequently, the electorate that chooses the one-third up in November 2008 is different in various ways—in regard to the array of salient issues that may influence peoples' choices, for example—from the voters who selected the other two-thirds of the Senate. These lawmakers were influenced, respectively, by the public mood of the voters in November 2004 and 2006; thus, some of them might act collectively as a "brake" and block or slow down floor consideration of issues debated during the 2008 campaigns. Second, to be a Senator, individuals must meet certain constitutional qualifications. For example, to hold office, Senators must be 30 years of age and nine years a citizen; House members are to be 25 years of age and seven years a citizen. The Framers expected Senators to be more seasoned and experienced than House members. Whether this expectation has been met is problematic, even in Congress's earliest years when the likes of James Madison and Albert Gallatin served in the House. Unlike House members, the selection of senators was done by the state legislatures, which bolstered the states' role as a counterweight to the national government and insulated the Senate from popular pressures. The House and Senate share lawmaking authority, but the Framers assigned special "advice and consent" prerogatives exclusively to the Senate. Under Article II, section 2, the Senate functions as a unicameral body when it considers (1) the ratification of treaties, which require approval by a two-thirds vote, or (2) presidential nominations for high governmental positions such as Federal judges, ambassadors, or Cabinet officers (all of whom require Senate consent by a majority vote). The Framers assigned the advice and consent responsibilities to the Senate (but not the House) because of certain characteristics embedded in that institution, such as stability, a longer time perspective, and its smaller size. As one of the Framers (Pierce Butler of South Carolina) noted, treaty negotiations "always required the greatest secrecy, which could not be expected in a large body" like the House. The Senate's role in the appointments process, wrote Hamilton in Federalist No. 65 , would serve as "an excellent check upon the spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice." The Constitution (Article I, section 3) also grants the Senate the "sole Power to try all Impeachments." The House possesses the constitutional authority to decide by majority vote whether to impeach (or indict) executive or judicial officials while the Senate, by a two-thirds vote, determines whether to convict the indicted public officials, which could even include the president. "Where else," wrote Hamilton in Federalist No. 65 , "than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation , to preserve unawed and uninfluenced the necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the representatives of the people, his accusers? " (Italics in the original.) The Senate, like any legislative institution, constantly changes in big and little ways. If the Framers returned today to visit the Senate, they would surely recognize that it remains the preeminent legislative forum for protecting minority rights and for debating and refining the great issues of the day. They would continue to find that many of their fundamental principles—two Senators from each state, the advice and consent role, or the impeachment prerogative—continue to govern the Senate's composition and activity. To be sure, they would likely be awe-struck by the country's many changes: the demographic diversity among the 50 states; the size and reach of the federal establishment; the rise of presidential power; the cost of campaigns; the role of political parties; the extent of the nation's international obligations; and numerous other societal, technological, or medical developments. They would soon discover a significant change to their handiwork, however: today's Senators no longer are elected by state legislatures. In 1913 the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified providing for the direct election of Senators. The Framers would probably view this as the most significant constitutional change affecting the Senate. The election of Senators by state legislatures lasted for more than 125 years until the two institutions that were vested politically in the procedure—the U.S. Senate and the state legislatures—opted for the popular election of Senators. Why? Two words epitomize the fundamental drivers of the change: democracy and deadlock. The direct election of Senators was triggered by the Progressive movement of the 1890s and early 1900s which advocated an agenda of democratic reform, such as women's suffrage, the direct primary, and the direct election of senators. Progressive leaders wanted to end the influence of powerful special interests, especially corporations, over state legislatures; block the purchase of Senate seats; blunt the influence of party bosses in determining who state lawmakers should select; and make senators directly answerable to the people for their actions or inactions. For example, the spread of direct primaries in many states "led to voters expressing their choice for senator on the primary ballot. Although not legally binding on the legislatures, the popular choice was likely to be accepted." The second major stimulus for the Seventeenth Amendment involved the often contentious state legislative deadlocks in electing Senators. Various factors provoked the deadlocks, such as different party control of the two chambers, and lengthy contests among as many as 80 or more senatorial candidates, with balloting extending over several weeks. As a scholar of the Senate reported, the "record of senatorial elections for the fifteen years, 1891 to 1905, shows forty-five such deadlocks—from one to seven in each of twenty states." The combination of these two forces—the democratic impulse and disgruntlement with deadlocks—led to congressional passage of a direct election constitutional amendment in May 1912. Ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures occurred a year later. To close, as British Prime Minister Gladstone said, the Senate is a "remarkable body." Many senators throughout history have shared his view. As Senator Claude Pepper, D-FL, said in 1939, on the occasion of the Senate's 150 th anniversary: The varied and extraordinary functions and powers of the Senate make it, according to one's view, a hydra-headed monster, or the citadel of constitutional and democratic liberties. Like democracy itself, the Senate is inefficient, unwieldy, inconsistent; it has its foibles, its vanities, its Members who are great, the near great, and those who think they are great. But, like democracy also, it is strong, it is sound at the core, it has survived many changes, it has saved the country from many catastrophes, it is a safeguard against any form of tyranny which ... might tend to remove the course of Government from persistent public scrutiny. In the last analysis it is probably the price we in America have to pay for liberty.

Decisions made at the Constitutional Convention about the Senate still shape its organization and operation today. Several of these features merit discussion, because they highlight important and enduring characteristics of the Senate. These aspects include constituency, size, term of office, and special prerogatives. In addition, this report identifies a major constitutional change that the Founding Fathers could not foresee: the direct election of Senators.

Since embarking on a road of free market reforms nearly three decades ago, China has been one of the world's fastest growing economies. The actual size of China's economy has been a subject of extensive debate among economists. China reports that its 2005 gross domestic product (GDP) was 18.4 trillion yuan. Using average annual nominal exchange rates (at 8.2 yuan per dollar) yields $2.2 trillion, equal to less than one-fifth the size of the U.S. economy. China's per capita GDP (a common measurement of living standards) in nominal dollars was $1,761, or 4.2% of U.S. levels. These data would indicate that China's economy and living standards in 2005 were vastly below U.S. levels. However, economists contend that these figures are very misleading. First, nominal exchange rates only reflect the price of currencies in international markets, which can vary greatly over time. Secondly, some exchange rate mechanisms, such as between the dollar and the Chinese yuan, may be significantly distorted by foreign government intervention. Finally, nominal GDP data fail to reflect differences in prices that exist across nations. Surveys indicate that prices in developing countries (such as China) are generally much lower than they are in developed countries (such as the United States and Japan), especially for non-traded goods and services. Thus, a measurement of a developing country's GDP expressed in nominal U.S. dollars will likely understate (often significantly) the actual level of goods and services that GDP can buy domestically. Economists have attempted to factor in national price differentials by using a purchasing power parity (PPP) measurement, which converts foreign currencies into a common currency (usually the U.S. dollar) on the basis of the actual purchasing power of those currencies (based on surveys of the prices of various goods and services) in each respective country. In other words, the PPP data attempt to determine how much local currency (yuan, for example) would be needed to purchase a comparable level of goods and services in the United States per U.S. dollar. This "PPP exchange rate" is then used to convert foreign economic data in national currencies into U.S. dollars. One of the largest PPP projects in the world is the International Comparison Program (ICP), which is coordinated by the World Bank. The ICP collects price data on more than 1,000 goods and services in 146 countries and territories (and makes estimates of 39 others). Prior to December 2007, data from the ICP and various private economic forecasting firms all seemed to agree that China's economy, measured on a PPP basis, was close to $9 trillion in 2005, ranking it as the world's second-largest economy, after the United States. Based on these estimates, and projections of continued rapid economic growth, many analysts predicted that China's economy would surpass that of the United States within a few years. Such projections helped fuel the growing debate over whether China posed an economic threat to the United States. However, newly revised PPP data released by the World Bank in December 2007 purport to show that China's economy in 2005 was 40% smaller than previously estimated. The ICP's previous 2005 PPP estimate of China's GDP (hereinafter referred to as ICP 1 ) at $8.8 trillion fell to $5.3 trillion (down by $3.3 trillion) under the ICP revision (hereinafter referred to as ICP 2 revision ). In addition, China's per capita GDP on a PPP basis dropped from $6,765 to $4,091 (see Table 1 ). The size of China's GDP relative to that of the United States fell from 71.3% under ICP 1 to 43.1% under ICP 2 revision , while per capita GDP relative to the United States dropped from 16.2% to 9.8%. Finally, the new revision decreased China's 2005 share of world GDP from 14.2% to 9.7% (the U.S. share rose from 20.5% to 22.5%). According to the ICP, the major difference between the old and new estimates of China's economy is that the latter reflects, for the first time, the inclusion of recent price survey data provided by China. Previously, the ICP estimated China's PPP data based on a 1986 comparative survey of prices in the United States and China and subsequent extrapolations of that data. ICP 2 revision significantly increased price level estimates within China's economy. The new data estimated that Chinese prices were on average 42% of U.S. levels (compared to 26% under the previous estimate), which is reflected in the change in the estimate of China's PPP exchange rate from 2.1 yuan to the dollar to 3.4. The revised data indicate it will likely take many more years than previously thought before China's GDP and living standards reach U.S. levels. Although China's access to assistance and loans from international development agencies may be unaltered by the ICP PPP revision, the data may directly or indirectly effect China's economic policies and its attitudes in international trade discussions. China may attempt to use the PPP revisions to boost its claim that it is a "poor" country and that, given its development needs and large numbers of people living in poverty, it should not be pressed to adopt economic reforms (such as changes to its currency policy) that could prove disruptive, or be expected to adopt policies that slow its economy, such as curtailing its energy use in response to international concerns over global climate change. As a recent article in The Economist put it, "China would probably be quite happy to see its GDP revised down, hoping that America might stop picking on a smaller, poorer economy." In February 2008, the World Bank stated that the ICP's revised estimate of China's PPP exchange rate data would affect its estimates of poverty levels in China, based on the daily cost of basic needs (estimated at roughly $1 PPP) and household surveys on consumption. The Bank estimates that the new PPP revisions would raise the estimated poverty rate in China in 2004 from 10% to 13-17%, or an increase from 130 million to between 169 to 221 million. Thus, previous estimates may have underestimated the number of Chinese living in poverty by up to 91 million people. Regardless of how China seeks to present the overall status of its economic development, commentators are speculating on the possible implications of the smaller GDP estimate of China for its socio-economic situation and policies, including: China ' s political stability may be weaker than previously thought —In the past, dissatisfaction with China's economic condition has lead to public unrest (e.g.—Spring 1989). The rising number of protests and demonstrations over the last few years may reflect, in part, the dissatisfaction of China's poor with their lack of economic progress. A 2005 article in People ' s Daily described China's growing income disparity as a "yellow alert" that could become a "red alert" in five years if the government failed to take proper actions. A 2005 United Nations report stated that the income gap between the urban and rural areas was among the highest in the world and warned that this gap threatened social stability. The report urged China to take greater steps to improve conditions for the rural poor, and bolster education, health care, and the social security system. The new PPP measurement may increase pressure within China to expand efforts to promote development in the rural areas where over 800 million people reside. According to a recent article in the Atlantic Monthly , some Chinese question why the government does not use its massive foreign exchange reserves to help alleviate poverty and respond to increasing income disparities across the country, rather than invest those funds overseas assets, such as in U.S. Treasuries. Such a reallocation of China's investment portfolio might have repercussions for the U.S. economy. Lower prospects for democracy —Prior to the release of the ICP revision report, some analysts had speculated that, once China reached a certain level of economic development and possessed a large and educated middle class, it would follow the examples of Taiwan and South Korea and begin to institute democratic reforms. The lower estimate of China's economy and living standards may dampen expectations in the West that China might soon move to adopt political reforms. Lower commitment to market reforms and trade liberalization —In an effort to reduce income disparities and improve conditions for China's poor, there may be a return to some of the "command economy" methods of the past. The recent decision to impose strict price controls on basic food items and other household necessities might be seen as a temporary retreat from market reforms. Finally, the ICP study may also alter how the U.S. government and the U.S. business community perceive China. The possible new view of China includes: Reevaluation of the Chinese government ' s budget —The PPP data may affect how U.S. policymakers evaluate China's spending levels on policies that affect U.S. policy. For example, the U.S. Defense Department's annual report on China's military spending includes conversions of China's budget data by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) from nominal U.S. dollars into PPP levels. The report estimated the PLA's 2003 budget in $30.6 billion in nominal dollars and $141 billion on a PPP basis. The World Banks's PPP revision could significantly decrease this estimate and other measurements of Chinese military spending as well as various public spending programs. Smaller export market potential —As a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations wrote, "U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs hoping to crack the Chinese and Indian markets must come to terms with a middle class that is significantly smaller than thought. Companies with growth plans tied to the Indian and Chinese markets could face disappointing results." However, it is important to note the limitations of PPP estimates of GDP—and where and when they provide useful insight in economic analysis. Although the estimated size of China's economy decreases under the PPP revisions, other aspects on China's economy remain significantly large. For example, trade and international financial data are generally unaffected by the reduction in China's PPP GDP. It is estimated that in 2007, China overtook the United States to become the world's second-largest exporter (after the European Union). Similarly, in 2006 China was the world's fifth-largest recipient of foreign direct investment, the largest steel producer, the second-largest consumer of oil, and by some accounts, the largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2). In addition, since 2006, China has been the world's largest holder of foreign exchange reserves ($1.5 trillion at the end of 2007). Thus, despite the ICP results, China remains a major trade and economic power and a major potential global player in international finances and investment flows.

China's rapid economic growth since 1979 has transformed it into a major economic power. Over the past few years, many analysts have contended that China could soon overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy, based on estimates of China's economy on a "purchasing power parity" (PPP) basis, which attempts to factor in price differences across countries when estimating the size of a foreign economy in U.S. dollars. However, in December 2007, the World Bank issued a study that lowered its previous 2005 PPP estimate of the size of China's economy by 40%. If these new estimates are accurate, it will likely be many years before China's economy reaches U.S. levels. The new PPP data could also have an impact on U.S. and international perceptions over other aspects of China's economy, including its living standards, poverty levels, and government expenditures, such as on the military. This report will not be updated.

Political instability in Georgia appeared to worsen in November 2007 after several opposition parties united in a "National Council" that launched demonstrations in Tbilisi, the capital, to demand that legislative elections be held in early 2008 as originally called for instead of in late 2008 as set by the government-dominated legislature. The demonstrations had been spurred by sensational accusations by former defense minister Irakli Okruashvili against President Mikheil Saakashvili (including that Saakashvili ordered him to commit murder). Calls for Saakashvili's resignation intensified after Okruashvili claimed that he had been coerced by the government to recant the accusations. On November 7, police and security forces forcibly dispersed demonstrators, reportedly resulting in several dozen injuries. Security forces also stormed the independent Imedi ("Hope") television station, which had aired opposition grievances, and shut it down. Saakashvili declared a state of emergency for 15 days, giving him enhanced powers. He claimed that the demonstrations had been part of a coup attempt orchestrated by Russia, and ordered three Russian diplomats to leave the country. U.S. and other international criticism of the crackdown may have influenced Saakashvili's decision to step down as president on November 25, 2007, so that early presidential elections could be held on January 5, 2008, "because I, as this country's leader, need an unequivocal mandate to cope with all foreign threats and all kinds of pressure on Georgia." At the same time, he called for a plebiscite on whether to have a spring or fall legislative election and on whether Georgia should join NATO. Legislative Speaker Nino Burjanadze became acting president. She called on prosecutors to drop charges against Imedi. It renewed broadcasts on December 12, and became for a time the main television outlet for opposition candidates in the election (see also below). Significant amendments to the electoral code were adopted in late November and mid-December to make elections more democratic, including by adding some opposition party representatives to electoral commissions. However, the adoption of new rules shortly before the election sometimes resulted in haphazard implementation, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which monitored the electoral process. Most observers considered the nomination process for presidential candidates to be inclusive and transparent. Besides Saakashvili, six other candidates were successfully registered (see Table 1). Among the campaign pledges made by the candidates, Saakashvili ran on his claimed record of reducing corruption and crime and improving living conditions, and pledged to further reduce poverty and to restore Georgia's territorial integrity peacefully. Levan Gachechiladze stated that he would work to create a parliamentary system of rule with a constitutional monarchy, nominate former foreign minister Salome Zourabichvili as the prime minister, and encourage private enterprise and poverty alleviation. Davit Gamqrelidze pledged to consider backing either a parliamentary system or constitutional monarchy, and to bolster freedom of speech, personal property rights, and an independent judiciary. Shalva Natelashvili pledged to boost social services and called for a parliamentary system. The Harvard-educated Giorgi Maisashvili stressed business creation. All the candidates except Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia and prominent businessman Badri Patarkatsishvili called for Georgia to seek membership in NATO. Sarishvili-Chanturia urged voters to either vote for her or other candidates she favored. Patarkatsishvili called for abolishing the presidency, creating a confederation with a weak central government, and establishing close ties with Russia. He pledged to use his fortune to provide unemployment benefits and some free utilities to the poor. Mass rallies were prominent in the campaign, and several candidates toured the country. In contrast, Patarkatsishvili faced charges of involvement in a coup attempt linked to the November demonstrations and conducted his campaign from abroad. Most observers considered much of the campaigning as focused on accusations rather than issues. Perhaps the most sensational event of the campaign occurred in late December, when the government released recordings which it claimed incriminated Patarkatsishvili in yet another coup planned for after the election. Patarkatsishvili denied planning a coup and called on journalists to defend him. He also stated that he would step down as a candidate, but later reversed course. Staff at Imedi, which was at least partially owned by Patarkatsishvili, decided to temporarily halt transmissions on December 26. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) reported that 56.2% of 3.35 million registered voters reportedly turned out and that Saakashvili received enough votes (over 50%) to avoid a legally mandated second round of voting for the top two candidates (preliminary results; see Presidential Election Results ). On the plebiscite issues, 77% of voters endorsed Georgia joining NATO and almost 80% supported holding legislative elections in spring 2008. An effort by the government to conduct balloting in Georgia-controlled areas in South Ossetia was denounced by officials in the breakaway region with the claim that almost all residents are citizens of Russia. Saakashvili's performance at the polls benefitted from a growing economy and a boost in social services provided by the government. His pledge of greater efforts to alleviate poverty also may have helped ease some grievances against his rule, according to many observers. The fractiousness of some of the opposition, which could not agree on a single candidate, was a major factor in the results. A preliminary report by observers from the OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament (EP) assessed the election as "in essence consistent with most ... commitments and standards for democratic elections, [although] significant challenges were revealed...." Several positive aspects of the election were listed, including that the race offered a competitive choice of candidates. Negative aspects included "pervasive" violations that were "not conducive to a constructive, issue-based election campaign." These included the use of government offices to support Saakashvili, "substantiated" instances in which officials harassed opposition campaigners, allegations that state employees were ordered to vote for Saakashvili, the use of social services to gain support for Saakashvili, and a tendency toward pro-Saakashvili bias by the CEC in resolving complaints. The monitors viewed the vote count more negatively, with a significant number assessing it as bad or very bad. The preliminary report argued that electoral abuses varied from region to region, appeared often due to incompetence or local fraud, and stopped short of organized and systematic manipulation. The CEC and the courts eventually invalidated or corrected the results in 18 of 3,511 voting precincts. Among other assessments of the election, the prestigious Georgian NGO, Fair Elections, reported on January 10 that its exit polling at 400 precincts appeared to indicate that Saakashvili may have won enough votes to avoid a runoff, even if there were voting irregularities. U.S. analyst Charles Fairbanks, however, argued on January 16, 2008, that the balloting reported for Saakashvili was inflated, so that it was "unlikely" that he won in the first round. Although no Russian election observers were invited, the Russian Foreign Ministry asserted on January 6, 2008, that the election "could hardly be called free and fair," including because "the campaign was accompanied with the extensive use of administrative resources, unconcealed pressure on opposition candidates and rigid limits on their access to financial and media resources." Many observers regarded the relative peacefulness of the election campaign (compared to the November 2007 violence) as a positive sign that at least fitful democratization might be preserved in Georgia. Among other possible signs of progress toward democratization and stability, Saakashvili in his inaugural address on January 20, 2008, pledged to facilitate greater opposition participation in political decision-making. Some analysts also suggest that opposition parties and politicians might have benefitted from the campaign by becoming better known and might gain votes in upcoming legislative elections, thereby enhancing political pluralism. These observers suggest that opposition parties and politicians will soon shift from protesting the results of the presidential race to campaigning for a prospective May 2008 legislative election. In the economic realm, these observers suggest that Saakashvili's re-election reassured international investors that Georgia has a stable investment climate, although boosted social spending could increase short-term inflation. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe (COE) on January 6 urged opposition politicians to eschew "immature" rabble-rousing and to "show responsibility, political maturity and respect for the democratic process" by working through constitutional procedures to address electoral irregularities. Thousands of people reportedly turned out on January 13 and January 20 to peacefully protest against what they considered a fraudulent election. Gachechiladze and other leaders of the National Council asserted that Saakashvili did not win enough votes to avoid a run-off, where he would have faced a single opponent (Gachechiladze). Many observers argue that Saakashvili's electoral victory with 53% of the vote contrasts sharply with the 96% of the vote he won in 2004 and illustrates that public trust in his governance has declined. One Georgian analyst has suggested, however, that despite this decline in public trust, many citizens remembered the disorder of past months and years and were fearful of voting for opposition candidates who promised radical political and economic changes if elected. The risk of disorder could greatly increase if public trust further declines as the result of a tainted prospective May 2008 legislative election. Saakashvili's win appeared to be a further blow to Russia's hopes of restoring its influence in Georgia, according to many observers. These observers also raise concerns that Saakashvili's campaign pledge to soon unify Georgia (although he called for peaceful measures) could contribute to further tensions with Russia. In his inaugural address, however, Saakashvili attempted to reassure Russia that Georgia was intent on repairing bilateral ties. One Tajik analyst has suggested that Saakashvili's re-election provides a positive example to reform-minded politicians in Russia and other Soviet successor states and threatens non-reformist governments in these states. On November 8, 2007, the U.S. State Department welcomed President Saakashvili's call for early presidential elections and a plebiscite on the timing of legislative elections. At the same time, it urged Saakashvili to relinquish emergency power and to "restore all media broadcasts" to facilitate a free and fair election, and urged all political factions to "maintain calm [and] respect the rule of law." Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza visited Tbilisi on November 11-13 with a letter from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that listed these and other proposals "to restore [the] momentum of democratic reform" in Georgia, highlighting U.S. interest in Georgia's fate. He argued that while in the past the United States had focused on Georgia as a conduit for oil and gas pipelines to the West and on security assistance, "today what makes Georgia a top tier issue for the U.S. government is democracy." He held extensive talks with government and opposition politicians to urge them to moderate their mutual accusations and to make compromises necessary for democratic progress. He also stressed that "the United States remains a firm supporter [of] Georgia's NATO aspirations," and called on unnamed NATO allies to await further political developments in Georgia before deciding whether or not the country is eligible for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Some observers have suggested that NATO's possible consideration of a MAP for Georgia may well be delayed beyond the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, for reasons that include assessing Georgia's performance in holding a prospective May 2008 legislative election. Just after the January 5 balloting, the State Department "congratulated" the people of Georgia for an election that many international observers considered "was in essence consistent with most OSCE and COE commitments and standards." However, the State Department also raised concerns about reported electoral violations and urged that they be thoroughly investigated and remedied. U.S. ambassador to Georgia John Tefft likewise appeared cautious when he stated on January 10 that the United States had not yet reached an "official political assessment" of the election, so had not congratulated a winner. After the CEC announced the final election results, President Bush on January 14 telephoned Saakashvili to congratulate him, and dispatched U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez to the inauguration. Some opposition supporters in Georgia criticized the United States for recognizing Saakashvili's win, perhaps reflecting some potential increase in anti-Americanism, but at an opposition protest at the U.S. Embassy on January 22, only one of the parties involved in the National Council participated. Many in Congress long have supported democratization and other assistance to Georgia, as reflected in hearings and legislation. The 110 th Congress ( P.L. 110-17 ) urged NATO to extend a Membership Action Plan for Georgia and designated Georgia as eligible to receive security assistance under the program established by the NATO Participation Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-447 ). Indicating ongoing interest in Georgia's reform progress, on December 13, 2007, the Senate approved S. Res. 391, which urged the U.S. President to publically back free and fair elections in Georgia. In introducing the resolution, Senator Richard Lugar averred that he was "a strong friend of the Georgian people," and that the resolution indicated "our strong hopes that ... Georgia will return to the democratic path and embrace a free and fair election process." He also urged Georgia to facilitate the work of international election monitors, particularly those from the OSCE. Representative Alcee Hastings was appointed as Special Coordinator by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to lead a mission of nearly 500 short-term observers who monitored the January 5 election. The day after the election, Representative Hastings reportedly stated that he viewed the election as a "viable expression of free choice of the Georgian people," but he also cautioned that Georgia's "future holds immense challenges" because of the high degree of mistrust and polarization in Georgian society. Similarly, former Representative Jim Kolbe, who led a delegation from the International Republican Institute, evaluated the election as broadly free and fair, but called for further reforms.

This report discusses the campaign and results of Georgia's January 5, 2008, presidential election and implications for Russia and U.S. interests. The election took place after the sitting president, Mikheil Saakashvili, suddenly resigned in the face of domestic and international criticism over his crackdown on political dissidents. Many observers viewed Saakashvili's re-election as marking some democratization progress, but some raised concerns that political instability might endure and that Georgia's ties with NATO might suffer. This report may be updated. Related reports include CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed].

The cornerstone of income support for unemployed workers is the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program, which may provide income support through UC benefit payments. UC benefits may be extended at the state level if certain economic situations under the Extended Benefit (EB) program within the state exist. The UC program has a direct impact on almost every business in the United States as most businesses are subject to state and federal unemployment taxes. An estimated $7.4 billion in federal unemployment taxes and $36.1 billion in state unemployment taxes were collected in FY2007. In FY2007, the federal appropriation for the UC program was $3.7 billion. In FY2007, states spent an estimated $31.4 billion on UC benefits. Approximately 133.4 million jobs are covered by the UC program. In March 2008, 3.2 million unemployed workers received UC benefits in a given week and the average weekly UC benefit amount was $291. Originally, the intent of the UC program, among other things, was to help counter economic fluctuations such as recessions. This intent is reflected in the current UC program's funding and benefit structure. When the economy grows, UC program revenue rises through increased tax revenues while UC program spending falls as fewer workers are unemployed. The effect of collecting more taxes than are spent dampens demand in the economy. This also creates a surplus of funds or a "cushion" of available funds for the UC program to draw upon during a recession. In a recession, UC tax revenue falls and UC program spending rises as more workers lose their jobs and receive UC benefits. The increased amount of UC payments to unemployed workers dampens the economic effect of earnings losses by injecting additional funds into the economy. Other programs that may provide workers with income support are more specialized. These programs may target special groups of workers; be automatically triggered by certain economic conditions; be temporarily created by Congress with a set expiration date; or target typically ineligible workers through a disaster declaration. Unemployment Compensation is a joint federal-state program financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). The underlying framework of the UC system is contained in the Social Security Act. Title III of the act authorizes grants to states for the administration of state UC laws, Title IX authorizes the various components of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF), and Title XII authorizes advances or loans to insolvent state UC programs. The federal government appropriates funds for federal and state UC program administration, the federal share of EB payments, and federal loans to insolvent state UC programs. In FY2008, the appropriation is $3.7 billion. The states will receive an estimated $2.29 billion from the federal government for the administration of their UC programs. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) administers the federal portion of the UC system, which operates in each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Federal law sets broad rules that the 53 state programs must follow. These include the broad categories of workers that must be covered by the program, the method for triggering the EB program, the floor on the highest state unemployment tax rate to be imposed on employers (5.4%), and how the states will repay UTF loans. If the states do not follow these rules, their employers may lose a portion of their state unemployment tax credit when their federal unemployment tax is calculated. The federal tax pays for both federal and state administrative costs, the federal share of the EB program, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, and state employment services. The states may only use their state tax revenues for UC benefits and not for administrative costs. States determine UC benefit eligibility, payments, and duration through state laws and program regulations. Generally, UC benefits are based on wages for covered work over a 12-month period. Most state benefit formulas replace half of a claimant's average weekly wage up to a weekly maximum. Weekly maximums in January 2008 ranged from $210 (Mississippi) to $600 (Massachusetts) and, in states that provide dependent's allowances, up to $900 (Massachusetts). In March 2008, the average weekly benefit was $291. Benefits are available for up to 26 weeks (30 weeks in Massachusetts). The average regular UC benefit duration in March 2008 was 15 weeks; the average regular UC benefit duration in FY2007 was 15.2 weeks. In April 2008, approximately 3.0 million unemployed workers received UC benefits in a given week. The Extended Benefit (EB) program, established by P.L. 91-373 (26 U.S.C. 3304), may extend UC benefits at the state level if certain economic situations within the state exist. The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) or its total unemployment rate (TUR) reaches certain levels. The weekly EB benefit is identical in value to the regular weekly UC benefit. The EB program provides for additional weeks of UC benefits, up to a maximum of 13 weeks during periods of high unemployment and up to a maximum of 20 weeks in certain states with extremely high unemployment. As of July 21, 2008 the EB program is active in Alaska and Rhode Island. On June 30, 2008, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program was created by P.L. 110-252 . This new temporary unemployment insurance program provides up to 13 additional weeks of unemployment benefits to certain workers who have exhausted their rights to regular unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The program began July 6, 2008, and will terminate on March 28, 2009. No EUC08 benefit will be paid beyond the week ending July 4, 2009. The EUC08 program should not be confused with the similarly named EB program. The EUC08 program is temporary and applies to all states. The EB program is permanently authorized and applies only to certain states on the basis of state economic conditions specified in law. EUC08 and EB Interactions . The EUC08 program allows states to determine which benefit is paid first. Thus, states may choose to pay EUC08 before EB or vice versa. States balance the decision of which benefit to pay first by examining the potential cost savings to the state with the potential loss of unemployment benefits for unemployed individuals in the state. It may be less costly for the state to choose to pay for the EUC08 benefit first as the EUC08 benefit is 100% federally financed (whereas the EB benefit is 50% state financed). However, if the state opts to pay EUC08 first, individuals in the state might receive less in total unemployment benefits if the EB program triggers off before the individuals exhaust their EUC08 benefits. Alaska has opted to pay EB before EUC08 benefits. In contrast, Rhode Island has opted to pay EUC08 benefits before EB. UC benefits are financed through employer taxes. The federal taxes on employers are under the authority of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), and the state taxes are under the authority given by the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). These taxes are deposited in the appropriate accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). If a state UC program complies with all federal rules, the net FUTA tax rate for employers is 0.8% on the first $7,000 of each worker's earnings. The 0.8% FUTA tax funds both federal and state administrative costs as well as the federal share of the EB program, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, and state employment services. Federal law defines which jobs a state UC program must cover for the state's employers to avoid paying the maximum FUTA tax rate (6.2%) on the first $7,000 of each employee's annual pay. Federal law requires that a state must cover jobs in firms that pay at least $1,500 in wages during any calendar quarter or employ at least one worker in each of 20 weeks in the current or prior year. The FUTA tax is not paid by government or nonprofit employers, but state programs must cover government workers and all workers in nonprofits that employ at least four workers in each of 20 weeks in the current or prior year. (States are reimbursed for expenditures related to federal workers by the federal government.) An estimated $7.3 billion in FUTA taxes were collected in FY2007. After the payments to the state accounts for administrative expenses, the expected net balance in the UTF of the Employment Security Administration Account, the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (for the EB program), and the Federal Unemployment Account (for federal loans to the states) was expected to be $35.2 billion at the end of March 2008. Expiring Provision: P.L. 110-140 . On December 19, 2008, the President signed P.L. 110-140 . Among many other items, P.L. 110-140 includes a one-year extension of 0.2% FUTA surtax. At the end of CY2008, the effective FUTA tax on employers for each employee will decrease to 0.6% (down from 0.8%) on the first $7,000 of wages. SUTA taxes are not directly affected by the expiring provision. States levy their own payroll taxes on employers to fund regular UC benefits and the state share of the EB program. These state UC tax rates are "experience-rated," in which employers generating the fewest claimants have the lowest rates. The state unemployment tax rate of an employer is, in most states, based on the amount of UC paid to former employees. Generally, in most states, the more UC benefits paid to its former employees, the higher the tax rate of the employer, up to a maximum established by state law. The experience rating is intended to ensure an equitable distribution of UC program taxes among employers and to encourage a stable workforce. State ceilings on taxable wages in 2008 range from the $7,000 FUTA federal ceiling (eight states) to $32,200 (Idaho). The minimum rates range from 0% (six states) to 1.69% (Rhode Island). The maximum rates range from 5.4% (17 states) to 12.27% (Massachusetts). Approximately $33.7 billion in SUTA taxes were collected in FY2007. State UC revenue is deposited in the U.S. Treasury. These deposits are counted as federal revenue in the budget. State accounts within the UTF are credited for this revenue. The U.S. Treasury reimburses states from the appropriate UTF state accounts for their benefit payments. These payments do not require an annual appropriation, but the reimbursements do count as federal budget outlays. If a state trust fund account becomes insolvent, a state may borrow federal funds. As of this writing, no state has an outstanding loan. The net balance of the state accounts in the UTF at the end of March 2008 was approximately $32.4 billion.

A variety of benefits may be available to unemployed workers to provide them with income support during a spell of unemployment. When eligible workers lose their jobs, the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide income support through the payment of UC benefits. Many workers who have exhausted their rights to regular UC benefits may have their unemployment insurance benefits extended for up to 13 additional weeks through the temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. In addition, the Extended Benefit (EB) program may extend UC benefits at the state level if certain economic situations within the state exist. This report briefly summarizes the UC program, its authorization, appropriations, benefit determination, and funding. For a comprehensive summary of all income support programs available to unemployed workers, consult CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Available Unemployment Benefits and Legislative Activity, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Short selling was best described by Daniel Drew, the Gilded Age speculator and robber baron: "He that sells what isn't his'n, must buy it back or go to prison." Short sellers borrow shares from a broker, sell them, and make a profit if the share price subsequently drops, allowing them to buy back the same number of shares for less money. In other words, short selling is a bet that the price of a stock will fall. Short sellers have always been unpopular on Wall Street. Like skeletons at the feast, they seem to stand against rising share values, expanding wealth, and national prosperity. However, most market participants recognize that they provide a valuable service to the extent that they identify companies and industries that are overvalued by investors in the grip of irrational exuberance. They may also provide a curb against manipulators who spread false news or otherwise attempt to artificially boost a stock price. By bringing such valuations down to earth, short selling can prevent economically wasteful over-allocation of resources to firms and sectors. Another persistent complaint against short sellers is that they cause artificial price volatility. A form of manipulation common in the 19 th century was the "bear raid"—a gang of speculators would sell a stock short, causing the price to drop. They would follow with another wave of short sales, depressing the price still further, and so on, until the stock's price was driven to the floor. In the 1930s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a regulation to prevent bear raiding. The "uptick rule" stated that a short sale may occur only if the last price movement in a stock's price was upward. This prevents short sellers from piling onto a falling stock and setting off a downward price spiral. In the words of a standard securities law textbook, the tick test (and related rules) "seem pretty well to have taken the caffeine out of the short sale." In 2007, the SEC concluded that growth in the market made the rule unnecessary, and it was repealed. However, in recent years, complaints about manipulative short selling have reappeared. Many shareholders and officers of smaller firms have identified "naked" short selling as a source of price manipulation and have criticized the SEC's enforcement record. At the same time, the SEC has identified short selling in connection with spreading rumors as an abuse that may raise fears about the solvency of the target firm and cut off its access to credit, potentially leading to the destruction of the firm, as was the case with Bear Stearns in March 2008. A short sale always involves the sale of shares that the seller does not own. The buyer, however, expects to receive real shares. Where do those shares come from? Normally, they are borrowed by the broker from another investor or from a brokerage's own account. This is usually not difficult to do if the shares are issued by a large company, where millions of shares change hands daily and where many shares are not registered to the actual owners, but are held in "street name," that is, in the broker's account. With smaller corporations, however, the number of shares in circulation may be limited, and brokers may find it difficult to locate shares to deliver to the buyer in a short sale transaction. When shares are not located to "cover" a short sale, the short position is said to be naked. If shares are not found by the time the transaction must be settled, there is a "failure to deliver" shares to the buyer. If it occurs sporadically and on a small scale, naked short selling does not raise serious manipulation concerns. However, when the number of shares sold short represents a significant fraction of all shares outstanding, there may be a strong impact on the share price. In such cases, when naked short selling creates a virtually unlimited quantity of shares, a market based on supply and demand can be seriously distorted. The SEC notes that "naked short sellers enjoy greater leverage than if they were required to borrow securities and deliver within a reasonable time period, and they may use this additional leverage to engage in trading activities that deliberately depress the price of a security." Opponents of naked short selling also charge that by permitting short sales to occur when there is no possibility of actually delivering shares to the buyers, brokers and dealers accommodate manipulation. When naked short selling drives prices down, holders of the stock understandably feel cheated. They do not believe the stock is overvalued; they are not selling; but the price drops anyway. It is important to note that naked short selling is not always evidence of intent to manipulate prices. Under certain circumstances, a market maker may engage in naked short selling to stabilize the market. For example, assume that there is a sudden flurry of buy orders for a stock. The market maker may judge the buying interest to be temporary and not justified by any real news about the company's prospects. It may be the result of a questionable press release or a rumor in an Internet chat room. The market maker may choose to sell short to avoid what in its view would be an unjustified run-up in the stock's price. In this situation, naked short selling by the market maker may protect investors against manipulation. It is also worth noting that while restrictions on short selling discourage certain forms of manipulation, they may encourage or facilitate others. Manipulations that involve artificially inflating stock prices are probably more common than techniques (like naked shorting) that seek to depress them. Rumors, false press releases, and unexpected purchases may all cause sudden run-ups of stock prices, which may be followed (in the classic "pump-and-dump" fraud) by sudden collapse, as the manipulators sell their shares to the unwary. Without short selling as a counterweight, the magnitude and duration of such fraudulent run-ups are likely to be greater Until July 2008, the SEC viewed the problem of naked shorting as largely confined to smaller firms, particularly small-capitalization "penny" stocks listed on the Nasdaq bulletin board market (OTCBB). In these companies, the bulk of outstanding shares may be owned by corporate insiders or by securities dealers who act as market makers, so that relatively few shares are available for purchase on the open market. This means that transactions have a proportionately greater impact on the stock price than do trades of the same size in the shares of a larger company, making manipulation easier. In addition to OTCBB stocks, however, smaller companies listed on the exchanges or the Nasdaq national market were also seen as vulnerable to short selling abuse. After several years of deliberation, the SEC in 2004 adopted rules designed to control abusive naked short selling. Regulation SHO took effect on January 3, 2005. The new regulation replaced existing exchange and Nasdaq rules with a uniform national standard. Under Regulation SHO, a broker may not accept a short sale order from a customer, or effect a short sale for its own account, unless it has either borrowed the security, or made a bona fide arrangement to borrow it; or has reasonable grounds to believe that it can locate the security, borrow it, and deliver it to the buyer by the date delivery is due; and has documented compliance with the above. The appearance of a stock on an exchange's "easy to borrow" list constituted reasonable grounds for believing that the stock can be located. Stocks on such lists tend to be highly capitalized, with large numbers of shares in circulation. If a broker executes a short sale, and then fails to deliver shares to the purchaser, further restrictions on short selling may come into force. If the "fail to deliver" position is 10,000 shares or more, for five consecutive trading days, and the position amounts to at least 0.5% of total shares outstanding, the stock becomes a threshold security . The exchanges and Nasdaq are now required to publish daily lists of threshold securities. Regulation SHO specifies that if a fail to deliver position in a threshold security persists for 13 trading days, the broker (or the broker's clearing house) must close the short position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity. After the 13 days have elapsed, the broker may not accept any more short sale orders until the fail to deliver position is closed by purchasing securities. The rules include exemptions for market makers engaged in bona fide market-making activities, and for certain transactions between brokers. The adoption of Regulation SHO did not put an end to investor complaints about naked short selling. Complaints were heard that the SEC did not enforce the rules vigorously enough and that some brokers evaded the 13-day requirement by passing fail-to-deliver positions from one firm to another. The SEC staff has monitored the incidence of fail to delivers after the effective date of Regulation SHO, and, in July 2006, Chairman Cox reported that the rule "appears to be significantly reducing fails to deliver without disruption to the markets." Nevertheless, some further amendments to Regulation SHO were considered. In July 2006, the SEC proposed rules to close two "loopholes" in Regulation SHO, which it called responsible for the persistence of fail to deliver positions in certain stocks. Under the proposed rules, the current exemption for options market makers would be restricted. Second, a "grandfather" provision in the original rule—which exempted short positions that had been established before a stock was placed on the threshold securities list from the requirement that fail to deliver positions be closed out after 13 consecutive trading days—would be eliminated. In August 2007, the SEC adopted the proposed rule abolishing the grandfather provision. When a stock goes onto the threshold list, all short positions in the stock will be subject to the 13-day close-out requirement. The SEC did not adopt the proposal relating to options market makers. As financial companies came under pressure from tight credit markets in late 2007 and 2008, concerns emerged about manipulative short sellers spreading rumors about firms' creditworthiness and liquidity. Despite regulators' assurances that Bear Stearns, a leading investment bank, had adequate capital and liquidity reserves, the firm was destroyed in March 2008 by the equivalent of a bank run: market participants, fearing that the firm might not be able to meet its obligations, refused to extend credit on any terms. The Federal Reserve was forced to arrange a hasty merger with JP Morgan Chase, which acquired Bear Stearns on condition that the Fed purchase $29 billion of risky mortgage assets. All large financial firms finance their operations by issuing short-term debt, which must be continually refinanced, or rolled over. Thus, they are vulnerable to "nonbank runs"—they cannot survive long if markets lose confidence and become unwilling to provide new funds. In July 2008, share prices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant government-sponsored enterprises that hold about $1.5 trillion in mortgage-backed assets, plunged, and fears arose that they might go the way of Bear Stearns. On July 15, the SEC issued an emergency order banning naked short sales of the shares of Fannie, Freddie, and 17 other large financial institutions. Under the terms of the order, no short sale of the stock of any of the 19 listed firms may occur unless the seller has actually borrowed (or arranged to borrow) the stock and delivers the stock to the buyer on the regular settlement date. The SEC explained the rationale for its unusual action: False rumors can lead to a loss of confidence in our markets. Such loss of confidence can lead to panic selling, which may be further exacerbated by "naked" short selling. As a result, the prices of securities may artificially and unnecessarily decline well below the price level that would have resulted from the normal price discovery process. If significant financial institutions are involved, this chain of events can threaten disruption of our markets. The events preceding the sale of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. are illustrative of the market impact of rumors. During the week of March 10, 2008, rumors spread about liquidity problems at Bear Stearns, which eroded investor confidence in the firm. As Bear Stearns' stock price fell, its counterparties became concerned, and a crisis of confidence occurred late in the week. In particular, counterparties to Bear Stearns were unwilling to make secured funding available to Bear Stearns on customary terms. In light of the potentially systemic consequences of a failure of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve took emergency action. The SEC's intervention has been criticized by some who believe that financial stocks had been battered not by false rumors, but by realistic assessments of firms' underlying financial weakness. Short selling, in this view, is simply market discipline at work. One view is that the SEC's objective of raising financial stock prices itself amounts to market manipulation. The SEC's original order, issued on July 15, was extended through August 12, 2008. On September 18, 2008, as financial stocks continued to plunge, the SEC issued another, much more sweeping emergency order. All short selling (naked or not) of the shares of more than 700 financial firms was banned. The rationale was the same as for the earlier action: whatever benefits short selling might provide in terms of price efficiency were far outweighed by the possible damage to the financial system and the economy if major firms were swept away by panic. The emergency order expired October 8, 2008. On October 1, 2008, in addition to extending the short sale ban announced on September 18, the SEC adopted a "interim final" rule that in effect banned naked short selling in all stocks. This order, in the form of an interim final rule, requires that when a failure to deliver shares within the normal three-day settlement period occurs, the seller's broker must immediately purchase or borrow securities and close out the fail to deliver position by no later than the beginning of trading on the next business day. Failure to comply means that the broker cannot sell that stock short either for its own account or for customers, unless the shares are not only located but also pre-borrowed. Failure to deliver shares also exposes brokers to fines and other sanctions. The SEC also adopted Rule 10b-21, a naked short selling anti-fraud rule, covering short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or any other market participants about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. The rule makes clear that such persons are violating the law when they fail to deliver. On July 27, 2009, the SEC made the interim rule permanent. In addition, the SEC announced that it was working with the stock markets to improve disclosure about short selling. Information on the amount of short selling of individual stock will be made public on a daily basis. After one month, details of specific short trades will be made public, but without identifying the individual short sellers.

Short sellers borrow stock, sell it, and hope to profit if they can buy back the same number of shares later at a lower price. A short sale is a bet that a stock's price will fall. A short sale is said to be "naked" if the broker does not in fact borrow shares to deliver to the buyer. When executed on a large scale, naked short sales can constitute a large portion of total shares outstanding, and can put serious downward pressure on a stock's price. Critics of the practice characterize it as a form of illegal price manipulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2004 adopted Regulation SHO, a set of rules designed to control short selling abuses, focusing on small-capitalization stocks where the number of shares held by the public was relatively small. Until the current financial crisis, the SEC did not view short selling of large, blue-chip stocks as a problem. In July 2008, however, the SEC temporarily banned naked short sales of the stock of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 17 other large financial institutions. On September 18, 2008, the SEC banned all short selling of the shares of more than 700 financial companies in an emergency action that expired on October 8, 2008. On October 1, 2008, the SEC adopted an interim rule requiring short sellers' brokers to actually borrow shares to deliver to buyers, within one day after the expiration the normal three-day settlement time frame. The rule was made permanent on July 27, 2009, and it applies to all stocks. This report will be updated as events warrant.

H.R. 6 was introduced by the House Democratic Leadership to revise certain tax and royalty policies for oil and natural gas and use the resulting revenue to support a reserve for energy efficiency and renewable energy. The bill is one of several introduced on behalf of the Democratic Leadership in the House as part of its "100 hours" package of legislative initiatives conducted early in the 110 th Congress. Title I proposes to reduce certain oil and natural gas tax subsidies to create a revenue stream to support energy efficiency and renewable energy. Title II would modify certain aspects of royalty relief for offshore oil and natural gas development to create a second stream of revenue to support energy efficiency and renewable energy. Title III of H.R. 6 creates a budget procedure for the creation and use of a Strategic Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Reserve, under which additional spending for energy efficiency and renewable energy programs can be accommodated without violating enforcement procedures in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended. The stated purpose of the bill is to "reduce our nation's dependency on foreign oil" by investing in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Specifically, Section 301 (a) of the bill would make the revenue in the Reserve available to "offset the cost of subsequent legislation" that may be introduced "(1) to accelerate the use of domestic renewable energy resources and alternative fuels, (2) to promote the utilization of energy-efficient products and practices and conservation, and (3) to increase research, development, and deployment of clean renewable energy and efficiency technologies." The budget adjustment procedure for use of the Reserve is set out in Section 301 (b). The procedure is similar to reserve fund procedures included in annual budget resolutions. It would require the chairman of the House or Senate Budget Committee, as appropriate, to adjust certain spending levels in the budget resolution, and the committee spending allocations made thereunder, to accommodate a spending increase (beyond FY2007 levels) in a reported bill, an amendment thereto, or a conference report thereon that would address the three allowed uses of the Reserve noted above. The adjustments for increased spending for a fiscal year could not exceed the amount of increased receipts for that fiscal year, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office, attributable to H.R. 6 . According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the proposed repeal of selected tax incentives for oil and natural gas would make about $7.7 billion available over 10 years, 2008 through 2017. The proposed changes to the royalty system for oil and natural gas are estimated to generate an additional $6.3 billion. This would yield a combined total of $14 billion for the Reserve over a 10-year period. The CBO estimates show that the total annual revenue flow would vary annually over the 10-year period, ranging from a low of about $900 million to a high of about $1.8 billion per year. H.R. 6 came to the House floor for debate on January 18, 2007. In the floor debate, opponents argued that the reduction in oil and natural gas incentives would dampen production, cause job losses, and lead to higher prices for gasoline and other fuels. Opponents also complained that the proposal for the Reserve does not identify specific policies and programs that would receive funding. Proponents of the bill countered that record profits show that the oil and natural gas incentives were not needed. They also contended that the language that would create the Reserve would allow it to be used to support a variety of R&D, deployment, tax incentives, and other measures for renewables and energy efficiency, and that the specifics would evolve as legislative proposals come forth for to draw resources from the Reserve. The bill passed the House on January 18 by a vote of 264-163. In general, the budget resolution would revise the congressional budget for FY2007. It would also establish the budget for FY2008 and set budgetary levels for FY2009 through FY2012. In particular, the House resolution ( H.Con.Res. 99 ) would create a single deficit-neutral reserve fund for energy efficiency and renewable energy that is virtually identical to the reserve described in H.R. 6 . In contrast, the Senate resolution ( S.Con.Res. 21 ) would create three reserve funds, which identify more specific efficiency and renewables measures and would allow support for "responsible development" of oil and natural gas. On March 28, the House passed H.Con.Res. 99 by a vote of 216-210. For FY2007, it would allow for additional funding for energy (Function 270) above the President's request that "could be used for research, development, and deployment of renewable and alternative energy." Section 207 would create a deficit-neutral reserve fund that fulfills the purposes of H.R. 6 to "facilitate the development of conservation and energy efficiency technologies, clean domestic renewable energy resources, and alternative fuels that will reduce our reliance on foreign oil." On March 23, the Senate passed S.Con.Res. 21 , its version of the budget resolution. In parallel to the House resolution, Section 307 of S.Con.Res. 21 would create a deficit-neutral reserve fund that could be used for renewable energy, energy efficiency, and "responsible development" of oil and natural gas. In addition, Section 332 would create a deficit-neutral reserve fund for extension through 2015 of certain energy tax incentives, including the renewable energy electricity production tax credit (PTC), Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, and provisions for energy efficient buildings, products, and power plants. Further, Section 338 would create a deficit-neutral reserve fund for manufacturing initiatives that could include tax and research and development (R&D) measures that support alternative fuels, automotive and energy technologies, and the infrastructure to support those technologies.

H.R. 6 would use revenue from certain oil and natural gas policy revisions to create an Energy Efficiency and Renewables Reserve. The actual uses of the Reserve would be determined by ensuing legislation. A variety of tax, spending, or regulatory bills could draw funding from the Reserve to support liquid fuels or electricity policies. The House budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 99) would create a deficit-neutral reserve fund nearly identical to that proposed in H.R. 6. The Senate budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 21) would create three reserve funds with purposes related to those in H.R. 6. However, the Senate version has more specifics about efficiency and renewables measures, and it would allow reserve fund use for "responsible development" of oil and natural gas.

China eagerly awaits the commencement of the Games of the XXIX Olympiad on August 8, 2008 in Beijing. After seven years of preparations, China will host the preeminent sporting event of the year. In the words of Premier Wen Jiabao, the 2008 Olympic Summer Games provide an opportunity to demonstrate to the world how "democratic, open, civilized, friendly, and harmonious" China is. In addition, much like the two previous Asian hosts for Olympic Summer Games—Japan in 1964 and Korea in 1988—China views the 2008 Olympics as a showcase for its modern economy and a springboard for future economic growth. To the Chinese government, hosting the Olympics also signifies a turning point in its economic development. It provides an opportunity to begin the shift from an economy based on being the assembly platform for global manufacturing to one geared to providing goods and services for China's growing and prosperous middle class. The 2010 World Expo in Shanghai will be a similar opportunity to highlight China's economic progress. In an effort to ensure the success of the 2008 Olympics, the Chinese government has invested billions of dollars in sports facilities, housing, roads, mass transit systems, and other infrastructure. China hopes that its investments, when combined with the goodwill generated by the successful completion of the Olympics, will attract more tourists, businesses, and investors to China—and foster future economic growth in its wake. In addition, to counteract possible negative publicity about labor and environmental conditions in China, the government passed new labor laws and is promoting the 2008 Beijing Olympics as the "Green Olympics." If the post-Olympic economic records of past host cities and nations are any indication, however, it is uncertain that Beijing and China will see substantial economic benefits from this summer's games. Academic research on "mega-events"—such as the Olympics—has found that their economic benefits generally fail to meet pre-event expectations, and sometimes fall short of the costs of staging the event. Certain aspects of China's current economic circumstances make it more likely that the economic gains from the 2008 Beijing Olympics could be smaller than some pre-event expectations. There is a vigorous scholarly debate over the correct method of evaluating the economic impact of "mega-events," such as the Olympics. It is difficult to disentangle changes in economic growth, employment, inflation, tourism, and other possible effects caused by the mega-event from changes caused by other factors (currency appreciation, fiscal and monetary policy changes, etc.). In addition, certain types of investments related to mega-events, such as the construction of new stadiums, often fail to generate significant economic benefits after the mega-event is over. Plus, it is uncertain if economic activities undertaken as part of the preparation for the mega-event (for example, the construction of new mass transit lines) might not have taken place even if the mega-event had not occurred. Also, impact assessments of mega-events frequently ignore the "opportunity costs" associated with investments made before the event. For example, assessments often do not consider the possibility that the money spent on the new Olympic stadium might have generated greater economic benefits if spent on hospitals or schools. Finally, while the economic gains associated with the construction of new infrastructure are generally calculated, the economic costs associated with the displacement of people and business (for example, in the demolition and construction of new housing for the mega-events) often are not. Besides the methodological questions associated with assessing the economic effects of mega-events, there are also serious problems in methodological application. In many cases, the companies or individuals conducting the economic impact assessment prior to the mega-event have an incentive to overstate the potential gains and understate the potential costs. In some cases, the assessors present the costs of the mega-event (for example, the construction cost of new sports facilities) as benefits. In other cases, the assessors overstate the certainty and size of the "investment multiplier," the secondary benefits (for example, increased future tourism) associated with the mega-event. Few studies have been done comparing the pre-event projections of the economic impact of the Olympics to their post-event reality. A study of the 1994 Winter Olympics held in Lillehammer, Norway, determined that the pre-event economic impact studies systematically overstated the potential economic benefits of hosting the event, and that actual economic gains were comparatively small and short in duration. Another study of the Lillehammer Olympics concluded, "the long-term impacts are marginal and out of proportion compared to the high costs of hosting the [Olympic] Games." A Bank of China (BoC) study of 12 host countries for Olympic Games over the last 60 years reportedly concluded that nine of the economies—including Japan and South Korea—experienced declines in their average GDP growth rates in the eight years after the Olympics when compared to the eight years prior to the Olympics. The Chinese press has run several stories pondering the question, "Will [China] succumb to the so-called Post-Olympics Effect (POE)?" When China originally bid on hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics, it estimated the cost at $1.625 billion. Since then, several revised budgets have been released, raising the official cost to over $2 billion. Included in this figure is the expense of building or renovating 76 stadiums and sport facilities in the seven venues—Beijing, Hong Kong, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Tianjin—at which events will take place. However, these figures only include the direct costs of construction of the Olympic sports facilities and related venues. According to one estimate, the actual total construction cost—including the capital spent on non-sport infrastructure—is expected to exceed $40 billion. By comparison, Greece spent an estimated $16 billion on the 2004 Olympic Summer Games. At a recent press briefing, The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) criticized estimates of this sort, indicating that investments on transportation ($26.2 billion), energy ($10.0 billion), water resources ($2.4 billion), and the urban environment ($2.5 billion) are to be considered part of the budget of the city in which the capital outlay took place and not part of the cost of the Olympics. The $41.1 billion on non-sport capital investment went to a variety of projects. For example, in Beijing, 200 miles of roads were refurbished, two additional ring roads completed, and more than 90 miles of subway and light rail lines were added to the city's transportation system. A 9,000 room Olympic Village was also built in Beijing to house 16,000 athletes; it is to be converted into a modern apartment complex after the Olympics are over. Similar projects were also completed in the other six Olympic venues. In 2007, two Chinese economists, Zhang Yaxiong and Zhao Kun, published a study of the projected impact of the Beijing Olympics on the economic development of Beijing, its surrounding areas, and the rest of China. According to the authors, "Apart from its significance as a grand societal gathering, hosting the Olympic Games will greatly promote investment and consumption." Their model estimated that Olympics-related investments in Beijing increased the city's economic growth by 2.02% between 2002 and 2007, raised the surrounding area's growth by 0.23%, and advanced the rest of the nation's growth by 0.09%. The paper recounts other studies of the projected impact of the Beijing Olympics on China's economy. The authors report that a study by Gu et al. published in Chinese in 2003 predicted that the Olympics will increase Beijing's economic growth by 5% between 2003 and 2009. A 2005 study by Wei and Yan (also in Chinese) concluded that the Olympics would increase Beijing's economic growth by 0.8% from 2005 to 2008. All of these studies appear to suffer from one or more of the methodological problems frequently associated with impact analysis of mega-events. In their input-output analysis, Zhang and Zhao include both sport and non-sport facility investments as part of the Olympics-related investments—contrary to the stance of the BOCOG—coming up with a total investment for the 2008 Olympics of 282.53 billion yuan, or $41.3 billion. According to some analysts, the $41.3 billion in "investments" should be properly classified as a cost—not a benefit—of the Olympics. The paper also implicitly assumes that all the investment made would not have been made if China was not hosting the Olympics. Nor do Zhang and Zhao consider the "opportunity cost" of the Olympics-related capital outlay. For example, could the money spent on the new "Bird's Nest"(National Stadium) or the "Water Cube"(the National Aquatic Center) have been instead spent in Beijing on housing, medical facilities, or schools? In addition, the paper does not attempt to estimate the losses of the people displaced from their homes or places of employment so that the new Olympic facilities could be built. Another significant drawback of the paper is its apparent lack of consideration of China's current economic circumstance, particularly its twin problems of overinvestment and inflation. At a time when the Chinese government is concerned that its economy is overheated, and the rate of inflation is rising (7.1% in June 2008), the expenditures associated with the 2008 Summer Olympics may be exacerbating the nation's economic problems in two ways. First, the direct demand for raw materials, equipment, and labor to construct the Olympic facilities may be increasing upward pressure on prices. Second, materials and resources used in constructing Olympic facilities might have been used on arguably more productive and urgent construction projects. Given the experiences of past hosts of Olympic Summer Games and the current economic situation in China, many analysts believe the 2008 Olympics are unlikely to provide much of a stimulus—or much of a deterrent—for economic growth in Beijing or the rest of China. Although the Olympics-related capital outlay is seemingly large, it is small when compared to the annual value of construction in China and the overall size of China's economy. During the first half of 2008, the gross value of construction in China was 2.27 trillion yuan, or $388 billion. In addition, China's economy—25 trillion yuan ($3.6 trillion) in 2007—is already growing at over 10% per year. By comparison, the potential economic impact of the Olympics is small. It is also unclear if the Olympics will foster greater tourism in China. There are reports that a stricter visa policy was implemented in the run-up for the Olympics, and that foreign business travelers have had a difficult time obtaining visas or have had their multiple entries visa converted into single entry visas. As a result, China's trade shows that historically have been crowded with buyers have seen a decline in attendance. While the visa situation may return to normal after the Olympics have ended, the short-term effect on China's exporters has been considerable. According to China's National Tourism Administration, China received nearly 132 million "inbound tourists"—including over 26 million "foreigners" in 2007. China's domestic tourism has grown over the last decade from 644 million domestic tourists in 1997 to 1.610 billion in 2007. For Beijing, it is unlikely that the new Olympic facilities—including the Bird's Nest and the Water Cube—will dramatically increase tourism to China's capital city. Beijing's tourism bureau reportedly reduced its projection for August's foreign visitors from 500,000 to between 400,000 and 450,000—or about the same level as last year. Just like the case of Lillehammer, Beijing hotels built in anticipation of a surge in tourism are experiencing unexpectedly high vacancy rates. There are some possible unexpected economic benefits that might be attributable to the 2008 Olympics. U.S. companies operating in China report that the new labor laws are being enforced. Such changes in labor conditions are unlikely to be reversed after the Olympics are over. Similarly, while the factories around Beijing that were closed down to help reduce air pollution during the Olympics will more than likely reopen, the increased awareness of the sources of pollution may keep China from reverting to its pre-Olympics status. It would appear that the potential gains that China may hope to acquire from hosting the Olympics will be mostly in its public image, prestige, and soft power. In the week prior to the opening ceremonies, there were some indications that obtaining these gains may prove problematic. Despite repeated government assurances, the air quality in Beijing has remained an issue of concern for the athletes. There has also been controversy over open access to the Internet for journalists covering the Olympics. In addition, there is a "risk" that protests or demonstrations on human rights in China may detract from the image the Chinese government wishes to portray in its motto for the 2008 Summer Games—"One World, One Dream." If, once the closing ceremonies are over and the 2008 Beijing Olympics are done, China has obtained neither the economic nor political gains it sought, it can look ahead to the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai as another opportunity to showcase its achievements. Alternatively, the 2010 World Expo could also be a chance to build on the successful 2008 Beijing Olympics. In either case, China will most likely use the next three years to bolster its global image as an economic and political power.

China will host the 2008 Olympic Summer Games from August 8 to 24, 2008. Most of the events will be held in the vicinity of Beijing, with selected competitions held in Hong Kong, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Tianjin. Since the International Olympic Committee's decision in July 2001 to select Beijing as the host for the 2008 Olympics, China has spent billions of dollars for facilities and basic infrastructure in preparation for the international event. China anticipates that the 2008 Olympics will provide both short-term and long-term direct and indirect benefits to its economy, as well as enhance the nation's global image. However, the experience of past host cities and China's current economic conditions cast serious doubt that the Games of the XXIX Olympiad will provide the level of economic growth being anticipated. This report will not be updated.

Since 1995, legislation that would guarantee collective bargaining rights for state and local public safety officers has been introduced in Congress. The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (PSEECA)—introduced in the 111 th Congress as H.R. 413 by Representative Dale E. Kildee, S. 1611 by Senator Judd Gregg, and S. 3194 and S. 3991 by Senator Harry Reid—would recognize such rights by requiring compliance with federal regulations and procedures if these rights are not provided under state law. Supporters of the measure maintain that strong partnerships between public safety officers and the cities and states they serve are not only vital to public safety, but are built on bargaining relationships. Opponents argue, however, that the bill infringes on an area that has traditionally been within state control. This report reviews the PSEECA and discusses the possible impact of the legislation. The report also identifies existing state laws that recognize collective bargaining rights for public safety employees, and considers the constitutional concerns raised by the measure. Under the PSEECA, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) would be required to determine whether a state substantially provides for specified labor-management rights within 180 days of the measures enactment. If the FLRA determines that a state does not substantially provide for such rights, the state would be subject to regulations and procedures prescribed by the FLRA. The FLRAs regulations and procedures would be consistent with the labor-management rights identified in the PSEECA. These rights include granting public safety officers the right to form and join a labor organization that is, or seeks to be, recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of such employees; requiring public safety employers to recognize the employees labor organization (freely chosen by a majority of the employees), to agree to bargain with the labor organization, and to commit any agreements to writing in a contract or memorandum of understanding; providing for bargaining over hours, wages, and terms and conditions of employment; making available an interest impasse resolution mechanism, such as fact-finding, mediation, arbitration, or comparable procedures; and requiring the enforcement of all rights, responsibilities, and protections provided by state law and any written contract or memorandum of understanding in state courts. The FLRA would have one year from the date of enactment of the PSEECA to issue regulations that establish these rights for public safety officers in states that do not substantially provide them. The new regulations would become applicable in noncomplying states either two years after the date of enactment of the PSEECA or on the date of the end of the first regular session of the states legislature that begins after the date of enactment of the PSEECA, whichever is later. The PSEECA defines the term public safety officer to include law enforcement officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services personnel. An employer, for purposes of the act, includes any state, political subdivision of a state, the District of Columbia, and any territory or possession of the United States that employs public safety officers. A political subdivision of a state that has a population of less than 5,000 or that employs fewer than 25 full time employees, however, may be exempted from the acts requirements. The sponsors of the PSEECA appear to rely on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution for the authority to enact the measure. Section 2(5) of the PSEECA states, The potential absence of adequate cooperation between public safety employers and employees has implications for the security of employees, impacts the upgrading of police and fire services of local communities, the health and well-being of public safety officers, and the morale of the fire and police departments, and can affect interstate and intrastate commerce. During the 110 th Congress, the House Committee on Education and Labor further observed that there is "little question that public safety employees [sic] and their role in homeland security affects interstate commerce.... The economic impact of terrorism and natural disasters is not limited to the locality where these events occur. Rather, such events have regional and economic impacts for which the federal government must be responsive." Whether the Commerce Clause provides sufficient authority to support the PSEECA, however, may not be entirely certain. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the Fair Labor Standards Act, a statute enacted pursuant to Congresss authority under the Commerce Clause, can be applied to employees of a public mass-transit authority, more recent decisions involving the Commerce Clause suggest that the regulation of labor-management relations for public safety officers may not be sufficiently related to commerce and may be invalidated, if challenged. In United States v. Lopez , a 1995 case involving the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and Congresss authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate pursuant to its commerce power: First, Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.... Finally, Congress commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e. , those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The Lopez Court concluded that the act, which prohibited any individual from possessing a firearm at a place the individual knew or had reasonable cause to believe was a school zone, exceeded Congresss authority under the Commerce Clause because the possession of a gun in a local school zone did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court maintained that upholding the act would require the Court to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States." Similarly, in United States v. Morrison , a 2000 case involving Congresss commerce power and a section of the Violence Against Women Act, the Court found that Congress exceeded its authority because gender-motivated crimes of violence occurring within a state have no substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court maintained that its cases upholding federal regulation of intrastate activity all involve activity that reflects some form of economic endeavor. The Court noted that the regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is "not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has [sic] always been the province of the States." Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich , the Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as a valid exercise of Congresss commerce authority. The CSA was challenged by two users of medical marijuana that was locally grown and prescribed in accordance with California law. They argued that Congress lacked the authority to prohibit the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes. Citing its decision in Wickard v. Filburn , a 1942 case that recognized Congresss authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities, the Court reiterated that even if an activity is "local and ... may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." The Court maintained that the production of a commodity has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity, and observed that there was a likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market would draw marijuana grown for home consumption into that market. The Court distinguished Raich from Lopez and Morrison by noting that the CSA, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act, regulates activities that are "quintessentially economic." The Court indicated that "[t]he CSA is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the interstate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product." While the PSEECA would not seem to regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, it has been argued that it would regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. By "improving the cohesiveness and effectiveness of public safety employers and their employees," it is believed that the PSEECA would minimize the costs associated with terrorism and natural disasters. During the 110 th Congress, the House Committee on Education and Labor noted, "The economic impact of terrorism and natural disasters is not limited to the locality where these events occur. Rather, such events have regional and national economic impacts for which the federal government must be responsive." Some maintain, however, that public safety employment is not an economic activity that may be regulated pursuant to Congresss commerce authority. In light of the Courts decisions in Lopez , Morrison , and Raich , it has been argued that police work, firefighting, and emergency medical services are not economic enterprises or activities related to commercial transactions. Rather, such duties are public services provided by states and localities to their citizens. Moreover, the PSEECA would not be regulating the production, distribution, or consumption of a commodity for which there is an interstate market by requiring collective bargaining rights for public safety officers. While the PSEECA would seem to raise questions involving Congresss authority under the Commerce Clause, it does not appear to present concerns over the commandeering of state or local regulatory processes in violation of the Tenth Amendment. In New York v. United States , a 1992 case involving a federal requirement that gave states a choice between taking title to radioactive waste or regulating in accordance with congressional directives, the Court indicated that "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'" Unlike the provision at issue in New York , the PSEECA would not seem to direct states to legislate collective bargaining for public safety officers. Instead, states would be given the option of either enacting legislation that satisfies the federal standards or becoming subject to the FLRAs regulations. One might also contend that the measure does not appear to require state or local governments to implement a federal regulatory program. Rather, a federal collective bargaining scheme for public safety officers would be implemented by the FLRA only if a state chose not to enact a program of its own. The PSEECA has generated strong reactions from both the business and organized labor communities, with the former generally opposing the measure and the latter supporting it. Critics of the act emphasize the administrative and personnel costs that would likely be expended to comply with the measure. Because of the difficulty in predicting how many workers may organize or what terms and conditions would be negotiated, the cost of the measure for state and local governments was not estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) when earlier versions of the legislation were considered. CBO did estimate, however, that the FLRA would need to spend an additional $3 million to develop regulations, to determine whether states were in compliance with the law, and to respond to judicial review of its determinations. Indeed, some have maintained that the PSEECA could increase demands on the FLRA, either by stretching its resources or requiring new staff. Although subsequent costs are difficult to predict because states may respond differently and, once given the right, public safety officers may or may not unionize, CBO estimated that the FLRA would spend about $10 million annually to administer the act. Opponents of the PSEECA have also argued that the measure could raise the cost of public safety because of potentially higher wages and benefits, as well as the cost of negotiating and administering collective bargaining agreements. Supporters of the PSEECA contend that the measure would give many public safety workers the right to organize and bargain collectively—rights that they may not currently have. The arguments in support of the act are generally based on what proponents maintain are the benefits of collective bargaining. For example, collective bargaining may improve the hours, pay, benefits, and working conditions of public safety workers. Higher pay and better working conditions may reduce turnover. Arguably, lower turnover could reduce the cost of hiring and training new workers. Supporters also argue that the PSEECA would give workers a "voice" in the workplace. They maintain that unions provide workers an additional way to communicate with management. Instead of expressing their dissatisfaction by quitting, workers can use formal procedures to resolve issues relating to working conditions or other matters. Thus, according to supporters, the PSEECA would give labor and management a way to work together to resolve differences. Therefore, supporters further maintain that, by improving labor-management relations, the measure would improve public safety.

