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Levels of pay for congressional staff are a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. Senators set the terms and conditions of employment for staff in their offices. This includes job titles and descriptions, rates of pay, subject to minimum and maximum levels, and resources available to them to carry out their official duties. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations, guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices, or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff pay data in a readily retrievable form. The most recent publicly available Senate staff compensation report was issued in 2006, and relied on anonymous, self-reported survey data. Data in this report are based on official Senate reports, which afford the opportunity to use consistently collected data from a consistent source. Pay information in this report is based on the Senate's Report of the Secretary of the Senate , published semiannually, in periods from April 1 to September 30, and October 1 to March 31, as collated by LegiStorm, a private entity that provides some congressional data by subscription. Additionally, this report provides annual data, which allows for observations about the nature of Senators' personal staff compensation over time. This report provides pay data for 16 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices. The positions include the following: Administrative Director Casework Supervisor Caseworker Chief of Staff Communications Director Counsel Executive Assistant Field Representative Legislative Assistant Legislative Correspondent Legislative Director Press Secretary Scheduler "Specials Director," a combined category that includes the job titles Director of Projects, Director of Special Projects, Director of Federal Projects, Director of Grants, Projects Director, or Grants Director Staff Assistant State Director Senators' staff pay data for FY2001-FY2015 were derived from a random sampling of Senators' offices in which at least one staff member worked in a position in each year. For each fiscal year, FY2001-FY2015, a random sample of 25 Senators' offices was taken for each position. In order to be included, Senate staff had to hold a position with the same job title in the Senator's office for the entire fiscal year examined, and not receive pay from any other congressional employing authority. For some positions, it was not possible to identify 25 offices that employed staff for an entire year. In circumstances when data for 14 or fewer staff were identified for a position, this report provides no data. Every recorded payment ascribed in the LegiStorm data to those staff for the fiscal year is included. Data collected for this report may differ from an employee's stated annual salary due to the inclusion of overtime, bonuses, or other payments in addition to base salary paid in the course of a year. Generally, each position has no more than one observation per Senator's office each fiscal year. Pay data for staff working in House Member offices are available in CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014 . Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014 , and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014 , respectively. There may be some advantages to relying on official salary expenditure data instead of survey findings, but data presented here are subject to some challenges that could affect findings or their interpretation. Some of the concerns include the following: Data are lacking for first-term Senators in the first session of a Congress. The periods of time covered by the Report of the Secretary of the Senate overlap the end of one Congress and convening of the next. This report provides no data for first-term Senators in the first nine months of their service. Pay data provide no insight into the education, work experience, position tenure, full- or part-time status of staff, or other potential explanations for levels of compensation. Staff could be based in Washington, DC, state offices, or both. Potential differences might exist in the job duties of positions with the same title. Aggregation of pay by job title rests on the assumption that staff with the same title carry out the same or similar tasks. Given the wide discretion congressional employing authorities have in setting the terms and conditions of employment, there may be differences in the duties of similarly titled staff that could have effects on their levels of pay. Acknowledging the imprecision inherent in congressional job titles, an older edition of the Senate Handbook states, "Throughout the Senate, individuals with the same job title perform vastly different duties." Tables in this section provide background information on Senate pay practices, comparative data for each position, and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides the maximum payable rates for staff in Senators' offices since 2001 in both nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars. Constant dollar calculations throughout the report are based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for various years, expressed in constant, 2016 dollars. Table 2 provides available cumulative percentage changes in pay in constant 2016 dollars for each of the 16 positions, Members of Congress, and salaries paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas. Table 3 - Table 18 provide tabular pay data for Senators' staff positions. The numbers of staff whose data were counted are identified as observations in the data tables. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability, in nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from FY2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change in pay of that position to changes in pay, in constant 2016 dollars, of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2015 pay, in 2016 dollars, in $10,000 increments. Between FY2011 and FY2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 9.86% increase for press secretaries to a -26.05% decrease for specials directors. Of the 16 positions, half saw pay increases, while the other half saw pay decreases during the five-year period. This may be compared to changes in the pay of Members of Congress, -5.1%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2011-2015). Between FY2006 and FY2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 15.69% increase for field representatives to a -18.96% decrease for executive assistants. Of the 16 staff positions, 4 saw pay increases while 12 saw declines. This may be compared to changes in the pay of Members of Congress, -10.41%, and General Schedule, DC, -0.13%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2006-2015). Between FY2001 and FY2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 27.09% increase for state directors to a -19.64% decrease for press secretaries. Of 15 staff positions for which data were available between FY2001 and FY2015, 7 positions saw pay increases while 8 saw declines. This may be compared to changes in the pay of Members of Congress, -10.4%, and General Schedule, DC, 7.36%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2001-2015).

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 16 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices. The positions include the following: Administrative Director, Casework Supervisor, Caseworker, Chief of Staff, Communications Director, Counsel, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Press Secretary, Scheduler, "Specials Director" (a combined category that includes the job titles Director of Projects, Director of Special Projects, Director of Federal Projects, Director of Grants, Projects Director, or Grants Director), Staff Assistant, and State Director. Tables provide tabular pay data for each of the selected staff positions in a Senator's office. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from FY2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change in pay for that position to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2015 pay in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (FY2011 and FY2015), the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 9.86% increase for press secretaries to a -26.05% decrease for specials directors. Eight of the 16 positions experienced increases in pay, while the remaining eight positions saw declines in pay. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2011-2015). Pay data for staff working in House Member offices are available in CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014, and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, respectively. Information about the duration of staff employment is available in CRS Report R44683, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44685, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senate Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44682, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2006-2016, and CRS Report R44684, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, 2006-2016.

The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220 ) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development. WIA includes four main titles: Title I—Workforce Investment Systems—provides job training and related services to unemployed or underemployed individuals. Title I programs, which are primarily administered through the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), include three state formula grant programs, multiple national programs, Job Corps, and demonstration programs. In addition, Title I authorizes the establishment of a One-Stop delivery system through which state and local WIA training and employment activities are provided and through which certain partner programs must be coordinated; Title II—Adult Education and Literacy—provides education services to assist adults in improving their literacy and completing secondary education; Title III—Workforce Investment-Related Activities—amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 to integrate the U.S. Employment Service (ES) into the One-Stop system established by WIA; and Title IV—Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998—amends the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides employment-related services to individuals with disabilities. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) expired at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process. In the 108 th and 109 th Congresses, bills to reauthorize WIA were passed in both the House and the Senate; however, no further action was taken. In the 112 th Congress, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) released discussion drafts in June 2011 of legislation to amend and reauthorize WIA. While markup of this legislation was scheduled, it was ultimately postponed indefinitely. No legislation has been introduced. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce, however, has ordered reported H.R. 4297 —the Workforce Investment Improvement Act of 2012. This bill was introduced on March 29, 2012, by Representative Virginia Foxx of North Carolina, the chair of the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training, (for herself, Representative Howard P. "Buck" McKeon of California, and Representative Joseph Heck of Nevada). A legislative hearing on H.R. 4297 was held before the full Committee on Education and the Workforce on April 17, 2012. On June 7, 2012, the committee, after considering 23 amendments to H.R. 4297 , ordered the bill reported by a vote of 23 to 15. This report summarizes each of the WIA titles and highlights the major features of H.R. 4297 pertaining to each title. The report also compares the proposed provisions of H.R. 4297 to current law in the following tables: Table 1 . Major Provisions of Title I. This table covers provisions governing the "workforce investment systems" that provide for, among other things, state formula grants, state and local planning procedures, and the establishment of the One-Stop delivery system. WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 career centers nationwide. Table 2 . Major Provisions of Title II. This table covers provisions for adult education and literacy activities. Table 3 . Major Provisions of Title III. This table covers changes to the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which was also amended in Title III of WIA. Wagner-Peyser provides authorization for the Employment Service. Table 4 . Major Provisions of Title IV of WIA and Title V of H.R. 4297 . This table addresses amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in particular to the Vocational Rehabilitation and other employment-related provisions of that act, which authorizes various employment services for individuals with disabilities. Title I of the Workforce Investment Act—Workforce Investment Systems—authorizes the establishment of a One-Stop delivery system through which state and local WIA training and employment activities are provided and through which certain partner programs must be coordinated. Title I also authorizes funding for the three major state formula grant programs (Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Worker), Job Corps (a DOL-administered program for low-income youth), and several other national programs that are directed toward subpopulations with barriers to employment (e.g., Native Americans). H.R. 4297 takes a fundamentally different approach from current law to the federal role in the delivery of workforce development services by consolidating multiple programs into a single block grant that is allocated to states by formula. At the same time, H.R. 4297 maintains the One-Stop delivery system as the delivery mechanism for employment and training services. The Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) is the current law that authorizes funds supporting programs related to basic education (i.e., instruction at the secondary school level and below) for individuals who are beyond school age, not enrolled in school, and lacking a high school diploma or equivalent. The program also funds educational services for English learners. The largest portion of AEFLA funds are grants to states that are subsequently allotted to local entities that conduct educational programs. H.R. 4297 reauthorizes Title II programs through 2018. It limits the annual authorized appropriation level to FY2012 levels and changes several AEFLA provisions to emphasize the relationship between adult education and employment. AEFLA is also amended to align with the new WIA performance indicators. Title III of the Workforce Investment Act—Workforce Investment-Related Activities—makes amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 (29 U.S.C. 49 et seq. ), which authorizes the Employment Service (ES). The ES is the central component of most states' One-Stop delivery systems, as ES services are universally accessible to job seekers and employers and ES offices may not exist outside of the One-Stop delivery system. Although the ES is one of the required partners in the One-Stop delivery system, its central mission—to facilitate the match between individuals seeking work and employers seeking workers—makes it critical to the functioning of the workforce development system under WIA. Title III adds Section 15 ("Employment Statistics") to Wagner-Peyser, which requires the Secretary of Labor to develop, provide, and improve various types of labor market information. H.R. 4297 repeals Sections 1-14, which authorize the Employment Service. Funding from the ES is consolidated into the new Workforce Investment Fund. The Rehabilitation Act, as amended, authorizes grants to support programs related to employment and independent living for individuals with disabilities. Most programs under the Rehabilitation Act are administered by the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) of the Department of Education (ED). In FY2012, the Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) grants to the states program accounted for the majority of the funds that were appropriated under the Rehabilitation Act. VR is a mandatory One-Stop partner program. Title V of H.R. 4297 reauthorizes the VR grants to the states program through FY2018 and limits authorization to the prior year's appropriation plus an increase equal to inflation. It also increases emphasis on students transitioning out of school by requiring state plans to address how they will serve this population and requiring that 10% of each state's federal allotments be set aside for services to transitioning students. H.R. 4297 also repeals several smaller programs that were authorized under the Rehabilitation Act.

The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development activities, including job search assistance, career development, and job training. WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 One-Stop career centers nationwide. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under the WIA expired at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process. In the 108th and 109th Congresses, bills to reauthorize WIA were passed in both the House and the Senate; however, no further action was taken. In the 112th Congress, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) released discussion drafts in June 2011 of legislation to amend and reauthorize WIA. While markup of this legislation was scheduled, it was ultimately postponed indefinitely. No legislation has been introduced. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce, however, has ordered reported H.R. 4297—the Workforce Investment Improvement Act of 2012. This bill was introduced on March 29, 2012, by Representative Virginia Foxx of North Carolina, the chair of the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training (for herself, Representative Howard P. "Buck" McKeon of California, and Representative Joseph Heck of Nevada). A legislative hearing on H.R. 4297 was held before the full Committee on Education and the Workforce on April 17, 2012. On June 7, 2012, the committee, after considering 23 amendments to H.R. 4297, ordered the bill reported by a vote of 23 to 15. H.R. 4297 would maintain the One-Stop delivery system established by WIA but would repeal numerous programs authorized by WIA and other federal legislation, and it would consolidate other programs into a new single funding source—the Workforce Investment Fund. In addition, H.R. 4297 would increase the role of business representatives in the state and local governance structure of WIA and would increase the ability for states to propose further program consolidation in the funding and delivery of workforce services. Adult Education and Vocational Rehabilitation retain separate titles and funding in H.R. 4297. This report first provides a brief introduction to the four main titles of WIA and then compares the proposed provisions of H.R. 4297 to the current law provisions by each of the four titles.

Wheat is grown in almost every temperate-zone country of North America, Europe, Asia, and South America. The largest wheat-producing countries are China, India, the United States, Russia, Canada, and Australia. U.S. wheat production accounts for about 9%-10% of world production; but the United States is the world's leading wheat exporter with roughly a 25% share of annual world trade. However, the international wheat market is very competitive and foreign sales often hinge on wheat variety and product characteristics as well as price. U.S. wheat is produced as both a winter and a spring crop. The United States produces all six of the world's major wheat classes—hard red winter (HRW), hard red spring (HRS), soft red winter (SRW), hard white, soft white, and durum. Hard wheats generally contain higher protein levels—a desirable trait for bread making, while softer wheats may be preferable for making noodles, crackers, and pastries. Durum wheat is ground into a coarse flour called semolina that is used for making pastas. In local markets, the demand for a particular wheat class (and quality) relative to its nearby supply will determine local prices. Traditional, higher-protein wheats command a premium over lower-protein varieties, often referred to as the "protein premium" ( Figure 1 ). However, linkages to national and global markets bring additional factors—such as transportation costs, competitors' supplies, and foreign demand—into play in determining the price of a particular wheat type and quality. Wheat is the principal food grain grown in the United States; however, a substantial portion (8%-10%) of the annual U.S. wheat crop is used as a feed grain. As a result, wheat must compete with other cereals for a place at the consumer's dinner table, while also vying with coarse grains and other feedstuffs in livestock feed markets. Almost half of the U.S. wheat crop is exported annually, although the importance of exports varies by class of wheat. White wheat and HRS wheat rely more than other wheat classes on sales into export markets. The larger the share of exports to production, the greater the vulnerability to international market forces. In the U.S. domestic market, flour millers are the major users of wheat, milling about 24% of annual wheat production into flour since 2000. In most cases, a wheat buyer at a flour mill will "source" wheat by general location and primary quality attributes such as protein quantity and quality (i.e., gluten share) and baking performance. Price premiums and/or discounts reflecting quality differences often develop and can also influence buyer preferences. Other major wheat processors include breakfast food, pet food, and feed manufacturers. Wheat may be used directly in feed rations when alternate feedstuffs are lacking or when production-related quality damage makes the wheat unmarketable as a food. Wheat milling by-products such as bran, shorts, and middlings are also used by feed manufacturers in the production of animal feeds. Early in 2007, estimates of Australia's wheat production and exports were reduced because of severe drought in 2006. Then, late-spring freeze damage in the United States and heavy rains at harvest in the United States and Western Europe reduced the output and quality of wheat. Next, dry weather hurt crops in Eastern Europe and some countries of the former Soviet Union. Drought in southeastern Europe reduced that area's wheat and corn crops, forcing livestock producers in the European Union (EU) to import wheat and feed grains for feed rations. By midsummer, it became apparent that Canada and the Ukraine would reap smaller wheat crops because of poor weather conditions. The production shortfalls curtailed exports from most traditional wheat exporters. In the spring of 2007, both Ukraine and Argentina initiated export restrictions in efforts to control food price inflation. The Ukraine imposed a ban on wheat exports and Argentina stopped issuing export registrations, which significantly slowed export sales during the rest of the year. Although the EU was able to export wheat without export subsidies, shipments out of the EU slowed sharply by late summer as wheat increasingly replaced corn used for feed. By early fall, only the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan had large volumes of wheat available for export. Recently Kazakhstan officials have said that they also intend on slowing their country's wheat export pace (via higher custom duties) due to declining supplies. Projected tight U.S. supplies, combined with reduced export competition, caused importers to buy U.S. wheat (in late 2007) at a pace not seen since the 1970s. U.S. wheat export sales were very strong despite higher prices and record-high ocean freight rates. Imports by high-income countries, which are not very price sensitive, followed normal seasonal purchase patterns. However, a number of low- and middle-income countries, generally expected to be more sensitive to price changes, continued to purchase wheat even while prices were rising. Some importers even bought larger amounts at record high prices, apparently out of fear that less wheat would be available in the future, and prices would be even higher. In most years, U.S. wheat export shipments decline seasonally during the winter, spring, and summer months. But in 2007, shipments generally rose during this period, significantly exceeding expectations almost every month. In August and September, U.S. wheat export volume spiked, rising from monthly averages of less than 2.5 million metric tons to more than 4 million tons. This occurred as wheat prices climbed to record highs. Record high outstanding export sales (i.e., wheat that has been purchased, but not yet exported) suggest that many importers have already purchased their future needs far in advance of normal purchasing patterns, and that large monthly U.S. wheat shipments can be expected to continue for some months to come, regardless of future price movements. Global stocks are projected to drop to a 30-year low by July 2008, following seven out of eight years in which global consumption exceeded production ( Figure 2 ). In the United States, the nearly three-decades-long decline in planted area and production, coupled with the surge in export demand, has led to projections for the lowest ending wheat stocks (237 million bushels) since 1947. Because of a shortage of milling-quality wheat, prices for high-protein (13%-15%) spring wheat (HRS)—grown primarily in the Northern Plains—have risen faster than prices for the ordinary-protein (10%-13%) wheats (HRW) of the Southern Plains or the low-protein wheat (SRW) grown in the Delta and Corn Belt states. In addition, in January USDA released an estimate for last fall's plantings of the winter wheat crop that, although up from last year, was significantly below market expectations. This increased the market concern about whether a large U.S. spring wheat crop would be produced. As a result, cash and futures market prices for HRS wheat—traded daily at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE)—hit almost daily record highs through January and February. On February 25, 2008, the nearby futures contract for HRS wheat closed at a record $24 per bushel. HRS wheat prices can be tracked in the cash market by following daily price quotes for Dark Northern Spring (DNS) wheat out of Minneapolis ( Figure 1 ). Prices for soft white wheat (grown primarily in the Pacific Northwest) have also risen sharply in recent months. White wheat is used to produce a very popular type of noodle eaten throughout eastern Asia. Australia is traditionally the world's largest supplier of white wheat, but last year's drought-reduced harvest drastically limited its export supplies. As a result, China and other Asian countries have been competing for dwindling U.S. and international supplies of white wheat and this has pushed prices sharply higher. U.S. wheat planted area has been steadily declining for the past 40 years as low relative returns have led many farmers to shift to other, more profitable activities. This phenomenon has clearly been evident in the Northern Plains, where the development of short-season corn and soybean varieties has steadily cut into traditional wheat areas. This process has accelerated since late 2005 with the rapid growth of corn-based ethanol production, which has sparked high corn and soybean prices ( Figure 3 ). Wheat prices must rise high enough to compete for planted acres this spring (2008) with the other grains and oilseeds. This area competition is also contributing to the price run-up at the MGE. High commodity prices are expected to encourage farmers to expand plantings this spring. However, since the land base is constant, the question is which crops will get more area and which will lose. For 2008, USDA projects that U.S. planted acreage will expand significantly for both wheat (up 6%) and soybeans (up nearly 12%), while corn plantings will decline slightly (by about 4%). As a result, assuming normal weather and average yields, U.S. wheat production is expected to rise by nearly 13%. In addition, USDA projects that global wheat plantings and output will rise substantially (although no official estimate for 2008 global production is released until May). Larger global wheat supplies are expected to significantly reduce international demand for U.S. wheat in the latter half of 2008. Thus, the combination of higher production and lower exports is expected to allow U.S. domestic wheat stocks to rebuild and wheat prices to decline from their early 2007 peaks (while remaining high relative to past years). Markets are likely to exhibit substantial price variability until global stock levels can be rebuilt. As the global supply rebounds from the shortfalls of 2007, higher projected production is expected to facilitate the rebuilding of stocks and the return of prices to the $4 to $5 per bushel range over the next five- to ten-year period. The rise in agricultural prices, combined with high oil prices, have contributed to higher food inflation in the United States and around the world. U.S. food prices increased by 4% during 2007, the highest one-year rise since 1990. Prices for cereals and bakery products were up by 4.4%. USDA predicts that food price inflation for 2008 will be in the range of 3% to 4%, while bakery goods are expected to rise by 5.5% to 6.5%. Inflation concerns were further heightened when the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics announced that food prices had jumped by 1.7% during the month of January 2008—the biggest monthly increase in three years. Despite the sharp increases in commodity prices in 2007, most economists agree that fuel costs have played a larger role in food price inflation than have commodity prices. In general, retail food prices are much less volatile than farm-level prices and tend to rise by a fraction of the change in farm prices. This is because the actual farm product represents only a small share of the eventual retail price, whereas transportation, processing, packaging, advertising, handling, and other costs—all vulnerable to higher fuel prices—comprise the majority of the final sales price. Due to trade linkages, high commodity prices ripple through international markets where impacts vary widely based on grain import dependence and the ability to respond to higher commodity prices. Import-dependent developing country markets are put at greater food security risk due to the higher cost of imported commodities. The overall impact to consumers from higher food prices depends on the proportion of income that is spent on food. Since food costs represent a relatively small share of consumer spending for most U.S. households (about 10%), food price increases (from whatever source) are absorbed relatively easily in the short run. However, low-income consumers spend a much greater proportion of their income on food than do high-income consumers. Their larger share combined with less flexibility to adjust expenditures in other budget areas means that any increase in food prices potentially could cause hardship. In particular, lower-income households in many foreign markets where food imports are an important share of national consumption and where food expenses represent a larger portion of the household budget may be affected by higher food prices. Humanitarian groups have expressed concern for the potential difficulties that higher grain prices imply for developing countries that are net food importers. International food aid is the United States' major response to reducing global hunger. Because most U.S. food aid activities are fixed in value by annual appropriations, the amount of commodities that can be purchased declines with rising food prices. In 2006, the United States provided $2.1 billion of such assistance, which paid for the delivery and distribution of more than 3 million metric tons of U.S. agricultural commodities. The United States provided food aid to 65 countries in 2006, more than half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects the U.S. season-average farm price (SAFP) received for all wheat in the 2007/08 marketing year (June to May) to be in the $6.45 to $6.85 per bushel range. The range midpoint exceeds the previous U.S. record of $4.55 (in 1995/96) by 46%. During the past 30 years, the all-wheat SAFP has stayed within a range of $2.42 to $4.55, while averaging $3.33 per bushel. USDA projects a replenishment of U.S. and global supplies in 2008 (assuming normal weather conditions) to moderate market prices in the latter half of 2008. However, prices are likely to exhibit substantial variability until global stock levels can be rebuilt. The initial impetus for rising prices over the past year has been a 30-year low in global stocks following seven out of eight years in which global consumption exceeded production. However, in recent months several other factors—including reluctance of traditional exporters to make further supplies available to international markets, strong international demand, the rapid growth in the demand for grains and oilseeds as feedstock for biofuels production, and USDA's announcement that last fall's winter-wheat plantings were less than expected—have contributed to a sharp rise in cash and futures contract prices, particularly for higher-protein wheat varieties. This report will be updated as events warrant.

This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces—the Navy and the Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DON). For an overview of defense transformation in general, see CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. Table 1 summarizes several key elements of U.S. naval transformation. Each of these elements is discussed below. In late 1992, with the publication of a Navy document entitled ...From the Sea , the Navy formally shifted the focus of its planning away from the Cold War scenario of countering Soviet naval forces in mid-ocean waters and toward the post-Cold War scenario of operating in littoral (near-shore) waters to counter the land- and sea-based forces of potential regional aggressors. This shift in planning focus has led to numerous changes for the Navy in concepts of operation, training, and equipment over the last 12 years. Among other things, it moved the focus of Navy planning from a geographic environment where it could expect to operate primarily by itself to one where it would need to be able to operate effectively in a joint manner, alongside other U.S. forces, and in a combined manner, alongside military forces of other countries. It also led to an increased emphasis on amphibious warfare, mine warfare, and defense against diesel-electric submarines and small surface craft. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the DDG-1000 (formerly DD(X)) destroyer are key current Navy efforts intended to improve the Navy's ability to operate in heavily defended littoral waters. The Navy in mid-2005 began implementing several initiatives intended to increase its ability to participate in what the administration refers to as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). These initiatives include the establishment of the following: a Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (ECC); a riverine force; a reserve civil affairs battalion; a maritime intercept operations (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program; an intelligence data-mining capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC); and a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions. The concept of network-centric operations, also called network-centric warfare (NCW), is a key feature of transformation for all U.S. military services. The concept, which emerged in the late 1990s, involves using computer networking technology to tie together personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations in a series of local and wide-area networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information. Many in DON believe that NCW will lead to changes in naval concepts of operation and significantly increase U.S. naval capabilities and operational efficiency. Key NCW efforts include the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network, the Naval Fires Network (NFN), the IT-21 investment strategy, and ForceNet, which is the Navy's overarching concept for combining the various computer networks that U.S. naval forces are now fielding into a master computer network for tying together U.S. naval personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations. A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). Many analysts believe that unmanned vehicles (UVs) will be another central feature of U.S. military transformation. Perhaps uniquely among the military departments, DON in coming years will likely acquire UVs of every major kind—air, surface, underwater, and ground. Widespread use of UVs could lead to significant changes in the numbers and types of crewed ships and piloted aircraft that the Navy procures in the future, in naval concepts of operation, and in measurements of naval power. The LCS is to deploy various kinds of UVs. Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat air vehicles, or UCAVs (which are armed UAVs), if implemented widely, could change the shape naval aviation. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and UAVs could significantly expand the capabilities of Navy submarines. Naval forces are inherently sea-based, but the Navy is currently using the term sea basing in a more specific way, to refer a new operational concept under which forces would be staged at sea and then used to conduct expeditionary operations ashore with little or no reliance on a nearby land base. Under the sea basing concept, functions previously conducted from the nearby land base, including command and control, fire support, and logistics support, would be relocated to the sea base, which is to be formed by a combination of amphibious and sealift-type ships. The sea basing concept responds to a central concern of transformation advocates—that fixed overseas land bases in the future will become increasingly vulnerable to enemy anti-access/area-denial weapons such as cruise missiles and theater-range ballistic missiles. Although the sea basing concept originated with the Navy and Marine Corps, the concept can be applied to joint operations involving the Army and Air Force. To implement the sea basing concept, the Navy wants to field a 14-ship squadron, called the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F) squadron, that would include three new-construction large-deck amphibious ships, nine new-construction sealift-type ships, and two existing sealift-type ships. Additional "connector" ships would be used to move equipment to the MPF(F) ships, and from the MPF(F) ships to the operational area ashore. Some analysts have questioned the potential affordability and cost effectiveness of the sea basing concept. The Navy in the past relied on carrier battle groups (CVBGs) (now called carrier strike groups, or CSGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) as its standard ship formations. In recent years, the Navy has begun to use new kinds of naval formations—such as expeditionary strike groups, or ESGs (i.e., amphibious ships combined with surface combatants, attack submarines, and land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft), surface strike groups (SSGs), and modified Trident SSGN submarines carrying cruise missiles and special operations forces —for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations. A key Navy objective in moving to these new formation is to significantly increase the number of independently deployable, strike-capable naval formations. ESGs, for example, are considered to be formations of this kind, while ARGs generally were not. The Navy in 2006 also proposed establishing what it calls global fleet stations, or GFSs . The Navy says that a GFS is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest. Focusing primarily on Phase 0 (shaping) operations, Theater Security Cooperation, Global Maritime Awareness, and tasks associated specifically with the War on Terror, GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations. Like all sea bases, the composition of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander requirements, the operating environment, and the mission. From its sea base, each GFS would serve as a self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the capacity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the GFS might provide classroom space, limited medical facilities, an information fusion center, and some combat service support capability. The GFS concept provides a leveraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence in support of national objectives. Additionally, it complements more traditional CSG/ESG training and deployment cycles. The Navy is implementing or experimenting with new ship-deployment approaches that are intended to improve the Navy's ability to respond to emergencies and increase the amount of time that ships spend on station in forward deployment areas. Key efforts in this area include the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) for emergency surge deployments and the Sea Swap concept for long-duration forward deployments with crew rotation. The FRP, Navy officials say, permits the Navy to deploy up to 6 of its 11 planned CSGs within 30 days, and an additional CSG within another 60 days after that (which is called "6+1"). Navy officials believe Sea Swap can reduce the stationkeeping multiplier—the number of ships of a given kind needed to maintain one ship of that kind on continuously station in an overseas operating area—by 20% or more. The Navy is implementing a variety of steps to substantially reduce the number of uniformed Navy personnel required to carry out functions both at sea and ashore. DON officials state that these actions are aimed at moving the Navy away from an outdated "conscript mentality," under which Navy personnel were treated as a free good, and toward a more up-to-date approach under which the high and rising costs of personnel are fully recognized. Under the DOD's proposed FY2008 budget and FY2008-FY2013 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), active Navy end strength, which was 365,900 in FY2005, is to decline to less than 325,000 by FY2010. Reductions in personnel requirements ashore are to be accomplished through organizational streamlining and reforms, and the transfer of jobs from uniformed personnel to civilian DON employees. Reductions in personnel requirements at sea are to be accomplished by introducing new-design ships that can be operated with substantially smaller crews—a shift that could lead to significant changes in Navy practices for recruiting, training, and otherwise managing its personnel. Current ship-acquisition programs related to this goal include the LCS, the DDG-1000, and the Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier (also known as the CVN-21 class). DON is pursuing a variety of initiatives to improve its processes and business practices so as to generate savings that can be used to help finance Navy transformation. These efforts are referred to collectively as Sea Enterprise. Many DON transformation activities efforts take place at the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), which is located at the Naval War College at Newport, RI, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), which is located at the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, VA. These two organizations generate ideas for naval transformation and act as clearinghouses and evaluators of transformation ideas generated in other parts of DON. NWDC and MCWL oversee major exercises, known as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs) and Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), that are intended to explore new naval concepts of operation. The Navy and Marine Corps also participate with the Army and Air Force in joint exercises aimed at testing transformation ideas. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: Are current DON transformation efforts inadequate, excessive, or about right? Are DON transformation efforts adequately coordinated with those of the Army and Air Force? Is DON striking the proper balance between transformation initiatives for participating in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and those for preparing for a potential challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces? Is DON achieving a proper balance between transformation and maintaining near-term readiness and near-term equipment procurement? How might naval transformation affect Navy force-structure requirements? Will the need to fund Army and Marine Corps reset costs in coming years reduce funding available for Navy transformation?

The Department of the Navy (DON) has several efforts underway to transform U.S. naval forces to prepare them for future military challenges. Key elements of naval transformation include a focus on operating in littoral waters, increasing the Navy's capabilities for participating in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), network-centric operations, use of unmanned vehicles, directly launching and supporting expeditionary operations ashore from sea bases, new kinds of naval formations, new ship-deployment approaches, reducing personnel requirements, and streamlined and reformed business practices. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA, P.L. 92-532) has two basic aims: to regulate intentional ocean disposal of materials, and to authorize related research. Title I of the act, which is often referred to as the Ocean Dumping Act, contains permit and enforcement provisions for ocean dumping. Research provisions are contained in Title II; Title IV authorizes a regional marine research program; and Title V addresses coastal water quality monitoring. The third title of the MPRSA, which authorizes the establishment of marine sanctuaries, is not addressed here. This report presents a summary of the law, describing the essence of the statute. It is an excerpt from a larger document, CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency . Descriptions of many details and secondary provisions are omitted here, and even some major components are only briefly mentioned. Further, this report describes the statute, but does not discuss its implementation. Table 1 shows the original enactment and subsequent amendments. Table 2 , at the end of this report, cites the major U.S. Code sections of the codified statute. The nature of marine pollution requires that it be regulated internationally, since once a pollutant enters marine waters, it knows no boundary. Thus, a series of regional treaties and conventions pertaining to local marine pollution problems and more comprehensive international conventions providing uniform standards to control worldwide marine pollution has evolved over the last 40 years. At the same time that key international protocols were being adopted and ratified by countries worldwide (in the early 1970s), the United States enacted the MPRSA to regulate disposal of wastes in marine waters that are within U.S. jurisdiction. It implements the requirements of the London Convention, which is the international treaty governing ocean dumping. The MPRSA requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, to the extent possible, to apply the standards and criteria binding upon the United States that are stated in the London Dumping Convention. This convention, signed by more than 85 countries, includes annexes that prohibit the dumping of mercury, cadmium, and other substances such as DDT and PCBs, solid wastes and persistent plastics, oil, high-level radioactive wastes, and chemical and biological warfare agents; and requires special permits for other heavy metals, cyanides and fluorides, and medium- and low-level radioactive wastes. The MPRSA uses a comprehensive and uniform waste management system to regulate disposal or dumping of all materials into ocean waters. Prior to 1972, U.S. marine waters had been used extensively as a convenient alternative to land-based sites for the disposal of various wastes such as sewage sludge, industrial wastes, and pipeline discharges and runoff. The basic provisions of the act have remained virtually unchanged since 1972, but many new authorities have been added. These newer parts include (1) research responsibilities for EPA; (2) specific direction that EPA phase out the disposal of "harmful" sewage sludges and industrial wastes; (3) a ban on the ocean disposal of sewage sludge and industrial wastes by December 31, 1991; (4) inclusion of Long Island Sound within the purview of the act; and (5) inclusion of medical waste provisions. Authorizations for appropriations to support provisions of the law expired at the end of FY1997 (September 30, 1997). Authorities did not lapse, however, and Congress has continued to appropriate funds to carry out the act. Four federal agencies have responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act: EPA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Coast Guard. EPA has primary authority for regulating ocean disposal of all substances except dredged spoils, which are under the authority of the Corps of Engineers. NOAA is responsible for long-range research on the effects of human-induced changes to the marine environment, while EPA is authorized to carry out research and demonstration activities related to phasing out sewage sludge and industrial waste dumping. The Coast Guard is charged with maintaining surveillance of ocean dumping. Title I of the MPRSA prohibits all ocean dumping, except that allowed by permits, in any ocean waters under U.S. jurisdiction, by any U.S. vessel, or by any vessel sailing from a U.S. port. Certain materials, such as high-level radioactive waste, chemical and biological warfare agents, medical waste, sewage sludge, and industrial waste, may not be dumped in the ocean. Permits for dumping of other materials, except dredge spoils, can be issued by the EPA after notice and opportunity for public hearings where the Administrator determines that such dumping will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities. The law regulates ocean dumping within the area extending 12 nautical miles seaward from the U.S. baseline and regulates transport of material by U.S.-flagged vessels for dumping into ocean waters. EPA designates sites for ocean dumping and specifies in each permit where the material is to be disposed. EPA is required to prepare an annual report of ocean dumping permits for material other than dredged material. In 1977, Congress amended the act to require that dumping of municipal sewage sludge or industrial wastes that unreasonably degrade the environment cease by December 1981. (However, that deadline was not achieved, and amendments passed in 1988 extended the deadline to December 1991.) In 1986, Congress directed that ocean disposal of all wastes cease at the traditional 12-mile site off the New York/New Jersey coast (that is, it barred issuance of permits at the 12-mile site) and directed that disposal be moved to a new site 106 miles offshore. In 1988, Congress enacted several laws amending the Ocean Dumping Act, with particular emphasis on phasing out sewage sludge and industrial waste disposal in the ocean, which continued despite earlier legislative efforts. In 1992, Congress amended the act to permit states to adopt ocean dumping standards more stringent than federal standards and to require that permits conform with long-term management plans for designated dumpsites, to ensure that permitted activities are consistent with expected uses of the site. Virtually all ocean dumping that occurs today is dredged material, sediments removed from the bottom of waterbodies in order to maintain navigation channels and port berthing areas. Other materials that are dumped include vessels, fish wastes, and human remains. The Corps of Engineers issues permits for ocean dumping of dredged material, using EPA's environmental criteria and subject to EPA's concurrence. The bulk of dredged material disposal results from maintenance dredging by the Corps itself or its contractors. According to data from the Corps, amounts of dredged material sediment that are disposed each year at designated ocean sites fluctuate, averaging in recent years about 47 million cubic yards. Before sediments can be permitted to be dumped in the ocean, they are evaluated to ensure that the dumping will not cause significant harmful effects to human health or the marine environment. EPA is responsible for developing criteria to ensure that the ocean disposal of dredge spoils does not cause environmental harm. Permits for ocean disposal of dredged material are to be based on the same criteria utilized by EPA under other provisions of the act, and to the extent possible, EPA-recommended dumping sites are used. Where the only feasible disposition of dredged material would violate the dumping criteria, the Corps can request an EPA waiver. Amendments to MPRSA enacted in 1992 expanded EPA's role in permitting of dredged material by authorizing EPA to impose permit conditions or even deny a permit, if necessary to prevent environmental harm to marine waters. Permits issued under the Ocean Dumping Act specify the type of material to be disposed, the amount to be transported for dumping, the location of the dumpsite, the length of time the permit is valid, and special provisions for surveillance. The EPA Administrator can require a permit applicant to provide information necessary for the review and evaluation of the application. In addition to issuing individual permits for non-dredged material, EPA has issued general permits under the MPRSA for several types of disposal activities, such as burial at sea of human remains, transportation and disposal of vessels, and disposal of manmade ice piers in Antarctica. The act authorizes EPA to assess civil penalties of not more than $50,000 for each violation of a permit or permit requirement, taking into account such factors as gravity of the violation, prior violations, and demonstrations of good faith; however, no penalty can be assessed until after notice and opportunity for a hearing. Criminal penalties (including seizure and forfeiture of vessels) for knowing violations of the act also are authorized. In addition, the act authorizes penalties for ocean dumping of medical wastes (civil penalties up to $125,000 for each violation and criminal penalties up to $250,000, five years in prison, or both). The Coast Guard is directed to conduct surveillance and other appropriate enforcement activities to prevent unlawful transportation of material for dumping, or unlawful dumping. Like many other federal environmental laws, the Ocean Dumping Act allows individuals to bring a citizen suit in U.S. district court against any person, including the United States, for violation of a permit or other prohibition, limitation, or criterion issued under Title I of the act. In conjunction with the Ocean Dumping Act, the Clean Water Act (CWA) regulates all discharges into navigable waters including the territorial seas. Although these two laws overlap in their coverage of dumping from vessels within the territorial seas, any question of conflict is essentially moot because EPA has promulgated a uniform set of standards (40 CFR Parts 220-229). The Ocean Dumping Act preempts the CWA in coastal waters or open oceans, and the CWA controls in estuaries. States are permitted to regulate ocean dumping in waters within their jurisdiction under certain circumstances. Title II of the MPRSA authorizes two types of research: general research on ocean resources, under the jurisdiction of NOAA; and EPA research related to phasing out ocean disposal activities. NOAA is directed to carry out a comprehensive, long-term research program on the effects not only of ocean dumping, but also of pollution, overfishing, and other human-induced changes on the marine ecosystem. Additionally, NOAA assesses damages from spills of petroleum and petroleum products. EPA's research role includes "research, investigations, experiments, training, demonstrations, surveys, and studies" to minimize or end the dumping of sewage sludge and industrial wastes, along with research on alternatives to ocean disposal. Amendments in 1980 required EPA to study technological options for removing heavy metals and certain organic materials from New York City's sewage sludge. Title IV of the MPRSA established nine regional marine research boards for the purpose of developing comprehensive marine research plans, considering water quality and ecosystem conditions and research and monitoring priorities and objectives in each region. The plans, after approval by NOAA and EPA, are to guide NOAA in awarding research grant funds under this title of the act. Title V of the MPRSA established a national coastal water quality monitoring program. It directs EPA and NOAA jointly to implement a long-term program to collect and analyze scientific data on the environmental quality of coastal ecosystems, including ambient water quality, health and quality of living resources, sources of environmental degradation, and data on trends. Results of these activities (including intensive monitoring of key coastal waters) are intended to provide information necessary to design and implement effective programs under the Clean Water Act and Coastal Zone Management Act.

The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) has two basic aims: to regulate intentional ocean disposal of materials, and to authorize related research. Permit and enforcement provisions of the law are often referred to as the Ocean Dumping Act. The basic provisions of the act have remained virtually unchanged since 1972, when it was enacted to establish a comprehensive waste management system to regulate disposal or dumping of all materials into marine waters that are within U.S. jurisdiction, although a number of new authorities have been added. This report presents a summary of the law. Four federal agencies have responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Coast Guard. EPA has primary authority for regulating ocean disposal of all substances except dredged spoils, which are under the authority of the Corps of Engineers. NOAA is responsible for long-range research on the effects of human-induced changes to the marine environment, while EPA is authorized to carry out research and demonstration activities related to phasing out sewage sludge and industrial waste dumping. The Coast Guard is charged with maintaining surveillance of ocean dumping. Title I of the MPRSA prohibits all ocean dumping, except that allowed by permits, in any ocean waters under U.S. jurisdiction, by any U.S. vessel, or by any vessel sailing from a U.S. port. Certain materials, such as high-level radioactive waste, chemical and biological warfare agents, medical waste, sewage sludge, and industrial waste, may not be dumped in the ocean. Permits for dumping of other materials, except dredge spoils, can be issued by the EPA after notice and opportunity for public hearings where the Administrator determines that such dumping will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities. Permits specify the type of material to be disposed, the amount to be transported for dumping, the location of the dumpsite, the length of time the permit is valid, and special provisions for surveillance. The law regulates ocean dumping within the area extending 12 nautical miles seaward from the U.S. baseline and regulates transport of material by U.S.-flagged vessels for dumping into ocean waters. EPA designates sites for ocean dumping and specifies in each permit where the material is to be disposed. Title II of the MPRSA authorizes two types of research: general research on ocean resources, under the jurisdiction of NOAA; and EPA research related to phasing out ocean disposal activities. NOAA is directed to carry out a comprehensive, long-term research program on the effects not only of ocean dumping, but also of pollution, overfishing, and other human-induced changes on the marine ecosystem. EPA's research role includes "research, investigations, experiments, training, demonstrations, surveys, and studies" to minimize or end the dumping of sewage sludge and industrial wastes, along with research on alternatives to ocean disposal. (Title III, concerning marine sanctuaries, is not discussed in this report.) Title IV of the MPRSA established nine regional marine research boards for the purpose of developing comprehensive marine research plans, considering water quality and ecosystem conditions and research and monitoring priorities and objectives in each region. Title V of the MPRSA established a national coastal water quality monitoring program. It directs EPA and NOAA jointly to implement a long-term program to collect and analyze scientific data on the environmental quality of coastal ecosystems, including ambient water quality, health and quality of living resources, sources of environmental degradation, and data on trends.

On August 31, 2010, President Obama announced that the U.S. combat mission in Iraq had ended. More than 100,000 troops have been withdrawn from Iraq, and a transitional force of U.S. troops has remained in Iraq with a different mission: "advising and assisting Iraq's Security Forces, supporting Iraqi troops in targeted counterterrorism missions, and protecting our civilians." This mission is called Operation New Dawn (OND). Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities and wounds in OND. All troops are slated for withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011. Table 2 provides statistics on fatalities and wounds during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and ended August 31, 2010. Statistics may be revised as circumstances surrounding a servicemember's death or injury are investigated and as all records are processed through the U.S. military's casualty system. More frequent updates are available at DOD's website at http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf . A detailed casualty summary that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at DOD's website at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm . According to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq's (UNAMI's) tally, 2,953 Iraqi civilians were killed and 10,434 were injured during 2010. In comparison, according to the same source, 3,056 civilians were killed and 10,770 civilians wounded in 2009. UNAMI also reports figures provided to UNAMI from the Iraq Ministry of Human Rights. According to these figures, 3,254 Iraqi civilians died and 13,788 were wounded in 2010. A separate report from the Iraq Ministry of Human Rights, published in October of 2009, gave figures of 85,694 civilian deaths from 2004 to 2008. The 2009 report specified that it included only those deaths due to terrorist attacks, defined as "direct bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and forced displacement of the population." In other words, the Iraq Ministry of Human Rights did not include in its 2009 total any civilian deaths that may have been due to coalition occupation or fighting between militias within Iraq. It is not clear whether this distinction was made with the 2010 data reported by UNAMI. Added together, the Iraq Ministry of Human Rights would seem to have a tally of 88,948 Iraqi civilian deaths from 2004 through 2010. Along with the Iraq Ministry of Human Rights, other Iraqi ministries also have kept data on civilian deaths. The Iraq Health Ministry releases data on civilian deaths and the Iraq Ministries of the Interior and Defense release data on police and security forces deaths. Each of these ministries releases their data to the press on a monthly basis. According to their totals, 9,466 civilians and 2,238 Iraqi police and security forces have died since January 2008. Figure 1 charts the deaths of civilians and police and security forces as reported by the Iraq Ministry of Health. The Iraq Body Count (IBC) website bases its casualty estimates on media reports of casualties, some of which may involve security forces as well as civilians. Using media reports as a base for casualty estimates can entail errors: some deaths may not be reported in the media, whereas other deaths may be reported more than once. The IBC documents each of the civilian casualties it records with a media source and provides a minimum and a maximum estimate. As of November 21, 2011, the IBC estimated that between 103,640 and 113,230 civilians had died as a result of military action. In a separate analysis of its data, the IBC also estimated that, between January 2006 and November 2008, 4,884 Iraqi police had been killed. A separate analysis used IBC data to look at Iraqi civilian deaths caused by perpetrators of armed violence during the first five years of the Iraq War. The researchers found that coalition forces caused 12% of civilian deaths, anti-coalition forces caused 11%, and unknown perpetrators caused 74%. In addition, they applied a "Dirty War Index" (DWI) and found that the most indiscriminate effects on women and children were from unknown perpetrators firing mortars, non-suicide vehicle bombs, and coalition air attacks. They concluded that "coalition forces had a higher DWI than anti-coalition forces for all weapons combined, with no decrease over the study period." The Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (ICCC) is another nonprofit group that, like the IBC, tracks Iraqi civilian and Iraqi security forces deaths using media reports of deaths. ICCC is also prone to the kind of errors likely to occur when using media reports for data: some deaths may not be reported, whereas other deaths may be reported more than once. The ICCC estimates that there were 50,152 civilian deaths from March 2005 through July 2011, and 8,825 security forces were killed from January 2005 to July 2011. Earlier studies include "the Lancet study." In 2006, researchers from Johns Hopkins University and Baghdad's Al-Mustansiriya University published their most recent cluster study on Iraqi civilian casualties, commonly referred to in the press as "the Lancet study" because it was published in the British medical journal of that name. The study surveyed 47 clusters and reported an estimate of between 426,369 and 793,663 Iraqi civilian deaths from violent causes since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom to July 2006. In a more recent cluster study, a team of investigators from the Federal Ministry of Health in Baghdad, the Kurdistan Ministry of Planning, the Kurdistan Ministry of Health, the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology in Baghdad, and the World Health Organization formed the Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) Study Group to research violence-related mortality in Iraq. In their nationally representative cluster study, interviewers visited 89.4% of 1,086 household clusters; the household response rate was 96.2%. They concluded that there had been an estimated 151,000 violence-related deaths from March 2003 through June 2006 and that violence was the main cause of death for men between the ages of 15 and 59 during the first three years after the 2003 invasion. This study seems to be widely cited for violence-related mortality rates in Iraq. Neither the Lancet study nor the IFHS study distinguish among different victims of violence, such as civilians versus police or security force members. The studies do not reflect trends that occurred during the period of the most intense civil violence from early 2006 through the end of 2008. In 2007, a British firm, Opinion Research Business (ORB), conducted a survey in Iraq in which it asked 2,411 Iraqis, "How many members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 (i.e., as a result of violence rather than a natural death such as old age)? Please note that I mean those who were actually living under your roof?" Extrapolating from its results, OBR estimated "that over 1,000,000 Iraqi citizens have died as a result of the conflict which started in 2003." Finally, the Brookings Institution has used numbers from the following sources to develop its own composite estimate for Iraqi civilians, police, and security forces who have died by violence: the U.N. Human Rights Report , the Iraq Body Count, the U.S. Central Command's General David Petraeus's congressional testimony given on September 10-11, 2007, Iraqi government sources, and other sources. By combining all of these sources by date, the Brookings Institution estimates that between May 2003 and July 2011, 115,515 Iraqi civilians died and between June 2003 and July 2011, 10,125 Iraqi police and security forces died. Table 4 provides Iraqi civilian, security forces, and police officers casualty estimates from nongovernmental sources. These estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, and therefore readers should exercise caution when using and comparing these statistics.

This report presents U.S. military casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND) as well as governmental and nongovernmental estimates of Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces casualties. For several years, there were few estimates from any national or international government source regarding Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces casualties. Now, however, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is reporting civilian casualty estimates. In addition, several Iraqi ministries have released monthly or total casualty statistics. Nongovernmental sources also have released various estimates of Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces casualties. This report includes estimates from Iraq Body Count (IBC), the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (ICCC), Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS), the most recent study published in the Lancet, the Brookings Institution, and the British survey firm, Opinion Research Business (ORB). Because the estimates of Iraqi casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact. This report will be updated as needed.

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the Establishment Clause, in general, to mean that government is prohibited from sponsoring or financing religious instruction or indoctrination. But the Court has drawn a constitutional distinction between aid that flows directly to sectarian schools and aid that benefits such schools indirectly as the result of voucher or tax benefit programs. With respect to direct aid, the Court has typically applied the tripartite test it first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman . The Lemon test requires that an aid program (1) serve a secular legislative purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. Because education is an important state goal, the secular purpose aspect of this test has rarely been a problem for direct aid programs. But prior to the Court's latest decisions, both the primary effect and entanglement prongs were substantial barriers. To avoid a primary effect of advancing religion, the Court required direct aid programs to be limited to secular use and struck them down if they were not so limited. But even if the aid was so limited, the Court often found the primary effect prong violated anyway because it presumed that in pervasively sectarian institutions it was impossible for public aid to be limited to secular use. Alternatively, it often held that direct aid programs benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions were unconstitutional because government had to so closely monitor the institutions' use of the aid to be sure the limitation to secular use was honored that it became excessively entangled with the institutions. These tests were a particular problem for direct aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools, because the Court presumed that such schools were pervasively sectarian. It presumed to the contrary with respect to religious colleges. The Court's decisions in Agostini v. Felton and Mitchell v. Helms , however, have recast these tests in a manner that has lowered the constitutional barriers to direct aid to sectarian schools. The Court has abandoned the presumption that sectarian elementary and secondary schools are so pervasively sectarian that direct aid either results in the advancement of religion or fosters excessive entanglement. It has also abandoned the assumption that government must engage in an intrusive monitoring of such institutions' use of direct aid. The Court still requires that direct aid serve a secular purpose and not lead to excessive entanglement. But it has recast the primary effect test to require that the aid be secular in nature, that its distribution be based on religiously neutral criteria, and that it not be used for religious indoctrination. The Court's past jurisprudence imposed fewer restraints on indirect aid to sectarian schools such as tax benefits or vouchers. The Court still required such aid programs to serve a secular purpose; but it did not apply the secular use and entanglement tests applicable to direct aid. The key constitutional question was whether the initial beneficiaries of the aid (i.e., parents or schoolchildren) had a genuinely independent choice about whether to use the aid for educational services from secular or religious schools. If the universe of choices available was almost entirely religious, the Court held the program unconstitutional because the government, in effect, dictated by the design of the program that a religious option be chosen. But if religious options did not predominate, the Court held the program constitutional even if parents chose to receive services from pervasively sectarian schools. Moreover, in its decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris , the Court legitimated an even broader range of indirect aid programs by holding that the evaluation of the universe of choice available to parents is not confined to the private schools at which the voucher aid can be used but includes as well all of the public school options open to parents. In Everson v. Board of Education , the Court held it to be constitutionally permissible for a local government to subsidize bus transportation between home and school for parochial schoolchildren as well as public schoolchildren. The Court said the subsidy was essentially a general welfare program that helped children get from home to school and back safely. In Wolman v. Walter , on the other hand, the Court held the Establishment Clause to be violated by the public subsidy of field trip transportation for parochial schoolchildren on the grounds field trips are an integral part of the school's curriculum and wholly controlled by the school. In several decisions, the Court has upheld as constitutional the loan of secular textbooks to children in sectarian elementary and secondary schools, and in Wolman v. Walter , it upheld the inclusion in such a textbook loan program of related manuals and reusable workbooks. The Court has reasoned that the textbooks are by their nature limited to secular use and that the loan programs are general welfare programs that only incidentally aid sectarian schools. In contrast, the Court in Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter held the provision of instructional materials other than textbooks, such as periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, films, sound recordings, projection and recording equipment, and lab equipment, to sectarian schools or sectarian school children to be unconstitutional because such aid provides substantial aid to the sectarian enterprise as a whole and inevitably has a primary effect of advancing religion. But in Mitchell v. Helms , the Court overturned those aspects of Meek and Wolman and held it to be constitutional for government to include sectarian schools in a program providing instructional materials (including computer hardware and software) on the grounds: (1) the aid was secular in nature; (2) was distributed according to religiously neutral criteria; and (3) could be limited to secular use within the sectarian schools without any intrusive government monitoring. In Lemon v. Kurtzman , the Court held it to be unconstitutional for a state to subsidize parochial school teachers of such secular subjects as math, foreign languages, and the physical sciences, either by way of a direct subsidy of such teachers' salaries or by means of a "purchase of secular services" program. The Court reasoned that the state would have to engage in intrusive monitoring to ensure that the subsidized teachers did not inculcate religion; and it held such monitoring to excessively entangle government with the schools. For a similar reason in Meek v. Pittenger , the Court struck down a program of "auxiliary services" to children in nonpublic schools which included enrichment and remedial educational services, counseling and psychological services, and speech and hearing therapy by public personnel. And in Aguilar v. Felton , it held unconstitutional the provision of remedial and enrichment services to eligible children in sectarian schools by public school teachers under the Title I program if they were provided on the premises of the sectarian schools. Finally, in City of Grand Rapids v. Ball , the Court also struck down a similar state program of remedial and enrichment services as well as a program in which the school district hired parochial school teachers to provide after-school extracurricular programs to their students on the premises of their sectarian schools. But in Agostini v. Felton , the Court overturned the Aguilar decision and the pertinent parts of Meek and Ball and upheld as constitutional the provision of remedial and enrichment educational services to sectarian schoolchildren by public teachers on the premises of sectarian schools. In addition, the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District upheld as constitutional the provision at public expense under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of a sign-language interpreter for a disabled child attending a sectarian secondary school. In both cases, the Court reasoned that the programs were general welfare programs available to students without regard to whether they attended public or private (sectarian) schools; and in Zobrest , it reasoned as well that the parents controlled the decision about whether the assistance took place in a sectarian school or a public school. In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education , the Court struck down a program reimbursing sectarian schools for the costs of administering and compiling the results of teacher-prepared tests in subjects required to be taught by state law because the teachers controlled the tests and might include religious content in them. In contrast, in Wolman v. Walter , the Court upheld a program in which a state provided standardized tests in secular subjects and related scoring services to nonpublic schoolchildren, including those in religious schools. Similarly, in Committee for Public Education v. Regan , the Court upheld a program that reimbursed sectarian schools for the costs of administering such state-prepared tests as the regents exams, comprehensive achievement exams, and college qualifications tests. In both cases, the Court reasoned that such tests were limited by their nature to secular use. In Regan , the Court also upheld as constitutional a program that reimbursed sectarian and other private schools for the costs of complying with state-mandated record-keeping and reporting requirements about student enrollment and attendance, faculty qualifications, the content of the curriculum, and physical facilities. The Court reasoned that the requirements were imposed by the state and did not involve the teaching process. In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist , the Court struck down as unconstitutional a state program subsidizing some of the costs incurred by sectarian schools for the maintenance and repair of their facilities, including costs incurred for heating, lighting, renovation, and cleaning, on the grounds the subsidy inevitably aided the schools' religious functions. In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon , the Court held unconstitutional programs which provided tuition grants and tax benefits to the parents of children attending private schools, most of which were religious. In both instances, the Court found that the programs benefited only those with children in private schools, that most of those schools were sectarian, and that the programs had a primary purpose and effect of subsidizing such schools. In three other decisions, however, the Court upheld voucher and tax benefit programs where the benefits were available to children attending public as well as private schools or their parents. Mueller v. Allen involved a state program giving a tax deduction to the parents of all elementary and secondary schoolchildren for a variety of educational expenses, including tuition. Witters v. Washington Depa rtment of Services for the Blind involved a grant to a blind person who wanted to attend a religious college to prepare for a religious vocation under a state vocational rehabilitation program which provided educational assistance for a wide variety of vocations. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris , the Court upheld a voucher program that assisted parents in failing public schools in Cleveland to send their children to private schools, most of which were sectarian. In each instance, the Court's rationale in upholding the programs was that the benefits were available on a religiously neutral basis and that sectarian schools benefited only indirectly as the result of the independent choices of students or their parents. In Zelman , the Court further held that the universe of choice open to parents was not limited to the private schools where the vouchers could be used, but included the full range of public school options open to them as well. The Court has in dicta repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of the public subsidy of physician, nursing, dental, and optometric services to children in sectarian schools; and in Wolman v. Walter , it specifically upheld the provision of diagnostic speech, hearing, and psychological services by public school personnel on sectarian school premises. In addition, the Court has repeatedly in dicta affirmed the constitutionality of the public subsidy of school lunches for eligible children in sectarian schools. In dicta in Everson v. Board of Education , the Court affirmed as constitutional the provision of such general public services as police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, highways, and sidewalks to sectarian schools. According to the Court, the Establishment Clause does not require that religious schools be cut off from public services "so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function...." In Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works , the Court upheld a state program of noncategorical grants to all private colleges in the state, including ones that were church-affiliated, because the program included a statutory restriction barring the use of the funds for sectarian purposes. The Court stressed that the church-related colleges that benefited were not "pervasively sectarian" and that the aid was statutorily restricted to secular use. In Tilton v. Richardson , the Court upheld as constitutional a federal program that provided grants to colleges, including church-affiliated colleges, for the construction of needed facilities, so long as the facilities were not used for religious worship or sectarian instruction. The statute provided that the federal interest in any facility constructed with federal funds would expire after 20 years, but the Court held that the nonsectarian use requirement would have to apply so long as the buildings had any viable use. Subsequently, in Hunt v. McNair , the Court upheld a program in which a state issued revenue bonds to finance the construction of facilities at institutions of higher education, including those with a religious affiliation. The program barred the use of the funds for any facility used for sectarian instruction or religious worship. In Rosenberger v. The Rector and Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia , the Court held that it would be constitutional for a state university to subsidize the printing costs of an avowedly religious student publication. The university made the subsidy available to non-religious student publications as a way of fostering student expression and discussion, and the Court held that it would constitute viewpoint discrimination in violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment to deny the subsidy to a student publication offering a religious perspective. In two summary affirmances, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of programs providing grants to students attending institutions of higher education, including religiously affiliated colleges. Both Smith v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina and Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v. Blanton involved grants given on the basis of need for students to use in attending either public or private colleges, including religiously affiliated ones. In affirming the decisions, the Supreme Court issued no opinion in either case, but the lower courts reasoned that the religious colleges benefited from the programs only if the students independently decided to attend. In Locke v. Davey , the Court considered the constitutionality of a state scholarship program that included a restriction on recipients that prohibited the use of scholarship funds to pursue devotional theological degrees. The Court noted that, because the recipient would make an independent choice regarding how to spend the funds, the federal Establishment Clause would not be violated by such a program.

