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The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 amended the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to establish a new loan forgiveness provision under the William D. Ford Direct Loan (DL) program for borrowers who are employed full-time in public service jobs for ten years during the repayment of their loans. Borrowers of DL program loans who make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, according to specified repayment plan terms, while concurrently employed full-time in certain public service jobs, will have any loan balance of principal and interest remaining due after their 120 th payment canceled or forgiven by the Secretary of Education. The DL program loan forgiveness provision is available to new and existing borrowers alike. The DL program loan forgiveness provision for public service employees is available to borrowers of new and existing DL program loans. The following types of DL program loans are specified as eligible for loan forgiveness: Federal Direct (subsidized) Stafford Loans, Federal Direct Unsubsidized Stafford Loans, Federal Direct PLUS Loans (both parent PLUS Loans and Graduate PLUS Loans), and Federal Direct Consolidation Loans. Borrowers of loans made under the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program are not eligible to have their FFEL program loans forgiven under the program. However, FFEL borrowers may consolidate their loans into Federal Direct Consolidation Loans to take advantage of the loan forgiveness provision. Also, while in most instances borrowers of Consolidation Loans are ineligible to reconsolidate their loans under either the FFEL or DL programs, effective July 1, 2008, borrowers of FFEL Consolidation Loans are eligible to reconsolidate their loans into Federal Direct Consolidation Loans for purposes of using the DL program loan forgiveness provision for public service employees. The terms of the loan forgiveness provision specify that borrowers must make 120 payments on eligible DL program loans pursuant to one or more specified repayment plans to become eligible for loan forgiveness. Borrowers may repay their DL program loans pursuant to any combination of the following repayment plans for which they are otherwise eligible: standard repayment plan, graduated repayment plan, extended repayment plan, income-contingent repayment (ICR) plan, and income-based repayment (IBR) plan. However, with the exceptions of the ICR and the IBR plans, borrowers must make payments of not less than the monthly amount calculated according to a standard 10-year repayment period to be eligible for loan forgiveness. It would appear that in practical terms, to qualify for loan forgiveness under this provision, borrowers may be precluded from repaying according to the extended and graduated repayment plans. On the basis of these requirements, it appears that for borrowers to make 120 payments on their loans and still have an outstanding balance available to be forgiven after the completion of those payments, borrowers will need to make at least some of their payments according to either the ICR or IBR plans. Additionally, it appears that if borrowers repay according to either the ICR or IBR plans, their incomes relative to their debt burden must be sufficiently low for at least some period, such that their monthly payments calculated according to the respective plan are less than the monthly payment amount calculated according to a standard repayment plan with a 10-year repayment period. Otherwise, after making 120 monthly payments, borrowers will have fully repaid their loans. Borrowers are required to be employed full-time in a specified public service job at the time of loan forgiveness and for the period during which they make each of the 120 monthly loan payments required for loan forgiveness. For purposes of the loan forgiveness provision, a public service job is defined as a full-time job in emergency management, government, military service, public safety, law enforcement, public health, public education (including early childhood education), social work in a public child or family service agency, public interest law services (including prosecution or public defense or legal advocacy in low-income communities at a nonprofit organization), public child care, public service for individuals with disabilities, public service for the elderly, public library sciences, school-based library sciences and other school-based services, or at an organization that is described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under Section 501(a) of such Code; or teaching as a full-time faculty member at a Tribal College or University as defined in Section 316(b) and other faculty teaching in high-needs areas, as determined by the Secretary. The DL program loan forgiveness provision for public service employees is available to borrowers of DL program loans who make 120 payments according to specified repayment plans while concurrently employed full-time in specified public service jobs, on or after October 2, 2007. Issues regarding the implementation of the loan forgiveness program are expected to be addressed by the Department of Education (ED) in the form of 'Dear Colleague' letters and regulations. On January 8, 2008, ED published a summary of major changes to the HEA, Title IV loan programs made by the CCRAA, including a brief description of the loan forgiveness for public service employees provision. Also, ED has begun meeting to develop proposed regulations through negotiated rulemaking to implement changes to HEA, Title IV programs enacted under the CCRAA, including the DL program loan forgiveness provision. If ED publishes final regulations by November 1, 2008, these would have an effective date of July 1, 2009. It appears that all payments made by DL program borrowers on or after October 2, 2007, while also meeting the terms and conditions of the loan forgiveness provision will apply toward the 120 payments required for loan forgiveness. However, a number of issues about the new loan forgiveness provision might be clarified by ED and be addressed in future guidance or regulations. Such issues include the procedures borrowers will follow in applying for loan forgiveness, how borrowers will substantiate their full-time employment in public service jobs during repayment, how any breaks in full-time employment in public service jobs will be addressed, and how borrowers may ensure that they have selected a repayment plan under which all of their monthly payments will satisfy the minimum monthly payment amount necessary to be counted toward the 120 monthly payments required for loan forgiveness. Guidance might also be provided to clarify a number of issues concerning Consolidation Loans. For example, it is unclear whether payments made by borrowers on their DL program loans will continue to count toward the 120 monthly payments required for loan forgiveness if these borrowers subsequently consolidate their loans into new DL Consolidation Loans, or whether Consolidation Loan borrowers must restart counting toward the required 120 monthly payments. The terms of the loan forgiveness provision indicate that borrowers must make 120 monthly payments on their loans according to either the ICR plan, the IBR plan, or another repayment plan that is based on a 10-year repayment period. Since a Consolidation Loan is a new loan, borrowers of Consolidation Loans may only be able to count the payments made on their Consolidation Loan toward the 120 monthly payments required for loan forgiveness. In addition, for borrowers of Consolidation Loans, the maximum repayment period under the standard repayment plan may range from 10 years to 30 years, depending on a borrower's total student loan indebtedness. It appears that Consolidation Loan borrowers may need to ensure that they repay at least the monthly payment amount calculated according to a 10-year repayment period to maintain eligibility for loan forgiveness, regardless of whether they would otherwise be eligible to repay according to a maximum standard repayment period of 12, 15, 20, 25, or 30 years, depending on their total student loan indebtedness. Finally, prior to July 1, 2006, married borrowers were eligible to obtain joint Consolidation Loans. Future guidance might address the eligibility of joint Consolidation Loan borrowers to have their loans forgiven under the DL loan forgiveness provision for public service employees. Guidance might address whether one or both borrowers must meet the employment and repayment requirements for loan forgiveness; and if these requirements are met by only one of the joint borrowers, whether that borrower's proportionate share of the joint loan balance will be forgiven. Guidance might also address how the future eligibility of FFEL Consolidation Loan borrowers to reconsolidate their loans into Federal Direct Consolidation Loans for purposes of using the DL program loan forgiveness provision, effective July 1, 2008, will apply to joint borrowers.

The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA; P.L. 110-84) establishes a new loan forgiveness provision for borrowers of loans made under the William D. Ford Direct Loan (DL) program who are employed in public service jobs for 10 years during the repayment of their loans. Borrowers who make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, according to specified repayment plan terms, while concurrently employed full-time in certain public service jobs, will have any loan balance of principal and interest remaining due after their 120th payment canceled or forgiven by the Secretary of Education. Since borrowers must make 120 monthly payments on or after October 2, 2007, while concurrently employed in public service jobs, borrowers will become eligible for loan forgiveness no earlier than 2017. This report provides a brief description of the DL program loan forgiveness provision for public service employees and identifies issues that may be addressed as it is implemented. It will be updated as warranted.

At the beginning of a Congress, or at the early organization meetings prior to the new Congress, committees organize. Members are assigned to full committees, committee chairs and ranking minority Members are determined, subcommittees are created and Members are assigned, and committee rules are adopted. Once panels are organized they can begin the work of holding hearings and considering legislative proposals. Committee assignments often determine the character of a Member's career. They are also important to the party leaders who organize the chamber and shape the composition of the committees. House rules identify some procedures for making committee assignments; Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus rules supplement these House rules and provide more specific criteria for committee assignments. In general, pursuant to House rules, Representatives cannot serve on more than two standing committees. In addition, both parties identify exclusive committees and generally limit service on them; other panels are identified as nonexclusive or exempt committees. House and party rules also restrict Members' service on the Budget, Select Intelligence, and Standards of Official Conduct Committees to a limited number of terms. Committee jurisdiction is determined by a variety of factors. Paramount is House Rule X, which designates the subject matter within the purview of each standing committee. The formal provisions of the rule are supplemented by an intricate series of precedents and informal agreements. The rule and precedents govern the referral of legislation. Bills can be referred to as many committees as can exhibit responsibility for the subject matter of the legislation. However, the Speaker, who makes referrals with the advice of the parliamentarian, generally designates a "primary" committee, and other committees may then receive a referral in a sequential order. The Speaker also has authority to impose time limitations on any committee receiving a referral. Subcommittees are entities created by full committees to assist them in managing their work. Subcommittees are subject to the authority and direction of their parent committee. Subcommittee jurisdictions are not enumerated in House rules, but instead are determined by each committee. By practice, most legislation is referred to a subcommittee prior to its consideration by a full committee. Committees are generally prohibited from having more than five subcommittees, although there are some exceptions, such as the Appropriations Committee, which has 12 subcommittees. Some committees create no subcommittees. Under House rules, Members are limited to service on four subcommittees, although there are some exceptions. Subcommittee assignments are governed, in addition, by respective party rules and practices. House Rule XI provides that the rules of the House "are the rules of its committees and subcommittees so far as applicable." The rule directs each standing committee to adopt written rules governing its procedures that "may not be inconsistent with the Rules of the House or with those provisions of law having the force and effect of Rules of the House.... " Adoption of committee rules is one of the first orders of business a committee undertakes after committees are organized at the convening of a Congress. Committees, for example, must select a regular meeting day, which may not be less frequently than monthly; determine appropriate quorums for various activities within the limits of House rules; identify the role of the chair and his or her relationship with the ranking minority member; and clarify the authority of the majority of the committee, especially vis-á-vis, the committee chair. These committee rules generally dictate the formal procedures a committee follows in conducting its business. All hearings, whether legislative or oversight, have a similar, formal purpose and follow similar procedures: to gather information for use by a committee in its activities. Further, each committee has authority to hold hearings whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned. Hearings can be held in Washington or elsewhere. However, House rules require that all committee chairs, except the chair of the Rules Committee, must give at least one week's notice to the public of the date, place, and subject of hearings, although a hearing may be held with less notice if either the chair, with the concurrence of the ranking minority member, or the committee by majority vote, determines a need to hold the hearing sooner. Hearings are open to the public unless the committee votes in open session to close a hearing. Although the chair determines the agenda and selects witnesses, the minority is entitled to one day of related hearings to call its own witnesses, if a majority of minority members so notify the chair. Witnesses before House committees generally must file with the committee an advance copy of their written testimony, and then limit their oral testimony to a brief summary. A question-and-answer period, with rules generally allowing each committee member five minutes to question each witness, usually follows a witness's opening statement. Under House rules, a committee may adopt a rule, or agree by motion, to allow an equal number of its majority and minority party members to question a witness for up to 30 minutes, and may also adopt a rule or motion allowing its staff to question a witness, with time divided equally between majority and minority staff. The essential purpose of a committee markup is to determine whether a measure pending before a committee should be amended in any substantive way. Of course, committees do not actually amend measures; instead, a committee votes on which amendments, if any, it wishes to recommend to the House. How a panel conducts a markup for the most part reflects procedures used in the House's Committee of the Whole (parliamentary device to consider amendments), as possibly modified by an individual committee's rules. There is also a widespread feeling that the level of formality in markup often reflects the level of contention over the measure being marked up. A markup begins with a chair calling up a particular measure for consideration by the committee. The next action depends on the nature of the "markup vehicle" (i.e., the text that a chair intends for the committee to amend and report), which may be different from the measure laid before the panel for consideration. A vehicle can come before a committee in several different forms, each of which has its own procedural and political consequences. A chair may lay before a committee either a bill that has been previously introduced and referred, or the text of a draft measure that has not been formally introduced, such as a subcommittee-reported version or a chairman ' s mark . In each case, the text laid before the committee is itself the markup vehicle, but, in the second case, at the end of the markup process, the text must be incorporated or converted into a measure for reporting to the House. Alternatively, the markup vehicle may be placed before the committee as an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the bill or text initially called up. At the end of a markup, a chair normally entertains a motion to report a measure favorably to the House. By House rule, a majority of the committee must be physically present. The committee can report the measure as introduced, with a series of amendments, with a single amendment in the nature of a substitute , or as a so-called clean bill. A clean bill would be introduced in the House and referred back to the committee. Such a measure would also have a number different from that of the measure as introduced. Once agreed to, a measure is "ordered reported;" it is actually "reported" when the committee report is filed in the House. A committee report is the committee's work product that accompanies a measure that is reported. When a committee orders a bill reported, it is incumbent upon the chair, pursuant to House rule, to report it "promptly" and take all other steps necessary to secure its consideration by the full House. House rules and statutes detail several substantive requirements of items to be included in reports accompanying measures reported from committees. For example, most reports explain a measure's purpose and the need for the legislation, its cost, committee votes on amendments and the measure itself, the position of the executive branch, and the specific changes the bill would make in existing law. As well, all committee members may file, within two calendar days, supplemental, minority, or additional views, which are then included in the committee report. Committees periodically conduct reviews of agency performance in the implementation of legislation, called oversight, or conduct investigations into perceived wrongdoing, referred to as investigations. Conducting oversight or an investigation is traditionally done initially by staff, followed by committee hearings. Legislation may result from a committee's work. House committees publish a variety of documents dealing with legislative issues, investigations, and internal committee matters. Usually these publications are available on-line or from the issuing committee. Printed hearings contain the edited transcripts of testimony. They often are not published for months after the hearing, but are usually available for inspection in committee offices; witness testimony is often available on-line. Committee reports accompany legislation provide an explanation of a measure, the committee's action in considering it, and certain cost and other findings. Activity reports published at the end of a Congress provide a description of a committee's actions over the course of that Congress. Committee calendars are a comprehensive record of a committee's actions, including committee rules, membership, a brief legislative history of each measure referred to it, a list of hearings and markups held, and often a list of other committee publications. Finally, committees also publish other information as "committee prints." A committee print might include committee rules or a report on a policy issue that the panel wants to distribute widely.

Committees are integral to the work of Congress in determining the policy needs of the nation and acting on them. This report provides a brief overview of six features of the committee system in the House: organization, hearings, markup, reporting, oversight, and publications. Committees in the House have four primary powers: to conduct hearings and investigations, to consider bills and resolutions and amendments to them, to report legislation to the House for its possible consideration, and to monitor executive branch performance, that is, to conduct oversight. The report will be updated as events warrant.

RS21816 -- Japan's Self-Defense Forces in Iraq: Motivations, Constraints, and Implications for U.S.-Japan AllianceCooperation Updated April 30, 2004 The April 8, 2004 seizure of three Japanese civilian volunteers near the chaotic city of Fallujah, created the first major test of Prime Minister JunichiroKoizumi's commitment to non-combat military participation in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The kidnapping inFallujah, west of Baghdad, reportedly wascarried out by a group calling itself the " Saraya al-Mujahideen " -- translated as "Mujahideen Brigades." According to the Al-Jazeera Arab news service, thehostage-takers gave the Japanese government three days to withdraw its troops or the hostages -- two men and awoman -- would be burnt alive. The two men,aged 18 and 32, were in Iraq as freelance journalists, while the woman, aged 34, reportedly had worked in anindividual capacity for more than a year helpingIraqi street children and families who had taken shelter in abandoned houses. All three were described in the pressas pacifists opposed to Japan's involvementin the war. (1) The hostage situation, the biggest challenge faced by Prime Minister Koizumi since he first took office on April 26, 2001, threw the government into a crisismode. Koizumi and other senior officials immediately vowed not to give in to the terrorists demands. The mainopposition party, the Democratic Party ofJapan (DPJ), strongly supported Koizumi's stance despite its prior and ongoing opposition to the troop deployment. On April 11, 2004, the Japanesegovernment dispatched a senior foreign ministry official and a special National Police Agency counter-terrorismteam to Jordan to coordinate informationgathering and cooperation with U.S. agencies and special operations forces on a possible rescue attempt. (2) In the end, a rescue attempt proved unnecessary. On April 15, 2004, all three hostages were turned over to a moderate Sunni group, the Islamic ClericsAssociation, which had been negotiating their release, and which then arranged their transfer to the JapaneseEmbassy. (3) The same day, two other Japanese,including a freelance journalist, reportedly were seized from a taxi near the scene of the downing of a U.S. Armyhelicopter outside of Fallujah. These hostagesapparently were not threatened, and were released to the same clerical group and turned over to the Japaneseembassy on April 17. For reasons that remain thesubject of much comment in Japan, a section of the press, the political world -- mainly in the ruling party -- and thegeneral public strongly criticized theformer hostages for ignoring government calls for civilians to leave Iraq, jeopardizing the SDF mission in Iraq, andfor having a leftist political agenda. (4) Senior Bush Administration officials expressed solidarity with Japan in regard to the hostages and U.S. officials in the region gave high priority to cooperationto gain the release of the hostages. Vice President Dick Cheney, who arrived on a previously scheduled visit Tokyoon April 10, in the course of a week-longtrip to Japan, China and South Korea, reportedly gave top priority to urging Japan to continue with its commitment regardless of the outcome of the hostagesituation. The Vice President reportedly reassured Japanese leaders that U.S. forces would make every effort torescue the hostages. (5) Although this provedunnecessary, Japanese and U.S. officials reportedly had begun to prepare for a possible rescue attempt by U.S.forces. (6) Concern about the near term threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles, as well as longer term concern about a rising China,has had a major influence on how Japan views its broader alliance relations with the United States and its owninternational role, including its role in Iraq. Thefirst indication of a shift in Japan's security outlook was apparent in the Koizumi government's unusually assertivesupport to the United States after theSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Among its more important actions, the Koizumigovernment pushed controversiallegislation through the Diet (parliament) that allowed Japan to send a small flotilla of the Maritime Self-DefenseForces (MSDF) into the Indian Ocean toprovide fuel and water to U.S. and allied ships supporting operations in Afghanistan. This naval deployment, whichwas unprecedented since the end of WorldWar II, marked a new chapter in U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. (7) Japan's vocal diplomatic support of U.S. policy toward Iraq before and during and after the U.S./U.K.-led invasion also represented sharp break with Tokyo'spast reticence. During a highly contentious debate over two days in the U.N. Security Council in February 2003involving more than 50 countries, Japan andAustralia stood alone in their unequivocal support for a U.S. and British call for the adoption of a security councilresolution authorizing the use of force againstIraq. (8) On December 9, 2003, despite the devastatingbombing of the Italian police headquarters in Nasiriyah, in Southern Iraq, a few weeks earlier, and theambush killing of two Japanese diplomats on December 1, the Koizumi cabinet adopted a "Basic Plan" for thedeployment of up to 1,100 Japanese troops toIraq. In late December 2003 and early 2004 Japan deployed its first contingents of some 550 troops to Iraq undersignificantly less constrained rules ofengagement than previous Japanese international peacekeeping operations. (9) While explaining his decision to send troops to Iraq in terms of Japan's international obligations, Prime Minister Koizumi has made clear that the NorthKorean threat and the longer term viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance have been uppermost in his thinking. (10) In January 2004, after announcing that Japanese troops would be sent toIraq, Koizumi told skeptical members of a parliamentary committee that "Japan cannot ensue its peace and safetyby itself, and that's why it has an alliance withthe United States." Denying that his government was abandoning Japan's "U.N.-centered" foreign policy, Koizumiargued that in the event of a crisis involvingJapanese security, "the U.N. will not deploy forces to fight with Japan and prevent an invasion." (11) Some American and Japanese analysts also seeJapan'sincreased support of U.S. global and regional policies as carrying the implied expectation of reciprocity in the formof greater U.S. recognition of Japan'sinterests and concerns regarding the Korean Peninsula. (12) The most noteworthy aspect of Japan's logistical support of U.S. and allied warships operating in the Indian Ocean and its later deployment of non-combattroops to Iraq is the extent that these actions stretched what previously had been regarded as clear constitutionalconstraints. Article 9 of Japan's U.S.-imposedpost-World War II "no-war constitution"renounces war and the right of belligerence. Under a long-standing findingby cabinet legal office, the constitutionallows Japan to cooperate with the United States militarily for purposes of self-defense but bars participation in"collective defense" involving third countries. These constraints have been viewed widely in Japan as stretched to the limit by the deployment of ground troopsto Iraq, especially because it could not rule outthat the troops might come under fire by Iraqi insurgents. As a consequence, Japan's main political parties and,according to polls, as much as 65% of the publicnow agree that the time has come to consider revising the constitution, regardless of their views on Japan's role inIraq. Koizumi has charged a committee ofthe LDP with drafting suggested revisions by the end of 2005. (13) Despite the favorable outcome, the hostage incidents have had a significant impact on both the political and bureaucratic leadership in Japan, and on publicopinion. The Japanese public, which generally did not favor sending troops to Iraq, nonetheless has appearedrecently to be warming to Japan's enlargedinternational role. In past hostage situations going back to the 1970s, Japanese policy often has appeared to bemotivated primarily by the desire to save thelives of the hostages. In this case, however, editorials, press commentary, and statements by government officialsindicated awareness that the country'sinternational standing and the U.S.-Japan alliance would be seriously damaged if the demands of the hostage-takerswere met. (14) According to polling data,more than 70% of the public -- including some 88% of younger Japanese -- supported this position. (15) Nonetheless, the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and the hostage-taking incidents appear generally to have undercut public and political supportfor the Koizumi's policy. Any further incidents of hostage-taking or serious attacks on the SDF troops couldseriously weaken Prime Minister Koizumi'sthree-party coalition government. In addition to criticism from the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),a number of senior LDP politicians, including aformer head of the Japan Defense Agency, also have expressed the view that it was a mistake to agree to join theU.S.-led coalition. (16) For the Bush Administration, faced with the worst fighting since the fall of Bagdad in April 2003, and the withdrawal of forces by Spain, Honduras, and theDominican Republic, Japan's strong stance has been important to stiffening the resolve of wavering coalitionpartners. The first contingent of Spain's 1,300troops withdrew from Najaf while U.S. Marines were battling the Al-Mahdi Army of the militant Shia cleric,Muqtada-al-Sadr, for control of the city. (17) Someother coalition partners reportedly have been considering withdrawing their forces or not replacing them when theircurrent tour of duty ends. (18) Questions remain about the Japanese government's staying power. A basic political weakness of the government's position is that the troops were sent on ahumanitarian and reconstruction mission, and are explicitly forbidden to engage in combat except in self-defense. This also limits their value to the coalition. The sharp upsurge in violence has raised the possibility that Japanese troops could be drawn into combat forself-defense, which would jeopardize support fortheir mission. The acting secretary general of the LDP reportedly said in an April 18, 2004 talk show interview thatthe government would have no choice towithdraw Japan's Self-Defenses from Iraq if they were to get involved in a firefight with Iraqi insurgents. (19) On April 8, 2004, a day before the first hostageswere seized, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, a close ally of the Prime Minister, had indicated that in viewof the rising violence, Japan was reviewingits longer-term options. "Conditions are changing, and we will respond to these as needed," Fukuda said. Meanwhile, he vowed that Japan would "carry on ourrebuilding and humanitarian missions to the fullest possible limit." (20) Koizumi must lead his party in elections to the upper house of the Japanese Diet (parliament) in June 2004 under what may well be adverse circumstances. Inlower house elections in November 2003, the LDP lost ten seats and just barely maintained its majority with the helpof smaller parties, whereas the oppositionDPJ gained 40 seats. (21) The opposition DPJ hascalled for separating the issue of not yielding to blackmail from the larger question of the legality of puttingtroops in what it says cannot be described as a "non-combat" area, and the purposes served by Japanese forces inIraq. (22) In any event, the DPJ can be expectedto make criticism of the Iraqi deployment a major theme its campaign for the Upper House elections this June. Following the release of the hostages and a continued resurgence of economic growth, Koizumi's popularity rose sharply. In a mid-April 2004 poll conductedby a major national daily newspaper, some 73% of the respondents said that they wanted Koizumi to stay on at leastfor another year, and LDP candidatesscored a clean sweep in three lower house bi-elections on April 26. (23) For a number of reasons, however, the LDP's prospects remain clouded. Koizumi'sannouncement on April 8 that he will not seek reelection after his current term ends in late 2006 may make it easierfor him to make hard decisions, but will notnecessarily help the LDP. Concerns about Japan's security and the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance would appear to continue to give Japan a strong interest in maintaining its troops inIraq. The Japanese Defense Agency already has announced that a replacement contingent of 460 troops was beingreadied for Iraq. (24) On the other hand, thedeteriorating security situation in Iraq could still reverse Japanese policy, creating new problems for the BushAdministration and straining the U.S.-Japanalliance. Also, despite sending replacement troops there are no indications whether Japan will carry out its originalintention to send up to 1,100 troops to Iraq. Japan's commitment to keeping its forces in Iraq could also weaken if the Koizumi government were to perceivethat U.S. policy towards North Korea nolonger was in accord with Japanese interests.

The capture and subsequent release of five Japanese civilians in two differenthostage-taking situations by Islamicterrorist groups in Iraq in April 2004 underscored the high stakes for both the Japanese government of PrimeMinister Junichiro Koizumi and for the U.S.-ledcoalition. Except for the small Communist and Socialist parties, Japanese political leaders across the boardsupported Koizumi's adamant stance againstresponding to the hostage-takers' demands that Japan withdraw its contingent of some 550 troops that were deployedto Samawah, in southern Iraq, in early2004. While this show of resolve by Japan has been welcomed by the Bush Administration, the longer-term effectof the hostage-taking and the upsurge inanti-coalition violence may reinforce the views of many in Japan, including the main opposition party, that agreeingto send Japanese troops to Iraq was amistake. A number of Japanese commentators and political leaders have suggested that the government's mainmotive for sending troops was to strengthenU.S.-Japan alliance cooperation in the face of perceived security threats from North Korea and a rising China, notbecause of strong agreement with U.S. policyin Iraq. From this perspective, Tokyo's steadfastness could have a positive influence on other coalition governments who may now be reconsidering theircommitments, while the withdrawal of Japanese forces, as many in Japan are demanding, could cause significantcomplications for the U.S. effort in Iraq andadversely affect broader U.S.-Japan alliance relations. This report will be updated as news events warrant.

On May 9, 2007, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51, which is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20 (NSPD 51/HSPD 20), on National Continuity Policy. NSPD 51/HSPD 20 updates longstanding continuity policy expressed in various directives issued by previous administrations to assure that governing entities are able to recover from a wide range of potential operational interruptions. Interruptions for which contingency plans might be activated include localized acts of nature, accidents, technological emergencies, and military or terrorist attack-related incidents. Continuity planning is not unique to government; efforts to assure essential operations are broadly integrated into many private sector industries. As with the private sector, government continuity planning is regarded by some observers as a "good business practice," and part of the fundamental mission of agencies as responsible and reliable public institutions. In the public and private sectors, continuity planning may be viewed as a process that incorporates preparedness capacities ranging from basic emergency preparedness to recovery plans and the resumption of normal operations. Unlike the private sector, however, federal continuity planning also incorporates efforts to maintain and preserve constitutional government, on the assumption that certain essential activities typically provided by government must be carried out with little or no interruption under all circumstances. Examples of those activities include the maintenance of civil authority, support for individuals and firms affected by an incident, infrastructure repair, or other action in support of recovery. Such a response presumes the existence of an ongoing, functional government to fund, support, and oversee recovery efforts. To support the provision of essential government activities, NSPD 51/HSPD 20 sets out a policy "to maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of continuity of operations and continuity of government programs in order to ensure the preservation of our form of government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of national essential functions (NEF) under all conditions." The directive identifies eight NEFs that "are the foundation for all continuity programs and capabilities and represent the overarching responsibilities of the federal government to lead and sustain the Nation during a crisis." These are as follows: "Ensuring the continued functioning of government under the Constitution, including the functioning of the three separate branches of government; "Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world and maintaining the trust and confidence of the American people; "Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests; "Maintaining and fostering effective relationships with foreign nations; "Protecting against threats to the homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes or attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests; "Providing rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic consequences of an attack or other incident; "Protecting and stabilizing the Nation's economy and ensuring public confidence in its financial systems; and "Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the national health, safety, and welfare needs of the United States." Since operations may be interrupted without warning, NSPD 51/HSPD 20 requires that continuity planning be incorporated into the daily operations of all executive departments and agencies. Executive branch continuity planning emphasizes "geographic dispersion of leadership, staff, and infrastructure to alternate facilities to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted Government Functions." The directive requires the application of risk management principles "to ensure that appropriate operational readiness decisions are based on the probability of an attack or other incident and its consequences." By mandating planning based on risk analysis, incorporating continuity activities in day-to-day operations, and mandating the utilization of alternate facilities and staffing, the directive appears to incorporate planning assumptions and approaches used widely in the private sector. NSPD 51/HSPD 20 designates the President to lead the activities of the federal government for ensuring constitutional government, and designates the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism as the National Continuity Coordinator (NCC). In coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and without exercising directive authority, the NCC coordinates the development and implementation of continuity policy for executive branch departments and agencies. In consultation with the heads of appropriate executive departments and agencies, the NCC was required to lead the development of a National Continuity Implementation Plan for submission to the President. NSPD 51/HSPD 20 does not explicitly specify the appropriate departments and agencies. The directive specifies a "Continuity Policy Coordination Committee (CPCC), chaired by a Senior Director from the Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff" appointed by the NCC, and designated as the main day-to-day forum for continuity policy coordination, but also indicates that the NCC will coordinate with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The directive designates the Secretary of Homeland Security "as the President's lead agent for coordinating overall continuity operations and activities of executive departments and agencies." Other than explicitly denying the NCC the capacity to exercise directive authority, the extent to which any official charged with continuity coordinating responsibilities can enjoin executive branch agencies to comply with their guidance or recommendations is unclear. NSPD 51/HSPD 20 provides that federal executive branch departments and agencies are "assigned to a category in accordance with the nature and characteristics of its national security roles and responsibilities in support" of the NEFs. Agency leaders are required to execute their respective department or agency COOP plans in response to emergencies that affect their operations. In addition, each agency head is required to appoint a senior accountable official, at the assistant secretary level, as the continuity coordinator for the department or agency; identify and submit to the NCC agency mission essential functions and "develop continuity plans in support of the NEFs and the continuation of essential functions under all conditions;" plan, program, and budget for continuity capabilities; plan, conduct, and support annual tests and training, to evaluate program readiness and ensure the adequacy and viability of continuity plans and communications systems; and support other continuity requirements, "in accordance with the nature and characteristics of the agency's national security roles and responsibilities." In addition to efforts within the federal executive branch, NSPD 51/HSPD 20 requires the integration of continuity planning with the "emergency plans and capabilities of state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and to prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of authority," and requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate that integration "to provide for the delivery of essential services during an emergency."

On May 9, 2007, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51, which is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20, on National Continuity Policy. The directive updates longstanding continuity directives designed to assure that governing entities are able to recover from a wide range of potential operational interruptions. Executive branch efforts to assure essential operations are similar to those that are broadly integrated into many private sector industries. Government continuity planning also incorporates efforts to maintain and preserve constitutional government, based on the assumption that certain essential activities typically provided by government must be carried out with little or no interruption under all circumstances.

Although the 11 th recession of the postwar period officially ended in June 2009, one economic indicator that is very visible in people's daily lives—the unemployment rate—has continued to rise. With the unemployment rate at 9.8% in November 2010, those still employed or able to find jobs are quite likely to know personally others who have been less fortunate. The still high unemployment rate partly reflects the slow pace at which employers have been adding workers to their payrolls despite enactment of job creation legislation in February 2009 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5 ), March 2010 (the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, P.L. 111-147 ), and August 2010 (the Education Jobs Fund at Title I of the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act, P.L. 111-226 ). This report addresses the question of when one might reasonably expect to see sustained improvement in the unemployment rate and a steady resumption of job growth following a recession's end. It first provides an explanation of why it is unlikely that the unemployment rate would begin trending downward and the number of jobs on employer payroll would begin trending upward immediately after the start of a recovery. It then analyzes the trend in the unemployment rate and jobs data before and after the bottom of the prior 10 business cycles to confirm these statements. A few definitions are called for before proceeding with the explanation. To begin with, the official definition of the unemployment rate prescribed by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is the percentage of persons in the civilian labor force age 16 and older who are unemployed. The labor force, in turn, is defined as the number of employed and unemployed individuals in the civilian noninstitutional population age 16 and older. Lastly, unemployment is defined as the number of people who actively searched for work in the four weeks before the week in which the Census Bureau administers the Current Population Survey to members of households. Mathematically, the unemployment rate is expressed as: The unemployment rate consequently may move up or down depending not just on a change in the number of workers who lack jobs (the numerator) but also on a change in the number of individuals participating in the labor force (the denominator). The size of the labor force may decrease during a recession in part because unemployed workers who give up searching for jobs out of discouragement over their reemployment prospects cease to be included. Conversely, the number of labor force participants may increase during a recession if people see signs the economy is improving and think it again worthwhile to look for work. If hiring does not keep pace with discouraged workers reentering the labor force, for example, the unemployment rate will rise in the face of otherwise good economic news. The unemployment rate thus is called a lagging economic indicator: it typically improves only after other indicators have signaled an impending recovery and actually may rise for some time after a recession's end. Firms usually are reluctant to add workers to their payrolls until convinced that the economy will continue growing (i.e., gross domestic product, GDP, will keep increasing). Before employers are fairly certain that the increase in demand for their goods and services will continue, they are likely to boost production by restoring the hours of those currently in their employ and by having employees work overtime rather than by hiring new workers or recalling laid off workers. As a result, job growth may not occur immediately upon the economy showing signs of a turnaround. The source of jobs data that labor market analysts generally utilize is the Current Employment Statistics program. In its establishment survey, BLS queries nonfarm employers each month about the number of jobs (employees) on their payrolls. Employers are considered to be a more accurate source for this information compared to the members of households who respond to the Current Population Survey, from which the unemployment rate and most demographic information on workers is derived. In addition, the Business Cycle Dating Committee appears to rely chiefly on changes in both national output (GDP) and employment trends from the establishment survey to determine the official beginning and end of recessions. The U.S. economy experienced 10 recessions since World War II, excluding the latest, which ran from December 2007 to June 2009. These recessions varied greatly in severity, as measured by the extent of decline in GDP, and their duration. But, without exception, the unemployment rate kept increasing until or more often after each recession had ended. (See Table 1 .) The unemployment rate peaked at the bottom of the business cycle in three instances: at 7.9% in October 1949, at 7.8% in July 1980, and at 10.8% in November 1982. In the remaining seven recessions, the unemployment rate did not peak until after they had ended. Four times the unemployment rate kept climbing for only a few months into the economic recovery: four months after the July 1953-May 1954 recession ended, three months after the August 1957-April 1958 recession and the April 1960-February 1961 recession ended, and two months after the November 1973-March 1975 recession ended. In contrast, the unemployment rate did not peak until well into the economic recovery in three instances. The unemployment rate kept rising for nine months after the end of the December 1969-November 1970 recession, 15 months after the end of the July 1990-March 1991 recession, and 18 months after the end of the March-November 2001 recession. Like the unemployment rate, the employment data generally fit the picture of no steady job growth until some months after a recession's end. As shown in Figure 1 , a sustained period of job growth failed to ensue until after the end of all 10 recessions. In only one of those instances—the very short January-July 1980 recession—did the employment level immediately begin trending upward. In the other nine cases, the number of jobs on employer payrolls fluctuated for months after the recession's end. Sustained job growth occurred within three to five months of the start of seven recoveries. In sharp contrast, steady job growth did not commence until March 1992—12 months after the July 1990-March 1991 recession ended; and not until September 2003—22 months after the March-November 2001 recession ended. The very delayed improvement in the labor market following the 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions led to the ensuing rebounds of the economy being referred to as jobless recoveries. With employment at public and private sector employers similarly having failed to show consistent improvement for well over a year since the recession's end, many observers think the nation has been experiencing another jobless recovery. While employment at firms in the private sector of the economy started to steadily rise in January 2010, it appears that the fiscal problems of local governments in particular have dampened the pace of overall job growth.

Although the 11th recession of the postwar period officially ended in June 2009, one economic indicator that is very visible in people's daily lives—the unemployment rate—has continued to rise. With the unemployment rate at 9.8% in November 2010, those still employed or able to find jobs are quite likely to know personally others who have been less fortunate. The still high unemployment rate partly reflects the slow pace at which employers have been adding workers to their payrolls despite enactment of job creation legislation in February 2009 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5), March 2010 (the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, P.L. 111-147), and August 2010 (the Education Jobs Fund at Title I of the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act, P.L. 111-226). This report addresses the question of when one might reasonably expect to see sustained improvement in the unemployment rate and a steady resumption of job growth following a recession's end. It first provides an explanation of why it is unlikely that the unemployment rate would begin trending downward and the number of jobs on employer payroll would begin trending upward immediately after the start of a recovery. It then analyzes the trend in the unemployment rate and jobs data before and after the bottom of the prior 10 business cycles to confirm these statements. The report concludes by noting that the much delayed improvement in the labor market following the 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions led to the ensuing rebounds of the economy being referred to as jobless recoveries. With employment at public and private sector employers similarly having failed to show consistent improvement for well over a year after the recession's end, many observers think that the nation has been experiencing another jobless recovery.

The FY2017 appropriation for Agriculture and Related Agencies was enacted on May 5, 2017, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-31 , Division A). The fiscal year started on October 1, 2016, under a continuing resolution (CR) that lasted until December 9, 2016 ( P.L. 114-223 , Division C). A second CR lasted until April 28, 2017 ( P.L. 114-254 , Division A). A third CR extended until May 5 ( P.L. 115-30 ). The CRs continued FY2016 funding with a few exceptions. In regular action, the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reported their FY2017 Agriculture appropriations bills ( H.R. 5054 , S. 2956 ) in April and May 2016, with some of the earliest subcommittee action in two decades ( Figure 1 ; Appendix ). But no further action on the individual bills occurred until they were incorporated into the omnibus appropriation. The discretionary total of the enacted appropriation is $20.877 billion, which is $623 million less than enacted in FY2016 (-2.9%). The appropriation also carries mandatory spending—largely determined in separate authorizing laws—that totaled about $132.5 billion. The overall total therefore exceeded $153 billion ( Table 1 ). The discretionary caps were set so as not to trigger sequestration under limits established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 ). The White House released its FY2017 budget request on February 9, 2016, along with the detailed justification from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The new Administration released an outline for FY2018 appropriations on March 16, 2017. The Agriculture appropriations act funds all of USDA, except for the U.S. Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services. In even-numbered fiscal years, the enacted Agriculture bill carries CFTC funding under the usual practice for handling jurisdictional differences between the House and Senate . Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending, but discretionary amounts are the primary focus since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws. The scope of the appropriation is shown by the major allocations in Figure 2 . The largest discretionary spending items are domestic nutrition, agricultural research, rural development, FDA, foreign food aid, farm assistance programs, food safety inspection, conservation, and animal and plant health. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, child nutrition, crop insurance, and the Commodity Credit Corporation (which pays for the farm commodity, conservation, and other mandatory USDA programs). The $20.877 billion enacted in the FY2017 Agriculture appropriation is officially $623 million smaller t han the FY2016 discretionary appropriation (in terms of its allocation that counts against the budget limit, the "302(b)" subcommittee allocation). It achieves this primarily by increasing budgetary offsets over the FY2016 level through greater rescissions of prior appropriations and greater scorekeeping adjustments primarily from "negative subsidies" from loan programs that charge fees ( Table 1 ). However, the budget authority provided to agencies in the major titles of the bill actually increase s by $462 million (the top of the shaded bars in Figure 3 ). Discretionary budget changes that are over $10 million within agencies include the following, relative to FY2016 ( Table 2 ): Conservation p rograms. + $ 163 million , mostly for $150 million of watershed and flood prevention programs that have not been funded since FY2010. Rural d evelopment . +$ 119 million , mostly for rural water and wastewater programs (+$49 million), rural broadband (+$24 million), and rural housing rental assistance (+$15 million). Food and Nutrition Service . +$ 65 million , mostly for commodity assistance (+$19 million) and nutrition programs administration (+$20 million) in the regular nutrition title and a $19 million supplemental in the general provisions for commodity assistance. Offset by an $850 million rescission in WIC because of lower prior-year participation than expected. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service . +$ 52 million , primarily for increases in emergency preparedness. Food and Drug Administration. +$42 million , including $36 million more for food safety activities. Farm Service Agency. +$29 million , including $23 million more to support a 25% increase in farm loan program authority. USDA administration . + $ 20 million to modernize headquarters facilities. Food Safety Inspection Service . +$1 7 million for inspection improvements. Food for Peace grants. -$116 million from less supplemental funding ($134 million) to augment constant base funding of $1.466 billion. Disaster assistance. -$114 million , comprised from $38 million less appropriated for programs than in FY2016 ($206 million in the second continuing resolution plus $28 million in the omnibus appropriation) and $76 million more in disaster designation offsets that do not count against budget caps. Agricultural research agencies. -$46 million , comprised primarily of $25 million more for Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI) grants, and $26 million more for Agricultural Research Service (ARS) operations, offset by $112 million less for ARS buildings and facilities. Mandatory spending carried in the bill—mostly determined in separate authorizing laws—increases $13.5 billion over FY2016. All of this increase is in farm programs, including a $14.4 billion increase in the reimbursement to the Commodity Credit Corporation for higher than expected payments for farm commodity revenue support programs ( Table 2 ). This increase is automatic based on farm bill formulas and does not affect discretionary spending limits. Over time, changes by title of the Agriculture appropriations bill have generally been proportionate to changes in the bill's total discretionary limit, though some activities have sustained relative increases and decreases. Agriculture appropriations peaked in FY2010 and declined through FY2013. Since then, total Agriculture appropriations have increased ( Figure 3 ). However, whether that increase returns the appropriation to various historical benchmarks depends upon inflation adjustments and other factors. The stacked bars in Figure 3 represent the discretionary spending authorized for each title in the 10 years since FY2007. The total of the positive stacked bars is the budget authority contained in Titles I-VI. It is higher than the official "302(b)" discretionary spending limit (the line) because of the budgetary offset from negative amounts in Title VII General Provisions and other scorekeeping adjustments. General Provisions are negative mostly because of limits placed on mandatory programs, which are scored as savings ( Table 2 ). For example, in the FY2017 appropriation, budget authority for the primary agencies in the bill (Titles I-VI) increased $462 million (the top of the stacked bars in Figure 3 ) even though the official discretionary spending allocation decreased $623 million (the line in Figure 3 ). Increases in the use of CHIMPS and other tools to offset discretionary appropriations ameliorated reductions in discretionary budget authority in FY2011 and succeeding years. For example, the official "302(b)" discretionary total for the bill was given credit for declining 13.6% in FY2011, while the total of Titles I-VI declined only 6.4% that year ( Figure 3 ). The effect is less pronounced in FY2016, since the offset was smaller, in part because of additional spending in General Provisions for foreign food aid and emergency programs. Some areas have sustained real increases, while others have declined (apart from the peak in 2010). Agencies with sustained real increases (that is, inflation-adjusted; Figure 4 ) since FY2008 include FDA and CFTC (Related Agencies) and, to a lesser extent, foreign food assistance. Areas with real decreases in discretionary spending since 2008 include general agricultural programs and domestic nutrition programs. Rural development and conservation also had a real decrease over the same period, though FY2016 reversed that trend for rural development, and FY2017 reversed it for conservation.

The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (For CFTC, the Agriculture appropriations subcommittee has jurisdiction in the House but not in the Senate.) Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development, since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; FDA; rural development; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance programs; food safety inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation. The FY2017 appropriation for Agriculture and Related Agencies was enacted on May 5, 2017, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31, Division A). The fiscal year started on October 1, 2016, under continuing resolutions (CRs) that continued FY2016 funding with a few exceptions. The House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reported their FY2017 Agriculture appropriations bills (H.R. 5054, S. 2956) in April and May 2016. The discretionary total of the enacted appropriation is $20.877 billion, which is $623 million less than enacted in FY2016 (-2.9%). It achieves this primarily by increasing budgetary offsets over the FY2016 level through greater rescissions of prior appropriations and greater scorekeeping adjustments. However, the budget authority for FY2017 provided to agencies in the major titles of the bill actually increases by $462 million compared to FY2016. Increases primarily include $163 million more for discretionary conservation programs than in FY2016, $119 million more for rural development, $65 million more for discretionary domestic nutrition programs, $52 million more for animal and plant health programs, $51 million more for agricultural research programs, $42 million more for the Food and Drug Administration, $29 million more for the Farm Service Agency, $20 million more for USDA administrative facilities, and $17 million more for food safety inspections. Reductions primarily come from a rescission of unused domestic nutrition assistance funding ($850 million rescission), supplemental funding for international food aid ($116 million less than in FY2016), agricultural research facilities ($112 million less), greater use of a disaster designation that does not count against budget caps ($76 million extra offset), and disaster assistance ($38 million less). The appropriation also carries mandatory spending that totaled about $132.5 billion. The overall total of the FY2017 Agricultural appropriation therefore exceeded $153 billion.