Since 1995, legislation that would guarantee collective bargaining rights for state and local public safety officers has been introduced in Congress. The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (PSEECA)—introduced in the 111th Congress as H.R. 413 by Representative Dale E. Kildee, S. 1611 by Senator Judd Gregg, and S. 3194 and S. 3991 by Senator Harry Reid—would recognize such rights by requiring compliance with federal regulations and procedures if these rights are not provided under state law. Supporters of the measure maintain that strong partnerships between public safety officers and the cities and states they serve are not only vital to public safety, but are built on bargaining relationships. Opponents argue, however, that the bill infringes on an area that has traditionally been within state control. This report reviews the PSEECA and discusses the possible impact of the legislation. The report also identifies existing state laws that recognize collective bargaining rights for public safety employees, and considers the constitutional concerns raised by the measure.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began on October 7, 2001, and was primarily conducted in Afghanistan. On December 28, 2014, President Obama announced that OEF had ended. A "follow-on mission," Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), was started on January 1, 2015, to "continue training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces." Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began on March 19, 2003, and was primarily conducted in Iraq. On August 31, 2010, President Obama announced that OIF had ended. A transitional force of U.S. troops remained in Iraq under Operation New Dawn (OND), which ended on December 15, 2011. Several thousand U.S. civilian personnel, contract personnel, and a limited number of U.S. military personnel remain in Iraq carrying out U.S. government business and cooperative programs under the auspices of agreements with the Iraqi government. On October 15, 2014, U.S. Central Command designated new military operations in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). (For more information on war and conflict dates, see CRS Report RS21405, U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts , by [author name scrubbed].) Daily updates of total U.S. military and civilian casualties in OIF, OEF, OND, OIR, and OFS can be found at the Department of Defense's (DOD's) website, at http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf . Table 1 gives the overall casualties in OIF, OND, and OEF. The U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General (OSG), using the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), provided data on the incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases. According to Dr. Michael Carino of the OSG, a case of PTSD is defined as an individual with two or more outpatient visits or one or more hospitalizations during which PTSD was diagnosed. The threshold of two or more outpatient visits is used in the DMSS to increase the likelihood that the individual has, or had, clinically diagnosable PTSD. A single visit on record commonly reflects a servicemember who was evaluated for possible PTSD, but did not actually meet the criteria for clinical diagnosis. In this data set, an incident of PTSD among deployed servicemembers is defined as occurring when a deployed servicemember was diagnosed with PTSD at least 30 days after being deployed. Many statistics on traumatic brain injury (TBI) are available to the public, at the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center, at http://dvbic.dcoe.mil/dod-worldwide-numbers-tbi . Unlike PTSD numbers, which are segmented by those deployed and those not previously deployed, TBI numbers represent medical diagnoses of TBI that occurred anywhere U.S. forces are located, including the continental United States. Table 4 shows the number of individuals with battle-injury major limb amputations for OEF, OFS, OIF, OND, and OIR. A major limb amputation includes the loss of one or more limbs, the loss of one or more partial limbs, or the loss of one or more full or partial hand or foot. The total number of individuals with major limb amputations as of June 1, 2015, is 1,645. Figure 3 charts the number of major limb amputations due to a battle injury in OIF, OND, OIR, OEF, and OFS from 2001 through June 1, 2015, for all services. DOD provides data on the demographics of servicemembers who have died or been wounded in action in OIF, OND, and OEF through the Defense Casualty Analysis System at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties.xhtml . To find this information, select a conflict and select between "deaths" or "wounded in action," and then select from the demographic categories, including gender, age, race, and ethnicity. Similar data have not yet been publically released for OEF and OIR.

This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military and civilian casualties in the active missions Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS, Afghanistan) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and, as well as operations that have ended, Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan). It also includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), and amputations. Some of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense's (DOD's) website and others have been obtained through DOD experts. For more information on pre-2000 casualties, see CRS Report RL32492, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as needed.

RS21237 -- Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Updated February 17, 2005 Almost 50 years of nuclear ambiguity were swept away by the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. Optimists hoped that overt nuclear weapons capabilities could help providemore conventional stability and that limited nuclear arsenals might dampen competition in missile development. (1) The 1999 conflict in Kargil and 2002 crisis in Kashmirchallengedthis viewpoint. (2) South Asia remains a nuclearflashpoint, and, potentially, a source for terrorists of access to weapons of mass destruction. India began its nuclear program shortly after independence in 1947. After a humiliating defeat in a border war with China in 1962, followed by China's first nuclear test in 1964, thedrive for nuclear weapons intensified. The 1974 test of a "peaceful nuclear device" was an important milestone,but it took several more years to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Simultaneously, India developed a nuclear infrastructure that supported both civilian and military purposes. Forexample, India's development of reprocessing capabilities supportedboth its use of mixed oxide fuel (plutonium and uranium) for its nuclear power plants and its plutonium-basedweapons. The size of India's nuclear stockpile has been a topic of considerable debate within scientific and defense communities. (3) Estimates vary from a few to 100,but several converge onaround 30-35 weapons, probably stored in component form. The U.S. Department of Defense believes that Indiais capable of manufacturing complete sets of components forplutonium-based weapons and has a small stockpile of such components. India "probably can deploy a few nuclearweapons within a few days to a week...and can deliver these weaponswith fighter aircraft." (4) Most agree that India isexpanding its stockpile, and that if India uses unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium, the potential to expand itsstockpile is verysignificant. India's delivery capability has long reflected two very different contingencies -- China and Pakistan. Because of the distances involved and India's lack of long-range bombers,capability against China inevitably required ballistic missiles. Against Pakistan, however, Indian officialsrecognized early on that aircraft would be more valuable, particularly in aretaliatory strike; the Indian air force is significantly more sophisticated and capable than Pakistan's. (5) India has some 35 Mirage 2000 fighters that arenuclear-capable, although otheraircraft could also be used. Ballistic missiles add considerable instability into the security equation because they are high priority targets; the pressure to use them quickly and, for the other side, to strike thempreemptively, is great. Indian officials have said short-range Prithvi ballistic missiles (150km and250km ranges) are conventionally armed. While nuclear-capable and able to reachalmost all of Pakistan, the use of nuclear-armed Prithvi s could pose major risks of fallout to India. (6) India has deployed Agni-II missiles witha 1500 km range and tested an 800 kmrange version of the Agni earlier this year. These solid-fueled missiles, which reportedly can belaunched within minutes, considerably enhance India's ability to respond rapidly in acrisis situation. In January 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs released to the public a short document on India's nuclear doctrine. The doctrine reiterated some of the points in the 1999 draftdocument on nuclear doctrine produced by the National Security Advisory Board. and refined others. In summary,the document committed India to a credible minimum deterrent,defined as: 1. a posture of "No First Use" and no use against non-nuclear weapon states, with the exception of theright to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a "major attack againstIndia, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons;" 2. Civil control in the form of the PrimeMinister as head of the Nuclear Command Authority; 3. Nuclearretaliation against a first strike as massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. (7) The document described the Nuclear Command Authority as being composedof a PoliticalCouncil (chaired by the Prime Minister and authorize the use of nuclear weapons) and an Executive Council (chairedby the National Security Advisor). Pakistan's nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the humiliating loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that reportedly triggered a political decision in January 1972 (justone month later) to begin a crash nuclear weapons program. Unlike India, Pakistan focused on the uranium routeto weapons. Pakistan sought technology from many sources, includingChina and North Korea. (8) This extensive assistanceis reported to have included, among other things, uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for asmall nuclearweapon from China and missile technology from China. Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for 30 to 50 nuclear weapons. (9) LikeIndia, Pakistan isthought to have "a small stockpile of nuclear weapons components and can probably assemble some weapons fairlyquickly." (10) Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s it purchased from the United States (28 F-16 and 12 trainer aircraft; 8 are no longer in service), provided the appropriate "wiring"has been added to make them nuclear-capable. In the 1980s, Pakistan moved assiduously to acquire ballistic missilecapabilities and now deploys short-range ballistic missiles and asmall number of medium-range missiles. AQ Khan, former head of Khan Research Laboratories, maintained thatonly the medium-range Ghauri missiles would be usable in a nuclearexchange (given fall-out effects for Pakistan of shorter-range missiles). Other observers view the 30 to 50 Hatf2 short-range (300km) missiles (modified Chinese M-11s) as potentialdelivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Ghauri missiles (1350 and 2300km), which reportedly are basedon the North Korean No-Dong and Taepo-Dong-1 , are capable of reaching NewDelhi with large payloads. (11) Pakistan has not yet enunciated a nuclear doctrine, but it is clear that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is seen as the key to military parity with India. Because of its fears of being overrun bylarger Indian forces, Pakistan has rejected the doctrine of no-first-use. In May 2002, Pakistan's ambassador to theUN, Munir Akram, stated that "We have not said we will use nuclearweapons. We have not said we will not use nuclear weapons. We possess nuclear weapons. So does India ...Wewill not neutralize the deterrence by any doctrine of no first use." (12) On June 4, 2002, President Musharraf went further: "The possession of nuclear weapons by any state obviouslyimplies they will be used under some circumstances." (13) In recent years, Pakistan apparently has taken steps toward refining command and control of nuclear weapons. In April 1999, General Musharraf announced that the Joint StaffHeadquarters would have a command and control arrangement and a secretariat, and a strategic force commandwould be established. (14) The connection to civilianleadership wasunclear, given a recent account of the 1999 Kargil incursion which suggested that Prime Minister Sharif wasunaware that his own nuclear missile forces were being prepared foraction. (15) Pakistan established a NationalCommand Authority (NCA) in February 2000, but little is publicly known about it. Pakistani officials haverepeatedly said that their nuclearcapabilities are safe. The new NCA is believed to be responsible for nuclear doctrine, as well as nuclear researchand development, wartime command and control, and advice toPresident Musharraf about the development and employment of nuclear weapons. (16) Kashmir has been a flashpoint since Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947. Many analysts have feared that nuclear weapons could be used if conventional hostilities over Kashmirwere to spiral out of control, especially if, as in 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, India opened a new front on the Punjabplains to break a stalemate in Pakistan or attempt to settle the issuedecisively by confronting Pakistan with a mortal threat to its territorial integrity. (17) Under these circumstances, some have suggested Pakistan might be temptedto detonate a smallnuclear weapon on its own territory to halt forward Indian movement. Other observers, however, believe such astrategy would be akin to a state acting as a suicide bomber. (18) Somemedia reports have suggested that paradoxically, "the fact that both countries have very small nuclear arsenalsincreases the pressure on both sides to use their weapons againsthigh-value targets." (19) Regardless of whethernuclear weapons might be used to stop war or to gain a military advantage, many observers agree that uncertaintyabout intentions couldworsen stability. Since 1998, both India and Pakistan appear to be integrating nuclear weapons into security strategy and planning. With the ominous logic of nuclear deterrence, each side's desire tomake its nuclear forces more credible may make those nuclear forces more usable. Ballistic missiles offer both sidesadvantages over using aircraft as delivery vehicles, but the shortranges create a hair-trigger situation. From launch to impact, missile flight times may be as short as 5 minutes. Inthe past, both sides appeared to use the separation of warheadcomponents as a form of command and control (in the sense of lowering the risk of unauthorized or accidental use). Some observers have noted that this approach becomes risky whenthe other side can launch short-range ballistic missiles against which there is no defense. These observers havecalled for improving command and control of nuclear forces, whilenoting, ironically, that reduced ambiguity could conversely increase the likelihood of war. (20) The Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly has estimated that a nuclear exchange could kill between 9 and 12 million persons on both sides, with 2 to 6 million injured. Theseestimates are likely predicated on nuclear exchanges aimed at cities; e.g., Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narainsuggested in 2002 that "India would retaliate against Pakistaniaggression and that both sides should be prepared for mutual destruction." President Musharraf's interview in June2002 with CNN offered respite from the nuclear rhetoric when hestated, "I don't think either side is that irresponsible to go to that limit [i.e., nuclear conflict]. ... One shouldn't evenbe discussing these things, because any sane individual cannot eventhink of going into this unconventional mode, whatever the pressures." (21) India and Pakistan have a 30-year history of confidence-building measures. These include hotlines between army commanders and prime ministers, a joint India-Pakistan MilitaryCommission (created in 1990), and agreements to provide prior notification of troop movements and ballistic missiletests. In 1991, both sides agreed not to attack nuclear facilities. (22) Implementation, however, has been sporadic. (23) In February 1999, the two parties concluded the Lahore Agreement. That agreement envisioned a plan for futurework, to includemeasures to reduce the risk of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, reviews of confidence-buildingmeasures and communications links, prior notification of ballisticmissile tests, continuation of unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, and dialogue on nuclear and security issues. The Lahore process was undermined by the summer 2001 militaryincursion by Pakistan in the vicinity of Kargil, but the two sides began a dialogue in 2004. In September 2004, Indiaand Pakistan announced 13 confidence-building measures. Threesecurity-related ones included: Experts' meetings on conventional and nuclear CBMs, including discussions on a draft agreement on advance notification of missile tests; Biannual meeting between Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and Pakistan Rangers; Implementation of the agreement reached between the defense secretaries in their talks in August todiscuss "modalities for disengagement and redeployment" onthe Siachen glacier. (24) Foreign secretaries reported progress in their discussions on missile notifications in December 2004. (25) Since the passage of the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, Congress has been closely involved in efforts to prevent or slow the development of nuclear arsenals by India and Pakistan. In the light of the global war on terrorism, and limited Pakistani cooperation in nonproliferation, Congress mightconsider the following questions: What sources of leverage does the U.S. now have toward India and Pakistan? Are new sources of leverage vis-a-vis Indian and Pakistani proliferation needed? Should new leveragebe focused on averting nuclear use rather than on limitingnuclear proliferation? Should India and Pakistan be priority recipients of cooperative threat reduction assistance? Whatoptions exist in this regard that do not undermine U.S. obligationsas a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? How effective are economic or other sanctions, and which might work best?

Until 2005, India and Pakistan were the only states outside the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty to declare, openly, their nuclear weaponscapability. In 1998, they tested nuclear weapons and since then, deployed ballistic missiles, enunciated nucleardoctrine, and made organizational changes to their nuclearestablishments. In 2002, they teetered on the brink of war in Kashmir. This paper summarizes Indian and Pakistaninuclear weapon capabilities and thinking, and discusses someconfidence-building measures in place intended to help avert nuclear war. It will be updated as events warrant.

RS21510 -- NATO's Decision-Making Procedure Updated March 8, 2004 In February 2003, the United States asked that NATO begin planning to provide Turkey with defensive systems in the event of an attack by Iraq during theimpending war with Saddam Hussein's regime. The request also asked that NATO members backfill for some U.S.forces in the Balkans, needed for thepossible conflict with Iraq. France, Germany, and Belgium objected in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO'ssupreme political body. They contendedthat granting the request would be the equivalent of acknowledging that Iraq had impeded U.N. weaponsinspections, as yet unproven in the view of the threegovernments, and be a pretext for war. NATO Secretary General Robertson at that point invoked the "silenceprocedure," under which any membergovernment objecting to the request must send him a formal letter stating its opposition. The three governmentssent such a letter in the stated time frame,stymieing the U.S. request. Turkey itself then asked for consultations concerning its defense needs under ArticleIV of the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States asked that Turkey's request for assistance be discussed in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), where France is not a member. TheGerman government was willing to grant the request for assistance to Turkey, and dropped its opposition. TheBelgian government, now isolated, dropped itsobjection. The DPC then granted the request for defense planning, which resulted in the deployment of AWACS,Patriot missiles, and other defensive systemsto protect Turkey. Consensus in the NAC is generally sought when allied governments must formulate policy on an important strategic issue. Examples include approval ofNATO's Strategic Concept (NATO's document that serves as a strategic guideline), relations with Partnership forPeace countries, the NATO budget,deployment of forces for peace operations, and invocation of Article V. Consensus is clearly differentiated from"unanimity," which NATO does not seek. Unanimity would require an actively stated vote in favor of a measure. Structure and Process. NATO has a civil and a military structure. The supreme political decision-makingbody, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), sits in Brussels, and is chaired by the Secretary General. Each of the 19member states has a representative on theNAC. Key proposals for military decisions are made by the Military Committee (MC). A senior European military officer chairs the Military Committee. The MChas 18 members because France withdrew from the alliance's integrated military structure in 1966. France sendsan observer, without a vote, to the MC. France has full representation on the NAC, however, as Paris did not withdraw from NATO's politicaldecision-making structure. The NAC has the authorityto approve all key MC documents. Normally, any government may have two opportunities to influence a major NATO decision. For example, the MC established a working group at the level ofcolonel to work out the deployment and responsibilities of NATO member state forces to be sent to Bosnia for peaceoperations in the 1990s. The 18representatives on the working group met for eight months, and eventually drafted a document that was approvedby the MC. The MC then sent the documentto the NAC's international staff. Ultimately, all 19 representatives on the NAC refined the document's language,and approved it. Reaching consensus is therefore a process in which member governments have ample opportunity to provide language to NATO documents and decisions thatreflect national governments' individual views. The North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC achieves consensus through a process in which nogovernment states its objection. A formal vote in which governments state their position is not taken. During theKosovo conflict, for example, it was clear toall governments that Greece was uncomfortable with a decision to go to war. NATO does not require a governmentto vote in favor of a conflict, but rather toobject explicitly if it opposes such a decision. Athens chose not to object, knowing its allies wished to take militaryaction against Serbia. In contrast toNATO, the EU seeks unanimity on key issues. Unanimity characterizes EU decision-making when, for example,new members are invited to join, or revisionsto the Union's governing treaties must be adopted. At NATO, the "silence procedure" may be used for any decision requiring a consensus. At times, the procedure allows governments in opposition to a measureto avoid confronting other allies around the table during a session of the NAC. The procedure can also providecover for a government from unwanted pressreporting that might characterize its policy as out of step with other allies. By not sending a letter to the SecretaryGeneral within a specified time period, agovernment can avoid the step of stating its explicit objection to a policy if it believes other allies are set on a courseof action. This procedure failed in theeffort to begin defense planning for Turkey when three governments were in opposition. The procedure can be moresuccessful if only one government is put inthe position of having to take the formal step of sending a letter of opposition to the Secretary General, and mayrefrain from doing so to avoid being isolated. NATO uses the same principle of consensus in the DPC, where 18 members make proposals on such matters as force structure. Normally, the DPC's proposalsare sent to the Military Committee or to the NAC for approval. When France withdrew from the MilitaryCommittee in 1966, it also surrendered its seat on theDPC. NATO in the past has made important preliminary decisions on military operations in the DPC. However,in 1992, when NATO decided to enforce thearms embargo in the Adriatic Sea against the countries of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, France wished to participatein the decision and to send forces as partof the operation. For this reason, NATO transferred the decision to the NAC, where France could play a role. Thispractice set a precedent for subsequentNATO military operations. The NAC made the decisions to establish SFOR, approve the plan for OperationAllied Force in Kosovo, and establish KFOR inthe conflict's aftermath, each time because France wished to participate in these operations. When France (andBelgium and Germany) objected in February2003 to military assistance to Turkey, however, the United States was instrumental in the maneuver to move outof the NAC and back to the DPC to approveAnkara's request for assistance under Article IV. The maneuver raised the question of whether the United States,and other allies, were attempting to avoid orweaken the principle of consensus. Within the U.S. government and in allied governments, there is varied support for preserving decision-making by consensus. Most senior U.S. officialsassociated with NATO affairs contend that they support the principle of consensus, although some acknowledgethat forging consensus in an era when NATOmay go out-of-area is likely to be difficult. Support for preserving the principle of consensus centers upon a desire to maintain political solidarity for controversial measures. In this view, the consent of19 sovereign governments, each taking an independent decision to work with other governments, is a formidableexpression of solidarity. At the same time,there can be political costs due to the sparring and the time involved in reaching consensus. NATO's decision togo to war against Serbia in 1999 was anexample of such an instance. Military action against Serbia had been postponed for a number of days, whilecivilians were losing their lives in Kosovo. Theallies first made an effort to achieve legitimization for the operation in the U.N., but did not submit the requisiteresolution when Russia signalled that it wouldcast a veto. The allies decided to debate in the NAC the issue of going to war without such a resolution, in the enddeciding that 19 governments consenting tothe use of military force supplied a measure of political legitimacy. Officials involved in that NAC debate say thatthe need for obtaining consensus outweighedthe need for acting quickly. The Kosovo conflict illustrated some of the difficulties involved in maintaining consensus. Some critics of management of the conflict, including someMembers of Congress, criticized the target-selection process. Press reports indicated that all governments in theNAC had to approve NATO's individualtargets for Serbia. France, in particular, was singled out in press reports for criticism for objecting to specifictargets. In fact, NATO was following a verydifferent procedure for target selection. Member governments, including the United States, wished to be carefulto avoid civilian casualties, particularly in theabsence of a U.N. resolution that might be cited to legitimize the ends used to compel the Milosevic governmentto cease ethnic cleansing. They made adecision before the conflict began, after an initial operational plan produced by the MC, to attack targets in threephases. Each phase marked an escalation overthe previous one; stepping up to the next phase - and not individual targets - required consent from the NAC. PhaseI targets were indisputably militarytargets, such as air defense systems, airfields, and troop concentrations, and there was strong agreement that thesemust be struck. Phase II targets wereinfrastructure, such as bridges and petroleum depots, that might serve both civilian and military usage, and weretherefore more controversial. Phase III targetswere "the more significant targets associated with Serb repression," such as police headquarters involved in ethniccleansing, often located in urban centers suchas Belgrade. According to then SACEUR General Wesley Clark, and to sources interviewed, it was the Pentagonand the White House, as well as the Britishgovernment, that above all raised barriers and sought delays before attacking Phase II and III targets, with Franceand other governments raising occasionalobjections. (2) The Kosovo conflict underscores the political pressure placed on the NAC in maintaining consensus when military action comes into play, and the fact that theFrench government has often been singled out when disagreements arise. Different governments place varyingdegrees of emphasis on civilian control of themilitary, and on the reactions of their own populations when there are civilian casualties. The United Statesgovernment tends to have more confidence in itsarmed forces in target selection and in making decisions on the battlefield than do most allied governments. Someallies, given the recent history of theirmilitaries stepping into political affairs or using excessive force against civilians, place greater restraints on theirarmed forces. In France, the effort by armyofficers to overthrow President de Gaulle's government in 1960-62, and in Germany, excesses of the Wehrmacht and the Gestapo in the Second World War, arewithin the memory of many leaders and populations, and affect how these governments seek to manage militaryconflict. The diversity of viewpoints in theNAC means that constant negotiation is necessary in providing authority to the SACEUR to plan and execute amilitary operation. Wrangling over precisephrasing of a document can be a means to provide clarity for decision-makers; in contrast, it can also be meant toprovide vagueness that gives political cover toa member government that may give its own interpretation to its populace about the purpose of a NATO decision. Altering or abandoning the principle of consensus at a moment when NATO may accept new members poses other problems. For candidate state governments,the prospect of such a change raises the question of whether the United States and other current members lackconfidence in the candidates to participate in thefull range of allied decision-making. Representatives of some of these governments also express displeasure withthe tendency of some Administration officialsto divide the continent into an "old" and "new" Europe, even if the characterization is meant to favor them. Sucha division suggests a possible marginalizationof France and Germany, and of an alliance where member states are set against each other, implicit for some in anyabandonment of the consensus principle. Some officials view any prospective effort by the United States to move away from the consensus principle as aversion of U.S. "unilateralism," in whichWashington might pressure weaker or small-state governments to follow its lead, an issue raised when the BushAdministration sought support of several alliedgovernments in the coalition against Iraq. The political complexities inherent in NAC and MC debates mean that there is no simple fix to improve NATO decision-making. At the same time, some U.S.officials believe that the growing necessity for out-of-area missions indicates a clear need to develop a new processto permit participation under NATOauspices by willing allies in such operations. (3) Some U.S. officials, without enthusiasm, suggest an EU model, where member states' votes are weighted, based on their populations. This form of "qualifiedmajority voting" (QMV) gives greater influence to the largest countries, but small states may still band together toblock an initiative. Critics of adopting suchan approach for NATO point out that the alliance is a mutual defense organization, where supreme national interestssuch as the survival of a country and thelives of a government's soldiers are at issue. In such circumstances, they believe that the EU's mechanistic approachto decision-making over less momentousissues is inappropriate for NATO. The EU is different in nature from NATO. The EU must grapple with issuesinvolving the sharing of national sovereignty ona wide range of issues. As a result, extensive deal-making has been part of the EU (earlier, the EuropeanCommunity) since its origins, but has not beenprevalent in NATO. Nonetheless, QMV in NATO could lead, as it often does in the EU, to faction-building orextended horse-trading. However, one system used in elements of EU decision-making is drawing interest from those in NATO who support coalitions of the willing and capable. Forissues that involve only selected governments, the EU has devised "committees of contributors." In this concept,governments that wish to participate in aproject receive general approval from a principal EU governing body to proceed among themselves, while the othergovernments take a general interest and aresponsibility that might involve oversight. An element of the concept involves "constructive abstention," in whichgovernments with interests not directlyaffected stand aside and permit action by those with interests that are directly in play. A "committee of contributors" in NATO might follow a similar outline, and might appeal especially to governments that are both NATO and EU members. Countries on the committee for a military operation, for example, would be those willing to contribute troops andother assets. The committee would formulatea general plan for operations, and submit it to the NAC for a "blessing." The NAC might allow the committee touse NATO assets, such as AWACS and theplanning staff. The NAC, in effect, would endorse the right of committee members to act in their own interests, butnot specifically endorse the operation itself. Committee members among themselves could then make key decisions, possibly based on consensus, such as howmuch authority to delegate to SACEUR forcontingency planning and target selection. The committee would keep the NAC informed on a regular basis. Shouldthe NATO Response Force (NRF),comprised of 25,000 troops, be fully developed for "expeditionary" operations beyond the Treaty area, "committeesof contributors" could be a means tostreamline decision-making and keep it within the ken of interested governments. Such committees could serve to avoid the recent maneuver of having to go to the DPC, since that step is effective only for sidelining France. France, after all,has been involved in virtually all key NATO military operations, and might in the future wish to participate inmissions. France's forces constitute a largecomponent of the Eurocorps, one of the high-value multinational military formations available to NATO. France,with Britain, has the only other continental"expeditionary" military able to serve in high-intensity conflicts. The "committees of contributors" might isolatesmall countries such as Belgium, which inrecent times has increasingly criticized NATO as a "toolbox" of U.S. policy, and opposed out-of-area operations,but has only minimal military capability tocontribute in any event. Some officials who have served at NATO make a contrary argument to the possible usefulness of "committees of contributors." They believe that smallcountries such as Belgium might insist that any out-of-area mission be decided by the NAC as a whole, since assets(AWACS, intelligence) being used wouldbelong to NATO as a whole, and would thus be assets for which, in part, each country pays.

This report provides a brief analysis of NATO's decision-making procedures, withseveral examples of how theallies have handled sensitive issues in the past. It describes the February 2003 dispute over providing NATO defenseplanning and equipment to Turkey, andanalyzes the debate over the decision-making process, including possible alterations of that process. This reportwill be periodically updated. See also CRS Report RS21354, The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002.

This report analyzes Division C of the Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-148 , which was signed into law on December 30, 2005, and which limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and other public health countermeasures. Division C, which is titled the "Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act," (PREP Act) created § 319F-3 of the Public Health Service Act, which provides that, except in one circumstance (discussed below under "New Federal Cause of Action"), a "covered person" would be immune from suit and liability for "all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration ... has been issued with respect to such countermeasure." The declaration referred to is a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency. Division C defines a "covered person" to include the United States and a (i) manufacturer, (ii) distributor, (iii) program planner, (iv) qualified person who prescribed, administered, or dispensed a covered countermeasure, or (v) official, agent, or employee of (i) through (iv). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), officials, agents, and employees of the United States are already immune from tort liability. Immunity is granted "to any claim for loss that has a causal relationship with the administration to or use by an individual of a covered countermeasure, including a causal relationship with the design, development, clinical testing or investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, or use of such countermeasure." A "covered countermeasure" includes (A) "a qualified pandemic or epidemic product," (B) "a security countermeasure," or (C) a drug, biological product, or device that is authorized for emergency use in accordance with section 564 of the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Each of the terms in (A), (B), and (C) is itself defined in Division C as follows: A. "Qualified pandemic or epidemic product" is defined as a drug, biological product, or device, as these three terms are defined in the FDCA, with the additional limitation that all three terms apply only to "a product manufactured, used, designed, developed, modified, licensed, or procured ... to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, treat, or cure a pandemic or epidemic," or "a serious or life-threatening disease or condition caused by [such] a product"—but only if such a product meets one of three other qualifications under the FDCA. B. "Security countermeasure" is defined in Division C as it is defined in § 319F-2(c)(1)(B) of the Public Health Service Act, as a drug, biological product, or device (as those terms are defined in the FDCA) that the Secretary of HHS approves as necessary to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, or treat harm from any biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent. C. "Drug," "biological product," and "device" are all defined by the FDCA. On January 26, 2007, Secretary Michael O. Leavitt made the first such declaration "to provide targeted liability protections for pandemic countermeasures based on a credible risk that an avian influenza virus spreads and evolves into a strain capable of causing a pandemic of human influenza." Since then, the Secretary of HHS has issued additional declarations covering various countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, acute radiation syndrome, smallpox, and various strains of influenza. Most recently, in response to the H1N1 influenza pandemic, Secretary Kathleen Sebelius issued declarations limiting liability for harm arising from the use of certain influenza antivirals and vaccines. The single circumstance in which Division C allows a covered person to be held liable is when a "death or serious physical injury" was caused by the "willful misconduct" of a covered person. Division C defines "willful misconduct" as an act or omission that is taken "(i) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit." In addition, the Secretary of HHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, "shall promulgate regulations ... that further restrict the scope of actions or omissions by a covered person that may qualify as 'willful misconduct.'" Furthermore, "the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence willful misconduct by each covered person sued and that such willful misconduct caused the death or serious physical injury." The "clear and convincing" standard is higher than the usual burden of proof in civil cases, which is proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." Finally, if an act or omission by a manufacturer or distributor is subject to regulation by Division C or by the FDCA, then such act or omission shall not constitute willful misconduct if neither the Secretary of HHS nor the Attorney General has initiated an enforcement action with respect to the act or omission, or if such an enforcement action has been initiated and the enforcement action has been terminated or finally resolved without a specified penalty imposed on the covered person. The proceeding in which an injured party may seek to prove that a covered person had engaged in willful misconduct is a new federal cause of action that Division C created; suits under state tort law are prohibited. Subsection (d) of the new § 319F-3 provides: "For purposes of section 2679(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, such a cause of action is not an action brought for violation of a statute of the United States under which an action against an individual is otherwise authorized." This apparently means that the new federal cause of action may not be brought against a federal employee. Division C provides that suits under the new federal cause of action may be brought only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and that such court, with exceptions noted below, shall apply the substantive law, including choice of law principles, of the state in which the alleged willful misconduct occurred. The reference to "choice of law principles" means that the court will apply the law of the state in which the alleged willful misconduct occurred, but, if that state's law provides that a different state's law should apply, then the court will apply the other state's law. Although federal district court cases are usually heard by a single judge, cases under Division C's new federal cause of action will be "assigned initially to a panel of three judges. Such panel shall have jurisdiction over such action for purposes of considering motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and matters related thereto. If such panel has denied such motions, or if the time for filing such motions has expired, such panel shall refer the action to the chief judge for assignment for further proceedings, including any trial." This suggests that the panel's jurisdiction is limited to pretrial motions, and that a single judge will run the trial, including ruling on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment that were made after the trial began. Under the new federal cause of action, certain matters are not governed by state law. Damage awards will be reduced by the amount of collateral source benefits, with "collateral source benefits" defined to include amounts the plaintiff is entitled to receive from any governmental program, workers' compensation law, health or disability insurance, and the like. Collateral sources will have no right of subrogation, which means that they could not recover, out of the damages the plaintiff recovers in a lawsuit brought under the new federal cause of action, benefits that they had paid the plaintiff. Under the new federal cause of action, noneconomic damages, which are damages for pain and suffering and other non-monetary losses, "may be awarded only in an amount directly proportional to the percentage of responsibility of a defendant for harm to the plaintiff." This means that, if two defendants are found liable for willful misconduct, then they will not be jointly and severally liable for noneconomic damages, which means that they will not each be liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's noneconomic damages. If, for example, one of the two defendants was 25% responsible for the harm and the other was 75% responsible for the harm, then the plaintiff may recover no more than 25% of his noneconomic damages from the first, even if the second is insolvent. With respect to economic damages, however, the plaintiff may recover up to 100% from either liable party, if the relevant state law provides for joint and several liability. Under the new federal cause of action, Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys, law firms, or parties, for filing frivolous claims or defenses or filing papers for improper purposes, are mandatory. Rule 11 currently makes sanctions discretionary on the part of the court. Division C also created a new section 319F-4 of the Public Health Service Act which, upon issuance by the Secretary of the declaration referred to in the first paragraph of this report, would establish in the Treasury the "Covered Countermeasure Process Fund." "[T]he Secretary shall, after amounts have by law been provided for the Fund under subsection (a) provide compensation to an eligible individual for a covered injury [i.e., serious physical injury or death] directly caused by the administration or use of a covered countermeasure pursuant to such declaration." Despite the "shall" quoted in the previous sentence, an eligible "individual has an election to accept the compensation or to bring an action under" the new federal cause of action, but may not do both. Compensation under this fund would be in the same amount as is prescribed by sections 264, 265, and 266 of the Public Service Health Act for persons injured as a result of the administration of certain countermeasures against smallpox. These three sections provide, respectively, medical benefits, compensation for lost employment income, and death benefits, but do not provide damages for pain and suffering. Congress has enacted other tort reform statutes to limit liability under state law. The rest of this report describes the broad categories into which these statutes may be placed, so that Division C can be compared with them. Some federal statutes have eliminated tort liability with no exceptions, and without providing an alternative means of compensation. Other federal statutes have eliminated tort liability for ordinary negligence but not for gross negligence or willful misconduct. Division C eliminated tort liability except for willful misconduct, and therefore falls in between these two categories. In addition, Division C would allow injured persons to recover compensation from the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund, if Congress appropriates money for it. More than 50 federal statutes provide total immunity to particular private parties, but make the U.S. government liable, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in their stead. There are situations, however, in which the U.S. government may not be held liable under the FTCA, and, in those situations, victims may be left without a remedy. Even when the United States may be held liable under the FTCA, it may never be held liable for punitive damages, even in states that authorize punitive damages awards. Occasionally Congress immunizes private parties but establishes a federal compensation program. Examples include the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which immunizes government contractors who carried out atomic weapons testing programs from 1946 to 1962, as well as the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 and the September 11 th Victims Compensation Fund of 2001. Finally, some federal tort reform statutes do not eliminate the right to sue and do not establish alternative compensation mechanisms. Rather, they cap noneconomic and punitive damages, limit each defendant's share of the total liability to its share of responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries, or take other steps to limit recovery. Division C substitutes a federal cause of action for state causes of action, but continues to apply state law.

Division C of P.L. 109-148 (2005), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, also known as the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and other public health countermeasures. Specifically, upon a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency, Division C would, with respect to a "covered countermeasure," eliminate liability, with one exception, for the United States, and for manufacturers, distributors, program planners, persons who prescribe, administer or dispense the countermeasure, and employees of any of the above. The exception to immunity from liability is that a defendant who engaged in willful misconduct would be subject to liability under a new federal cause of action, though not under state tort law, if death or serious injury results. Division C's limitation on liability is a more extensive restriction on victims' ability to recover than exists in most federal tort reform statutes. However, victims could, in lieu of suing, accept payment under a new "Covered Countermeasure Process Fund," if Congress appropriates money for this fund. The first PREP Act declaration was issued on January 26, 2007, to limit liability for the administration of the H5N1 influenza vaccine. Since then, declarations have been issued covering countermeasures against other strains of influenza (including H1N1), anthrax, botulism, small pox, and acute radiation syndrome.

Paragraph 5(a) of Senate Rule XXVI, sometimes referred to as the "two-hour rule," restricts the times that most Senate committees and subcommittees can meet when the full Senate is in session. The rule, which has evolved over the years, is intended to help balance the Senate's committee and floor work and to minimize the logistical conflicts that Senators face between participating in committee hearings and markups and attending to their duties on the chamber floor. The two-hour rule applies to all committee meetings, including hearings and markups. Pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Senate Rule XXVI, no Senate committee or subcommittee (except for the Appropriations and Budget Committees and their subcommittees) can meet after the Senate has been in session for two hours or past 2:00 p.m. unless both the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) agree to permit the meeting and their agreement has been announced on the floor. The Senate can also, by unanimous consent, grant permission for committees to meet, and until recently the practice was for a Senator to ask unanimous consent that committees be authorized to meet, rather than for the leaders to announce their agreement that meetings be permitted. A third but arguably impractical option is for the Senate to adopt a privileged motion to allow the meeting. Most of the time, the restrictions of the two-hour rule are not invoked. It is a routine, often daily, occurrence for committees to be given permission to meet during periods proscribed by the rule after agreements are announced on the Senate floor that grant them the authority to do so. Committee staff, when preparing for a hearing or a markup, routinely notify floor staff of the time and date of the meeting to ensure it is included in any unanimous consent agreement or joint leadership announcement. Sometimes, however, the two-hour rule's restrictions on committee meeting are insisted upon, most commonly as a form of protest or to delay a committee's action on a specific measure or matter. To invoke the rule does not necessarily require any formal parliamentary action. Senators can object if a unanimous consent agreement for committees to meet is propounded on the floor. In practice, however, informal communication with leadership is likely required to invoke the rule. This is true not only because the leaders alone could grant permission for committees to meet but also because, from a practical perspective, it would be difficult for Senators to predict when any unanimous consent agreement might be propounded so that they could arrange to be present to object. It was the long-standing practice of the Senate that, after receiving the requests from committees and clearing them with the minority leader, the majority leader (or a designee) would state on the floor I have [number] unanimous consent requests for committees to meet during today's session of the Senate. They have the approval of the majority and minority leaders. I ask consent that these requests be agreed to and these requests be printed in the R ecord . If no Senator objected, the Congressional Record would print, as if they were spoken on the floor, a series of unanimous consent requests for each committee to meet at stated times, each request being ordered "without objection." Perhaps partly due to this practice, it was widely understood in the Senate that unanimous consent was necessary to permit committees to meet after the Senate was in session for two hours or past 2:00 p.m. If leaders usually honored any request to prevent committees from meeting, then that practice would also leave the impression that unanimous consent was required. Currently, permission for Senate committees to sit during times prohibited by the two-hour rule is being granted almost exclusively by joint leadership agreement instead of by unanimous consent, a change from prior practice. A Senator on the floor now typically states I have [number] requests for committees to meet during today's session of the Senate. They have the approval of the majority and minority leaders. The presiding officer responds, "duly noted" to the Senator; no opportunity is afforded for a Senator to object, because unanimous consent is not requested. The list of committees authorized to meet is then printed in the Congressional Record following the statement made on the floor . Joint leadership permission has been used over 130 times since November 30, 2016, to authorize one or more Senate committees to meet during restricted hours and now appears to be the preferred way to provide a waiver of the rule. The change in practice might be in response to an apparent increase in invoking the rule, discussed in the final section of this report. The consequences for a Senate committee of violating the two-hour rule are potentially significant. Any action taken by a committee during a meeting prohibited by the rule is "null, void, and of no effect." For example, a nomination reported by a committee when it did not have authority to meet "is not properly before the Senate and, on a point of order, will be returned to committee." If a Senate committee was meeting without permission, it would immediately have to adjourn when the restricted hour arrived in order to comply with the rule. In response to the two-hour rule being invoked, a Senate committee could cancel its meeting or reschedule it to periods not covered by the rule—for example, meeting early in the morning before the Senate has convened or after it has adjourned. The Senate could also recess or adjourn in order for a committee to sit during the hours restricted by the two-hour rule, and in some cases it has done so in order for a committee to hear testimony or act on an important measure or matter. There are examples of Senate committees adjourning an official hearing pursuant to the two-hour rule and continuing to interact with witnesses in a non-formal setting, characterized as a "briefing" or "listening session." Such gatherings are not official, however, and do not enjoy the same powers and protections of actual Senate hearings. For example, witnesses could not testify under oath at such a meeting, and no official transcript of the interactions would be kept. Senate rules restricting committee meeting times have existed for over 70 years and have evolved over time. A rule limiting committees from sitting while the Senate is in session was first enacted in Section 134(c) of P.L. 79-753, the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1946, which stated No standing committee of the Senate or the House, except the Committee on Rules of the House, shall sit without special leave, while the Senate or the House, as the case may be, is in session. The stated intent of the1946 rule was to reduce scheduling conflicts between committee and floor work. The Senate committee report accompanying the 1946 act predicted that the new rule would "make for closer concentration on committee work, on the one hand, and for fuller attendance on the floor, on the other." Under the 1946 form of the rule, all Senate committees had to cease sitting when the Senate went into session unless the unanimous consent of the Senate to meet was obtained. The provisions of the 1946 LRA were superseded on January 30, 1964, by Senate adoption of S.Res. 111, which placed an amended restriction on committee meetings in (then) paragraph 5 of Rule XXV of the standing rules of the Senate. As adopted, S.Res.111 stated Sec.1 No standing committee shall sit without special leave while the Senate is in session after (1) the conclusion of the morning hour, or (2) the Senate has proceeded to the consideration of unfinished business, pending business, or any other business except private bills and the routine morning business, whichever is earlier. Sec.2 Section 134(c) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 shall not be applicable to the standing committees of the Senate. The 1964 amendment to the standing rules was intended to provide additional periods for Senate committees to meet. Legislative history documents accompanying S.Res.111 make clear that many Senators felt the 1946 LRA rule had been too restrictive and had impeded the ability of committees to conduct their work. As two Senators noted in individual views in the committee report accompanying S.Res.111 Every Senator has had the experience of having consideration of a measure in which he is vitally interested repeatedly put off because of the inability of standing committees to meet ... while the Senate is in session. The problem has now assumed a chronic and persistent character. Objections against committees sitting are lodged as a matter of course, and often it is only in the exceptional case that a committee is able to secure unanimous consent to sit.... As the sessions of the Congress drag on through the year, the problem of finding time for committee work grows progressively worse. Daily sessions of the Senate begin earlier and end later, occupying an increasingly greater share of the working hours of the day. And, as if matters were not bad enough, as the time available for committee work decreases, the need for time to clear committee dockets before the end of the session grows more urgent. Whereas, under the 1946 LRA provision, no Senate committee could meet at any time that the Senate was in session, the 1964 amendment effected by S.Res. 111 permitted committees to sit during the first two hours of Senate session on a new legislative day (a period known as the "Morning Hour") and immediately thereafter if the Senate was engaged in routine "housekeeping" business or the processing of private bills. Subsequently, Section 117(a) of P.L. 91-510, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, enacted on October 26, 1970, established a provision in law that supplemented the 1964 version of the rule contained in paragraph 5 of Senate Rule XXV. That statutory provision stated Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no standing committee of the Senate shall sit, without special leave, while the Senate is in session. The prohibition contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Any other standing committee of the Senate may sit for any purpose while the Senate is in session if consent therefor has been obtained from the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate. In the event of the absence of either of such leaders, the consent of the absent leader may be given by a Senator designated by such leader for that purpose. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, any standing committee of the Senate may sit without special leave for any purpose as authorized by paragraph 5 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. The cumulative effect of the 1970 statutory provision and the still-existing provisions of Senate Rule XXV adopted in 1964 were to exempt the Appropriations Committee from any restrictions on meeting and to permit a committee to sit during a restricted period not just if it obtained the unanimous consent of the Senate to do so but also if the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) jointly authorized it to do so. The present form of the two-hour rule, which combined the provisions of the 1964 standing rule and the 1970 statutory provision, was adopted by the Senate on February 4, 1977, via Section 402 of S.Res. 4 , a resolution implementing the recommendations of the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System. The 1977 rules change added an exception for the Committee on the Budget, created in 1974, from the existing restrictions on meeting. Subsequent Senate action relocated the two-hour rule unchanged from Rule XXV to its current place in Section 5(a) of Rule XXVI. Table 1 lists examples identified by CRS of the enforcement of the two-hour rule between 1985 and 2017. The table includes the date the rule was invoked; where possible, an identification of the committee or committees affected; a summary of the proceedings; and a citation to the Congressional Record page, news account, or hearing transcript used to identify the table entry. In preparing the table, CRS conducted full-text searches in the Congressional Record and electronic news databases for either discussion of the rule or instances of objection to unanimous consent requests authorizing committees to meet. Not included in the table are instances where Senators or their staff indicated an intention to invoke the two-hour rule but for which no further evidence demonstrates that the rule was enforced. CRS cannot guarantee that these records are comprehensive of all instances of the two-hour rule being invoked. First, as discussed above, public action is not necessary to invoke the rule. As seen from the cases in Table 1 , sometimes no statement regarding authority for committees to meet was made on the floor. The majority leader was simply made aware that there was not an agreement and therefore no consent request or announcement was ever made on the floor. In 2017, in contrast, announcements were sometimes made when agreement was not reached, an apparently new practice that could affect results. Second, because the research is necessarily partly dependent on news accounts, variations in the nature of reporting on Senate action could potentially affect the results, although it is reasonable to expect unexpected adjustments to committee meetings and schedules to be newsworthy over the entire period under study. Third, and finally, various full-text search strategies employed may not necessarily identify every reported instance or every objection to a unanimous consent request made on the floor. Nevertheless, the cases identified suggest two general trends in the use of the two-hour rule. First, as has been noted, for the life of the two-hour rule, it has been a routine occurrence for committees to be given permission to meet during restricted periods. In recent years, however, it appears that the restrictions on sitting contained in the rule are being invoked more frequently. Over the 32-year period examined, CRS identified 47 occasions where one or more Senate committees had a meeting restricted by invocation of the two-hour rule. Over half of these instances have occurred since 2005. The eight instances identified by CRS as occurring in 2017 represent the highest number in any year over the period. Second, these data suggest that, since 1985, when the two-hour rule restrictions on committee meetings have been invoked, it appears to have been done in a large majority of cases as a form of protest or to delay committee action on a specific measure or matter. Invoking the rule to delay the consideration of judicial nominations has been particularly common.

Paragraph 5(a) of Senate Rule XXVI, sometimes referred to as the "two-hour rule," restricts the times that most Senate committees and subcommittees can meet when the full Senate is in session. The rule is intended to help balance the Senate's committee and floor work and to minimize the logistical conflicts that Senators face between participating in committee hearings and markups and attending to their duties on the chamber floor. Under the terms of the rule, no Senate committee or subcommittee (except the Committees on Appropriations and Budget and their subcommittees) can meet after the Senate has been in session for two hours or past 2:00 p.m. unless one of the following things occur: (1) the Senate grants unanimous consent for them to meet; (2) both the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) agree to permit the meeting, and their agreement has been announced on the Senate floor; or (3) the Senate adopts a privileged motion to allow the meeting. Should a committee meet during a restricted time period without being granted permission, any action that it takes—such as ordering a bill or nomination reported to the Senate—is considered "null, void, and of no effect." Senate rules restricting committee meeting times have existed for over 70 years and have evolved over time. A rule limiting committees from sitting while the Senate is in session was first enacted in Section 134(c) of P.L. 79-753, the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1946. Rules regulating the meeting times of Senate committees were amended in 1964 and again in 1970. The Senate adopted the present form of the two-hour rule on February 4, 1977, via Section 402 of S.Res. 4, a resolution implementing the recommendations of the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System. Permission for committees to sit during the hours restricted by the rule is routinely granted in the Senate. On occasion, however, the two-hour rule is invoked, most often as a form of protest or in order to delay committee action on a particular measure or matter. Invoking the rule for these reasons has increased in recent years. Permission to sit during times prohibited by the rule is now most often granted by joint leadership agreement instead of by unanimous consent, a change from prior practice.

For some 45 years, the primary international organization for coordinating restrictions on dual-use exports was COCOM, the Coordinating Committee For Multilateral Export Controls. COCOM was formed in 1949 to limit military-related transfers to Communist countries. At the time of its termination at the end of March 1994, it consisted of 17 industrial countries, including all members of NATO—except Iceland—and Japan and Australia. COCOM operated on the basis of "consensus," and functioned without the existence of a treaty or specific international legal authorization. In reality, COCOM "consensus" gave any member—and that member was most likely to be the United States—a veto over the export by any other member of a controlled good or technology. The day-to-day operations of COCOM involved meetings of a Secretariat in Paris at which the members agreed upon the technical specifications of the dual-use items that were being considered for export to Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. The Secretariat also decided whether to allow exceptions to agreed-upon restrictions. Irregular COCOM "High Level" meetings set or enunciated overall policy for the members. To provide guidance, COCOM created three lists of controlled items: an International Industrial List, an International Atomic Energy List, and an International Munitions List. The export control organizations of the member countries then incorporated some variant of the listed items. In the United States, the Export Administration Regulations contained the U.S. version of the items on the COCOM lists. Since COCOM had no independent legal existence, implementation of COCOM decisions depended upon the effectiveness of the export control laws and bureaucracies of each of the individual members. It was the responsibility of COCOM member countries to pass and enforce adequate laws and regulations to control exports. The comprehensiveness of the member countries' export control regimes, the degree of high level attention given to export controls, and the effectiveness of the export control bureaucracies varied considerably. In almost every instance, the United States was the most active in pursuing COCOM limitations on exports, while its major trading partners—especially France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany—often seemed more concerned about facilitating exports. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, COCOM members agreed, in November 1993, to disband COCOM, replace it with a new entity, and to move to "national discretion" in export licensing decisions as of January 1994. National discretion meant that each country, not COCOM as an entity, would determine what should be exported, and no country could veto the export decisions of another. Beginning in November 1993, Clinton Administration representatives undertook a major effort to create a "broadly based" replacement accord for COCOM which, as initially conceived would include the formerly COCOM-proscribed countries. It was initially hoped that this successor accord would be in place by the time that COCOM was disbanded on March 31, 1994. That deadline was not met. This effort resulted in the establishment of initial elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement, by 28 nations at the Hague on December 19, 1995, subject to the approval of their governments. After meetings in early April and mid-July 1996, the Secretariat of the Arrangement was established in Vienna in 1996. Initially called the "New Forum", the Wassenaar Arrangement has as its primary focus two basic areas: (1) conventional weapons exports and, (2) sensitive dual-use items and technologies with military end uses. The Clinton Administration viewed the new accord as the "centerpiece" of its efforts to promote "multilateral restraint" in conventional arms sales and transfers of sensitive military technologies. The Clinton Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, set out in February 1995, was a restatement of a policy approach that has guided U.S. arms transfers since the Reagan Administration. The Wassenaar Arrangement (formally titled the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) does not appear to break any new ground in the multilateral conventional arms control area. Previous attempts to achieve regional conventional arms sales agreements—most notably the effort in 1991-1992 by the George H.W. Bush Administration aimed at securing restraint on Middle East arms sales by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—failed due to the lack of consensus among the parties regarding which weapons could be sold and to whom. Elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement dealing with conventional weapons transfers depend for their success on securing the agreement of other weapons suppliers to forego activities that might otherwise be to their political or financial benefit. There are four major areas of policy concern within the Wassenaar Arrangement. These areas are membership, target countries, materials to be controlled, and organization/operational procedures. The initial negotiations on the successor accord among the 17 COCOM members were expanded to include, in addition to the original members, several new European countries and New Zealand as participants. Then at the January 1994 Moscow summit, Secretary of State Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev issued a joint statement welcoming the decision to establish a new multilateral regime and indicating Russia's wish to join. In the spring of 1994, State Department officials stated that they would oppose the accession of Russia to the new regime as long as it continued weapons sales to Iran. The Russian decision to sell nuclear power reactors to Iran further complicated matters. By early 1995, the United States still was unwilling to agree to Russian participation in the formation of the new regime, while other members of COCOM were unwilling to start the new regime without the Russians. The matter was resolved in June 1995 at a Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting when the Russians agreed not to make any new weapons contracts with Iran or to sell nuclear reprocessing equipment. The "agreed membership criteria" under the Wassenaar Arrangement are that participants have adequate export controls, adhere to the major existing nonproliferation regimes—the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group—and have "responsible" export control policies toward the so-called pariah countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. According to Clinton Administration officials, China has not been invited to join the new regime because of concerns by the United States and its allies regarding Chinese weapons exports to Iran, Pakistan, and other shortcomings in meeting membership criteria. Closely related to the question of Russian participation, has been the participation of the other members of the former Soviet Union. The export control system that existed in the Soviet Union was centralized in Moscow. The countries that had been part of the Soviet Union had few responsibilities for controlling exports. Since 1991, the amount of attention paid by these newly independent countries to developing adequate export controls has varied greatly. Even now, a high level of uncertainty continues to exist as to the export control capabilities and the willingness of leaders of these countries to support export controls generally, and an association such as the Wassenaar Arrangement specifically. A second major area of policy concern relates to countries against which the new Arrangement is to be targeted. From the outset, the United States has wanted to target "countries of concern," specifically identified as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. However, most of the countries participating in the negotiations have preferred setting a general objective of promoting security and stability and then letting each member country determine its export control policies and target countries. As currently constructed, Wassenaar "will not, however, be directed against any state or group of states; impede bona fide civil transactions; nor interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means with which to defend themselves." France, Germany, and Russia, in particular, are opposed to a U.S. proposal to require advance notification of arms sales to regions of concern. However, former Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis noted that participants in the Wassenaar Arrangement have national policies banning arms and related exports to Iran, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. Secretary Davis also noted the U.S. will continue to insist that prospective new members adhere to such policies. Based on discussions at the December 1996 plenary session, Secretary Davis said that no participating country was currently transferring arms or ammunition to Afghanistan in keeping with a recent U.N. Security Council resolution. Under the Wassenaar Arrangement, member states have agreed to control exports or retransfers of items and technologies contained on an agreed basic list of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, and a separate Munitions List. Information on transfers of more than 100 sensitive dual-use goods and technologies on the agreed list are to be shared by members of the Arrangement. Arms transfer reporting is currently confined to the categories of major weapons systems used for the CFE (Conventional Forces, Europe) Treaty and the United Nations Arms Register. Related to the questions concerning which items should be controlled is the issue of regime organization and operations. None of the participants in the process appears to favor the types of strong controls—and U.S. dominance—that existed under COCOM. National discretion with coordination is the most rigorous procedural option that emerged from the negotiations. Indeed, American officials have publicly acknowledged that only the United States favors prior notification of transfers, and this procedure is not part of the new regime. During plenary sessions and working group discussions, under Wassenaar, member governments are to share information on potential threats to peace and stability. They are to examine closely dubious weapons or technology acquisition trends. Specific information regarding global transfers to non-participating countries of arms in the seven categories, including model and type, (and technology) is to be made available in this manner, as are notices of denials of transfers of specific items on the lists established by the Wassenaar Arrangement. Members will regularly review the dual-use and Munitions List to reflect technological advancements and experience gained. The Arrangement envisions "more intensive consultations and more intrusive information sharing" among 6 major weapons suppliers: the United Kingdom, the U.S., France, Russia, Germany, and Italy. Through transparency of national activities involving weapons and technology transfers, it is hoped that dangerous acquisition patterns can be detected and halted before they become problematic. At the July 11-12, 1996 meeting in Vienna, the 33 Wassenaar states approved the "Initial Elements" to govern the Arrangement, and set November 1, 1996, as the date to launch both the control aspects of the agreement and the information exchange. Under the Arrangement, twice a year Participating States report all transfers or licenses issued for sensitive dual-use goods or technology (items in Annex 1 which is a subset of the Dual-Use list)—currently for transfers in the seven U.N. categories. In the case of conventional arms transfers, a biannual data exchange among participants gives details of arms deliveries . Twice a year, Participating States also report denials of licenses to transfer items on the Dual-Use list to non-member states. When a Participating State denies an export license for sensitive dual-use items, it is to notify other participants on an early and timely basis (preferably within 30 days, but definitely within 60 days). The Arrangement does not prohibit a participating country from making an export to a particular destination that has been denied by another participant (this practice is called "undercutting"). But participants are required to notify other participants within 60 days, and preferably within 30 days, after they approve a license for an export of sensitive dual-use goods that are essentially identical to those that have been denied by another participant during the previous three years. At the December 1999 plenary session of Wassenaar Arrangement members, the U.S. team proposed reporting on specific exports rather than aggregated reporting, reporting on exports of all listed items (not just the sensitive and very sensitive items), extensive pre-export reporting, and a "no undercut rule" which would ban exports by a Wassenaar partner of goods already denied by another partner. Russian and Ukrainian delegates reportedly blocked these reforms and the primary accomplishment was a joint statement of the importance of strong enforcement based on national laws. Beginning with the December 2000 plenary meeting, member states continued to reaffirm their concern regarding the threats posed by the illicit possession and use of Man Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) and agreed on elements of export controls on such weapons. In subsequent December plenary meetings of the Wassenaar Arrangement, through 2005, member states have also reaffirmed their commitment to prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organizations and by individual terrorists, agreed to a document setting out detailed "best practice" guidelines and criteria for small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports, and agreed to impose strict controls on the activities of those who engage in the brokering of conventional arms by introducing and implementing adequate laws and regulations based on agreed Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering. The agreed membership criteria of the Wassenaar Arrangement basically rely upon statements by members that they will abide by fairly general standards. Since the Russian export control system and those of other NIS countries lack substantial transparency, what steps can be taken to ensure that the membership criteria will be complied with by these states and others with traditions of weak export control systems? Is there an effective means by which the United States can induce acceptance of higher standards for evaluating sensitive technology transfers by other participating states? Is legislation sanctioning nations that continue to transfer weapons and technology to aggressive nations in regions of tension such a mechanism? Would a greater emphasis on use of oversight mechanisms in U.S. law, such as the Arms Export Control Act, or the reauthorization of the Export Administration Act provide the United States with a more effective means of achieving some of the fundamental goals it has been pursuing through the Wassenaar Arrangement?

This report provides background on the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was formally established in July 1996 as a multilateral arrangement aimed at controlling exports of conventional weapons and related dual-use goods and military technology. It is the successor to the expired Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). This report focuses on the current status, features, and issues raised by the establishment and functioning of the Wassenaar Arrangement. It will be updated only if warranted by notable events related to the Arrangement.