A recurring issue in constitutional law concerns the extent to which the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment imposes constraints on the provision of public aid to private sectarian schools. The U.S. Supreme Court's past jurisprudence construed the clause to impose severe restrictions on aid given directly to sectarian elementary and secondary schools but to be less restrictive when given to colleges or indirectly in the form of tax benefits or vouchers. The Court's later decisions loosened the constitutional limitations on both direct and indirect aid. This report gives a brief overview of the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause in this area and analyzes the categories of aid that have been addressed by the Court. The report explains which categories have been held to be constitutionally permissible or impermissible, both at the elementary and secondary school level and at the postsecondary level.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Base Closure Act), as amended,generally governs the military base realignment and closure (BRAC) process. (2) After three previous BRACrounds, Congress authorized a fourth round for 2005, which is now underway. (3) The BRAC process involves a complex statutory scheme, under which numerousgovernmental entities play a role in recommending bases to be closed or realigned. A brief summaryof the major steps in the process is illustrated in Figure 1 on the following page. In addition toestablishing the basic framework for the BRAC process, the Base Closure Act sets forth a varietyof selection criteria and mandatory procedures, such as the requirements that certain information bedisclosed and that certain meetings be made open to the public This report analyzes whether judicial review is available when plaintiffs allege that theDepartment of Defense (DOD), the independent BRAC Commission (Commission), or the Presidenthas either (1) failed to comply with procedural requirements of the Base Closure Act or (2) failedto properly apply specified selection criteria in making BRAC determinations. Congress couldemploy numerous strategies to attempt to "enforce" the Base Closure Act. (4) However, this report focuseson the effect a failure to comply would have if Members of Congress or other parties sued based onan alleged failure to comply with the Act's provisions. (5) In particular, the report synthesizes key federal court decisions thataddress three potential bases for judicial review of BRAC-related actions: the AdministrativeProcedure Act (APA), the Base Closure Act, and the U.S. Constitution. Figure 1: The BRAC Process (6) Additional CRS reports addressing a variety of BRAC issues are also available. (7) The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for judicial review of "final agencyaction," (8) unless either oftwo exceptions applies: (1) when a statute precludes judicial review or (2) when "agency action iscommitted to agency discretion by law." (9) In Dalton v. Specter , Members of Congress and other plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secretaryof Defense (Secretary) from closing a military installation during a previous BRAC round becauseof alleged substantive and procedural violations of the Base Closure Act. (10) Specifically, plaintiffsalleged that the Secretary's report and the Commission's report were subject to judicial review underthe APA. (11) In Dalton , the Supreme Court held that the issuances of the Secretary's report and theCommission's report were not judicially reviewable actions under the APA because they were not"final agency action[s]." (12) The Court explained that "'[t]he core question' for determiningfinality [of agency action under the APA is] 'whether the agency has completed its decisionmakingprocess, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties.'" (13) Because the Base ClosureAct established a process under which the President takes the final action that affects militaryinstallations (see Figure 1 on the previous page), the actions of the Secretary and the Commissiondid not directly affect the parties. (14) Thus, the Court held that they were unreviewable under theAPA. (15) The Dalton decision affirmed the analysis in Cohen v. Rice , in which the First Circuit statedthat the President's statutory right to affect the BRAC process meant that previous steps of the BRACprocess were not final. (16) As the Cohen court explained: Under the 1990 Act, the President is not required tosubmit the Commission's report to Congress. In addition, the 1990 Act gives the President the powerto order the Commission to revise its report, and, in the final analysis, the President has the powerto terminate a base closure cycle altogether via a second rejection of a Commission report. (17) In addition, a subsequent Supreme Court decision described the BRAC reports as "purely advisory"and subject to the "absolute discretion" of the President, thus making them non-final agency actionfor APA purposes. (18) Importantly, the Dalton Court applied its analysis of finality under the APA to bothsubstantive claims (applying improper selection criteria) and procedural claims (e.g., failing to makecertain information public). (19) Therefore, the lack of finality in BRAC actions taken by theSecretary or the Commission bars judicial review of such actions under the APA. (20) Four Justices concurred in the Dalton Court's judgment that judicial review was not availableunder the APA, but argued in a separate concurring opinion that the Court should not have decidedthe issue of whether the agency actions were final. (21) The foundation for this argument is that under the APA, judicialreview is not available if statutes preclude judicial review. (22) Justice Souter -- writing for these four Justices -- argued that "the text, structure, and purposeof the Act compel the conclusion that judicial review of the Commission's or the Secretary'scompliance with it is precluded" (except for certain environmental objections to base closureimplementation plans). (23) Souter's opinion concluded that Congress intended for BRACactions to be "quick and final, or [for] no action [to] be taken at all." (24) Souter cited a variety of evidence to support the contention that Congress generally intendedto preclude judicial review under the Base Closure Act: (25) statutorily-mandated strict time deadlines for making and implementing BRACdecisions "the all-or-nothing base-closing requirement at the core of theAct" congressional frustration resulting from previous attempts to close militarybases "nonjudicial opportunities to assess any procedural (or other) irregularities,"(i.e., the opportunities for the Commission and the Comptroller General to review the Secretary'srecommendations, the President's opportunity to consider procedural flaws, and Congress'sopportunity to disapprove the recommendations) "the temporary nature of the Commission" the fact that the Act expressly provides for judicial review regarding objectionsto base closure implementation plans under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)that are brought "within a narrow time frame," but the Act does not explicitly provide for any otherjudicial review Importantly, whether the Supreme Court applies the rationale of the Dalton majority orJustice Souter's Dalton concurrence, the Court would likely decide not to review the BRAC actionsof the Secretary or the Commission under the APA in the 2005 round. Under the APA, judicial review of agency action is not available if "agency action iscommitted to agency discretion by law." (26) Even if the actions of the Secretary or the Commission were heldto be final agency action (which would be unlikely, given the Dalton decision), courts might considerthose agency actions to be committed to agency discretion by law -- thus making them judiciallyunreviewable. (27) Because there is a "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrativeaction," "clear and convincing evidence" of contrary congressional intent must exist in order for thisexception to judicial review to apply. (28) The issue of whether actions of the Secretary or the Commission under the Base Closure Actare committed to agency discretion by law has not been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Instead,several Supreme Court cases have addressed this issue in non-BRAC contexts and one D.C. Circuitcase addressed the applicability of the exception to the Base Closure Act. These cases are analyzedin the following paragraphs. In Heckler v. Chaney , the Supreme Court explained that the exception for agency actionbeing committed to agency discretion applies if "a court would have no meaningful standard againstwhich to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." (29) The Court continued, saying that "if no judicially manageablestandards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion, then itis impossible to evaluate agency action for 'abuse of discretion,' [as provided for in 5 U.S.C. §706]." (30) In National Federation , the D.C. Circuit found that the criteria DOD and the Commissionuse for making BRAC determinations do not provide judicially manageable standards, as requiredby the Heckler test. (31) The D.C. Circuit articulated the rationale for its finding: [T]he subject matter of those criteria is not 'judiciallymanageable' . . . . [because] judicial review of the decisions of the Secretary and the Commissionwould necessarily involve second-guessing the Secretary's assessment of the nation's military forcestructure and the military value of the bases within that structure. We think the federal judiciary isill-equipped to conduct reviews of the nation's military policy. (32) Based on this finding, the National Federation court held that application of the selection criteriato military installations during the BRAC process is agency action committed to agency discretionby law, thus making it judicially unreviewable under the APA. (33) More recently, the Supreme Court observed that this exception has generally applied in threecategories of cases: (1) cases involving national security; (2) cases where plaintiffs sought judicial review of an agency's refusal to pursue enforcementactions; and (3) cases where plaintiffs sought review of "an agency's refusal to grant reconsideration of anaction because of material error." (34) Although the Base Closure Act may not fit squarely within any of those three categories, theSupreme Court might adopt the D.C. Circuit's construction of the exception from NationalFederation were it to construe the exception in the context of BRAC. In Dalton , the Supreme Court held that the President's approval of the Secretary's BRACrecommendations was not judicially reviewable under the APA, because the President is not anagency. (35) Althoughthe APA's definition of an "agency" does not explicitly include or exclude the President, (36) the Court had previouslyheld that the President is not subject to the APA, due to separation of powers principles. (37) The Dalton Court distinguished between two types of potential claims: (1) claims that thePresident exceeded his statutory authority and (2) claims challenging the constitutionality of thePresident's actions. (38) The Court stated that not every case of ultra vires conduct by an executive official was ipso facto unconstitutional. (39) In Dalton , the lower court had held that the President would be acting in excess of his statutoryauthority under the Base Closure Act if the Secretary or the Commission had failed to comply withstatutorily-required procedures during previous stages of the BRAC process. (40) On appeal, the SupremeCourt characterized this claim as a statutory claim -- not as a constitutional claim. (41) The Court assumed arguendo that some statutory claims against the President could bejudicially reviewable apart from the APA. (42) However, it stated that statutory claims are not judiciallyreviewable apart from the APA "when the statute in question commits the decision to the discretionof the President." (43) According to the Court, the Base Closure Act did not limit the President's discretion in anyway. (44) Thus, thePresident's authority to approve the BRAC recommendations was "not contingent on the Secretary'sand Commission's fulfillment of all the procedural requirements imposed upon them by the [BaseClosure] Act." (45) Therefore, the issue of how the President chose to exercise his discretion under the Base Closure Actwas held to be judicially unreviewable. (46) Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, attempted to narrowlydefine the scope of the Dalton decision. (47) He considered the decision to be one that would allow judicialreview of a claim (1) if the President acted in contravention of his statutory authority (e.g., addinga base to the Commission's BRAC recommendations list) or (2) if a plaintiff brought "a timely claimseeking direct relief from a procedural violation" (e.g., a claim that a Commission meeting shouldbe public or that the Secretary should publish proposed selection criteria and allow for publiccomment). (48) However, Justice Blackmun's argument that plaintiffs could seek relief from a proceduralviolation of the Base Closure Act appears to directly conflict with Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinionon behalf of the Dalton majority, which stated: The President's authority to act is not contingent on theSecretary's and Commission's fulfillment of all the procedural requirements imposed upon them bythe [Base Closure] Act. Nothing in § 2903(e) requires the President to determine whether theSecretary or Commission committed any procedural violations in making their recommendations,nor does § 2903(e) prohibit the President from approving recommendations that are procedurallyflawed. (49) As mentioned in the preceding section of this report, the Dalton Court explained that claims thatthe President acted in excess of his statutory authority differ from claims that the Presidentunconstitutionally acted in the absence of statutory authority. (50) Specifically, the Courtdistinguished the issues in Dalton from those in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , alandmark case on presidential powers. (51) The Court said that Youngstown "involved the conceded absence of any statutory authority, not a claim that the President acted in excess of such authority." (52) Because the Base ClosureAct provides statutory authority to the President, the Dalton Court did not find it necessary toexamine the constitutional powers of the President (e.g., the President's powers asCommander-in-Chief). A litigant could also challenge the constitutionality of the Base Closure Act itself. For example,in National Federation , plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the 1988 Base Closure Act violated thenon-delegation doctrine and the separation of powers doctrine. (53) However, the BaseClosure Act has not yet been held unconstitutional by any federal appellate courts.

The 2005 round of military base realignments and closures (BRAC) is now underway. TheDefense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Base Closure Act), as amended, establishesmandatory procedures to be followed throughout the BRAC process and identifies criteria to be usedin formulating BRAC recommendations. However, judicial review is unlikely to be available toremedy alleged failures to comply with the Base Closure Act's provisions. A synopsis of the relevantlaw regarding the availability of judicial review in this context is included below: The actions of the Secretary of Defense (Secretary) and the independent BRACCommission (Commission) are not considered to be "final agency action," and thus cannot bejudicially reviewed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Even if a court determined that the actions of the Secretary and the Commission were "final agency action," the court would likely consider the case to fall under oneof two APA exceptions to judicial review: (1) when statutes preclude judicial review or (2) whenagency action is committed to agency discretion by law. The President's actions cannot be judicially reviewed under the APA, becausethe President is not an "agency" covered by the statute. A claim that the President exceeded his statutory authority under the BaseClosure Act has been held to be judicially unreviewable, because the Base Closure Act gives thePresident broad discretion in approving or disapproving BRACrecommendations. Thus, courts would likely allow the BRAC process to proceed even if the Department ofDefense, the Commission, or the President did not comply with the Base Closure Act's requirements. This report was prepared by [author name scrubbed], Law Clerk, under the general supervision of[author name scrubbed], Legislative Attorney. It will be updated as case developments warrant.

The National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) is a database of personal information and wage and employment information of American workers. Employers are required by P.L. 104-193 to send new hire reports to the State Directory of New Hires, which then sends the required information to the NDNH. States also are required to send quarterly wage information of existing employees (in UC-covered employment) and unemployment compensation claims information to the NDNH. Federal employers (i.e., agencies) send their new hire reports and quarterly wage information directly to the NDNH. A new hire report contains six data elements on new employees, which include the name, address, and Social Security number of each new employee and the employer's name, address, and tax identification number. The NDNH contains three components. (1) The first component of the NDNH is the new hires file (i.e., report). It contains information that is also on each employee's W-4 form. (2) The second component of the NDNH is the quarterly wage file. The quarterly wage file contains quarterly wage information on individual employees in UC-covered employment. This information comes from the records of the State Workforce Agencies (sometimes called State Employment Security Agencies) and the federal government. When an individual has more than one job, separate quarterly wage records are established for each job. (3) The third component of the NDNH is the Unemployment Compensation file. The Unemployment Compensation file contains information pertaining to persons who have received or applied for unemployment compensation, as reported by State Workforce Agencies. With respect to this file, the state can only submit information that is already contained in the records of the state agency (i.e., generally the State Workforce Agency) that administers the Unemployment Compensation program. Thus, the NDNH obtains its data from State Directories of New Hires, State Workforce Agencies, and federal agencies. The NDNH, itself, is a component of the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), which is maintained by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) and is housed at the Social Security Administration's National Computer Center in Baltimore, MD. According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), during FY2010 about 672 million records were posted to the NDNH. The original purpose of the NDNH was to help states locate child support obligors who were working in other states so that child support could be withheld from the noncustodial parent's paycheck. It is estimated that about 30% of child support cases involve noncustodial parents who do not live in the same state as their children. States generally use NDNH data rather than state new hire data or state quarterly wage data because they are more likely to acquire earnings information about noncustodial parents who have obtained work or claimed unemployment insurance benefits in a different state, or who are employed by the federal government. Moreover, because many noncustodial parents are in temporary employment or move from job to job, the quick reporting of information on new hires greatly increases the likelihood that the NDNH will be able to locate a noncustodial parent and pass on the information to states, so that the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) agencies can collect child support via income withholding before the noncustodial parent changes jobs. Since its enactment in 1996, access to the NDNH has been expanded, mostly to prevent fraud and abuse, to certain other programs and agencies (discussed later). Employers are required to collect from each newly hired employee and transmit to the State Directory of New Hires a report that contains the name, address, and Social Security number of the employee and the employer's name, address, and tax identification number. Most states require only these six basic data elements in each new hires report; some states require or request additional information. The State Directory of New Hires is required to submit its new hire reports to the NDNH. New hire reports must be deleted from the NDNH 24 months after the date of entry. For CSE purposes, quarterly wage and unemployment compensation reports must be deleted 12 months after entry unless a match has occurred in the information comparison procedures. The reporting and deletion requirements result in a constant cycling of wage and employment data into and out of the NDNH. (The HHS Secretary may keep samples of data entered into the NDNH for research purposes. ) The HHS Secretary has the authority to transmit information on employees and employers contained in the new hires reports to the Social Security Administration (SSA), to the extent necessary, for verification. SSA is required to verify the accuracy of, correct, or provide (to the extent possible) the employee's name, Social Security number, and date of birth and the employer's tax identification number. According to OCSE, all Social Security numbers on new hire reports and unemployment compensation files are verified by SSA before the information is added to the database of the National Directory of New Hires. Quarterly wage files, however, often do not include all of the necessary elements for a successful verification. In such situations, the information is transmitted to the NDNH, but it is flagged indicating that SSA was not able to verify the Social Security number and name combination. Employers must provide a new hires report on each newly hired employee to the State Directory of New Hires generally within 20 days after the employee is hired. The new hires report must be entered into the database maintained by the State Directory of New Hires within five business days of receipt from an employer. Within three business days after the new hire information from the employer has been entered into the State Directory of New Hires, the State Directory of New Hires is required to submit its new hire reports to the NDNH. Within two business days after the new hire information is received from the State Directory, the information must be entered into the computer system of the NDNH. For purposes of locating individuals in a paternity establishment case or a case involving the establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support, the HHS Secretary must compare information in the NDNH against information in the child support abstracts in the Federal Child Support Case Registry at least every two business days. If a match occurs, the HHS Secretary must report the information to the appropriate state CSE agency within two business days. The CSE agency is then required to instruct, within two business days, appropriate employers to withhold child support obligations from the employee's paycheck, unless the employee's income is not subject to withholding. Quarterly wage information on existing employees is required to be transmitted to the NDNH from the State Workforce Agencies within four months of the end of a calendar quarter. However, some states report quarterly wage data to the NDNH on a monthly or weekly basis. Federal agencies are required to transmit quarterly wage information on federal employees to the NDNH no later than one month after the end of a calendar quarter. Unemployment compensation information (which comes from State Workforce Agencies) is required to be transmitted to the NDNH within one month of the end of a calendar quarter. In order to safeguard the privacy of individuals in the NDNH, federal law requires that the OCSE restrict access to the NDNH database to "authorized" persons. Moreover, the NDNH cannot be used for any purpose not authorized by federal law. Thus, in order for any agency not mentioned in this section to gain access to the NDNH, Congress must authorize a change in law. The HHS Secretary is required to share information from the NDNH with state CSE agencies, state agencies administering the Title IV-B child welfare program, state agencies administering the Title IV-E foster care and adoption assistance programs, state agencies administering the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, the Commissioner of Social Security, the Secretary of the Treasury (for Earned Income Tax Credit purposes and to verify income tax return information), and researchers under certain circumstances. P.L. 106-113 (enacted in November 1999) granted access to the Department of Education. The provisions were designed to improve the ability of the Department of Education to collect on defaulted student loans and grant overpayments. OCSE and the Department of Education negotiated and implemented a computer matching agreement in December 2000. P.L. 108-199 (enacted in January 2004) granted access to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The provisions were designed to verify the employment and income of persons receiving federal housing assistance. P.L. 108-295 (enacted in August 2004) granted access to the State Workforce Agencies responsible for administering state or federal Unemployment Compensation programs. The provisions were designed to determine whether persons receiving unemployment compensation are working. P.L. 108-447 (enacted in December 2004) granted access to the Department of the Treasury. The provisions were designed to help the Treasury Department collect nontax debt (e.g., small business loans, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) loans, agricultural loans, etc.) owed to the federal government. P.L. 109-250 (enacted in July 2006) granted access to the state agencies that administer the Food Stamp program. These provisions were designed to assist in the administration of the Food Stamp program. P.L. 110-246 (enacted in June 2008) changed the Food Stamp program references to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). P.L. 113-79 (enacted in February 2014) required all state SNAP agencies (rather than giving them the option) to data-match with the NDNH at the time of SNAP certification for the purposes of determining eligibility to receive SNAP benefits and determining the correct amount of those benefits. P.L. 110-157 (enacted in December 2007) requires the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide the HHS Secretary with information for comparison with the National Directory of New Hires for income verification purposes in order to determine eligibility for certain veteran benefits and services. It requires the Secretary to (1) seek only the minimum information necessary to make such a determination; (2) receive the prior written consent of the individual before seeking, using, or disclosing any such information; (3) independently verify any information received prior to terminating, denying, or reducing a benefit or service; and (4) allow an opportunity for an individual to contest negative findings. P.L. 110-157 terminated the New Hires Directory comparison authority for the VA Secretary at the end of FY2011 (i.e., September 30, 2011). P.L. 112-37 (enacted in October 2011) extended the termination date to November 18, 2011. During the period from November 19, 2011, through September 29, 2013, the provision was not in effect. The Department of Veterans Affairs Expiring Authorities Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-37 ) made the provision effective beginning September 30, 2013, and for 180 days thereafter. The NDNH is almost unanimously viewed as a successful and pivotal element of the CSE program. According to HHS, in FY2010 4.7 million noncustodial parents and putative fathers were located through the NDNH, up from 2.8 million in FY1999 (a 68% increase). The NDNH, however, does not provide information on the self-employed nor does it include hours worked or industry/occupation-related data. Since the establishment of the NDNH, federal law has been amended six times to expand access of more programs and agencies to the NDNH (listed above). Although Congress specifically included several provisions that would safeguard the information in the NDNH, some advocacy groups are concerned that as more agencies and programs are granted access to the NDNH, the potential for mismanagement of the database and accidental or intentional misuse of confidential information escalates. The NDNH is a database that contains personal and financial data on nearly every working American, as well as those receiving unemployment compensation. The size and scope of the NDNH has continued to cause much concern over whether the privacy of individuals will be protected. In addition to the data security safeguards, federal law includes privacy protection provisions that require the removal or deletion of certain information in the NDNH after specified time periods. It has been argued that stronger safeguards may be needed to prevent the unauthorized intrusion into the personal and confidential information of millions of Americans associated with the NDNH. The federal government and states administer numerous benefit programs that provide aid, in cash and noncash form, to persons with limited income. In theory, all of these programs could use the employment and income information contained in the NDNH to verify program eligibility, prevent or end unlawful or erroneous access to program benefits, collect overpayments, or assure that program benefits are correct. Some observers are worried that more of these federal and state programs will try to obtain access to the NDNH. They contend that expanded or wider access to, and use of, these data could potentially lead to privacy and confidentiality breaches, financial fraud, identity theft, or other crimes. They also are concerned that a broader array of legitimate users of the NDNH may conceal the unauthorized use of the personal and financial data in the NDNH. Some policymakers maintain that, although many agencies and programs could potentially benefit from access to the NDNH, those entities will not pursue access because many of these agencies currently do not have the computer capacity or capability to use an automated system such as the NDNH. Many of these agencies and programs are administered at the local level where computer availability is limited or computer capability to interface with the automated NDNH is nonexistent. Moreover, many of the privacy protections and strict security requirements tied to the NDNH may be administratively burdensome for many agencies. Finally, some child support advocates are concerned that the wider access to the NDNH may have negative repercussions for the CSE program in that as other programs and agencies use the NDNH effectively and find matches in cases that involve an overpayment, those agencies will want to collect their money and may use income withholding as the mechanism to do so. Thus, these other programs will be in direct competition with the CSE program for the income of noncustodial parents.

The National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) is a database that contains personal and financial data on nearly every working American, as well as those receiving unemployment compensation. Contrary to its name, the National Directory of New Hires includes more than just information on new employees. It is a database that includes information on (1) all newly hired employees, compiled from state reports (and reports from federal employers), (2) the quarterly wage reports of existing employees (in Unemployment Compensation (UC)-covered employment), and (3) unemployment compensation claims. The NDNH was originally established to help states locate noncustodial parents living in a different state so that child support payments could be withheld from that parent's paycheck. Since its enactment in 1996, the NDNH has been extended to several additional programs and agencies to verify program eligibility, prevent or end fraud, collect overpayments, or assure that program benefits are correct. Although the directory is considered very effective, concerns about data security and the privacy rights of employees remain a part of debates regarding expanded access to the NDNH.

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. 107-155 ( H.R. 2356 , 107 th Congress) significantly amended federal campaign finance law. Shortly after President Bush signed BCRA into law, Senator Mitch McConnell filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) arguing that portions of BCRA violate the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Likewise, the National Rifle Association (NRA) filed suit against the FEC and the Attorney General arguing that the law deprives it of freedom of speech and association, of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and of the rights to equal protection and due process, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Ultimately, eleven suits challenging the law were brought by more than 80 plaintiffs and were consolidated into one lead case, McConnell v. FEC. On May 2, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued its decision in McConnell v. FEC, striking down many significant provisions of the law. The three-judge panel, which was split 2 to 1 on many issues, ordered that its ruling take effect immediately. After the court issued its opinion, several appeals were filed and on May 19 the U.S. district court issued a stay to its ruling, leaving BCRA, as enacted, in effect until the Supreme Court ruled. Under the BCRA expedited review provision, the court's decision was directly reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court. On September 8 the Supreme Court returned to the bench a month before its term officially began to hear four hours of oral argument in the case, and issued its decision in December. In its most comprehensive campaign finance decision since its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC upheld against facial constitutional challenges key portions of BCRA. The most significant portion of the Court's decision is the 119 page majority opinion coauthored by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, in which the Court upheld two critical features of BCRA: the limits on raising and spending previously unregulated political party soft money, and the prohibition on corporations and labor unions using treasury funds—which is unregulated soft money—to finance electioneering communications. Instead, BCRA requires that such ads may only be paid for with corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) funds, also known as hard money. In general, the term "hard money" refers to funds that are raised and spent according to the contribution limits, source prohibitions, and disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), while the term "soft money" is used to describe funds raised and spent outside the federal election regulatory framework, but which may have at least an indirect impact on federal elections. In upholding BCRA's "two principal, complementary features," the McConnell Court readily acknowledged that it was under "no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter" of money in politics. "Money, like water, will always find an outlet," the Court predicted, and therefore, campaign finance issues that will inevitably arise, and corresponding legislative responses from Congress, "are concerns for another day." Indeed, in 2007, the Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) determined that BCRA's "electioneering communications" provision was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., sought to run, thereby limiting the law's application. Title I of BCRA prohibits national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money. As the Court noted, Title I takes the national parties "out of the soft-money business." In addition, Title I prohibits state and local party committees from using soft money for activities that affect federal elections; prohibits parties from soliciting for and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that spend money in connection with federal elections; prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection with federal elections and restricts their ability to do so in connection with state and local elections; and prevents circumvention of the restrictions on national, state, and local party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public communications that promote or attack federal candidates. Plaintiffs challenged Title I based on the First Amendment as well as Art. I, § 4 of the U.S. Constitution, principles of federalism, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 14 th Amendment. The Court upheld the constitutionality of all provisions in Title I, finding that its provisions satisfy the First Amendment test applicable to limits on campaign contributions: they are "closely drawn" to effect the "sufficiently important interest" of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. Rejecting plaintiff's contention that the BCRA restrictions on campaign contributions must be subject to strict scrutiny in evaluating the constitutionality of Title I, the Court applied the less rigorous standard of review—"closely drawn" scrutiny. Citing its landmark 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo, and its progeny, the Court noted that it has long subjected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on contributions in view of the comparatively "marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication" that contribution limits entail. The Court observed that its treatment of contribution limits is also warranted by the important interests that underlie such restrictions, i.e. preventing both actual corruption threatened by large dollar contributions as well as the erosion of public confidence in the electoral process resulting from the appearance of corruption. Determining that the lesser standard shows "proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise," the Court noted that during its lengthy consideration of BCRA, Congress properly relied on its authority to regulate in this area, and hence, considerations of stare decisis as well as respect for the legislative branch of government provided additional "powerful reasons" for adhering to the treatment of contribution limits that the Court has consistently followed since 1976. Responding to plaintiffs' argument that many of the provisions in Title I restrict not only contributions but also the spending and solicitation of funds that were raised outside of FECA's contribution limits, the Court determined that it is "irrelevant" that Congress chose to regulate contributions "on the demand rather than the supply side." Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether its mechanism to implement a contribution limit or to prevent circumvention of that limit burdens speech in a way that a direct restriction on a contribution would not. The Court concluded that Title I only burdens speech to the extent of a contribution limit: it merely limits the source and individual amount of donations. Simply because Title I accomplishes its goals by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not render it tantamount to an expenditure limitation. Unpersuaded by a dissenting Justice's position that Congress' regulatory interest is limited to only the prevention of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption "inherent in" contributions made to a candidate, the Court found that such a "crabbed view of corruption" and specifically the appearance of corruption "ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation." According to the Court, equally problematic as classic quid pro quo corruption, is the danger that officeholders running for re-election will make legislative decisions in accordance with the wishes of large financial contributors, instead of deciding issues based on the merits or constituent interests. As such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize, the Court reasoned, Title I offers the best means of prevention, i.e., identifying and eliminating the temptation. Title II of BCRA created a new term in FECA, "electioneering communication," which is defined as any broadcast, cable or satellite communication that "refers" to a clearly identified federal candidate, is made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary, and if it is a House or Senate election, is targeted to the relevant electorate. Title II prohibits corporations and labor unions from using their general treasury funds (and any persons using funds donated by a corporation or labor union) to finance electioneering communications. Instead, the statute requires that such ads may only be paid for with corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) regulated hard money. The Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court construed FECA's disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as its expenditure limitations, to apply only to funds used for communications that contain express advocacy of the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Numerous lower courts have since interpreted Buckley to stand for the proposition that communications must contain express terms of advocacy, such as "vote for" or "vote against," in order for regulation of such communications to pass constitutional muster under the First Amendment. Absent express advocacy, according to most lower courts, a communication is considered issue advocacy, which is protected by the First Amendment and therefore, may not be regulated. Effectively overturning such lower court rulings, the McConnell Court held that neither the First Amendment nor Buckley prohibits BCRA's regulation of "electioneering communications," even though electioneering communications, by definition, do not necessarily contain express advocacy. When the Buckley Court distinguished between express and issue advocacy, the McConnell Court found, it did so as a matter of statutory interpretation, not constitutional command. Moreover, the Court announced that by narrowly reading the FECA provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth, it "did not suggest that a statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to toe the same express advocacy line." "[T]he presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad," according to the Court. While Title II prohibits corporations and labor unions from using their general treasury funds for electioneering communications, the Court observed that they are still free to use separate segregated funds (PACs) to run such ads. Therefore, the Court concluded that it is erroneous to view this provision of BCRA as a "complete ban" on expression rather than simply a regulation. Further, the Court found that the regulation is not overbroad because the "vast majority" of ads that are broadcast within the electioneering communication time period (60 days before a general election and 30 days before a primary) have an electioneering purpose. The Court also rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the segregated fund requirement for electioneering communications is under-inclusive because it only applies to broadcast advertisements and not print or Internet communications. Congress is permitted, the Court determined, to take one step at a time to address the problems it identifies as acute. With Title II of BCRA, the Court observed, Congress chose to address the problem of corporations and unions using soft money to finance a "virtual torrent of televised election-related ads" in recent campaigns. In upholding BCRA's extension of the prohibition on using treasury funds for financing electioneering communications to non-profit corporations, the McConnell Court found that even though the statute does not expressly exempt organizations meeting the criteria established in its 1986 decision in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), it is an insufficient reason to invalidate the entire section. As MCFL had been established Supreme Court precedent for many years prior to enactment of BCRA, the Court assumed that when Congress drafted this section of BCRA, it was well aware that it could not validly apply to MCFL-type entities. Subsequently, in the 2007 decision FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), the Supreme Court held that Title II of BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., sought to run. While not expressly overruling its 2003 ruling in McConnell v. FEC, the Court limited the law's application. Specifically, it ruled that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy and, therefore, cannot be regulated. The Court invalidated BCRA's requirement that political parties choose between coordinated and independent expenditures after nominating a candidate, finding that it burdens the right of parties to make unlimited independent expenditures. The Court invalidated BCRA's prohibition on individuals age 17 or younger making contributions to candidates and political parties. Determining that minors enjoy First Amendment protection and that contribution limits impinge on such rights, the Court determined that the prohibition is not "closely drawn" to serve a "sufficiently important interest."

McConnell v. FEC, a 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision, upheld the constitutionality of key portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) against facial challenges. (BCRA, which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA], codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq., is also known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform law). A 5 to 4 majority of the Court upheld restrictions on the raising and spending of previously unregulated political party soft money, and a prohibition on corporations and labor unions using treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications," requiring that such ads may only be paid for with corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) funds. The Court also invalidated a requirement that parties choose between making independent expenditures or coordinated expenditures on behalf of a candidate, and a prohibition on minors age 17 and under making campaign contributions. A 2007 Supreme Court decision, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), while not expressly overruling McConnell, narrowed the application of BCRA. Finding that the BCRA "electioneering communications" provision was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., sought to run, the Court in WRTL II held that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate cannot be regulated. For further discussion of WRTL II, see CRS Report RS22687, The Constitutionality of Regulating Political Advertisements: An Analysis of Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., by [author name scrubbed].

Senate rules, procedures, and precedents give significant parliamentary power to individual Senators during the course of chamber deliberations. Many decisions the Senate makes—from routine requests for additional debate time, to determinations of how legislation will be considered on the floor—are arrived at by unanimous consent. When a unanimous consent request is proposed on the floor, any Senator may object to it. If objection is heard, the consent request does not take effect. Efforts to modify the original request may be undertaken—a process that can require extensive negotiations between and among Senate leaders and their colleagues—but there is no guarantee that a particular objection can be addressed to the satisfaction of all Senators. The Senate hold emerges from within this context of unanimous-consent decision-making as a method of transmitting policy or scheduling preferences to Senate leaders regarding matters available for floor consideration. Many hold requests take the form of a letter addressed to the majority or minority leader (depending on the party affiliation of the Senator placing the hold) expressing reservations about the merits or timing of a particular policy proposal or nomination. An example of a hold letter is displayed in Appendix A . More often than not, Senate leaders—as agents of their party responsible for defending the political, policy, and procedural interests of their colleagues—honor a hold request because not doing so could trigger a range of parliamentary responses from the holding Senator(s), such as a filibuster, that could expend significant amounts of scarce floor time. Unless the target of a hold is of considerable importance to the majority leader and a supermajority of his colleagues—60 of whom might be required to invoke cloture on legislation under Senate Rule XXII—the most practical course of action is often to lay the matter aside and attempt to promote negotiations that could alleviate the concerns that gave rise to the hold. With hold-inspired negotiations underway, the Senate can turn its attention to more broadly-supported matters. Holds can be used to accomplish a variety of purposes. Although the Senate itself makes no official distinctions among holds, scholars have classified holds based on the objective of the communication. Informational holds, for instance, request that the Senator be notified or consulted in advance of any floor action to be taken on a particular measure or matter, perhaps to allow the Senator to plan for floor debate or the offering of amendments. Choke holds contain an explicit filibuster threat and are intended to kill or delay action on the target of the hold. Blanket holds are leveled against an entire category of business, such as all nominations to a particular agency or department. Mae West holds intend to foster negotiation and bargaining between proponents and opponents. R etaliatory holds are placed as political payback against a colleague or administration, while rolling (or rotating ) holds are defined by coordinated action involving two or more Senators who place holds on a measure or matter on an alternating basis. Until recently, many holds were considered a nonymous (or secret ) because the source and contents of the request were not made available to the public, or even to other Senators. Written hold requests emerged as an informal practice in the late 1950s under the majority leadership of Lyndon B. Johnson as a way for Senators to make routine requests of their leaders regarding the Senate's schedule. Early usage was largely consistent with prevailing expectations of Senate behavior at that time, such as reciprocity, deference, and accommodation of one's Senate colleagues. Over time, holds have evolved to become a potent extra-parliamentary practice, sometimes likened to a "silent filibuster" in the press. "The hold started out as a courtesy for senators who wanted to participate in open debate," two Senators wrote in 1997. Since then, "it has become a shield for senators who wish to avoid it." These and other Senators were concerned that keeping holds confidential tended to enable Senators who placed holds to block measures or nominations while leaving no avenue of recourse open to their supporters. Accordingly, rather than restricting the process itself, recent attempts to alter the operation of holds have focused on making the secrecy of holds less absolute. The Senate has considered a variety of proposals targeting the Senate hold in recent years, two of which the chamber adopted. Both sought to eliminate the secrecy of holds by creating a process through which holds—formally referred to in the new rules as "notices of intent to object to proceeding"—would be made public within some period of time if certain criteria were met. Prior to these rules changes, hold letters were written with the expectation that they would be treated as private correspondences between a Senator and his or her party leader. The first proposal, enacted in 2007 as Section 512 of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act ( P.L. 110-81 ), established new reporting requirements that were designed to take effect if either the majority or minority leader or their designees, acting on behalf of a party colleague on the basis of a hold letter previously received, objected to a unanimous consent request to advance a measure or matter to the Senate floor for consideration or passage. If objection was raised on the basis of a hold letter, then the Senator who originated the hold was expected to submit a "notice of intent to object" to his or her party leader and, within six days of session thereafter, deliver the objection notice to the Legislative Clerk for publication in both the Congressional Record and the Senate's Calendar of Business (or, if the hold pertained to a nomination, the Executive Calendar ). Under Section 512, objection notices were to take the following form: "I, Senator ___, intend to object to proceeding to ___, dated ___ for the following reasons___." To accommodate the publication of these notices, a new "Notice of Intent to Object to Proceeding" section was added to both Senate calendars as shown in Appendix B . Each calendar entry contained four pieces of information: (1) the bill or nomination number to which the hold pertained; (2) the official title of the bill or nomination; (3) the date on which the hold was placed; and (4) the name of the Senator who placed the hold. Publication was not required if a Senator withdrew the hold within six session days of triggering the notification requirement. Once published, an objection notice could be removed from future editions of a calendar by submitting for inclusion in the Congressional Record the following statement: "I, Senator ___, do not object to proceed to ___, dated ___." On October 3, 2007, roughly two weeks after the new disclosure procedures were signed into law, the first notice of an intent to object was published in the Congressional Record . A total of 5 such notices appeared during the 110 th Congress (2007-2008), and 12 were published during the 111 th Congress (2009-2010), but these numbers should not be interpreted to reflect the entirety of hold activity that occurred during those two Congresses. Instead, they represent the subset of holds that activated the notification requirements established in Section 512 of P.L. 110-81 . Recall that notification is required when three conditions are met: (1) the majority or minority leader (or their designee) asks unanimous consent to proceed to or pass a measure or matter; (2) objection is raised on the basis of a colleague's hold letter; and (3) six days of session have elapsed since the objection was made. Many holds lodged during the 110 th and 111 th Congresses (2007-2010) are likely to have fallen outside the purview of Section 512 regulation. At least two reasons account for this. First, the new notification requirements would not apply to holds placed on measures or matters the Senate did not attempt to proceed to or pass (perhaps on account of an implicit filibuster threat contained in a hold letter). When scheduling business for floor consideration, the content and quantity of hold letters received on a particular measure or matter are likely to factor into the negotiations and considerations Senate leaders make. Rather than take action that could have the effect of vitiating the confidentiality of a holding Senator, Senate leaders might simply decide to advance other matters to the floor instead (or at least try to). A second reason the actual number of holds is likely to exceed the number published in the Record during these two Congresses has to do with the six session day window between an objection being raised and reporting requirements becoming mandatory. Designed to provide Senators with sufficient time to study an issue before deciding whether or not to maintain a hold beyond the six session day grace period, this provision may have encouraged the use of revolving (or rotating) holds. If one Senator removes his or her hold within six session days of activating the reporting requirement and another Senator puts a new hold in its place, the effect would be to reset the six session day clock each time a new hold was placed on a given measure or matter. In this way, two or more Senators could maintain the secrecy of their holds for an indefinite period without running afoul of the new disclosure procedures. In response to the limited applicability of Section 512, the Senate established—by a 92-4 vote on January 27, 2011—a standing order ( S.Res. 28 ) that extends notification requirements to a larger share of hold activity. Instead of a six day reporting window, S.Res. 28 provides two days of session during which Senators are expected to deliver their objection notices for publication. The action that triggers the reporting requirement also changed: from an objection on the basis of a colleague's hold request (under Section 512) to the initial transmission of a written objection notice to the party leader (under S.Res. 28 ). The proper language to communicate a hold remained largely the same as before, except that holding Senators must now include a statement that expressly authorizes their party leader to object to a unanimous consent request in their name. In the event that a Senator neglects to deliver an objection notice for publication within two session days and a party leader nevertheless raises objection on the basis of that hold, S.Res. 28 requires that the name of the objecting party leader be identified as the source of the hold in the "Notice of Intent to Object" section of the appropriate Senate calendar. The process of removing an objection notice from either calendar remains unchanged. During the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), a total of 24 objection notices were published in accordance with the provisions of S.Res. 28 . Nine notices were printed during the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), and 34 were published in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). See Appendix C for an example of how these notices appear in the Congressional Record . As before, caution should be exercised when interpreting these numbers. What looks like a drop-off in the use of holds could instead reflect broader challenges inherent in efforts to regulate this kind of communication. Senate holds are predicated on the unanimous consent nature of Senate decision-making. The influence they exert in chamber deliberations is based primarily upon the significant parliamentary prerogatives individual Senators are afforded in the rules, procedures, and precedents of the chamber. As such, efforts to regulate holds are inextricably linked with the chamber's use of unanimous consent agreements to structure the process of calling up measures and matters for floor debate and amendment. While not all holds are intended to prevent the consideration of a particular measure, some do take that form, and Senate leaders justifiably perceive those correspondences as implicit filibuster threats. As agents of their party, Senate leaders value the information that holds provide regarding the policy and scheduling preferences of their colleagues. For this reason, rules changes that require enforcement on the part of Senate leaders—as both efforts discussed here do—tend to conflict with the managerial role played by contemporary Senate leaders and the expectation on the part of their colleagues that leaders will defend their interests in negotiations over the scheduling of measures and matters for floor consideration. A second challenge to hold regulation involves the nature of the transmission itself. Both recent proposals address a particular kind of communication: a letter written and delivered to a Senator's party leader that expresses some kind of reservation about the timing or merits of a particular proposal or nomination. Hold requests might be conveyed in less formal ways as well; in a telephone call to the leader's office, for instance, or in a verbal exchange that occurs on or off the Senate floor. An objection to a unanimous consent request transmitted through the "hotline" represents another common method of communicating preferences to Senate leaders. Some Senate offices have circulated "Dear Colleague" letters specifying certain requirements legislation must adhere to in order to avoid a hold being placed. It remains unclear, however, whether or not these alternative forms of communication fall within the purview of recent hold reforms. Appendix A. A Hold Letter Appendix B. The "Notice of Intent to Object" section of the Calendar of Business Appendix C. A Notice of Intent to Object

The Senate "hold" is an informal practice whereby Senators communicate to Senate leaders, often in the form of a letter, their policy views and scheduling preferences regarding measures and matters available for floor consideration. Unique to the upper chamber, holds can be understood as information-sharing devices predicated on the unanimous consent nature of Senate decision-making. Senators place holds to accomplish a variety of purposes—to receive notification of upcoming legislative proceedings, for instance, or to express objections to a particular proposal or executive nomination—but ultimately the decision to honor a hold request, and for how long, rests with the majority leader. Scheduling Senate business is the fundamental prerogative of the majority leader, and this responsibility is typically carried out in consultation with the minority leader. The influence that holds exert in chamber deliberations is based primarily upon the significant parliamentary prerogatives individual Senators are afforded in the rules, procedures, and precedents of the chamber. More often than not, Senate leaders honor a hold request because not doing so could trigger a range of parliamentary responses from the holding Senator(s), such as a filibuster, that could expend significant amounts of scarce floor time. As such, efforts to regulate holds are inextricably linked with the chamber's use of unanimous consent agreements to structure the process of calling up measures and matters for floor debate and amendment. In recent years the Senate has considered a variety of proposals that address the Senate hold, two of which the chamber adopted. Both sought to eliminate the secrecy of holds. Prior to these rules changes, hold letters were written with the expectation that their source and contents would remain private, even to other Senators. In 2007, the Senate adopted new procedures to make hold requests public in certain circumstances. Under Section 512 of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (P.L. 110-81), if objection was raised to a unanimous consent request to proceed to or pass a measure or matter on behalf of another Senator, then the Senator who originated the hold was expected to deliver for publication in the Congressional Record, within six session days of the objection, a "notice of intent to object" identifying the Senator as the source of the hold and the measure or matter to which it pertained. A process for removing a hold was also created, and a new "Notice of Intent to Object" section was added to both Senate calendars to take account of objection notices that remained outstanding. An examination of objection notices published since 2007 suggests that many hold requests are likely to have fallen outside the scope of Section 512 regulation. In an effort to make public a greater share of hold requests, the Senate adjusted its notification requirements by way of a standing order (S.Res. 28) adopted at the outset of the 112th Congress (2011-2012). Instead of the six session day reporting window specified in Section 512, S.Res. 28 provides two days of session during which Senators are expected to deliver their objection notices for publication. The action that triggers the reporting requirement also shifted: from an objection on the basis of a colleague's hold request (under Section 512) to the initial transmission of a written objection notice to the party leader (under S.Res. 28). In the event that a Senator neglects to deliver an objection notice for publication and a party leader nevertheless raises objection on the basis of that hold, S.Res. 28 requires that the name of the objecting party leader be identified as the source of the hold in the "Notice of Intent to Object" section of the appropriate Senate calendar.

To better confront the military demands of a post-Cold War world, as well as to reduce costs of maintaining excess military infrastructure, Congress authorizes the Department of Defense (DOD) to realign or close military bases. Following an examination of its military forces and installations, the department compiles a list of recommended Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) actions. This proposed list of base closures and realignments is presented to an independent BRAC Commission, which reviews the proposed actions and sends the list to the President with any recommended changes. After the President reviews and approves the list, it is sent to Congress. The recommended list is automatically enacted unless Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving the list as a whole and sustains it over a potential presidential veto. Following the actual base closings and realignments, the DOD carries out an environmental remediation plan to enable the conveyance of surplus federal land to other entities. Four separate BRAC rounds were initiated in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. In total, 97 bases were closed or realigned under these rounds. By 2001, the DOD had implemented the recommendations from the previous rounds, although significant environmental remediation and asset transfers remain unfinished in many of the affected communities. Congress authorized a fifth round of military base realignments and closures for 2005 through the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107 - 107 ). A primary objective of the 2005 BRAC round was "joint activity"—integration and realignment of cross-service functions in such areas as industrial, supply and storage facilities, technical, training, headquarters, and support activities. The list of recommended actions to achieve these objectives was presented to the BRAC Commission on May 13, 2005. The report became law on November 10, 2005. Small-area economic impact analysis can be a difficult and imprecise undertaking. Assumptions and supporting statistical reasoning can lead to predictions that are, in hindsight at least, inaccurate. For example, multiplier effects—measures of the rate at which a direct effect (e.g., base job losses) creates indirect effects—are central elements in estimating the socioeconomic impact of a base closing or realignment. If, for example, one assumes that a base job has a large indirect employment multiplier (e.g., 2.5-3.0), then for each direct job lost, employment indirectly related to the base job within some defined geographic area is also predicted to be lost. Similarly, an income multiplier allows one to estimate the total income generated by a military base and the resulting income loss or gain within a region. Assumptions about the extent to which base incomes are spent within a particular community can lead to very different assessments of the impacts from the loss of that income. A shift to a smaller employment multiplier will show a much reduced total employment loss from closure. Using data from military base closings between 1971 and 1994, one 2001 study estimated multipliers of less than one and concluded that employment impacts were mostly limited to the direct job loss associated with military transfers out of the region. On average, the study found that per capita income was little affected by the closures. Base closings in communities that have been declining economically for some time, however, may produce impacts different from (and possibly more severe than) those of base closings in communities where growth and economic diversification are more in evidence. The relative strength or weakness of the national or regional economy also can strongly influence the magnitude of community effects from base closure or realignment and the length of time for economic recovery. Evidence from earlier base closures suggests that the impacts can be less than expected because, unlike many other major employers, military bases may be relatively isolated economic entities, purchasing base needs outside the community and spending income at the base rather than in the local community. Local communities are also concerned about the fiscal impacts borne by local governments, especially rural governments. Revenue from property taxes, sales tax, licenses and permits, and state and federal aid is influenced by population gains and losses. With population loss, and related changes to local income, base closures can affect the ability of local governments to raise revenue and support existing services. Similarly, with significant population increases, a community may find greater demand for public services (e.g., transportation, schools, public safety, water and sewerage) without the necessary revenue to support the additional demand. Even where increased revenue can contribute to mitigating the impact of base expansion, the planning and adjustment costs impose other burdens on communities and residents. Local government expenditures and services can also be affected by closure and realignment, depending on the extent to which the military base is integrated into the community's fiscal planning. Here as well, statistical assumptions can lead to significant differences in estimated impact. For example, an economic development analyst estimated that the closure of Hanscom Air Force Base would mean the loss of about $200 million in defense contracts to Massachusetts's firms. Another analysis estimated the same losses at $3 billion. A review of impacts on local government revenue and expenditures, however, generally confirmed that these impacts were, like those impacts affecting the economy, not as severe as had been originally projected. The announcements of previous BRAC Commissions have been greeted in affected communities and elsewhere by significant concern over the potential consequences of closing or significantly realigning a military installation. Military bases in many rural areas, for example, provide an economic anchor to local communities. Even where the local and regional economy is more diversified, military bases provide a strong social and cultural identification that can be shaken by the announcement that a base is closing or being downsized. Not only can there be an immediate impact from the loss of military and civilian jobs, local tax revenues also can decline, leaving counties and communities less able to provide public services. School districts with a high proportion of children from military families can experience significant declines in enrollment. With these effects can come related reductions in state and/or federal funding. With the importance given to joint service activity in the 2005 BRAC round, some bases saw their functions moved to other bases. Other bases, however, are expanding and creating impacts on schools, housing, traffic, and local government services (e.g., Fort Belvoir, Virginia). DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment identified 20 locations where expected growth as a result of force realignments in FY2006-FY2012 would adversely affect surrounding communities. Communities have until September 15, 2011, to implement the changes specified in the BRAC Commission Report. While it is predictable that communities will react to news of a base's closing with concern and anxiety, evidence from past BRAC rounds shows that local economies are, in many cases, more resilient after an economic shock than they expected. Some worst-case scenarios predicted for communities did not occur, perhaps because they were based, in part, on assumptions about economic multipliers, the perceived versus actual role of a base in the local economy, and over-generalization from individual cases where there was significant economic dislocation. Many communities that developed a comprehensive and realistic plan for economic redevelopment were able to replace many of the lost jobs and restore lost income. The DOD programs for assisting communities with base redevelopment (e.g., the Office of Economic Adjustment) have also played a role in mitigating some of the effects of base closure and/or realignment. Some communities came to regard the closing as an opportunity for revitalizing and diversifying their economies. Other communities found they were in stronger economic shape after several years than they thought possible on first learning their bases were closing. Coping with the closure in the short term and revitalizing communities over the long haul can, nonetheless, be daunting tasks. Not all communities recover, and for those that do, the recovery can be uneven. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that many communities in 2005 were still recovering from prior closures. Rural areas in particular can find the loss of a base and the revitalization of their communities especially difficult challenges. The effects on individuals can also vary. For example, persons who lose jobs in a closure may not have the kinds of skills needed by the economic activity generated by the redevelopment. Individuals may relocate to other regions where the jobs they find may not match the wages of the jobs lost. Significant environmental cleanup costs from toxic elements at military installations can delay the transfer of the base to local authorities and limit the kinds of redevelopment options available to a community. In some respects, a closed military base shares similarities with other closed industrial facilities such as steel mills, oil refineries, or port facilities. Research and previous economic development experience suggest that converting a closed military base into a source of new competitive advantage is a major community effort. Some bases closed in earlier BRAC rounds have been successfully redeveloped into manufacturing facilities, airports, and research laboratories (e.g., Charleston, SC). Bases also may hold certain advantages for redevelopment that are not shared by other industrial sites. Pricing for the closed bases might be steeply discounted and liability for environmental protection indemnified. Federal grants and incentives also exist to aid community redevelopment efforts. Once a base is slated for closing, consideration of property transfer mechanisms, the extent of environmental cleanup necessary, and a realistic base reuse plan for the transferred property become central elements in organizing the economic development process. Establishing a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) with power to assume ownership of the transferred land is a necessary initial step in the economic redevelopment process. The LRA must be approved by the DOD before property can be transferred. The DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) is a resource available to communities seeking assistance in managing the impact of a base closing or realignment. The OEA awards planning grants to communities and also provides technical and planning assistance to local redevelopment authorities. By 2002, a cumulative $1.9 billion in DOD and other federal funds had been expended to assist communities affected by base closures. Other sources of federal assistance may also be available to assist communities in recovering from a base closure. Given the variance in the economic conditions of the local area and the usable facilities left behind, there is no single template for redeveloping a closed military base. One generality that might be applied to almost all cases, however, is that the sooner economic redevelopment can begin after base closure, the better for local communities. Base closure can be economically difficult for a community, but closure with a long lag in which the closed base is essentially a hole in the local economy can be worse. While many factors can delay the economic redevelopment of a closed base, the most common may be the need for environmental cleanup of the closed property. Except for limited circumstances, property from a closed military base must be cleaned of environmental contamination before being transferred for redevelopment. The degree of cleanup and the timetable for completion, however, is left to DOD which operates under the appropriations authorized by Congress. Because of the extent of contamination and magnitude of costs involved once funds are allocated, the process of environmental cleanup can be lengthy. A complicating factor in the cleanup process can be the different levels of cleanup that might be completed. As of FY2009, 88% of sites from bases closed in prior BRAC rounds (so-called Legacy BRAC sites) that were not contaminated with munitions had been readied for transfer to local development authorities. Approximately 54% of the sites from the 2005 BRAC that were not contaminated with munitions have now been readied for transfer to local development authorities. For sites with munitions contamination, 68% of Legacy BRAC sites and 33% of 2005 BRAC sites had been readied for transfer at the end of FY2009. Land intended for use as housing or schools, for example, must be cleaned to a greater degree than land intended for industrial use. DOD, however, is not legally required to clean land past the point needed for industrial use. Sites that have been cleaned to DOD's satisfaction and readied for transfer to local authorities, may not have actually been transferred. When a community desires an ultimate land use that would require a greater level of cleanup than that done by DOD, this may result in a property being left vacant until either another use is found or until additional cleanup is done. In general, previous base closures suggest that communities face many specialized challenges, but there is little strong evidence that the closing of a base is the definitive cause of a general economic calamity in local economies. On the other hand, rural areas could experience substantially greater and longer-term economic dislocation from a base closing than urban and suburban areas. Rural areas with less diversified local economies may be more dependent on the base as a key economic asset than urban/suburban economies. Communities where bases are recommended for significant expansion can also find the effects of growth a major challenge. Over the five- to six-year phasing out of a base, however, environmental cleanup, successful property transfers to a local redevelopment authority, and widespread community commitment to a sound base reuse plan have been shown to be crucial elements in positioning communities for life without a military installation.