The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in 1803 that in order to maintain a society governed by laws, a legal remedy should accompany each legal right. Toward this end, courts apply various remedies to ensure effective enforcement of constitutional rights. For example, courts sometimes order retrials to remedy violations of defendants' trial-by-jury or assistance-of-counsel rights. A remedy that excludes impermissibly obtained evidence from use at a criminal trial—the "exclusionary rule"—similarly protects constitutional rights. The exclusionary rule typically applies in cases involving violations by law enforcement of rights guaranteed by the Fourth or Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It differs from remedies such as retrial, because in addition to retrospectively redressing injustice, its major aim is prospective deterrence of government misconduct. In theory, although it only actually redresses violations when probative evidence is found, the exclusionary rule also protects innocent people by deterring unwarranted privacy intrusions. The rule operates to prohibit the introduction at trial of probative evidence that would be admissible if collected in a constitutionally permissible manner. Because the excluded evidence is frequently incriminating, many believe that its application aids criminals in escaping punishment. For this reason, the rule has long been controversial. In past cases, the Supreme Court has defended the rule as a necessary corollary to the constitutional rights it protects. More recently, a division has emerged. Some justices adhere to the view of the rule as constitutionally required. Other justices express concerns about the cost to society of freeing criminals who would likely be convicted if the excluded evidence was admitted. Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases—that is, in cases involving illegal searches or seizures. The Court's 2009 decision in Herring v. United States furthers this trend. Because Herring is the first Supreme Court decision that rejects the exclusionary rule in the context of police error regarding a warrant, the decision has made news headlines and prompted debate about whether the Herring decision appropriately limits the exclusionary rule's reach. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a right "of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." As a general rule, "reasonableness" requires law enforcement officers to demonstrate "probable cause" and obtain a warrant (unless a recognized warrant exception applies) before conducting searches or seizures. For example, under the general rule, a police officer may not arrest a person unless a judicial magistrate has issued a warrant, based on evidence establishing sufficient probable cause, for that person's arrest. Likewise, a police officer typically may not search a person's belongings without first obtaining a warrant that describes, with sufficient particularity, the property for which sufficient evidence justifies a search. The Constitution does not explicitly provide a remedy that applies when governmental actors violate a citizen's Fourth Amendment right. To deter Fourth Amendment violations, courts apply the exclusionary rule, which "is often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment violation." In the Fourth Amendment context, the exclusionary rule requires a trial court to forbid the prosecution's use of evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure. For example, if a police officer arrests a person in violation of constitutionally mandated procedures (i.e., without a warrant or a warrant exception), then the exclusionary rule requires a trial court to suppress any contraband the officer discovered during the search incident to that arrest. Although the exclusionary rule protects constitutional rights, a question remains regarding its status—that is, is it constitutionally required in the Fourth Amendment context? In past Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has stated that the exclusionary rule is "of constitutional origin." In other cases, the Court has characterized the rule as a "judicially created remedy ... rather than a personal constitutional right." This distinction affects Congress's authority to alter the exclusionary rule statutorily. Congress may not reduce a constitutionally guaranteed remedy but could potentially alter a rule that lacks constitutional status. Regardless, the Court has narrowed the exclusionary rule's reach in Fourth Amendment cases throughout the past several decades. For example, it has barred courts' use of the rule in civil cases, grand jury proceedings, and parole revocation hearings. Arguably, the most important narrowing trend has been the Court's development of the good-faith exception. The Supreme Court introduced what has come to be known as the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon . In Leon , the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when police officers act with "objectively reasonable reliance" on a search warrant later found to be invalid. Language in the opinion embraced a cautionary "balancing" approach to the exclusionary rule in which the benefits of exclusion (namely any deterrence effect on unconstitutional police action) must outweigh the costs (namely the risk that a guilty person will escape justice because evidence is excluded at trial) before the Court will apply the rule to new factual circumstances. Police officers in Leon , acting on a tip about drug activity in a particular home, investigated the license plate number and connections of a man who exited the home holding a small paper sack. The officers then observed people coming and going from the residences of several people connected to that man, including the home of Leon, the respondent in the case, whom the man had listed as his employer and who had a criminal record. Based on these observations, the officers obtained a warrant from a magistrate to search three homes and several automobiles. The subsequent search uncovered illegal drugs and other evidence. At trial, a federal district court held that the warrant was not supported by probable cause; thus, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Applying the exclusionary rule remedy, the district court suppressed the evidence of drugs found in the homes and cars. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that suppression is inappropriate in cases, such as Leon , where the violation occurred despite a police officer's "objectively reasonable reliance"—for example, on a warrant that is actually invalid. By creating an exception to the exclusionary rule, the Leon court arguably opened the door to permitting evidence in cases involving multiple types of Fourth Amendment violations. However, the Leon decision itself addressed only the particular circumstance in which a warrant exists but was invalidly issued based on insufficient probable cause. The Leon opinion, including several exceptions to the good-faith exception articulated in the case, evidences a holding that only addresses that particular context. To justify its holding, the Leon court noted the logical inconsistency between exclusion in cases involving non-police errors and the rule's traditional deterrence rationale, stating: "Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Based on the Court's reliance on this rationale, one might argue that the Court did not originally anticipate an extension of the good-faith exception to cases involving police error. The Supreme Court has extended the Leon good-faith exception in relatively minor ways over the past several decades. In a 1995 case, Illinois v. Krull , the Court applied the exception where police officers had searched an auto dealer's list of licenses pursuant to a statute that courts later struck down as unconstitutional. Several years later, in Arizona v. Evans , the Court applied Leon to evidence obtained after an arrest based on a facially valid warrant that the clerk of the court had neglected to show had been quashed seventeen days earlier. Until recently, these extensions had involved police reliance on errors made by actors—for example, the clerk of the court in Evans and the legislative branch in Krull — not the police themselves. Furthermore, in a 2004 case, Groh v. Ramirez , the Court seemed to draw an explicit line between police errors and errors made by other actors. Police officers in Groh searched a home where they suspected that the owners had stored illegal weaponry. The court of appeals held that the search warrant, which a magistrate had signed but the officers had themselves prepared, violated the constitutional requirement that property to be searched be described with particularity; thus, the officers' search violated the homeowners' Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, because it found that the officers' search pursuant to a warrant that failed to list property to be searched was not a "reasonable" mistake. In so holding, the Court stressed that the officer in Groh was himself responsible for the Fourth Amendment violation. However, only two years after Groh , the Court declined to find any distinction between police error and third-party errors. In Michigan v. Hudson , it held that police officers' violation of the "knock and announce" rule did not trigger the exclusionary rule. Knock and announce, an "ancient" procedure derived from common-law, constitutional, and statutory sources, protects occupants' privacy by requiring police officers to wait a short while after knocking and announcing their presence before entering a residence for which they have a warrant. The rule is viewed as a less stringent requirement than the warrant or probable cause requirements under the Fourth Amendment, and the Hudson court noted that it is "unnecessary" in various circumstances. Because the Court limited its opinion in Hudson to knock and announce violations, it was unclear after that case whether the Court would extend the good-faith exception to more serious police errors, such as those involving warrants or warrant exceptions. In Herring v. United States , a 2009 case, the Supreme Court for the first time applied the good-faith exception in a case involving police error regarding a warrant. Officers arrested the defendant, Bennie Dean Herring, outside of an impound lot where Herring had come to retrieve an item from his truck. An officer at the lot, recognizing Herring, called the county warrant clerk to determine whether an outstanding arrest warrant applied to him. The warrant clerk found no such warrant but agreed to inquire about warrants in a neighboring county. The clerk then identified as active an arrest warrant in the neighboring county, although it was in fact no longer active. After learning about the warrant, two officers followed Herring from the impound lot, arrested him, and performed a search incident to arrest. The officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and an illegal pistol in his vehicle. Because the arrest warrant was actually invalid, both parties in Herring admitted that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. The disagreement in the case centered on whether the exclusionary rule should apply to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the violation. Extending the good-faith exception, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply. The Court also announced a new test for the exception: "To trigger the exclusionary rule," police conduct must be "sufficiently deliberate" and the police must be "sufficiently culpable." The Court emphasized that this "analysis of deliberateness and culpability" is objective: a court should ascertain not whether the police officer in question acted with good intentions, but rather "'whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal' in light of 'all the circumstances.'" In rejecting the exclusionary rule in Herring , the Court appeared to embrace the view that it is not constitutionally required in the Fourth Amendment context. Quoting Hudson v. Michigan , the Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is a "'last resort'" rather than a "necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation." It then applied a cost-benefit analysis similar to the approach in Leon , stating that in order for the exclusionary rule to apply, "the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs." In contrast, dissenting justices in Herring cited cases in which the Court has viewed the exclusionary rule as "inseparable" from the Fourth Amendment, suggesting that the remedy of exclusion has constitutional status. Starting from this different philosophical foundation, the dissenters rejected the cost-benefit approach as inappropriate and would instead have applied the exclusionary rule in all cases where it has " any power to discourage" law enforcement misconduct. Dissenters also highlighted the substantive distinction between errors made by judicial branch personnel and errors made by police, noting three specific distinctions: (1) the exclusionary rule historically aims to deter police, rather than judicial, misconduct; (2) no evidence suggests that court employees are "inclined to subvert the Fourth Amendment"; and (3) because judicial officers have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal investigations, "there [is] 'no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule ... [would] have a significant effect on court employees.'" For those reasons, the four dissenting justices would not have extended the good-faith exception to situations involving police conduct regarding a warrant. Although the Herring decision broadens the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and has shifted the analysis to one of "deliberateness and culpability," the scope of its impact remains to be seen. For example, although it is perhaps difficult to imagine recordkeeping errors that would meet the Court's "deliberate and culpable" test, the Herring court suggested that "reckless[ness] in maintaining a warrant system," such as a recordkeeping system that routinely led to false arrests, could justify application of the exclusionary rule. Thus, although most recordkeeping and clerical errors made by police will no doubt fit within the relatively broad parameters of the good-faith exception as interpreted in Herring , lower courts will likely decline to apply Herring in situations where defendants demonstrate knowledge or ongoing patterns of wrongdoing by law enforcement officers. In addition to broadening the good-faith exception, the Herring decision appears to further the trend toward interpreting the exclusionary rule as lacking constitutional status. One important outcome of this might be greater congressional authority to legislate changes to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Congress has occasionally considered legislation that would expand or contract the exclusionary rule's reach. Because Congress may always guarantee a greater right than the Constitution demands as a minimum, Congress clearly may expand the remedy of exclusion. In contrast, whether Congress has the authority to restrict the remedy of exclusion depends upon the status of the remedy vis-à-vis the Constitution. If, as Herring appears to indicate, the exclusionary rule lacks constitutional status, then legislation restricting the right—for example, legislation expanding the Herring holding—is likely constitutionally permissible. If, on the other hand, the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally required remedy in Fourth Amendment cases, as the Herring dissenters suggested, then Congress would lack the authority to narrow the scope of the remedy.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a right against "unreasonable searches and seizures." To deter the federal and state governments from violating this right, courts have developed an "exclusionary rule," which requires that evidence obtained as a result of an invalid search or seizure be excluded from use at trial. The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule in several cases since the late 1970s. In United States v. Leon, the Court created the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. The good-faith exception applies when officers conduct a search or seizure with "objectively reasonable reliance" on, for example, a warrant that is not obviously invalid but that a judicial magistrate should not have signed. Until a 2006 case, Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court had applied the good-faith exception only in cases in which the error creating the constitutional violation was caused by judicial or legislative actors, rather than by the police themselves. In Hudson, the Court applied the exception to a case in which police officers had violated the "knock and announce" rule by entering a home without waiting a sufficient period of time. In Herring v. United States, a 2009 decision, the Supreme Court for the first time applied the good-faith exception to bar application of the exclusionary rule in a case involving police error regarding a warrant. A police officer in the case mistakenly identified an arrest warrant for the defendant. The Court held that evidence discovered after the subsequent arrest was admissible at trial because the officer's error was not "deliberate" and the officers involved were not "culpable." In future cases, courts will apply the Herring "deliberate and culpable" test to determine whether to admit evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure which is unconstitutional as a consequence of police error. A second impact of the Herring decision is a weaker constitutional footing for the exclusionary rule. Whereas judicially-created remedies have gained "constitutional status" in the context of some other constitutional rights, it appears that the exclusionary rule lacks such a grounding under the Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Cash flow financing (CFF) is a statutory provision in the Arms Export Control Act that enables presidentially authorized recipients of U.S. foreign military aid to pay for U.S. defense equipment in partial installments over time rather than all at once. Countries which are not authorized by the President to benefit from CFF must adhere to "full commitment financing" and reserve the total amount of a purchase upon reaching a contractual agreement with a U.S. supplier. Traditionally, the President has authorized CFF to select countries in order to demonstrate strong U.S. support for their continued security. CFF began as a benefit exclusively available to Israel in the mid-1970s, and the arrangement has since been expanded to other nations. Egypt has been authorized to benefit from CFF arrangements since 1979. Other countries, such as Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, have used CFF to finance purchases of the F-16 fighter jet. South Korea and Spain also have been authorized to benefit from CFF. However, as of May 2015, only Israel and Egypt are currently authorized to use cash flow financing for their purchases of U.S. weaponry. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) administer foreign military sales using CFF. If a foreign government has insufficient U.S. military aid (which is nearly always Foreign Military Financing or FMF) to meet its CFF commitments for a given fiscal year (perhaps due to appropriations decisions by Congress), then the cash flow amount must be paid from the purchaser's national funds. If a foreign government cancels an existing CFF defense contract, funds may be provided to U.S. defense contractors from what is known as a "Termination Liability Reserve." Foreign governments must set aside a portion of their annual CFF funds to contribute to the reserve. Advocates of CFF have touted it for facilitating the sale of technologically advanced but high-cost U.S. weapons systems, particularly U.S. fighter aircraft, to friendly foreign nations. For example, presidential authorization of CFF for Israel has enabled Israel to purchase U.S. combat aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16, and more recently the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, while still continuing purchases of other critical U.S.-supplied weapons. However, at times some lawmakers and observers have criticized the use of CFF, arguing that as a policy tool, it effectively commits Congress to future appropriations in order to pay for previously purchased, high-priced defense systems. Over 20 years ago, former Representative and House Appropriations Chairman David Obey remarked that, "It is, in fact, going to be virtually impossible for this committee to consider reductions in aid to that region [Middle East] over the next decade if those military contracts continue to be signed because of the principle of so-called cash flow financing." In the early 1980s, the then-General Accounting Office (now U.S. Government Accountability Office or GAO) published a report on U.S. foreign assistance to Israel in which it stated, "Cash flow financing implies a strong commitment by the United States to provide large amounts of credit in future years, limiting, in our view, the prerogatives of the Congress in authorizing the U.S. security assistance program." The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt led to a dramatic expansion in what had previously been limited amounts of U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt. In 1979, President Carter authorized CFF for Egypt, and the Reagan Administration and successive Administrations have continued the practice, though recent announcements by the Obama Administration (see below) indicate the practice will be discontinued in FY2018. According to the 1982 congressional hearing testimony of Frank Conahan, former Director of the International Division at the GAO: The decision to provide cash flow authorization to Egypt was made in 1979 at the time U.S. and Egypt were considering the types and amounts of military equipment Egypt would buy with the $1.5 billion credit authorization from the peace treaty. While the peace treaty credits were originally seen as a one-time payment, U.S. officials quickly realized that Egypt's needs would require much more financing over a longer period of time. Cash flow financing was seen as a way to allow Egypt to order larger quantities of equipment in the early years of its relationship with the United States. Without cash flow, Egypt could only order equipment with a total price of $1.5 billion. Under cash flow authorization, Egypt placed orders totaling $3.5 billion over the same time period. Although at the time there appeared to be significant congressional support for the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty and expanded U.S. foreign assistance to both Israel and Egypt, some lawmakers did question whether the extension of CFF to Egypt ostensibly bound Congress to future appropriations in order to meet payment obligations for U.S. defense equipment. In one exchange between the late Senator Daniel Inouye and a State Department official at a congressional hearing, Senator Inouye asked if this method of financing "places considerable pressure on the Congress to continue providing substantial levels of credit" to Egypt. In response, the officials stated that the Reagan Administration had repeatedly told the Egyptian government that future appropriations are subject to the approval of Congress and "to the extent that pressure exists, it stems not from the cash flow system but from the importance of the relationship which the United States enjoys with Egypt ... any action on our part to curtail that support could only be interpreted by Egypt as reflecting a reassessment on our part of the basic relationship." As U.S. military assistance to Egypt has continued fairly steadily for over three decades, successive administrations have continued the practice of authorizing CFF for Egypt—until earlier this year. On March 31, 2015, after a phone call between President Obama and Egyptian President Abdelfattah al Sisi, the White House announced that, though the Administration was releasing the deliveries of select weapons system to Egypt that had been on hold since October 2013 (and pledged to continue seeking $1.3 billion in aid from Congress), "Beginning in fiscal year 2018, the President noted that we will channel U.S. security assistance for Egypt to four categories—counterterrorism, border security, Sinai security, and maritime security—and for sustainment of weapons systems already in Egypt's arsenal." In a separate National Security Council (NSC) press release, NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan noted that At the same time, the President has decided to modernize the U.S.-Egypt military assistance relationship. First, beginning in fiscal year 2018, we will discontinue Egypt's use of cash flow financing (CFF)—the financial mechanism that enables Egypt to purchase equipment on credit. By ending CFF, we will have more flexibility to, in coordination with Egypt, tailor our military assistance as conditions and needs on the ground change. This announcement had come after the Administration's lengthy review of U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, a process that began immediately following the Egyptian military's ouster of former president Mohammed Morsi, a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. These events triggered questions about the legality of continued assistance to Egypt's government given U.S. law prohibiting assistance to any government whose duly elected leader is deposed by military coup or decree, as well as questions about the advisability of such assistance given a number of considerations. During this review between 2013 and 2015, several lawmakers, outside experts, and media outlets called on the President to end the practice of authorizing Egypt for CFF. These include Senator Patrick Leahy in 2013, at the time the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: "It [CFF] has gotten us into a situation where we are mortgaged years into the future for expensive equipment.... It is not a sensible way to carry out U.S. policy toward a country of such importance, where circumstances have changed, our interests and needs change, our budget is under stress, and yet we've been stuck on autopilot for more than 25 years." A 2014 letter to President Obama signed by "The Working Group on Egypt," a bipartisan group of various foreign policy and Egypt experts: "Cash flow financing—the special arrangement for military aid that allows Egypt to make demands on U.S. public resources before they have been approved by our Congress—must come to an end so that U.S. policy is no longer handcuffed by contractual arrangements that narrow policy options." A 2014 op-ed in the New York Times : "First, Washington must stop allowing Egypt to place military hardware orders under a preferential system called cash flow finance. Available only to Israel and Egypt, the mechanism works much like a credit card, permitting the countries to place orders under the assumption that Congress will eventually appropriate enough funds to cover them. It will take years to wean Egypt off cash flow finance, since orders can take years to process, but doing so now will help untangle contractual and legislative knots in the future." The President's decision to phase out CFF to Egypt is perhaps part of a broader policy approach that may seek to balance national security interests and the promotion of democratic principles in dealing with the post-Morsi, military-backed Egyptian government. The March 31 White House announcement contemplates maintaining a modicum of security cooperation (e.g., ending weapons suspension and continuing $1.3 billion in aid) while moving the relationship away from its traditional military-to-military foundations (e.g., ending CFF and limiting future arms sales to specific defense categories). In practice, U.S. military aid to Egypt has not been used to finance purchases of new acquisitions of major defense equipment in recent years. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which issues notifications of proposed sales of major defense equipment to Congress, has notified Congress of just one such new proposed sale to Egypt between 2011 and April 2015. Instead, cash-flow-financed FMF has been channeled toward paying for previous purchases. This is due to a number of factors, such as a large amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases that were agreed to between 2009 and 2011; the uncertain political environment that surrounded Egypt from 2011 to 2013; and congressionally mandated restrictions on FMF to Egypt in both the FY2014 and FY2015 Appropriations Acts ( P.L. 113-76 and P.L. 113-235 ) that partially limited the use of FMF obligations to existing sales only. Thus, the President's plan to eliminate CFF by 2018 seems to be in line with recent trends and congressional action. Moreover, since CFF has been used primarily to fund air power acquisitions for foreign militaries, it is entirely unclear whether the United States needs to extend credit to the Egyptian Air Force when Egypt, unlike Israel and Turkey, is not a partner in the new generation of technologically advanced platforms such as the F-35. Since Egypt is already the fourth-largest operator of F-16s in the world, U.S. defense officials may encourage Egypt to allocate a greater proportion of annual FMF grants to sustainment and upgrades of existing U.S.-origin systems rather than for procurement of new items. In order to phase out CFF, Congress could include in future legislation language from previous acts specifying that FMF to Egypt "shall only be made available at the minimum rate necessary to continue existing programs." However, unless Congress specifically prohibits Egypt from being eligible for CFF in law, the next President could conceivably reverse President Obama's pledge to end CFF. Conversely, Congress could legislate a continuation of CFF for Egypt, whether in deference to presidential determinations on the matter, under specified conditions in an annual appropriations bill, or by amending standing law such as the Arms Export Control Act. To date, there has been relatively muted public discussion of the President's proposed policy changes. According to Tamara Coffman Wittes of the Brookings Institution, "In Washington, Egypt's cash-flow financing had lost support from both parties and is not likely to be reinstated no matter who moves into the White House in 2017." Others have blamed President Obama for ending CFF and therefore hurting overall U.S. Egyptian-relations. According to Eric Trager of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Ironically, President Obama may have thought his phone call to Cairo announcing the release of weapons would turn a new page in a rocky relationship. But by coupling that decision with the cancellation of a financing scheme that was a signal of Egypt's special relationship with Washington, Obama might have closed the book on any chance for closer U.S.-Egypt ties until a new president takes another look at this old alliance." Public response to the President's policy from the Egyptian government has also been limited. Overall, Egypt seems to be searching for new international partners in order to both diversify its military-to-military relationships and signal its displeasure with recent U.S. policy that has maintained a certain distance from the Sisi regime. The military has signed new arms agreements with Russia (S-300) and France (Rafale Fighters), while Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates continue to provide significant financial assistance to Egypt. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Egypt's reliance on U.S. platforms for its key military capabilities is likely to change in the near term. Some longtime supporters of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship may lament the possibility of diminished U.S. influence in Egypt, while others may see a U.S.-Egyptian rebalancing, and particularly the proposed elimination of CFF, as necessary and ultimately healthier for both governments.

On March 31, 2015, after a phone call between President Obama and Egyptian President Abdelfattah al Sisi, the White House announced that beginning in FY2018, the United States would stop providing cash flow financing (CFF) to Egypt. Cash flow financing is the financial mechanism that enables foreign governments to pay for U.S. defense equipment in partial installments over time rather than all at once; successive Administrations have authorized CFF for Egypt since 1979. In recent years, as public scrutiny of U.S. military aid to Egypt has increased, some observers have criticized the provision of CFF to Egypt. Critics argue that the financing of expensive conventional weapons systems is based on an assumption of future appropriations from Congress. Others argue that as the Egyptian military combats terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere, now may not be the optimal time to alter U.S. military aid to Egypt. The Administration's proposed policy change comes after its lengthy review of U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, a process that began immediately following the Egyptian military's ouster of former president Mohammed Morsi, a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. The House draft FY2016 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill specifies that the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations on any plans to restructure military assistance for Egypt. This report analyzes this proposed change in U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt; it provides background on the history of CFF and reviews various issues for Congress. For more on U.S. policy toward Egypt, please see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

Justice Stevens's position on the death penalty has transformed during his tenure on the Court. Although Stevens initially supported the imposition of the death penalty in accordance with adequately protective state enacted guidelines, over the next 35 years the Justice has voted to narrow the application of the death penalty as he has become more skeptical of the punishment's underlying rationale and the states' ability to protect the rights of capital defendants. In 2008, Justice Stevens questioned the continuing constitutionality of the death penalty in his concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees . Shortly before Justice Stevens's appointment, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia , established what amounted to a moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty. The 1972 decision invalidated the capital punishment systems of Georgia and Texas along with the systems of "no less than 39 states and the District of Columbia," holding that the inherently arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the states' application of the death penalty violated both the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment and the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the Furman case, capital punishment essentially ceased to exist anywhere in the United States. However, less than six months after Justice Stevens took his seat on the Supreme Court, and four years after Furman , Stevens cast an essential, if not deciding, vote in favor of reviving the death penalty. In the Gregg cases, the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, upheld a number of re-enacted state capital punishment schemes that had been tailored to remedying the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman . Greg g, and its companion cases issued that same day, have been characterized as representing the "resurrection" of capital punishment. At the time, Justice Stevens had confidence that the states could indeed provide adequate procedural safeguards—with guidance from a continued re-examination of capital sentencing procedures by the Court—that would successfully eliminate the constitutional concerns associated with the states' earlier use of the death penalty. In the decades following Gregg , Justice Stevens's death penalty jurisprudence was governed by his belief in "fundamental fairness" and the notion that the death penalty, as the ultimate punishment, must be treated differently from any other lesser form of punishment. The "qualitative difference" between death and any other form of punishment, wrote Justice Stevens, leads to a "corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." In case after case, Stevens has voted to narrow the application of the death penalty through limiting the class of individuals that was eligible for the punishment, or by increasing procedural protections for capital defendants. Justice Stevens, often in dissent, has voted to prohibit judges from overriding a jury's decision on the imposition of the death penalty; limit the use of emotional victim impact statements; ensure adequate legal representation for capital defendants; prohibit the use of the death penalty on the mentally retarded; prohibit the use of the death penalty on minors; alter the composition of jury pools in capital cases to include those who object on moral grounds to the imposition of the death penalty; prohibit substantially delayed executions; overturn convictions that "present an unacceptable risk that race played a decisive role in [the defendant's] sentencing"; and prohibit states from punishing the crime of rape, or rape of a child, with the death penalty. Perhaps the opinion that is most representative of Justice Stevens's attempts at narrowing the application of the death penalty, and one in which Stevens was able to draw five other justices to his position, was his majority opinion in the 2002 case Atkins v. Virginia . A landmark case, Atkins v . Virginia highlights two key aspects of Justice Stevens's death penalty jurisprudence. The opinion illustrates the Justice's reliance on state-by-state trends in assessing societal views on what qualifies as "cruel and unusual." Additionally, the opinion discusses Stevens's growing skepticism of the accepted justifications for capital punishment. In Atkin s , the Court considered the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded. The mentally retarded defendant in the case had been found guilty of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and sentenced to death by a jury under Virginia law. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens overturned the sentence on the grounds that the punishment was disproportionate to the crime and therefore in violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Stevens began by summarizing the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, noting that at its core, the amendment's prohibition on excessive punishment demands that "punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense." Known as the proportionality principle, whether a punishment is excessive in relation to the crime is judged not by the views that prevailed when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but by the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Stevens went on to cite long-standing Court precedent in concluding that the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislature." The Court, both before and after Atkins , has utilized the actions of the state legislatures as a barometer of society's acceptance of the death penalty in a given scenario. In considering how state legislatures have approached the issue of imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded, Justice Stevens identified a clear trend towards prohibiting the practice. Although a majority of states had not yet prohibited the use of capital punishment on the mentally retarded, Stevens noted "it is not so much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change." After showing the clear trend among the states towards prohibiting the practice over the previous decade, Stevens concluded that imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded had "become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it." As a Justice, Stevens typically placed greater weight on current trends, rather than simply deferring to the position adopted by a majority of state legislatures. Stevens's opinion also determined that the social purposes served by the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—were not adequate to justify the execution of a mentally retarded criminal. Retribution, argued Stevens, is directly associated with culpability. As the "severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the defendant," the Court has reserved the imposition of the death penalty for only the most serious crimes and the most culpable defendants. Stevens concluded that the lesser degree of culpability, due to cognitive and behavioral impairments associated with the mentally retarded defendant, "surely does not merit that form of retribution." As to deterrence, Stevens noted that the diminished ability of the mentally retarded to "engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses," defeated the purpose of creating a deterrent as it was less likely that mentally retarded individuals could "process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information." Stevens then concisely summarized his "narrowing" view of the death penalty, developed over more than 30 years of experience on the Court, in concluding: "[T]hus pursuant to our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate." In 2008, Justice Stevens abandoned his three-decade endeavor of attaining a narrowed, fair, and non-discriminatory capital punishment system. Rather, Stevens's position on the death penalty came full circle in Baze v. Rees as he cited back to the Court's decision in Furman in asserting that capital punishment was "patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment." In Baze , the Court heard an Eighth Amendment challenge to Kentucky's multi-drug lethal injection procedure. Although a majority of the Court voted to uphold Kentucky's method of execution, including Justice Stevens, it was Stevens's concurring opinion that drew the most attention. Picking up where he left off in Atkins , Stevens questioned the accepted rationales underlying the death penalty. His opinion openly attacked the legitimacy of the deterrence and retribution rationales, arguing that the value of both had dwindled and must now be "called into question." With respect to deterrence, Stevens noted that "despite 30 years of empirical research in the area, there remains no reliable statistical evidence that capital punishment in fact deters potential offenders." As to retribution, he pointed out that the relatively painless methods of execution required under the Eighth Amendment "actually undermine the very premise on which public approval of the retribution rationale is based"—that the offender suffer a punishment comparable to the suffering experienced by his victim. In confronting the Court's decisions, and his vote in the Greg g cases, Justice Stevens admitted that the Court "relied heavily on our belief that adequate procedures were in place that would avoid the danger of discriminatory application identified … in Furman ." Stevens then pointed to three key failures of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence. First, juries in capital cases do not represent a fair cross section of the community; rather, eliminating jurors who oppose the death penalty on moral grounds "is really a procedure that has the purpose and effect of obtaining a jury that is biased in favor of conviction." Second, the emotional impact of capital offenses and the often disturbing facts associated with those crimes leads to a greater risk of error in capital cases because "the interest in making sure the crime does not go unpunished may overcome residual doubt concerning the identity of the offender." Third, Justice Stevens highlighted the continued risk of a discriminatory application of the death penalty, noting that the Court has continued to allow race to play an "unacceptable role" in capital cases. Given what he considered the now unpersuasive rationales for the death penalty, and the inability of the Court and the states to cooperatively establish adequate procedural protections in capital cases, Justice Stevens, relying on his "own experience" and "extensive exposure" to death penalty cases, quoted the Court's decision in Furman in unequivocally concluding that the death penalty represents "the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the state [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment." Notwithstanding his clear position that the death penalty itself was unconstitutional, Stevens voted to uphold the Kentucky lethal injection statute. Citing a "respect [for] precedents that remain a part of our law," Stevens deferred to the Court's long-standing framework for evaluating the death penalty in light of the Eighth Amendment, and joined the Court in concluding that, under the existing framework, the evidence failed to show that the Kentucky statute was unconstitutional. From casting a vote that resurrected the use of the death penalty to becoming the only Justice thus far on the Roberts Court to formally question the death penalty's per se constitutionality, Justice Stevens's position on capital punishment has undergone significant changes during his tenure on the Court. However, his jurisprudence has been consistently guided by his belief in "fundamental fairness" and his recognition that, due to its special risks and irrevocable nature, "death is different." Although Stevens initially had hopes that the Court, working in cooperation with the states, could correct the imperfections of capital punishment, after more than 30 years of experience with death penalty cases, and a declining acceptance of the proffered justifications for the death penalty, Justice Stevens ultimately has questioned whether sentencing a defendant to death can ever be consistent with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual" punishment. With his retirement imminent, the Court faces the loss of its most vocal death penalty opponent.

Justice Stevens's position on the death penalty has undergone a thorough transformation during his tenure on the Court. Although Stevens initially supported the imposition of the death penalty in accordance with adequately protective state enacted guidelines, over the next 35 years the Justice has voted to narrow the application of the death penalty as he has become more skeptical of the punishment's underlying rationale and the states' ability to protect the rights of capital defendants. In 2008, Justice Stevens's death penalty jurisprudence may have culminated with his concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees, in which the Justice unequivocally expressed his ultimate conclusion that the death penalty is itself unconstitutional.

Periodically (approximately every five years) the Chinese Communist Party holds a Congress, attended by some 2,000 senior Party members, to authorize important policy and leadership decisions within the Party for the coming five years. In addition to authorizing substantive policies, the Party at its Congress selects a new Central Committee, comprised of the most important figures in the Party, government, and military. The Central Committee in turn technically selects a new Politburo and a new Politburo Standing Committee, comprised of China's most powerful and important leaders. The appearance generally is given that these choices are being made at the Party Congress itself. But the decisions almost always are made ahead of time by a select group of senior leaders, then ratified at the Congress in a public demonstration of political unity that belies months of political infighting, negotiation, and compromise. The October 2007 session was the 17 th of these Party Congresses held since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the first full Congress held under the leadership of Party Secretary Hu Jintao, who ascended to that post at the 16 th Party Congress in 2002. The 17 th Party Congress brought no surprises in terms of substantive policy decisions. In keeping with established practice, Party General Secretary (hereafter Secretary) Hu Jintao opened the Congress by presenting a lengthy political report extolling the Party's accomplishments over the past five years and noting problems the Party still has to address. The report, the product of months of work among senior leaders, includes issues on which the Party has been able to agree. The catch-phrases in the report continued to be to "build a well-off society (xiao kang she hui) in an all-round way" and to adhere to the "scientific development concept"—both core ideas developed by Secretary Hu. The "scientific development concept" has been described as a new concept of development, one that moves away from China's previous 'development at all costs' approach and toward economic and social progress that is "people-oriented, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable." According to the political report that Secretary Hu delivered at the opening of the Congress, components of scientific development include emphasizing issues that would improve "people's livelihood," including: employment, health, national education, renewable energy resources, and environmental quality. As indicated by early rumors and news reports, the Congress voted at its closing session on October 21, 2007 to enshrine the "scientific development" doctrine in an amendment to the Party Constitution. This elevates this doctrine of Party General Secretary Hu to a similar level of importance in the Party's thinking as those of his predecessors. Hu's report also addressed the issue of Taiwan, reiterating China's goal to "never waver in the one-China principle [and] never abandon our efforts to achieve peaceful reunification." But Hu also appeared to make a peace overture, calling for consultations, ending hostilities, and "reaching a peace agreement" on the basis of the "one-China" principle. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian denounced the overture, saying that basing such a treaty on the "one-China" principle would make it "a treaty of surrender." The primary policy emphasis of the Congress, as anticipated, was on continued economic development in China, continued market reform and continued integration of China into the global system. According to Secretary Hu's political report, the Party also endorsed the goal of moving away from a purely investment and export-driven economic growth model to one that includes expansion of domestic consumption. Other economic goals included: developing and improving modern service sectors; promoting rural development, including protecting arable land, strengthening rural infrastructure, enhancing food security, preventing animal and plant diseases, and narrowing gaps in urban-rural development; promoting private companies and individual entrepreneurship by removing institutional barriers and promoting equitable market access; improving fiscal, tax, and financial restructuring in order to improve access to basic public services; and improving the implementation of intellectual property rights strategies. For much of the year leading up to the 17 th Party Congress, U.S. China-watchers followed a remarkably public PRC debate on political reform that hinted at ongoing internal Party dissension between conservatives and reformers. This debate was carried out in a number of articles by notable PRC academicians and scholars, appearing in respected PRC journals, citing deficiencies in the Party's ability to govern and calling for greater democratization and political reform. Secretary Hu's report at the Congress made several references to these deficiencies, suggesting that problems of governance continue to preoccupy central leaders: "The Party's ability to govern has not been fully competent to deal with the new situation and tasks ..." and "... the democratic legal building is still unable to completely adapt to the requirements of expanding people's democracy and of economic and social development.... " Despite these calls for greater political pluralism, the Party at its 17 th Party Congress endorsed no major political reforms and further made clear that its monopoly on power would continue. But in a clear sign that the Party is feeling increasing pressure from public sentiment—what Hu in his report acknowledged as the "growing enthusiasm of the people for participation in political affairs"—Hu's report called for modest, controversial, and potentially far-reaching democratization reforms, but only within the Party itself. These included: allowing greater public participation in nominating Party leaders at grassroots levels, allowing ordinary Party members to participate in direct elections for lower level leaders, and expanding the role of Party Congress delegates beyond choosing Central Committee members. At the leadership and institutional levels, the story is somewhat more complex, with attending implications likely to be unfolding for some months to come and a number of trends potentially significant. According to one analyst, the make-up of Party leadership that emerged from the Congress has some unique collective characteristics. These include: a significant number (32% of the Central Committee) from the so-called "lost generation" of the Cultural Revolution, when the country's educational system ceased to function and Chinese teenagers were dispatched to the countryside to spend years working alongside peasants; a decline in those with technocratic and engineering educational backgrounds and an increase in those educated in the social sciences; a higher number of foreign-educated members; a greater percentage (76% of the Politburo) of members with provincial leadership credentials; and a higher number of entrepreneurs and corporate CEOs. These characteristics suggest a senior leadership that may be more familiar with the problems that the disenfranchised in China's interior provinces face; more personal experience in the social and economic disruptions that can come from an excess of ideological political zeal and loss of central government control; and a greater feel for the global business environment. In addition, rather than the standard practice of designating an "heir apparent" to succeed Secretary Hu Jintao, the 17 th Party Congress appeared to field two potential candidates for this post. Such a move could serve to institutionalize a certain amount of democratic choice in China's leadership succession arrangements. But the prospect of two rival candidates competing with one another for the next five years also could raise new uncertainties in the succession process. The Politburo sits at the top of the Chinese Communist Party's political structure. The 17 th Party Congress announced the selection of a 25-member Politburo (including nine new members—ten if counting as "new" the promotion of a previous alternate to a full member). This is an expansion from its predecessor's membership of 24 members (which included 17 new members) plus 1 alternate. Officially, the Politburo in Beijing is the PRC's chief decision-making body. In the past, its relatively unwieldy size and its lack of a known formalized meeting schedule have suggested that the full Politburo has been involved only when the stakes are high—as when considering major policy shifts, dealing with matters of immediate urgency, or when a higher level of legitimization of a particular policy direction is necessary. But some now maintain that the Politburo emerging from the 17 th Party Congress may end up being more involved in routine decision-making than previous Politburos. Broader Politburo participation, according to this view, is more likely under the increasingly collective leadership that China has been moving toward in the years since Chairman Mao Zedong as "paramount leader" effectively wielded vast decision-making power. With only one female member—the newly appointed Liu Yandong—the new Politburo continues the PRC tradition of male-dominated decision-making bodies. Four well-known Politburo members, all born before 1940, stepped down from those positions at the 17 th Party Congress. They included Wu Yi, a frequent contact for U.S. government officials and named by Forbes in 2007 as the world's second most powerful woman; and three members of the Politburo Standing Committee: Zeng Qinghong, China's current Vice-President; Wu Guanzheng, primarily responsible for China's anti-corruption work; and Luo Gan, the only protégé of former Premier Li Peng named to the previous, 16 th Party Congress Politburo. The retirements of these four suggest the seriousness of the PRC leadership about mandatory retirement for Politburo members at the age of 68. The establishment of unofficial retirement age requirements for Party cadres at senior levels of leadership and the imposition of "term limits" for top-level positions in the Party and government have been part of the incremental political reforms PRC leaders have made since 1978. The 17 th Congress demonstrated the Party's continued willingness to adhere to these agreed-upon requirements. In the absence of statutory discipline or electoral fiat, then, the Party appears to be counting on precedent to try to institutionalize leadership succession issues and avert potentially divisive power struggles. Of more significance is the new membership of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the smaller group of elite Party members that wields much of the political power in China. The new 17 th Congress PSC has nine members, including five returning members and four new members. Of the latter, two—Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang—have been tipped as frontrunners to be Hu Jintao's successor as Party Secretary at the 18 th Party Congress in 2012. The two are the only PSC members to have been born in the 1950s, making them the first of the "fifth generation" of China's potential leadership to rise to this level. If accepted retirement practices hold true, only these two will be young enough to remain in the Politburo after the 18 th Party Congress; all others will have to retire. One expert holds that Xi and Li each sit at the pinnacle of what effectively is an equal PSC split between two distinct leadership camps: the "populist" group, represented by Li Keqiang, a protegee of Hu Jintao; and the "elitist" group, represented by Xi Jinping, one of the so-called "princelings"—meaning a child of one of the early senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party and thus someone with elite personal connections. According to this analyst, the "populist" group favors balanced economic development, focus on improving the lots of the poor and disenfranchised, and an emphasis on the principles of "harmonious society"; the "elitist" group favors continued rapid and efficient economic development, less emphasis on social issues, and an emphasis on nurturing the entrepreneurial and middle-class populations. According to news accounts, Li Keqiang is a close protégé of Hu Jintao and is his presumed preferred choice. But Xi Jinping, who has slightly higher ranking than Li on the PSC and is also the new head of the Secretariat (the "front office" of the Politburo) has emerged from the Congress in a slightly better position. Both Xi and Li have doctoral degrees (in law and in economics, respectively), and thus bring a different background and set of experiences to the PRC leadership than the "revolutionary" generation of Mao Zedong or the "technocratic" generations of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. The 17 th Congress also announced the selection of a new, eleven-member Central Military Commission (CMC), the most senior military decision-making body in China. As expected, Secretary Hu Jintao, as head of the Party, remained the head of the CMC. Like its predecessor in the 16 th Party Congress, the new CMC includes no other Politburo Standing Committee members other than Secretary Hu, with only three (including Hu) on the Politburo. Unlike its predecessor, the new CMC includes no one on the Secretariat, the PSC "front office." More suggestive, while Secretary Hu spent years on the CMC (and on the PSC Secretariat) while he was the "successor-in-waiting" for the top Party position, neither of the two "heirs apparent"—Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang—was named to the new CMC, leaving them without significant military contacts or experience during their ostensible apprenticeship. One analyst has interpreted this to be an attempt to make China's military more apolitical. But the absence of stronger connections between the military and the younger generation on the Politburo also raises questions about the strength of the formal lines of communication between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the rest of the Party and government during the coming five-year period.

The Chinese Communist Party's 17th Congress, held from October 15 to 21, 2007, demonstrated the Party's efforts to try to adapt and redefine itself in the face of emerging economic and social challenges while still trying to maintain its authoritarian one-Party rule. The Congress validated and re-emphasized the priority on continued economic development; expanded that concept to include more balanced and sustainable development; announced that the Party would seek to broaden political participation by expanding intra-Party democracy; and selected two potential rival candidates, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, with differing philosophies (rather than one designated successor-in-waiting) as possibilities to succeed to the top Party position in five years. More will be known about the Party's future prospects and the relative influence of its two potential successors once the National People's Congress meets in early 2008 to select key government ministers. This report will not be updated.

T he Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, better known as Social Security, is administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Survivors Insurance component of OASDI covers insured workers in case of death. When a worker insured by Social Security dies, his or her family may qualify for survivors benefits. At the end of 2017, there were approximately 6 million survivor beneficiaries, representing 9.7% of the total OASDI beneficiary population. Average monthly survivors benefits in December 2017 were $1,151.71. That month, 80.9% of survivor beneficiaries were female (including female children) and 31.8% of survivor beneficiaries were children. Additional data on survivor benefits are provided in Table 1 at the conclusion of this report. The Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271), which created the Social Security program, did not include any provisions for monthly survivors benefits, but did include a lump-sum payment upon the death of a fully insured person over the age of 65. Monthly survivors benefits were established in the Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379), including those for widows, parents, and children. This was offset by a reduction in the size of the lump-sum death payment, although coverage expanded to both fully or currently insured workers (defined in the " Lump-Sum Death Benefits " section), regardless of age. These changes were made to "afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit" than could be afforded by a single lump-sum payment that did not take into account family size or number of survivors. Coverage for survivors benefits is based on the insurance status of the deceased worker. To become insured for survivors benefits, a worker must have a sufficient work history in covered employment (employment subject to Social Security payroll taxes). A worker can earn up to four Social Security credits each year, based on his or her earnings in a covered job. The number of credits a worker needs to qualify for Survivors Insurance depends on how old the worker is when he or she dies. A worker is fully insured for benefits if he or she has earned at least one credit for each year between age 21 and turning 62, dying, or becoming disabled; a worker is permanently insured if he or she has at least 40 credits (at least 10 years of work). In 2017, 87% of Americans over the age of 20 were fully insured. Spouses, former spouses, children, and parents of fully insured workers are eligible for survivors benefits as long as they meet the other requirements for those benefits. A deceased worker's children and the (former) spouse caring for those children could be eligible for survivors benefits even if the deceased worker was not fully insured―survivors benefits are available to these dependents if the deceased worker was currently insured at the time of death. The deceased worker is currently insured if he or she earned at least six credits during the three years prior to death. Survivors benefits are determined using the same basic formula used to calculate Social Security retirement and disability benefits. Benefits are based on the average lifetime covered earnings of the worker who died, so survivors of higher earners tend to receive higher benefits than survivors of lower earners. However, the benefit formula is progressive, so survivors benefits replace a higher proportion of lower earners' wages than of higher earners' wages. When a person applies for survivors benefits, the deceased worker's basic benefit amount, called the primary insurance amount (PIA), is determined. Each qualifying survivor will receive a percentage of the worker's PIA, depending on the survivor's age and relationship to the deceased worker. Survivors benefits may be subject to reductions based on earnings and family size. If a survivor qualifies for benefits based on both his or her own work record and a spouse's record, the survivor receives the higher amount of the two. Survivors benefits, like all Social Security benefits, are subject to an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). In most cases, survivors benefits are payable to eligible family members beginning with the deceased beneficiary's month of death, regardless of when the death occurred during the month. Table 1 , at the conclusion of this report, provides data on the various types of survivors benefits. Surviving spouses of fully insured workers must meet an age requirement to be eligible for widow's or widower's benefits. Divorced surviving spouses may also be eligible if they were married to the deceased worker for at least 10 years. Surviving spouses receive 100% of the deceased worker's PIA if they begin to collect survivor benefits at their full retirement age. Widow(er)s may receive reduced widow(er)'s benefits if the benefit is claimed early. The earlier the benefit is claimed, the larger the reduction is. Reduced benefits range from 71.5% of the worker's PIA, if the widow(er) claims at the age of 60, to 100% of the worker's PIA, if the widow(er) claims at full retirement age. If the surviving spouse is receiving Social Security disability benefits, they may begin to receive reduced widow(er)'s benefits as early as 50 years old. Disabled widow(er)s receive 71.5% of the worker's PIA. Widow(er)'s benefits are not paid to spouses or former spouses who remarry before the age of 60 (or aged 50 if disabled). A worker's claiming age affects the widow(er) benefit. If a worker is receiving reduced benefits due to claiming benefits before full retirement age, the widow(er) benefit cannot exceed the worker's reduced benefit amount. For workers entitled (or who would have been entitled) to an increase (or subject to being increased) in their benefit amount due to claiming benefits after full retirement age, their benefits are increased at death to take into account the delayed retirement credits from claiming benefits after full retirement age, thereby increasing the widow(er) benefit. If they are not eligible for widow(er)'s benefits, unmarried surviving spouses of fully or currently insured workers may be entitled to mother's or father's benefits. To qualify, the spouse must care for a child of the deceased worker who is either under the age of 16 or disabled. Divorced spouses may also qualify, regardless of the length of the marriage. Mother's and father's benefits are 75% of the worker's PIA, and may be collected regardless of the age of the mother or father. Surviving children of fully or currently insured workers may be entitled to child's benefits. Child's benefits are paid to unmarried surviving children who are under the age of 18, or under 19 if still in high school. They are also paid to the disabled children of insured workers, regardless of age, as long as the disability occurred before the age of 22. Biological and adoptive children are eligible for survivors benefits, as are children born out of wedlock. Dependent grandchildren and step-children may also qualify for these benefits. Child's benefits are 75% of the worker's PIA. The surviving parents of fully insured workers are eligible for parent's benefits if they are over the age of 62 and were receiving at least half of their support from the deceased worker. Parent's benefits are 82.5% of the worker's PIA if one parent is entitled to benefits and 75% of the worker's PIA (for each parent) if two parents are entitled to benefits. The total survivors benefits paid to an insured worker's family are capped regardless of the number of family members who qualify for benefits. The maximum family benefit is 150% to 188% of the worker's PIA, depending on the amount of the PIA. If the total survivors benefits payable to a worker's family exceed this maximum, each person's benefit will be reduced proportionately. Divorced widow(er) benefits do not count toward the maximum. Survivors benefits may also be reduced for beneficiaries who are working and younger than full retirement age. Survivor beneficiaries younger than full retirement age are subject to a retirement earnings test , wherein their benefits are reduced if their earnings exceed certain limits. The benefits of other family members would not be affected by this reduction. Working in employment not covered by Social Security can also lead to lower benefits. The government pension offset (GPO) affects the benefits of beneficiaries who have worked in non-covered employment. If the survivor receives a government pension based on non-covered work, the GPO will reduce the survivors benefits by two-thirds of the survivor's monthly pension amount. In addition to monthly survivors benefits, a deceased worker's family may be eligible to receive a one-time death benefit of $255. Only one lump-sum death benefit is payable to the family of an insured worker. The lump-sum death benefit is paid to the insured worker's surviving spouse, regardless of age, as long as the spouse meets certain requirements. If no eligible widow or widower exists, the death benefit is paid in equal shares to any children who qualify for child's benefits based on the deceased worker's record. If a worker leaves no eligible spouse or child, the lump-sum death payment will not be paid.

Social Security is formally known as the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. This report focuses on the Survivors Insurance component of Social Security. When workers die, their spouses, former spouses, and dependents may qualify for Social Security survivors benefits. This report describes how a worker becomes covered by Survivors Insurance and outlines the types and amounts of benefits available to survivors and eligibility for those benefits. This report also provides current data on survivor beneficiaries and benefits.