Casework , in a congressional office, refers to the response or services that Members of Congress provide to constituents who request assistance. As part of the process of determining how to carry out their congressional duties, Members of Congress largely determine the scope of casework and their other constituent service activities. Typically with casework, Members and their staffs help individual constituents deal with federal administrative agencies by acting as facilitators, ombudsmen, and, in some cases, advocates. Some congressional offices may consider their liaison activities between the federal government and local governments or businesses concerned with the effects of federal legislation or regulation to be casework. Other offices may include interactions with communities and nonprofit organizations seeking federal grants or other assistance as casework. Common congressional casework requests include tracking a misdirected benefits payment; helping to fill out a government form; applying for Social Security, veterans', education, and other federal benefits; explaining government activities or decisions; applying to a military service academy; seeking relief from a federal administrative decision; and immigrating to the United States or applying for U.S. citizenship. Contrary to the widely held public perception that Members of Congress can initiate a broad array of actions resulting in a speedy, favorable outcome, there are significant limitations on the degree of permissible intervention from a Member office. More of these restrictions are described later in this report: see " 3. What rules govern casework? ". Casework is not required of Members of Congress, but it is commonly expected by constituents. Some constituents may view a Member's office as the best point of a contact for assistance with the federal government. It appears that each Member office today provides some type of casework, reflecting a broadly held understanding among Members and their staff that casework is integral to the representational duties of a Member of Congress. Some also believe that casework activities can be part of an outreach strategy to build political support among constituents. Casework may also be viewed as an evaluative stage of the legislative process. Some observers suggest that casework inquiries afford Members the opportunity to evaluate whether a program is functioning as Congress intended. Constituent inquiries about specific policies, programs, or benefits may also suggest areas in which programs or policies require additional oversight, or further legislative consideration. Federal statute prohibits Members of Congress, chamber officers, and congressional staff from representing anyone before the federal government, except in the performance of their official duties. House and Senate rules and federal law also prohibit ex parte , or off-the-record, communications with agency employees reasonably expected to be involved in case adjudication. Generally, a Member of Congress may do the following on behalf of eligible individuals seeking their assistance, under House and Senate guidelines: request information or a status report; urge prompt consideration; arrange for interviews or appointments; express judgments; call for reconsideration of an administrative response that the Member believes is not reasonably supported by statutes, regulations, or considerations of equity or public policy; or perform any other service of a similar nature consistent with the provisions of the rules of the House or Senate. Under the Privacy Act of 1974, executive branch agencies cannot share records containing an individual's personally identifiable information with any outside entity unless that individual has authorized the release of that information. Agencies may request a particular format or types of information on a Privacy Act release. Requests involving medical information might require an additional waiver, pursuant to rules promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). House rules regarding casework services are discussed in the House Ethics Manual . Guidelines in the House Ethics Manual say that when contacting a federal agency on behalf of a constituent, a Member, officer, or employee of the House should not make prohibited, off-the-record comments, receive things of value for providing casework assistance, or improperly pressure agency officials. Casework requests typically do not involve the courts, but guidelines in the House Ethics Manual  provide a range of options to Members who might choose to participate in judicial proceedings. Senate Rule XLIII and the Senate Ethics Manual establish parameters for casework services in that chamber. Senate Rule XLIII (3) prohibits the provision of casework assistance on the basis of contributions or services to organizations in which the Senator has a political, personal, or financial interest. The Senate Ethics Manual describes constituent service as something that occurs with respect to the executive branch and is silent on service before the courts. Because casework is often viewed as a representational activity, the primary recipients of an office's casework services are usually considered to be individual constituents residing within a House Member's district, or a Senator's state. Yet there are reasons why other persons or entities might seek assistance from a Member's office. For example, foreign-born individuals seeking to immigrate to the United States may contact a Member of Congress for assistance. A family member or other concerned party outside of a Member's district may contact an office on behalf of a resident constituent. Strict definitions of who is eligible for casework assistance are not provided by the House or Senate; however, other guidelines may imply certain parameters. Senate Rule XLIII recognizes that not everyone who seeks assistance from a Senator will be a constituent of the state the Senator represents, and uses the term "petitioner" to refer to the casework requester. No such distinction is drawn in the House Ethics Manual , which uses the term "constituents" to refer to the recipients of Members' casework services. In the House, guidance issued by the Committee on Ethics suggests that "particular care should be exercised when providing assistance to individuals who are not from the Member's congressional district." The guidance also indicates that a Member should not use official resources to provide casework for individuals who live outside the district the Member represents. When a Member of the House is unable to assist a non-constituent, the Member may refer the person to his or her own House Member or Senators. Matters regarding the management of casework activities are at the discretion of individual congressional offices, subject to the rules of their respective chambers, relevant law, and the priorities of that office. The number and type of constituent requests, how an office defines casework, Member priorities, and the distribution of responsibilities among office locations and staff are some of the factors that can affect a congressional office's casework policies and procedures. Most casework is conducted by staff in state or district offices, and staff are commonly hired in these locations to work on casework or other constituent services. Offices often establish and document procedures for how they handle casework; this is not required, but some offices find it useful to specify casework goals, management procedures, or expectations of staff. This can help ensure that all cases are addressed in a similar manner, and that all appropriate staff can process new casework requests and access casework records if needed. Offices sometimes create their own forms to serve as Privacy Act waivers or to gather necessary case-related information from constituents. Most constituents expect that offices will handle their personal information carefully and discreetly. Casework and other records created in a congressional office are considered to be the personal property of the Member; the House and Senate provide guidance for managing these materials. Many state or district offices have enough constituent requests to assign at least one staff member to work specifically on casework. Congressional staff serving as caseworkers typically act as liaisons between constituents and federal agencies. The decision to hire a caseworker, the specific qualifications for that role, and job responsibilities, however, are left to each Member office to determine. In some offices, certain caseworkers work with particular agencies or on certain types of cases; in other offices, all caseworkers work on all types of cases. For some staff, casework is their primary job responsibility; others perform casework alongside another role in the office. Caseworkers generally first obtain information about the constituent's situation from the person requesting assistance. This often involves understanding the problem presented by, or on behalf of, the constituent. Caseworkers may need to establish what services or benefits the constituent may be eligible for. They may also need to request documentation, like copies of birth certificates or military service or other records, to provide to the agency in support of a case. Caseworkers also identify the appropriate way to address the constituent's concerns. Often, this involves contacting a federal agency's congressional liaison. To receive any information from federal agencies about a constituent, caseworkers must provide a Privacy Act waiver, signed by the constituent, which allows the agency to share the constituent's personal information with a Member. Throughout the process, caseworkers try to communicate with the constituent about realistic expectations. While many congressional offices focus on national agencies, some issues presented by constituents may lead caseworkers to contact state or local governments, or nonprofit or community organizations; in some instances, these entities may be able to provide intermediary or alternative assistance to constituents. Caseworkers also determine when a case may require additional support from a Member of Congress, other officials, or other staff. Additional information for caseworkers on working with constituents is available on the CRS casework resources website ( http://www.crs.gov/resources/casework ) or by contacting CRS. Often, federal agencies have designated legislative affairs or congressional relations staff assigned as general points of contact for congressional caseworkers. Many of these contacts are listed in CRS Report 98-446, Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies . Congressional liaisons generally are not agency decisionmakers, and essentially serve as a resource available to assist Members and congressional staff on legislative and constituent service matters. Individuals serving in this capacity commonly work in an agency's legislative or intergovernmental affairs office. Although most of these congressional liaisons are located in Washington, DC, agency locations, they can refer caseworkers to the appropriate local or regional office staff members, if needed, for further assistance. Caseworkers may also need to identify other sources of assistance for constituents. Frequently, caseworkers can utilize contacts known to their offices. This can include local leaders or community organizations that may be able to provide alternative means of assistance for constituents. Caseworkers may also learn about helpful points of contact through other caseworkers who have worked on similar issues in another congressional office. In addition to developing a broad network of contacts, caseworkers often develop expertise through their interactions with agencies and insights into what agency acronyms or terminology mean in practical terms for the constituent. This sometimes enables caseworkers to provide information to constituents that the constituents may not have otherwise gleaned from the agency's formal response. Although Members and caseworkers are limited in how much they can directly intervene in an agency's decisionmaking process on behalf of a particular case, there are several reasons why agencies typically are responsive to congressional concern. Congress, broadly, is responsible for creating federal agencies and programs, determining their scope, providing their funding, and overseeing their activities. Because some constituents seek congressional assistance only after other means of working with an agency have failed, agencies may view congressional casework inquiries as micro-level exercises of oversight and respond to them accordingly. Response times, whether for an acknowledgment that a case inquiry has been received, or for a response the agency considers final, can vary considerably from agency to agency. Waiting periods may be determined in part by the priority agencies place on constituent service, the type or complexity of an individual case, or the volume of cases to which an agency responds. In some instances, agency response practices might result in slower response than constituents and some congressional offices expect or would prefer. Federal agencies might have different protocols that apply for emergency or time-sensitive situations, and congressional liaisons can share these methods with caseworkers. There are, however, limits on what caseworkers and agency officials can do to expedite requests. As constituents wait for an agency response, caseworkers might try to provide information about how long the process could take, based on information from or past work with the agency. Caseworkers may choose to provide regular updates to constituents at defined intervals to help assure constituents that their case is still being considered by the agency. Federal agencies are required to comply with statutes and regulations governing their activities, including decisions regarding services and benefits provided to constituents. As a consequence, an agency might sometimes be unable to provide a response that is satisfactory to the constituent. If there is reason to believe that incomplete information was available to the agency, or that an agency decision was not in keeping with its statutory or regulatory requirements, a Member office may, pursuant to House or Senate rules, request reconsideration of a constituent's concerns. Caseworkers can sometimes refer constituents to state, local, or community resources that might address some of the challenges a constituent is experiencing. Nonfederal entities that provide services to veterans, the elderly, or others with specific needs might offer services while a constituent awaits an agency decision or fashion a remedy if no agency resolution is available. CRS has a number of casework resources for congressional offices, accessible online through http://www.crs.gov/resources/CASEWORK . These resources include an introductory video on casework (CRS Video WVB00093, Introduction to Congressional Casework ); a longer report on casework practices (CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources ); a report on U.S. service academy nominations (CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management ); and a list of frequently updated congressional liaison contacts (CRS Report 98-446, Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies ). CRS periodically hosts seminars for district and state staff that can provide additional information; upcoming programs are listed at http://www.crs.gov/events . Congressional offices may also contact CRS analysts directly to address more specific questions or concerns related to casework. Further case support may be obtained by contacting local or state officials, professional associations, or community groups that help individuals facing similar situations; these entities may have access to additional resources that can help resolve or alleviate a constituent's problem. Caseworkers working in district offices may find it useful to contact staff in the Member's Washington, DC, office for additional information about policies or programs that affect casework. Similarly, information from fellow caseworkers in neighboring states or districts where constituent and agency experiences may be similar can be useful in providing caseworkers with contacts, resources, or advice.

Constituents often contact a congressional office looking for assistance; the work congressional offices do in response to these requests is generally referred to as casework . Members of Congress determine the scope of their constituent service activities, including casework. Many requests for casework come from constituents seeking assistance from federal agencies, but offices may also receive requests from non-constituents. Congressional offices can have different conceptualizations of casework based on Member preferences, district needs, and constituent expectations. This report addresses frequently asked questions (FAQs) about congressional casework. It is intended to provide resources for congressional offices and individual caseworkers. This includes the casework rules and guidelines established by the House and Senate, as well as some observations about how congressional offices generally approach casework and work with federal agencies on behalf of constituents. Casework practices are largely left to each Member office to determine, like many other aspects of congressional operations. Each constituent's situation is unique, and federal agencies vary in their casework practices, which makes it difficult for either chamber to issue prescriptive guidelines regarding casework. The degree of flexibility afforded to offices can help caseworkers tailor their assistance to best meet constituents' needs. The relative autonomy afforded to congressional offices regarding casework also means that many of the answers provided here are necessarily broad-based. Further resources are available from CRS that can provide more specific, context-specific information. Several of these CRS resources are discussed throughout this report, including the following: CRS Video WVB00093, Introduction to Congressional Casework , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report 98-446, Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies , by [author name scrubbed] the CRS resources website, "Constituent Services: Casework," by [author name scrubbed], available at http://crs.gov/resources/casework

On June 4, 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed that a cyber intrusion into its information technology systems and data "may have compromised the personal information of [approximately 4.2 million] current and former Federal employees." Later in June, OPM reported a separate cyber incident, which it said had compromised its databases housing background investigation records and resulted in the theft of sensitive information of 21.5 million individuals. The OPM breach, one of the largest reported on federal government systems, was detected partly through the use of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Einstein system—an intrusion detection system that "screens federal Internet traffic to identify potential cyber threats." Reportedly, the hackers used compromised security credentials—those assigned to a KeyPoint Government Solutions employee, a federal background check contractor working on OPM systems—to exploit OPM's systems and gain access. Officials do not believe that the intruders are still in the system. In the aftermath of the intrusions, Katherine Archuleta has stepped down as the director of OPM amid criticisms of how the agency managed its response to the intrusions and secured its information systems. Beth Cobert has taken on the role of acting director. In addition, OPM's Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) application, the "web-based automated system that was designed to facilitate the processing of standard investigative forms used when conducting background investigations," has been taken offline for "security enhancements." Notably, as is common with data breaches, a vailable information on the recent OPM breach developments remains incomplete. Assumptions about the nature, origins, extent, and implications of the data breach may change, and some media reporting may conflict with official statements. Policymakers have received official briefings on the breach developments, and Congress has held a number of hearings on the issue. This report provides an overview of the current understanding of the recent OPM breaches, as well as issues and questions raised about the source of the breaches, possible uses of the information exfiltrated, potential national security ramifications, and implications for the cybersecurity of federal information systems. Information released in June 2015 regarding the first OPM breach indicates that hackers gained access to personal information including "employees' Social Security numbers, job assignments, performance ratings and training information." The second reported breach involved the theft of data on 19.7 million current, former, and prospective employees and contractors who applied for a background investigation in 2000 or after using certain OPM forms. This second breach also impacted personal information of 1.8 million non-applicants; OPM notes that these non-applicants are primarily individuals married to or otherwise cohabitating with background investigation applicants. OPM confirmed that "the usernames and passwords that background investigation applicants used to fill out their background investigation forms were also stolen." About 1.1 million stolen records also include fingerprints. Notably, the two breaches revealed in June 2015 are not the first incidents targeting OPM databases containing such sensitive information. In a previous 2014 breach of OPM, hackers purportedly targeted "files on tens of thousands of employees who [had] applied for top-secret security clearances." Determining an actor (and actor's motivation) involved in a cyber incident can help guide how the United States responds. If a perpetrator is believed to be motivated by profit or economic advantage, the investigation and response may be led by law enforcement using the tools of the criminal justice system. If the perpetrator is deemed to be a state-sponsored actor with a different motivation, the United States may utilize diplomatic or military tools in its response. Speaking at an intelligence conference on June 24, 2015, Admiral Michael Rogers, director of the National Security Agency and head of U.S. Cyber Command, declined to discuss who might be responsible for the attacks, stating "I'm not [going to] get into the specifics of attribution.... That's a process that we're working through on the policy side. There's a wide range of people, groups and nation states out there aggressively attempting to gain access to that data." Speaking at the same conference a day later, however, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper identified China as the "leading suspect" in the attacks. Mr. Clapper expressed grudging admiration for the alleged hackers, noting "[y]ou have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did.... You know, if we had an opportunity to do that, I don't think we'd hesitate for a moment." Without explicitly denying involvement, China has called speculation about its role in the OPM breaches neither "responsible nor scientific." In late June 2015, top officials from the United States and China met in Washington, DC, for the annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue—the two countries' most high-level dialogue. The dialogue included discussion of cyber issues, but progress on these issues was not mentioned among the dialogue's official "outcomes." China said in early July that it was "imperative to stop groundless accusations, step up consultations to formulate an international code of conduct in cyberspace and jointly safeguard peace, security, openness and cooperation of the cyber space through enhanced dialogue and cooperation in the spirit of mutual respect." Of note, the United States in May 2014 filed criminal charges over a set of computer intrusions allegedly from China. The U.S. Department of Justice indicted   five members of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) for commercial cyber espionage that allegedly targeted five U.S. firms and a labor union. It was the first, and so far only, time the United States has filed criminal charges against known state actors for cyber economic espionage. Criminal charges appear to be unlikely in the case of the OPM breach. As a matter of policy, the United States has sought to distinguish between cyber intrusions to collect data for national security purposes—to which the United States deems counterintelligence to be an appropriate response—and cyber intrusions to steal data for commercial purposes—to which the United States deems a criminal justice response to be appropriate. Describing discussions with Chinese officials at the July 2013 session of the annual U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, a month after Edward Snowden made public documents related to U.S. signals intelligence, a senior Obama Administration stated, "[W]e were exceptionally clear, as the President has been, that there is a vast distinction between intelligence-gathering activities that all countries do and the theft of intellectual property for the benefit of businesses in the country, which we don't do and we don't think any country should do." The OPM breach so far appears to be seen in the category of intelligence-gathering, rather than commercial espionage. If the United States chooses to respond in other ways to intrusions from China, experts have suggested that China has multiple vulnerabilities that the United States could exploit. "China's uneven industrial development, fragmented cyber defenses, uneven cyber operator tradecraft, and the market dominance of Western information technology firms provide an environment conducive to Western CNE [computer network exploitation] against China," notes one scholar of Chinese cyber issues. It remains unclear how data from the OPM breaches might be used if they are indeed now in Chinese government hands. Experts in and out of government suspect that "China may be trying to build a giant database of federal employees" that could help identify U.S. officials and their roles. Writing in Wired magazine, Senator Ben Sasse observed, "China may now have the largest spy-recruiting database in history." There have been suggestions that information exposed in the breaches "could be useful in crafting 'spear-phishing' e-mails, which are designed to fool recipients into opening a link or an attachment so that the hacker can gain access to computer systems." In addition to being used by nation states, a trove of data from breaches such as those at OPM can provide a number of avenues for criminals to exploit. For instance, compromised Social Security numbers and other personally identifiable information (PII) may be used for identity theft and financially motivated cybercrime, such as credit card fraud. However, experts have been skeptical as to whether compromised information from the OPM breaches will even appear for sale in the online black market. When cybercriminals have tried in the underground markets to pass off other stolen data as that coming from the OPM breaches, this has been debunked, and the stolen data were shown to have come from other sources. The lack of stolen OPM data appearing in the criminal underworld has led some to speculate the breaches were more likely conducted for espionage rather than criminal purposes. Nonetheless, even if data were stolen for non-criminal purposes, they could still fall into criminal hands. While discussion about the stolen fingerprint information has been limited, analysts have begun to question how this data could be used. Some have speculated that if the fingerprints are of high enough quality, there may be "acutely negative long-term consequences for individuals affected and their future use of fingerprints to verify their identities." Depending on whose hands the fingerprints come into, they could be used for criminal or counterintelligence purposes. For instance, they could be trafficked on the black market for profit or used to reveal the true identities of undercover officials. Also a concern is that biometric data such as fingerprints cannot be reissued—unlike other identifying information such as Social Security numbers. This could make recovery from the breach more challenging for some. Reports have emerged indicating that OPM had attempted to take over the administration of Scattered Castles—the intelligence community's (IC's) database of sensitive clearance holders—and create a single clearance system for government employees. Although the IC refused out of concerns of increased vulnerability to hacking, news reports allege that some sharing of information between systems was underway by 2014. U.S. officials have denied that Scattered Castles was affected by the OPM hack, but they have neither confirmed nor denied that the databases were linked. If the IC's database were linked with OPM's, this could potentially help the hackers gain access to intelligence agency personnel and identify clandestine and covert officers. Even if data on intelligence agency personnel were not compromised, the hackers might be able to use the sensitive personnel information to "neutralize" U.S. officials by exploiting their personal weaknesses and/or targeting their relatives abroad. Access to the IC's database could also reveal the process and criteria for gaining clearances and special access, allowing foreign agents to more easily infiltrate the U.S. government. Some in the national security community have compared the potential damage of the OPM breaches to U.S. interests to that caused by Edward Snowden's leaks of classified information from the National Security Agency. Yet the potential exists for damage beyond mere theft of classified information, including data manipulation or misinformation. While there is no evidence to suggest that this has happened, hackers would have had the ability, some say, while in U.S. systems to alter personnel files and create fictitious ones that would have gone undetected as far back as 2012. Another concern is the possibility for data publication, as was done with the Snowden records. Dissemination of sensitive personnel files could damage the ability of clearance holders to operate with cover, and could open them up to potential exploitation from foreign intelligence agents. The cybersecurity of most federal information systems is governed by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA, 44 U.S.C. §3551 et seq.), which was updated at the end of the 113 th Congress ( P.L. 113-283 ). The update gave explicit operational authority to DHS for implementation, including the authority to issue binding operational directives, and it set requirements for breach notification for federal agencies. In addition, 40 U.S.C. §11319, as added by P.L. 113-291 , provided agency chief information officers (CIOs) with additional budgeting and program authorities. A potential question for Congress is whether those and other provisions of law give agencies the legislative authority and resources they need to adequately address the risks of future intrusions. Among the specific questions Congress might consider are the following: Are the current authorities and requirements under FISMA sufficient, if fully implemented, to protect federal systems from future intrusions such as the most recent OPM intrusions? If not, what changes are needed to sufficiently reduce the level of risk? For example, should the priority level for cybersecurity be elevated with respect to other aspects of mission fulfillment; should the federal government adopt the explicit goal of being assessed by independent experts as having world-class cybersecurity? What are the barriers to improving federal cybersecurity to a level that would sufficiently reduce the risks of incidents such as the breaches at OPM, and what legislative actions are needed to remove them? For example, do agency heads, responsible for cybersecurity under FISMA, have sufficient understanding of cybersecurity to execute those responsibilities effectively—a broadly held concern with respect to private-sector chief executive officers that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework was designed in part to help address? Are the recent amendments to CIO authorities sufficient for them to implement their cybersecurity responsibilities under FISMA? Does DHS have sufficient authorities to protect federal civilian systems under its statutory responsibilities? For example, should it have greater legislative authority to deploy countermeasures on federal systems, as some legislative proposals would provide? Are the specific actions taken and proposed by the Obama Administration in the wake of the OPM breaches, such as the "cybersecurity sprint" and the proposed strategy and acquisition guidance initiatives, sufficient to provide the required improvements in cybersecurity at federal agencies? Congress is currently considering legislation to reduce perceived barriers to information sharing among private-sector entities and between them and federal agencies. An additional potential question for Congress is whether the protections outlined in the proposed bills against inadvertent disclosure by federal agencies will be sufficient in the wake of breaches such as those involving OPM.

On June 4, 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed that a cyber intrusion had impacted its information technology systems and data, potentially compromising the personal information of about 4.2 million former and current federal employees. Later that month, OPM reported a separate cyber incident targeting OPM's databases housing background investigation records. This breach is estimated to have compromised sensitive information of 21.5 million individuals. Amid criticisms of how the agency managed its response to the intrusions and secured its information systems, Katherine Archuleta has stepped down as the director of OPM, and Beth Cobert has taken on the role of acting director. In addition, OPM's Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) application, the system designed to help process forms used in conducting background investigations, has been taken offline for security improvements. Officials are still investigating the actors behind the breaches and what the motivations might have been. Theft of personally identifiable information (PII) may be used for identity theft and financially motivated cybercrime, such as credit card fraud. Many have speculated that the OPM data were taken for espionage rather than for criminal purposes, however, and some have cited China as the source of the breaches. It remains unclear how the data from the OPM breaches might be used if they are indeed now in the hands of the Chinese government. Some suspect that the Chinese government may build a database of U.S. government employees that could help identify U.S. officials and their roles or that could help target individuals to gain access to additional systems or information. National security concerns include whether hackers could have obtained information that could help them identify clandestine and covert officers and operations. The cybersecurity of most federal information systems is governed by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA, 44 U.S.C. §3551 et seq.). Questions for policymakers include whether existing provisions of law give agencies the legislative authority and resources they need to adequately address the risks of future intrusions. In addition, effective sharing of cybersecurity information has been considered an important tool for protecting information systems from unauthorized intrusions and exfiltration of data. The 114 th Congress is considering legislation to reduce perceived barriers to information sharing among private-sector entities and between them and federal agencies.

The U.S. Census Bureau periodically collects national survey information on child support. By interviewing a random sample of single-parent families, the Census Bureau is able to generate an array of data that is useful in assessing the performance of noncustodial parents in paying their child support. Although the Ce nsus Bureau has been collecting child support information in a special Child Support Supplement to the April Current Population Survey (CPS) biennially since 1978, the supplement survey has changed significantly over the years. According to the Census Bureau, the most recent data, from 2013, are comparable only back to 1993. During the early years of the survey, information was collected only from custodial mothers. Beginning with the 1991 data, information was also collected from custodial fathers. This report presents unsegmented data with respect to custodial mothers and fathers (i.e., custodial parents' data). The survey population includes all persons who have their own children under the age of 21 living with them, while the other parent lives outside the household. The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as part of P.L. 93-647 (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act). It is a federal-state program whose purpose is to help strengthen families by securing financial support for children from their noncustodial parent on a consistent and continuing basis, and by helping some families to remain self-sufficient and off public assistance by providing the requisite CSE services. The CSE program is administered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and funded by general revenues. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands operate CSE programs and are entitled to federal matching funds. The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) parent location, (2) paternity establishment, (3) establishment of child support orders, (4) review and modification of child support orders, (5) collection of child support payments, (6) distribution of child support payments, and (7) establishment and enforcement of medical child support. The CSE program is estimated to handle at least 50% of all child support cases; the remaining cases are handled by private attorneys, collection agencies, or through mutual agreements between the parents. In FY2013, the CSE program collected $28.0 billion in child support payments (from noncustodial parents) and served 15.6 million child support cases. The national Census Bureau data show that the aggregate amount of child support received in 2013 was $22.5 billion, and that 13.4 million parents had custody of children under the age of 21 while the other parent lived elsewhere. In 2013, almost 83% of custodial parents were mothers. Of all custodial parents, 48% were white (non-Hispanic), 25% were black, 23% were Hispanic, 16% were married, 33% were divorced, 38% were never married, 13% did not have a high school diploma, almost 20% had at least a bachelor's degree, 50% worked full-time year-round, 29% had family income below poverty, and nearly 43% received some type of public assistance (i.e., Medicaid, food stamps, public housing or rent subsidy, TANF, or general assistance). Table 1 summarizes several child support indicators from biennial survey data for selected years from 1993 through 2013. The table shows that the likelihood of having a child support award, being legally entitled to a child support payment, and actually receiving at least one child support payment decreased over the 21-year period from 1993 through 2013. In contrast, the percentage of custodial parents (owed child support) who received the full amount of the child support that they were owed increased by almost 24%, from 37% in 1993 to 46% in 2013. In 2013, about 49% of the 13.4 million custodial parents (with children under the age of 21) were awarded child support. Of those who were actually due child support payments (5.7 million), about 74% of them received at least one payment and almost 46% received all that they were owed. In 2013, only 2.6 million (19%) of the 13.4 million custodial parents eligible for child support actually received the full amount of child support that was owed to them. In 2013, the average child support payment received by custodial parents amounted to $3,953, 6.5% higher than the average child support payment in 1993 ($3,712). In 2013, 68% of the $32.9 billion in aggregate child support due was actually paid. In 1993, 65% of the $38 billion (adjusted for inflation, in 2013 dollars) in child support due was paid. During the 21-year period 1993 through 2013, after adjusting for inflation, aggregate child support due started at $38.0 billion in 1993, fluctuated to a high of $46.9 billion in 2003, and dropped to a low of $32.9 billion in 2013. Over the entire period, aggregate child support due decreased by 13%, total child support received decreased 9%, and the amount left unpaid decreased 21% (see Table 1 ). While sex, race, marital status, and education are significant factors in predicting whether a custodial parent will be issued a child support order, award rates tend to be significantly lower than receipt rates. For example, although female custodial parents were almost 1.7 times more likely to be awarded child support in 2013 as their male counterparts, among parents who were owed/due child support, both had at least a 73% chance of actually receiving child support payments. (See Table 2 .) Moreover, in 2013, 37% of black custodial parents were awarded child support compared to 56% of white custodial parents. Even so, nearly 65% of black custodial parents who were owed/due child support actually received child support payments and 79% of white custodial parents who were owed child support actually received child support payments in 2013. Similarly, while 42% of never-married parents were awarded child support in 2013, almost 68% of never-married parents who were owed child support actually received child support payments in 2013. Also, 38% of custodial parents without a high school diploma were awarded child support, while almost 62% of custodial parents without a high school diploma who were owed child support actually received child support. The pattern of receipt rates being higher than award rates also held for the economic factors listed in Table 2 —in that once a child support obligation was awarded, the probability of actually receiving payments rose significantly for all categories of custodial parents. In 2013, 45% of custodial parents with incomes below the poverty level were awarded child support, and nearly 66% of those owed/due payments actually received child support payments. Table 2 also shows that 49% of custodial parents who worked full-time year-round were awarded child support, while almost 77% of those owed received child support payments. Similarly, 47% of custodial parents who received public assistance were awarded child support, while nearly 67% of those who were owed child support payments actually received child support payments. Of the categories of custodial parents presented in Table 2 , custodial parents who were divorced followed by custodial parents who were white (non-Hispanic) were the categories of parents most likely to be awarded child support. In 2013, 57.7% of custodial parents who were divorced and 56.4% of white (non-Hispanic) custodial parents were awarded child support. The table also shows that custodial parents with an associate's degree who were owed/due child support was the category of parents most likely to receive child support payments in 2013. In 2013, 83.1% of custodial parents with an associate's degree who were owed payments actually received child support payments. In 2013, the average yearly child support payment received by custodial parents with payments was $5,333; $5,181 for mothers and $6,526 for fathers. These full or partial payments represented (on average) 14% of the custodial parent's yearly income, 16% of the custodial mothers' total yearly income, and 9% of the custodial fathers'. In 2013, for custodial parents with income below the poverty level, child support payments for those who received them made up, on average, 49% of their yearly income. In 2013, child support payments made up 13% of the yearly income of custodial parents without a high school diploma who were owed child support and who actually received full or partial payments. In 2013, child support represented about 18% of the income of the 2.6 million custodial parents who received all of the child support that they were owed. The Census Bureau data also include information on health insurance. In 2013, 54% of the 6.5 million custodial parents with child support awards had awards that included health insurance. The noncustodial parent provided the health insurance coverage in 51.1% of the awards with health insurance provisos and in 10.4% of the awards without health insurance stipulations. Moreover, the noncustodial parent provided health insurance coverage for 19.4% of the nearly 6.9 million custodial parents who did not have a child support award. Overall, 3.5 million noncustodial parents provided health care for their children in 2013. This represented 26.1% of the 13.4 million children under the age of 21 who were living with a custodial parent while their other parent lived elsewhere.

The national Census Bureau data show that in 2013, 13.4 million parents had custody of children under the age of 21 while the other parent lived elsewhere, and the aggregate amount of child support received was $22.5 billion. In 2013, almost 83% of custodial parents were mothers. Of all custodial parents, 48% were white (non-Hispanic), 25% were black, 23% were Hispanic, 16% were married, 33% were divorced, 38% were never married, 13% did not have a high school diploma, almost 20% had at least a bachelor's degree, 50% worked full-time year-round, 29% had family income below poverty, and nearly 43% received some type of public assistance. In 2013, 2.6 million (40%) of the 6.5 million custodial parents with child support orders actually received the full amount of child support that was owed to them. The average yearly child support payment received by custodial parents with payments was $5,181 for mothers and $6,526 for fathers. These full or partial payments represented about 16% of the custodial mothers' total yearly income and 9% of the custodial fathers' yearly income. Compared to 1993 Census data, less child support was received by custodial parents in 2013 ($24.8 billion in 1993 versus $22.5 billion in 2013; in 2013 dollars). However, a higher percentage of those owed child support actually received all that they were due (36.9% in 1993 versus 45.6% in 2013).

The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with preventing the entry of terrorists, securing the borders, and carrying out immigration enforcement functions. The Department of Defense's (DOD) role in the execution of this responsibility is to provide support to DHS and other federal, state and local (and in some cases foreign) law enforcement agencies, when requested. Since the 1980s, the DOD (and National Guard), as authorized by Congress, has conducted a wide variety of counterdrug support missions along the borders of the United States. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, military support was expanded to include counterterrorism activities. Although the DOD does not have the "assigned responsibility to stop terrorists from coming across our borders," its support role in counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts appears to have increased the Department's profile in border security. Some states, particularly those along the southern border that are experiencing reported escalations in crime and illegal immigration, are welcoming the increased military role and have taken steps to procure additional military resources. Governor Janet Napolitano of Arizona, for example, sent the DOD a request for federal funding to support the state's deployment of National Guard troops to the border after reportedly exhausting available state resources for combating illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Others view the increased presence of military support along the borders as undiplomatic, potentially dangerous, and a further strain on already overextended military resources. Nonetheless, the concerns over aliens and smugglers exploiting the porous southern border continue to grow, and some now argue that the military should play a much larger and more direct role in border security. On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced that up to 6,000 National Guard troops would be sent to the southern border to support the Border Patrol. According to the President, the Guard will assist the Border Patrol by operating surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, installing fences and vehicle barriers, building roads, and providing training. Guard units will not be involved in direct law-enforcement activities and will be under the control of the Governors. The Administration has indicated that the vast majority of the force at the border would be drawn from Guardsmen performing their regularly scheduled, two- or three-week annual training, pursuant to Title 32 of the U.S. Code (see later discussion). Initial deployments of Guardsmen to the border began in June 2006 under the mission name, "Operation Jump Start." As of November 2006, approximately 5661 guardsmen were participating in the mission. In the 109 th Congress, Senate-passed S. 2611 and House-passed H.R. 5122 , as well as H.R. 1986 , H.R. 3938 , and H.R. 3333 , would have authorized, under certain parameters, the use of military forces or the National Guard along the border. The military does not appear to have a direct legislative mandate to protect or patrol the border or to engage in immigration enforcement. Indeed, direct military involvement in law enforcement activities without proper statutory authorization might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act. The military does have, however, general legislative authority that allows it to provide support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (LEA) in counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts, which might indirectly provide border security and immigration control assistance. Military personnel for these operations are drawn from the active and reserve forces of the military and from the National Guard. The primary restriction on military participation in civilian law enforcement activities is the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). The PCA prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force to execute the domestic laws of the United States except where expressly authorized by the Constitution or Congress. The PCA has been further applied to the Navy and Marine Corps by legislative and administrative supplements. For example, 10 U.S.C. §375, directs the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations forbidding the direct participation "by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity" during support activities to civilian law enforcement agencies. DOD issued Directive 5525.5, which outlines its policies and procedures for supporting federal, state, and local LEAs. According to the Directive, the following forms of direct assistance are prohibited: (1) interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity; (2) a search or seizure; (3) an arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity; and (4) use of military personnel in the pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators. It is generally accepted that the PCA does not apply to the actions of the National Guard when not in federal service. As a matter of policy, however, National Guard regulations stipulate that its personnel are not , except for exigent circumstances or as otherwise authorized, to directly participate in the arrest or search of suspects or the general public. The PCA does not apply "in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution." Under the Constitution, Congress is empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union. The Constitution, however, contains no provision expressly authorizing the President to use the military to execute the law. The question of whether the constitutional exception includes instances where the President is acting under implied or inherent constitutional powers is one the courts have yet to answer. DOD regulations, nonetheless, do assert two constitutionally based exceptions—sudden emergencies and protection of federal property. The PCA also does not apply where Congress has expressly authorized use of the military to execute the law. Congress has done so in three ways: by giving a branch of the armed forces civilian law enforcement authority (e.g., the Coast Guard), by addressing certain circumstances with more narrowly crafted legislation, and by establishing general rules for certain types of assistance. The military indirectly supports border security and immigration control efforts under general legislation that authorizes the armed forces to support federal, state, and local LEAs. Since the early 1980s, Congress has periodically authorized an expanded role for the military in providing support to LEAs. Basic authority for most DOD assistance was originally passed in 1981 and is contained in Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code—Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. Under Chapter 18 of Title 10, Congress authorizes DOD to share information (§371); loan equipment and facilities (§372); provide expert advice and training (§373); and maintain and operate equipment (§374). For federal LEAs, DOD personnel may be made available, under §374, to maintain and operate equipment in conjunction with counterterrorism operations (including the rendition of a suspected terrorist from a foreign country) or the enforcement of counterdrug laws, immigration laws, and customs requirements. For any civilian LEA, §374 allows DOD personnel to maintain and operate equipment for a variety of purposes, including aerial reconnaissance and the detection, monitoring, and communication of air and sea traffic, and of surface traffic outside the United States or within 25 miles of U.S. borders, if first detected outside the border. Congress placed several stipulations on Chapter 18 assistance, e.g., LEAs must reimburse DOD for the support it provides unless the support "is provided in the normal course of military training or operations" or if it "results in a benefit...substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military operations or training." Pursuant to §376, DOD can only provide such assistance if it does not adversely affect "the military preparedness of the United States." Congress incorporated posse comitatus restrictions into Chapter 18 activities in §375. In 1989, Congress began to expand the military's support role. For example, Congress directed DOD, to the maximum extent practicable, to conduct military training exercises in drug-interdiction areas, and made the DOD the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Congress later provided additional authorities for military support to LEAs specifically for counterdrug purposes in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1991. Section 1004 authorized DOD to extend support in several areas to any federal, state, and local (and sometimes foreign) LEA requesting counterdrug assistance. This section has been extended regularly and is now in force through the end of FY2011. As amended, §1004 authorizes the military to: maintain, upgrade, and repair military equipment; transport federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement personnel and equipment within or outside the U.S.; establish bases for operations or training; train law enforcement personnel in counterdrug activities; detect, monitor, and communicate movements of air, sea, and surface traffic outside the U.S., and within 25 miles of the border if the detection occurred outside the U.S.; construct roads, fences, and lighting along U.S. border; provide linguists and intelligence analysis services; conduct aerial and ground reconnaissance; and establish command, control, communication, and computer networks for improved integration of law enforcement, active military, and National Guard activities. Section 1004 incorporates the posse comitatus restrictions of Chapter 18. Unlike Chapter 18, however, this law does allow support which could affect military readiness in the short-term, provided the Secretary of Defense believes the support outweighs such short-term adverse effect. The National Guard is a military force that is shared by the states and the federal government and often assists in counterdrug and counterrrorism efforts. After September 11, for example, President Bush deployed roughly 1,600 National Guard troops for six-months under Title 10 authority to support federal border officials and provide a heightened security presence. Under "Title 10 duty status," National Guard personnel operate under the control of the President, receive federal pay and benefits, and are subject to the PCA. Typically, however, the National Guard operates under the control of state and territorial Governors. In "state active duty" National Guard personnel operate under the control of their Governor, are paid according to state law, can perform activities authorized by state law, and are not subject to the restrictions of the PCA. Because border security is primarily a federal concern, some states have looked to the federal government for funding to support some of their National Guard activities. Under Title 32 of the U.S. Code, National Guard personnel generally serve a federal purpose and receive federal pay and benefits, but command and control remains with the Governor. This type of service is commonly referred to as "Title 32 duty status," and examples are discussed below. According to the Administration, the deployment of the 6,000 Guardsmen derives its authority from 32 U.S.C. §502(a), which allows the Secretary of the Army and Air Force to prescribe regulations for National Guard drill and training and §502(f), described below. Federal funding may be provided to a state for the implementation of a drug interdiction program in accordance with 32 U.S.C. §112. Under this section, the Secretary of Defense may grant funding to the Governor of a state who submits a "drug interdiction and counterdrug activities plan" that satisfies certain statutory requirements. The Secretary of Defense is charged with examining the sufficiency of the drug interdiction plan and determining whether the distribution of funds would be proper. While the emphasis is certainly on counterdrug efforts, a state plan might include some related border security and immigration-related functions that overlap with drug interdiction activities. Arizona's drug interdiction plan, for example, recognizes related border issues created by human smuggling and terrain vulnerabilities with respect to the illegal entry of aliens into the United States. By approving the State of Arizona's drug interdiction plan, the Secretary of Defense has enabled the Arizona National Guard to engage in some border security measures. Section 502(f) of Title 32 has been used to expand the operational scope of the National Guard beyond its specified duties. This provision provides that "a member of the National Guard may ... without his consent, but with the pay and allowances provided by law ... be ordered to perform training or other duty " in addition to those he is already prescribed to perform (emphasis added). This is the provision of law that was used to provide federal pay and benefits to the National Guard personnel who provided security at many of the nation's airports after September 11 and who participated in Katrina and Rita-related disaster relief operations. States, such as Arizona, have argued that the "other duty" language should be liberally applied (like it was for Hurricane Katrina and Rita) to include activities associated with border security efforts. Some question, however, whether domestic operations, in general, are a proper use of this Title 32 authority. In 2004, Congress passed another law that could arguably provide federal funding for National Guard personnel conducting border security operations under Title 32. Chapter 9 of Title 32 of the U.S. Code authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide federal funding at his discretion to a state, under the authority of the Governor of that state, for the use of their National Guard forces if there is a "necessary and appropriate" "homeland defense activity." A "homeland defense activity" is statutorily defined as "an activity undertaken for the military protection of the territory or domestic population of the United States ... from a threat or aggression against the United States." Although a deployment of National Guard troops for border security purposes could arguably be an activity "undertaken for the military protection" of a "domestic population," it is unclear whether the porous nature of the border or illegal entry of aliens is the type of "threat" or "aggression" that would be "necessary and appropriate" for National Guard troops. The State of Arizona requested federal funds for its National Guard under Chapter 9 for the performance of homeland defense-border security activities.

The military generally provides support to law enforcement and immigration authorities along the southern border. Reported escalations in criminal activity and illegal immigration, however, have prompted some lawmakers to reevaluate the extent and type of military support that occurs in the border region. On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced that up to 6,000 National Guard troops would be sent to the border to support the Border Patrol. Addressing domestic laws and activities with the military, however, might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits use of the armed forces to perform the tasks of civilian law enforcement unless explicitly authorized. There are alternative legal authorities for deploying the National Guard, and the precise scope of permitted activities and funds may vary with the authority exercised. This report will be updated as warranted.

Depending on one's point of view, new chemicals legislation in the European Union (EU) is likely to vastly improve environmental and public health protections and serve as a model for future U.S. law, or it might unnecessarily burden commercial enterprises with regulations and interfere with international trade. The subject of such conjecture is an EU law for Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) in EU commerce, which went into force June 1, 2007. This report summarizes REACH and progress in its implementation. For information about U.S. chemical law, see CRS Report RL34118, The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA): Implementation and New Challenges , by [author name scrubbed]. On June 1, 2007, the EU began to implement a new approach to the management of chemicals in EU commerce. The REACH directive simplifies and consolidates more than 40 former regulations in an effort to balance two EU goals: to protect public health and the environment from hazardous chemicals and to ensure the continuing competitiveness of European industry. Although certain chemicals are exempt entirely, and requirements for the other chemicals are being phased in over 11 years, the law generally will apply to nearly all chemicals in EU commerce, including imported chemicals, chemical mixtures, and certain articles that release chemicals to the environment. The REACH legislation is based on a proposal developed by the EU General Directorates for Enterprise and Environment, which was adopted by the European Commission in February 2001. The draft law was revised several times in response to public comments and amendments adopted by the European Parliament and Council of Ministers (which is comprised of the executive officers of EU member states). The final regulation is binding on all member states. REACH requires all chemical producers and importers of more than one metric ton (t) per year of any chemical to register the product by submitting a technical dossier of information about the properties of that chemical and its uses to a new agency created by the law, the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). The dossier also must contain information about how any risks associated with use of that chemical should be managed. Downstream users of chemicals are required to manage their risks in the manner indicated by producers. Information requirements for the dossier increase as production volume increases beyond 10 t, 100 t, and 1,000 t. Since June 1, 2008, when the ECHA began to function, registration has been required for new chemicals before they enter commerce. Companies had between one year and 18 months to pre-register existing chemicals. Pre-registration ended November 30, 2008. The first registration deadline for existing chemicals was on November 30, 2010, and applied only to "substances of very high concern," or substances produced in volumes greater than 1,000 t annually or greater than 100 t annually if they are very toxic to aquatic life. A total of 4,632 substances reportedly were registered by the first deadline. The second registration deadline for existing chemicals is May 31, 2013, and applies to substances produced in the 100 to 1,000 t range annually. A total of 2,998 substances reportedly were registered by the second deadline. The final deadline is May 31, 2018, by which point all substances produced or imported in small quantities, between 1 and 100 t annually, must be registered. Member states (i.e., the nations of the EU) evaluate the dossiers based on guidelines provided by the ECHA, and may require additional data, if such data are needed to assess health and environmental effects of potential chemical exposure. Member states also may determine that action should be taken to authorize or restrict particular chemical uses. The list of substances currently under evaluation is published and updated in the REACH Community Rolling Action Plan (CoRAP). On February 29, 2012, ECHA announced that it had used the information submitted in the first round of data collection for substances produced in high volumes to identify 90 high-priority substances for risk evaluation by Member States. These will be the first chemicals subject to the evaluation stage of REACH, because ECHA suspects that use of these substances might pose a risk to human health or the environment. The evaluations will aim to clarify such risks to determine whether additional data should be collected and whether authorizations or restrictions may be necessary. On March 20, 2013, ECHA published an update to the CoRAP stating that it will evaluate 115 substances in the next two years. Fifty-three substances were transferred from the 90 high-priority substances previously identified. Producers of "substances of very high concern" may be required to apply for authorization of each particular use, demonstrate that the risks can be adequately controlled (e.g., through labeling or worker training), and justify such uses by submitting additional information to authorities. Companies will not be allowed to manufacture, import, or use a chemical after a specified date unless they have obtained an authorization for a use. In addition, producers will be required to submit an analysis of possible substitutes, a "substitution plan" if substitutes are available, or a research and development plan if no suitable substitute exists. As of October 23, 2013, 22 substances have been identified as substances of very high concern (SVHC) that are effectively banned from use in the EU unless such use is authorized under the law. In all, ECHA has identified 144 chemicals or chemical groups as SVHC candidates for authorization, with many more chemicals being evaluated for this designation, including approximately 1,350 chemicals known or likely to be carcinogens, mutagens, or chemicals toxic to reproductive systems; persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic chemicals (PBTs); or very persistent and very bioaccumulative chemicals (vPvBs). According to the law, no use of PBTs or vPvBs is to be authorized unless there is no suitable alternative, and the socioeconomic benefits of the use outweigh the risks. If a chemical use presents unacceptable risks, that chemical use may be restricted. High-production-volume chemicals routinely will be subject to the authorization process. The authorization and restriction processes also may be applied to chemicals produced or imported in volumes less than 1 t. The U.S. government was actively engaged throughout the development of REACH. The Bush Administration expressed concerns about its trade implications for U.S.-produced chemicals. Specific concerns included increased costs of and timelines for testing chemicals exported to the EU; placement of responsibility on businesses (as opposed to governments or consumers) to generate data, assess risks, and demonstrate the safety of chemicals; possible inconsistency with international rules for trade adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO); and the effect of the legislation on efforts to improve the coherence of chemical regulatory approaches among countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Some U.S. chemical industry representatives believe that REACH is "impractical." Industry has expressed objections to the proposed list of "high concern" chemicals, some of which are essential building blocks for the manufacture of other chemicals. The EU chemical industry is concerned about the cost of compliance, and what it might mean to innovation and international competitiveness. Some national governments of the EU also are concerned about the impact of REACH on their economies and employment, especially if REACH leads to companies relocating outside the EU (i.e., no longer producing or selling products in the EU). The EU has estimated that about 12% of chemicals in commerce will be withdrawn by chemical producers, because continued production under REACH will be costly and distribution not sufficiently profitable to recoup costs. In cases where no substitute is available, loss of a production source might leave some end users without the chemicals they need. Many environmental, health, and U.S. and EU labor organizations strongly supported the original proposal for REACH, but some are less enthusiastic about the final regulation, which retains its basic purpose and shape but exempts some chemicals from requirements. Nevertheless, these groups agree that REACH addressed some of what they saw as flaws in older EU laws covering chemicals. For example, REACH reduces and coordinates EU regulatory requirements for providing health and safety information about chemicals new to the EU market (as well as the number of new chemicals subject to such requirements), while at the same time increasing collection of such information for chemicals already in the EU market, thus potentially removing disincentives to innovation and encouraging substitution of less toxic for more toxic chemicals in various chemical applications. In addition, to address concerns about the slow pace of chemical risk assessment and management by the EU government, REACH shifts responsibility for assessing and managing the safety of chemicals away from the government and onto chemical manufacturers, importers, and users. Some public interest groups are urging U.S. legislators to adopt a similar legislative approach. For more discussion of the perceived flaws of U.S. law, see CRS Report RL34118, The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA): Implementation and New Challenges , by [author name scrubbed].

On June 1, 2007, the European Union (EU) began to implement a new law governing chemicals in EU commerce: Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). It is intended to protect human health and the environment from hazardous chemicals while at the same time protecting the competitiveness of European industry. REACH evolved over eight years and reflects compromises reached among EU stakeholders. The final regulation reduces and coordinates EU regulatory requirements for chemicals new to the EU market and increases collection of such information for chemicals already in the EU market, thus potentially removing disincentives to innovation that existed under the former law. It also shifts responsibility for safety assessments from government to industry and encourages substitution of less toxic for more toxic chemicals in various chemical applications. Some U.S. chemical industry representatives believe that REACH is "impractical," in part due to the large number of chemicals and difficulties of identifying end uses of chemicals in many products. In contrast, some public-interest groups are urging U.S. legislators to adopt a similar legislative approach.

When the House considers legislation, one of the last steps it takes is to consider a motion to recommit. The motion to recommit represents the last chance of the House to affect a measure. In practice, that means either to offer amendatory language or to send the bill back to committee. In practice, the motion to recommit, as authorized by Rule XIX, is offered after the previous question has been ordered on passage. For these motions, the Speaker affords priority in recognition to those opposed to the measure and gives preference among those opposed to a minority party Member, which has resulted in the motion being dubbed, "the minority's motion." Among minority opponents, priority to offer the motion is given first to the minority leader or his or her designee and then to Members from the reporting committee in order of their committee seniority. Only one proper motion to recommit is in order. If a motion to recommit is ruled out of order, a second, proper motion to recommit may be offered. A motion to recommit may be amended (although it is uncommon in practice) but only if the previous question has not yet been ordered on the motion. A motion to recommit offered after the previous question has been ordered on the bill may not be tabled. House rules specifically prohibit the House Committee on Rules from reporting a special rule that would prevent the motion to recommit from being offered on initial passage of a bill or joint resolution. House rules also guarantee that the motion to recommit may include instructions that include an amendment otherwise in order if offered by the minority leader or his or her designee. This guarantee does not apply to consideration of a Senate bill for which the text of a House-passed measure has been substituted, because the motion would have been protected during initial consideration of the House-passed measure. Motions to recommit are characterized as being of two types. The first type, referred to as a "simple" or "straight" motion to recommit, includes no instructions. If adopted by the House, it returns the underlying measure to committee. When a "straight" motion to recommit is offered, the clerk will report it in the following form: Mr. Obey of Wisconsin moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 3010 to the Committee on Appropriations. The other type of motion to recommit, offered much more frequently, includes instructions and must contain language directing that the legislation be reported "forthwith," meaning that if the House adopts such a motion, the measure remains on the House floor, and the committee chair (or designee) immediately rises and reports the bill back to the House with any amendment(s) contained in the instructions of the recommittal motion. The House votes on agreeing to the amendment(s) before moving to final passage of the bill as it may have been amended. Typically, if the motion to recommit has been agreed to, the amendment in the instructions is agreed to by voice vote. However, amendment(s) in the instructions are subject to division of the question if it consists of two or more separable substantive propositions. When a motion to recommit with instructions is offered, the clerk will report it in the following form: Mr. Scott of Virginia moves to recommit the bill H.R. 10 to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith with the following amendment: Add at the end of section 6 the following new subsection:(f) Requiring Protection of Students and Applicants Under Civil Rights Laws.—Section 3008 (sec. 38-1853.08, D.C. Official Code) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: "(i) Requiring Protection of Students and Applicants Under Civil Rights Laws.—In addition to meeting the requirements of subsection (a), an eligible entity or a school may not participate in the opportunity scholarship program under this Act unless the eligible entity or school certifies to the Secretary that the eligible entity or school will provide each student who applies for or receives an opportunity scholarship under this Act with all of the applicable protections available under each of the following laws:" (1) Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000c et seq.). Both types of motions to recommit are debatable for 10 minutes. The majority floor manager of a bill or joint resolution may ask that debate time be extended to one hour. In either case, debate time is equally divided between the Member making the motion and a Member opposing it. Instructions in a motion to recommit generally may not propose to do that which may not be done by amendment under the rules of the House. For example, instructions that do any of the following would be out of order: Propose an amendment that is not germane to the measure. Amend or eliminate an amendment already adopted by the House, unless permitted by a special rule. Propose an amendment in violation of Rule XXI clause 2, 4, or 5. Propose an amendment in violation of Rule XXI, clause 10, "the CUTGO rule." Authorize a committee to report at any time or direct a committee to report by a date certain. A motion to recommit may have several procedural effects. First, it allows the minority to offer and obtain a vote on policy language of their design, an opportunity that might otherwise be unavailable if the measure is being considered under the terms of a special rule that restricts or prevents the offering of amendments. Further, a motion to recommit grants the minority the last opportunity to amend legislation before final passage. The motion to recommit even allows the offering of an amendment previously rejected by the House during consideration in Committee of the Whole. House approval of a "straight" motion to recommit could have the effect of sending the bill back to the committee from which it was reported for further work on the measure. If the underlying legislation was not first reported by the committee of jurisdiction before coming to the floor—either because it was never referred to committee or because the committee was discharged from further consideration of the bill—the minority might try to use the motion as a way to put the legislation before the committee for its consideration. A motion to recommit can also send a measure to a committee to which the bill had not been originally referred. This kind of action could be tied to the creation of an ad hoc committee, such as in the following example: Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin moves to commit the resolution ( H.Res. 6 ) to a select committee composed of the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader with instructions to report back the same to the House forthwith with only the following amendment. An ad hoc committee like this has no permanence and is not required to meet. Such motions to commit are frequently used in conjunction with the House rules package on the opening day of Congress, before standing committees have been established. Additionally, the motion to recommit might seek to send the bill to a committee to which it was not referred due to jurisdictional issues. For example, in 1975, a "straight" motion to recommit attempted to send a bill which had been reported by the Committee on Ways and Means, not only to that committee, but also to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. This motion to recommit appeared to suggest that the goal of the underlying legislation might be achieved in additional ways under the jurisdiction of this second panel. "Straight" motions to recommit could also create a situation that would effectively dispose of the underlying measure, since once the measure is recommitted, a committee is not obligated to take further action. It could be argued that it would be unlikely for a committee to report back a measure that the House has voted to remove from the floor. Debate in the House on a "straight" motion to recommit may, however, provide a committee with a non-binding understanding of what should be done to improve the measure. A committee's decision whether to act on a recommitted measure might also be influenced by House and committee rules. For instance, a Speaker pro tempore observed in response to a parliamentary inquiry, "The Chair cannot say what in the rules of a committee might constrain the timing of any action it might take. Neither can the Chair render an advisory opinion whether points of order available under the rules of the House might preclude further proceedings on the floor." As described below, the motion to recommit underwent fundamental changes in 1909 with the stated purpose of giving the minority the right "to have a vote upon its position upon great public questions." This seems to imply that the motion was intended to have not only procedural effects but also political ones, allowing Members to go on record as supporting or opposing a specific policy, an opportunity that may be important for demonstrating their policy preference to constituents that might not otherwise occur in the absence of the motion. Besides providing a policy vote, the motion to recommit can have additional political effects. A motion to recommit may combine several proposed amendments, providing the opportunity to package together a set of views as a way to create a comprehensive public record to emphasize the minority party's differences from the platform of the majority. As described above, using a "straight" motion to recommit without instructions can have the effect of delaying or even "killing" a measure, since a committee to which the measure is recommitted would never be required to act. Motions to recommit may also have the effect of providing an outlet for the minority to express its discontent with restrictions related to the openness or fairness of the legislative process. For example, a minority dissatisfied with the number of amendments its Members have been allowed to offer in the Committee of the Whole may make use of their right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions as a means for expressing their opposition to the policies of the majority party. The motion to recommit has its antecedents in the British Parliament and has existed since the First Congress. Prior to 1909, however, it operated differently than it does today, and priority in recognition for the offering of the motion to recommit was not reserved for a Member opposed to the measure. Instead, as former Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon remarked: The object of this provision [for a motion to recommit] was, as the Chair has always understood, that the motion should be made by one friendly to the bill. Often, the majority floor manager of a bill would make a "straight" motion to recommit with the expectation that it would be defeated. Since only one proper motion to recommit is in order, this would preclude anyone else from trying to use the motion in order to defeat or amend the measure. For most of the history of the House, the purpose of the motion to recommit more closely resembled the current usage of the motion to reconsider. Recommittal provided Members with a final opportunity to correct errors within the measure, and in 1891, the Speaker ruled that a bill could be recommitted "forthwith," meaning the committee chair would report the amendments in the motion at once without the bill having to be sent back to committee. The use of the motion to recommit changed substantially in 1909 as a result of changes made in House procedures championed largely by a coalition of Democrats and Progressive Republicans who opposed the autocratic rule of Speaker Cannon. During debate on the adoption of the rules package for the 61 st Congress (1909-1910), the previous question was defeated, allowing Representative John Fitzgerald to propose a set of rules changes, one of which guaranteed priority in recognition to offer the motion to recommit to a Member opposed to the bill. This rules change was offered with the stated purpose of giving the minority the right "to have a vote upon its position upon great public questions." Further, the Fitzgerald amendment prohibited the Rules Committee from reporting any special rule that would prevent the offering of a motion to recommit. This amended rules package passed 211-173. It was not until 1932, however, that precedent definitively established giving priority in recognition to offer the motion to a minority party Member opposed to the bill. This solidified the motion as a "minority right." At the beginning of the 92 nd Congress (1971-1972), the language now contained in House Rule XIX, clause 2(b), was added to the standing rules, allowing 10 minutes of debate on a motion to recommit with instructions, equally divided between a proponent and an opponent. Also in the 92 nd Congress, a new rule made recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole in order for the first time, causing some to question whether the motion to recommit had become redundant or unnecessary. An earlier ruling by the Speaker pro tempore noted that in the Committee of the Whole, "there is no roll-call vote, so that the only opportunity that a minority may have to go on record is by means of a motion to recommit in the House." Because the rules now allowed for recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole, some argued that the motion's main purpose could be achieved in other ways, making the motion to recommit "much less necessary." The right of the minority to offer a motion to recommit, however, remained intact, even in light of the expanded rules on voting. Following the successful adoption of a motion to recommit in 1984 that included the Crime Bill as amendatory instructions, the House decided that 10 minutes of debate might not always be sufficient, since these motions had the potential of adding substantial portions of legislation to an underlying measure. At the start of the 99 th Congress (1985-1986), the current language in clause 2(c) of the rule was added, allowing the majority floor manager to demand that debate time on the motion be extended to one hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent. To date, the one-hour extension has been demanded only once. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Rules Committee issued what the minority perceived to be an increased number of special rules restricting both the amending process as well as the motion to recommit. In 1995, the House added language now in Rule XII, clause 6(c), prohibiting the Rules Committee from reporting a special rule that would prevent the offering of a motion to recommit with instructions, thereby preventing the Rules Committee from restricting the scope or content of the motion to recommit. During the 110 th Congress (2007-2008), there was a significant increase in motions to recommit offered, specifically motions to recommit with instructions that did not include the term forthwith , referred to as motions to recommit with "non-forthwith" instructions (or sometimes referred to as "promptly" motions). If adopted, a motion to recommit with "non-forthwith" instructions would have returned the bill to the specified committee whose eventual report, if any, would not have been immediately or automatically before the House. Motions to recommit with "non-forthwith" instructions sometimes had the effect of creating a difficult political choice for Members who supported both the underlying measure and the amendment contained in the motion to recommit. Some Members argued that motions to recommit with "non-forthwith" instructions were designed to trap majority party Members reluctant to vote against the motion's amendment, forcing them into a "lose-lose" situation. Also, it was argued that the use of motions to recommit with "non-forthwith" instructions including specific policy amendments were not necessary because the motion could usually be offered "forthwith," which if successful would have immediately incorporated the motion's amendments. These arguments led the House to amend its rules. The rules adopted by the House at the beginning of the 111 th Congress (2009-2010) added a requirement that any instructions must be in the form of a direction to report an amendment or amendments back to the House "forthwith." The rules package of the 111 th Congress further altered the rules surrounding the motion to recommit by making "straight" motions to recommit debatable. Prior to this, only motions to recommit with instructions had been debatable. These changes are still in effect.

The motion to recommit provides a final opportunity for the House to affect a measure before passage, either by amending the measure or sending it back to committee. The motion to recommit is often referred to as "the minority's motion," because preference in recognition for offering a motion to recommit is given to a member of the minority party who is opposed to the bill. The stated purpose of giving the minority party this right was to allow them to "have a vote upon its position upon great public questions." House rules protect this minority right, as it is not in order for the House Committee on Rules to report a special rule that would preclude offering a motion to recommit a bill or joint resolution prior to its initial passage. Motions to recommit are of two types: "straight" motions and motions that include instructions. A Member offering a "straight" motion to recommit seeks to send the measure to committee with no requirement for further consideration by the House. A Member offering a motion to recommit with instructions seeks to immediately amend the underlying bill on the House floor. A motion to recommit may have various procedural effects, including amending an underlying measure, sending it to one or more committees, providing additional time for its consideration, or potentially disposing of the legislation. Due to its inclusion of policy language, the motion to recommit might also have political effects, such as allowing Members to go on record as supporting or opposing a specific policy and creating a comprehensive public record to emphasize the minority party's differences from the platform of the majority. This report provides an overview of House rules and precedents governing the motion to recommit and describes procedural and political effects of the motion. This report will be updated to reflect any changes in House rules governing the usage of the motion to recommit.

In the 110 th Congress, Members have introduced numerous bills that would directly or indirectly address climate change. This report describes and compares bills that directly address climate change, as opposed to those that primarily address other issues (e.g., energy efficiency and conservation) but could have ancillary impacts on climate. In some cases, it is difficult to draw a line between direct and indirect climate change bills, because a specific bill or action may seek to achieve multiple objectives. This report focuses on legislative actions—including comprehensive bills with individual climate change titles or sections—that explicitly address climate change issues. These bills fall into six major categories: (1) research on the causes and effects of climate change and on methods to measure and predict climate change; (2) deployment of emission-reducing technologies in the United States or other countries; (3) requirements for U.S. participation in international climate agreements; (4) investments in systems to adapt to changes in climate; (5) establishment of greenhouse gas (GHG) monitoring systems as a basis for research or for any potential reduction program; and (6) implementation of mandatory GHG emission reduction programs. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and several bills address more than one of the above categories. There has been considerable interest in climate change issues in the 110 th Congress. As of the date of this report, Members have introduced more than 100 bills that would directly address climate change issues. Congress has enacted six legislation proposals that address climate change to some degree: P.L. 110-140 : The President signed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 December 19, 2007. Among other provisions, some of which indirectly address GHG emissions, this act amends the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to expand the carbon capture research and development program. It also directs the Department of the Interior to conduct a national assessment of geologic storage capacity for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), and instructs the Department of Energy to implement a program to demonstrate technologies for the large-scale capture of CO 2 from industrial sources of CO 2 . In addition, the act establishes within the Department of Transportation an Office of Climate Change and the Environment to coordinate research and implement strategies to address transportation issues associated with climate change. P.L. 110-161 : The President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 into law December 26, 2007. Among other provisions, this statute directs EPA to promulgate regulations that require mandatory reporting of GHG emissions "above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy." The act directs EPA to develop the proposed rule by September 2008 and the final rule by June 2009. In addition, the act instructs NOAA to work with the National Academy of Sciences to establish a Climate Change Study Committee that will study climate change issues and make recommendations regarding climate change mitigation strategies. P.L. 110-181 : On January 28, 2008, the President signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. In addition to many non-climate related provisions, the act directs the Department of Defense to assess the risks of projected climate change to the department's facilities, capabilities, and missions. P.L. 110-229 : On May 8, 2008, the President signed the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008. Among other provisions, the act requires the Secretary of Energy, when reviewing research and development activities for possible inclusion in the steel research and development initiative, to expand the plan in order to consider among steel project priorities the development of technologies that reduce GHG emissions. P.L. 110-246 : On June 18, 2008, Congress enacted (overriding the President's veto) the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act. Among many other provisions, the act (Section 2709) directs the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish technical guidelines to "measure the environmental services benefits from conservation and land management activities in order to facilitate the participation of farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners in emerging environmental services markets." USDA is to give priority to carbon markets. P.L. 110-343 : On October 3, 2008, the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Among many other provisions, the legislation provides a tax credit for select (geologic) carbon sequestration activities. In addition, the act directs the Department of Treasury to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to "undertake a comprehensive review of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to identify the types of and specific tax provisions that have the largest effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions and to estimate the magnitude of those effects." NAS is to report its findings to Congress by October 3, 2010. In addition to enacted legislation, the House and Senate have passed several bills. Numerous bills have been reported out of committees. These bills address a range of climate change topics. These topics are discussed briefly below. Appendix A categorizes the bills and enacted legislation by the topics discussed below. Appendix B provides a brief summary of each bill's provisions and status in the legislative process. Global climate change is a complex issue. While most scientists agree that the climate is changing in response to GHG emissions, uncertainties concerning the causes and effects of climate change remain and are a continuing subject of extensive scientific research. These uncertainties include the potential effects on natural systems, as well as effects on social and political systems. Further, research is ongoing regarding technologies that improve efficiency, reduce fossil fuel consumption, and capture and store carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. One approach to addressing climate change is to promote the deployment and diffusion of technologies to reduce GHG emissions, such as carbon capture and storage (or sequestration). Within the legislative proposals, there are different methods of promoting technology deployment. One deployment strategy may involve tax incentives for investment in technologies to improve efficiency and/or lower emissions. Other deployment strategies would provide grants, loans, and other incentives for technology transfer to developing countries. In the 110 th Congress, some bills deal solely with technology deployment through tax incentives for lower-carbon technology or grants to develop and deploy carbon capture and sequestration, or through requirements that the federal government use technology with lower emissions. Other bills that create mandatory GHG reduction programs also include technology deployment as one component. The United States ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Five years later, the United States signed the convention's Kyoto Protocol, but it was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. In 2001, President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol and withdrew the United States from subsequent negotiations. Since that time, the United States has entered into other cooperative agreements, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. This partnership focuses on voluntary action by member states to promote cleaner technology and related goals. However, U.S. participation in discussions over binding agreements has been limited. Some critics of GHG regulation argue that the effects on global GHG concentrations—and consequently the effects on climate—from any reduction scheme will be limited. Some therefore contend that investment should focus on preparing communities and systems to adapt to the effects of a changing climate. This notion is shared by some proponents of GHG regulation, who argue that because of earlier greenhouse gas emissions, some level of warming will occur regardless of mitigation activity. Those stakeholders support adaptation initiatives in concert with mitigation efforts. Pursuant to the UNFCCC, the United States publishes annual reports on its GHG emissions. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports this information using various techniques (e.g., fuel analysis for CO 2 ). The 2005 emissions estimates indicate that the three dominant sources of GHG emissions are electricity generation (33%), transportation (28%), and industry (19%). At the national level, the 1990 Clean Air Act requires most electric utilities to report their GHG emissions, but there is no overall national GHG reporting requirement. However, some states also gather data through voluntary registries or mandatory GHG emissions reporting mechanisms. The United States has no federal GHG reduction requirements, although there have been proposals to require such reductions. These proposals include "command and control" regulations and market-based techniques to limit emissions. Market-based programs typically take as their model the Clean Air Act's acid rain program, which employs a cap-and-trade design to control several air pollutants. Cap-and-trade systems set strict limits on specific emissions from a particular group of sources. Sources may reduce their own emissions or purchase credits (i.e., trade) from other sources that have reduced emissions below their individual allotment. This flexibility in who makes reductions can lead to lower costs. In an efficient market, entities that face relatively low emission-reduction costs would have an incentive to achieve extra emission reductions, because these additional reductions could be sold to entities that face higher emission-reduction costs. An entity facing higher costs could purchase allowances that would allow it to emit more than its initial emissions allotment. Total U.S. emissions may decrease or increase, depending on the entities covered, the GHGs controlled, and the emissions trading schemes. In the 110 th Congress, some bills cover just the electric utility sector, while others cover most or all emissions throughout the economy. Another market-based option is to establish a "carbon tax"—a direct tax on GHG emissions or on the fuels that generate emissions when combusted. To the extent that emissions reductions can be achieved at costs lower than the tax rate, those reductions will be undertaken; if emissions reductions are more expensive, covered entities would opt to pay the tax. In this way, there is an upper limit to the cost of the control program. Members have introduced several bills in the 110 th Congress that would control emissions from only the electric utility sector. The rationale for such a policy is that electricity generation emits the highest percentage of GHGs by sector, and the number of covered sources would be relatively small compared to other sectors (e.g., transportation). Moreover, power plants have experience with reporting (if not reducing) their CO 2 emissions under the Clean Air Act. Sector-specific bills generally fall into two categories: (1) bills that would control only GHGs and (2) bills that would control both GHGs and other pollutants such as mercury, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. This latter category of bills is generally referred to as "multi-pollutant" legislation. A broader approach is to require emission reductions from multiple economic sectors. Several bills in the 110 th Congress would apply to most or all U.S. GHG emissions. These bills are often described as an "economy-wide" GHG reduction approach. These bills vary in their coverage: some bills cover the most high-emitting sectors (e.g., electricity generation, industry, and transportation) while excluding other sectors (e.g., residential and commercial); other bills grant EPA broad authority to establish regulations to reduce the most emissions at the lowest cost. Appendix A. Major Focus Areas of Climate Change Bills and Enacted Legislation in the 110 th Congress Appendix B. Key Provisions of Climate Change Legislation in the 110 th  Congress

Congressional interest in climate change legislation has grown in recent years. In the 110th Congress, Members have introduced numerous bills that directly address various aspects of climate change. These bills cover a wide spectrum, ranging from climate change research to comprehensive greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions cap-and-trade programs. As of the date of this report, Congress has enacted six broader pieces of legislation that—among many other non-climate-related provisions—address climate change in some fashion: P.L. 110-140 expands the carbon capture research and development program, requires a national assessment of geologic storage capacity for CO2, and supports technologies for the large-scale capture of CO2 from industrial sources. The act also establishes an Office of Climate Change and the Environment to coordinate research and implement strategies to address climate change-related transportation issues. P.L. 110-161 directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop regulations that establish a mandatory GHG reporting program that applies "above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy." P.L. 110-181 directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to assess the risks of projected climate change to the department's facilities, capabilities, and missions. P.L. 110-229 requires the Secretary of Energy, when reviewing research and development activities for possible inclusion in the steel research and development initiative, to expand the plan in order to consider among steel project priorities the development of technologies that reduce GHG emissions. P.L. 110-246 directs the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish technical guidelines to "measure the environmental services benefits from conservation and land management activities in order to facilitate the participation of farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners in emerging environmental services markets." USDA is to give priority to carbon markets. P.L. 110-343 provides a tax credit for select (geologic) carbon sequestration activities. In addition, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is "to identify the types of and specific tax provisions that have the largest effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions and to estimate the magnitude of those effects." NAS is to report its findings to Congress by October 3, 2010. This report briefly discusses the basic concepts on which climate change bills are based, and compares major provisions of the bills in each of the following categories: climate change research; emissions reduction technologies; U.S. actions pursuant to international emission reduction agreements; adaptation to the effects of climate change; GHG reporting and registration; and GHG emissions reduction programs.