The most recent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission submitted its final report to the Administration on September 8, 2005. Implementation of the BRAC round was officially completed on September 15, 2011. In the report, the commission rejected 13 of the initial Department of Defense recommendations, significantly modified the recommendations for 13 other installations, and approved 22 major closures. The loss of related jobs, and efforts to replace them and to implement a viable base reuse plan, can pose significant challenges for affected communities. However, while base closures and realignments often create socioeconomic distress in communities initially, research has shown that they generally have not had the dire effects that many communities expected. For rural areas, however, the impacts can be greater and the economic recovery slower. Early planning and decisive leadership from officials are important factors in addressing local socioeconomic impacts from base realignment and closing. Drawing from existing studies, this report assesses the potential community impacts and proposals for minimizing those impacts. For additional information on the BRAC process, see CRS Report RL32216, Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33766, Military Base Closures and Realignment: Status of the 2005 Implementation Plan, by [author name scrubbed].

Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules, which may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules. The requirement that each committee must adopt its own set of rules dates to the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (P.L. 91-510). That law built on the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act (P.L. 79-601), which set out some requirements to which most Senate committees must adhere. Under the provisions of the 1970 law (now incorporated into Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 2), Senate committees must adopt their rules and generally have them printed in the Congressional Record not later than March 1 of the first year of a Congress. Typically, the Senate also publishes a compilation of the rules of all the committees each Congress, and some individual committees also publish their rules as committee prints. Committee rules govern actions taken in committee proceedings only, and they are enforced in relation thereto by the committee's members in a similar way that rules enforcement occurs on the Senate floor. There is generally no means by which the Senate can enforce committee rules at a later point on the floor. So long as the committee met the requirement of Senate Rule XXVI that a physical majority be present for reporting a measure or matter, no point of order lies against the measure or matter on the floor on the grounds that the committee earlier acted in violation of other procedural requirements. Beyond the requirements of Senate rules and a committee's own formal rules, many committees have traditions or practices they follow that can affect their procedures. (One committee, for example, does not allow Senators to offer second-degree amendments during committee markups, though this restriction is not contained in either the Senate or the committee's rules.) An accounting of any such informal practices that committees might observe is not provided below. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then provides four tables that summarize each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, and scheduling of witnesses ( Table 1 ); hearing quorum, business quorum, and amendment filing requirements ( Table 2 ); proxy voting, polling, and nominations ( Table 3 ); and investigations and subpoenas ( Table 4 ). Table 4 also identifies selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. Although there is some latitude for committees to set their own rules, the standing rules of the Senate set out specific requirements that each committee must follow. The provisions listed below are taken from Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate. (Some committees reiterate these rules in their own rules, but even for those committees that do not, these restrictions apply.) This is not an exhaustive explanation of Senate rules and their impact on committees. Rather, this summary is intended to provide a background against which to understand each committee's individual rules that govern key committee activities. Rules. Each committee must adopt rules; those rules must generally be published in the Congressional Record not later than March 1 of the first year of each Congress. If a committee adopts an amendment to its rules later in the Congress, that change becomes effective only when it is published in the Record (Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Meetings. Committees and subcommittees are authorized to meet and hold hearings when the Senate is in session and when it has recessed or adjourned. A committee may not meet on any day (1) after the Senate has been in session for two hours, or (2) after 2 p.m. when the Senate is in session. Each committee must designate a regular day on which to meet weekly, biweekly, or monthly. (This requirement does not apply to the Appropriations Committee.) A committee is to announce the date, place, and subject of each hearing at least one week in advance, though any committee may waive this requirement for "good cause" (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(a); Rule XXVI, paragraph 3). Special meeting. Three members of a committee may make a written request to the chair to call a special meeting. The chair then has three calendar days in which to schedule the meeting, which is to take place within the next seven calendar days. If the chair fails to do so, a majority of the committee members can file a written motion to hold the meeting at a certain date and hour (Rule XXVI, paragraph 3). Open meetings. Unless closed for reasons specified in Senate rules (such as a need to protect national security information), committee and subcommittee meetings, including hearings, are open to the public. When a committee or subcommittee schedules or cancels a meeting, it is required to provide that information—including the time, place, and purpose of the meeting—for inclusion in the Senate's computerized schedule information system. Any hearing that is open to the public may also be open to radio and television broadcasting at the committee's discretion. Committees and subcommittees may adopt rules to govern how the media may broadcast the event. A vote by the committee in open session is required to close a meeting (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(b)). Quorums. Committees may set a quorum for doing business so long as it is not less than one-third of the membership. A majority of a committee must be physically present when the committee votes to order the reporting of any measure, matter, or recommendation. Agreeing to a motion to order a measure or matter reported requires the support of a majority of the members who are present. Proxies cannot be used to constitute a quorum (Rule XXVI paragraph 7(a)(1)). Meeting r ecord . All committees must make public a video, transcript, or audio recording of each open hearing of the committee within 21 days of the hearing. These shall be made available to the public "through the Internet" (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(2)(A)). Proxy voting. A committee may adopt rules permitting proxy voting. A committee may not permit a proxy vote to be cast unless the absent Senator has been notified about the question to be decided and has requested that his or her vote be cast by proxy. A committee may prohibit the use of proxy votes on votes to report. However, even if a committee allows proxies to be cast on a motion to report, proxies cannot make the difference in ordering measure reported, though they can prevent it (Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a)(3)). Investigations and subpoenas. Each standing committees (and its subcommittees) is empowered to investigate matters within its jurisdiction and issue subpoenas for persons and papers (Rule XXVI, paragraph 1). Witnesses selected by the minority. During hearings on any measure or matter, the minority shall be allowed to select witnesses to testify on at least one day when the chair receives such a request from a majority of the minority party members. This provision does not apply to the Appropriations Committee (Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(d)). Reporting. A Senate committee may report original bills and resolutions in addition to those that have been referred to it. As stated above in the quorum requirement, a majority of the committee must be physically present for a measure or matter to be reported, and a majority of those present is required to order a measure or matter favorably reported. A Senate committee is not required to issue a written report to accompany a measure or matter it reports. If the committee does write such a report, Senate rules specify a series of required elements that must be included in the report (Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a)(3); Rule XXVI, paragraph 10(c)). Table 1 summarizes each's committee's rules in three areas: meeting day(s), notice requirements for meetings and hearings, and witness selection provisions. Many committees repeat or otherwise incorporate the provisions of Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(a), which, as noted above, requires a week's notice of any hearing (except for the Appropriations and Budget committees) "unless the committee determines that there is good cause to begin such hearing at an earlier date." Provisions in committee rules are identified and explained in this column only to the extent that they provide additional hearing notice requirements, specifically provide the "good cause" authority to certain members (e.g., chair or ranking minority member), or apply the week's notice to meetings other than hearings (such as markups). Similarly, as noted in the report, Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(d) (sometimes referred to as the "minority witness rule"), provides for the calling of additional witnesses in some circumstances (except for the Appropriations Committee). Some committees restate this rule in their own rules. Only committee rule provisions that go further in specifically addressing the selection of witnesses or a right to testify are identified in this column. Table 2 focuses on each's committee's rules on hearing quorums, business quorums, and requirements to file amendments prior to a committee markup. In regard to a business quorum, the "conduct of business" at a committee meeting typically refers to actions (such as debating and voting on amendments ) that allow the committee to proceed on measures up to the point of reporting. Some committees require that a member of the minority party be present for such conduct of business; such provisions are noted below. As noted earlier, Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a), requires a majority of the committee to be physically present (and a majority of those present to agree) to report out a measure or matter; this is often referred to as a "reporting quorum." The rule allows Senate committees to set lower quorum requirements, though not less than a third of membership for other business besides hearings. Some committees restate the Senate requirement in their own committee rules, but even those committees that do not are bound by the reporting quorum requirement. Table 2 does not identify committee rules that simply restate the reporting quorum requirement unless the committee has added additional requirements to its provisions (e.g., that a reporting quorum must include a member of each party). Though no Senate rules govern the practice, several committees require, in their committee rules, that Senators file with the committee any first-degree amendments they may offer during a committee markup before the committee meets. Such a provision allows the chair and ranking member of the committee to see what kind of issues may come up at the markup and may also allow them to negotiate agreements with amendment sponsors before the formal markup session begins. Some committees distribute such filed amendments in advanced of the markup to allow committee members a chance to examine them. It also provides an opportunity to Senators to draft second-degree amendments to possible first-degree amendments before the markup begins. Table 3 summarizes each's committee's rules on proxy voting, committee polling, and nominations. Since Senate rules require a majority of a committee to be physically present for a vote to report a measure or matter, a committee vote to report an item of business may not rely on the votes cast on behalf of absent Senators (that is, votes by proxy). Some committees effectively restate this requirement in their committee rules by either stating that proxies do not count toward reporting or referencing the proxy provisions of Senate Rule XXVI. However, committees may still allow (or preclude) proxy votes on a motion to report (as well as on other questions so long as members are informed of the issue and request a proxy vote). Table 3 identifies committees that explicitly allow or disallow proxy votes on a motion to report (even though such votes cannot, under Senate rules, count toward the presence of a "reporting quorum" or make the difference in successfully reporting a measure or matter). "Polling" is a method of assessing the position of the committee on a matter without the committee physically coming together. As such, it cannot be used to report out measures or matters, because Senate rules require a physical majority to be present to report a measure or matter. Polling may be used, however, by committees that allow it for internal housekeeping matters before the committee, such as questions concerning staffing or how the committee ought to proceed on a measure or matter. Senate Rule XXVI does not contain provisions specific to committee consideration of presidential nominations. Some committees, however, set out timetables in their rules for action or have other provisions specific to action on nominations. Some committees also provide in their rules that nominees must provide certain information to the committee. Such provisions are not detailed in this table except to the extent that the committee establishes a timetable for action that is connected to such submissions. This column of the table also identifies any committee provisions on whether nominees testify under oath. Table 4 describes selected key committee rules in relation to investigations and subpoenas. Note that some Senate committees do not have specific rules providing processes for committee investigations, and many also do not set out procedures for issuing subpoenas. The lack of any investigation or subpoena provisions does not mean the committees cannot conduct investigations or issue subpoenas; rather, the process for doing so is not specified in the committee's written rules. Some committees have provisions that are generally not included in other committee rules. Selected notable examples (that do not fit into other categories in other tables) are summarized in the last column of Table 4 .

Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for certain Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules to govern its own proceedings. These rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees may also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules but are not specifically addressed by Senate rules. In sum, Senate committees are allowed some latitude to establish tailored procedures to govern certain activities, which can result in significant variation in the way different committees operate. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committee actions. The report then provides tables that summarize selected, key features of each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules, and provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's Standing Rules are not included. This report will be not be updated further during the 114th Congress.

DOD in 2001 adopted a new approach for developing new weapon systems, called evolutionary acquisition with spiral development (EA/SD), as its preferred standard. EA/SD, which is referred to informally (though not entirely accurately) as spiral development, is an outgrowth of the defense acquisition reform movement of the 1990s, and is part of DOD's effort to make its acquisition system more responsive to rapid changes in threats, technology, and warfighter needs. It is also intended to increase DOD's control over program costs, DOD program-manager accountability, and participation of high-tech firms in DOD weapon acquisition programs. DOD's goals in using EA/SD are to: get useful increments of new capability into the hands of U.S. personnel more quickly; take better advantage of user feedback in refining system requirements and developing subsequent increments of capability; mitigate technical development risk in weapon programs that are to employ new or emerging technologies; and facilitate the periodic injection of new technology into weapons over their life cycles, so as to better keep pace with technological changes. Under DOD's previous weapon acquisition method, now known as single step to full capability (SSFC), DOD would first define a specific performance requirement to be met, and then work, usually for a period of more than 10 years in the case of a complex weapon system like an aircraft or ship, to develop and build a design that, upon first deployment, was intended to meet 100% of that requirement. The core idea of EA/SD is to set aside the quest for 100% fulfillment of the requirement in the initial version of the weapon and instead rapidly develop an initial version that meets some fraction (for example, 50% to 60%) of the requirement. Field experience with this initial version is then be used to develop later versions, or blocks, of the weapon that meet an increasing fraction of the requirement, until a version is eventually developed that meets the 100% standard. Figure 1 below details the process for each block. Each block includes four phases for conceiving, developing, producing, and sustaining (i.e., supporting) a weapon system. Each phase is governed by certain acquisition rules and regulations, including entrance and exit criteria, and is subject to the requirements process, including the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and Capability Development Document (CDD). Each block includes its own acquisition contracts and fully funded budgets for a defined time period. As shown in Figure 1 , spiral development occurs as the second phase within a block . Spiral development is an iterative process for developing a weapon system's capabilities in which the developer, tester, and user to interact with one another so as refine (i.e., spiral down to a specific understanding of) the system's operational requirements. Spiral interaction can change the course of a system's technology development. Although EA/SD differs from SSFC in its use of block development from the outset of a program, from a program-management perspective, EA/SD is similar in some areas to SSFC, including the development milestones and reviews that are used at each development stage. EA/SD, however, is intended to be more flexible than SSFC in terms of permitting changes in a program's requirements or development path resulting from changes in threats, technology, or warfighter needs. EA/SD is also intended to be more flexible than SSFC regarding entry points into the acquisition process. Under SSFC, the dominant entry point was the beginning. Under EA/SD, in contrast, programs can enter various phases of any block (A, B, or C in Figure 1 ), depending on the maturity of the program. Under EA/SD, the final desired capability of the system can be determined in two ways—at the beginning of the program, with the content of each deployable block determined by well-understood (i.e., mature) key technologies, or along the way, with the content of each block determined by success or failure in developing less-well-understood (i.e., emerging) technologies or the evolving needs of the military user. Applying EA/SD at the outset of large weapon acquisition programs, such as the ballistic missile defense program, can create significant initial uncertainty regarding the design and ultimate cost of the systems that will eventually be procured under the program, the number of systems to be procured, and the schedule for procuring them. Applying EA/SD to other programs, particularly those intended to develop more up-to-date subsystems for improving existing weapons such as the F-16 fighter or M-1 tank, can produce much less uncertainty regarding the program's ultimate outcome. Although DOD used EA/SD for years on a somewhat limited basis, DOD decided in 2001 that EA/SD would henceforth be the "preferred" (i.e., standard or default) acquisition strategy for all types of weapon acquisition programs—newly initiated programs, existing programs for developing new weapons, and programs for upgrading weapons already in existence. EA/SD was elevated in prominence that year when DOD announced that it was applying EA/SD to its ballistic missile defense program and that the Navy's program for a new family of surface combatants would be an EA/SD program. Several defense programs are now using EA/SD. The ballistic missile defense program is a more complex case than others because it includes multiple weapon systems, some existing and some in initial development, in different phases and blocks of development. In addition, although the ballistic missile defense program has embraced most of the EA/SD model (notably, the possible absence of ultimate cost and timeline projections), it differs from other programs being pursued under EA/SD because it operates under different oversight rules instituted in January 2002 by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. A November 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on EA/SD prepared at the direction of the Senate Armed Services Committee (see " Legislative Activity " section below) concluded the following: DOD has made major improvements to its acquisition policy by adopting knowledge-based, evolutionary practices used by successful commercial companies. If properly applied, these best practices can put DOD's decision makers in a better position to deliver high-quality products on time and within budget.... The next step is for DOD to provide the necessary controls to ensure a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach is followed. For example, the policy does not establish measures to gauge design and manufacturing knowledge at critical junctures in the product development process. Without specific requirements to demonstrate knowledge at key points, the policy allows significant unknowns to be judged as acceptable risks, leaving an opening for decision makers to make uninformed decisions about continuing product development. DOD was responsive to the requirements in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 [see " Legislative Activity " section below].... This [GAO] report makes recommendations that the Secretary of Defense strengthen DOD's acquisition policy by requiring additional controls to ensure decision makers will follow a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. DOD believes the current acquisition framework includes the controls necessary to achieve effective results, but department officials will continue to monitor the process to determine whether other controls are needed to achieve the best possible outcomes. DOD agreed it should record and justify program decisions for moving from one stage of development to next but did not agree with the need to issue a report outside of the department. EA/SD poses potential issues for Congress regarding DOD and congressional oversight of weapon acquisition programs. Some of these issues appear to arise out of uncertainty over how EA/SD differs from the SSFC approach; others appear to arise out of the features of EA/SD itself. One issue for Congress, addressed in the GAO report, is whether DOD has established adequate rules and regulations for conducting internal oversight of EA/SD programs. Some observers have expressed concern about this issue, particularly with regard to the spiral development phases of programs. In support of this concern, they have cited budget justification documents for the ballistic missile program, which have included some references to block development but have provided incomplete information on how much funding is spent for specific blocks, over what period of time, and on what progress has been made to date in each block. Supporters of EA/SD argue that DOD is fully aware of the need for adequate oversight and will take steps to ensure that it is provided. Potential questions for Congress include: How does DOD oversight for EA/SD programs compare to DOD oversight of SSFC weapon acquisition programs in terms of frequency and nature of reviews, information required to be submitted to reviewing authorities, and evaluation and reporting by reviewing authorities? Will DOD oversight procedures, and review bodies be the same for all EA/SD programs, or will they vary from program to program? Another issue for Congress is how to carry out its responsibility to allocate defense spending. EA/SD poses potentially significant issues for congressional oversight, particularly for newly initiated weapon acquisition programs, in three areas: Ambiguous initial program description. Programs initiated under EA/SD may not be well defined at the outset in terms of system design, quantities to be procured, development and procurement costs, and program schedule. These are key program characteristics that Congress in the past has wanted to understand in some detail before deciding whether to approve the start of a new weapon acquisition program. EA/SD can thus put Congress in the position of deciding whether to approve the start of a new a program with less information than it has had in the past. Lack of well-defined benchmarks. A corollary to the above is that Congress may not, years later, have well-defined initial program benchmarks against which to measure the performance of the military service managing the program or the contractor. Funding projections potentially more volatile. Although projections of future funding requirements for weapons acquisition programs are subject to change for various reasons, funding projections for EA/SD programs may be subject to even greater volatility due to each program's inherent potential for repeated refinements in performance requirements or technical approaches. As a result, any long-range projections of future funding requirements for EA/SD programs may be even less reliable than projections for systems pursued under the SSFC approach. Supporters of EA/SD argue that it can improve congressional oversight of DOD weapon acquisition programs because the information that DOD provides for a given program will focus on the specific block that is proposed for development over the next few years. This information, they argue, will be more reliable—and thus better for Congress to use in conducting its oversight role—than the kind of long-range information that used to be provided under the SSFC approach. Under SSFC, DOD provided information about the entire projected program, stretching many years into the future. Such information, supporters of EA/SD argue, may appear more complete, but is not very reliable because it requires projecting program-related events well into the future. DOD's history in accurately projecting such events, they argue, is far from perfect. As a result, they argue, information provided in connection with an SSFC weapon acquisition program can give Congress the illusion—but not the reality—of understanding the outlines of the entire program. On the other hand, critics of EA/SD contend that it has the potential for drawing Congress into programs to a point where extrication becomes difficult if not impossible, and without a clear idea of a program's ultimate objectives. Potential questions for Congress and DOD regarding congressional oversight of EA/SD programs include the following: What might be the impact, on congressional approval of new weapon acquisition programs and subsequent congressional oversight of those programs, of having limited initial detail in terms of system design, quantities to be procured, procurement schedules, and total costs? How might congressional oversight of weapon development programs be affected if program information with longer time horizons but potentially less reliability is exchanged for program information with potentially greater short-term reliability—but, without previously available, if imperfect, estimates of full program costs? To what extent might DOD's new preference for EA/SD be influenced, as some critics contend, by the knowledge that it might relieve DOD of the responsibility for providing specific answers to congressional questions regarding system architecture, effectiveness, time lines, long-term strategic implications and cost? Section 231 of H.R. 5122 / P.L. 109-364 (conference report H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) would, among other things, require DOD to review and revise policies and practices on weapon test and evaluation in light of new acquisition approaches, including programs conducted pursuant to authority for spiral development granted in Section 803 of P.L. 107-314 (see below), or other authority for conducting incremental acquisition programs. In its report ( S.Rept. 108-46 of May 13, 2003, page 346) on S. 1050 , the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed support for incremental acquisition and directed GAO "to assess current acquisition policies and regulations and to determine whether: (1) the policies support knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisitions; (2) the regulations enforcing these policies provide the necessary controls to ensure the Department's intent is followed; and (3) the policies are responsive to concerns expressed by the committee in [ P.L. 107-314 ]." As discussed above, GAO submitted the required report in November 2003. Section 802 of the conference report ( H.Rept. 107-772 of November 12, 2002) on the FY2003 defense authorization act ( H.R. 4546 / P.L. 107-314 of December 2, 2002) required DOD to report on how it planned to apply to EA/SD programs certain statutory and regulatory requirements for major DOD acquisition programs. Section 803 set forth conditions to be met before a DOD acquisition program can be pursued as an EA/SD effort, and required DOD provide annual status reports for the next five years on each research and development program being pursued under EA/SD. Section 132 required the Air Force to submit to Congress a list of programs that it had designated as acquisition reform "pathfinder programs," set forth conditions under which those programs can proceed, and applied to them the requirement for filing status reports established under Section 803. These provisions are also discussed on pages 455-456 and 667-668 of the report. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report ( S.Rept. 107-151 of May 15 [legislative day, May 9], 2002) on the FY2003 defense authorization bill ( S. 2514 ), included similar provisions and commented extensively on the EA/SD process (see pages 94 and 333-335).

The Department of Defense (DOD) in 2001 adopted a new approach for developing major weapon systems, called evolutionary acquisition with spiral development (EA/SD), as its preferred standard. EA/SD is intended to make DOD's acquisition system more responsive to rapid changes in military needs. EA/SD poses potentially important challenges for Congress in carrying out its legislative functions, particularly committing to and effectively overseeing DOD weapon acquisition programs. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Research on former foster youth is limited and most of the studies on outcomes for these youth face methodological challenges. For example, they include brief follow-up periods; have low response rates, non-representative samples, and small sample sizes; and do not follow youth prior to exit from foster care. Few studies include comparison groups to gauge how well these youth are transitioning to adulthood in relation to their peers in the foster care population or general population. However, two studies—the Northwest Foster Care Alumni Study and the Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth—have tracked outcomes for a sample of youth across several domains, either prospectively (following youth in care and as they age out and beyond) or retrospectively (examining current outcomes for young adults who were in care at least a few years ago), and compared these outcomes to other groups of youth, either those who aged out and/or youth in the general population. Nonetheless, these studies focus only on youth who were in foster care in four states. The 1999 law ( P.L. 106-169 ) authorizing the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP) required that HHS develop a data system to capture the characteristics and experiences of certain current and former foster youth across the country. The law directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to consult with state and local public officials responsible for administering independent living and other child welfare programs, child welfare advocates, Members of Congress, youth service providers, and researchers to (1) "develop outcome measures (including measures of educational attainment, high school diploma, avoidance of dependency, homelessness, non-marital childbirth, incarceration, and high risk behaviors) that can be used to assess the performances of States in operating independent living programs"; and (2) identify the data needed to track the number and characteristics of children receiving independent living services, the type of services provided, and state performance on the measures. In response to these requirements, HHS created the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). The final rule establishing the NYTD became effective April 28, 2008, and it required states to report data to HHS on youth beginning in FY2011. This report provides summary and detailed data for FY2011 through FY2013. HHS uses NYTD to engage in two data reporting activities. First, states report information twice each fiscal year on eligible youth who currently receive independent living services regardless of whether they continue to remain in foster care, were in foster care in another state, or received child welfare services through an Indian tribe or privately operated foster care program. These youth are known as served youth . Independent living services refer to the supports that youth receive—such as academic assistance and career preparation services—to assist them as they transition to adulthood. Second, states report information on foster youth on or about their 17 th birthday, two years later on or about their 19 th birthday, and again on or about their 21 st birthday. In this second group, foster youth at age 17 are known as the baseline youth, and at ages 19 and 21 they are known as the follow-up youth (and are also referred to as tracked youth in this report). These current and former foster youth are tracked regardless of whether they receive independent living services at ages 17, 19, and 21. States may track a sample of youth who participated in the outcomes collection at age 17 to reduce the data collection burden. Information is to be collected on a new group of foster youth at age 17 every three years. Table 1 includes an overview of data on the served youth who received an independent living service and the type of services they received for each of FY2011 through FY2013. The number of youth receiving an independent living service in each of those years ranged from about 97,500 to nearly 102,000. Across all three years, youth were 18 years old, on average, and more than half were female (51% to 52%). The largest share of youth were white (41%-42%) followed by black (29%-31%) and Hispanic youth (19%). About 7 out of 10 youth were in foster care when they reported receiving a service. Youth generally had less than a 12 th grade level of education, and about one out of five received special education instruction during a given fiscal year. In addition, nearly one out of five had been adjudicated delinquent, meaning that a court has found the youth guilty of committing a delinquent act. Among the most frequently received services in most of the three years were academic support to assist the youth with completing high school or obtaining a general equivalency degree (GED), such as academic counseling and literacy training; career preparation services that focus on developing a youth's ability to find, apply for, and retain appropriate employment, including vocational and career assessments and job seeking and job placement support; and an independent living needs assessment to identify the youth's basic skills, emotional and social capabilities, strengths, and needs to match the youth with appropriate independent living services (see Figure 1 ). About 60% of youth received three or more independent living services. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics and outcomes of the 19-year-old follow-up youth in FY2013. These youth—part of the follow-up population—were initially surveyed in FY2011 (at "baseline") when they were 17 years of age. The table displays information for the entire surveyed group of 19-year-olds (youth overall) as well as four sub-categories of these youth: those who were in foster care and those who were not, and those who had received at least one independent living service and those who had not. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Most of the 19-year-old youth who were in foster care also received at least one independent living service. Therefore, the data for these two groups are similar. In total, 7,536 youth participated in the survey at age 19 (this is compared to 15,597 who participated at age 17). Those who did not participate had declined to participate, were considered to be on runaway or missing status; could not be otherwise located; were incapacitated or incarcerated; or were deceased. Figure 2 includes data on selected outcomes for youth in foster care and those who are no longer in foster care. Slightly more than half of the 19-year-old youth participants were male. The largest share of youth were white (42%), followed by black (31%) and Hispanic (19%) youth. Youth were asked about their outcomes across six areas—financial self-sufficiency, educational (academic or vocational) training, positive connections with adults, homelessness, high-risk behaviors, and access to health insurance. About one-third of youth were working full-time and/or part-time at age 19; however, youth in foster care were more likely to be working part-time and youth not in foster care or not receiving any independent living service were slightly more likely to be working full-time. Approximately 30% of youth had completed an apprenticeship, internship, or other type of on-the-job training in the past year. (For comparison, approximately 13% of these youth were working full-time and/or part-time and 20% had completed employment-related skills training when they were surveyed at age 17). The 19-year-old youth were about equally likely to receive Social Security benefits, either Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) (12% to 14%), regardless of foster care status or receipt of independent living services. (About the same share of these youth was receiving Social Security at age 17.) Youth not receiving any independent living services were slightly less likely to report receiving other ongoing financial support (11% versus 13%-17%). Youth who were in foster care at age 19 did not qualify for public supports such as financial assistance, food assistance, and public housing. The other groups of 19-year-old youth—those not in care, those receiving at least one independent living service (and not in care), and youth not receiving any independent living services (and not in care)—were equally likely to receive such public supports. Overall, youth were most likely to have a high school diploma (56%) or its equivalent. Educational outcomes were notably distinct for follow-up youth at age 19 depending on whether or not they were in foster care or whether they received an independent living service. Youth who were in foster care at age 19 and/or who received at least one independent living service were also slightly more likely to have a high school diploma or equivalent than those youth who were not in care or had not received at least one independent living service (58%-60% versus 52%-53%). Overall, 54% of youth were enrolled in school at age 19, which could include high school, college, or vocational school. Among youth in foster care, 70% were currently enrolled. This is compared to 44%-62% of youth in the other three subgroups (youth not in care, youth receiving at least one independent living service, and youth not receiving at least one such service). (Also for comparison, when these youth were age 17, almost all (93%) were attending school and 8% had obtained a high school diploma or its equivalent.) Almost all youth at age 19—regardless of foster care status or receipt of independent living services—said that they had a positive connection to an adult who could serve in a mentoring or substitute parent role, including a relative, former foster parent, birth parent, or older member of the community. (Nearly all youth had reported the same when they were surveyed at age 17.) Most of the 19-year-old youth had not experienced homelessness in their lifetime, and youth in foster care were much less likely to report being homeless than the other groups (11% versus 18%-24%). (This is compared to 16% of youth overall when they were surveyed at age 17.) Youth in care at age 19 were also less likely to report having been incarcerated (14% versus 20%-29%). About the same share of youth (13%-17%) self-referred or were referred for an alcohol or drug abuse assessment or counseling during the fiscal year, regardless of foster care or independent living status. Youth in care and/or receiving at least one independent living service were slightly less likely to report that they had ever given birth to, or fathered, any children (9%-10% versus 13%-14%). In general, nearly 9 out of 10 youth had Medicaid or some other health insurance at age 19 (about the same share of youth had health insurance coverage at age 17). Youth in care and/or youth receiving at least one independent living service were more likely to report having health insurance (95%-99%), compared to youth not in care nor receiving independent living services (74%-88%). Most youth in care or receiving at least one independent living service received Medicaid coverage (81%-85%). About the same share of youth (14% to 17%), regardless of foster care status or their receipt of independent living services, had other health insurance. Among youth who had health insurance, youth receiving at least one independent living service and/or not in foster care were slightly more likely than youth in foster care and/or not receiving any independent living services to have insurance coverage for at least some prescription drugs (77%-78% versus 70%-72%).

Congress has long been concerned with the well-being of older youth in foster care and those who have recently emancipated from care without going to a permanent home. Research on this population is fairly limited, and the few studies that are available have focused on youth who live in a small number of states. This research has generally found that youth who spend time in foster care during their teenage years tend to have difficulty as they enter adulthood and beyond. The Chafee Foster Care Independence Act (P.L. 106-169), enacted in 1999, specified that state child welfare agencies provide additional supports to youth transitioning from foster care under the newly created Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP). The law also directed the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers child welfare programs, to consult with stakeholders to develop a national data system on the number, characteristics, and outcomes of current and former foster youth. In response to these requirements, HHS created the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD) under a final rule promulgated in 2008. The rule requires that each state child welfare agency commence collecting and reporting the data beginning in FY2011 (October 1, 2010). This report provides summary and detailed data about current and former foster youth, as reported by states to HHS via the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). Data are available on two sets of youth. First, states report information each fiscal year on eligible youth who currently receive independent living services regardless of whether they continue to remain in foster care, were in foster care in another state, or received child welfare services through an Indian tribe or privately operated foster care program. These youth are known as served youth. Data on served youth are intended to show how many youth received independent living services. Second, states report information on foster youth on or about their 17th birthday, on or about their 19th birthday, and on or about their 21st birthday. This reported information is based primarily on data collected through surveys of the youth. In this second group, foster youth at age 17 are known as the baseline youth, and at ages 19 and 21 they are known as the follow-up youth. Data from the tracked population of youth are intended to show education, work, health, and other outcomes of youth who were in foster care at age 17. These current and former foster youth are tracked regardless of whether they receive independent living services at ages 17, 19, and 21. As noted, states began reporting NYTD data to HHS for served and baseline youth in FY2011. The data in this report include those for served youth in FY2011 through FY2013 and for follow-up youth for FY2013. Between 97,000 and 102,000 youth received an independent living service in each of FY2011 through FY2013. The median age of these youth was 18. In each of the three years, the most common independent living services they received were academic support, career preparation, and education about housing and home management. Approximately 7,500 follow-up youth were surveyed about their outcomes at age 19. About one-third of youth were working full-time and/or part-time. Just over half (54%) were enrolled in school. Almost all of the youth had a positive connection with an adult who could serve in a mentoring or substitute parent role. Most youth had not experienced homelessness or incarceration in their lifetimes. The majority of youth had Medicaid or some other health insurance. However, youth who were no longer in foster care tended to have more negative outcomes on certain indicators. For example, youth in foster care were much less likely to report ever having been homeless compared to youth who left care (11% versus 24%). Likewise, they were less likely to report having ever been incarcerated compared to these same peers (14% versus 29%).

Although the advent of digital technology has brought about higher quality for audio and video content, creators of such content and policy makers are concerned that, without adequate content protection measures, unlawful digital copying and distribution of copyrighted material may endanger the viability of the motion picture, television, and music industries. As a result, technological measures have been proposed that are aimed at protecting copyrighted media from, among other things, unauthorized reproduction, distribution, and performance. One of these content protection schemes is the Audio Protection Flag (APF or "audio flag"), which would protect the content of digital radio transmissions against unauthorized dissemination and reproduction. To understand digital audio, an explanation of how analog and digital technology differ is helpful. Analog technology is characterized by an output system where the signal output is always proportional to the signal input. Because the outputs are analogous, the word "analog" is used. An analog mechanism is one where data is represented by continuously variable physical quantities like sound waves or electricity. Analog audio technologies include traditional radio (AM/FM radio), audio cassettes, and vinyl record albums. These technologies may deliver imprecise signals and background noise. Thus, the duplication of analog audio often erodes in quality over time or through "serial copying" (the making of a copy from copies). The term "digital" derives from the word "digit," as in a counting device. Digital audio technologies represent audio data in a "binary" fashion (using 1s and 0s). Rather than using a physical quantity, a digital audio signal employs an informational stream of code. Consequently, the code from a digital audio source can be played back or duplicated nearly infinitely and without any degradation of quality. Digital audio technologies include digital radio broadcasts (such as high-definition radio, or "HD Radio"), satellite radio, Internet radio, compact discs, and MP3-format music files. With the advent of digital technology, content providers have been interested in using content security measures to prevent unauthorized distribution and reproduction of copyrighted works. These technology-based measures are generally referred to as "digital rights management," or DRM. As the name suggests, DRM applies only to digital media (which would include analog transmissions converted into digital format). Examples of DRM include Internet video streaming protections, encrypted transmissions, and Content Scrambling Systems (CSS) on DVD media. In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA added a new chapter 12 to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205, entitled "Copyright Protection and Management Systems." Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits any person from circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work. This newly created right of "access" granted to copyright holders makes the act of gaining access to copyrighted material by circumventing DRM security measures, itself, a violation of the Copyright Act. Prohibited conduct includes descrambling a scrambled work, decrypting an encrypted work, and avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or impairing a technological measure without the authority of the copyright owner. In addition, the DMCA prohibits the selling of products or services that circumvent access-control measures, as well as trafficking in devices that circumvent "technological measures" protecting "a right" of the copyright owner. In contrast to copyright infringement, which concerns the unauthorized or unexcused use of copyrighted material, the anti-circumvention provisions of the Copyright Act prohibit the design, manufacture, import, offer to the public, or trafficking in technology produced to circumvent copyright encryption programs, regardless of the actual existence or absence of copyright infringement. One form of DRM technology that may be used to protect the content of digital audio transmissions from unauthorized distribution and reproduction is the "audio flag." The flag has two primary aspects: a physical component and rules and standards that define how devices communicate with flagged content transmitted from digital audio sources. For instance, a satellite digital audio radio stream of a particular broadcast music program could contain an audio flag (the mechanism) that prohibits any reproduction or further dissemination of the broadcast (the standard). The audio flag, according to its proponents, would operate in a similar manner as the broadcast video flag that has been proposed for digital television transmissions. Functionally, the audio flag system would work by embedding a special signal within transmitted digital audio data, informing the receiving device of certain copyright restrictions on the use of the content by the listener—for example, limiting the number of copies of a recording that the user may make. Those advocating the use of an audio flag for digital radio programming include musicians, songwriters, record labels, and other providers of audio content that could be broadcast to the public through digital transmissions. The Copyright Act bestows several exclusive rights upon the creator of a work (or the individual having a legal interest in the work) that permit the copyright holder to control the use of the protected material. These statutory rights allow a copyright holder to do or to authorize, among other things, reproducing the work, distributing copies or phonorecords of the work, and publicly performing the work. Parties holding a copyright interest in content transmitted through digital radio services are interested in ensuring that such content is protected from unauthorized reproduction and distribution by the broadcast recipient; the audio flag, in their view, is an effective way to achieve this objective and enforce their rights. Proponents of audio flag technology also suggest that it would help prevent certain digital radio services (like satellite radio) from becoming a music download service through the creation of recording and storage devices that allow for further reproduction and distribution of audio broadcasts. Some copyright holders argue that these broadcasters must either pay additional royalties for the privilege of offering what appears to be a music download service, or comply with an audio flag regime that will effectively prevent broadcasters from allowing the recording in the first place. Critics of the audio flag proposal raise concerns that such a government-mandated measure may stifle technological innovation and restrict the rights of consumers to record broadcast radio—conduct that, according to audio flag opponents, is protected by the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, as well as "fair use" principles in copyright law. The introduction of the Digital Audio Tape (DAT) by Sony and Philips in the mid-1980s prompted passage of the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in 1992. A DAT recorder can record CD-quality sound onto a specialized digital cassette tape. Through the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), sound recording copyright holders turned to Congress for legislation in response to this technology, fearing that a consumer's ability to make near-perfect digital copies of music would displace sales of sound recordings in the marketplace. The AHRA requires manufacturers of certain types of digital audio recording devices to incorporate into each device copyright protection technology—a form of DRM called the Serial Copying Management System (SCMS), which allows the copying of an original digital work, but prevents "serial copying" (making a copy from a copy). In exchange, the AHRA exempts consumers from copyright infringement liability for private, noncommercial home recordings of music for personal use. Manufacturers of audio equipment, sellers of digital recording devices, and marketers of blank recordable media are also protected from contributory infringement liability upon payment of a statutory royalty fee—royalties that are distributed to the music industry. Opponents of the audio flag contend that the AHRA created a "right" for consumers to make digital recordings, a practice that might be limited or even effectively revoked by audio flag mandates. The doctrine of "fair use" in copyright law recognizes the right of the public to make reasonable use of copyrighted material, in certain instances, without the copyright holder's consent. Because the language of the fair use statute is illustrative, determinations of fair use are often difficult to make in advance—it calls for a "case-by-case" analysis by the courts. However, the statute recognizes fair use "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research." A determination of fair use by a court considers four factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. In the context of digital music downloads and transmissions, some alleged copyright infringers have attempted to use the doctrine of fair use to avoid liability for activities such as sampling, "space shifting," and peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing. These attempts have not been very successful, as several federal appellate courts have ruled against the applicability of the fair use doctrine for these purposes. No litigation has yet settled the extent to which home recording of an audio broadcast (whether transmitted through digital or analog means) is a legitimate fair use. Critics of the audio flag also suggest that it places technological, financial, and regulatory burdens that may stifle the innovation behind digital audio technologies. They argue that the audio flag may limit the functionality of digital audio transmissions in favor of analog transmissions—thereby negatively affecting the digital audio marketplace. Legislation that expressly delegates authority to the FCC to mandate audio flags for digital radio transmissions would appear to be necessary before the FCC could take such steps, in the wake of a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2005 that vacated an FCC order requiring digital televisions to be manufactured with the capability to prevent unauthorized redistributions of digital video content. The court ruled that the FCC lacked the statutory authority to establish such a broadcast video flag system for digital television under the Communications Act of 1934. Two bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress that would have delegated such authority; these may represent legislative approaches that could be taken in the 110 th Congress. This bill would have empowered the FCC to promulgate regulations governing the licensing of "all technologies necessary to make transmission and reception devices" for digital broadcast and satellite radio. The bill directed that any such digital audio regulation shall prohibit unauthorized copying and redistribution of transmitted content through the use of a broadcast flag or similar technology, "in a manner generally consistent with the purposes of other applicable law." Title IV, Subtitle C of S. 2686 would have granted the FCC the authority to issue "regulations governing the indiscriminate redistribution of audio content with respect to—digital radio broadcasts, satellite digital radio transmissions, and digital radios." It also directed the FCC to establish an advisory committee known as the "Digital Audio Review Board," composed of representatives from several industries, including information technology, software, consumer electronics, radio and satellite broadcasting, audio recording, music publishing, performing rights societies, and public interest groups. The Board would have been responsible for drafting a proposed regulation that reflects a consensus of the members of the Board and that is "consistent with fair use principles," although the bill did not define whether such "fair use" has the same connotation as that used in the copyright law.

Protecting audio content broadcasted by digital and satellite radios from unauthorized dissemination and reproduction is a priority for producers and owners of those copyrighted works. One technological measure that has been discussed is the Audio Protection Flag (APF or "audio flag"). The audio flag is a special signal that would be imbedded into digital audio radio transmissions, permitting only authorized devices to play back copyrighted audio transmissions or allowing only limited copying and retention of the content. Several bills introduced in the 109th Congress would have granted the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority to promulgate regulations to implement the audio flag. The parties most likely affected by any audio flag regime (including music copyright owners, digital radio broadcasters, stereo equipment manufacturers, and consumers) are divided as to the anticipated degree and scope of the impact that a government-mandated copyright protection scheme would have on the "fair use" rights of consumers to engage in private, noncommercial home recording. Critics of the audio flag proposal are concerned about its effect on technological innovation. However, proponents of the audio flag feel that such digital rights management (DRM) technology is needed to thwart piracy or infringement of intellectual property rights in music, sports commentary and coverage, and other types of copyrighted content that is transmitted to the public by emerging high-definition digital radio services (HD Radio) and satellite radio broadcasters. This report provides a brief explanation of the audio flag and its relationship to digital audio radio broadcasts, and summarizes legislative proposals considered by the 109th Congress, including H.R. 4861 (Audio Broadcast Flag Licensing Act of 2006) and S. 2686 (Digital Content Protection Act of 2006), that would have authorized its adoption. Although not enacted, these two bills represent approaches that may be taken in the 110th Congress to authorize the use of an audio flag for protecting broadcast digital audio content.

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 ) authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations in response to certain incidents that overwhelm the capabilities of tribal, state, and local governments. The Stafford Act defines a major disaster as any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. Major disaster declarations can authorize several types of federal assistance to support response and recovery efforts following an incident. The primary source of funding for federal assistance following a major disaster is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). While this fund also provides assistance as a result of emergency declarations and Fire Management Assistance Grants, major disaster declarations historically account for the majority of obligations from the DRF. This report provides a national overview of actual and projected obligations funded through the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations between FY2000 and FY2015. In addition to providing a national overview, the electronic version of this report includes links to CRS products that summarize actual and projected obligations from the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations in each state and the District of Columbia. Each state profile includes information on the most costly incidents and impacted localities. In both the national and state-level products, information is provided on the types of assistance that have been provided for major disasters. Many other federal programs that provide assistance following a major disaster are not funded through the DRF. While the specific agencies and programs called upon will vary from one disaster to another, an overview of selected programs can be found in CRS Report R42845, Federal Emergency Management: A Brief Introduction , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. A total of 936 major disaster declarations were made between FY2000 and FY2015. These declarations resulted in more than $133.6 billion in actual and projected obligations from the DRF. There was a high level of variation in the amount of actual and projected funding obligated for major disasters each year, with more than $48.6 billion in actual and projected obligations for disasters in FY2005 alone. Figure 1 displays the actual and projected obligations for all major disaster declarations each fiscal year. In Figure 1 , obligations associated with each declaration are reported in the fiscal year in which the major disaster was declared. However, disaster response and recovery expenses are often incurred over several years following an incident, including some of the incidents from FY2000 to FY2015. To account for the total amount of federal assistance ultimately obligated for major disasters, the obligations data used throughout this report reflect actual obligations as well as obligations projected under FEMA-approved spending plans. A major disaster declaration can authorize funding for different purposes, depending on the needs of the state. These purposes include the following: Public Assistance , which is used by tribal, state, or local governments, or certain private nonprofit organizations to provide emergency protective services, conduct debris removal operations, and repair or replace damaged public infrastructure; Individual Assistance , which provides direct aid to impacted households; Hazard Mitigation Assistance , which funds mitigation and resiliency projects and programs, typically across the entire state; FEMA administrative costs associated with each disaster declaration; and Mission Assignment , which tasks and reimburses other federal entities that provide direct disaster assistance. The decision concerning which types of assistance to provide is made either when the major disaster is declared or when the declaration is amended. For many major disasters, all of the assistance types outlined above are authorized. For others, some assistance types are not authorized. Figure 2 compares the actual and projected obligations for different types of assistance provided as a result of a major disaster declaration from FY2000 to FY2015. In addition to the major disaster assistance described above, there are other forms of assistance that are funded through the DRF. These include assistance associated with Emergency Declarations and with Fire Management Assistance Grants. The funding associated with these types of assistance typically results in lower obligation levels than assistance provided as a result of major disaster declarations, although there is significant variation across incidents. Emergency Declarations are often made at the time a threat is recognized in order to assist tribal, state, and local efforts prior to an incident. For the period FY2000 through FY2015, total obligations for emergency declarations were just over $2.37 billion. Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAGs) provide aid for the control, management, and mitigation of fires. Total obligations for FMAGs from FY2000 through FY2015 were slightly more than $1.21 billion. Floods represent a majority of all major disaster declarations nationwide. One of the primary sources of assistance for flooding events is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is not funded through the DRF. For more information on the NFIP, please refer to CRS Report R44593, Introduction to FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Many existing CRS products address issues related to the DRF, the disaster declaration process, and types of DRF assistance. Below is a list of several of these resources: CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to Major Disasters and Emergencies , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43519, Natural Disasters and Hazards: CRS Experts , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43784, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43537, FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected Issues , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44619, FEMA Disaster Housing: The Individuals and Households Program—Implementation and Potential Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43990, FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program: Background and Considerations for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] In the electronic version of this report, Table 1 includes links to CRS products that summarize major disaster assistance from the DRF for each state and the District of Columbia. Actual and projected obligations from the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations for tribal lands, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are available upon request.

The primary source of funding for federal assistance authorized by a major disaster declaration is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Major disaster declarations have occurred in every U.S. state since FY2000, with obligations for each incident ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to more than $31 billion. This report summarizes DRF actual and projected obligations as a result of major disaster declarations at the national level for the period FY2000 through FY2015. CRS profiles for each state and the District of Columbia are linked to this report. Information on major disaster assistance from the DRF for tribal lands, U.S. territories, and freely associated states is available upon request. This report also includes lists of additional resources and key policy staff who can provide more information on the emergency management issues discussed.

House Judiciary Committee Chairman Goodlatte introduced H.R. 3713 , the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, for himself, ranking Judiciary Committee Member Representative Conyers, and a number of others on October 8, 2015. The proposal addresses four issues: the so-called safety valve that permits courts to disregard otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in certain drug cases; the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in such cases; the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in firearms cases; and the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. The bill's Senate counterpart, S. 2123 , features many of the same provisions, often in identical language. The so-called safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) allows a court to sentence qualified defendants below the statutory mandatory minimum in controlled substance trafficking and possession cases. To qualify, a defendant may not have used violence in the course of the offense. He must not have played a managerial role in the offense if it involved group participation. The offense must not have resulted in a death or serious bodily injury. The defendant must make full disclosure of his involvement in the offense, providing the government with all the information and evidence at his disposal. Finally, the defendant must have an almost spotless criminal record. Any past conviction that resulted in a sentence of more than 60 days, that is, a sentence meriting the assignment of more than 1 criminal history point, is disqualifying. Criminal history points are a feature of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines assign points based on the sentences imposed for prior state and federal convictions. For example, the Guidelines assign 1 point for any past conviction that resulted in a sentence of less than 60 days incarceration; 2 points for any conviction that resulted in a sentence of incarceration for 60 days or more; and 3 points for any conviction that resulted in a sentence of incarceration of more than a year and a month. The Sentencing Commission's report on mandatory minimum sentences suggested that Congress consider expanding safety valve eligibility to defendants with 2 or possibly 3 criminal history points. The report indicated that under the Guidelines a defendant's criminal record "can have a disproportionate and excessively severe cumulative sentencing impact on certain drug offenders." The commission explained that the Guidelines are construed to ensure that the sentence they recommend in a given case calls for a term of imprisonment that is not less than an applicable mandatory minimum. In addition, the drug offenses have escalated mandatory minimums for repeat offenders. Moreover, similarly situated drug offenders may be treated differently, because the states punish simple drug possession differently and prosecutors decide when to press recidivism qualifications differently. H.R. 3713 would change the safety valve in two ways. First, a defendant would be safety valve eligible with 4 or fewer criminal history points if he had not been convicted previously of a 2-point drug trafficking or violent crime (one that resulted in a sentence of 60 days or more), or any 3-point offense (one for which he was incarcerated for more than 13 months). Second, the proposal would permit the court to waive the criminal history disqualification, in cases other than those involving a past serious drug felony or serious violent felony conviction, if it concluded that the defendant's criminal history score overstated the seriousness of his criminal record or the likelihood that he would commit other offenses. The Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act establish a series of mandatory minimum sentences for violations of their prohibitions. Class A offenses involve trafficking—that is, importing, exporting, or manufacturing, growing, possessing with the intent to distribute—a very substantial amount of various highly addictive substances, such as more than 10 grams of LSD. Class A offenses carry a sentence of imprisonment for not less than 10 years or more than life. Class B offenses involve substantial but lesser amounts, such as 1 gram of LSD. Class B offenses carry a sentence of imprisonment for not less than 5 years or more than life, and imprisonment for not less than 10 years or more than life in the case of a subsequent conviction. Penalties for both sets of offenses increase if the crime results in a death or if the defendant has a prior conviction for a drug felony. H.R. 3713 would create a mini-safety valve to reduce the mandatory minimum for Class A offenses to imprisonment for not less than 5 years, unless the offender had used violence in the commission of the offense; had acted as a supervisor, leader, supplier, or importer for a drug undertaking; sold to minors; failed to fully reveal all the information or evidence at his disposal relating to the offense or related offenses; or had prior serious drug or violent felony convictions. H.R. 3713 would both expand and contract the recidivist mandatory minimums. Under existing law, any prior drug felony conviction triggers the enhanced recidivist mandatory minimum. Under H.R. 3713 , only drug convictions carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years or more and resulting in a sentence of a year or more would trigger the increased recidivist mandatory minimums. On the other hand, convictions for kidnapping, burglary, arson or other serious violent crimes would also serve as a basis for the recidivist mandatory minimums. In addition, it would reduce the mandatory minimums for Class A recidivists. A defendant with a single qualifying prior offense would face a mandatory minimum of not less than 10 years rather than one of not less than 15 years. The defendant with two or more prior qualifying offenses could expect a mandatory minimum of not less than 25 years instead of a mandatory life sentence. The bill would allow the courts, on their own motion or that of the defendant or the Bureau of Prisons, to resentence defendants, convicted prior to H.R. 3713 's enactment, as though the bill's reduced recidivist mandatory minimums were in place at the time of prior sentencing. In doing so, the courts would be compelled to consider: the nature and seriousness of the risks to an individual or the community; the defendant's conduct following his initial sentencing; and the statutory sentencing factors that they must ordinarily weigh before imposing punishment. H.R. 3713 would insist on a sentence of imprisonment for not more than 5 years to be added to, and to be served after, any sentence imposed for the drug trafficking, exporting, or importing offenses, when fentanyl, a chemical used to "cut" heroin, is involved. There are two firearms-related offenses that call for the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment. One, the so-called three strikes provision, also known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on an offender convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions for a drug offense or a violent felony. The other, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), imposes one of a series of mandatory terms of imprisonment upon a defendant convicted of the use of a firearm during the course of a drug offense or a crime of violence. The ACCA limits qualifying state and federal drug offenses to those punishable by imprisonment for more than 10 years. The qualifying federal and state violent felonies are burglary, arson, extortion, the use of explosives, and any other felony that either has the use or threat of physical force as an element. H.R. 3713 would reduce the mandatory minimum penalty from 15 years to 10 years. It also would make the modification retroactively applicable in the same manner as the proposed mandatory minimum reductions in the case of controlled substances. That is, H.R. 3713 would permit federal courts to reduce the terms of imprisonment of defendants previously sentenced, after considering the defendant's conduct after his initial sentence, "the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community," and the generally applicable sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). H.R. 3713 's retroactivity would apply to defendants without a prior drug offenses but not to those with serious violent felony convictions. Section 924(c) brings firearm mandatory minimum tack-on status to any federal drug felony and to any other federal felony, that by its nature involves a substantial risk of the use of physical force or that features the use of physical force or threat of physical force as an element. The ACCA calls for a single 15-year mandatory minimum. Section 924(c), in contrast, imposes one of several different minimum sentences when a firearm is used or possessed in furtherance of another federal crime of violence or of drug trafficking. The mandatory minimums, imposed in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking, vary depending upon the circumstances: imprisonment for not less than 5 years, unless one of the higher mandatory minimums below applies; imprisonment for not less than 7 years, if a firearm is brandished; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is discharged; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; imprisonment for not less than 15 years, if the offense involves armor-piercing ammunition; imprisonment for not less than 25 years, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c); imprisonment for not less than 30 years, if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and imprisonment for life, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. Section 924(c)'s repeat offender provision is somewhat distinctive. Most recidivist statutes assess a more severe penalty if the defendant commits a second offense after proceedings for the first have become final. Section 924(c) assesses successively more severe penalties for each count within the same prosecution. Under this stacking of counts, a defendant convicted of several counts arising out of a single crime spree involving the robbery of several convenience stores, for example, may face a mandatory term of imprisonment of well over 100 years. H.R. 3713 would make clear that a conviction must have become final before it could be counted for purposes of enhancing the mandatory minimum. H.R. 3713 also would reduce the repeat offender mandatory minimum assessment from imprisonment for not less than 25 years to not less than 15 years. The assessment however, would encompass recidivists with prior equivalent state convictions as well. Except for defendants with prior serious violent felony convictions, H.R. 3713 it would permit courts to apply its amendments to 18 U.S.C. 924(c) retroactively, provided they took into account the defendant's post-conviction conduct, the nature and seriousness of threats to individual or community safety, and the generally applicable sentencing factors. H.R. 3713 contains a third firearms amendment that, although not a strict mandatory minimum amendment, would increase the likelihood of imprisonment by operation of implementing sentencing guidelines by simply increasing the maximum sentence authorized for the offense or offenses. More precisely, it would increase from imprisonment for not more than 10 years to not more than 15 years the sentences for the following firearms offenses: false statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm or ammunition; sale of a firearm or ammunition to, or possession by, a convicted felon or other disqualified individual; while in the employ of a disqualified individual, receipt or possession of a firearm or ammunition; knowing transportation of stolen firearms or ammunition; knowing sale, possession, or pledge as security of stolen firearms or ammunition; or transfer or possession of a machine gun under certain circumstances. Originally, the Controlled Substances Act made no distinction between powder cocaine and crack cocaine (cocaine base). The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act introduced a 100-1 sentencing ratio between the two, so that trafficking in 50 grams of crack cocaine carried the same penalties as trafficking in 5,000 grams of powder cocaine. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) replaced the 5,000 to 50 ratio with the present 500-28 ratio, so that trafficking in 280 grams of crack cocaine carries the same penalties as 5,000 grams of powder cocaine. The Sentencing Commission subsequently adjusted the Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the change and made the modification retroactively applicable at the discretion of the sentencing court. The FSA reductions apply to cocaine offenses committed thereafter. They also apply to offenses committed beforehand when sentencing occurred after the time of enactment. Federal courts have discretion to reduce a sentence imposed under a Sentencing Guideline that was subsequently substantially reduced. The FSA, however, does not apply to sentences imposed prior to its enactment, and it does not apply in sentence reduction hearings triggered by new Sentencing Guidelines. In such proceedings, the courts remain bound by the mandatory minimums in effect prior to enactment of the FSA, so in some instances they may not reduce a previously imposed sentence to the full extent recommended by the FSA-adjusted Sentencing Guidelines. H.R. 3713 would change that. It would allow a court to reduce a sentence that was imposed for an offense committed prior to the FSA, to reflect the FSA amendments, unless the court had already done so or unless the original sentence was imposed consistent with the FSA amendments.