Claims of asbestos-related injury have flooded the courts since the 1970s, but litigation has proven to be an inadequate means to resolving all the claims. The Supreme Court has twice struck down attempted global asbestos settlements, in both instances inviting Congress to craft a legislative solution. In an attempt to resolve this problem, Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 852 , the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution (FAIR) Act. The bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 16 ( S.Rept. 109-97 ). The bill would establish within the Department of Labor the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation, which would award damages to claimants on a no-fault basis according to their respective levels of injury and asbestos exposure. The Office would be headed by an Administrator, who would be appointed by the President—with the advice and consent of the Senate—to a five-year term and report directly to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Employment Standards Administration. The Office would pay awards from the privately funded Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund ("the Fund"), discussed in greater detail below. New asbestos claims—and most pending ones—could no longer be pursued in federal or state court. Upon enactment of S. 852 , all pending asbestos claims (other than some individual actions at the evidentiary stage and actions with final verdicts, judgments, or orders) would be stayed. If, after nine months, the administrative process outlined in the bill is not up and running so that it can review and pay "exigent health claims"—i.e., claims by those suffering from mesothelioma or having a life expectancy of less than one year, or claims by relatives of those who died from asbestos-related conditions after enactment of the bill—at a reasonable rate, then those claims could be maintained in the same courts in which the claims were pending when the act was enacted. The comparable time period for all other asbestos claims (with the exception of the least serious claims) would be two years. Any individual who suffers from an asbestos-related disease or condition meeting the medical criteria listed in the bill (or, in the case of death or incompetence, that person's personal representative) could bring a claim under the administrative process outlined in the bill. An initial claim would have to be filed no later than five years after the claimant receives a medical diagnosis and medical test results that would make the claimant eligible for one of the bill's disease levels. For claimants who have asbestos claims pending in court, the statute of limitations would be five years from enactment of the bill. The Administrator would establish a claimant assistance program to, among other things, provide to claimants information and legal assistance. Attorneys representing claimants under the draft bill could charge their clients no more than five percent of the final award. The Administrator would be required to submit annual reports to Congress on the claims process and recommend changes if awards exceed or fall below predicted levels. Awards . In order to receive compensation, a claimant would have to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant suffers from an eligible disease or condition. In addition, claimants would be required to demonstrate a minimum exposure to asbestos. Claimants would be compensated according to the tiered compensation scheme outlined in the bill. This scheme would set medical criteria and awards for nine levels of asbestos-related injury, with awards ranging from medical monitoring for claimants in Level I (asbestos-related non-malignant disease and five years occupational exposure to asbestos) to $1.1 million for claimants in Level IX (mesothelioma). The bill would also allow claimants suffering from asbestos-related injuries that cannot fit into one of the nine levels to seek compensation for their "exceptional medical claims." One of the more controversial aspects of the effort to reach a legislative solution to the asbestos problem has been the question of smoking. Levels VII and VIII of the tiered compensation scheme both deal with lung cancer, and some have expressed concern that smoking may have contributed to many of these claimants' conditions. As a result, the awards in Levels VII and VIII are pegged to each claimant's smoking history, in that non-smokers would get higher awards than ex-smokers, who would get higher awards than smokers. The Administrator would be required to provide to the claimant a proposed decision within ninety days of the filing of the claim. If unsatisfied with the proposed decision, the claimant would be entitled to seek review by a "representative of the Administrator," so long as the request is made within ninety days of the issuance of the proposed decision. After a review, or if no review is requested within ninety days, the Administrator would issue a final decision. A claimant would then have ninety days to seek judicial review of the final decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the claimant resides. Under the bill, a claimant would receive his or her award in structured payments over a three-to-four year period. The amount of the award would have to be reduced by the amount of collateral source compensation and most prior awards made pursuant to the administrative scheme. "Collateral source compensation," however would include only compensation paid by defendants, insurers of defendants, and compensation trusts pursuant to judgments and settlements; it apparently would not include payments from disability insurance, health insurance, medicare/medicaid, etc. Another sticking point in the debate over previous asbestos bills has been the effect any legislative resolution would have on so-called "mixed dust" (i.e., silica and asbestos) claims. Some have expressed concern that, if these claims are not included in the legislation (and therefore removed from the courts), asbestos claimants could avoid the administrative process by re-filing their claims in court as mixed dust claims. S. 852 would remove silica claims from the courts to the bill's administrative process unless those bringing such claims establish by a preponderance of the evidence that exposure to silica caused their impairments and that asbestos did not significantly contribute to their impairments, and submit specific supporting evidence (e.g., x-rays, history of asbestos exposure, etc.). The Fund would be paid for by contributions from defendants in asbestos suits – "defendant participants" – and their insurers – "insurer participants." Defendant participants would be required to contribute, in the aggregate, no more than $90 billion, while insurer participants would be required to contribute no more than $46.025 billion. The Administrator would be authorized to borrow to enhance the Fund's liquidity, to sue any participant for failure to pay any obligation imposed under the bill, and to monitor and take action against participant companies that attempt to transfer their assets through business transactions. Under the bill, if the Administrator determines that the Fund does not have sufficient resources, then the Fund would sunset and claimants with unresolved claims could return to federal or state court. From the date of termination onward, any asbestos or class action trust established to distribute funds pursuant to a final judgment or settlement would be required to adopt the bill's medical criteria. Defendant Participants. Defendant participants would be grouped into tiers and subtiers according to prior asbestos expenditures, except that one tier would be reserved for organizations that have filed for bankruptcy in the year preceding enactment of the bill. These tiers and subtiers would determine the exact amount of each defendant participant's required annual contribution to the Fund, ranging from $27.5 million down to $100,000. A defendant participant would be able to petition the Administrator for adjustments of its obligations in cases of severe financial hardship or "demonstrated inequity," or when the defendant participant can demonstrate that meeting its obligations under the bill would render the company insolvent. In addition, persons or businesses classified as "small business concerns" under section 3 of the Small Business Act would be exempt from these payment obligations. The aggregate annual payments to the Fund by defendant participants would have to be no less than $3 billion for the first thirty years of the Fund. The bill would provide for ten-percent reductions in this minimum amount following the tenth, fifteenth, twentieth, and twenty-fifth years after enactment, unless the Administrator finds that a reduction could endanger the Fund's ability to satisfy future obligations. Further, beginning ten years after enactment, the Administrator would be empowered to suspend all or part of the defendant participants' payments in a given year in which the Fund contains sufficient assets to satisfy that year's obligations. Insurer Participants . S. 852 would establish the Asbestos Insurers Commission—composed of five members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate—charged with instituting a methodology for determining the amount to be contributed to the Fund by each insurer participant. Insurer participants would be able to appeal such determinations to the D.C. Circuit. The aggregate annual payments to the Fund by insurer participants would be $2.7 billion for the first two years, $5.075 billion for years three through five, $1.147 billion for years six through twenty-seven, and $166 million for year twenty-eight. Beginning ten years after enactment, the Administrator would be empowered to suspend all or part of the insurer participants' payments in a given year in which the Fund contains sufficient assets to satisfy that year's obligations. The bill would require the Administrator to promulgate regulations prohibiting the manufacture, processing, or distribution in commerce of products containing asbestos. The Administrator would be empowered to grant exemptions where doing so would not unreasonably risk injury to the public health or the environment and those seeking the exemptions have made good faith, unsuccessful efforts to find minerals to substitute for asbestos in their products. The bill would specifically exempt from the prohibition: (1) asbestos-containing products necessary to the "critical functions" of the Defense Department or NASA; (2) asbestos diaphragms used in the manufacture of chlor-alkali and its derivatives; and (3) roofing cements, coatings, and mastics containing asbestos that is totally encapsulated by asphalt. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, would be required to review and possibly revoke this last exemption within eighteen months of enactment of the bill. Under S. 852 , the EPA Administrator would be required to study the exposure risks associated with naturally occurring asbestos, and to develop management guidelines, model state regulations, testing protocols, etc., for naturally occurring asbestos.

This report provides an overview of S. 852, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution (FAIR) Act of 2005. The bill would largely remove asbestos claims from the courts in favor of the no-fault administrative process set out in the bill. The bill would establish the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation to award damages to asbestos claimants from the Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund. Companies that have previously been sued for asbestos-related injuries—and insurers of such companies—would be required to make contributions totaling roughly $140 billion to this Fund.

The Higher Education Amendments (HEA) of 1998 ( P.L. 105-244 ) added a provision, Section 484(r), to the Higher Education Act of 1965 to suspend eligibility for federal student aid (grants, loans or work assistance under Title IV of the HEA) to students who were convicted for the sale or possession of a controlled substance. Although the provision was not scheduled to go into effect until two years after the reauthorization, debate regarding the implementation of the provision immediately ensued. Many policymakers questioned the appropriateness of denying financial assistance to individuals who had already been convicted of a crime and paid their debt to society. Other policymakers questioned the Department of Education's (ED) interpretation of the bill's language and their subsequent implementation of the policy. The debate has continued since the last reauthorization of the HEA. Campus crimes, including the sale and use of illegal drugs, were among the topics discussed during the debates over the 1998 HEA amendments. During the discussion, studies were introduced that illustrated that, although campus crime rates in general were decreasing, the number of drug-related incidents on campuses was increasing. In various reauthorization hearings and in committee reports, Congress expressed concern about the increasing number of drug and alcohol-related incidents occurring on college campuses. During the reauthorization discussions, Representative Souder stated that the country was facing an epidemic of drug abuse, and proposed the provision on student eligibility as an "important first step" in dealing with this epidemic. Congress ultimately added the provision to eliminate student eligibility for financial assistance for those who were convicted of drug-related crimes, as a part of P.L. 105-244 . The legislation specifies that any student who is convicted of a state or federal offense for the sale or possession of a controlled substance shall not be eligible to receive any federal student assistance under Title IV of the HEA. The period of ineligibility depends upon whether the conviction was for the sale or possession of a controlled substance, the recency of the conviction, and the number of prior convictions. A student becomes indefinitely ineligible if he/she has more than two convictions for possession or more than one conviction for selling a controlled substance. Once a student is deemed indefinitely ineligible, the student must successfully complete an approved drug rehabilitation program (to be further discussed later), or the conviction must be removed from the student's record, in order for the student's eligibility to be reinstated. The period of ineligibility begins on the date of such charge and ends after the interval noted in the following: Possession of a controlled substance —ineligibility period for the first, second, and third offense is First offense: one year from the date of the conviction; Second offense: two years from the date of the conviction; Third offense: indefinite. Sale of a controlled substance —ineligibility period for the first and second offense is First offense: two years from the date of the conviction; Second offense: indefinite. According to the 2006-2007 Federal Student Aid Handbook (Volume 1, Student Eligibility), any convictions that occurred prior to the student turning 18, unless the student was tried as an adult, or any convictions that were overturned, reversed, or otherwise removed from the student's record are not used in determining eligibility. A student who is indefinitely ineligible for federal financial assistance must complete a drug rehabilitation program in order to reacquire eligibility. According to the program regulations (34 C.F.R. § 668.40), an eligible rehabilitation program is one that meets the following requirements: Has received or is qualified to receive funds directly or indirectly under a federal, state or local government program; Is administered or recognized by a federal, state or local government agency or court; Has received or is qualified to receive payment directly or indirectly from a federally or state licensed insurance company; or Is administered or recognized by a federally or state licensed hospital, health clinic or medical doctor. In addition, the rehabilitation program must include at least two unannounced drug tests. Participation in a rehabilitation program reduces ineligibility to the preceding applicable period. For example, if a student has been convicted three times for possession of a controlled substance, participation in a rehabilitation program reduces the ineligibility period to the equivalent of two convictions (e.g., two years from the date of the most recent remaining conviction). A person can participate in a rehabilitation program for any of the convictions, not just those resulting in indefinite ineligibility. In addition, future convictions will make the student ineligible again. Upon completion of the rehabilitation program the student self-certifies that he/she has in fact completed the course. It is estimated that more than 180,000 students have been denied federal financial aid or had the receipt of federal aid delayed since the adoption of this provision. According to data released by the organization Students for Sensible Drug Policy, this has represented fewer than .25% of all federal financial aid applicants since the provision was enacted. However, at least two states, California and Texas, have had a large number of students who have been declared ineligible as a result of this provision (see Table 1 ). Largely in response to the confusion and contention surrounding the provision, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) ( P.L. 109-171 ) was enacted to change the manner in which the provision was being implemented. The amended provision specifies that only those convictions for the sale or possession of a controlled substance that occur while the student is enrolled in postsecondary education and receiving Title IV student aid would disqualify a student from receiving federal student aid. The DRA did not change the provisions pertaining to the period of ineligibility due to a conviction for the sale or possession of a controlled substance. It remains that the period of ineligibility depends upon whether the conviction was for the sale or possession of a controlled substance, the recency of the conviction, and the number of prior convictions. Title IV of the HEA may be considered in the upcoming reauthorization. There are several legislative proposals to modify the existing drug conviction provision. Since its initial enactment, issues have continued to arise, including how the provision should be implemented, what types of penalties, if any, should be imposed, who should be penalized, and whether there are other crimes that are more deserving of disqualifying a student from receiving financial aid. The following section presents a brief analysis of selected issues that may be considered during the reauthorization discussions. In the discussions surrounding the addition of this provision to the student eligibility requirements during the 1998 reauthorization, the increased incidence of drug usage on college campuses was continually referenced. Many policymakers expressed concern about the growing number of drug-related crimes that were reported each year by institutions across the country. Largely in response to this increasing problem, Congress included this provision for eligibility. However, critics assert that drugs are unfairly being singled out. Representative Frank is reported to contend that singling out drugs as the only crime for which a student can lose financial aid eligibility treats drug convictions more harshly than rape, arson or armed robbery. Supporters maintain that robbery, rape and arson are less likely to occur on a college campus than drug-related crimes, thus justifying the focus on drug-related crimes. The implications of limiting the loss of financial aid eligibility to students convicted of drug-related crimes might be considered during reauthorization. If it was the intent of Congress to deter certain illegal behaviors occurring on college campuses when this provision was included, crimes such as alcohol abuse on college campuses may arise as an issue. As noted above, the existing provision does not distinguish between a misdemeanor or felony drug-related conviction. At present all convictions, whether or not the conviction warranted jail or prison time and regardless of the amount of time served, result in a loss of eligibility. The separate ineligibility periods and the allowable number of convictions for selling versus possession of a controlled substance acknowledges a difference between those who use and those who sell. Similarly, Congress may debate the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor drug conviction in relation to suspending eligibility for student aid.

The Higher Education Amendments (HEA) of 1998 added a provision to the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, to suspend eligibility for federal student assistance (grants, loans, or work assistance under Title IV of the HEA) for any student who is convicted of a state or federal offense for the sale or possession of a controlled substance. This provision was amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) to apply only to students who were convicted for the sale or possession of a controlled substance that occurred while the student was enrolled in postsecondary education and receiving Title IV student aid. DRA did not change the criteria pertaining to the period of ineligibility due to a conviction for the sale or possession of a controlled substance. It remains that the period of ineligibility is determined by the recency of the conviction, the number of prior convictions, and whether the conviction was for selling or possessing a controlled substance. A student is considered indefinitely ineligible after the third conviction for possession and after the second conviction for selling a controlled substance. Participation in an eligible rehabilitation program enables a student to reestablish eligibility. This report includes a description of the drug conviction provision and a brief discussion of selected reauthorization issues. This report will be updated as warranted by major legislative or other relevant developments.

Futures contracts—like other financial derivatives such as options or swaps—gain or lose value as the price of some underlying commodity rises or falls. They allow traders to invest in corn, gold, or T-bills without actually owning the underlying commodities themselves. Futures can be used to avoid, or "hedge," price risk. That is, farmers, utilities, airlines, banks, and many other businesses can use derivatives to protect themselves against unfavorable changes in commodity prices, interest rates, or other variables. Most futures trading, however, is done by speculators who profit if their forecasts of price trends are correct. (The futures exchanges are associations of professional speculators.) There are two benefits to speculation: liquidity and price discovery. Speculators provide liquidity because they are willing to assume the risks that hedgers wish to avoid. Speculation provides an efficient price discovery mechanism because futures prices adjust immediately to new information and serve as the basis for many physical (or spot market) transactions in energy, agricultural, and other markets. The public interest in regulating derivatives markets flows from these two functions: price discovery and risk transfer. Because futures prices are used as reference points for many physical transactions, manipulation in the futures markets can affect the prices actually paid by consumers or received by farmers and other producers. Similarly, the ability to hedge risks allows the economy to function more efficiently. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan frequently described the general benefits of derivatives markets. For example: Derivatives have permitted financial risks to be unbundled in ways that have facilitated both their measurement and their management.... Concentrations of risk are more readily identified, and when such concentrations exceed the risk appetites of intermediaries, derivatives can be employed to transfer the underlying risks to other entities. As a result, not only have individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient. But although derivatives markets may generally support stability and resilience, they also enable very high-risk speculative strategies, which at times may pose a threat to financial stability. How much government regulation is needed to see that derivatives markets remain sound, to keep markets competitive and free from fraud and manipulation, and to insulate the financial system from shocks arising from sudden large speculative losses? What kinds of customers are in need of government protection? These are the basic questions for congressional oversight of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) In several respects, the CFMA was a fundamental rethinking of the government's role in derivatives markets. Before 2000, the CEA was intended to regulate all forms of derivative trading; any contract "in the character of" a futures contract was to be traded only under CFTC regulation. However, this "one-size-fits-all" regulatory scheme did not correspond to the reality of the marketplace, where a very large over-the-counter (OTC, that is, off-exchange) derivatives market was flourishing without CFTC oversight. Under the CFMA, most trading in OTC derivatives was placed beyond the reach of the CEA (and thus the CFTC). Where trading was off-limits to small investors, market discipline was deemed to be a sufficient regulatory force. The exception was for contracts based on agricultural commodities, which were thought to be susceptible to price manipulation. As a result, the CFMA did not provide a statutory exemption for OTC agricultural derivatives. The derivatives market in farm commodities is dominated by exchange-traded futures contracts. The CFMA provided for the creation of unregulated futures exchanges, where all trading involved sophisticated or professional investors. (Again, there is an exception for farm derivatives.) Potentially, therefore, the futures exchanges can reconfigure themselves into largely unregulated entities, and several such entities have registered with the CFTC. However, since the enactment of the CFMA, the major futures exchanges continue to operate in (more or less) the same regulatory environment as before. Both the exchanges and the OTC markets have experienced strong growth in trading volumes since 2000. Given the CFTC's satisfaction with its role under the CFMA, the growth of trading volumes, and continued innovation in the markets, few in the Congress saw the need for another thorough overhaul of the CEA. During hearings before the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, however, the CFTC and industry participants suggested several areas where fine-tuning of the CFMA might be desirable. Several of these issues were addressed by the reauthorization legislation enacted by the 110 th Congress—title XIII of the Farm Bill ( P.L. 110-234 , H.R. 2419 ), enacted over the President's veto on May 22, 2008, and authorizing appropriations for the CFTC through FY2012. Major provisions are summarized below. Energy markets have seen turmoil in recent years: prices have been high and unusually volatile, there have been numerous episodes of fraud, and many suspect that energy prices have been driven artificially high by excessive speculation. During the California electricity crisis of 2000, severe shortages were combined with soaring prices, and several energy trading firms (including Enron) were found to have manipulated the partially deregulated electricity marketing system that California had established. After the collapse of Enron, numerous energy firms were found to have made fictitious "wash" trades, for purposes of manipulating prices and/or falsifying their accounting statements. The CFTC has charged dozens of traders with manipulating the price of natural gas by providing false information about market prices and supplies. Finally, many suspect that hedge funds and other financial speculators have driven prices higher than fundamental economic factors of supply and demand would warrant, and have called for more CFTC oversight of OTC markets and/or limits on the size of speculative futures positions. Some observers attribute these problems in the markets to a regulatory gap, arguing that neither the CFTC nor the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has sufficient authority or resources to enforce anti-fraud and -manipulation rules. A particular focus of these arguments is the over-the-counter (OTC) market for energy derivatives, which under the CFMA is subject to very limited oversight. In August 2006, the Amaranth hedge fund lost $2 billion in natural gas derivatives, and liquidated its entire $8 billion portfolio. A June 2007 staff report by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ("Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market") found that the fund's collapse triggered a steep, unexpected decline in prices, and that Amaranth's large positions had caused significant price movements in the months before it failed. The report concludes that Amaranth was able to evade limits on the size of speculative positions (a key feature of the futures exchanges' anti-manipulation program) by shifting its trading from Nymex to exempt and unregulated markets. The reauthorization legislation creates a new regulatory regime for certain OTC energy derivatives markets, subjecting them to a number of exchange-like regulations. The provisions would apply to "electronic trading facilities"—markets where multiple buyers and sellers are able to post orders and execute transactions over an electronic network. If the CFTC determines that these markets, currently exempt from most regulation, play a significant role in setting energy prices, they will be required to register with the CFTC and comply with several regulatory core principles aimed at curbing manipulation and excessive speculation. They will be required to publish and/or report to the CFTC information relating to prices, trading volume, and size of positions held by speculators and hedgers. These new regulatory requirements apply only to electronic markets that have come to resemble the regulated futures exchanges. Bilateral OTC derivative contracts between two principals (e.g., between a swap dealer and an institutional investor customer), that are not executed on a trading facility where multiple bids and offers are displayed, will continue to be largely exempt from CFTC regulation. Security futures are futures contracts based on single stocks or narrow-based stock indexes. Until the CFMA, these contracts were not permitted, largely because of concerns that they might be used to manipulate stock prices. The CFMA provided for joint regulation of the new contracts by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the CFTC. Perhaps as a result, the process of writing trading rules was slow: the first contracts were not traded until 2003. Trading volumes in security futures trading remain very low relative to the stock option market. The only currently active market is OneChicago, a joint venture between the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). During 2007, a total of about 8.1 million security futures contracts were traded. By contrast, 2007 stock option volume on the CBOE in 2007 was 944.5 million contracts. Single-stock futures volume may continue to grow but the product has had difficulty competing with the highly liquid and well-developed stock options market, which offers contracts that permit most (if not all) the investment strategies that security futures do. During the reauthorization hearings in March 2005, several witnesses argued that the dual regulatory regime is cumbersome and hampers trading. CFTC Chairman Brown-Hruska stated that the CFTC would continue to work with the SEC to reduce duplicative regulation. Representatives of the Chicago futures exchanges called for an amendment to the CFMA to allow security futures to trade like any other futures contract. This would set aside the joint CFTC/SEC oversight arrangement and allow the futures exchanges to set margin requirements on security futures, as they do on all other futures contracts. (At present, margins are set at 20% of the underlying stocks' value, a figure that was determined by the SEC and CFTC to be comparable to margin requirements on stock options, as the CFMA requires, but which is much higher than most futures margins, which generally are in the range of 3%-8% of the value of the underlying commodity.) By reducing margin requirements, the exchanges would lower the cost of trading security futures and would likely boost trading volumes. However, such a move would be resisted by the options exchanges, who would argue unfair competition, and by the SEC, which would be concerned about the possibility of manipulation of stock prices. Section 13106 of the reauthorization legislation directs the CFTC and SEC to permit risk-based, or portfolio margining, for security futures by September 30, 2009. This would have the effect of lowering margins for traders with partially offsetting positions in stock options and securities futures, and would reduce trading costs somewhat. The agencies are further directed to permit trading in futures based on certain foreign stock indexes, also by September 30, 2009. The Commodity Exchange Act generally prohibits the selling of off-exchange futures contracts to small "retail" investors. There has been some dispute over whether this prohibition applies to contracts based on foreign currency rates. In 1974, Congress exempted contracts based on foreign exchange and Treasury securities from CFTC regulation (the so-called Treasury Amendment). The CFTC has long argued that this exemption applied only to professional markets, and that it had authority to prevent the sale of futures-like contracts to small investors. The CFMA addressed this question, and the CFTC believed it had been given clear authority, but a 2004 federal court case held that certain retail foreign exchange contracts were not futures contracts and could be legally sold. In 2005 hearings, CFTC Chairman Brown-Hruska suggested that additional legal authority or clarification might be needed to protect small investors from fraud. Both House and Senate reauthorization bills in the 109 th Congress sought to clarify the CFTC's authority over retail agreements and contracts in foreign currency. S. 1566 as reported included provisions designed to address the impact of the Zelener decision, specifying that the CFTC has jurisdiction over foreign exchange contracts offered to retail customers that feature margin or leveraged financing, and that are entered into for reasons other than commercial or personal use of a foreign currency (that is, speculative contracts). In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee on September 8, 2005, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (representing the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the SEC, and the CFTC) recommended that the retail foreign exchange language in S. 1566 be amended to ensure that it did not inadvertently impose restrictions on large foreign exchange contracts traded by banks and other institutional investors. A floor amendment satisfactory to all regulators was expected to be offered by Chairman Chambliss of the Agriculture Committee and Chairman Shelby of the Banking Committee. However, S. 1566 never reached the Senate floor during the 109 th Congress. The 110 th Congress legislation contains provisions similar to this regulatory agreement, clarifying the CFTC's authority over retail contracts and preserving the ability of banks and other financial institutions to continue their foreign exchange trading without CFTC regulation.

Authorization for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a "sunset" agency established in 1974, expired on September 30, 2005. In the past, Congress has used the reauthorization process to consider amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which provides the basis for federal regulation of commodity futures trading. The last reauthorization resulted in the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), the most significant amendments to the CEA since the CFTC was created in 1974. Both chambers considered reauthorization bills in the 109th Congress, but none was enacted. In the 110th Congress, CFTC reauthorization provisions were added to the Farm Bill (H.R. 2419) and enacted over the President's veto on May 22, 2008, as P.L. 110-234. This report provides brief summaries of the issues addressed in that law, including (1) regulation of energy derivatives markets, where some blame excessive price volatility on a lack of effective regulation, (2) the legality of futures-like contracts based on foreign currency prices offered to retail investors, and (3) the market in security futures, or futures contracts based on single stocks, which were authorized by the CFMA, but trade in much lower volumes than their proponents expected. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

The United States Supreme Court recently held that the police may enter and search a home without the usually required warrant if they reasonably believe steps are being taken within the home to destroy the evidence they seek, Kentucky v. King . In doing so, the Court rejected limitations which some of the state and lower federal courts had imposed on the exigent circumstance exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The lone dissenter worried that her brethren may have "arm[ed] the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases." The Fourth Amendment provides that, "The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...." The Court has explained that "the Fourth Amendment has [thus] drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house ... '[a]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.'" "Exigent circumstances" refers to those situations, among others, "in which police action literally must be 'now or never' to preserve the evidence of the crime," and consequently those in which "it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation." For some courts, inexcusable exigencies occurred when the police created them in order to avoid seeking a warrant. There was no consensus, however, on the test to be used to determine whether they had done so. King was convicted in the aftermath of a Lexington, KY, "buy and bust." An informant made a street purchase of crack cocaine. A monitoring undercover officer radioed a description of the dealer to waiting uniformed officers who were to make the arrest. Before they could apprehend him, however, the dealer walked around a corner into an apartment complex breezeway. Two apartments opened onto the breezeway. The uniformed officers heard a door shut, but did not see which apartment the dealer had entered. Close to the apartment door on the left, however, they detected the strong smell of burnt marijuana. This suggested to them that the odor had drifted into the breezeway when the dealer opened and then closed the apartment on the left. They pounded on the door and shouted, "police." Hearing movement within the apartment and concluding that evidence was being destroyed, they kicked in the door. Inside they found King and two others, one of whom was smoking marijuana. A protective sweep of the apartment disclosed marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in plain view. The three were arrested, as was the drug dealer found later in the apartment on the right. King ultimately pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and trafficking in a controlled substance, contingent upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence secured after the officers' warrantless entry and search. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed. On the question of whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the apartment, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted a two-part test: First, courts must determine whether the officers deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement. If so, then the police cannot rely on the resulting exigency. Second, where police have not acted in bad faith, courts must determine whether, regardless of good faith, it was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances relied upon to justify a warrantless entry. If so, then the exigent circumstances cannot justify the warrantless entry. The officers in King failed the second test. "[I]t was reasonably foreseeable that knocking on the apartment door and announcing 'police,' after having smelled marijuana emanating from the apartment, would create the exigent circumstance relied upon, i.e. destruction of the evidence." That is, "[i]t was reasonably foreseeable that, upon hearing police announce their presence, the persons inside the apartment would proceed to destroy evidence of their crime." On the other hand, "[b]efore police announced their presence, there would have been no reason to destroy evidence of either the marijuana which the officers had smelled, or evidence of the original drug transaction." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question of "when does lawful police action impermissibly 'create' exigent circumstances which preclude warrantless entry; and which of the five tests currently being used by the United States Courts of Appeals is proper to determine when impermissibly created exigent circumstances exist?" The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by seven other members of the Court, noted the Court's regular acknowledgement that exigent circumstances, such as the threatened destruction of evidence, will excuse compliance with the warrant requirement. Thus, the Court reasoned, where "the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed." It then proceeded to explain why it found unpersuasive the various lower court justifications for a restriction of the exigent circumstance exception: bad faith, reasonable foreseeability, sufficient time to secure a warrant, deviation from standard police procedures, the threat of imminent police entry, and Court precedent. The Court rejected the argument that the exigent circumstance exception should be unavailable when the officers created the exigency in bad faith in order to avoid the warrant requirement. It observed that, "we have never held, outside limited contexts ... 'that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.'" The reasonable foreseeability test favored by the Kentucky Supreme Court would "introduce an unacceptable degree of unpredictability." The "deviation from the preferred police practice" standard would produce yet another unclear test, the Court thought. It gave no credence to the suggestion that the exception should be unavailable if officers had sufficient probable cause and time to secure a warrant. In the mind of the Court, there are many acceptable reasons why officers might "knock and talk" or engage in other investigative techniques rather than seeking a search warrant as soon as some minimal level of probable cause exists. "Faulting the police for failing to apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible time after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is nowhere to be found in the Constitution." King argued that "law enforcement officers impermissibly create an exigency when they engage in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is imminent and inevitable. In [his] view, relevant factors include the officers' tone of voice in announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their knocks." The Court dismissed this with the observation that "the ability of law enforcement officers to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such subtleties." Finally, the Court denied its decision was controlled by Johnson v. United States . The Court in Johnson found a violation of the Fourth Amendment when police entered a hotel room after hearing shuffling within the room. Like King , Johnson involved a warrantless arrest and search occurring after officers smelled burnt drugs, knocked, and heard movement within the premises. Unlike King , however, the officers did not claim that exigent circumstances—movement suggesting evidence was being destroyed—justified the warrantless entry and search. The Kentucky Supreme Court had incorrectly held that the Fourth Amendment imposed a "foreseeability" limitation on warrantless searches conducted under exigent circumstances. The United States Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded. Justice Ginsburg dissented. She "would not allow an expedient knock to override the warrant requirement." Rather, she would "accord that core requirement of the Fourth Amendment full respect." From her perspective, there was "every reason to conclude that securing a warrant was entirely feasible ... and no reason to contract the Fourth Amendment's dominion." The Court did not address whether sufficient exigent circumstances really existed in the case before it. Certiorari had been granted on the question of the permissible limits, if any, on police-created exigencies. The existence of a police-created exigency was assumed by both the Kentucky Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. The concern that gave rise to the "police-created exigency" doctrine in the lower courts may lead to a more demanding threshold of exigency in the future.

Authorities may enter and search a home without a warrant if they have probable cause and reason to believe that evidence is being destroyed within the home. So declared the United States Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision, Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011)(No. 09-1272). The Kentucky Supreme Court had overturned King's conviction for marijuana possession and drug dealing, because the evidence upon which it was based had been secured following a warrantless search which failed to conform with that court's restrictions under its "police-created exigencies" doctrine. The Fourth Amendment usually permits authorities to search a home only if they have both probable cause and a warrant. The warrant requirement may be excused in the presence of exigent circumstances, for instance, when it appears the occupants are attempting to flee or to destroy evidence. Leery lest authorities create exigent circumstances to avoid the warrant requirement, some state and lower federal courts had adopted one form or another of a police-created exigencies doctrine. The Court rejected each of these and endorsed searches conducted under the exigent circumstance exception, unless authorities had created the exigency by threatening to, or engaging in, activities which themselves violated the Fourth Amendment. In order to reach the question of limitations on police-created exigencies, the Court assumed the existence of exigent circumstances in King. The concerns from which the police-created exigencies doctrine emerged may now give rise to more stringent standards for what qualifies as an exigency.

97-86 -- Indian Tribes and Welfare Reform Updated September 28, 2004 Before enactment of TANF, American Indians or Alaska Natives (Indians, Inuit [Eskimos], or Aleuts) received family cash welfare on the same terms as other families in their state, with benefits and income eligibility rules ofthe program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) set by the state and costs shared by the state. The law had no provision for administration of cash aid by tribes. However, some Wisconsin tribessubcontracted with the state to provide AFDC independently on their reservations. In FY1994, 1.3% of thenational AFDC caseload (about 68,000 families) were American Indians and Alaska Natives. In addition, morethan 65,000 needy Indians who were not in categories eligible for AFDC received cash aid based on their state'sAFDC benefit standards, but paid by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Under pre-TANF law, more than 80tribes and tribal organizations exercised an option to run their own work and training programs, called JobOpportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) programs, with 100% federal funds. Under TANF, which provides fixed annual state grants through FY2002, numerous Indian tribes and Alaska Native Villages in 16 states (see Table 1) are operating their own tribal family assistanceprograms. Tribes thatoperated their own JOBS program also receive annual appropriations under TANF law of $7.6 million (theirFY1984 funding for JOBS) for work and training activities (renamed Native Employment Works -- NEW). Finally, $28.6 million in Welfare-to-Work (WtW) grants was awarded for FY1998 and 1999 by the LaborDepartment to Indian and Native American tribal governments (86 grantees in FY1998, 91 in FY1999). Standard TANF work participation rates and time limit rules do not apply to tribal assistance programs. Theirrules are set by the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary with tribal participation. Eligible for tribal assistance grants are the more than 330 federally recognized tribes in the contiguous 48 states and 13 Alaska entities. As of September 15, 2004, 45 tribal TANF grants were approved for 230 tribes plussome non-reservation Indians in Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Annual federalfunding, deducted from the basic TANF grant of their state(s), totals $134.2 million (for funding by tribal plan,see Table 1 ). Grantees estimated their monthly caseload at 33,510 families. According to thefifth annual TANFreport, the average number of Indian families served by state governments under regular TANF programs wasabout 35,000 in FY2000, down 50% from the corresponding FY1996 figure (a part of the decline representedpersons who moved from the regular state program to a tribal program). Some features of tribal programsfollow. Recognized tribes and tribal organizations may operate family assistance programs in their service areas. A tribe's TANF grant equals federal AFDC payments to the state for FY1994 attributable toIndians in its service area; the tribal grant is subtracted from the state's TANF grant. Tribal TANF plans are for three years (rather than 2, as for states) and contain many fewerrequired elements than state plans. However, regular TANF data collection and reporting rules apply to tribalplans. The HHS Secretary, with participation of the tribe, establishes work participation rules,time limits for benefits, and penalties for each tribal family assistance program. In general, Indian tribes inAlaska must operate plans in accordance with rules adopted by the state for TANF. (The National Congress ofAmerican Indians has asked for removal of this provision, and for the restrictive definition immediately below,saying that it wants Alaskan tribes to be treated like other tribes.) TANF law generally defines an Indian tribe as in Section 4 of the IndianSelf-Determination and Education Assistance Act, but it specifies that an "eligible Indian tribe" in Alaska means one of 12 specified regional nonprofit corporations plus a reservation. Tribal TANF regulations permit 35% of a tribal grant to be used for administrative costs inthe first year, 30% in the second year, and 25% thereafter. State TANF programs, however, generally may spentno more than 15% of their grants on administration. The state governor must certify equitable access from the TANF program to Indians noteligible for help from a tribal family assistance plan. The law gives explicit permission for state TANF programs to use money from the TANFloan fund for aid to Indian families that have moved out of the service area of a tribe with a tribal familyassistance plan. A special rule exempts from the 60-month TANF benefit time limit any month in which therecipient lives in Indian country or an Alaskan native village with an adult unemployment rate of at least50%. The law makes tribes eligible for TANF loans, but not for bonuses offered to states for highperformance or for cutting non-marital births. HHS has ruled that state funds contributed to an approved tribal assistance plan may becounted toward the spending level (maintenance-of-effort) that a state must achieve to qualify for a full TANFgrant. A 1999 amendment permits tribes, like states, to reserve TANF grants for assistance(ongoing needs and supportive services for the unemployed) in any future year. Since July 1, 2001, tribes alsohave been allowed to reserve unobligated NEW funds for assistance in any future year. The House-passed TANF reauthorization bill ( H.R. 4 ) and the Senate Finance Committee substitute version of H.R. 4 (PRIDE) renew tribal grants at their current level and make Indian tribalorganizations eligible for proposed marriage promotion grants and the proposed employment achievementbonus. Both bills require tribal family assistance plans to provide assurance that tribes have consulted with theirstate(s) regarding the plan's design. The Senate Committee bill also authorizes appropriation of $100 millionannually for five years for a tribal TANF improvement fund, which could be used to provide technical assistanceto tribes, fund competitive grants, and conduct research. The American Indian Welfare Reform Act( S. 751 / H.R. 2770 ) proposes many changes. They include federal payments to statesthat contribute (with TANF MOE funds) to costs of Indian tribal assistance programs, increased tribal fundingfrom the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG), authority for tribes to receive federal funds forfoster care and adoption assistance, and (on a demonstration basis) to determine eligibility for food stamps,Medicaid, and SCHIP. The 1996 law reserves between 1% and 2% of its child care funds for payments to Indian tribes and tribal organizations, to be subtracted from national totals. Previously no AFDC-related child care funds wereearmarked for Indians. In FY2002, $96 million was allocated to tribes, 2% each of mandatory and discretionaryfunds. (Discretionary funds are provided under the Child Care and Development Block Grant [CCDBG].) Thelaw also allows Indian tribes, subject to HHS approval, to use CCDBG funds for construction. The 1996 welfarelaw authorizes direct federal funding for child support operations to Indian tribes (and, again, Alaska Nativeorganizations) with approved child support plans. By regulation, tribes receive 90% federal funding for the firstthree years, 80% for later years. As of March, 2004, 9 tribes received direct federal funding and handled morethan 21,000 cases. Final regulations replaced interim rules in March. Data compiled by the Division of Tribal Services show that most tribal TANF plans have adopted the 60-month lifetime time limit for federally funded TANF to an adult. The two Oregon tribes (Klamath tribes andConfederated Tribes of Siletz Indians) adopted a limit of 24 months within an 84-month period (similar toOregon state plan limit). Work activities shown in most tribal plans are the same as those specified in TANFlaw, but several tribes make additions. Thus, two Washington tribes list as additional work activities: "teachingcultural activities" and "barrier removal, including counseling, and chemical dependency treatment." TheTanana Chiefs Conference, in Alaska, includes as work activities "approved subsistence hunting, fishing,gathering." Most two tribal plans limit the "service population" to Indians. However, the Red Cliff Band ofLake Superior Chippewa Indians in Wisconsin says it will serve all families, including non-Indians, on thereservation (and tribal member families in Bayfield County); and the White Mountain Apache Tribe in Arizonaalso says it will serve all families on the reservation. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe serves only one-parentfamilies with its tribal plan; its 2-parent families are aided by BIA's General Assistance program. Table 1 shows that most of the tribal TANF plans have set work participation rates below the all-family rate of50% and the 2-parent family rate of 90% specified for state TANF programs in FY2002. The table also showsthat 36 of the 45 tribal grantees (including the Navajo Nation in Arizona and Utah) receive state funds --claimed as TANF MOE amounts -- to help pay for their programs. The tribes that do not receive state fundingare located in Wisconsin (8 tribes), South Dakota (1 tribe) and New Mexico (part of the Navajo Nation). Table 1. TANF Grants for Tribal Family Assistance Programs (as of September 15, 2004) and Their Work Rules a. These tribes also receive federal funds for the Native Employment Works (NEW) employment and training program. b. For FY2000 c. For FY2001 d. Increased progressively over the three years 2005-07.

The 1996 welfare law (P.L. 104-193) gives federally recognizedIndian tribes (defined to include certain Alaska Native organizations) the option to design and operate their owncash welfare programs for needy children with funds subtracted from their state's block grant for TemporaryAssistance to Needy Families (TANF). As of September 15, 2004, 45 tribal TANF plans were in operation in 16states. Their annual rate of federal funding totaled $134.2 million. The 1996 law also appropriated $7.6 millionannually for work and training activities to tribes in 24 states that operated a pre-TANF work and trainingprogram (now named Native Employment Works -- NEW), authorized direct federal funding to Indian tribes foroperation of child support enforcement programs, and set aside a share of child care funds for them. Theoriginal TANF law was scheduled to expire September 30, 2002, but Congress extended funding through severallaws, most recently through September 30, 2004. Pending are two major TANF reauthorization bills:H.R. 4, as passed by the House, and H.R. 4, as approved by the Senate FinanceCommittee. Both bills would renew tribal TANF grants through FY2008 and make tribal organizations eligiblefor new marriage promotion grants. In addition, the Senate Committee bill would authorize some new funding(tribal improvement fund). This report will be updated for significant developments.

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1337) is the primary option available to U.S. companies to protect themselves from imports into the United States of goods made by foreign companies that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) administers Section 337 investigations. The ITC is a quasi-judicial federal government agency responsible for investigating and arbitrating complaints of unfair trade practices. The majority of unfair competition acts asserted under Section 337 involve allegations of patent infringement. These cases tend to be complex and require adjudication by the ITC. In the case of most copyrights and trademarks, the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, is empowered to make on-the-spot determinations of IPR infringement. In general, U.S. companies must fulfill three requirements in order to assert unfair competition under Section 337. First, there must be an importation or a sale for, sale after, or potential future importation of the infringing product into the United States. It is not necessary for the imports to be in commercial, or mass, quantities. Second, an unfair act of competition relating to the imported good must occur, i.e., an infringement of a valid U.S. patent, copyright, or trademark. Third, a domestic company must be engaged in sufficient domestic activity, such as investment in plant and equipment or employment of labor and capital, in the United States related to the imported product in question. U.S. citizenship is not necessary to meet this third requirement. Under statute, Section 337 investigations must completed "at the earliest practicable time" (19 U.S.C. §1337). The ITC issues "target dates" for identifying when the ITC proceedings should be completed. Previously, the ITC has attempted to complete most investigations in less than 15 months. In recent years, the target dates for many investigations have increased, due in part to the growing complexity of the subject matter and number of unfair acts under investigation in cases and the workload of ITC judges. As shown in Table 1 , Section 337 ITC investigations involve multiple steps that take place over the course of many months. Any company seeking relief under Section 337 must prepare a detailed complaint with information supporting the claims with the ITC, including background information on the intellectual property asserted in the claim and evidence of infringement. Upon receiving a complaint, the ITC has thirty days to determine whether or not to initiate a Section 337 investigation. If an investigation is instituted, the ITC assigns the case to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who oversees and conducts the investigation. The ITC also assigns an investigative attorney from its Office of Unfair Import Investigations (OUII), who provides his or her views to the ALJ regarding whether or not a Section 337 violation has taken place. The attorney also represents the public interest during the investigation. A target date for completion of the investigation will be set. The ALJ conducts a formal evidentiary hearing, typically lasting one to two weeks, generally within seven to ten months of the filing. The ALJ then issues a preliminary ruling (an "Initial Determination") determining whether or not a Section 337 violation has occurred and proposing remedies (discussed in next section) if violations are found. The ALJ decision is based on the merits of the case. For instance, in a Section 337 case involving U.S. patents, the ALJ would evaluate the case based on patent infringement issues. The Initial Determination must be issued no later than four months prior to the target date. Within 45 days of the Initial Determination, the ITC Commissioners decide whether or not to review the Initial Determination. The Commissioners may decide to adopt the ruling. Alternately, they may elect to change all or some parts of the Initial Determination, or to completely reject or remand it. Generally, within three months of the Initial Determination, the Commissioners issue a "Final Determination," which takes into account public interest considerations, such as the impact on the public's health and safety or on the ability to satisfy U.S. market demands. Some cases before the ITC are settled before a final decision is made. Complainants (typically the patent holder) and respondents (the alleged infringer) may move to terminate an investigation. For instance, they may agree to cross-licensing or to resolve the dispute through arbitration. The Final Determination is sent to the President for review based on national security considerations. This decision is enforceable within 60 days if no actions are taken by the President. The President rarely has overturned the Final Determination. During the 60 day review period, respondents who continue activities ruled by the ITC to be in violation of Section 337 do so under bond. If the Final Determination is not disapproved by the President, respondents engaging in such activities stand to lose a significant amount of money. In some cases, the bond is 100% of the total value of the imported products. Thus, while remedies are not enforceable until the conclusion of the 60 day review period, the bond frequently serves as a deterrent from engaging in IPR-infringing activities. This is especially the case because the President rarely disapproves of ITC Final Determinations. Within the 60-day Presidential review period, the respondent (or anyone adversely affected by the Final Determination) can file an appeal of the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Depending on the circumstances, the Final Determination may or may not be enforceable while the appeal is being heard. In the original enactment of Section 337, Congress stipulated that the ITC complete investigations within 15 months (from institution of a case to Final Determination). Section 337 was later amended to become compliant with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), whose national treatment provision requires that member states not treat foreign member states' nationals any less favorably than their own nationals. There was concern that Section 337, as initially enacted, may not have allowed foreign companies to defend themselves adequately because the ITC adjudication process generally takes place at a faster pace than litigation in federal district courts. The ITC is now required by statute to complete investigations "at the earliest practicable time" (19 U.S.C §1337). The ITC grants two primary remedies to U.S. companies: exclusion orders and cease and desist orders. The ITC may not issue monetary damages to U.S. companies. The time that it takes for remedies to become enforceable may vary because of differences in target dates and the possibility of appeals by respondents. Exclusion orders prohibit the importation of the infringing good into the United States. They are effective for as long as the patent is valid. Limited exclusion orders, the most commonly issued type of exclusion order, prohibit the importation of only those infringing goods originating from the parties named in the ITC investigation. In contrast, general exclusion orders prohibit the importation of all goods of the kind determined to be infringing, irrespective of the source of the infringing good. Because general exclusion orders are broad in their scope, they may disrupt international trade significantly. In general, they are issued only when circumvention of a limited exclusion order would be likely or it would be difficult to identify all infringing parties. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency enforces exclusion orders. Cease and desist orders require the termination of infringing-related activities, such as selling infringing articles previously imported that are currently in domestic inventories. These orders frequently are issued in conjunction with exclusion orders, particularly in situations where the infringing goods are imported in commercial quantities. Cease and desist orders are enforced by the ITC, which is authorized to impose civil penalties on U.S. importers that violate cease and desist orders. Penalties per day may be as high as $100,000 or double the value of the goods involved. U.S. companies may request that the ITC conduct expedited temporary relief proceedings and issue a temporary exclusion or cease and desist order while the regular investigation takes place. For preliminary relief, U.S. companies must provide significantly more evidence prior to the hearing than for a standard case. The ITC's decision to grant preliminary injunctions is based on: the likelihood of success for the complainant's case and the extent to which the domestic industry, respondents, and the public interest would be adversely affected if a preliminary injunction was not issued. For temporary relief proceedings, a Final Determination (following an Initial Determination by the ALJ) is granted 90 days after institution for standard cases. For more complex cases, a Final Determination is granted 150 days after institution of the case. In cases where the complainant receives a temporary remedy, the complainant is required to put up a bond. Following the preliminary ruling, the full Section 337 standard case will proceed. If the preliminary injunction is not upheld in the regular investigation, the complainant may lose the bond money. In FY2008, the ITC reported a total of 88 active Section 337 investigations and ancillary proceedings, up from 73 in FY2007. Of the 88 active investigations in FY2008, 43 represented new Section 337 investigations and 7 represented new ancillary proceedings stemming from previously concluded Section 337 investigations. The Section 337 investigations frequently involved advanced technology areas such as integrated circuits, computer components, consumer electronic products, and chemical compositions. Over 90% of the new Section 337 investigations that were active in FY2008 involved cases of alleged patent infringement. Since 2002, there has been a general uptick in the number of Section 337 cases. In FY2008, the number of new cases was nearly four times higher than the number of new cases in FY2000. There also were over 50% more active cases in FY2008, compared to FY2007. The overall rise in international IPR infringement has contributed to the increase in Section 337 activity. Additionally, there has been increased publicity of the ITC as an IPR border enforcement entity, partly due to recent high-profile rulings. Moreover, there is greater corporate awareness of the potential benefits of filing a Section 337 case. Prior to 2006, the average length for investigations (in which a final decision was reached) was less than 15 months. In FY2008, the average length for investigations rose to 16.7 months; the shortest completion time was six months and the longest was 28 months. In FY2008, the ITC issued two general exclusion orders, five limited exclusion orders, and 14 cease and desist orders. In the prior year, the ITC issued four general exclusion orders, five limited exclusion order, and 14 cease and desist orders. U.S. companies also may bring lawsuits against foreign entities in the venue of U.S. district courts to challenge the entry of infringing products into the United States. Federal district courts, unlike the ITC, can award monetary damages to the IPR holder and issue injunctions against infringers. If the adjudicated infringer violates the injunction by continuing to import the infringing product, it may face sanctions if the rights holder claims the infringer has acted in contempt of court. However, the federal courts do not possess direct authority to block imports, as the ability to issue exclusion orders enforced by the CBP rests with the ITC. If the adjudicated infringer lacks assets in the United States, enforcing a U.S. court's orders may prove difficult. In addition, litigation in U.S. district courts tends to be more costly and to take longer to yield decisions than the Section 337 venue. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the Section 337 venue does not provide immediate relief to U.S. companies facing unfair import competition. Proponents of a faster process have argued that the U.S. economy and public health and safety may be adversely affected by the continued importation of IPR-infringing goods while Section 337 investigations take place. ITC proponents maintain that the length of time for investigations has risen because of increased Section 337 activity, which has contributed to heavier dockets for ALJs and investigation backlogs. In addition, they indicate that recent cases tend to involve more technologically complex products and that filings increasingly name multiple respondents, whereas previous cases generally named one respondent. Others point out that ITC investigations are generally faster than litigation in federal district courts, where proceedings may take several years. Concerns also have been raised about CBP enforcement of exclusion orders. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report notes that U.S. companies spend millions of dollars to file Section 337 complaints before the ITC, but that enforcement of exclusion orders is limited because of a lack of resources. As of July 2007, CBP reported that 66 exclusion orders were in effect. The number of exclusion order exams carried out by CBP has declined since FY2002. While U.S. capacity to carry out IPR enforcement has increased, according to GAO, challenges remain because IPR enforcement frequently may not be a top CBP priority and there may not be adequate resources targeted to this effort.

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 allows U.S. companies to protect themselves from imports that infringe intellectual property rights. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) adjudicates complaints filed by U.S. companies alleging Section 337 violations. Primary remedies under Section 337 include exclusion orders and cease and desist orders. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of Section 337 proceedings or actions. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the length of time for completion of Section 337 investigations and the effectiveness of enforcement of exclusion orders.