The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) was established by the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103-82 ). Operating as an independent federal agency, the CNCS oversees all national and community service programs authorized by the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (NCSA) and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 (DVSA). The NCSA and DVSA were last reauthorized by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act ( P.L. 111-13 ). Although authorization of appropriations under the Serve America Act expired in FY2014, NCSA and DVSA programs have continued to receive funding through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). CNCS programs are funded through the end of FY2018 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). The final enacted appropriations law for FY2018 included $1.064 billion for CNCS. The overall FY2018 funding level for CNCS is 3% above the FY2017 level of $1.030 billion. This report provides a summary of each NCSA and DVSA program and compares funding under Labor-HHS-ED in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ); and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). The purpose of the NCSA is to address unmet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs and to renew an ethic of civil responsibility and community spirit in the United States by encouraging citizens to participate in national service programs. The NCSA was enacted in 1990 as P.L. 101-610 and last reauthorized in 2011 by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act ( P.L. 111-13 ). NCSA programs include AmeriCorps State and National Grants, the National Service Trust, the National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC), and Learn and Serve America (LSA). See Table A-1 for NCSA funding information. Program Focus : Created in 1993, programs under AmeriCorps State and National Grants identify and address critical community needs, including tutoring and mentoring disadvantaged youth, managing or operating after-school programs, helping communities respond to disasters, improving health services, building affordable housing, and cleaning parks and streams. Grants include formula grants to states and territories, and competitive grants to states, territories, Indian tribes, and national nonprofit organizations. Volunteer Eligibility : Individuals aged 17 and older. Amount of Volunteer Service : Full-time or part-time for a 9- to 12-month period. Volunteer Benefits : Some full-time AmeriCorps members receive a living allowance, health coverage, and child care for those who qualify. Participants in AmeriCorps may receive educational awards for their service through the National Service Trust (see the following section of this report). AmeriCorps members can also obtain loan forbearance (i.e., postponement) in the repayment of their qualified student loans while participating in these programs and have the interest on their accrued loans paid from the trust once they earn an educational award. Administrative Entity : Each state and territory governor appoints members of a service commission to manage, monitor, and administer annual grant applications for the state. CNCS reviews the state commission formula package and makes the awards. For multistate or national awards, grantees are selected competitively by the CNCS headquarters office. The National Service Trust, a special account in the U.S. Treasury, provides educational awards for participants in AmeriCorps Grants, NCCC, and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). An individual may not receive more than an amount equal to the aggregate value of two awards for full-time service. The educational award for full-time service is equal to the maximum amount of a Pell Grant in effect at the beginning of the federal fiscal year in which the Corporation approves the national service position. AmeriCorps members serving in programs funded in FY2018 will receive an education award of up to $5,920, which is the Pell Grant maximum in the year the positions were approved. Prorated awards are also made for other terms of service, such as half-time (see Table 1 ). AmeriCorps members aged 55 or older at the beginning of a term of service may transfer the education award to a child, grandchild, or foster child. AmeriCorps State and National participants can serve a maximum of four terms of service. Full-time, half-time, reduced half-time, quarter time, and minimum time terms of service each count as one term of service. In addition to education awards, the National Service Trust provides interest payments on qualified student loans to recipients of AmeriCorps Grants and participants in NCCC or VISTA who have obtained forbearance (postponement of loan repayment). Program Focus : NCCC is a full-time residential program that focuses on short-term projects that meet national and community needs related to disaster relief, infrastructure improvement, environment and energy conservation, environmental stewardship, and urban and rural development. Volunteer Eligibility : Individuals aged 18 to 24. By statute (42 U.S.C.S. §12613(c)), the Corporation is required to take steps to increase the percentage of program participants who are disadvantaged to 50% of all participants. Amount of Volunteer Service : Participants can serve up to two years full time. Full-time service is defined as 10 months each year. Volunteer Benefits : NCCC participants may receive a living allowance, room and board, limited medical benefits, and an educational award through the National Service Trust. Administrative Entity : NCCC programs are administered by the CNCS. CNCS continues to have broad authority to fund a range of activities as authorized by Subtitle I-H, Investment for Quality and Innovation. The Serve America Act established the following programs. Social Innovation Fund (SIF). The Social Innovation Fund leverages federal investments to increase state, local, business, and philanthropic resources to replicate and expand proven solutions and invest in the support of innovation for community challenges. P.L. 115-141 does not include funding for the Social Innovation Fund. Volunteer Generation Fund. The Volunteer Generation Fund awards competitive grants to state commissions and nonprofit organizations to develop and support community-based entities that recruit, manage, or support volunteers. Innovation, Demonstration, and Call to Service. The corporation supports innovative initiatives and demonstration programs, such as the Call To Service, which would engage Americans in community needs, such as the Martin Luther King Jr. National Day of Service and the September 11 th National Day of Service and Remembrance. Since 1990, NCSA has authorized community service programs benefitting students and communities through "service-learning," which integrates community service projects with classroom learning. This program was last funded in FY2010 by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ). The DVSA was enacted in 1973 as P.L. 93-113 . Like the NCSA, it was last reauthorized in 2011 by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act ( P.L. 111-13 ). The purpose of DVSA is to foster and expand voluntary citizen service throughout the nation. DVSA programs are designed to help the poor, the disadvantaged, the vulnerable, and the elderly. Administered by the CNCS, DVSA programs include VISTA and the National Senior Volunteer Corps. See Table A-1 for DVSA funding information. Program Focus : The VISTA program encourages Americans to participate in community service in an effort to eliminate poverty. Volunteer Eligibility : Individuals aged 18 and older. Amount of Volunteer Service : VISTA members serve full time for up to five years. Volunteer Benefits: VISTA members may receive a living allowance, student-loan forbearance, health coverage, relocation costs, training, and child care assistance. VISTA members have the option of receiving an educational award, which is equivalent to the educational awards earned by AmeriCorps or NCCC members, or they may choose to receive an end-of-service lump sum stipend of $1,500 instead. Like NCCC members, VISTA members receive an educational award based on the Pell Grant. Full-time, half-time, reduced half-time, quarter time, and minimum time terms of service each count as one term of service. Administrative Entity : CNCS state offices. The National Senior Service Corps consists of three programs, summarized below: the Retired Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP), the Foster Grandparent Program (FGP), and the Senior Companion Program (SCP). Program Focus : Volunteers in RSVP may play community service roles in education, health and nutrition services, community and economic development, and other areas of human need. Volunteer Eligibility : Individuals aged 55 and older. Amount of Volunteer Service : Participants can contribute up to 40 hours each week. Volunteer Benefits : The RSVP offers no direct benefits (e.g., stipends or educational awards), with the exception of mileage reimbursement and insurance coverage during assignments. Administrative Entity : CNCS state offices. Program Focus : FGP participants support children with exceptional needs by providing aid and services. FGP participants mentor children and teenagers, teach model parenting skills, and help care for premature infants and children with disabilities. Volunteer Eligibility : Individuals must be 55 or older to participate in FGP and meet income eligibility requirements to receive a stipend. Amount of Volunteer Service : Volunteer schedules, which range from 15 to 40 hours each week, average 20 hours per week. Volunteer Benefits : Income eligible participants may receive a tax-free hourly stipend. Participants may also receive mileage reimbursements and accident, liability, and automobile insurance coverage during assignments. Administrative Entity : CNCS state offices. Program Focus : SCP gives older adults the opportunity to assist homebound elderly individuals to remain in their own homes and to enable institutionalized elderly individuals to return to home care settings. Volunteer Eligibility : Individuals must be 55 or older to participate in SCP and meet income eligibility requirements to receive a stipend. Amount of Volunteer Service : Volunteer schedules, which range from 15 to 40 hours each week, average 20 hours per week. Volunteer Benefits : Participants may receive a stipend. Participants may also receive mileage reimbursements and accident, liability, and automobile insurance coverage during assignments. Administrative Entity : CNCS state offices.

The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) is an independent federal agency that administers the programs authorized by two statutes: the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (NCSA; P.L. 101-610), as amended, and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 (DVSA; P.L. 93-113), as amended. NCSA and DVSA programs were most recently reauthorized by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act (P.L. 111-13). This report describes programs authorized by these laws and compares CNCS funding for FY2015, FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018. The NCSA is designed to meet unmet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs and to renew an ethic of civic responsibility by encouraging citizens to participate in national service programs. The major programs authorized by NCSA include AmeriCorps State and National Grants and the National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC). The NCSA also authorizes the National Service Trust, which funds educational awards for community service participants. A central purpose of the DVSA, which authorizes the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program and the National Senior Volunteer Corps, is to foster and expand voluntary service in communities while helping the vulnerable, the disadvantaged, the elderly, and the poor. The DVSA also authorizes the National Senior Volunteer Corps, which includes three programs for senior citizens: the Foster Grandparent Program, the Senior Companion Program, and the Retired and Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP). Appropriations for the DVSA and the NCSA programs are made annually through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). CNCS programs are funded through FY2018 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141). The FY2018 appropriations amount for CNCS is $1.064 billion, which is $34 million more than the FY2017 amount of $1.030 billion. This report will be updated as warranted by legislative developments.

The average spot market price for West Texas Intermediate (WTI), a reference grade of U.S. crude oil, was up 9.5% in 2007 compared to 2006, while the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) futures price for WTI approached $100 per barrel (p/b) in December 2007. Refinery capacity utilization rates approached 90% or more for much of the year, while oil supply disruptions from Nigeria, Venezuela, and the Persian Gulf remained both a threat and a sometime reality. As the strength of product demand began to weaken in the latter stages of the year, responding to high petroleum product prices as well as a possible slow down of economic growth, refinery margins began to narrow, suggesting that the companies were less able to pass through the increased cost of crude oil to consumers. However, even in the face of uncertainty and weakening markets, the oil industry enjoyed record revenues and profits in 2007. In 2007, the oil industry recorded revenues of approximately $1.9 trillion, of which 78% was accounted for by the five major integrated oil companies. Profits for the industry totaled over $155 billion, 75% of which were earned by the five major oil companies, with the largest, ExxonMobil, earning over 25% of the total profit. Although the financial results for the industry were at record levels, the performance of different sectors of the industry varied, as did the performance of individual companies within those sectors, leaving some firms as relative under-performers compared to the industry leaders. This report analyzes the industry's profit performance in 2007. While recent profit levels in the oil industry are of interest to policy makers, investors, and analysts, among others, the financial results of 2007 should be put in a longer term perspective to understand the performance of the industry. For example, as recently as 2002, the financial picture in the oil industry was far different, with declining earnings in key sectors, such as refining. The oil industry historically has been cyclic, with periods of high earnings often followed by sharp declines, driven by movements in the world price of crude oil. For this reason, projections of future industry performance, based on current performance, are unlikely to be reliable. Integrated oil companies operate in both the upstream (exploration and production) and the downstream (refining and marketing) segments of the industry. Among the integrated oil companies listed in Table 1 , the five largest companies are usually identified as the major oil companies, or the super-majors. ExxonMobil is the largest such company; its profits in 2007 were over 90% of the profits earned by both of its largest international competitors, Royal Dutch Shell and BP. Revenue growth among the integrated oil companies in 2007 was driven by increases in the price of crude oil, especially in the last two quarters of the year. Even though five of the nine companies experienced a decline in oil production, and one of the nine experienced a decline in natural gas production, as shown in Table 2 , their revenues increased on average by 7.1% in 2007. With output declining, it is likely that revenue growth was based on increasing prices. Two profit rates, return on sales and return on equity, are presented in Table 1 . In a report that appears periodically, most recently after the oil companies announced their third quarter earnings in 2007, the American Petroleum Institute (API) compared the returns earned in the oil industry to other American industries. The API comparisons are based on returns on revenue. They found that the oil and natural gas industries earned 7.6 percent on revenues, compared to 5.8 percent for all U.S. manufacturing industries. Although this result implies a 31 percent margin over the returns earned by all U.S. manufacturing industries, it is less than the 9.2 percent earned by all U.S. manufacturing industries excluding the automobile and auto parts industries, that had a negative 26 percent return for the third quarter of 2007. Calculating return on revenues dilutes the effect of growing total profits of the oil industry due to higher prices and growing revenues, another standard percentage measure of profitability, return on equity, is presented in Table 1 . This measure indicates the success of the companies, and industry, in earning profit by utilizing the invested capital of the owners, i.e., the shareholders of the company. This measure is widely used by investors and financial analysts in evaluating the performance of firms seeking access to capital markets. By this measure, the integrated oil companies returned 22.7% in 2007, over twice the return on revenue. The industry leader, ExxonMobil, earned 33.4%. These rates of return are likely to assure these firms', and the industry's, position as a desirable investment as long as the price of oil remains high. Table 2 and Table 3 separate the upstream and downstream performance of the integrated oil companies in 2007. Table 1 and Table 2 show that upstream net income growth led overall corporate net income growth for most of the companies, and they earned almost 80% of their total net income from upstream activities. Oil and gas production declined for each product, almost 3% in oil, and less than one half of one percent in natural gas. Four of the five largest oil producers had declining output. In natural gas, only BP and Shell experienced declining output in 2007. Table 3 presents financial results for the downstream activities of the integrated oil companies for 2007. Net incomes declined by more than twice as much as product sales, suggesting that profit margins per barrel of crude oil refined had declined. In the fourth quarter of 2007, only ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were able to produce positive net income growth, with all the other firms showing negative net income growth, or in the case of BP, financial losses from downstream activities. Crude oil prices increased rapidly during the second half of 2007, and reached over $110 per barrel in March 2008. During this period gasoline price increases were thought by many to have lagged behind crude oil price increases. A potential weakening of the demand for gasoline in the United States was thought to be responsible for the lag. With a perception of weakening demand, passing through cost increases to consumers was not thought to be economically feasible. The result was a decline in refining margins. Table 4 presents data for 2007 for the independent oil and gas producers. Although they are large companies, with revenues of more than $10 billion in 2007 for the industry leaders, their total revenues are only about 5% of the integrated oil companies. Their net incomes, however, were approximately 15% of the net incomes of the integrated companies. Although all of the companies in this category experienced increases in revenue, six out of ten experienced negative net income growth. All of the companies, except Andarko and Newfield experienced increases in production of oil and natural gas, or both. With prices for both oil and natural gas rising late in 2007, these companies seemingly should have performed better with respect to net income growth. A possible explanation for the declining net income experienced by some companies might be the large outlays the companies made investing in unconventional oil asset exploration and development. Many of these companies are involved in shale oil work in Texas, Arkansas, and South Dakota. Valero is the leading firm among the group of independent refiners and marketers. Valero accounted for over one half of the sector's revenue, and two thirds of its net income. Valero is the largest refiner in the United States, with a total capacity of over 2.2 million barrels per day, approximately 13% of the total U.S. capacity. Independent refiners experienced the same pressure on refining margins as the integrated oil companies. The difference was that these companies produce no crude oil and therefore were not positioned to take advantage of the increases in the price of crude oil during the second half of 2007. The severity of the economic pressure on refiners in the fourth quarter of 2007 is shown in Table 6 . Although revenues for the group grew by 53.4%, net incomes declined by two thirds. Four of the seven companies in the group not only had negative growth in net income in the fourth quarter of 2007, but generated losses from business operations. Valero, the sector's leading firm, earned 53% of the revenue, but fully 97% of the earned net income. Not only was the cost of crude oil rising for the independent refiners, but relatively weaker demand conditions made it harder for the firms to quickly pass cost increases on to consumers. Valero was able to remain profitable because it was able to purchase and utilize lower cost heavy, sour crude oil at its refineries. Crude oil prices spot prices reached $110 per barrel in the first quarter of 2008. Should the price of crude oil remain at, or above, $100 per barrel for large portions of the year, the profits of oil producing firms should be high. However, the economic conditions will likely be difficult for firms that refine crude oil, but do not have their own supplies. It is likely that a greater effort will be made by refiners to adapt technologies that allow them to use heavy, sour, oil stocks. These lower quality crude oils are more readily available than high quality oils and sell at a price discount relative to the reference oils, West Texas Intermediate, for example. Another key factor in the industry's profitability is whether demand for petroleum products continues to grow in the United States and the rest of the world. U.S. gasoline demand is arguably beginning to weaken as a result of high prices. Some projections see $4 per gallon gasoline in the second and third quarters of 2008. While prices at that level might allow refiners to recover the cost of crude oil, they might also reduce demand, putting downward pressure on price. Demand for petroleum products outside the United States remains strong, and will likely remain strong as consumers in developing nations use their higher incomes to fuel additional consumption. A world-wide economic slowdown is the most likely factor that would lead to slower demand growth. The oil industry, in general, continued to generate high profits, as it has since 2004. However, it might be that the first sign of problems, in at least part of the industry, have arisen. Weakening demand for petroleum products, specifically the U.S. demand for gasoline, has put pressure on the downstream side of the industry. While demand growth, political uncertainty, the weak U.S. dollar, tight spare capacity, and other factors make it likely that the price of crude oil will remain high in 2008, the weakening U.S. economy, coupled with the demand reducing effects of higher prices, may make it more difficult to raise petroleum product prices. New capacity investments in refineries, one possible source of gasoline price relief for consumers, are likely to be slowed by the poor profit performance of the refining sector. If new capacity does not come on line the need for imported gasoline will remain a key factor in avoiding shortages in the U.S. market.

Increases in the price of crude oil that began in 2004 pushed the spot price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI), a key oil in determining market prices, to nearly $100 per barrel in the third quarter of 2007. Tight market conditions persisted through the remainder of 2007, with demand growth in China, India, and other parts of the developing world continuing. Uncertain supply related to political unrest in Nigeria, Venezuela, Iraq, and other places continued to threaten the market and contribute to a psychology that pushed up prices. The decline of the value of the U.S. dollar on world currency markets, as well as the investment strategies of financial firms on the oil futures markets, has also been identified by some as factors in the high price of oil. The profits of the five major integrated oil companies remained high in 2007, as they generally accounted for approximately 75% of both revenues and net incomes. For this group of firms, oil production led the way as the most profitable segment of the market, even though oil and gas production growth was not strong. The refining segment of the market performed relatively poorly. Independent oil and natural gas producers are small relative to the integrated oil companies, and their financial performance was weaker, with more than half of the firms reporting declines in net income. Independent refiners and marketers also experienced a difficult year that was reflected in profits in 2007. The combination of high crude oil prices that raised their costs and the inability to quickly pass cost increases on to consumers lowered refining margins, resulting in generally declining profits. The potential volatility of the world oil and financial markets, coupled with the weakness of the U.S. and other economies, makes any profit forecast for 2008 highly speculative. While continued high oil prices are likely—the price of oil reached $110 per barrel in the first quarter of 2008—the ability of the industry to pass those prices on to consumers of gasoline and other products during 2008 is uncertain due to possibly weakening demand.

A health insurance exchange has been established in every state, as required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Each exchange has two parts, a marketplace where individuals can shop for and enroll in health insurance coverage, and a small business health options program (SHOP) exchange for small employers. Some individuals are eligible to receive financial assistance for their coverage obtained through an exchange, and some small employers can obtain tax credits toward coverage purchased through a SHOP. Exchanges are not intended to supplant the private market outside of exchanges, and the ACA does not require that individuals and small businesses obtain coverage through an exchange. A state can choose to establish its own state-based exchange (SBE). If a state opts not to, or if the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) determines that the state is not in a position to administer its own exchange, then HHS will establish and administer the exchange in the state as a federally facilitated exchange (FFE). Fourteen states and DC established SBEs in 2014, while the remaining 36 states have FFEs. There are varying levels of state involvement in FFEs. In some cases, a state has partnered with HHS to establish and administer the exchange, and in other cases HHS is administering the individual exchange while the state administers the SHOP exchange. In many states with FFEs, the exchange is wholly operated and administered by HHS. To fund the establishment of exchanges, the ACA authorizes the HHS Secretary to award grants to states through 2014. Each exchange is expected to generate its own funds to sustain its operations beginning January 1, 2015. This report provides a state-by-state breakdown of the grants awarded to date. It then briefly describes the requirement for exchanges to be self-sustaining, and concludes with a discussion of the sources and amounts of funding that HHS has used and plans to use to support FFE operations. Section 1311 of the ACA appropriated indefinite (i.e., unspecified) amounts for planning and establishment grants for health insurance exchanges. For each fiscal year, the HHS Secretary is to determine the total amount that will be made available to each state for exchange grants. Any state that intends to do exchange establishment work can apply for and receive a Section 1311 grant; for instance, a state that is not establishing an SBE may receive a grant provided the state uses the funds for activities related to exchange establishment and implementation. States have had multiple opportunities to apply for Section 1311 grants. One deadline remains for submitting an application this year (i.e., November 14). No grants will be awarded after December 31, 2014. HHS has awarded three different types of exchange grants, which are described below. Figure 1 shows the total amount of funding each state has received from the grants as well as the type of exchange (SBE or FFE) each state has in 2014. Table 1 shows the amount each state has received from the various types of grants. Exchange planning grants were given to 49 states and DC. These grants of about $1 million each were used by states to conduct the research and planning needed to determine how their exchanges would be administered and operated. Three states returned all (Florida and Louisiana) or a portion (New Hampshire) of their exchange planning grants. There are two levels of exchange establishment grants. Level one establishment grants provide up to one year of funding to states that have made some progress under their exchange planning grants. States may seek additional years of level one funding in order to meet the criteria necessary to apply for level two funds. Level two establishment grants are designed to provide funding through December 31, 2014, to states that are farther along in the establishment of an exchange. States applying for level two establishment grants must meet specific eligibility criteria regarding the structure and governance of the exchange they are developing. HHS has announced several rounds of exchange establishment grant awards, the most recent of which was on October 14, 2014. To date, 37 states and DC have received a total of approximately $4.7 billion in exchange establishment grant funding. Within that group, 14 states—California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington—and DC have received both level one and level two funds. On February 16, 2011, HHS announced that it was awarding seven grants to help a group of "early innovator" states design and implement the information technology (IT) infrastructure needed to operate health insurance exchanges. The goal is for these states to develop exchange IT models that can be adopted and implemented by other states. Six states and a consortium of New England states received a total of $249 million in early innovator grant funding. Three states—Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin—have since returned their early innovator grants. Beginning January 1, 2015, the ACA requires that each exchange is self-sustaining. The ACA provides that an exchange may charge an assessment or user fee to participating issuers, but also allows an exchange to find other ways to generate funds to sustain its operations. A description of how each SBE intends to generate funding is currently beyond the scope of this report; however, HHS has described how it intends to generate funding for the 36 FFEs it administers. Beginning in 2014, HHS will charge a monthly user fee to all issuers that sell plans through an FFE. The fee for an issuer is equal to the product of the billable members enrolled in the plan through an FFE and a monthly user fee rate. For benefit years 2014 and 2015, the monthly user fee rate is 3.5% of the plan's monthly premium. CMS is incurring significant administrative costs supporting exchange operations. CMS operates a number of IT systems that control various FFE functions including eligibility and appeals, certification and oversight of qualified health plans, and payment and financial management. It also operates the data services hub, which routes information about exchange applicants to and from trusted data sources at other federal agencies (e.g., Internal Revenue Service) in order to verify eligibility. In addition, CMS provides consumer assistance through a call center and website for the FFEs, and it funds navigators who offer in-person support. Finally, CMS provides technical assistance to states operating SBEs. Table 2 summarizes the sources and amounts of administrative funding for exchange operations to date. This information was included in CMS's FY2015 budget submission. During the period FY2010 through FY2012, a total of $456 million was used to support exchange operations. Of that amount, $331 million came from annual discretionary appropriations that cover the routine costs of running federal agencies, including salaries and expenses: $307 million from CMS's Program Management account, and an additional $24 million from the HHS Departmental Management account. The remaining $125 million came from the Health Insurance Reform and Implementation Fund (HIRIF), a $1 billion fund within HHS that was established and funded to help pay for the administrative costs of ACA implementation. CMS's administrative costs to support exchange operations totaled $1,545 million in FY2013. In the FY2013 budget, CMS requested an increase of $1,001 million for its Program Management account for ACA implementation and other activities. However, Congress did not provide any additional discretionary funds for ACA implementation in FY2013. CMS instead used funds from other sources to help pay for ongoing administrative costs associated with exchange operations. Those funds included (1) discretionary funds transferred from other HHS accounts under the Secretary's transfer authority; (2) expired discretionary funds from the Nonrecurring Expenses Fund (NEF); (3) mandatory funds from the HIRIF; and (4) mandatory funds from the Prevention and Public Health Fund (see Table 2 ). CMS estimated that its FY2014 administrative costs for exchange operations would total $1,390 million. The agency requested an increase of $1,397 million for its Program Management account in the FY2014 budget for ACA implementation and other activities. But, as in FY2013, Congress chose not to give CMS any additional funding. Once again, the agency relied on transferred departmental funds as well as NEF and HIRIF funding to help support exchange operations in FY2014. In addition, CMS projected that it would collect an estimated $200 million in FFE user fees in FY2014 (see Table 2 ). The President's FY2015 budget includes a total of $1,788 for exchange operations. Of that amount, $629 million is from CMS's Program Management account, and the remaining $1,159 million is projected to come from FFE user fees. The FY2015 budget does not identify any other sources of funding to support exchange operations (see Table 2 ). CMS has requested an increase of $227 million for its Program Management account in FY2015 for ACA implementation and other activities. The Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) at CMS is responsible for implementing ACA's private health insurance reforms and administering the grant programs discussed above. Detailed information on the grants, including funding opportunity announcements, guidance, news releases, and amounts awarded, is available on CCIIO's website.

Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), a health insurance exchange has been established in each state and the District of Columbia (DC). Exchanges are marketplaces where individuals and small businesses can "shop" for health insurance coverage. The ACA instructed each state to establish its own state-based exchange (SBE). If a state elected not to create an exchange or if the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined a state was not prepared to operate an exchange, the law directed HHS to establish a federally facilitated exchange (FFE) in the state. Fourteen states and DC established SBEs in 2014, while the remaining 36 states have FFEs. In some states that have FFEs, the states carry out certain functions of the exchange; in other states, the exchange is wholly operated and administered by HHS. The ACA provided an indefinite appropriation for HHS grants to states to support the planning and establishment of exchanges. For each fiscal year, the HHS Secretary is to determine the total amount that will be made available to each state for exchange grants. No grant may be awarded after January 1, 2015. There are three different types of exchange grants. First, planning grants were awarded to 49 states and DC. These grants of about $1 million each were intended to provide resources to states to help them plan their health insurance exchanges. Second, there have been multiple rounds of exchange establishment grants. There are two levels of exchange establishment grants: level one establishment grants are awarded to states that have made some progress using their planning funds, and level two establishment grants are designed to provide funding to states that are farther along in the establishment of an exchange. Finally, HHS awarded seven early innovator grants to states (including one award to a consortium of New England states) to support the design and implementation of the information technology systems needed to operate the exchanges. To date, HHS has awarded a total of more than $4.8 billion to states and DC in planning, establishment, and early innovator grants. Under the ACA, each exchange is expected to be self-sustaining beginning January 1, 2015. The law authorizes exchanges to generate funding to sustain their operations, including by assessing fees on participating health insurance issuers. To raise funds for each of the FFEs, beginning in 2014, HHS is assessing a monthly fee on each health insurance issuer that offers plans through an FFE. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is incurring significant administrative costs to support FFE operations. According to CMS, a total of $456 million was used to support exchange operations over the period FY2010-FY2012. CMS spent $1,545 million on exchange operations in FY2013 and an estimated $1,390 million in FY2014. The agency has relied on a mix of annual discretionary appropriations and funding from other sources for these expenditures. Those sources include expired discretionary funds from the Nonrecurring Expenses Fund, mandatory funding from the Health Insurance Reform Implementation Fund and the Prevention and Public Health Fund, and FFE user fees. CMS has budgeted $1.8 billion for exchange operations in FY2015. Most of that funding is projected to come from FFE user fees.

RS20553 -- Air Quality and Electricity: Initiatives to Increase Pollution Controls Updated October 25, 2002 Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has initiated actions that have resulted in regulatorymandates and enforcement actions that would, if implemented, substantially reduce air pollutants (particularlynitrogenoxides - NOx) emitted by some electric generating facilities. An Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG),formed byEPA in May 1995, laid the groundwork for the regulatory initiatives; it directly led to the Ozone Transport Rule(also calledthe NOx SIP Call). In a supplementary action, 12 states petitioned EPA under Section 126 of the CAA, concerninginterstate pollution, alleging that NOx originating in upwind states prevented their attainment of ozone standards. An EPAOffice of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance audit of New Source Review (NSR) applications requiredunderprovisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA) that began in late 1996 was the precursor to the enforcement initiative; itled inNovember 1999 to lawsuits against seven utilities in the Midwest and South and an administrative order against theTennessee Valley Authority alleging violations of NSR requirements of the CAA. (1) The first two initiatives, the Ozone Transport Rule and the Section 126 petitions, are related to each other substantively. (2) These initiatives would further control NOx to assist states in the Northeast in meeting the existing, statutory 1-hourozoneNational Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS). The Ozone Transport Rule includes all or part of 19 easternstates andthe District of Columbia. Based on the eight petitions EPA has ruled on, EPA's Section 126 determinations wouldinvolvea subset of the NOx SIP Call's 19 states - 12 states and the District of Columbia. The enforcement initiative is not legally or procedurally related to the above initiatives; however, the NSR enforcementaction by EPA has substantive associations with them in that NOx is a primary (but not sole) focus, and many oftheutilities named as defendants in these cases would also have to reduce emissions under the NOx SIP Call andSection 126determinations. Unlike the other actions, the NSR action does not involve new regulatory action, but enforcementofexisting law and regulations. As such, it is handled by the EPA's Office of Enforcement & ComplianceAssurance, not aregulatory office, and involves other pollutants electric generators emit besides NOx (specifically sulfur dioxide(SO 2 ) andparticulates). The primary focus of the regulatory initiatives and a primary effect of EPA's enforcement action is to reduce NOxemissions in the eastern part of the United States. The environmental purpose for doing so is to reduce the interstatetransportation of this ozone precursor, thus assisting localities along the eastern seaboard in attaining the ozoneNAAQS. The actions would also mitigate acid rain. The initiatives and enforcement action by EPA focus on coal-firedelectricgenerating facilities both because they are major sources of emissions - in 1997 they emitted 24% of the country'sNOx(and also 62% of its SO 2 , 31% of its carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), and approximately one-thirdof the country's mercury (Hg)) -and because they represent the most cost-effective sources of large emission reductions for NOx andSO 2 . In the case of the Section 126 determinations and the NSR enforcement action, coal-fired powerplants are explicitlytargeted for emissions reductions. In the case of the NOx SIP Call, EPA cannot explicitly target sources (that is theresponsibility of each affected state), but the allocation scheme used by EPA to determine the allowable emissionsbudgetfor individual states is based primarily on substantial reductions from coal-fired powerplants. In general, theinitiativesidentified here would require affected powerplants to reduce their NOx emissions by about 75%-85%. AlthoughtheSection 126 determinations and the NSR enforcement action target individual sources, EPA provides flexibility forutilitiesto achieve the mandated reduction by means other than simply installing NOx control equipment on affected units. Asindicated by EPA's NSR settlement with Tampa Electric discussed later, the consent decree involves severaldifferent NOxcontrol strategies to reduce NOx emissions by over 85%, as well as controls to reduce SO 2 emissionsby almost 80%, by theyear 2010. Figure 1 indicates the states affected by the initiatives identified here. In line with the initiatives' focus on coal-firedelectric generating facilities, the Midwest is the primary location of affected powerplants. Five states - Indiana,Kentucky,North Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia - would be affected by all three initiatives. In contrast, Mississippi andFloridahave utilities targeted only under the NSR enforcement initiatives; Missouri, Connecticut, Rhode Island, andMassachusettsare targeted only under the Ozone Transport Rule. The other states have utilities targeted under the Ozone TransportRuleand either a Section 126 determination or NSR enforcement. PDF version The costs and benefits of these initiatives could be substantial, as indicated by Table 1. The NOx SIP Call is the most wideranging of the initiatives, with estimated costs of $1.7 billion annually and estimated quantifiable benefits of$1.1-$4.2billion annually. Because EPA's methodology uses cost-effectiveness for determining emission budgets, the lion'sshare ofthe costs would be borne by the utility industry. The smaller scope of the Section 126 determinations reducesemissionsabatement and benefits, but also costs. Of course, this scope could increase if additional petitions submitted to EPAresultin more states being implicated as sources of transported ozone. Finally, the evolving scope of EPA's NSR actionmakesestimates of its costs and benefits difficult, if not impossible, at this time. Table 1. Estimated Costs and Benefits of Initiatives n/a = not available Source: CRS Report 98-236. Since January 2000 significant actions have occurred with all three of the initiatives. The status of these initiatives as ofJanuary 22, 2002, is summarized in Table 2. Perhaps the most significant action has been the decision of a 3-judgepanel ofthe D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold EPA's Ozone Transport Rule with respect to the 1-hour ozone NAAQS( Michigan v. EPA , No. 98-1497 (D.C. Cir. March 3, 2000)), and to lift the stay on implementation. In upholding EPA'sauthority and methodology in developing the NOx SIP Call, the court did make some modifications; in particular,thatEPA's methodology did not support the inclusion of Wisconsin or all of Missouri and Georgia in the Rule (adecisionreflected in Figure 1). In lifting the stay, the court ordered affected states to submit revised State ImplementationPlans(SIPs) within 4 months of its June 22, 2000, order. In a subsequent ruling issued August 30, 2000, the court orderedEPAto move its original May 2003, compliance deadline to May 31, 2004. In March 2001, the Supreme Court denieda hearingto opponents of the SIP Call, effectively affirming the appeals court decision. In December 2000, EPA declaredthat 11states and the District of Columbia failed to submit revised SIPs by the extended October 30, 2000 deadline. ByNovember2002, all the affected states had submitted revised SIPs except Michigan, which has submitted a draft SIP revision. None of these proceedings, however, affect the indefinite stay of EPA findings with respect to the 8-hour ozone standard. In February 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that although EPA has the authority to set a new 8-hour ozone standard,itsinterpretation of the relationship between the 1-hour standard's statutory implementation strategy and its new 8-hourstandard implementation strategy was unreasonable and unlawful. The Court left it to EPA to "develop a reasonableinterpretation" of the statutory provisions as they relate to the implementing the new 8-hour standard( Whitman v. AmericanTrucking Associations , 531 U.S. 457 (2001) decided February 27, 2001). Table 2. Status of Initiatives With respect to the Section 126 petitions, EPA announced its 1-hour ozone findings on the 8 original petitions on January18, 2000. (3) EPA granted four of the eight petitionsfor the 1-hour ozone standard: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York,and Pennsylvania. Petitions from four other states were denied as these states no longer had areas that were not inattainment with the 1-hour standard. The rule specifies NOx allocations for 392 facilities in 12 states and theDistrict ofColumbia, and implemented through a cap-and-trade program. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld EPA'sauthorityto issue the rule on May 15, 2001, but ordered EPA to reconsider factors used in setting emission limits( AppalachianPower Co. v. EPA ). EPA responded to the court's order on August 3, 2001. On January 15, 2002, the EPAannounced itwould delay the compliance deadline for the Section 126 rule from May 1, 2003, to May 31, 2004, in line with thedeadlinefor the NOx SIP Call. EPA argues that a court order issued August 24, 2001, had already suspended the compliancedeadline for powerplants, and it would be unfair to make other emission sources meet an earlier deadline. In January 2000, EPA decided to indefinitely stay its original final determinations with respect to the 8-hour standard, givenlitigation regarding that standard. It also announced that findings with respect to petitions by the District ofColumbia,Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey would be determined in the future. Since the filing of the NSR lawsuits in November 1999 (and subsequent lawsuits filed in 2000), several significant actionshave occurred. First, in February 2000, EPA announced that it had come to an agreement with Tampa ElectricCompany ona consent decree that will settle the NSR lawsuit against that utility. The agreement will reduce NOx emissions byover85% (and SO 2 emissions by almost 80%) through a combination of fuel switching to natural gas,pollution controlequipment optimization, and other techniques. The estimated $1 billion program is expected by Tampa Electric tohave a"small" impact on its customers' bills. (4) Second, on November 16, 2000, EPA and Virginia Power announced that an "agreement in principle" had been reach tosettle EPA's NSR suit against Virginia Power. Over 12 years, Virginia will spend $1.2 billion to reduce NOx andSO2emissions by about 70% through a combination of pollution control equipment and fuel switching. Thisannouncement wasfollowed on December 21, 2000 by a similar agreement in principle between EPA and Cinergy involving a $1.4billioninvestment in control technology. Third, on January 24, 2002, EPA and the State of New Jersey announced the filing and settlement of an NSR suit againstPSEG Fossil LLC. PSEG agreed to reduce its SO2 emissions by 90% and its NOx emissions by 83% from 2000levels by2012 at an estimated cost of $337 million. In addition, PSEG agreed to reduce CO2 emissions by 15% from 1990levels. Litigation on these cases has slowed as participants assess the impact of the Bush Administration's June 2002 recommendations to revise the New Source Review process. Of particular interest is an EPA recommendation thata newrulemaking be commenced on the definition of "routine maintenance," a key point of contention in the abovelawsuits. Asof October 2002, no formal rulemaking has been proposed by EPA as the drafting process has not beencompleted. (5) The continuing difficulties in the Northeast both in meeting the ozone NAAQS and in reducing acid precipitation havefocused attention on emissions from fossil fuel-fired utilities, particularly of NOx - and on the potential costs ofreducingthose emissions. Concerned about the piecemeal nature of these initiatives, some in Congress have been workingoncomprehensive, multi-pollutant alternative strategies to reduce emissions. In June 2002, the Senate EnvironmentandPublic Works Committee reported out S. 556 - a comprehensive, multi-pollutant bill that would incorporatemarket-oriented mechanisms to control NOx, SO2, and CO2, and tonnage limitations on Hg. (6) No floor action has beenscheduled.

Since the mid-1990s, EPA has initiated actions resulting in regulatory mandatesand enforcement actions directed primarily at coal-fired electric generating utilities. These actions would, ifimplemented,substantially reduce air pollutants, particularly nitrogen oxides (NOx). These initiatives include the OzoneTransport Rule(also called the NOx SIP Call); a set of "Section 126 petitions" in which 12 states allege under Section 126 of theClean AirAct (CAA) that pollutants originating in upwind states prevent their attainment of clean air standards; and a set ofenforcement actions based on New Source Review (NSR) requirements of the CAA that have resulted in lawsuitsagainstseveral utilities and an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority. Although these are separateinitiatives,they are related in that each ultimately focuses on emissions from utilities in the Midwest and South. As of January22,2001, the EPA has declared 11 states and the District of Columbia as failing to submit revised SIPs required undertheOzone Transport Rule; the EPA has approved four section 126 petitions; and two of the NSR lawsuits have resultedinconsent decrees (Tampa Electric Co. and PSEG), and two others have been settled in principle (Virginia Power andCinergy). In June 2002, the Bush Administration recommended new rulemaking be commenced on the definitionof"routine maintenance": a key point of contention in the lawsuits. Legislative activity focuses on multi-pollutantstrategiesas an alternative to these piecemeal initiatives. In June 2002, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committeereported out S. 556 - a comprehensive, multi-pollutant reduction bill. This report will be updated as eventswarrant.

This report answers several common questions regarding the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), an index representing prevailing interest rates in London money markets. Recently, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reached settlements with Barclays, in which the British bank admitted submitting false responses to the survey used to calculate LIBOR and the Euro Interbank Offer Rate (EURIBOR) to manipulate the indexes. American policymakers have a number of concerns, including the possibility that American banks that participate in the LIBOR survey may also have attempted to manipulate the index, the effect that changes in LIBOR can have on borrowers and lenders whose contracts reference LIBOR to determine the interest rate of a loan, and the reliance of policymakers on LIBOR as one of the indicators of the stability of the financial system. For brevity and ease of exposition, this report focuses on LIBOR, although the manipulation and policy issues regarding EURIBOR are similar. LIBOR is an index that measures the cost of funds to large global banks operating in London financial markets or with London-based counterparties. The British Bankers' Association (BBA), a private trade association, constructs LIBOR, and Thomson Reuters publishes it worldwide. Each day, the BBA surveys a panel of banks, asking the question, "At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?" The BBA throws out the highest and lowest portion of the responses, and averages the remaining middle. The average is reported at 11:30 a.m. LIBOR is actually a set of indexes. There are separate LIBOR rates reported for 15 different maturities (length of time to repay a debt) for each of 10 currencies. The shortest maturity is overnight, the longest is one year. In the United States, many private contracts reference the three-month dollar LIBOR, which is the index resulting from asking the panel what rate they would pay to borrow dollars for three months. The panel surveyed to construct the dollar LIBOR is made up of the 18 banks listed in Table 1 . The U.S. banks on the dollar panel include Bank of America, Citibank, and JPMorgan Chase, although all of the listed banks have significant U.S. activities. For the dollar LIBOR, the highest 4 and lowest 4 responses of the 18 banks on the panel are thrown out, and the middle 10 are averaged. The panel of banks for the LIBOR for each currency is chosen according to a published set of criteria. Market share in London and in transactions of various maturities for the currency are important factors. The committee also considers a firm's reputation and expertise in transactions in a currency. Banks can apply to be participants in the LIBOR survey, and the number of reporting banks has changed occasionally. Similar indexes are reported for other locations by other banking associations. For example, there is a EURIBOR for Europe, and a TIBOR for Tokyo. A primary difference between these other indexes and LIBOR is that they measure the cost of borrowing funds in these other locations, for various maturities, in various currencies. The sponsoring organizations and the methodologies may vary slightly from place to place, but the public reporting and the ability of third parties to reference the indexes are similar. The LIBOR index is used in many ways. Many private loan contracts use LIBOR as a benchmark; for example, the interest rate on a mortgage, student loan, or car loan may be set to LIBOR plus a few percentage points. Many financial derivatives, such as an interest rate swap, compare a fixed interest rate to LIBOR (because LIBOR is capable of varying from day to day). Futures exchanges use LIBOR for contracts traded in the market. Policymakers use LIBOR as one element in even more complex indexes, such as the TED spread (Treasury-Eurodollar), used to assess the level of stress in financial markets. Private parties are not legally required to use LIBOR (or any other index) as a benchmark; instead, they choose to do so voluntarily. Conceptually, a lender setting the interest rate for a future loan might try to take into account what its cost of funds will be when the loan actually has to be issued. A lender knows that permanent surveys like LIBOR will be published on the future date on which a loan is to be offered. The contract could specify that on the future date, the borrower will be given the loan with an interest rate based on the index value of LIBOR reported on that day. Because LIBOR is meant to represent the cost of borrowing dollars by the largest banks in global financial markets, other lenders may choose LIBOR if they believe that their own cost of funds is likely to follow a similar pattern over time. Alternatives to LIBOR for private contracts exist, but may have shortcomings. Differences in the type of borrower or the maturity of the loan may make other benchmarks less suitable for some purposes. For example, lenders could choose to use the yield on U.S. Treasury securities as a benchmark. However, the recent financial crisis served as a reminder that the borrowing costs of banks do not always trend in the same direction as the borrowing costs of the U.S. government. Or, banks could use the Federal Funds Rate as a benchmark, but that rate is subject to changes for policy reasons, not just market conditions. The rate charged on interbank repurchase agreements in New York money markets could be an alternative, although repurchase agreements may be more analogous to collateralized debt under some circumstances. The appropriate alternative is likely to vary with the types of loans or the types of financial derivatives being benchmarked. The value of loans, derivatives, and other financial instruments that reference LIBOR is very large. One estimate by staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland found that 45% of prime adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and 80% of subprime ARMs used LIBOR as the benchmark. A financial adviser to municipalities stated that about 75% of municipalities have some contracts tied to the index. Because the BBA throws out the highest and lowest survey responses, some people may think that a single bank on a LIBOR reporting panel cannot affect the final index. A single bank can affect the index, but will not always be able to move the index in the direction it wants, or may not be able to move the index at all, under some circumstances. It is possible for a single bank on the panel to affect the dollar LIBOR if the bank's response would have been within the middle of the responses, or if it can change which responses are the middle responses. An illustrative example follows. Recall that the dollar LIBOR panel is made up of 18 banks, with only the responses of the middle 10 being averaged. Suppose that 4 banks report an interest rate of 3%, the next 10 banks report an interest rate of 8%, and 4 banks report an interest rate of 10%. The dollar LIBOR would be calculated by throwing out all of the 3% and 10% responses because the calculation throws out the highest and lowest 4 responses. In this example, the remaining 10 responses are all 8%, so the average would be 80/10 = 8%. LIBOR would be reported at 8%. However, if a bank that would have reported 10% wants to lower the LIBOR, and the bank lowers its bid from 10% to below 8% (for the sake of this example, assume the response is changed to 2%), the average will change, even though the bank's response is still thrown out. Why? Because one of the 8% responses is now among the highest 4 responses, and one of the 3% responses is in the middle 10. The average is now 75/10=7.5%. In this example, a single bank could move the index from 8% to 7.5%. If the bank exaggerates its lie, perhaps by reporting 1% instead of 2%, the LIBOR remains 7.5% in this example. Thus, it is possible for a single bank to affect LIBOR under some circumstances, but there is a limit on the magnitude of the effect. In some cases, the actions of a single bank will not move the index. In the above example, if the bank that would honestly report a 10% response wanted to increase the LIBOR index instead of lowering it, a change in the bank's own response would not achieve the desired manipulation because it would not change the value of any of the middle responses, nor would it change the responses comprising the middle. Why? Because reporting 12% instead of 10% still leaves the same 10 responses in the middle to be averaged. In this example, LIBOR remains 8%. Barclays has admitted submitting false survey responses to manipulate LIBOR. Because LIBOR is used in U.S. derivatives markets participated in by Barclays, an attempt to manipulate LIBOR is an attempt to manipulate U.S. derivatives markets, and thus a violation of U.S. law. Barclays has settled separately with United Kingdom officials for violating UK law. Focusing on U.S. issues, the following describes Barclays' admissions with the CFTC and DOJ. The material in this section is drawn from the Statement of Facts in Appendix A of the settlement documents. The settlement documents signed by Barclays with the CFTC and DOJ include employee emails that can be divided into three categories documenting manipulation: (1) changing the survey response for the benefit of Barclays' derivatives trade positions, (2) changing the survey response to protect Barclays' reputation, and (3) attempting to induce other banks to change their survey responses. The first two categories, Barclays acting alone, can affect LIBOR under some circumstances, but the methodology of LIBOR's calculation limits the magnitude of any impact of a single bank submitting a false bid. The third category, collusion, can have an impact of greater magnitude, but the settlement documents report only Barclays' attempts to reach out to other panel responders. Like any large and complex global bank, derivatives trades make up only one part of Barclays' balance sheet. LIBOR survey responders are supposed to be from the firm's treasury office, or other general office, and kept separate from derivatives traders. During 2005-2007, Barclays' internal emails reveal derivatives traders asking other employees to submit false survey responses to benefit their trading positions. In one particularly telling email exchange, a survey responder says that he or she was happy to help, and the trader thanks the individual. Unlike many other divisions within Barclays, the derivatives traders' preferred LIBOR outcome changes direction from day to day; that is, on some days the derivatives traders prefer LIBOR to be high to benefit their position while on other days the traders prefer LIBOR to be low. Many other lines of business have only one preferred direction; for example, units of Barclays that pay interest will consistently prefer the LIBOR index to be low. In the settlement, Barclays admits that it submitted false survey responses (both too high and too low) during the 2005-2007 period. When global financial markets came under increasing stress during 2008, Barclays' management preferred that Barclays lower its responses to protect the firm's reputation. Barclay's managers said that they did not want Barclays' "head to be above the parapet," lest it be shot at. As financial turmoil increased throughout that year, large complex banks like Barclays were having increasing difficulty in raising funds. At times, Barclays' responses tended to be higher than other responders, drawing the attention of UK officials. UK financial regulators raised concerns with Barclays. If Barclays' LIBOR survey responses were significantly higher than those of other LIBOR panel responders, then global investors might take that as a sign of weakness at Barclays. Individual submissions are made public in part to promote transparency of the index. Upon hearing that UK officials raised concerns with Barclays' management that the firm's responses were high, some Barclays employees concluded that UK officials wanted Barclays to submit lower LIBOR responses, a conclusion that the managers who met with UK officials have said was not warranted. Unlike the 2005-2007 period during which Barclays submitted false responses in both directions, Barclays consistently under-reported its cost of funds in 2008. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) reportedly raised concerns with Barclays about its LIBOR responses. Reportedly, the FRBNY also raised concerns with UK regulators and the BBA about the methodology for the LIBOR index. In response to congressional inquiries, FRBNY has posted several documents that reveal its concerns with LIBOR as it was being calculated and reported in 2008. Included among the documents are Explanatory Note; April 11, 2008: MarketSOURCE Weekly Market Review; May 6, 2008: Slide Deck of Presentation to U.S. Treasury, "Recent Developments in Short-Term Funding Markets"; May 20, 2008: MarketSOURCE report "Recent Concerns Regarding LIBOR's Credibility"; June 1, 2008: Timothy F. Geithner e-mail to Mervyn King, copying Paul Tucker, with attached "Recommendations for Enhancing the Credibility of LIBOR"; June 3, 2008: Mervyn King e-mail to Timothy F. Geithner; and June 5, 2008: Slide Deck of Presentation to the Interagency Financial Markets Group Meeting, "Market Concerns Regarding LIBOR."

The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is an estimate of prevailing interest rates in London money markets. Barclays, a British bank that serves on the panel responding to the LIBOR survey, recently admitted submitting false responses to manipulate the index (and attempting to manipulate a similar index, the Euro Interbank Offer Rate [EURIBOR]). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reached settlements with Barclays in which the bank agreed to admit fault and pay a large fine. This report answers several frequently asked questions. How is LIBOR calculated? Which banks serve on the dollar LIBOR panel? How can a single bank manipulate LIBOR? How did Barclays manipulate LIBOR? How is LIBOR used in the U.S. financial systems? Are there alternatives to LIBOR? Were U.S. policymakers, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, aware of problems with LIBOR?

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is both a grants statute and a civil rights statute. It provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Originally enacted in 1975, the act responded to increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and to judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities. The statute contains detailed due process provisions, including the right to bring suit in order to ensure the provision of FAPE. IDEA states in part "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision ... made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section ...." The judicial decisions concerning the rights of non attorney parents of children with disabilities to bring suit without an attorney have raised issues concerning whether the parents of a child with a disability are "part[ies] aggrieved" under IDEA. Whether the parents are parties aggrieved turns in large part on whether the rights guaranteed under IDEA are guaranteed for the child with a disability, for the parent of such a child, or both. Courts have varied in their views on this issue and therefore on the issue of whether non-attorney parents have the ability to pursue an IDEA case pro se. Jacob Winkelman has autistic spectrum disorder and, in accordance with an individualized education program (IEP), was placed in a preschool with the concurrence of both his parents and the Parma City school district. When he was old enough for kindergarten, his parents and school officials disagreed on his proper placement with his parents alleging that the school's proposed placement at Pleasant Valley elementary school was not appropriate to Jacob's needs. After rulings supporting the school district's determination by the hearing officer and a state level review officer, the Winkelmans appealed pro se to U.S. district court. The district court agreed with the administrative rulings and the Winkelmans appealed, again without a lawyer, to the sixth circuit court of appeals. The court of appeals issued an order dismissing the appeal unless an attorney was obtained within thirty days. The Winkelmans then sought and received a stay of this order from the Supreme Court pending a decision by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 27, 2006. The sixth circuit decision in Winkelman found that the recent sixth circuit decision in Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District was dispositive of the question of whether non-attorney parents of a child with a disability could represent their child in court. Cavanaugh held that parents could not represent their child in an IDEA action and that the right of a child with a disability to FAPE did not grant such a right to the child's parents. The sixth circuit in Cavanaugh first noted that federal law allows an individual to act as their own counsel but that generally parents "cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor children because a minor's personal cause of action is her own and does not belong to her parent or representative." Finding that this general principle was not abrogated by IDEA, the sixth circuit observed that IDEA explicitly grants parents the right to a due process hearing but "in stark contrast, the provision of the IDEA granting '[a]ny party aggrieved' access to the federal courts ... makes no mention of parents whatsoever." In addition, the court observed that the intended beneficiary of IDEA is the child with a disability, not the parents, and that although IDEA does grant parents some procedural rights, these only serve to ensure the child's substantive right and do not provide the parents with substantive rights. The circuit courts are not all in accord with the sixth circuit in finding that parents may not proceed pro se in an IDEA case. Currently, there is a three way split in their determinations of this issue with some circuits finding that non-attorney parents may not proceed pro se , another circuit holding that non-attorney parents have no limitations on their ability to proceed, and other courts of appeals holding that parents can proceed on procedural claims but must use a lawyer for substantive claims. In Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School District the first circuit held that parents have a right to proceed pro se on both procedural and substantive grounds. The IDEA language stating that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision ... made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section ..." was seen as including parents of children with disabilities. This provision was described as not making a distinction between procedural and substantive claims and the procedural and substantive rights under IDEA were described as "inextricably intertwined." The first circuit noted that there are some "practical concerns" about recognizing parents as aggrieved parties: parents may not be the best advocates for their child as they may be emotionally involved and not able to "exercise rational and independent judgment." In addition, pro se litigants were seen as imposing burdens on the courts and schools districts due to poorly drafted or vexatious claims. However, the Maroni court rejected these practical concerns finding that, since there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil case, having a parent represent them was better for children with disabilities than having no advocate. In addition to the court of appeals decisions in Winkelman v. Parma City School District and Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District which were discussed previously, other circuits have also denied parents the right to proceed pro se. For example, in Devine v. Indian River County School Board, the parents of a child with autism brought suit alleging that the child's IEP was inadequate. Although the parents were represented by an attorney at the beginning of the suit, they informed the court that they wished to discharge the attorney and proceed pro se. The court noted that IDEA does allow parents to present evidence and examine witnesses in due process hearings but found "no indication that Congress intended to carry this requirement over to federal court proceedings. In the absence of such intent, we are compelled to follow the usual rule—that parents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child's behalf—because it helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents." In Collinsgru v. Palmyra Board of Education, the parents sought special education services for their son whom they contended had a learning disability. The parents pursued the administrative remedies under IDEA without an attorney although they did retain a non-attorney expert. The administrative law judge found that the child's difficulties were not severe enough to qualify for special education and rejected the parents' complaint. The parents then filed a civil action in district court. The district court held that the parents could not proceed pro se to represent their child and rejected the parents assertion that the parents were pursuing their own rights. The court of appeals in Collinsgru first found that, under general legal theories regarding pro se representation, IDEA did not allow parents to proceed pro se to represent their child stating: "Congress expressly provided that parents were entitled to represent their child in administrative proceedings. That it did not also carve out an exception to permit parents to represent their child in federal proceedings suggests that Congress only intended to let parents represent their children in administrative proceedings." The third circuit noted that the requirement of representation by counsel was based on two policy considerations. First, the court found, there is a strong state interest in regulating the practice of law. Requiring a minimum level of competence was described as protecting not only the represented party but also his or her adversaries as well as the court from poor drafted or vexatious claims. Second, the court emphasized the importance of the rights at issue and the final nature of the adjudication. A licensed attorney would be subject to ethical obligations and may be sued for malpractice while an individual not represented by an attorney would not have these protections. The parents in Collinsgru argued that since, as parents, they were responsible for their son's education, they had joint substantive rights with their child under IDEA. They noted that parents are often the only available advocates for their child and that attorneys are often unwilling to take IDEA cases due to their specialized and complicated nature and since the cases often lack significant retainers. The court expressed some sympathy for these arguments but noted that Congress had provided for attorneys' fees in IDEA, and concluded that IDEA's statutory provisions indicated that "the rights at issue here are divisible, and not concurrent." The parents and the child were thus found to possess different IDEA rights: the parents "possess explicit rights in the form of procedural safeguards" while the child possesses both procedural and substantive rights. Other courts have also found that parents have procedural rights under IDEA which they can bring suit pro se to enforce. In Mosely v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, the seventh circuit observed that IDEA "provides both children and their parents with an elaborate set of procedural safeguards that must be observed in the course of providing the child a free, appropriate public education." Citing Collinsgru for the proposition that IDEA confers different rights on parents and children, the court found that the parent's procedural rights were enough of an interest to allow a pro se suit to enforce these parental rights to proceed. Similarly, in Wenger v. Canastota Central School District the second circuit denied a parent's attempt to bring a suit pro se on behalf of his child but stated that the parent "... is, of course, entitled to represent himself on his claims that his own rights as a parent under the IDEA were violated...."

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Winkelman v. Parma City School District (05-983) to determine whether, and if so, under what circumstances non-attorney parents of a child with a disability may bring suit without using an attorney under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The circuit courts are split in their determinations of this issue with some circuits finding that non-attorney parents may not proceed pro se , another circuit holding that non-attorney parents have no limitations on their ability to proceed, and other courts of appeals holding that parents can proceed on procedural claims but must use a lawyer for substantive claims. This report will not be updated.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated more than a trillion dollars for military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world. The House and Senate are now considering an additional request for $33 billion in supplemental funding for the remainder of FY2010, and the Administration has also requested $159 billion to cover costs of overseas operations in FY2011. In the face of these substantial and growing sums, a recurring question has been how the mounting costs of the nation's current wars compare to the costs of earlier conflicts. The following table provides estimates of costs of major wars from the American Revolution through conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991. It also provides updated estimates of costs of current operations. Estimates are in current year dollars that reflect values at the time of each conflict and in constant dollars that reflect today's prices. The table also shows estimates of war costs as a share of the economy. Comparisons of costs of wars over a 230-year period, however, are inherently problematic. One problem is how to separate costs of military operations from costs of forces in peacetime. In recent years, the DOD has tried to identify the additional "incremental" expenses of engaging in military operations, over and above the costs of maintaining standing military forces. Before the Vietnam conflict, however, the Army and the Navy, and later the DOD, did not view war costs in such terms. Figures are problematic, as well, because of difficulties in comparing prices from one vastly different era to another. Inflation is one issue—a dollar in the past would buy more than a dollar today. Perhaps a more significant problem is that wars appear more expensive over time as the sophistication and cost of technology advances, both for military and for civilian activities. Adjusted for inflation, the War of 1812 cost about $1.6 billion in today's prices, which appears, by contemporary standards, to be a relatively small amount. But using commonly available estimates of gross domestic product, the overall U.S. economy 192 years ago was less than 1/1,400 th as large as it is now. So at the peak of the conflict in 1813, the war consumed more than 2% of the nation's measurable economic output, the equivalent of more than $300 billion today. The data in the attached table, therefore, should be treated, not as truly comparable figures on a continuum, but as snapshots of vastly different periods of U.S. history. For the Vietnam War and the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the figures reported here are DOD estimates of the "incremental" costs of military operations (i.e., the costs of war-related activities over and above the normal, day-to-day costs of recruiting, paying, training, and equipping standing military forces). Estimates of the costs of post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere through FY2009 are by [author name scrubbed] of CRS, based on (1) amounts appropriated by Congress in budget accounts designated to cover war-related expenses and (2) allocations of funds in reports on obligations of appropriated amounts by the DOD. Data for FY2010 are DOD estimates of costs defined quite similarly. These figures appear to reflect a broader definition of war-related expenses than earlier DOD estimates of incremental costs of the Vietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts. In years prior to the Vietnam War, neither the Army and Navy, nor the DOD, nor any other agency or organization attempted to calculate incremental costs of war-related operations over and above the costs of peace-time activities. In the absence of official accounts of war expenditures, CRS estimated the costs of most earlier wars—except for the American Revolution, the Confederate side of the Civil War, and the Korean conflict—by comparing war-time expenditures of the Army and the Navy with average outlays for the three years prior to each war. The premise is that the cost of a war reflects, in each case, a temporary buildup of forces from the pre-war level. During the Korean War, however, the United States engaged in a large buildup of forces not just for the war, but for deployments elsewhere in the world as well. For the Korean conflict, therefore, CRS compared outlays of the DOD during the war with a trend line from average expenditures of the three years before the war to average expenditures of the three years after the war. Estimated costs of most conflicts, from the War of 1812 through the Korean War, are based on official reports on the budgets of the Army, Navy, and, for Korea, the Air Force. No official budget figures are available, however, for the Revolution or for the confederate states during the Civil War. The estimated cost of the American Revolution is from a financial history of the United States published in 1895 and cited in a Legislative Reference Service memo prepared in 1956. The estimated Civil War cost of the confederacy is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994 edition. Data on Army and Navy outlays prior to 1940 are from the Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2, 1975. GDP estimates prior to 1940 are from Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, "The Annual Real and Nominal GDP for these United States, 1790 - Present." Economic History Services, October 2005, at http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/ . Outlays and GDP figures from FY1940 on are from the Office of Management and Budget. For each conflict, CRS converted cost estimates in current year prices into constant FY2011 dollars using readily available inflation indices. For years since 1948, CRS used an index of inflation in defense outlays from the DOD. For years from 1940-1947, CRS used an index of inflation in defense outlays from the Office of Management and Budget. For years prior to 1940, CRS used an index based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) that the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) maintains and updates quarterly. That index extends back to 1913. For earlier years, CRS used an extension of the CPI by academic researchers that is maintained at Oregon State University. That index also uses the official BLS CPI from 1913 forward and periodically updates both earlier and later figures to reflect new, official CPI estimates. Inflation adjustments extending over a period of more than 200 years are problematic in many ways. The estimates used here are from reliable academic sources, but other experts might use alternative indices of prices or might weight values differently and come up with quite different results. In addition, over long periods, the relative costs of goods within the economy change dramatically. By today's standards, even simple manufactured goods were expensive in the 1770s compared, say, to the price of land. Moreover, it is difficult to know what it really means to compare costs of the American Revolution to costs of military operations in Iraq when, 230 years ago, the most sophisticated weaponry was a 36-gun frigate that is hardly comparable to a modern $3.5 billion destroyer. As a result, yesterday's wars appear inexpensive compared to today's conflicts if only because the complexity, value, and cost of modern technology are so much greater. Finally, a very technical and relatively minor point—the inflation indices used here are more specialized for more recent periods. Figures since 1940 are adjusted using factors specific to defense expenditures, but no such index is available for earlier years. At least in recent years, cost trends in defense have differed considerably from cost trends in the civilian economy. Contemporary inflation indices capture such differences, while older ones do not.

This CRS report provides estimates of the costs of major U.S. wars from the American Revolution through current conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It presents figures both in "current year dollars," that is, in prices in effect at the time of each war, and in inflation-adjusted "constant dollars" updated to the most recently available estimates of FY2011 prices. All estimates are of the costs of military operations only and do not include costs of veterans benefits, interest paid for borrowing money to finance wars, or assistance to allies. The report also provides estimates of the cost of each war as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the peak year of each conflict and of overall defense spending as a share of GDP at the peak. Comparisons of war costs over a 230-year period, however, are inherently problematic. One problem is how to separate costs of military operations from costs of forces in peacetime. In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has tried to identify the additional "incremental" expenses of engaging in military operations, over and above the costs of maintaining standing military forces. Figures used in this report for the costs of the Vietnam War and of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War are official DOD estimates of the incremental costs of each conflict. Costs of post-9/11 military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere are estimates of amounts appropriated to cover war-related expenses. These amounts appear to reflect a broader definition of war-related expenditures than earlier DOD estimates of incremental Vietnam or Persian Gulf War costs. Before the Vietnam conflict, the Army and Navy, and later the DOD, did not identify incremental expenses of military operations. For the War of 1812 through World War II, CRS estimated the costs of conflicts by calculating the increase in expenditures of the Army and Navy compared to the average of the three years before each war. The premise is that increases reflect the cost of a temporary buildup to fight each war. Costs of the Revolutionary War and of the Confederate side in the Civil War are from other published sources. Costs of the Korean War were calculated by comparing DOD expenditures during the war with a trend line extending from the average of three years before the war to the average of three years after the war. Figures are problematic, as well, because of difficulties in comparing prices from one vastly different era to another. Inflation is one issue—a dollar in the past would buy more than a dollar today. Perhaps a more significant problem is that wars appear vastly more expensive over time as the sophistication and cost of technology advances, both for military and for civilian purposes. The estimates presented in this report, therefore, should be treated, not as truly comparable figures on a continuum, but as snapshots of vastly different periods of U.S. history.