H.R. 3713, the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, addresses the sentences that may be imposed in various drug and firearms cases. It proposes amendments to those areas of federal law that govern mandatory minimum sentencing requirements for drug and firearm offenses; the so-called safety valves which permits court to impose sentences below otherwise required mandatory minimums in the case of certain low-level drug offenders; and the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. Related reports include CRS Report R44246, Sentencing Reform: Comparison of Selected Proposals, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

The Multinational Species Conservation Fund (MSCF; 16 U.S.C. §4246) supports international conservation efforts benefitting several species of animals. The MSCF has five sub-funds, which provide grants for activities to conserve tigers, rhinoceroses, Asian and African elephants, marine turtles, and great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and various species of gibbons). Each of the funds receives appropriations from Congress through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). This support is often in conjunction with efforts under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and local efforts in the countries in which these animals reside. MSCF provides funding in the form of technical and cost-sharing grants to groups conducting conservation activities in the species' home range countries. The grants address habitat conservation, improve law enforcement, and provide technical assistance for conserving the specified species. The conservation efforts funded by the MSCF funds also benefit from funding and in-kind support provided by partners and collaborators. Congress and constituents have shown interest in conserving iconic endangered species in foreign countries, such as elephants and tigers. Congress has appropriated funds to address wildlife trafficking and to conserve foreign endangered species and their habitats, and it is considering other forms of funding to augment this support. One form of existing support is funds generated through semipostal stamps, which are first-class stamps that are sold with a surcharge over their postage value. The additional charge is recognized by the stamp purchaser as a voluntary contribution to a designated cause (for more information, see " Overview of Semipostal Stamps ," below). To boost funds for conservation programs under MSCF, Congress authorized the creation and distribution of the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp (MSCF stamp) under the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-241 ). This law requires the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to issue and sell the MSCF stamp. A portion of the proceeds (11 cents, less USPS's administrative costs) from the stamp are transferred to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which equally distributes the stamp-generated funds among the five MSCF sub-funds (see Figure 1 ). The other portion of the revenue goes to the Postal Service Fund, which is a revolving fund in the U.S. Treasury that consists largely of revenues generated from the sale of postal products and services. USPS introduced the MSCF stamp, entitled "Save Vanishing Species," in September 2011. The stamp depicts an Amur tiger, a design approved by the Postmaster General, who has the final authority to decide the design for semipostal stamps. Congress initially provided for the MSCF stamp to be available to the public for at least two years. Congress extended the mandated sale of the MSCF stamp by an additional four years through the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp Reauthorization Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-165 ). Authorization for the MSCF stamp is set to expire in September 2017. This expiration does not preclude USPS from continuing to issue and sell the stamp, should it choose to do so. As of November 2016, more than 36.6 million MSCF stamps had sold, generating more than $3.9 million for conservation. According to FWS, funds from the stamps have supported 84 conservation projects in 33 countries. Projects and programs funded by stamp sales address antipoaching activities, capacity building for conserving species, community engagement and outreach, habitat restoration, and activities to raise public awareness of the illegal wildlife trade, among other things. In addition, federal grants from MSCF receive matching funds from nonfederal conservation supporters. FWS has noted that the funds from stamp sales have leveraged more than double their value in funds for conservation. For example, from FY2012 to FY2016, $3.1 million of funds generated from stamps leveraged $12.5 million in additional funds from nonfederal stakeholders for conservation projects. The MSCF stamp's efficacy in generating funds for international conservation made reauthorizing the stamp a priority for addressing wildlife trafficking, as the Presidential Taskforce on Wildlife Trafficking created by the Obama Administration in 2014 noted. Funds generated by MSCF stamp sales have supported efforts to decrease wildlife trafficking. For example, FWS used MSCF stamp funds to support a program that rehabilitates trafficked tigers for return to the wild in Indonesia. Semipostal stamps are first-class letter stamps that are sold with a surcharge over their postage value. The additional charge is recognized by the stamp purchaser as a voluntary contribution to a designated cause. For example, a first-class stamp may be purchased for 49 cents, but a first-class semipostal stamp costs 60 cents. USPS sells a semipostal stamp and then transfers a portion of the proceeds (less USPS's administrative costs) to the U.S. Treasury, which allocates funding to the federal agency designated to administer the funds. The agency then expends or distributes the funds for the statutorily designated purpose. Congress first authorized the issuance of semipostal stamps in 1997. The first semipostal stamp sold in the United States was the Breast Cancer Research stamp in 1997, which was created by the Stamp Out Breast Cancer Act ( P.L. 105-41 ). This act authorized the USPS to issue a first-class stamp at a price up to 25% higher than the standard first-class stamp price. The law required USPS to deliver 70% of the additional proceeds to the National Institutes of Health and 30% to the Department of Defense to fund breast cancer research, less USPS's administrative costs. After the success of the Breast Cancer Research stamp, Congress enacted the Semipostal Authorization Act ( P.L. 106-253 ) in 2000. The act gave USPS broad authority to issue and sell semipostal stamps for causes that USPS considers to be in the "national public interest and appropriate." The law specified that funds raised must go only to federal agencies supporting the cause, and it gave discretion to USPS for the selection and depiction of future semipostal stamps. The authority for USPS to issue semipostal stamps expires 10 years after the issuance of the first stamp. This 10-year sunset provision has not started, because USPS has not issued any semipostal stamps through its own authority. All current semipostal stamps have been mandated separately in enacted legislation. However, USPS recently revised its semipostal regulations (39 C.F.R. 551) and has begun the process of developing and issuing its first discretionary semipostal stamp. Recent changes to the USPS semipostal program could affect the MSCF stamp. In 2016, the USPS amended its regulations and began the process of developing and issuing its own semipostal stamps. The Semipostal Authorization Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-253 ) provided USPS with authority to issue semipostals for a 10-year period beginning on the date on which semipostals are first made available to the public. Under the original regulations implementing the Semipostal Stamp Program, USPS stated that it would not exercise its authority to issue semipostal stamps under 39 U.S.C. §416 until after the sales period of the Breast Cancer Research Stamp is concluded. A rule issued by USPS in April 2016 retracts the restriction on the start of the discretionary Semipostal Stamp Program. The amended regulations state that USPS will issue one discretionary semipostal stamp at a time, five in total, to be sold for a period of no more than two years each. Public proposals for the first discretionary semipostal were due in July 2016. The final decision regarding the subject of the discretionary semipostal stamps belongs to the Postmaster General; as of February 28, 2017, a decision on what semipostals to issue had not been made. If the MSCF stamp is not reauthorized in 2017, USPS could discontinue the MSCF stamp and focus on other semipostal stamps per its plan in the amended regulations. Several bills introduced in the 115 th Congress address the MSCF stamp and other semipostal stamps. Some bills would reauthorize the issuance of the MSCF stamp for an additional four years (e.g., S. 480 and H.R. 1247 ). Further, H.R. 1247 would require an MSCF semipostal stamp depicting an African elephant in addition to an Amur tiger. Other bills would require USPS to issue semipostal stamps supporting other causes, such as the Peace Corps ( H.R. 332 ), efforts to combat invasive species ( H.R. 1837 ), agricultural conservation programs ( H.R. 581 ), and the families of fallen service members ( H.R. 1147 ). H.R. 128 would take away the general authority of USPS to issue semipostal stamps. Under the bill, USPS could issue semipostals as long as the stamps were mandated by Congress. Overall, many people view semipostal stamps as an easy and inexpensive way to raise both funds from the public and awareness for a given organization or cause. (See Table 1 .) Supporters of the MSCF stamp also contend the following points: Some contend that the MSCF stamp has a great deal of support and leverages additional funds for conservation. They note that funds generated and leveraged by the sale of the stamp have provided a boost to conservation and antipoaching efforts for species targeted by the MSCF. Further, they assert that semipostal stamps have the potential to generate greater amounts of funding, as evidenced by the success of the Breast Cancer Research Stamp. According to some, the MSCF stamp provides the public with an opportunity to participate in financing conservation and anti-wildlife trafficking efforts for MSCF species. Some contend that, apart from raising funds for conservation, MSCF stamps can be used to raise public awareness of wildlife trafficking. In addition, some contend that MSCF stamps created in collaboration with efforts in other countries could increase public awareness about wildlife trafficking and conservation on an international scale. Some potential detracting points associated with the issuance of the MSCF stamp and other semipostal stamps include the following: In the past, USPS expressed limited interest in selling semipostal stamps. During a Senate hearing in 2000, a USPS representative noted that USPS did not favor the issuance of further semipostal stamps after the Breast Cancer Research Stamp. USPS stated that fundraising was a diversion from the service's core mission and that the philatelic community opposed semipostals on the grounds that they dilute the quality of the stamp program. USPS further noted that choosing among the many worthy causes eager for semipostal revenue would be difficult and requested that Congress help make decisions on what semipostal stamps should be created in the future. Given USPS's stated intention in 2016 to issue semipostal stamps under its general authority, the service's position may have changed. Further, if USPS issues more types of semipostal stamps, it is unclear whether the increased competition will decrease sales of the MSCF stamp. Some might suggest that causes other than the MSCF could receive wider attention and therefore should be prioritized over the MSCF for semipostal stamp programs. The success of semipostal stamps varies widely. The Breast Cancer Research Stamp has generated several million dollars a year for its cause, but two other semipostal stamps—the "Heroes of 2001" and "Stop Family Violence" semipostal stamps—generated significantly less funding (see Table 1 ). It is difficult to predict which causes would benefit most from the sale of semipostals. Some might contend that future MSCF stamps may not generate sufficient funds to support their existence. No analysis has clarified the precise factors that affect the sales of any particular semipostal. Factors that could affect the success of semipostal sales, such as the MSCF stamp, may include advertising, competition with other semipostal stamps, and popularity of the cause represented by the semipostal stamp. Some might be concerned that the range of eligible uses for funds generated by MSCF stamp is limited to a small set of species. They might suggest creating specific or alternative guidelines so that the funds raised address broader international conversation efforts.

The Multinational Species Conservation Fund (MSCF) supports international conservation efforts benefitting several species of animals, often in conjunction with efforts under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). MSCF receives annual appropriations under the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to fund five grant programs for conserving tigers, rhinoceroses, Asian and African elephants, marine turtles, and great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and various species of gibbons). To provide a convenient way for the public to contribute to these activities and to boost funds for these conservation programs, Congress authorized the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-241). With the MSCF semipostal stamp (MSCF stamp) program set to expire in 2017, Congress is considering whether to reauthorize the MSCF stamp through pending legislation (e.g., S. 480 and H.R. 1247). Semipostal stamps are postage stamps that are sold with a surcharge above the normal price for a 1-ounce first-class letter stamp. For example, the current price for a first-class stamp is 49 cents, whereas a first-class semipostal stamp costs 60 cents. The additional charge is recognized by the stamp purchaser as a voluntary contribution to a designated cause. Since 1997, Congress has authorized the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to sell four different semipostal stamps, including the MSCF stamp. The MSCF stamp, entitled "Save Vanishing Species," was first issued by USPS on September 22, 2011. A portion of the stamp's sale proceeds is transferred to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers the MSCF and provides grants to international organizations to help protect the species listed above. As of November 2016, proceeds from MSCF stamp sales had generated more than $3.9 million for the MSCF. Many view semipostal stamps as an easy and inexpensive way to raise funds and awareness for a given organization or cause. Some contend that the MSCF stamp provides a significant amount of funding for MSCF conservation programs and raises awareness about the conservation of certain international threatened and endangered species. Others argue that semipostal stamps detract from the mission of the USPS and divert consumers away from other stamps the USPS has to offer. Additionally, some contend that other causes could benefit more than the MSCF from a semipostal stamp program.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires the payment of a minimum wage, as well as overtime compensation at a rate of not less than one and one-half times an employee's hourly rate for hours worked in excess of a 40-hour workweek. While the FLSA exempts some employees from these requirements based on their job duties or because they work in specified industries, most employees must be paid in accordance with the statute's requirements for work performed. The increased use of personal data assistants (PDAs) and smartphones by employees outside of a traditional work schedule has raised questions about whether such use may be compensable under the FLSA. As PDAs and smartphones provide employees with mobile access to work email, clients, and co-workers, as well as the ability to create and edit documents outside of the workplace, it may be possible to argue that non-exempt employees who perform work-related activities with these devices should receive overtime if such activities occur beyond the 40-hour workweek. This report reviews the FLSA's overtime provisions and examines some of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decisions on work. Although PDAs and smartphones provide a new opportunity to consider what constitutes work for purposes of the FLSA, the Court's past FLSA decisions, including those involving on-call time, may provide guidance on how courts could evaluate overtime claims involving the new devices. Section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA, states, in relevant part, [N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. The term "employ" is defined by the FLSA to mean "to suffer or permit to work." The term "work," however, is not defined by the statute. In 1944, the Supreme Court sought to clarify the meaning of that term in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123 , a case involving miners who travelled daily to and from the working face of underground iron ore mines. Muscoda Local No. 123 and two other unions representing the miners maintained that the workers' hours of employment should include the travel time, and that the miners were entitled to overtime compensation because their hours of employment exceeded the statutory maximum workweek. Without a statutory definition for "work," the Court in Tennessee Coal relied on the plain meaning of the term to conclude that the miners' travel time should be construed as work or employment for purposes of the FLSA. The Court noted, "[W]e cannot assume that Congress here was referring to work or employment other than as those words are commonly used—as meaning physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business." The Court maintained that the dangerous conditions in the mine shafts provided proof that the journey to and from the working face involved continuous physical and mental exertion. In addition, the miners' travel to and from the working face was not undertaken for the convenience of the miners, but was performed for the benefit of the mining companies and their iron ore mining operations. In Armour v. Wantock , the Court clarified that actual physical or mental exertion was not necessary for an activity to constitute work under the FLSA. In Armour , a group of fire guards who remained on call on the employer's premises contended that they were entitled to overtime compensation for their on-call time. Although the employer attempted to make this time tolerable by providing beds, radios, and cooking equipment, the Court found that the guards were entitled to overtime compensation. The Court observed the following: Of course an employer, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for something to happen. Refraining from other activity often is a factor of instant readiness to serve, and idleness plays a part in all employments in a stand-by capacity. Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as much as service itself, and time spent lying in wait for threats to the safety of the employer's property may be treated by the parties as a benefit to the employer. Whether time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the employee's is a question dependent upon all the circumstances of the case. In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery , a 1946 case involving workers at a pottery plant and the computation of compensable work time, the Court concluded that time spent walking to a work area on the employer's premises after punching a time clock was compensable. The Court indicated that because the statutory workweek includes all time that an employee is required to be "on the employer's premises, on duty, or at a prescribed workplace," the time spent in these activities must be compensated. Other preliminary activities, such as putting on aprons and preparing equipment, were also found to be compensable because they were performed on the employer's premises, required physical exertion, and were pursued for the employer's benefit. At the same time, however, the Court in Mt. Clemens Pottery recognized "a de minimis rule" for activities that involve only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond an employee's scheduled work hours. The Court explained that "[i]t is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that compensable working time is involved." Fearing that Mt. Clemens Pottery would subject employers to significant and "wholly unexpected" financial liabilities, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, which abolished all claims for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation related to activities engaged in prior to May 14, 1947. The Portal-to-Portal Act also provided prospectively that an employer would not be subject to liability under the FLSA for failing to pay a minimum wage or overtime compensation for travel to and from the place where an employee's principal activity or activities are performed, or for activities that are "preliminary to or postliminary to [those] principal activity or activities." The Court's recognition of a de minimis rule and the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act have been viewed as attempts to limit the broad definition of "work" established in Tennessee Coal . Even after the Portal-to-Portal Act's enactment, however, the Court continued to find certain preparatory and concluding activities to be compensable under the FLSA. In Steiner v. Mitchell , for example, the Court found that the time spent by workers in a battery plant changing clothes at the beginning of a shift and showering at the end of a shift was compensable work time under the FLSA. Citing a colloquy between several senators and one of the sponsors of the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Court maintained that Congress did not intend to deprive employees of the benefits of the FLSA if preliminary or postliminary activities are an integral and indispensible part of the principal activities for which they are employed. In IBP v. Alvarez , the Court further concluded that the time spent walking between a changing area where protective clothing was put on and taken off and a work area was also compensable time under the FLSA. Whether non-exempt workers may be entitled to overtime compensation for work activities performed using a PDA or smartphone beyond a 40-hour workweek will probably depend on the facts of each case. At a minimum, an employee seeking such compensation will likely have to establish that he was engaged in compensable work. The factors articulated by the Court in Tennessee Coal continue to be recognized as a starting point for determining whether an employee's activities constitute work under the FLSA. First, does use of a PDA or smartphone require physical or mental exertion? Second, is the use of a PDA or smarthphone controlled or required by the employer? Finally, is the use of a PDA or smartphone necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business? While the facts of each case will ultimately determine whether the Tennessee Coal factors are satisfied, it seems possible that at least some PDA or smartphone use could be viewed as compensable work under the FLSA. Even with the Court's reconsideration in Armour of the need for physical or mental exertion to constitute work, it appears reasonable to conclude that at least some PDA or smartphone use will require mental exertion. An employee responding to work email or reviewing or editing documents is arguably engaged in mental exertion. Further, providing PDAs and smartphones to non-exempt employees without any statement or policy about not using the devices outside of regular work hours may lead to the conclusion that their use is controlled or required by the employer, particularly if supervisors or senior employees send messages or documents with the expectation that they will be immediately read or reviewed. Finally, because employers could benefit from an employee's response to email or his review of a document after regular work hours, it could be argued that the employee's PDA or smartphone use is necessarily or primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business. The absence, however, of any significant case law involving the FLSA and PDA or smartphone use makes it difficult to know exactly how courts will evaluate related claims for overtime compensation. Some believe that cases involving on-call time could be instructive, particularly because they present an analogous situation in which an employee is kept in constant contact with the employer. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co ., one of the Court's early cases involving on-call time and the payment of overtime compensation, the Court indicated that the law does not preclude "waiting time from also being working time." The Court maintained, however, that the availability of overtime pay involves an examination of the agreement between the parties, consideration of the nature of the service provided and its relation to the waiting time, and all of the surrounding circumstances. In reversing a denial of overtime compensation in Skidmore , the Court further explained that whether on-call time should be considered compensable under the FLSA depends upon the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal activities during periods of idleness when he is subject to call and the number of consecutive hours that the employee is subject to call without being required to perform active work. Hours worked are not limited to the time spent in active labor, but include time given by the employee to the employer. Since the Court's decision in Skidmore , other courts have found on-call time compensable under the FLSA. In Pabst v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co ., for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that a group of electronic technicians who were expected to respond to alarms sent to their pagers and computers were entitled to compensation for their on-call time. Citing Skidmore and Armour , the court focused on the burdens placed on the technicians as a result of their on-call duties, such as diminished sleep habits because of the frequency of the alarms and the employer's required response time. Where the burdens placed on employees as a result of on-call duties are minimal, courts appear more likely to find that on-call time is not compensable under the FLSA. In Owens v. Local No. 169 , for example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an employer with an ongoing policy of phoning its regular daytime mechanics after hours to return to the workplace to fix equipment was not liable for overtime compensation resulting from the employees' on-call duties. The court maintained that the employer's on-call policy was far less burdensome than other policies that had been successfully challenged. Unlike the technicians in Pabst , the mechanics in Owens were not required to respond to all calls and received an average of only six calls a year. The courts' focus on an employee's ability to engage in personal activities in on-call cases may indeed prove instructive as they begin to consider whether work-related PDA and smartphone use is compensable under the FLSA. Although a court may find that an employee's use of a PDA or smartphone is "work" for purposes of the FLSA, it may conclude that such use is so minimal or unobtrusive that it is not compensable under the FLSA. Such a finding would seem to be consistent not only with the on-call jurisprudence, but also with the de minimis rule articulated by the Court in Mt. Clemens Pottery . At the very least, a court will likely have to evaluate all of the circumstances of an employee's case to determine whether his PDA or smartphone use is compensable. As PDA and smartphone use by employees increases and the expectations of supervisors, co-workers, and clients evolve, it seems likely that courts will be confronted with numerous cases involving overtime compensation based on the work-related use of these devices. At least one case involving the retail sales consultants and assistant store managers of AT&T Mobility is currently being litigated. The non-exempt plaintiffs in Zivali v. AT&T Mobility are seeking overtime compensation for their work outside of their regular work hours. The employees argue that AT&T Mobility required them to carry company-owned smartphones and encouraged them to provide their numbers to customers. They contend that AT&T Mobility fosters a corporate culture in which employees "are expected to perform certain tasks off-duty." In May 2011, a federal district court found that the plaintiffs were not similarly situated for purposes of maintaining a collective action under the FLSA. However, the court also concluded that the evidence suggested that at least some of the plaintiffs might be able to recover uncompensated overtime from AT&T Mobility, and rejected the company's motion for summary judgment. The case is likely to be watched closely by both employers and employees who are required to carry PDAs and smartphones.

The increased use of personal data assistants (PDAs) and smartphones by employees outside of a traditional work schedule has raised questions about whether such use may be compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). As PDAs and smartphones provide employees with mobile access to work email, clients, and co-workers, as well as the ability to create and edit documents outside of the workplace, it may be possible to argue that employees who are not exempt from the FLSA's requirements and who perform work-related activities with these devices should receive overtime if such activities occur beyond the 40-hour workweek. This report reviews the FLSA's overtime provisions, and examines some of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decisions on work. Although PDAs and smartphones provide a new opportunity to consider what constitutes work for purposes of the FLSA, the Court's past FLSA decisions, including those involving on-call time, may provide guidance on how courts could evaluate overtime claims involving the new devices.

A major issue in the upcoming farm bill debate is likely to be funding for conservation programs. Current authorization for mandatory funding for most of these programs, under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107 - 171 ), expires at the end of FY2007. Mandatory funding means that the amount authorized by Congress is available unless limited to smaller amounts in the appropriations process; if appropriators do not act, the amount that was authorized is provided to the program. These mandatory funds are provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation, a financing institution for many agriculture programs, including commodity programs and export subsidies. While most conservation programs currently are authorized using mandatory funding, discretionary funding is used for six conservation programs. For discretionary programs, appropriators decide how much funding to provide each year in the annual agriculture appropriations bill, subject to any maximum limit set in law. Conservation program advocates prefer mandatory funding over discretionary funding. They believe that it is generally easier to protect authorized mandatory funding levels from reductions during the appropriations process than to secure appropriations each year. However, since FY2002, Congress has limited funding for some of the mandatory programs each year below authorized levels in annual appropriations acts. Advocates for these programs decry these limitations as significant changes from the intent of the farm bill, which compromise the programs' ability to provide the anticipated magnitude of benefits to producers and the environment. Others, including those interested in reducing agricultural expenditures or in spending the funds for other agricultural purposes, counter that, even with these reductions, overall funding has grown substantially. Congress provided mandatory funding for selected conservation programs for the first time in the 1996 farm bill ( P.L. 104 - 127 ). Prior to 1996, all conservation programs had been funded as discretionary programs. Conservation program advocates viewed mandatory funding as a much more desirable approach, and Congress agreed, enacting provisions that moved some conservation programs from discretionary to mandatory funding. Some advocates viewed this change in funding as a major achievement in the 1996 farm bill. Amounts authorized for these programs at the time may seem modest when compared with today's levels. Programs funded with mandatory funding, and their authorized levels under the 1996 law, included the following: Conservation Reserve Program (a maximum of 36.4 million acres at any time through FY2002, with no dollar amount specified); Wetland Reserve Program (a maximum of 975,000 acres at any time through FY2002, with no dollar amount specified); Environmental Quality Incentives Program ($130 million in FY1996, and $200 million annually thereafter through FY2002); Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (a total of $50 million between FY1996 and FY2002); Farmland Protection Program (a total of $35 million with no time span specified); and Conservation Farm Option ($7.5 million in FY1997, increasing each year to a high of $62.5 million in FY2002). The 2002 farm bill greatly expanded mandatory funding for conservation, authorizing the annual funding levels shown in Table 1 . Mandatory funding was provided both for expiring programs that were reauthorized and for new programs created in the legislation. The increase in authorized funding levels was widely endorsed for many reasons. Conservation supporters had long been seeking higher funding levels, and this was another significant step in that effort. An argument that proved particularly persuasive in this farm bill debate was documentation of large backlogs of interested and eligible producers who were unable to enroll because of a lack of funds. Demand to participate in some of the programs exceeded the available program dollars several times over, and some Members reasoned that higher funding was warranted to satisfy this demand. Funding for FY2002 is not included in Table 1 , as the FY2002 appropriations legislation was enacted on November 28, 2001, six months before the 2002 farm bill. Program funding decisions had to be based on prior legislation. Indeed, by the time this farm bill was enacted, the FY2003 appropriations process was well along. However, the 2002 farm bill did authorize money in FY2002 for several mandatory programs. In each year since FY2002, annual agriculture appropriations acts have capped funding for some of the mandatory conservation programs below authorized levels. The programs that are limited and the amounts of the limitations change from year to year. One program, the Wetland Reserve Program, has been capped in enrolled acres, which appropriators translate into savings based on average enrollment costs. Table 1 compares the authorized spending level for each of the programs with the amount that Congress actually provided through the appropriations process. It does not include any mandatory conservation programs enacted since the 2002 farm bill, including the Conservation Reserve Program Technical Assistance Account (enacted in P.L. 108 - 498 ), the Healthy Forest Reserve (enacted in P.L. 108 - 148 ), and the Emergency Forestry Conservation Reserve Program (enacted in P.L. 109 - 148 ). Many of the spending reductions originate in the Administration's budget request. Since the farm bill states that the Secretary "shall" spend the authorized amounts for each program each year, Congress must act to limit spending to a lesser amount. The mix of programs and amounts of reduction in the Administration request have varied from year to year. Congress has concurred with the Administration request some years for some programs. Starting in FY2003, the requested reductions in mandatory funding below the authorized levels (shown in the table), are as follows: In FY2003, the request was submitted before the farm bill was enacted, and did not include any requests to reduce funding levels. In FY2004, the request was to limit the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) to 200,000 acres ($250 million), limit the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) to $850 million, limit the Ground and Surface Water Program (GSWP) to $51 million, limit the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP) to $42 million, limit the Farmland Protection Program (FPP) to $112 million, limit the Conservation Security Program (CSP) to $19 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and Agricultural Management Assistance (AMA) Programs. In FY2005, the request was to limit the WRP to 200,000 acres ($295 million), EQIP to $985 million, WHIP to $59 million, FPP to $120 million, and CSP to $209 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and AMA Programs. In FY2006, the request was to limit the WRP to 200,000 acres ($321 million), EQIP to $1.0 billion, WHIP to $60 million, FPP to $84 million, Biomass Research and Development to $12 million, and CSP to $274 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and AMA Programs. In FY2007, the request is to limit EQIP to $1.0 billion, GSWP to $51 million, WHIP to $55 million, FPP to $50 million, Biomass Research and Development to $12 million, and CSP to $342 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and AMA Programs. While Congress has reduced funding for some mandatory conservation programs, either in support of an Administration request or on its own, the reductions did not exceed 10% of the total until FY2005. However, the gap between authorized levels and actual amounts continues to grow. As a percentage, this gap has grown from 2.4% of the total authorized amount in FY2003 to 12.7% in FY2006. Even with these changes, however, actual total funding has risen almost $720 million over the same four-year time period, which is an increase of almost 25% from the FY2003 authorization. Reductions have not been uniform among programs. The largest mandatory program, the CRP, has not been limited in any way by appropriators since the 2002 farm bill was enacted. The second-largest program, EQIP, has absorbed the largest reductions from authorized levels, totaling $396 million between FY2003 and FY2006. Funding for a third program, the CSP, has been amended four times since 2002. As initially enacted, it was the first true conservation entitlement program; that is, any individual who met the eligibility requirements would be accepted into the program. Congress has capped CSP and then repeatedly reduced the cap to fund other activities, usually disaster assistance. More generally, the table shows that reductions have varied from year to year and program to program since 2002. At one extreme, the Watershed Rehabilitation Program has received no mandatory funding in any year (it is one of the five conservation programs authorized to receive discretionary appropriations as well, and those have been provided), and at the other extreme, the CRP has not been limited in any way. Some of the programs have unusual characteristics that affect how they are treated for budget purposes, as noted in the table footnotes. For example, the Grasslands Reserve and Klamath River Basin Programs each have a total authorized level that is not subdivided by fiscal year in the authorizing legislation. For those programs, the amount that was spent each year (not the remaining lifetime authorization) is included for purposes of calculating the percentage by which funding is reduced. As a result of the many variations in how these programs are authorized (some in acres and others in dollars, and some as a total amount and others by year), there are several alternative ways to calculate the annual and total reduction from the authorized level. However, all of these calculations lead to the same general set of observations. First, overall funding for the suite of mandatory agriculture conservation programs has been reduced each year. Second, the magnitude by which this suite of programs is being reduced has been growing each year. Third, these reductions may still be significant to current or potential beneficiaries of those program. Fourth, even with the reductions, overall funding for the group of mandatory programs has continued to rise. Finally, funding for the discretionary agricultural conservation programs varies more from year to year, with much larger percentage reductions than the mandatory programs in some years. Greater variation in funding for discretionary programs supports the view of conservation proponents that using the mandatory approach has been a more successful and predictable approach to conservation program funding in recent years. (For more information on each of these programs, CRS Report RL32940, Agriculture Conservation Programs: A Scorecard , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] (pdf).) When considering whether reductions in mandatory funding for conservation programs compromise the conservation effort, three points are relevant. First, a measure of how conservation funding is viewed in relation to other agriculture funding was provided in the FY2006 reconciliation process, which required the agriculture committees to reduce total USDA mandatory program funding by $3.0 billion over five years, including a reduction of $176 million in FY2006. Conservation provided $934 million of those savings, with no reductions for FY2006. This amount is about 25% of the total reduction that was enacted, $3.7 billion over five years. The savings came from lowering caps on spending for CSP and EQIP in future years (which also required authorizing them beyond FY2007), and eliminating unspent funds for the Watershed Rehabilitation Program carried over from earlier years. Part of the debate was whether conservation is being asked to bear a disproportionate share of these reductions. (For more information, see CRS Report RS22086, Agriculture and FY2006 Budget Reconciliation , by [author name scrubbed] .) Second, it appears highly likely that reductions to mandatory program spending at the current scale will continue. Reductions have been in every administration request and annual appropriations bill since FY2003. It is less certain, however, whether these reductions will continue to grow as a percentage of the total. Future change will depend on both congressional support for conservation specifically, and broader pressures that influence overall federal spending. It is likely that the affected programs and the magnitude of the reductions will continue to vary from year to year, making it difficult to forecast the future based on the past. Third, supporters of conservation programs may look for ways to address the challenge of spending reductions in the next farm bill. However, several broader forces may make it difficult to authorize higher funding levels or to protect current funding levels for these conservation programs. One force may be broad efforts to control federal spending. A second force may be competition among various agriculture constituencies for limited funds; the FY2006 reconciliation process provided an indication of how Congress will treat conservation when it must make decisions based on this competition. A third force may be limits on the capacity of federal conservation agencies, at current staffing levels and with the current approaches, to plan and install all the conservation practices that additional funding would support, and it seems likely that increasing staff levels in federal agencies to provide more conservation will not be an option.

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 authorized large increases in mandatory funding for several agricultural conservation programs. Most of these programs expire in FY2007, and the 110th Congress is likely to address future funding levels in a farm bill. Since FY2002, Congress has acted, through the appropriations process, to limit funding for some of these programs below authorized levels. It limited total funding for all the programs to 97.6% of the authorized total in FY2003, and the percentage declined annually to 87.3% in FY2006. Program supporters decry these growing limitations as reductions that compromise the intent of the farm bill. Others counter that, even with the limitations, overall conservation funding has grown substantially, from almost $3.1 billion in FY2003 to almost $3.8 billion in FY2006. This report reviews the funding history of the programs since the 2002 farm bill was enacted. It will be updated periodically.

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. Members of the House of Representatives typically set the terms and conditions of employment for staff in their offices. This includes job titles, duties, and rates of pay, subject to a maximum level, and resources available to them to carry out their official duties. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. Publicly available resources do not provide aggregated congressional staff pay data in a readily retrievable form. The most recent staff compensation report was issued in 2010, which, like previous compensation reports, relied on anonymous, self-reported survey data. Pay information in this report is based on the House Statement of Disbursements (SOD), published quarterly by the Chief Administrative Officer, as collated by LegiStorm, a private entity that provides some congressional data by subscription. Data in this report are based on official House reports, which afford the opportunity to use consistently collected data from a single source. Additionally, this report provides annual data, which allows for observations about the nature of House Member staff compensation over time. This report provides pay data for 12 staff position titles that are typically used in House Members' offices. The positions include the following: Caseworker Chief of Staff District Director Executive Assistant Field Representative Legislative Assistant Legislative Correspondent Legislative Director Office Manager Press Secretary Scheduler Staff Assistant House Member staff pay data for the years 2001-2015 were developed based on a random sampling of staff for each position in each year. In order to be included, House staff had to hold a position with the same job title in the Member's office for the entire calendar year. For each year, the SOD reports pay data for five time periods: January 1 and 2; January 3-March 31; April 1-June 30; July 1-September 30; and October 1-December 31. The aggregate pay of those five periods equals the annual pay of a congressional staff member. For each year, 2001-2015, a random sample of 45 staff for each position, and who did not receive pay from any other congressional employing authority, was taken. Every recorded payment ascribed to those staff for the calendar year is included. Data collected for this report may differ from an employee's stated annual salary due to the inclusion of overtime, bonuses, or other payments in addition to base salary paid in the course of a year. For some positions, it was not possible to identify 45 employees who held that title for the entire year. In circumstances when data for 18 or fewer staff were identified for a position, this report provides no data. Generally, data provided in this report are based on no more than three observations per Member office per year, and only one per office per position each year. Pay data for staff working in Senators' offices are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014 . Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014 , and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014 , respectively. There may be some advantages to relying on official salary expenditure data instead of survey findings, but data presented here are subject to some challenges that could affect the findings or their interpretation. Some of the concerns include the following: There is a lack of data for first-term Members in the first session of a Congress. Authority to use the Member Representational Allowance (MRA) for the previous year expires January 2, and new MRA authority begins on January 3. As a consequence, no data are available for first-term Members of the House in the first session of a Congress. Pay data provide no insight into the education, work experience, position tenure, full- or part-time status of staff, or other potential explanations for levels of compensation. Data do not differentiate between staff based in Washington, DC, district offices, or both. Member offices that do not utilize any of the 12 job position titles or their variants, or whose pay data were not reported consistently, are excluded. Potential differences could exist in the job duties of positions with the same title. Aggregation of pay by job title rests on the assumption that staff with the same title carry out similar tasks. Given the wide discretion congressional employing authorities have in setting the terms and conditions of employment, there may be differences in the duties of similarly titled staff that could have effects on their levels of pay. Tables in this section provide background information on House pay practices, comparative data for each position, and detailed pay data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides the maximum payable rates for House Member staff since 2001 in both nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars. Constant dollar calculations throughout the report are based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for various years, expressed in constant, 2016 dollars. Table 2 provides the available cumulative percentage changes in pay in constant 2016 dollars for each of the 12 positions, Members of Congress, and salaries paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas. Table 3 - Table 14 provide tabular pay data for each House Member office staff position. The numbers of staff for which data were counted are identified as observations in the data tables. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, 2001-2015, in nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars; a comparison, at 5-, 10-, and 15- year intervals from 2015, of the cumulative percentage change in median pay for that position to changes in pay, in constant 2016 dollars, of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay in 2016 dollars, in $10,000 increments. Between 2011 and 2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, increased for one position, office manager, by 0.22%, and decreased for 11 staff positions, ranging from a -3.53% decrease for field representatives to a -25.83% decrease for executive assistants. This may be compared to changes over the same period to Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%. Between 2006 and 2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, decreased for all 12 staff positions, ranging from a -1.99% decrease for legislative directors to a -24.82% decrease for executive assistants. This may be compared to changes over the same period to Members of Congress, -10.41%, and General Schedule, DC, -0.13%. Between 2001 and 2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 4.27% increase for chiefs of staff to a -23.35% decrease for executive assistants. Of the 12 positions, one saw a pay increase, while 11 saw declines. This may be compared to changes over the same period to the pay of Members of Congress, -10.40%, and General Schedule, DC, 7.36%.

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 12 staff position titles that are typically used in House Members' offices. The positions include the following: Caseworker, Chief of Staff, District Director, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Office Manager, Press Secretary, Scheduler, and Staff Assistant. Tables provide tabular pay data for each House Member office staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, 2001-2015; a comparison, at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from 2015, of the cumulative percentage change in pay of that position to changes in pay of Members of Congress and salaried federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (2011-2015), the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, increased for one position, office manager, by 0.22%, and decreased for 11 staff positions, ranging from a -3.53% decrease for field representatives to a -25.83% decrease for executive assistants. This may be compared to changes over the same period to Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%. Pay data for staff working in Senators' offices are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014, and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, respectively. Information about the duration of staff employment is available in CRS Report R44683, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44685, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senate Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44682, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2006-2016, and CRS Report R44684, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, 2006-2016.

E nacted over three decades ago, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs or activities. Although Title IX bars recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of sex in a wide range of educational programs or activities, both the statute and the implementing regulations have long permitted school districts to operate single-sex schools. In 2006, however, the Department of Education (ED) issued Title IX regulations that, for the first time, authorized schools to operate individual classes on a single-sex basis. The issuance of these regulations has raised a number of legal questions regarding whether single-sex classrooms pose constitutional problems under the equal protection clause or conflict with statutory requirements under Title IX or under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA). Under Title IX, "No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Although the statute prohibits a broad range of discriminatory actions, such as bias in college sports and sexual harassment in schools, Title IX does contain several exceptions. One of these exceptions provides that, with respect to admissions, Title IX applies only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education, unless the latter has traditionally admitted students of only one sex. As a result, Title IX does not apply to admissions to nonvocational elementary or secondary schools, nor does it apply to certain institutions of undergraduate higher education. This means that Title IX permits public or private single-sex elementary and secondary schools, as well as some single-sex colleges. This exception for single-sex schools has existed since the legislation was enacted, and "the legislative history indicates that Congress excepted elementary and secondary schools from Title IX because of the potential benefits of single-sex education." Less clear is whether Congress intended to permit coeducational schools to establish individual classes on a single-sex basis, as ED's regulations now allow. Noting that some studies demonstrate that students learn better in a single-sex educational environment, ED issued new Title IX regulations in 2006 that provide recipients of educational funding with additional flexibility in providing single-sex classes. The regulations apply to both public and private elementary and secondary schools but not to vocational schools. Specifically, the regulations permit recipients to offer single-sex classes and extracurricular activities "if (1) the purpose of the class or extracurricular activity is achievement of an important governmental or educational objective, and (2) the single-sex nature of the class or extracurricular activity is substantially related to achievement of that objective." In its regulations, ED identified two objectives that would meet the first requirement: (1) to provide a diversity of educational options to parents and students, and (2) to meet the particular, identified educational needs of students. According to the regulations, any schools that choose to provide single-sex classes must meet certain requirements designed to ensure nondiscrimination. For example, participation in single-sex classes must be completely voluntary, recipients must treat male and female students in an "evenhanded" manner, and a recipient's justification must be genuine. These latter requirements mean than a school's use of overly broad sex-based generalizations in connection with offering single-sex education would be sex discrimination. Thus, recipients are prohibited from providing single-sex classes on the basis of generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of either sex. In addition, although schools must always provide a "substantially equal" coeducational class in the same subject, they are not always required to provide single-sex classes for the excluded sex, unless such classes would be required to ensure nondiscriminatory implementation. If recipients can show that students of the excluded sex are not interested in enrolling in a single-sex class or do not have educational needs that can be addressed by such a class, then they are not required to offer a corresponding single-sex class to the excluded sex. Although schools must offer classes that are substantially equal, these classes do not have to be identical. In comparing classes under the "substantially equal" requirement, ED will consider a range of factors, including, but not limited to, admissions policies; the educational benefits provided, including the quality, range, and content of curriculum and other services, and the quality and availability of books, instructional materials, and technology; the qualifications of faculty and staff; the quality, accessibility, and availability of facilities and resources; geographic accessibility; and intangible features, such as the reputation of the faculty. In order to ensure compliance with the regulations, recipients are required to periodically conduct self-evaluations, and students or their parents who believe the regulations have been violated may file a complaint with the school or with ED. ED also has the authority to conduct periodic compliance reviews. According to the National Association for Single Sex Public Education, there are currently at least 514 public schools in the United States that offer single-sex education in the form of single-sex schools or classrooms. As noted above, the enactment of the new regulations raises questions regarding whether ED has the statutory authority under Title IX to authorize single-sex classrooms and whether the regulations comply with the statutory requirements of the EEOA. Although Title IX explicitly authorizes single-sex schools, the statute is silent with respect to the question of single-sex classrooms within schools that are otherwise coeducational. As a result, it is possible that the regulations could face a legal challenge on the grounds that ED exceeded its statutory authority. Any court ruling as to the validity of ED's regulations would hinge on the level of deference paid to the agency decision by the reviewing court. The standard for judicial review of such agency action was delineated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council . There, the Supreme Court established that judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute consists of two related questions. First, the court must determine whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue at hand. If the intent of Congress is clear, the inquiry is concluded, since the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress must be respected. However, if the court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue at hand, the court must determine "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." It is important to note that the second prong does not require a court to "conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." The practical effect of this maxim is that a reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute must be accorded deference, even if the court believes the agency is incorrect. Ultimately, given Title IX's silence with respect to single-sex classrooms, it's possible, but not certain, that a court could determine that the statutory language was ambiguous enough to support ED's interpretation of the statute. Although the EEOA contains a congressional finding that "the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to schools solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment," the statute's prohibition against "the deliberate segregation" of students applies only to segregation on the basis of race, color, or national origin, but not sex. Therefore, ED's regulations regarding single-sex classrooms do not appear to conflict with the EEOA. Over the years, several courts have considered the question of whether single-sex education violates the EEOA. Although these cases, which are few in number, have contemplated single-sex schools rather than single-sex classes, they are instructive. For example, in Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia , the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered a challenge filed by a female student who was denied admission to an all-male public high school in Philadelphia. Because the statute did not explicitly prohibit the segregation of schools by sex and because the corresponding all-female high school was found to provide equal educational opportunities for girls, the court rejected the EEOA challenge. In United States v. Hinds County School Board , however, the Fifth Circuit held that the EEOA prohibited a Mississippi school district from splitting the four schools in the district into two all-male schools and two-all female schools. The court distinguished the case from the Vorchheimer decision, noting that Vorchheimer involved two voluntary single-sex schools in an otherwise coeducational school system while the Mississippi school district in question involved the mandatory sex segregation of all of the schools, and therefore all of the students, in the system. Read together, these cases indicate that the EEOA may permit single-sex schools as long as coeducational options are available. Such an interpretation would mean that the new Title IX regulatory requirements are consistent with the EEOA. As noted above, the 2006 Title IX regulations may raise constitutional issues for public schools that offer single-sex classes. Under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the government from denying to any individual the equal protection of the law, governmental classifications that are based on sex receive heightened scrutiny from the courts. Laws that rely on sex-based classifications will survive such scrutiny only if they are substantially related to achieving an important government objective. Currently, there are only two Supreme Court cases that address the equal protection implications of sex-segregated schools. Although both of these cases occurred in a higher education setting, they provide some guidance that may be applicable to the elementary and secondary education context. In the earlier case, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan , the Court held that the exclusion of an individual from a publicly funded school because of his or her sex violates the equal protection clause unless the government can show that the sex-based classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Because the Court found that the state had not met this burden, it struck down Mississippi's policy of excluding men from its state-supported nursing school for women. The Court's most recent constitutional pronouncement with respect to sex discrimination in education occurred in United States v. Virginia . In that case, the Court held that the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a public institution of higher education designed to prepare men for military and civilian leadership, was unconstitutional, despite the fact that the state had created a parallel school for women. Although the Court reiterated that sex-based classifications must be substantially related to an important government interest, the Court also appeared to conduct a more searching form of inquiry by requiring the state to establish an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its actions. According to the Court, this justification must be genuine and must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the talents, capacities, or preferences of men and women. In applying this standard, the Court rejected the two arguments that Virginia advanced in support of VMI's exclusion of women, namely, that the single-sex education offered by VMI contributed to a diversity of educational approaches in Virginia and that VMI employed a unique method of training that would be destroyed if women were admitted. In rejecting VMI's first argument, the Court concluded that VMI had not been established or maintained to promote educational diversity. In fact, VMI's "historic and constant plan" was to offer a unique educational benefit to only men, rather than to complement other Virginia institutions by providing a single-sex educational option. With respect to Virginia's second argument, the Court expressed concern over the exclusion of women from VMI because of generalizations about their ability. While the Court believed that VMI's method of instruction did promote important goals, it concluded that the exclusion of women was not substantially related to achieving those goals. After determining that VMI's exclusion of women violated constitutional equal protection requirements, the Court reviewed the state's remedy, a separate school for women known as the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL). Unlike VMI, VWIL did not use an adversarial method of instruction because it was believed to be inappropriate for most women, and VWIL lacked the faculty, facilities, and course offerings available at VMI. Because VWIL was not a comparable single-sex institution for women, the Court concluded that it was an inadequate remedy for the state's equal protection violations, and VMI subsequently became coeducational. In light of the VMI case, it appears that schools that establish single-sex classrooms under ED's Title IX regulations may face some legal hurdles but are not necessarily constitutionally barred from establishing such classes. Consistent with the Court's ruling, the Title IX regulations require schools that wish to establish single-sex classes to demonstrate that such classes serve an important governmental objective and are substantially related to achievement of that objective. What is unclear is whether the objectives approved by the Title IX regulations—to provide a diversity of educational options to parents and students and to meet the particular, identified educational needs of students—would be sufficiently "important" to pass judicial review. Although the Virginia Court rejected VMI's diversity rationale, it did so because it found that VMI's justification was not genuine. As a result, the Court has not ruled on whether diversity is an important governmental objective in cases involving sex-based classifications, although the Court, which stated in the VMI case that it does not question "the State's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities," may be inclined to uphold the diversity rationale with regard to the new Title IX regulations. Moreover, the Virginia Court ruled that the parallel school Virginia established for women—VWIL—was not a sufficient remedy for the exclusion of women from VMI because it lacked the faculty, facilities, and course offerings available at VMI. In contrast, the Title IX regulations require schools that offer single-sex classes to provide "substantially equal" classes to the excluded sex. While it's not clear whether the Court would view the "substantially equal" requirement as sufficient to pass constitutional muster, judicial resolution in a given case would most likely depend on the specific facts surrounding a school's single-sex class offerings. Indeed, organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) regularly file lawsuits against schools that provide single-sex education. For example, the ACLU has filed a lawsuit alleging that single-sex classrooms in Breckenridge County, KY violate the Constitution, Title IX, the EEOA, and state antidiscrimination law and that ED's Title IX regulations violate the Constitution, Title IX, and the Administrative Procedures Act.

Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education programs or activities, school districts have long been permitted to operate single-sex schools. In 2006, the Department of Education (ED) published Title IX regulations that, for the first time, authorized schools to establish single-sex classrooms as well. This report evaluates the regulations in light of statutory requirements under Title IX and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) and in consideration of constitutional equal protection requirements.

As the role of lawyers in most countries has evolved from advocates regulated by local courts and their rules to legal advisors for transactions in economic activities, the increase in cross-border provision of legal services led to the inclusion of such services in the trade agreements and negotiations under the WTO, over the objections of some countries. The scope of agreements under the WTO has expanded over the years to cover issues and sectors not traditionally considered to fall within trade laws and regulations through periodic multilateral negotiations that are called "rounds," the latest being the Doha Round. The commitments the United States has made and may make in current and future negotiations could affect domestic regulation of the legal profession, including ethical issues. Legal services are classified as part of professional services, which in turn are under the business services sector covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), concluded as part of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade that created the WTO. Under the GATS, WTO countries undertake obligations with regard to all service sectors, including most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) under GATS Article II; transparency under GATS Article III; the notice and publication of relevant domestic laws and measures; judicial or administrative review of domestic regulation under GATS Article VI(2); and recognition agreements under GATS Article VII. In addition to the general obligations under the GATS, the United States included legal services in its schedule of commitments under the GATS; not all WTO countries included legal services in their schedules. Such schedules set forth specific additional obligations made by a WTO country with respect to specific service sectors, including any limitations or qualifications to obligations undertaken. These obligations include market access under GATS Article XVI, national treatment under GATS Article XVII, and any other additional commitments under GATS Article XVIII, including those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters. A schedule also summarizes obligations as they apply via four modes of supply—(1) cross-border supply, the ability of non-resident service suppliers to supply services cross-border into a WTO country; (2) consumption abroad, the ability of a WTO country's residents to buy services located in another WTO country; (3) commercial presence, the ability of foreign service suppliers to establish a branch or representative office in a WTO country, sometimes referred to as the right of establishment; and (4) movement of natural persons, the ability of foreign individuals to enter and stay in a WTO country's territory to supply a service. The U.S. schedule sets forth its obligations in terms of limitations and qualifications under the laws and/or rules governing the practice of law by foreign lawyers and foreign law firms in each of the States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. territories, and before certain federal agencies, such as patent prosecution before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). As part of the sectors subject to WTO negotiations in the Doha Round, legal services are potentially subject to changes. Indeed, several members have sought concessions from the United States regarding legal services. Such changes could affect the laws and rules governing foreign lawyers and foreign law firms in each of the 50-plus jurisdictions in the United States and the federal agencies. Such laws and rules comprise the bar admission of lawyers who are admitted to practice in a foreign jurisdiction or who are foreign nationals and the eligibility of foreign legal consultants and foreign firms to provide legal services in the United States. Rules regarding foreign legal consultants may address the applicability to such consultants of ethics rules and disciplinary procedures for attorneys. The European Union, which together with the United States has the most active trade in legal services among WTO members, is seeking several new legal services concessions from the United States. One significant change sought by the European Union is to eliminate the requirement in the U.S. states and territories that qualified U.S. lawyers providing legal services must be "natural persons," not law firms or other organizational/corporate persons. This apparently is not a requirement in some other WTO countries. The EU and the United States also propose eliminating the U.S. requirement that an attorney admitted to the patent bar for the purpose of prosecuting a patent before the USPTO must be a U.S. citizen. In addition, there has been consideration of whether disciplines (WTO parlance for certain guidelines) on domestic regulation in the legal services sector should be adopted and applied. This may be accomplished by negotiation of a discipline specific to legal services or by application of the existing Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector to legal services. Under GATS Article VI(4), disciplines on domestic regulation are developed "[w]ith a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services." Disciplines aim to ensure that requirements are not more burdensome than necessary to ensure quality of service and that licensing procedures are not per se restrictions on the supply of the service. After the accountancy disciplines were developed and adopted, there was active consideration and debate about whether they should be extended to legal services, which the International Bar Association recommended against. Any substantive Doha Round concessions or any agreement to a legal services discipline by the United States would obligate it, under GATS Article I(3)(a), to take reasonable measures to ensure that each of its political subdivisions observes such agreements. This could pose federalism issues, since the rules governing practice in a state are a matter for the highest court of a state or for its legislature and not traditionally a matter for federal legislation or policy. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) does not make WTO commitments with which the United States is not in a position to comply. This is the reason the current schedule of commitments notes obligations in terms of which states have certain requirements, such as in-state residency for licensure. In accordance with §102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), the USTR has consulted with several states concerning the negotiating position of the United States on legal services, apparently to consider what changes these states would be amenable to observing. If the United States were to commit to liberalizing the rules for foreign lawyers or firms to provide legal services in the United States, any related complaint against the United States could be brought only by another WTO country and would be resolved through the WTO dispute settlement system. An individual foreign attorney or firm could not bring a complaint because disputes can only be brought by one WTO country against another WTO country. Nor could an individual attorney or firm bring a suit domestically for noncompliance with a WTO obligation. WTO agreements are not self-executing international agreements, so obligations under those agreements must be implemented through domestic legislation or other domestic measures. Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) provides that only the United States may bring an action to declare a state law invalid because it is inconsistent with an Uruguay Round agreement and that no private person may challenge a state or local law or other measure on the grounds that it is not consistent with an Uruguay Round agreement. The global nature of business, including legal services, and its continued growth has necessitated the consideration and adoption of rules concerning multijurisdictional practice of law. In 2007, 71 persons were licensed as foreign legal consultants in the United States across 16 jurisdictions. Twenty-nine jurisdictions have a rule permitting the licensing of foreign legal consultants. Some adopted a version of the ABA Model Rule on Foreign Legal Consultants (first approved in 1993, most recently revised in 2006), itself modeled on the New York rule first adopted in 1974. Others adopted their own rule differing significantly from the ABA Model Rule. The ABA Model Rule provides that foreign legal consultants may be licensed to provide certain legal services in a jurisdiction without an examination, if they are members in good standing in a recognized legal profession in a foreign country. They are not actually admitted as members of the bar in the host jurisdiction in the United States and are prohibited from providing certain services, such as appearing in court to represent a client or giving advice on U.S. law or a state law in the United States. Foreign legal consultants would be able to provide advice on the laws of their foreign home countries. Additionally, five jurisdictions have rules that expressly refer to temporary practice by foreign lawyers, some similar to the ABA Model Rule for Temporary Practice by Foreign Lawyers (approved in 2002). This ABA Model Rule provides that foreign lawyers not admitted in a U.S. jurisdiction may provide legal services in that jurisdiction in certain circumstances, including, among others, where they are working with a lawyer admitted to practice in that jurisdiction or where they are advising clients with regard to legal proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction where they are admitted to practice. The WTO Secretariat has noted that WTO countries generally require foreign legal consultants to submit to the local code of ethics as a prerequisite to licensing in the host country. The WTO has observed that the legal profession does not consider this a major obstacle to trade in legal services. There are certain common principles shared by the national legal ethical codes, including rules on conflicts of interest, loyalty to the client, and confidentiality. The WTO has observed, for example, that the EU has developed a common legal ethics code applicable to some EU countries; the U.S., Japanese and European lawyers' professional associations have compared their ethical codes and found no serious differences; and a bilateral agreement exists between the ABA and its counterpart for England and Wales with regard to mutual recognition on matters such as ethical standards. However, the agreements of such associations are not binding on the U.S. jurisdictions whose courts or legislatures would implement such recognition in conjunction with the bar disciplinary authorities. Negotiations in the Doha Round of the WTO could help resolve ethical issues that have arisen in the cross-border provision of legal services. The prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law is a basic tenet of U.S. legal ethics; therefore, any new agreement under WTO auspices that may affect the regulation of legal services providers admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction could have implications for ethical compliance. However, U.S. legal ethics rules or codes have recognized that business demands and the mobility of society necessitate refraining from unreasonable territorial limitations. Any liberalizing of licensing requirements could facilitate the operations of law firms. ABA Opinion 01-423, dated September 21, 2001, found that U.S. law firms may include partners who are foreign lawyers, as long as the arrangement complies with U.S. and foreign law, and the foreigners are members of a recognized legal profession in the foreign jurisdiction. It cautioned that U.S. lawyers must avoid assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by foreign lawyers in the United States. ABA Opinion 01-423 further noted that many countries recognize only a narrow attorney-client privilege. Some legal authorities cite the opinion in a European Union (EU) case, Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission , as supporting the proposition that attorney-client privilege does not apply to attorneys not admitted to practice in the EU. In response, the ABA passed a resolution that attorney-client privilege should apply to non-European Union attorneys. In a more recent case, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission , the EU Court of First Instance declined to consider whether the discriminatory non-recognition of privilege with respect to non-EU lawyers violated certain EU principles. A paper summarizing a discussion on Cross-Border Travel Traps: Protecting Client Confidences at the Frontier at the ABA Section of International Law 2007 Fall Meeting discusses the problems posed for U.S. attorneys by the narrower European view of profession privilege/confidentiality with regard to attorney-client communications. With regard to disciplinary measures and proceedings, U.S. legal professional groups have submitted letters to the USTR supporting local disciplinary jurisdiction over foreign attorneys and disciplinary reciprocity with foreign jurisdictions in Doha Round negotiations.