As in past disasters, the Secretary of HUD issued a number of waivers to permit local communities to redirect their existing HUD housing and community development grant funds to meet their emergency needs shortly after the storm. Waivers were issued for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program , the HOME Investments Partnerships Program (HOME), the Emergency Shelter Grants Program (ESG), and the Housing for Persons with AIDS Program (HOPWA). Waivers issued ranged from extensions in the amount of time grantees had to spend their funds to easing of benefit eligibility requirements. HUD also issued $2 million in base program funding as "Imminent Threat" funding to Indian Community Development Block Grant recipient communities affected by the storm. The Administration was proactive in making existing housing programs and assistance available to victims of Katrina. Immediately after the storm, HUD created a toll-free number that allowed displaced HUD-assisted families (e.g., public housing residents and Section 8 rental housing voucher holders) to reestablish their benefits. In conjunction with that number, HUD identified a number of vacant units across the country in which to house displaced tenants, both formerly assisted and unassisted. HUD also issued a notice summarizing waivers available to public housing authorities (PHAs), including suspensions of reporting deadlines, loosening of quality standards and income determination rules, and increases in subsidy limits for public housing authorities affected by the storm. The department also made emergency capital reserve funds available to local PHAs to repair damaged public housing units. FEMA-HUD Joint Initiative . On September 24, 2005, the Secretaries of HUD and Homeland Security announced a joint transitional housing assistance initiative for Hurricane Katrina evacuees. The initiative provided two types of assistance, both funded by emergency funds provided to FEMA in a supplemental appropriation shortly after the storm. The first was a type of individual and household grant administered by FEMA. Displaced homeowners and renters (except for HUD-assisted renters) received a cash grant of $2,358 to be used for housing-related expenses. The amount was meant to represent three months of housing costs and was calculated using the national average fair-market rent (FMR) for a two-bedroom apartment. The assistance could be extended for up to 18 months. Second, for families who were homeless or receiving HUD assistance before the storm, FEMA initially provided funding to HUD, through a mission assignment, to administer the HUD Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP). It provided ongoing rental assistance, for up to 18 months, to displaced HUD-assisted renters (including Section 8 voucher holders, families who had lived in public housing, and families who had lived in other forms of HUD-assisted rental housing) and displaced homeless families. It was administered by local PHAs and was calculated at 100% of the local area FMR. Families were required to pay any difference between the rental assistance amount and the actual rent for the unit they selected. This program had no income eligibility or targeting requirements, and families' eligibility was determined after they registered for FEMA assistance and contacted HUD. Disaster Voucher Program . Language included in the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-148 ) transferred $390 million in FEMA funds to HUD to administer a modified form of KDHAP called the Disaster Voucher Program. The act also included administrative provisions permitting housing authorities to combine their public housing and Section 8 voucher funds, and directed the Secretary, to the extent feasible, to preserve all assisted housing damaged by the storm. On August 31, 2005, HUD issued mortgagee letter 2005-33, reminding HUD-approved lenders that when the President declares a disaster, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, it automatically triggers certain procedures with regard to FHA-insured mortgages in the affected areas. The following procedures become effective for one year from the date of declaration: (1) a moratorium on foreclosures for 90 days from the date of declaration ; (2) lenders are encouraged to offer special forbearance, mortgage modification, refinancing, and waiver of late charges to affected borrowers; (3) families whose residences were destroyed or severely damaged are eligible for 100% financing under the Section 203(h) program for the cost of reconstruction or replacement; (4) damaged properties become eligible for Section 203(k) financing, under which costs to purchase and rehabilitate the property are included in one loan and HUD waives the requirement that the property has been completed for more than one year prior to application for the mortgage; (5) underwriting guidelines are relaxed to permit disaster victims to qualify for loans even if their total monthly debt, including the proposed mortgage, would equal 45% of gross income; and (6) lenders must ensure that hazard claims are expeditiously filed and settled, and lenders may not retain hazard insurance proceeds to make up an existing arrearage without written consent of the borrower. The Section 203(h) program is available for borrowers who already own homes in the affected area. The loans are limited to the FHA loan limit for the area, subject to the provision that the loan may not exceed 100% of the appraised value of the property. In some cases it may not be possible to obtain 100% financing. It may often be the case that the cost to repair or replace the property exceeds the appraised value of the property. This is the reason that most lenders require borrowers to obtain hazard insurance that covers the replacement cost of the property instead of its appraised value. The Section 203(k) program permits borrowers who do not already own homes to purchase and rehabilitate properties in the area that are either abandoned by owners, or are being sold by owners who do not want to repair them and remain in the area. The current FHA underwriting guidelines provide that a prospective borrower's total debt, including the proposed mortgage payment, may not exceed 41% of the borrower's gross monthly income. In recognition of the fact that borrowers in these programs (§203 (h) and (k)) may have to incur debt to replace personal property, the underwriting guidelines are relaxed to permit loans to borrowers whose total debt is up to 45% of gross monthly income. The limit may even be exceeded if justified by compensating factors. On December 5, 2005, HUD announced the Mortgage Assistance Initiative (MAI), under which HUD will make mortgage payments for up to 12 months on behalf of borrowers who have FHA-insured mortgages on their homes and who have been displaced or are unemployed because of the recent disasters. Eligible borrowers must: (1) have homes that are repairable and are located within parts of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas declared eligible for individual assistance as a result of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, or Wilma; (2) have missed between four and 12 payments on an FHA-insured home loan; (3) be temporarily unable to make mortgage payments but have the expectation to resume full mortgage payments; and (4) the homes must be the primary residences of the borrowers and the borrowers must be committed to continued occupancy of the properties as primary residences. No interest is charged on the MAI loans, and repayment is not required until the original FHA-insured loans are repaid. The program is scheduled to expire18 months after it began, and is expected to assist about 20,000 families. FHA notes that more than 52,000 FHA-insured loans were delinquent due to the storms. In April 2005, before Hurricane Katrina struck, HUD augmented its existing 203(k) program by announcing the "Streamline(k) Limited Repair Program" to facilitate the purchase of properties needing minor rehabilitation (HUD Mortgagee Letter 2005-19). Eligible properties were those needing repairs costing at least $5,000 but not more than $15,000. The program was amended in December to, among other changes, eliminate the minimum repair cost, increase the maximum repair cost to $35,000, and make lead-based paint stabilization an eligible work item (HUD Mortgagee Letter 2005-50). The Streamline(k) program is not directed specifically at properties damaged by Katrina, but could facilitate the purchase and repair of such properties that meet program requirements. Congress enacted several emergency supplemental funding bills following the hurricanes, two of which provided CDBG funds to affected communities. The Defense Appropriations Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $11.5 billion for CDBG for "necessary expenses related to disaster relief, long-term recovery, and restoration of infrastructure in the most impacted and distressed areas" in the five states impacted by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The act allowed the affected states to use up to 5% for administrative costs; HUD to grant waivers of program requirements (except those relating to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, and the environment); Mississippi and Louisiana, the most affected states, to use up to $20 million for local community development corporations; and the Governor of each state to designate multiple entities to administer either a portion or all of a state's share of the $11.5 billion. The act also lowered the income targeting requirement for activities benefitting low- and moderate-income persons from 70% to 50% of the state's allocation; limited the maximum amount of assistance any of the five states may receive to no more than 54% of the total amount appropriated; and required each state to develop, for HUD's approval, a plan detailing the proposed use of funds, including eligibility criteria and how the funds will be used to address long-term recovery and infrastructure restoration activities. On January 25, 2006, HUD announced its allocation of the funds. Using data from FEMA and several other agencies, HUD calculated the extent of each state's unmet housing needs and areas of concentrated distress for each of the five states. HUD allocated 55% of the funds based on each state's unmet housing needs and the remaining 45% on the degree of concentrated distress as measured by each state's share of damaged and destroyed housing stock, and business and infrastructure damage. On February 13, 2006, HUD published a notice of allocations, waivers, and alternative requirements governing the CDBG disaster recovery assistance. In addition to providing waivers allowing the states to allocate funds to CDBG entitlement communities and directly administer the program, the notice also included language stating that "Funds allocated are intended by HUD to be used toward meeting unmet housing needs in areas of concentrated distress." The language included in the act did not restrict the use of these funds to unmet housing needs. Rather, the act provided some level of flexibility allowing funds to be used for long-term recovery and infrastructure restoration in the areas most affected by the Gulf Coast Hurricanes of 2005. On June 15, 2006, the President signed P.L. 109-234 , a second emergency supplemental appropriations act, providing funds for Gulf Coast recovery efforts. The law included $5.2 billion in additional CDBG assistance for the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. It limited the amount that any one state could receive to $4.2 billion, and encouraged states to target assistance to infrastructure reconstruction and activities that would spur the redevelopment of affordable rental housing, including federally assisted housing and public housing. The law contained provisions regarding the use and administration of funds, including most of the provisions that applied to the funds authorized by P.L. 109-148 , as well as provisions that required that at least $1 billion of the CDBG amount be used for repair and reconstruction of affordable rental housing in the impacted areas; ensured that each state's plan gives priority to activities that support infrastructure development and affordable rental housing activities; required each state to file quarterly reports with House and Senate Appropriations Committees detailing the use of funds; required HUD to file quarterly reports with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees identifying actions by the department to prevent fraud and abuse, including the duplication of benefits; and prohibited the use of CDBG funds to meet matching fund requirements of other federal programs. On July 11, 2006, HUD announced that $4.2 billion of the $5.2 billion supplemental appropriation for CDBG would be allocated to Louisiana, and on August 18, it announced how funds would be distributed to the remaining states (see Table 1 ). HUD determined the distribution of funds for Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas based on unmet need, analyzing data from FEMA and the Small Business Administration. It then invited each state to provide their own data on remaining recovery needs in order to make its decision. Two important developments related to HUD's role in response to the 2005 hurricanes occurred after the initial response period that is the focus of this report. First, in July 2007, FEMA announced it would transfer responsibility for ongoing housing assistance for families displaced by the 2005 hurricanes to HUD, noting HUD's expertise in assisting families with long-term housing needs through its existing infrastructure of PHAs. Additional funding related to this added responsibility was provided to HUD in FY2008 and FY2009, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 . Second, in November 2007 Congress provided another $3 billion in emergency supplemental CDBG funding to Louisiana for its recovery needs ( P.L. 110-116 ).

The catastrophic devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005, and to a lesser degree, Hurricanes Wilma and Rita, led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of families. Following the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) took primary responsibility for meeting the emergency housing needs of displaced families. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the nation's housing agency, also played a role. HUD modified its existing grant programs—primarily through waivers—to make them more flexible for communities wishing to serve displaced families. The department also took steps to aid displaced families that had been homeless or receiving HUD assistance prior to the storm by developing a new voucher program, and by issuing guidance to lenders offering protections for homeowners with FHA-insured mortgages. Finally, Congress has used HUD programs, particularly the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, as a conduit for providing relief and recovery funds to devastated communities. This report details HUD's efforts to provide assistance to affected families and communities immediately after the storm and in the initial rebuilding stages. It will not track HUD's role in the longer-term rebuilding of the devastated areas.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits to veterans who meet specific eligibility rules. Benefits are provided through the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). The focus of this report is travel benefits offered through VHA to assist veterans in accessing health care by providing reimbursements for some travel costs. In most cases, veterans must enroll to receive health benefits through VHA. All enrolled veterans are offered a standard medical benefits package ; additional health benefits may be available to veterans based on their veteran status, the presence of service-connected disabilities or exposures, income, and other factors, such as status as a former prisoner of war or receipt of a Purple Heart. In order to improve access to VA health care services, and because veterans may need to travel significant distances to reach VA medical centers or clinics, Congress authorized VA to reimburse some veterans for travel expenses related to medical appointments as part of the medical benefits package with the passage of P.L. 76-432 in 1940. Since its authorization, the Veterans Beneficiary Travel Program has undergone a number of significant legislative and regulatory changes affecting eligibility and the type of transportation covered, as well as the cost to VA for the benefit. Congress has changed mileage reimbursement rates and veteran deductible costs for this program. The most recent changes to the program were made by the Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-163 ). Appendix A provides a summary of legislative and regulatory changes to the program. Benefit changes have affected actual and projected program costs; details on program funding are included in Appendix B . Not all veterans are eligible for travel benefits, and not all travel costs are covered by the Veterans Beneficiary Travel Program. VA determines eligibility for Veterans Beneficiary Travel Program benefits based on the characteristics of the veteran, the type of medical appointment, or a combination of the two. Travel benefits are also provided for a limited group of non-veterans. Although the benefits are standardized nationally, specific mileage calculations and reimbursements are made individually at VA's 153 hospitals (medical centers) around the country through their business or travel offices. Time limits also apply for requesting reimbursement. Veterans can receive travel reimbursement if they meet certain criteria, generally related to service connection and income levels. "Service connection" refers to disabilities that veterans have incurred or aggravated in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. Travel reimbursement is provided for veterans rated 30% or more service-connected for travel relating to any condition. Veterans who receive pensions or who would qualify to receive a pension based on income are also eligible for travel reimbursement. Veterans receiving VA pension benefits can receive travel benefits for appointments related to all conditions. Veterans who do not qualify for pensions (e.g., those who did not serve during a period of war), but with annual incomes below the maximum annual rate for VA pensions, can receive benefits for travel related to all conditions. Veterans who can present clear evidence that they are unable to defray the cost of travel can receive benefits for travel related to all conditions. For two categories of appointment, travel costs are covered for all veterans, without regard to income or service-connected disability status. All veterans who travel for Compensation and Pension (C&P) exams have all travel costs covered and do not pay a deductible for the travel. All veterans traveling to a transplant center for transplant care have travel costs covered. Veterans who are rated less than 30% service-connected are eligible for travel reimbursement for appointments that are related to their service-connected condition. A limited group of non-veterans is also eligible for reimbursement of some travel costs related to medical appointments at VA facilities: an attendant of a veteran, if a VA provider determines the attendant is required; donors or potential donors of tissue, organs, or parts to a veteran receiving VA-authorized care; veterans' immediate family members traveling for bereavement counseling related to the death of the veteran in the active line of duty; veterans' immediate family members, guardians, or those in whose home a veteran lives if traveling for consultation, counseling, training, or mental health services relating to a veteran receiving care for a service-connected disability; allied beneficiaries, if the travel and reimbursement have been authorized by the appropriate foreign government agency; and beneficiaries of other federal agencies, when authorized by that agency. Travel benefits are provided only for care that is being paid for by VA, and only for care that has been previously scheduled, unless it is emergency care. In general, for those eligible to receive benefits through the program as described above, VA will provide a per-mile payment for travel by car, reimbursement for "special mode" transportation when justified, and in some circumstances reimbursement for air travel. Veterans must submit requests for reimbursement within 30 days of the travel, although certain cost reimbursements must be requested before the travel takes place. Deductibles apply in most cases. Eligible veterans who drive in private cars to appointments are reimbursed at a per-mile rate for travel both to the appointment and back home. If two or more eligible beneficiaries are riding in the same car, only one mileage reimbursement will be made (i.e., the reimbursement is provided for costs actually incurred, not per person traveling). "Special mode" transportation refers to travel in an ambulance, wheelchair van, or other vehicle specially designed for transporting people with disabilities. Other types of transportation, such as subways, trains, airplanes, and privately owned vehicles, are not considered special mode even if they have been adapted or are capable of transporting people with disabilities. To receive benefits for special mode transportation, the veteran must be eligible for the benefit, as described above, and the special mode transportation must be medically required, as determined by a VA clinician. Reimbursement for special mode transportation must be requested prior to the trip, except in the case of medical emergencies. Special mode transportation from a VA facility to a community emergency facility and back is authorized for reimbursement if the transportation is required because the VA facility could not provide the needed care. Special mode transportation to an emergency facility for treatment can be retroactively authorized if the emergency episode of care is approved for VA payment. The Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 clarified that "actual necessary expense of travel includes the reasonable costs of airfare if travel by air is the only practical way to reach a Department facility.'' The veteran's medical condition and any other impediments to the use of ground transportation should be considered in the evaluation of whether travel by air is practical. VA will reimburse for actual cost up to 50% of the government employee rate for meals and lodging when deemed appropriate by VA based on medical condition, distance required to travel, weather conditions, time of appointment, and other factors. Reimbursement for food and lodging should be requested in advance. Tolls, parking fees, luggage fees, and costs for travel by taxi or other hired vehicle may be reimbursed if receipts are offered. Travel benefits are distributed as reimbursements for actual costs incurred (with the exception noted above for meals and lodging capped at 50% of government employee rates), and a deductible applies in most cases. Deductible rates have varied in recent years (see Appendix A ). Current deductible rates are $3 for one-way travel and $6 for round-trip travel, with a monthly cap of $18 (six one-way trips or three round-trips). Deductible waivers are available for those receiving VA pensions or qualifying based on income, and for those traveling for C&P exams. Mileage rates have also changed several times in recent years (see Appendix A ). The current reimbursement rate is set at 41.5 cents per mile. Mileage rate calculation methods vary between VA facilities. Some facilities calculate mileage based on zip codes; others use online mapping tools, such as Mapquest, to determine miles traveled. Veterans are reimbursed based on their current place of residence, whether or not it is the address to which official mail is sent. Generally travel reimbursement is paid only from the place of current residence to the nearest facility that can provide the required care. Veterans are usually able to apply for travel reimbursement at the VA medical center in which their appointment was held, through a travel office or business office within the facility. Medical centers also establish procedures to provide benefits for eligible veterans traveling to Community Based Outpatient Clinics or other facilities under their jurisdiction. Claimants must apply in person or in writing within 30 calendar days of completing the travel. Special mode transportation must be preapproved for reimbursement. In cases of emergency that involved special mode transportation, applications for reimbursement must be made within 30 days. If a veteran does not qualify for travel reimbursement based on eligibility criteria, the veteran may be able to access other resources to assist in funding travel. VA facilities will provide reduced-fare request forms to veterans for submission to bus companies and other transportation providers. The transportation provider determines whether reduced fare will be offered to the veteran. Veterans may also be able to access transportation assistance or services from non-governmental veterans service organizations, such as the Disabled American Veterans' (DAV) Transportation Network. The only exceptions to the service-connected disability or income qualification eligibility criteria for the benefit are for those traveling for a C&P exam or those traveling to a transplant center for transplant care. Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn veterans, veterans with spinal cord injuries, and other "special groups" must meet standard eligibility criteria to receive the benefit. Only veterans receiving inpatient VA care and considered to be in a "terminal condition" (expected to live six months or less) are eligible to receive travel benefits to relocate to a health care facility that is not located in the area where they lived when they entered their current facility. VA will not pay return travel for a beneficiary who has been irregularly discharged. If a veteran arrives at a medical center for non-emergency services without an appointment and receives care or services, VA will approve payment only for return trip costs; if no services are provided, VA will not approve payment for travel. If a veteran has a travel claim denied, the veteran must be provided with written notice of the decision. Veterans have rights to appeal the decision, which can be filed with the Board of Veterans Appeals. Appendix A. Beneficiary Travel Program History Appendix B. Beneficiary Travel Program Funding According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, the costs associated with the Travel Beneficiary Program have risen in recent years due to the increased number of veterans claiming mileage reimbursement, a rise in the average number of claims per veteran, and higher costs per veteran claim. VA showed a 30% increase in the number of veterans claiming reimbursement (estimated at 450,000 in FY2008 and 586,000 in FY2009), and showed the average number of claims per veteran increased from 5.5 to 7.1 during that same period. As shown in Table B -1 , spending for the Beneficiary Travel Program increased by approximately 285% between FY2006 and FY2010. It is estimated that VA will spend approximately $798 million in FY2011. It should be noted that the funding for this program comes directly from the VA health care appropriation.

The Department of Veterans Affairs administers a Travel Beneficiary Program to help alleviate the costs of travel to medical appointments for eligible veterans. Travel benefit eligibility for veterans is based on either the characteristics of the veteran, the type of medical appointment, or a combination of the two. Certain people who are not veterans, including family members or others accompanying veterans to appointments and organ donors, are also eligible for the benefit. Travel costs are reimbursed to beneficiaries, usually after a deductible. Costs covered by the program include a per-mile rate for travel in private vehicles, "special mode" (e.g., ambulance) travel in certain circumstances, and in some cases airfare and meals and lodging. This report offers an overview of the benefit and includes a question-and-answer section with basic information about eligibility, the types of travel covered and how benefits are calculated, and how to apply for the benefit. The report also includes an appendix containing a review of major legislative and regulatory changes to the benefit since its inception in 1940 (P.L. 76-432) through the most recent changes enacted in 2010 (P.L. 111-163). Recent changes are primarily related to mileage reimbursement rates and deductibles. Another appendix details funding for the program between FY2006 and FY2011. Spending for the program has increased by 285% between FY2006 and FY2010, and the number of veterans claiming travel reimbursement has increased by 30% during that time.

The Constitution grants the "power of the purse" to Congress, but does not establish any specific procedure for the consideration of budgetary legislation. Instead, a number of laws and congressional rules contribute to the federal budget process, with two statutes in particular forming the basic framework. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as codified in Title 31 of the United States Code , established the statutory basis for an executive budget process by requiring the President to submit to Congress annually a proposed budget for the federal government. It also created the Bureau of the Budget (reorganized as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970) to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities, and the General Accounting Office (GAO, renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004) to assist Congress as the principal auditing agency of the federal government. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-344 , 88 Stat. 297) established the statutory basis for a congressional budget process, and provided for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for facilitating congressional budgetary decision making. It also established the House and Senate Budget Committees, and created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide budgetary information to Congress independent of the executive branch. The President is required to submit to Congress a proposed budget by the first Monday in February. Although this budget does not have the force of law, it is a comprehensive examination of federal revenues and spending, including any initiatives recommended by the President, and is the start of extensive interaction with Congress. Within six weeks of the President's budget submission, congressional committees are required to submit their "views and estimates" of spending and revenues within their respective jurisdictions to the House and Senate Budget Committees. These views and estimates, along with information from other sources, are then used by each Budget Committee in drafting and reporting a concurrent resolution on the budget to its respective house. Other information is gathered by the Budget Committees in reports and hearing testimony. That information includes budget and economic projections, programmatic information, and budget priorities, and comes from a variety of sources, such as CBO, OMB, the Federal Reserve, executive branch agencies, and congressional leadership. Although it also does not have the force of law, the budget resolution is a central part of the budget process in Congress. As a concurrent resolution, it represents an agreement between the House and Senate that establishes budget priorities, and defines the parameters for all subsequent budgetary actions. The spending, revenue, and public debt legislation necessary to implement decisions agreed to in the budget resolution are subsequently enacted separately. Discretionary spending, in the form of appropriation bills, involves annual actions that must be completed before the beginning of a new fiscal year on October 1. Changes in direct spending or revenue laws may also be a part of budgetary actions in any given year. When these changes are directly tied to implementing the fiscal policies in the budget resolution for that year, the reconciliation process may be used. Reconciliation typically follows a timetable established in the budget resolution. Other budgetary legislation, such as changes in direct spending or revenue laws separate from the reconciliation process, changes in the public debt limit, or authorizing legislation, are not tied directly to the annual budget cycle. However, such legislation may be a necessary part of budgetary actions in any given year. The budget resolution represents an agreement between the House and Senate concerning the overall size of the federal budget, and the general composition of the budget in terms of functional categories. The amounts in functional categories are translated into allocations to each committee with jurisdiction over spending in a process called "crosswalking" under Section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act. Legislation considered by the House and Senate must be consistent with these allocations, as well as with the aggregate levels of spending and revenues. Both the allocations and aggregates are enforceable through points of order that may be made during House or Senate floor consideration of such legislation. These allocations are supplemented by nonbinding assumptions concerning the substance of possible budgetary legislation that are included in the reports from the Budget Committees that accompany the budget resolution in each house. In some years, the budget resolution includes reconciliation instructions. Reconciliation instructions identify the committees that must recommend changes in laws affecting revenues or direct spending programs within their jurisdiction in order to implement the priorities agreed to in the budget resolution. All committees receiving such instructions must submit recommended legislative language to the Budget Committee in their respective chamber, which packages the recommended language as an omnibus measure and reports the measure without substantive revision. A reconciliation bill would then be considered, and possibly amended, by the full House or Senate. In the House, reconciliation bills are typically considered under the terms of a special rule. In the Senate, reconciliation bills are considered under limitations imposed by Sections 305, 310, and 313 of the Congressional Budget Act. These sections limit debate on a reconciliation bill to 20 hours, and limit the types of amendments that may be considered. The annual appropriations process provides funding for discretionary spending programs through regular annual appropriations bills. Congress must enact these measures prior to the beginning of each fiscal year (October 1) or provide interim funding for the affected programs through a "continuing resolution." By custom, appropriations bills originate in the House, but may be amended by the Senate, as other legislation. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees are organized into subcommittees, each of which is responsible for developing an appropriations bill. Appropriations bills are constrained in terms of both their purpose and the amount of funding they provide. Appropriations are constrained in terms of purpose because the rules of both the House (Rule XXI) and the Senate (Rule XVI) generally require authorization prior to consideration of appropriations for an agency or program. Constraints in terms of the amount of funding exist on several levels. For individual items or programs, funding may be limited to the level recommended in authorizing legislation. The overall level of discretionary spending provided in appropriations acts is limited by the allocations from the budget resolution made to the Appropriations Committees under Section 302(a) of the Budget Act. These allocations provide limits that may be enforced procedurally through points of order in the House and Senate during consideration of legislation. In the absence of a final agreement on a concurrent resolution on the budget, the House or Senate may adopt a "deeming resolution" to establish provisional enforcement levels. Section 302(b) of the Budget Act further requires the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to subdivide the amounts allocated to them under the budget resolution among their subcommittees. These suballocations are to be made "as soon as practicable after a concurrent resolution on the budget is agreed to." Because each subcommittee is responsible for developing a single general appropriations bill, the process of making suballocations effectively determines the spending level for each of the regular annual appropriations bills. Legislation (or amendments) that would cause the suballocations made under 302(b) to be exceeded is subject to a point of order. The Appropriations Committees can (and do) issue revised subdivisions over the course of appropriations actions to reflect changes in spending priorities effected during floor consideration or in conference. The budget resolution provides a guideline for the overall level of revenues, but not for their composition. Legislative language controlling revenues is reported by the committees of jurisdiction (the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee). The revenue level agreed to in the budget resolution acts as a minimum, limiting consideration of revenue legislation that would decrease revenue below that level. In addition, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution requires that all revenue measures originate in the House of Representatives, although the Senate may amend them, as other legislation. Revenue legislation may be considered at any time, although revenue provisions are often included in reconciliation legislation. The budget resolution also specifies an appropriate level for the public debt that reflects the budgetary policies agreed to in the resolution. Any change in the authorized level of the public debt must be implemented through a statutory enactment. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 ( P.L. 99-177 , 99 Stat. 1037) established the sequester as a means to enforce statutory budget limits. Amendments to this act were designed to use sequesters to control direct spending and revenues (through the pay-as-you-go, or PAYGO, process) and discretionary spending (through spending caps). Under these mechanisms, the budgetary impact of all legislation was scored by OMB, and reported three times each year (a preview with the President's budget submission, an update with the Mid-Session Review of the Budget, and a final report 15 days after Congress adjourned). If the final report on either the PAYGO or spending caps mechanism indicated that the statutory limitations within that category had been violated, the President was required to issue an order making across-the-board cuts of nonexempt spending programs within that category. Those mechanisms expired October 1, 2002. Although formal enforcement of these mechanisms was through a presidential order, by enforcing the allocations and aggregates for spending and revenues provided in the budget resolution consistent with these limits, Congress was able to use points of order to enforce them as well. Although these statutory limits expired at the end of FY2002, Congress has continued to use the concurrent resolution on the budget and points of order to establish and enforce budgetary limits. More recently, new statutory control mechanisms have been established. The first was the Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010 to limit increases in the deficit caused by new direct spending or revenue legislation. Like its predecessor, it uses sequestration as its enforcement mechanism. On August 2, 2011, the Budget Control Act of 2011 was signed into law. This law reestablished discretionary spending caps to apply to FY2012-FY2021 as well as parameters for further deficit reduction to be achieved over the same period. It includes two separate sequester mechanisms to enforce its requirements. These sequesters would enforce (1) the discretionary spending limit and (2) any amounts of the additional deficit reduction required under the act not achieved through a privileged measure to be authored by a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction. Although the primary enforcement of these limits is through sequestration, the Budget Control Act also established a point of order against the consideration of legislation that would exceed the discretionary spending caps. In addition, by enforcing allocations and aggregates in the budget resolution consistent with these limits, Congress can enforce them through existing points of order as well.

The term "budget process," when applied to the federal government, actually refers to a number of processes that have evolved separately and that occur with varying degrees of coordination. This overview, and the accompanying flow chart, are intended to describe in brief each of the parts of the budget process that involve Congress, clarify the role played by each, and explain how they operate together. They include the President's budget submission, the budget resolution, reconciliation, sequestration, authorizations, and appropriations. This report will be updated to reflect any changes in the budget process.

"Ideas can come from anywhere," a scholar of American politics once wrote. To be sure, ideas and recommendations for legislation come from a wide variety of sources, such as individual Senators; committees and other Senate working groups; legislative staff; party and chamber leaders; executive branch agencies and the White House; states and localities; members of the media; citizens; and interest groups. Any or all of these individuals or entities may participate in drafting legislation, but only a Senator may formally introduce legislation in the Senate. Some common considerations taken into account when drafting a bill include the following: What problem does the bill seek to address? Understanding the source of a problem is necessary in order to properly address it. An abundance of information is available to Senators in the form of reports, studies, and presentations offered by a wide range of individuals, groups, and organizations, including CRS. Soliciting expert testimony in the context of a committee hearing is another common method by which the Senate gathers relevant information for use in policymaking. To what committee is it likely to be referred? Committee referral can matter because one committee might be especially receptive to the proposed legislation in comparison to another committee. Senators may also prefer that their bill be referred to a committee on which they serve in order to ensure continued involvement at the committee stage of proceedings. Will the bill attract cosponsors? Cosponsorship conveys a Senator's support for a measure, so bills that attract many cosponsors could be seen as enjoying broad support within the chamber. A measure with many cosponsors, especially if they include committee and party leaders, could encourage the relevant committee chair to take some action on the legislation, such as hold hearings on it. Does it have bipartisan appeal? Senate rules tend to favor deliberation over decision, so building a coalition of support for a proposal can take time. With few limits on Senate debate, reaching a final vote on legislation often requires a supermajority of 60 Senators to bring debate to a close, so some amount of bipartisan cooperation usually is needed to secure final passage. Measures that are limited in scope but have broad bipartisan appeal may be passed (or "cleared") by unanimous consent with minimal floor time expended. The Senate's clearance system (or "hotline") can facilitate swift action on noncontroversial proposals, but this pathway can be blocked by even a single objection. What are the budgetary implications? The Senate places a number of restrictions on legislation with budgetary consequences. For instance, if a proposal adds to the federal deficit, it may be subject to a point of order on the chamber floor for violating congressional budget rules (many of which are codified in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974). Support for a measure may also hinge on how its costs are paid for. Senators may agree about the merits of a bill but disagree with how its provisions are funded. Should companion legislation be introduced in the House? To become law, a bill or joint resolution must pass both houses of Congress in identical form (including the same text and bill number) and be signed by the President. For this reason, Senate sponsors sometimes encourage their allies in the House to introduce identical or similarly worded legislation into that body to encourage bicameral consideration. Companion bills might also attract wider public and Member attention to the issues addressed in the legislation. Is the measure best introduced at the beginning, in the middle, or toward the end of a Congress? Timing the introduction of a measure can be important. Comprehensive legislation is likely to require a great deal of time to work through, both in committee and on the floor. An early introduction will give the Senate more time to examine the measure's provisions. Advantage might also be gained by being the first to address an issue. Those who move first tend to attract media attention and may be seen by their colleagues as exercising leadership in that particular policy area. Strategic delay is another option. This approach might provide more time for an individual or committee to study the issue and build support for a preferred solution. To be sure, many bills do not follow a linear (or "regular order") legislative process—introduction, consideration in committee, and arrival on the floor for further debate and amendment. For example, a legislative proposal that had languished in committee might suddenly be taken up in the Senate because it deals with an unfolding crisis or emergency. There is no Senate rule that introduced bills and resolutions must be prepared by the Office of the Legislative Counsel. Senators can receive drafts of bills from executive officials, interest groups, and others. Still, the office plays an important role by providing Senators and staff, at their request, with drafts of legislation. Use of the office by Senators and staff is nearly universal. Its staff attorneys are experts in legislative drafting, and they focus almost exclusively on policy issues within their areas of expertise. Legislative attorneys are often assigned to serve a specific committee as a kind of nonpartisan, shared staff. They work closely with committee members and staff to ensure that a bill's language and form match the intent of its sponsor and adhere to drafting rules and linguistic traditions of the Senate. Several drafts may be required before a measure is ready for formal introduction. Those drafting legislation may seek assistance from the Office of Legislative Counsel at any stage. All communications with the office are treated as confidential. The office is located in Room 668 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building and can be reached at extension 4-6461 or by sending an email request to Receptionist@slc.senate.gov. The number of requests to draft bills and amendments has nearly doubled over the past 10 years, from roughly 20,000 requests handled by the office during the 109 th Congress (2005-2006) to more than 40,000 in more recent congresses. To guide the management of its workload, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration has established a system for prioritizing requests received by the office. Measures currently in conference committee receive the highest priority, followed by amendments to measures pending on the Senate floor. Measures being considered in committee are prioritized next, followed by proposals drafted at the request of individual Senators. It is this latter category into which many introduced bills will fall. Within each of these categories, priority is given to requests in the order they are received. Given the volume of its work, it is advisable to give the office as much advance notice as possible when making a drafting request. Depending on the nature of the policy area, the workload of the office, and other factors, it can take substantial time to draft legislation, especially if it addresses complex issues or involves multiple subject areas. When Senators introduce a measure, they commonly attach a form listing the names of cosponsors. Cosponsorship signifies a Senator's support for the proposal. Prior to its introduction, Senators may cosponsor a measure by contacting the office of the legislative sponsor and requesting that their names be added to the bill or resolution. Initial (or "original") cosponsors can be added until the measure is presented to the bill clerk in the Senate chamber. Thereafter, unanimous consent is required to include additional cosponsors on the measure. There is no limit on the number of cosponsors a measure may attract. Cosponsors do not sign the bill, but the sponsor is required to. A "Dear Colleague" letter sent to most or all Senators is a common technique for informing Senators of the pending introduction of a bill or resolution, and for soliciting support. Typically, these letters briefly state the issue the measure addresses, the measure's significant features, and an appeal to become a cosponsor. These letters almost always include the name and telephone number of a staff aide to contact about cosponsoring the bill. At the beginning of each new Congress, the Senate traditionally adopts a standing order allowing Senators to introduce measures at any time the chamber is in session by presenting them to the bill clerk seated at the desk on the Senate floor. A measure must be signed by the sponsoring Senator in the top right hand corner before it can be introduced. Printing should be one-sided, and staff contact information should be written on the back of the last page of the bill. There is no limit on the number of measures a Senator may introduce, and Senators may propose legislation for any reason. Between 1973 and 2016, Senators introduced an average of about 40 bills and resolutions per Congress. Statistics on introduced bills and resolutions are provided in Table 1 . Senators who wish to make a statement on the measure may deliver their remarks during morning business (which is common) or at another point during the day, or they may ask unanimous consent to insert their statement in the Congressional Record . These statements appear in the "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions" section. By unanimous consent, the text of the measure is also typically printed in the Record . Senators and staff may also consider devising an attention-grabbing title for their legislation, such as the USA-Patriot Act ("Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism"). Such titles might attract media attention and notice by other lawmakers. Although rare, a Senator may object to the introduction of a bill or joint resolution. If objection is heard, the bill may be introduced on the following legislative day (or anytime thereafter) as a matter of right under paragraph 1 of Rule XIV. Referral decisions are made by the Senate Parliamentarian acting on behalf of the presiding officer. Referral occurs primarily on the basis of committee jurisdictions set forth in Senate Rule XXV. Under the provisions of Senate Rule XVII, a measure is referred to the committee with "jurisdiction over the subject matter which predominates in such proposed legislation." The word "predominates" in Rule XVII implies a majority standard by which subject matter is determined, which at times can arouse inter-committee disagreements as only a single subject can be considered predominant. Multiple referral occurs only occasionally in the Senate on account of Rule XVII, and in almost all cases is made by unanimous consent or standing order. When referring a measure to committee, the Parliamentarian might begin by asking two related questions: "What is this measure mainly about?" and "What committee has subject matter jurisdiction that corresponds most closely to the measure's main subject?" Senate Rule XIV requires that all bills and resolutions be read twice before they are referred to committee, but rarely is this requirement strictly adhered to. Measures are typically referred immediately if there is no objection, and this is what occurs in the large majority of cases. (House bills and resolutions messaged to the Senate are often referred immediately as well.) A procedure in Rule XIV allows an introduced (or House-received) bill or joint resolution to be placed directly on the calendar of business without first being referred to a standing committee. The number of bills and resolutions introduced in the Senate fluctuates over time as Table 1 shows. There is little reason to expect that the demand for legislation would stay constant over this period; new issues arise, those that exist are dealt with, and old issues fade away. The 109 th Congress (2005-2006) reached a high point with 4,869 introductions, while the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) falls at the lower end of recent congresses with 2,628 introduced bills and resolutions. Most introduced measures are bills, as shown in the second column of Table 1 . Only bills and joint resolutions can make or change law; concurrent and simple resolutions are used primarily to address internal matters of one or both chambers. For instance, a concurrent resolution is used to organize a joint session of Congress to receive the President's State of the Union address. A simple resolution would be appropriate to address Senate-related matters, such as proposals to amend the standing rules of the chamber. Legislation to honor or celebrate an individual, group, or event may also be drafted as a simple or concurrent resolution. Most measures are introduced by individual Senators, but Senate committees may also report an "original" bill for chamber consideration. As Senate Rule XXV states, standing committees have "leave to report by bill or otherwise on matters within their respective jurisdictions." This means that committees do not have to wait for measures to be referred to them in order to act. The relevant committee chair is generally considered the sponsor in these instances, although the measure is perhaps best understood as a product that incorporates views and input from other committee members as well. Original bills may not have cosponsors.

Authoring and introducing legislation is fundamental to the task of representing voters as a U.S. Senator. Part of what makes the American political process unique is that it affords all Senators an ability to propose their own ideas for chamber consideration. By comparison, most other democratic governments around the world rely on an executive official, often called a premier, chancellor, or prime minister, to originate and submit policy proposals for discussion and enactment by the legislature. Legislators serving in other countries generally lack the power to initiate legislative proposals of their own. In the American political system, ideas and recommendations for legislation come from a wide variety of sources. Any number of individuals, groups, or entities may participate in drafting bills and resolutions, but only Senators may formally introduce legislation in the Senate, and they may do so for any reason. When a Senator has determined that a bill or resolution is ready for introduction, it can be delivered to the bill clerk's desk on the chamber floor when the Senate is in session. The sponsor must sign the measure and attach the names of any original cosponsors on a separate form. Cosponsors do not sign the bill. There is no Senate rule that introduced bills and resolutions must be prepared by the Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, but the office plays an important role by providing Senators and staff, at their request, with drafts of legislation. Use of the office by Senators and staff is nearly universal. Once introduced, the Senate Parliamentarian, acting on behalf of the presiding officer, refers legislation to committee based primarily on how its contents align with the subject matter jurisdictions of committees established in Senate Rule XXV. Multiple referral is rare in the Senate due to Senate Rule XVII, which states that a measure is referred to the committee with "jurisdiction over the subject matter which predominates in such proposed legislation." This report is intended to assist Senators and staff in preparing legislation for introduction. Its contents address essential elements of the process, including bill drafting, the mechanics of introduction, and the roles played by key Senate offices involved in the drafting, submission, and referral of legislation. Statistics on introduced bills and resolutions are presented in the final section to illustrate patterns of introduction in recent Congresses.

In its discussion of strategies for aviation security, the 9/11 Commission recommended that: The TSA [Transportation Security Administration] and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As a start, each individual selected for special screening should be screened for explosives. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to place high priority on developing and deploying equipment for passenger explosives screening; required TSA, part of DHS, to submit a strategic plan for deploying such equipment; and authorized additional research funding. It also required that passengers who are selected for additional screening be screened for explosives, as an interim measure until all passengers can be screened for explosives. Congressional interest in this topic continues, particularly as the 110 th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 ( H.R. 1 ) would require TSA to issue the strategic plan called for by P.L. 108-458 within seven days of passage and would establish a Checkpoint Screening Security Fund, paid for with fees on airline passengers, to develop and deploy equipment for explosives detection at screening checkpoints. The Improving America's Security Act of 2007 ( S. 4 ) would require DHS to issue the same strategic plan within 90 days of passage and begin its implementation within one year of passage. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Health, and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007 ( H.R. 1591 , the FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill) would provide an additional $45 million for expansion of checkpoint explosives detection pilot systems. This report discusses the current state of passenger explosives trace detection and related policy issues. Explosives detection for aviation security has been an area of federal concern for many years. Much effort has been focused on direct detection of explosive materials in carry-on and checked luggage, but techniques have also been developed to detect and identify residual traces that may indicate a passenger's recent contact with explosive materials. These techniques use separation and detection technologies, such as mass spectrometry, gas chromatography, chemical luminescence, or ion mobility spectrometry, to measure the chemical properties of vapor or particulate matter collected from passengers or their carry-on luggage. Several technologies have been developed and deployed on a test or pilot basis. Parallel efforts in explosives vapor detection have employed specially trained animals, usually dogs. The effectiveness of chemical trace analysis is highly dependent on three distinct steps: (1) sample collection, (2) sample analysis, and (3) comparison of results with known standards. If any of these steps is suboptimal, the test may fail to detect explosives that are present. When trace analysis is used for passenger screening, additional goals may include nonintrusive or minimally intrusive sample collection, fast sample analysis and identification, and low cost. While no universal solution has yet been achieved, ion mobility spectrometry is most often used in currently deployed equipment. In 2004, TSA began pilot projects to deploy portal trace detection equipment for operational testing and evaluation. In the portal approach, passengers pass through a device like a large doorframe that can collect, analyze, and identify explosive residues on the person's body or clothing. The portal may rely on the passenger's own body heat to volatilize traces of explosive material for detection as a vapor, or it may use puffs of air that can dislodge small particles as an aerosol. Portal deployment is ongoing. One alternative to portals is to collect the chemical sample using a handheld vacuum "wand". Another is to test an object handled by the passenger, such as a boarding pass, for residues transferred from the passenger's hands. In this case, the secondary object is used as the carrier between the passenger and the analyzing equipment. The olfactory ability of dogs is sensitive enough to detect trace amounts of many compounds, but several factors have inhibited the regular use of canines for passenger screening. Dogs trained in explosives detection can generally only work for brief periods, have significant upkeep costs, are unable to communicate the identity of the detected explosives residue, and require a human handler when performing their detection role. In addition, direct contact between dogs and airline passengers raises liability concerns. Direct detection of explosives concealed on passengers in bulk quantities has been another area of federal interest. Technology development efforts in this area include portal systems based on techniques such as x-ray backscatter imaging, millimeter wave energy analysis, and terahertz imaging. As such systems detect only bulk quantities of explosives, they would not raise "nuisance alarms" on passengers who have recently handled explosives for innocuous reasons. Some versions could simultaneously detect other threats, such as nonmetallic weapons. On the other hand, trace detection techniques are also likely to detect bulk quantities of explosives and may alert screening personnel to security concerns about a passenger who has had contact with explosives but is not actually carrying an explosive device when screened. Current deployments for passenger screening are focused on trace detection, and the remainder of this report does not discuss bulk detection. However, many of the policy issues discussed below would apply similarly to bulk detection equipment. Any strategy for deploying and operating passenger explosives detection portals must consider a number of challenges. Organizational challenges include deciding where and how detectors are used, projecting costs, and developing technical and regulatory standards. Operational challenges include maximizing passenger throughput, responding to erroneous and innocuous detections, ensuring passenger acceptance of new procedures, minimizing the potential for intentional disruption of the screening process, and providing for research and development into future generations of detection equipment, including techniques for detecting novel explosives. For security reasons, many technical details of equipment performance are not publicly available, which makes independent analysis of technical performance challenging. An important component of a deployment strategy is identifying where and how passenger explosives detection equipment will be used. Portals could be deployed widely, so that all locations benefit from them, or they could be used only at selected locations, where they can most effectively address and mitigate risk. In any given location, portals could be used as a primary screening technology for all passengers, or as a secondary screening technology for selected passengers only. Widespread deployment and use for primary screening might provide more uniform risk reduction, but would require many more portals and thus increase costs. The total cost of deploying explosives detection equipment for passenger screening is unknown. According to TSA, the portal systems currently being deployed in U.S. airports cost more than $160,000 each. Document scanning systems are somewhat less expensive; according to a 2002 GAO study, similar tabletop systems used for screening carry-on baggage can cost from $20,000 to $65,000. It is possible that technology improvements or bulk purchasing could lower costs. The number of devices required would depend on throughput rates, device reliability and lifetime, and deployment strategy. The United States has more than 400 commercial passenger airports; if equally distributed, several thousand devices might be required, corresponding to a total capital cost for equipment of up to hundreds of millions of dollars. Installation and maintenance costs would be additional. Operating the equipment would require additional screening procedures and might lead to costs for additional screening personnel, or else create indirect costs by increasing passenger wait times. It is unknown whether the personnel limit for TSA screeners, currently set at 45,000 full time equivalent screeners nationwide ( P.L. 108-90 ), could accommodate the potential additional staffing requirements. Standards for the performance of passenger explosives trace detection equipment, procedures for evaluation and certification of the equipment, and regulations for its use are all yet to be established. Regulations and screening procedures have been established for explosives trace detection on luggage. Detection on passengers is a more complicated venture, involving possible privacy concerns, greater difficulty in sampling, and potentially different sensitivity requirements. Nevertheless, the current luggage regulations could be a model for future certification criteria for passenger screening. Procedures will also need to be established for the use of the equipment, such as how an operator should resolve detector alarms to distinguish genuine security threats from false positives and innocuous true positives. When multiplied by the large number of airline passengers each day, even small increases in screening times may be logistically prohibitive. The TSA goal for passenger wait time at airports is less than 10 minutes, and screening systems reportedly operate at a rate between 7 to 10 passengers per minute; additional screening that slows passenger throughput and increases passenger wait time may add to airport congestion and have a detrimental economic impact. A 1996 GAO study stated that throughput goals for portal technologies at that time were equivalent to 6 passengers per minute. According to the same study, non-portal technologies, such as secondary object analysis, had slightly higher throughput goals. The TSA's pilot deployment of passenger explosives trace detection equipment will likely provide useful information on passenger throughput. If no appreciable increase in screening times occurs, then passenger explosives screening may involve few additional direct economic costs beyond those of procuring, deploying, operating, and maintaining the equipment. If passenger throughput is drastically decreased, then alternatives for passenger screening may need to be considered. In between these extremes, it may be possible to moderate the economic impact by adding screening lanes or by using explosives detection equipment only on those passengers who are selected for secondary screening, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission as a possible initial step. A potential complication of explosives trace detection is the accuracy of detector performance. False positives, false negatives, and innocuous true positives are all challenges. If the detection system often detects the presence of an explosive when there actually is none (a false positive) then there will be a high burden in verifying results through additional procedures. Because of the large volume of air passengers, even small false positive rates may be unacceptable. Conversely, if the system fails to detect the presence of an explosive (a false negative) then the potential consequences may be serious. Assuming the system has adequate sensitivity to detect explosives traces in an operational environment, the detection threshold or criteria required for an alarm can generally be adjusted, enabling a tradeoff between false positives and false negatives, but neither can be eliminated entirely; the appropriate balance may be a matter of debate. Innocuous true positives occur when a passenger has been in contact with explosives, but for legitimate reasons. Examples include individuals who take nitroglycerin for medical purposes or individuals in the mining or construction industry who use explosives in their work. Such passengers would be regularly subject to additional security scrutiny. Similar issues arise from the current use of trace detection equipment on some airline passenger carry-on baggage, and innocuous true positives in such cases are generally handled without incident. The impact of innocuous true positives will likely depend on their frequency and on the proportion of passengers subject to explosives trace detection. Some passengers may have personal concerns about the addition of passenger explosives trace detection to the screening process. Issues of privacy may be raised by the connection between innocuous true positives and passenger medical status or field of employment. Also, equipment that uses a vacuum "wand" or puffs of air for sample collection may offend some passengers' sense of propriety or modesty. Passenger reluctance could then increase screening times. Allowing alternative forms of screening, such as within privacy enclosures or through different imaging technology, might mitigate passenger concerns in some cases. Another concern is the possibility that a passenger screening regimen that includes explosives trace detection could be exploited to intentionally disrupt the operation of an airport. The dissemination of trace quantities of an explosive material on commonly touched objects within the airport might lead to many positive detections on passengers. This would make trace detection less effective or ineffective for security screening, and might disrupt airport operations generally until alternative screening procedures, such as enhanced baggage screening by TSA personnel, could be put in place or the contamination source could be identified and eliminated. The DHS and its predecessor agencies have historically been the main funders of research on explosives detection for airport use. (Most of this research has focused on detecting explosives in baggage rather than on passengers.) Several other federal agencies, however, also fund research related to trace explosives detection. These include the Departments of Energy and Justice, the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the interagency Technical Support Working Group. Much of this research has been dedicated to overcoming technical challenges, such as increasing sensitivity and reducing the time required for sample analysis. A different research challenge is the detection of novel explosives. Detectors are generally designed to look for specific explosives, both to limit the number of false or innocuous positives and to allow a determination of which explosive has been detected. As a result, novel explosives are unlikely to be detected until identifying characteristics and reference standards have been developed and incorporated into equipment designs. Unlike imaging techniques for detecting bulk quantities of explosives, trace analysis provides no opportunity for a human operator to identify a suspicious material based on experience or intuition. Liquid explosives are a novel threat that has been of particular interest since August 2006, when British police disrupted a plot to bomb aircraft using liquids. The DHS is evaluating technologies to detect liquid explosives. Its efforts are mainly focused on bulk detection, such as scanners to test the contents of bottles. Like solid explosives, however, liquids might be found through trace detection, if the trace detection system is designed to look for them.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations via H.R. 1 and S. 4.