Information about contracts and other award types related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is available from several sources, including: Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), at https://www.fpds.gov . Department of Homeland Security (DHS), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0729.xml . (Information about contracts awarded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is available at this website.) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), at http://www.usace.army.mil . U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command (MSC), at http://www.procurement.msc.navy.mil/Contract/Welcome.jsp . (The Military Sealift Command is the agency that awarded four contracts for four cruise ships to house evacuees in the Gulf Region. ) The Federal Procurement Data System is a government database that contains detailed information about contracts that have been awarded; task, delivery, and purchase orders that have been issued; and purchases that have been made under blanket purchase agreements (BPAs). Three spreadsheets are available on the FPDS website: Hurricane Katrina contract information, Hurricane Rita contract information, and contract information for other disasters that occurred in 2005. Although agencies are required to submit information to FPDS about contracts and other types of awards that exceed $2,500 in value, it is likely, as noted at the beginning of the three spreadsheets available on the FPDS website, that not all contracting actions have been entered into FPDS yet. Nevertheless, with more than 2,500 contracting actions listed by late October from many different agencies, and the use of 50 FPDS data elements to describe the contracting actions, FPDS spreadsheets offer the most comprehensive picture of emergency contracting. Contracting information available from the other three sources—FEMA (via the DHS website), USACE, and MSC—is not included in the FPDS spreadsheets. As noted on the FPDS spreadsheets, some contracting officials may not have access to the necessary computer systems or may not have time to submit information to FPDS. This caveat may also apply to FEMA. In the case of USACE and MSC, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not completed its connections to FPDS, though it expects to do so sometime in FY2006. Thus, very few DOD contracting actions are listed on the Hurricane Katrina spreadsheet. While the information presented here applies to government procurements generally, the information is provided to aid specifically in understanding the FPDS spreadsheets. Information listed on the FPDS spreadsheets includes the date that a transaction was signed; the date that the parties (that is, the government and a company) agreed would be the starting date for the contract's requirements, which may be the same as the date signed; the current completion date, which is the completion date of the base contract plus any options that have been exercised; the dollar value of the contract or other award; and the name and location of the vendor. Although the definition of "current completion date" does not mention, for example, delivery orders (DOs), it seems likely that completion date entries for DOs indicate the date by which deliveries are to be completed. The type of award an agency makes for a particular procurement depends, at a minimum, on whether the required items or services are available from an existing contract, a federal supply schedule, or a blanket purchase agreement. A blanket purchase agreement (BPA) is a "charge account" with qualified sources of supply. Generally, BPAs are used by agencies to fill anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services. A contract is a mutually binding legal relationship which obligates a vendor to provide goods or services and the government to pay for them. A delivery order or a task order (TO) is used to purchase supplies or services, respectively, from an established government contract or with government sources. When this procurement vehicle is used, it is said that the agency "placed a task (or delivery) order against a contract." A purchase order (PO) is an offer by the government to buy supplies or services, under specified terms and conditions and using simplified acquisition procedures, from a vendor. Several different types of contracts are available to contracting officers and contractors, and contracting officers have many factors to consider when selecting which type of contract to use for a particular procurement. Factors include type and complexity of the agency's requirement, urgency of the requirement, performance period, and the extent and nature of proposed subcontracting. The following contracts have different pricing arrangements: Fixed-price contracts "provide for a firm price or, in appropriate cases, an adjustable price.... A fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment provides for upward or downward revision of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified contingencies." Cost-reimbursement contracts "provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract." Time-and-materials contracts provide "for acquiring supplies or services on the basis of—(1) Direct labor hours at specified fixed hourly rates that include wages, overhead, general and administrative expenses, and profit; and (2) Materials at cost, including, if appropriate, material handling costs as part of material costs." Labor-hour contracts are "a variation of the time-and-materials contract, differing only in that materials are not supplied by the contractor." A fixed price or cost-reimbursement contract that includes an incentive may be referred to as an "incentive contract." Incentive contracts "are appropriate when ... the required supplies or services can be acquired at lower costs and, in certain instances, with improved delivery or technical performance, by relating the amount of profit or fee payable under the contract to the contractor's performance." Another variation is called the "indefinite-delivery contract," which is "used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award," and which is sometimes referred to as an "indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract." For every contracting action reported to FPDS, the procuring agency must assign a unique identifier—a procurement instrument identifier (PIID). Agencies are responsible for developing their own PIID coding schemes, but they must use alphabetical characters in the first positions to indicate the agency; assign alphanumeric characters to identify the appropriate office or administrative subdivision; and, similar to the assignment of numbers sequentially to public laws, assign numbers sequentially to contracting actions. Agencies may add other information, such as fiscal year, to their PIIDs. The Federal Procurement Data Center is required to maintain a registry of agencies' coding schemes and validate their use in all transactions. Full and open competition, which "means that all responsible sources are permitted to compete," is the policy of the federal government. However, exceptions are permitted. One category of exceptions provides for full and open competition after exclusion of sources. Procurements that are set aside for certain types of small businesses belong to this category, because large businesses are excluded from competition. Other than full and open competition, which is popularly referred to as "no bid" or "sole source" contracting, is permitted under seven circumstances: only one responsible source exists, and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements; an unusual and compelling urgency for supplies or services exists; the government needs to achieve industrial mobilization, establish or maintain an essential engineering or research and development capability, or obtain expert services; an international agreement or treaty precludes full and open competition; a statute authorizes or requires that supplies or services be procured through another agency or from a specified source; disclosure of an agency's needs could compromise national security; and it is in the public interest not to conduct a full and open competition. Two columns on the FPDS spreadsheets—"Extent Competed" and "Reason Not Competed"—provide competition information about each procurement. While some spreadsheet entries include the phrase "other than full and open competition" or "full and open after exclusion of sources" for the former column, and the appropriate reason why there was no or limited competition, other entries refer to other types of limitations on procurements. For example, an agency might indicate that a particular procurement was "not available for competition," and then, as the reason, cite the Javits-Wagner-O'Day (JWOD) Act, which mandates that organizations that employ individuals who are blind or severely disabled are a required source of supplies and services for federal agencies. The FPDS data dictionary provides descriptions for the different entries permitted in these two columns. The term "interagency contracting" has several meanings. Perhaps the best known example is when agencies purchase goods and services from a federal supply schedule that has been established and is maintained by another federal agency, such as the General Services Administration (GSA). Another type of interagency contracting occurs when agency A purchases goods or services on behalf of agency B, which funds the purchase. An examination of the FPDS spreadsheets indicate that numerous purchases were made using this method. The purchasing department, and agency or office, if applicable, are listed in columns A and B, respectively. The funding agency code is located in column M. Apparently, if there is no entry in column M for a particular procurement, the department identified in column A funded the procurement. Conversely, there are many procurements for which the entry in column M does not match the department and agency identified in columns A and B. For example, GSA purchased goods and services that were paid for by the Air Force, the Army, DHS, FEMA, the Navy, and an office within the Department of Health and Human Services. A useful feature of FPDS is that it allows agencies to identify a contractor by type of organization or business, such as tribal government, small disadvantaged business, educational institution, woman-owned business, veteran-owned business, and nonprofit organization. The three hurricane-related spreadsheets available at FPDS use this information to show what type of organization was involved in each procurement. The data provided through the FPDS website and the other websites listed above provide a degree of transparency in what is often a murky process and can be used to analyze hurricane-related recovery procurements.

Information about contracts and other types of government procurements made in support of hurricane recovery efforts may be obtained online from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command websites. The government-wide database, FPDS, provides the most comprehensive and detailed information, but the other three websites include contracts not currently listed in FPDS. Available information about government procurements includes, among other things, the type of award (for example, a contract or a delivery order), the type of contract, and the extent of competition.

The public disclosure of the details of one's personal finances, ownerships, investments, and income is required from high-level elected and appointed officials in all three branches of the federal government under the provisions of law originally enacted as the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Such public disclosure requirements in federal law were enacted in the wake of the "Watergate" scandal to facilitate supervision, regulation, and deterrence of conflicts of interest between the private financial interests and the official public duties of federal officers, and to increase the confidence of the public in the integrity of their elected and appointed officials in the federal government. The public reports mandated by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 have always been available to the public and the press at the ethics office of the employee's agency. Provisions of law more recently adopted by Congress in the so-called "STOCK Act" now require that the personal financial disclosure reports by the highest-level officials in the government—the President, Vice President, Members of and candidates to Congress, and executive officials compensated on the Executive Schedule at level I (Cabinet officials) and level II (Under Secretaries of departments and heads of many executive branch and independent regulatory agencies)—are also to be posted on the Internet for public access and searching. The disclosure reports for other government employees who are required to file public reports will remain publicly available at the employee's agency. Reporting under the disclosure law is to be made annually by May 15 of each year by all federal officials covered by the law, and must also be made periodically during the course of the year by such covered officials and employees with respect to certain securities transactions over $1,000. In addition to the public disclosure reports from high-level officials and employees, there may also be required from other federal employees (who are not required to file public reports) confidential financial disclosure reports that are made to the employee's agency. The law requiring public disclosure of personal financial information applies to the President, the Vice President, all Members of Congress (as well as candidates for President, Vice President, and Congress), federal judges and justices, and to high-level staff in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government. For those federal officials and employees not in positions specifically named in the law, whether such employee is required to file public financial disclosure statements is generally determined, in the first instance, by the rate of compensation that the employee is entitled to receive from the federal government, and then, secondly, by the number of days such employee works for the federal government at that salary rate. In the executive branch, any officer or employee of the government who "occupies a position classified above GS-15," or, if not on the General Schedule, is in a position compensated at a "rate of basic pay ... equal to or greater than 120 percent of the minimum rate of basic pay payable for GS-15," and who is compensated at that rate for at least 60 days in a calendar year, is required to file public financial disclosure reports. In a somewhat similar manner in the judicial and legislative branches, employees are generally covered if they earn a salary greater than 120% of the base salary of a GS-15 (regardless of whether they are on the General Schedule or not) and if they work at that rate of pay on more than 60 days in a calendar year. In addition to incumbent federal officials, persons who are nominated by the President to a position for which Senate confirmation is required must also file a public financial disclosure report within five days of transmittal by the President to the Senate of such nomination. This financial disclosure statement is filed with the designated agency ethics officer of the agency in which the nominee will serve, and copies of the report are transmitted by the agency to the Director of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). The Director of OGE then transmits a copy to the Senate committee which is considering the nomination of that individual. A presidential nominee must file an updated report to the Senate committee reviewing his or her nomination at or before the commencement of hearings, updating the information through the period "not more than five days prior to the commencement of the hearing," concerning information specifically related to honoraria and outside earned income. Committees of the Senate may require any additional information from a nominee that they deem necessary or desirable, and may further require ethics agreements from the nominee as to the disposition of particular assets, or the intention to recuse himself or herself from certain governmental matters. The annual financial disclosure statements mandated under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978—to be filed by May 15 of each year by incumbent officials—require the public reporting and disclosure of detailed financial information about the private financial interests, assets, ownerships, and financial and business associations of the public official, as well as certain financial information relative to the official's spouse and dependent children. The disclosure statement requires public listing of the identity and/or the value (generally in "categories of value") of such items as the following: Income—the official's private income of $200 or more (including earned and unearned income such as dividends, rents, interest, and capital gains) and the source of such income Gifts—gifts received from private sources over a certain amount (including reimbursements for travel over threshold amounts) Assets—the identification of all assets and income-producing property (such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, other securities, rental property, etc.) of over $1,000 in value (including savings accounts over $5,000) Liabilities—liabilities owed to creditors exceeding $10,000. Information on mortgages on personal residences must be disclosed by the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, and nominees and incumbents in most presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed positions Transactions—financial transactions, including purchases, sales, or exchanges exceeding $1,000 in value, of income-producing property, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, exchange traded funds, or other securities Outside Positions—positions held in outside businesses and organizations Agreements—agreements for future employment or leaves of absence with private entities, continuing payments from or participation in benefit plans of former employers Blind Trusts—the cash value of the interests in any blind trusts Information in the reports concerning the finances of the spouse and dependent children of covered federal officials is to include particular disclosures with regard to the income, gifts, assets, liabilities, and financial transactions of such individuals. Although the identity of financial assets and of income-producing property over $1,000 in value must generally be disclosed by federal officials, even if such assets are held in "trusts" for the benefit of the official or the official's spouse or dependent children, the identity of the underlying assets need not be disclosed if held in a "qualified blind trust," or in a trust not established by the official (when the official and his or her spouse and children have no knowledge of the holdings in such trust). The conflict of interest theory under which the "blind trust" provisions operate is that since the government officer will eventually not know the identity of the specific assets in the trust (there cannot be any restrictions on the sale or disposition of assets in a "qualified" blind trust and the trustee must be independent of the official), those financial interests could not act as influences on the officer or employee's official decisions, thus avoiding real or apparent conflicts of interests. Assets originally placed into the trust will, of course, be known to the official, and therefore will generally continue to be "financial interests" of the public official for conflict of interest purposes, when applicable, until the trustee notifies the official "that such asset has been disposed of, or has a value of less than $1,000." Under the provisions of the "STOCK Act," signed into law on April 4, 2012, all federal officials who are required to file annual public financial disclosure statements must also file periodic reports during the year which detail financial transactions of $1,000 or more taken by or for the official. These more frequent, periodic transaction reports must be filed within 30 days after the official is notified of a covered transaction in stocks, bonds, or other such securities (but no later than 45 days after the date of the transaction). The requirement for more frequent filing applies generally to transactions in stocks and bonds of individual companies, but does not apply to most mutual funds or to exchange traded funds (ETFs), nor to transactions in real property. The requirement for more frequent and prompt reporting of transactions was adopted as part of the so-called STOCK Act as an adjunct to the existing prohibition on the use of "inside information" by public officials, and was intended to apply to trading in securities whose value could be affected by such information. Federal officials generally file copies of their financial disclosure reports with their designated agency ethics official in the agency in which the reporting official is employed. In the executive branch of government, the President and Vice President file their reports with the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), while all other financial disclosure reports are to be filed with the designated agency ethics officer within the agency or department in which the officer serves. In the legislative branch of government, Members and covered staff of the House of Representatives file their disclosure reports to the Clerk of the House, who forwards a copy to the House Ethics Committee for review. Senators and covered Senate staff file copies of their reports to the Secretary of the Senate, who forwards a copy to the Senate Select Committee on Ethics. In the judicial branch of government, judges, justices, and judicial staff file copies of their reports with the Judicial Conference. The public financial disclosure reports required to be made by officers and employees of the federal government under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 have always been available to the public and the press for copy or inspection from the official's agency (the designated ethics office) within 30 days after the May 15 filing deadline. Under more recent legislation known as the STOCK Act, reports for the highest-level officials in the government, including the President, Vice President, Members of and candidates to Congress, and executive officials compensated at level I of the Executive Schedule (Cabinet officials), and level II of the Executive Schedule (which includes Deputy Secretaries of the departments as well as the heads of many executive and independent agencies) are now also required to be posted on the Internet by their respective agencies. The public availability or Internet publication of the disclosure reports include, in addition to the annual May 15 reports, the more frequent periodic transaction reports concerning purchases or sales of securities of $1,000 or more in value. As originally adopted, the STOCK Act would have required the Internet posting of all the public financial disclosure reports required from nearly 30,000 employees in the executive and legislative branches of government. Concerns over potential identity theft, the increased opportunities for malicious data mining, and public safety concerns for many federal employees in law enforcement or for those employed overseas, as well as constitutional concerns over financial privacy, led to a study and re-examination of the issue of Internet publication of the detailed financial reports by lower-level federal officials. In a study by the independent National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), that organization concluded that "the online posting requirement does little to help detect conflicts of interest and insider trading, but that it can harm federal missions and individual employees. " Congress responded by amending the STOCK Act to require the Internet posting of the disclosure reports filed by the highest-level officials in the government, but leaving in place the existing public availability of the disclosure reports for all other employees in the executive and legislative branches. In addition to the legislative and regulatory scheme for public financial disclosure for certain federal officials, there is in place a requirement for confidential disclosure reports to be filed with an employee's agency by some lower-level federal officers and employees. The confidential reporting requirements are intended to complement the public disclosure system, and apply to those employees who do not have to file under the public reporting provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. Generally, the confidential reporting requirements apply to certain "rank and file" employees who are compensated below the threshold rate of pay for public disclosures (GS-15 or below, or less than 120% of the basic rate of pay for a GS-15), and who are determined by the employee's agency to perform duties or exercise responsibilities in regard to government contracting or procurement, government grants, government subsidies or licensing, government auditing, or other governmental duties which may particularly require the employee to avoid financial conflicts of interest. Such a person may be required to file a confidential report if he or she performs the duties of such a position "for a period in excess of 60 days during the calendar year." Additionally, unless required to file public reports, confidential reports are required from all "special Government employees" in the executive branch (those employees who are employed by the government for not more than 130 days in a year), including those who serve on advisory committees. With respect to advisory committees, it should be emphasized, however, that the disclosure provisions of federal law and regulation apply only to persons who are "officers or employees" of the federal government, and thus do not apply to private individuals who are serving on advisory committees as "representatives" of outside, private, or other non-federal entities.

High-level officials in all three branches of the federal government are required to publicly disclose detailed information concerning their financial holdings and transactions in income-producing property and assets, such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and real property, as well as information on income, gifts, and reimbursements from private non-governmental sources. Covered federal officials must disclose this information not only for themselves, but also must disclose much of the same required financial information with regard to their spouses and dependent children. Public financial disclosure and reporting requirements, originally adopted in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, apply to the President, Vice President, all Members of Congress (as well as to candidates for President, Vice President, or Congress), federal judges and justices, and to employees in all three branches of the federal government who are compensated at a rate of pay over a particular amount (generally, 120% of the base salary of a GS-15) for more than 60 days in a calendar year. Covered officers and employees of the federal government must file detailed financial reports on an annual basis by May 15, setting out information for the previous year on income, gifts, reimbursements, financial holdings and assets, financial transactions, outside positions held, and any agreements or understandings for future private employment. In addition to the annual May 15 reports, all covered public filers must file more frequent public reports throughout the year concerning financial transactions of over $1,000 in assets such as stocks or bonds. Such periodic reports on financial transactions must be filed within 30 days of the receipt of notice of any such covered purchase or sale (but not later than 45 days of the actual transaction). For the highest-level officials in the executive and legislative branches of government—the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, and executive officials compensated on Level I of the Executive Schedule (Cabinet officials) and Level II of the Executive Schedule (including sub-Cabinet officials and heads of executive branch and independent agencies)—all of the public reports required to be filed, including the annual report and the periodic transaction reports, are to be posted on the Internet for public availability, searching, and downloading. For all other covered employees in the federal government, the financial disclosure reports remain publicly available to individuals and the press at the employee's agency.

RS21341 -- Credit Scores: Credit-Based Insurance Scores Updated January 19, 2005 An insurance score, a type of credit score, is a number produced by a proprietary computer scoring model that analyzes a person's credit history information,such as payment history, collection, balances, and bankruptcies. While credit scores are used by lenders to helpthem decide whether to offer a person a loan,insurance scores are used by insurers to determine what level of risk a person represents. The information used incredit and insurance score models is obtainedprincipally from credit reports, generated by the three major national credit reporting agencies (CRAs): Equifax,Experian, and Trans Union. (1) CRAs aresubject to the consumer protections set forth in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). (2) Credit scores have been used widely for some time in credit-relatedbusinesses such as banks, home mortgage lenders, and credit card issuers, but the use of insurance scores by insurersis relatively new. FCRA allows CRAs tofurnish a credit report without the consumer's permission to an insurer when the report is to be used in connectionwith the underwriting of insurance. However, FCRA also provides that when any users of credit information from CRAs use such information to takeaction that is adverse to the consumer, thennotification of that action must be given to the consumer. Over the past several years, insurers increasingly have included credit information from credit reports as factors in insurance underwriting, especially inpersonal lines of insurance such as automobile and homeowners insurance. There is some indication, however, thatcredit information may also have somerelevance in commercial lines of insurance. (3) It hasbeen estimated that 90% of property insurers now use credit information in some way in their underwritingdecisions. (4) Insurers maintain that there is a clearstatistical connection between a person's insurance score and the likelihood of that person filing claims, aswell as how expensive such claims might be. Thus, even though a good insurance score does not necessarily meana person is a good driver or a moreresponsible homeowner, insurers contend that their research has shown that persons with better insurance scoresgenerally file fewer insurance claims and havelower insurance losses. Insurers maintain that as a result of using insurance scores, they can charge lower premiumsor give discounts to many customers whootherwise would pay more for insurance, and are also able to offer coverage to more consumers. Many insurers havedeveloped their own scoring models,while others contract with third parties to obtain their insurance scores. Either way, insurers say the link betweeninsurance scores and insurance losses is clear,and point to two possible explanations. The first explanation relates to stress -- that people under stress are morelikely to have auto accidents, and financialproblems are a known cause of stress. The second explanation relates to risk-taking behavior -- that people havedifferent aversions to risk, and people withpoor insurance scores are more likely to engage in risky behavior and, therefore, more likely to incur losses. State insurance laws generally provide that insurance rates cannot be unfairly discriminatory. Some state regulators and consumer advocates insist thatinsurance scores do in fact discriminate against low-income and minority consumers and that their use should bebanned or limited. Critics also say thatinsurance scores penalize poor people, immigrants, and seniors who may not have credit records. One consumeradvocate recently asserted that insurancescores are the most controversial new addition to the rate-setting process, that they allow insurers to doubleautomobile premiums even for drivers whoserecords are pristine, and that states should ban insurers from using them to set rates. (5) Another consumer advocate has created a separate website to informinsurance consumers about the use of insurance scores and to urge them to get involved in forcing insurers toabandon the practice. (6) FCRA allows CRAs to furnish a credit report to an insurer without the consumer's permission if the report is to be used in connection with the underwriting ofinsurance. However, if any user of credit information from CRAs uses such information to take any adverse action,the person so affected must be givennotification of that action. The provisions of FCRA fall under the enforcement jurisdiction of the Federal TradeCommission (FTC), which, in its commentaryon FCRA, stated that "An insurer may obtain a consumer report to decide whether or not to issue a policy to theconsumer, the amount and terms of coverage,the duration of the policy, the rates or fees charged, or whether or not to renew or cancel a policy, because these areall 'underwriting' decisions." (7) Subsequently, in an interpretative letter, the FTC opined that the term "underwriting decision" included the casewhere an insurer would be obtaining creditreports on existing policyholders to determine whether they would be entitled to a discount under a Good CreditDiscount Program upon renewal of existingpolicies. (8) The use of credit scores in the mortgage lending industry and its potential impact on mortgage applicants have been addressed by the Federal Reserve System'sMortgage Credit Partnership Credit Scoring Committee. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago published an articlein 2000 in which it outlined how creditscores are used in the mortgage application process and also addressed several related issues. (9) One such issue is that while credit scores can servean importantfunction to facilitate access to credit, their nature and usage could result in unlawful discrimination againstminorities and low income applicants. This isgenerally referred to as the "disparate impact" of the use of credit scores. Congress has continued to monitor the effectiveness of FCRA with interest peaking during the first session of the 108th Congress as portions of FCRA were setto expire at the end of 2003. Following a wide-ranging series of hearings and two markups, the House FinancialServices Committee reported H.R. 2622 amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act on July 25, 2003. While the FCRA's primary focus is onthe regulation of credit information,the usage of this information, particularly insurance scores, by insurers drew congressional interest. CongressmanGutierrez previously introduced H.R. 1473 to specifically regulate insurers' use of credit information and he offered an amendment at thesubcommittee markup of H.R. 2622 calling for a study of insurer usage of credit information. This amendment was accepted andincluded in the bill as reported from the fullcommittee. The Senate held hearings and passed a bill amending the FCRA, S. 1753 , after the House. Thisbill also included the requirement for aslightly different study on the usage of credit information in insurance. The conference committee made furtherslight changes to the study requirement and itwas included in the conference report as passed and signed by the President ( P.L. 108-159 ). Unlike banks and other financial institutions that are regulated primarily at the federal level, insurers are regulated primarily at the state level. (10) Most stateinsurance laws prohibit unfair trade practices, and also require that insurance rates not be unfairly discriminatory. Many states require prior approval ofinsurance premium rates, especially those for personal lines such as automobile and homeowners insurance. Statelawmakers are beginning to turn theirattention to the issue of insurers' using credit-based insurance scores in making underwriting, marketing, and ratingdecisions. According to the NationalAssociation of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), 48 states have taken legislative or regulatory actionaddressing insurer use of credit historyinformation. (11) Many of the state laws arefollowing a model law (12) recommended by theNational Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) and generallysupported by insurers. The law was described in congressional testimony (13) as requiring "insurers: to notify an applicant for insurance if credit information will be used in underwriting and rating; to notify a consumer in the event of an adverse action based on credit information, includingnotification of factors that were the primaryinfluences on the adverse action; to re-underwrite and re-rate a policyholder whose credit report was corrected; to indemnify insurance agents/brokers who obtained credit information and/or insurance scoresaccording to an insurer's procedures andaccording to applicable laws and regulations; to file its scoring models with the applicable state department of insurance; such filings are deemedtrade secrets." Although described by a prominent consumer group as improving upon the previous market practices, the NCOIL law is seen as far from the prohibition on useof credit scores that some would prefer. (14) State insurance regulators are also increasing their regulatory oversight over credit-based insurance scores. In some states, the regulators have already addressedthe issue, but in an effort to develop a more unified national approach, most regulators are working through theirtrade organization, the National Association ofInsurance Commissioners (NAIC). In March 2002, the NAIC appointed a credit scoring working group to focuson the various regulatory issues related to theuse of credit information in the insurance underwriting and rating process. The working group has drafteddocuments to aid insurance consumers, and to assistthe regulators in clarifying the issues and recommending a set of best practices. Two draft documents were citedin NAIC congressional testimony (15) andapproved by the full NAIC shortly thereafter: Consumer Brochure: Understanding How Insurers Use Credit Information : This is a question/answer brochure, addressing such mattersas the legality of an insurer's obtaining a credit report under FCRA without permission, why and how insurers usecredit information, and how to improve one'sinsurance score. Credit-Based Insurance Scoring: Regulatory Options : This document seeks to set forth thepros and cons of various regulation options,including a ban on the use of credit history for rating purposes. These two documents, however, did not complete the recommendations or policies some hoped would emanate from the working group and the NAIC. A studyon the possible disparate impact of credit scoring was proposed. This proposed study, however, provokedsignificant debate and opposition. The workinggroup cancelled a previously scheduled session at the regular NAIC summer national meeting that was held June21-24, 2003. (16) At the NAIC fall nationalmeeting, held September 13-16, 2003, this study was put off and it was suggested that concerned states should dostudies of their own. (17) Indiana, Louisiana,Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington planned such a study, eventually abandoned theeffort under the threat of litigation from theindustry. (18) More recently, the NAIC workinggroup produced a white paper with a set of "best practices" relating to the usage of credit scoring. A number of lawsuits have been filed alleging violations of either state or federal law relating to the usage of credit information. For example, a lawsuit againstAllstate was filed seeking class action status in U.S. District Court in San Antonio, Texas, by several minorityplaintiffs alleging that the insurer usedinformation from credit reports and improperly factored it into a secretive scoring formula to target non-whites formore expensive policies than similarlysituated whites. Allstate's motion to dismiss was denied, and the case as been allowed to proceed after successiveappeals to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court and theU.S. Supreme Court. Insurers are concerned that the case could lead to a determination of a new discriminationstandard over and above the state lawprohibiting unfair discrimination, and thus usurp the authority of state insurance regulators and state laws. (19) Allstate is not the only insurer who has been to court on such an issue. In Illinois, a suit alleged that State Farm had engaged in the practice of refusing to issueor renew insurance policies solely on the basis of a credit report, in violation of the Illinois Insurance Code. (20) In Texas, the attorney general sued FarmersInsurance Group, alleging, among other charges, that the insurer was "using credit history as a significant factor insetting premiums, without disclosing theadverse impact of doing so...." (21) A settlementwas reached in the Texas case in December 2002, but it was challenged by some Texas policyholders. (22)

An insurance score, a type of credit score, is a number produced by a computer scoringmodel that analyzes aperson's credit information (i.e., payment history, collections, balances, and bankruptcies) obtained principally fromthat person's credit reports. Increasingly,insurers have been using insurance scores as an underwriting factor to evaluate insurance applications, especiallyfor automobile and homeowners insurance, inpredicting possible future insurance claims an applicant might generate. Insurers maintain that there is a clearstatistical connection between a person'sinsurance score and the likelihood of that person filing claims, as well as how expensive such claims might be. Byusing insurance scores, insurers say that theyare able to charge lower premiums to most customers who are better risks. On the other hand, some consumeradvocates dispute the insurers' position andargue that the use of insurance scores has a disparate effect on minorities, and is merely a new method by whichinsurers can increase premium rates. Even though credit scores have been widely used for some time by credit-related businesses such as homemortgage lenders and credit card issuers, the use ofinsurance scores by insurers is relatively new. The growing discontent regarding the use of credit-based scoring hasbeen reflected in proposed legislationamending the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require additional consumer protections, and in increased litigation. Insurance scores, like other credit scores basedon credit reports, are regulated to some degree at the federal level. Unlike other credit scores, however, insurancescores used in the underwriting process arealso subject to state insurance laws and regulations. Most of the states have been active in recently reviewing theirlaws and regulations in this area. Federallegislation in the 108th Congress that would have affected insurance scoring included H.R. 1473,H.R. 2796, H.R. 2622,and S. 1753. The latter two were the House and Senate versions of what would become P.L. 108-159, whichmandated a study on the impact ofinsurance scoring. This report will be updated in the event of significant legislative or regulatory developments.

On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204 . This law has been described by some as the most important and far-reaching securities legislation since passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, both of which were passed in the wake of the Stock Market Crash of 1929. Sarbanes-Oxley had its genesis early in 2002 after the declared bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation, but for some time it appeared as though its impetus had slowed. However, when the WorldCom scandal became known in late June, the Congress showed renewed interest in enacting stiffer corporate responsibility legislation, and Sarbanes-Oxley quickly became law. The act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board), which is supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission). The act restricts accounting firms from performing a number of other services for the companies which they audit. The act also requires new disclosures for public companies and the officers and directors of those companies. Among the other issues affected by the legislation are securities fraud, criminal and civil penalties for violating the securities laws and other laws, blackouts for insider trades of pension fund shares, and protections for corporate whistleblowers. Currently, one of the most controversial provisions of the act is Section 404, Management Assessment of Internal Controls. The provision states: (a) Rules Required—The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal control report, which shall— (1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting. (b) Internal Control Evaluation and Reporting—With respect to the internal control assessment required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate engagement. The provision's controversy stems from charges that some aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly Section 404, are overly burdensome and costly for small and medium-sized companies. For example, one critic has stated that the costs of Section 404 are "extreme." "As one of our members testified before the House Small Business Committee, his company's efforts to comply with Section 404 in preparation to go public were simply too excessive to justify the effort—10% to 15% of gross revenues.... Well-published studies and hard data demonstrate similar cost percentages for small firms." The SEC over the years has taken various steps to delay compliance with Section 404 by defined small companies. For example, on May 17, 2006, the SEC issued a press release which, among other actions, announced that it would briefly postpone application of Section 404 to the smallest companies but that ultimately all public companies would be required to comply with the internal control reporting requirements of Section 404. This view taken by the Commission conflicted with several recommendations in a report issued by the Commission's Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies on April 23, 2006, which would exempt small companies from many of the internal reporting requirements of Section 404. On December 15, 2006, the SEC adopted rule changes which give smaller firms, referred to as non-accelerated filers, more time to comply with Section 404's internal controls reporting requirements. Under the extension, a non-accelerated filer must provide management's assessment concerning internal control over financial reporting in its annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007. On April 4, 2007, the SEC's commissioners endorsed the recommendations of its staff to work closely with the PCAOB to issue auditing standards intended to ease the burden on small companies in complying with Section 404. Additionally, on May 23, 2007, the SEC commissioners voted unanimously to approve a relaxed set of guidelines for the internal accounting controls required by Section 404 for smaller public companies, defined in most cases as those with a public float below $75 million. The perceived problem of compliance with Section 404 reporting requirements faced by small and medium-sized companies was an issue in both the 109 th and 110 th Congresses and continued to be an issue in the 111 th Congress. Virtually identical bills addressing this issue were introduced in both houses of the 109 th Congress: H.R. 5405 in the House and S. 2824 in the Senate. Each bill was titled the Competitive and Open Markets that Protect and Enhance the Treatment of Entrepreneurs (COMPETE) Act. The bills would have permitted an issuer to elect voluntarily not to be subject to much of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley if the issuer has a total market capitalization for the relevant reporting period of less than $700 million; has total product revenue for that reporting period of less than $125 million; has fewer than 1,500 record beneficial holders; has been subject to the various reporting requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for a period of less than 12 calendar months; or has not filed and was not required to file an annual report under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The bills would have set forth a de minimus standard for implementing the requirements of Section 404. The bills would also have required the SEC and the PCAOB to conduct a study assessing the principles-based Turnbull Guidance under the securities laws of Great Britain to the implementation of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley and to submit the report to Congress within one year of enactment of the COMPETE Act. Bills introduced in the 110 th Congress continued the attempt to correct the perceived problems created by Section 404. H.R. 1049 , referred to the Committee on Financial Services, was titled the Amend Misinterpreted Excessive Regulation in Corporate America Act (AMERICA). The bill would have created an ombudsman for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board). The ombudsman would have been appointed by the Board and would have acted as a liaison between the PCAOB and any registered public accounting firm or issuer concerning issues or disputes related to the preparation or issuance of any audit report of that issuer, especially with respect to the implementation of Section 404; assured that safeguards existed to encourage complainants to come forward and to preserve confidentiality; and carried out other activities in accordance with guidelines prescribed by the Board. The bill would have required the SEC and the PCAOB to adopt revisions to their rules or standards under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley so that the costs of implementation of Section 404 would not significantly increase the costs of complying with the annual audits required by the Securities Exchange Act. Further, the bill would have prohibited a private right of action to be brought against any registered public accounting firm in any federal or state court on the basis of a violation or alleged violation of the requirements of Section 404 or of the standards issued by the Board for the purposes of implementing the provisions of Section 404. H.R. 1508 , referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and S. 869 , referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, were titled the COMPETE Act of 2007 and were comparable. They were similar to H.R. 5405 and S. 2824 , introduced in the 109 th Congress. They would have amended Section 404 so that each registered public accounting firm preparing or issuing an audit report for an issuer would have been required to attest to and report on the management assessment of the issuer. The attestation and report on the assessment made by the management of the issuer would not have included a separate opinion on the outcome of the assessment. This attestation and report would have been required to be performed at three-year intervals. The attestation would have been required to be made in accordance with standards adopted by the Board. The SEC would have had to develop a standard of materiality for the conduct of the assessment and report on an internal control based upon whether the internal control had a material affect on the company's financial statements and was significant to the issuer's overall financial status. The bills would have permitted a smaller public company not to be subject to Section 404. A "smaller public company" was defined as having a total market capitalization for the relevant reporting period of less than $700 million and total product and services revenue for the reporting period of less than $125 million or at the beginning of the reporting period fewer than 1,500 record beneficial owners. The SEC and the Board would have had to conduct a study examining the lack of and impediments to robust competition for the performance of audits for issuers. The SEC and the Board would have also been required to conduct a study comparing and contrasting the principles-based Turnbull Guidance under the securities laws of Great Britain to the implementation of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Several other bills affecting compliance with Section 404 were introduced in the 110 th Congress. Bills introduced in the 111 th Congress to provide an exemption for small companies from the requirements of Section 404 included H.R. 1797 and H.R. 3775 . On November 4, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee recommended H.R. 3817 , the Investor Protection Act, which contained a clause, inserted as a bipartisan amendment, permanently exempting businesses with a market capitalization up to $75 million from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. The SEC and others would study how the burden of compliance with Section 404 could be reduced for companies valued between $75 million and $250 million and whether reducing or eliminating their compliance with Section 404 would encourage these companies to offer their shares to the public on United States exchanges. This bill was included in H.R. 4173 , the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, as Section 7606, passed by the House on December 11, 2009. The Senate-passed bill on financial regulatory reform, S. 3217 , did not have a comparable provision. House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform approved a conference report, H.Rept. 111-517 , which has a provision exempting businesses with a market capitalization of $75 million or less from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. The provision also requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to determine how it can reduce the burden of complying with Section 404 for companies whose market capitalization is between $75 million and $250 million while maintaining investor protections. Both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report. The President signed the bill, known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010. Bills were introduced in the 112 th Congress which would allow, at least temporarily, certain companies capitalized at more than $75 million to have an exemption from complying with parts of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley and other provisions of the federal securities laws. One of these bills, H.R. 3606 , eventually a combination of several House bills, passed both the House and the Senate and is titled the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). The bill's Section 103 exempts certain companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion, called emerging growth companies, from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404(b) for up to five years. The President signed the bill on April 5, 2012.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue rules requiring annual reports filed by reporting issuers to state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and for each accounting firm auditing the issuer's annual report to attest to the assessment made of the internal accounting procedures made by the issuer's management. There have been criticisms that this provision is overly burdensome and costly for small and medium-sized companies. On December 15, 2006, the SEC adopted rule changes giving smaller firms more time to comply with Section 404's reporting requirements. Compliance with Section 404 by small and medium-sized companies was an issue in both the 109th and 110th Congresses and continued as an issue in the 111th Congress. On November 4, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee recommended H.R. 3817, the Investor Protection Act, which contained a clause, inserted as a bipartisan amendment, permanently exempting businesses with a market capitalization up to $75 million from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. This bill was included in H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, as Section 7606, passed by the House on December 11, 2009. The Senate-passed bill on financial regulatory reform, S. 3217, did not have a comparable provision. House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform approved a conference report, H.Rept. 111-517, which had a provision exempting businesses with a market capitalization of $75 million or less from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404. Both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report. The President signed the bill, known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010. Bills were introduced in the 112th Congress which would allow, at least temporarily, certain companies capitalized at more than $75 million to have an exemption from complying with parts of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley and other provisions of the federal securities laws. One of these bills, H.R. 3606, eventually a combination of several House bills, passed both the House and the Senate and is titled the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). The bill has a provision which would exempt certain companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion from complying with the auditing requirements of Section 404(b) for up to five years. The President signed the bill on April 5, 2012.

D isaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits are available only to those individuals who have become unemployed as a direct result of a declared major disaster and who are not eligible for regular Unemployment Compensation (UC). First created in 1970 through P.L. 91-606, DUA benefits are authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (the Stafford Act), which authorizes the President to issue a major disaster declaration after state and local government resources have been overwhelmed by a natural catastrophe or, "regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States" (42 U.S.C. 5122(2)). Based upon the request of the affected state's governor, the President may declare a major disaster. The declaration identifies the areas in the state eligible for assistance. The declaration of a major disaster provides the full range of disaster assistance available under the Stafford Act, including, but not limited to, the repair, replacement, or reconstruction of public and nonprofit facilities, cash grants for the personal needs of victims, housing, and unemployment assistance related to job loss from the disaster. The UC program generally does not provide UC benefits to the self-employed, to those who are unable to work, or to those who do not have a recent earnings history. However, when the President declares a major disaster, individuals who would typically be ineligible for UC (or who have exhausted UC benefits) may be eligible for DUA. In some cases, UC beneficiaries who had an entitlement to UC benefits of fewer than 26 weeks and who had become unemployed as a direct result of a disaster and exhaust their weeks of UC entitlement may be entitled to some DUA benefits. No more than a total of 26 weeks of total benefits (UC plus DUA) are allowable in this situation. DUA benefits are funded through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The DRF is funded annually through discretionary appropriations on a no-yea r basis, meaning that any unobligated funds from a previous fiscal year may be used in future fiscal years. In general, when the balance of the DRF has become low, additional funding has previously been provided through annual and/or supplemental appropriations to replenish the account. DOL administers the DUA program and coordinates with FEMA to provide the funds to the state UC agencies for payment of DUA benefits and payment of state administrative costs under agreements with DOL. The individual eligibility requirements for DUA differ from the UC program requirements. First, an individual generally must have no entitlement to UC benefits. (UC beneficiaries who had an entitlement to UC benefits of fewer than 26 weeks and who had become unemployed as a direct result of a disaster and exhaust their weeks of UC entitlement may be entitled to DUA benefits. No more than a total of 26 weeks of benefits [UC plus DUA] are allowable in this situation.) For example, eligibility for DUA benefits does not necessarily require that the individual have a substantial work history and in some cases does not require that the worker be available for work (unlike the UC program requirements). In particular, the DUA regulation defines eligible unemployed workers to include the self-employed; workers who experience a "week of unemployment" following the date the major disaster began when such unemployment is a direct result of the major disaster; workers unable to reach the place of employment as a direct result of the major disaster; workers who were to begin employment and do not have a job or are unable to reach the job as a direct result of the major disaster; individuals who have become the breadwinner or major support for a household because the head of the household has died as a direct result of the major disaster; and workers who cannot work because of injuries caused as a direct result of the major disaster. As with state UC programs, workers who do not have permission to work legally in the United States are not eligible for DUA benefits. Noncitizens must have a Social Security number and an alien registration card number in order to apply for DUA benefits. Generally, applications must be filed within 30 days after the date the state announces availability of DUA benefits. When applicants have good cause, they may file claims after the 30-day deadline. This deadline may be extended. However, initial applications filed after the 26 th week following the declaration date will not be considered. On November 13, 2001, DOL issued a new interpretive rule clarifying the definition of the phrase "unemployment as a direct result of the major disaster." DOL issued this clarifying rule because the September 11, 2001, disasters presented a number of exigencies not anticipated by the existing regulations. The action by DOL amended 20 C.F.R. §625.5 by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows: §625.5 Unemployment caused by a major disaster. (c) Unemployment is a direct result of the major disaster. For the purposes of paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(1) of this section, a worker's or self-employed individual's unemployment is a direct result of the major disaster where the unemployment is an immediate result of the major disaster itself, and not the result of a longer chain of events precipitated or exacerbated by the disaster. Such an individual's unemployment is a direct result of the major disaster if the unemployment resulted from: (1) physical damage or destruction of the place of employment; (2) physical inaccessibility of the place of employment due to its closure by the federal government, in immediate response to the disaster; or (3) lack of work, or loss of revenues, provided that, prior to the disaster, the employer, or the business in the case of a self-employed individual, received at least a majority of its revenue or income from an entity that was either damaged or destroyed in the disaster, or an entity closed by the federal government in immediate response to the disaster. Prior to the construction of this new rule, the phrase "unemployed as a direct result of a major disaster" had never been defined in the regulations. Although DOL issued the new clarifying rule in the wake of the September 11, 2001, disasters, the rule applies to any subsequently declared major disasters. The rule is intended to make clear a distinction between those individuals unemployed as an immediate result of the disaster itself, and those whose unemployment may have been caused by a long chain of events initiated by the disaster. The rule is also intended to exclude from DUA those individuals whose unemployment is the result of general economic decline that has been an indirect effect of a major disaster. DUA benefits are generally calculated by state UC agencies under the provisions of the state law for UC in the state where the disaster occurred. The maximum weekly benefit amount is determined under the provisions of the state law. The minimum weekly DUA benefit a worker may receive is half of the average weekly UC benefit for the state where the disaster occurred. In all cases, workers will receive a DUA benefit that is at least half of the average UC benefit for that state and cannot receive more than the maximum UC benefit available in that state. DUA beneficiaries (because they are not entitled to regular UC or have exhausted their entitlement to UC) are not eligible to receive Extended Benefits (EB). When a reasonable comparative earnings history can be constructed, DUA benefits are determined in a similar manner to regular state UC benefit rules. Self-employed persons are expected to bring in their tax records to prove a level of earnings for the previous two years. These records would take the place of the employer-reported wage data in UC benefit determination. Likewise, workers who would otherwise be eligible for UC benefits except for the injuries caused as a direct result of the disaster that make them unavailable for work would receive DUA benefits of an amount equivalent to what they would have received under the UC system if they were not injured and were available to work. Workers who do not have a sufficient employment history to qualify for UC benefits (either as a new worker or as a recent hire) receive a DUA benefit equivalent to half of the average UC benefit for that state. Unemployed workers could also be eligible for reemployment services, which may include counseling and referrals to suitable work opportunities. DUA assistance is available to eligible individuals as long as the major disaster continues, but no longer than 26 weeks after the disaster declaration. The duration of DUA has been temporarily extended for certain disasters three times: after the September 11th terrorist attacks, after the 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and after the 2017 Hurricanes Irma and Maria. In the 107th Congress, P.L. 107-154 was signed into law on March 25, 2002, temporarily extending the duration of DUA benefits from 26 to 39 weeks for victims of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the declared major disaster areas in New York and Virginia. This was the first time the duration of DUA benefits was statutorily extended. This extension did not apply to any subsequent major disasters. In the 109th Congress, P.L. 109-176 was signed into law on March 6, 2006, extending the duration of DUA benefits from 26 to 39 weeks for victims of the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disasters. This extension ended on June 3, 2006, for those qualifying for benefits on account of Hurricane Katrina and on June 24, 2006, for those affected by Hurricane Rita. This extension did not apply to any subsequent major disasters. In the 115th Congress, P.L. 115-254 , the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, was signed into law on October 5, 2018. Among its many provisions, it retroactively extended DUA for an additional 26 weeks for persons who were unemployed in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands as a direct result of the 2017 Hurricane Irma or Hurricane Maria disasters. (This created a total potential entitlement to DUA of up to 52 weeks for some individuals.) Because the disasters had both been declared more than 52 weeks before the enactment of P.L. 115-254 , the remaining DUA weeks will be paid retroactively. Individuals who worked in these areas and who have exhausted entitlement to UC or EB may also be eligible for DUA benefits for the remaining otherwise uncompensated weeks in the disaster assistance period that were not covered by UC and EB. DUA benefits may be reduced by other income received by the DUA beneficiary. These reductions are made in a manner similar to how such additional income reduces UC benefits (e.g., all states disregard some earnings as an incentive to take short-term work while unemployed workers search for a permanent job), but do not mirror them exactly. The reductions are made for additional income that includes benefits or insurance for loss of wages due to illness or disability; supplemental unemployment benefits paid pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement; private income protection insurance; worker's compensation or survivor's benefits if the DUA beneficiary becomes household head due to the head of the household's death because of the disaster; retirement, pension, or annuity income; earnings from employment or self-employment; and subsidy or price support payments, crops insurance, and farm disaster relief payments. When the President declares a major disaster in a state and indicates DUA benefits may be available, the state's UC agency requests DUA funds from DOL, which in turn receives funds from the Disaster Relief Fund admi nistered by FEMA. The DOL obligates a portion of that request to the state. The state may request more funding as a supplement if needed. Table 1 shows DUA benefit payments from FY2002 through April 2018. Figure 1 plots the number of individuals who applied for DUA benefits (Initial Claims) and the number of individuals who received DUA benefits for at least one week (First Payments) from January 2001 through April 2018. As with the UC program, many more individuals apply for DUA benefits than receive them. There is a seasonal element to claims and payments that centers on the hurricane season (running from June 1 to November 30). The one exception to the patterns of initial claims and first payments centering on the hurricane season is the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Workers continued to apply for and receive benefits stemming from the terrorist attacks in substantial numbers through March 2002. This was attributable to the extension of benefits for an additional 13 weeks provided by P.L. 107-154 . The Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disasters overwhelm all other disasters in the amount of benefits that were paid. The extension of DUA benefits for an additional 13 weeks allowed workers who would have originally been receiving UC benefits and had exhausted them to file for DUA benefits. This created a second wave of first filings and initial claims in March 2006. To determine whether DUA is available in a state, disaster victims must ascertain whether the President has declared the event a major disaster; for which counties (if any) DUA has been made available; and how to contact the state UC agency. FEMA maintains a list of disasters by calendar year, located at http://www.fema.gov/disasters . Each disaster is given a contract number , which provides a link to relevant information pertaining to each disaster, including a list of counties designated to receive assistance. To determine if individual disaster assistance is available for a particular address (and the potential availability of DUA), individuals should access http://disasterassistance.gov and follow the instructions. If counties in a state have been included in a major disaster declaration and have been designated to receive DUA, it is necessary to contact the state's unemployment agency to obtain the details of how to apply for and receive DUA benefits. The DOL maintains a website with links to each state's unemployment agency at https://www.careeronestop.org/localhelp/unemploymentbenefits/unemployment-benefits.aspx .

Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits are available only to those individuals who have become unemployed as a direct result of a declared major disaster and are not eligible for regular Unemployment Compensation (UC). First created in 1970 through P.L. 91-606, DUA benefits are authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (the Stafford Act), which authorizes the President to issue a major disaster declaration after state and local government resources have been overwhelmed by a natural catastrophe or, "regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States" (42 U.S.C. §5122(2)). The DUA program provides income support to individuals who become unemployed as a direct result of a major disaster and who have no remaining entitlement for regular UC benefits. DUA is funded through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL) through each state's UC agency. DUA beneficiaries (because they are not entitled to regular UC) are not eligible to receive Extended Benefits (EB). On October 5, 2018, P.L. 115-254, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, was signed into law. Among its many provisions, it temporarily extends the duration of DUA for an additional 26 weeks (up to 52 weeks total) for persons who were unemployed in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands as a direct result of the 2017 Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria disasters. This report contains information on how to ascertain if an individual is eligible for DUA benefits. For information on how unemployment and employment programs respond to disasters, see CRS Report R45182, Unemployment and Employment Programs Available to Workers Affected by Disasters.

Recent tragic events in Tucson, AZ, have raised questions about the extent to which federal law outlaws crimes of violence committed against federal officials or federal employees. More than a few outlaw such conduct. Murder or assault committed anywhere in the United States is outlawed in the law of the state in which it occurs. Notwithstanding any state prosecution, however, a number of federal laws outlaw crimes of violence committed under various federal jurisdictional circumstances, including but not limited to the fact that crime is committed against a Member of Congress, a federal judge, the President, or a federal employee. The more prominent of these, with particular attention to the events in Tucson, are mentioned briefly below. The federal homicide and related statutes include: 18 U.S.C. 351(a) (killing a Member of Congress, certain senior executive officials, Justices of the Supreme Court, a Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate, or nominee to the Supreme Court) Penalties: 1 st degree murder—death or imprisonment for life or any term of years, 18 U.S.C. 1111 2d degree murder—imprisonment for life or any term of years, id. Voluntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 15 years, 18 U.S.C.1112 Involuntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 8 years, id. attempted murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 351(c) conspiracy to commit murder—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 351(d)(or death, if death results) 18 U.S.C. 1751(a) (killing the President, Vice President, an official serving as President, or certain senior executive officials) Penalties: 1 st degree murder—death or imprisonment for life or any term of years, 18 U.S.C. 1111 2d degree murder—imprisonment for life or any term of years, id. Voluntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 1112 Involuntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 8 years, id. attempted murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1751 conspiracy to commit murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1751 (or death, if death results) 18 U.S.C 1114 (killing a federal officer or employee (including a federal judge or a member of the armed forces) during or on account of the performance of their duties or someone during or on account of assistance provided such officers or employees) Penalties: 1 st degree murder—death or imprisonment for life or any term of years, 18 U.S.C. 1111 2d degree murder—imprisonment for life or any term of years, id. Voluntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 1112 Involuntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 8 years, id. attempted murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1114 conspiracy to commit murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C.1117 18 U.S.C. 930(c) (a use of firearm or dangerous weapon in federal facility to kill another) Penalties: 1 st degree murder—death or imprisonment for life or any term of years, 18 U.S.C. 1111 2d degree murder—imprisonment for life or any term of years, id. Voluntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 1112 Involuntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 8 years, id. attempted murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1113 conspiracy to commit murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1117 18 U.S.C. 115 (murder of a former federal official or employee or the family member of a current or former federal official or employee, in order to influence, impede, or retaliate against such current or former federal official or employee) Penalties: 1 st degree murder—death or imprisonment for life or any term of years, 18 U.S.C. 1111 2d degree murder—imprisonment for life or any term of years, id. attempted murder—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1113 conspiracy to commit murder—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1117 18 U.S.C. 1111, 1112, 1113, 1117 (homicide within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States (including U.S. overseas facilities and residences when committed by or against a U.S. national, 18 U.S.C. 7(9)) also applicable when committed overseas by those serving in, accompanying, or employed by the U.S. armed forces, 18 U.S.C. 3261) Penalties: 1 st degree murder—death or imprisonment for life or any term of years, 18 U.S.C. 1111 2d degree murder—imprisonment for life or any term of years, id. Voluntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 1112 Involuntary manslaughter—imprisonment for not more than 8 years, id. attempted murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1113 conspiracy to commit murder or manslaughter—imprisonment for any term of years or for life, 18 U.S.C. 1117 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (use of a firearm during and in furtherance of a federal crime of violence) Penalties: firearm is possessed—imprisonment for not less than 5 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) firearm is brandished—imprisonment for not less than 7 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence, id. firearm is discharged—imprisonment for not less than 10 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence, id. second & subsequent convictions—imprisonment for not less than 25 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence and any initial or subsequent conviction for use of a firearm during and in furtherance of a federal crime of violence, id. There are dozens of other federal homicide provisions. Many involve either a violation of some lesser offense where death results or a homicide committed against a federal employee in relation to enforcement of a particular federal law. The federal assault statutes include: 18 U.S.C. 351(e) (assaulting a Member of Congress, certain senior executive officials, Justices of the Supreme Court, a Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate, or nominee to the Supreme Court) Penalties: committed with a dangerous weapon or if personal injury results—imprisonment for not more than 10 years otherwise—imprisonment for not more than 1 year 18 U.S.C. 1751(e) (assaulting the President, Vice-President, an official serving as President, or certain senior executive officials) Penalties: committed with a dangerous weapon or if personal injury results—imprisonment for not more than 10 years otherwise—imprisonment for not more than 1 year 18 U.S.C 1114 (assaulting a federal officer or employee (including a federal judge or a member of the armed forces) during or on account of the performance of their duties or someone during or on account of assistance provided such officers or employees) Penalties: committed with a dangerous weapon or if personal injury results—imprisonment for not more than 20 years resulting in physical contact or committed with intent to commit another felony—imprisonment for not more than 8 years otherwise—imprisonment for not more than 1 year 18 U.S.C. 115 (assaulting a former federal official or employee or the family member of a current or former federal official or employee, in order to influence, impede, retaliate against such current or former federal official or employee) Penalties: committed with a dangerous weapon or if personal injury results—imprisonment for not more than 10 years otherwise—imprisonment for not more than 1 year 18 U.S.C. 113 (assault within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States—including U.S. overseas facilities and residences when committed by or against a U.S. national, 18 U.S.C. 7(9)—also applicable when committed overseas by those serving in, accompanying, or employed by the U.S. armed forces, 18 U.S.C. 3261) Penalties: with intent to murder—imprisonment for not more than 20 years assault with intent to commit any other felony—imprisonment for not more than 10 years assault with intent to harm and with a dangerous weapon—imprisonment for not more than 10 years assault resulting in serious bodily injury—imprisonment for not more than 10 years assault resulting in substantial bodily injury of a child under 16 years of age—imprisonment for not more than 5 years simple assault under 16 years of age—imprisonment for not more than 5 years otherwise—imprisonment for not more than 6 months 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (use of a firearm during and in furtherance of a federal crime of violence) Penalties: firearm is possessed—imprisonment for not less than 5 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) firearm is brandished—imprisonment for not less than 7 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence, id. firearm is discharged—imprisonment for not less than 10 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence, id. second & subsequent convictions—imprisonment for not less than 25 years to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence and any initial or subsequent conviction for use of a firearm during and in furtherance of a federal crime of violence, id. There are dozens of other federal assault provisions. Many involve assaults committed against a federal employee in relation to enforcement of a particular federal law. 18 U.S.C. 115 (threatening to assault, kidnap, or kill a federal official or employee, a former federal official or employee, or the family member of a current or former federal official or employee, in order to influence, impede, retaliate against such current or former federal official or employee) Penalties: threat to kidnap or kill—imprisonment for not more than 10 years threat to assault—imprisonment for not more than 6 years 18 U.S.C. 871 (use of the mails to threaten to kill, kidnap, or harm the President, Vice President, or President- or Vice President-elect) Penalty: imprisonment for not more than 5 years 18 U.S.C. 879 (threatening to kill, kidnap, or harm a candidate for President or Vice President; a former President or Vice President; any member of their immediate families; or any member of the family of a President, of a Vice President, or of a President or Vice President-elect Penalty: imprisonment for not more than 5 years 18 U.S.C. 875(c) (transmitting in interstate or foreign commerce a threat to kidnap or injure another) Penalty: imprisonment for not more than 5 years 18 U.S.C. 876(c) (mailing a threat to kidnap or injure) Penalty: imprisonment for not more than 5 years (not more than 10 years if the victim is a federal judge or other federal official or employee) The First Amendment limits criminal proscription of a threat to "true threats." There are dozens of federal threat statutes relating to threats under more narrow jurisdictional circumstances.

Dozens of federal statutes outlaw homicide, assault, and threats under varying jurisdictional circumstances. Those which appear most relevant to tragic events in Tucson, AZ, are identified in abbreviated form here.

Most private equity and hedge funds are organized as partnerships. For tax purposes, a partnership is broadly defined to include two or more individuals who jointly engage in a for-profit business activity. They typically consist of general partners (who actively manage the partnership), and limited partners (who contribute capital). General partners may also contribute capital. According to a George W. Bush Administration official, tax considerations likely motivate the organization of private equity and hedge funds as partnerships. In general, partnerships do not pay the corporate income tax and, instead, pass all of their gains and losses on to the partners. The returns of these partnerships are generally taxed as capital gains. In addition, the tax rules for partnerships allow sufficient flexibility to accommodate many economic arrangements, such as special allocations of income or loss among the partners. General and limited partners are compensated when the investment yields a positive return. This income, as mentioned above, is not taxed at the partnership level; only the individual partners pay taxes, usually at the capital gains rate. In addition, the general partners typically receive additional compensation from the limited partners. Compensation structures may vary from fund to fund, but the standard pay formula is called "2 and 20." The "2" represents a fixed management fee (2%) that does not depend upon the performance of the fund. It is characterized as ordinary income for the general partner and is taxed at ordinary income tax rates. The "20" is a share of the profits from the assets under management (20%). This portion of the general partners' compensation is commonly referred to as the carried interest. Selecting this form of compensation aligns the interests of both the limited and general partners toward achieving a positive return on investment. Carried interest is characterized as a capital gain and taxed at the capital gains rate. Issues surrounding the characterization of carried interest are the focus of the remainder of this report. Central to the current debate concerning the tax treatment of carried interest is whether it is compensation for services, or an interest in the partnership's capital. Current law treats carried interest the same as all other profits derived from the partnership and thus characterizes carried interest as being derived from an interest in the partnership's capital. As a result, carried interest is taxed at capital gains rates, which have historically been lower than the rates on ordinary income. This rate differential is generally thought to motivate the current structure of compensation received by fund managers. If carried interests were treated as compensation for services provided by the general partners, then the realized gains would be characterized as ordinary income, taxed at generally higher rates, and subject to payroll taxes. In the United States, debate on the appropriate characterization of carried interest has been brought to the forefront by the President's 2010, 2011, and 2012 Budget Outlines, proposed legislation, and a series of congressional hearings on carried interest. The President's 2010, 2011, and 2012 Budget Outlines along with numerous bills in prior Congresses (House-passed H.R. 4213 and H.R. 1935 in the 111 th Congress) would make carried interest taxable as ordinary income, whereas a House-passed amendment in the 111 th Congress to H.R. 4213 , the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, would have treated a portion of carried interest as ordinary income. The former approach may mirror that taken in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 2834 , H.R. 3996 , and H.R. 6275 , in making carried interest taxable as ordinary income. The bills stated that carried interest "shall be treated as ordinary income for the performance of services" and thus taxed as ordinary income at rates up to 35%. H.R. 3996 was passed by the House of Representatives on November 9, 2007, and by the Senate on December 6, 2007, with an amendment that removed the carried interest provision, while H.R. 6275 was passed by the House of Representatives on June 25, 2008, and subsequently received by the Senate Finance Committee. In addition, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee held a series of hearings on carried interest during the last session. Debate concerning the characterization of carried interest is not unique to the United States. In fact, the United Kingdom's Treasury Select Committee has asked HM Revenue and Customs to explain a 2003 memorandum of understanding that allows general partners in private equity funds to characterize carried interest as investment income. In addition, Table 1 illustrates that European countries have not achieved a consensus view on the appropriate characterization of carried interest. Most analysts view carried interest as representing, at least partly, compensation for services provided by the general partner. In some instances this distinction is clear, but in others it is more opaque. Analysts generally base their characterization of carried interest upon the degree to which the general partners' own assets are at risk and differences in the profit interest of the general and limited partners. Some view carried interest as a type of performance-based compensation that should be characterized as ordinary income. That is, the general partner is being compensated for providing the service of generating a positive return on the investment. This argument would seem to have greater merit in cases where a "hurdle rate" must be reached prior to the award of a carried interest. Some also argue for a change in the characterization of carried interest based upon the economic principles of efficiency and equity. Tax systems are generally deemed more efficient when they tax similar activities in a like manner. Critics note that under the current characterization of carried interest, these performance fees are taxed less heavily than other forms of compensation, leading to distortions in employment, organizational form, and compensation decisions. As a result of these distortions, they maintain that the economy misallocates its scarce resources. They also argue that the current treatment of carried interest violates the principles of both horizontal and vertical equity. That is, individuals with the same income should owe the same in taxes regardless of the form of the income, and that those that earn more should pay more in taxes than those that earn less. Others view the current characterization of carried interest as appropriate, because of the general partners' contribution of "sweat equity" to the fund. That is, the general partners contribute their management skills to the partnership, in lieu of contributing capital. Once granted a carried interest, the general partner has an immediate ownership interest in the partnership, and thus is taxed on the proceeds of the partnership, based upon the character of the proceeds. Under this view, the limited partners agree to finance the carried interest through a reduction (relative to their capital investment) in their rights to the profits of the partnership. This view, however, highlights a general inconsistency in the tax code, from an economic perspective—the blurring of the returns from labor and capital. For example, imagine the case of a sole proprietor who turns an idea into a business. If the sole proprietor is later able to sell the business for a profit, the tax system will characterize the profit as a capital gain, though the provision of labor unquestionably contributed to the increased value of the business. In other cases, such as when nonqualifed stock options are exercised, the issue is more transparent, and the gain is characterized as compensation and taxed as ordinary income. Any subsequent gain or loss is characterized and taxed as a capital gain. Some have interpreted this "sweat equity" argument to represent an implicit loan to the general partners that should be taxed somewhere between that of pure capital and pure ordinary income. Under this option, the general partner would be viewed as receiving an interest-free loan from the limited partners equal to share of the partnership represented by the carried interest. The general partner would count the implicit interest from the loan as ordinary income. Subsequent profits from the carried interest would then be taxed as capital gains. Some view potential modifications to the treatment of carried interest as unadministrable. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Eric Solomon stated that the current taxation of carried interest provides certainty for taxpayers and is administrable for the Internal Revenue Service. He cautioned against making significant changes in these rules, given the widespread reliance of partnerships on these rules. Others argued that the current characterization of carried interest contributes to innovation and adds economic value to the economy. They asserted that venture capitalists engage in risking time, money, and effort to assist the most compelling business models to improve the way that Americans live and work. Further, they argued that private equity allows companies to invest in long-term strategies that might otherwise be ignored by the managers of publicly traded companies forced to keep a close eye on quarterly earnings.

General partners in most private equity and hedge funds are compensated in two ways. First, to the extent that they contribute their capital in the funds, they share in the appreciation of the assets. Second, they charge the limited partners two kinds of annual fees: a percentage of total fund assets (usually in the 1% to 2% range), and a percentage of the fund's earnings (usually 15% to 25%, once specified benchmarks are met). The latter performance fee is called "carried interest" and is treated, or characterized, as capital gains under current tax rules. In the 112th Congress, the President's Budget Proposal would make carried interest taxable as ordinary income. In the 111th Congress, the House-passed American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, would have treated a portion of carried interest as ordinary income, whereas the Tax Extenders Act of 2009, H.R. 4213, H.R. 1935, and the President's 2010 and 2011 Budget Proposals would have made carried interest taxable as ordinary income. In addition, in the 110th Congress, H.R. 6275 would have made carried interest taxable as ordinary income. Other legislation (H.R. 2834 and H.R. 3996) made similar proposals. This report provides background on the issues related to the debate concerning the characterization of carried interest. It will be updated as legislative developments warrant.