This report provides a broad overview of the treatment of legal services under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and its potential effect on laws and rules governing the provision of legal services by foreign lawyers in the United States and legal ethics rules.

In the more than 15 years since gaining independence, Estonia's political scene has been characterized by the creation and dissolution of numerous parties and shifting alliances among them. This has often resulted in politics resembling a game of "musical chairs." Estonian governments have lasted on average only slightly longer than a year each. Nevertheless, due to a wide-ranging policy consensus, Estonia has followed a remarkably consistent general course—building a democracy, a free-market economy, and integrating into NATO and the European Union (EU). Estonia's current government, formed after March 2007 parliamentary elections, is led by Prime Minister Andrus Ansip of the center-right Reform Party. His coalition partners are the conservative and nationalist Pro Patria-Res Publica Union and the center-left Social Democratic Party. The government's priorities include cutting taxes, reducing business and labor regulation, and increasing spending on child care and education. In September 2006, Toomas Hendrik Ilves was chosen as Estonia's President by an electoral college composed of members of the Estonian parliament and local government representatives. The result was a blow to the left-of-center Center Party and People's Union, which had aggressively campaigned for the re-election of incumbent Arnold Ruutel. Ilves was born in the United States. After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, he moved to Estonia, and later served as Ambassador to the United States and Foreign Minister. In these posts he became known as an outspoken defender of Estonia's interests, especially against Russian encroachment. The post of President is largely ceremonial, but it plays a role in defining Estonia's international image, as well as in expressing the country's values and national unity. Estonia has one of the most dynamic economies in central Europe, and indeed in Europe as a whole. Its real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 11.4% in 2006 and 9.9% in the first quarter of 2007. Due to its use of a currency board that strictly ties Estonia's kroon to the euro, Estonia has pursued a stringent monetary policy. However, inflation remains significant, at a 5.5% rate in April 2007, on a year-on-year basis, a result of increasing energy prices and rapid wage growth. Unemployment in April 2007 was estimated at 5.3%, one of the lowest rates in the EU. The country is on target for a budget surplus of 1.9% of GDP in 2007, due in part to prudent fiscal policies and rising revenues fostered by economic growth. Estonia has a flat income tax rate of 22%. The new government has pledged to cut the tax rate by 1% per year until it reaches 18% in 2011. President Bush praised Estonia's tax system during a visit to the country in November 2006. According to the State Department, Estonia's "excellent" business climate, along with its sound economic policies, have ensured strong inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Estonia was ranked 12 th in the world in the 2007 Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. The survey praised the country for the fairness and transparency of its business regulations and foreign investment codes, and the independence of its judiciary in enforcing property rights. Corruption remains a problem in Estonia, but significantly less so than in other countries in the region. Total FDI inflows to Estonia in 2004 were $850 million, a large amount for a very small country. Companies owned in whole or part by foreigners account for one-third of the country's GDP and over half of its exports. The country has a modern banking system, largely controlled by banks from the Nordic countries. It has developed an innovative technology sector. Estonians played a key role in developing software for the popular Skype Internet phone. Prime Minister Ansip gave President Bush a Skype phone during his visit to Estonia in November 2006. Estonia achieved its two key foreign policy objectives when it joined NATO and the European Union in 2004. Estonia continues to try to bring its armed forces up to NATO standards, and has maintained defense spending at over 2% of GDP. Estonia was perhaps the best prepared of the candidate states in central and eastern Europe to join the EU, due to its successful economic reforms. However, Estonia still lags behind most EU members in many areas, and receives substantial EU funding to address such issues as border security, public infrastructure, and the environment. Estonia has had to put off plans to adopt the euro as its currency until 2011, due to an inflation rate above the EU's strict criteria for euro zone membership. Estonia enjoys a close relationship with its Baltic neighbors and the Nordic countries. It has acted as an advocate for democratic and pro-Western forces in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and other countries bordering Russia. Estonia's relations with Russia remain difficult. Russia claims that Estonia violates the human rights of its Russian-speaking minority, which makes up about 30% of the country's population. While international organizations have generally rejected these charges, many Russian-speakers remain poorly integrated into Estonian society, despite Estonian government efforts to deal with the problem. Some 130,000 Russian-speakers in Estonia are stateless, about 10% of the population. Over 100,000 more have adopted Russian citizenship. They are denied Estonian citizenship by Estonian law because they or their ancestors were not Estonian citizens before the Soviet takeover of Estonia in 1940 and they have not successfully completed naturalization procedures, which require a basic knowledge of the Estonian language. As a result, a significant portion of Estonia's population cannot vote in national elections and lack some other rights and opportunities accorded to citizens. In addition, at least part of the Russian-speaking population suffers from higher unemployment and lower living standards than ethnic Estonians do, due to a variety of factors, including inability to speak Estonian, which is required by Estonian law for many jobs. Russia has also expressed irritation at NATO's role in patrolling the airspace of Estonia and the other two Baltic states, and Estonia's failure to join the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. The role of Estonia in the transit of Russian oil through its ports, once key to Estonia's economy, may be reduced by the decision by the Russian government-controlled Transneft oil transit company to expand the use of its own port facilities at Primorsk in Russia. Estonia is heavily dependent on Russia for oil and natural gas supplies. Estonia and other states in Central Europe have expressed concern about the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline which, when completed, will link Germany directly with Russia via the Baltic Sea floor. In addition to environmental concerns, they fear Russia will gain additional political and economic leverage over the region once Russia has an alternative to key energy infrastructure that runs through their territories. Russo-Estonian relations deteriorated sharply in April 2007, when Estonia moved "the Bronze Soldier," a World War II-era statue of a Soviet soldier from a park in the capital, Tallinn, to another location, along with the bodies of Red Army soldiers buried nearby. The move provoked a furious reaction among some ethnic Russians in Estonia, and from Russian government leaders, who viewed the action as dishonoring Red Army soldiers who liberated Estonia from the Nazis. For their part, many Estonians see the "liberation" as the exchange of Nazi domination for a Soviet one, and not worthy of prominent commemoration. In addition to harsh verbal attacks from Moscow, harassment of Estonia's ambassador to Moscow by youth groups with close ties to the Kremlin, and violent demonstrations by hundreds of ethnic Russians in Estonia, Estonia's Internet infrastructure came under heavy attack from hackers in late April and early May. Estonian officials said some assaults came from Russian government web servers, although many others came from all over the world. These cyberattacks were particularly damaging to Estonia, which has integrated the Internet into public life perhaps more than almost any country in the world. Estonia has asked for Russia's cooperation in investigating the origin of the cyberattacks. The Russian government has denied involvement in the attacks. At the invitation of the Estonian government, NATO cyber experts visited Estonia in the wake of the attacks to assess their scope and discuss with their Estonian counterparts how to deal with possible future attacks. Estonian officials have called for greater cooperation in the EU and NATO to find practical ways of combating cyberattacks. They note that the EU and NATO have yet to define what constitutes a cyberattack and what the responsibilities of member states are in such cases. Russia also appears to have imposed unannounced economic sanctions on Estonia; Estonian railway officials reported a sharp drop in freight traffic from Russia, and Russia limited traffic over a key highway bridge between the two countries. Russia attributed these actions to repair work and safety concerns. Observers have noted that these actions fit a pattern in Russian foreign policy toward neighboring countries of interrupting energy, transportation, and other links under various pretexts to punish these countries for perceived anti-Russian behavior. U.S. officials have expressed concern about Russia's statements and actions surrounding the statue's relocation. On June 14, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said that" threats, attacks, [and] sanctions, should have no place" in Russo-Baltic relations and that warned that the Baltic states "will never be left alone again, whether threatened by old, new, or virtual threats..." The United States and Estonia enjoy excellent relations. The United States played a key role in advocating NATO membership for Estonia and the other two Baltic states, against the initial resistance of some European countries, which feared offending Russia. U.S. officials have lauded Estonia's support in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, including its deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Estonia has deployed 105 soldiers to Afghanistan, as part of the International Security Assistance Force, a significant force for a small country. Two Estonian soldiers were killed there in June 2007. There are 40 Estonian soldiers deployed in Iraq. Two Estonian soldiers have died in Iraq. Estonia also contributes troops to EU and NATO-led peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. In November 2006, President Bush visited Estonia. He praised Estonia as a "strong friend and ally of the United States" and expressed appreciation for Estonia's contributions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in training young pro-democracy leaders in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Addressing perhaps the most difficult issue in U.S.-Estonian relations, he pledged to work with Congress to extend the U.S. Visa Waiver program to Estonia and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The program, in which 27 countries (mainly from western Europe) participate, allows persons to visit the United States for business or tourism for up to 90 days without a visa. In order to join the program, a country must have a visa refusal rate of no more than 3% a year, and must also have or plan to have tamper-resistant, machine-readable passport and visa documents. Estonia does not currently meet these standards, although it is attempting to do so. Some believe that Estonians should enjoy visa-free travel to the U.S., in part due to their country's status as an EU member and to their troop contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a meeting in Washington, DC with President Ilves on June 25, 2007, President Bush said that Ilves had "pushed him very hard" on the visa waiver issue. President Bush added that he would continue to seek Congressional action on extending the Visa Waiver program to Estonia. President Bush said that the two leaders had also discussed the cyberattacks on Estonia and that Ilves had suggested that a NATO "center of excellence" be based in Estonia to study cybersecurity issues. Estonia "graduated" from U.S. economic assistance after FY1996, due to its success in economic reform, but the United States continues to provide other aid to Estonia. In FY2006, Estonia received $5.8 million in U.S. aid, mainly in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and IMET military education and training funds to improve Estonia's interoperability with U.S. and other NATO forces in peacekeeping and other missions. The Administration requested $4.1 million for the same purposes for FY2008.

After restoration of its independence in 1991, following decades of Soviet rule, Estonia made rapid strides toward establishing a democratic political system and a dynamic, free market economy. It achieved two key foreign policy goals when it joined NATO and the European Union in 2004. However, relations with Russia remain difficult. Estonia suffered cyberattacks against its Internet infrastructure in April and May 2007 during a controversy about the removal of a Soviet-era statue in Estonia. Estonian leaders believe the cyberattacks may have been instigated by Moscow. Estonia and the United States have excellent relations. Estonia has deployed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and plays a significant role in efforts to encourage democracy and a pro-Western orientation among post-Soviet countries. This report will be updated as needed.

In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as "tax extenders." Of the 33 temporary tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2016 and extended retroactively through 2017, three are individual income tax provisions. The three individual provisions that expired at the end of 2017 have been included in recent tax extenders packages. The above-the-line deduction for certain higher-education expenses, including qualified tuition and related expenses, was first added as a temporary provision in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ), but has regularly been extended since. The other two individual extender provisions are housing related. The provision allowing homeowners to deduct mortgage insurance premiums was first enacted in 2006 (effective for 2007). The provision allowing qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence to be excluded from income was first enacted in 2007. Both provisions were temporary when first enacted, but in recent years have been extended as part of the tax extenders. In recent years, Congress has chosen to extend most, if not all, recently expired or expiring provisions as part of "tax extender" legislation. The most recent tax extender package is the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123 ). Information on costs associated with extending individual income tax expired provisions is provided in Table 1 . The provisions that were extended in the BBA18 were extended for one year, retroactive for 2017. The estimated cost to make expired provisions permanent is reported by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). The JCT reports estimated deficit effects of extending expired and expiring tax provisions through the 10-year budget window (2018–2027). Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the amount canceled has been included in the taxpayer's gross income. This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income. Canceled (or forgiven) mortgage debt is common with a "short sale." In a short sale, a homeowner agrees to sell their house and transfer the proceeds to the lender in exchange for the lender relieving the homeowner from repaying any debt in excess of the sale proceeds. For example, in a short sale, a homeowner with a $300,000 mortgage may be able to sell their house for only $250,000. The lender would receive the $250,000 from the home sale and forgive the remaining $50,000 in mortgage debt. Lenders report the canceled debt to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) using Form 1099-C. A copy of the 1099-C is also sent to the borrower, who in general must include the amount listed in his or her gross income in the year of discharge. It may be helpful to explain why forgiven debt is viewed as income from an economic perspective in order to understand why it has historically been taxable. Income is a measure of the increase in an individual's purchasing power over a designated period of time. When individuals experience a reduction in their debts, their purchasing power has increased (because they no longer have to make payments). Effectively, their disposable income has increased. From an economic standpoint, it is irrelevant whether a person's debt was reduced via a direct transfer of money to the borrower (e.g., wage income) that was then used to pay down the debt, or whether it was reduced because the lender forgave a portion of the outstanding balance. Both have the same effect, and thus both are subject to taxation. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ), signed into law on December 20, 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income that is associated with a primary residence from taxation. Thus, the act allowed taxpayers who did not qualify for one of several existing exceptions to exclude canceled mortgage debt from gross income. The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Division A of P.L. 110-343 ) extended the exclusion of qualified mortgage debt for debt discharged before January 1, 2013. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) subsequently extended the exclusion through the end of 2013. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Division A of P.L. 113-295 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2014. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2016. The act also allowed for debt discharged after 2016 to be excluded from income if the taxpayer had entered into a binding written agreement to sell his or her house before January 1, 2017. Most recently, the BBA18 ( P.L. 115-123 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. The rationales for extending the exclusion are to minimize hardship for households in distress and lessen the risk that nontax homeowner retention efforts are thwarted by tax policy. It may also be argued that extending the exclusion would continue to assist the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy. Opponents of the exclusion may argue that extending the provision would make debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations. The exclusion may also be viewed by some as unfair, as its benefits depend on whether a homeowner is able to negotiate a debt cancelation, the income tax bracket of the taxpayer, and whether the taxpayer retains ownership of the house following the debt cancellation. The JCT estimated the one-year extension included in the BBA18 would result in a 10-year revenue loss of $2.4 billion (see Table 1 ). Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as any property taxes they pay as long as they itemize their tax deductions. Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ). Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if the homeowner itemized, and if the homeowner's adjusted gross income was below a certain threshold ($55,000 for single, and $110,000 for married filing jointly). Originally, the deduction was only to be available for 2007, but it was extended through 2010 by the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ). The deduction was extended again through 2011 by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ), through the end of 2013 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ), and through the end of 2014 by the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Division A of P.L. 113-295 ). The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), extended the deduction through the end of 2016. Most recently, the BBA18 ( P.L. 115-123 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. A justification for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums is the promotion of homeownership and, relatedly, the recovery of the housing market following the Great Recession (the Great Recession began in December 2007 and lasted to June 2009). Homeownership is often argued to bestow certain benefits to society as a whole, such as higher property values, lower crime, and higher civic participation, among others. Homeownership may also promote a more even distribution of income and wealth, as well as establish greater individual financial security. Last, homeownership may have a positive effect on living conditions, which can lead to a healthier population. With regard to the first justification, it is not clear that the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums has an effect on the homeownership rate. Economists have identified the high transaction costs associated with a home purchase—mostly resulting from the downpayment requirement, but also closing costs—as the primary barrier to homeownership. The ability to deduct insurance premiums does not lower this barrier—most lenders will require mortgage insurance if the borrower's downpayment is less than 20% regardless of whether the premiums are deductible. The deduction may allow buyers to borrow more, however, because they can deduct the higher associated premiums and therefore afford a higher housing payment. Concerning the second justification, it is also not clear that the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums is still needed to assist in the recovery of the housing market. Based on the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Composite Index, home prices have generally increased since the bottom of the market following the Great Recession. In addition, the available housing inventory is now slightly below its historical level. Both of these indicators suggest that the market as a whole is stronger than when the provision was enacted, and that it may no longer be warranted. Economists have noted that owner-occupied housing is already heavily subsidized via tax and nontax programs. To the degree that owner-occupied housing is oversubsidized, extending the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums would lead to a greater misallocation of resources that are directed toward the housing industry. The JCT estimated the one-year extension included in the BBA18 would result in a 10-year revenue loss of $1.1 billion (see Table 1 ). The BBA18 extended the above-the-line deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses through the 2017 tax year. This provision allows taxpayers to deduct up to $4,000 of qualified tuition and related expenses for postsecondary education (both undergraduate and graduate) from their gross income. Expenses that qualify for this deduction include tuition payments and any fees required for enrollment at an eligible education institution. Other expenses, including room and board expenses, are generally not qualifying expenses for this deduction. The deduction is "above-the-line," that is, it is not restricted to itemizers. Individuals who could be claimed as dependents, married persons filing separately, and nonresident aliens who do not elect to be treated as resident aliens do not qualify for the deduction, in part to avoid multiple claims on a single set of expenses. The deduction is reduced by any grants, scholarships, Pell Grants, employer-provided educational assistance, and veterans' educational assistance. The maximum deduction taxpayers can claim depends on their income level. Taxpayers can deduct up to $4,000 if their income is $65,000 or less ($130,000 or less if married filing jointly); or $2,000 if their income is between $65,000 and $80,000 ($130,000 and $160,000 if married filing jointly). Taxpayers with income above $80,000 ($160,000 for married joint filers) are ineligible for the deduction. These income limits are not adjusted for inflation. One criticism of education tax benefits is that the taxpayer is faced with a confusing choice of deductions and credits and tax-favored education savings plans, and that these benefits should be consolidated. Tax reform proposals have consolidated these benefits into a single education credit in some cases. Taxpayers may use this deduction instead of education tax credits for the same student. These credits include permanent tax credits: the Hope Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit. The Hope Credit has been expanded into the American Opportunity Tax Credit, a formerly temporary provision that was made permanent by the PATH Act. The American Opportunity Tax Credit and the Hope Credit are directed at undergraduate education and have a limited number of years of coverage (two for the Hope Credit and four for the American Opportunity Tax Credit). The Lifetime Learning Credit (20% of up to $10,000) is not limited in years of coverage. These credits are generally more advantageous than the deduction, except for higher-income taxpayers, in part because the credits are phased out at lower levels of income than the deduction. For example, for single taxpayers, the Lifetime Learning Credit begins phasing out at $56,000 for 2017. The deduction benefits taxpayers according to their marginal tax rate. Students usually have relatively low incomes, but they may be part of families in higher tax brackets. The maximum amount of deductible expenses limits the tax benefit's impact on individuals attending schools with comparatively high tuitions and fees. Because the income limits are not adjusted for inflation, the deduction might be available to fewer taxpayers over time if extended in its current form. The distribution of the deduction in Table 2 indicates that some of the benefit is concentrated in the income range where the Lifetime Learning Credit has phased out, but also significant deductions are claimed at lower income levels. Because the Lifetime Learning Credit is preferable to the deduction at lower income levels, it seems likely that confusion about the education benefits may have caused taxpayers not to choose the optimal education benefit. The JCT estimated the one-year extension included in the PATH Act would result in a 10-year revenue loss of $0.4 billion (see Table 1 ). Table A-1 provides information on key policy staff available to answer questions with respect to specific provisions or policy areas.

Three individual temporary tax provisions expired in 2017. In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as "tax extenders." Most recently, Congress addressed tax extenders in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123). Three of the four individual income tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2016 were extended in the BBA18, retroactive to 2017. These include the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt, Mortgage Insurance Premium Deductibility, and Above-the-Line Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses. Brief background information on these provisions is provided in this report. The other individual income tax provision that expired at the end of 2016, the medical expense deduction adjusted gross income (AGI) floor of 7.5% for individuals aged 65 and over, was expanded to all taxpayers through 2017 and 2018 in the December 2017 tax legislation (P.L. 115-97). Options related to expired tax provisions in the 115th Congress include (1) extending all or some of the provisions that expired at the end of 2017 or (2) allowing expired provisions to remain expired. This report provides background information on individual income tax provisions that expired in 2017. For information on other tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016, see CRS Report R44677, Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed]. See also CRS Report R44990, Energy Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44930, Business Tax Provisions that Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders"), coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

Obesity is a condition that has been deemed an epidemic in the United States. Results of a survey by the National Center for Health Statistics found that in the years 2003 to 2004, an estimated 66% of U.S. adults were either overweight or obese. The American Obesity Association estimates that approximately 127 million adults in the United States are overweight, 60 million obese, and 9 million severely obese. It has been argued that obese individuals have been the targets of discrimination. There is no federal law that specifically prohibits obesity discrimination. However, some obese individuals have argued that their weight can be considered a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and, therefore, they have legal protection against weight discrimination. Courts have evaluated numerous claims of obesity discrimination brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability in the areas of employment, public services, public accommodations, and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications. In order to prevail in a discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that he or she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines "disability" with respect to an individual as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual [such as walking, or working]; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has promulgated ADA regulations that give insight as to what constitutes an impairment within the meaning of the term "disability," as well as what is considered to be "substantially limit[ing] a major life activity." The ADA regulations have been used by the courts in determining the validity of obesity discrimination claims. Obesity discrimination cases have also been brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states that "no otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Courts have often applied the same standard when deciding cases arising under the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Also, the standards for determining employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act are identical to those used in title I of the ADA. The ADA regulations address whether obesity can be an impairment that qualifies as a disability under the ADA. In general, the regulations suggest that the ADA offers limited protection to obese individuals. The ADA regulations state that temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. Such impairments may include, but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints [and] concussions.... Similarly, except in rare circumstances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment. The EEOC has expounded on how obesity is to be covered under the ADA. In its ADA compliance manual, the EEOC states that being overweight, in and of itself, generally is not an impairment. On the other hand, severe obesity, which has been defined as body weight more than 100% over the norm is clearly an impairment. In addition, a person with obesity may have an underlying or resultant physiological disorder, such as hypertension or a thyroid disorder. A physiological disorder is an impairment. Based on the ADA regulations and EEOC guidance, it may be difficult for an obese plaintiff to successfully bring a discrimination claim. Still, courts have found some plaintiffs entitled to protection under the ADA. Both state and federal courts have considered whether the ADA or Section 504 applies to obesity and have used varying (and sometimes conflicting) lines of reasoning and conclusions. Courts have disagreed on issues such as (1) whether a plaintiff must have a physiological disorder in order for the plaintiff's morbid obesity to be covered under the ADA and (2) whether a plainitiff's obesity can cause a "substantial limitation of a major life activity." The following cases include some of the different arguments that courts have used in finding that a plaintiff is eligible or non-eligible for ADA or Section 504 protection. One of the first appellate decisions to address weight discrimination as a disability was Cook , which established that an obese plaintiff can be considered disabled. In Cook , the plaintiff applied for a position she had previously held as an institutional attendant. At the time Cook applied, she was five feet two inches tall and weighed 320 pounds. The institution refused to rehire Cook, claiming that Cook's weight compromised her ability to evacuate patients in an emergency situation and increased her chances of developing aliments that could lead to Cook to be out of work or claim workers' compensation. Cook brought a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as certain state statutes, claiming that the failure to hire her was based on an unlawful perceived disability—although she was fully able to perform the job, the institution considered her physically impaired. The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Cook. However, the court acknowledged that Cook could also prevail because she had an actual physical impairment. The court pointed to the fact that Cook had admitted that she was morbidly obese, and had presented expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder, a dysfunction of the metabolic system. The institution argued that Cook's claims failed because her weight was a condition that was both "mutable" and "voluntary." The court rejected the institution's arguments and noted that nowhere in the Rehabilitation Act, nor in the regulations implementing the act, was there a mention of either characteristic disqualifying a claim. The court also discussed whether Cook's weight "substantially limited one or more [of Cook's] major life activities." The court pointed to evidence introduced by the institution demonstrating that Cook was not hired because the institution believed that her morbid obesity interfered with her ability to undertake physical activities such as walking, lifting, or bending. On this basis alone, the court stated, a jury could find that the institution perceived the plaintiff's impairment to interfere with a major life activity. In addition, the court explained that the plaintiff could be found substantially limited, without having to seek out other jobs that she was qualified to perform. The court stated that "denying an applicant ... a job that requires no unique physical skills, due solely to the perception that the applicant suffers from a physical limitations that would keep her from qualifying for a broad spectrum of jobs, can constitute treating an applicant as if her condition substantially limited a major life activity, viz., working." The First Circuit also concluded that there was no evidence that Cook could not perform the job, and it upheld the district court's decision for Cook. The Second Circuit in Francis also examined claims of obesity discrimination under disability law. In this case, the City of Meriden disciplined Francis, a firefighter employed by the city, after he failed to meet certain weight guidelines. Francis claimed that this discipline was discrimination based on a perceived disability in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The court found that Francis' claims failed because Francis only alleged that the city disciplined him for not meeting a weight standard, not because he suffered from an impairment within the meaning of the disability statutes. In its analysis, the court discussed the applicability of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to obesity. The Second Circuit stated that Francis's claim failed because "obesity, except in special cases where obesity relates to a physiological disorder, is not an impairment within the meaning of [the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act]." The court also pointed out, in dicta, that a cause of action may exist against an employer who discriminates against an employee based on the perception that the employee is morbidly obese. Still, the court concluded that simply failing to meet weight guidelines was insufficient for ADA protection. In 2006, the Sixth Circuit took up the issue of obesity discrimination in EEOC v. Watkins . In Watkins , the EEOC claimed that the defendant company violated the ADA when it discharged a morbidly obese employee after the employee sustained an injury on the job. The employee, whose weight fluctuated between 340 and 450 pounds during his employment, was injured during a routine job activity. The employee claimed he was unaware of any physiological or psychological cause for his heavy weight. After taking a leave of absence following his injury, the employee's personal doctor cleared him to work. However, a company doctor found that the employee weighed more than 400 pounds, had a limited range of motion, and shortness of breath after a few steps. The doctor determined that even though the employee met the Department of Transportation's standards for truck drivers, the employee could not safely perform the requirements of his job. The employee was terminated as a result. The EEOC argued under a "regarded as" theory, claiming that although the employee had an actual impairment, the impairment was erroneously regarded as an inability to perform his job. In its analysis, however, the Sixth Circuit did not focus on how the company regarded the employee, but instead on whether morbid obesity qualified as an ADA impairment. The court cited the ADA regulations stating that an impairment is defined in relevant part as "any physiological disorder or condition." The court interpreted this definition to require evidence of a physiological cause of morbid obesity in order for an impairment to exist under the ADA. Because the EEOC did not produce any evidence that the employee suffered from a physiological condition, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Watkins. It is likely that courts will continue to look at obesity discrimination under the ADA. Based on the various ways in which courts have interpreted the act and its supporting regulations, the outcome of these cases will remain an open question.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities. However, to be covered under the statute, an individual must first meet the definition of an individual with a disability. Questions have been raised as to whether and to what extent obesity is a disability under the ADA and whether the ADA protects obese individuals from discrimination. This report provides background regarding how obesity is covered under the ADA and its supporting regulations. It also discusses some of the ways in which courts have applied the ADA to obesity discrimination claims.

The Office of Management and Budget traces its origin to 1921. Established as the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) within the Treasury Department by the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (42 Stat. 20), it functioned under the supervision of the President. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939 (53 Stat. 1423) transferred the bureau to the newly created Executive Office of the President (EOP). Subsequently, BOB was designated as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970 (84 Stat. 2085). Concern about OMB's accountability prompted Congress to make the director and deputy director subject to Senate confirmation in 1974 (88 Stat. 11). Congress also established four statutory offices within OMB to oversee several cross-cutting processes and management matters. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (88 Stat. 796) established the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in 1974. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (94 Stat. 2812; later recodified as the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 163) established the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 2838) established the Office of Federal Financial Management (OFFM). The E-Government Act of 2002 (116 Stat. 2899) established the Office of Electronic Government (E-Gov Office). The current profile of OMB's leadership and organizational structure is available on the agency's website. In addition to OMB's leadership and their support staff, OMB has three major types of offices: (1) resource management offices; (2) statutory offices; and (3) OMB-wide support offices. Each of OMB's four resource management offices (RMOs) focuses on a cluster of related agencies and issues (e.g., natural resource programs) to examine budget requests and make funding recommendations. In addition, RMOs are tasked with integrating management, budget, and policy perspectives in their work as a result of OMB's latest major reorganization in 1994. Politically appointed program associate directors (PADs) lead the RMOs. Below the PAD level, RMO staff are almost always career civil servants, and are organized into divisions and branches. Each RMO branch covers a cabinet department or collection of smaller agencies and is led by a career member of the Senior Executive Service (SES). OMB's program examiners staff each RMO branch. Three of the statutory offices focus on management areas: financial management (OFFM), procurement policy (OFPP), and information technology (E-Gov Office, shared with OIRA). The fourth office, OIRA, has a broad portfolio of responsibilities, including regulation, information policy and technology, paperwork reduction, statistical policy, and privacy. Analysts in the statutory offices develop policy, coordinate implementation, and work with the RMOs on agency-specific issues. OMB's seven support offices also play key roles. For example, the Budget Review Division (BRD) coordinates the process for preparing the President's annual budget proposal to Congress. The Legislative Reference Division (LRD) coordinates review of agencies' draft bills, congressional testimony, and correspondence to ensure compliance with the President's policy agenda. OMB's Economic Policy Office works with the President's Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and the Treasury Department to develop economic assumptions. The other support offices are general counsel, legislative affairs, communications, and administration. OMB had 484 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions in FY2005 and estimated 500 for FY2006. OMB typically has a total of 20-25 political appointees and staff, while the rest are career civil servants. OMB's director, deputy director, and deputy director for management are presidentially appointed with Senate confirmation (PAS). The heads of OFPP, OFFM, and OIRA are also PAS officials. In contrast, the administrator of the E-Gov Office is presidentially appointed (PA). Figure 1 shows OMB's historical staffing. OMB's budget is driven mainly by personnel costs. Compensation and benefits were 88% of OMB's $67.8 million in total obligations for FY2005. The remainder chiefly covered contractual services (8%). Among OMB's offices, 51% of FY2005 funding went to the RMOs, 31% to the OMB-wide support offices (including the E-Gov Office), and 18% to the statutory offices. Figure 2 shows OMB's budget history. OMB's budget has fluctuated in recent years due to reallocations of funding, related to the "enterprise services program," among budget accounts in the EOP. For FY2003, Congress reallocated $8.3 million from OMB to the EOP's Office of Administration (OA) for central procurement of goods and services, reducing OMB's appropriation compared to the prior fiscal year. The President subsequently requested for both FY2004 and FY2005 that similar, though slightly reduced, funding be shifted back to OMB, but Congress continued a similar reallocation in both years. For FY2006, the President requested that the reallocation to OA continue, but Congress shifted $7 million, for rent and health unit costs, from OA back to OMB, and appropriated $76.2 million (after rescission) to OMB. For FY2007, the President proposed $68.8 million for OMB (9.7% lower than the FY2006 level) and $7.9 million (related to OMB's rent, health unit, transit subsidy, and flexible spending account costs) for OA. Including the $7.9 million proposed for OA that otherwise might be in OMB's budget, the FY2007 OMB proposal is a 0.6% increase in nominal dollars compared to FY2006, and a 1.7% decrease in constant dollars. As a primary support agency for the President, OMB has important and varied responsibilities. A 1986 study identified 95 statutes, 58 executive orders, five regulations, and 51 circulars that reflected OMB's operational authorities at the time. Most observers include as "major functions" of OMB those listed below. The Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as amended and recodified, requires the President to submit each year a consolidated budget proposal for Congress's consideration. In this "formulation phase," OMB sends budget guidance to agencies via its Circular No. A-11 , which is updated each year to reflect the President's budget and management priorities. Agency heads then forward their formal budget requests to OMB, where the RMOs and E-Gov Office (for information technology initiatives) assemble options and analysis for decisions by OMB and the White House. After an opportunity for agency appeals, OMB's BRD coordinates production of the President's budget. When Congress completes action on appropriations bills and they are signed into law, the "execution phase" begins. The Antideficiency Act (which includes 31 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1514) requires OMB to "apportion" appropriated funds (usually quarterly) to prevent agencies from spending at a rate that would exhaust their appropriations before the end of the fiscal year. OMB plays a key role in coordinating the President's legislative activities. Under Circular No. A-19 , OMB's LRD coordinates executive branch review and clearance of congressional testimony and correspondence and agencies' draft bills to ensure compliance with the President's policy agenda, make known the Administration's views on legislation, and allow affected agencies to provide input during intra-executive branch policy development. For non-appropriations legislation, LRD plays a coordination role in preparing "Statements of Administration Policy" (SAPs) for Congress, and memoranda to advise the President on enrolled bills (e.g., recommending signature or veto, or contents for signing statements). BRD performs similar duties for appropriations legislation. OMB exercises considerable influence over agency regulations. Under Executive Order 12866, OIRA works with OMB's RMOs to review agency rules and cost-benefit analyses. In addition, other OIRA policy and oversight responsibilities include statistical policy; paperwork reduction; government use of personal information under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a); information technology investment under the Clinger-Cohen Act ( P.L. 104-106 , 110 Stat. 679); and information security. OIRA shares some responsibilities with the E-Gov Office. OMB has responsibility for overseeing management in the executive branch. OMB is responsible for clearing and approving proposed executive orders (EOs) and many proclamations. OMB's deputy director for management (DDM) is charged with overall responsibility for general management policies in the executive branch, including the domains of the statutory offices, plus human resources management. The statutory offices also develop policy and coordinate implementation in the areas of financial management (OFFM), procurement policy (OFPP), and information policy and technology (OIRA and E-Gov Office). OMB's RMOs are tasked with integrating budget, policy, and management issues for specific agencies in cooperation with the statutory offices. Observers disagree as to how well OMB has fulfilled these management responsibilities. Some have argued that the "M" in OMB is more mirage than real, because budget responsibilities crowd out attention to management issues, while others have argued that budget and management responsibilities cannot realistically be separated. OMB leads implementation of the George W. Bush Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) and President's Management Agenda (PMA). The PART, which OMB uses to rate the "overall effectiveness" of programs, has been used to help justify the President's budget proposals. The PMA includes, among other things, five government-wide initiatives and quarterly evaluation of agencies on a "scorecard" with red, yellow, or green "stoplight scores" for each of the initiatives, based on published "standards for success." As an agency, OMB's scorecard ratings for December 31, 2005, were two yellow and three red for "status" and, for "progress," four green and one yellow.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is located within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). As a staff agency to the President, OMB acts on the President's behalf in preparing the President's annual budget proposal, overseeing the executive branch, and helping steer the President's policy actions and agenda. In doing so, OMB interacts extensively with Congress in ways that are both visible and hidden from view. This report provides a concise overview of OMB and its major functions, and highlights a number of issues influenced by OMB in matters of policy, budget, management, and OMB's internal operations. This report will be updated annually.

T he House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. According to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016), 1,200 pieces of legislation received House floor action. This report provides a statistical snapshot of the forms, origins, and party sponsorship of these measures and of the parliamentary procedures used to bring them to the chamber floor during their initial consideration. Legislation is introduced in the House or Senate in one of four forms: the bill (H.R./S.), the joint resolution (H.J.Res./S.J.Res.), the concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res./S.Con.Res.), and the simple resolution (H.Res./S.Res.). Bills and joint resolutions can become law, but simple and concurrent resolutions cannot; they are used instead for internal organizational or procedural matters or to express the sentiment of one or both chambers. In the 114 th Congress, 1,200 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 907 (76%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 293 (24%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. Of the 1,200 measures receiving initial House floor action in the 114 th Congress, 1,068 originated in the House, and 132 originated in the Senate. It is generally accepted that the House considers more legislation sponsored by majority party Members than measures introduced by minority party Members. This was borne out in practice in the 114 th Congress. As is reflected in Table 1 , 78% of all measures receiving initial House floor action in the last Congress were sponsored by Members of the Republican Party, which had a majority of seats in the House. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are considered, 76% of measures receiving House floor action in the 114 th Congress were sponsored by Republicans, 24% by Democrats, and none by political independents. The ratio of majority to minority party sponsorship of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 114 th Congress varied widely based on the parliamentary procedure used to call up the legislation on the House floor. As noted in Table 2 , 69% of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by Republicans, 31% by Democrats, and none by political independents. That measures introduced by Members of both parties were considered under Suspension is unsurprising in that (as discussed below) Suspension of the Rules is generally used to process non-controversial measures for which there is wide bipartisan support. In addition, passage of a measure under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, in practice, usually requires the affirmative votes of at least some minority party Members. The ratio of party sponsorship on measures initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House was far wider. Of the 172 measures the Congressional Research Service identified as being initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule in the 114 th Congress, all but one were sponsored by majority party Members. The breakdown in party sponsorship on measures initially raised on the House floor by unanimous consent was uneven, with majority party Members sponsoring 76% of the measures brought up in this manner. The following section documents the parliamentary mechanisms that the House used to bring legislation to the floor for initial consideration during the 114 th Congress. In doing so, it does not make distinctions about the privileged status such business technically enjoys under House rules. Most appropriations measures, for example, are considered "privileged business" under clause 5 of House Rule XIII (as detailed in the section on " Privileged Business " below). As such, they do not need a special rule from the Rules Committee to be adopted for them to have floor access. In actual practice, however, in the 114 th Congress the House universally provided for the consideration of these measures by means of a special rule, which, in general, could also provide for debate to be structured, amendments to be regulated, and points of order against the bills to be waived. Thus, appropriations measures considered in the 114 th Congress are counted in this analysis as being raised by special rule, notwithstanding their status as "privileged business." In recent Congresses, most legislation has been brought up on the House floor by Suspension of the Rules, a parliamentary device authorized by clause 1 of House Rule XV that waives the chamber's rules to enable the House to act quickly on legislation that enjoys widespread (even if not necessarily unanimous) support. The main features of the Suspension of the Rules procedure include (1) a 40-minute limit on debate, (2) a prohibition against floor amendments and points of order, and (3) a two-thirds vote of Members present and voting for passage. The suspension procedure is in order in the House on the calendar days of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday; during the final six days of a congressional session; and at other times by unanimous consent or special order. In the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), the House leadership announced additional policies that restrict the procedure for certain "honorific" legislation, generally require measures considered under Suspension to have been available for three days prior to their consideration, and require the sponsor of the measure to be on the floor at the time of a measure's consideration. These policies continued in force in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). In the 114 th Congress, 743 measures, representing 62% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought up using the Suspension of the Rules procedure. This includes 703 bills or joint resolutions and 40 simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 78% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 114 th Congress came up by Suspension of the Rules. Eighty-nine percent of measures brought up by Suspension of the Rules originated in the House. The remaining 11% were Senate-passed measures. House rules and precedents place certain types of legislation in a special "privileged" category, which allows measures to be called up for consideration when the House is not considering another matter. Bills and resolutions falling into this category that saw floor action in the 114 th Congress include the following: Order of b usiness r esolutions. Procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules affecting the "rules, joint rules, and the order of business of the House" are themselves privileged for consideration under clause 5 of House Rule XIII. Order of business resolutions are commonly known as "special rules" and are discussed below in more detail. Committee a ssignment r esolutions. Under clause 5 of House Rule X and the precedents of the House, a resolution assigning Members to standing committees is privileged if offered by direction of the party caucus or conference involved. Providing for a djournment. Under Article I, Section 5, clause 4, of the Constitution, neither house can adjourn for more than three days without the consent of the other. Concurrent resolutions providing for such an adjournment of one or both chambers are called up as privileged. Questions of the p rivileges of the House. Under clause 2 of House Rule IX, resolutions raising a question of the privileges of the House affecting "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings" are privileged under specific parliamentary circumstances described in the rule. Such resolutions would include the constitutional right of the House to originate revenue measures and resolutions impeaching government officials. Bereavement r esolutions. Resolutions expressing the condolences of the House of Representatives over the death of a Representative, President, or former President have been treated as privileged. Measures r elated to House o rganization. Certain organizational business of the House—such as resolutions traditionally adopted at the beginning of a session to notify the President that the House has assembled and to elect House officers, as well as concurrent resolutions providing for a joint session of Congress—have been treated as privileged business. Correcting e nrollments. Under clause 5 of House Rule XIII, resolutions reported by the Committee on House Administration correcting errors in the enrollment of a bill are privileged. In the 114 th Congress, 197 measures, representing 16% of the measures receiving floor action, came before the House on their initial consideration by virtue of their status as "privileged business." All of these 197 measures were simple or concurrent resolutions. The most common type of measure brought up in the House as "privileged business" during the 114 th Congress was special orders of business (special rules) reported by the Rules Committee, followed by resolutions assigning Representatives to committees. A special rule is a simple resolution that regulates the House's consideration of legislation identified in the resolution. Such resolutions, as noted above, are sometimes called "order of business resolutions" or "special orders," although most Members and staff simply refer to them as "rules." Special rules enable the House to consider a specified measure and establish the terms for its consideration—for example, how long the legislation will be debated, what (if any) amendments may be offered to it, and whether points of order against the measure or any amendments to it are waived. Under clause 1(m) of House Rule X, the Committee on Rules has jurisdiction over the "order of business" of the House, and it reports such procedural resolutions to the chamber for consideration. In current practice, although a relatively small percentage of legislation comes before the House via special rule, most measures that might be characterized as significant, complicated, or controversial are brought up in this way. In the 114 th Congress, 172 measures, or 14% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought before the chamber under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the House. Of these, 163 (95%) were bills or joint resolutions, and nine (5%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 18% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 114 th Congress came up by special rule. Ninety-one percent of the measures considered under a special rule during the 114 th Congress originated in the House, 9% being Senate legislation. As noted above, all but one measure—a Senate bill—brought before the House using this parliamentary mechanism were sponsored by majority party Members. In current practice, legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members. Long-standing policies announced by Speakers of both parties regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose. Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction. In the 114 th Congress, 87 measures, or 7% of all legislation identified by LIS as receiving House floor action, were initially considered by unanimous consent. Of these, 41 (47%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 46 (53%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 5% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 114 th Congress came up by unanimous consent. Of the measures initially considered by unanimous consent during the 114 th Congress, 66% originated in the House. House Rule XV, clause 2 (sometimes called the "discharge rule"), establishes a means by which a majority of the House can bring to the floor for consideration a bill or resolution that has not been reported from House committee. Discharging a committee in this manner is a lengthy, multi-step process that is rarely successful. If a measure has been referred and pending in committee for at least 30 legislative days, any Member may submit a petition to discharge the committee of its further consideration. If 218 Members—a majority of the House—sign such a petition, a motion to discharge the committee of consideration of the measure may then be offered on the floor. This discharge motion can be made only on a second or fourth Monday that occurs after the petition is filed, and such a motion may not be made in the last six days of a congressional session. The motion to discharge is debatable for 20 minutes, and if it is adopted, a Member may then move that the House consider the legislation in question. In modern practice, it has become common for Members to introduce a special rule establishing unique terms of debate and amendment for an unreported measure and then file a discharge petition on that resolution after it has been pending before the Rules Committee for at least seven legislative days. In the 114 th Congress, one measure—a special rule introduced by a majority party Member providing for the consideration of an unreported bill—was brought to the House floor by the procedures contained in the discharge rule. The House of Representatives has established special parliamentary procedures to bring private legislation to the chamber floor and consider legislation dealing with the business of the District of Columbia. It has also created the Calendar Wednesday procedure, where the standing committees are recognized in turn to call up measures that have been reported but not granted a rule by the Rules Committee. These procedures are infrequently used, and no legislation was brought before the House in the 114 th Congress by any of these three parliamentary mechanisms.

The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures that, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress, received action on the House floor in the 114th Congress (2015-2016) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration. In the 114th Congress, 1,200 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 907 (76%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 293 (24%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. Of these 1,200 measures, 1,068 originated in the House, and 132 originated in the Senate. During the same period, 62% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 16% came to the floor as business "privileged" under House rules and precedents, 14% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 7% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. One measure was processed under the procedures associated with clause 2 of Rule XV, the House Discharge Rule. When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 78% of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 114th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 18% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 5% came up by unanimous consent. No lawmaking forms of legislation received House floor action via the Discharge Rule or by virtue of being "privileged" under House rules. The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 114th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Sixty-nine percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All but one of the 172 measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members.

RS21558 -- Genetically Engineered Soybeans: Acceptance and Intellectual Property Rights Issues in SouthAmerica Updated October 17, 2003 The United States is the world's leading producer and exporter of soybeans. However, South American soybean production and tradehas expanded rapidly during the past 15 years, greatly increasing the competitiveness of international oilseedmarkets. Together, theUnited States, Argentina, and Brazil are expected to produce nearly 83% of the world's soybeans in 2002/03, andto account for over90% of all soybeans traded on international markets. (1) Given a highly competitive international soybean market and growinginternational debate over the nature of production and trade in genetically- engineered (GE) crops, controversy hasemerged in recentyears over the growing pirated use of Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans, a GE variety, by producers in Argentina andBrazil. (2) Thispractice appears to provide a competitive advantage to Argentine and Brazilian soybean exports, and to be aviolation of theintellectual property rights (IPR) of the RR technology producer, Monsanto. Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans are genetically engineered to be resistant to the herbicide glyphosate. Glyphosate also was developedby Monsanto and is marketed under the brand name Roundup. RR soybeans are patented in the United States byMonsanto. (3) Monsanto licenses the RR technology to seed companies, which incorporate it into their conventional soybeanvarieties and sell theGE seeds to farmers. Among other things, the patent gives Monsanto and those companies to whom it has licensedthe technologymore control in setting prices and restricting the product's use. For example, U.S. farmers pay a technology feeestimated at $7.44 oneach 50-pound bag of RR planting seed. (4) In addition,as part of a signed purchase agreement, U.S. farmers are prohibited fromsaving seed from harvest for future planting or for resale to other farmers. Despite the additional cost andrestrictions, RR soybeansare favored over traditional varieties because they significantly lower production costs, offer more flexibility in cropmanagement, andin many cases increase yields. According to USDA's March 31, 2003, Planting Intentions Report , 80%of the soybeans planted in theUnited States in 2003 will be RR varieties. The Monsanto company is based in St. Louis, Missouri, but has offices throughout the world where its seeks to market its technologyto agricultural producers. Since 1960, a total of 30 countries have approved Monsanto's RR soybean technologyfor import orplanting. (5) However, Monsanto has been unable toobtain patent protection in either Argentina or Brazil. In 1995, Monsanto'sapplication for a patent for RR soybeans in Argentina was rejected. Subsequent applications have not succeeded. (6) In Brazil, thecommercial status of GE soybeans (and GE crops in general) remains in dispute in the courts and no patents on RRtechnology havebeen issued. The status of GE soybeans in Brazil is particularly important to international oilseed markets sinceBrazil representsessentially the last potential major source for non-GE soybeans to world markets. Although RR soybean seeds are not patented in Argentina, Monsanto has agreements with other seed firms in Argentina allowingthem to use the RR technology in their seeds. As a result, Argentine farmers have access to and have increasinglyswitched to RRsoybean varieties. In 2001, about 90% of Argentina's soybean crop was planted to RR varieties. (7) The RR share of the 2003 crop isnearly 100%, according to news reports. An Argentine seed law (Act No. 20247; 1973) requires that all seeds must be certified for commercial use. However, Argentinefarmers have reportedly ignored this law and routinely save RR soybean seeds for planting or resale. Since thegovernment does notenforce this law, a large black market for RR soybeans in Argentina has developed that keeps seed prices low anddiscourages anyattempts by Monsanto or licensed companies to assess technology fees on RR soybeans. According to Monsanto,it is not feasible tocharge a technology fee on soybean seeds in Argentina without patent protection. (8) As a result, Argentine farmers save about $8 to $9per metric ton on the technology fee. (9) This is aconsiderable cost advantage over U.S. soybeans in a highly competitive internationalsoybean market. (10) In September 1998, the Brazilian Biosafety Commission (CTNBio), acting under government authority, approved the commercialplanting of RR soybeans. Two major groups opposed to the use of GE crops -- Greenpeace and the BrazilianConsumer DefenseInstitute -- immediately filed lawsuits in Brazilian courts challenging the CTNBio approval. In 1999 a lower courtissued aninjunction suspending the CTNBio approval of commercial planting of RR soybeans before any approvedcommercial plantingactually occurred. The case was appealed to a three-judge panel of the Brasilia Appeals Court, where it haslanguished. In February2002, the lead judge of the three-judge Appellate Court publicly announced in favor of commercial planting of RRsoybeans. However, a majority of the three-judge panel has yet to render a decision on the commercial use of RR soybeans. As a result, itremains illegal to plant GE soybeans in Brazil. However, Brazilian farmers are aware of the benefits of RRsoybeans and havereportedly smuggled seeds into Brazil from Argentina's black market. Despite the lack of government approval,80% of the crop inthe southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul is estimated to be planted to RR soybean varieties. (11) USDA estimates that 10 to 20% ofBrazil's total soybean crop may be planted to RR soybean varieties (trade estimates range as high as 30%). (12) As in Argentina, notechnology fees are paid by RR soybean growers in Brazil. (13) The American Soybean Association (ASA) claims that the technologyfee savings for Brazilian growers ranges from $9.30 to $15.50 per acre depending on yields. (14) More recently, other international events have forced the Brazilian government to temporarily alter its official position on GEsoybeans. In June 2001, China -- the world's leading importer of soybeans -- issued controversial rules governingthe use, sale, andimportation of GE soybeans. Under the rulings, China will only accept GE soybeans that have been approved forexport by the sourcecountry, along with certain other conditions. On January 10, 2003, China rejected Brazil's initial application toexport GE soybeans,in part because Brazil does not officially recognize the domestic production and export of GE soybeans. In lateMarch 2003, underpressure from producer groups, the Brazilian government announced temporary Regulation 113 (R113) as an interimmeasureallowing official sales of RR soybeans from the 2002-03 (April-March) crop for both domestic uses and export. R113 expires inMarch 2004, after which Brazilian growers are expected to comply with the current law. Because Brazil's courts have been unable to resolve the crisis prior to this year's October-December planting period, the Lulagovernment has been forced to issue a second temporary reprieve from the GE planting ban. Temporary Regulation130 (R130),signed into law on September 25, 2003, approves the planting of GE soybeans for the 2003-04 growing season andextends thepossible sale period of RR soybeans through December 2004. In an attempt to curb black market trade in RRtechnology, farmersseeking to sell GE soybeans during this period must sign a document pledging not to buy seeds of untraced originin the future. (15) Inaddition, Brazilian soybean farmers are limited to planting GE seed stocks already on hand because R130 containsno provision forimporting or selling GE seeds in Brazil. Also, lack of any labeling protocol for GE crops is likely to complicatedomestic marketing. The Lula government states that it is preparing a comprehensive "bio-safety law" to address these regulatory gaps,but this legislationhas been slow to emerge. The Lula government remains split on this issue. The Minister of Agriculture favorsprompt legalization,while the Minister of Environment is opposed and has asked for an environmental impact study beforecommercialization isallowed. (16) Both ministers agree that rigidenforcement of existing regulations would mean the incineration of all GE crops and theimprisonment of growers for 1 to 3 years at great cost to the country's agricultural sector. Within Brazil, two principal camps argue against legalizing GE soybeans, but for very different reasons. Some consumer andenvironmental groups argue that, because the risks associated with GE crops are unknown, they should not belegalized. Peasantgroups such as the Landless Workers Movement (MST), on the other hand, are not against GE crops per se, butargue that legalizingGE crops will accelerate large-scale farming and give control over Brazil's agriculture to multinational corporationssuch asMonsanto. (17) Brazilian producer groups claim that lack of access to RR technology would place them at a competitive disadvantage in internationalmarkets. To date, no significant market premium for non-GE soybeans has emerged in either domestic orinternational marketssufficient to offset the cost advantages of adopting GE varieties. Given the rapid growth and widespread use of GEsoybeans,legalizing their commercial use may be the only viable solution for Brazil's government. GE Labeling in Brazil. Brazil's food labeling regulation for products containingGE ingredients took effect on December 31, 2001. (18) The law mandates the labeling of all foods for human consumption when morethan 4% of the ingredients are derived from GE commodities. R113, the first temporary regulation allowing GEsoybean planting, hasimposed stricter GE labeling conditions on Brazil's food marketing system. Under R113, non-GE soybeans are tobe segregated witha 0% tolerance level from GE soybeans. (19) Inaddition, labeling is required on all shipments into or out of Brazil with a GE soybeanpresence in excess of 1%. (20) Since improperlabeling is subject to a severe fine, and since Brazil's marketing system is not set up tohandle such strict segregation requirements, it is likely that all soybeans passing through Brazil's marketing systemwill have to belabeled as having GE content. It is reported that Brazil's National Agriculture Federation (NAF) estimates the costof testing thecurrent 2002/03 crop for GE content at about $277 million. The NAF says that passing this cost on to consumerswould make itimpossible for Brazil to remain competitive in the global soybean market. (21) International Market Implications. According to many market analysts, thedecision on the status of GE crops in Brazil will have significant market implications, especially for global soybeanmarkets. First, ifBrazil permanently legalizes GE soybeans, nearly all (about 90%) of the world's internationally traded soybeans willbe of GEvarieties. Second, a decision in favor of GE crops will be nearly irreversible because of mixing in the distributionand transportationsystems. Some analysts suggest that the current widespread planting of GE crops in Brazil is already irreversible. In short, a decisionin favor of GE soybeans by Brazil could do much to moot the debate about whether or not GE soybeans should belabeled or eventraded because there simply would not be any major international supplier of non-GE soybeans left. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. is committed to a policy of promoting increased intellectual property protection,both through the negotiation of free trade agreements that strengthen existing international laws and through useof U.S. statutorytools as appropriate. (22) The U.S. Administration'sposition regarding GE crops is that, not only are food products made from GEcrops as safe as their conventional counterparts, but their production has the potential to spur agriculturalproductivity whilebenefitting the environment. (23) Congress hasgenerally supported this position. For example, both the Senate ( S.Res. 154 ) and the House ( H.Res. 252 ) have passed resolutions in support of the Administration's dispute settlementcase atthe World Trade Organization (WTO) brought against the European Union's ban on imports of GE crops. In hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs on May 20,2003, to discuss opportunities for U.S. agriculture in agricultural trade negotiations in the Western Hemisphere, theIPR issue of RRsoybean piracy in Brazil was raised in testimony given by the ASA and Monsanto. (24) In the absence of patent protection in Argentinaor Brazil, accusations of IPR violation may be difficult to sustain in a court of law. However, both Argentina andBrazil are membersof the WTO and, as such, have agreed to abide by the WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights(TRIPS Agreement). As a result, if Monsanto were able to eventually obtain patent protection for the RRtechnology in eitherArgentina or Brazil, Monsanto could then seek recourse for IPR infringement via the legal systems of thosecountries perrequirements of the WTO TRIPS agreement.