On May 8, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 1406 , the Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013. If enacted, the bill would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to allow private sector employers to provide paid leave in the future ( compensatory time or comp time ) in lieu of overtime pay when the overtime is worked. Under H.R. 1406 , compensatory time would be available only when an employer and employee (or representative of the employee) agree to replace overtime wages with paid time off. Compensatory time would be accrued at a rate of not less than one and one-half hours of comp time for each hour of employment for which overtime pay is required. In October 2013, a Senate version of the Working Families Flexibility Act ( S. 1623 ) was introduced. The bill's language was identical to the House-passed version of H.R. 1406 . S. 1623 was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions but, as of this writing, has seen no further action. This report begins with a brief overview of the weekly hours and overtime provisions of the FLSA. It then describes the existing comp time provisions that cover public sector employees. The report then discusses the changes proposed by H.R. 1406 . Initially enacted in 1938, the FLSA regulates weekly hours of work and overtime wages. The act covers most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Exemptions are discussed briefly later in this report. The hours of work regulations discussed in this section are national minimums. The FLSA allows states to enact shorter maximum work hours. Section 7 of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. §207) specifies that employers must pay covered workers at least one and one-half times their regular hourly wage for hours worked in excess of 40 in a single work week. This "time and a half" wage is often referred to as overtime pay. A work week is characterized as a fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours (seven 24-hour periods). Work weeks are determined by the employer and may begin on any day and hour. Exceeding 40 hours in a work week is the only scheduling circumstance that entitles a private sector worker to overtime wages. An employer may schedule hours of work in any combination of hours under 40 for a work week (e.g., three 12-hour days) and not be required to pay overtime wages. If an employer does pay overtime wages, there is no maximum number of hours of work for an employee age 16 or over. Section 13 of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. §213) exempts certain workers from the overtime provisions of the act. The largest group of workers who are exempt are bona fide executive, administrative, and professional employees (the "EAP exemption"). Regulations specify that workers under the EAP exemption must be paid a salary of at least $455 per week and meet certain job duty requirements. The FLSA allows nonexempt state and local government employees to receive comp time in lieu of overtime pay. Under a separate law, both exempt and nonexempt federal employees may receive comp time. When it was enacted in 1938, the FLSA covered private sector employees only. In 1966, FLSA coverage was extended to state and local government employees of hospitals, elementary and secondary schools, institutions of higher education, and local transit systems. In 1974, coverage was extended to most federal, state, and local government employees . A 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision ( National League of Cities v. Usery ) held that the 1966 and 1974 amendments to the FLSA that extended coverage to state and local governments were unconstitutional. In February1985, the U.S. Supreme Court ( Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority ) overturned the 1976 decision. After the 1985 Supreme Court ruling, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 ( P.L. 99-150 ) delayed, until April 15, 1986, the requirement that state and local governments pay nonexempt employees time-and-a-half for overtime. The act also allowed employees of state and local governments to receive comp time at a rate of at least one-and-a-half hours for each hour of overtime worked. According to House and Senate committee reports on the 1985 amendments, the purpose of delaying the implementation of time-and-a-half for overtime was to allow state and local governments time to adjust to the new standard. The committee reports also noted that, at the time, many state and local governments had comp time arrangements with their employees. These arrangements were often the result of collective bargaining agreements. Thus, a reason for the comp time provision was to accommodate current practices. Federal employees may receive overtime pay if they work more than 40 hours in a week or 8 hours in a day. Both FLSA exempt and nonexempt employees are eligible for overtime pay. Federal employees may request comp time in lieu of overtime pay. However, an agency head may direct an employee whose pay is greater than the maximum pay for a General Schedule (GS) pay grade 10 employee to take comp time instead of receiving overtime pay when overtime is worked. Federal employees are granted one hour of comp time for each hour of overtime worked. An employee must use accrued comp time by the end of the 26 th pay period after the pay period during which it was earned. At their discretion, federal agencies may pay employees for unused comp time at the employees' overtime rate of pay. For nonexempt employees, comp time is paid at one-and-a-half times an employee's hourly rate of pay. For exempt employees, if an employee's pay is less than the minimum pay of a GS-10 employee, comp time is paid at one-and-a-half times the employee's hourly rate of pay. If an employee's pay is more than the minimum pay of a GS-10 employee, comp time is paid at the greater of one-and-a-half times the minimum hourly pay of a GS-10 employee or the employee's actual hourly rate of pay. The 113 th Congress marks the third time since 1996 that the House has passed a bill to expand comp time to the private sector. In the 104 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 2391 and in the 105 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1 . While some details varied, these bills were largely similar to H.R. 1406 in the 113 th Congress. H.R. 1406 would amend the FLSA to permit an employee to receive "in lieu of monetary overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required[.]" Under the act, an employee would be eligible to accrue a maximum of 160 hours of comp time. Under H.R. 1406 , the use of comp time in lieu of overtime wages would be optional for both the employer and employee. If an employer declines to offer comp time, the changes to the FLSA would have no effect and employees would continue to be eligible for overtime wages. If an employer does choose to offer comp time, eligible employees may accept comp time through a written agreement or decline comp time and continue to be eligible for overtime wages. In cases where employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the employee representative may choose to accept or decline comp time. The bill would limit eligibility for comp time to employees who have worked at least 1,000 hours for the employer during the prior 12-month period. H.R. 1406 would allow employees to withdraw from a comp time agreement and return to overtime wages at any time. Employees who withdraw from a comp time agreement may also request to have any unused comp time converted to a cash payment. Employers would be required to comply with this request within 30 days. Employers would be permitted to discontinue offering comp time with 30 days' notice, absent a collective bargaining agreement providing otherwise. The legislation states that employers shall not "directly or indirectly intimidate, threaten, or coerce or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce" any employee in relation to the employee's choice to accept, forego, or use compensatory time. An employer that violates these provisions "shall be liable to the employee affected in the amount of the rate of compensation ... for each hour of compensatory time accrued by the employee and in an additional amount of such rate of compensation for each hour of compensatory time used by such employee." H.R. 1406 specifies that an employee who has accrued comp time shall be permitted to use it "within a reasonable period after making the request" if the request "does not unduly disrupt the operations of the employer." This language is similar to the provisions in current law regulating the use of comp time by state and local government employees. Comp time may be used as paid time off in place of regular work hours. H.R. 1406 , however, also specifies several circumstances in which unused comp time would be converted into a cash payment. No later than January 31 of each year, an employer must provide monetary compensation for any unused comp time accrued during the preceding calendar year. An employer may designate another fixed 12-month period as the work year, though payment for unused comp time must be provided no later than 31 days after the end of the specified work year. An employee may request unused comp time to be converted to monetary payment at any time. The employer must comply with this request within 30 days. An employer, with 30 days' notice, may convert any accrued comp time in excess of 80 hours to a monetary payment. If employment is terminated, either voluntarily or involuntarily, unused comp time must be converted to a monetary payment. Under H.R. 1406 , if compensation is paid for accrued comp time, it would be paid at the higher rate of (1) the employee's regular rate of pay when it is earned or (2) the employee's final rate of pay. The act specifies that any payment owed to an employee for unused comp time would be considered unpaid overtime compensation. H.R. 1406 would require the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to submit reports to Congress, beginning two years after the date of enactment and each of the three years thereafter. The reports would provide data on the extent to which the comp time provisions are utilized as well as the number of complaints, enforcement actions, and remedies related to comp time. Under H.R. 1406 , the changes to the FLSA made would expire five years after enactment.

On May 8, 2013, the House passed H.R. 1406, the Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013. If enacted, this bill would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to allow private sector employers to provide future paid leave (compensatory time or comp time) in lieu of overtime wages. Under current law, the FLSA requires employers to pay covered, nonexempt employees one and one-half times their regular hourly wage ("time and a half") for any hours worked in excess of 40 in a single work week. If enacted, H.R. 1406 would give employers and employees the option to agree to replace overtime wages with one and one-half hours of paid time off for each hour of overtime worked. H.R. 1406 would not affect workers who are not presently covered by, or are exempt from, the overtime provisions of the FLSA such as many executive, administrative, and professional employees. Under H.R. 1406, the replacement of overtime wages with comp time would be optional for both employers and employees. If an employer and an employee (or the representative of the employee) enter into a comp time agreement, either party may terminate the agreement. If such an agreement is terminated, any unused comp time would be converted to a cash payment to the employee. Under a comp time agreement, employees would be permitted to accrue up to 160 hours of comp time. Once a year, employers would be required to convert all unused comp time to a monetary payment. Accrued comp time would also be converted to a monetary payment upon the voluntary or involuntary termination of an employee. If enacted, the comp time provisions of H.R. 1406 would expire five years after enactment. In October 2013, a Senate version of the Working Families Flexibility Act (S. 1623) was introduced. The bill's language was identical to the House-passed version of H.R. 1406. S. 1623 was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions but, as of this writing, has seen no further action.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the safety of foods (including animal feeds) and cosmetics, and the safety and effectiveness of drugs, biologics (e.g., vaccines), and medical devices. The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides FDA's annual funding. The total amount that FDA can spend, its program level, consists of direct appropriations (which FDA calls budget authority) and other funds, most of them user fees. An appropriations bill specifies both the budget authority and user fee amounts each year. It also dictates the total for each of FDA's major program areas (Foods, Human Drugs, Biologics, Devices, Animal Drugs and Feeds, and Toxicological Research ) and several agency-wide support areas (Office of the Commissioner and other headquarter offices, rents to the General Services Administration, and other rent and rent-related activities). It also authorizes collections and spending from several specific other funds (relating to mammography quality standards, and color and export certification). Traditionally, the appropriations committees have used report language to recommend, urge, or request specific activities within major programs. The standard appropriations procedure involves congressional passage of 12 annual regular appropriations acts, of which agriculture (including FDA) is one. Except that final passage occurred after the start of the fiscal year, the FY2010 agriculture appropriations followed the standard process. Table 1 provides a timeline of the administrative and congressional steps toward FY2010 appropriations for FDA. For 7 of the previous 11 fiscal years, Congress had not completed that standard process and had passed omnibus or consolidated appropriations legislation, as shown in Table 2 . For FY2009, Congress acted in the final days of FY2008 to provide appropriations for the start of FY2009 as part of the larger Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 , signed on September 30, 2008). In March 2009, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations bill that included FDA ( P.L. 111-8 ). In February of each year (except for when a new President has taken office the month before), the President presents a budget request to Congress. The annual Food and Drug Administration Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees contains program-level details of the President's request, while also highlighting successes, needs, and special initiatives (e.g., drug safety, imports, bioterror countermeasures, inspections). Because the topics selected for discussion vary over the years, analysts cannot use this information to track exact changes over time. The program-level detail, however, provides a window into the priorities and activities of the agency. The FY2010 request—$3.178 billion—is 19% higher than FY2009-enacted appropriations. It includes increased funding for food and medical product safety activities and cost-of-living expenses. Data column 4 of Table 3 displays the President's FY2010 request by major program area. This follows columns for FY2008-enacted appropriations, FY2008 actual appropriations (as of April 2009), and FY2009-enacted appropriations. The appropriations committees in the House and the Senate each have subcommittees that parallel the 12 annual appropriations bills. The subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies consider FDA appropriations. The textbook order of activity is as follows: In each chamber, the subcommittee considers the issues, perhaps holds hearings, and marks up a bill for the full committee's consideration. In each chamber, the full committee considers the subcommittee-marked bill or a version that the full committee chair presents, and reports a bill, perhaps with committee amendments, to the full House or the full Senate for consideration. The full House considers the House Committee on Appropriations-reported bill, perhaps amending it on the floor, and passes the bill; the full Senate considers the Senate Committee on Appropriations-reported bill, perhaps amending it on the floor, and passes the bill. If the House-passed and Senate-passed bills are not identical, each chamber assigns Members to meet in conference to work out one acceptable bill. Each chamber must vote to approve the conference bill; the second chamber that passes the conference bill sends it to the President for signing. On June 23, 2009, the full Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 2997 , which the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies had marked up on June 11, 2009. The bill matched the President's request but did not include the proposed new user fees. Data column 5 of Table 3 shows the committee-reported amounts. As it had in previous years, the committee included in the bill a provision to preclude FDA's closing or relocating its Division of Pharmaceutical Analysis outside the St. Louis, MO, area. In H.Rept. 111-181 , which accompanied H.R. 2997 , the committee highlighted the increased support for food and medical product safety that would cover, for example, more foreign and domestic inspections. The committee also noted that the increase would fund research in biomarkers; collection and analysis of data on foodborne illnesses; research on screening tests for bloodborne diseases; efforts to understand adverse events related to medical devices used in pediatric hospitals; evaluations of drug Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies; and investment in information technology. The report also noted funding for congressionally directed spending items. In its report, the committee stated its intention to authorize FDA to collect and spend tobacco product user fee revenue once the tobacco legislation was signed into law. The committee also encouraged FDA to prioritize its review of products that would address neuroblastoma; to issue a final rule on over-the-counter sunscreen testing and labeling; to devise targeted communications strategies to allow consumers to use the findings of the upcoming Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee report; and to remind honey manufacturers about the law's misbranding and adulteration provisions and to respond to a pending citizen petition proposing a standard of identity for honey. The House-passed bill included an anticipated amendment to allow the collection and spending of newly authorized tobacco product user fees. It would allocate most of the $235 million to a new Center for Tobacco Products and related field activities of the Office of Regulatory Affairs, reserving a small part for rent and rent related activities, GSA rent, and other activities, including the Office of the Commissioner. Data column 7 of Table 3 shows the House-passed amounts. On July 7, 2009, the Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1406 , although the subcommittee had not voted on and referred a bill. The budget authority and user fee amounts matched both the House committee-reported and the President's request amounts; it also included the St. Louis, MO, provision. Data column 6 of Table 3 shows the committee-reported amounts. The accompanying report, S.Rept. 111-39 , highlighted the increase related to food and medical product safety, which would allow additional inspections. The Senate committee also mentioned laboratory capacity; screening test development; adverse event data collection and analysis; research on bioequivalence standards of generic products; enforcement against fraudulent products; noninvasive techniques to better understand the risks of anesthetic use in children; and information technology systems. The committee specifically encouraged FDA to develop a program for increasing the inspection of imported shrimp for banned antibiotics; to issue guidance regarding antibiotic development and to work with others to promote development and appropriate use of antibacterial drugs for humans; and to continue its activities regarding antimicrobial resistance. The committee recommended a $2 million increase (approximately a 25% increase) to the cosmetics program. It directed the agency to use $18 million for its critical path initiative, with one-third going to partnerships, and to use at least $2 million of the critical path partnership funding to support research in treatment or rapid diagnosis of tropical diseases. The committee directed FDA to report quarterly on critical path spending. The committee also directed the agency to clarify the relationship of dietary supplements to a definition of food; recommended $3 million for demonstration grants for improving pediatric device availability; directed FDA to report on planned research involving bioequivalent anti-epileptic drugs; recommended $93 million for the generic drugs program, increasing the Office of Generic Drugs by $10 million; directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and FDA to resolve problems with the Rockville Human Resources Center and to report to the Committee; directed FDA to submit a report regarding infant formula products introduced in the past decade; recommended that $5 million in appropriated funds, as well as the $19 million in user fees, be used for Mammography Quality Standards Act activities; urged FDA to stimulate the development of products that could address orphan tropical diseases; and recommended $6 million for the Office of Women's Health. It also directed FDA to consider the need for regulations on the safe handling and processing of packaged ice; to continue priority attention to products for neuroblastoma; to work with states to more aggressively combat fraud in the seafood industry; to respond to a proposed standard of identity to prevent the misbranding and adulteration of honey. The committee instructed FDA to report quarterly on its use of appropriated funds in its implementation of the new tobacco program, and noted its intention to authorize the collection and use of fees. The Senate-passed bill included an anticipated amendment to allow the collection and spending of newly authorized tobacco product user fees. It also authorized the FDA commissioner to conduct and report on a study regarding addiction to certain types of food and addiction to classic drugs of abuse. Data column 8 of Table 3 shows the Senate-passed amounts. Another amendment authorized the commissioner to establish two review groups to recommend activities regarding products to prevent, diagnose, and treat rare diseases and neglected diseases of the developing world, and directed the commissioner to report to Congress on those recommendations and to develop review standards based on those recommendations. The Senate-passed bill also directed the commissioner to report (with the administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) to Congress on the technical challenges associated with inspecting imported seafood, and to study the labeling of FDA-regulated personal care products for which organic content claims are made. A conference committee, with members appointed by each chamber, submitted a conference report, H.Rept. 111-279 , on September 30, 2009, concerning H.R. 2997 , the agriculture appropriations bill for FY2010. Table 3 displays the FDA-relevant amounts in data column 9. The conference agreement would provide FDA with a total program level of $3.279 billion. The two components of the total are $2.357 in direct appropriations (budget authority) and $922 million in user fees. The total, which includes $235 million in newly authorized user fees to support a new Center for Tobacco Products (and related activities of the agency-wide Office of Regulatory Affairs), would be 22.9% higher than FY2009 appropriations for FDA. Excluding the new tobacco program, to provide a comparison of similar program responsibilities, FY2010 appropriations would be 14.1% higher than FY2009 appropriations. The conference agreement would increase the budget authority to the human drugs program by $7 million and specifies that at least $52 million be made available to the Office of Generic Drugs. It also specifies $4 million for a grant to the National Center for Natural Products Research. Accepting a provision in the Senate and House bills, the conference agreement would prohibit the use of appropriated funds to close or relocate the FDA Division of Pharmaceutical Analysis in St. Louis, MO. The conference agreement includes a provision, based on one in the Senate-passed bill, to require the FDA commissioner to establish two review groups to recommend activities regarding products to prevent, diagnose, and treat rare diseases and neglected diseases of the developing world, and directed the commissioner to report to Congress on those recommendations and to develop guidance and internal review standards based on those recommendations. The Explanatory Statement, the part of the conference report with a narrative approach similar to the committee reports that accompany the bills in each chamber, included a few of the items from the Senate report. The conference agreement states that at least $93 million is for the generic drugs program, of which $52 million is for the Office of Generic Drugs, noting that this is a $10 million increase from FY2009. Also included is a $2 million increase for cosmetics activities, $3 million for demonstration grants for improving pediatric device availability, $18 million for the critical path initiative, and $6 million for four congressionally directed projects. The conference agreement requests FDA to report on adverse events and seizures associated with brand and generic anti-epileptic drugs, specifically the pharmacokinetic profiles of drugs that FDA rates as therapeutically equivalent, and to recommend changes to current bioequivalence testing. The conference agreement directs FDA to report on safety challenges associated with imported seafood. It also directs FDA to report regarding personal care products for which organic content claims are made, to include recommendations on the need for labeling standards and premarket approval of labeling. The House agreed to the conference report on October 7, 2009 (vote: 263-162). The Senate agreed to conference report on October 8, 2009 (vote: 76-22). The FDA title of the agriculture appropriations bill as signed by the President on October 21, 2009, provides the agency with the budget authority and the authorized user fees that the President had requested, plus user fees that Congress enacted after the Administration had submitted its request. The conference agreement increased the budget authority by $7 million. The enacted appropriations provide FDA with a FY2010 total program level of $3.3 billion ($2.4 billion in budget authority and $922 million in user fees). This total does not include an additional $141 million in user fees that the Administration has proposed and included in its request (concerning generic drugs, food export certification, reinspection, and food inspection and facility registration).

On October 21, 2009, the President signed into law, as P.L. 111-80, an Act making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and for other purposes. This followed House and Senate agreement to the conference report. The law provides the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with a program level of $3.28 billion for FY2010, dividing that total authorized spending into $2.36 billion in direct appropriations (which FDA refers to as budget authority) and $922 million in user fees. The total, which includes $235 million in newly authorized user fees to support a new Center for Tobacco Products (and related activities of the agency-wide Office of Regulatory Affairs), is 22.9% higher than FY2009 appropriations for FDA. Excluding the new tobacco program, to provide a comparison of similar program responsibilities, FY2010 appropriations are 14.1% higher than FY2009 appropriations. Congress intends the increase to go toward enhanced food safety and medical product safety activities as well as cost-of-living personnel expenses. Neither the signed legislation nor any of the House- and Senate-considered bills include $141 million in proposed user fees that the Administration included in its request. The proposed fees were intended for generic drug review, food export certification, reinspection, and food inspection and facility registration. The versions of H.R. 2997 passed by the House and the Senate agreed on the appropriations to FDA. The conference agreement increased the appropriation to the human drugs program by $7 million. In its explanatory statement, the conference report includes directions and requests to FDA for studies and reports.

Federal campaign finance law provides political parties with three major options for providing financial support to House, Senate, and presidential candidates: (1) direct contributions, (2) coordinated expenditures, and (3) independent expenditures. With direct contributions , parties give money (or in the case of in-kind contributions, financially valuable services) to individual campaigns, but such contributions are subject to strict limits; most party committees are limited to direct contributions of $5,000 per candidate, per election. Since the 1996 Colorado I Supreme Court ruling (discussed below), parties may make independent expenditures , which are not limited, on anything allowable by law, but may not coordinate those expenses with candidates. Coordinated expenditures allow parties (notwithstanding other provisions in the law regulating contributions to campaigns) to buy goods or services on behalf of a campaign, and to discuss those expenditures with the campaign. Candidates may request that parties make coordinated expenditures, and may request specific purchases, but parties may not give this money directly to campaigns. Because parties are the spending agents, they (not candidates) report their coordinated expenditures to the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Coordinated party expenditures are subject to limits based on office sought, state, and voting-age population (VAP). Exact amounts are determined by formula and updated annually by the FEC. Limits for Senate candidates in 2016, adjusted for inflation, ranged from $96,100 in states with the smallest VAPs to approximately $2.9 million in California. In 2016, parties may make up to $48,100 in coordinated expenditures in support of each House candidate in multi-district states, and $96,100 in support of House candidates in single-district states. State party committees may authorize their nat ional counterparts to make coordinated party expenditures on their behalf (or vice versa). If such agreements exist, one party could essentially assume the spending limit for another in particular states, in which case the designated party could spend up to its own limit and up to the other party's limit. Parties may also make coordinated expenditures on behalf of presidential candidates. For 2016, the presidential limit is $23.8 million. In its 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo , the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), and determined that limits on independent expenditures were unconstitutional, while it upheld reasonable limits on contributions. FECA defines an "independent expenditure" to include spending for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, and is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of a candidate or a political party. In contrast, a "contribution" is generally given to a candidate or party, and is defined to include any gift of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Most notably, the Buckley Court determined that the spending of money, whether in the form of contributions or expenditures, is a form of "speech" protected by the First Amendment. However, according to the Court, contributions and expenditures invoke different degrees of First Amendment protection. Recognizing contribution limitations as one of FECA's "primary weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence" on candidates by contributors, the Court found that these limits "serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process." On the other hand, the Court determined that FECA's expenditure limits on individuals, political action committees (PACs), and candidates impose "direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech" and are not justified by an overriding governmental interest. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) (Colorado I ( 1996 ) ) , the Supreme Court found that political parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures. The Court determined that FECA's coordinated party expenditure limit was unconstitutionally enforced against a party's funding of radio advertisements directed against a likely opponent. Specifically, this case concerned the constitutionality of the coordinated party expenditure limit as applied to expenditures for radio ads by the Colorado Republican Party (CRP) that criticized the likely Democratic Party candidate in the 1986 U.S. Senate election. The Court's ruling turned on whether CRP's ad purchase was an "independent expenditure," a "campaign contribution," or a "coordinated expenditure." The Court found that the CRP's ad purchase was an independent expenditure deserving constitutional protection, emphasizing that the "constitutionally significant fact" of an independent expenditure is the absence of coordination between the candidate and the source of the expenditure. Independent expenditures, the Court held, do not raise heightened governmental interests in regulation because the money is deployed to advance a political point of view separate from a candidate's viewpoint and, therefore, cannot be limited. The Court's opinion in Colorado I was limited to the constitutionality of the application of FECA's coordinated party expenditure limit to an independent expenditure by the CRP. Later, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) , the Court considered a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the limit on coordinated party spending. In Colorado II, the Supreme Court ruled that a political party's coordinated expenditures—unlike genuine independent expenditures—may be constitutionally limited in order to minimize circumvention of FECA contribution limits. As the Court explained, coordinated party expenditures have no "significant functional difference" from direct party candidate contributions. Relying on its holding in Colorado I , in a case evaluating the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), the Court invalidated a statutory provision that essentially required political parties to choose between making coordinated or independent expenditures after nominating a candidate. In McConnell v. FEC , the Court determined that the statute burdened the right of parties to make unlimited independent expenditures and therefore, was unconstitutional. In Citizens United v. FEC , the Court overruled a separate portion of McConnell and invalidated BCRA's restriction on corporate and union spending for electioneering communications, as well as the long-standing ban on such spending for independent expenditures. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has found, it does not appear that Citizens United affected the Supreme Court's holding in Colorado II . In contrast to the coordinated party expenditure limit addressed in Colorado II , Citizens United evaluated the constitutionality of limits on independent —not coordinated—spending. Reiterating its holding in Buckley , the Court in Citizens United found that while large campaign contributions create a risk of quid pro quo candidate corruption, large independent expenditures do not. Therefore, in Buckley , the Citizens United Court observed, it determined that limiting independent expenditures fails to serve any substantial government interest in stemming either the reality or the appearance of such corruption. Reconsidering coordinated party expenditure limits is a consistent part of the debate over the role of political parties compared with other political committees and "outside groups." However, bills devoted specifically to altering the limits have not been considered recently. Perhaps most notably, H.R. 6286 (Cole) during the 111 th Congress, and S. 1091 (Corker) and H.R. 3792 (Wamp) during the 110 th Congress, would have eliminated existing caps on coordinated party expenditures. On April 18, 2007, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held a hearing on S. 1091 ; it was not subject to additional legislative action. H.R. 3792 was introduced on October 10, 2007; it did not receive additional action. Since that time, legislative activity concerning coordinated party expenditures has been limited. During this period, most proposals to alter coordinated party expenditure limits have been components of other bills. As Table 1 below shows, public financing and appropriations legislation considered during the 114 th Congress would increase or eliminate limits on coordinated party expenditures in some cases. As of this writing, only one such bill, S. 1910 , has advanced beyond introduction, but this appropriations bill was superseded by another measure that excluded the coordinated party expenditure language. Although coordinated expenditures played a large role in party financial activity throughout the 1970s and 1980s, recent elections suggest that party reliance on coordinated expenditures is changing. As Table 2 and Figure 1 (below) show, although the Colorado I decision permitted parties to make unlimited independent expenditures during and after the 1996 cycle, those expenditures remained relatively modest through 2002. From 1996 to 2002, total party coordinated expenditures outpaced independent expenditures—often by large amounts. Beginning in 2004, however, party spending shifted dramatically, with far more total independent expenditures than coordinated expenditures. In 2004, the two major parties made more than four times in independent expenditures what they did in coordinated expenditures. That allocation of resources continued thereafter, albeit in some cases less dramatically than in 2004. In 2014, the two major parties spent more than eight times on independent expenditures what they did in coordinated party expenditures (approximately $229 million versus about $28 million). These data do not establish why independent expenditures were so heavily favored compared with coordinated party expenditures in 2014. However, some disparity would be expected because spending would be naturally lower without a presidential race on which to make coordinated expenditures. It also is possible that parties are relying on "outside" spending, such as by super PACs, and are instead focusing their efforts on other activities (including their own independent expenditures). The decrease also could reflect party decisions about whether to support particular House or Senate campaigns. As the table also shows, at various points since 1996, each major party has outspent the other in coordinated expenditures. Despite some exceptions, Democrats and Republicans generally have allocated similar amounts to coordinated party expenditures. One potential concern about lifting the caps on party coordinated expenditures could be that one party would have an inherent advantage over the other. Recent fundraising totals suggest that the historic fundraising gap between Democrats and Republicans has narrowed, although disparities between the two parties still exist. As Table 3 and Figure 2 show, since 1996, local, state, and national Republican Party committees have accumulated more receipts than their Democratic counterparts, as has generally occurred since at least the 1970s. Although Republicans raised approximately 88% more than Democrats in 1996 ($416.5 million versus $221.6 million), beginning in 2004, the two parties began to raise roughly similar amounts. Despite a 24% Republican advantage in 2006 ($599 million versus $483.1 million), differences between the parties have been smaller since 2008. In 2012, the Democratic and Republican parties both raised about $800 million. In 2014, however, Democrats raised 16% more than Republicans ($657.2 million versus $565.7 million). On their own, these data do not suggest particular outcomes if caps on party coordinated expenditures were lifted, but they do indicate that one party might not necessarily have a major total financial advantage over the other if the caps are lifted in the near future. Although the parties would not choose to spend all those funds on coordinated party expenditures, the data suggest that they would likely be working with roughly equal resources. For those who support lifting the caps on coordinated party expenditures, current limits impinge on parties' abilities to orchestrate unified campaigns with their candidates after the limits are reached. Unrestricted coordinated party expenditures could shift party spending away from independent expenditures, although each option would retain unique characteristics. Parties might continue to choose independent expenditures if they wish to distance campaigns from what many political professionals and some candidates view as necessary, but politically unpopular, purchases (e.g., for political advertising attacking opponents). On the other hand, coordinated expenditures would be more attractive for parties wishing to communicate freely with campaigns about campaign-related spending. Raising or eliminating coordinated party expenditure limits might also provide parties with additional resources to compete against independent expenditures from super PACs or other "outside" groups. Additional coordinated expenditures could, therefore, strengthen arguably weakening ties between parties and campaigns. Proponents of limits on party coordinated expenditures contend that the caps reduce the amount of money in politics. They also potentially prevent circumvention of individual contribution limits by donors who may seek to indirectly support campaigns by making contributions to political parties. (However, it should be noted that FECA already restricts "earmarked" contributions.) For those who generally support regulating political money, lifting or raising the caps on party-coordinated expenditures would likely be objectionable on principle, could appear to undercut similar regulatory efforts adopted since the 1970s, and could go against public sentiment generally favoring limiting the amount of money in politics. Finally, revisiting coordinated party expenditure limits might also be relevant following a 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision, McCutcheon v. FEC . The McCutcheon case, which concerned now-invalidated aggregate limits on contributions to political parties, is not centrally related to coordinated party expenditures. However, post- McCutcheon , some might argue that providing parties with increased limits (or none) on coordinated party expenditures is a logical extension of their newfound ability to solicit donors who previously would have been unable to contribute to as many party committees as they wished. Additional discussion of McCutcheon and potential party fundraising implications appears in other CRS products.

A provision of federal campaign finance law, codified at 52 U.S.C. §30116(d) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)), allows political party committees to make expenditures on behalf of their general election candidates for federal office and specifies limits on such spending. These "coordinated party expenditures" are important not only because they provide financial support to campaigns, but also because parties and campaigns may explicitly discuss how the money is spent. Although they have long been the major source of direct party financial support for campaigns, coordinated expenditures have recently been overshadowed by independent expenditures. In a 1996 ruling, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) (Colorado I), the U.S. Supreme Court found that political parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Federal campaign finance law defines an independent expenditure to include spending for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, and is not made in cooperation or consultation with a candidate or a political party. In a subsequent case, Colorado II, however, the Court ruled that a political party's coordinated expenditures—that is, expenditures made in cooperation or consultation with a candidate—may be constitutionally limited in order to minimize circumvention of contribution limits. According to the Court, in contrast to independent expenditures, coordinated party expenditures have no "significant functional difference" from direct party candidate contributions. Despite limited legislative activity on the topic in recent Congresses, coordinated party expenditures remain a component of the debate over the strength of modern political parties. In recent Congresses, provisions in some appropriations bills would have increased or abolished coordinated party expenditure limits, as would some public financing bills (H.R. 20; H.R. 424; H.R. 2143; S. 1176; S. 1910; S. 2132; and S. 3250 in the 114th Congress; and H.R. 20, H.R. 268, H.R. 269, H.R. 270, and S. 2023 in the 113th Congress). Those who support existing limits on coordinated party expenditures argue that the caps reduce potential corruption and the amount of money in politics. Opponents maintain that the limits are antiquated, particularly because political parties may make unlimited independent expenditures supporting their candidates. If the caps were lifted and fundraising patterns remained consistent with those discussed here, it appears that neither party would have a substantial resource advantage over the other. It is important to note, however, that individual circumstances would determine particular fundraising and spending decisions. This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant.

I n situations where a private-sector company goes out of business, questions may arise concerning how the company's pension plan may be terminated. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), provides a comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of pension and other employee benefit plans, and the Act includes a plan termination insurance program for defined benefit pension plans. Various types of pension plans are not covered by the insurance program, including defined contribution plans (individual account plans), government plans, and church plans. The insurance program distinguishes between single-employer plans and multiemployer plans (i.e., collectively bargained plans to which more than one company makes contributions). This report only discusses the termination of single-employer plans. The insurance program is administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC has two primary responsibilities. First, it oversees plan terminations, which is the focus of this report. Second, the PBGC pays certain guaranteed benefits under the plan, should the plan be terminated with insufficient funds to pay these benefits. For more information on the PBGC and its payment of benefits, see CRS Report 95-118, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC): A Primer , by [author name scrubbed]. This report provides an overview of the three types of plan terminations and the PBGC's role in each type of termination. The report also provides a brief overview of the liability of an employer following a plan termination, enforcement and penalties relating to the plan termination provisions. ERISA provides for three types of single-employer plan terminations: standard, distress, and involuntary. The plan administrator initiates a standard or distress termination, whereas the PBGC initiates an involuntary termination. A standard termination occurs when a plan administrator decides to terminate a plan that has assets sufficient to meet its benefit liabilities. The plan administrator initiates the termination by giving written notice to each affected party of the intent to terminate the plan between 60 and 90 days in advance of the proposed termination date. He or she must then report information about the plan to the PBGC, including a certification by an enrolled actuary that the plan's assets are sufficient to meet all benefit liabilities. The plan administrator is also responsible for informing the plan participants and beneficiaries of the benefits due them, as well as information used in determining benefit liabilities. The PBGC's involvement in a standard termination is minimal, and its role is basically to confirm that the above requirements have been met. Upon receiving the plan information, the PBGC generally has 60 days to review it and either approve the termination or send out a notice of noncompliance. If the PBGC determines the requirements have been met, the termination proceeds. The plan administrator then distributes the plan's assets to participants and beneficiaries by purchasing annuities from a commercial insurer or by other permissible means. If there are missing participants, the plan administrator may, after a diligent search, purchase an annuity for these individuals or transfer their distributions to the PBGC, which will hold them until the participants are found. The plan administrator's final action is to certify to the PBGC that the assets have been distributed, and the plan is terminated. A distress termination occurs when a plan administrator seeks to terminate a plan that does not have sufficient assets to cover all the benefits owed to plan participants and beneficiaries. The plan may be terminated only if certain criteria are met, such as if its contributing sponsor, or a member of the sponsor's controlled group, (1) has filed (or has had filed against such person) a petition for liquidation or reorganization in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, and certain other requirements have been met, or (2) has demonstrated that termination is required to enable payment of debts while staying in business or to avoid unreasonably burdensome pension costs caused by a declining workforce. In order to initiate a distress termination, a plan administrator must give written notice of an intent to terminate the plan to each affected party, including the PBGC, at least 60 days and (except with PBGC approval) not more than 90 days before the proposed termination date. After the notice of intent is submitted to affected parties, the plan administrator must submit certain additional information to the PBGC, which may include a certification by an enrolled actuary regarding the amount of the current value of the assets of the plan, the actuarial present value of the benefit liabilities under the plan, and whether the plan is sufficient to pay benefit liabilities. Based on this information, the PBGC determines whether the distress termination criteria are met (or whether the PBGC is unable to make such a determination) and must notify the plan administrator of its finding as soon as practicable. If the distress criteria have not been met, the plan continues to operate. If the criteria are met, the PBGC must then determine whether the plan's assets are sufficient to pay the benefits guaranteed by the PBGC and/or meet all benefit liabilities. These amounts may be different because, as mentioned, the benefits guaranteed by the PBGC under the plan insurance termination program are subject to statutory limitations; therefore, the benefit liabilities owed under the plan may exceed the benefits guaranteed by the PBGC. If the PBGC determines that the plan's assets are sufficient to pay benefit liabilities, a plan administrator must carry out termination of the plan under the procedures of a standard termination, and take additional action if necessary. Similarly, if the PBGC determines that a plan has sufficient assets to cover guaranteed benefits, but not benefit liabilities, the plan administrator will be required to distribute plan assets as with a standard termination, certify to the PBGC that the distribution has occurred, and take other actions as necessary to terminate the plan. If the plan's assets are not sufficient to pay the guaranteed benefits, the PBGC must commence involuntary termination proceedings (discussed below). If the plan administrator discovers during the distribution that the plan's assets are not sufficient to cover benefits, he or she must notify the PBGC, which may then be required to initiate an involuntary termination. If there are missing participants, the plan administrator may purchase an annuity for these individuals, or transfer their distributions to the PBGC after a diligent search. An involuntary termination occurs when the PBGC decides a plan should be terminated. The PBGC must initiate termination proceedings once it determines a plan does not have assets available to pay benefits currently due. The PBGC may seek to terminate a plan if the plan has not met the minimum funding requirements or there has been notification from the Treasury Secretary that a notice of deficiency concerning the initial tax on a funding deficiency has been mailed; the plan will not be able to pay benefits when due; a distribution of at least $10,000 has been made to a participant who is a substantial owner of the sponsoring company and, immediately after the distribution, the plan has unfunded nonforfeitable benefits; or the long-run loss to the PBGC may reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated. A trustee, who may be the PBGC, may be appointed to administer the plan until it is ordered to be terminated. The trustee may be appointed by a U.S. district court upon petition by the PBGC or plan administrator, or the PBGC and plan administrator may agree to the appointment without court involvement. Once appointed, the trustee is responsible for the plan's administration, including management of the plan's assets. After the PBGC has given notice to the plan administrator, the plan may be terminated in one of two ways. First, the PBGC may file a petition with the U.S. district court for a ruling that the plan must be terminated to protect the participants' interests, to avoid an unreasonable deterioration of the plan's financial condition, or to avoid an unreasonable increase in the PBGC's liability. If a trustee has been appointed, he or she may intervene in the proceeding. The PBGC may file the petition regardless of whether there is a pending proceeding (1) involving bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or equity receivership; (2) to reorganize, conserve, or liquidate the plan or its property; or (3) to enforce a lien against the plan's property. Furthermore, the court may stay any pending proceedings that involve plan property. If the court agrees with the PBGC that the plan should be terminated, the court will then appoint a trustee, or authorize the existing trustee, to terminate the plan. Alternatively, the PBGC and plan administrator may agree to terminate the plan without court proceedings. There is no requirement under ERISA that plan participants and other interested parties receive notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the PBGC and plan administrator coming to an agreement to terminate the plan. In a standard termination, the plan sponsor has no further liability to the PBGC or plan participants. The plan sponsor may be able to recapture any assets remaining after participants have received their share, which is known as a "reversion." A reversion may be subject to an excise tax at a 20% rate, which is increased to 50% if the plan sponsor does not take certain actions, such as establishing a qualified replacement plan. In a distress termination and an involuntary termination, the plan sponsor and members of its controlled group are jointly and severally liable to the PBGC for, among other things, the amount that the benefit liabilities exceed plan assets, with interest, at termination. The PBGC will have a claim to recover at least some of these amounts. If successful, the PBGC will pay some of the recovery to plan participants as additional benefits and will keep the remaining amount to help cover its losses. The employer's payment for the liability is due on the plan's termination date. The PBGC is authorized to make arrangements with the liable parties for the payments, and any amount in excess of 30% of the collective net worth of the sponsor and controlled group will be paid under commercially reasonable terms. In addition, the PBGC may claim a lien for up to 30% of the collective net worth of the sponsor and controlled group. The PBGC may bring a civil action in U.S. district court to enforce the lien, which generally must be filed within six years of the plan's termination date. The lien has the same priority as a federal tax lien in Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code and is treated as a federal tax lien in bankruptcy proceedings. If a company sells or transfers a business with an underfunded pension plan in order to evade liability and the plan is ended within five years of the sale or transfer, ERISA provides that the company can still be treated as a contributing sponsor at the plan's termination date. Thus, the company may be held liable for the unfunded liabilities. The PBGC is broadly authorized to make any investigation it deems necessary to enforce ERISA and may assess a penalty against anyone who fails to provide a required notice or other material information. The penalty is limited to $1,000 for each day the failure occurs. In addition, plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and sponsors who are adversely affected by an action of another (other than the PBGC) that violates the termination provisions may file suit in U.S. district court to enjoin the action or obtain other equitable relief. Employee organizations representing affected participants and beneficiaries are also able to file a claim, and the PBGC has the right to intervene in any action.

Questions may arise regarding the pensions of private-sector workers and how pension plans may be terminated, particularly in instances where a company experiences financial difficulties. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates plan terminations and provides for three types of single-employer plan terminations—standard, distress, and involuntary—and imposes different responsibilities on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) for each type. A standard termination occurs when a plan administrator decides to terminate a plan that has assets sufficient to meet its benefit liabilities. The PBGC's involvement in a standard termination is minimal, with its role basically limited to confirming all legal requirements have been met. In a standard termination, the plan sponsor has no further liability to the PBGC or plan participants. The sponsor may be able to recapture any assets remaining after participants have received their share, although the reversion may be subject to tax. A distress termination occurs when a plan administrator seeks to terminate a plan that does not have sufficient assets to cover all the benefits owed to plan participants and beneficiaries. The PBGC is responsible for ensuring that all criteria for termination have been met, as well as for determining whether the plan's assets are sufficient to pay the guaranteed benefits and/or meet all benefit liabilities. Meanwhile, the plan sponsor and members of its controlled group are jointly and severally liable to the PBGC for the amount that the benefit liabilities exceed plan assets, with interest, at termination. An involuntary termination occurs when the PBGC decides a plan should be terminated. The agency must initiate termination proceedings once it determines a plan does not have assets available to pay benefits currently due. It may seek termination under certain circumstances, including the plan has not met the minimum funding requirements; the plan will not be able to pay benefits when due; or the long-run loss to the PBGC may be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated. In an involuntary termination, the sponsor and controlled group are jointly and severally liable to the PBGC for the unfunded liabilities. The PBGC is broadly authorized to make any investigation it deems necessary to enforce ERISA and may assess a penalty against anyone who fails to provide a required notice or other material information. In addition, plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and sponsors who are adversely affected by an action of another that violates the termination provisions may file suit in U.S. district court to enjoin the action or obtain other equitable relief. Employee organizations representing affected participants and beneficiaries are also able to file a claim, and the PBGC has the right to intervene in any action.

The franking privilege, which allows Members of Congress to send official mail via the U.S. Postal Service at government expense, has its roots in 17 th century Great Britain; the British House of Commons instituted it in 1660. In the United States, the practice dates from 1775, when the First Continental Congress passed legislation giving its Members mailing privileges so as to communicate with their constituents. Congress continues to use the franking privilege to help Members communicate with their constituents. The communications may include letters in response to constituent requests for information, newsletters regarding legislation and Member votes, press releases about official Member activities, copies of the Congressional Record and government reports, and notices about upcoming town meetings organized by Members. The franking privilege is regulated by federal law, House and Senate rules, regulations of the Committee on House Administration and the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, and regulations of the Senate Select Committee on Ethics and the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards. The franking privilege may only be used for matters of public concern or public service. It may not be used to solicit votes or contributions, to send mail regarding campaigns or political parties, or to mail autobiographical or holiday greeting materials. Although few would argue with the intent behind the frank—to help Members better communicate with their constituents—the privilege in recent years has been subjected to increased public criticism and extensive scrutiny by the media. Proponents of franking argue that, without the privilege, most Members could not afford to send important information to their constituents, in effect curtailing the delivery of ideas, reports, assistance, and services. Opponents, concerned with incumbent perquisites, mail costs, and the overall cost of Congress, have called for additional changes to the franking privilege, including an outright ban on franking for Members and a prohibition on use of the frank in election years. Significant reforms have been adopted as a consequence of this debate. Although the cost of official congressional mail has fluctuated widely, franking reform efforts have produced over an 85% reduction in even-numbered-year costs and over a 90% reduction in odd-numbered-year costs in the past 30 years, from a high of $113.4 million and $89.5 million in FY1988 and FY1989 to $16.9 million and $8.3 million in FY2014 and FY2015. Despite common public perception, franking is not free. Congress pays the U.S. Postal Service for franked mail through annual appropriations for the legislative branch. Each chamber makes an allotment to Members from these appropriations. In the Senate, the allocation process is administered by the Committee on Rules and Administration; in the House, by the Committee on House Administration. Overall congressional mail costs include official mail sent by Members (both regular and mass mail), committees, and chamber officers. During FY2015, Congress spent $8.3 million on official mail according to the U.S. Postal Service, representing slightly less than two-tenths of 1% of the $4.3 billion budget for the entire legislative branch for FY2015. House official mail costs ($6.8 million) were 82% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.5 million) were 18% of the total. During FY2014, Congress spent $16.9 million on official mail. House official mail costs ($15.1 million) were 89% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.8 million) were 11% of the total. During FY2013, Congress spent $7.6 million on official mail. House official mail costs ($6.2 million) were 82% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.4 million) were 18% of the total. During FY2012, Congress spent $24.8 million on official mail. House official mail costs ($23.3 million) were 94% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.5 million) were 6% of the total. During FY2011, total expenditures on official mail were $12.8 million. House official mail costs ($11.3 million) were 88% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.5 million) were 12% of the total. The higher official mail costs in FY2014, FY2012, FY2010, FY2008, and FY2006 compared with FY2015, FY2013, FY2011, FY2009, and FY2007 continue a historical pattern of Congress spending more on official mail costs during election years. However, monthly data indicate that election year costs may be attributable to multiple factors. Figure 1 plots monthly congressional mail costs from October 2005 to December 2015. As shown in Figure 1 , the lowest monthly costs occur in the fourth quarter (October, November, and December) of the even-numbered calendar years, corresponding to the first quarter of the odd-numbered fiscal years. This reflects the prohibition on mass mailing in the Senate (60 days) and House (90 days) prior to the general elections of November 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The higher monthly costs occurred in December 2005 ($5.8 million), December 2007 ($5.0 million), December 2009 ($6.6 million), December 2011 ($5.4 million), December 2013 ($2.9 million), December 2015 ($3.2 milion), and the six months (March-August) prior to the pre-election prohibited period for the 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 general elections. Figure 1 demonstrates that the higher mail costs in FY2006, FY2008, FY2010, FY2012, and FY2014 result from two separate events: a general increase in monthly mail costs prior to the pre-election prohibited period, and a significant spike in costs during December of 2005, December of 2007, December of 2009, December 2011, December of 2013, and December 2015, perhaps reflecting the traditional end-of-session newsletters many Members mail to constituents. Both of these increases are largely due to increased mailings by the House during those periods. House mailings made during the first quarter (October-December) of FY2006, FY2008, FY2010, FY2012, FY2014, and FY2016 cost $9.6 million, $9.4 million, $11.2 million, $9.5 million, and $5.85 million, respectively, compared to an average of $1.7 million over the four quarters of FY2015, $1.5 million over the four quarters of FY2013, $2.8 million over the four quarters of FY2011, $3.7 million over the four quarters of FY2009, and $4.4 million over the four quarters of FY2007. House mailings made during the second quarter and third quarter of FY2008, FY2010, FY2012, and FY2014 also were significantly higher than the FY2007, FY2009, FY2011, FY2013, or FY2015 quarterly average. Critics of the franking privilege have often cited increased election-year mail costs as evidence of political use of the frank prior to elections. Although mail costs do rise in the months prior to the pre-election prohibited period, Figure 1 shows that the structure of the fiscal calendar is also important in creating large disparities between election year and non-election year mail costs. Since the fiscal years run from October 1 to September 30, both the December spike in mail costs and the pre-election rise in mail costs occur in the same fiscal year, despite taking place in different calendar years and different sessions of Congress. Table 1 compares mail costs between 2005 and 2015, measured by fiscal and calendar year. As shown in Table 1 , when annual costs are compared by calendar year, the December spike and the pre-election increase balance out, and the totals are relatively similar. Thus comparisons of fiscal year official mail costs tend to overstate the effect of pre-election increases in mail costs, because they also capture the effect of the December spike in mail costs. Data on congressional official mail costs are only available back to FY1978. The Post Office, however, kept records of overall franking costs beginning in FY1954, when Congress began reimbursing the Post Office for franked mail costs. Franked mail costs differ only slightly from congressional official mail costs, as they include the franking privilege granted to former Presidents and widows of former Presidents. Figure 2 is a plot of overall franked mail costs (FY1954 to FY1977) and official mail costs (FY1978 to FY2015) in both current and constant 1954 dollars. Figure 2 demonstrates that franked mail/official mail costs significantly increased and then significantly decreased between FY1954 and FY2015. Although costs began to increase during the 1960s, the largest increases occurred during the 1970s. Costs remained high during the 1980s, and then were reduced significantly beginning in FY1989. The sharp increase in costs that begins in the late 1960s and extends into the 1980s is plausibly attributable to several factors. The overall volume of mail sent by Members of Congress increased rapidly during this time period, aided by computer technology that simplified the creation of mass-mailing newsletters and other frankable mail. Second, postal rates increased significantly during the same time period, with first-class mail rates more than tripling from 8 cents in FY1972 to 25 cents by FY1988. Standard mail (formerly third-class) rates doubled from 5 cents in FY1972 to 10 cents in FY1988. Official congressional mail costs have decreased significantly in the past 30 years. Even-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 85% from $113.4 million in FY1988 to $16.9 million in FY2014. Odd-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 90% from $89.5 million in FY1989 to $8.3 million in FY2015. Figure 3 illustrates changes in official mail costs, by chamber, between FY1978 and FY2015. The decrease in official mail expenditures during the early 1990s was primarily due to congressional reforms that placed individual limits on Members' mail costs and required public disclosure of individual Member franking expenditures. In 1986, the Senate established a franking allowance for each Senator and for the first time disclosed individual Member mail costs. In 1990, the House established a separate franking allowance for its Members and required public disclosure of individual mail costs. Tighter restrictions were also placed on Member mass mailings. Since October 1992, Members have been prohibited from sending mass mailings outside their districts. Since October 1994, Senators have been limited to mass mailings that do not exceed $50,000 per session of Congress. Senators may not use the frank for mass mailings above that amount. Finally, the widespread adoption of new communications technology (such as email) since 1995 has shifted a proportion of communications formerly sent via franked mail to electronic format. Official mail costs in both the House and Senate have shown significant monthly variation. Figure 4 plots monthly official mail costs for the House of Representatives from FY2000 to FY2015. Figure 4 demonstrates that the spikes in official mail costs found in FY2006, FY2008, FY2010, FY2012, and FY2014 (as described in Table 1 ) are regular trends. From FY2000 to FY2015, peaks in House official mail cost occur cyclically, with the highest costs found in December of odd-numbered years and July or August of even-numbered years. The lowest costs occur during the pre-election months in which Member mass mailings are prohibited, and in the months immediately following the general elections. Figure 5 plots monthly official mail costs for the Senate on the same scale as Figure 4 . The figure demonstrates the relatively low costs of Senate official mail in comparison to House official mail costs. These lower costs are attributable to proportionally fewer Senators than Representatives franking mass mailings, as well as Senate rules that limit Senators to $50,000 for mass mailings in any fiscal year. Figure 5 shows that the pattern of costs in the Senate is similar to the House of Representatives, but not as pronounced. Costs peak annually in September, and are higher in the months just prior to the pre-election prohibited period.