RS21529 -- Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict May 23, 2003 There is a great deal that remains unknown or debatable about the specific nature, size, structure and reach of the organization, despite many years of studyingit. For example, Western experts are not exactly sure how many members it has now or has had in the past. Estimates are often based upon an approximationof how many people trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Sudan. The estimates range as high as60,000 (7) and as low as 20,000. (8) These assessmentsare inexact in part because the total number of camps that operated is not firmly agreed. (9) But even if experts knew the correct total number of camps andtrainees, not all the people who took the training necessarily became (or remained) actual members of theorganization. (10) The State Department estimatesthatAl Qaeda "probably has several thousand members and associates." (11) But since these are all estimates, it is not known what proportion of AlQaeda membersU.S. and allied forces have captured or killed. (12) But do operatives even necessarily need to be members? It is apparent from some of those apprehended in failed plots that it is not essential to be formally "in"Al Qaeda in order to carry out attacks. Operatives seem to vary, from the best-trained, controlled and financedprofessional cadres, such as Mohammed Atta(who led the September 11th attacks), to less-trained and relatively uncontrolled volunteers, such asAhmed Ressam (who intended to blow up Los AngelesInternational Airport) and Richard Reid (who tried to detonate plastic explosives in his shoes aboard an AmericanAirlines transatlantic flight). (13) Al Qaedaeven acts like a foundation at times, reportedly giving grants to existing local terrorist groups who present"promising" plans for attacks that serve theorganization's general goals. (14) Unlike manytraditional terrorist groups, Al Qaeda has no single standard operating procedure, although it does have awell-developed manual for its operations. Benefitting from Osama bin Laden's considerable experience in business,the organization is said to be structuredlike a modern corporation, reflective of management concepts of the early 1990s, including bottom-up and top-downnetworks, a common "mission statement,"and entrepreneurial thinking even at the lowest levels. This makes it extraordinarily flexible and, many believe, ableto survive serious blows. (15) Al Qaeda has also developed strong ties to other terrorist organizations, some new and some long-standing. (16) Osama bin Laden formed an umbrella group inlate 1998, "The International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," which included not only AlQaeda, but also groups from Egypt, Algeria,Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Some argue that Al Qaeda has been something of a hybrid terrorist organization for sometime. (17) A sampling of groups currentlythought to be connected includes the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Jemaah Islamiah (SoutheastAsia), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (merged with AlQaeda in 2001), Al-ansar Mujahidin (Chechnya), al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Egypt, and has a worldwide presence), AbuSayyaf (Philippines), the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan, and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Pakistan/Kashmir). The list is illustrative, not comprehensive. Some experts see increased reliance onconnections to other groups as a sign of Al Qaeda's weakness; others point to enhanced cooperation with othergroups as a worrisome indicator of strength,especially with groups that formerly focused on local issues and now display evidence of convergence on Al Qaeda'sinternational anti-U.S., anti-West agenda. An important question is whether Al Qaeda might be evolving further into a new form, more like a movement thana formal organization, increasingly diffuseinternationally and less reliant upon its own membership. Clearly Al Qaeda is in transition. Whether that transition will lead to something more or less dangerous is a point of contention. On one hand, clear progress inapprehending or killing senior leaders of Al Qaeda has been evident. In recent weeks, President Bush announcedthat the United States has captured about halfthe senior leadership; (18) other sources claim thatabout a third have been captured. (19) Many of theseterrorist leaders have been crucial participants in past AlQaeda attacks; the arrests of September 11 plotter and third-in-command Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and operationschief Abu Zubaydah, for example, arebelieved to have hurt the organization and disrupted its operations. According to U.S. officials, the organization'sprevious communications network hasapparently been crippled, its leaders are on the run, and its Afghanistan base has been largely eliminated. (20) Still, Al Qaeda is not like a state, whose regime you can remove in order to disable it. Counterterrorism officials describe it more as an organic structure thatadapts to changing circumstances, including the loss of some senior leaders. The two most senior leaders, Osamabin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are widelybelieved to be alive and at large, and terrorism experts argue over the extent to which a succession plan is in effectto replace those who have been captured. (21) During the week before the Riyadh attacks, email interviews conducted by the London-based magazine AlMajalla apparently with Al Qaeda spokesman Thabetbin Qais claimed that Al Qaeda had undertaken a thorough restructuring of its leadership. (22) One of the worrisome aspects of the attack itselfwas the apparentinvolvement of people thought to have been lower-level fighters who may have now stepped into the breach. Forexample, Khaled Jehani, who was previouslyconsidered a low-level operative, seems to have been involved in the Riyadh operation. (23) Also mentioned is Seif al-Adel, one of a number of younger AlQaeda members who seem to have gained influence in the absence of former leaders and who may have played arole. (24) Many worry that this could illustratean evolution within Al Qaeda to a new generation. (25) This, as well as other evidence in the attack itself, seems to demonstrate a level of central direction. Finally, some believe that there has been a spike in recruitment to the network as a result of the U.S. militaryoperations in Iraq, leading to a worry that, despiteits serious recent losses, Al Qaeda could grow stronger in future months. (26) Ultimately, the debate about Al Qaeda's current status centers on the important question of whether it is growing or declining in strength. In the wake of theAfghanistan and Iraq military campaigns, when the predicted terrorist attacks on the United States and its interestsdid not materialize, what is the current levelof threat to the United States? Most believe that the denial of safe havens and arrests of senior leaders have seriously crippled the organization when judged by its earlier form. However, itmay be evolving into something new. For terrorist groups, periods of evolution can be particularly dangerous. Organizations in transition can be especiallyvulnerable to disruption and destruction, but they can also be less predictable and prone to lash out in order to causeadditional damage, rally flaggingsupporters, and/or prove their continuing viability. (27) With respect to Al Qaeda, evidence of new sophisticated operations, a possible succession planin action,central coordination of attacks, and growing international ties, all increasingly converging on a commoninternational agenda hostile to the United States and itsallies, may give U.S. officials new reason for concern. In the short term at least, even successes in counterterroristoperations against a more decentralizedorganization can lead to greater difficulty in collecting reliable intelligence, as the paths of communication areincreasingly unfamiliar, the personalities arechanging, and the locations of operatives are more diffuse. While the long term trajectory is very difficult to assess,for the time being it seems that Al Qaeda(or its successors) has emerged from a period of inactivity and remains a very serious threat, requiring concentratedattention and vigorous countermeasures onthe part of its prospective targets. Congress may face a number of questions in the coming months. These include How does U.S. counterterrorism policy need to adapt to match the changingthreat of Al Qaeda and its associated groups? Is there a need for strategic reassessment of the successes and failuresof U.S. counterterrorism policy in thepost-Iraq strategic environment, not only in the military and intelligence fields but also in foreign policy, lawenforcement, international cooperation, publicdiplomacy, foreign aid, homeland security, and elsewhere? Are there places where U.S. policies in a given area arenow no longer meeting the challenge, arepotentially counterproductive, or where funding is inadequate or misplaced? How will the U.S. occupation of Iraqaffect the changing regional terrorist threat? To what degree will regime change in Iraq alter the overall international terrorist threat to the United States at homeand abroad? Will progress, or the lackthereof, in achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and resolving sensitive issues such as the conflicts inKashmir, southern Philippines, Chechnya, andelsewhere affect Al Qaeda's prospects?

The May 12, 2003, suicide bombings of three Western housing compounds in Riyadh,Saudi Arabia reopenedquestions about the strength and viability of Al Qaeda in the post-Iraq conflict environment. The apprehension ofa number of senior Al Qaeda leaders in recentmonths, combined with the absence of major terrorist attacks during the military campaign in Iraq, had led someto believe that Al Qaeda was severely crippledand unable to launch major attacks. Others argued that the organization was in transition to a more decentralizedstructure, had gained new recruits, and mighteven be a growing threat. This report analyzes current viewpoints about the state of Al Qaeda and the threat it posesto the United States. It will be updated asevents warrant.

Following incidents of terrorism or mass violence in the United States, jurisdictions and individuals may be eligible to receive various types of victim assistance both directly from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and indirectly from DOJ through their respective state victim assistance agencies or other programs. While circumstances in some terrorism or mass violence incidents may make a jurisdiction or organization eligible for assistance from other federal departments, this report focuses solely on assistance available from DOJ's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). As authorized by the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA), the OVC supports several federal programs that may assist victims of terrorism or mass violence. The OVC awards funds through formula and discretionary grants to states, local units of government, individuals, and other entities with the primary purpose of assisting victims. These programs are funded by the Crime Victims Fund (CVF)—an account within the U.S. Treasury that is not funded through traditional appropriations but largely through the collection of federal criminal fines. The Director of the OVC is authorized to set aside $50 million of CVF money in the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve, which funds OVC-administered programs that support victims of terrorism or mass violence. This report examines CVF-funded assistance for victims of terrorism or mass violence. It includes discussion of programs that broadly cover crime victim assistance and programs that are specifically designed to address terrorism or mass violence. It also includes a discussion of how these programs have assisted victims of various incidents of terrorism or mass violence over the last several years. Several DOJ programs may be used to assist jurisdictions in responding to the needs of victims following incidents of terrorism or mass violence. Grant programs include the victim assistance and victim compensation formula grant programs and the Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program (AEAP). Other programs and operations directly assist victims, including the Victim Assistance Program at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), victim witness assistance at the Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP) and the Victim Reunification Travel Program at the OVC, and various supplemental grants to and agreements with agencies and organizations that provide assistance to victims of terrorism or mass violence. Victim assistance formula grant program funds may be used by states to immediately respond with victim services in the event of a large-scale incident such as the shooting that occurred in Charleston, SC, in June 2015. States use these funds to support crime victim assistance programs that provide direct services to crime victims. Eligible services, activities, and costs include the following: those that respond to the immediate emotional and physical needs (excluding medical care) of crime victims such as crisis intervention, mental health assistance, assistance with participation in criminal justice proceedings, forensic examinations, costs necessary and essential for providing direct services such as pro-rated costs of rent and transportation costs for victims to receive services, special services such as assisting victims in recovering property retained as evidence, personnel costs directly related to providing direct services, and restorative justice, which includes opportunities for crime victims to meet with perpetrators. Other allowable costs, such as training and advanced technologies, are listed in the Final Program Guidelines for the Victim Assistance Grant Program. Each year in support of victim assistance programs, states and territories receive a base amount plus the remaining funds available after all other CVF-funded programs have received funding—this remaining amount is distributed based on population. In FY2016, $2.22 billion in victim assistance grant funds was distributed to the states, territories, and the District of Columbia. In FY2015 and FY2016, victim assistance grants were substantially increased as the annual obligation cap on the CVF was tripled for FY2015 ($2.361 billion) and increased further in FY2016 ($3.042 billion). Victim assistance grant award project periods span several years. For example, the project period for FY2016 victim assistance grants is October 1, 2015, through September 30, 2019. Victim compensation formula grant funds may be used to help victims offset the costs of expenses related to incidents of terrorism or mass violence, including out-of-pocket expenses such as medical and mental health counseling expenses, lost wages, funeral and burial costs, and other costs (except property loss) authorized in a state's compensation statute. Victims are reimbursed for crime-related expenses that are not covered by other resources, such as private insurance. Maximum reimbursement amounts vary widely from state to state. For example, California set its maximum reimbursement at $63,000 on a single application while Virginia set its maximum award at $25,000. The OVC awards each eligible state victim compensation program an annual grant equal to 60% of what the state spent in state-funded benefits in the previous two years. Like victim assistance grants, victim compensation award project periods span several years. In FY2016, $125.4 million in victim compensation grant funds was distributed to the states, territories, and the District of Columbia. The Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve was established in P.L. 104-132 to meet the immediate and long-term needs of victims of terrorism or mass violence. The Director of the OVC was authorized to set aside $50 million of CVF money in the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve to respond to the needs of victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks, and subsequently to replenish any amounts expended so that not more than $50 million is reserved in any fiscal year for any future victims of terrorism or mass violence. Of note, these funds do not fall under the annual obligation cap of the CVF, but rather funds retained in the CVF may be used to replenish the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve. This reserve fund supports the Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program (AEAP), the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP), the Crime Victim Emergency Assistance Fund, the Victim Reunification Program, and other activities in support of victims of mass violence or terrorism. In addition, the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve supports other activities such as supplemental grants to other entities to provide emergency relief (e.g., crisis response efforts, assistance, compensation, training and technical assistance, and ongoing assistance, including during any investigation or prosecution) to victims of terrorist acts or mass violence occurring within the United States. The OVC may respond to incidents of terrorism or mass violence with grants from the AEAP. Following these incidents, the OVC verifies that an act of terrorism or mass violence has resulted in a significant number of victims being injured or killed. It then contacts the relevant state's VOCA administrative office and advises the administrator that AEAP resources may be available. In cases of terrorism or mass violence outside the United States, the OVC will determine which organizations or agencies within the United States may apply for funding. Eligible applicants include U.S. Attorneys' Offices; federal, state, and local governments (including state victim assistance and compensation programs); and nongovernmental victim service organizations. AEAP funds may be used for the following types of assistance: crisis response, consequence management, criminal justice support, crime victim compensation, and training and technical assistance. See Table A-1 for award amounts distributed under the AEAP from FY2014 through July 2016. In addition to the AEAP, the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve funds several other programs and operations that support victims of terrorism or mass violence. These programs and operations include the following: The International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP) —Through ITVERP, the OVC reimburses victims of international terrorism and their families for expenses related to medical and mental health care, a funeral and burial, repatriation of the victim's remains, property loss, and other expenses including emergency travel. Crime Victim Emergency Assistance Fund at the FBI —With support from this fund, the FBI's Office for Victim Assistance provides support and emergency assistance to victims of terrorism or mass violence. Victim Reunification Program —Through this program, the OVC assists parents whose children are illegally taken across U.S. borders by a spouse or biological parent. Support includes services such as payment of transportation expenses required to attend a court proceeding with the child, translation of documents related to court hearings and the reunification process, and counseling support to prepare the parents for reunification and minimize the trauma for the child. Interagency Agreements —The OVC contracts with and reimburses other agencies, including federal agencies, to provide assistance and compensation to victims of terrorism acts or mass violence occurring within the United States. Special Masters Claims —The OVC funds reimbursement for federal court special masters in certain terrorism-related civil lawsuits. Funds from the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve have supported most of these listed activities over the last several years. See the Appendix for further details on use of these funds. This appendix includes award data for the past three fiscal years to illustrate how the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve has been used to assist victims of terrorism or mass violence. Table A-1 includes awards made under the Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program (AEAP) from FY2014 through July 2016. Table A-2 includes all other activities funded by the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve from FY2014 through July 2016.

Following incidents of terrorism or mass violence in the United States, jurisdictions and individuals may be eligible to receive various types of victim assistance both directly from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and indirectly from DOJ through their respective state victim assistance agencies or other programs. While circumstances in some incidents may result in a jurisdiction's eligibility for assistance from other federal departments, such as Department of Education grants awarded to Newtown Public School District in recovery efforts from the Newtown, CT, elementary school shooting, this report focuses solely on assistance available from DOJ's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC)—the primary federal assistance available to victims of terrorism or mass violence. As authorized by the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA, P.L. 98-473), the OVC supports several federal programs that may assist victims of terrorism or mass violence. Grant programs include the victim assistance and victim compensation formula grant programs and the Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program (AEAP). Other programs and operations directly assist victims, including the Victim Assistance Program at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), victim witness assistance at the Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP), the Victim Reunification Travel Program, and various supplemental grants to and agreements with agencies and organizations that provide assistance to victims of terrorism or mass violence. These activities are funded by the Crime Victims Fund (CVF), an account within the U.S. Treasury that is not funded through traditional appropriations but largely through the collection of federal criminal fines. At the end of FY2015, the balance of the CVF was over $12 billion. The Director of the OVC is authorized to set aside $50 million of CVF money in the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve, which funds operations that support victims of terrorism and mass violence. From FY2014 through July 2016, the OVC has distributed $42.2 million toward activities funded by the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve in response to incidents including, but not limited to, the Boston Marathon bombing, Newtown school shooting, and Charleston church shooting.

The United States Border Patrol (USBP) is the lead federal agency charged with securing the U.S. international land border with Mexico and Canada. The USBP's San Diego sector is located north of Tijuana and Tecate, Mexican cities with a combined population of 2 million people, and features no natural barriers to entry by unauthorized migrants and smugglers. As part of the "Prevention Through Deterrence" strategy, which called for reducing unauthorized migration by placing agents and resources directly on the border abutting population centers, in 1990 the USBP began erecting a physical barrier to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in the San Diego sector using the broad powers granted to the Attorney General (AG) to control and guard the U.S. border. The ensuing "primary" fence was completed in 1993 and covered the first 14 miles of the border, starting from the Pacific Ocean, and was constructed of 10-foot-high welded steel. This fence (and the subsequent three-tiered fence, see discussion below) was constructed with the assistance of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Army Corps of Engineers. According to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the primary fence, in combination with various labor-intensive USBP enforcement initiatives along the San Diego border region (i.e., Operation Gatekeeper), proved to be quite successful but fiscally and environmentally costly. For example, as undocumented aliens and smugglers breached the primary fence and attempted to evade detection, USBP agents were often forced to pursue the suspects through environmentally sensitive areas. It soon became apparent to immigration officials and lawmakers that the USBP needed, among other things, a "rigid" enforcement system that could integrate infrastructure (i.e., a multi-tiered fence and roads), manpower, and new technologies to further control the border region. The concept of a three-tiered fence system was first recommended by a 1993 Sandia Laboratories study commissioned by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The study concluded that aliens attempting to enter the United States from Mexico had shown remarkable resourcefulness in bypassing or destroying obstacles in their path, including the existing primary fence, and postulated that "[a] three-fence barrier system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and lights will provide the necessary discouragement." Congress responded to these enforcement needs, in part, with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. This comprehensive law, among other things, expanded the existing fence by authorizing the INS to construct a triple-layered fence along the same 14 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border near San Diego. Section 102 of IIRIRA concerns the improvement and construction of barriers at our international borders. As described later, several of the provisions in §102 were amended in the 109 th Congress to facilitate the construction of the San Diego fence, as well as other border barriers. The following paragraphs, however, discuss §102 as originally passed in IIRIRA to provide a historical perspective and comparative analysis. Section 102(a) appears to give the AG broad authority to install additional physical barriers and roads "in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States." The phrase vicinity of the United States border is not defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq .) or in immigration regulations. The section also does not stipulate what specific characteristics would designate an area as one of high illegal entry . This subsection has not been amended. Section 102(b)—before its amendment in the Secure Fence Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-367 )—mandated that the AG construct a barrier in the border area near San Diego. Specifically, §102(b) directed the AG to construct a three-tiered barrier along the 14 miles of the international land border of the United States, starting at the Pacific Ocean and extending eastward. Section 102(b) ensured that the AG would build a barrier, pursuant to his broader authority in §102(a), near the San Diego area. Other non-amended provisions in §102(b) provide authority for the acquisition of necessary easements, require that certain safety features be incorporated into the design of the fence, and authorize an appropriation not to exceed $12 million. Section 102(c)—before its amendment in the REAL ID Act as part of P.L. 109-13 —waived the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq .) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq .), to the extent the AG determined necessary, in order to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers authorized to be constructed under §102. The waiver authority in this provision appears to apply both to barriers that may be constructed in the vicinity of the border under §102(a) and to the barrier that is to be constructed near the San Diego area under §102(b). Apprehension statistics have long been used as a performance measure by the USBP. However, the number of apprehensions may be a misleading statistic for several reasons, including the data's focus on events rather than people and the absence of reliable estimates for how many aliens successfully evade capture. These factors aside, however, apprehensions data remain the best way to gain a glimpse into the reality facing USBP agents and the trends in unauthorized migration along the border. As Figure 1 shows, apprehensions remained stable during the early 1990s in the San Diego sector despite the construction of the "primary" fence in 1993. After the IIRIRA's mandate for increased enforcement along the Southwest border in 1996, including construction of the triple-fence, apprehensions dropped rapidly in the San Diego sector in the late 1990s—from 480,000 in FY1996 to 100,000 in FY2002. The reduction in apprehensions was even more marked in the areas where fencing was constructed within San Diego sector. The USBP's Imperial Beach and Chula Vista stations saw their apprehensions decline from 321,560 in FY1993 to 19,035 in FY2004—a reduction of 94% over the 12 year period. Although much of this reduction in apprehensions in those stations and in San Diego sector may have been due to the construction of the triple-fence, the sector also saw an increase in other resources that may account for part of the reduction. For example, the number of agents assigned to the San Diego sector increased significantly during this period—from 980 agents in 1993 to 2,274 in 1998. Additionally, the number of underground sensors deployed in the San Diego sector almost tripled from 1993 to 1998, and the fleet of vehicles increased by over 150% over the same period. The increase in manpower and resources reflected the USBP's policy of re-routing unauthorized migration away from population centers to remote border regions where their agents have a tactical advantage over border-crossers. Other sectors, especially the remote Tucson sector in Arizona, saw apprehensions increase significantly in the late 1990s. Proponents of border fences point to the drastic reduction in apprehensions along the San Diego sector as tangible proof that these fences succeed in their goal of reducing cross-border smuggling and migration where they are constructed. Opponents attribute part of the decrease in apprehensions to the increase in manpower and resources in the sector and (pointing to the increase in apprehensions in less-populated sectors) contend that the fence only succeeds in re-routing unauthorized migration. By 2004, only nine miles of the 14 miles of fence authorized to be constructed had been completed. Two sections, including the final three-mile stretch of fence that leads to the Pacific Ocean, were not finished because of environmental concerns and litigation. In order to finish the fence, the USBP proposed to fill a deep canyon known as "Smuggler's Gulch" with over 2 million cubic yards of dirt. The triple-fence would then be extended across the filled gulch. California's Coastal Commission (CCC), however, essentially halted the completion of the fence in February 2004. The CCC determined that the CBP had not demonstrated, among other things, that the project was consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with the policies of the California Coastal Management Program—a state program approved under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (16 U.S.C. §§1451-1464). Specifically, the CCC was concerned with the potential for significant adverse effects on (1) the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research and Reserve; (2) state and federally listed threatened and endangered species; (3) lands set aside for protection within California's Multiple Species Conservation Program; and (4) other aspects of the environment. The CCC held that Congress did not specify a particular design in the IIRIRA and that the CBP failed to present a convincing argument that the less environmentally damaging alternative projects it rejected would have prevented compliance with the IIRIRA. Although the IIRIRA initially allowed DHS to waive two major environmental laws, it did not include the CZMA in its purview. Congress, accordingly, attempted to pass legislation to facilitate the completion of the fence. The 107 th Congress, in §446 of the Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ), expressed its sense that completing the 14-mile border project should be a priority for the Secretary of DHS. The 108 th Congress considered measures that would have allowed the Secretary of DHS to waive the CZMA and other environmental laws, but no bill passed both chambers. However, the 109 th Congress subsequently passed the REAL ID Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-13 , Div. B), which authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive all legal requirements determined necessary to ensure expeditious construction of barriers and roads authorized under IIRIRA § 102. Such waivers are effective upon publication in the Federal Register. Federal district courts are provided with exclusive jurisdiction to review claims alleging that the actions or decisions of the Secretary violate the U.S. Constitution, and district court rulings may only be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Because the REAL ID Act amended only the waiver provision of §102 of IIRIRA, the new waiver authority appears to apply to all the barriers that may be constructed under IIRIRA—that is, both to barriers constructed in the vicinity of the border and to the barrier that is to be constructed near the San Diego area. The 109 th Congress also passed the Secure Fence Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-367 ), which removed the specific provisions authorizing the San Diego fence and added provisions authorizing five stretches of two-layered reinforced fencing along the southwest border. CBP has estimated that this fencing will total roughly 850 miles. While the specific authorization of the San Diego fence was deleted, the project appears permissible under the general fence authorization in §102(a) of IIRIRA. In the 110 th Congress, S. 1639 , introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy on June 20, 2007, would amend § 102 of IIRIRA to once again expressly authorize the construction of the San Diego fence. CBP, in conjunction with the Army Corps of Engineers and the National Guard, have now begun the process of acquiring the land required to finish building the San Diego border fence. On September 22, 2005, DHS published a Federal Register notice declaring the waiver of, in their entirety: (1) the NEPA; (2) the ESA; (3) the CZMA; (4) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. §§1251 et seq .); (5) the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §§470 et seq .); (6) the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. §§703 et seq .); (7) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq .); and (8) the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq .). DHS predicts that the San Diego fence will have a total cost of $127 million for its 14-mile length when it is completed—roughly $9 million a mile. Construction of the first 9.5 miles of fencing cost $31 million, or roughly $3 million a mile, while construction of the last 4.5 miles of fencing is projected to cost $96 million, or roughly $21 million a mile. DHS is proposing to hire private contractors to expedite the construction of the remaining 4.5 miles of fencing; this fact, and the complex construction project of filling Smuggler's Gulch, may account for part of the difference in cost. The FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-90 ) provides $35 million for the construction of the border fence in San Diego. For FY2007, conferees for the DHS Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-295 ) recommended $30.5 million be allocated to the San Diego fence. Since 1990, Congress has also included language in DOD appropriations bills allowing the DOD to assist federal agencies in counter-drug activities, including the construction of fencing and roads to reduce the flow of narcotics into the country.

This report outlines the issues involved with DHS's construction of the San Diego border fence and highlights some of the major legislative and administrative developments regarding its completion; it will be updated as warranted. (For more analysis of border fencing and other barriers, please see CRS Report RL33659, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border , by [author name scrubbed], Yule Kim, and [author name scrubbed].) Congress first authorized the construction of a 14-mile, triple-layered fence along the U.S.-Mexico border near San Diego in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. By 2004, only nine miles had been completed, and construction was halted because of environmental concerns. The 109 th Congress subsequently passed the REAL ID Act ( P.L. 109-13 , Div. B), which contained provisions to facilitate the completion of the 14-mile fence. These provisions allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive all legal requirements determined necessary to ensure expeditious construction of authorized barriers and roads. In September 2005, the Secretary used this authority to waive a number of mostly environmental and conservation laws. Subsequently, the Secure Fence Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-367 ) removed the specific IIRIRA provisions authorizing the San Diego fence and added provisions authorizing five stretches of two-layered reinforced fencing along the southwest border. While the specific authorization of the San Diego fence was deleted, the project appears permissible under a separate, more general authorization provision of IIRIRA. In the 110 th Congress, S. 1639 , introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy on June 20, 2007, would amend § 102 of IIRIRA to once again expressly authorize the construction of the San Diego fence.

The source of federal copyright law originates with the Copyright and Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The Copyright Act offers legal protection to creators of original works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Such original works must be captured in some form that is sufficiently permanent or stable for it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period beyond a transitory duration. The types of creative works that are potentially eligible for copyright protection fall into several categories, including literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works. In addition, copyright protects compilations and derivative works. However, copyright protection does not extend to any underlying abstract idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, but rather it only protects the manner in which those ideas are expressed. Works of the federal government are statutorily excluded from the scope of copyright protection. This includes the written opinions of federal courts, federal reports and documents, administrative regulations, and public laws. These materials are considered to be in the public domain. Works in the public domain are available for anyone to use without concern of infringement. The grant of copyright bestows several rights upon the creator of a work (or the individual having a legal interest in the work) that permit the copyright holder to control the use of the protected material. These statutory rights allow a copyright holder to do or to authorize the following: the reproduction of the copyrighted work; the preparation of derivative works based on the copyrighted work; the distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work; the public performance of the copyrighted work; and the public display of the copyrighted work, including the individual images of a motion picture. The Copyright Act contains several statutory limitations on the copyright monopoly. These include the "first sale doctrine" that limits the copyright owner's exclusive control over distribution of the material objects in which a work is expressed. The "first sale doctrine" permits the owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of that copy without the copyright owner's permission. Other limitations involve allowing certain reproductions by libraries and archives, limited performances and displays for educational purposes or in the course of services at a place of worship, and certain performances for non-profit, charitable causes. The doctrine of "fair use" in copyright law recognizes the right of the public to make reasonable use of copyrighted material, under particular circumstances, without the copyright holder's consent. For example, a teacher may be able to use reasonable excerpts of copyrighted works in preparing a scholarly lecture or commentary, without obtaining permission to do so. The Copyright Act mentions fair use "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research." However, a determination of fair use by a court considers four factors: the purpose and character of the use including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Because the language of the fair use statute is illustrative, determining what constitutes a fair use of a copyrighted work is often difficult to make in advance—according to the U.S. Supreme Court, such a determination requires a federal court to engage in "case-by-case" analysis. In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Section 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA prohibits any person from circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work. This newly created right of "access" granted to copyright holders makes the act of gaining access to copyrighted material by circumventing digital rights management (DRM) security measures, itself, a violation of the Copyright Act. Prohibited conduct includes descrambling a scrambled work; decrypting an encrypted work; or avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or impairing a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner. In addition, the DMCA prohibits the selling of products or services that circumvent access-control measures, as well as trafficking in devices that circumvent "technological measures" protecting "a right" of the copyright owner. In contrast to copyright infringement, which concerns the unauthorized or unexcused use of copyrighted material, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions prohibit the act of DRM circumvention, as well as the design, manufacture, import, offer to the public, or trafficking in technology used to circumvent those copyright protection measures, regardless of the actual existence or absence of copyright infringement activity. The rights conferred on a copyright holder do not last forever. Copyrights are limited in the number of years a copyright holder may exercise his/her exclusive rights. In general, an author of a creative work may enjoy copyright protection for the work for a term lasting the entirety of his/her life plus 70 additional years. At the expiration of a term, the copyrighted work becomes part of the public domain. The unauthorized use of one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner constitutes infringement. For example, unauthorized copying of a copyrighted work is an infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction. Anyone interested in doing anything with a copyrighted work that implicates one of the holder's exclusive rights must either (1) obtain the permission of the copyright holder, (2) comply with the terms of compulsory licenses established by law, or (3) assert that such use falls within the scope of certain statutory limitations on the exclusive rights such as the "fair use" doctrine. The Copyright Act has both criminal and civil provisions for infringement. Civil copyright infringement involves a violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner that are provided by 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-122, 602, including the right to control reproduction, distribution, public performance, and display of copyrighted works. Criminal copyright infringement includes the following offenses: copyright infringement for profit, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b); copyright infringement without a profit motive, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c); pre-release distribution of a copyrighted work over a publicly accessible computer network, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 2319(d); circumvention of copyright protection systems in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1204; bootleg recordings of live musical performances, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A; unauthorized recording of motion pictures in a movie theater (camcording), 18 U.S.C. § 2319B; and counterfeit or illicit labels and counterfeit documentation and packaging for copyrighted works, 18 U.S.C. § 2318. The direct infringer is not the only party potentially liable for infringement; the federal courts have recognized two forms of secondary copyright infringement liability: contributory and vicarious. The concept of contributory infringement has its roots in tort law and the notion that one should be held accountable for directly contributing to another's infringement. For contributory infringement liability to exist, a court must find that the secondary infringer "with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." Vicarious infringement liability is possible where a defendant "has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities." The statute of limitations for initiating a civil action for copyright infringement is within three years after the claim accrued, while a criminal proceeding must be commenced within five years after the cause of action arose. Federal courts determine the civil remedies in an action for infringement brought by the copyright owner, among those statutorily authorized. If the federal government chooses to prosecute individuals for copyright violations, the imprisonment terms are set forth in the statutes describing the particular copyright crime (mostly in 18 U.S.C. § 2319), while the criminal fine amount is determined in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (specifies the amount of the fine under Title 18 of the U.S. Code). For a copyright owner who prevails in a copyright infringement lawsuit, the court may approve the following legal remedies: injunctions, 17 U.S.C. § 502; impounding, destruction, or other reasonable disposition of all copies made in violation of the copyright owner's rights, as well as all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies may be reproduced, 17 U.S.C. § 503; actual damages suffered by the copyright owner due to the infringement, and any profits of the infringer attributable to the infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b); statutory damages (at the copyright owner's election to recover in lieu of actual damages and profits), in the amount of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court deems just, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). For willful infringement, a court may increase the statutory damages award to a sum of not more than $150,000, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2); and costs and attorney's fees, 17 U.S.C. § 505. Willful infringement of copyright for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain is subject to criminal prosecution, and is punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000. Another additional remedy for criminal copyright infringement is civil and criminal forfeiture of all infringing copies and all devices and equipment used in the manufacture of such infringing copies.

This report provides a general overview of copyright law and briefly summarizes the major provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act.

A full list of the damaging biological and economic effects of invasive plants and animals risks sounding like hyperbole. It includes loss of western rangelands to invasive plants, blockage of power plant intakes to invasive mussels, and major declines of birds and mammals to invasive snakes in the Everglades. So vast is this "bioinvasion" (as some have termed it) that only rough estimates can be made of the numbers of non-native species now in North America or in the rest of the world. Moreover, despite a few rare successes, eradication of these species, once they become established, is extremely improbable. But because of the number and variety of non-native species, it is unclear how best to manage or prevent these effects or what legislation would be needed to address these problems. Laws concerning wild plants and animals do not form a comprehensive body at the federal level. Under the U.S. system, inherited from English legal tradition, the government regulates the taking of native wild animals generally while landowners control the native (and other) plants growing on their lands. Thus, colonial governments regulated native wild animals (to the extent there was regulation of the take of wild animals at all) and, after the U.S. Constitution was ratified, states retained the rights they had as colonies to control the wildlife within their boundaries. With states retaining the regulation of wildlife, the majority of wild plant and animal species are not federal responsibilities under current law. Moreover, because the problem of invasive species presents itself as a series of seemingly disconnected crises, legislation has become a patchwork, enacted as each crisis was addressed. The absence of a general federal responsibility for wildlife affects the federal role in addressing invasive species. A local or state government, faced with the recent arrival of a new invasive species—whether terrestrial, freshwater, or marine; plant or animal; agricultural pest or recreational nuisance—has no single source to query to begin its response or guide it through a maze of options. Moreover, federal help, especially any timely help in the weeks or months after initial discovery, is rare to nonexistent and, if forthcoming, focuses more on information and less on practical assistance. The National Invasive Species Council (NISC) was created by Executive Order 13112 in 1999, and has addressed some aspects of the invasive species problem. It has taken steps toward sharing more information across governments and with the public. NISC asks specific agencies to take the lead in developing policies within their existing legislative mandates. In its 2008-2012 report, NISC outlined a set of actions to address the bulk of existing problems. These actions include developing legislative proposals to fill gaps in current law. However, legislative efforts to date have tended to focus on well-established problems: the invasion of a single species, a specific pathway of introduction, or damage or risks to agriculture. Invasive species occur throughout the United States, but some ecosystems are more susceptible to invasion than others. Hawaii and Florida are perhaps the major examples of this phenomenon in the United States. Both states have many threatened and endangered species and, not coincidentally, many invasives, and both were long isolated biologically and have a number of native species found nowhere else. The mild climates of Hawaii and Florida make it easier for the rich flora and fauna from other tropical and semitropical regions to survive, and they also make the states attractive to businesses that import, maintain, or breed non-native animals and plants, such as tropical fishes and ornamental plants. Another factor putting some environments at risk is the plethora of opportunities for new introductions. Easy transportation access increases the likelihood of invasion in aquatic habitats such as the Great Lakes. Seaports, where many ships exchange ballast water, are at particular risk. Even if only a tiny fraction of newly arriving non-native species survive in San Francisco Bay or Chesapeake Bay, the actual number of successful invasive species may be very large. The areas around airports, with increased levels of international traffic and tourism, also are at risk. Between or within countries, some pathways for species invasions already are well-known. They include transportation corridors, intentionally imported non-native pets, landscaping plants, aquaculture, and non-native organisms deliberately released for propagation in the wild. To some extent, the pathways of invasion between countries can be predicted. For example, brown tree snakes have a propensity to hide in dark places, and the damage they have caused on Pacific islands such as Guam has done much to focus attention on air stowaways. The arrival of a number of beetle species has played a similar role in focusing attention on pallet wood, packing crates, live plants, and airport warehouses as pathways and centers of biotic invasion. Legally shipped live animals or plants may harbor microorganisms, parasites, or seeds that pose a danger to other species, even if the animal or plant itself does not survive in the wild. In general, any arrival of living or untreated material offers a possible pathway for biotic invasion. A comprehensive review of possible pathways, their risks, options for control, and research needs is, to the authors' knowledge, currently lacking. Federal laws have tended to focus on black lists (anything not on the list is allowed) in contrast to white lists (anything not on the list is excluded). Each requires some, or even considerable, knowledge of the species to be listed to predict the likelihood of invasion. A black list can be prepared in various ways, but usually it is made up of species already shown to cause serious damage to fisheries, endangered species, or (especially) agriculture. This evidence may be based on experience with the species domestically or in other countries. Preventing the spread of the species after it enters the United States may rely on public education, penalties for shippers, monitoring, and other means. In general, black lists require time to gather information on the damage created by the species and then proceed through a regulatory response. This approach allows more flexibility for industries that depend on the importation of new species of plants or animals. Black lists do not readily address introductions by persons who are unaware that they are bringing in non-native organisms. With the white list approach, there is an attempt to predict potential harm before a species' arrival. The prediction would be based on known characteristics of a species, such as how it reproduces, the number of seeds or offspring, etc. Any species not on the list would be excluded. The mongoose, for example, has a history of becoming a pest on islands where it has been introduced. It seems unlikely that the mongoose would ever be placed on a (white) list of allowable species. In contrast, new varieties of orchids, sheep, tulips, or any other species with a long track record in this country likely would gain admission. The existence of a list, whether white or black, implies that importers actually know they are importing living organisms. An effort to prevent unintentional introductions would be compatible with any shade of list or no list at all. Potential pathways for unintentional introductions continue to be discovered, and there are likely other pathways yet to be determined. Federal laws concerning invasive species form a patchwork, stronger in some areas, such as agriculture and ballast water, and weaker or absent in other areas. Current laws do not clearly address prevention of biological invasion across foreseeable pathways (with the exception of ship ballast water); or early detection and rapid response (EDRR) before the establishment of the new species, when the focus of effort shifts from less expensive prevention to more expensive and less efficient control. Coordination of current efforts alone means that gaps will remain if they are due to lack of coverage by existing laws or agency jurisdiction. Congress could choose to address these gaps either by explicitly delegating such authority to the President or by crafting legislation. NISC has become the focus for federal efforts to control and prevent invasive species affecting a broad range of industries or ecosystems. However, gaps in authorities or shortages of personnel that have hampered efforts to limit the entrance of and damage from invasive species continue. Four agencies have had major roles in addressing invasive species for many years: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Marine Fisheries Service. Yet even for these four agencies, important gaps in their authorities remain. Legislation to address invasive species could take a species-by-species approach, a pathway approach, or a combination of the two. The species approach implicitly assumes knowledge about a species' risk (black list) or safety (white list). A central dilemma, however, is the difficulty in making this prediction. Moreover, it assumes knowledge that a particular species actually is being imported. A pathway approach does not assume knowledge about any particular species, only that a particular set of circumstances favors the arrival of unwanted organisms. Some agencies, including APHIS and FWS, analyze the risk presented by particular species that may become invasive. However, addressing the multitude of agricultural pests relies on scarce agency resources at APHIS. In addition, FWS has been criticized for its slow response to the blacklisting of species under the Lacey Act. Both agencies would benefit from faster assessments of either species or pathways so they could direct resources to the most critical areas. Regulation by pathway is an approach suited to unintentional or unknowing introductions, as no list needs to be created. Among the most comprehensive pathway approaches to date has been the Non-indigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act. Its goals put prevention on an equal or higher footing compared with control of species that are already established. It requires the participation of several federal agencies, promotes research, and implements regulations on the mid-ocean exchange of ballast water and other measures to exclude invasives from U.S. ports. A review of writings by various specialists in this field suggests a number of areas that might be explored by policymakers. The list below is compiled from many sources. Not all would require new legislation; some might benefit from congressional oversight. Research to identify pathways . Research goals in this area might overlap with research designed to prevent certain kinds of security threats and might benefit from cooperation with agencies involved in antiterrorism programs. Expert review of planned releases . Panels of experts might be created to analyze risks and make recommendations on planned releases by governmental or nongovernmental sources into any environment in which species are not native. According to NISC, steps along these lines are planned. For instance, experts could provide a public warning on planned releases of exotic grasses by federal agencies or of non-native game fish. In addition, various exotic plants are proposed as feedstocks for biofuels, and such a release might benefit from expert review. Education al campaign . An educational campaign to prevent inadvertent acts by the public might help prevent some invasive species introductions. This type of approach might be particularly effective at preventing releases of exotic pets and aquarium species after the point of sale. Warning list . An informational warning list (or gray list ) of species might be created by the collaboration of federal and state agencies. The warning list might include species currently restricted under state laws, species thought to be newly arrived from other countries, and other species felt to merit special attention by regulators. Although a gray list would lack regulatory force at the federal level, it could be designed to provide information on species whose eradication or control is in its early phases. Review of industries dependent on importing and transferring non-native species . Such a review could include a focus on cooperative methods to reduce releases after the point of sale. The focus of past efforts has tended to be on the entry of these species into the United States. To protect their businesses, import-dependent industries naturally have tried to reduce current obstacles and to prevent imposition of new ones. Yet there are other avenues to reduce risk besides prohibition. These avenues might include incentives for the sale of sterile animals or plants only or efforts to create point-of-sale educational programs about the risk of, or penalties for, releasing pets or plants into the wild. Measures to reduce the risk of exporting invasive species . The United States might take further internal steps to avoid exporting potentially invasive species to other countries. These measures could be as simple as preventing their accidental export in bilateral aid programs or certifying that identified U.S. products (e.g., used tires) are free of pests. Such certification is done for agricultural shipments. A review might examine disaster aid and emergency relief, for example; in the rush to provide humanitarian relief, shipments of supplies, equipment, and personnel may inadvertently introduce diseases or pests unknown in the receiving country. Because such supplies sometimes are prepared for shipment in advance, they could be examined to reduce the risk of such transfers. Multi-agency federal or cooperative center for first - strike prevention and control . Since the creation of NISC, agencies have begun to respond across a broad front in the days, weeks, or months after an invasion is discovered. NISC is beginning to model its efforts on interagency fire management, a federal program that has long faced similar issues. It seems possible that a similar center devoted to first-strike prevention and control of invasive species, regardless of affected industry, ecosystem, or lead agency, could provide critical support at a time when eradication of a new animal or plant invader still might be possible. These options are not mutually exclusive. They likely would be under the jurisdiction of multiple committees in both the House and Senate. They may offer opportunities for savings both to the economy and to ecosystems.

For the first few centuries after the arrival of Europeans in North America, plants and animals of many species were sent between the two continents. The transfer of non-natives consisted not only of intentional westbound species ranging from pigs to dandelions but also of intentional eastbound species, such as gray squirrels and tomatoes. And for those centuries, the remaining non-native species crossing the Atlantic, uninvited and often unwelcome, were ignored if they were noticed at all. They were joined by various species arriving deliberately or accidentally from Asia and Africa. The national focus on invasive species arose in the 19 th century, primarily owing to losses in agriculture (due to weeds or plant diseases), the leading industry of the time. A few recently arrived invasive species, and estimates of adverse economic impacts exceeding $100 billion annually, have sharpened that focus. Very broadly, the unanswered question regarding invasive species concerns whose responsibility it is to ensure economic integrity and ecological stability in response to the actual or potential impacts of invasive species. As this report shows, the current answer is not simple. It may depend on answers to many other questions: Is the introduction deliberate or accidental? Does it affect agriculture? By what pathway does the new species arrive? Is the potential harm from the species already known? Is the species already established in one area of the country? Finally, if the answers to any of these questions are unsatisfactory, what changes should be made? The specific issue before Congress is whether new legislative authorities and funding are needed to address issues related to invasive species and their increasing economic and ecological impacts on such disparate matters as power plant operations, grazing lands, and coral reef fishes. Such legislation could affect domestic and international trade, tourism, industries dependent on importing non-native species and those dependent on keeping them out, and, finally, the variety of natural resources that have little direct economic value and yet affect the lives of a broad segment of the public. In the century or so of congressional responses to invasive species, the usual approach has been an ad hoc attack on the particular problem, from impure seed stocks to Asian carp in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. A few notable attempts have begun to address specific pathways by which invasives arrive (e.g., ship ballast water), but no current law addresses the broad general concern over non-native species and the variety of paths by which they enter this country. A 1999 executive order took a step in bringing together some of the current authorities and resources to address a problem that has expanded with both increasing world trade and travel and decreasing transit time for humans and cargo. Multiple bills have been introduced on this subject in recent Congresses as well as in the 114 th Congress. There are two basic approaches to addressing invasive species: a species-by-species assessment of the risks or benefits of admitting or excluding species, and a policy based on controlling pathways of entry in which vigilance is maintained on incoming ballast tanks, cargo holds, packing materials, and similar vehicles for unwanted organisms. These two approaches may complement each other. Policymakers also have the choice of an emphasis on preventing the arrival or establishment of more invasive species versus post hoc control of species that have already arrived and become established.

The 112 th Congress is currently discussing how to fund the federal government's discretionary programs for the remainder of FY2011, which began on October 1, 2010. Congress approved a series of seven short-term continuing resolutions (CRs) to fund government activities. The current CR provides funding until April 15, 2011. If further funding were not provided, much of the federal government would be shut down. This report compares the various funding levels that have been considered during the 112 th Congress with H.R. 1473 , a compromise reached just before the expiration on April 8 of the sixth CR ( P.L. 112-8 ). H.R. 1473 provides discretionary budget authority to run the federal government for the remainder of FY2011, and includes both discretionary and mandatory spending reductions. Budget authority (BA) provides government agencies with the legal ability to make obligations on behalf of the federal government, subject to restrictions in appropriations legislation. Outlays occur once the U.S. Treasury Department disburses funds to discharge those obligations. The last part of this report summarizes long-term trends in federal spending and presents projections of FY2011 and FY2012 federal spending in terms of outlays. Congress approved a series of seven short-term continuing resolutions to fund government activities since October 1, 2010, when the fiscal year began. The current CR ( P.L. 112-8 ; H.R. 1363 ) provides funding until April 15, 2011. The bill reflecting the last minute compromise reached on April 8, 2011, H.R. 1473 , the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, is expected to be considered this week. Table 1 shows both short-term and longer-term continuing resolutions considered during the 112 th Congress. Congressional discussions of FY2011 measures have opened a vigorous interchange of views on the federal budget, with a strong focus on restraining federal spending. Some contend that FY2011 funding decisions should take a first step in reshaping the size and responsibilities of the federal government. Others note that the economy has not yet fully recovered from the 2009 recession, and criticize the proposed reductions for their likely impact on programs and services provided by the government, and potentially on a still fragile economy. In particular, unemployment rates remain high in most parts of the country, the housing sector remains weak, and the number of banking and financial institutions on watch lists is at historically elevated levels. Much of the discussion has focused on comparing proposed funding levels with the FY2010 enacted level, the President's FY2011 budget request, and H.R. 1 , the funding level approved by the House on February 19, 2011, which was intended to return spending levels for most agencies other than the Defense Department and other security-related agencies to FY2008 levels. For several years, the Administration has shown funding levels for "security" and "non-security" agencies separately. In its definition, security agencies include the Defense Department, the Veterans Administration (VA), the State Department/USAID, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). All other agencies are non-security. There has been little debate about the Administration's proposed funding levels for the Afghan and Iraq wars, which is treated separately. More recently, the House Budget Committee and the House Appropriations Committee have adopted a definition of "security" which includes DOD, VA, and DHS but excludes the State Department/USAID. Some House presentations of spending data also exclude war funding (described as Overseas Contingency Operations) from security totals. Table 2 below shows funding levels for H.R. 1473 and other funding proposals by the House subcommittee allocations, with subtotals for "security" and "non-security" using the House definition to give a sense of how funding for different purposes compares in the various funding proposals. (See Appendix for a summary of other FY2011 funding measures.) As Table 2 shows, for non-emergency funding, the continuing resolution enacted at the end of the 111 th Congress ( H.R. 3082 ; P.L. 111-322 ) set funding levels at close to FY2010 levels—a total of $1.087 trillion compared to $1.090 trillion until final levels could be agreed upon. H.R. 1 , as passed by the House on February 19, 2011, but which failed in the Senate on March 9, 2011, proposed a total of $1.026 trillion, below the FY2010 enacted level and substantially below the President's FY2011 budget request. H.R. 1473 , being considered this week, proposes a level of $1.050 trillion, an overall total below the FY2010 enacted level but above the level proposed in H.R. 1 . Comparisons between various spending measures, as noted above, have been central to the spirited discussions of FY2011 funding measures. Table 3 presents dollar differences between bills. Overall, H.R. 1473 is $66.5 billion below FY2010 enacted levels including a decrease of $42.0 billion for non-security agencies and a $1.3 billion increase for security agencies. Decreases relative to FY2010 levels are concentrated in Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS; $11 billion); Labor, HHS, and Education ($7.1 billion); and Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (T-HUD)($12.4 billion). Much of the decrease in CJS funding relative to FY2010 reflects the winding down of costs of the 2010 decennial census of population and housing. Much of the decrease in T-HUD funding relative to FY2010 was in cuts to transportation funding; the largest cuts came from zeroing out funding for the high speed rail grant program for FY2011 (as well as rescinding $400 million from prior year funding and from rescissions in prior year highway contract authority). (These comparisons do not reflect the 0.2% across-the-board reduction in Section 119 of Division B of H.R. 1473 .) Table 4 shows those differences in percentage-change terms. In percentage terms, the largest spending (BA) decreases relative to FY2010 enacted levels would affect program funding controlled by the following subcommittees: Agriculture/Rural Development (-14%); Commerce, Justice, Science (-17%); Financial Services (-9%); Interior and the Environment (-8%); and Transportation and Housing (-18%). The President's FY2011 budget request sets another benchmark for FY2011 funding proposals. Compared to the FY2011 request, H.R. 1473 would be $78.5 billion lower, or 6% overall. Decreases range from 8% (Labor-HHS-Education) to 19% (Transportation-HUD) in all of the non-security subcommittee jurisdictions. H.R. 1 , the FY2011 funding measure passed by the House, provides another benchmark. H.R. 1473 funding is $28.8 billion or 2% higher than H.R. 1 . Levels in H.R. 1473 are higher for Agriculture (10%), Labor/HHS (10%), as well as Energy & Water (6%), Financial Services (8%), and Interior-Environment (7%). A comparison of totals for "Security" and "Non-Security" shows that essentially all reductions are being taken in non-security areas. While the funds within the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee's jurisdiction would receive funding below the President's FY2011 request in all of the proposals, both H.R. 1473 and H.R. 1 propose funding above FY2010 enacted levels—almost $5 billion in the case of H.R. 1473 and about $7 billion in the case of H.R. 1 . These totals omit some Department of Defense funding because military construction is considered by the Military Construction/VA Subcommittee. That funding was slated to decrease in FY2011 with completion of funding for base closures. If that funding is taken into account, overall funding for the Department of Defense in H.R. 1473 would be $2 billion below FY2010 enacted levels. Discretionary spending is provided and controlled through appropriations acts, which fund many of the activities commonly associated with such federal government functions as running executive branch agencies, congressional offices and agencies, and international operations of the government. Essentially all spending on federal wages and salaries is discretionary. Discretionary spending, in general, funds costs of administering federal programs such as Medicare and Social Security, whose benefits are funded by mandatory spending. Mandatory spending, by and large, has grown more rapidly than discretionary spending over the past several decades. Figure 1 shows trends in spending, as measured by budget authority, since FY1976. Budget authority (BA), which gives federal agencies the legal ability to obligate federal funds, has been compared to funds in a checking account. Outlays occur once the U.S. Treasury disburses funds to federal contractors, employees, grantees, or other payees. Congressional analysts often consider spending in terms of budget authority, which Congress controls, rather than outlays, which can depend on decisions made in the executive branch. Deficits, however, are computed as the difference between revenues and outlays. Both discretionary and mandatory spending spiked in FY2009 due to the effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the subsequent recession. President Obama has proposed a five-year freeze in discretionary spending in his FY2012 budget submission, which is reflected in the projected decline in discretionary spending as a proportion of the economy after FY2011. Net interest payments are expected to rise after FY2011 because interest rates typically increase during economic recovery. CBO current-law baseline projections are computed using assumptions set forth in budget enforcement legislation. The CBO baseline projections are not intended to serve as a prediction of what budget outcomes are most plausible or likely. Rather, the CBO baseline projections are designed to serve as a budgeting tool, which is used to determine how legislative changes would increase or decrease the federal deficit. CBO baseline projections are based on current law, not current policy. If under current law a provision is slated to expire, the CBO baseline is computed on the assumption that the provision will expire—even when past Congresses have repeatedly extended similar provisions. For example, if a tax cut is slated to expire under current law, the baseline revenue projections would include an increase in revenues after the scheduled expiration of that tax cut—even if similar tax cuts had been extended in the past. CBO baseline projections presume that discretionary spending remains constant in inflation-adjusted (real) terms. As Figure 1 shows, discretionary spending in past decades has generally kept pace with growth of the economy as a whole, and thus has increased in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars. For these reasons, the CBO current-law baseline projections typically yield estimates of higher growth in revenue and slower growth of discretionary spending relative to scenarios that independent forecasters consider likely. CBO typically includes alternative projections that use assumptions that many economists consider more plausible as predictions of future budgetary outcomes. Appropriation legislation sometimes includes changes in mandatory programs (CHIMPs). CBO often includes summaries of cost savings or increases due to CHIMPs in its cost estimates. H.R. 1473 includes $17.5 billion in reductions in mandatory programs. A new CBO estimate suggests that these reductions in mandatory programs would have relatively little effect on outlays. The treatment of CHIMPs in CBO scoring differs from changes in discretionary spending. Suppose a proposal to increase discretionary spending by $1 is offset by a $1 reduction in mandatory spending in order to keep scoring of discretionary spending below a cap. If the proposal were enacted, the next update of the CBO current-law baseline would be rebased in order to reflect the legislative changes necessary to achieve the mandatory spending reduction. To keep the increased discretionary spending below the cap would then require a new decrease in mandatory spending. By contrast, if the discretionary spending increase were offset by a reduction in another discretionary program, additional offsets would not be necessary. Thus, changes in mandatory spending serve as one-time offsets to discretionary spending increases. While discussions of appropriations legislation typically consider spending in terms of budget authority, data on estimated outlays are important because they are used to compute total budget deficits. Furthermore, the federal government's current fiscal policy stance (i.e., its effect on current macroeconomic trends) depends on outlays. Table 5 presents projections and proposals for FY2011, along with enacted levels for FY2010. Table 6 presents projections and proposals for FY2012, along with actual levels for FY2010.

The 112th Congress is considering H.R. 1473, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, which would fund the federal government's discretionary programs for the remainder of FY2011, which began on October 1, 2010. H.R. 1473 represents a last-minute compromise reached on April 8, the eve of the expiration of the sixth short-term continuing resolution (CR) enacted to date. The current CR (H.R. 1373/P.L. 112-8) provides funding until April 15, 2011. If further funding is not provided, much of the federal government would be shut down. The difficulty in reaching agreement on funding levels for the current fiscal year reflects a larger debate about how to restrain federal spending in the face of large deficits this year and in years to come. Much of the debate has focused on how various proposed funding levels compare to the FY2010 enacted level and President Obama's FY2011 budget request. H.R. 1473 proposes a total federal spending level of $1.21 trillion, or $66.5 billion below the FY2010 enacted level and $78.5 billion below the President's request. All of the proposed funding levels include $159 billion in emergency spending for the Afghan and Iraq wars as proposed by the President. While funding levels for the Defense Department and other security-related agencies (defined here as Defense, Military Construction/Veterans' Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security) have been reduced below the President's request in H.R. 1473, those levels are slightly above FY2010 enacted levels. Most of the debate about reducing spending has focused on discretionary spending for all other non-security areas ranging from Agriculture and Commerce to Transportation and Housing. For all non-security agencies, H.R. 1473 proposes a funding level of $421.7 billion—$42.0 billion or 4% below the FY2010 enacted level and $56.1 billion or 7% below the President's request. H.R. 1473 proposes a funding level of $23.8 billion or 2% above H.R. 1, which was passed by the House on February 19, 2011, and intended to return non-security spending to FY2008 levels. These comparisons are not precise because the $42 billion decrease relative to FY2010 enacted includes $17 billion in decreases to mandatory programs. A new CBO estimate suggests that H.R. 1473 reduces cumulative outlays by about $20 billion to $25 billion, largely because many of the changes to mandatory programs would have little effect on outlays. This report will be updated as necessary.

China has made clear advances in space capabilities over the past decade. The country has launched over 100 orbital missions since 1970, including a string of 50 consecutive successful Long March rocket launches from 1996 to 2006, after overcoming technical problems with the help of U.S. companies in the mid-1990s. China sent humans into space in 2003 and 2005, and orbited a lunar explorer in October 2007 that is paving the way for additional moon exploration. China is now a world leader in yearly space launches, yet remains notably less active than Russia or the United States, as shown in Table 1 . China's space program was initially institutionalized under the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In a series of government reforms in the 1990s, the China National Space Administration (CNSA)—roughly equivalent to the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—was created under the civilian Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The PLA continues to play a role in China's overall space activities, managing both manned civilian and military efforts, while CNSA handles unmanned scientific projects and international collaboration. China's space activities and intentions are not transparent; the dual-use nature of most space technology compounds the uncertainties of interpreting Chinese decision making. China's Space White Paper of 2006 states that Chinese space activities are subservient to domestic social and economic development goals, which include national security. China has been a strong proponent of an arms control regime in space and has argued for the peaceful use of outer space in the United Nations' Conference on Disarmament and at the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space dialogue. Some claim that China takes this stand in order to prevent further progress by the United States in space while allowing it to covertly catch up. China's spending on space is growing, although details are often not available. The CNSA reports to have a budget about one-tenth the size of NASA's. Western experts estimate Chinese space spending at $1.4-2.2 billion per year, on par with France and Japan. Chinese budget opacity, the dual-use nature of most space technology, and currency conversion difficulties make direct comparisons uncertain. China collaborates with other countries on civilian space activities, but it is not considered a key member of the international space community. Currently, China collaborates with Russia, the European Union (EU), Brazil, Canada, Nigeria, and others. The Russian partnership is probably the most active and has benefitted China's manned space effort significantly. A China-EU collaborative framework on space has been in place since 1998. This includes cooperation on the EU-led Galileo satellite positioning system, but progress on this has been slow and sometimes controversial. Competition in space also exists among China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Although there may be military implications to this competition, each country seems more focused on building national pride by displaying technology prowess. China's program to launch humans into space began earnestly in 1992 and is designated as "Project 921." China has apparently chosen the more expensive route of sending humans into space, over machines, for the wider attention it attracts both domestically and internationally. A manned program builds greater national prestige—an increasingly important political benefit in China—and by drawing international attention to the country's technical capabilities. China has made steady, although unremarkable progress in its human space schedule. Compared to the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Soyez programs of the 1960s and 1970s, China's Shenzhou effort is far more modest. Project 921 is divided into three phases. Phase I included the first five Shenzhou flights, culminating in China's first human spaceflight on October 15, 2003. Phase II began with Shenzhou 6, which flew two Chinese taikonauts on a five-day mission starting on October 12, 2005. Shenzhou 7 was a three-day mission starting on September 24, 2008, and built experience with extra-vehicular activities. Shenzhou 8, 9, and 10 are scheduled for 2009-2010 and will attempt to establish a space laboratory module with docking capability. Shenzhou 9 will test docking procedures with the module delivered by Shenzhou 8, and Shenzhou 10 will carry a crew to the module. Phase III is less well developed, but includes establishing a permanent space station. China claims that it has not set a date for development of the station. The Shenzhou modules have been designed to dock at the International Space Station if that becomes politically feasible in the future. On October 24, 2007, China successfully launched Chang-e 1, the country's first lunar probe. Approximately 14 days later, the probe entered final orbit around the moon. China became the fourth country to orbit a satellite around the moon; Japan became the third only weeks before China. Orbiting 200 kilometers (124 miles) above the surface, China's explorer uses stereo cameras and X-ray spectrometers to map three dimensional images of the lunar surface. One goal of the mission is to begin mapping potential lunar resources that could some day be used by Chinese industry. China plans to send Chang-e 2, equipped with a robotic lunar rover, to the moon around 2012. Approximately five years later, Chang-e 3 is scheduled to send another rover to collect samples that will be returned to Earth. After this third phase, an effort to send humans to the moon will commence, but China denies that it has a timetable for this effort. China also has plans to explore Mars and the outer solar system and is discussing collaboration with Russia to do so. These plans are more vague and uncertain than Program 921 and the lunar exploration. China and the United States have a limited history of both civilian and military collaboration in space. China has publicly pushed for more dialogue and joint activities. Mistrust of Chinese space intentions grew in the mid-1990s when U.S. companies were accused of transferring potentially sensitive military information to China. Since then, cooperation has stagnated, often roiled by larger economic, political, and security frictions in the U.S.-China relationship. In September 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin visited his Chinese counterpart, Laiyan Sun, in China. He couched the visit as a "get acquainted" opportunity rather than the start of any serious cooperation in order to keep expectations low. No follow-on activities were announced after the trip, although the Chinese issued a four-point proposal for ongoing dialogue between the two organizations that stressed annual exchanges and confidence building measures. On January 11, 2007, China conducted its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, destroying one of its inactive weather satellites. No advance notice of the test was given, nor has China yet explained convincingly the intentions of the test. The international community condemned the test as an irresponsible act because it polluted that orbital slot with thousands of pieces of debris that will threaten the space assets of more than two dozen countries, including China's, for years. Understanding the nuances of China's intent in conducting the test is important, but remains open to interpretation. How was the decision made to conduct a test that would contradict Beijing's publicly-held position on the peaceful use of outer space, and that would almost certainly incur international condemnation? Some speculate that the United States' unilateral positions encouraged China to conduct the test to demonstrate that it could not be ignored. In particular, the U.S. National Space Policy issued in September 2006 declares that the United States would "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests." Given China's apparent commitment to space, the growing U.S. dependence on space for security and military use, and Chinese concerns over Taiwan, the ASAT test may have been a demonstration of strategic Chinese deterrence. Others saw a more nefarious display of China's space capabilities, and a sign that China has more ambitious objectives in space. Still others speculate that the engineers running China's ASAT program simply wanted to verify the technology that they had spent decades developing and significantly underestimated the international outrage the test provoked. The Chinese ASAT test seemed to derail any movement to build on the meeting between NASA and CNSA. Some believe that China's ASAT test will continue to dampen momentum that might have been building for the two countries to expand cooperation, while others argue that it is a pressing reason to boost dialogue. Some of the most important challenges of expanding cooperation in space with China include: Inadvertent technology transfer. From this perspective, increased space cooperation with China should be avoided until Chinese intentions are clearer. Joint space activities could lead to more rapid (dual-use) technology transfer to China, and in a worst-case scenario, result in a "space Pearl Harbor," as postulated by a congressionally appointed commission led by Donald Rumsfeld in 2001. Moral compromise. China is widely criticized for its record on human rights and non-democratic governance. Any collaboration that improves the standing of authoritarian Chinese leaders might thus be viewed as unacceptable. Ineffectiveness. Some argue that increased collaboration will not produce tangible benefits for the United States, especially without a new bilateral political climate. The potential benefits of expanded cooperation and dialogue with China include: Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations understand each others' intentions more clearly. Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning. Offsetting the need for China's unilateral development. Collaborating with China—instead of isolating it—may keep the country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship. Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint space cooperation. Cost-sharing of joint projects could help NASA achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some have argued that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China while doing little to keep sensitive technology out of China. Information and data sharing. Confidence building measures (CBMs) such as information exchange on debris management, environmental and meteorological conditions, and navigation, are widely considered an effective first step in building trust in a sensitive relationship. NASA has done some of this with CNSA in the past, but more is possible. Space policy dialogue. Another area of potential exchange could begin with "strategic communication," an attempt for each side to more accurately understand the other's views, concerns, and intentions. Dialogue on "rules of the road," a "code of conduct," or even select military issues could be included. Joint activities. This type of cooperation is more complex and would probably require strong political commitments and confidence building measures in advance. Bi-and multi-lateral partnerships on the international space station, lunar missions, environmental observation, or solar system exploration are potential options. A joint U.S.-Soviet space docking exercise in 1975 achieved important technical and political breakthroughs during the Cold War.

China has a determined, yet still modest, program of civilian space activities planned for the next decade. The potential for U.S.-China cooperation in space—an issue of interest to Congress—has become more controversial since the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test. The test reinforced concerns about Chinese intentions in outer space and jeopardized space assets of more than two dozen countries by creating a large cloud of orbital space debris. Some argue that Chinese capabilities now threaten U.S. space assets in low earth orbit. Others stress the need to expand dialogue with China. This report outlines recent activities and future plans in China's civilian space sector. It also discusses benefits and trade-offs of possible U.S.-China collaboration in space, as well as several options to improve space relations, including information exchange, policy dialogue, and joint activities. For more information, see CRS Report RS21641, China's Space Program: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed].