U.S. soybean growers and trade officials charge that Argentina and Brazil -- the UnitedStates' two major export competitors in international soybean markets -- gain an unfair trade advantage by routinelysavinggenetically-engineered (GE), Roundup Ready (RR) soybean seeds from the previous harvest (a practice prohibitedin the UnitedStates) for planting in subsequent years. These groups also argue that South American farmers pay no royalty feeson the saved seed,unlike U.S. farmers who are subject to a technology fee when they purchase new seeds each year. The cost savingto South Americansoybean growers on the technology fee alone nets out to about $8 to $9 per metric ton -- a considerable costadvantage over U.S.soybeans in the highly competitive international soybean market. This practice also raises concerns about theintellectual propertyrights (IPR) of Monsanto (the developer of RR technology). Commercial use of RR soybeans in Brazil remains illegal despite apparent widespread planting. A 1998government approval of theircommercial use remains suspended by court injunction, and resolution over their commercial legality is beingconsidered by anappellate court. However, two recent Presidential decrees have given temporary reprieve to the ban on planting andmarketing GEsoybeans through December 2004. The eventual outcome on commercial legalization of GE crops in Brazil mayhave importantconsequences for intellectual property rights, as well as for international trade in GE crops. This report will beupdated as needed.

The potential outcome of the resignation of long-time Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is unknown and any ramifications for the oil and natural gas sectors are uncertain. This paper examines the impact of a disruption of Egypt's oil and natural gas sector or a complete halt to exports of either oil or natural gas and closure of the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) oil pipeline, and the impact of those actions on world oil and natural gas markets. It is important to keep in mind that even the most nationalistic, isolationist, or anti-Western government would most likely not undertake all these measures. Oil, natural gas, and transit generate large amounts of revenue for Egypt and taking these measures could precipitate outside intervention, particularly closing the Suez Canal. Additionally, the timing of these actions would also change the impact on oil and natural gas markets, i.e., whether they occurred during the summer driving season or the winter heating season. An additional factor mitigating the impact on world oil and natural gas markets is that in 2009, Egypt consumed much of the energy it produced and had to import coal, highlighting the limited importance of Egypt as a global energy producer; see Figure 2 . Closing the Suez Canal would be one of the most visible actions a new government could take, particularly for the oil and natural gas industry. Although it would probably take only several weeks to re-route and re-size oil and natural gas tankers along with a possible drawdown of inventories, a closure of the canal would cause an immediate and most likely short-lived rise in global oil prices. Despite there being adequate spare production capacity in the world, oil prices tend to react quickly to market disruptions before settling back to their pre-existing price range. However, if the canal remained closed indefinitely, shipping costs would likely increase, adding upward pressure on oil prices. The same would likely be true for liquefied natural gas (LNG), but the effect would be less. Most LNG is sold under long-term contract, and there is currently a glut of LNG around the world to make up for any disruption. In 2009, an estimated 1.8 million barrels per day of oil (Mb/d) (of the world's roughly 80 Mb/d of production) moved through the canal—almost 1 Mb/d northbound and 0.85 Mb/d southbound. This is down from 2.4 Mb/d in 2008. The decline is mostly attributed to lower global demand for oil; production cuts by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly from the Persian Gulf producing countries; and piracy. More oil is also flowing to Asia from the Middle East, while more West African oil is going to Europe and North America, and does not have to traverse the canal. 2010 data shows an increase in cargos, but is incomplete for the year. The last time the canal was closed, in 1967 until 1975, approximately 60% of Europe's oil supplies had been passing through the canal. Currently, only about 15% is shipped through the canal. Similar to the decrease in cargos through the canal, the SUMED oil pipeline—which is owned through state companies by Egypt (50%), Saudi Arabia (15%), the United Arab Emirates (15%), Kuwait (15%), and Qatar (5%)—is operating below its capacity of 2.5 Mb/d. In 2009, approximately 1.1 Mb/d moved through the pipeline, a decrease of about 50% compared to 2008. The reduction resulted from many of the same causes as the canal's drop-off in oil transportation. In 2009, 331 billion cubic feet (bcf) of LNG traversed the canal, which represents 4% of global LNG trade and less than 1% of natural gas consumed globally. Unlike oil, LNG cargos through the Suez Canal have been steadily rising. Between 2008 and 2009, the volume of LNG passing through the Suez Canal increased over 40%, more than doubling northbound cargos. Data for the first 10 months of 2010 show a 66% increase in LNG shipments through the canal compared to the 2009 total. The rise in LNG cargos is mostly attributable to the large increase in Qatar LNG exports. Nevertheless, there is ample supply of LNG in the global market, and rerouting LNG cargos to demand centers could be accomplished in a relatively short time frame. While Egypt is a relatively small player in the global natural gas industry, it can have a larger impact on regional natural gas supply. Egypt produces all the natural gas consumed in Lebanon, almost all the natural gas consumed in Jordan, and more than half the natural gas consumed in Israel. On a world scale, Egypt accounted for only 2.1% of global natural gas production and 2.1% of global natural gas trade in 2009. Egypt holds 77 trillion cubic feet or 1.2% of the world's proved gas reserves. Egypt exports natural gas through two pipelines and two LNG facilities. Currently, the Arab Gas Pipeline connects Egypt to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. There are plans to expand the pipeline further, enabling Egypt to export natural gas through Turkey to Europe. In 2008, Egypt opened an export pipeline to Israel. There was an explosion in early February that shut down both pipelines for a short time although the damage was primarily to the Arab Gas Pipeline. Egypt has almost 600 bcf of LNG export capacity, with one facility in Damietta and one in Idku. Egypt accounted for approximately 5% of global LNG trade last year, with most cargos going to Europe. At the end of April 2011 the natural gas terminal near El-Arish in Egypt (see Figure 1 above) was attacked for the second time since protests erupted in that country in January. Natural gas from the terminal supplies the Arab Gas Pipeline to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, and a separate pipeline to Israel. There is no estimate for how long natural gas will not be exported. The pipeline was also attacked and disabled in February causing natural gas supplies to be stopped for about a month. The terminal has been a target for Bedouins who feel neglected and oppressed by Cairo. Aside from its role as a transit center, withdrawal of Egypt's own oil production from the global market would likely have limited impact on world oil prices. In 2010, Egypt was a small net importer of oil, producing approximately 0.66 Mb/d while consuming close to 0.71 Mb/d. Egypt's oil production has been in decline since the early 1990s, a trend not likely to be reversed. The country—which has the largest refining capacity in Africa, with 975,000 barrels of processing capacity—did export some refined products, such as naptha, but imported others. Cutting off exports of naptha, an oil product that can be used in making petrochemicals and gasoline, could put minor upward pressure on European prices, which is a main market for Egyptian exports. Global oil prices have already reacted to the unrest in Egypt despite no disruption to Egyptian production. The reaction comes from two concerns: (1) the near-term risk that any disruption to oil transit through Egypt could delay oil shipments for several weeks (as they are rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding extra shipping time) and (2) the more significant concern that political unrest could spread to other, more important energy exporters in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Kuwait. There has been some upward pressure on natural gas prices as companies scramble to hedge against a disruption of Egyptian exports, but the benchmark natural gas price in the United Kingdom is actually down. Should the scenario described above come to pass, there would likely be little impact on the global oil and natural gas market in the long term. Both industries will take some time to recalibrate flows, but should be able to accomplish that with minor or no disruptions. Additionally, the strategic petroleum reserves of member countries of the International Energy Agency, which are mostly from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), could also be utilized to bridge any gap in oil flows should a disruption prove to be significant.

The change in Egypt's government will likely not have a significant direct impact on the global oil and natural gas markets. There may be some short-term movements in price, mostly caused by perceived instability in the marketplace, but these would most likely be temporary. However, prolonged instability that raises the specter of spreading to other oil and natural gas producers in the region would likely add to upward price pressures. Although Egypt is considered an energy producer or net exporter overall, its oil and natural gas exports are not large enough to affect regional or global prices. The most serious impact would be on regional recipients of its natural gas exports. Egypt's main influence on energy markets is its control of the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean oil pipeline (SUMED). The current low utilization of these two pieces of infrastructure would likely limit any effect of their closure in the near term. Both the oil and natural gas industry would, over time, find alternative routes to circumvent the canal and pipeline if necessary.

Foreign Policy Budget for FY2002 RS20855 -- Foreign Policy Budget for FY2002 Updated April 12, 2001 President Bush seeks $23.85 billion in discretionary budget authority for U.S. foreign policy activities in FY2002,representing a nominal increase of 5.3% over levels enacted for FY2001. Administration officials, includingSecretaryPowell, have characterized the proposal as a "responsible increase" for international affairs programs within thecontext ofoverall budget constraints in which discretionary budget authority for all federal programs will rise by just 4% underthePresident's plan. They further emphasize that their highest priorities - State Department personnel, security, andtechnology needs - would grow by 18.6% above current spending. The proposal has met with a largely favorable reception in Congress. In the FY2002 budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. 83 ), the House approved the full $23.9 billion for international affairs. The Senate added $200million for HIV/AIDS and $50 million for global climate change programs beyond what President Bush requested. Callsfor higher international affairs spending have been fueled in recent years not only by appeals from theAdministration, butalso by the recommendations of numerous "expert" commissions that have cited inadequate resources anddysfunctionalorganizational structures as major impediments to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. (1) PDF version In real terms, taking into account the effects of inflation, international affairs resources proposed for next year are2.6%more than for FY2001 (Figure 1). While higher than any year between FY1995 and FY1998, the FY2002 proposalwouldfall 4.8% and 2.8% short of FYs1999 and 2000, respectively. (2) Although the overall size of foreign policy resources would grow in FY2002, most of the increase is concentrated in thearea of State Department operations, with much smaller growth projected for foreign assistance programs andreductionssought for export promotion activities. Congress approves the bulk of international affairs resources in twoappropriationbills: Foreign Operations, which includes foreign aid and export programs, and Commerce, Justice, StateDepartments,which finances diplomatic, international organization payments, and educational exchange activities. (3) As seen in Table 1,Foreign Operations would receive an increase of 1.9%, in nominal terms, while State Department programs, funded intheDepartments of Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations, would grow by about 14%. Table 1. Foreign Policy Budget by Major Appropriation Components (discretionary budget authority in millions of dollars) a FY2000 includes $1 billion for Plan Colombia counternarcotics initiative. Source: Department of State. Two trade promotion programs - the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) - arescheduled for reductions in FY2002, representing the only policy-based budget cut within the International Affairsaccount. The 25% reduced appropriation for the Export-Import Bank is the result of lower lending risks assumed for FY2002plus aneffort to concentrate Bank support on American exporters who cannot access private financing. OPIC, accordingtoAdministration estimates, will have sufficient unspent resources from prior years to continue operations at currentlevelswithout the need for new appropriations in FY2002. Both Eximbank and OPIC have been the target in recent yearsof somecongressional critics who believe that these export promotion activities generally benefit only a few, wealthybusinessesand represent the equivalent of "corporate welfare." Pro-business activists, however, are likely to challenge thebudgetrecommendation, arguing that export subsidies are necessary for American firms to compete with foreign-backedtradesubsidies. (4) Funding for nearly all foreign aid programs are included in annual Foreign Operations spending bills for which the BushAdministration seeks a 4% nominal increase (after adjusting for export promotion programs). Major programs andpotential issues for Congress contained in this sector of the foreign policy budget include: Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) contributions. The FY2002 budget proposes $1.21 billionfor U.S. payments to the World Bank and other regional MDBs, a 5.8% increase over current levels. This amountwill fullyfund all U.S. scheduled contributions for next year, but it will not include resources to clear any of the approximate$450million American arrears owed to the Global Environment Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank'sMultilateralInvestment Fund, the Asian Development Fund, and other institutions. Bilateral development assistance. Congress funds development aid activities, aimed at reducingpoverty, improving health care and education, protecting the environment, and promoting good governance indevelopingnations, through two primary Foreign Operations accounts: Child Survival and Diseases and DevelopmentAssistance. Combined, these accounts would grow by $73 million, or 3.2% in nominal terms. But over two-thirds of theincrease willfund two priorities: HIV/AIDS (+$30 million) and basic education (+$20 million) The request for HIV/AIDS, anareawhere resources doubled in FY2001, increases resources by 10% to $330 million in FY2002. Most otherdevelopment aidprogram sectors will remain at approximate current levels. Population aid will receive the same $425 millionallocation asin FY2001, but remains a highly controversial issue due to President Bush's decision to re-impose restrictions oninternational family planning. (5) The Bush Administration is also proposingto reorient U.S. development aid strategiesaround three "spheres of emphasis" - Global Health, Economic Growth and Agriculture, and Conflict PreventionandDevelopment Relief. USAID will also introduce a Global Development Alliance, an initiative designed to forgeapublic/private partnership, with about $160 million in USAID resources, to promote a leverage sound developmentprograms. Debt reduction and the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. Although the FY2002request cuts by nearly half - to $224 million - FY2001 spending on HIPC debt reduction, the proposal will fulfillallcurrent U.S. commitments to the multi-year HIPC initiative. Nevertheless, some debt relief proponents continueto pressthe United States and other major creditors to enhance and accelerate HIPC terms, actions which would requireadditionalresources. Counternarcotics activities. The largest foreign aid increase sought by the Bush Administrationwould supplement and broaden the $1 billion Colombia counternarcotics program funded in FY2000 with a new$731million Andean regional initiative. The objective is to address drug production and trafficking problems that may havemigrated from Colombia to surrounding states. It further differs from the FY2000 initiative by providing morefunding foralternative development programs. Security assistance. Strategic-oriented economic assistance, provided through the Economic SupportFund (ESF), non-proliferation, and military assistance accounts are heavily concentrated in the Middle East, asituation thatwill continue in FY2002. Military aid for Israel will grow by $60 million, but overall security assistance to Egyptand Israelwill decline by $100 million as part of a ten-year plan to reduce aid to these two countries. Nevertheless, Israel andEgyptwill remain the largest recipients of American aid, with amounts totaling about $2.76 billion and $1.96 billion,respectively. Due to the net aid cuts for Israel and Egypt, plus a small increase overall for security assistance, ESF and militaryaid wouldgain about $230 million in FY2002 that could be allocated for new members of NATO and selected recipients inLatinAmerica and Asia. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the House International Relations Committee on March 15, "If we think it's importantfor our fighting men in the Pentagon to go into battle with the best weapons and equipment and tools we can givethem,then we owe the same thing to the wonderful men and women of the Foreign Service, the Civil Service, and theForeignService Nationals, who are in the front line of combat in this new world." The FY2002 budget places specialemphasis onfour aspects of State Department operations. Personnel. The FY2002 budget request would provide a 17% increase in State'sDiplomatic andConsular Affairs account which provides for salaries and expenses of the Department's personnel. This increaseisintended to"reinvigorate" a Foreign and Civil Service that has failed to attract or retain the "best and the brightest"in recentyears. State Department officials assert that the agency currently has a shortfall of about 1,100 people. TheAdministrationis proposing a multi-year program (for which the FY2002 budget request would provide an initial tranche) to fillthe currentgap in personnel, enhance retention and training, and provide for a float allowing personnel to take leaves of absencefortraining, without leaving a position empty. Initially, the State Department seeks to hire 360 personnel (both inForeign andCivil Service), 186 security professionals, and some FSN replacements. This hiring, according to State Departmentbudgetofficials, would be separate from filling positions due to attrition. Information technology. In recent years, State Department technology acquisition has not kept pacewith its needs and with technology advancements. This condition was exacerbated by the October 1999 merger ofthe U.S.Information Agency (USIA)-an agency whose mission includes providing information and outreach to foreignpublics-intothe Department of State where classified communication and information is required. The Capital Investment Fund(CIF),established by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY1994/95 ( P.L. 103-236 ), provides funding for theDepartment's information technology and capital equipment. As recently as FY1997 the CIF appropriation was$24.6million but grew by FY2000 to $96 million. The Bush Administration is requesting $250 million to connect StateDepartment offices worldwide with classified local area network (LAN) capabilities as well as providing everydesktopwith unclassified internet capabilities. Security. Since the August 1998 bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa, State has made personneland information security a top priority. The Administration is requesting $1.3 billion, an increase of 22% over theFY2001enacted $1.07 billion. Of the total security request, $665 million would be for construction of secure embassies,$211million for the continuation of perimeter security program, and $424 million for an ongoing security readinessprogram. State is requesting security funding within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account, as well as the EmbassySecurityConstruction and Maintenance account. Embassy Infrastructure. The Bush Administration's FY2002 budget includes $60 million foroverseas infrastructure needs, such as replacing obsolete equipment, aging motor vehicles, and improvingmaintenancearound the embassies. State Department officials say these needs have been underfunded and have accumulatedover theyears.

The Bush Administration seeks a $23.85 billion foreign policy budget forFY2002, representing a nominal increase of 5.3% over FY2001 (2.3% in real terms when the effects of inflationare takeninto account). Most of the additional resources are concentrated in a few areas, especially for State Departmentoperationsand a new regional Andean counternarcotics initiative. The budget further proposes to cut funding for theExport-ImportBank by 25%. This report analyzes the FY2002 international affairs funding submission, compares it with recentlyenactedforeign policy budgets, identifies major priorities and recommended reductions, and discusses potentialcongressionalissues. It will be revised as the Administration provides further details in April and May about the FY2002 budget.

Presidential establishment of national monuments under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 U.S.C. §§431-433) has protected valuable sites, but also has been contentious. President Clinton used his authority 22 times to proclaim 19 new monuments and to enlarge 3 others (see Appendix ). With one exception, the monuments were designated during President Clinton's last year in office, on the assertion that Congress had not acted quickly enough to protect federal land. The establishment of national monuments by President Clinton raised concerns, including the authority of the President to create large monuments; impact on development within monuments; access to monuments for recreation; and lack of a requirement for environmental studies and public input in the monument designation process. Lawsuits challenged several of the monuments on various grounds, described below. The Bush Administration examined monument actions of President Clinton and the Interior Department is developing management plans for DOI-managed monuments. Recent Congresses have considered, but not enacted, bills to restrict the President's authority to create monuments and to establish a process for input into monument decisions. Monument supporters assert that changes to the Antiquities Act are neither warranted nor desirable, courts have supported presidential actions, and segments of the public support such protections. The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to proclaim national monuments on federal lands that contain "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest." The act does not specify particular procedures for creating monuments. It was a response to concerns over theft and destruction of archaeological sites, and was designed to provide an expeditious means to protect federal lands and resources. Congress later limited the President's authority in Wyoming (16 U.S.C. §431a) and Alaska (16 U.S.C. §3213). Presidents have designated about 120 national monuments, totaling more than 70 million acres, although most of this acreage is no longer in monument status. Congress has abolished some monuments outright, and converted many more into other designations. For instance, Grand Canyon initially was proclaimed a national monument, but was converted into a national park. Congress itself has created monuments on federal lands, and has modified others. President Clinton's 19 new and 3 enlarged monuments comprise about 5.9 million federal acres. Only President Franklin Delano Roosevelt used his authority more often—28 times—and only President Jimmy Carter created more monument acreage—56 million acres in Alaska. Various issues regarding presidentially-created monuments have generated both controversy and lawsuits. Issues have included the size of the areas and types of resources protected, the inclusion of non-federal lands within monument boundaries, restrictions on land uses that may result, the manner in which the monuments were created, the selection of the managing agency, and other legal issues. Courts have upheld both particular monuments and the President's authority to create them. For instance, a court dismissed challenges to Clinton monuments which were based on improper delegation of authority by Congress; size; lack of specificity; non-qualifying objects; increased likelihood of harm to resources; and alleged violations of the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA, 16 U.S.C. §1601 et seq .), Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C. §551 et seq .), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq .). In another case, a court found that plaintiffs did not allege facts sufficient to support the court's inquiry into whether the President might have acted beyond the authority given him in the Antiquities Act. Critics assert that large monuments violate the Antiquities Act, in that the President's authority was intended to be narrow and limited. The monuments designated by President Clinton range in size from 2 acres to 1,870,800 acres. Defenders argue that the Antiquities Act gives the President discretion to determine the acreage necessary to ensure protection of the designated resources, while reserving "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected" (16 U.S.C. §431). Critics also contend that President Clinton used the Antiquities Act for impermissibly broad purposes, such as general conservation and scenic protection. Supporters counter that the act's wording—"other objects of historic or scientific interest"—grants broad discretion to the President. Further, some claim that the Antiquities Act is designed to protect only objects that are immediately endangered or threatened, but others note that the Antiquities Act lacks such a specific requirement. To date, the courts have upheld the authority of the President on these issues. Non-federal lands are contained within the boundaries of some national monuments. Some state and private landowners have been concerned that development of such non-federal land is, or could be, more difficult because it might be judged incompatible with monument purposes or constrained by management of surrounding federal lands. Monument supporters note that concerned state and local landowners can pursue land exchanges with the federal government. State and local officials and other citizens have been concerned that monument designation can limit or prohibit development on federal lands. They argue that local communities are hurt by the loss of jobs and tax revenues that result from prohibiting or restricting future mineral exploration, timber development, or other activities. The potential effect of monument designation on energy development has been particularly contentious, given the current emphasis on energy production. Subject to valid existing rights, most of the recent proclamations bar new mineral leases, mining claims, prospecting or exploration activities, and oil, gas, and geothermal leases, by withdrawing the lands within the monuments from entry, location, selection, sale, leasing, or other disposition under the public land laws, mining laws, and mineral and geothermal leasing laws. Further, the FY2006 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-54 ) continued a ban on using funds for energy leasing activities within the boundaries of national monuments as they were on January 20, 2001, except where allowed by the presidential proclamations that created the monuments. Mineral activities that would be allowed may have to adhere to a higher standard of environmental regulation to ensure compatibility with the monument designation and purposes. Others claim that monuments have positive economic impacts, including increased tourism, recreation, and relocation of businesses in those areas. Some maintain that development is insufficiently limited because recent monument proclamations typically have preserved valid existing rights for particular uses, such as mineral development, and continued certain activities, such as grazing. Some recreation groups and other citizens have opposed restrictions on recreation, such as hunting and off-road vehicle use. Proclamations typically have restricted some such activities to protect monument resources, and additional restrictions are being considered for management plans in development. Critics of the Antiquities Act argue that its use is inconsistent with the intent of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §1701 et seq .) to restore land withdrawal policy to Congress. A withdrawal restricts the use or disposition of public lands, e.g., for mineral leasing. In enacting FLPMA, Congress repealed much of the President's withdrawal authority and limited the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to make land withdrawals. It required congressional review of secretarial withdrawals exceeding 5,000 acres, and contains notice and hearing procedures for withdrawals. Supporters note that in enacting FLPMA, Congress did not repeal or amend the Antiquities Act and thus desired to retain presidential withdrawal authority. Critics of the Antiquities Act also assert that there has been insufficient public input and environmental studies on presidentially-created monuments, and favor amending the Antiquities Act to require public and scientific input similar to that required under NEPA, FLPMA, and other laws. Others counter that such changes would impair the ability of the President to act quickly and could result in resource impairment or additional expense. They assert that Presidents typically consult in practice , and that NEPA applies only to proposed actions that might harm the environment and not to protective measures. Whereas previously the National Park Service (NPS) had managed most monuments, President Clinton selected the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and other agencies to manage many of the new monuments. Some critics have expressed concern that the BLM lacks sufficient expertise or dedication to land conservation to manage monuments. President Clinton chose BLM where its own lands were involved, to increase the agency's emphasis on land protection, and possibly both to protect the lands and manage them for multiple uses. Mineral development, timber harvesting, and hunting are the principal uses that would be legally compatible with BLM management but not with management by the NPS. Grazing also typically is allowed on BLM lands, but often precluded on NPS lands. The "Property Clause" of the Constitution (Article IV, sec. 3, cl. 2) gives Congress the authority to dispose of and make needed rules and regulations regarding property belonging to the United States. Some have asserted that the Antiquities Act is an unconstitutionally broad delegation of Congress' power, because the President's authority to create monuments is essentially limitless since all federal land has some historic or scientific value. A court dismissed a suit raising this issue, and this holding was affirmed on appeal. (See footnote 2 ). The recent monument designations renewed discussion of whether a President can modify or eliminate a presidentially-created national monument. While it appears that a President can modify a monument, it has not been established that the President, like Congress, has the authority to revoke a presidential monument designation. (For more information, see CRS Report RS20647, Authority of a President to Modify or Eliminate a National Monument , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf).) The Bush Administration examined the monument actions of President Clinton, including whether to exclude private, state, or other non-federal lands from the boundaries of newly-created monuments. There has been no comprehensive Administration effort to redesignate the monuments with altered boundaries. While the monument designation does not apply to these non-federal lands, most of President Clinton's monument proclamations stated that they will become part of the monument if the federal government acquires title to the lands from the current owners. Also, the Interior Department continues to develop management plans for new monuments within its jurisdiction. Further, President Bush reestablished one monument—the Governors Island National Monument in New York—on February 7, 2003. Legislation to amend the Antiquities Act of 1906 has not been introduced thus far in the 109 th Congress, but was considered in recent Congresses. For instance, H.R. 2386 of the 108 th Congress sought to amend the Antiquities Act to make presidential designations of monuments exceeding 50,000 acres ineffective unless approved by Congress within two years. The measure also would have established a process for public input into presidential monument designations and required monument management plans to be developed in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Other legislation in recent Congresses has sought to alter particular monuments, for instance, to exclude private land from within their boundaries.

Presidential creation of national monuments under the Antiquities Act of 1906 often has been contentious. Controversy was renewed over President Clinton's creation of 19 monuments and expansion of 3 others. Issues have related to the size of the areas and types of resources protected, the inclusion of non-federal lands within monument boundaries, restrictions on land uses, and the manner in which the monuments were created. The Bush Administration reviewed President Clinton's monument actions and continues to develop management plans for some of the monuments. Congress has considered measures to limit the President's authority to create monuments and to alter particular monuments. Monument supporters assert that these changes are not warranted and that the courts and segments of the public have supported monument designations. This report will be updated to reflect changes.

RS21283 -- Homeland Security: Intelligence Support Updated February 23, 2004 Better intelligence is held by many observers to be a crucial factor in preventing terrorist attacks. Concerns have been expressed that no single agency or office in the federal government prior to September 11, 2001 was in aposition to "connect the dots" between diffuse bits of information that might have provided clues to the plannedattacks. Testimony before the two intelligence committees' Joint Inquiry on the September 11 attacks indicated thatsignificant information in the possession of intelligence and law enforcement agencies was not fully shared withother agencies and that intelligence on potential terrorist threats against the United States was not fully exploited. For many years, the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information was circumscribed by administrative policies and statutory prohibitions. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, much effort has gone intoimprovinginteragency coordination. (1) After the September 11attacks, a number of statutory obstacles were addressed by the USA-Patriot Act of 2001 and other legislation. (2) Nevertheless, there had been no one place where theanalyticaleffort is centered; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was designed to remedy that perceived deficiencyas is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center announced by the President in his January 2003 State of the Unionaddress. The Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ), signed on November 25, 2002 established within DHS a Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) headed by an Under Secretary for Information Analysisand Infrastructure Protection (appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate) with anAssistant Secretary of Information Analysis (appointed by the President). The legislation, especially theInformation Analysis section, seeks to promote close ties between intelligence analysts and those responsible forassessing vulnerabilities of key U.S. infrastructure. The bill envisions an intelligence entity focused on receivingandanalyzing information (3) from other governmentagencies and using it to provide warning of terrorist attacks on the homeland to other federal agencies and to stateand local officials, and for addressing vulnerabilities that terroristscould exploit. DHS is not intended to duplicate the collection effort of intelligence agencies; it will not have its own agents, satellites, or signals intercept sites. Major intelligence agencies are not transferred to the DHS, although some DHSelements, including Customs and the Coast Guard, will continue to collect information that is crucial to analyzingterrorist threats. The legislation establishing DHS envisioned an information analysis element with the responsibility for acquiring and reviewing information from the agencies of the Intelligence Community, from law enforcementagencies, stateand local government agencies, and unclassified publicly available information (known as open source informationor "osint") from books, periodicals, pamphlets, the Internet, media, etc. The legislation is explicit that, "Except asotherwise directed by the President, the Secretary [of DHS] shall have such access as the Secretary considersnecessary to all information, including reports, assessments, analyses, and unevaluated intelligence relating to threatsofterrorism against the United States and to other areas of responsibility assigned by the Secretary, and to allinformation concerning infrastructures or other vulnerabilities of the United States to terrorism, whether or not suchinformation has been analyzed, that may be collected, possessed, or prepared by any agency of the FederalGovernment." (4) DHS analysts are charged with using this information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats; producing comprehensive vulnerability assessments of key resources and infrastructure; identifying prioritiesforprotective and support measures by DHS, by other agencies of the federal government, state and local governmentagencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. They are to disseminate information to assist in thedeterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the U.S. The intelligence element isalso charged with recommending measures necessary for protecting key resources and critical infrastructure incoordination with other federal agencies. DHS is responsible for ensuring that any material received is protected from unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the performance of official duties. (This provision addresses a concern that sensitivepersonalinformation made available to DHS analysts could be misused.) As is the case for other federal agencies that handleclassified materials, intelligence information is to be transmitted, retained, and disseminated in accordance withpolicies established under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect intelligence sourcesand methods and similar authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement information. (5) Despite enactment of the Homeland Security Act, it is clear that significant concerns persisted within the executive branch about the new department's ability to analyze intelligence and law enforcement information. Mediaaccounts suggest that these concerns center on DHS' status as a new and untested agency and the potential risksinvolved in forwarding "raw" intelligence to the DHS intelligence component. (6) Another concern is that a new entity,rather than long-established intelligence and law enforcement agencies, would be relied on to produce all-sourceintelligence relating to the most serious threats facing the country. DHS Role in the Intelligence Community. The U.S. Intelligence Community consists of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and some 14 other agencies; (7) it providesinformation in various forms to the White House and other federal agencies (as well as to Congress). In addition,law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also collect information for use in thefederal government. (8) Within the IntelligenceCommunity, priorities for collection (and to some extent for analysis) are established by the DCI, (9) based in practice on inter-agency discussions. Being"at the table" when prioritiesare discussed, it is widely believed, helps ensure equitable allocations of limited collection resources. The Homeland Security Act makes the DHS information analysis element a member of the Intelligence Community, thus giving DHS a formal role when intelligence collection and analysis priorities are being addressed. DHSofficials have indicated that the new Department is actively participating in the process of setting priorities. The Question of "Raw" Intelligence. There has been discussion in the media whether DHS will have access to "raw" intelligence or only to finished analytical products, but thesereports may reflect uncertainty regarding the definition of "raw" intelligence. A satellite photograph standing byitself might be considered "raw" data, but it would be useless unless something were known about where and whenitwas taken. Thus, satellite imagery supplied to DHS would under almost any circumstances have to include someanalysis. The same would apply to signals intercepts. Reports from human agents present special challenges. Someassessment of the reliability of the source would have to be provided, but information that would identify a specificindividual is normally retained within a very small circle of intelligence officials so as to reduce the risk ofunauthorized disclosure and harm to the source. The issue of the extent and nature of information forwarded to DHS has proved to be difficult. Reviewing copies of summary reports prepared by existing agencies is seen by some observers as inadequate for the task ofputtingtogether a meaningful picture of terrorist capabilities and intentions and providing timely warning. On the otherhand, there is a need to ensure that DHS would not be inundated with vast quantities of data and that highly sensitiveinformation is not given wider dissemination than absolutely necessary. Analytical Quality. The key test for homeland security will of course be the quality of the analytical product -- whether terrorist groups can be identified and timely warning givenof plans for attacks on the U.S. A critical need exists for trained personnel. The types of information that have tobe analyzed come from disparate sources and require a variety of analytical skills that are not in plentiful supply. Academic institutions prepare significant numbers of linguists and area specialists, but training in the inner workingsof clandestine terrorist entities is less often undertaken. Analysts with law enforcement backgrounds may not beattuned to the foreign environments from which terrorist groups emerge. In July 2003 DHS had only some 53analysts and liaison officials with plans to increase this number to about 150. (10) President Bush, in his State of the Union address delivered on January 28, 2003, called for the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) that would merge and analyze all threat information in a singlelocation under the direction of the DCI. According to Administration spokesmen, TTIC will eventually encompassCIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, along with elements of otheragencies, including DOD and DHS. TTIC's stated responsibilities are to "integrate terrorist-related informationcollected domestically and abroad" and to provide "terrorist threat assessments for our national leadership." (11) OnMay 1, 2003, TTIC began operations at CIA Headquarters under the leadership of John O. Brennan, who hadpreviously served as the CIA's Deputy Executive Director. By July 2003, it consisted of some 100 analysts andliaisonofficials with plans to increase to 300 by May 2004. (12) TTIC appears to be designed to assume at least some of the functions intended for DHS' information analysis division. Representative Cox, chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, has welcomed theestablishment of TTIC, while noting that "The establishment of the Center in no way reduces the statutoryobligations of the Department [of Homeland Security] to build its own analytic capability. (13) " Making the DCI responsiblefor TTIC will facilitate its ability to use highly sensitive classified information and TTIC can expand upon therelationships that have evolved in the CTC that was established in CIA's Operations Directorate in the mid-1980s. According to testimony by Administration officials to the Senate Government Affairs Committee on February 26,2003, TTIC will in effect function as an information analysis center for DHS and DHS will require a smallernumber of analysts with less extensive responsibilities. Subsequent Administration testimony indicates that DHSwill receive much of the same intelligence data from other agencies and will undertake analysis. A key distinctionisthat DHS is not responsible for information relating to threats to U.S. interests overseas. (14) In FY2004, funds were appropriated for 206 intelligence analysts in IAIP;the Administration requested 225 for FY2005. Some observers express concern that the DCI's role in the TTIC -- responsibility for the analysis of domestically collected information and for maintaining "an up-to-date database of known and suspected terrorists that will beaccessible to federal and non-federal officials and entities," (15) -- may run counter to the statutory provision that excludes the CIA from "law enforcement orinternal security functions." (16) There are alsoquestions abouttransferring the FBI's Counterterrorism Division to the DCI. Some express concern about how the TTIC under theDCI will coordinate with state and local officials and with private industry as contemplated in provisions of theHouse-passed version of the FY2004 intelligence authorization bill ( H.R. 2417 ). The relationship between DHS and TTIC is also a continuing concern to Members of Congress. Some may consider modifications of the Homeland Security Act that could affect the analytical efforts of DHS. (17) Section 359 of theIntelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 ( P.L. 108-177 ) requires that the President report on the operations ofIAIP and TTIC by May 1, 2004. The report, which is to be unclassified (with the option of a classified annex), asksfor a delineation of the responsibilities of IAIP and TTIC and an assessment of whether areas of overlap, if any,"represent an inefficient utilization of resources." The President is asked to "explain the basis for the establishmentand operation of the Center [TTIC] as a 'joint venture' of participating agencies rather than as an element of theDirectorate [IAIP]...." The report is also to assess the "practical impact, if any, of the operations of the Center[TTIC]on individual liberties and privacy." Legislation creating a homeland security department recognized the crucial importance of intelligence. It proposed an analytical office within DHS that would draw upon the information gathering resources of othergovernmentagencies and of the private sector. It envisioned the DHS information analysis entity working closely with otherDHS offices, other federal agencies, state and local officials, and the private sector to devise strategies to protectU.S.vulnerabilities and to provide warning of specific attacks. The Administration appears to prefer a modification to the approach originally envisioned in the legislation that created DHS. TTIC, under the direction of the DCI, will provide the integrative analytical effort that the draftersofhomeland security legislation and others in Congress have felt to be essential in light of breakdowns incommunication that occurred prior to September 11, 2001. Whether TTIC is consistent with the intent of Congressin passingthe Homeland Security Act and whether it is ultimately the best place for the integrative effort is current a matterof discussion in Congress. Regardless of where the integrative effort is ultimately located, the task will remainfundamentally the same. Pulling together vast amounts of data from a wide variety of sources concerning terroristgroups, analyzing them, and reporting threat warnings in time to prevent attacks is and will remain a dauntingchallenge.

Legislation establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (P.L. 107-296) included provisions for an information analysis element within the new department. It did not transferto DHS existing government intelligence and law enforcement agencies but envisioned an analytical office utilizingthe products of other agencies -- both unevaluated information and finished reports -- to provide warning ofterrorist attacks, assessments of vulnerability, and recommendations for remedial actions at federal, state, and locallevels, and by the private sector. In January 2003, the Administration announced its intention to establish a newTerrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to undertake many of the tasks envisioned for the DHS informationalanalysis element, known as Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), but some Members ofCongress argue that TTIC cannot be a substitute for a DHS analytical effort. This report examines differentapproaches to improving the information analysis function and the sharing of information among federal agencies.It willbe updated as circumstances warrant.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE and includes a provision for attorneys' fees. Originally enacted in 1975, the act responded to increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and to judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities. The attorneys' fees provisions were added in 1986 by the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, P.L. 99-372 . These provisions were amended in 1997. The P.L. 105-17 amendments allowed the reduction of attorneys' fees if the attorney representing the parents did not provide the LEA with timely and specific information about the child and the basis of the dispute, and specifically excluded the payment of attorneys' fees for most individualized education plan (IEP) meetings. The House and Senate bills leading to the 2004 law contained very different approaches to the attorneys' fees issue. The House bill, H.R. 1350 , 108 th Cong., would have changed the determination of the amount of attorneys' fees by requiring the Governor, or other appropriate state official, to determine rates. The Senate bill, S. 1248 , 108 th Cong., kept the same general framework as in previous law with several changes. The final 2004 IDEA reauthorization was closer to the Senate version and kept many of the previous provisions on attorneys' fees but also made several additions. These include allowing attorneys' fees for the state educational agency (SEA) or the local educational agency (LEA) against the parent or the parent's attorney in certain situations. Under the new law the general provisions regarding filing a complaint and appeals have not changed except that the local educational agency may also file a complaint. A parent or LEA may file a complaint with respect to the identification, evaluation, educational placement, provision of a free appropriate public education or placement in an alternative educational setting. The parents or LEA then have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing with a right to appeal. At the court's discretion, reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. The 2004 reauthorization also allows the award of reasonable attorneys' fees against a parent's attorney to a prevailing SEA or LEA in two situations. These are when the attorney files a complaint or subsequent cause of action that is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or continues to litigate after the litigation clearly becomes frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. P.L. 108-446 also allows for the award of attorneys' fees against the attorney of a parent of a child with a disability or a parent to a prevailing SEA or LEA if the parent's complaint or subsequent cause of action was for an improper purpose such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation. In the Senate debate on the attorneys' fees amendment, Senator Grassley stated that the amendment regarding attorneys' fees would "in no way limit or discourage parents from pursuing legitimate complaints against a school district if they feel their child's school has not provided a free appropriate public education. It would simply give school districts a little relief from abuses of the due process rights found in IDEA and ensure that our taxpayer dollars go toward educating children, not lining the pockets of unscrupulous trial lawyers." Senator Gregg also emphasized the need for the attorneys' fee amendment. He noted that the concept that a defendant should be able to obtain attorneys' fees when a plaintiff's actions were "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" has been applied to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission held that prevailing defendants should recover attorneys' fees when a plaintiff's actions were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation in order to "protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis." Senator Gregg observed that the standard is "very high...and prevailing defendants are rarely able to meet it and obtain a reimbursement of their attorneys fees" and that case law "directs courts to consider the financial resources of the plaintiff in awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant." The attorneys' fee provision also would allow defendants to recover fees if lawsuits were brought for an improper purpose. In the Senate debate, Senator Gregg noted that this concept was drawn from Rule11of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that "in interpreting this language from Rule 11, courts must apply an objective standard of reasonableness to the facts of the case." Attorneys' fees are based on the rates prevailing in the community and no bonus or multiplier may be used. There are specific prohibitions on attorneys' fees and reductions in the amounts of fees. Fees may not be awarded for services performed subsequent to a written offer of settlement to a parent in certain circumstances: if the offer is made with the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or ten days before an administrative proceeding begins; if the offer is not accepted within ten days; and if the court finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement. Also, attorneys' fees are not to be awarded relating to any meeting of the individualized education program (IEP) team unless the meeting is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action or, at the state's discretion, for a mediation. The 2004 reauthorization added a requirement for a "resolution session" prior to a due process hearing. Essentially, this is a preliminary meeting involving the parents, relevant members of the IEP team, and a representative of the LEA who has decision-making authority. Attorneys' fees are not allowable for the resolution session. Like previous law, P.L. 108-446 specifically provides that an award of attorneys' fees and related costs may be made to a parent who is the prevailing party if the parent was substantially justified in rejecting a settlement offer. Attorneys' fees may be reduced in certain circumstances including where the court finds that the parent or the parent's attorney unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the controversy; the amount of attorneys' fees unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation and experience; where the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive considering the nature of the action or proceedings; or the attorney representing the parent did not provide the school district with the appropriate information in the due process complaint. This information includes the name of the child, the child's address and school, or available contact information in the case of a homeless child, a description of the problem, including facts relating to the issue, and a proposed resolution to the problem. As in previous law, P.L. 108-446 contains a specific exception to these circumstances where attorneys' fees may be reduced. There shall be no reduction if the court finds that the SEA or LEA unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a violation of the section. The final regulations for P.L. 108-446 were issued on August 14, 2006. Generally, the Department of Education (ED) declined to elaborate on the statutory language, observing that "further guidance on the interpretation of this statutory language is not appropriate since judicial interpretations of statutory provisions will necessarily vary based upon case-by-case factual determinations, consistent with the requirement that the award of reasonable attorneys fees is left to a court's discretion." One of the issues ED declined to address in the regulations involved whether a court could award fees to non-attorney advocates who accompanied and advised the parents at a due process hearing. ED stated that "[l]ay advocates are, by definition, not attorneys and are not entitled to compensation as if they were attorneys." ED also noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy held that if Congress wishes to allow recovery of experts' fees by prevailing parents, it must include explicit language authorizing such a recovery. Such explicit language was not added in the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA. The Supreme Court's rationale was found by ED to be controlling concerning the fees of non-attorney experts, and the Department of Education declined to add a regulatory provision on the subject.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE and includes a provision for attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees were among the most controversial provisions in the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA. This report analyzes the attorneys' fees provisions in P.L. 108-446 and the final regulations. For a general discussion of the 2004 reauthorization, see CRS Report RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as necessary.

With the official end of the most recent recession in June 2009, congressional interest remains heightened with regard to job creation and the income security of the workers in this country. Traditionally, the path to high wage growth and secure employment for workers has been to pursue and complete education through vocational schools, post-secondary schools, or other institutions. However, employment prospects remain dim for the growing number of recent graduates. Many young workers who have lost their jobs or are still in school face challenges such as unemployment, or if they have a job, underemployment. In February 2013, among individuals aged 16 to 24 in the United States, the unemployment rate was 16.3%. Workers who have lost their job through no fault of their own often rely on Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits for income support during periods of unemployment. Current graduating students, as well as recent graduates from years past, may have worked during previous periods, or worked while they were attending school. If they earned sufficient wages to qualify for UC benefits, they may be eligible to receive this form of income support if they became subsequently unemployed (depending on state considerations). However, students who worked previously, or are concurrently working and attending school, may face barriers and impediments to their UC claims once they are unemployed. This can occur in a number of ways. For example, a student could be attending school full-time, while also working full-time in covered employment, and then lose his or her job. In addition, a worker could have a job in covered employment, and also start school, and subsequently lose his or her job. In both cases, the individual may apply for UC benefits, but the eligibility for those benefits may differ according to the governing state. Many states disqualify workers from UC benefits for school attendance, although some states make exceptions for certain students, typically those receiving approved training or training under Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) program, which provides federal assistance to workers adversely affected by foreign trade. This report examines the treatment of students as a special group within the UC system, and how states define student eligibility for their respective state UC programs. UC is a joint federal-state program that provides unemployment benefits to eligible workers. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) administers the federal portion of the UC system, which operates in each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The UC program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). In addition to establishing how the UC program is financed, these laws also establish certain criteria for UC eligibility. Federal law excludes few positions or types of workers from coverage (with certain exceptions such as the self-employed or others as noted below). Because federal law provides broad guidelines for UC coverage, eligibility, and determination, specifics of each UC program are left to the determination of each state. Although general similarities exist between states, each state establishing its own criteria results in essentially 53 different UC programs. State laws and program regulations determine UC benefit eligibility, payments, and duration. Generally, UC benefits are available to eligible workers who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own and are willing, able, and available to work. In addition, UC eligibility is typically based on attaining qualified wages and employment covered in a 12-month period (called a base period) prior to unemployment. All states require a worker to earn a certain amount of wages or to work a certain period of time (or both) within the base period to be monetarily eligible to receive any UC benefits. Nothing in federal law precludes recent graduates from receiving UC benefits if unemployed. However, the likelihood of a recent unemployed graduate receiving UC benefits is low. Recent college graduates and younger individuals may not be receiving UC benefits for a number of reasons, but basic criteria noted above often dictate eligibility. Generally, to be eligible for UC benefits, a recent graduate would need to have worked in covered employment, earned sufficient wages in his or her base period, and left his or her work involuntarily. In February 2013, the unemployment rate for individuals 16 to 24 years of age was 16.3%, with about 3.5 million individuals in this age group unemployed in the United States. Moreover, during that month, individuals 24 years of age or under received 8.9% of total UC benefits yet made up 29.1% of the unemployed population. Although younger workers generally earn lower wages and would likely therefore receive less return in UC benefits, this difference is substantial. Approximately 1 in 10 unemployed workers aged 16 to 24 receives unemployment insurance. Moreover, recent testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress suggested that individuals graduating from college during a large recession are likely to face reduced earnings that persist for up to 10 years compared with graduates during a boom economy. UC benefits are financed through employer taxes that are established by federal and state law. Federal taxes on employers are provided under the authority of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), whereas state taxes are provided under the authority of the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). Federal law defines which jobs a state UC program must cover and provides broad guidelines concerning benefit eligibility, in order for the state's employers to avoid paying the maximum FUTA tax rate on each employee's annual pay. State laws govern student eligibility, but FUTA provides further guidelines concerning the eligibility of school personnel for UC benefits. Most states disqualify workers from UC benefits if attending school and some states extend this disqualification to vacation periods. The typical presumption behind this policy is that students are unable or unavailable to accept full-time work while in school. Workers must have established wages prior to receiving UC benefits, and the sufficiency of earned wages often depends on the part-time or full-time status of their job. States vary in how they establish definitions of a student, as well as whether they distinguish between part-time and full-time students for the purposes of UC benefits eligibility. In addition, states differ in how they establish these policies, whether through statute, regulation, or case law. FUTA requires states to disqualify school employees from UC benefits if they are unemployed between school terms or vacation periods. This denial applies if the individual has a contract or reasonable assurance of returning to work when the school reopens. This denial applies to instructional, research, or principal administrative employees. FUTA also requires states to deny benefits to these school personnel if they perform services in regular, but not successive, years or terms. For example, school personnel who only work during the academic year would not be eligible for UC benefits during the summer period. In this case, personnel are not eligible for compensation during the entire period between the regular but non-successive academic years or terms. This denial also applies to vacation or holiday periods within school years or terms. The report further discusses how states treat students in two circumstances: whether they qualify for UC benefits while attending school (e.g., a student loses his or her job while in school) or whether they qualify for UC benefits if leaving work to attend school. Most states disqualify students from UC benefits while they are attending school. States' policies tend to presume that students will be unavailable for full-time work because school hours often overlap with standard work hours. In addition, many students, if working part-time, would likely have insufficient prior earnings to qualify for UC benefits. However, if certain conditions are met, some states may allow students to remain eligible for UC benefits. Exceptions to disqualification for UC benefits vary considerably. Almost 45% of states allow students to remain eligible for UC benefits if school attendance does not interfere with the ability and availability to accept suitable work or the student can demonstrate that he or she is seeking and able to accept full-time work. In addition, almost one-third of states allow students to qualify while in school if they are attending an approved training program or can demonstrate that they are willing to quit school or adjust class hours if suitable work is offered. A few states have stricter UC eligibility requirements and do not provide exceptions for students to qualify for UC benefits. Conversely, a few states have little restriction on UC eligibility for students attending school. Table 1 shows the variation among the states. As Table 1 shows, just three states (Alabama, New York, and South Carolina) do not provide an exception to benefits disqualification if attending school. Many state UC programs will consider students eligible if certain conditions are met, namely through the combination of availability for work or seeking full-time work, or if the student is attending appropriate training. A few states specify that a student may be eligible if a major part of his or her base period wages was for services performed while in school. State laws vary with respect to workers remaining eligible for UC benefits while leaving their jobs to attend school. Just over half the states, including the District of Columbia, disqualify individuals from UC benefits for leaving work to attend school. However, many states make exceptions for students leaving work to attend approved training sessions, union apprenticeships, or training under TAA. About one-third of states allow students to remain eligible for UC benefits if leaving work and pursuing one of these forms of training. Finally, a few states do not disqualify students from UC benefits for leaving work to attend school. Table 2 shows variation among the states. As Table 2 shows, most states disqualify students if they leave their jobs to attend school. The main exceptions to this policy are if the student is leaving work to attend approved training or training under TAA. Only eight states have no restrictions on students leaving work and remaining eligible for UC benefits. Individual states approve the training programs they deem appropriate for students to attend and remain eligible for UC benefits. Typically, state workforce agencies determine the training providers that would be qualified to provide educational programs. These programs generally include those provided by a state under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) program, and potentially other state-approved training programs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220 ) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development. Title I of WIA authorizes state formula grants to provide job training and related services to unemployed or underemployed individuals. These programs are primarily administered through the Employment and Training Administration of DOL, but operated in partnership with each state. TAA, on the other hand, provides federal assistance to workers who have been adversely affected by foreign trade. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011 (TAAEA; Title II of P.L. 112-40 ) most recently authorized TAA. Because approved training is granted at the discretion of each state, the types of training offered vary widely, even under programs eligible through WIA and TAA. Approved training is constituted by both public and private options. These options can include employer-based training, remedial programs, prerequisite education or coursework required to enroll in an approved training program, technical skills classes, and various trade and vocational courses. Training providers may have an agreement or contract with state workforce agencies to provide these particular programs. They can be delivered in a number of ways, either through the classroom, via correspondence or web-based applications, or apprenticeships. The treatment of students within the UC program varies by state. Only a few states allow students to attend school and qualify for UC benefits if unemployed. Generally, in approximately half the states, students must be able to show that they are available for and seeking full-time work to be eligible for UC benefits. This can be a high standard to meet, as many students are attending school full-time. In addition, some states require that students demonstrate that they would be willing to quit school to work if offered a job. In the instance of workers leaving their jobs to attend school, states are less flexible in allowing individuals to continue receiving UC benefits. Generally, about one-third of states allow individuals to remain benefits eligible only if they are taking training courses under TAA, WIA, or other state-approved program. The content of approved training classes varies from state to state. Typically, each state workforce agency is granted discretion as to what constitutes approved training for the purposes of attending school and remaining benefits eligible. States identify training providers that are eligible or qualified to receive funds under WIA or TAA.

The recent economic recession and subsequent recovery period has produced one of the most challenging labor markets in recent decades. Many workers lost their jobs during this time period, as others were just entering the market for the first time. As a strategy to cope with the difficult employment situation, many individuals entered school to acquire skills to become more competitive, while others never left, remaining in school to postpone the employment search. However, due to the prolonged nature of the recovery, many students and workers remain jobless and struggle to find work. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, in February 2013, approximately 12.0 million workers remained jobless, of which almost 3.5 million individuals aged 16 to 24 were unemployed. Those that have gone back to school, and have now graduated, still face a competitive job market, and may need to search for work for a prolonged period of time. According to BLS data, in June 2012, there were approximately 3.4 unemployed workers for every available job, and almost 40% of the unemployed have been jobless for more than six months. Because of this economic climate, Congress has been interested in not only job creation and how students are coping with the competitive job market, but whether they are receiving income support during times of unemployment in order to cope. Unemployment Compensation (UC) is a joint federal-state program that provides income support payments to eligible workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. Federal law sets out broad guidelines with regard to how the UC program operates and how it should be administered. State laws establish eligibility criteria for who qualifies for the program. In the case of a student who becomes unemployed, eligibility would depend on how their respective state treats students within the UC system. Most states disqualify students from UC benefits while they are in school or disqualify individuals from UC benefits if they leave work to attend school. This is typically due to the presumption that students would be unavailable for work during the time that they are in school. However, exceptions and variations exist from state to state. Many workers who lost their jobs and remain in school may be eligible for UC benefits depending on their circumstances and how their respective states treat students. This report describes these state variations in further detail and how states consider students within the framework of their own unique UC programs.