The congressional franking privilege allows Members of Congress to send official mail via the U.S. Postal Service at government expense. This report provides information and analysis on the costs of franked mail in the House of Representatives and Senate. In FY2015, total expenditures on official mail were $8.3 million. House official mail costs ($6.8 million) were 82% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.5 million) were 18% of the total. In FY2014, total expenditures on official mail were $16.9 million. House official mail costs ($15.1 million) were 89% of the total, whereas Senate official mail costs ($1.8 million) were 11% of the total. These expenditures continue an historical pattern of Congress spending less on official mail costs during non-election years than during election years (Figure 3). However, analysis of monthly data on official mail costs indicates that, due to the structure of the fiscal year calendar, comparisons of election year and non-election year mailing data tend to overstate the effect of pre-election increases in mail costs, because they also capture the effect of a large spike in mail costs from December of the previous calendar year. The analysis demonstrates that between FY2000 and FY2015, higher official mail costs in even-numbered fiscal years occurred for two reasons: a general increase in monthly mail costs prior to the pre-election prohibited period, and a significant spike in costs during December of odd-numbered calendar years. Both increases were largely the result of an increase in the number of House Members sending mass mailings during those months. Reform efforts during the past 30 years have reduced overall franking expenditures in both election and non-election years. Even-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 85% from $113.4 million in FY1988 to $16.9 million in FY2014, while odd-numbered-year franking expenditures have been reduced by over 90% from $89.5 million in FY1989 to $8.3 million in FY2015. House mail costs have decreased from a high of $77.9 million in FY1988 to $6.8 million in FY2015. The Senate has dramatically reduced its costs, from $43.6 million in FY1984 to $1.5 million in FY2015. This report will be updated annually.

Following the end of the Second World War, the allied powers established the International Tracing Service (ITS) in 1947 "for the purpose of tracing missing persons and collecting, classifying, preserving and rendering accessible to Governments and interested individuals the documents relating to Germans and non-Germans who were interned in National-Socialist concentration camps or to non-Germans who were displaced as a result of the Second World War." Since its inception, ITS has assembled archives of some 50 million Holocaust- and post-war-era documents in Bad Arolsen, Germany relating to approximately 17.5 million civilian victims of Germany's National Socialist (Nazi) regime. Experts estimate that roughly one quarter of the materials relate to Jews persecuted by the regime. After the 1954 repeal of the Occupation Statute in Germany, an international commission of nine member states (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) charged the ITS with continuing its mission as a missing persons tracing service and caretaker of the archives in Bad Arolsen under the neutral auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In the so-called Bonn Accords of 1955, the International Commission established the oversight and administrative structure under which ITS continues to function today: a Swiss delegate of the ICRC, accountable both to the ICRC and the eleven-member International Commission, oversees ITS's day-to-day operations and reports to the Commission at its annual meetings; Germany has provided and continues to provide ITS's operating budget. ITS officials traditionally administered the service based on an understanding that ITS was established to act primarily as a tracing service for victims of Nazi war crimes. To this end, access to information in the Bad Arolsen archives had been limited almost exclusively to civilian victims of such crimes and their descendants. Although they were not granted direct access to the archives, victims and their descendants have had the right to request information pertaining to their individual cases. Before November 2007, materials in the archives were not available for historical research. ITS claims to have provided approximately 11 million written responses to individual requests for information since its inception. However, before 2006, the tracing service was often criticized by survivors, their families, and others who alleged that the service left hundreds of thousands of requests unanswered and that it often provided inadequate or incomplete information to survivors and their descendants. Criticism of ITS heightened in 2000 and 2001 as the service struggled to handle a dramatic increase in requests from people seeking documentation for compensation from funds made available by the German government to survivors of Nazi slave and forced labor camps. Much of the criticism focused on perceived mismanagement and neglect on the part of ITS's long-time former director Charles-Claude Biedermann. Biedermann's detractors contend that his resistance represented the primary obstacle to improving the tracing service's responsiveness and providing greater access to archived materials. When, under strong public and International Commission pressure, the ICRC agreed to replace Biedermann in 2006, ITS had a recorded backlog of 425,000 requests for information. ICRC officials acknowledge that this represented an unacceptable breach of the organization's mission. Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (Holocaust Museum), Holocaust survivor organizations, and others began to pressure International Commission members to open the ITS archives to historical research. According to the State Department, the United States and several other Commission member states advocated opening the archives as early as 1998. However, then-ITS director Biedermann and a number of member states reportedly blocked passage of the proposal, arguing that the release of such sensitive personal information represented a violation of individual privacy rights. In May 2006, after more than five years of debate, and in response to increasing public and political pressure, the International Commission of the ITS unanimously agreed to amend the 1955 Bonn Accords to open the ITS archives to researchers and make digital copies of archived materials available to designated institutions in Commission member states. To address continuing concerns regarding individual privacy rights, the Commission agreed that access to digital files would be guided by the respective privacy laws of those states. In November 2007, France and Greece became the final two Commission member states to ratify the May 2006 agreement to open the archives, paving the way both for the digitization and transfer of archived materials, and for historians and members of the public to visit the archives. Observers and officials from ITS, the State Department, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum highlight several priorities and concerns relating to the future of the archives, including ensuring prompt digitization and transfer of the files to research institutions in Commission member states; designing and implementing a classification system to allow for more efficient searches of archived and digitized documents; continuing to reduce the backlog of requests for information from the archives, and training and hiring staff to better assist researchers in navigating the archives; and, in the long term, contemplating reform of what many consider a cumbersome administrative and oversight structure. ITS management considers the digitization and transfer, and effective classification of archived materials to be top priorities for the coming years. Some 17.9 million digital images making up the archives' Incarceration/Concentration Camp Collection and a so-called Central Names Index of about 17.5 million names which appear in the archives have been transferred to the Holocaust Museum thus far. Members of the public will be able to access these files with the assistance of museum staff beginning in January 2008. ITS officials expect their so-called Wartime or Forced Labor Collection to be digitized, transferred and accessible at the Holocaust Museum by mid-2008, and the Post-war or Migration Collection by late 2009. A collection of correspondence between ITS and survivors and others requesting information is expected to be available in digitized form by early 2011. Some Holocaust survivors and observers have raised concerns about the Holocaust Museum's ability and intention to make digitized materials from Bad Arolsen as accessible as possible to survivors and their heirs. In particular, critics have questioned a decision not to make the Bad Arolsen records directly available on the Internet, arguing that many survivors who are unable to travel to Washington, DC, or Bad Arolsen deserve the opportunity to search the digitized records online. ITS, Holocaust Museum and State Department officials contend that navigating the millions of documents in the collection requires the assistance of trained archivists, and note that an index of the 20,000 individual collections making up the transferred materials is available on the Museum's website. Members of the public will be able to browse this list online and contact the Museum for help in finding individual records. Although State Department and Holocaust Museum officials express confidence in ITS's file digitization process, they emphasize that digitizing, transferring, and organizing the records in a searchable manner has required and will continue to require additional resources. In particular, they note that as the focus of inquiries shifts from tracing individual victims of the Holocaust to conducting historical research, ITS and the museum will need to employ trained archivists and information specialists both to reclassify and to help search the collection. While the German government has agreed to cover costs relating to file digitization, the Holocaust Museum is seeking funds to pay for file transfer and to cover staffing, software, and hardware costs associated with organizing and making the millions of records as accessible to the public as possible. In all, the Museum estimates that these costs will total about $6.5 million over the coming five years. In 2006, the ICRC replaced long-time ITS director Biedermann and initiated efforts to significantly reduce a 425,000 request backlog. ITS aims to eliminate the backlog by mid-2008. Although most observers commend current ITS director Reto Meister for his efforts both to reduce the backlog, and make the archives more accessible, some question the methods by which the backlog has been so substantially reduced. Specifically, they contend that many of the requests have been discarded, a significant portion likely due to the deaths of requesters. ITS has said it is committed to responding to new requests within an eight-week period and appears to be complying with its policy. As ITS's mission shifts from tracing individuals to facilitating historical research, experts could increasingly question the archives' unique and oft-criticized administrative and oversight structure. Specifically, some have argued that the ICRC—an organization dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance—may not be the most appropriate entity to administer a historical archive. Others contend that requiring the unanimous consent of an 11-member Commission for most significant management decisions has impeded and could continue to impede effective day-to-day management of the archives. Nonetheless, both the ICRC and the U.S. State Department appear committed to supporting ITS's current oversight structure, at least through 2012, when the contents of the archives are expected to have been digitized and transferred to the Holocaust Memorial Museum. ICRC officials have signaled a desire to discuss the organization's continuing role in managing the archives after the file transfer, but also acknowledge that difficult questions as to the ownership of the archives and their location in Germany could complicate any decisions regarding a change in leadership. ITS representatives perceive the service's mission as having evolved over time from tracing victims and their families to providing information for a wide variety of purposes including documentation for claims on World War II-era insurance policies. In 1998, following a series of high-profile class-action lawsuits against insurance companies alleged never to have honored millions of such policies, an international commission, the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), was established to honor unpaid Holocaust-era insurance policies. ICHEIC ended its claims process in March 2007, having facilitated the payment of $306.25 million to approximately 48,000 of what it had determined to be about 90,000 eligible claimants. Throughout its existence, ICHEIC was criticized, including by some Members of Congress, for long delays in its claims process, for honoring only a small portion of legitimate claims, and for conducting its activities with a general lack of transparency and accountability. ICHEIC supporters and members of the Administration contend that the ICHEIC process, which included publication of a total of about 520,000 policyholder names, was fair and comprehensive, especially given the unprecedented legal and historical complexities of the task. ICHEIC reports that its work was the result of extensive research and collaboration with a number of insurance companies and with a wide variety of national and Holocaust archives. ICHEIC did not seek access to materials in Bad Arolsen. ICHEIC and ITS representatives contend that searches of the archives indicate that the records contain little if any definitive information that could help resolve outstanding claims or lead to new insurance claims. ITS also iterates that the archives have been and remain open to requests for documentation from Holocaust victims and their families. The February 2007 settlement of a lawsuit brought by Holocaust survivors against Italian insurance giant Assicurazioni Generali (Generali) highlights disagreement with ICHEIC and ITS's statements regarding the potential usefulness of ITS records to new or existing insurance claims. In the settlement, Generali agreed to continue to accept claims from individuals providing documentation from the ITS archives until August 2008. The primary reason cited for the extension is to allow potential claimants to take advantage of the expected opening of the archives. How much information the archives contain relating to insurance policies remains unclear. However, all but a small number of insurance-related lawsuits have been settled, and ICHEIC is no longer accepting claims. According to Holocaust survivors, their advocates and Administration and ITS officials, congressional action was instrumental in drawing international attention to the archives' closure, and to opening them to historical research. After the May 2006 agreement to open the archives, both the House and Senate passed resolutions urging International Commission member states to expedite approval of the agreement. Several Members have also expressed an interest in ensuring the timely digitization and transfer of ITS collections, and in exploring the possibility that opening the archives could reveal documentation to substantiate additional claims on World-War II era insurance policies. On March 28, 2007, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 1746 requiring the disclosure of Holocaust-era policies by insurers and establishing a federal cause of action for claims arising out of a covered policy. Similar bills were introduced in the 107 th , 108 th , and 109 th Congresses. Although H.R. 1746 would have no direct effect on the Bad Arolsen archives, some assert that improved access to the archives may reveal documentation relating to unpaid Holocaust-era insurance policies. On the other hand, while the evidence is by no means conclusive, ITS officials and some historians indicate it is unlikely that the archives contain definitive evidence of such policies.

On November 28, 2007, the International Tracing Service (ITS) opened its vast archives of materials on victims of Germany's National-Socialist (Nazi) regime to the public, granting direct access to the archives for the first time since their establishment shortly after World War II. Access to information in the archives was previously limited to victims of Nazi crimes and their descendants, and as recently as 2006, ITS had a recorded backlog of over 400,000 requests for information. As part of its May 2006 agreement to open the archives, the 11-nation International Commission overseeing ITS agreed to provide a digital copy of the collections to designated research institutions in Commission member states. To date, digital copies of the archives' Central Name Index of about 17.5 million names, and of some 13 million records documenting deportations to Nazi concentration camps, have been transferred to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Museum officials expect these documents to be accessible to the public by early 2008, and hope that all the ITS archives will be digitized and transferred to the museum by late 2010. Access to the archives has been an issue of ongoing interest to many Members of Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

In the nearly 17 years since Latvia gained independence, the country's political scene has been characterized by the creation and dissolution of numerous parties and shifting alliances among them. Latvia has had 14 governments since independence, none of them serving out a full parliamentary term. Many of the parties lack a clear ideological profile and have shallow roots in society. Critics assert that the parties are in large part interest groups struggling for the narrow, business interests of their members and financial backers. High-level corruption remains a significant problem in Latvia, as elsewhere in the region. Nevertheless, due to a broad policy consensus among the elites and in society at large, Latvia has followed a consistent general course—building democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law, establishing a free-market economy, and integrating into NATO and the European Union (EU). Latvia's current government is led by Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis of the First Party-Latvia's Way (LPP-LC). It was formed in December 2007, after the fall of the previous government. Aside from the LPP-LC, the government consists of the People's Party, the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS), and the nationalist For Fatherland and Freedom-Latvian National Independence Movement (TB-LNNK). The coalition holds a slender 53-seat majority in the 101-member Saeima (parliament). In September 2007, the previous Prime Minister, Aigars Kalvitis, heading a government composed of the same parties as the current government, tried to fire Aleksejs Loskutovs, the head of Latvia's independent Corruption Monitoring and Prevention Bureau, allegedly for financial irregularities. The move was widely viewed in Latvia as an effort to quash high-profile corruption investigations against powerful supporters of the government. Street demonstrations forced the parliament to drop the effort and the government fell in December 2007. Latvia last held parliamentary elections in October 2006. New elections do not have to be held until 2010, but the thin and shrinking majority of the government may force an earlier vote. The Loskutovs affair has underlined Latvia's ongoing corruption problem, and, more generally, the tendency for key decisions in Latvia to be made non-transparently by a small number of self-interested insiders. Latvian President Valdis Zatlers was elected by the Saeima in July 2007. Zatlers is an orthopedic surgeon and was the director of the Latvian Traumatology and Orthopedics Center. He had no prior political affiliation or experience before his election. His election was a surprise to many Latvians. He was reportedly a compromise choice of the ruling coalition when they could not agree on other candidates. Although the Latvian presidency has few powers in Latvia's parliamentary system, the president plays an important rule in representing Latvia abroad and symbolizing the state's moral principles rather than narrow party interests. His predecessor, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, was widely believed to have fulfilled these functions very well, and was Latvia's most popular politician until term limits forced her retirement. Zatlers's reputation suffered a blow shortly after his election, when it emerged that he had taken gratuities from his patients and had not paid taxes on those payments. He said that he had forgotten to report the income and paid the taxes. However, he may have recovered his position somewhat by criticizing the government during the Loskutovs affair. Latvia has experienced rapid economic growth in recent years, with Gross Domestic Product increasing by 12.2% in 2006 and 10.3% in 2007. However, growth slowed sharply in the last quarter of 2007 and is expected to decelerate during 2008, in line with other economies in the region. Inflation remains a serious problem. Average annual inflation in 2007 was 10.1%, and inflation in March 2008 was 16.8% on a year-on-year basis. These increases are in part due to higher food and energy costs. Latvia has maintained a prudent fiscal policy; the government projects a budget surplus of 1% for 2008. Latvia suffered from a large current account deficit of 22.8% of GDP in 2007. However, the deficit is declining as economic growth slows. After reestablishing its independence in 1991, Latvia's key foreign policy goals were to join NATO and the European Union. It joined both of them in 2004. Latvia continues to try to bring its armed forces up to NATO standards, spending the 2% of GDP recommended by NATO. Latvia lags behind most EU members in many areas, and receives substantial EU funding to address such issues as border security, public infrastructure, and the environment. Latvia has had to put off plans to adopt the euro as its currency until at least 2012 or 2013, due to an inflation rate well above the EU's strict criteria for euro zone membership. Latvia enjoys a close relationship with its Baltic neighbors and the Nordic countries. It has acted as an advocate for democratic and pro-Western forces in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and other countries bordering Russia. Latvia supported the unsuccessful efforts of Ukraine and Georgia to receive a Membership Action Plan at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. It supported the summit communique's commitment to eventual Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO. Latvia and Russia have had sometimes difficult relations. Russia has expressed irritation at NATO's role in patrolling the airspace of Latvia and the other two Baltic states, and the non-participation of Latvia and the other Baltic states in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which Moscow claims could lead to the deployment of large NATO forces on its northwest border. In December 2007, Russia suspended its implementation of the CFE treaty. Russia claims that Latvia violates the human rights of its ethnic Russian minority, which, along with other Russian-speaking groups, make up 37.5% of the country's population. While international organizations have generally rejected these charges, many Russian-speakers are poorly integrated into Latvian society. When Latvian independence was restored in 1991, only those persons who has been citizens when the Soviet Union took over the country in 1940 or their descendants were recognized as Latvian citizens. This policy excluded most Russian-speakers. In part due to naturalization (which requires passing a Latvian language test), 57.5% of ethnic Russians living in Latvia now have Latvian citizenship. The others remain stateless or hold Russian citizenship. Over 18% of Latvia's permanent residents lack Latvian citizenship. Noncitizens cannot hold public office or vote in elections. Russia has also criticized laws that demand Latvian-language competency for many jobs and require that most secondary education take place in the Latvian language. Latvia has expressed concern about Russia's use of its energy exports for political purposes. Latvia is virtually entirely dependent on Russia for oil and natural gas. Latvia and the United States are concerned about the North European Gas Pipeline project, which will transit the Baltic Sea floor between Russia and Germany, bypassing central European countries. Latvian and U.S. officials have called for the establishment of a variety of energy supply routes between the Caspian Sea region and Europe, in order to provide greater energy security to Latvia and other countries in the region. Russia has reduced the role of Latvia in its oil transit trade. The Russian-government controlled Transneft oil pipeline company cut off all oil shipments to the Latvian oil terminal at the port of Ventspils, after having decreased shipments in late 2002. The move was a blow to Latvia, as Ventspils has been important to its economy. Transneft diverted the oil shipments to its own Baltic Pipeline System and the Russian port of Primorsk, which it controls. Transneft claims that there is no demand for using Ventspils, a claim viewed with skepticism by outside observers. Most saw the move as a power play by Transneft to secure a controlling share of the firm Ventspils Nafta, which operates the oil terminal. However, Russian-Latvian relations have improved in some areas. In December 2007, a Russian-Latvian border treaty entered into force. Latvian business interests have reportedly benefitted from an increase in transit business from Russia in the past year, as Russian traffic has declined with neighboring Estonia due to deteriorating relations between Moscow and Tallinn. The United States and Latvia have enjoyed excellent relations. The United States refused to recognize the Soviet annexation of Latvia in 1940 and hailed the restoration of the country's independence in 1991. The United States strongly supported Latvia's membership in NATO and the EU. The two countries have cooperated in Iraq and Afghanistan. From May 2003 until June 2007 (when the last 120 of its combat troops were withdrawn), a total of 1,153 soldiers had served in the country, in a number of rotations. Three Latvian soldiers died in Iraq. After withdrawing from Iraq, Latvia boosted its contribution to the ISAF peacekeeping force in Afghanistan from 35 to its current level of 100 men. There are 19 Latvian troops in Kosovo as part of NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR. Latvia receives a modest amount of security assistance from the United States to help it improve its capabilities within NATO, including its deployment in Afghanistan. In FY2008, Latvia is expected to receive $2.55 million in U.S. aid, including $1.5 million in Foreign Military Financing and $1.05 million in IMET military training assistance. For FY2009, the Administration requested $4.05 million in military aid, $3 million in FMF and $1.05 in IMET. There have been a few controversies in U.S.-Latvian relations. Perhaps the most sensitive issue is Latvia's strong desire to join the U.S. Visa Waiver program. Latvia and many other central and eastern European countries in the same position are upset that their citizens are required to seek visas for U.S. travel, despite the fact that visas are not required for most EU countries in western Europe. Brussels has also demanded equal treatment for all EU countries. In March 2008, the United States and Latvia signed a memorandum of understanding on steps Latvia has taken and needs to take to join the Visa Waiver Program. U.S. officials say Latvia could join the program by the end of this year. Another controversy concerned speeches in October 2007 by outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Latvia Catherine Todd Bailey that were interpreted in Latvia as frank criticisms of corruption and the state of democratic development of Latvia, in the wake of the Loskutovs affair. The move raised eyebrows among some commentators in the Latvian press, although Bailey received backing from State Department officials. The current U.S. ambassador, Charles Lawson, has also mentioned strengthening Latvia's democracy as a key U.S. goal in Latvia.

After restoration of its independence in 1991 following decades of Soviet rule, Latvia made rapid strides toward establishing a democratic political system and a dynamic, free market economy. It achieved two key foreign policy goals when it joined NATO and the European Union in 2004. However, relations with Russia remain strained over such issues as the country's Russian-speaking minority and energy relations. Latvia and the United States have excellent relations. Latvia has deployed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and plays a significant role in efforts to encourage democracy and a pro-Western orientation among post-Soviet countries. This report will be updated as needed.

RS21690 -- The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Attorneys' Fees Provisions in Current Law andin H.R. 1350 as Passed by the House and Senate, 108th Congress Updated June 8, 2004 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (1) authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a conditionfor the receipt of suchfunds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (2) The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE andincludes a provisionfor attorneys' fees. Originally enacted in 1975, the act responded to increased awareness of the need to educatechildren with disabilities, and to judicial decisions requiring that statesprovide an education for children with disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities. The attorneys' fees provisions were added in 1986 by the HandicappedChildren's Protection Act, P.L. 99-372 . (3) Congress is presently considering reauthorizing IDEA. H.R. 1350 , 108th Congress, passed the House on April 30, 2003, by a vote of 251 to 171. On May 13, 2004, theSenate incorporated S. 1248 in H.R. 1350 and passed H.R. 1350 in lieu of S. 1248 by a vote of95 to 3. (4) Current Statutory Language Relating to Attorneys' Fees (5) Under current law, a parent may file a complaint with respect to the identification, evaluation, educational placement, provision of a free appropriate public education or placement in analternative educational setting. The parents then have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing (6) with a right to appeal. (7) At the court's discretion, attorneys' fees may be awarded as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. (8) Attorneys'fees are based on the ratesprevailing in the community and no bonus or multiplier may be used. There are specific prohibitions on attorneys'fees and reductions in the amounts of fees. Fees may not be awardedfor services performed subsequent to a written offer of settlement to a parent in certain circumstances including ifthe court finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is not morefavorable to the parents than the offer of settlement. Also, attorneys' fees are not to be awarded relating to anymeeting of the Individualized Education Program (IEP) team unless themeeting is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action or, at the state's discretion, for amediation. Current law specifically provides that an award ofattorneys' fees and related costs may be made to a parent who is the prevailing party if the parent was substantiallyjustified in rejecting a settlement offer. Attorneys' fees may bereduced in certain circumstances including where the court finds that the parent unreasonably protracted the finalresolution of the controversy; the amount of attorneys' feesunreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar services by attorneys of reasonablycomparable skill, reputation and experience; where the time spent andlegal services furnished were excessive considering the nature of the action or proceedings; and when the court findsthat the parent did not provide the school district with theappropriate information in the due process complaint. This information includes the name of the child, the child'saddress and school, a description of the problem, including factsrelating to the issue, and a proposed resolution to the problem. (9) The attorneys' fees provisions in H.R. 1350 would change the determination of the amount of attorneys' fees by requiring the Governor, or other appropriate state official, todetermine rates. As discussed above, under current law, attorneys' fees are determined by the court hearing the case. More specifically, H.R. 1350 would amend current law by changing the general statement under current law that attorneys' fees may be awarded at the court's discretion toread: "Fees awarded under this paragraph shall be based on rates determined by the Governor of the State (or otherappropriate State official) in which the action or proceeding arose forthe kind and quality of services furnished. No bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating the fees awarded underthis subsection." In addition, the amendment provides that theGovernor or other appropriate official shall make these rates available to the public on an annual basis. The otherprovisions of current law regarding the prohibition of attorneys' fees incertain situations, the exception to this prohibition, and the reduction of attorneys' fees in certain circumstances werenot amended. The House report discussed the proposed attorneys' fee provision noting that "the Committee remains concerned about excessive litigation under the act and the burden that localeducational agencies face in paying fees to attorneys." (10) The report noted that the Governor may take the geographic differences in a state into account andencouraged the Governor tomake the established rates public prior to the beginning of the school year. This provision was described in thereport as helping to "restore balance to the proceedings under this Act andcontinue to provide early opportunities for schools and parents to foster more cooperative partnerships and resolveproblems." (11) However, the attorneys' fees provision in H.R. 1350 has been criticized. The minority views in the committee report argued for removal of the language stating: "There is noquestion that this will limit access to knowledgeable and experienced legal representation by the people who needit the most-low income, inexperienced parents seeking to obtain thebest education for their children with disabilities." (12) The Senate bill would keep the same general framework as is in current law; a federal district court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to theparents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. However, <108>the Senate bill would make somechanges. The Senate bill would add a requirement for apreliminary meeting prior to a due process hearing to provide an opportunity to resolve the complaint and the billspecifically provides that attorneys' fees are not available for thispreliminary meeting. In addition, the bill would add language to the provision on the reduction of attorneys' feesclarifying that if the parents' attorney does not provide the requiredinformation to the local educational agency, the court shall reduce the attorneys' fees. The Senate bill would add a new subsection specifically allowing parents to represent their children in court. Generally, an individual has a right to proceed as his or her own counsel infederal court. (13) Rule 17 of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure precludes minors from proceeding pro se although a representative or guardian maysue on the minor's behalf. However, several circuits have held that the right to proceed pro se in federal court does not give parentswho are not attorneys the right to represent their children. (14) The IDEA casesthat have specifically addressed this issue have generally found that parents cannot proceed pro se onbehalf of their child. (15) The leading case is Collinsgru v. Palmyra Board ofEducation where the third circuit held that "parents seeking to enforce their child's substantive right to anappropriate education under the IDEA may not represent their child in federalcourt." (16) However, in a detailed examination ofthe issue, the first circuit declined to follow Collinsgru. In Maroni v. Pemi-Baker RegionalSchool District, the court held that parentsdo have procedural and substantive rights under IDEA since they are "parties aggrieved" because they are able torequest due process hearings "and thus are logically within the groupsof 'parties aggrieved' given the right to sue." (17) The Senate bill does not state whether or not parents who represent their children in court have a right to attorneys'fees. Generally,under current law, even if the parent is a licensed attorney, attorneys' fees have not been allowed in pro se cases. (18) An amendment on attorneys' fees was agreed to on the Senate floor which would allow the court to award fees to a SEA or LEA against the attorney of a parent or a parent in certaincircumstances. The attorney of a parent may be required to pay the SEA's or LEA's fees if he or she files a complaint that is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, continues to litigate when the litigation clearly became frivolous, unreasonable or without foundationor if the complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any improper purpose, such as toharass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in thecost of litigation. Like the provision relating to attorneys, the parent of a child with a disability who files a complaint may be required to pay the SEA's or LEA's attorneys' fees if the complaint orsubsequent cause of action was presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delayor needless increase in the cost of litigation. The Senate bill alsoincluded a provision that nothing in the subparagraph shall be construed to affect the attorneys' fees provisionsapplicable to the District of Columbia. In the Senate debate on the attorneys' fees amendment, Senator Grassley stated that the amendment would "in no way limit or discourage parents from pursuing legitimate complaintsagainst a school district if they feel their child's school has not provided a free appropriate public education. It wouldsimply give school districts a little relief from abuses of the dueprocess rights found in IDEA and ensure that our taxpayer dollars go toward educating children, not lining thepockets of unscrupulous trial lawyers." (19) SenatorGregg also emphasizedthe need for the attorneys' fee amendment. He noted that the concept that a defendant should be able to obtainattorneys' fees when a plaintiff's actions were "frivolous, unreasonable, orwithout foundation" has been applied to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (20) held that prevailing defendants should recover attorneys' fees when a plaintiff's actions were frivolous, unreasonable,or without foundation in order to "protect defendants fromburdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis." (21) Senator Gregg observed that the standard is "very high...and prevailing defendants are rarely ableto meet it and obtain areimbursement of their attorneys fees" and that case law "directs courts to consider the financial resources of theplaintiff in awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant." (22) The attorneys' fee amendment also would allow defendants to recover fees if lawsuits were brought for an improper purpose. Senator Gregg noted that this concept was drawn fromRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (23) and that "in interpreting this language from Rule 11, courts must apply an objective standard of reasonableness tothe facts of thecase." (24)

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal funding forthe education of children with disabilities andrequires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE).The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure theprovision of FAPE and includes a provision for attorneys' fees. Congress is presently considering reauthorizing IDEA. H.R. 1350, 108th Congress, passed the House onApril 30, 2003, by a vote of 251 to 171. On May 13, 2004, the Senate incorporated S. 1248 in H.R. 1350and passed H.R. 1350 in lieu of S.1248 by a vote of 95 to 3. This report will discuss current IDEA provisions on attorneys' fees and the differingprovisions in the House and Senate bills. This report will not beupdated.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a grants and civil rights statute which provides federal funding to the states to help provide education for children with disabilities. If a state receives funds under IDEA, it must make available a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) for all children with disabilities in the state. Under the law prior to the enactment of P.L. 105-17 in 1997, states were required to set forth policies and procedures to ensure that provision was made for the participation of children with disabilities who are enrolled in private schools by their parents consistent with the number and location of these children. These requirements were further detailed in regulations which required that local education agencies (LEAs) provide private school students an opportunity for equitable participation in program benefits and that these benefits had to be "comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to the program benefits" provided to students in the public schools. The vagueness of the statute and the "equitable participation" standard led to differences among the states and localities and to differences among the courts. Prior to P.L. 105-17 , the courts of appeals that had considered these issues had sharply divergent views. Some courts gave local authorities broad discretion to decide whether to provide services for children with disabilities in private schools which generally resulted in fewer services to such children while others attempted to equalize the costs for public and private school children. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari in several of these cases but when Congress rewrote the law in 1997, the Court vacated and remanded these cases. The IDEA Amendments of 1997 rejected the "equitable participation"standard and provided that to the extent consistent with the number and location of children with disabilities in the state who were enrolled in private schools by their parents, provision was made for the participation of these children in programs assisted by Part B by providing them with special education and related services. The amounts expended for these services by an LEA were to be equal to a proportionate amount of federal funds made available to the local educational agency under Part B of IDEA. These services could be provided to children with disabilities on the premises of private schools, including parochial, elementary and secondary schools. There was also a requirement that the statutory provisions relating to "child find," identifying children with disabilities, are applicable to children enrolled in private schools, including parochial schools. More changes to these provisions were made by the 2004 reauthorization. The Senate report observed that "the intent of these changes is to clarify the responsibilities of LEAs to ensure that services to these children are provided in a fair and equitable manner." In addition, the Senate report stated that "many of the changes reflect current policy enumerated either in existing IDEA regulations or the No Child Left Behind Act." The House report noted that "the bill makes a number of changes to clarify the responsibilities of local educational agencies to children with disabilities who are placed by their parents in private schools. The Committee feels that these are important changes that will resolve a number of issues that have been the subject of an increasing amount of contention in the last few years." A child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the LEA or the State Educational Agency (SEA) as a means of fulfilling the FAPE requirement for the child. In this situation the cost is paid for by the LEA. A child with a disability may also be unilaterally placed in a private school by his or her parents. In this situation, the cost of the private school placement is not paid by the LEA unless a hearing officer or a court makes certain findings. However, IDEA does require some services for children in private schools, even if they are unilaterally placed there by their parents. The 2004 reauthorization includes several changes to the provisions relating to children who are placed in private school by their parents. The provisions relating to children placed in private schools by public agencies were not changed. Generally, children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in private schools are to be provided special education and related services to the extent consistent with the number and location of such children in the school district served by a LEA pursuant to several requirements (§612(a)(10)(A)(I)). In addition to this general LEA responsibility, there are also five specific requirements regarding parentally placed children. The general provision discussed above was changed from previous law by the addition of the requirement that the children be located in the school district served by the LEA. The Senate report described this change as protecting "LEAs from having to work with private schools located in multiple jurisdictions when students attend private schools across district lines." Although the intent was to protect LEAs from working with private schools in multiple jurisdictions, this provision has generated considerable controversy. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this report; however, several of the issues raised include the disproportional effect on LEAs with large concentrations of private schools, the lack of change in the funding formula to reflect the change, and potential conflicts with state laws. There are five requirements regarding children parentally placed in private schools. The first is that the funds expended by the LEA, including direct services to parentally placed private school children, shall be equal to a proportionate amount of federal funds made available under part B of IDEA. The 2004 reauthorization added the phrase regarding direct services. The Senate report stated that "it is the committee's intent that school districts place a greater emphasis on services provided directly to such children—like specifically designed instructional activities and related services—rather than devoting funds solely to indirect services such as professional development for private school personnel." Second, a new provision relating to the calculation of the proportionate amount is added. In calculating this amount, the LEA, after timely and meaningful consultation with representatives of private schools, shall conduct a thorough and complete child find process to determine the number of children with disabilities who are parentally placed in private schools. The final regulations provide a discussion and example of the proportionate share calculation. Third, the new law keeps the previous requirement that the services may be provided to children on the premises of private, including religious schools, to the extent consistent with law. P.L. 108-446 added the term "religious" while deleting the term "parochial." Fourth, a specific provision regarding supplementing funds, not supplanting them, is added. State and local funds may supplement but not supplant the proportionate amount of federal funds required to be expended. Fifth, each LEA must maintain records and provide to the SEA the number of children evaluated, the number of children determined to have disabilities, and the number of children served under the private school provisions. The House report stated that "such requirement ensures that these funds are serving their intended purpose." The general requirement regarding child find is essentially the same as previous law. The requirement for finding children with disabilities is the same as that delineated in §612(a)(3) for children who are not parentally placed in private schools, including religious schools. As was done in the previous section, the former use of the term "parochial" is replaced by the term "religious" in the new law. New provisions are added concerning equitable participation, activities, cost and the completion period. Child find is to be designed to ensure the equitable participation of parentally placed private school children with disabilities and their accurate count. The cost of child find activities may not be considered in meeting the LEA's proportional spending obligation. Finally, the child find for parentally placed private school children with disabilities is to be completed in a time period comparable to that for students attending public schools (§612(a)(10)(A)(ii)). P.L. 108-446 adds requirements concerning LEA consultation with private school officials and representatives of the parents of parentally placed private school children with disabilities. This consultation is to include the child find process and how parentally placed private school children with disabilities can participate equitably; the determination of the proportionate amount of federal funds available to serve parentally placed private school children with disabilities, including how that amount was calculated; the consultation process among the LEA, private school officials and representatives of parents of parentally placed private school children with disabilities, including how the process will operate; how, where, and by whom special education and related services will be provided for parentally placed private school children with disabilities, including a discussion of the types of services, including direct services and alternate service delivery mechanisms, how the services will be apportioned if there are insufficient funds to serve all children and how and when these decisions will be made; and how the LEA shall provide a written explanation to private school officials of the reasons why the LEA chose not to provide services if the LEA and private school officials disagree (§612(a)(10)(A)(iii)). The Senate report described the consultation procedure as similar to that in the No Child Left Behind Act and "therefore, the committee does not believe including these provisions places an undue burden on LEAs." The new law requires a written affirmation of the consultation signed by the representatives of the participating private schools. If the private school representatives do not sign within a reasonable period of time, the LEA shall forward the documentation to the SEA (§612(a)(10)(A)(iv)). Compliance procedures also are added by P.L. 108-446 . Generally, a private school official has the right to submit a complaint to the SEA alleging that the LEA did not engage in meaningful and timely consultation or did not give due consideration to the views of the private school official. If a private school official submits a complaint, he or she must provide the basis of the noncompliance to the SEA, and the LEA must forward the appropriate documentation. If the private school official is dissatisfied with the SEA's determination, he or she may submit a complaint to the Secretary of Education, and the SEA shall forward the appropriate documentation to the Secretary (§612(a)(10)(A)(v)). The 2004 reauthorization contains a specific subsection regarding the provision of equitable services. Services are to be provided by employees of a public agency or through contract by the public agency. In addition, the services provided are to be "secular, neutral, and nonideological" (§612(a)(10)(A)(vi)). The new law further states that the funds that are available to serve pupils attending private schools shall be controlled and administered by a public agency (§612(a)(10)(A)(vii)). As noted above, when a child with a disability is unilaterally placed in a private school by his or her parents, the cost of the private school placement is not paid by the LEA unless a hearing officer or a court makes certain findings. As in previous law, this reimbursement may be reduced or denied if the child's parents did not give certain notice (§612(a)(10)(C)(iii)). Both the 1997 and 2004 reauthorizations contain an exception to this limitation, but this exception is changed somewhat in the new law. Under the new law, the cost of reimbursement is not to be reduced or denied for the failure to provide notice if: the school prevented the parent from providing such notice; the parents had not received notice of the notice requirement; or compliance would likely result in physical harm to the child. Previous law had included a provision requiring that reimbursement not be reduced or denied if a parent is illiterate and had included "serious emotional harm." P.L. 108-446 also contains a provision allowing, at the discretion of a court or hearing officer, the reimbursement not to be reduced or denied if: the parent is illiterate or cannot write in English; or compliance with the notice requirement would likely result in serious emotional harm to the child (§612(a)(10)(C)(iv)). An issue that is not specifically addressed in the statute is whether parents of a child with a disability are entitled to private school reimbursement even though the student had never received special education services from the school district. In the Supreme Court's most recent IDEA decision, Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v. Tom F. , the Court, dividing 4-4, upheld an appeals court ruling that parents of a child with a disability are entitled to private school reimbursement even though the student had never received special education services from the school district. The Court's per curiam decision does not set a precedent for lower courts; therefore, the issue is not settled. On October 15, 2007, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in another case presenting the same issue.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as amended by P.L. 108-446, provides for services for children with disabilities in private schools. A child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the local educational agency (LEA) or the State Educational Agency (SEA) and costs are paid by the agency. Children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in private schools are treated differently; generally, they are to be provided special education and related services to the extent consistent with the number and location of such children in the school district served by a LEA pursuant to several requirements. These requirements include provisions relating to direct services to parentally placed private school children with disabilities, the calculation of the proportionate amount of funds, and a requirement for record keeping. Compliance procedures for these requirements were added by the 2004 reauthorization. For a general discussion of the changes made by P.L. 108-446, see CRS Report RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as necessary.

The basic antitrust law is § 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), which prohibits contracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Although most alleged restraints are analyzed pursuant to the rule of reason, some categories of anticompetitive activity (e.g., price fixing, joint refusals to deal, tying the purchase of a desired commodity to the purchase of a less-desired commodity) have, over the years, been deemed automatically to violate § 1 as per se offenses because "the effect and ... purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of a predominantly free-market economy." As the antitrust laws are not industry-specific, whether an entity is subject to the strictures of the antitrust laws depends on whether, and under what circumstances, Congress has specifically exempted an industry or activity. Where Congress has been silent, however, the courts have created the doctrine of "implied immunity" to cover situations in which the application of the antitrust laws would be contrary to an expressed public policy or could subject entities to possibly conflicting mandates. The Supreme Court has been generally unreceptive to arguments in favor of implied antitrust immunity (i.e., that inferred, with respect to a member of a regulated industry, from the mere fact that Congress has given regulatory jurisdiction over an industry to a federal agency; or, with respect to those acting in purported furtherance of a congressional statute, from the mere existence of the legislative pronouncement), except in instances where "there is a plain repugnance" between the antitrust laws and the regulatory scheme or statutorily expressed preference. As the Court put it in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange , the problem arises from the need to reconcile pursuit of the antitrust aim of eliminating restraints on competition with the effective operation of a public policy contemplating [certain activity] which may well have anti-competitive effects in general and in specific applications. 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963). Distillation of the Court's previous jurisprudence on implied immunity from the antitrust laws—especially that concerning the securities industry—has yielded several still-valid guidelines for determining whether a particular practice will be protected. In Silver , supra , the practice at issue was the Exchange's disconnection of a broker's private wire service, which service he alleged was critical to his ability to profitably do business. Because the Court found the manner in which the Exchange and its members carried out their collective refusal to deal to be "fundamentally unfair," it decided that "the Exchange ha[d] plainly exceeded the scope of its authority under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-regulation and ha[d] not even reached the threshold of justification under that statute for what would otherwise be an antitrust violation." Moreover, since the SEC could exercise no regulatory supervision over the application of the Exchange rules that permitted or required wire-service termination, there was no potential for conflict between the securities regulatory scheme and enforcement of the antitrust laws. Therefore, implied immunity was not available, and the actions were amenable to prosecution under § 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange involved an antitrust challenge to the system of fixed commission rates for securities transactions of less than $500,000. There, because there had been a time when "[t]he antitrust law had forbidden the very thing that the securities law had then permitted, namely an anticompetitive rate setting process," the Court determined that immunity was required in order to make the securities market scheme (and the SEC's specifically authorized supervision of stock exchange commission rates) work. As the Court explained: [T]o deny antitrust immunity with respect to commission rates would be to subject the exchanges and their members to conflicting standards. 422 U.S. at 689. The third major Supreme Court securities/antitrust decision was U.S. v. National Association of Securities Dealers ( NASD ). In that instance, the Court looked at challenged price restrictions imposed on the sale and transfer of mutual fund shares in the secondary market (i.e., the market for transactions occurring after the initial sale of the shares). It concluded that because the purpose of the Investment Company Act was to "restrict most of secondary market trading," it had to reject the Government's too-literal reading of the applicable section of the act and find instead that the agreements in question were immune as "among the kinds of restrictions Congress contemplated when it enacted that section." Moreover, even though the SEC had not prescribed any rules or regulations concerning the restrictions, it had the power to do so: [Although t]he Government also urges that the SEC's unexercised power ... is insufficient to create repugnancy between its regulatory authority and the antitrust laws ... we see no way to reconcile the Commission's power to authorize these restrictions with the competing mandate of the antitrust laws. 422 U.S. at 721, 722. The Securities and Exchange Commission administers a comprehensive body of securities regulation statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. ), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. ). The typical manner in which investment securities are offered to the public first involves underwriting services offered by an underwriting firm to an issuer of securities. The most common delivery of those services has been said to be by "firm-commitment agreements." In such an agreement the underwriter agrees that on a fixed date the issuer will be given a certain amount of money for a certain amount of its securities. Such an agreement removes the uncertainty of an early cash infusion for the issuer and transfers the risk of selling the issue to the underwriter. In the first half of the twentieth century, syndicates, consisting of a few to many underwriting firms, emerged to manage many of the risks that underwriters assume. A syndicate often buys the entire new issue of the securities at a fixed price and then reoffers it to the public at a somewhat higher predetermined price. The price difference is in effect a kind of commission for the syndicate. These principal underwriters often contact other brokers or underwriters who act as wholesalers of the securities. The issuer and the underwriters often agree on the size and the pricing of the offering. Credit Suisse gave the Court the opportunity—not exercised since 1981 —to reiterate and apply its previously stated standards for granting implied antitrust immunity. An antitrust suit (originally a class action) was filed by a group of IPO purchasers against the underwriters of those issues (10 major investment banks) alleging conspiracy, price fixing-related, and tying violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The particular, allegedly harmful practices included (1) required investor promises to place bids in the aftermarket at prices above the initial public offering price, referred to as "laddering"; (2) required investor commitments to purchase other, less attractive securities, a kind of tying arrangement; and (3) investor payment of excessive commissions. These requirements, according to the investors, artificially inflated the share prices of the securities and constituted per se price fixing. At first glance, this system of agreement by the issuer and all of the major underwriters of size and pricing of the offering does appear, in fact, to be antitrust-violative price manipulation. However, not all underwriter manipulations have been prohibited. A "little price manipulation" has been permitted in order to further appropriate market goals. The Securities and Exchange Commission has traditionally recognized certain types of manipulative activities, considered "stabilizing" activities, as permissible under § 9(a)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-1. In fact, the Court itself indicated that the complaint was an attack not on the existence of the SEC-approved joint IPO activity, but rather, the abuse of that activity. The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, began its analysis of the availability of implied antitrust immunity in this instance by noting that all of the challenged activities meet the basic prerequisite for implied antitrust immunity in the regulated securities industry: they are "central to the proper functioning of well-regulated capital markets." Further, the SEC has, and has exercised, its specific authority to supervise those activities. Moreover, injured investors are specifically authorized to recover damages, and have successfully sued under the securities statutes, for violation of applicable SEC regulations "for conduct virtually identical to the conduct at issue here." Further, the Court observed, the challenged practices all seemed to describe "conditions that the investors apparently were willing to accept in order to obtain an allocation of new shares that were in high demand." Continuing, the opinion noted the variously nuanced SEC decisions concerning, for example, commissions and future sales, and "laddering," the Court observing that it would "often be difficult for someone who is not familiar with accepted syndicate practices to ... distinguish what is forbidden from what is allowed"—the more so because "evidence tending to show unlawful antitrust activity and evidence tending to show lawful securities marketing activity may overlap." Further, since antitrust challenges to securities-marketing activities could be brought "throughout the Nation in dozens of different courts with different nonexpert judges," the decision to defer to the SEC's expertise seemed only logical. We believe it fair to conclude that, where conduct at the core or the marketing of new securities is at issue; where securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible from the forbidden; where the threat to antitrust lawsuits, through error and disincentive, could seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways, to allow an antitrust lawsuit would threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets. 127 S.Ct. at 2396. Given (1) Congress's expressed concern that securities markets become and remain stable, (2) the continued oversight and actions of a single expert regulatory agency versus the probability of diverse and possibly conflicting decisions by nonexpert judges in the event of securities/antitrust lawsuits, and (3) the likelihood of conflict between the mandates of antitrust law and allowable activities under the securities laws, the Court found that "the securities laws are 'clearly incompatible' with the application of the antitrust laws." Accordingly, implied immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws is accorded to participants in securities markets. Justice Stevens concurred separately to emphasize that, in his opinion, neither the incompatibility between the antitrust and securities laws, nor the question of implied antitrust immunity for regulated entities should have been the issue. In my view, agreements among underwriters on how best to market IPOs, including agreements on price and other terms of sale to initial investors, should be treated as procompetitive joint ventures for purposes of antitrust analysis. In all but the rarest of cases, they cannot be conspiracies in restraint of trade within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act .... 127 S.Ct. at 2398. Justice Thomas's dissent found fault with the Court's assertion that the securities acts were silent on whether the antitrust laws should be applicable to entities in the securities industry. He noted that both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 state, in "savings clauses," that their remedies "shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity": Therefore, both statutes explicitly save the very remedies the Court holds to be impliedly precluded. 127 S.Ct. at 2399.

In Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing, the Supreme Court examined whether entities in a heavily regulated industry are necessarily entitled to immunity from prosecution under the federal antitrust laws simply by virtue of their regulated status. The Court had previously ruled that, absent a specific congressional mandate, such immunity may be granted only by findings either of "clear repugnance" between the regulatory scheme and enforcement of the antitrust laws, or sufficiently pervasive regulation of an industry as would be disrupted by application of the antitrust laws; the Credit Suisse opinion reaffirms that reasoning. A class of securities investors alleged that they had paid artificially inflated prices for certain securities because of purportedly antitrust-violative actions taken by the underwriters of some initial public offerings (IPOs). The challenged practices included the formation of syndicates; requiring purchasers of IPOs to make future purchases ("laddering"); and requiring purchasers to buy other, less desirable securities ("tying"). In response, defendants/appellants asserted that they were immune to prosecution under the antitrust laws because of the pervasive regulation of the securities industry by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which administers a comprehensive system of regulation including major parts of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC, they argued, should be the sole arbiter of the validity of their actions, notwithstanding that Congress had not expressly so provided in the applicable legislation. Although the district court, which agreed with the underwriters, dismissed the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed after a lengthy discussion of Supreme Court case law in the area. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, accepting the "pervasive regulation of the securities industry" argument. Specifically, it found that the conduct at issue was "at the core of marketing new securities," noted that "securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible from the forbidden," and concluded, therefore, "that the securities laws are 'clearly incompatible with the application of the antitrust laws in this context." This report will not be updated.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation are often referred to with the abbreviation PAS. This report identifies, for the 114 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports. Information for this report was compiled using the Legislative Information System (LIS) Senate nominations database at http://www.lis.gov/nomis , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2016 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related CRS reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointment-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . During the 114 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted 43 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 22 were confirmed, 16 were returned to the President, and 5 were withdrawn. Table 1 summarizes the appointment activity. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate varies widely. Some nominations are confirmed within a few days, others are not confirmed for several months, and some are never confirmed. This report provides, for each agency nomination confirmed in the 114 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). Under Senate Rules, nominations not acted on by the Senate at the end of a session of Congress (or before a recess of 30 days) are returned to the President. The Senate, by unanimous consent, often waives this rule—although not always. In the case of nominations that are returned to the President and resubmitted, this report measures the days to confirm from the date of receipt of the resubmitted nomination, not the original. For agency nominations confirmed in the 114 th Congress, a mean of 174.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 152.0. Agency profiles in this report are organized in two parts. The first table lists the titles and pay levels of all the agency's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 114 th Congress. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule. As of the end of the 114 th Congress, these pay levels range from level I ($205,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($150,200) for lower-ranked positions. The second table lists appointment action for vacant positions during the 114 th Congress in chronological order. This table provides the name of the nominee, position title, date of nomination or appointment, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation, and notes relevant actions other than confirmation (e.g., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). When more than one nominee has had appointment action, the second table also provides statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. The average days to confirm are provided in two ways: mean and median. The mean is a more familiar measure, though it may be influenced by outliers in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time to be confirmed might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. In the final two rows, the table includes the mean and median values for the "days to confirm" column. Table A-2 provides summary data from the appointments identified in this report and is organized by agency type, including independent executive agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral organizations, and agencies in the legislative branch. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each agency grouping. It also includes mean and median values for the number of days taken to confirm nominations in each category. Appendix B provides a list of department abbreviations. Appendix A. Summary of All Nominations and Appointments to Independent and Other Agencies Appendix B. Agency Abbreviations

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. This report identifies all nominations during the 114th Congress that were submitted to the Senate for full-time positions in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports. Information for each agency is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each agency. Additional summary information across all agencies covered in the report appears in an appendix. During the 114th Congress, the President submitted 43 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 43 nominations, 22 were confirmed, 5 were withdrawn, and 16 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 174.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 152.0. Information for this report was compiled using the Legislative Information System (LIS) Senate nominations database at http://www.lis.gov/nomis, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2016 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

A streetcar is a type of light rail public transportation that operates mostly in mixed traffic on rail lines embedded in streets and highways. Streetcar service is typically provided by single cars with electric power delivered by overhead wires known as catenaries, although streetcars can also draw power from underground cables or from batteries. Compared with non-streetcar light rail, streetcar lines tend to be shorter and the stops more frequent. Because of the short distance between stops and the overall operating environment, streetcars are slow compared with non-streetcar light rail and other types of rail public transportation, such as commuter rail and heavy rail. Streetcar systems can be categorized into four different types: 1. legacy systems, lines that have been in operation for many years, but are the remnants of more extensive past systems (e.g., New Orleans); 2. heritage systems, new or revived systems using historical equipment (e.g., Memphis); 3. replica systems, new or revived systems using equipment built to replicate historical systems, but sometimes with modern amenities such as air conditioning (e.g., Tampa); 4. modern systems, new systems using modern equipment (e.g., Portland, OR). In early 2014, there were 12 operating streetcar systems, 7 new systems under construction, and approximately 21 new systems in the planning stages ( Figure 1 ). Not included in these figures are several short streetcar lines associated with museums (e.g., Issaquah, WA) or primarily oriented to tourists (e.g., San Pedro, CA). Additionally, a few systems already in operation have extensions in construction or being planned. Because they are often controversial, streetcar systems that are being planned may not be built. The streetcars systems with the largest ridership include those in Philadelphia; New Orleans; San Francisco; Portland, OR; Tacoma; Memphis; and Seattle. Streetcars are intended to provide high-quality transit service for traveling short distances in urban environments. As part of this service, streetcars can link to other transportation modes as part of the "last mile" of a trip, as in Salt Lake City, where a new streetcar line links to light rail and bus lines. Streetcars are often promoted as a means of increasing transit ridership by offering a better quality of service than buses, including such things as frequency of service, predictability of trip time, passenger capacity, and comfort. Additionally, streetcars can more easily accommodate wheelchairs and bicycles. Service quality, however, is not better in all cases: streetcars can be delayed by problems that would not affect buses, such as fallen catenaries or vehicles double-parked on the tracks. Greater capacity in modern streetcars may in part come at the expense of seating. Overall, there is no clear evidence as to whether streetcars attract new riders to transit. In some circumstances, streetcars can help attract and focus development by providing a more permanent transportation investment than buses and by promoting a walkable environment. For example, the greater permanence of a streetcar may improve the coherence of the urban environment, and may reduce the risk for developers of offices, residences, and retail, spurring job creation. The proximity of a streetcar may also reduce some costs that would otherwise confront private developers, such as the need for a large numbers of parking spaces. According to one study, the area within a quarter-mile of the Little Rock streetcar system, opened in 2004, has had a capital investment of $800 million in new businesses, residences, and other activities between 2000 and 2012. In addition, during construction, streetcars tend to be less disruptive of existing activities than other forms of rail systems. However, it is possible that development spurred by streetcar lines is merely shifted from other parts of the urban area. This is a concern in analyzing the effects of rail transit in general, but there is little empirical research on this question for streetcars specifically. In addition to the expense of the streetcar itself, development along streetcar lines has sometimes benefited from other subsidies. Not all streetcar lines have succeeded in stimulating property development. The city planning literature suggests that if a streetcar is to spur development, the host locality needs to at least provide supportive land use laws, such as permitting higher-density, mixed-use developments along a corridor. One study found that government support in the form of such things as incentives, zoning changes, and marketing is the leading factor determining whether or not development occurs around investment in public transportation. The same study found that both light rail transit, including streetcars, and bus rapid transit (BRT) led to development, but that BRT leveraged much more private investment per dollar of transit expenditure. Streetcar systems can be much less costly to build than light rail systems, and may be particularly attractive in small and medium-size cities where a larger and more expensive rail system is not appropriate. Capital costs per mile can vary dramatically, however, depending on the specific circumstances of projects, including the need for major new infrastructure. A study of 21 light rail, streetcar, and BRT lines found that streetcars were middling in terms of capital cost per mile. While the 21 projects ranged from below $10 million per mile to over $80 million per mile, the two streetcar projects analyzed, Portland, OR, and Seattle, cost about $30 million per mile and $60 million per mile to build, respectively (in 2010 dollars). Although conventional buses do not provide some of the advantages of BRT and rail transit, including streetcars, regular bus service improvements are likely to be the least costly of all measures to increase transit capacity. Operating costs, including such things as drivers' salaries, fuel, and track and vehicle maintenance, are difficult to compare among modes because of differing service characteristics. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of operational costs, for example, showed no consistent advantage for BRT or light rail. A comparison of operating costs of streetcar and bus service in seven cities found that costs per trip were higher for streetcars in only two cities. But measured by cost per passenger mile, streetcar operating costs were significantly higher than bus operating costs. There are currently three main sources of funding available for the construction of streetcar systems: (1) the TIGER grant program; (2) the New Starts and Small Starts program; and (3) flexible federal-aid highway program funds, including funding from the Surface Transportation Program and the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) program. The predominant form of federal support for the construction of streetcars over the past few years has been the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program. This is likely because TIGER provides moderate sums of discretionary funding, streetcars are favored by the Obama Administration as so-called "livability" projects, and, until passage of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ) in 2012, streetcar projects did not score well in the evaluation of projects funded by the New Starts and Small Starts program. Initially enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ), the TIGER program has been funded in five subsequent appropriations bills. TIGER funding was $1.5 billion in FY2009, $600 million in FY2010, $527 million in FY2011, $500 million in FY2012, $474 million in FY2013, and $600 million in FY2014. Funds are drawn from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Nine streetcar projects have been awarded a total of $279 million from the TIGER program (see Table 1 ). To date, FY2014 funding has not been awarded. According to a notice of funding availability, applications for FY2014 funding must be submitted by April 28, 2014. The New Starts and Small Starts program provides federal funds to public transportation agencies on a largely competitive basis for the construction of new fixed guideway transit systems and the expansion of existing systems (49 U.S.C. §5309). The New Starts and Small Starts program is one of six major funding programs administered by FTA, accounting for about 18% of FTA's budget. Unlike the other major federal transit programs, which are funded from the mass transit account of the highway trust fund, funding for the New Starts and Small Starts program comes from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. MAP-21 authorized $1.9 billion for FY2013 and FY2014. Funding appropriated for the program was $1.855 billion in FY2013 and $1.943 billion in FY2014. In addition, the FY2014 appropriations act provided $93 million in unobligated funds from the former discretionary bus and bus facilities program for bus rapid transit projects, and an unspecified amount of unobligated funds from the former alternatives analysis program for any type of New Start and Small Start project. Streetcar projects typically fall into the Small Starts category, defined as projects requesting $75 million or less in federal assistance and costing $250 million or less in total. To go with the smaller amount of federal funds being committed, the approval process for Small Starts projects is simpler than for larger and more expensive New Starts projects. Few streetcar projects have received New Starts and Small Starts program funding over the past two decades, but changes in the way projects are evaluated by FTA may make it easier in the future. GAO found that of the 57 projects approved for funding under the New Starts and Small Starts program between October 2004 and June 2012, only one was a streetcar project (Portland, OR). This was likely due to the use of cost of time savings as part of the evaluation of projects prior to MAP-21, as that measure tended to favor projects supporting faster long-distance trips, like those on commuter rail, rather than slower, shorter trips like those on streetcars. As required by MAP-21, the cost of time savings measure has now been dropped in favor of cost per rider. In December 2013, two streetcar projects, those in Tempe, AZ, and Ft. Lauderdale, FL, were in the project development phase of the Small Starts process. In its study, GAO did not include projects receiving less than $25 million in New Starts and Small Starts program funding, which were exempt from the normal New Starts and Small Starts evaluation process. In FY2010, five streetcar projects were awarded $25 million or less. Streetcar projects in Fort Worth, St. Louis, Charlotte, and Cincinnati were awarded $24.99 million each, and Dallas received $4.9 million. These funds distributed by FTA were from $130 million in unallocated New Starts and Small Starts program funds. The Obama Administration decided that it would use them for what it termed "urban circulator" projects, mainly streetcar and bus rapid transit projects. Instead of the New Starts and Small Starts selection criteria, the Urban Circulator grant program evaluated projects based on livability, including providing additional transportation options, sustainability, and economic development. MAP-21 continues to allow certain federal-aid highway funds to be used for public transportation projects at the discretion of state and local officials. Most of the "flexed" funds have come from two programs, the Surface Transportation Program (STP) and the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ). Several streetcar projects have used or are proposing to use flexed funding. For example, the streetcar project in Tempe, AZ, is proposing to use $32.1 million dollar of CMAQ funding in addition to $56 million from the New Starts and Small Starts program and $41.24 million in local funding. The costs of operating transit service include such functions as vehicle operation and maintenance, maintenance of stations and other facilities, general administration, and purchase of transportation from private operators. In general, federal law prohibits transit operators in urbanized areas of 200,000 or more residents from using federal transit funds for operating expenditures, including annual distributions of federal public transportation funds by formula. Federal support in urbanized areas of this size is limited to capital expenditures. However, the definition of transit capital expenses includes some items traditionally considered to be operating expenses, such as preventive maintenance. In some circumstances, CMAQ funds can be used to support the operating expenses of streetcars. As the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) notes, "projects designed to attract new riders, typically by providing new transit facilities or services, are eligible for CMAQ funds ... Projects can include both constructing and operating new facilities." Among other things, CMAQ funds may be used to provide fare subsides. However, FHWA also notes that CMAQ funds typically provide short-term help to launch new or expanded service. Relatively recent changes in federal programs, should they be maintained, are likely to lead to greater support for streetcars in the coming years. These changes include the creation of the TIGER program in FY2009 and its continued funding through FY2014, and reforms to the evaluation of projects in the New Starts and Small Starts program that favor streetcars. Increased funding of these programs may lead to even greater federal support for building new streetcar lines, although this would depend on the competition for funds from other types of projects. Another way to increase federal support for streetcar construction would be to direct more existing funding to these types of projects. One way for Congress to accomplish this would be to reinstitute the set-aside of New Starts and Small Starts funding for Small Starts projects, those requesting $75 million or less in federal assistance and costing $250 million or less in total. Prior to MAP-21, $200 million of the program's funding was reserved for Small Starts projects. This again would not guarantee the funding of streetcars because Small Starts grants also go to other types of projects, such as BRT, but it would limit the competition for these funds. Congress might also consider supporting streetcar systems by allowing the use of federal transit funds to pay for operating costs. The federal government generally prohibits the use of federal transit funds for operating expenses in urbanized areas over 200,000. However, small bus operators in these larger urbanized areas were provided support in MAP-21. Operators of small fixed-guideway systems, such as streetcars, might be afforded the same opportunity. Alternatively, Congress might decide to reduce or eliminate the use of federal funds for streetcar construction and operation. This could be accomplished by reducing or eliminating funding for the TIGER program, the New Starts and Small Starts program, and flexible highway programs, or by prohibiting the use of program funds for streetcars. In the case of the New Starts and Small Starts program it might be easier to reinstitute evaluation criteria that are unfavorable to streetcar projects. This might entail requiring the use of time savings or passenger miles, not passenger trips, as a measure of mobility benefits.

Streetcars, a type of rail public transportation, are experiencing a revival in the United States. Also known as trolleys, streetcars were widespread in the early decades of the 20th century, but almost extinct by the 1960s. Several new streetcar systems have been built over the past 20 years, and many more are being planned. In early 2014, there were 12 operating streetcar systems, 7 new systems under construction, and approximately 21 new systems in the planning stages. Many streetcars systems, though not all, have been built or are being built with the support of federal funds. This report answers some frequently asked questions about streetcars and federal involvement in their construction and operation. It concludes by laying out policy options for Congress in dealing with streetcars.

The "discharge rule" of the House of Representatives (Rule XV, clause 2) provides a means for the House to bring to the floor for consideration a measure (a bill or resolution) that has not been reported from committee. Normally, each measure introduced in the House is routinely referred to a committee and cannot receive floor consideration until the committee reports. Because House committees are in general not required to report measures, they can normally prevent House action on any referred measure simply by taking no action thereon. This "gatekeeping" function is a key reason for the central position of committees in shaping the congressional agenda. The discharge rule provides one of the few procedures by which the House can circumvent this gatekeeping role. More generally, the discharge rule offers the only means by which a majority of House Members may secure consideration of any measure against the simultaneous opposition of the committee of jurisdiction, the leadership of the majority party, and the Committee on Rules. Other House procedures may permit bringing a measure to the floor over the opposition of some of these entities—but only through the concurrence of others. For example, the motion to suspend the rules and pass a measure can bring to the floor even an unreported measure, because the motion can suspend the rule requiring it to be reported before it can be considered. The Speaker, however, has discretion in recognition for this motion and, for this purpose, normally recognizes the chair of the committee of jurisdiction (or the chair's designee). Similar practices govern recognition for requests to consider a measure by unanimous consent. Finally, the House can adopt a "special rule" directing that a specified unreported measure be "extracted" from committee and taken up on the floor. Special rules, however, are normally privileged for consideration only when reported by the Rules Committee. The discharge procedure is designed to be difficult to accomplish so as to discourage Members from resorting routinely to a procedure that takes control of the floor agenda away from the Rules Committee and other leadership organs that are normally responsible for it. A discharge motion may be offered on the floor only if a majority of the entire membership of the House, 218 Members, first signs a petition in support of the action. (Delegates are not eligible to sign.) A Member may initiate such a petition only after the measure has remained in committee for at least 30 legislative days without being reported. Seldom is a petition filed this soon; Members generally refrain from initiating one until they consider it clear that the committee does not plan to act. The discharge rule explicitly excludes private bills from being subject to discharge. The chair once asserted that a resolution to establish an investigating committee also is immune from discharge. Apparently, discharge may be sought on any other measure pending before committees of the House. A Member obtains the petition form at the Clerk's desk in the House chamber, where pending petitions are also maintained and made available for signature. Members may sign a petition only by going to the Clerk's desk while the House is in session. Members may sign or remove their names until the total of 218 is obtained, at which point the signature list is frozen and printed in the Record , and the motion is "entered" on the Discharge Calendar. Few petitions reach this point. For those that do, the process usually takes some months, although on three occasions the petition garnered the necessary signatures in one day. The motion to discharge may then be offered on the floor, but only at the beginning of a day's session that falls at least seven legislative days after the motion is entered; only on a "discharge day" (the second or fourth Monday of each month); and not during the last six days of a session of Congress. Any Member who signed the petition may offer the motion; normally the one who initiated the petition is recognized. The motion is debatable for 20 minutes, equally divided between supporters and opponents (typically, controlled by the Member calling it up and the chair of the committee to be discharged). If a simple majority of Members present and voting adopt the motion, the committee is discharged, and the House may proceed to consider the measure. Because the measure has not been reported, however, it comes to the floor in the form introduced, with no recommended committee amendments and no written committee report to guide Members or establish legislative history. Once the House acts on a discharge motion on any measure, any further action under the discharge rule is precluded for any measure on the same subject during the same session of Congress (that is, roughly, for that calendar year). At the final sine die adjournment of a Congress, all legislative business terminates, including pending discharge petitions. A discharge motion that never comes to the floor may still serve proponents' purposes, for a committee may sometimes respond to a discharge effort by reporting the measure on its own initiative. This response may become increasingly likely as the petition approaches or obtains the required 218 signatures. Even counting such cases, nevertheless, usually no more than one measure on which discharge is attempted reaches the House floor in a single Congress. Also, some such measures fail to pass the House, and only 30 have ever become law or otherwise received final approval. Within the structure of this general mechanism, the discharge rule incorporates two distinct approaches: The petition may be filed either directly on the unreported measure itself or on a special rule for its consideration. The first approach permits the committee of referral to nullify the discharge attempt by reporting the measure, for once the committee no longer has the measure in its possession, it can no longer be discharged. The committee may even wait until all 218 signatures are obtained and then report the measure before the next discharge day. The motion to discharge then cannot be called up, because it is moot. Although the measure is then procedurally available to be considered, it remains unlikely to reach the floor unless the reporting committee takes action to bring it up. If a measure is referred to more than one committee, all the committees may be discharged simultaneously by a single petition. A measure referred to multiple committees remains eligible for action under the discharge rule until all committees of referral report it (or otherwise lose possession of it). In these circumstances a single committee cannot nullify the discharge attempt by reporting unless it is the last committee holding the measure. If 218 signatures are obtained and the committee does not report the measure, the discharge motion may be called up, and the House may adopt it. Any Member who signed the petition may then move for the House to take up the measure under the appropriate general rules. (If this motion is defeated, the measure may later be taken up by any of the usual means, but these, again, are normally under the control of the leadership.) If a measure reaching the floor by discharge is a "money bill" (including an authorization, appropriation, or revenue bill) House Rules mandate that it initially be considered in the Committee of the Whole; the proper motion is therefore that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole for its consideration. If the House agrees to this motion, the measure is considered under the equivalent of an "open rule": It is read by section for amendment, and any germane amendment is in order to each section. This form of consideration offers no possibility of limiting or structuring the amendment process or, conversely, of providing any waivers that prospective amendments might need. It also precludes limiting the time for general debate on the measure or placing it under the control of managers except by unanimous consent. If the House agrees to discharge on a measure that is not a "money bill," then the motion in order is that the House consider it. On agreement to this motion, the House considers the measure under the "one-hour rule," which permits the Member calling up the measure to move the previous question after one hour of debate. If the House orders the previous question, it then proceeds to vote on the measure in the form introduced before any Member has any opportunity to offer an amendment. Even if the House defeats the previous question, a Member who led the effort to do so then normally offers an amendment and is recognized for one hour for debate, at the end of which he or she moves the previous question on the amendment and the measure. Under these conditions, too, this first method of discharge provides no way to adapt the terms of consideration and amendment to the circumstances of the specific measure. The second method of discharge was added to House Rules in 1931 as a means of avoiding the difficulties just discussed, and it became more common in the mid-1990s. Under this second approach, a Member must first draft and submit a special rule (which takes the form of a House resolution) providing that a specified measure be considered even if it remains unreported. The special rule may not permit the offering of any non-germane amendment nor provide for consideration of more than one measure. If the Rules Committee has not reported this resolution after seven legislative days, the same (or another) Member may file a petition to discharge that committee from considering it. At that point, the measure the special rule makes in order either must have remained in committee for at least 30 legislative days or must have been reported. If the petition obtains the requisite 218 signatures, the motion in order on a discharge day is to discharge the Rules Committee from the resolution. If that motion is adopted, the House then automatically proceeds to consider the resolution under the one-hour rule, just as with any other special rule. Presumably, the Member who offered the motion to discharge would likely be recognized to control the one-hour debate on the resolution. The Member would normally yield half the hour to an opponent, most likely a representative of the Rules Committee, and would move the previous question on the resolution at the end of the debate. If the House orders the previous question and then agrees to the resolution itself, the terms of the resolution bring the desired measure out of committee and to the floor, just as with an "extraction rule" that the Rules Committee may report in the ordinary course of events. This method permits supporters of a measure to propose whatever terms to regulate the consideration and amendment of the measure they find appropriate to the specific situation, just as the Rules Committee normally does. A special rule for such purposes normally provides that consideration continue on subsequent days, if necessary, until a final vote. Such a provision guards against the possibility that the leadership will recover control of the floor agenda by turning to other business before the House completes action on the desired measure. This second approach to discharge also prevents the committee of jurisdiction from nullifying the discharge effort by reporting the measure and then taking no steps to call it up. If the special rule provides for considering a measure whether or not it has been reported, then even if the committee does report the measure, its action raises no obstacle to discharging the Rules Committee from consideration of the special rule. House Rules also protect against the possibility that the Rules Committee itself might attempt to vitiate a discharge effort by reporting the special rule and then declining to call it up. If the committee reports any special rule and then fails to call it up within seven legislative days, House Rule XIII, clause 6(d), requires the Speaker to recognize any member of the committee for that purpose once he or she has given one day's notice of intent to do so. This requirement protects any discharge effort that can rely on cooperation from at least one member of the Rules Committee. Finally, if the committee reports the special rule adversely, House Rule XIII, clause 6(e), and House Rule XV, clause 3, require the Speaker, on any discharge day, to recognize any Member of the House for the purpose of calling up that special rule. The chief potential difficulty with this second approach is that it requires Members to draft the special rule at the beginning of the process even though, by the time the measure reaches the floor, judgments about appropriate terms for consideration may have changed. Care may be required to formulate terms for consideration that are flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen circumstances, such as permitting amendments to be offered that may remedy problems recognized subsequently or that may attract broader support. When Members seek to discharge the Rules Committee from a special rule for considering an unreported measure, the actual obstacle to action is presumably not the Rules Committee but rather the committee to which the measure is referred. By contrast, if the Rules Committee declines to report a special rule for considering a measure that the committee of jurisdiction has reported, it can itself become the obstacle to consideration. Such action is not common today but was more frequent before the mid-1960s, when the committee often did not work as an organ of the leadership in managing the agenda. The second method of discharge offers recourse in these circumstances as well, for Members may submit, and seek discharge on, a special rule for considering the already reported measure. This approach was used, for example, by supporters of campaign finance legislation in the 107 th Congress. In such cases, the reporting committee might even support the attempt to discharge the Rules Committee. Although the Rules Committee cannot nullify a discharge attempt directed against a special rule by reporting the special rule, in recent years it has often taken another course of action by which it may recover control of the floor agenda. Often after a discharge petition has obtained the required 218 signatures, and sometimes when such a result has seemed imminent, the committee has reported not the special rule on which discharge was being sought but its own special rule for considering the same measure (or, sometimes, for considering an alternative measure on the same subject). The committee has then called up this special rule during the required layover period before the discharge motion can be brought to the floor. The House has then often adopted this resolution, in which case it has then considered the measure under the schedule and terms that the committee (and perhaps the leadership and the committee of jurisdiction) has found appropriate rather than those preferred by the supporters of discharge. These special rules have also provided that no further action take place pursuant to the original discharge petition. As a result of these actions, supporters of the measure in question still succeed in securing House consideration of the subject, yet the leadership retains its normal control over the schedule and terms of action on the floor. For consideration of campaign finance legislation in the 107 th Congress, however, the Rules Committee reported a special rule that was identical in text to the one on which discharge had been sought. Under such conditions, the leadership's recovery of floor control might be viewed as merely nominal. Ultimately, however, this course of action does not leave discharge proponents without recourse. If they dislike the terms for consideration that the Rules Committee proposes, they can attempt to defeat the committee's special rule, thereby retaining the capacity to call up their discharge motion on a subsequent discharge day. On some occasions, the prospect of such action has led to a negotiated agreement on the terms of consideration and discharge of the committee by unanimous consent. U.S. Congress. House Committee on Rules. Subcommittee on Rules of the House. Discharge Petition Disclosure. Hearing on H.Res. 134 . 103 rd Cong., 1 st sess. Washington: GPO, 1993. CRS Report 97-856, The Discharge Rule in the House: Recent Use in Historical Context , by [author name scrubbed]

The "discharge rule" of the House of Representatives allows a measure to come to the floor for consideration even if the committee of referral does not report it and the leadership does not schedule it. To initiate this action, a majority of House Members must first sign a petition for that purpose. After a petition has garnered 218 signatures, a motion to discharge may then be offered on the floor—but only after at least seven legislative days and only on a second or fourth Monday of a month. The rule allows for two main methods of action: (1) The committee of referral may be discharged from a measure that has been before it for 30 legislative days or more; or (2) the Committee on Rules may be discharged from a special rule for considering such a measure if the rule has been before the committee for at least seven legislative days. If a measure dealing with raising or spending money reaches the floor through the first method of action, it is considered in the Committee of the Whole, as if under an open rule. Other measures reaching the floor through this method of action are considered in the House under the one-hour rule, with the previous question in order. Under the second method of action, if the House takes up a measure under a special rule from which the Committee on Rules has been discharged, it is considered under the terms provided by the special rule. Under either method of action, the layover periods required by the discharge rule permit the Committee on Rules to preempt the discharge attempt, and recover control of the floor agenda, by securing House adoption of an alternative special rule for considering the measure.

On July 23, 2004, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) published ADA and Architectural Barriers Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG). These guidelines in part provided detailed guidance on play and recreation areas, lodging at a place of education, and communications requirements. These guidelines have no legal effect and serve as guidance only until adopted by the Department of Justice in final regulations. In its June 17, 2008, Notice of Proposed Rule Makings (NPRM), DOJ proposed the adoption of Parts I and III of the Access Board guidelines and also proposed several other amendments. The regulations were sent to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) but were not released for publication in the Federal Register. On January 20, 2009, the White House issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies stating that, with certain exceptions, no proposed or final regulation should be sent to the Office of the Federal Register unless and until it has been reviewed or approved by a department or agency head appointed or designated by President Obama. In response to this memorandum, on January 21, 2009, the Department of Justice notified the OMB of its withdrawal of the draft final rules from the OMB review process. There is considerable uncertainty regarding what form, if any, new proposed regulations would take. The Department of Justice has indicated that "[i]ncoming officials will have the full range of rule-making options available to them under the Administrative Procedure Act." However, it is instructive to briefly examine the provisions of the regulations which were proposed in June 2008. The adoption of the Access Board guidelines would serve to increase accessibility; however, the Department of Justice expressed concern about the potential effect of these changes on existing structures. To address these concerns, DOJ added "safe harbor" provisions for both titles II and III. For title II, which applies to states and localities, individuals with disabilities must be provided access to programs "when viewed in their entirety." Unlike title III, a public entity under title II is not required to make each of its existing facilities accessible. However, in order to provide certainty to public entities and individuals with disabilities, DOJ's proposed regulations add a "safe harbor" provision stating that "public entities that have brought elements into compliance in existing facilities are not, simply because of the Department's adoption of the 2004 ADAAG as its new standards, required to modify those elements in order to reflect incremental changes in the proposed standards." Title III of the ADA, which covers places of public accommodation, requires each covered facility to be accessible but only to the extent that accessibility changes are "readily achievable." The proposed regulations for title III, like those for title II, also contain a "safe harbor" provision. This provision would presume that a qualified small business has done what is readily achievable in a given year "if, in the prior tax year, it spent a fixed percentage of its revenues on readily achievable barrier removal." DOJ stated that it was concerned that "the incremental changes in the 2004 ADAAG may place unnecessary cost burdens on businesses that have already removed barriers by complying with the 1991 Standards in their existing facilities." DOJ solicited comments on whether public accommodations that operate existing facilities with play or recreation areas should be exempted from compliance with certain requirements. The proposed regulations for both titles II and III contain virtually identical language relating to service animals. They define service animal as meaning "any dog or other common domestic animal individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of a qualified individual with a disability.... " Some examples provided were guiding individuals who are blind, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, and retrieving medicine or the telephone. The term "service animals" would not include farm animals or wild animals, such as non human primates (including those born in captivity), reptiles, ferrets, amphibians, and rodents. Assistance for individuals with psychiatric, cognitive and mental disabilities was specifically included; however, "[a]nimals whose sole function is to provide emotional support, comfort, therapy, companionship, therapeutic benefits, or to promote emotional well-being are not service animals." Generally, a public entity (title II) or a public accommodation (title III) must modify its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability. If the entity can show that the use of the service animal would fundamentally alter the entity's service, program, or activity, the service animal need not be allowed. The proposed regulations delineate exceptions where a service animal may be removed. These include where the animal is out of control or not housebroken, and where the animal poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. If the animal is excluded because of these reasons, the entity must give the individual with a disability the opportunity to participate without the animal. The work the service animal performs must be directly related to the individual's disability and the animal must be individually trained, housebroken, under the control of its handler, and have a harness, leash, or other tether. A public entity or public accommodation is not responsible for supervising the animal and, although the entity may not ask about the individual's disability or require documentation, the entity may ask what work the animal has been trained to perform. Finally, an individual with a service animal must be allowed access to areas open to the public, program participants, and invitees, and there shall be no special fees or surcharges although there may be charges for damages caused by the service animal. In its discussion of the proposed regulations, the Justice Department observed that it received a large number of complaints about service animals and that there was a trend toward the use of wild or exotic animals. The Justice Department also noted a distinction between "comfort animals" that have the sole function of providing emotional support and which would not be covered, and "psychiatric service animals" which may be trained to provide a number of services, such as reminding an individual to take his or her medicine, and which would be covered. However, DOJ specifically recognized "that there are situations not governed exclusively by the title II and title III regulations, particularly in the context of residential settings and employment, where there may be compelling reasons to permit the use of animals whose presence provides emotional support to a person with a disability." Since 1990 when the ADA was enacted, the choices of mobility aids for individuals with disabilities have increased dramatically. Individuals with disabilities have used not only the traditional wheelchair but also large wheelchairs with rubber tracks, riding lawn mowers, golf carts, gasoline-powered two-wheeled scooters, and Segways. DOJ indicated that it had received inquiries concerning whether these devices need to be accommodated, the impact of these devices on facilities, and personal safety issues. The proposed regulations under both titles II and III include sections on mobility devices. They require a public entity under title II or a public accommodation under title III to permit individuals with mobility impairments to use wheelchairs, scooters, walkers, crutches, canes, braces, or other similar devices designed for use by individuals with mobility impairments in areas open to pedestrian use. A public entity or public accommodation under title III must make reasonable modifications in its policies and procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities unless it can be demonstrated that such use is not reasonable or would result in a fundamental alteration of the nature of the services or programs. In addition, a public entity or a public accommodation under title III shall establish policies permitting the use of other power-driven mobility devices when reasonable. The determination of reasonableness is to be based on the dimensions, weight, and operating speed of the mobility device in relation to a wheelchair; the potential risk of harm to others by the operation of the mobility device; the risk of harm to the environment or natural or cultural resources; and the ability of the public accommodation to stow the mobility device when not in use if requested by a user. A public entity or public accommodation under title III may ask a person using a power-driven mobility device if the mobility device is required because of the person's disability, but may not ask questions about the person's disability. DOJ solicited comments on whether there are certain types of power-driven mobility devices that should be accommodated; whether motorized devices that use fuel, such as all terrain vehicles, should be covered; and whether power-driven mobility devices should be categorized by intended function, indoor or outdoor use, or some other factor. The proposed title II and title III regulations contain a number of other provisions. The title II proposed regulations include provisions on program accessibility, including play areas, swimming pools, and dormitories and residence halls at educational facilities, assembly areas, and medical care facilities. Accessibility requirements for detention and correctional institutions are also included in the proposed title II regulations as are provisions on ticketing for accessible seating, and communications. The title III proposed regulations, like the title II proposed regulations, contain provisions on ticketing for accessible seating, provisions relating to play areas and swimming pools, and provisions on communications. Accessibility requirements for place of lodging, including housing at a place of education, are included. A new provision for examinations is added that specifies that if any request for documentation is required, the requirement is to be "reasonable and limited to the need for the modification or aid requested." DOJ noted that this change was made to eliminate inappropriate or burdensome requests by testing entities.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has often been described as the most sweeping nondiscrimination legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." (42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(1)) On June 17, 2008, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for ADA title II (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities by state and local governments), and ADA title III (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities by places of public accommodations). These proposed regulations are detailed and complex. They would adopt accessibility standards consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board. More specifically, the regulations include more detailed standards for service animals and power-driven mobility devices, and provide for a "safe harbor" in certain circumstances. Comments on the regulations were due by August 18, 2008. The regulations did not advance beyond the Office of Management and Budget during the Bush Administration. On January 20, 2009, the White House issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies stating that, with certain exceptions, no proposed or final regulation should be sent to the Office of the Federal Register unless and until it has been reviewed or approved by a department or agency head appointed or designated by President Obama. In response to this memorandum, on January 21, 2009, the Department of Justice notified the OMB of its withdrawal of the draft final rules from the OMB review process. There is considerable uncertainty regarding what form, if any, new proposed regulations would take. However, it is instructive to briefly examine the provisions of the regulations which were proposed in June 2008.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent deliberate release of anthrax sporesin the mail have focused policymakers' attention on the preparedness and response capability of theU.S. public health system. Though small in scale compared to the scenarios envisioned bybioterrorism experts and played out in recent government exercises, the recent anthrax attacksstrained the public health system and exposed weaknesses at the federal, state, and local levels. Many bioterrorism experts believe that had those responsible for the anthrax attacks employed amore sophisticated delivery mechanism or released a deadly communicable biological agent suchas smallpox, the health care system may have been overwhelmed. Bioterrorism poses a unique challenge to the medical care and public health systems. Unlike an explosion or chemical attack, which results in immediate and visible casualties, the public healthimpact of a biological attack can unfold gradually over time. Until a sufficient number of peoplearrive at emergency rooms and doctors' offices complaining of similar illnesses, there may be nosign that an attack has taken place. The speed and accuracy with which doctors and laboratoriesreach the correct diagnoses and report their findings to public health authorities has a direct impacton the number of people who become ill and the number that die. The nation's ability to respondto a bioterrorist attack, therefore, depends crucially on the state of preparedness of its medical caresystems and public health infrastructure. Public health experts have for years complained about the deterioration of the public health system through neglect and lack of funding. They warn that the nation is ill-equipped andinsufficiently prepared to respond to a bioterrorist attack. For example, they point out that there aretoo few medical personnel trained to spot biological attacks, a shortage of sophisticated laboratoriesto identify the agents, and inadequate supplies of drugs and vaccines to counteract the threat. Theyalso contend that inadequate plans exist for setting up quarantines and emergency facilities to handlethe sick and infectious victims. Improving public health preparedness and response capacity offersprotection not only from bioterrorist attacks, but also from naturally occurring public healthemergencies. Public health officials are increasingly concerned about our exposure andsusceptibility to infectious disease and food-borne illness because of global travel, ubiquitous foodimports, and the evolution of antibiotic-resistant pathogens. On June 12, 2002, the President signed into law the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 , H.R. 3448 ), which is intendedto bolster the nation's ability to respond effectively to bioterrorist threats and other public healthemergencies. This report provides a brief overview and legislative history of P.L. 107-188 , followedby a detailed side-by-side comparison of the act's provisions with preexisting law. Appendix A lists,by committee, all the bioterrorism-related hearings held in the 107th Congress prior to enactment of P.L. 107-188 . In most cases, hearing testimony is available on the committee Web sites. AppendixB provides a list of bioterrorism-related Web sites. For a discussion of bioterrorism preparednessissues, see CRS Report RL31225, Bioterrorism: Summary of a CRS/National Health Policy ForumSeminar on Federal, State, and Local Public Health Preparedness. Representatives Tauzin (R-LA) and Dingell (D-MI) introduced the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act ( H.R. 3448 ) on December 11, 2001. The bill wasimmediately considered under suspension of the rules and passed by the House the following dayon a vote of 418-2. H.R. 3448 built on the provisions of a bipartisan Senate bill, theBioterrorism Preparedness Act ( S. 1765 ), which had been introduced by Senators Fristand Kennedy on November 15, 2001. S. 1765 incorporated ideas and objectives fromseveral other Senate bioterrorism bills introduced in the wake of the anthrax attacks. (1) The Senatetook up H.R. 3448 on December 20, 2001, following its passage in the House, substitutedthe text of S. 1765 and passed H.R. 3448, as amended, by unanimous consent. A conference report ( H.Rept. 107-481 ) was filed on May 21, 2002. The next day the House agreedto the conference report by a vote of 425-1. The Senate approved the conference report 98-0 on May23, 2002. The President signed H.R. 3448 into law ( P.L. 107-188 ) on June 12, 2002. As enacted, P.L. 107-188 incorporates many of the provisions in the original House and Senate-passed bills. It adds to the programs and authorities established in Title III of the PublicHealth Service (PHS) Act by the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-505 ,Title I) and creates a new PHS Act Title XXVIII: National Preparedness for Bioterrorism and OtherPublic Health Emergencies. P.L. 107-188 is a 5-year authorization act, which calls for a total of $2.4billion in funding for FY2002, $2.0 billion for FY2003, and such sums as may be necessary for theremaining years. The act authorizes grants to state and local health departments and hospitals toimprove planning and preparedness activities, enhance laboratory capacity, and educate and trainhealth care personnel. It also directs the Secretary to upgrade and renovate CDC's facilities. Inaddition, the act authorizes the HHS Secretary to purchase smallpox vaccine and expand the nationalstockpile of medicine and medical supplies to meet the nation's health security needs. To help prevent bioterrorism and to establish a national database of potentially dangerous pathogens, P.L. 107-188 requires the HHS Secretary to register facilities and individuals inpossession of biological agents and toxins that pose a severe threat to public health and safety, andto promulgate new safety and security requirements for such facilities and individuals. The actgrants authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a parallel set of requirements for facilitiesthat handle agents and toxins that threaten crops and livestock. The bioterrorism legislation alsoincorporates language taken from S. 1275 that authorizes grants to states and localitiesto increase public access to defibrillators (i.e., devices that restore normal heart rhythm to patientsin cardiac arrest by administering a controlled electric shock). P.L. 107-188 contains several provisions to protect the nation's food and drug supply and enhance agricultural security. The act authorizes $545 million for FDA and USDA to hire newborder inspectors, develop new methods of detecting contaminated foods, work with state foodsafety regulators, and protect crops and livestock. It also provides FDA with new regulatory powersto require prior notice of all imported foods and detain suspicious foods for inspection. All foreignand domestic food facilities are required to register with the FDA. Finally, P.L. 107-188 includesa set of provisions aimed at protecting the nation's drinking water supply, including authorizing $160million to provide financial assistance to community water systems to conduct vulnerabilityassessments and prepare response plans. The bioterrorism legislation also includes language reauthorizing the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), which was set to expire on September 30, 2002. Congress first enacted PDUFAin 1992. (2) The original law authorized the FDA tocollect fees from pharmaceutical companies anduse the funds to hire additional reviewers to expedite the drug review and approval process, inaccordance with performance goals developed by the agency in consultation with the industry priorto PDUFA enactment. The 1992 law directed the FDA to provide Congress with an annual reporton the agency's progress in achieving those goals. Encouraged by the success of the user feeprogram, Congress in 1997 reauthorized PDUFA through FY2002. (3) Under PDUFA II, the FDA triedto meet tighter performance goals, as well as achieve more transparency in the drug review processand better communication with drug makers and patient advocacy groups. For more information onPDUFA, see CRS Report RL31453(pdf) , The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Structure andReauthorization Issues. Table 1 below summarizes the bioterrorism legislation's authorizations of appropriations forFY2002 and FY2003. Only those authorizations that specify a dollar amount are included. Table 1. P.L.107-188: Authorizations of Appropriations for FY2002 and FY2003 ($ millions) Table 2 , beginning on page 6, provides a detailed side-by-side comparison of the provisionsof P.L. 107-188 with preexisting law, where applicable. All the PHS Act Title III provisions relatingto public health emergencies that were established by P.L. 106-505 (i.e., Sections 319, 319A --319G) are included in the table, regardless of whether they are amended by the bioterrorism bill. Unless specifically noted otherwise, the term Secretary refers to the Secretary of HHS. Table 2. Comparison of P.L.107-188 with Preexisting Law

Last fall's anthrax attacks, though small in scale compared to the scenarios envisioned by bioterrorism experts, strained the public health system and raised concern that the nation isinsufficiently prepared to respond to bioterrorist attacks. Improving public health preparedness andresponse capacity offers protection not only from bioterrorist attacks, but also from naturallyoccurring public health emergencies. On June 12, 2002, the President signed into law the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 , H.R. 3448 ), which is intendedto bolster the nation's ability to respond effectively to bioterrorist threats and other public healthemergencies. The act builds on the programs and authorities established in Title III of the PublicHealth Service (PHS) Act by the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-505 ,Title I). P.L. 107-188 is a 5-year authorization bill, which calls for a total of $2.4 billion in funding in FY2002, $2.0 billion in FY2003, and such sums as may be necessary for the remaining years. Theact authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to upgrade and renovate facilitiesat the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), purchase smallpox vaccine, expand thenational stockpile of drugs, vaccines, and other emergency medical supplies, and provide grants tostate and local governments and hospitals to improve preparedness and planning. The Secretariesof HHS and Agriculture are required to register and regulate facilities that handle potentiallydangerous biological agents. The anti-bioterrorism legislation also includes provisions to protect the nation's food and drug supply and enhance agricultural security, including new regulatory powers for the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA) to block the importation of unsafe foods. To protect the drinking watersupply, the act requires community water systems to conduct vulnerability assessments and developemergency response plans. P.L. 107-188 also reauthorizes the Prescription Drug Use Fee Actthrough FY2007. The following analysts may be contacted for additional information:

The U.S. Post Office Department, the predecessor to the U.S. Postal Service, did not officially address the naming of post offices until 1891. Until then, the names of post offices were derived from a number of sources, including the name of the town or township in which the post office was located, certain neighborhoods, crossroads, local landmarks, and even the postmaster's name or place of residence. On February 18, 1891, Postmaster Miscellaneous Order 87 instructed the clerks of post offices nationwide to utilize the post office names published in the bulletins of the United States Board on Geographic Names when naming post offices. The next year, Postmaster Miscellaneous Order 48 instructed the fourth assistant Postmaster General not to "establish any post office whose proposed name differed from that of the town or village in which it was to be located." The goal of this policy was to facilitate the expeditious and efficient delivery of mail by avoiding confusion over the location of a post office. Congress first honored an individual by naming a post office through freestanding legislation in 1967. It named a combined post office and federal office building in Bronx, NY, as the "Charles A. Buckley Post Office and Federal Office Building" in honor of the late Representative Charles A. Buckley (P.L. 90-232; 81 Stat. 751). Courthouses and federal buildings, some no doubt containing postal facilities, had been named before that. The United States Postal Service (USPS) came into being in 1971 with its own separate real estate authority (39 U.S.C. 401(5)). All legislation to name USPS facilities then was referred to the House and Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committees, and when these committees were abolished, to the House Oversight and Government Reform and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committees. As Table 1 indicates, the number of post office naming bills made law rose and fell between the 108 th and 112 th Congresses. During this period, post office naming acts were a very common form of legislation, comprising almost 20% of all statutes enacted. Many of the persons honored by post office naming acts were individuals of local renown. For example, the 110 th Congress named a Kansas City, MO, post office for the Reverend Earl Abel ( P.L. 110-353 ; 122 Stat. 3983). Other honorees, though, were nationally recognized persons, such as Gerald R. Ford, Jr. (twice), Ronald Reagan (three times), Bob Hope, Cesar Chavez, Nat King Cole, Mickey Mantle, and Buck Owens. During the recent Congresses, many post offices have been named for U.S. soldiers killed in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Usually, these bills honor individual soldiers. Congress also has named at least one post office for all of a locality's fallen soldiers. The first step normally considered in preparing a post office naming bill is the selection of an appropriate post office. Most congressional districts contain many postal facilities. A few factors might be examined in selecting a post office, such as the proposed honoree's ties to the area served by the post office and the condition of the building to ensure that it is aesthetically adequate. Another factor is whether the facility is owned by the USPS or is leased from a private owner. In the latter case, the building's owner might be consulted. Finally, a search might be done to determine whether a proposed post office already has been named for someone. The USPS has compiled a comprehensive list of all the statutes enacted since 1967 to name post offices, including the addresses, name of the honoree, and reason(s) for the post office dedication. During this process, it can be helpful to work with the USPS's designated government relations person for a Member's home state. Once a post office has been selected, two pieces of information are needed to draft the legislation. One is the precise address of the facility, and a second is the precise form and spelling of the name of the person who is to be honored. Wording of post office naming legislation shows little variation. A statute ( P.L. 108-17 ; 117 Stat. 623) signed by then President George W. Bush on April 23, 2003, is typical: Most post office naming acts originate in the House. In the past, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee had a policy (though not a formal rule) that a post office naming bill would not be approved unless and until all Members from the state where the post office is located have signed on as cosponsors of the bill. In the 113 th Congress, the committee adopted a rule which states: "The consideration of bills designating facilities of the United States Postal Service shall be conducted so as to minimize the time spent on such matters by the committee and the House of Representatives." At the time of the publication of this report, no additional committee guidance had been issued. In recent years, the committee has generally not marked up or otherwise formally approved naming bills in a committee meeting. Rather, committee staff keep a list of naming bills and other measures appropriate for consideration under suspension of the rules, or by unanimous consent, to be taken up when opportunities appear. Negotiations between the majority and minority leaders determine when and how the bills are to be considered on the floor. Passage by the House has almost always been routine, commonly by voice vote or on a roll call vote that is unanimous. An exception occurred on the House floor on September 27, 2005, when the motion to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 438 was defeated on a 190 to 215 roll call vote. The bill, which would have designated a post office in Berkeley, CA, as the Maudelle Shirek Post Office Building, was intended to recognize a community activist and long-time member of the Berkeley City Council. During the debate, opposition was expressed based on her attributed espousal of "principles that would be running contrary to American values." Under both Democratic and Republican leadership in the 107 th , 108 th , and 109 th Congresses, the committee of jurisdiction—the Committee on Governmental Affairs, later the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs—required both Senators from a state to agree to a naming bill, though formal co-sponsorship was not required. After the first session of the 109 th Congress, the committee adopted a policy (not a formal rule) that it would no longer consider post office naming bills that honor living persons. In the 111 th Congress, the committee adopted the rule stating that it— will not consider any legislation that would name a postal facility for a living person with the exception of bills naming facilities after former Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United States, former Members of Congress over 70 years of age, former state or local elected officials over 70 years of age, former judges over 70 years of age, or wounded veterans. The committee re-adopted this policy in the 112 th Congress and the 113 th Congress. It is not uncommon for post office naming bills that have passed the House to wait several months for action by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the full Senate. To clear this backlog of legislation, the Senate sometimes considers these bills en bloc, passing them all by unanimous consent without debate. As in the House, postal naming bills tend to be uncontroversial in the Senate. However, in 2008 there was some concern over H.R. 4774 , which proposed to name a post office after a lobbyist. The House passed the bill; the Senate did not. The practical effect of legislation renaming a post office is less than might be imagined. For operational reasons, post offices retain their geographical designations in the USPS addressing system, and there is no change in the way renamed post offices are identified in the USPS's listings of post offices. The tangible effect of naming a post office is the installation of a dedicatory plaque in "a prominent place in the facility's lobby, preferably above the post office boxes." The plaque, which is purchased locally at USPS expense running from $250 to $500, measures about 11 inches by 14 inches and contains the following inscription: USPS, working with the sponsor of the legislation, may take responsibility for organizing a dedication ceremony. The protocol includes inviting the honored individual and his or her family, an honor guard, a religious figure for an invocation, media notification, and light refreshments such as cake and punch. Costs for these expenses may be borne by USPS from its contingency funds or shared with local community interests. During the 111 th Congress, Representative Darrell E. Issa, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's ranking minority Member, introduced H.R. 3137 on July 9, 2009. This bill would require the USPS to provide for a suitable plaque ... no later than 120 days after the date as of which—(1) a law has been enacted providing for the designation of the postal facility involved; and (2) sufficient amounts have been received ... to provide for such plaque. Federal law authorizes the USPS "to accept gifts or donations of services or property, real or personal, as it deems, necessary or convenient in the transaction of its business" (39 U.S.C. 401(7)). H.R. 3137 also would amend 39 U.S.C. 404(7) to read, [The USPS shall have the power to] accept gifts or donations of services or property, real or personal, as it deems, necessary or convenient in the transaction of its business including monetary donations made (in such manner as the Postal Service may prescribe) for the funding of plaques in connection with the commemorative designation of postal facilities. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee reported the bill on July 10, 2009. No further action was taken on the bill.