Through its oversight, authorization, and appropriations roles, Congress will likely play a central role in helping implement any decision to increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, as well as any change in their mission. Beyond committing additional forces to Afghanistan, Congress will also likely need to address how sending additional forces to Afghanistan will affect the overall readiness of the U.S. military, the availability of forces in the event of a crisis elsewhere, and what additional resources will be required to support this potential long-term commitment of additional U.S. troops. Today, the Afghanistan War—approaching 16 years—is the longest armed conflict in U.S. history. U.S. military forces entered Afghanistan in late 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (see Figure 1 ). The United States and allies initially drove the Taliban from power and largely destroyed al Qaeda's ability to plan and execute terrorist attacks from Afghanistan. By October 2006, the United States and NATO had assumed responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan. In September 2008, President Bush deployed an extra 4,500 U.S. troops as part of what was described as a "quiet surge." In February 2009, the United States announced the deployment of 17,000 additional troops and NATO pledged to increase its military commitment to Afghanistan. In March 2009, President Obama decided to deploy an additional 4,000 personnel to train and advise the Afghan military and police, as well as support the development of Afghan government agencies. In December 2009, President Obama increased U.S. troop numbers by 30,000—bringing the total of U.S. troops to 100,000—and announced that the United States would begin withdrawing its forces by 2011. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in November 2010, NATO agreed to hand control of security to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. In December of 2014, NATO formally ended its combat mission in Afghanistan and handed it over to Afghan forces. In January 2015, the NATO-led mission "Resolute Support" commenced, with the separate mission to train and advise and assist Afghan security forces. In October 2015, President Obama announced that 9,800 U.S. troops would remain in Afghanistan until the end of 2016, which differed from an earlier pledge to pull out all but about 1,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan. In July 2016, at the NATO Warsaw Summit, in light of what he called "a precarious security situation," President Obama said that 8,400 U.S. troops would remain in Afghanistan. Also at the Summit, NATO agreed to maintain its troop levels and funding until 2020. Since the late 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, coalition troops have undertaken three basic missions, often simultaneously. The first mission, characterized as counterterrorism, primarily revolves around U.S. efforts to kill al Qaeda terrorists and destroy their networks. It is a mission that continues today. The second mission—conducted unilaterally or in conjunction with allied and Afghan forces—involved direct combat against Taliban insurgents attempting to reassert their control over Afghanistan. As previously noted, this mission ended for U.S. and NATO forces in December 2014. The third mission, which began early in the campaign and is the focus of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) today, primarily involves working with allies to train and advise the Afghan military and police, as well as support the development of Afghan government agencies such as, for example, the Ministry of Defense. As part of RSM, U.S. advisors are not supposed to participate in direct combat unless it is in self-defense, but under certain circumstances, U.S. air support may be provided to Afghan security forces. Recent press articles suggest that the Administration is considering proposals to deploy additional ground forces to Afghanistan. These forces would likely be part of the Resolute Support Mission, the ongoing NATO mission to train and support Afghan security forces. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 9, 2017, General John Nicholson, Commander U.S. Forces–Afghanistan noted, based on a mission review, that he had adequate forces for the U.S. counterterrorism mission but there was "a shortfall of a few thousand troops" for RSM if what he described as a "stalemate" with the Taliban-led insurgency were to be broken. Recently, in April, about 300 U.S. Marines were deployed to Helmand Province to advise and assist Afghan forces in the region. The current Pentagon request reportedly under consideration, which requires presidential approval, is said to call for expanding the U.S. military role as part of a broader effort to compel the resurgent Taliban back to the negotiating table. As part of this expanding role, the Pentagon is reportedly considering deploying an additional 3,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, as well as asking for greater latitude in setting overall troop levels, determining how they might be used, at what level advisors might be assigned (battalion or company level), and providing military commanders greater authority for employing airstrikes. Since the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and its allies have pursued a variety of different strategic objectives. Within the military campaign alone, those objectives are, at times, in tension with each other. The initial goals for Afghanistan included the elimination of al Qaeda, and in the process, overthrowing the Taliban and installing a new, legitimate government in Kabul. Over time, however, these goals gave way to the more ambitious project of assisting the Afghan government as it extended its reach across the country—an inherently political undertaking—utilizing both civilian and military means to do so. This has led to considerable debate in Washington and around the world about the overall objectives for U.S. and international engagement there. Successive U.S. administrations have sought to synchronize the counterterrorism and nation-building missions, arguing that their operations are mutually reinforcing. In practice, however, their respective operations sometimes undermine each other. As one scholar notes , "the United States might be able to maintain an open-ended military presence in Afghanistan or stabilize the country, but not both." A recent example of these campaign tensions is the use of a GBU 43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) munition to strike a cave complex used by the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan known as Islamic State- Khorasan Province (ISIL-K or ISKP). General Nicholson maintains the MOAB was the "right weapon against the right target," and that it dealt a devastating blow to ISKP. Other observers, however, note while General Nicholson is probably right about the tactical efficacy of the weapon, it has created an opportunity for opposition forces to foment further dissatisfaction among Afghans toward both their legitimate government in Kabul, as well as a continued U.S. presence in the country. Former Afghan President Karzai, for example, described the attack as the use of a weapon of mass destruction by the United States on Afghan soil, and an "immense atrocity against the Afghan people." The use of the MOAB, in his judgment, should be a clear signal to the Afghan people that they should stop the United States. In addition to the issue of different campaign elements sometimes working at cross-purposes, some observers question the overall feasibility of achieving stability in Afghanistan. According to the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, territory controlled by the Afghan government has receded by nearly 12% since November 2015, to approximately 60% of the country today. Complicating matters, U.S. commanders and other observers have noted other actors, such as Russia, might be supplying Taliban fighters, frustrating U.S. efforts on the ground. Accordingly, most scholars and practitioners note that the military elements of the campaign are necessary, but not sufficient, to deliver lasting stability in the region. In the first instance, building the conditions that might lead to a lasting peace settlement with the Taliban—the main opposing force to the Afghan government—is generally thought to require a broader strategy that addresses political, diplomatic, development, and governance building challenges. To date, the United States has yet to develop and implement a joint strategy with the Afghans for bringing the war to a successful conclusion. Second, as some note, the U.S. focus on countering terror threats such as those posed by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State rather than the Taliban has created a mismatch between Afghan and coalition objectives; the Afghan government itself is far more concerned with the Taliban. Finally, most scholars note the need to deal with Pakistan, which is generally believed to conduct activities that undermine U.S. and Afghan advances. In all of these respects, it is generally unclear how additional U.S. forces will help resolve these underlying campaign issues. Others take the view that despite these difficulties, allowing Afghanistan to once again descend into chaos would ultimately harm U.S. national security. Such a vacuum might enable terrorist groups—including, but not limited to al Qaeda and the Islamic State—to plan and launch attacks against the United States and its allies. An influx of additional forces might therefore be better able to monitor, if not manage, terrorist groups and other threats using Afghanistan and the region as a safe haven. In testimony, General Nicholson noted he had adequate forces for the U.S. counterterrorism mission but there was "a shortfall of a few thousand troops" for RSM. He suggested additional tr oops were needed to bolster the training and advising of Afghan units, increase advisory efforts across Afghan ministries, and provide more advisory capacity at brigade level. General Nicholson suggested the additional troops could also be provided by NATO partners (more below). DOD's reported current request supposedly will give military officials greater latitude in determining how U.S. troops may be employed, which suggests they could be used not only in ongoing counterterrorism operations but in a combat role as well. In order to gain a better understanding of how the Pentagon plans to use these additional troops, policymakers might benefit from a detailed breakdown of what types of troops are required and where and how they will be employed. Will these additional troops be used primarily in a training and advisory capacity, or can they also be involved in combat operations independent of or in support of Afghan security forces? Also, if additional U.S. forces are to take on an enhanced role, does this mean that the current RSM-dedicated U.S. troops in Afghanistan will also be permitted to operate in a manner that is outside their current training and advisory mandate? If missions for U.S. forces are enhanced or changed, will this require changes to existing Rules of Engagement (ROE) and, if so, will new ROEs conflict with those employed by non-U.S. NATO and coalition forces in Afghanistan? According to NATO, as of February 2017, there were 13,459 troops deployed from 39 nations to support RSM, including 6,941 U.S. troops. There are also an unspecified number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan dedicated to the U.S. counterterrorism mission, which could account for the 8,400 overall U.S. troop level cited in congressional testimony and in press reports. Reportedly, the United States has asked NATO partners and other nations for additional troops and any additional non-U.S. troops could help to meet General Nicholson's requirement for "a few thousand more troops" to assist in advisory and training activities. According to one report, NATO is currently considering the U.S request for additional troops but any NATO troops provided would not participate in direct combat missions. Depending on the possible contributions of troops from other nations, the United States could send anywhere from a few hundred to 5,000 troops to Afghanistan. Because troop-contributing nations in the past have placed "caveats" on where and how their troops may be employed, additional U.S. forces might be required to assume a greater burden and conduct missions that other countries are unable to because of caveats. If additional non-U.S. forces are made available, policymakers might decide to examine how they will be employed and if there are associated caveats as to their use and how these caveats might affect the employment of U.S. forces. While an additional commitment of U.S. troops could prove to be modest, ongoing operations in Iraq, Syria, Eastern Europe, and the unpredictable threat from North Korea could create a demand for additional U.S. forces that is not currently forecasted. Ultimately, any troops that are deployed to Afghanistan, as well as those training to replace them, will be taken out of the "pool" of forces available and ready to respond to other possible contingencies. The potential commitment of additional Army forces to Afghanistan also has implications for Army readiness. When units are sent on Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) missions, typically only officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are required in great numbers, meaning these individuals are "stripped" from existing units. The remaining junior officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers in those units are unable to train fully because they lack senior leadership. To address this problem, the Army is planning to establish six Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)—four in the Active Component and two in the Army National Guard—comprising approximately 500 officers and NCOs each, to be used for such missions instead of stripping Brigade Combat Teams of their leadership and degrading readiness. These SFABs will not be available initially; plans call for the first SFAB to be available for deployment by the end of 2018 and that all brigades be established by 2022. From a joint force perspective, policymakers might decide to examine how committing additional forces to Afghanistan—possibly raising the level to over 10,000 U.S. troops—affects the force pool and overall force readiness. The possible addition of 3,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops and the resulting nonavailability of those units designated to take their place carries with it an element of risk to U.S. national security that policymakers might consider. As noted above, the military campaign in Afghanistan has evolved over the past 16 years, as have U.S. strategic goals for the region. At present, it is difficult to discern an overall, coherent strategy for Afghanistan, although this may be resolved by the Trump Administration's review of U.S. activities in that region. Absent clear and coherent guidance, some observers question whether the key objective for the United States is primarily enabling a coalition withdrawal by building a capable and credible Afghan security force, or whether the United States is instead more concerned with maintaining a long-term counterterrorism presence in the country or avoiding major territorial gains by the Taliban. Still others wonder what an influx of several thousand additional forces might realistically do to "break the stalemate," and thereby force the Taliban to accept a political settlement. Skeptics note that the coalition was unable to achieve that objective earlier in the campaign when over 100,000 troops were in theater; however, it is not clear whether this was a result of strategy or execution issues, or both. Given the complexity of the campaign, along with the imprecise nature of U.S. goals for the region and absent a definitive statement from the Trump Administration regarding its priorities, it is currently difficult to evaluate the likely impact that additional forces may have.

The Trump Administration is reportedly considering proposals to deploy additional ground forces to Afghanistan and somewhat broaden their mission. These forces would likely be part of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), the ongoing NATO mission to train and support Afghan security forces. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 9, 2017, General John Nicholson, Commander U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, noted based on a mission review that he had adequate forces for the U.S. counterterrorism mission but there was "a shortfall of a few thousand troops" for RSM if a "stalemate" with the Taliban-led insurgency is to be broken. Especially in light of recent Afghan National Defense and Security Force (ANDSF) shortcomings, notably the Taliban gains in Helmand Province and the April 21, 2017, attack on an Afghan Army installation near Mazar-i-Sharif, some observers maintain additional forces are necessary to shore up the ANDSF. There is no consensus as to the best way to determine the suitability, size, and mission profile of the ground elements of any military campaign. This short report is designed to assist Congress as it evaluates various proposals to introduce more ground forces for RSM.

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers a broad range of benefits to veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces and to certain members of their families. Among these benefits are various types of financial assistance, including monthly cash payments to disabled veterans, health care, education, and housing. Certain criteria must be met to be eligible to receive any of the benefits administered by the VA. This report focuses on basic eligibility and entitlement requirements for former servicemembers for benefits administered by the VA. Certain VA benefits are available to current servicemembers, and the eligibility requirements for those benefits are not a component of this report. The VA uses a two-step process to evaluate claims for benefits. First, the claimant must demonstrate eligib i l ity for veterans' benefits in general. That is, the claimant must prove that he or she is a bona fide veteran and verify certain related matters. Second, the veteran must prove entitlement to the particular benefit being sought. To be eligible for most VA benefits, the claimant must be a veteran or, in some circumstances, the survivor or the dependent of a veteran. By statute, a veteran is defined as a "person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable." In evaluating the evidence to determine whether the claimant is a veteran for the purposes of VA benefits, the VA relies upon military service records. The VA is bound by information that the service documents contain. Such records may include an original military service record; a copy issued by the military service with the certification that it is a true document; or a copy submitted by an accredited agent, attorney, or service representative with special training, who certifies that it is a copy of an original military service document or a copy of a copy of such a document. In addition, the document must contain data regarding the length, time, and character of the service, and the VA must believe that the document is genuine and accurate. If the claimant does not provide the requisite documentation or other evidence, or the submitted documentation does not meet the requirements, the VA must seek to verify the claimant's military service directly from the appropriate military service. A claimant must have "active military, naval, or air service" to be considered a veteran for most VA benefits. However, not all types of service are considered active military service for this purpose. In general, active service means full-time service, other than active duty for training, as a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; as a commissioned officer of the Public Health Service; or as a commissioned officer of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or its predecessors. Active service also includes a period of active duty for training during which the person was disabled or died from an injury or disease incurred or aggravated in the line of duty and any period of inactive duty for training during which the person was disabled or died from an injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty or from certain health conditions incurred during the training. Additional circumstances of service, and whether they are deemed to be active military service, are set out in law. For example, if on authorized travel to and from the performance of active duty training or inactive duty for training, a person is disabled or dies, the duty will be considered to be active duty for training or inactive duty for training. The determination of whether a claimant has met the active service requirement may not be a simple process. The claimant and the VA may have to scrutinize the claimant's service records to determine whether the claimant's service fits into one of the many categories of active service, or whether an exception has been made for his or her service, so that it is considered to be active service for the purposes of veterans' benefits. In addition, a claimant may have more than one period of service, which may further complicate the determination. For people who enlisted prior to September 8, 1980, no minimum length of service is necessary to be considered a veteran for most VA benefits. However, certain minimum length of service requirements apply to people who enlisted on or after September 8, 1980. The general requirement is the "full period" for which the servicemember was called or ordered to active duty or, if less, 24 months of continuous active duty. Several exceptions exist to this rule. For example, service-connected disability compensation benefits are exempt from the length of service requirement. Thus, a veteran with a disease or injury incurred during active service generally may receive service-connected compensation for that disability. Other exceptions to the minimum service requirements include claims for VA life insurance benefits, hardship discharges, and persons retired or separated from service because of a service-related disability. If the former servicemember did not serve for the full period of active duty and served less than 24 months, and none of the statutory exceptions apply, then the veteran did not complete a minimum period of active duty and is "not eligible for any benefit under Title 38, United States Code or under any law administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs based on that period of active service." The statutory definition of veteran requires that the individual be discharged or released from military service "under conditions other than dishonorable." There are currently five types of discharges issued by the military services: 1. honorable discharge (HD), 2. discharge under honorable conditions (UHC) or general discharge (GD), 3. discharge under other than honorable conditions (UOTHC) or undesirable discharge (UD), 4. bad conduct discharge (BCD), and 5. dishonorable discharge (DD). The statutory definition of veteran does not precisely match those five categories of the discharges, and the VA often determines on a case-by-case basis whether the claimant's discharge qualifies as under conditions other than dishonorable. In most cases, the VA considers honorable discharges and discharges under honorable conditions (the first two of the five categories) to be conditions other than dishonorable and will usually qualify a claimant as a veteran under the first step of the eligibility test, which usually qualifies a veteran for most benefits. A bad conduct discharge from a special court-martial and other discharges made under other than honorable conditions do not always disqualify the claimant from being considered a veteran for purposes of benefits eligibility. In the case of such a discharge, the VA makes a special "character of service determination," based on the facts of the case. The VA reviews the entire period of the claimant's enlistment to assess the quality of the service and to determine whether it is sufficient to qualify the discharge as being under conditions other than dishonorable. If a claimant has served more than one period of enlistment, different discharge categories may be specified for each period. Dishonorable and bad conduct discharges issued by general courts-martial may bar VA benefits. Veterans in prison and parolees may be eligible for certain VA benefits and must contact the VA to determine eligibility. VA benefits are not provided to any veteran or dependent wanted for an outstanding felony warrant. Benefits are awarded in some cases even when the character of the discharge would ordinarily make the individual ineligible. For example, if the claimant is found to have been insane at the time of the offense leading to the discharge, VA benefits may be granted. There does not need to be a direct connection between the insanity and the misconduct. All military service is classified as either wartime or peacetime service. The type of service may affect eligibility for VA benefits. For example, only veterans with wartime service qualify for Improved Pension, which pays benefits to low-income veterans who are either elderly or non-service-connected disabled veterans. Periods considered "wartime" for the purposes of veterans' benefits are defined in law. Veterans who served during those periods are considered to have "served during wartime" by the VA, even if the service was not in a combat zone. Those time periods not designated by Congress as wartime are considered to be peacetime. If a veteran served partly during wartime and partly during peacetime, the veteran meets the wartime criteria if he or she served 90 consecutive days, at least one day of which occurred during a period designated as wartime. Congress has designated eight wartime periods: Indian Wars —January 1, 1817, through December 31, 1898; Spanish-American War —April 21, 1898, through July 4, 1902; Mexican Border Period —May 19, 1916, though April 5, 1917; World War I —in general, April 6, 1917, through November 11, 1918; extended to later dates under certain conditions; World War II —December 7, 1941, through December 31, 1946; extended through July 25, 1947, for veterans in service on December 31, 1946; Korean Conflict —June 27, 1950, through January 31, 1955; Vietnam Era —in general, August 5, 1964, through May 7, 1975, but the period begins on February 28, 1961, for veterans who served in the Republic of Vietnam during that period ; Persian Gulf War —August 2, 1990, through a date to be prescribed by presidential proclamation or law. To be eligible for VA benefits, members of the National Guard and the reserve components must meet the same standards as other claimants. In many cases, however, they do not meet the active duty standard or length of service standard and are therefore ineligible for VA benefits. Members of the National Guard and reserves who are never activated for federal active duty military service do not meet the active duty requirement. National Guard and reserve members who are called to active duty and serve the full period for which they are called meet both the active service and length of duty requirements. National Guard and reserve members also qualify as veterans for the purposes of VA benefits if they are disabled or die from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty. National Guard and reserve members may qualify as veterans for the purposes of VA benefits under other circumstances, which adds to the complexity of the eligibility determination. For example, under certain conditions Guard and reserve members may be eligible for education benefits (through the Reserve Educational Program or the Post-9/11 GI Bill) and home loans from the VA (with six years of service in the Selected Reserves or National Guard). Eligibility under these special cases is usually determined by the VA after reviewing the individual servicemember's military service records. Some groups of civilians who participated in World War I and World War II are also eligible for VA benefits. The GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 ( P.L. 95-202 ) recognized the service of the Women's Air Forces Service Pilots, a civilian group, as active service for benefits administered by the VA. That law also provided that the Secretary of Defense could determine that service for the Armed Forces by a group of civilians or contractors be considered active service for benefits administered by the VA. Based on the provisions of P.L. 95-202 , the Secretary of Defense established that the Secretary of the Air Force would develop and maintain the process to determine if the wartime employment of certain groups of individuals is considered active duty military service for the purpose of receiving certain veterans' benefits. If these groups are considered to be active duty by the Secretary, they are eligible to receive certain benefits, including health care. Regulations implementing P.L. 95-202 specify which groups the Secretary has determined were employed in active duty service. The regulations also established the Department of Defense Civilian/Military Service Review Board and Advisory Panel to review each application for active duty status. Following its review, the board recommends to the Secretary whether the applicant group should be considered active duty for the purposes of the act; the Secretary makes the final decision. Changes and clarification to the regulations were implemented in 1989 in response to "a Federal Court determination [ Schumacher v. Aldridge ] that the Department of Defense had failed to clarify factors and criteria in their implementing directive concerning P.L. 95-202 ." To date, only certain groups who participated in World War I and World War II have been accorded active duty status under this procedure, including Women's Air Force Service Pilots (WASPs), Signal Corps Female Telephone Operators Unit (World War I), Engineer Field Clerks (World War I), Male Civilian Ferry Pilots (World War II), and other groups of employees with war-related occupations. Civilian groups granted veterans status pursuant to P.L. 95-202 are eligible for VA burial benefits including interment or inurnment in VA National Cemeteries. Pursuant to legislation enacted on May 20, 2016 ( P.L. 114-158 ), these veterans are eligible for inurnment in the Columbarium or Niche Wall at Arlington Cemetery but not ground burial. Merchant mariners are civilians who engage in certain maritime activities, such as the transportation of military equipment by sea, in support of the armed forces. In general, merchant mariners are not considered veterans for the purposes of any VA benefits. However, pursuant to regulations promulgated in accordance with P.L. 95-202 , the following groups of merchant mariners are considered veterans for purposes of eligibility for all programs administered by the VA: United States Merchant Seamen who served on blockships in support of Operation Mulberry in World War II; and American Merchant Marine personnel who served in oceangoing service during the period of armed conflict between December 7, 1941, and August 15, 1945. In addition, pursuant to Section 402 of the Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-368 ), merchant mariners may qualify for interment or inurnment at a VA National Cemetery and VA burial benefits only if they were members of the United States Merchant Marine, Army Transport Service, or Naval Transport Service who served between August 16, 1945, and December 31, 1946.

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers a broad range of benefits to U.S. Armed Forces veterans and certain members of their families. Among these benefits are various types of financial assistance, including monthly cash payments to disabled veterans, health care, education, and housing. Basic criteria must be met to be eligible to receive any of the benefits administered by the VA. This report examines the basic eligibility criteria for VA administered veterans' benefits, including the issue of eligibility of members of the National Guard and reserve components. For a former servicemember to receive certain VA benefits, the person must have active U.S. military service for a minimum period of time, generally the lesser of the full period ordered to active duty or 24 months, and be discharged "under conditions other than dishonorable." Some members of the National Guard and reserve components have difficulty meeting the active duty and length of service requirements. However, a member of the National Guard or reserve components who is activated for federal military service and meets the length of service requirement is considered a veteran for purposes of VA benefits. The Secretary of Defense may determine that service for the Armed Forces by a group of civilians or contractors will be considered active service, allowing members of those groups to be considered veterans for purposes of VA benefits. Such determinations, authorized by the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-202), have been made only for groups involved in World War I and World War II.

The DRA continues the TANF block grant created in the 1996 welfare reform law through FY2010. In general, TANF funding levels, rules for use of funds, and program requirements continue unchanged through FY2010. With respect to funding, there are some exceptions: Supplemental grants paid to 17 states that have met criteria of low historic grants per poor person or high rates of population growth are continued at current levels only through FY2008. TANF bonuses totaling $300 million to states are repealed. The DRA established new project and demonstration grants for promoting healthy marriages ($100 million per year) and "responsible fatherhood" ($50 million per year). The DRA makes some significant changes to TANF work participation. These changes require most states to engage more of their caseloads in activities and/or reduce cash assistance caseloads from FY2005 levels. As originally enacted and also under DRA, TANF sets minimum work participation standards that a state must meet or be penalized by a reduction in its block grant. The standards are performance measures computed in the aggregate for each state, which require that a specified percentage of families with an adult or minor head of household receiving assistance be considered engaged in specified activities for a minimum number of hours. A state must meet two standards each year: 50% of all families with an adult recipient or minor head-of-household recipient must have a work participant; and (2) 90% of two-parent families must meet participation rules. However, the 1996 welfare reform law included a caseload reduction credit , which provided that the standards were reduced one percentage point for each 1% decline in the assistance caseload that had occurred since FY1995. States were not given credit for caseload declines that resulted from eligibility changes that had occurred since FY1995, the year before enactment of the federal welfare reform law ( P.L. 104-193 ). After the federal and state welfare reforms of the mid-1990s, many states had large declines in their cash assistance caseloads. Though the rate of caseload decline varied among the states, most states received fairly substantial caseload reduction credits which reduced their effective (after-credit) TANF work participation standards well below 50%. In FY2004, caseload reduction credits were large enough to reduce to 0% the effective (after-credit) work participation standard for 18 states. The DRA revises the caseload reduction credit, so that states will receive credit only for future caseload reductions. Effective in FY2007, states will only receive credit for caseload reductions that occur from FY2005 forward. The FY2007 credit will be based on caseload declines (if any) that occur from FY2005 to FY2006; the FY2008 credit will be based on caseload declines that occur from FY2005 to FY2007 and so on. As under prior law, states are not given credit for caseload declines that occur because of eligibility changes that occurred from the base year for measuring caseload changes; the base year will be FY2005 under the DRA. The TANF program was created in 1996 by consolidating three programs that provided matching grants to states, with the federal government funding approximately 55% of expenditures made in these predecessor programs. TANF requires states to meet a maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement, which is to spend, from their own funds, at least 75% of what they had spent in FY1994. State spending to meet the MOE need not be in the TANF program, but must be for needy families with children and for the same types of activities allowed under state TANF programs. Under the 1996 law, most TANF requirements, including the work participation standards, did not apply to families receiving assistance under separate state programs (SSPs): programs with expenditures countable toward the MOE but designated by the states as outside the TANF program. States used SSPs to, among other things, assist two-parent families, which freed them from the 90% standard applicable to that part of the caseload; operate "Parents as Scholars" programs for recipients attending college; and assist special populations such as families with a disabled member, permitting them to be exempted from work requirements without negatively affecting participation rates. The DRA requires that states count families in SSPs in determining their work participation rates. The major impact of this change is that states will have to meet a 90% standard for the two-parent portion of its caseload. This change will also subject special populations to the TANF work participation standards and, together with the HHS regulations defining TANF work activities, affect states' ability to allow recipients to attend college without negatively affecting work participation rates. Though the 1996 welfare reform law established TANF participation standards, minimum hours requirements, and a list of 12 categories of activities that count toward meeting the standards, much of the detail in operating and enforcing these standards was left to the states. The DRA required HHS to issue regulations to "ensure consistent measurement of work participation rates" by further defining TANF work activities beyond the current statutory list; requiring uniform methods for reporting hours of work; and determining the circumstances in which parents must be included in the work participation rate calculation. The HHS regulations were issued in interim, final form on June 29, 2006. Table 1 , at the end of this report, shows the specific work activities that may be included in each of the 12 federal statutory categories, as defined by HHS. These definitions prohibit states from counting participation in a four-year college degree program as vocational educational training. They also provide that activities such as substance abuse and mental health counseling may be counted as a "job readiness activity," countable together with job search for up to six weeks (12 weeks under some circumstances) in a fiscal year. Additionally, the HHS regulations also include requirements that activities be "supervised," many on a daily basis. The DRA requires states to have procedures to verify recipients' work participation, which identify who is subject to or excluded from work standards, how recipients' activities represent countable TANF work activities, and how reported hours of work are verified. HHS regulations require states to submit a description of these procedures in a state work verification plan. Preliminary work verification plans were due to HHS on September 30, 2006; final plans are due on September 30, 2007. Under the 1996 welfare reform law, all child-only TANF families (families where there are no adult recipients) were excluded from the work participation calculation. The DRA required that the HHS regulations specify the types of families with parent caretakers that should be included in or excluded from the participation rate. HHS regulations specifically exclude from the participation rate immigrant parents who are ineligible for assistance (with citizen children eligible for assistance). It allows states to make a case-by-case determination of whether to include in the participation rate a parent receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Other nonrecipient parents must be included in the participation rate, particularly affecting parents removed from the assistance unit because of a time limit or sanction. These regulations do not affect the status of non-recipient, nonparent caretakers, such as grandparents, aunts, and uncles caring for children, who are exempt from the work participation standards. The regulations also allow states to exclude parents caring for a disabled family member from the participation rate calculation. From FY2002 through FY2005, mandatory child care funding for the Child Care and Development Block Grant has been set at $2.717 billion per year. The DRA increases mandatory child care funding to $2.917 billion per year for FY2006 through FY2010, an increase from current levels of $200 million per year or $1 billion over five years. The DRA establishes new categorical grants within TANF for healthy marriage promotion and responsible fatherhood initiatives. As originally enacted and continuing under DRA, TANF law allows states to use block grant and MOE funds for activities to further any TANF purpose, including promotion of the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. However, state expenditures in this category have generally been small. The healthy marriage promotion initiative is funded at approximately $100 million per year, to be spent through grants awarded by the Secretary of HHS to support research and demonstration projects by public or private entities; and technical assistance provided to states, Indian tribes and tribal organizations, and other entities. The activities supported by the healthy marriage promotion initiatives are programs to promote marriage to the general population, such as public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and education in high schools on the value of marriage; education on "social skills" (e.g. marriage education, marriage skills, conflict resolution, and relationship skills) for engaged couples, those interested in marriage, or married couples; and programs that reduce the financial disincentive to marry, if combined with educational or other marriage promotion activities. The DRA requires applicants for marriage promotion grants to ensure that participation in such activities is voluntary and that domestic violence concerns be addressed, including through consultation with experts on domestic violence. Additionally, the DRA makes available up to $50 million per year for responsible fatherhood initiatives. These initiatives will be funded through competitive grants made by HHS to states, territories, Indian tribes and tribal organizations, and public and nonprofit community organizations (including religious organizations). Responsible fatherhood initiatives are defined as including activities to promote marriage; teach parenting skills through counseling, mentoring, mediation, and dissemination of information; support employment and job training services, and develop and promote media campaigns and a national clearinghouse focused on responsible fatherhood. (See CRS Report RL31025, Fatherhood Initiatives: Connecting Fathers to Their Children , by [author name scrubbed] for more on these initiatives.)

The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) includes a scaled-back version of welfare reauthorization. More extensive versions were considered during the preceding four-year debate. (See CRS Report RL33418, Welfare Reauthorization in the 109 th Congress: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] for details.) The DRA extends funding at current levels for basic state grants under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant through Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. It requires most states to either raise participation in work activities among families receiving cash welfare from TANF or further reduce the cash assistance rolls. DRA also required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations to define activities countable toward work participation standards and set rules for state enforcement and verification of participation in activities. These regulation were published on June 29, 2006. The DRA also extends Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) mandatory funding through FY2010, increasing mandatory child care funding by $200 million per year from previous levels (a total increase of $1 billion over five years). The DRA further establishes $100 million per year in TANF research and technical assistance funds for "healthy marriage promotion" initiatives and $50 million per year for "responsible fatherhood initiatives." This report will not be updated.

Because of the annual budget and appropriation process in Congress and the current conflicts involving U.S. servicemembers overseas, there is a strong interest in the levels of spending by the federal government for veterans' benefits and services among members of Congress and the public. For this report, veterans' benefits and services include direct spending on veterans (such as disability compensation or health care) and indirect spending (such as administration and construction of facilities). This report provides information on the historical budget authority for veterans' benefits and services for FY1940 through FY2012, and a brief discussion of major changes in budget authority over this period. Budget authority is presented in both current dollars and constant 2011 dollars (i.e., inflation-adjusted). The budget authority for veterans' benefits and services over the FY1940-FY2012 period has generally shown a steady increase. As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1 , the FY2012 budget authority in current dollars was more than 20 0 times the FY1940 budget authority, reflecting an average annual growth rate for the period of 7.9%. In constant 2011 dollars, the FY2012 budget authority is 1 4 times the FY1940 budget authority and reflects a 3.8% average annual growth rate over the period. A large number of Americans, 16.1 million, served in the military in World War II (WWII, December 7, 1941, through December 31, 1946), making WWII the largest conflict to date in terms of the number of servicemembers. Because the servicemembers volunteered (or were drafted) for "the duration," a large number of servicemembers were released in a relatively short period of time at the end of the war. Before the end of the war, the Servicemen's Readjustment Act (P.L. 346 of the 78 th Congress), commonly known as the GI Bill, was signed into law in 1944, providing a major change in benefits for veterans. The GI Bill introduced education and training benefits that enabled millions of servicemembers who may have otherwise been unable to attend college or training schools to receive a college education or specific job skills training. In addition, the housing loan guarantee benefits provided by the GI Bill enabled WWII veterans to purchase homes for their families. As shown in Table 1 , the combination of the large number of veterans being released in a relatively short period of time and the change in benefits resulted in the budget authority for veterans increasing from $561.1 million before the war in FY1940 to a peak in the post-war period in FY1947 of almost $8.4 billion. In current dollars, the FY1947 budget authority was 14.9 times the FY1940 pre-war budget authority for veterans. In constant 2011 dollars, the FY1947 budget authority for veterans was $80.7 billion, or 9. 8 times the FY1940 pre-war budget authority for veterans. The Vietnam era (February 28, 1961 through May 7, 1975) was significantly longer than WWII, with a total of 8.7 million Americans who served in the military during the period. Until the end of 1972, a military draft was in place (the last drafted servicemembers began service in 1973), and drafted servicemembers were released through the period at the end of their military obligation. Also, while benefit changes or expansions were made during the period, no new large benefit programs were started during the period (unlike the WWII period). As a result of the regular release of servicemembers from the military over the period and the relatively stable levels of veterans' benefits and services, the large peak in budget authority at the end of WWII was not repeated at the end of the Vietnam era. There was however a smaller peak in budget authority for the FY1975-FY1976 period that reflected an increase in the number of veterans at the end of the Vietnam conflict. While the current dollar budget authority for FY1975 and FY1976 was 2.0 and 2.3 times the FY1947 budget authority, in constant 2011 dollars (after adjusting for inflation) the budget authority for FY1975 and FY1976 was below that of FY1947. This reflects in large part the differences between the two conflicts in terms of the timing for release of servicemembers and veterans benefits and services (compared to the pre-conflict period). During the current conflicts [Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, which began October 2001), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, March 2003 - August 2010), and Operation New Dawn (which began September 2010)], there is no military draft in place. Servicemembers generally leave at the end of their obligation, or at retirement. The somewhat steady increase in budget authority for veterans' benefits and administration each year since the late 1990s reflects the impact of the aging of the veteran population (with an accompanying increased demand for services) in addition to the impact of the returning OEF/OIF veterans. Also, increases in appropriations for disability compensation reflect changes to the conditions considered presumed to be service-connected for Vietnam veterans. In FY2000, of the 83,159 veterans who began receiving disability compensation that year, 19.8% were aged 55 or older. By FY2011, of the 272,509 veterans who began receiving disability compensation that year, 52.9% were aged 55 or older. The budget authority for FY2009 and later years also reflect the impact of the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Program. Over time, the increases in the budget authority for veterans' benefits and services have reflected the impact of increases in the number of veterans as the result of wars and other conflicts, the aging of the veteran population, and changes in the benefits and services provided for veterans. The most dramatic impact of the combination of an increase in the number of veterans and changes in veterans' benefits can be seen in the period shortly after World War II.

Budget authority—the amount of money a federal department or agency can spend or obligate to spend by law—for veterans' benefits and services has increased significantly since FY1940. In FY1940, the budget authority for veterans' benefits and services was $561.1 million, and in FY2012 the budget authority was $125.3 billion, or more than 200 times the FY1940 budget authority. In constant 2011 dollars (i.e., inflation-adjusted), the FY2012 budget authority is 14 times the FY1940 budget authority. The increases over time have reflected the impact of increases in the number of veterans as the result of wars and other conflicts, the aging of the veteran population, and changes in benefits and services provided for veterans. This report provides information on the historical budget authority of the Department of Veterans Affairs (formerly the Veterans Administration) for FY1940 through FY2012. Budget authority is presented in both current dollars and constant 2011 dollars. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available.

President Obama's budget outline for FY2010 includes several proposals to reduce federal spending by $16 billion over 10 years on the farm commodity and crop insurance programs. The issue was highlighted in the President's address to Congress on February 24, 2009, when he said, "In this budget, we will ... end direct payments to large agribusinesses that don't need them." Mr. Obama also highlighted the farm commodity programs when, as president-elect, he cited a GAO report on improper payments to farmers by remarking that, "There's a report today that, from 2003 to 2006, millionaire farmers received $49 million in crop subsidies even though they were earning more than the $2.5 million cutoff for such subsidies. Now, if this is true ... it is a prime example of the kind of waste that I intend to end as president." Criticism over parts of the farm subsidy program from an Administration is not new. Throughout the 2008 farm bill debate, the Bush Administration wanted tighter income eligibility limits on farm subsidies, and it vetoed the farm bill—albeit unsuccessfully—partly for such reasons. Reaction to the proposal has been generally negative from groups affiliated with or supportive of agriculture. The most vehement reaction has been to a proposal to eliminate direct payments to farms with more than $500,000 of sales. Several members of the House and Senate agriculture committees have spoken out against the proposal in part or in whole. Support, although not explicitly expressed, would likely originate from some groups or individuals who supported tighter payments limits in the 2008 farm bill and would want tighter payment limits in any form. The FY2010 budget proposal for the farm commodity and crop insurance programs is separate from the discretionary budget that funds USDA operations. The discretionary budget usually is the centerpiece of the Administration's annual proposal, but that element of the budget is delayed in the first year of a President's term, and is not expected until April. Pending that submission, the Administration has proposed a budget outline that, in the context of fiscal discipline, includes several proposals to reduce mandatory spending programs. The mandatory farm commodity programs are not subject to annual appropriations, but are part of the five-year 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ). The FY2010 budget indicates that most of the proposed $16 billion in farm commodity reductions would be used to offset $9.9 billion of proposed increases in child nutrition, although the savings could be used in any number of ways throughout the federal government. Given the nature of the mandatory programs, it is important to note—relative to the Administration's proposal—that: any changes would require legislative action by Congress and would likely need to originate in the agriculture authorizing committees. They would not be part of the annual appropriations process. such action would be viewed as "reopening" the 2008 farm bill, which most in the agriculture community see as a five-year contract with farmers. The agriculture committees are neither obligated nor likely to take up the proposal (some committee members have spoken out against the proposal in part or in whole). if budget reconciliation is ordered by the budget committees, and the agriculture committees are tasked to find savings of a certain magnitude, then the President's farm proposals may draw more attention from Congress. Even then, the proposal likely would be modified or a different budget-saving approach chosen, given the reaction by farm groups and agriculture committee members. Specifically, the President's FY2010 budget proposes four reductions in the farm subsidies, including direct payments, payment limits, cotton storage payments, and crop insurance. The savings are estimated by the Administration to total $16 billion over 10 years ( Table 1 ). 1. Prohibit "direct payments" to farmers with sales exceeding $500,000 per year. 7 This would be a new and different type of "payment limit." About 76,500 farms in 2007 receiving government payments had sales over $500,000 (11% of farms receiving government payments, Table 4 ). Midwestern farms would be affected in the greatest number, but the proportion of cotton and rice farms affected would be greater than for corn, soybean, and wheat farms. The Administration estimates savings of $9.8 billion over 10 years. Relative to the $44 billion of direct payments that USDA expects to pay from FY2010-FY2019 in the baseline under the 2008 farm bill, the proposal would reduce total direct payments by 22% over 10 years ( Table 2 , Figure 1 ). 2. Tighten payment limits (maximum amount of subsidies paid) to $250,000 per person . The proposal is not detailed, but indications suggest it would re-impose limits on marketing loan benefits and tighten the limit on direct and counter-cyclical payments. This would be similar to prior-year proposals for the same amount (e.g., S.Amdt. 3695 , 110 th Congress). Current law has a per-person limit of $210,000 for direct and counter-cyclical payments, with no limit on marketing loan benefits. Prior law had a $360,000 limit that included marketing loans (although the limit could be avoided). The Administration estimates $126 million of savings over 10 years. 3. Eliminate storage payments for cotton. Only cotton has a payment program to pay storage costs for crops placed under government loan. The Administration estimates savings of $570 million over 10 years. 4. Reduce crop insurance subsidies. The proposal is not detailed, but savings could be achieved by reducing the subsidy on premiums that farmers pay, reducing underwriting gains received by the insurance companies that sell the policies, or reducing administrative and operating expense reimbursements to the insurance companies. The Administration estimates savings of $5.2 billion over 10 years. Relative to the $72 billion of crop insurance subsidies estimated from FY2010-FY2019 in the CBO baseline, the proposal would reduce the crop insurance baseline by 7.2% over 10 years ( Table 3 , Figure 2 ). The budget also mentions reductions in the Market Access Program (MAP) and elimination of the Resource Conservation and Development (RC&D) program, both of which are outside the scope of the farm commodity programs. Much of the attention given to the Administration's budget proposal has centered on the proposal to eliminate direct payments to farms with sales of more than $500,000. Several observations may be made about the effect of using a limit on sales, and on the number and types of farms that would be affected. A limit on sales would add a new type of "payment limit" for farm commodity support. Currently there is (1) a limit on amount of payments that a farmer can actually receive, and (2) an adjusted gross income (AGI) limit to determine eligibility. The proposal would add a third type of payment limit—an eligibility test of $500,000 of gross farm sales. A $500,000 limit on sales generally would be more restrictive than the existing AGI limit of $750,000 of "farm AGI" (after expenses) and $500,000 of "nonfarm AGI." The AGI measure is after expenses are subtracted from income; farms with $750,000 of farm AGI likely have sales exceeding $1-$2 million or more. The proposed limit on sales would be on a gross basis—that is, before expenses. Gross farm sales may be more variable than net farm sales ("farm AGI"). Net farm sales are less variable because higher expenses may offset higher sales. Thus, many opponents to the proposal have argued that farms exceeding a $500,000 sales limit may have very little profit or even a loss. The high magnitude of commodity price increases during 2007-2008 changed the share of farms with sales over $500,000 from the 3%-4% share of the previous nine years to 5.5% in 2007-2008. ( Figure 3 ). Although this share may decline in the future given the drop in commodity prices since the fall of 2008, it highlights that sales may be variable and more subject to "bracket creep" than net measures of income. Sales vary directly with prices and yields. Years with high prices or yields could push farms over the limit. In contrast, a net income measure may be more constant if higher production expenses occur or tax management tools are used. For example, expenses may vary in proportion to production (e.g., costs per acre, fertilizer-to-yield). Some expenses may be fixed regardless of production (e.g., land costs or sunk production costs). Other expenses may be manipulated to manage taxable income (e.g., purchasing equipment, and prepaying expenses), or delayed to reduce outlays in low-income years (e.g., postponing repairs or capital improvements, reducing withdrawals for family living expenses). USDA data show about 76,500 farms in 2007 receiving government payments and having sales over $500,000. They accounted for 11% of farms receiving government payments, and they received 47% of government payments ( Table 4 ). When estimating the number of farms affected, it is important to look both at farms receiving government payments and farms with sales greater than $500,000. About 116,000 farms (5.3% of all farms in 2007) had sales over $500,000, but only about 38% of all farms received government payments ( Figure 4 ). Many large fruit, vegetable, or livestock farms have sales over $500,000 but do not receive subsidies that accrue primarily to grains, oilseeds, and cotton. Large farms, although fewer in number, account for most of the production and government payments. The 116,000 farms with sales over $500,000 produced 74% of the value of production and received 47% of government payments. The effect on farms by region is visible in Table 4 . Overall, the states with the highest number of farms affected are Iowa (about 8,200 farms), Illinois (6,500 farms), Minnesota (5,300 farms), and Nebraska (5,100 farms). About one-third of the 76,500 affected farms in the nation are in these four states. About 13%-16% of farms in these states receive government payments and have sales over $500,000. The table also shows the importance of combining information about high sales and government payments, and the effect of producing non-subsidized commodities. For example, in California the effect of fruit and vegetable production on large farms is apparent with only 9% of farms receiving government payments. More California farms have sales over $500,000 (8,600 farms) than receive government payments (7,100 farms). Delaware has the highest ratio of farms (28%) with sales exceeding $500,000, likely an indicator of the state's concentrated poultry production on a relatively small amount of land (compare Figure 6 and Figure 7 ). By commodity, a limit on sales would affect a higher percentage of cotton and rice farms (in the southern tier of the United States) than corn, soybean, or wheat farms. Cotton and rice farms on average are larger than corn, soybean, or wheat farms, and their value of production per acre is much higher—making them more likely to exceed a sales threshold. Government payments to cotton and rice farms also are higher ( Figure 5 , Figure 7 ). This comparison is similar to arguments that have been made in the payment limits debate for many years. Specific to the Administration's proposal, about 17%-21% of farms selling corn, soybeans, or wheat have sales over $500,000. Their sales account for 51%-59% of the national production of corn, soybeans, and wheat ( Table 5 ). About 36% of farms selling cotton, and 43% of farms selling rice have sales over $500,000. Their sales account for 75% of the national production ( Table 5 ). But given the predominance of acreage devoted to corn, soybeans, and wheat compared with cotton and rice, the sheer number of corn, soybean, and wheat farms affected is larger than for cotton and rice. This is indicated by the number of farms with sales over $500,000 ( Table 5 ) and the rank of states like Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska in Table 4 .

President Obama's budget outline for FY2010—in the context of fiscal discipline—includes several proposals to reduce federal spending by $16 billion over 10 years on the farm commodity and crop insurance programs. Reaction to the proposal has been generally negative from groups that are affiliated with or supportive of agriculture. The most vehement reaction has been to a proposal to eliminate direct payments to farms with more than $500,000 of sales. Any change would require legislative action by Congress; it would not be part of the annual appropriations process. Such action would be viewed as "reopening" the 2008 farm bill, which most in the agriculture community see as a five-year contract with farmers. The agriculture committees are neither obligated nor likely to take up the proposal. If budget reconciliation is ordered by the budget committees, and the agriculture committees are tasked to find savings, then the President's farm proposals may draw more attention—but even then, the proposal likely would be modified or a different budget-saving approach could be chosen. Specifically, the President's FY2010 budget proposes four reductions in the farm subsidies: Prohibit "direct payments" to farmers with sales exceeding $500,000 per year. This would add a new type of "payment limit." About 76,500 farms in 2007 receiving government payments had sales over $500,000 (11% of farms receiving government payments). They received 47% of government payments. Midwestern farms would be affected in the greatest number. Four states (Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska) account for one-third of the number of farms affected nationally. But the proportion of cotton and rice farms affected would be greater than for corn, soybean, and wheat farms (36%-43% compared to 17%-21%, respectively). The Administration estimates savings of $9.8 billion over 10 years, a reduction of about 22% of expected direct payments. Tighten payment limits (the maximum amount of subsidies paid) to $250,000 per person. The proposal is not detailed, but indications suggest it would re-impose limits on the marketing loan program and tighten the limit on direct and counter-cyclical payments. The Administration estimates $126 million of savings over 10 years. Eliminate storage payments for cotton. Only cotton has a payment program to pay storage costs for crops placed under government loan. The Administration estimates savings of $570 million over 10 years. Reduce crop insurance subsidies. The proposal is not detailed, but savings could be achieved by reducing the subsidy on premiums that farmers pay, reducing underwriting gains to insurance companies that sell policies, or reducing administrative and operating expense reimbursements. The Administration estimates savings of $5.2 billion over 10 years, about 7.2% of expected outlays.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted to the President alone. Other appointments, generally referred to with the abbreviation PAS, are made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation process. This report identifies, for the 112 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. It excludes appointments to regulatory boards and commissions as well as to independent and other agencies. This report features a pair of tables presenting information for each of these 15 executive departments. The first table in each pair provides information on full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation as of the end of the 112 th Congress and the pay levels of those positions. The second table for each department tracks appointment activity within the 112 th Congress by the Senate (confirmations, rejections, returns to the President, and elapsed time between nomination and confirmation) as well as further related presidential activity (including withdrawals and recess appointments). In some instances, no appointment action occurred within an agency during the 112 th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointments-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . Table 1 summarizes appointment activity, during the 112 th Congress, related to full-time PAS positions in the 15 executive departments. President Barack H. Obama submitted 116 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions to executive departments. Of these 116 nominations, 90 were confirmed; 11 were withdrawn; and 15 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate has varied widely. Some nominations were confirmed within a few days, others were confirmed within several months, and some were never confirmed. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 112 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For confirmed nominations, a mean of 151.4 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 131.5. Each of the 15 executive department profiles provided in this report is divided into two parts: a table listing the organization's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 112 th Congress and a table listing appointment action for vacant positions during the 112 th Congress. Data for these tables were collected from several authoritative sources. In each department profile, the first of these two tables identifies, as of the end of the 112 th Congress, each full-time PAS position in that department and its pay level. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, the pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule. As of January 2013, these pay levels ranged from level I ($199,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($145,700) for lower-ranked positions. The second table, the appointment action table, provides, in chronological order, information concerning each nomination. It shows the name of the nominee, position involved, date of nomination or appointment, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation. It also notes actions other than confirmation (e.g., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). The appointment action tables with more than one nominee to a position also list statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. Each appointment action table provides the average days to confirm in two ways: mean and median. Although the mean is a more familiar measure, it may be influenced by outliers in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. For a small number of positions within a department, the two tables may contain slightly different titles for the same position. This is a result of the fact that the title used in the nomination the White House submits to the Senate, the title of the position as established by statute, and the title of the position used by the department itself are not always identical. The first table listing incumbents at the end of the 112 th Congress uses data provided by the department itself. The second table listing nomination action within each department relies primarily upon the Senate nominations database of the LIS. This information is based upon the nomination sent to the Senate by the White House. Any inconsistency in position titles between the two tables is noted in the notes following each appointment table. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. The table also includes the mean and median values for the "days to confirm" column. Table A-2 provides summary data for each of the 15 executive departments identified in this report. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each department. It also provides the mean and median values for the numbers of days taken to confirm nominations within each department. During the 112 th Congress, the Presidential Appointments Streamlining and Efficiency Act ( P.L. 112-166 ) was enacted, which eliminated the requirement for the Senate's advice and consent for 163 positions in federal agencies. A number of those positions, listed in Appendix B , have been included in previous versions of this tracking report. This report notes each agency and position affected. A list of department abbreviations can be found in Appendix C . Appendix A. Presidential Nominations, 112 th Congress Appendix B. Positions Affected by P.L. 112-166 Appendix C. Abbreviations of Departments

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 349 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 112th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments. Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix. During the 112th Congress, the President submitted 116 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 116 nominations, 90 were confirmed, 11 were withdrawn, and 15 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 151.4 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 131.5. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in Congress, or job tenure, is a source of recurring interest among Members of Congress, congressional staff, those who study staffing in the House and Senate, and the public. There may be interest in congressional tenure information from multiple perspectives, including assessment of how a congressional office might oversee human resources issues, how staff might approach a congressional career, and guidance for how frequently staffing changes may occur in various positions. Others might be interested in how staff are deployed, and could see staff tenure as an indication of the effectiveness or well-being of Congress as an institution. This report provides tenure data for 15 staff position titles that are typically used in Senate committees, and information for using those data for different purposes. The positions include the following: Chief Clerk Chief Counsel Communications Director Counsel Deputy Staff Director Legislative Assistant Minority Staff Director Press Secretary Professional Staff Member Senior Counsel Senior Professional Staff Member Staff Assistant Staff Director Subcommittee Staff Director Systems Administrator Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff tenure data in a readily retrievable or analyzable form. Data in this report are based on official Senate pay reports, from which tenure information arguably may be most reliably derived, and which afford the opportunity to use complete, consistently collected data. Tenure information provided in this report is based on the Senate's Report of the Secretary of the Senate , published semiannually, as collated by LegiStorm, a private entity that provides some congressional data by subscription. Senate committee staff tenure data were calculated for each year between 2006 and 2016. Annual data allow for observations about the nature of staff tenure in Senate committees over time. For each year, all staff with at least one week's service on March 31 were included. All employment pay dates from October 2, 2000 to March 24 of each reported year are included in the data. Utilizing official salary expenditure data from the Senate may provide more complete, robust findings than other methods of determining staff tenure, such as surveys; the data presented here, however, are subject to some challenges that could affect the interpretation of the information presented. Tenure information provided in this report may understate the actual time staff spend in particular positons, due in part to several features of the data. Figure 1 provides potential examples of congressional staff, identified as Jobholders A-D, in a given position. Some individuals, represented as Jobholder A, may have an unknown length of prior service before October 2, 2000, when the data begin. In the data captured for this report, no jobholders fall into this category. The earliest date at which Senate committee staff included in this report received pay was October 4, 2000. Thus, the tenure periods of all staff for which data are provided completely begin within the observed period of time; some tenure periods, as represented by Jobholders B and C, also end within the observed period. The data last capture those who were employed in Senate committees as of March 31, 2016, represented as Jobholder D, and some of those individuals likely continued to work in the same roles after that date. Data provided in this report represent an individual's consecutive time spent working in a particular position in a Senate committee. They do not necessarily capture the overall time worked in a Senate office or across a congressional career. If a person's job title changes, for example, from staff assistant to professional staff member, the time that individual spent as a staff assistant is recorded separately from the time that individual spent as a professional staff member. If a person stops working for the Senate for some time, that individual's tenure in his or her preceding position ends, although he or she may return to work in Congress at some point. No aggregate measure of individual congressional career length is provided in this report. Other data concerns arise from the variation across commirrees and lack of other demographic information about staff. Potential differences might exist in the job duties of positions with the same or similar title, and there is wide variation among the job titles used for various positions in congressional offices. The Appendix provides the number of related titles included for each job title for which tenure data are provided. Aggregation of tenure by job title rests on the assumption that staff with the same or similar title carry out the same or similar tasks. Given the wide discretion congressional employing authorities have in setting the terms and conditions of employment, there may be differences in the duties of similarly titled staff that could have effects on the interpretation of their time in a particular position. As presented here, tenure data provide no insight into the education, age, work experience, pay, full- or part-time status of staff, or other potential data that might inform explanations of why a congressional staff member might stay in a particular position. Tables in this section provide tenure data for selected positions in Senate committees and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides a summary of staff tenure for selected positions since 2006. The data include job titles, average and median years of service, and grouped years of service for each positon. The "Trend" column provides information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Table 2 - Table 16 provide information on individual job titles over the same period. In all of the data tables, the average and the median length of tenure columns provide two different measures of central tendency, and each may be useful for some purposes and less suitable for others. The average represents the sum of the observed years of tenure, divided by the number of staff in that position. It is a common measure that can be understood as a representation of how long an individual remains, on average, in a job position. The average can be affected disproportionately by unusually low or high observations. A few individuals who remain for many years in a position, for example, may draw the average tenure length up for that position. A number of staff who stay in a position for only a brief period may depress the average length of tenure. Another common measure of central tendency, the median, represents the middle value when all the observations are arranged by order of magnitude. The median can be understood as a representation of a center point at which half of the observations fall below, and half above. Extremely high or low observations may have less of an impact on the median. Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in at least three potentially significant ways, including the following: the relatively brief period of time for which reliable, largely inclusive data are available in a readily analyzable form; how the unique nature of congressional work settings might affect staff tenure; and the lack of demographic information about staff for which tenure data are available. Considering tenure in isolation from demographic characteristics of the congressional workforce might limit the extent to which tenure information can be assessed. Additional data on congressional staff regarding age, education, and other elements would be needed for this type of analysis, and are not readily available at the position level. Finally, since each Senate committee serves as its own hiring authority, variations from committee to committee, which for each position may include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in a particular office. Despite these caveats, a few broad observations can be made about staff in Senate committees. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in four position titles in Senate committees. The median tenure was unchanged for seven positions, and decreased for four positions. This may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Although pay is not the only factor that might affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job, staff in positions that generally pay less typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in higher-paying positions. Some of these lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level positions in some Senate committees; if so, Senate committee employees in those roles appear to follow national trends for others in entry-level types of jobs, remaining in the role for a relatively short period of time. Similarly, those in more senior positions, which often require a particular level of congressional or other professional experience, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. There is wide variation among the job titles used for various positions in congressional offices. Between October 2000 and March 2016, House and Senate pay data provided 13,271 unique titles under which staff received pay. Of those, 1,884 were extracted and categorized into one of 33 job titles used in CRS Reports about Member or committee offices. Office type was sometimes related to the job titles used. Some titles were specific to Member (e.g., District Director, State Director, and Field Representative) or committee (positions that are identified by majority, minority, or party standing, and Chief Clerk) offices, while others were identified in each setting (Counsel, Scheduler, Staff Assistant, and Legislative Assistant). Other job title variations reflect factors specific to particular offices, since each office functions as its own hiring authority. Some of the titles may distinguish between roles and duties carried out in the office (e.g., chief of staff, legislative assistant, etc.). Some offices may use job titles to indicate degrees of seniority. Others might represent arguably inconsequential variations in title between two staff members who might be carrying out essentially similar activities. Examples include the following: Seemingly related job titles, such as Administrative Director and Administrative Manager, or Caseworker and Constituent Advocate Job titles modified by location, such as Washington, DC, State, or District Chief of Staff Job titles modified by policy or subject area, such as Domestic Policy Counsel, Energy Counsel, or Counsel for Constituent Services Committee job titles modified by party or committee subdivision. This could include a party-related distinction, such as a Majority, Minority, Democratic, or Republican Professional Staff Member. It could also denote Full Committee Staff Member, Subcommittee Staff Member, or work on behalf of an individual committee leader, like the Chair or Ranking Member. The titles used in this report were used by most Senate committees, but a number of apparently related variations are included to ensure inclusion of additional offices and staff. Table A-1 provides the number of related titles included for each position used in this report or related CRS Reports on staff tenure. A list of all titles included by category is available to congressional offices upon request.

The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in a particular position in Congress—or congressional staff tenure—is a source of recurring interest to Members, staff, and the public. A congressional office, for example, may seek this information to assess its human resources capabilities, or for guidance in how frequently staffing changes might be expected for various positions. Congressional staff may seek this type of information to evaluate and approach their own individual career trajectories. This report presents a number of statistical measures regarding the length of time Senate committee staff stay in particular job positions. It is designed to facilitate the consideration of tenure from a number of perspectives. This report provides tenure data for a selection of 15 staff position titles that are typically used in Senate committee offices, and information on how to use those data for different purposes. The positions include Chief Clerk, Chief Counsel, Communications Director, Counsel, Deputy Staff Director, Legislative Assistant, Minority Staff Director, Press Secretary, Professional Staff Member, Senior Counsel, Senior Professional Staff Member, Staff Assistant, Staff Director, Subcommittee Staff Director, and Systems Administrator. Senate committee staff tenure data were calculated as of March 31, for each year between 2006 and 2016, for all staff in each position. An overview table provides staff tenure for selected positions for 2016, including summary statistics and information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Other tables provide detailed tenure data and visualizations for each position title. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in four position titles in Senate committees. The median tenure was unchanged for seven positions, and decreased for four positions. These findings may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Pay may be one of many factors that affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job. Senate committee staff holding positions that are generally lower-paid typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in generally higher-paying positions. Lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level roles; if so, tenure for Senate committee employees in these roles appears to follow national trends for other entry-level jobs, which individuals hold for a relatively short period of time. Those in more senior positions, where a particular level of congressional or other professional experience is often required, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in some ways, because each Senate committee serves as its own hiring authority. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in another office. Direct comparisons of congressional employment to the general labor market may have similar limitations. Change in committee leadership, for example, may cause staff tenure periods to end abruptly and unexpectedly. This report is one of a number of CRS products on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report R43946, Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

Congress may continue to consider fiscal stimulus as unemployment remains high even though the economy is recovering from the 2007-2009 recession and a recent provision has been acted to avert much of the so-called fiscal cliff, a set of tax increases and spending cuts. Several types of tax cuts were partially or fully enacted for purposes of short run economic stimulus in the recent past (2001-2008). These tax revisions were the first in some time that were motivated, at least in part, by the need for expansionary fiscal policy. In the late 1990s, the economy experienced a protracted period of significant growth, and, in the decade prior to that most tax legislation addressed a need for deficit reduction (the objective of most tax change between 1982 and 1997, as was the case in the 1990 and 1993 tax changes) or a desire for structural change (in the 1986 and 1997 tax revisions). Different types of stimulus provisions were enacted in the period 2001-2008: the 2001 tax cut was aimed at individuals, but most of its provisions, especially the rate cuts, which were phased in over a number of years, were not based on the recession that was apparent in 2000 and that appeared in the spring of 2001. When concerns about the economy continued towards the end of 2001 and in 2002, the Congress enacted bonus depreciation. And, in 2003, the tax provision advanced to stimulate the economy was a reduction in dividend taxation. In February 2008, a stimulus package containing a rebate similar to the 2001 rebate, and bonus depreciation, was adopted. In February 2009, as the recession continued, a package consisting of a mix of spending and tax cuts was adopted (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act). In this case, the income tax cut was in the form of a two-year income tax cut that appeared in withholding rather than a rebate, in part in response to views of some economists that lump-sum rebates were less effective. During 2010 as unemployment continued to be high, no general individual tax cuts were enacted, although in March 2010, a temporary credit against payroll taxes was allowed to employers for hiring workers who had been unemployed. This tax provisions was small compared to the 2008 and 2009 tax cuts ($13 billion). Bonus depreciation was extended, but that extension was largely retroactive. In December of 2010, a package that extended the Bush tax cuts for two years and provided for a one-year reduction in payroll taxes for workers was adopted ( P.L. 111-312 ). It also increased bonus depreciation to 100% for 2011, returning to 20% in 2012. In recent legislation, to address the fiscal cliff, most of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were made permanent (except for very high income taxpayers), including rate cuts and dividend reductions. Bonus depreciation was extended for a year, but the payroll tax was not extended. Of course, the policy issues did not solely reflect the need for short run stimulus. However, the crucial element in evaluating alternative provisions is whether they induce spending. This report discusses the rebate and bonus depreciation as mechanisms for stimulating the economy in the short run based on evidence of the effectiveness of these proposals in expanding spending. The findings reported below suggest that one-time rebates are effective in stimulating spending, and that the effects of tax cuts are largest in lower-income households, while provisions directed at businesses and investment income may have more limited effects. The 2001 tax cut was not primarily enacted because of concerns about a recession and most of the provisions were phased in over a number of years. However, concerns about a slowing economy did motivate the advance tax rebate provided in 2001. Because the tax cut was enacted close to mid-year (in May) it was difficult to provide a tax cut for 2001 that could be reflected appropriately in withholding. By the time withholding changes could be put into place, much of the year would have passed and either withholding changes would be inadequate (deferring tax cuts until returns were filed the following year), or if made larger to compensate for the partial year effect would have resulted in a withholding increase for some taxpayers at the beginning of 2001. The rebate proposal provided for the mailing out of checks to taxpayers in the fall of 2001 that were advance reductions for the introduction of a 10% rate bracket for 2001. They were, however, based on taxpayers' 2000 tax returns and any excess credits did not have to be repaid when returns for tax year 2001 were filed. (Taxpayers whose credits were smaller than those allowed on 2001 returns, however, received additional relief when tax returns were filed). The checks were mailed out between July and October. The rebate met some important standards for an effective tax cut stimulus. Unlike many stimulus proposals in the past, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, where the stimulus occurred during the recovery rather than the recession phase (potentially adding to inflationary pressures), its impact occurred during the recession. In addition, tax cuts are most effective as a stimulus if they are spent, and the tax reductions affected lower and moderate income taxpayers who have a high propensity to spend. At the same time, there was some concern that lump sum payments might be spent in the same fashions as a continued increase in income through tax reductions. There was some evidence that temporary rebates in the past were not spent. It appears, however, that most of the rebate was spent fairly quickly: at least 20% to 40% in the quarter received and two-thirds by the end of the second quarter after receipt. Studies of the 2001 rebate also point to the importance of directing the rebate to households with low incomes and with fewer liquid assets. In the study by Johnson, Parker, and Souleles, households with low incomes were estimated to have increased spending by more than the rebate, while middle-income individuals spent less than 20%. Households with few liquid assets also increased spending more. Another study found that households with lower credit card limits, or who were near their limits, or used their credit cards intensively, increased spending the most. The Joint Tax Committee study discusses some important administrative issues surrounding a cash rebate. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, concerns once more arose about the economy. A tax package proposal that included a business tax cut in the form of reduction in the corporate alternative minimum tax and an acceleration of rate reductions failed to achieve passage in 2001. In 2002, a bill was adopted and the centerpiece, as far as tax provisions were concerned, was a temporary, two-year, provision for bonus depreciation. This provision, responding to a concern about lagging business investment, allowed businesses to deduct 30% of the cost of most business equipment purchases when incurred rather than depreciating them over several years (typically five to seven years). Bonus depreciation was increased to 50% in 2003 and extended through 2004. Among the business tax incentives, a temporary investment subsidy should have the most "bang for the buck." By directing the subsidy at investment, the stimulus does not provide a windfall for existing capital. By making the provision temporary there is an incentive to make investment now rather than later. Nevertheless, a study of the effect of temporary expensing by Cohen and Cummins at the Federal Reserve Board found little evidence that bonus depreciation was effective in stimulating investment. They suggest several potential reasons for a small effect. One possibility is that firms without taxable income could not benefit from the timing advantage. In a Treasury study, Knittel confirmed that firms did not elect bonus depreciation for about 40% of eligible investment, and speculated that the existence of losses and loss carry-overs may have made the investment subsidy ineffective for many firms, although there were clearly some firms that were profitable that did not use the provision. Cohen and Cummins also suggested that the incentive effect was quite small (largely because depreciation already occurs relatively quickly for most equipment), reducing the user cost of capital by only about 3%, that planning periods may be too long to adjust investment across time, and that adjustment costs outweighed the effect of bonus depreciation. Knittel also suggests that firms may have found the provision costly to comply with, particularly because most states did not allow bonus depreciation. A study by House and Shapiro found a more pronounced response to bonus depreciation, given the magnitude of the incentive, but found the overall effect on the economy was small, which in part is due to the limited category of investment affected and the small size of the incentive. Their differences with the Cohen and Cummins study reflect in part uncertainties about when expectations are formed and when the incentive effects occur. A study by Hulse and Livingstone found mixed results on the effectiveness of bonus depreciation, which they interpret as weakly supportive of an effect. One issue that these studies do not provide insight to is the desirable length of time to allow the temporary provision. If the time is too long, the provision is not very effective because the stimulus may be delayed, but if it is too short firms do not have time to make adjustments. Cohen and Cummins also report the results of several surveys of firms, where from 2/3 to over 90% of respondents indicated bonus depreciation had no effect on the timing of investment spending. Overall, bonus depreciation did not appear to be very effective in providing short-term economic stimulus. It is possible, however, that a stimulus during current times, when losses are not as large as they were in 2002-2004 when the economy was already in a recession, could be more successful. The February 2008 stimulus package included an individual tax rebate. Unlike the 2001 rebate, this rebate provided for refundability for taxpayers with at least $3,000 of earnings, Social Security benefits, or veterans benefits. It also included bonus depreciation of 50% for one year. In a preliminary study of households, Broda and Parker found that 20% of the rebate was spent in the first month. They predict that the 2008 rebate will have a significant effect on spending in subsequent months. Their study also found higher levels of spending for lower income households and those with fewer liquid assets. Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland, examining the timing of payments and spending, found 12% to 30% was spent on consumption in the first three months, and adding spending on consumer durables raised the share to 50% to 90%. They also found that a larger fraction of the payment was spent by lower-income households. Finally, they tested whether self-reporting provided a reliable measure of spending and concluded that self- reporting understated the amount of spending.

Although the economy is recovering from the 2007-2009 recession, unemployment continues to be high and further stimulus may be considered in the 113th Congress. Recent legislation in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240) averted part of the so-called "fiscal cliff," a set of tax increases and spending cuts that were scheduled to occur at the beginning of 2012. Shortly a decision must be made about continuing with sequestration, a set of automatic spending cuts that were delayed by two months by P.L. 112-240. In addition, while most changes were permanent, bonus depreciation was extended for only a year. Stimulus (or avoiding contraction) could include individual tax cuts and business tax provisions. In recent years, several different types of short run fiscal stimulus measures have been enacted: an individual income tax rebate in 2001, a temporary investment incentive (bonus depreciation) in 2002, and dividend relief in 2003. The February 2008 stimulus included a rebate, bonus depreciation, and small business expensing. A stimulus adopted in February 2009 included a large component of spending, but also extended bonus depreciation and small business expensing. It also enacted an income tax credit that was spread over two years. In December of 2010, in addition to temporarily extending the expiring Bush tax cuts and unemployment compensation, a temporary one-year payroll tax credit was adopted. This payroll credit was extended through 2012, but was not extended by P.L. 112-240. Two types of stimulus provisions have been subject to specific empirical study. They suggest that the 2001 and 2008 rebates were an effective stimulus but bonus depreciation had a limited effect. They also suggest that tax cuts directed to lower-income households are more likely to be effective in stimulating spending. Bonus depreciation was extended for another year by P.L. 112-240, and a large share of other provisions affected high income taxpayers. Thus many of the tax increases averted by the legislation probably had small effects on the economy.