According to the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders, exposure to loud sounds is responsible for hearing impairment in 10 million of the nearly 30 million people with hearing loss in the United States, and another 30 million people are daily exposed to dangerous noise levels. Many individuals are also regularly exposed to sound levels that may not lead to hearing loss, but can be intrusive and impair one's quality of life. Several federal laws require the federal government to maintain standards for various sources of noise. However, the standards do vary in stringency among individual sources. Although there is some variance among the standards, all of them limit sound levels at least to a degree that would prevent human hearing loss. The responsibility for setting and enforcing noise control standards is divided among multiple federal agencies. In the past, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) coordinated all federal noise control activities through its Office of Noise Abatement and Control. However, Congress phased out the office's funding in FY1983 as part of a shift in federal noise control policy to transfer the primary responsibility for regulating noise to state and local governments. Although EPA no longer plays a prominent role in regulating noise, its past standards and regulations remain in effect, and other federal agencies continue to set and enforce noise standards for sources within their regulatory jurisdiction. Public interest in the federal regulation of noise and the adequacy of existing standards continues to be strong, especially among communities where sources of noise have proliferated, and as residential development has resulted in people living closer to sources of noise. Considering that existing standards generally are protective against hearing loss, the primary concern among the public has been whether the standards should be tightened to protect the quality of life in communities where sound levels may be perceived as annoying or intrusive, but not necessarily harmful to human hearing. Potential effects of various sound levels, and the roles of federal, state, and local governments in regulating individual sources of noise, are discussed below. Sound is measured in units of decibels (dbA), and an increase of 10 dbA represents sounds that are perceived to be twice as loud. There is broad consensus among regulators in the United States that constant or repeated exposure to sound levels in the vicinity of 90 dbA and higher can lead to hearing loss. Exposure to sounds significantly below these levels are generally not considered harmful to human hearing. However, most individuals perceive unwanted sound above 65 dbA to be intrusive, which can impair one's quality of life, depending on the sensitivity of the individual and the frequency and duration of exposure. Some also argue that persistent exposure to intrusive sound may have certain physiological effects, such as headaches or nausea, even though one's hearing ability may not be impaired. There also have been some questions about the vibration-induced effects of low frequency sound, which can be felt but not heard. The Noise Control Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-574) and several other federal laws require the federal government to set and enforce noise standards for aircraft and airports, interstate motor carriers and railroads, workplace activities, engines and certain types of equipment, federally funded highway projects, and federally funded housing projects. The Noise Control Act also requires federal agencies to comply with all federal, state, and local noise requirements. Various federal laws and regulations governing the administration of park and recreational lands owned by the federal government also provide authorities for agencies to regulate noise that would be generated from human activities on, and in the vicinity of, these lands. Most federal noise standards focus on preventing hearing loss by limiting exposure to sounds of 90 dbA and higher. Some federal standards are stricter and focus on limiting exposure to lower levels of around 65 dbA to protect quality of life. Whether "quality-of-life" standards should be tightened has been an ongoing issue, particularly among communities located near transportation sources such as airports and highways, where exposure to noise is a daily or routine occurrence. As noted above, there also have been some questions about the effects of low frequency sound, but so far, noise standards in the United States have not regulated low frequency sound below the threshold of human hearing. Major existing federal standards that regulate human exposure to noise, and the agencies responsible for setting and enforcing them, are discussed below. The Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-411) requires the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop and enforce standards for aircraft noise. In developing these standards, the FAA generally follows noise limits recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Federal noise regulations define aircraft according to four noise classes: Stage 1, Stage 2, Stage 3, and Stage 4. Stage 1 aircraft are the loudest, and Stage 4 are the quietest. All Stage 1 aircraft have been phased out of commercial operation, and all unmodified Stage 2 aircraft over 75,000 pounds were phased out by December 31, 1999, as required by the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-508 , Title IX, Subtitle D). Stage 3 aircraft must meet separate standards for runway takeoffs, landings, and sidelines, ranging from 89 to 106 dbA depending on the aircraft's weight and its number of engines. Stage 4 standards are stricter and require a further reduction of 10 dbA overall relative to Stage 3 standards. The Stage 4 standards are relatively new and are based on standards that the ICAO adopted in June 2001 (referred to as "Chapter 4" in ICAO parlance). The FAA finalized these standards in July 2005, adopting the ICAO standards by reference. The Stage 4 standards apply to newly manufactured subsonic jet airplanes, and subsonic transport category large airplanes, for which a new design is submitted for airworthiness certification on or after January 1, 2006. As the majority of jet aircraft designed in recent years are already quiet enough to attain the Stage 4 standards, some have commented that the impact of the stricter standards on most aircraft manufacturers may be less significant than otherwise. The ICAO also had recommended separate standards for propeller-driven, small airplanes. The FAA finalized these standards in January 2006. They apply to newly manufactured, propeller-driven, small aircraft for which a new design is submitted for airworthiness certification on or after February 3, 2006. In addition to aircraft certification standards, airports receiving federal funds are required to meet noise control standards for their operation. The standards range from 65 dbA for airports adjacent to residential areas to over 85 dbA for those adjacent to lands used for agricultural and transportation purposes. The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 ( P.L. 97-248 ) established the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) to provide federal assistance for airport construction projects and to award grants for mitigating noise resulting from the expansion of airport capacity. Airport operators applying for such grants must design noise exposure maps and develop mitigation programs to ensure that noise levels are compatible with adjacent land uses. The Noise Control Act required EPA to develop noise standards for motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and it authorized the Federal Highway Administration to enforce them. All commercial vehicles over 10,000 pounds are subject to standards for highway travel and stationary operation, but the standards do not apply to sounds from horns or sirens when operated as warning devices for safety purposes. For highway travel, the standards range from 81 to 93 dbA, depending on the speed of the vehicle and the distance from which the sound is measured. The standards for stationary operation are similar and range from 83 to 91 dbA, depending on the distance from the vehicle. The standards apply at any time or condition of highway grade, vehicle load, acceleration, or deceleration. The Noise Control Act required EPA to establish noise standards for trains and railway stations engaged in interstate commerce, and the law authorized the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to enforce those standards. There are separate standards for locomotives, railway cars, and railway station activities such as car coupling. For locomotives built before 1980, noise is limited to 73 dbA in stationary operation and at idle speeds, and is limited to 96 dbA at cruising speeds. The standards for locomotives built after 1979 are stricter, and limit noise in stationary operation and at idle speeds to 70 dbA and at cruising speeds to 90 dbA. Noise from railway cars must not exceed 88 dbA at speeds of 45 miles per hour (mph) or less, and must not surpass 93 dbA at speeds greater than 45 mph. Noise from car coupling activities at railway stations is limited to 92 dbA. There are no uniform noise standards that control sounds from locomotive horns, whistles, or bells when they are operated as warning devices for safety purposes. However, in response to concerns about noise from horns in communities located near railways, the FRA finalized regulations in 2005, and modified them in 2006, allowing such communities to designate "quiet zones." Within these zones, communities could prohibit the routine sounding of locomotive horns. Designation of these zones is subject to certain conditions, including that there would be no significant risk of loss of life or risk of serious personal injury resulting from the lack of a horn sounding. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-596) required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to develop and enforce safety and health standards for workplace activities. To protect workers, OSHA established standards which specify the duration of time that employees can safely be exposed to specific sound levels. At a minimum, constant noise exposure must not exceed 90 dbA over 8 hours. The highest sound level to which workers can constantly be exposed is 115 dbA, and exposure to this level must not exceed 15 minutes within an 8-hour period. The standards limit instantaneous exposure, such as impact noise, to 140 dbA. If noise levels exceed these standards, employers are required to provide hearing protection equipment to workers in order to reduce sound exposure to acceptable limits. In April 2007, the Department of Labor proposed regulations that would require minors to wear hearing protection devices when working with wood processing machinery. The Noise Control Act directed EPA to set and enforce noise standards for motors and engines, and transportation, construction, and electrical equipment. With this authority, EPA established standards for motorcycles and mopeds, medium and heavy-duty trucks over 10,000 pounds, and portable air compressors. The standards for motorcycles only apply to those manufactured after 1982 and range from 80 to 86 dbA, depending on the model year and whether the motorcycle is designed for street or off-road use. Noise from mopeds is limited to 70 dbA. The standards for trucks over 10,000 pounds only apply to those manufactured after 1978 and range from 80 to 83 dbA depending on the model year. These standards are separate from those for interstate motor carriers. Noise from portable air compressors is limited to 76 dbA. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-605) required the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to develop standards for highway noise levels that are compatible with adjacent land uses. The law prohibits the approval of federal funding for highway projects that do not incorporate measures to attain these standards, which range from 52 to 75 dbA depending on adjacent land use. Among the most common method to attain these standards is to erect a physical barrier (i.e., a noise wall) between the highway and the adjacent land. Under general authorities provided by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-448), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has established standards for federally funded housing projects located in noise-exposed areas. The standards limit interior noise to a daily average of 65 dbA. Possible methods to mitigate noise in housing include the installation of doors and windows designed to diminish the transmission of sound, the insertion of noise-blocking insulation within walls, and the use of thicker walls and floors in new construction. Various federal laws and regulations governing the administration of park and recreational lands owned by the federal government also provide authorities for agencies to regulate noise that would be generated from human activities on, and in the vicinity of, these lands. For example, the National Park Service has included noise standards in its regulations governing the operation of vessels on waters within all National Parks. Certain regulations also govern noise from specific sources in particular parks and recreational areas. For example, the FAA has promulgated regulations limiting noise from aircraft operations in the vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park. These and other restrictions have been motivated by rising interest among recreational users in maintaining the serene qualities of public lands for their enjoyment. However, there have been conflicting desires between recreational users who seek a quieter environment and those users whose preferred recreational activities would be restricted because of the noise those activities would generate. The federal government also is responsible for rating consumer devices designed to be worn by individuals to reduce exposure to potentially harmful or intrusive sound levels. The Noise Control Act authorized EPA to require labels for products that reduce noise. Under this authority, EPA established Noise Reduction Ratings for noise reduction devices, such as head gear and ear plugs. Manufacturers are required to use these ratings to identify the reduction of sound in decibels that the user would experience when wearing these devices. The federal role in regulating noise is primarily limited to transportation, workplace activities, certain types of equipment, and human activities on public lands owned by the federal government. State and local governments determine the extent to which other sources of noise are controlled, and regulations for such sources can vary widely among localities. Further, some states do not directly regulate noise, but allow local governments to play the primary role. Sources of noise commonly regulated at the state and local level include commercial, industrial, and residential activities. Regulations for such sources typically control the public's exposure to noise by limiting certain activities to specific times, such as construction noise only during business hours. Public concern about differing state and local control of noise has led some to suggest that the federal role should be expanded to regulate a greater variety of sources uniformly across the country.

Community perceptions of increasing exposure to noise from a wide array of sources have raised questions about the role of the federal government in regulating noise, and the adequacy of existing standards. The role of the federal government in regulating noise has remained fairly constant overall since the enactment of the Noise Control Act in 1972 (P.L. 92-574). With authorities under this and other related statutes, the federal government has established, and enforces, standards for maximum sound levels generated from aircraft and airports, federally funded highways, interstate motor carriers and railroads, medium- and heavy-duty trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, workplace activities, and portable air compressors. The federal government also regulates human exposure to noise in federally funded housing. In more recent years, the federal role has expanded to include regulation of noise generated by human activities on public lands, including National Parks. State and local governments determine the extent to which other sources of noise are regulated, including commercial, industrial, and residential activities. Although noise standards generally provide a level of protection sufficient to prevent human hearing loss, they vary among individual sources in terms of what level of sound is permissible. This report explains potential effects of various sound levels, describes the role of the federal government in regulating noise, characterizes existing federal standards, discusses the role of state and local governments, and examines relevant issues.

Recent estimates that the unauthorized (illegally present) alien population in the United States exceeds 11 million has focused renewed attention on this population. The 107 th and 108 th Congresses considered legislation to address one segment of the unauthorized population—aliens who, as children, were brought to live in the United States by their parents or other adults. In a 1982 case, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that prohibited unauthorized alien children from receiving a free public education, making it difficult, if not impossible, for states to deny an elementary or secondary education to such students." Unauthorized aliens who graduate from high school and want to attend college, however, face various obstacles. Among them, a provision enacted in 1996 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) discourages states and localities from granting unauthorized aliens certain "postsecondary education benefits." This provision (IIRIRA §505) directs that an unauthorized alien— shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident. Although IIRIRA §505 does not refer explicitly to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes and some question whether it even covers in-state tuition, the debate surrounding §505 has focused on the provision of in-state tuition rates to unauthorized aliens. The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, also makes unauthorized alien students ineligible for federal student financial aid. In most instances, they are likewise ineligible for state financial aid. Moreover, as unauthorized aliens, they are unable to work legally and are subject to removal from the country regardless of the number of years they have lived in the United States. In the 107 th and 108 th Congresses, legislation was introduced—but not enacted—to provide relief to unauthorized alien students. These bills sought to repeal IIRIRA §505 and, thereby, provide unauthorized students greater access to postsecondary education. These bills also would have enabled certain unauthorized students to adjust to legal permanent resident (LPR) status. Legal permanent residents, sometimes referred to as "green card holders," are able to live and work indefinitely in the United States. In most cases, they are able to apply for U.S. citizenship after five years. The unauthorized student bills introduced in the 107 th and 108 th Congresses were H.R. 1563 , Preserving Educational Opportunities for Immigrant Children Act, introduced in the 107 th Congress and reintroduced as H.R. 84 in the 108 th Congress by Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee; H.R. 1582 , Immigrant Children's Educational Advancement and Dropout Prevention Act, introduced in the 107 th Congress by Representative Luis Gutierrez; H.R. 1918 , Student Adjustment Act, introduced in the 107 th Congress and reintroduced as H.R. 1684 in the 108 th Congress by Representative Chris Cannon; S. 1291 , Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), introduced in the 107 th Congress and reintroduced (in modified form) as S. 1545 in the 108 th Congress by Senator Orrin Hatch; S. 1265 , Children's Adjustment, Relief, and Education Act (CARE Act), introduced in the 107 th Congress by Senator Richard Durbin; and Title III, Subtitle D of S. 8 , Educational Excellence for All Learners Act of 2003, introduced in the 108 th Congress by then-Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle. In the 107 th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported an amended version of S. 1291 , known as the DREAM Act. This amended measure represented a compromise between S. 1291 , as introduced, and S. 1265 . None of the other pending bills saw any action beyond committee referral. ( Appendix A contains a table comparing four unauthorized alien student bills introduced in the 107 th Congress.) In the 108 th Congress, S. 1291 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 107 th Congress, was included as part of S. 8 , an education measure introduced by then-Senate Minority Leader Daschle. In addition, a new version of the DREAM Act ( S. 1545 ) was introduced by Senator Hatch. On November 25, 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 1545 with an amendment. The other unauthorized alien student bills did not see any action beyond committee referrals. Four bills ( H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , S. 8 , and S. 1545 , as reported) would have enabled eligible unauthorized students to obtain LPR status through an immigration procedure known as cancellation of removal . (The major features of the bills are compared in Appendix B .) Cancellation of removal is a discretionary form of relief authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, that an alien can apply for while in removal proceedings before an immigration judge. If cancellation of removal is granted, the alien's status is adjusted to that of an LPR. H.R. 84 and H.R. 1684 would have permanently amended the INA to make unauthorized alien students who meet certain requirements eligible for cancellation of removal/adjustment of status, whereas S. 8 and S. 1545 would have established temporary cancellation of removal/adjustment of status authorities separate from the INA. H.R. 1684 , S. 8 , and S. 1545 would have allowed aliens to affirmatively apply for relief without being placed in removal proceedings. Other bills, H.R. 3271 and H.R. 1830 , also would have enabled eligible unauthorized alien students to obtain LPR status, but they would not have done so through a cancellation of removal mechanism. Instead, they would have established a temporary adjustment of status authority. The INA limits the number of aliens who can be granted cancellation of removal/adjustment of status in a fiscal year to 4,000. It, however, contains exceptions for certain groups of aliens. H.R. 1684 would have amended the INA to add an exception to the numerical limitation for aliens granted cancellation of removal/adjustment of status under its terms. No numerical limit would have applied under H.R. 3271 , S. 8 , or S. 1545 . S. 1545 differed from the other bills in that it would have established a two-stage process by which aliens could obtain LPR status. Aliens granted cancellation of removal under the bill would have been adjusted initially to conditional permanent resident status. Such conditional status would have been valid for six years and would have been subject to termination. To have the condition removed and become full-fledged LPRs, the aliens would have had to submit an application during a specified period and meet additional requirements. The other bills would have adjusted all eligible aliens directly to full-fledged LPR status. As detailed in Appendix B , H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , H.R. 3271 , S. 8 , and S. 1545 varied in their eligibility criteria. Among these criteria, all five would have required continuous physical presence in the United States for a specified number of years. In the case of S. 8 and S. 1545 , the continuous presence requirement would have had to be satisfied prior to the date of enactment. Under H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , and H.R. 3271 , the continuous presence requirement would have needed to be met prior to the date of application for relief. All of the bills except H.R. 84 would have limited relief to aliens meeting specified age requirements. All five bills would have required a showing of good moral character. With respect to educational status, H.R. 1684 and H.R. 3271 would have required prospective beneficiaries to be enrolled at or above the 7 th grade level, or enrolled in, or actively pursuing admission to, an institution of higher education in the United States. S. 8 would have granted LPR status only to individuals with a high school diploma or equivalent credential. Under S. 1545 , in order to obtain conditional LPR status, aliens would have needed to gain admission to an institution of higher education or possess a high school diploma or equivalent credential. H.R. 84 contained no educational requirements. On October 16 and October 23, 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee marked up S. 1545 . At the October 16 session, the Committee voted in favor of an amendment in the nature of a substitute proposed by Senator Hatch for himself and Senator Durbin. The substitute amended various provisions of S. 1545 , as introduced. Among the substantive amendments were changes to the confidentiality of information section. For example, the bill, as introduced, stated that information furnished by applicants could not be used for any purpose other than to make a determination on the application. The substitute amended this provision to state that information furnished by applicants could not be used to initiate removal proceedings against individuals identified in the application. At the October 23 meeting, the Judiciary Committee considered a set of amendments to S. 1545 offered by Senator Charles Grassley. Two of these amendments were the subject of debate at the markup. The first proposed to amend a provision in the bill allowing aliens who, prior to the date of enactment, met the requirements for both conditional resident status and removal of the condition, to petition for LPR status without first becoming conditional residents. The amendment would have made these aliens subject to the same period of conditional residence as other aliens eligible for relief under the bill. The second amendment proposed to place restrictions on the availability of federal student financial aid to aliens eligible for adjustment to LPR status under the bill. Under the amendment, these aliens would have been eligible only for specified student loan and work-study programs. Among the other amendments in the Grassley package was one that would have required beneficiaries of the bill to be registered in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the monitoring system for foreign students. The Committee voted, 18-1, to approve the Grassley amendments, and voted, 16-3, to report the bill, as amended. The Committee acted, however, with the understanding that the bill would be subject to further discussion and modification prior to being reported. In S. 1545 , as reported, the Grassley amendment language on federal financial assistance was modified, as described in the next section. The rest of the Grassley amendments were unchanged. Under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, LPRs and certain other eligible noncitizens may receive federal student financial aid. Pell Grants and Stafford loans authorized under Title IV comprise 85% of postsecondary student aid. S. 1545 , as reported, would have placed restrictions on eligibility for higher education assistance for beneficiaries of the bill's adjustment provisions. With respect to assistance provided under Title IV, it would have made aliens who adjust to LPR status under the bill eligible only for student loans, federal work-study programs, and services (such as counseling, tutorial services, and mentoring), subject to the applicable requirements. Thus, aliens adjusting status under S. 1545 would not have been eligible for Pell Grants. H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , H.R. 3271 , and S. 8 , as introduced, did not contain restrictions on eligibility for federal student financial aid. An alien who adjusted to LPR status under any of these bills would have been eligible, as an LPR, for federal financial aid under Title IV. H.R. 84 and H.R. 1684 additionally would have extended this eligibility to unauthorized students who had applied for, but not yet been granted, cancellation of removal/adjustment of status. Appendix A. Comparison of Major Provisions of Bills in the 107 th Congress on Unauthorized Alien Students Appendix B. Comparison of Major Provisions of Bills in the 108 th Congress on Unauthorized Alien Students

Unauthorized alien students constitute a subpopulation of the total U.S. unauthorized alien population that is of particular congressional interest. These students receive free public primary and secondary education, but often find it difficult to attend college for financial reasons. A provision enacted as part of a 1996 immigration law prohibits states from granting unauthorized aliens certain postsecondary educational benefits on the basis of state residence, unless equal benefits are made available to all U.S. citizens. This prohibition is commonly understood to apply to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes. In addition, unauthorized aliens are not eligible for federal student financial aid. More generally, as unauthorized aliens, they are not legally allowed to work in the United States and are subject to being removed from the country at any time. Bills were introduced in the 107th and 108th Congresses to address the educational and immigration circumstances of unauthorized alien students. Most of these bills had two key components. They would have repealed the 1996 provision. They also would have provided immigration relief to certain unauthorized alien students by enabling them to become legal permanent residents of the United States. In both Congresses, bills known as the DREAM Act (S. 1291 in the 107th Congress; S. 1545 in the 108th Congress) containing both types of provisions were reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. This report will not be updated.

RS21771 -- Animal Rendering: Economics and Policy Updated March 17, 2004 Renderers convert dead animals and animal parts that otherwise would require disposal into a variety of materials, including edibleand inedible tallow and lard and proteins such as meat and bone meal (MBM). (2) These materials in turn are exported or sold todomestic manufacturers of a wide range of industrial and consumer goods such as livestock feed and pet food, soaps,pharmaceuticals, lubricants, plastics, personal care products, and even crayons (also see Table 1 on page 6). Although rendering provides an essential service to the increasingly intensive and cost-competitive U.S. animal and meat industries(and is subject to certain government food safety and environmental regulations), the industry has largely operatedoutside of publicview. However, rendering has attracted greater public attention since the discovery of bovine spongiformencephalopathy (BSE ormad cow disease) in two North American cows in 2003. U.S. officials have announced or are considering newregulatory actionsintended to reassure foreign and domestic customers that BSE will not threaten food safety or U.S. cattle herds. These actions arelikely to cause changes in renderers' business practices, costs, and product values. Any changes in the economicsof rendering likelywill affect the economics of animal and meat producers too. Renderers annually convert 47 billion pounds or more of raw animal materials into approximately 18 billion pounds of products. Sources for these materials include meat slaughtering and processing plants (the primary one); dead animals fromfarms, ranches,feedlots, marketing barns, animal shelters, and other facilities; and fats, grease, and other food waste fromrestaurants and stores. In meat animal slaughtering and processing plants, the amount of usable material from each animal depends largely upon the species. For example, at slaughter, a 1,200-pound steer can yield anywhere from 55% to 60% of human edible product,including meat forretail sale, edible fat, and variety meats (organs, tongue, tail, etc.), according to various estimates. Subtractinganother 5%-8% for theweight of the hide, which goes into leather, leaves 32%-40% of material for rendering. If this range were appliedconsistently to all35.5 million U.S. cattle slaughtered in 2003, the equivalent would represent the weight of approximately 11 millionto 14 million livecattle. (3) Elsewhere, independent renderers collect and process about half of all livestock and poultry that die from diseases or accidents beforereaching slaughter plants (Sparks 2002). U.S. farm animal mortalities in 2000 included approximately 4.1 millioncattle and calves(totaling 1.9 billion pounds); 18 million hogs (1 billion pounds); 833,000 sheep, lambs, and goats (64 millionpounds); and 82 millionchickens and turkeys (347 million pounds), according to Sparks, which examined USDA data. "Disposing of these mortalities is complicated because of the need to minimize adverse environmental consequences, such as thespread of human and animal disease or the pollution of ground or surface water," Sparks (2002) observed. "Formany producers,paying a modest fee to have a renderer remove dead carcasses is likely preferred to finding alternative on-farmdisposal methods"(i.e., burial, incineration, or composting). Number and Types of Rendering Plants. One study estimated that 137 firmsoperated 240 plants in 1997, with a total payroll of nearly 10,000 employees. (4) More recently, the National Renderers Association(NRA) estimated that Canada and the United States have a combined 250-260 rendering plants. Rendering facilitiesmay be eitherintegrated or independent operations. Integrated plants operate in conjunction with animal slaughter and meat processing plants and handle 65%-70% of all renderedmaterial. The estimated 95 U.S. and Canadian facilities (NRA) render most edible animal byproducts (i.e., fattyanimal tissue),mainly into edible fats (tallow and lard) for human consumption. Edible rendering is subject to the inspection andsafety standards ofUSDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) or its state counterparts, which by law already are present in themeat slaughterand processing plants. These plants also render inedible byproducts (including slaughter floor waste) into fats andproteins for animalfeeds and for other ingredients. Because a meat plant typically processes only one animal species (such as cattle,hogs, or poultry), itsassociated rendering operations likewise handle only the byproducts of that species. The inedible and ediblerendering processes aresegregated. Independent operations handle the other 30%-35% of rendered material. These plants (estimated by NRA at 165 in the United Statesand Canada) usually collect material from other sites using specially designed trucks. They pick up and process fatand bonetrimmings, inedible meat scraps, blood, feathers, and dead animals from meat and poultry slaughterhouses andprocessors (usuallysmaller ones without their own rendering operations), farms, ranches, feedlots, animal shelters, restaurants, butchers,and markets. Asa result, the majority of independents are likely to be handling "mixed species." Almost all of the resultingingredients are destinedfor nonhuman consumption (e.g., animal feeds, industrial products). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)regulates animalfeed ingredients, but its continuous presence in rendering plants, or in feed mills that buy rendered ingredients, isnot a legalrequirement. The Rendering Process. In most systems, raw materials are ground to a uniformsize and placed in continuous cookers or in batch cookers, which evaporate moisture and free fat from protein andbone. A series ofconveyers, presses, and a centrifuge continue the process of separating fat from solids. The finished fat (e.g., tallow,lard, yellowgrease) goes into separate tanks, and the solid protein (e.g., MBM, bone meal, poultry meal) is pressed into cakefor processing intofeed. (5) Other rendering systems are used, includingthose that recover protein solids from slaughterhouse blood or that process usedrestaurant grease. This restaurant grease generally is recovered (often in 55-gallon drums) for use as yellow greasein non-humanfood products like animal feeds. Value and Use of Rendered Products. The 18 billion pounds of ingredients thatrenderers produce each year have been valued at more than $3 billion, of which $870 million is exported. Of the18 billion poundtotal, 10 billion pounds were feed ingredients with a value of approximately $1 billion (Sparks 2001). MBMaccounted for 6.6 billionpounds of this, poultry byproducts 4 billion pounds, and blood meal 226 million pounds (Sparks). (6) Such ingredients are valued fortheir nutrients -- high protein content, digestible amino acids, and minerals -- and their relatively low cost. Poultryoperations andpet food manufacturers accounted for 66% of the domestic MBM market of nearly 5.7 billion pounds in 2000, whilehog and cattleoperations took most of the rest. So long as animals are raised and processed for food, vast amounts of inedible materials will be generated, the result of prematuredeaths, herd culls, and slaughter byproducts. "Regardless of quantity, byproducts and rendered products from theslaughter processmust be sold at whatever price will clear the market or the industry (and the environment) incurs a cost fordisposal." (7) Asgovernment rules and industry practices evolve to address food safety and animal disease concerns like BSE, optionsfor using thesebyproducts may become more limited. If animal byproducts have fewer market outlets, new questions may ariseabout how todispose of them safely and who should pay. "Feed Ban" Impacts. Scientists currently maintain that infected animal feed is theprimary source of BSE transmission (although research continues into other potential sources). Therefore, U.S.officials believe thatregulation of feed ingredients is the single most effective method for controlling BSE. Following the widespreadoutbreaks of BSE inGreat Britain and Europe, the FDA in August 1997 imposed a ban on feeding most mammalian proteins to cattleand other ruminants. Prohibited proteins still can be fed to other animals such as pigs, poultry and pets. (FDA in late January 2004announced plans toexpand the list of prohibited proteins.) Estimates vary on the economic impact of the feed ban. According to a 1997 report prepared for the FDA on compliance costs andmarket impacts, the FDA feed ban could reduce MBM values by between $63 million and $252 million, or $25 to$100 per ton. (8) Sparks (June 2001) estimated that the average MBM value loss since the 1997 rule was $18 per ton, for a total of$288 million duringthe period 1996 to 2000. Sparks added that these losses likely were highly concentrated among renderers thatproduce MBMexclusively, and among those handling mixed species. The FDA-commissioned report predicted that rendererswould pass much ofthe lost value to packers by paying less for raw materials; packers in turn were expected to reduce their paymentsfor cattle. The 2001 Sparks study examined potential cost impacts of several options for more extensive feed restrictions. It estimated that atotal animal protein feed ban to ruminants would cost $100 million yearly; a total ban on all ruminant proteins toall farm animals,$636 million yearly; and a total animal protein ban to all farm animals, $1.5 billion yearly. Downers and Dead Animals. Another recent regulatory action with an impact onthe rendering industry was USDA's December 30, 2003, ban on all "downer" (nonambulatory) cattle from the humanfood supply. U.S. officials consider downers, or animals unable to rise or walk, to be one of the higher-risk cattle groups for BSE(althoughindustry officials note that most animals become nonambulatory from injuries or non-BSE diseases). Before theban, USDAestimated that 150,000-200,000 downers were entering slaughter plants. One issue is whether the downer ban hasremoved aneconomic incentive to market downers and thus made it more difficult for USDA to obtain such animals for BSE(and other disease)surveillance. On March 15, 2004, USDA announced a major expansion of its BSE surveillance program that will samplemany more downers anddead animals, adding that it is looking to renderers (among other sites) to make these animals available. Numerouspracticalproblems -- such as how to recover and store carcasses, who will sample, the costs, etc. -- now confront bothgovernment andindustry officials. (9) Disposal Questions. If renderers earn less money from rendered byproducts anddead animals, they will pay less for such materials. In the past, renderers paid for dead animals. Now most chargea fee to pick themup. (10) In its 2002 study on the cost of livestockmortalities, Sparks assumed that so long as MBM could be sold for feed, the averageper-head cost of disposing of dead cattle and calves might be $8.25 per head; if MBM is banned from animal feed,the cost could riseto $24.11 per head. Sparks estimated the per-head costs for other disposal methods at $9.33 for incineration, $10.63for burial, and$30.34 for composting. The 2002 World Health Organization (WHO) report observed that rendering, because it "sanitizes" animal wastes, "performs anessential public service: the environmental clean-up of wastes too hazardous for disposal in conventional ways. Forexample, animalwastes provide ideal conditions for the growth of pathogens that infect humans as well as animals. Incinerationwould cause major airpollution. Landfill could lead to disease transmission." (11) A USDA advisory committee in February 2004 said that along with an enhanced BSE surveillance program, "a comprehensive systemmust be implemented to facilitate adequate pathways for dead and non-ambulatory cattle to allow for collection ofsamples, and forproper, safe disposal of carcasses; this must be done to ensure protection of public health, animal health, and theenvironment; such asystem will require expending federal resources to assist with costs for sampling, transport and safe disposal." (12) Others temper this view of rendering by observing that the nation's clean air and water laws are in place to address possible adverseenvironmental impacts. These responsibilities are enforced under the purview of the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA)and generally through states and localities, which often impose their own environmental and health standards aswell. Whilerendering (which also must abide by such standards) certainly is one option for handling dead stock and animalbyproducts, it hasbeen argued, this option does not relieve the animal and meat industries of their environmental responsibilities. Because theseindustries created this material, they should bear the costs, not the public, particularly at a time when budget deficitsare forcingdifficult spending choices, the argument goes. Table 1. U.S. Production, Consumption, and Export of Rendered Products,1999-2003(p) Source : NRA; 2003 data preliminary (p). a. Includes poultry fat and by-product meal and raw products for pet food. b. Withheld to avoid disclosing individual firm data.

Renderers convert dead animals and animal byproducts into ingredients for a widerangeof industrial and consumer goods, such as animal feed, soaps, candles, pharmaceuticals, and personal care products. U.S. regulatoryactions to bolster safeguards against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) could portendsignificant changesin renderers' business practices, the value of their products, and, consequently, the balance sheets of animalproducers and processors. Also, if animal byproducts have fewer market outlets, questions arise about how to dispose of them safely. Thisreport, which willnot be updated, describes the industry and discusses several industry-related issues that have arisen in the108th Congress. (1)

The fundamental policy assumption that has changed between the U.S. ratification of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the current Bush Administration's decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol process concerns costs. The ratification of the FCCC was based at least partially on the premise that significant reductions could be achieved at little or no cost. This assumption helped to reduce concern some had (including those of the former Bush Administration) that the treaty could have deleterious effects on U.S. competitiveness—a significant consideration because developing countries are treated differently from developed countries under the FCCC. Further ameliorating this concern, compliance with the treaty was voluntary. While the United States could "aim" to reduce its emissions in line with the FCCC's goal, if the effort indeed involved substantial costs, the United States could fail to reach the goal (as has happened) without incurring any penalty under the treaty. This flexibility would have been eliminated under the Kyoto Protocol with its mandatory reduction requirements. The possibility of failure to comply with a binding commitment intensifies one's perspective on potential costs: How confident can one be in the claim that carbon reductions can be achieved at little or no cost? Compliance cost estimates ranging from $5.5 billion to $200 billion annually cause some to pause. The current Bush Administration was sufficiently concerned about potential CO 2 control costs to reverse a campaign pledge to seek CO 2 emissions reductions from power plants, in addition to its decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol process. Proposed CO 2 reduction schemes present large uncertainties in terms of the perceived reduction needs and the potential costs of achieving those reductions. In an attempt to prevent any CO 2 control program from incurring unacceptable costs, several cost-limiting "safety valves" have been proposed to bound costs. These safety valves are designed to work with market-based CO 2 reduction schemes, similar to the tradeable permit strategy used by the acid rain program, and would effectively limit the unit (per ton of emissions) control costs sources would pay. This report examines four such safety valves: (1) a straight carbon tax, (2) a contingent reduction scheme, (3) unlimited permit purchases, (4) cost-based excess emissions penalties. In general, market-based mechanisms to reduce CO 2 emissions focus on specifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity), or compliance costs (price), and allowing the marketplace to determine the economically efficient solution for the other variable. For example, a tradeable permit program sets the amount of emissions allowable under the program (i.e., the number of permits available caps allowable emissions), while permitting the marketplace to determine what each permit will be worth. Likewise, a carbon tax sets the maximum unit (per ton of CO 2 ) cost that one should pay for reducing emissions, while the marketplace determines how much actually gets reduced. In one sense, preference for a carbon tax or a tradeable permit system depends on how one views the uncertainty of costs involved and benefits to be received. For those confident that achieving a specific level of CO 2 reduction will yield significant benefits—enough so that even the potentially very high end of the marginal cost curve does not bother them—a tradeable permit program may be most appropriate. CO 2 emissions would be reduced to a specific level, and in the case of a tradeable permit program, the cost involved would be handled efficiently, though not controlled at a specific cost level. This efficiency occurs because through the trading of permits, emission reduction efforts concentrate at sources at which controls can be achieved at least cost. However, if one feels more certain of the potential downside risk of substantial control costs to the economy than of the benefits of a specific level of reduction, then a carbon tax may be most appropriate. In this approach, the level of the tax effectively caps the marginal cost of control that affected activities would pay under the reductions scheme, but the precise level of CO 2 achieved is less certain. Emitters of CO 2 would spend money controlling CO 2 emissions up to the level of the tax. However, since the marginal cost of control among millions of emitters is not well known, the overall emissions reductions for a given tax level on CO 2 emissions cannot be accurately forecast. Hence, a major policy question is whether one is more concerned about the possible economic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some uncertainty about the amount of reduction received (i.e., carbon taxes); or one is more concerned about achieving a specific emission reduction level with costs handled efficiently, but not capped (i.e., tradeable permits). A model for a tradeable permit approach is the sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) allowance program contained in Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Also called the acid rain control program, the tradeable permit system is based on two premises. First, a set amount of SO 2 emitted by human activities can be assimilated by the ecological system without undue harm. Thus the goal of the program is to put a ceiling, or cap, on the total emissions of SO 2 rather than limit ambient concentrations. Second, a market in pollution licenses between polluters is the most cost-effective means of achieving a given reduction. This market in pollution licenses (or allowances, each of which is equal to one ton of SO 2 ) is designed so that owners of allowances can trade those allowances with other emitters who need them or retain (bank) them for future use or sale. Initially, most allowances were allocated by the federal government to utilities according to statutory formulas related to a given facility's historic fuel use and emissions; other allowances have been reserved by the government for periodic auctions to ensure market liquidity. There are no existing U.S. models of an emissions tax, although five European countries have carbon-based taxes. As a stalemate has continued on strategies to control CO 2 emissions, particularly because of costs fears, attention increasingly focuses on the cost-limiting benefit of a carbon tax, either as the primary strategy or as a component blending a carbon tax with the reduction certainty of the tradeable permit system. The object is to create a safety valve to avert unacceptable control costs, particularly in the short term. These safety valves limit unit (per ton) costs of reducing emissions. Four ideas are identified below: Carbon taxes: generally conceived as a levy on natural gas, petroleum, and coal according to their carbon content, in the approximate ratio of 0.6 to 0.8 to 1, respectively. However, proposals have been made to impose the tax downstream of the production process. Several European countries have carbon taxes in varying degrees and forms. Unlimited permits at set price: generally conceived as part of an auction system where permits are allocated to affected sectors by auction with an unlimited number available at a specific price. The most recent proposal is by the National Commission on Energy Policy, which recommends an initial limiting price of $7/ton that would increase by 5% annually. Other variations include the Resources for the Future/Skytrust proposal, which would increase the limiting price ($25/ton) by 7% above inflation annually, and the Brookings proposal, which would set up a short-term market based on a $10/ton price, and a long-term market based on market rates. Contingent reduction: generally conceived as a declining emission cap system where the rate of decline over time is determined by the market price of permits. If permit prices remain under set threshold prices, the next reduction in the emission cap is implemented. If not, the cap is held at the current level until prices decline. Discussions have centered on a 2% annual declining cap subject to a $5 a permit CO 2 cost cap. Excess emissions penalty: generally involves a fee on emissions exceeding available permits based on control costs or other economic criteria, rather than criminal or civil considerations. For example, Oregon's CO 2 standard for new energy facilities includes a fee of 57 cents per short ton on CO 2 emissions in excess of the standard (increase to 85 cents proposed). Table 1 summarizes the key considerations of each of the proposals identified above. As indicated, each safety valve effectively controls cost, but at the price of some uncertainty about the amount of emissions reduced. If one uses the existing Title IV acid rain control program as a baseline, the excess emissions penalty option is the most similar, while the carbon tax option is the most different. The excess emissions penalty option would work in essentially the same fashion as the acid rain program, with the primary difference being the penalty for having insufficient permits at the end of the year. Under Title IV, the penalty is intended to be punitive—to punish the offender for breaking the law. Thus, the offender pays a fine three times the estimated cost of control in addition to forfeiting a future permit. The overriding assumption is that the offender could have reduced his emissions sufficiently, but refused to do so. Under the excess emissions penalty option, there is uncertainty as to whether an offender could have reduced his emissions sufficiently at the estimated price, and that reductions at a cost greater than that price are either socially unacceptable or economically unjustifiable. Hence, the penalty is assessed on the basis of a socially acceptable or economically justifiable price so that the offender pays a cost for his unlawful activity and is encouraged to comply with the law, but is not punished beyond what society has deemed reasonable. Arriving at such an acceptable penalty could be contentious. The carbon tax is the most radical compared with the Title IV program because it dispenses with the permit system approach to emissions control. All the pressure under a carbon tax scheme is on the timing, pace, and level of the tax, as there is no stigma for not controlling pollution. The strength of this approach is that it is self-enforcing, and considerable revenues will be generated that could be recycled to polluters or used for other priorities. However, U.S. environmental policy has generally opposed any approach suggesting a polluter's right to pollute, which the carbon tax approach does grant. Depending on how the unlimited permit approach is implemented, it can look and act a lot like a carbon tax. If the initial allocation of permits is by auction and unlimited permits are available at a low price, the auction price will equal the unlimited permit price, resulting in a carbon tax equal to the excess emissions permit price. Thus, without limits on the quantity of permits allowed, the unlimited permits approach is merely a carbon tax by another name, at least in the short term. In addition, the unlimited permits system requires the tracking mechanisms of a tradeable permit system if it is ever to evolve into a permit system. As with a carbon tax, setting the unlimited permit price could be contentious. The contingent reduction approach attempts to turn both the price and the quantity of reductions into variables solved by the trading market. This requires agreements on both the profiles of emissions reductions and threshold price triggers. It also puts enormous pressure on the trading permit market to produce an accurate price to make the whole system work. Although in some ways the most innovative, the contingent approach also could be the most difficult in terms of arriving at acceptable parameters for the reductions and triggers. In short, employing a safety valve shifts much of the emission reduction debate from compliance targets to the specifications of the safety valve. The safety valve becomes the controlling mechanism of the permit tradeable system, or the sole mechanism in the case of a carbon tax. Whether this shift would contribute to an acceptable result is not clear.

Proposed CO2 reduction schemes present large uncertainties in terms of the perceived reduction needs and the potential costs of achieving those reductions. Several cost-limiting "safety valves" have been proposed to bound costs of any CO2 control program, including (1) a straight carbon tax, (2) a contingent reduction scheme, (3) unlimited permit purchases, and (4) cost-based excess emissions penalties. Employing a safety valve shifts much of the emission reduction debate from compliance targets to the specifications of the safety valve, in particular, the level of the tax or fee involved. This report will be updated if events warrant.

The U.S. strategy in pursuing the war on international terrorism involves a variety of missions conducted by military and civilian intelligence personnel characterized as "special operations" or paramilitary operations. The separate roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are not always clearly reflected in media accounts and at times there has been considerable operational overlap. Proposals such as those made by the 9/11 Commission to change organizational relationships will, however, be evaluated on the basis of separate roles and missions, operating practices, and relevant statutory authorities. DOD defines special operations as "operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement." DOD defines paramilitary forces as "forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission." In this report, the term "paramilitary operations" will be used for operations conducted by the CIA whose officers and employees are not part of the armed forces of the United States. (In practice, military personnel may be temporarily assigned to the CIA and CIA personnel may temporarily serve directly under a military commander.) In general, special operations are distinguishable from regular military operations by degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and mode of employment among other factors. DOD special operations are frequently clandestine—designed in such a way as to ensure concealment; they are not necessarily covert, that is, concealing the identity of the sponsor is not a priority. The CIA, however, conducts covert and clandestine operations to avoid directly implicating the U.S. Government. USSOCOM was established by Congress in 1987 ( P.L. 99-661 , 10 U.S.C. §167). USSOCOM's stated mission is to plan, direct and execute special operations in the conduct of the War on Terrorism in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) to collect intelligence through human sources and to analyze and disseminate intelligence from all sources. It was also to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct." This opaque phrase was, within a few months, interpreted to include a range of covert activities such as those that had been carried out by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Although some observers long maintained that covert actions had no statutory basis, in 1991 the National Security Act was amended (by P.L. 102-88 ) to establish specific procedures for approving covert actions and for notifying key Members of Congress. The statutory definition of covert action ("activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly....") is broad and can include a wide range of clandestine efforts—from subsidizing foreign journals and political parties to participation in what are essentially military operations. In the case of paramilitary operations, there is a clear potential for overlap with activities that can be carried out by DOD. In general, the CIA would be designated to conduct operations that are to be wholly covert or disavowable. In practice, responsibilities for paramilitary operations have been assigned by the National Security Council on a case-by-case basis. In addition to acquiring intelligence to support US military operations from the Korean War era to Iraq today, the CIA has also worked closely alongside DOD personnel in military operations. On occasion it has also conducted clandestine military operations apart from the military. One example was the failed Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba in 1961. Especially important was a substantial CIA-managed effort in Laos in the 1960s and 1970s to interdict North Vietnamese resupply efforts. The CIA was directed to undertake this effort in large measure to avoid the onus of official U.S. military intervention in neutral Laos. The CIA's paramilitary operations in Afghanistan in 2001 have been widely described; CIA officers began infiltrating Afghanistan before the end of September 2001 and played an active role alongside SOF in bringing down the Taliban regime by the end of the year. According to media reports, the CIA has also been extensively involved in operations in Iraq in support of military operations. SOF have reportedly been involved in clandestine and covert paramilitary operations on numerous occasions since the Vietnam War. Operations such as the response to the TWA 847 and Achille Lauro highjackings in 1985, Panama in 1989, Mogadishu in 1993, and the Balkans in the late 1990s have become public knowledge over time but other operations reportedly remain classified to this day. Some speculate that covert paramilitary operations would probably become the responsibility of a number of unacknowledged special operations units believed to exist within USSOCOM. Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: "Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command." The 9/11 Commission's basis for this recommendation appears to be both performance and cost-based. The report states that the CIA did not sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11, and instead relied on improperly trained proxies (foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory outcome. The report also states that the United States does not have the money or people to build "two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations," and suggests that we should "concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity." Some observers question whether procedures are in place to insure overall coordination of effort. Press reports concerning an alleged lack of coordination during Afghan operations undoubtedly contributed to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation regarding paramilitary operations. Although such accounts have been discounted by some observers, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ( P.L. 108-458 ) included a provision (Section 1013) that requires DOD and CIA to develop joint procedures "to improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve elements" of the CIA and DOD. When separate missions are underway in the same geographical area, the CIA and DOD are required to establish procedures to reach "mutual agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort." Some observers suggest that a capability to plan and undertake paramilitary operations is directly related to the Agency's responsibility to obtain intelligence from human sources. Some individuals and groups that supply information may also be of assistance in undertaking or supporting a paramilitary operation. If CIA were to have no responsibilities in this area, however, certain types of foreign contacts might not be exploited and capabilities that have proven important (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) might erode or disappear. Some question if this proposed shift in responsibility would place additional strains on SOF who are extensively committed worldwide. Others argue that SOF lack the experience and requisite training to conduct covert operations. They suggest that if SOF do undertake covert operations training, that it could diminish their ability to perform their more traditional missions. The 9/11 Report notes the CIA's "reputation for agility in operations," as well as the military's reputation for being "methodical and cumbersome." Some experts question if DOD and SOF are capable of operating in a more agile and flexible manner. They contend that the CIA was able to beat SOF into Afghanistan because they had less bureaucracy to deal with than did SOF, which permitted them to "do things faster, cheaper, and with more flexibility than the military." Some are concerned that if SOF takes over responsibility for clandestine and covert operations that they will become less agile and perhaps more vulnerable to bureaucratic interference from defense officials. Section 1208 of P.L. 108-375 permits SOF to directly pay and equip foreign forces or groups supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism. Although not a recommendation in the 9/11 Commission's report, many feel that this authority will not only help SOF in the conduct of unconventional warfare, but could also be a crucial tool should they become involved in covert or clandestine operations. In Afghanistan, SOF did not have the authority to pay and equip local forces and instead relied on the CIA to "write checks" for needed arms, ammunition, and supplies. Congress may choose to review past or current paramilitary operations undertaken by the CIA and might also choose to assess the extent of coordination between the CIA and DOD. P.L. 108-458 required that a report be submitted to defense and intelligence committees by June 2005 describing procedures established in regard to coordination and deconfliction of CIA and DOD operations. That report provided an opportunity to indicate how initiatives by the executive branch have addressed relevant issues. CIA has not maintained a sizable paramilitary force "on the shelf." When directed, it has built paramilitary capabilities by using its individuals, either U.S. or foreign, with paramilitary experience under the management of its permanent operations personnel in an entity known as the Special Activities Division. The permanent staff would be responsible for planning and for maintaining ties to former CIA officials and military personnel and individuals (including those with special language qualifications) who could be employed should the need arise. Few observers doubt that there is a continuing need for coordination between the CIA and DOD regarding paramilitary capabilities and plans for future operations. Furthermore, many observers believe that the CIA should concentrate on "filling the gaps," focusing on those types of operations that DOD is likely to avoid. Nevertheless, they view this comparatively limited set of potential operations to be a vitally important one that should not be neglected or assigned to DOD. There may be occasions when having to acknowledge an official U.S. role would preclude operations that were otherwise considered vital to the national security; the CIA can provide the deniability that would be difficult, if not impossible, for military personnel. Some experts believe that there may be legal difficulties if SOF are required to conduct covert operations. One issue is the legality of ordering SOF personnel to conduct covert activities that would require them to forfeit their Geneva Convention status to retain deniability. To operate with deniability, SOF could be required to operate without the protection of a military uniform and identification card which affords them combatant status under the Geneva Convention if captured. Also, covert operations can often be contrary to international laws or the laws of war and U.S. military personnel are generally expected to follow these laws. Traditionally, the public text of intelligence legislation has included few provisions regarding paramilitary operations; levels of funding and other details are included in classified annexes which are understood to have the force of law. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees do have considerable influence in supporting or discouraging particular covert actions. In a few cases Congress has formally voted to deny funding to ongoing covert operations. Special Forces, however, fall under the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and it is unclear how Congress would handle oversight if covert operations are shifted to SOF as well as how disputes between the intelligence and armed services committees would be dealt with. The 109 th Congress did not address this issue legislatively. On November 23, 2004, President Bush issued a letter requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review matters relating to Recommendation 32 and submit their advice to him by February 23, 2005. In unclassified testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005, the Director of the CIA testified that the CIA and DOD disagreed with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation. In June of 2005 it was reported that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency responded to the President, stating that "neither the CIA nor DOD endorses the commission's recommendation on shifting the paramilitary mission or operations." The Administration reportedly rejected the 9-11 Commission's recommendation to shift the responsibility for paramilitary operations to DOD. The 110 th Congress saw the enactment of P.L. 110-53 , Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 which did not address either paramilitary operations by CIA or special operations by DOD. Opposition by the Pentagon, the Intelligence Community, and the Bush Administration undoubtedly affected the congressional response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to vest responsibilities for paramilitary operations in DOD. CIA's reputation may have also been assisted by the generally favorable assessments given to the Agency's post-9/11 performance, especially in the initial phases of the Afghan campaign that led to the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001. Although most observers believe that there remains little inclination among Members to transfer responsibilities for all paramilitary operations out of CIA, some Members have expressed concerns about apparent blurring of lines between DOD clandestine operations and CIA intelligence-gathering operations.

The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. For additional information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].

The offices of the resident commissioner from Puerto Rico and the delegates to the House of Representatives from American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are created by statute, not by the Constitution. Because they represent territories and associated jurisdictions, not states, they do not possess the same parliamentary rights afforded Members. This report examines the parliamentary rights of the delegates and the resident commissioner in legislative committee, in the House, and in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. Under clause 3 of Rule III, the delegates and the resident commissioner are elected to serve on standing committees in the same manner as Representatives and have the same parliamentary powers and privileges as Representatives there: the right to question witnesses, debate, offer amendments, vote, offer motions, raise points of order, include additional views in committee reports, accrue seniority, and chair committees and subcommittees. The same rule authorizes the Speaker of the House to appoint delegates and the resident commissioner to conference committees as well as to select and joint committees. The delegates and the resident commissioner may not vote in or preside over the House. Although they take an oath to uphold the Constitution, they are not included on the Clerk's roll of Members-elect and may not vote for Speaker. They may not file or sign discharge petitions. They may, however, sponsor and cosponsor legislation, participate in debate—including managing time—and offer any motion that a Representative may make, except the motion to reconsider. A delegate or resident commissioner may raise points of order and questions of personal privilege, call a Member to order, appeal rulings of the chair, file reports for committees, object to the consideration of a bill, and move impeachment proceedings. Under the rules of the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), the delegates and the resident commissioner may not vote in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. In a change from the rules of the prior Congress, however, they may preside over the Committee of the Whole. Under Rules III and XVIII, as adopted in both the 110 th and 111 th Congresses (2007-2010), when the House was sitting as the Committee of the Whole, the delegates and resident commissioner had the same ability to vote as Representatives, subject to immediate reconsideration in the House when their recorded votes had been "decisive" in the committee. These prior House rules also authorized the Speaker to appoint a delegate or the resident commissioner to preside as chairman of the Committee of the Whole. These rules of the 110 th and 111 th Congresses were identical in effect to those in force in the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), which permitted the delegates and the resident commissioner to vote in, and to preside over, the Committee of the Whole. These provisions were stricken from the rules as adopted in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) and remained out of effect until readopted in the 110 th Congress. They were again removed from House rules at the beginning of the 112 th Congress (2011-2012). At the time of the adoption of the 1993 rule, then-Minority Leader Robert H. Michel and 12 other Representatives filed suit against the Clerk of the House and the territorial delegates seeking a declaration that the rule was unconstitutional. The constitutionality of the rule was ultimately upheld on appeal based on its inclusion of the mechanism for automatic reconsideration of votes in the House. The votes of the delegates and the resident commissioner were decisive, and thus subject to automatic revote by the House, on three occasions in the 103 rd Congress. There were no instances identified in the 110 th Congress in which the votes of the delegates and the resident commissioner were decisive. In the 111 th Congress, the votes of the delegates were decisive, and subject to an automatic revote, on one occasion. The prior rule governing voting in the Committee of the Whole by delegates and the resident commissioner was not interpreted to mean that any recorded vote with a difference of six votes or fewer was subject to automatic reconsideration. In determining whether the votes of the delegates and the resident commissi oner were decisive, the chair followed a "but for" test—namely, would the result of a vote have been different if the delegates and the commissioner had not voted? If the votes of the delegates and resident commissioner on a question were determined to be decisive by this standard, the committee automatically rose and the Speaker put the question to a vote. The vote was first put by voice, and any Representative could, with a sufficient second, obtain a record vote. Once the final result of the vote was announced, the Committee of the Whole automatically resumed its sitting.

As officers who represent territories and properties possessed or administered by the United States but not admitted to statehood, the five House delegates and the resident commissioner from Puerto Rico do not enjoy all the same parliamentary rights as Members of the House. They may vote and otherwise act similarly to Members in legislative committee. They may not vote on the House floor but may participate in debate and make most motions there. Under the rules of the 115th Congress (2017-2018), the delegates and resident commissioner may not vote in, but are permitted to preside over, the Committee of the Whole. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), signed into law on January 8, 2002 ( P.L. 107-110 ), required that all paraprofessionals assigned instructional duties and employed in Title I, Part A-funded schools meet minimum qualifications by January 8, 2006. The NCLB states that paraprofessionals (also known as instructional aides) must have completed two years of college, obtained an associate's degree, or demonstrated content knowledge and an ability to assist in classroom instruction. On June 17, 2005, the Education Department (ED) announced that the paraprofessional deadline would be extended to the end of the 2005-2006 school year to coincide with the related NCLB deadline for highly qualified teachers (HQT). The use of instructional aides in U.S. classrooms has been increasing every year since data on paraprofessionals were first collected by ED's National Center for Education Statistics. Instructional aides accounted for 2.5% of total full-time equivalent instructional staff in 1970, 11.9% in 1980, 16.5% in 2000, and 17.2% in 2009. ED's interim report on NCLB teacher quality implementation revealed that paraprofessionals accounted for about one-third of instructional staff in Title I-A funded schools and districts. Instructional aides are also increasingly handling classroom responsibilities without supervision. ED's final report on NCLB teacher quality implementation indicated that 19% of paraprofessionals spent "at least half of their time working with students in the classroom without a teacher present." Recognition that the quality of instruction in U.S. schools is increasingly affected by the quality of paraprofessional staff has bolstered support for federal instructional aide standards. Prior to the NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) required only that paraprofessionals possess a high school diploma. This requirement was established in previous ESEA amendments passed under the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-382 ). Legislative proposals establishing higher standards for paraprofessionals were supported by ED under both the Clinton and Bush Administrations, and were eventually enacted under the NCLB. As of the enactment of the NCLB on January 8, 2002, all newly hired Title I paraprofessionals whose duties include instructional support must possess the minimum qualifications prior to employment. That is, they must have completed two years of study at an institution of higher education, obtained an associate's (or higher) degree, or passed a formal state or local academic assessment, demonstrating knowledge of and the ability to assist in instructing reading, writing, and mathematics. Paraprofessionals hired on or before January 8, 2002, who were performing instructional duties in a program supported with Title I funds, were required to meet these requirements by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. The NCLB paraprofessional qualification requirements apply only to Title I paraprofessionals with instructional duties; that is, those who provide one-on-one tutoring if the tutoring is scheduled at a time when a student would not otherwise receive instruction from a teacher; assist with classroom management, such as organizing instructional and other materials; provide assistance in a computer laboratory; conduct parental involvement activities; provide support in a library or media center; act as a translator; or provide instructional services to students under the direct supervision of a teacher. Individuals who work in food services, cafeteria or playground supervision, personal care services, non-instructional computer assistance, and similar positions are not considered paraprofessionals, and do not have to meet these requirements. Also, ESEA Section 1119(e) indicates that paraprofessionals who only serve as translators or who only conduct parental involvement activities must have a secondary school diploma or its equivalent, but do not have to meet additional requirements. Under NCLB, local education agencies (LEAs) must make progress toward meeting their state's annual objectives for teacher quality and student achievement. If a state determines that an LEA has failed to make progress toward meeting those annual objectives for three consecutive years, the LEA is prohibited from using Title I-A funds on any paraprofessional hired after the date of the determination. The most recent non-regulatory guidance on paraprofessionals, issued by ED on March 1, 2004, clarifies a number of questions that have been raised during implementation of the NCLB. The guidance describes various school settings under which paraprofessionals may or may not be required to meet the NCLB rules. The requirements apply to all paraprofessionals employed in a Schoolwide Title I program without regard to whether the position is funded with federal, state, or local funds. In Targeted Assistance Title I programs, only those paraprofessionals paid with Title I funds must meet the requirements (not those paid with state or local funds); however, special education paraprofessionals in targeted assistance programs must meet the requirements even if only part of their pay comes from Title I funds. A paraprofessional who provides services to private school students and is employed by an LEA with Title I funds must meet the NCLB requirements; however, these requirements do not apply to those in the Americorps program, volunteers, or those working in either 21 st Century Community Learning Centers or Head Start programs. LEAs have discretion when it comes to considering who is an "existing" paraprofessional and whether qualified status is "portable." If an LEA laid off a paraprofessional who was initially hired on or before January 8, 2002, the LEA may consider that person an "existing" employee when the individual is subsequently recalled to duty. Also, an LEA may determine that a paraprofessional meets the qualification requirements if the individual was previously determined to meet these requirements by another LEA. The ED guidance clarifies that "two years of study" means the equivalent of two years of full-time study as determined by an "institution of higher education" (IHE)—the definition of an IHE is specified in Section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965. Continuing education credits may count toward the two-year requirement if they are part of an overall training and development program plan and an IHE accepts or translates them to course credits. Section C of the guidance discusses issues related to the assessment of paraprofessionals. The guidance indicates that a state or LEA may develop a paraprofessional knowledge and ability assessment using either a paper and pencil form, a performance evaluation, or some combination of the two. These assessments should gauge content knowledge (e.g., in reading, writing, and math) as well as competence in instruction (which may be assessed through observations). The content knowledge should reflect state academic standards and the skills expected of a child at a given school level. The results of the assessment should establish a candidate's content knowledge and competence in instruction, and target the areas where additional training may be needed. Most states are employing more than one type of written assessment along with performance evaluation. Two of the most common tests are ParaPro (developed by the Educational Testing Service). Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia allow LEAs to use ParaPro for paraprofessional assessment. In addition, 21 states allow LEAs to develop their own assessments. ECS considers 12 states to have established paraprofessional qualifications that exceed federal standards, and identifies 10 states that require paraprofessionals to obtain professional certification. The ECS also identifies 11 states that have professional development programs for paraprofessionals. Section D of the guidance discusses programmatic requirements that pertain to the supervision of paraprofessionals. The guidance points out that ESEA Section 1119(g)(3)(A) stipulates that paraprofessionals who provide instructional support must work under the "direct supervision" of a highly qualified teacher. Further, the guidance states the following: A paraprofessional works under the direct supervision of a teacher if (1) the teacher prepares the lessons and plans the instruction support activities the paraprofessional carries out, and evaluates the achievement of the students with whom the paraprofessional is working, and (2) the paraprofessional works in close and frequent proximity with the teacher. [§200.59(c)(2) of the Title I regulations] As a result, a program staffed entirely by paraprofessionals is not permitted. In addition, the guidance states that the rules regarding direct supervision also apply to paraprofessionals who provide services under contract. That is, paraprofessionals hired by a third-party contractor to work in a Title I program must work under the direct supervision of a teacher (even though teachers employed by the contractor need not meet NCLB highly qualified teacher requirements). The ED guidance discusses funding sources for the professional development and assessment of paraprofessionals. An LEA must use not less than 5% of its Title I, Part A allocation for the professional development of teachers and paraprofessionals. LEAs may also use their general Title I funds for this purpose. Funds for professional development of paraprofessionals may also be drawn from Title II, Part A (for core subject-matter personnel); from Title III, Part A (for those serving English language learners); from Title V, Part A (for "Innovative" programs); and from Title VII, Part A, subpart 7 (for those serving Indian children). Schools and LEAs identified as needing improvement must reserve additional funds for professional development. Section B-2 of the guidance describes conditions under which LEAs are prohibited from using Title I funds to hire new paraprofessionals. Such a prohibition may be imposed by a state on an LEA that has failed to make progress toward meeting the annual measurable objectives established by the state for increasing the percentage of highly qualified teachers , and has failed to make adequate yearly progress for three cumulative years. Two exceptions to this rule are (1) if the hiring is to fill a vacancy created by the departure of another paraprofessional, and (2) if the hiring is necessitated by a significant increase in student enrollment or an increased need for translators or parental involvement personnel. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia reported data to ED on the qualifications of their paraprofessionals for the 2003-2004 school year. Among them, 10 states reported that fewer than half of their paraprofessionals met the NCLB requirements; four states reported that at least 9 of every 10 of their paraprofessionals met these standards. However, ED officials indicated that most paraprofessionals acquired the minimum qualifications by the June 30, 2006, deadline. NCLB authorized most ESEA programs through FY2007. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provided an automatic one-year extension of these programs through FY2008. While most ESEA programs no longer have an explicit authorization, the programs continue to receive annual appropriations and paraprofessional quality requirements continue to be in place. LEAs in states that have received an ESEA flexibility waiver are not restricted in the use of Title I-A funds for failing to meet NCLB teacher quality and student achievement accountability requirements; however, all LEAs still must comply with the law's paraprofessional quality requirements. The 114 th Congress has acted on legislation to reauthorize the ESEA. Possible reauthorization issues concerning the paraprofessional provisions in Title I include the following: Are the assessments used to evaluate paraprofessional quality rigorous enough, and are they adequately tied to academic standards for students? Some consider the ParaPro and WorkKeys tests to be the "easy route," and claim they do not measure a instructional aide's ability to improve classroom instruction. Might a reauthorized ESEA be more explicit about the nature of these tests by linking them to other accountability provisions? Should ED be given greater authority to enforce higher standards for paraprofessional assessments? Should the paraprofessional qualification requirements be applied to a broader group of instructional aide s? For example, should these requirements be applied to all paraprofessionals with instructional responsibilities, not just to those paid with Title I-A funds? Should the exceptions currently made for computer lab assistants, translators, and those assisting with parental involvement be curtailed? Is the language regarding "direct supervision" too vague or too difficult to enforce? Do current provisions for the professional development of instructional aide s adequately encourage states to improve the paraprofessional workforce? Should states be given incentives to adopt paraprofessional certification requirements, as have been adopted in some states? Are there other ways to encourage paraprofessional development beyond the minimum qualifications that would positively affect the overall level of instructional quality? Have the paraprofessional qualification requirements significantly affected the extent to which Title I-A funds are used to hire these staff? In particular, have a significant number of paraprofessionals lost their jobs, or been assigned to non-Title I-A positions, after the end of the 2005-2006 school year because they were unable to meet the paraprofessional qualification requirements? Has this resulted in an overall decline or improvement in the quality of instruction? Should the roles of states versus LEAs in setting policies and implementing these requirements be clarified? Particularly in comparison to the teacher quality requirements of the NCLB, there has been relatively little guidance from ED, or clarity in the statute, on state-versus-LEA roles in the area of paraprofessional qualification requirements. Has the result been a constructive form of flexibility or dysfunctional ambiguity?

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) established minimum qualifications for paraprofessionals (also known as instructional aides) employed in Title I, Part A-funded schools. NCLB required that paraprofessionals must complete two years of college, obtain an associate's degree, or demonstrate content knowledge and an ability to assist in classroom instruction. Prior to the NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) required only that paraprofessionals possess a high school diploma. These requirements, as enacted through NCLB, apply to all paraprofessionals employed in a Title I-A Schoolwide (§1114) program without regard to whether the position is funded with federal, state, or local funds. In Title I-A programs known as Targeted Assistance (§1115), only those paraprofessionals paid with Title I-A funds must meet the requirements (not those paid with state or local funds). A report by the Education Department (ED) reveals that paraprofessionals accounted for about one-third of instructional staff in Title I-A funded schools and districts. NCLB authorized most ESEA programs through FY2007. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provided an automatic one-year extension of these programs through FY2008. While most ESEA programs no longer have an explicit authorization, the programs continue to receive annual appropriations and paraprofessional quality requirements continue to be in place. LEAs in states that have received an ESEA flexibility waiver are not restricted in the use of Title I-A funds for failing to meet NCLB teacher quality and student achievement accountability requirements; however, all LEAs still must comply with the law's paraprofessional quality requirements. This report describes the paraprofessional quality provisions and guidance provided by ED regarding implementation. The report concludes with discussion of issues that may arise as Congress considers reauthorization of the ESEA.

T he Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) includes a 40% excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, often referred to as the Cadillac tax . The 40% excise tax is assessed on the aggregate cost of employer-sponsored health coverage that exceeds a dollar limit. If a tax is owed, it is levied on the entity providing the coverage (e.g., the health insurance issuer or the employer). Under the ACA, the excise tax was to go into effect in 2018; however, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (CAA of 2016; P.L. 114-113 ) delays implementation until 2020. The excise tax is included in the ACA to raise revenue to offset the cost of other ACA provisions (e.g., the financial subsidies available through the health insurance exchanges). The most current publicly available cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) indicates that the excise tax was expected to increase federal revenues by $87 billion between 2016 and 2025, based on 2018 implementation. The excise tax also is expected to limit the tax advantages for employer-sponsored health coverage. Many economists contend that the tax advantages lead to an overconsumption of coverage and health care services. This report provides an overview of the excise tax. The report includes cost estimates for the excise tax and explores the excise tax's relationship with the tax advantages for employer-sponsored health coverage. The information in this report is based on statute and two notices issued by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Notice 2015-16 was issued February 17, 2015, and the comment period for the notice closed May 15, 2015. Notice 2015-52 was issued July 30, 2015. The comment period for the notice closed October 1, 2015. As of the date of this report, regulations related to the excise tax have not been promulgated. Many employers offer health insurance plans and other health-related benefits (e.g., health care flexible spending accounts, or FSAs). These benefits are one part of an employee's total compensation. Often employers pay for part or all of these benefits. To illustrate, 57% of employers offered health insurance plans to their employees in 2015, and on average employers covered 82% of the premiums for single coverage and 71% of the premiums for family coverage. Beginning in 2020, a 40% excise tax is to be assessed on the aggregate cost of an employee's applicable coverage that exceeds a dollar limit during a taxable period. Unlike some other ACA provisions, assessment of the excise tax is not dependent on an employer's characteristics (e.g., number of workers); assessment is dependent on whether the aggregate cost of an employee's applicable coverage exceeds a dollar limit. The entity responsible for paying the excise tax to the IRS is the coverage provider. The terms applicable coverage, dollar limit, and coverage provider are defined and described in more detail below. The excise tax is assessed on the amount by which the aggregate cost of an employee's applicable coverage exceeds a dollar limit. The amount is called the excess benefit . Determining the excess benefit requires knowing which types of coverage are considered applicable coverage and how the cost of such coverage is calculated. For example, consider an employee who has an employer-sponsored health plan, a separate vision-only plan, and a health care flexible spending account (FSA). To determine the excess benefit, if any, of the employee's coverage, it is necessary to know whether any of the coverage is considered applicable coverage and the methods for determining the cost of such coverage. Applicable coverage is defined as coverage under any group health plan made available to the employee by an employer which is excludable from the employee's gross income under section 106 [of the IRC], or would be so excludable if it were employer-provided coverage (within the meaning of such section 106). Coverage that is excluded from an employee's gross income under Section 106 of the IRC includes, but is not limited to, employers' contributions to health insurance premiums, Archer Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs), and health savings accounts (HSAs). Additionally, three arrangements are identified in the statute as applicable coverage: (1) the employee-paid portion of health insurance coverage (i.e., an employee's contribution to premiums); (2) a self-employed individual's health insurance coverage for which a deduction is allowable under Section 162(l) of the IRC; and (3) coverage under a group health plan for civilian employees of federal, state, or local governments. See Table 1 for a list of what is considered applicable coverage based on the statute and Notice 2015-16. Certain arrangements are excluded from the definition of applicable coverage ( Table 2 ). Arrangements not considered applicable coverage are not included in the calculation for determining the aggregate cost of applicable coverage. The cost of applicable coverage is to be determined under rules "similar to" the rules in Section 4980B(f)(4) of the IRC. These rules currently apply under Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA; P.L. 99-272 ). Under COBRA, an employer with 20 or more employees that provided health insurance benefits must provide qualified employees and their families the option of continuing their coverage under the employer's group health insurance plan in certain cases where the employee's coverage otherwise would end (e.g., the employee is terminated). For COBRA purposes, the rules in Section 4980B(f)(4) of the IRC are used to determine the cost of the premium for the health insurance plan in which the former employee can continue. As of the date of this report, information is not available about how the rules in Section 4980B(f)(4) of the IRC will be applied in the context of the excise tax. In Notice 2015-16, Treasury and IRS describe potential approaches they are considering for applying the COBRA rules to determine the cost of applicable coverage. The statute also includes specific calculation rules for determining the cost of applicable coverage: Any portion of the cost of applicable coverage that is attributable to the excise tax will not be taken into account. The cost of applicable coverage will be calculated separately for single coverage and non-single coverage (e.g., family coverage). In the case of applicable coverage provided to retired employees, the plan can choose to treat a retired employee who is under the age of 65 and a retired employee aged 65 or older as similarly situated beneficiaries. With respect to a health care FSA, the cost of applicable coverage is the greater of an employee's salary reduction election or the total reimbursements under the FSA. With respect to Archer MSAs, the cost of applicable coverage is equal to an employer's contributions to the Archer MSA. With respect to HSAs, the cost of applicable coverage is equal to an employer's contributions, including salary reduction contributions, to the HSA. If the cost of applicable coverage is not determined on a monthly basis, the cost of the coverage will be allocated to months on a basis prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The excise tax is assessed on the excess benefit—the portion of an employee's applicable coverage that exceeds a dollar limit. Under the ACA, the dollar limits for 2018 were to be $10,200 for single coverage and $27,500 for non-single coverage (e.g., family coverage), as adjusted by the health cost adjustment percentage. For 2019, the limits were to be the 2018 limits adjusted by the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U), plus 1%. For 2020 and beyond, the limits were to be the previous year's limits adjusted by the CPI-U. The CAA of 2016, which delayed implementation of the excise tax until 2020, did not change the 2018 dollar limits or modify how the 2018 dollar limits were to be adjusted. The Department of the Treasury has not yet issued the 2020 limits, but the Congressional Research Service estimates they will be about $10,800 for single coverage and $29,100 for non-single coverage. The dollar limits also could be subject to two different adjustments, which are described below. The CAA of 2016 did not modify these adjustments. For some employers, the dollar limits for each year could be increased based on their employees' demographic characteristics. The adjustment could occur if the age and gender characteristics of all employees of an employer are significantly different from the age and gender characteristics of the national workforce. The adjustment uses the BCBS Standard plan offered through the FEHB program. The cost of the BCBS Standard plan is determined based on the age and gender characteristics of the employer's workforce and on the age and gender characteristics of the national workforce. The amount the dollar limits could be increased is equal to the excess cost of the BCBS Standard plan adjusted for the employer's workforce as compared to the BCBS Standard plan adjusted for the national workforce. The limits also may be adjusted for (1) individuals who are qualified retirees and (2) individuals who participate in an employer-sponsored plan that has a majority of its enrollees engaged in a high-risk profession or "employed to repair or install electrical or telecommunications lines." For purposes of this adjustment, qualified retirees are retired individuals aged 55 and older who do not qualify for Medicare. Employees engaged in high-risk professions are law enforcement officers (as such term is defined in section 1204 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), employees in fire protection activities (as such term is defined in section 3(y) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), individuals who provide out-of-hospital emergency medical care (including emergency medical technicians, paramedics, and first-responders), individuals whose primary work is longshore work (as defined in section 258(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1288(b)), determined without regard to paragraph (2) thereof), and individuals engaged in the construction, mining, agriculture (not including food processing), forestry, and fishing industries. Such term includes an employee who is retired from a high-risk profession described in the preceding sentence, if such employee satisfied the requirements of such sentence for a period of not less than 20 years during the employee's employment. Under this adjustment, the dollar limits are increased for these individuals by $1,650 for self-only coverage and $3,450 for coverage other than self-only. The excise tax is not assessed on an employee; rather it is assessed on the entity providing the applicable coverage—the coverage provider . Table 3 lists the coverage providers identified in statute. It is possible that an employee's applicable coverage may not be provided by just one coverage provider. In the case of multiple coverage providers, each coverage provider is responsible for paying the excise tax on its applicable share of the excess benefit. A coverage provider's applicable share is based on the cost of the coverage provider's applicable coverage in relation to the aggregate cost of all of the employee's applicable coverage. In general, the employer is responsible for calculating the aggregate amount of applicable coverage that is in excess of the threshold and determining each coverage provider's applicable share of the tax. The employer is required to notify the Secretary of the Treasury and each coverage provider about the amount determined. A penalty may be imposed on the employer if the excess benefit is not calculated correctly. Under the ACA, the excise tax was nondeductible—coverage providers could not deduct the excise tax as a business expense. However, the CAA of 2016 includes a modification to allow coverage providers to deduct the tax. The excise tax is one of several taxes and fees included in the ACA to raise revenue to offset the cost of other ACA provisions (e.g., the financial subsidies available through the health insurance exchanges). In March 2015, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated the excise tax would increase federal revenues by $87 billion between 2016 and 2025, based on the tax's implementation beginning in 2018. CBO and JCT indicate that the revenue raised by the excise tax will come from both collection of the excise tax and increases in taxable income, with most of the revenue raised a result of increases in taxable income. The relationship between the excise tax and taxable income is discussed in the following section. Employer-sponsored health insurance and benefits generally are excluded from employees' gross income for purposes of determining employees' income tax liability. Additionally, these amounts generally also qualify for exclusion from Social Security and Medicare (FICA) taxes and unemployment (FUTA) taxes. These exclusions often are collectively referred to as the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance and benefits. Modifying or repealing the tax exclusion has been discussed for many years. One reason federal policymakers are interested in the tax exclusion is that the exclusion results in considerable revenue loss to the federal government. JCT estimates the income tax exclusion will result in $785 billion in foregone revenue for the federal government between 2014 and 2018. Ending or modifying the tax exclusion could raise a significant amount of revenue, depending on how it would be modified or repealed and how employers and workers would adjust. The excise tax does not directly modify or end the tax exclusion; however, the excise tax is seen as an indirect method for limiting the tax exclusion. As discussed above, official scores indicate that the revenue raised by the excise tax will come both from collection of the excise tax and from increases in taxable income. The increases in taxable income are a result of the expectation that employers will reduce the amount of health coverage they offer to employees to avoid paying the excise tax. Provided employers do this but keep total compensation for employees constant (i.e., shift the compensation from health benefits to taxable wages), the result will be generally higher taxable wages for affected employees. CBO and JCT have estimated that about one-quarter of the revenue raised will come from collection of the excise tax, while about three-quarters of the revenue raised will stem from employers' responses to the tax.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) includes a 40% excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health coverage. This excise tax is often called the Cadillac tax. Under the ACA, the excise tax was to be implemented beginning in 2018; however, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-113) delays implementation until 2020. The excise tax applies to the aggregate cost of an employee's applicable coverage that exceeds a dollar limit. Applicable coverage includes, but is not limited to, the employer's and the employee's contribution to health insurance premiums and certain contributions to tax-advantaged health accounts (e.g., health care flexible spending accounts, or FSAs). In 2020, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates the dollar limits will be about $10,800 for single coverage and $29,100 for non-single (e.g., family) coverage. The dollar limits may be adjusted based on growth in health insurance premiums and characteristics of an employer's workforce. Additionally, the dollar limits are to be adjusted for inflation in subsequent years. The entity providing the coverage, the coverage provider, is responsible for paying its share of the excise tax. A coverage provider may be an employer, a health insurer, or another entity that sponsors the coverage. The employer is responsible for calculating the amount of tax owed by each coverage provider (if any). All of this information is covered in more detail in this report, which provides an overview of how the excise tax is to be implemented. The information in the report is based on statute and guidance issued by the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service.

Federal lawmakers view many financial businesses as having an important role in the U.S. economy, and therefore warrant providing these businesses protection for their individual account holders against loss, should the firms fail. Such protections exist both to protect the individuals from risks they probably could not discern for themselves and to protect the economy against the effects of financial panics when failures occur. Panics, the attendant collapses of wealth, and severe consequences for the economy occurred before Congress created federal deposit insurance in 1934. Prior to the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343 ), government policy protected customers of depository institutions—banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions—in full for accounts up to $100,000 and up to $250,000 for retirement accounts. Although the enactment of EESA on September 23, 2008, immediately raised the maximum deposit insurance to $250,000, retirement accounts remain at $250,000 until December 31, 2009. Since then, Congress and the President enacted the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (HFSTHA; P.L. 111-22 ), extending both the EESA increases and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) $30 billion borrowing authority from the U.S. Treasury to as much as $500 billion until 2013. Because of the wording of P.L. 111-22 , after 2013, it is possible that deposit insurance protection could revert back to the $100,000 and $250,000 for retirement accounts. Other institutions such as insurance companies, securities broker/dealers, and many pension funds receive government or government-sponsored guarantees on specified accounts. This report provides a summary of the major features of financial institutions' customer protection systems, reflecting safety-net provisions legislated over time, usually in reaction to specific financial collapses. Besides these explicit guarantees, regulatory bodies can attempt the rescue of failing financial enterprises, using many tools authorized by laws and regulations and often implemented in the background. Such tools include liquidity lending, arranging memoranda of understanding, issuing cease-and-desist orders against risky practices, and arranging mergers of weak entities into stronger institutions. If the entire financial economy seems threatened by pending collapse of either a sizeable financial institution that is "too big to fail" or many financial businesses collectively, the Federal Reserve (Fed) can step in as the lender of last resort to avert serious adverse consequences for the economy (e.g., use of the Fed's liberal bank liquidity policy immediately after the 911 attacks, and currently the subprime meltdown led to failures of institutions once believed to be too big to fail—Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG—all of which were or are being assisted by the federal government). Moreover, Congress may have to provide emergency funding when parts of the federal safety net are under severe pressure. The cleanup of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, required appropriated funds plus a new deposit insurance fund and regulator. A more recent example is the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which provided $700 billion to purchase distressed assets, and has been used to make direct capital investments in troubled financial institutions. An important conceptual distinction between support structures is who ultimately pays for the protection. Lawmakers originally created federal deposit insurance using a "user fee" model of insurance, in which the government owned and operated each insurance system and charged member banks for its use. Following the banking failures of the late 1980s ─ early 1990s, legislation moved deposit protection part way toward an alternative "mutual" model, in which the burden of financing the system falls more clearly on the banking industry. Mutual institutions are owned by their customers, such as saving associations' depositors and insurance companies' policyholders. As a result, some analysts now claim that the banking industry "owns" the deposit insurance fund (DIF) in mutual mode. However, when the FDIC begins to draw on its credit line at the U.S. Treasury, which it has never done before, the use of the credit line would move the system back to the user fee model as the banks would have to pay their FDIC assessments as well as pay back the borrowed funds to the federal government, which owns and operates the DIF. The ultimate guarantor of deposit insurance is the economic power of the federal government, particularly the power to tax. History has shown that deposit guarantees by governments beneath the federal level have universally been inadequate to prevent panics, runs, and severe economic damage when called upon. Industry-sponsored and state-level programs have contained the collapses of their covered entities only if the damages have been small. The troubled pension benefit arrangement remains mainly in user fee mode. Credit union share insurance, in contrast, more nearly follows the mutual model. Likewise, state insurance company guaranty and federally sponsored securities investor protection arrangements follow the mutual model. However, in the current financial crisis, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) has joined the FDIC in accepting an increased line of credit from the U.S. Treasury to resolve failing corporate credit unions and restoring the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). Corporate credit unions are owned by retail or natural credit unions. Corporate credit unions operate as wholesale credit unions providing financing, investments, and clearing services for natural credit unions. It was the corporate credit unions that suffered most of the industry's losses in the current subprime foreclosure turmoil. Consequently, like the FDIC, when the NCUA uses its U.S. Treasury credit line to stabilize the NCUSIF, it too would move closer to the user fee mode. The following tabulation lists the major elements and components of these safety nets. Table 1 compares account protection at depository institutions. Table 2 does the same for the non-depository supports. Readers may obtain further analysis of each system via the websites of the administering agencies noted. On October 23, 2008, in the midst of the current financial crisis, the FDIC announced its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee program to help unfreeze the U.S. short-term credit markets. At the time, financial institutions were not lending to each other, especially in the commercial paper market, which was almost completely frozen. The two-part program temporarily guarantees all new senior unsecured debt and fully guarantees funds in certain non-interest bearing accounts at FDIC-insured institutions issued between October 14, 2008, and June 30, 2009, with guarantees expiring no later than June 30, 2012. The FDIC expects these guarantees would restore the necessary confidence for investors to begin investing in obligations of depository institutions. Evidence suggests that these short-term markets returned to normal after the TLG program was implemented. The second part of the FDIC's TLG program is to guarantee 100% of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts held in insured depository institutions until December 31, 2009. This addresses the concern that many small business accounts, such as payroll accounts, frequently exceed the current maximum deposit insurance limit of $250,000. The TLG program is being paid for by additional fees placed on depository institutions that use these guarantees, not taxpayers.

After the onset of the current financial crisis and economic contraction, the 111th Congress increased some of the long-standing provisions that protect account holders from risk. Specifically, provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) and the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (HFSTHA; P.L. 111-22) increased account holders' protection. Both laws raised the maximum deposit account insurance to $250,000, and the HFSTHA extended the higher level of risk protection until 2013. Lawmakers have long recognized the importance of protecting some forms of financial savings from risk. Such provisions apply to deposits in banks and thrift institutions and credit union "shares." Remedial and other safety net features also cover insurance contracts, certain securities accounts, and even defined-benefit pensions. Questions over how to fund and guarantee Social Security, along with the troubles of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, have renewed interest in these arrangements. This report portrays the salient features and legislation of account protection provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), state insurance guaranty funds, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. It provides a discussion of the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLG) , which extends unlimited temporary deposit guarantees to certain depositors and debt held in insured depository institutions. Overall, the report provides a summary of the major federal risk protections for account holders. This report will be updated as appropriate.

T he issue of health care fraud and abuse has attracted a lot of attention in recent years, primarily because the financial losses attributed to it are estimated to be billions of dollars annually. Considering that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is the largest purchaser of health care in the United States, and that Medicare and Medicaid combined pay about one-third of the nation's health expenditures, it is not surprising that these federal health programs have been considered prime targets for fraudulent activity. Accordingly, efforts to address this fraud and abuse continue to be a priority for Congress. The federal government has an array of statutes that it uses to fight health care fraud. This report provides a brief overview of some of the key federal statutes, including program-related civil and criminal penalties, the anti-kickback statute, the Stark law, and the False Claims Act, that are used to combat fraud and abuse in federal health care programs. Title XI of the Social Security Act contains Medicare and Medicaid program-related anti-fraud provisions, which impose penalties and exclusions from federal health care programs on persons who engage in certain types of misconduct. Under Section 1128A of the Social Security Act, the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG) is authorized to impose civil penalties and assessments on a person, including an organization, agency, or other entity, who engages in various types of improper conduct with respect to federal health care programs, including the imposition of penalties against a person who knowingly presents or causes to be presented to a federal or state employee or agent certain false or fraudulent claims. For example, penalties apply to services that were not provided as claimed, or claims that were part of a pattern of providing items or services that a person knows or should know are not medically necessary. In addition, certain payments made to physicians to reduce or limit services are also prohibited. This section provides for monetary penalties of up to $10,000 for each item or service claimed, up to $50,000 under certain additional circumstances, as well as treble damages. Section 1128B of the Social Security Act provides for criminal penalties involving federal health care programs. Under this section, certain false statements and representations, made knowingly and willfully, are criminal offenses. For example, it is unlawful to make or cause to be made false statements or representations in either applying for benefits or payments, or determining rights to benefits or payments under a federal health care program. In addition, persons who conceal any event affecting an individual's right to receive a benefit or payment with the intent to either fraudulently receive the benefit or payment (in an amount or quantity greater than that which is due), or convert a benefit or payment to use other than for the benefit of the person for which it was intended may be criminally liable. Persons who have violated the statute and have furnished an item or service under which payment could be made under a federal health program may be guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of up to $25,000, up to five years imprisonment, or both. Other persons involved in connection with the provision of false information to a federal health program may be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined up to $10,000 and imprisoned for up to one year. One of the most severe sanctions available under the Social Security Act is the ability to exclude individuals and entities from participation in federal health care programs. Under Section 1128 of the Social Security Act, exclusions from federal health programs are mandatory under certain circumstances, and permissive in others (i.e., OIG has discretion in whether to exclude an entity or individual). Exclusion is mandatory for those convicted of certain offenses, including (1) a criminal offense related to the delivery of an item or service under Medicare, Medicaid, or a state health care program; (2) a criminal offense relating to neglect or abuse of patients in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service; or (3) a felony relating to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance. OIG has permissive authority to exclude an entity or an individual from a federal health program under numerous circumstances, including conviction of certain misdemeanors relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty, or other financial misconduct; a conviction based on an interference with or obstruction of an investigation into a criminal offense; and revocation or suspension of a health care practitioner's license for reasons bearing on the individual's or entity's professional competence, professional performance, or financial integrity. In light of the concern that decisions of health care providers can be improperly influenced by a profit motive, and in order to protect federal health care programs from additional costs and overutilization, Congress enacted the anti-kickback statute. Under this criminal statute, it is a felony for a person to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive anything of value (i.e., "remuneration") in return for a referral or to induce generation of business reimbursable under a federal health care program. The statute prohibits both the offer or payment of remuneration for patient referrals, as well as the offer or payment of anything of value in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for, or recommending the purchase, lease, or ordering of any item or service that is reimbursable by a federal health care program. Persons found guilty of violating the anti-kickback statute may be subject to a fine of up to $25,000, imprisonment of up to five years, and exclusion from participation in federal health care programs for up to one year. There are certain statutory exceptions to the anti-kickback statute. Under one exception, "remuneration" does not include a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of services or other entity if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider or entity under a federal health care program. Another exception includes, under certain circumstances, amounts paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person authorized to act as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals that furnish services reimbursable by a federal health program. In addition to these exceptions, the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspector General (OIG) has promulgated regulations that contain several "safe harbors" to prevent common business arrangements from being considered kickbacks. Safe harbors listed by regulation include certain types of investment interests, personal services and management contracts, referral services, and space rental or equipment rental arrangements. OIG has indicated that the safe harbor provisions are not indicative of the only acceptable business arrangements, and that business arrangements that do not comply with a safe harbor are not necessarily considered "suspect." Limitations on physician self-referrals were enacted into law in 1989 under the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, commonly referred to as the "Stark law." The Stark law, as amended, and its implementing regulations prohibit certain physician self-referrals for designated health services (DHS) that may be paid for by Medicare or Medicaid. In its basic application, the Stark law provides that if (1) a physician (or an immediate family member of a physician) has a "financial relationship" with an entity, the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing of designated health services (DHS) for which payment may be made under Medicare or Medicaid, and (2) the entity may not present (or cause to be presented) a claim to the federal health care program or bill to any individual or entity for DHS furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral. It has been noted that the general idea behind the prohibitions in the Stark law is to prevent physicians from making referrals based on financial gain, thus preventing overutilization and increases in health care costs. A "financial relationship" under the Stark law consists of either (1) an "ownership or investment interest" in the entity or (2) a "compensation arrangement" between the physician (or immediate family member) and the entity. An "ownership or investment interest" includes "equity, debt, or other means," as well as "an interest in an entity that holds an ownership or investment interest in any entity providing the designated health service." A "compensation arrangement" is generally defined as an arrangement involving any remuneration between a physician (or an immediate family member of such physician) and an entity, other than certain arrangements that are specifically mentioned as being excluded from the reach of the statute. The Stark law includes a large number of exceptions, which have been added and expanded upon by a series of regulations. These exceptions may apply to ownership interests, compensation arrangements, or both. Violators of the Stark law may be subject to various sanctions, including a denial of payment for relevant services and a required refund of any amount billed in violation of the statute that had been collected. In addition, civil monetary penalties and exclusion from participation in Medicaid and Medicare programs may apply. A civil penalty not to exceed $15,000, and in certain cases not to exceed $100,000, per violation may be imposed if the person who bills or presents the claim "knows or should know" that the bill or claim violates the statute. The federal False Claims Act (FCA), codified at 31 U.S.C. Sections 3729-3733, is considered by many to be an important tool for combating fraud against the U.S. government. The FCA is a law of general applicability that is invoked frequently in the health care context. It has been reported that from January 2009 through the end of the 2015 fiscal year, the Justice Department used the False Claims Act to recover more than $16.5 billion in health care fraud cases. In general, the FCA imposes civil liability on persons who knowingly submit a false or fraudulent claim or engage in various types of misconduct involving federal government money or property. Health care program false claims often arise in terms of billing, including billing for services not rendered, billing for unnecessary medical services, double billing for the same service or equipment, or billing for services at a higher rate than provided ("upcoding"). Penalties under the FCA include a penalty of $5,500 to $11,000 for each false claim filed, plus additional damages. Civil actions may be brought in federal district court under the FCA by the Attorney General or by a person known as a relator (i.e., a "whistleblower"), for the person and for the U.S. government, in what is termed a qui tam action. The ability to initiate a qui tam action has been viewed as a powerful weapon against health care fraud, in that it may be initiated by a private party who may have independent knowledge of any wrongdoing. Popularity of qui tam actions brought under the FCA may be attributed partially to the fact that successful whistleblowers can receive between 15% and 30% of the monetary proceeds of the action or settlement that are recovered by the government.

A number of federal statutes aim to combat fraud and abuse in federally funded health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Using these statutes, the federal government has been able to recover billions of dollars lost due to fraudulent activities. This report provides an overview of some of the more commonly used federal statutes used to fight health care fraud and abuse. Title XI of the Social Security Act contains Medicare and Medicaid program-related anti-fraud provisions, which impose civil penalties, criminal penalties, and exclusions from federal health care programs on persons who engage in certain types of misconduct. Penalties apply in circumstances where, among many other things, services were not provided as claimed, or claims were part of a pattern of providing items or services that a person knows or should know are not medically necessary. Under the federal anti-kickback statute, it is a felony for a person to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive anything of value (i.e., "remuneration") in return for a referral or to induce generation of business reimbursable under a federal health care program. The statute prohibits both the offer or payment of remuneration for patient referrals, as well as the offer or payment of anything of value in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for, or recommending the purchase, lease, or ordering of any item or service that is reimbursable by a federal health care program. The Stark law and its implementing regulations prohibit physician self-referrals for certain health services that may be paid for by Medicare or Medicaid. Under the Stark law, if (1) a physician (or an immediate family member of a physician) has a "financial relationship" with an entity, the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing of these health services for which payment may be made under Medicare or Medicaid, and (2) the entity may not bill the federal health care program or any individual or entity for services furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral. The federal False Claims Act (FCA) imposes civil liability on persons who knowingly submit a false or fraudulent claim or engage in various types of misconduct involving federal government money or property. Health care program false claims often arise in billing, including billing for services not rendered, billing for unnecessary medical services, double billing for the same service or equipment, or billing for services at a higher rate than provided ("upcoding"). Civil actions may be brought in federal district court under the FCA by the Attorney General or by a person known as a relator (i.e., a "whistleblower"), for the person and for the U.S. government, in what is termed a qui tam action.

Witnesses in a federal criminal case may find themselves arrested, held for bail, and in some cases imprisoned until they are called upon to testify. The same is true in most if not all of the states. Although subject to intermittent criticism, it has been so at least from the beginning of the Republic. The Supreme Court has never squarely considered the constitutionality of the federal statute or any of its predecessors, but it has observed in passing that, "[t]he duty to disclose knowledge of crime ... is so vital that one known to be innocent may be detained in the absence of bail, as a material witness" and that, "[t]he constitutionality of this [federal material witness] statute apparently has never been doubted." In spite of the concerns of some that the authority can be used as a means to jail a suspect while authorities seek to discover probable cause sufficient to support a criminal accusation or as a preventive detention measure, the lower courts have denied that the federal material witness statute can be used as a substitute for a criminal arrest warrant. Particularly in the early stages of an investigation, however, an individual's proximity to a crime may make him both a legitimate witness and a legitimate suspect. The case law and statistical information suggest that the federal statute is used with surprising regularity and most often in the prosecution of immigration offenses involving material witnesses who are foreign nationals. Critics, however, contend that since September 11, 2001, seventy individuals, mostly Muslims, have been arrested and detained in abuse of the statute's authority. An arrest warrant for a witness with evidence material to a federal criminal proceeding may be issued by federal or state judges or magistrates. The statute applies to potential grand jury witnesses as well as to potential trial witnesses. Section 3144 on its face authorizes arrest at the behest of any party to a criminal proceeding. In the case of criminal trial, both the government and the defendants may call upon the benefits of section 3144. Availability is a bit less clear in the case of grand jury proceedings. In a literal sense, there are no parties to a grand jury investigation other than the grand jury. Moreover, it seems unlikely that a suspect, even the target of a grand jury investigation, would be considered a "party" to a grand jury proceeding. The purpose of section 3144 is the preservation of evidence for criminal proceedings. Potential defendants, even if they are the targets of a grand jury investigation, have no right to present evidence to the grand jury. On the other hand, a federal prosecutor ordinarily arranges for the presentation of witnesses to the grand jury. It is therefore not surprising that the courts seem to assume without deciding that the government may claim the benefits of section 3144 in the case of grand jury witnesses. Issuance of a section 3144 arrest warrant requires affidavits establishing probable cause to believe (1) that the witness can provide material evidence, and (2) that it will be "impracticable" to secure the witness' attendance at the proceeding simply by subpoenaing him. Neither the statute nor the case law directly address the question of what constitutes "material" evidence for purposes of section 3144, but in other contexts the term is understood to mean that which has a "natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." At the grand jury level, the government may establish probable cause to believe a witness can provide material evidence through the affidavit of a federal prosecutor or a federal investigator gathering evidence with an eye to its presentation to the grand jury. This may not prove a particularly demanding standard in some instances given the sweeping nature of the grand jury's power of inquiry. As to the second required probable cause showing, a party seeking a material witness arrest warrant must establish probable cause to believe that it will be impractical to rely upon a subpoena to securing the witness' appearance. The case law on point is sketchy, but it seems to indicate that impracticality may be shown by evidence of possible flight, or of an expressed refusal to cooperate, or of difficulty experienced in serving a subpoena upon a trial witness, or presumably by evidence that the witness is a foreign national who will have returned or been returned home by the time his testimony is required. Evidence that investigators have experienced difficulties serving a particular grand jury witness may not be enough to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant in all cases. With limited variations, federal bail laws apply to material witnesses arrested under section 3144. Arrested material witnesses are entitled to the assistance of counsel during bail proceedings and to the appointment of an attorney when they are unable to detain private counsel. The bail laws operate under an escalating system in which release is generally favored, then release with conditions or limitations is preferred, and finally as a last option detention is permitted. A defendant is released on his word (personal recognizance) or bond unless the court finds such assurances insufficient to guarantee his subsequent appearance or to ensure public or individual safety. A material witness need only satisfy the appearance standard. A material witness who is unable to do so is released under such conditions or limitations as the court finds adequate to ensure his later appearance to testify. If neither word nor bond nor conditions will suffice, the witness may be detained. The factors a court may consider in determining whether a material witness is likely to remain available include his deposition, character, health, and community ties. Section 3144 declares that "[n]o material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice." The corresponding federal deposition rule permits the witness, the government, or the defendant to request that a detained material witness' deposition be taken. A court enjoys only limited discretion to deny a detained witness' request. The Fifth Circuit has observed that, "Read together, Rule 15(a) and section 3144 provide a detained witness with a mechanism for securing his own release. He must file a written motion requesting that he be deposed. The motion must demonstrate that his testimony can adequately be secured by deposition, and that further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Upon such showing, the district court must order his deposition and prompt release." Other courts seem to agree. The "failure of justice" limitation comes into play when release of the witness following the taking of his deposition would ultimately deny a defendant the benefit of favorable material testimony in derogation of his right to compulsory process. It does not include the fact that a judicial officer will not be present at the taking of the deposition or that the witness is an illegal alien subject to prosecution. Unlike the request of a detained witness, a government or defendant's request that a witness' deposition be taken must show "exceptional circumstances" and that granting the request is "in the interest of justice," F.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(1). Nevertheless, the fact that a witness is being detained will often be weighed heavily regardless of who requests that depositions be taken. The Circuits appear to be divided over whether in compliance with a local standing order the court may authorize depositions to be taken sua sponte in order to release a detained material witness. In any event, whether any such depositions may be introduced in later criminal proceedings will depend upon whether the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory process have been accommodated. The government must periodically report to the court on the continuing justification for holding an incarcerated material witness. While a material witness is being held in custody he is entitled to the daily witness fees authorized for attendance at judicial proceedings. Upon his release, the court may also order that he be provided with transportation and subsistence to enable him to return to his place of arrest or residence. Should he fail to appear after he has been released from custody he will be subject to prosecution, an offense which may be punished more severely if his failure involves interstate or foreign travel to avoid testifying in a felony case. H.R. 3199 : Witnesses at Congressional oversight hearings charged that the authority under 18 U.S.C. 3144 had been misused following September 11, 2001: [The authority has been used] to secure the indefinite incarceration of those [prosecutors] wanted to investigate as possible terrorist suspects. This allowed the government to ... avoid the constitutional protections guaranteed to suspects, including probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime and time-limited detention. . . Witnesses were typically held round the clock in solitary confinement, subjected to the harsh and degrading high security conditions typically reserved for the most dangerous inmates accused or convicted of the most serious crimes ... they were interrogated without counsel about their own alleged wrongdoing. … [A] large number of witnesses were never brought before a grand jury or court to testify. More tellingly, in repeated cases the government has now apologized for arresting and incarcerating the "wrong guy." The material witnesses were victims of the federal investigators and attorneys who were to[o] quick to jump to the wrong conclusions, relying on false, unreliable and irrelevant information. By evading the probable cause requirement for arrests of suspects, the government made numerous mistakes. At the same hearings the Justice Department pointed out that the material witness statute is a long-standing and generally applicable law and not a creation of the USA PATRIOT Act; that it operates under the supervision of the courts; that witnesses are afforded the assistance of counsel (appointed where necessary); and that witnesses are ordinarily released following their testimony. Section 12 of H.R. 3199 as reported by the House Judiciary Committee amended section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act by directing periodic review of the exercise of the authority under section 3144. In its original form section 1001 instructs the Justice Department Inspector General to designate an official who is (1) to receive and review complaints of alleged Justice Department civil rights and civil liberties violations, (2) to widely advertise his availability to receive such complaints, and (3) to report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees twice a year on implementation of that requirement, P.L. 107 - 56 , 115 Stat. 381 (2001). Section 12 amended section 1001 to impose additional responsibilities upon the Inspector General's designee , i.e., (1) to "review detentions of persons under section 3144 of title 18, United States Code, including their length, conditions of access to counsel, frequency of access to counsel, offense at issue, and frequency of appearances before a grand jury," (2) to advertise his availability to receive information concerning such activity, and (3) to report twice a year on implementation to the Judiciary Committees on implementation of this requirement. OMB announced that the Administration generally supports H.R. 3199 as passed by the House, but that "[t]he Administration strongly opposes section 12 of H.R. 3199 , which would authorize the Department of Justice's Inspector General to investigate the use of material witnesses. As it is written, this provision would entail wholesale violation of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which protects the secrecy and sanctity of grand jury proceedings." Perhaps because of Administration opposition, the provision was dropped from H.R. 3199 prior to House passage. No similar provision could be found in H.R. 3199 ( S. 1389 ) as approved in the Senate or in the conference bill sent to the President. S. 1739 : S. 1739 , introduced by Senator Leahy, rewrites section 3144. In its recast form, section 3144, among other things, would establish a preference for postponing arrest until after a material witness has been served with a summons or subpoena and failed or refused to appear, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that service is likely to result in flight or otherwise unlikely to secure the witness' attendance; make it clear that the provision applies to grand jury proceedings; explicitly permit arrest by officers who are not in physical possession of the warrant; require an initial judicial appearance without unnecessary delay in the district of the arrest or in an adjacent district if more expedient, or if the warrant was issued there and the appearance occurs on the day of arrest; limit detention to five day increments for a maximum of 30 days (10 days in the case of grand jury witness); require the Attorney General to file an annual report to the Judiciary Committees on the number of material witness warrants sought, granted and denied within the year; the number of material witnesses arrested who were not deposed or did not appear before judicial proceedings; and the average number of days arrested material witnesses were detained. In lieu of the clear and convincing evidence standard in favor of release and the time limits on detention, the existing statute insists that "no material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice," 18 U.S.C. 3144. The proposed amendment has no comparable provision. In light of the five day limit on detention without further judicial approval, S. 1739 would eliminate the reporting requirement now found in Rule 46(h)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., "An attorney for the government must report biweekly to the court, listing each material witness held in custody for more than 10 days pending indictment, arraignment, or trial. For each material witness listed in the report, an attorney for the government must state why the witness should not be released with or without a deposition being taken under Rule 15(a)."

The federal material witness statute provides that, "If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding [including a grand jury proceeding], and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title [relating to bail]. No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 18 U.S.C. 3144. In response to objections that the authority had been misused, H.R. 3199 as reported by the House Judiciary Committee required Justice Department reports on use of the authority in a grand jury context. The provision was dropped before the bill was taken up. The version sent to the President after passage had no such provision. S. 1739 would rewrite section 3144, among other things, establishing explicit and more demanding standards for arrest and detention and imposing explicit time limitations on detention. This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL33077, Arrest and Detention of Material Witnesses: Federal Law In Brief, by [author name scrubbed], without footnotes, most citations to authority, or appendixes.

The federal Lifeline program, established in 1985 by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), assists qualifying low-income consumers to gain access to and remain on the telecommunications network. The program assists eligible individuals in paying the reoccurring monthly service charges associated with telecommunications usage. While initially designed to support traditional landline service, in 2005 the FCC expanded the program to cover either a landline or a wireless/mobile option. On March 31, 2016, the FCC adopted an Order (2016 Order or Order) to once again expand the program to make broadband an eligible service. The Lifeline program is available to eligible low-income consumers in every state, territory, commonwealth, and on tribal lands. The Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), an independent not-for-profit corporation, established by the FCC in 1997, is the designated administrator of the Universal Service Fund (USF) and the related support programs of which the Lifeline Program is a part. USAC administers the USF programs on behalf of the FCC. As an administrative and oversight entity, USAC does not set or advocate policy, or interpret statutes, policies, or FCC rules. The Lifeline program provides a discount in most cases of up to $9.25 per month, for eligible households to help offset the costs associated with use of the telecommunications network. The program provides a subsidy for network access for one line, either a landline or wireless/mobile option, per eligible household and does not provide a subsidy for devices (i.e., handsets or customer premises equipment). The 2016 Order has expanded the scope of the program to provide subsidies for broadband adoption. The Order provides support for stand-alone mobile or fixed broadband, as well as combined bundles of voice and broadband, and sets minimum broadband and mobile voice standards for service offerings. The Order phases down and eventually eliminates support, in most cases, for stand-alone voice services. The one line per eligible household limitation and the prohibition on support for devices remain. Most providers that offer a prepaid wireless option currently offer a wireless phone to the subscriber at no charge. The cost of this device is not covered under the Lifeline program but is borne by the designated provider. Misinformation connecting the program to payment for a "free phone" has resulted in numerous queries. Yes. There are some differences in the program for those living on tribal lands. Tribal lands are defined as any federally recognized Indian Tribe's reservation, pueblo, or colony, including former reservations in Oklahoma, Alaska, Native regions, Hawaiian Home Lands, or Indian Allotments. For those providing Lifeline service to eligible consumers living on tribal lands the Lifeline program subsidy is $34.25 ($9.25 in general support plus additional support of up to $25 per month). In addition assistance programs unique to those living on tribal lands (e.g., Bureau of Indian Affairs general assistance [BIA general assistance]) may also be used to certify subscriber eligibility. Subscribers living on tribal lands are also eligible for additional assistance under the FCC's Link Up Program. This program, while established by the FCC in 1987 for the general eligible population, was restricted in 2012 solely to those residing on tribal lands. The Link Up program assists eligible subscribers to pay the costs associated with the initiation of service and provides a one-time discount of up to $100 on the initial installation/activation of the service for the primary residence. Under the program, subscribers may pay any remaining amount on a deferred schedule interest free. A subscriber may be eligible for Link Up for a second or subsequent time only when moving to a new primary residence. Link Up support is not available to all providers offering service, but only to those who are building out infrastructure on tribal lands. Therefore, eligible subscribers residing on tribal lands may receive a monthly subsidy of up to $34.25 in Lifeline support plus a one-time initiation of service discount of up to $100 for Link Up support. To participate in the program, a consumer must either have an income that is at or below 135% of the federal poverty guidelines or be enrolled in certain qualifying needs-based programs (e.g., Medicaid). USAC has an eligibility pre-screening tool available which may assist consumers in determining eligibility. Once enrolled in the program, participants are required to verify their eligibility on a yearly basis. If a program recipient becomes ineligible for the program (e.g., due to an increase in income or de-enrollment in a qualifying program) the recipient is required to contact the provider and de-enroll from the program. Failure to de-enroll can lead to penalties and/or permanent disbarment from the program. Consumers can apply for Lifeline by contacting a Lifeline program provider in his or her state or through the state-designated public service commission. To locate a state-designated provider the consumer may call USAC's toll free number (1-888-641-8722) or access USAC's website. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) provides a listing of contact information for state public utility commissions. The provider, selected by the enrollee, will provide a Lifeline application form, upon request, to complete. Information required includes name, address, date of birth, and the last four digits of the enrollee's social security or tribal identification number. If applying based on household income eligibility the enrollee will be required to show proof of income documentation. If applying based on program eligibility the enrollee will be required to show documentation proving program participation. (Providers are required to keep documentation demonstrating subscriber eligibility.) The provider will process the application form and enrollee information will be entered into a nationwide USAC database to verify enrollee identity and to verify that the household is not currently receiving a Lifeline program discount. The 2016 Order establishes an independent National Lifeline Eligibility Verifier (National Verifier), under the auspices of USAC, that removes the responsibility of determining Lifeline subscriber eligibility from service providers. The National Verifier will launch in six states, Colorado, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, in December 2017, with use required for all verifications within those states by March 13, 2018. By December 31, 2018, 20 more states will join the National Verifier. By December 31, 2019, the FCC expects that all states and territories will be required to use the National Verifier to determine Lifeline eligibility. Once enrolled, participants must be recertified annually to confirm eligibility. Recertification can be done by the provider or the provider may elect for USAC to undertake the recertification on its behalf. If the provider chooses to recertify their own enrollees they may query databases that confirm that an enrollee meets program-based or income-based eligibility requirements or the provider may send the enrollee a yearly recertification letter. The letter requires the enrollee to certify that he or she is still eligible to receive the discount, and that no other household member is receiving a Lifeline discount. If no longer eligible, participants must de-enroll or will be removed from the program. Lifeline benefits are not transferable, even to other qualifying subscribers. If an enrollee is still eligible but does not meet the recertification deadline, the discount will be lost and the participant must re-enroll to regain the discount. Those enrolled under a pre-paid wireless option where there is no charge may be de-enrolled for nonusage. If the participant either does not initiate or use the service for 30 consecutive days the provider is required to automatically de-enroll the participant 15 days from notification. This gives the participant a total of 45 days in which to demonstrate usage. No. Enrollment is limited to one discount for either a landline or wireless connection, per household. A household is defined for Lifeline program eligibility as any individual, or group of individuals, who live together at the same address, that function as a single economic unit (i.e., share income and household expenses). All adult individuals (e.g., husband, wife, domestic partner, another related or unrelated adult) living at the same address that share expenses (e.g., food, living expenses) and shares income (e.g., salary, public assistance benefits, social security payments) would be considered part of a single household. If any one of these persons is enrolled in the Lifeline program no other member of that household is eligible. However it is possible that more than one household can reside in a single dwelling if they are separate economic units. Any violation of the one-per-household rule will result in de-enrollment from the program and may subject the enrollee to criminal and/or civil penalties. Providers must be certified as "eligible telecommunications carriers" to participate in the Lifeline program. That certification is given by the state or in some cases the FCC. In most cases the state public utility regulator establishes certification criteria and approves providers for participation in the program. However, for those providing service on tribal lands and in those cases where a state utility regulator does not have jurisdiction, certification is done by the FCC. A third alternative certification path for federal Lifeline Broadband Providers (LBPs), a subset of eligible telecommunications carriers, has been established as a result of the 2016 Order. Under this certification path LBP's may receive a designation from FCC staff to solely provide broadband Lifeline services to eligible subscribers and receive subsidies under the Federal Lifeline program. The LBP designation process is an alternative to the ETC process which remains in place. However, this federal designation process is currently not in use. Yes. A recipient may transfer the discount to another provider, but no more than once every 60 days for voice services and 12 months for data services. To transfer to a new provider the recipient must contact a provider that participates in the program and ask them to transfer the benefit to them. The recipient must provide selected information to verify identity (e.g., name, date of birth, address, last four digits of his or her social security number) as well as give consent acknowledging that the benefit with the previous provider will be lost and that the new provider has explained that there may not be more than one benefit per household. In most cases no service disruption should occur. Telecommunications carriers that provide interstate service and certain other providers of telecommunications services are required to contribute to the federal Universal Service Fund (USF) based on a percentage of their end-user interstate and international telecommunications revenues. These companies include wireline telephone companies, wireless telephone companies, paging service providers, and certain Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers. The USF (and its related programs including Lifeline) receives no federal monies. Some consumers may notice a "Universal Service" line item among their telephone charges. This line item appears when a company choses to recover its USF contributions directly from its subscribers. The FCC permits, but does not require, this charge to be passed on directly to subscribers. Each company makes a business decision about whether and how to assess charges to recover its universal service obligations. The charge, however, cannot exceed the amount owed to the USF by the company. No. The Lifeline program does not have a designated funding cap, or ceiling, but the 2016 Order does establish a budget-type mechanism. Funding for the Lifeline program can increase, decrease, or remain the same depending on program need as determined on a quarterly basis by USAC. According to USAC, authorized support for the Lifeline program peaked in 2012 at $2.18 billion and has continued to decline totaling $1.49 billion in 2015. The 2016 Order has established a nonbinding yearly funding ceiling of $2.25 billion, indexed to inflation. The funding ceiling for the calendar year beginning January 1, 2018, will be $2,279,250,000. The FCC has taken steps, including the following, to combat fraud, waste, and abuse in the Lifeline program: established an annual recertification requirement for participants receiving a Lifeline subsidy. The program requires those enrolled to certify, under penalty, on a yearly basis, that they are still eligible to receive the discount and that no one else in their household is receiving the Lifeline program discount; created a National Lifeline Accountability Database (NLAD) to prevent multiple carriers from receiving support for the same household; established an independent National Eligibility Verifier, under the auspices of USAC, to confirm subscriber eligibility. Prior to this the provider who received the subsidy verified subscriber eligibility; refined the list of federal programs that may be used to validate Lifeline eligibility; revised documentation retention to require providers of Lifeline service to retain documentation demonstrating subscriber eligibility; established minimum service standards for any provider that receives a Lifeline program subsidy; increased the amount and publication of program data; and undertakes enforcement actions against providers and subscribers who have broken program rules, resulting in fines and program disbarment.

The Federal Lifeline Program, established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1985, is one of four programs supported under the Universal Service Fund. The Program was originally designed to assist eligible low-income households to subsidize the monthly service charges incurred for voice telephone usage and was limited to one fixed line per household. In 2005 the Program was modified to cover the choice between either a fixed line or a mobile/wireless option. Concern over the division between those who use and have access to broadband versus those who do not, known as the digital divide, prompted the FCC to once again modify the Lifeline program to cover access to broadband. On March 31, 2016, the FCC adopted an Order to expand the Lifeline Program to support mobile and fixed broadband Internet access services on a stand-alone basis, or with a bundled voice service. Households must meet a needs-based criteria for eligibility. The program provides assistance to only one line per household in the form of a monthly subsidy of, in most cases, $9.25. This subsidy solely covers costs associated with network access (minutes of use), not the costs associated with devices, and is given not to the subscriber, but to the household-selected service provider. This subsidy is then in turn passed on to the subscriber. The Lifeline program is available to eligible low-income consumers in every state, territory, commonwealth, and on tribal lands.