No. Congress wrote restrictions that would have prevented the closure of military installations without prior congressional action into several National Defense Authorization Acts during the 1960s and 1970s, but each of these bills was vetoed. Nevertheless, Congress has been able to place in statute provisions that delay actions to reduce operations at or close installations that employ civilians above certain numbers. What is commonly referred to as a "BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) round," a comprehensive reduction of Department of Defense (DOD) real property, has been carried out under the provisions of temporary statutes. The authorization for the most recent BRAC round expired on April 16, 2006. As outlined below, the President and his subordinates have considerable existing authority to close military installations. Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution appoints the President as the commander in chief of the Army, the Navy, and the state Militias (National Guards) when they are called into federal service. This gives the President the authority to deploy those forces, which in common practice has included creating and closing the installations needed to house and train them. Title 10 of the United States Code encompasses laws pertaining to the federal armed forces. Section 113 of Title 10 (10 U.S.C. §113) creates a Secretary of Defense, who is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to DOD and who has authority, direction, and control over the department. The Secretary is second to the President in commanding operational military forces. Other sections within Title 10 create the secretaries of the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force). These offices are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and their statutory powers include the administration of federal real property (facilities and land) needed to carry out the functions of their departments. The authority to create, realign, or close installations under their administration has commonly been held to be one of those powers. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gives the Congress the authority to raise revenues and pay the debts of the United States, to provide for the common Defense, and to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and regulate the Militias when called to federal service. Therefore, Congress funds the operations of DOD through its annual defense and military construction appropriations acts and sets DOD organization and policy through the annual National Defense Authorization Act. Through this legislation, Congress authorizes the acquisition and transfer of title of military real property; funds the construction, maintenance, and operation of military installations; empowers DOD to waive statutory requirements in the disposal of property, and otherwise enables DOD to shape and maintain its infrastructure inventory. Nevertheless, primarily because the President and his subordinates have been responsible for the deployment of military forces, Congress has been hesitant to direct the creation or disestablishment of specific military installations. Yes. Congress has passed, and the President has enacted, restrictions on presidential powers to close military installations using the annual appropriation and defense authorization bills. Yes, some are. Principal among them are 10 U.S.C. §2687 (Base Closures and Realignments), enacted in 1977, and 10 U.S.C. 993 (Notification of Permanent Reduction of Sizable Numbers of Members of the Armed Forces), enacted in 2011. These sections impose a "notify, evaluate, and wait" process on the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the military departments before they may take actions to close or realign any military installation that meets certain criteria. Under 10 U.S.C. §2687 , for military installations at which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, the Secretary of Defense or a secretary of a military department may take no action to carry out a closure until he submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate 1. notification of the closure as part of the department's annual request for appropriations; 2. an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of the closure; 3. the criteria used to consider and recommend the military installation for closure; and 4. a period of 30 legislative days or 60 calendar days, whichever is longer, expires following the day on which the notice and evaluation is submitted to the committees. The statute defines a realignment as any action that both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions. Exempted from the definition of a realignment is a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes. For realignments at installations of at least 300 authorized civilian positions, it imposes the same restrictions on the secretaries as a closure if the realignment involves a reduction by more than 1,000, or by more than 50%, in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed there. The section also bans the preparation of any facility at another military installation intended to accept employees relocated by the closure or realignment until the four conditions listed above have been fulfilled. While Section 2687 is predicated on the predicted reduction of civilian employees at an installation, 10 U.S.C. §993 lays out a similar, though slightly different, process where a reduction in uniformed military personnel is involved. Section 993 prevents the secretaries concerned from taking any irrevocable action to implement a reduction of more than 1,000 members of the armed forces at an installation until they 1. notify the Committees on Armed Services of the reduction (there is no restriction on when such notification may be given); 2. justify the reduction and evaluate its local strategic and operational impact; 3. wait for a period of 21 days after the notification is submitted (14 days if submitted in electronic format). Both statutes state that they do not apply in cases where the actions are being taken for reasons of national security or a military emergency No. U.S. Joint Forces Command, a major combatant command, was headquartered in several military installations in the Hampton Roads, Virginia, area. During August of 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the command would be disestablished and its headquarters staff would be disbanded, an event that occurred on August 31, 2011. Although the civilian employment within the headquarters exceeded the number needed to invoke Section 2687, it was not concentrated on a single installation. Rather, the disbandment represented either a reduction in force or a realignment at each of the several installations it affected. At none of the installations did the reduction in numbers reach a realignment threshold. Section 993, pertaining to the number of uniformed personnel, was not enacted until after JFCOM was disestablished. Therefore, there was no statutory requirement for congressional notification and justification. No. As outlined earlier, BRAC has been a process established under specific authorization from Congress that has been time-limited. There have been five distinct BRAC rounds, of which the last four have been carried out under the provisions of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended. The authority under that act expired on April 16, 2006. Therefore, there can be no future BRAC round until and unless Congress passes and the President signs legislation that specifically authorizes one. Because the relevant statutory authority has expired any such future round need not follow processes used in prior rounds. The issues involved with the closing of any military installation can cover a range not necessarily restricted to those regarding real property. For questions related to the following broad areas, please consult with the following CRS experts: 1. Military personnel, manpower, pay, benefits: [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Military Manpower Policy ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed]) 2. Defense budget, policy: [author name scrubbed], Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed]) 3. Military construction, installations, BRAC: [author name scrubbed], Specialist in National Defense ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed]).

These FAQs examine the provisions in the Constitution and in permanent statute that define and limit federal authority to disestablish or diminish employment at defense sites. They do not discuss the special, temporary BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) process that Congress has periodically authorized for the reduction of defense infrastructure.

A "lame duck" session of Congress takes place whenever one Congress meets after its successor is elected but before the term of the current Congress ends. From 1940 to 2016, there were 21 lame duck sessions. The most recent la me duck session, which commenced on November 13, 2018, is not included in the data presented in this report. Of the 21 lame duck sessions examined, seven followed an election that switched the majority party in one or both chambers. That is, the party that controlled the House or Senate during the lame duck session did not retain its majority into the next Congress. Tab l e 1 displays these sessions, occurring in 1948, 1954, 1980, 1994, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Like the 2018 lame duck session, three lame duck sessions (1940 to 2016) followed a majority-changing midterm election during a President's first term of office. In each of these sessions (1954, 1994, 2010), the same party had controlled the White House, House, and Senate prior to the election. This report provides additional information on the 1954, 1994, and 2010 lame duck sessions. Lame duck sessions have been held for a variety of reasons. Their primary purpose is to complete action on legislation. They have also been used to prevent recess appointments and pocket vetoes, to consider motions of censure or impeachment, to keep Congress assembled on a standby basis, or to approve nominations (Senate only). In recent years, most lame duck sessions have focused on program authorizations, trade-related measures, appropriations, and the budget. Critics of lame duck sessions object to recently defeated Members or parties managing and acting on the legislative agenda. Proponents consider these post-election sessions to be useful for lawmaking at the end of a Congress. In the last two decades, lame duck sessions have become a routine occurrence during even-numbered years, regardless of which party is in the majority before the election. Prior to 1933, the last regular session of Congress was always a lame duck session. However, the 20 th Amendment to the Constitution changed the dates of the congressional term from beginning and ending on March 4 of odd-numbered years to January 3 of odd-numbered years. As a result, lame duck sessions are no longer an automatic feature of Congress. Today, lame duck sessions consist of any portion of a regular second session that falls after the November election in an even-numbered year and before the next Congress commences on January 3. Between 1935 and 1998, one or both houses held a lame duck session in 12 of the 32 Congresses (74 th -105 th ). In contrast, both houses held a lame duck session in every Congress from the 106 th through the 114 th (2000-2016). These sessions are now an anticipated—although not guaranteed—biennial event. In Congresses featuring a lame duck session, the preceding election break spanned an average of six to seven weeks and generally began by early to mid-October. During the break, the chambers either were in recess or held a series of pro forma sessions. Lame duck sessions begin once regular, consecutive daily sessions resume after an election break. Typically, sessions have started around the third week of November. Between 1935 and 2016, the average session length was about one calendar month. Within that time frame, the House held an average of 15 daily sessions, and the Senate held an average of 18 daily sessions. The shortest lame duck sessions featured a limited agenda. For instance, in 1998, the House spent three days considering the President Clinton impeachment proceedings. In 1948, the House and Senate met for one day, mainly to wrap up the 80 th Congress, and in 1994, the Members spent the two-day lame duck session considering a tariff and trade agreement. The 1948 and 1994 sessions took place after an election that switched the majority party. However, the other majority-change lame duck sessions were similar in length to the overall average. From 1935 to 2016, seven lame duck sessions followed an election that changed the majority party in one or both chambers of Congress. Two occurred during a presidential election year (1948, 1980), two followed a midterm election during the second term of a President (2006 and 2014), and three followed a midterm election during the first term of a President (1954, 1994, 2010). Tabl e 1 displays lame duck sessions that convened after an election that changed the majority party in either the House or the Senate. The table identifies the number of seats the majority party lost as well as the key measures approved during the post-election periods. In each of the lame duck sessions that followed a midterm election in a President's first term in office, the same party controlled the White House, the House, and the Senate. Below, more information is provided on the 1954 (Republican-controlled), 1994 (Democratic-controlled), and 2010 (Democratic-controlled) lame duck sessions of Congress. For a detailed review of lame duck sessions of Congress (1935-2016), see CRS Report R45154, Lame Duck Sessions of Congress, 1935-2016 (74th-114th Congresses) . In the 1954 midterm election, the Republican Party lost its majorities in both chambers during President Eisenhower's first term in office. After the election, the Senate reconvened solely to consider disciplinary actions against Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. (The House remained adjourned for the remainder of the 83 rd Congress.) On November 9, a select investigative committee reported a resolution of censure, which was subsequently debated and amended on the Senate floor. On December 2, the Senate approved the two-count resolution censuring Senator McCarthy for behavior related to his inquiry into alleged communist influence in the federal government. Two years into President Clinton's presidency, the 1994 midterm gave Republicans control of the House and Senate for the next Congress. On November 29, both houses reconvened in order to consider the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The measure, which had stalled in the Senate prior to the election, received bipartisan support in the lame duck. The House passed the bill on the first day of the session, and the Senate passed it on December 1. In the 2010 election, midway through President Obama's first term in office, congressional Democrats lost their House majority as well as six seats in the Senate. On November 15, both chambers reconvened after the election to consider an extensive legislative agenda. Among the measures adopted, Congress passed the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (NDAA, P.L. 111-383 ), the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act ( P.L. 111-353 ), the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act ( H.R. 2965 ), and the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act ( H.R. 847 ). The House and Senate also extended the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts and adopted a series of continuing resolutions (CRs) to provide government funding through March 4, 2011. In addition, the Senate voted to approve ratification of an arms control treaty with Russia (New START) and confirmed 19 federal judges.

"Lame duck" sessions of Congress take place whenever one Congress meets after its successor is elected but before the term of the current Congress ends. Their primary purpose is to complete action on legislation. They have also been used to prevent recess appointments and pocket vetoes, to consider motions of censure or impeachment, to keep Congress assembled on a standby basis, or to approve nominations (Senate only). In recent years, most lame duck sessions have focused on program authorizations, trade-related measures, appropriations, and the budget. From 1940 to 2016, there were 21 lame duck sessions. Seven followed an election that switched the majority party in one or both chambers. That is, the party that controlled the House or Senate during the lame duck session did not retain its majority into the next Congress. These sessions occurred in 1948, 1954, 1980, 1994, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Three lame duck sessions between 1940 and 2016 followed a majority-changing midterm election during a President's first term of office. In each of these sessions (1954, 1994, 2010), the same party had controlled the White House, House, and Senate prior to the election. This report provides additional information on the 1954, 1994, and 2010 lame duck sessions. The most recent lame duck session, which commenced on November 13, 2018, is not included in the data presented.

RS20258 -- Patient Protection and Mandatory External Review: Amending ERISA's Claims Procedure Updated January 19, 2001 The Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 1344 , was introduced by Senator Trent Lott (R-MS) on July 8, 1999, and passed by the Senate onJuly 15, 1999. S. 1344 sought to amend ERISA to provide additional requirements for group health plansand health insurance issuers offeringcoverage in connection with group health plans. If enacted, S. 1344 would have required group health plans and health insurance issuers to develop written procedures for addressing grievances. Agrievance was defined by the bill as any complaint made by a participant or beneficiary that does not involve acoverage determination. Once a grievance wasaddressed, a resulting determination would not have been appealable. S. 1344 would have allowed participants and beneficiaries to appeal any adverse coverage determination to an internal review process. An adversecoverage determination was defined as any determination under the plan which results in a denial of coverage orreimbursement. A participant or beneficiaryseeking internal review would have been allowed at least 180 days after the date of the adverse coveragedetermination to make an appeal. Review would havebeen conducted by an individual with appropriate expertise who was not involved in the initial determination. Appeals involving issues of medical necessity orexperimental treatment would have been conducted by physicians with appropriate expertise. Internal review would have been completed within 30 working days of receiving the request for review. Where delay could jeopardize the life or health of theclaimant, S. 1344 would have required that review was completed no later than 72 hours after receiving therequest for review. A request forexpedited review would have to include documentation of a medical exigency by the treating health careprofessional. For routine determinations, notice of thedecision would have to be issued no later than 2 working days after the completion of review. For expediteddeterminations, notice would have to be issuedwithin the 72-hour review period. Failure to issue a timely decision would been treated as an adverse coveragedetermination for purposes of obtaining externalreview. If enacted, S. 1344 would have required all plans and issuers to have written procedures to permit access to an independent external review process. External review would have been available to selected adverse coverage determinations. Those determinationsincluded coverage decisions that (1) are based onmedical necessity and exceed a significant financial threshold; (2) are based on medical necessity and involve asignificant risk of placing the life or health of theparticipant in jeopardy; or (3) involve an experimental or investigational treatment. To obtain external review, aclaimant would have to complete the internalreview process and file a written request for review within 30 working days of receiving the internal reviewdecision. Within 5 working days after receiving the request for external review, the plan or issuer would have selected an external appeals entity. (13) This external appealsentity would have designated an external reviewer who would conduct the review. The external reviewer wouldhave to (1) be appropriately credentialed orlicensed to deliver health care; (2) not have any material, professional, familial, or financial affiliation with the caseunder review; (3) have expertise in thediagnosis or treatment under review and be a physician of the same specialty, when reasonably available; (4) receiveonly reasonable and customary compensationfrom the plan or issuer; and (5) not be held liable for decisions regarding medical determinations. The externalreviewer would have been required to consider allvalid, relevant, scientific, and clinical evidence to determine the medical necessity, appropriateness, or experimentalnature of the proposed treatment. Review would have been conducted in accordance with the medical exigencies of the case, but would have to be completed within 30 days of the date on whichthe reviewer was designated or all necessary information was received, whichever was later. For cases where delaycould jeopardize the life or health of theparticipant, review would have to be conducted within 72 hours of the date on which the reviewer was designatedor all necessary information was received,whichever was later. The determination of the external reviewer would have been binding upon the plan or issuer. The Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2990 , combined two bills: the Quality Care for the Uninsured Act of 1999,originally H.R. 2990 , was introduced by Representatives James M. Talent (R-MO) and John B. Shadegg(R-AZ) on September 30, 1999, and theBipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, originally H.R. 2723 , was introduced byRepresentatives Charlie Norwood (R-GA)and John D. Dingell (D-MI) on August 5, 1999. (14) The combined bill was passed by the House of Representatives on October 7, 1999. H.R. 2990 would not only have required group health plans and health insurance issuers to provide an external review processfor denied claims, but would have alsoestablished new deadlines for the internal review process and mandated the creation of a formal grievance system. Under H.R. 2990 , group health plans and health insurance issuers would have been required to maintain a system that addressed oral and writtengrievances. These grievances would have included any aspect of the plan's or issuer's services, but would notinclude a claim for benefits. Once resolved,grievances would not have been subject to appeal. If enacted, H.R. 2990 would have permitted a participant, beneficiary, or enrollee to request and obtain an internal review of his claim within 180days following a denial of a claim for benefits. Review would have been conducted by a named fiduciary if thedispute involved a claim for benefits under theplan. For disputes involving denied coverage, review would have been conducted by a named appropriate individual. If the case involved medical judgment,review would have been conducted by a physician. Internal review would have been completed in accordance with the medical exigencies of the case, but not later than 14 days after receiving the request for review. If additional information was needed, this deadline could be extended to 28 days. Where delay could seriouslyjeopardize the life or health of the claimant, reviewwould have to be completed within 72 hours after receiving a request for expedited review. This request could besubmitted orally or in writing by the claimant orprovider. H.R. 2990 would have required all plans and issuers to create an external review process. External review would have been available for benefitdenials that were either based on medical necessity or involved investigational or experimental treatment. Externalreview would have also been available when adecision as to whether a benefit is covered involved a medical judgment. H.R. 2990 would have allowed theSecretary of Labor to establishadditional standards for external review, including a filing deadline. The plan or issuer would have been permittedto condition external review on the exhaustionof the internal review process. In addition, the plan or issuer would have been able to charge a filing fee for externalreview. However, this fee could not exceed$25. External review would have been conducted by a certified external appeal entity. For group health plans, the entity would have to be certified either by theSecretary of Labor, under a process recognized or approved by the Secretary of Labor, or by a qualified privatestandard-setting organization. For state healthinsurance issuers, the entity would have to be certified by the applicable state authority or under a processrecognized or approved by such authority. If the statehad not established a certification process, the entity would have to be certified either by the Secretary of Health andHuman Services, under a process recognizedor approved by such Secretary, or by a qualified private standard-setting organization. The external appeal entitywould have to conduct its activities through apanel of not fewer than three clinical peers, and have sufficient medical, legal, and other expertise and sufficientstaffing to conduct its activities in a timelymanner. The determination of the external appeal entity would have been made in accordance with the medical exigencies of the case, but not later than 21 days afterreceiving the request for external review. Where delay could seriously jeopardize the life or health of the claimant,a determination would have to be made within72 hours after receiving the request for external review. The decision of the external appeal entity would have beenbinding on the plan and issuer involved in thedetermination. Please see the following CRS Issue Briefs and Reports for additional information. CRS Issue Brief IB98002, Medical Records Confidentiality . CRS Issue Brief IB98017, Patient Protection and Managed Care: Legislation in the 106thCongress . CRS Issue Brief IB98037, Tax Benefits for Health Insurance . CRS Report 97-643, Medical Savings Accounts . CRS Report 98-286 , ERISA's Impact on Medical Malpractice and Negligence Claims . CRS Report RL30077(pdf) , Managed Care: Recent Proposals for New Grievance and AppealsProcedures . CRS Report RL30144, Side by Side Comparison of Selected Patient Protection Bills in the106th Congress . CRS Report 97-482, The Use of Financial Incentives . CRS Report 97-913, A Primer . CRS Report 97-938, Federal and State Regulation .

This report discusses the existing claims procedure required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974(ERISA), and legislative efforts in the 106th Congress to amend ERISA to provide for the mandatoryexternal review of denied benefits. Although most of thepatient protection bills introduced in the 106th Congress included provisions for external review andmore rigorous standards for the internal review of deniedbenefits, this report focuses on the Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 1344, passed by the Senateon July 15, 1999, and the BipartisanConsensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2990, passed by the House of Representatives onOctober 7, 1999.

Most analysts agree that Russia's democratic progress was uneven at best during the 1990s, and that the previous two cycles of legislative and presidential elections held under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin (those in 1999-2000 and 2003-2004) demonstrated further setbacks for democratization. After the pro-Putin United Russia Party gained enough seats and allies to dominate the State Duma (the lower legislative house of the Federal Assembly; the upper house is not directly elected) after the 2003 election, the Kremlin moved to make it more difficult for smaller parties to win seats in the future, including by raising the hurdle of minimum votes needed to win seats from 5% to 7%. Also, the election of 50% of Duma deputies in constituency races—where independent candidates and those from small opposition parties usually won some seats—was abolished, with all Duma members to be elected via party lists. Changes in campaign and media laws also made it more difficult for small parties and opposition groups to gain publicity in the run-up to the December 2, 2007, Duma election. Out of 16 registered political parties, eleven succeeded in submitting the required paperwork by late October and were approved by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to run in the December 2007 Duma election. The most prominent of the approved parties were United Russia, A Fair Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Communist Party, Union of Right Forces, and Yabloko. The latter three parties are opposition parties, and the latter two are liberal democratic parties. A Fair Russia is widely viewed as a creation of the Putin administration and considers itself a centrist party. The ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party usually supports Putin's initiatives in the Duma. Other Russia, an opposition bloc of movements and unregistered parties co-chaired by former international chess champion Garry Kasparov, called on the CEC to permit it to field candidates, but the CEC denied their request, saying it could not rewrite a new law that permits only single registered parties to participate in the election. Perhaps the most significant event in the run-up to the 2007 Duma election was President Putin's October 1, 2007, announcement at the convention of the United Russia Party that he would "accept" its invitation to head its list of candidates, although he declined to join the party. The parties long have relied on the prestige of prominent persons at the top of their lists, and the voters are often aware that these people will pass on taking their seats in the Duma if the party wins. In his acceptance speech, Putin stated that a suggestion by a previous speaker that he become the prime minister after his second term as president ends "is entirely realistic, but it is too soon to talk about this at the moment because at least two conditions would first need to be met. First, United Russia would have to win the State Duma election on December 2, and second, our voters would have to elect a decent, effective and modern-thinking president." A short campaign season was permitted by law to begin on November 3 and end on November 30. On November 16, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) informed the Russian CEC that it could not send its electoral observers, stating that "despite repeated attempts to attain entry visas into the Russian Federation for ODIHR experts and observers, entry visas have continuously been denied." CEC head Vladimir Churov claimed that the visas had been issued. President Putin stated that "we have information that ... this [ODIHR decision] was made on the recommendation of the U.S. State Department," and asserted that "actions such as these cannot wreck the elections," by making them appear illegitimate (these allegations were denied by the U.S. State Department and White House; see below). Despite the inability of ODIHR to organize an electoral mission, over one hundred observers came from the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the Nordic Council. United Russia declined to participate in any broadcast political debates, but on October 1 approved a platform that pledged to continue Putin's policy course. All the parties were provided with some free television and print access, and on-air candidate debates at times appeared informative. The United Russia Party and the Putin administration-supported Nashi youth group stressed Russian nationalism and an anti-Western image, absorbing and amplifying the themes of the former Motherland Party (which was allegedly created and later abolished by the Putin administration). These themes appeared to at least partly reflect real fears by some part of the Putin administration that small domestic groups funded by "enemy" Western countries might try to launch democratic "color revolutions," like those that took place in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, to re-install the so-called oligarchs and divvy up Russia's oil and gas resources. A flyer attributed to Nashi called for rallies on December 3-6 to prevent the United States from using "traitors and thieves" such as Kasparov to launch a "color revolution." Some observers have warned that although United Russia might have gained some electoral support by using such themes, associated dangers include fueling ethnic and religious hate crimes and calls for a belligerent and isolationist foreign policy. Reflecting these themes, Putin explained in a major speech to his supporters on November 21 that he had agreed to head the United Russia party list in order to prevent the Duma from becoming "a collection of populists paralyzed by corruption and demagoguery," as in the past. He warned his supporters that Russia's stability and peace were still threatened by three groups, which he seemed to conflate: the supporters of Soviet-era politicians, the supporters of former Russian president Boris Yeltsin, and "those who scavenge outside foreign embassies, foreign diplomatic missions, [and] rely on support from foreign foundations and governments." These groups, he asserted, want "a weak and sick state," and a "disorganized and disoriented society ... in order to wheel and deal behind its back; in order to receive their piece of pie at our expense." He warned that some members of these groups are campaigning for seats in the Duma and staging demonstrations as taught by Western advisors in the hope of "restoring the oligarchs' regime based on corruption and lies." According to the final results reported by the CEC, four parties won enough votes to pass the 7% hurdle and win seats in the Duma (see Table 1 ). United Russia increased the number of seats over those it won in 2003, but the real effect may be minor, since many deputies in that Duma later aligned with United Russia, giving it the two-thirds majority needed to approve changes to the constitution. The losing parties altogether garnered about 7% of the vote (another 1% of votes were deemed invalid). The relatively high turnout (63.7% of 109 million voters), compared to 2003 (56%), won plaudits for the CEC, although the main contribution appeared to be Putin's active role. Some regions vied to report high voter turnouts and numbers for United Russia, with the North Caucasus republics hailing improbable turnouts nearing 100% with correspondingly high percentages of votes for United Russia. Observers from the Russian non-governmental organization Golos assessed the election as not free and fair. The observers from the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the Nordic Council issued a press statement on December 3 that the election was more efficiently run than past races, but "there was not a level political playing field." They criticized the placement of most governors, as well of the president, on the United Russia list as "an abuse of power," the use of government resources to support United Russia, and "widespread reports of harassment of opposition parties." The active role of the president, they stated, turned the election "into a referendum on the president." They stated that it was difficult for voters to make informed choices because "state-funded media failed in their public mandate to offer balanced and objective coverage." One Russian CEC official dismissed this assessment as reflecting only a small group of the observers and dictated "from overseas" (presumably from the United States). Observers from regional organizations Russia belongs to—the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—assessed the election as democratic. The 2007 Duma election appears very similar to the previous 2003 election as a mandate on Putin's rule, according to many observers. In the 2007 election, however, Putin did not just endorse the United Russia Party but placed his name at the head of its list, and many observers viewed the election results as more a popular endorsement of Putin than an endorsement of United Russia. In this view, the voters were indicating that they wanted Putin to remain in a leadership position even after his presidential term ends. On December 3, Putin announced that he would use his power as president to convene the new Duma within a few days, so that it could start working with the government. He argued that since more citizens than in past elections had turned out and voted for parties that ended up with legislative seats, this incoming Duma would be more legitimate (some critics suggested that by this definition, voting during the Soviet era for the sole communist party would have been the most perfect "legitimacy"). Putin also praised voters for rejecting "a destructive shift in the development of the country," presumably as had occurred in Ukraine and Georgia. He lamented that "tired voters" would soon (March 2, 2008) be faced with a presidential election and suggested that the new Duma examine means of "spreading apart these two election campaigns in the future." Some observers interpreted this as a possible plan to delay the presidential race and stretch out Putin's second term in office, as Uzbek President Islam Karimov did in 2002 to lengthen his term in office. Since United Russia strengthened its dominance of the Duma, the party leader and outgoing Duma Speaker, Boris Gryzlov, stressed on December 3 that the party would not fundamentally change its already nonpareil record in passing legislation to implement Putin's development plans and budgets. Similarly, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zhukov suggested that there would be few if any changes in the government. Although the Communist Party is now the sole opposition in the Duma, the dominance of United Russia over legislative offices and committees will permit the communists little leeway for influencing legislation. Also, the Communist Party in the last Duma appeared to play the role of a "constructive opposition" by seeking to work with United Russia on many legislative issues, including agreement on such foreign policy issues as sanctions against Georgia and condemnation of NATO enlargement and U.S. missile defense plans. United Russia planned to hold a convention on December 17 to choose its candidate for president. This "choice" is likely to be Putin's preferred successor, according to many observers. There is speculation that the candidate could be first deputy prime ministers Dmitriy Medvedev or Sergey Ivanov, or sitting Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov. According to one scenario, such an official would be elected in March 2008 and serve as a "placeholder" president, and might even resign after a short period in office, permitting Putin to constitutionally run in a presidential by-election. Under this scenario, Putin might serve as prime minister. According to some indicators, intra-elite conflicts are increasing as pro-Putin groups maneuver to protect their interests in the run-up to the supposed Putin succession. One security chief in October 2007 warned that these conflicts threatened Russia's stability. Most opposition party leaders criticized the election as marking the further whittling away of democratic freedoms. Putin's former economic advisor, Andrey Illarionov, now in opposition, denounced the newly elected Duma as illegitimate and predicted on December 3 that Putin will have to stay in office to violently suppress rising dissension against the authoritarian political system. A co-leader of the Union of Right Forces, Boris Nadezhdin, asserted on December 2 that Putin was planning to use United Russia to rule, similar to single-party rule during the Soviet era. Another Union of Right Forces co-leader, Boris Nemtsov, called for opposition parties and groups to join in backing a single presidential candidate to run against the Kremlin's candidate. Under the law, parties that gained only 2-4% or less of the vote face heavy financial penalties that threaten their existence, including losing their state subsidies, forfeiting their relatively large election deposits, and paying for the "free" airtime they had been alloted. The result could be a political system with fewer parties and choices for voters, according to some observers. The Bush Administration has expressed increasing concerns about anti-democratic trends and human rights problems in Russia. Most recently, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that U.S.-Russia cooperation remained good on global terrorism, nuclear threats, North Korea, and even addressing Iranian nuclear proliferation, but that there was less cooperation in relations with Central Europe and Soviet successor states, and difficulty in seeing eye-to-eye on democratization in Russia. She envisaged that while the United States would probably be able to continue to negotiate with Russia on such issues as ballistic missile defense and Iranian nuclear proliferation, it might prove harder for the United States to convince Russia to democratize or not use its energy for international political leverage. The White House and the State Department on November 25-26 raised concerns about the detention of Garry Kasparov during a demonstration and other Russian government actions that limited freedom of speech and assembly. White House spokeswoman Dana Perino reportedly adopted a cautious tone after the Duma election, stating on December 3 that the United States would reserve judgment for the time being about the legitimacy of the election, and urging Russian authorities to address alleged electoral irregularities. Congress has had growing concerns about democratization and human rights progress in Russia, as reflected in calls in yearly foreign operations appropriations bills for added Administration attention to Russian democratization, as well as in other legislation, in hearings, and visits. Among recent Member attention, the Co-Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission), Repr. Alcee Hastings, stated on December 3, 2007, that it was "regrettable" that the Duma election "was fraught with numerous violations of widely accepted democratic standards ... true democracies, and Russia claims to be one, do not make a mockery of elections." Senator Barak Obama on December 3, 2007, likewise criticized the Russian government for restricting media coverage except for United Russia, breaking up opposition party rallies, and being implicated in many vote-counting irregularities. He and other U.S. observers, while criticizing voting irregularities, also have stressed that the United States should continue to cooperate with Russia on counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, non-proliferation, and other issues. The anti-U.S. rhetoric of the Duma election campaign, however, may signal that such cooperation will be harder to achieve, according to some observers. The international private investment research firm Moody's has suggested that the victory of United Russia in the election signifies a stable economic climate and the likelihood that Russia will maintain progressive macroeconomic policies.

This report discusses the campaign and results of Russia's December 2, 2007, election to the State Duma (the lower legislative chamber), and implications for Russia and U.S. interests. Many observers viewed the election as a setback to democratization. Unprecedented for modern Russia, President Vladimir Putin placed himself at the head of the ticket of the United Russia Party. This party won a majority of Duma seats, and Putin was widely viewed as gaining popular endorsement for a possible role in politics even after his constitutionally-limited second term in office ends in early 2008. This report may be updated. Related reports include CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed].

The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. According to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), in the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), 943 pieces of legislation received House floor action. This report provides a statistical snapshot of the forms, origins, and party sponsorship of these measures and of the parliamentary procedures used to bring them to the chamber floor during their initial consideration. Legislation is introduced in the House or Senate in one of four forms: the bill (H.R./S.), the joint resolution (H.J.Res./S.J.Res.), the concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res./S.Con.Res.), and the simple resolution (H.Res./S.Res.). Generally speaking, bills and joint resolutions can become law, but simple and concurrent resolutions cannot; they are used instead for internal organizational or procedural matters or to express the sentiment of one or both chambers. In the 113 th Congress, 943 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 692 were bills or joint resolutions, and 251 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 73% to 27%, respectively. Of the 943 measures receiving House floor action in the 113 th Congress, 846 originated in the House, and 97 originated in the Senate. It is generally accepted that the House considers more legislation sponsored by majority party Members than measures introduced by minority party Members. This was born out in practice in the 113 th Congress. As is reflected in Table 1 , 74% of all measures receiving initial House floor action in the last Congress were sponsored by Members of the Republican Party, which had a majority of seats in the House. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are considered, 73% of measures receiving House floor action in the 113 th Congress were sponsored by Republicans, 27% by Democrats, and 0.002% by political independents. The ratio of majority to minority party sponsorship of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 113 th Congress varied widely based on the parliamentary procedure used to raise the legislation on the House floor. As noted in Table 2 , 68% of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by Republicans, 32% by Democrats, and less than 1% by political independents. That measures introduced by Members of both parties were considered under Suspension is unsurprising in that (as discussed below) Suspension of the Rules is the parliamentary procedure that the House generally uses to process non-controversial measures for which there is wide bipartisan support. In addition, passage of a measure under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, in practice, usually requires the affirmative votes of at least some minority party Members. The ratio of party sponsorship on measures initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House was far wider. Of the 148 measures the Congressional Research Service (CRS) identified as being initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule in the 113 th Congress, 144 (about 97%) were sponsored by majority party Members. The breakdown in party sponsorship on measures initially raised on the House floor by unanimous consent was uneven, with majority party Members sponsoring only 45% of the measures brought up in this manner. The following section documents the parliamentary mechanisms that were used by the House to bring legislation to the floor for initial consideration during the 113 th Congress. In doing so, it does not make distinctions about the privileged status such business technically enjoys under House rules. Most appropriations measures, for example, are considered "privileged business" under clause 5 of House Rule XIII (as detailed in the section on " Privileged Business " below). As such, they do not need a special rule from the Rules Committee to be adopted for them to have floor access. In actual practice, however, in the 113 th Congress the House universally provided for the consideration of these measures by means of a special rule, which, in general, could also provide for debate to be structured, amendments to be regulated, and points of order against the bills to be waived. Thus, appropriations measures considered in the 113 th Congress are counted in this analysis as being raised by special rule, notwithstanding their status as "privileged business." In recent Congresses, most legislation has been brought up on the House floor by Suspension of the Rules, a parliamentary device authorized by clause 1 of House Rule XV that waives the chamber's rules to enable the House to act quickly on legislation that enjoys widespread, even if not necessarily unanimous, support. The main features of the Suspension of the Rules procedure include (1) a 40-minute limit on debate, (2) a prohibition against floor amendments and points of order, and (3) a two-thirds vote of Members present and voting for passage. The suspension procedure is in order in the House on the calendar days of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday; during the final six days of a congressional session; and at other times by unanimous consent or special order. In the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), the House Republican leadership first announced additional policies related to its use of the Suspension of the Rules procedure that restrict the use of the procedure for certain "honorific" legislation, generally require measures considered under Suspension to have been available for three days prior to their consideration, and require the sponsor of the measure to be on the floor at the time of a measure's consideration. These policies continued in force in the 113 th Congress (2013-2014). In the 113 th Congress, 555 measures, representing 59% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought up using the Suspension of the Rules procedure. This includes 520 bills or joint resolutions and 35 simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 75% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 113 th Congress came up by Suspension of the Rules. Ninety percent of measures brought up by Suspension of the Rules originated in the House. The remaining 10% were Senate measures. House rules and precedents place certain types of legislation in a special "privileged" category, which gives measures of this kind the ability to be called up for consideration when the House is not considering another matter. Bills and resolutions falling into this category that saw floor action in the 113 th Congress include the following: Order of Business Resolutions. Procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules affecting the "rules, joint rules, and the order of business of the House" are themselves privileged for consideration under clause 5 of House Rule XIII. Order of business resolutions are commonly known as "special rules" and are discussed below in more detail. Committee Assignment Resolutions. Under clause 5 of House Rule X and the precedents of the House, a resolution assigning Members to standing committees is privileged if offered by direction of the party caucus or conference involved. Correcting Enrollments. Under clause 5 of House Rule XIII, resolutions reported by the Committee on House Administration correcting errors in the enrollment of a bill are privileged. Providing for Adjournment. Under Article I, Section 5, clause 4, of the Constitution, neither house can adjourn for more than three days without the consent of the other. Concurrent resolutions providing for such an adjournment of one or both chambers are called up as privileged. Questions of the Privileges of the House. Under clause 2 of House Rule IX, resolutions raising a question of the privileges of the House affecting "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings" are privileged under specific parliamentary circumstances described in the rule. Such resolutions would include the constitutional right of the House to originate revenue measures. Bereavement Resolutions. Under House precedents, resolutions expressing the condolences of the House of Representatives over the death of a Representative or of a President or former President have been treated as privileged. Measures Related to House Organization. Certain organizational business of the House—such as resolutions traditionally adopted at the beginning of a session to notify the President that the House has assembled and to elect House officers, as well as concurrent resolutions providing for a joint session of Congress—have been treated as privileged business. In the 113 th Congress, 174 measures, representing 18% of the measures receiving floor action, came before the House on their initial consideration by virtue of their status as "privileged business." All of these 174 measures were non-lawmaking forms of legislation, that is, simple or concurrent resolutions. The most common type of measure brought up in the House as "privileged business" during the 113 th Congress was special orders of business (special rules) reported by the Rules Committee, followed by resolutions assigning Representatives to committee. A special rule is a simple resolution that regulates the House's consideration of legislation identified in the resolution. Such resolutions, as noted above, are sometimes called "order of business resolutions" or "special orders," although Members and staff frequently simply refer to them as "rules." Special rules enable the House to consider a specified measure and establish the terms for its consideration—for example, how long the legislation will be debated, what (if any) amendments may be offered to it, and whether points of order against the measure or any amendments to it are waived. Under clause 1(m) of House Rule X, the Committee on Rules has jurisdiction over the "order of business" of the House, and it reports such procedural resolutions to the chamber for consideration. In current practice, although a relatively small percentage of legislation comes before the House via special rule, most measures that might be characterized as significant, complicated, or controversial are brought up in this way. In the 113 th Congress, 148 measures, or 16% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought before the chamber under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the House. Of these, 138 (93%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 10 (7%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 20% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 113 th Congress came up by special rule. Ninety-eight percent of the measures considered under a special rule during the 113 th Congress originated in the House, 2% being Senate legislation. As is noted above, all but four measures brought before the House using this parliamentary mechanism were sponsored by majority party Members. In current practice, legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members. Long-standing policies announced by the Speaker regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose. Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction. In the 113 th Congress, 65 measures, or 7% of all legislation identified by LIS as receiving House floor action, were initially considered by unanimous consent. Of these, 33 (51%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 32 (49%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 5% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 113 th Congress came up by unanimous consent. Of the measures initially considered by unanimous consent during the 113 th Congress, 63% originated in the House. Clause 5 of House Rule XV establishes special parliamentary procedures to be used for the consideration of private legislation. Unlike public legislation, which applies to public matters and deals with individuals only by classes, the provisions of private bills apply to "one or several specified persons, corporations, [or] institutions." When reported from House committee, private bills are placed on a special Private Calendar established by House Rule XIII. The consideration of Private Calendar measures is in order on the first and (if the Speaker of the House so chooses) third Tuesday of a month. On those days, the Private Calendar is "called," and each measure on it is automatically brought before the House in order. Private bills are considered under a set of procedures known as the "House as in Committee of the Whole," which is a hybrid of the procedures used in the full House and those used in the Committee of the Whole. Under these procedures, private bills may technically be debated and amended under the five-minute rule, although in actual practice they are almost always passed without debate or record vote. In the 113 th Congress, one measure was brought to the floor via the call of the Private Calendar. The House of Representatives has established special parliamentary procedures that may be used to bring legislation to the chamber floor dealing with the business of the District of Columbia, a discharge process to force consideration of measures triggered by a petition signed by a numerical majority of the House, and a procedure known as the Calendar Wednesday procedure. These procedures are rarely used, and no legislation was brought before the House in the 113 th Congress by any of these three parliamentary mechanisms.

The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures that, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress, received action on the House floor in the 113th Congress (2013-2014) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration. In the 113th Congress, 943 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 692 were bills or joint resolutions, and 251 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 73% to 27%. Of these 943 measures, 846 originated in the House, and 97 originated in the Senate. During the same period, 59% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 18% came to the floor as business "privileged" under House rules and precedents, 16% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 7% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. One measure, representing less than 1% of legislation receiving House floor action in the 113th Congress, was processed under the procedures associated with the call of the Private Calendar. When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 75% of such measures receiving initial House floor action in the 113th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 20% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 5% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. Less than 1% of lawmaking forms of legislation received House floor action via the call of the Private Calendar or by virtue of being "privileged" under House rules. The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 113th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Sixty-eight percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All but four of the 148 measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members.

RS21630 -- Immigration of Religious Workers: Background and Legislation September 30, 2003 Permanent legal immigration to the United States is regulated by a set of numerical limits and systems of preference categories delineated in the Immigrationand Nationality Act (INA), and employment-based immigration comprises one of the major groups of the preferencecategory systems. (1) Aliens who come tothe United States through the permanent legal immigration categories are commonly known as legal permanentresidents (LPRs). The fourth category of theemployment-based preference system is known as "special immigrants," and the largest number of specialimmigrants are ministers of religion and religiousworkers. (2) Religious workers are treated separatelyfrom ministers of religion and are limited to 5,000 immigrants annually. Accompanying spouses and minorchildren of ministers of religion and religious workers are included as special immigrants. Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-649 ), ministers of religion were admitted to the United States without numerical limits, and there was noseparate provision for religious workers. Religious workers immigrated through one of the more general categoriesof numerically-limited, employment-basedimmigration that were in effect at that time. The Immigration Act of 1990 amended the INA to redefine the specialimmigrant category to include ministers ofreligion and religious workers, but contained a "sunset"of the provision for religious workers on September 30,1994. It was subsequently extended severaltimes, most recently through September 30, 2003. (3) The 1990 Act also created a new nonimmigrant (i.e., temporary) visa for religious workers, commonlyreferred to as the R visa. (4) Defining what constitutes religious work is daunting given the theological diversity of religions, denominations, and faith traditions. The education, training,and ordination requirements for ministers of religion and religious workers vary greatly by religious group. Underthe special immigrant provisions, the INAdefines ministers of religion and religious workers as follows: (C) an immigrant, and the immigrant's spouse and children if accompanying or following to join the immigrant,who -- (i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application foradmission, has been a member of areligious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the UnitedStates; (ii) seeks to enter the United States -- (I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of thatreligiousdenomination, (II) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization at the requestof the organization in aprofessional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or (III) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization (or a bona fide organization which is affiliatedwith the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code of 1986) at therequest of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and (iii) has been carrying on such a vocation, professional work, or other workcontinuously for at least the 2-yearperiod described in clause (i); (5) The regulations further define religious occupation as "an activity which relates to a traditional religious function." (6) The nonimmigrant R visa category ofreligious workers holds to the same definitions; aliens on R visas are not, however, held to the 2-year experiencerequirement. Religious workers are notsubject to the labor certification requirements that many other employment-based immigrants must meet. (7) The INA is silent on what constitutes a religious denomination, but the regulations offer the following definition: Religious denomination means a religious group or community of believers having some form of ecclesiasticalgovernment, a creed or statement of faith, some form of worship, a formal or informal code of doctrine anddiscipline, religious services and ceremonies,established places of religious worship, religious congregations, or comparable indica of a bona fide religious denomination. For the purposes of this definition,an interdenominational religious organization which is exempt from taxation pursuant to �501(c)(3) of the InternalRevenue Code will be treated as a religiousdenomination. (8) The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead agency for immigrant admissions. (9) In the wider sweep of legal immigration to the United States, religious workers represent a tiny fraction of the annual flow -- 0.3% of the 1,063,732 immigrantsin FY2002. While the number of nonimmigrant R visas issued since FY1992 (first year the category was available)exceeds that of the permanent admissions,it likewise constitutes a small portion of all nonimmigrants admitted. The issuances of R visas has moved steadilyupward, but the levels of admission forpermanent religious workers has varied since FY1992 ( Figure 1 ). Most religious workers who become LPRs are not arriving from abroad; rather they are adjusting status after they have lived in the United States. In FY2002,only 389 of the 3,127 religious workers and their families arrived from abroad, while 87.6% adjusted to LPR statusas religious workers in the United States. Itis likely that most of those who adjusted status had entered on R visas as temporary religious workers. PDF version Bills ( H.R. 2152 / S. 1580 ) to extend the religious worker provision through September 30, 2008, have been introduced in bothchambers. Congressman Barney Frank introduced H.R. 2152 on May 19, 2003. The House JudiciaryCommittee ordered H.R. 2152 reported onSeptember 10, 2003, and the House passed H.R. 2152 on September 17, 2003. Senate Committee on theJudiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch introduceda bill similar to H.R. 2152, the Religious Worker Act of 2003 (S. 1580), on September 3, 2003. Although the extension of the religious worker provision has a broad base of support, efforts to make it a permanent immigration category have not succeeded. Some have criticized the religious worker provision as vulnerable to fraud. A few have expressed fear that it maybe an avenue for religious extremists to enterthe United States. Others, however, point out that the INA has provisions to guard against visa fraud and to excludefrom admission aliens who may threatenpublic safety or national security, and who commit fraud to enter the United States. (10) 1. (back) The largest preference grouping isfamily-based immigration. Other groupings include diversity and humanitarian admissions. For more information,see CRS Report RS20916(pdf) , Immigration and Naturalization Fundamentals , by [author name scrubbed]. 2. (back) Other "special immigrants" include certainemployees of the U.S. government abroad, Panama Canal employees, retired employees of internationalorganizations, certain aliens who served in the U.S. armed forces, and certain aliens declared a ward of a juvenilecourt. INA �101(a)(27). 3. (back) Immigration and Nationality TechnicalCorrections Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-416 ), the Religious Workers Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-54 ), and the ReligiousWorkersAct of 2000 ( P.L. 106-409 ). 4. (back) Religious workers on the nonimmigrantR visas may be admitted for up to 5 years. 5. (back) INA �101(a)(27)(C); 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(27)(C). 6. (back) The regulations elaborate: "(E)xamplesinclude but are not limited to liturgical workers, religious instructors, religious counselors, cantors, catechists,workers in religious hospitals or religious health care facilities, missionaries, religious translators, or religiousbroadcasters. The group does not includejanitors, maintenance workers, clerks, fund raisers, or persons solely involved in the solicitation of donations." 8C.F.R. �204.5(m)(2). 7. (back) Labor certification provisions are aimedat ensuring that foreign workers do not displace or adversely affect working conditions of U.S. workers. For a fulldiscussion, see: CRS Report RS21520(pdf) , Labor Certification for Permanent Immigrant Admissions , by[author name scrubbed]. 8. (back) 8 C.F.R. �204.5(m)(2). For a discussionof the tax exempt status, see: CRS Report RL31545, Congressional Protection of Religious Liberty ,by [author name scrubbed],p. 47-48. 9. (back) Other agencies with primary responsibilityfor immigration functions are the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration andCustoms Enforcement, both in DHS, and the Bureau of Consular Affairs in the Department of State. 10. (back) For a full discussion of the groundsof inadmissibility, see CRS Report RL31215, Visa Issuances: Policy, Issues, and Legislation , by RuthEllen Wasem.

A provision in immigration law that allows for the admission of immigrants to performreligious work is scheduledto sunset on September 30, 2003. Although the provision has a broad base of support, some have expressed concernthat the provision is vulnerable to fraud. The foreign religious worker must be a member of a religious denomination that has a bona fidenonprofit, religious organization in the United States, and musthave been in the religious vocation, professional work, or other religious work continuously for at least 2 years. Bills (H.R. 2152/S. 1580) to extend the religious worker provision through September 30, 2008, have been introduced in both chambers. The House passed H.R. 2152 onSeptember 17, 2003. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants.

The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329), authorizes the operation of numerous federal aid programs that provide support both to individuals pursuing a postsecondary education and to institutions of higher education (IHEs). It also authorizes certain activities and functions. The most recent comprehensive reauthorization of the HEA was in 2008 under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315 ). As amended by the HEOA, appropriations were authorized for most HEA discretionary spending programs through FY2014. However, under generally applicable provisions in the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), the authorization periods for most HEA programs were effectively extended through the end of FY2015. From September 30, 2015, through December 18, 2015, Congress provided additional appropriations for many of these programs with three consecutive continuing resolutions. On December 18, 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 was enacted ( P.L. 114-113 ), under which Congress provided additional appropriations for many of the HEA programs through FY2016, such that they will continue operation until through September 30, 2016. Additional legislative action must occur for the provisions extended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 to continue beyond September 30, 2016. Not all authorizations of appropriations in the HEA were set to expire at the end of FY2014. For some HEA programs, authorization of appropriations or mandatory budget authority is permanent, while for others authorization is provided through a date beyond the end of FY2014. For a number of programs, the period during which appropriations are authorized to be provided has ended. For instance, the authorizations of appropriations for Teacher Quality Partnership Grants expired at the end of FY2011. In a few other instances that are discussed below, program authority had a sunset date (e.g., the end of FY2014, the end of FY2015). The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) contains a broad array of statutory provisions that are applicable to the majority of federal education programs administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). GEPA Section 422 provides that, in the absence of the enactment of a law to extend or repeal a program administered by ED, the authorization of appropriations for, or the duration of, a program is extended for one additional fiscal year beyond its terminal year. The authorization of appropriations for such programs in the additional year shall be the same as that for the terminal year of the program. Section 422 of GEPA explicitly states that the automatic one-year extension does not apply to the authorization of appropriations for commissions, councils, or committees that are required by statute to terminate on a specific date. Prior to the conclusion of FY2015, two HEA committees had specific termination dates: Under Section 114(f), the authority for the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) terminated on September 30, 2015. Under Section 491(k), the authority for the Advisory Committee for Student Financial Assistance (ACSFA) was provided until October 1, 2015. Congress did not extend or repeal many of the provisions authorized by the HEA through FY2014. Thus, except for the advisory committees noted above, GEPA automatically extended most of these HEA programs and authorizations of appropriations through FY2015 at the same levels as were authorized to be provided for FY2014. However, because GEPA Section 422 only provides an additional one-year extension to HEA programs and many of those programs that were set to expire at the end of FY2014 were automatically extended through FY2015 under GEPA—and subsequently through FY2016, under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016—additional legislative action must occur if these expiring provisions are to continue beyond September 30, 2016. Most HEA provisions that were set to expire at the end of FY2014 had been provided an additional one-year extension under GEPA. This additional one-year extension terminated at the end of FY2015. The implications of this expiration in the context of a particular program or activity depend on the nature of the provision that expired. In general, there is a distinction between an authorization provision that establishes the authority for a program, policy, project, or activity and a provision that explicitly authorizes subsequent congressional action to provide appropriations. The Comptroller General has explained that there is no constitutional or general statutory requirement that an appropriation must be preceded by a specific act that authorized it. "Congress may ... appropriate funds for a program or object that has not been previously authorized or which exceeds the scope of a prior authorization, in which event the enacted appropriation, in effect, carries its own authorization and is available to the agency for obligation and expenditure. " That is, in the event that an authorization of appropriations has lapsed, an appropriation would generally provide the necessary legal authorization for the agency to spend money for the particular purpose specified in the appropriations act. Furthermore, if an authorization of appropriations for an activity expires but the underlying authority for that activity does not, those statutory authorities still exist and the agency may continue to take actions pursuant to them, assuming that appropriations are available for those purposes. Extension of the HEA authorization provisions that expired at the end of FY2014 and were extended through GEPA to the end of FY2015, the vast majority of which are discretionary authorizations of appropriations, could be addressed in a variety of ways through either the authorization or appropriations processes (or both). For instance, one or more laws could be enacted that extend the authorization of appropriations for an individual program or multiple programs. Alternatively, a program for which the authorization of appropriations has expired may continue to operate if Congress continues to appropriate funds for it. In a few other instances, however, where the authority for the program itself terminates, an explicit extension of that program would be required for it to continue to operate. For the HEA provisions that, with the GEPA extension, expired at the end of FY2015, a law could be enacted to explicitly extend the authorization. For instance, prior to the enactment of the HEOA ( P.L. 110-315 ) in 2008, the most recent reauthorization of the HEA, HEA programs were extended beyond their prior terminal authorization date of FY2003 through a series of Higher Education Extension Acts that temporarily extended the HEA. These extension acts broadly extended the authorization of appropriations for and the duration of each program authorized under the HEA for an additional period of time beyond their prior terminal authorization dates. As an alternative to an explicit authorization extension, for many of the HEA provisions that expired, with the GEPA extension, at the end of FY2015, additional funds could be appropriated for periods beyond FY2015 to ensure a program's continued operation. As was previously mentioned, in general, an appropriation for the purposes of a program with an expired authorization of appropriations would ensure the continued operation of that program. For example, although the authorization of appropriations under HEA, Title II, Part A, for Teacher Quality Partnership Grants was provided only through FY2011 (and extended under GEPA through FY2012), the program remains operational due to continued funding provided in previous appropriations acts through FY2015, and now through FY2016 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. While it seems that most of the HEA programs that expired at the end of FY2015 could continue operations with the appropriation of funds for FY2016, it appears that an explicit extension would be required for the advisory committees mentioned above to ensure continued operation in their current form beyond the end of FY2015. Congress uses an annual appropriations process to fund routine activities of most federal agencies. This process anticipates regular appropriations bills to fund activities before the beginning of the fiscal year. When this process is delayed beyond the start of the fiscal year, one or more continuing appropriations acts (continuing resolutions) can be used to provide funding until action on regular appropriations is completed. In the event a regular appropriations bill to appropriate funding for the expiring HEA provisions is not enacted prior to their expiration date, a continuing resolution (CR) could be enacted to provide continued funding for these expiring provisions. In most cases, the appropriation of funds for a program through a CR would be sufficient for a program's continued operation. However, for those programs with explicit termination or sunset dates, a CR or other appropriations law would likely need to contain specific language, beyond the appropriation of funds, indicating Congress's intent to continue the operation of the program. Thus, for certain provisions, the extension of the explicit authorization for the program or activity may be required for continued operations. Beginning on September 30, 2015, a variety of measures were taken to provide additional appropriations for federal programs beyond FY2015. First, three CRs were enacted, which, in general, provided continuing appropriations for federal programs through December 18, 2015. Then, on December 18, 2015 the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 was enacted ( P.L. 114-113 ), under which Congress provided additional appropriations for many of the HEA programs through FY2016. Thus, many of the HEA programs that, under GEPA provisions, were set to expire at the end of FY2015 continued to operate through December 18, 2015, under the various CRs and will continue to operate through FY2016 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. Congress did not, however, extend the authorization of or provide additional funding under any of the CRs or the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 for the Advisory Committee for Student Financial Assistance. Because the Advisory Committee for Student Financial Assistance neither received additional funding nor an extension of authorization, it has disbanded and operations ceased immediately upon the expiration of its authorization. Additionally, although Congress did not provide additional funding for the Federal Perkins Loan program under the CRs or the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, it did provide authorization for the continued operation, but not additional appropriations, for the program through separate legislation—the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-105 ). Under the act, institutions of higher education may continue to award Perkins Loans to eligible undergraduate students through September 30, 2017 and to eligible graduate and professional students through September 30, 2016. Beyond then, the act specifically prohibits additional appropriations for the program. It also specifies that the automatic one-year extension under GEPA Section 422 will not apply to further extend the program. In the event additional funding is not provided beyond September 30, 2016 for those HEA programs that were funded through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 either through regular appropriations or another CR, a funding gap would follow. Should this occur, an agency must suspend operations of affected programs, except in certain situations when law authorizes continued activity, until further appropriations are provided. The programs may subsequently resume once funds for them are appropriated, unless otherwise provided. In many past instances, a CR following a funding gap has contained authorization extensions and provided that those extensions shall be considered to have been enacted on the date that the funding gap commenced, as if no funding gap occurred. For instance, under the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-46 ), which followed the FY2013 16-day funding gap from October 1, 2013, to October 16, 2013, appropriations were provided for federal programs and the time covered by the joint resolution was "considered to have begun on October 1, 2013." This may be especially relevant for programs with a specific termination date, such as the advisory committees discussed above. While additional action beyond providing appropriations is likely needed to continue their operation, should these programs not receive an explicit extension prior to the termination, it appears that Congress would have the ability to restore the committees through provisions in a CR as if a lapse in authorization never occurred, such that it may be unnecessary to reform the committees completely (e.g., appoint new committee members). In addition to the HEA, the Compact of Free Association contains several provisions that relate to the eligibility of students and IHEs of the Freely Associated States to participate in the HEA programs. In accordance with the Compact of Free Association, students and IHEs in the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are eligible to receive appropriations for and participate in many federal student aid programs through FY2023 (e.g., Pell Grants). With respect to the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program and the Federal Work Study (FWS) program, however, the Compact of Free Association, as amended by the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), extended eligibly for students and IHEs in Palau to receive appropriations for and participate in the programs only through the end of FY2015. The various CRs temporarily extended the provisions of the Compact of Free Association pertaining to students and IHEs in Palau and their eligibility to receive appropriations for and participate in the FSEOG and FWS programs, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 further extended these provisions through FY2016. However, it appears this extension would expire September 30, 2016 without additional legislative action. Table 1 presents information on the discretionary authorization of appropriations or mandatory budget authority for HEA programs and activities. For each program, it identifies the HEA section authorizing the appropriation of funds or providing mandatory budget authority; whether budget authority for these funds is classified as discretionary (D) or mandatory (M); the amount authorized to be appropriated during specified fiscal years; the period or duration for which the authorization of appropriations or mandatory budget authority is provided; whether the authorization provision is extended by GEPA; and for discretionary spending authorizations of appropriations, the amount appropriated for FY2016 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; for mandatory programs, budget authority for FY2016. Generally, the provisions are presented in the order in which they appear in the HEA.

The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329), authorizes the operation of numerous federal aid programs that provide support both to individuals pursuing a postsecondary education and to institutions of higher education (IHEs). It also authorizes certain activities and functions. The HEA was first enacted in 1965. It has since been amended and extended numerous times, and it has been comprehensively reauthorized eight times. The most recent comprehensive reauthorization occurred in 2008 under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315), which authorized most HEA programs through FY2014. Many of the programs with HEA authorizations set to expire at the end of FY2014 were automatically extended through FY2015 under Section 422 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA). Additionally, many HEA programs due to expire at the end of FY2015 were extended through FY2016 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). This report identifies provisions under the HEA that were, with GEPA extensions, set to expire at the end of FY2015. It also discusses authorization and appropriations options for extending the statutory authorities that are scheduled to lapse. These options include an explicit extension of, or an appropriation of funds for, these programs either through a regular appropriations measure or a continuing resolution. Finally, for all HEA mandatory and discretionary programs and activities, the report provides information on the authorization of appropriations or mandatory budget authority, the duration for which such authority is provided, the applicability of extensions under GEPA, and FY2016 appropriations and mandatory budget authority.

Iran's ballistic missile program dates to the late 1970s after the Shah was overthrown and the Islamic Republic of Iran established. The new Iranian government embarked on a ballistic missile program marked by considerable secrecy. Many consider that Iran's ballistic missile development was in full force by the mid-1980s during its protracted war against Iraq, during which Iran reportedly launched more than 600 ballistic missiles. Today, there is little disagreement among most experts that Iran has acquired some number of ballistic missiles from other countries and has developed other ballistic missiles indigenously or in cooperation with others. Iranian ballistic missile proliferation has been a matter of U.S. and international concern. At the same time, however, there has been considerable public disagreement over precisely what kinds of ballistic missile systems Iran has or is developing itself or in cooperation with others. This is because there is little transparency in Iran's ballistic missile programs, which has led to some degree of a lack of confidence in Iran's public assertions of its activities. Finally, details about Iranian ballistic missile programs remain classified in the United States. Because of the secrecy inherent in the development of weapon systems, especially in less open societies, open-source analyses reflect a wide-range of technical views and assessments. This report provides a brief description of what is publicly discussed regarding Iran's ballistic missile programs ; it does not discuss Iranian cruise missiles or rockets. These latter weapons were a source of concern when some reportedly Iranian-made rockets and other missiles may have been used by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006. Charges of Iranian military support to Iraqi insurgents do not include Iranian-made rockets or missiles, however. This report first examines Iran's long-range ballistic missile programs because those efforts generally drive the greatest concerns within the United States, especially when coupled with concern over the development of Iran's nuclear capabilities. A brief overview of Iran's medium and short-range ballistic missile programs then follows. Traditionally, the United States has defined long-range or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) as those ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (about 3,400 miles). To date, five countries have deployed operational ICBMs (all with nuclear weapons): the United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain. Other countries, such as Iran, are believed by some observers to have ICBM programs in varying stages of development. In 1999, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that at some point the United States would probably face ICBM threats from Iran. This remains the official U.S. position, that "Iran could test an ICBM in the last half of the next decade using Russian technology and assistance" (emphasis in the original). A similar report was issued in 2001. This assessment is often interpreted that Iran will have ICBMs by 2015, but the unclassified intelligence statements place various caveats on that potential capability. These intelligence statements serve as the official U.S. basis for assessing the Iranian ICBM threat to the United States and its friends and allies. These assessments drive U.S. military efforts designed to respond to such threats, such as the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program in general and the U.S. proposed missile defense system in Europe specifically, as well as U.S. diplomatic efforts to curb Iranian long-range ballistic missile programs. These assessments, in conjunction with official U.S. assessments of Iranian nuclear weapons development, contribute significantly to ongoing U.S. concerns over Iranian threats to U.S. and international security. These assessments do not mean, however, that there is universal agreement within the U.S. intelligence community on the issue of an Iranian ICBM. According to these unclassified statements, some argue that an Iranian ICBM test is likely before 2010, and very likely before 2015. Other U.S. officials believe, however, that there is "less than an even chance" for such a test before 2015. Furthermore, U.S. assessments are also conditional in that an Iranian ICBM capability would have to rely on access to foreign technology, from, for example, North Korea or Russia. Finally, it is argued that an Iranian ICBM could develop from an Iranian space program under which a space-launch vehicle program might be converted into an ICBM program. Some have argued that Iran could develop and test such a space launch vehicle by 2010. Some observers argue that although the U.S. position may be based upon a realistic assessment, it is also a worst-case analysis of the potential threat from Iran. They argue that "with rare exception this level of threat has rarely turned out to be the historical reality." Beyond these general U.S. public statements about Iranian ICBM developments, there are few unclassified details. Further, non-official public sources reflect little technical or program consensus regarding an Iranian ICBM program. Some have referred to a program called the Shahab-6 (or Kosar in some instances) as a potential ICBM development program, perhaps derived from North Korean or Russian missile technology, or both. Although Iran continues to declare it has no plans to develop an ICBM program, there appears to be considerable public uncertainty and debate as to whether the Shahab-6 is an actual design study concept, or an active or abandoned Iranian ICBM or even space-launch program. In January 2004, Iran's Defense Minister reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within 18 months. Iran then launched its first commercial satellite on a Russian rocket in 2005, and announced that it had allocated $500 million for space projects over the next five years. In February 2008, Iran reportedly launched a low-orbit research rocket in preparation for a later satellite launch. The Bush White House called that launch "unfortunate." In August 2008, Iran said it successfully launched a rocket that could carry its first satellite, but U.S. defense officials said the test aimed failed shortly after launch. In early February 2009, Iran successfully launched its Omid (Hope) satellite on a Safir-2 (or Ambassador-2) rocket , which has a range of about 155 miles. A Pentagon spokesman said this launch was "clearly a concern of ours" because "there are dual-use capabilities here which could be applied toward the development of long-range missiles." Many experts believe that Iran's Shahab-3, which sometimes appears also to be called the Zelzal-3 ballistic missile, is a derivative of the North Korean No-Dong 1 ballistic missile. It has a reported range of about 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers. This could reach potential targets throughout most of the Middle East. Some have speculated that North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan entered into a cooperative effort at one point to develop a missile of this range and capability. Other observers have alleged Russian assistance in Iranian development of this missile. Some reports suggest that Iran has already deployed a number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Of all Iranian ballistic missile programs, there seems to be more publicly available information in relative terms about this particular missile system than others. Even so, there remains considerable and varying differences in open sources about this system. Longer range versions of the Shahab-3, variously referred to as Shahab-3 variants, the Shahab-3A, Shahab-3B, and Shahab-4, and a BM-25, may have range capabilities of 1,500-2,500 kilometers. These missiles potentially could reach targets throughout the Middle East, Turkey, and into southeastern Europe. Some have reported that perhaps several dozen or more of these missile types may be deployed and operational. Some Chinese, North Korean, or Russian involvement is suspected. In 2006, Iran announced the successful test of a Fajr-3 MRBM comparable to the Shahab-3, although U.S. and Israeli intelligence analysts reportedly expressed skepticism. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles and rockets of varying ranges during military exercises. Some observers noted the missile launches were in direct response to long-range Israeli air force exercises at the time. Iran claimed it flight tested a 2,000 km version of the Shahab-3 that could carry a 1-ton warhead. If accurate, this missile could hit targets throughout the Middle East and Turkey. But some analysts are skeptical of these Iranian claims pending further technical analyses of these recent military exercises, and others have cited Iranian exaggerations of its missile capabilities in the past. Various major international media retracted initial images of the missile launches because they were reportedly digitally altered. Bush Administration officials said Iran did not test new technologies or capabilities, but said the missile launches were evidence of the need for its proposed missile defense system in Europe. Secretary of State Rice stated the exercises were not helpful and that Iran should refrain from such activities. Iran said it successfully test fired a 2-stage solid-fuel missile with a 2,000 kilometer range in November 2008. At the time, a Pentagon spokesman said he could not confirm the launch occurred, but that this was consistent with the fact that Iran continues to develop a ballistic missile program that poses a threat to Iran's neighbors in the region and beyond. Other reports have also surfaced over Iran's development of a much longer MRBM with ranges of 4,000-5,000 kilometers, or even a space launch vehicle derived from these efforts that some refer to as the Shahab-5. The degree to which this effort might be actually underway also is highly uncertain. Iran is widely believed to have deployed a number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—those with ranges less than 1,000 kilometers. In addition, Iran is believed to have various other SRBMs under development, either indigenously or in varying degrees of cooperation with countries such as China, North Korea, or Russia. Beyond these speculations, however, open source materials do not reflect a consensus over technical capabilities and performance. Additionally, there appear to be considerable differences in descriptions of the numbers of systems operational or deployed and even the agreed-upon names of SRBMs ascribed to Iran. Some of the more commonly referred to Iranian missiles are discussed briefly. Some believe that Iran may have imported perhaps 200 Chinese CSS-8 (or Tondar-69) SRBMs in the late 1980s, as well as a number of associated launch systems for their operational deployment. The CSS-8 may have a range of about 150 kilometers. Iran may have developed an SRBM in the 1990s called the Fateh A-110 (also apparently referred to as the Mershad or Zelzal-2 variant). According to various reports, this missile may have been developed with Chinese, Syrian, and North Korean involvement. This missile may have a range of about 200 kilometers and may have become operational around 2004. Some believe that Iran acquired several dozen Chinese M-11 or CSS-7 SRBMs and associated launch vehicles in the mid-1990s, although China has denied this. The M-11 reportedly has a range of around 280 kilometers. Iran may also possess a number of SRBMs with ranges of 200-300 kilometers that it might have acquired from Libya or North Korea. Some may have been produced or modified indigenously. These have variously been referred to as the SCUD-B, SCUD-B variants, or Shahab-1 SRBMs. Iran might also possess a few hundred SRBMs with a range of about 500-700 kilometers or so. These SRBMs have sometimes been referred to as the SCUD-C and Shahab-2. Analysts have expressed uncertainty over whether the Iranians developed and built these missiles on their own, or had help from China and North Korea. Finally, there are some reports of an operational SRBM with a range up to 800 kilometers, which may possibly be referred to as an M-9 variant, DF-15, or CSS-6. Reportedly, the PRC produced the M-9 for export and Iran has acquired some number of them.

Iran has an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic missiles, as well as developing a space launch capability. This was spotlighted several times since 2008. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles during military exercises, reportedly including the medium-range Shahab-3. At the time, a Pentagon spokesman said Iran was "not testing new technologies or capabilities, but rather firing off old equipment in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors and escalate tension in the region." Subsequent analysis of the July 2008 missile launches shows Iran apparently digitally altered images of those launches. Iran announced other missile and space launch tests in August and November 2008. In February 2009, Iran announced it launched a satellite into orbit and "officially achieved a presence in space." This short report seeks to provide an overview of the reported or suspected variety of Iranian ballistic missile programs. Because there remains widespread public divergence over particulars, however, this report does not provide specificity to what Iran may or may not have, or is in the process of developing. This report may be updated.