Legislation naming post offices for persons has become a very common practice. During the 108th through 112th Congresses, almost 20% of all statutes enacted were post office naming acts. This report describes how the practice of naming post offices through public law originated and how it is commonly done today. It also details the House and Senate committee policies for considering such legislation and the U.S. Postal Service's procedures for implementing post office naming acts. Unanimity of a state's congressional delegation is required for the movement of naming bills to the floor of the House or Senate. Additionally, the Senate committee of jurisdiction has adopted the rule that it "will not consider any legislation that would name a postal facility for a living person with the exception of bills naming facilities after former Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United States, former Members of Congress over 70 years of age, former state or local elected officials over 70 years of age, former judges over 70 years of age, or wounded veterans." The cost of dedicating a post office in the name of an individual is modest. Renaming a post office through legislation does not change either the U.S. Postal Service's or the public's identification of the facility by its geographic location. Rather, a small plaque is installed within the post office. In the 111th Congress, H.R. 3137 was introduced to amend current postal law to clarify that the U.S. Postal Service may accept financial donations toward the cost of providing a commemorative plaque. This bill did not become law. This report will be updated early in the 114th Congress or in the event of significant legislative action in the 113th Congress.

S ection 1332 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) allows states to apply for waivers of specified provisions of the ACA. Under a state innovation waiver, a state is expected to implement a plan (in place of the waived provisions) that meets certain minimum requirements. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS's) initial interpretation of these requirements was published in guidance released in 2015 but has since been superseded, as with other aspects of the waiver process, in updated guidance released by the agency on October 24, 2018. Under current guidance, the state's plan must provide health insurance coverage to as many state residents as would be covered absent the waiver and must make available to a comparable number of residents coverage that is both as affordable and as comprehensive as it would be absent the waiver. However, applications do not need to demonstrate that the affordable and comprehensive health insurance coverage will be purchased by a comparable number of state residents. Additionally, the state's plan cannot increase the federal deficit. This report answers frequently asked questions about how states can use and apply for state innovation waivers. It also addresses recent changes to the Section 1332 waiver process, as made by the 2018 CMS guidance. A state may apply to waive any or all of the ACA provisions listed below for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017. Part I of S ubtitle D of the ACA : Part I of Subtitle D comprises Sections 1301-1304. In general, the provisions in Part I relate to the establishment of qualified health plans (QHPs). Part II of S ubtitle D of the ACA : Part II of Subtitle D comprises Sections 1311-1313, which largely include provisions related to the establishment of health insurance exchanges and related activities. Section 1402 of the ACA : This section includes the provision of cost-sharing reductions to eligible individuals who purchase individual market coverage through a health insurance exchange. Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) : This section includes the provision of premium tax credits to eligible individuals who purchase individual market coverage through a health insurance exchange. Section 4980H of the IRC: This section includes the shared responsibility requirement for large employers (often called the employer mandate ). Section 5000A of the IRC: This section includes the requirement for individuals to maintain health insurance coverage (often called the individual mandate ). Each part noted above is comprised of many provisions, which makes the scope of the provisions that can be waived under a state innovation waiver quite broad. For example, Part I of Subtitle D of the ACA includes provisions that outline requirements for health plans to be certified as QHPs. It defines the essential health benefits (EHB) package that each QHP must offer, places limitations on the enrollee cost sharing that QHPs may impose, and requires that QHPs provide coverage meeting a minimum level of actuarial value. Additionally, Part I of Subtitle D establishes requirements for catastrophic health plans and determines eligibility for such plans. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is to review and grant waiver requests for provisions not included in the IRC; the Secretary of the Treasury is to review and grant requests to waive provisions in the IRC (the availability of premium tax credits and the application of the employer and individual mandates). The Secretary of HHS or the Treasury is to assess a waiver application to determine whether the state's plan meets the requirements related to coverage, affordability, comprehensiveness, and federal-deficit neutrality outlined in statute and further described in guidance. These requirements are described in Table 1 . The Secretary or Secretaries (as appropriate) may grant a request for a state innovation waiver if a state's application meets the requirements. In making this determination, the Secretaries will "consider favorably" any waiver that incorporates some or all of the following principles: provide increased access to affordable private market coverage, encourage sustainable spending growth, foster state innovation, support and empower those in need, and promote consumer-driven health care. In guidance, HHS and the Treasury note that their assessment of a state's waiver application considers changes to the state's health care system that are contingent only upon approval of the waiver. Their assessment does not consider policy changes that are dependent on further state action or other federal determinations. For example, the Secretary's or Secretaries' (as appropriate) assessment of a state innovation waiver application would not consider changes to Medicaid or the state Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) that require approval outside of the state innovation waiver process, and savings accrued as a result of changes to Medicaid or CHIP would not be considered when determining whether the state innovation waiver meets the deficit-neutrality requirement. HHS and the Treasury indicate that this is the case regardless of whether a state's application for a state innovation waiver is submitted alone or in coordination with another waiver application. (For more information about the coordinated waiver process, see " May States Submit State Innovation Waiver Applications in Coordination with Other Federal Waiver Applications? ") Although not possible initially, HHS and the Treasury indicated in the updated guidance released in October 2018 that technical enhancements have made it feasible for CMS to support some federally facilitated health insurance exchange (FFE) variation. For example, waivers that would require a state to create its own website to replace the consumer-facing aspects of HealthCare.gov also can incorporate CMS's enrollment functionalities (e.g., account creation, application, enrollment and coverage maintenance experience for consumers). States are asked to work with HHS early in the waiver application process to determine whether specific modifications can be accommodated. States are responsible for funding all FFE modifications and associated operational support. Therefore, these costs are not considered when determining whether a waiver application satisfies the deficit neutrality requirement; however, any other changes to CMS administrative processes are taken into account. In guidance issued in October 2018, HHS and the Treasury describe some federal operational considerations that may limit the scope of the waivers. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally is not able to accommodate any state-specific changes to tax rules. The IRS may be able to accommodate small changes to the administration of federal tax provisions, in particular when such changes overlap with the IRS's current capabilities. For example, waivers that would require the IRS to expand premium tax credit eligibility to individuals with household income under 100% of the federal poverty level may be feasible, because it incorporates a similar special rule that the IRS currently administers. States are responsible for funding all changes to IRS administrative processes associated with wavier implementation. These costs are incorporated into the assessment of whether a waiver application satisfies the deficit neutrality requirement. A state seeking a state innovation waiver must enact a law that allows the state to carry out the actions under the waiver prior to submitting an application for a waiver. In certain circumstances, a state can be considered to have enacted such a law by coupling a state law that enforces ACA provisions and/or the state plan with administrative or executive actions. Prior to submitting an application, a state must provide a public notice and comment period and conduct public hearings regarding the state's application. Upon conclusion of these activities, a state may submit its application to the Secretary of HHS. The Secretary of HHS is to transmit any application seeking to waive requirements in the IRC to the Secretary of the Treasury for review. The Secretary or Secretaries (as appropriate) are to review a state's application to determine whether it is complete. A state's application is not considered complete unless it includes the materials identified in regulations. The materials include, but are not limited to, information about the enacted state legislation allowing the state to carry out the actions under the waiver, a description of the plan or program the state expects to implement in place of the waived provisions, and analyses showing that the state's plan or program meets the requirements for granting a waiver. If a state's application is not complete, the state is to be notified about the missing elements and given an opportunity to submit them. Once the Secretary or Secretaries (as appropriate) make a preliminary determination that a state's application is complete, the entire application is to be made available to the public for review and comment. The final decision of the Secretary or Secretaries on a state's application must be issued no later than 180 days after the determination that the Secretary of HHS received a complete application from a state. It is possible for a state to receive federal funding under an approved waiver. A state's receipt of a state innovation waiver could result in the residents of the state not receiving the "premium tax credits, cost-sharing reductions, or small business credits under sections 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or under part I of subtitle E for which they would otherwise be eligible." If this occurs, the state is to receive the aggregate amount of subsidies that would have been available to the state's residents had the state not received a state innovation waiver—this is referred to as pass-through funding . The amount of pass-through funding is to be determined annually by the appropriate Secretary and may be updated at any time to account for changes in state or federal law. The state is to use the pass-through funding for purposes of implementing the plan or program established under the waiver. State innovation waivers cannot extend longer than five years unless a state requests continuation and such request is not denied by the appropriate Secretary. Requests for continuation are to be deemed granted if they are not denied by the appropriate Secretary within 90 days of submission. The Secretaries are required to develop a process for coordinating applications for state innovation waivers and applications for other existing waivers under federal law relating to the provision of health care, including waivers available under Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP. Under the coordinated process, a state must be able to submit a single application for a state innovation waiver and any other applicable waivers available under federal law. The single application must comply with the procedures described for state innovation waiver applications and the procedures in any other applicable federal law under which the state seeks a waiver. As discussed in the answer to the question " What Are the Minimum Requirements for a Successful Application? ," HHS and the Treasury have indicated that an application for a state innovation waiver will be assessed on its own terms and that assessment of the state innovation waiver will not consider the impact of changes that require separate federal approval. This is the case even if the state submits a single application for multiple waivers. As of the date of this report, 14 states have submitted applications for state innovation waivers—Alaska, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. HHS and the Treasury have approved eight applications, from Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin. All of these waivers were considered and approved under the initial state innovation waiver guidance, and all but one of the approved waivers implement a variant of a statewide individual market reinsurance program. Massachusetts, Ohio, and Vermont received notification from HHS and the Treasury that their applications were incomplete, and it does not appear that any of these states has modified its application in response to the notification. If one of these three states does take action, any further review of its waiver application would be under the updated state innovation waiver guidance. California, Iowa, and Oklahoma have withdrawn their applications. See Table 2 for more details.

Section 1332 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) provides states with the option to waive specified requirements of the ACA. In the absence of these requirements, a state is to implement its own plan to provide health insurance coverage to state residents that meets the ACA's terms. Under a state innovation waiver, a state can apply to waive ACA requirements related to qualified health plans, health insurance exchanges, premium tax credits, cost-sharing subsidies, the individual mandate, and the employer mandate. The state can apply to waive any or all of these requirements, in part or in their entirety. To obtain approval for a waiver application, a state must show that the plan it will implement in the absence of the waived provision(s) meets certain requirements. Under current guidance, the state's plan must provide coverage to as many state residents as would be covered absent the waiver and must make available to a comparable number of residents coverage that is both as affordable and as comprehensive as would be absent the waiver. However, applications do not need to demonstrate that the affordable and comprehensive coverage will be purchased by a comparable number of state residents. Additionally, the state's plan cannot increase the federal deficit. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Secretary of the Treasury share responsibility for reviewing state innovation waiver applications and deciding whether to approve applications. The earliest a state innovation waiver could have gone into effect was January 1, 2017. In October 2018, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released updated guidance regarding the state innovation waiver process that superseded previously issued CMS guidance from December 2015. In general, the updated guidance attempts to make it easier for a state plan to be approved. The updated guidance applies to all waiver applications that had not been approved prior to the date of the guidance's release. Waivers approved under the previously issued guidance did not require reconsideration. As of the date of this report, eight states—Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin—have approved state innovation waivers. All of these waivers were considered and approved under the initial state innovation waiver guidance, and all but one of the approved waivers implement a variant of a statewide individual market reinsurance program. Massachusetts, Ohio, and Vermont have submitted applications and received notification that their applications were incomplete. It does not appear that any of these states has modified its application in response to the notification (as of the date of this report). If these states take action, any further review of their waiver application would be under the updated state innovation waiver guidance. Three states—California, Iowa, and Oklahoma—submitted waiver applications and have since withdrawn their applications.

RS20365 -- Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process Updated June 5, 2001 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) ( P.L. 96-8 ) has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China(PRC) instead. Sec. 3(a) states that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles anddefense services in such quantity as may benecessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Sec. 3(b) stipulates that both thePresident and the Congress shall determine thenature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. The TRA set up the American Institute inTaiwan (AIT), a nonprofit corporation, to handle relations with Taiwan. AIT implements U.S. policy, with directionfrom the Departments of Defense and Stateas well as the National Security Council (NSC) of the White House, and organizes the meetings on arms sales inTaipei or Washington. SuccessiveAdministrations used a process in determining arms sales to Taiwan that became institutionalized as annual roundsof talks with Taiwan authorities consisting ofseveral phases leading up to final meetings usually in April. In 1999, U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks took place onApril 27-28, in Washington, and the ClintonAdministration confirmed that a Taiwan military delegation was still in Washington on April 29, 1999. (1) On the positive side, the process used in determining arms sales to Taiwan has evolved over the last two decades into a routine, rather than ad hoc, one whereTaiwan's evolving defense needs can be expected to be considered carefully every year by the United States at a highlevel. Official Taiwan media say that in thelast 20 years, Taiwan's armed forces have procured "a lot of defensive weapons and equipment" from the UnitedStates. (2) Quoting a Taiwan military source, aTaiwan newspaper reports that the military there believes the Pentagon, rather than the State Department, is "quitesupportive" of Taiwan's needs, and thesituation is thus "favorable." (3) This regular processallows for more predictable planning by Taiwan authorities in charge of the defense budget and potentiallyreduces the chance that developments in U.S. relations with the PRC could influence arms sales to Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan could send senior militarydelegations to Washington. Through the 1990s, the arms talks were low-profile, reducing the opportunities forgreater U.S.-PRC friction. Indicating securitybenefits of arms sales for Taiwan, China objects to the TRA and argues that Washington is not observing the August17, 1982 U.S.-PRC communique (onreducing arms sales to Taiwan). (4) Testifying beforethe Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 4, 1999, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense KurtCampbell declared that the TRA "has been the most successful piece of legislative leadership in foreign policy inrecent history." Indeed, despite the unofficial nature of relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. From 1991 to 1998, arms deliveries (primarily U.S.) to Taiwantotaled $20 billion -- the second highest (after arms transfers to Saudi Arabia). (5) Contracts are signed under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, withnotification to Congress as required by the Arms Export Control Act. Moreover, beginning after tensions in theTaiwan Strait in 1996, the Pentagon, under theClinton Administration, is said to have quietly expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levelsunprecedented since 1979. The broaderexchanges reportedly have increased attention to "software," including discussions over strategy, military thinking,and plans in the event of an invasion. (6) InSeptember 1999, to enhance cooperation, a Pentagon team visited Taiwan to assess its air defense capability andmake recommendations on upgrading it. (7) Criticisms within the United States of the arrangements in determining arms sales might include observations on the lack of a strategic, longer-range U.S.approach, rather than currently looking at Taiwan's defense needs narrowly on a year-by-year, weapon-by-weaponfashion, that has involved intense inter-agencydifferences. Some defense industry observers say that the arms sales talks have "generally ended in disappointmentfor Taiwan because its requests for dieselsubmarines, long-range surveillance radars, and other defensive items have been rejected in deference to Beijing." (8) In 1999, some in Congress introduced theTaiwan Security Enhancement Act ( S. 693 , Helms; H.R. 1838 , Delay), arguing that "pressures to delay,deny, and reduce arms sales toTaiwan have been prevalent since the signing of the August 17, 1982 communique." Other comments both within and outside the Administration criticize a perceived traditional overemphasis on selling military equipment. Some would prefergreater attention to diplomatic solutions, including efforts to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In 1998, formerAssistant Secretary of Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs Chas. Freeman argued that increasing military tensions in the Taiwan Strait "call for a reevaluationof arms sales to Taiwan." (9) Susan Shirk,Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, is quoted as saying in a speech on April 14,1999, that "neither the PRC or Taiwan wouldbe served by overemphasis on military hardware, while neglecting the art of statesmanship." (10) Others who urge greater support for Taiwan'smilitary have calledfor more attention to "software," including absorption of new equipment, military contacts, training, and advice forTaiwan's military, especially broader trainingprograms on C4I, combined arms, and joint warfare operations -- rather than narrow training tied to particularweapon systems. (11) Some critics are concerned that the White House might secretly negotiate with Beijing over arms sales to Taiwan. An authoritative weekly magazine reported that,during the June 1998 summit in Beijing, the PRC requested a U.S. promise to deny theater missile defense (TMD)technology to Taipei, in return for a PRCpledge not to provide missiles to Iran; but no agreement was reached. (12) Finally, some on Capitol Hill contend that successive Administrations have neglected a congressional role in determining arms sales as outlined in the TRA, and some Members are seeking to increase their say. Representative Gilman, Chairman of the House InternationalRelations Committee, wrote President Clinton onApril 19, 1999, to urge approval for the sale of long-range early warning radars to Taiwan. He also wrote Secretaryof State Albright on April 22, 1999, sayingthat if the Administration did not approve the sale, he would introduce legislation to do so. (13) In the end, the Clinton Administration decidedin principle to sellearly warning radars to Taiwan (see below). The process for arms sales talks between Washington and Taipei generally has included four stages, culminating in an arms sales meeting in Washington eachApril. 1. Pre-Talks. Taiwan's various military services request items for procurement to be decided by their Ministryof National Defense (MND). The MND decides on an official list of about 5-15 major items to request from theUnited States. The list may include hardware,technical assistance, and professional military education courses. This list is usually presented to the U.S. sidetowards the end of each year. In recent years, Taiwan has requested items such as P-3 anti-submarine reconnaissance aircraft and AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles(AMRAAM). (14) For the 1999 talks, Taiwan'srequest reportedly totaled $1.7 billion and included: (15) four Aegis-equipped destroyers (or technology); (16) 6-10 diesel-electric submarines (including training, technical assistance, and logistical support possiblyfor assembly inTaiwan); (17) two Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense systems; (18) two AN/BOND long-range, early-warning radars for missile defense; (19) satellite early-warning reconnaissance. (20) 2. Working-Level Talks in Taiwan. At the beginning of the following year, a few small working-level teamsorganized by AIT travel to Taiwan to collect information and discuss the request in greater detail with Taiwan'smilitary. Composed mainly of Pentagon staff, theteams may visit various sites in Taiwan to obtain a better understanding of its defense needs. After the visits, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) formulates the Pentagon's position, including the views ofthe various services and the joint staff. Meanwhile, the State Department and NSC formulate their own positionson the requests from Taiwan. The agencies mayformulate decisions based on different priorities involving several factors, including: implications for regional stability; military balance in the Taiwan Strait (including assessments of the PRC threat against Taiwan andprospects for a peaceful resolution of theTaiwan question); U.S.-PRC relations; U.S. policy on technology transfer; offensive vs. defensive capabilities of the items; the value of arms called the "bucket." (21) 3. Resolution of Disagreements Within U.S. Government. From March to April, U.S. policymakers work toresolve any disagreements with the Defense Department's position at the level of the Under Secretary of Defensefor Policy, Under Secretary of State for ArmsControl and International Security Affairs, and the Deputy National Security Advisor at the NSC. If disagreementspersist, they are then elevated to the highestlevels at the various agencies. For example, in the case of the 1999 decision on early-warning radars, toppolicymakers at the NSC, State Department, and thePentagon reportedly agreed to approve the sale, overruling mid-level NSC and State officials who opposed the saleout of concerns that it might provoke the PRCand increase already heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing. (22) 4. Annual Talks. The talks between Washington and Taipei on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan take place everyyear, usually in April. The U.S. side, as represented by AIT and the Defense Department, presents the finaldecisions on the requested items. A militarydelegation from Taiwan usually visits for a few days of scheduled meetings and social functions. The formalmeetings on approved sales may take place on oneday. There may also be trips outside of Washington to visit military bases, inspect pilots from the Taiwan Air Forcetraining to fly F-16 fighters, and watchdemonstrations of equipment for possible acquisition. During the April 1999 talks, the State Department, which prefers to avoid public discussion of the talks, nonetheless confirmed that a Taiwan delegation was inWashington at the end of April. It also confirmed that, in providing defensive weapons and services to Taiwanunder the TRA, "periodic consultations take placethat include Taiwan military representatives" and that there was a "frank and broad exchange of views on issuesrelated to Taiwan self-defense needs, but bothsides agreed not to discuss the details of this process." (23) On the sale of long-range early-warning radars to Taiwan urged by some in Congress, the State Department spokesperson confirmed that the United States agreedon the request in principle and acknowledged that under the TRA, "the President and Congress determined whichdefense articles and services Taiwan needs." (24) The Pentagon spokesperson also confirmed that the United States "agreed to work with the Taiwanese to evaluatetheir early warning radar needs, and that willtake place over the next year or so, but there is no specific agreement on a specific type of radar, specific sale, orspecific terms of sale at this time." (25) For the 1999 talks, Taiwan's military was reportedly represented by its new Vice Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Teng Tzu-lin, accompanied by deputydefense ministers in charge of intelligence, operations, logistics, and planning. (26) The director of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office(TECRO), Stephen Chen, also participated in the talks. (27) The U.S. side, sponsored by AIT, was said to include the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense(International Security Affairs) on Asian and Pacific Affairs. This representative was apparently accompanied bythose from the Defense Security CooperationAgency (DSCA) and the State Department's Office of Taiwan Coordination in the East Asian and Pacific AffairsBureau.

This CRS Report discusses the low-profile annual arms talks process that successiveAdministrations used from theearly 1980s to 2001 in determining arms sales to Taiwan, which are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. Thediscussion is based on interviews in 1998 and1999 with U.S. and Taiwan observers as well as U.S. and Taiwan news reports. This report on the process will notbe updated. (On April 24, 2001, PresidentGeorge W. Bush announced that he would drop this annual arms talks process in favor of one with considerationson an "as-needed basis." See also CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)

Since August, four major storms have directly struck or passed close to Haiti, killing hundreds and affecting hundreds of thousands of people. The storms have caused flooding in all ten of the country's departments. Tropical Storm Fay struck Haiti on August 16 while Hurricane Gustav struck on August 26 with heavy rains and winds. In the first days of September, Tropical Storm Hanna brought more torrential rain, causing floods as deep as almost ten feet in Gonaives. Hurricane Ike did not directly strike Haiti, but significantly increased water levels in areas that were already flooded. Overall, almost 500 people have died. Haiti was already experiencing a food crisis; the impact of the storms has greatly exacerbated the problem, mainly due to flooding. The storms destroyed approximately one-third of the country's rice crop. Haiti's rice crop is essentially used for domestic consumption, and reportedly is a lifeline for many Haitians. Livestock, other crops, seeds, and farm equipment were destroyed as well. The storms hit during harvest season, meaning that farmers will not have capital from this crop to reinvest in future crops. Some observers worry that additional food shortages and price increases could again lead to riots, like the ones in April of this year that killed several people and contributed to the dismissal of the Prime Minister. Nearly 70% of the internally displaced persons living in shelters in the wake of the storms were in the Department of Artibonite, known as Haiti's rice bowl. In the departmental capital of Gonaives, at least 80% of the city's 300,000 residents were affected. Nearly half of those affected by the storm are reportedly children. Almost half of the shelters across the country are located in schools. The Haitian Ministry of Education is working with international organizations to clean and rehabilitate schools and find alternative shelters. The number of internally displaced people living in shelters dropped from just over 111,000 in mid-September to an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 in mid-October. Nonetheless, some schools will share their space with displaced people until they are able to return to their homes. Moreover, many families who have lost their homes and possessions will not be able to afford school costs for their children. Even though damage to schools delayed the start of the school year by over a month, the UN World Food Program has already resumed school feeding programs throughout most of the country. Prior to the storms, the Haitian Office for Disaster Preparedness issued warnings through radio and television, although not all citizens have access to those media. After the storms, the Haitian government declared eight departments to be under a state of emergency, allowing for the release of extra funding from the national budget for relief efforts in those areas. The government is coordinating emergency response through the Civilian Protection Unit of the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior is coordinating the distribution of relief assistance, working with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Red Cross, and a U.S. ship with hospital capability, the USS Kearsarge, all of which are providing helicopters for delivering food and water aid to remote and inaccessible areas. The Minister of Finance has lifted regulations on incoming aid for several months so that disaster relief assistance will not be subject to the usual customs delays. All government ministers were dispatched around the country to help assess needs and compose lists of assistance requirements for international donors. The U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Janet Sanderson, issued a disaster declaration on September 2, 2008, in response to the flooding throughout the country caused by Hurricane Gustav. Subsequently, U.S. officials from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense (DOD) met with Haitian President René Préval, who said that infrastructure and transportation were key priorities; many roads and bridges were washed away or heavily damaged by the storms. Préval also requested general assistance for the next six months. As of October 21, 2008, the U.S. government has either provided or pledged over $31 million in humanitarian assistance to affected Haitian populations in response to the storms. This includes: $10 million, USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), including support to the American Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Pan American Health Organization; $14 million, USAID/Food for Peace (FFP) assistance provided through the U.N. World Food Program; $5 million, USAID/Haiti assistance, re-directing regular U.S. foreign aid funding toward food and other humanitarian assistance; $2.6 million, Department of Defense assistance (helicopter transport); and (still to be determined), Department of Homeland Security, for Coast Guard transportation and logistics. USAID's OFDA also authorized the deployment of a three-member support team to Haiti to supplement a U.N. disaster team based in the city of Gonaives. The USS Kearsarge has delivered almost 2 million pounds of supplies, with supplies ferried by helicopters and boats to affected areas. OFDA has been providing assistance in disaster preparedness and mitigation, including training in disaster management, to the Caribbean since 1991. From FY2005 to FY2007, OFDA worked in conjunction with the UN Development Program to reduce the risks faced by vulnerable Haitian populations due to natural hazards. A number of observers, including some Members of Congress, are calling for significantly more assistance to help Haiti in its recovery and reconstruction efforts. Representative Maxine Waters has called for at least $300 million in appropriations in assistance for Haiti. The FY2009 continuing resolution signed into law on September 30, 2008 ( P.L. 110 - 329 ) provides not less than $100 million for hurricane relief and reconstruction assistance for Haiti and other Caribbean countries subject to prior consultation with, and the regular notification procedures of, the Committees on Appropriations. At a hearing of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on "Hurricanes in Haiti: Disaster and Recovery" on September 23, 2008, several Members of Congress called for the Administration to grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians living in the United States to give Haiti time to deal with the effects of the recent hurricanes. Haiti's Ambassador to the United States, Raymond Joseph, maintains that his country is ill-prepared to receive deportees. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary Kirsten Madison said the State Department had not made a recommendation, but did not wish to encourage an exodus of Haitians from the island to the U.S. by granting TPS, saying that could create another humanitarian disaster. The State Department also noted that the final decision lies with the Department of Homeland Security. Members expressed concerns that the devastation from the storms, if insufficiently addressed, could lead to famine and widespread waterborne diseases, which in turn could contribute to an increase in the number of Haitians fleeing their country. Haitian Ambassador Joseph stated at a Capitol Hill forum on September 18 that Haiti would need $400 million over the next 18 months for hurricane recovery and reconstruction, and that so far the international community had committed $145 million. It is unclear how much of the $400 million reflects short-term humanitarian needs as opposed to longer-term development needs. At the request of the Haitian government, the World Bank and other international partners are conducting a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment that will be the basis for early recovery and strategic planning for Haiti. In the aftermath of the hurricanes, the U.N. OCHA issued an international flash appeal for $108 million for Haiti's recovery. As of October 23, contributions and commitments of funds amounted to almost $25 million, while another $16.9 million has been pledged, but not yet committed, by the United States, the European Union, and 12 other countries—Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Austria, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, Andorra, Italy, and the Netherlands. The aid is channeled through a variety of U.N. agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), U.N. Development Program (UNDP), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The U.S. contribution equals 42.8% of that funding. MINUSTAH is also helping to coordinate disaster assistance, providing support for relief deliveries, and has been involved in rescuing Haitians from the floods. In addition to assistance contributed to the flash appeal, OCHA reports that another $25 million in humanitarian assistance has been pledged or provided by the United States and other countries and international organizations. P.L. 110 - 329 ( H.R. 2638 ). Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. Provides not less than $100 million for hurricane relief and reconstruction assistance for Haiti and other Caribbean countries subject to prior consultation with, and the regular notification procedures of, the Committees on Appropriations. Introduced June 8, 2007, signed into law September 30, 2008. H.R. 522 (Hastings). Would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate Haiti as a country whose qualifying nationals may be eligible for temporary protected status for an initial 18-month period. Introduced January17, 2007, referred to House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law February2, 2007. H.Con.Res. 438 (Lee). Expressing the sense of Congress with regard to providing humanitarian assistance to countries of the Caribbean devastated by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and Tropical Storms Fay and Hanna. Introduced and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs September 27, 2008.

In August and September 2008, four major storms directly hit or passed close to Haiti, causing widespread devastation. As of early October, 2008, the U.S. government has either provided or pledged just over $30 million in humanitarian assistance to affected Haitian populations in response to the hurricanes in Haiti. Congress provided not less than $100 million for hurricane relief and reconstruction assistance for Haiti and other Caribbean countries in the FY2009 continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 110-329) signed into law September 30, 2008. The Haitian government says it needs $400 million over the next 18 months for hurricane recovery and reconstruction, and that so far the international community has committed $145 million. For more information, see CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22879, Haiti: Legislative Responses to the Food Crisis and Related Development Challenges, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Secret, or closed, sessions of the House and Senate exclude the press and the public. They may be held for matters deemed to require confidentiality and secrecy—such as national security, sensitive communications received from the President, and Senate deliberations during impeachment trials. Although Members usually seek advance agreement for going into secret session, any Member of Congress may request a secret session without notice. When the House or Senate goes into secret session, its chamber and galleries are cleared of everyone except Members and officers and employees specified in the rules or designated by the presiding officer as essential to the session. When the chamber is cleared, its doors are closed. Authority for the House and Senate to hold secret sessions appears in Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.... Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.... " Both chambers have implemented these constitutional provisions through rules and precedents. In the House, Rule XVII, clause 9 governs secret sessions. A secret session may be held when the House has received confidential communications from the President or when a Member informs the House that the Member has communications that should be kept secret. A secret session may occur pursuant to a special rule or by a motion to resolve into a secret session made in the House. The House has also agreed on one occasion to a unanimous consent request authorizing the chair to resolve the House into secret session pursuant to this rule. A motion to resolve into secret session is in order in the House; it is not in order in the Committee of the Whole. A Member who offers such a motion announces the possession of confidential information and moves that the House go into a secret session. The motion is not debatable, and no point of order is available to require the communication at issue to be disclosed before the vote. If the motion is agreed to by a simple majority (a quorum being present), the chamber and galleries are cleared. When the only persons present are Members, officials allowed under Rule XVII, clause 9, and staff designated by the Speaker as essential to the proceedings, the chamber doors are closed, and the House begins the secret session. The Member making the motion is then recognized under the hour rule for debate. In addition, under Rule X, clause 11, paragraphs (g)(2)(D) through (g)(2)(G), the House Select Committee on Intelligence may move that the House hold a secret session to determine whether classified information held by the committee should be made public. This procedure is invoked only if the committee desires such a disclosure and the President personally objects to it. In the Senate, any Senator may make a motion that the Senate go into closed session, and, if seconded by another Senator, the Senate will immediately proceed into a secret session. Under Senate Rule XXI, the presiding officer exercises no discretion about going into secret session if the motion is made and seconded. The motion is not debatable. A Senator may interrupt another Senator to make the motion and may cause the other Senator to lose the floor. Once in a secret session, the Senate operates under applicable portions of Senate Rules XXIX and XXXI. Rule XXIX specifies which of the Senate's officers and staff may stay during the closed session and authorizes the presiding officer to include other staff at his discretion. Rule XXXI requires Senate business to be transacted in open session, but states that the Senate by majority vote may determine that a specific treaty, nomination, or other matter may be considered in secret session. A motion to return to open session is in order at any time, is not debatable, and requires a simple majority vote, a quorum being present. When the Senate is conducting an impeachment trial, it may hold deliberations behind closed doors. During this time, Senate standing rules are supplemented by additional rules, called "Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials." Members and staff of both houses are prohibited from divulging information from secret sessions. In the Senate, staff are sworn to secrecy, whereas in the House, staff must sign an oath not to reveal what happens in the secret session, unless the House decides to make its actions public. Violations of secrecy are punishable by the disciplinary rules of a chamber. A Member may be subject to a variety of punishments, including loss of seniority, fine, reprimand, censure, or expulsion. An officer or employee may be fired or subject to other internal disciplinary actions. The proceedings of a secret session are not published unless the relevant chamber votes, during the meeting or at a later time, to release them. Then, those portions released are printed in the Congressional Record . Under Rule XVII, if the House decides not to release the transcript of a secret session, the Speaker refers the proceedings to the appropriate committee(s) for evaluation. The committees are required to report to the House on their ultimate disposition of the transcript. If a committee decides not to release the transcript, it becomes part of the committee's noncurrent records (pursuant to House Rule VII, clause 3) and is transferred to the Clerk of the House for transmittal to the Archivist of the United States at the National Archives and Records Administration. Transcripts may be made available to the public after 30 years unless the Clerk of the House determines that such availability "would be detrimental to the public interest or inconsistent with the rights and privileges of the House" (Rule VII, clauses 3 and 4). If the Senate does not approve release of a secret session transcript, it is stored in the Office of Senate Security and ultimately sent to the National Archives and Records Administration. The proceedings remain sealed until the Senate votes to remove the injunction of secrecy. The Senate met in secret until 1794, its first rules reflecting a belief that the body's various roles, including providing advice and consent to the executive branch, compelled it to act behind closed doors. Although legislative sessions were generally open after 1795, the Senate's executive sessions (to consider nominations and treaties) were usually closed until 1929. Since 1929, the Senate has held 57 secret sessions, generally for reasons of national security or for consideration of impeachment questions. On December 20, 2010, for example, the Senate met in closed session to discuss the ratification of the New Start Treaty with Russia (Treaty Doc. 111-5). On December 7, 2010, the Senate met in closed session to debate the impeachment of federal judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., of Louisiana. Six secret sessions were held during the impeachment trial of President William J. Clinton in 1999. In 1997, the Senate met in secret to consider the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty and, in 1992, to debate the "most favored nation" status of China. Table 1 identifies the 57 secret sessions of the Senate since 1929. The House met frequently in secret session through the end of the War of 1812, mainly to receive confidential communications from the President, but occasionally for routine legislative business. Subsequent secret meetings were held in 1825 and in 1830. Since 1830, the House has met behind closed doors four times: in 1979, 1980, 1983, and 2008. Table 2 identifies secret House sessions since 1825.

Secret, or closed, sessions of the House and Senate exclude the press and the public. They may be held for matters deemed to require confidentiality and secrecy—such as national security, sensitive communications received from the President, and Senate deliberations during impeachment trials. Although Members usually seek advance agreement for going into secret session, any Member of Congress may request a secret session without notice. When the House or Senate goes into secret session, its chamber and galleries are cleared of everyone except Members and officers and employees specified in the rules or designated by the presiding officer as essential to the session. After the chamber is cleared, its doors are closed. Authority for the House and Senate to hold secret sessions appears in Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings…. Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their judgment require Secrecy.... " Both chambers have implemented these constitutional provisions through rules and precedents. In the House, Rule XVII, clause 9 governs secret sessions, including the types of business to be considered behind closed doors. In addition, House Rule X, clause 11 authorizes the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to bring before the House material to help it determine whether classified material held by the committee should be made public. In the Senate, under Senate Rule XXI, the presiding officer exercises no discretion about going into secret session. Any Senator may make a motion that the Senate go into closed session, and, if seconded, the Senate will immediately proceed into a secret session. Once in a secret session, the Senate operates under applicable portions of Senate Rules XXIX and XXXI. The Senate met in secret until 1794, its first rules reflecting a belief that the body's various special roles, including providing advice and consent to the executive branch, compelled it to conduct its business behind closed doors. Since 1929, when the Senate began debating nominations and treaties (referred to as executive business) in open session, the Senate has held 57 secret sessions, most often for reasons of national security or for consideration of impeachment proceedings. The House met frequently in secret session through the end of the War of 1812, mainly to receive confidential communications from the President, but occasionally for routine legislative business. Subsequent secret meetings were held in 1825 and in 1830. Since 1830, the House has met behind closed doors four times: in 1979, 1980, 1983, and 2008. A chamber's rules apply during a secret session. The proceedings of a secret session are not published unless the relevant chamber votes, during the meeting or at a later time, to release them. Then, those portions released are printed in the Congressional Record. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Federal laws have long prohibited corrupt payments of things of value to federal officials, such as payments in the form of "bribes" from favor-seekers in the private sector. The regulations and limitations on mere "gifts" to federal officials from domestic sources — where there is not necessarily any bargain (reciprocity), compensation, or favor explicitly sought, understood, or agreed to — are, however, of a more recent vintage. The ethical issues and problems of "gifts" to public officials may arise because of the tacit or subtle influence or feelings of gratitude and appreciation that a public official may feel towards his or her benefactors that might "sway his decisions" and erode the official's "sense of mission to the public" in favor of loyalty to "his private benefactors and patrons." This concern, of course, must be balanced to some extent with the normal, expected, and generally innocent expressions of gratitude from the public, the realities of friendships and personal relationships, as well as the requirements of protocol and etiquette in an public officer's official and ceremonial duties and functions. With respect to the President, the exigencies of the office and considerations of protocol, courtesy, and etiquette, have led to an express exemption from the general limitation in regulations on the acceptance of private gifts which might apply to other officers and employees in the executive branch of the United States Government. The current restriction under federal statutory law on the receipt or solicitation of "gifts" by federal employees and officials was enacted as part of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. The underlying statutory restriction enacted in 1989 in many respects merely codified similar gift standards which had already been applicable to all executive branch employees by way of executive orders and regulations since 1965. The current law, codified at 5 U.S.C. §7353(a), prohibits any federal officer or employee from soliciting or receiving any gift of any amount from a prohibited source, that is, from someone who is seeking action from, doing business with, or is regulated by one's agency, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of one's official duties. The statute expressly provides in the next paragraph, however, that the designated supervisory ethics agencies in the government may make exceptions to this general restriction, and may issue regulations setting out circumstances under which gifts from private sources may be accepted for those under their jurisdictions. In the executive branch of the federal government, the regulations and interpretations of the Office of Government Ethics [OGE] apply to gifts that are offered to or received by executive branch officials. The regulations of the Office of Government Ethics set out the guidelines and standards for receipt of gifts by officials in the executive branch of the federal government. The executive branch gift regulations generally follow the statutory prohibitions by restricting the solicitation or acceptance of gifts from a "prohibited source" and , furthermore, restrict the solicitation or receipt of any gifts that are given "because of the employee's official position," often referred to as "status gifts." Under the regulations, "prohibited sources" are persons seeking official action from the employee's agency, those who do business or are seeking to do business with the agency, those whose activities are regulated by the employee's agency, persons whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance of the employee's official duties, or an organization a majority of whose members fit the above categories. Although an official may not receive a gift given because of his official position, that is, if the gift would not have been given "had the employee not held the status, authority or duties associated with his Federal position," an executive branch official may accept a gift without limitation when it is clear that the gift "is motivated by a family relationship or personal friendship rather than the position of the employee." Within the executive branch gift regulations there are numerous exceptions which would permit the acceptance (but not the solicitation) of certain things of value in particular circumstances. Such exceptions to the prohibition may allow, for example, the receipt of gifts of "minimal value" (under $20 in value), incidental food or drinks at events, bona fide awards, normal loans, prizes, honorary degrees, pensions, discounts which are generally available, and free attendance at certain widely attended conferences and similar events which are seen to benefit the agency. The federal regulations on gifts are not directly applicable to the spouses of federal officials since such regulations extend only to "officers or employees" of the government. However, in many cases, gifts to the spouse of a federal official may be "imputed" to the federal official himself or herself, and would thus come within the same kinds of restrictions, limitations, or permissions on gifts to the federal employee. The OGE regulations apply to gifts accepted or solicited directly or indirectly, and expressly provide that a gift which is "solicited or accepted indirectly includes" gifts which are "[g]iven with the employee's knowledge and acquiescence to his parent, sibling, spouse, child or dependant relative because of that person's relationship to the employee...."  As noted, the President and Vice President are generally exempt by regulation from the statutory gift restrictions and the regulations promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics as to the receipt of gifts. Under these regulations, the President is expressly exempt from the broad restrictions on receiving or accepting gifts from prohibited sources or gifts given because of his official position, and thus may accept gifts from the general public, even from "prohibited sources," or gifts given because of his official position, as long as the President does not "solicit or coerce" the offering of gifts from such sources, nor accept a gift in return for an official act. The exception for the President and Vice President in the OGE regulations states: Because of the considerations relating to the conduct of their offices, including those of protocol or etiquette, the President and the Vice President may accept any gift on his own behalf or on behalf of any family member, provided that such acceptance does not violate §2635.202(c)(1) or (2), 18 U.S.C. §201(b) or 201(c)(3), or the Constitution of the United States. In promulgating its rules and exceptions, the Office of Government Ethics has noted that: "The ceremonial and other public duties of the President and Vice President make it impractical to subject them to standards that require an analysis of every gift offered." The regulations and exemptions indicate that the President is still subject to the prohibition on receiving a gift "in return for being influenced in the performance of an official act," and is still subject to the instruction under the regulations not to "solicit or coerce the offering of a gift," at 5 C.F.R. §2635.202(c)(2). It appears that the existing prohibition on "solicitations" of gifts would reach only solicitations which are restricted by the general rule, that is, solicitations of gifts from "prohibited sources," or given "because of the employee's official position." Since the President is not flatly prohibited from accepting gifts from the general public, such a gift made to the President personally, and accepted, may be retained by him when he leaves office. Gifts coming to the White House that are not intended for the President or First Lady personally, however, but rather are given with the intent to be made for the "White House," or otherwise made to the government of the United States, and personal gifts not retained by the President or First Lady, are catalogued, distributed, or disposed of by the United States. "Furnishings," for example, may be accepted by the National Park Service for use in the White House; "historic material" may be accepted by the Archivist for the Archives or Presidential Libraries; and other gifts for the United States, or ones not retained by the President, may be transferred to the General Services Administration for disposition, storage, or sale. In practice, domestic or private gifts are screened, categorized, and evaluated by aides in the White House Gift Office, and then distributed appropriately. If personal gifts to the President or First Lady are not to be retained by them, they are generally recorded, tracked, and sent to the National Archives and Records Administration [NARA] for courtesy storage, and possible eventual use and display at a presidential library. The process in the Reagan White House was explained as follows: While gifts from family and friends go directly from the White House Gift Unit to the first family, it is simply impossible for the President and First Lady to retain, or even view, most of the gifts from the general public. The Gift Unit, therefore, sees to the disposition of most of these items. Some are transferred to the National Archives, and eventually join head of state gifts as part of a presidential library museum collection. The President and all federal officials are restricted by the Constitution, at Article I, Section 9, clause 8, from receiving any "presents" from foreign governments, kings, or princes, without the consent of the Congress. The Congress has consented generally, in the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, to the acceptance of gifts of "minimal value" from foreign governments offered as souvenirs or marks of courtesy, and the acceptance of other gifts when a refusal of the gift may cause "offense or embarrassment" or otherwise harm the foreign relations of the United States. A tangible gift of more than minimal value accepted for reasons of protocol or courtesy may not be kept as a personal gift, however, but is considered accepted on behalf of and property of the United States, and in the case of such a gift for the President or the President's family, is handled by the National Archives and Records Administration. In the past, Presidents, as well as Vice Presidents and other federal officials, have been allowed to accept an award such as the Nobel Prize for a variety of reasons. With respect specifically to the prohibition on acceptance of things of value and gifts from foreign governments, the Nobel Prize is funded and managed by a private foundation and a private foundation board, and is thus not considered to be a gift given by a foreign government nor an instrumentality of a foreign state. The President and all federal officials are subject to the restrictions of the bribery law at 18 U.S.C. §201(b)(2), prohibiting the receipt of or agreement to receive anything of value "in return for being influenced" in the performance of one's official duties; and the so-called "illegal gratuities" clause of that statute, 18 U.S.C. §201(c)(1)(B), prohibiting the receipt of anything of value "for or because of" an official act performed or to be performed. The bribery provision requires a "corrupt" bargain or understanding to do some official act in return for something of value (often referred to as a quid pro quo ), where the payment was the motivation for the official act; while under the "illegal gratuities" provision, the official act may have been done even without the payment as motivation, but the payment was connected to the act in some way, for example, as a thank-you or other reward ( i.e. , a "gratuity"). Neither provision is technically a "gift" law, and neither applies merely to gifts given with no demonstrated connection to a particular official act. In addition to restrictions on the receipt of gifts, the President is required to publicly disclose personal financial information, including personal gifts over minimal amounts ($350 as of this writing) which have been received by him and his immediate family. These public disclosure reports are required each May 15 th , and upon leaving office, under the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended. Despite the permissibility of the receipt and acceptance of gifts by the President and the First Lady from the American public, certain acceptances of private gifts have in the past engendered some public and press criticism, and thus the receipt of particularly lavish or excessive gifts, even if free of legal liability, may not be free from political or public relations consequences.

This report addresses provisions of federal law and regulation restricting the acceptance of personal gifts by the President of the United States. Although the President, like all other federal officers and employees, is prohibited from receiving personal gifts from foreign governments and foreign officials without the consent of Congress (U.S. Const., art. I, §9, cl. 8), the President is generally free to accept unsolicited personal gifts from the American public. Most of the restrictions on federal officials accepting gifts from "prohibited sources" (those doing business with, seeking action from, or regulated by one's agency) are not applicable to the President of the United States (5 C.F.R. §2635.204(j)), although the President may not solicit gifts from such sources. The President, in a similar manner as other federal officials, may also receive unrestricted gifts from relatives and gifts that are given on the basis of personal friendship. When personal gifts accepted by the President or his immediate family exceed a certain amount, those gifts are required to be publicly disclosed in financial disclosure reports filed annually by the President. 5 U.S.C. app., §§101(f)(1), 102(a)(2). The President remains subject to the bribery and illegal gratuities law which prohibits the receipt of a gift or of anything of value when that receipt, or the agreement to receive such thing of value, is connected in some way to the performance (or nonperformance) of an official act.

Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) P.L. 109-58 . The tax provisions are located in Title XIII. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) P.L. 110-343 . The tax provisions are located in Titles I, II, and III of Division B, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) P.L. 111-5 . Conference Report with full text of the act ( H.R. 1 , as passed, P.L. 111-5 ) and the Joint Explanatory Statement. The tax provisions are located in Division B, Title I. This section lists and describes several resources that contain information about federal incentives available to support energy efficiency and renewable energy. Tax Incentives Assistance Project (TIAP) http://www.energytaxincentives.org/ This website is sponsored by a number of government agencies, nonprofit groups, and other organizations. It focuses solely on information about federal tax incentives. Information is organized into categories for consumers, businesses, and builders/manufacturers. The site includes updates about enacted federal legislation and provides links to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax forms. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Energy Star http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=products.pr_tax_credits This website has a page on "Federal Tax Credits for Energy Efficiency." The information on that page is organized into categories for consumers (home improvements, cars, solar energy, fuel cells), home builders, appliance manufacturers, and commercial buildings. The site includes a frequently asked questions (FAQ) section providing answers about energy efficiency tax credits. Department of Energy (DOE) Financial Opportunities http://www1.eere.energy.gov/financing/ This website is focused mainly on information about matching funds, grants, and financing. Information is organized into categories for consumers, business/industry/universities, inventors (small business), federal energy managers, states, and Native American tribes. The site includes a section on energy efficiency and consumer home financing. U.S. Department of Energy Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center (AFDC) http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/ This website presents information about incentives for alternative fuels (renewable fuels and others) and vehicles. A key link provides access to "State and Federal Incentives and Laws." Incentives covered include grants, tax credits, loans, rebates, regulatory exemptions, fuel discounts, and technical assistance. Information on state incentives is made available through a national map and through summary tables organized by type of incentive, regulation, technology/fuel, and user. The information about state incentives is updated after each state legislature's session ends. Information about federal incentives is updated after pertinent legislation is enacted into law. Another link provides access to "Laws and Incentives Enactment History." U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Clean Cities Financial Opportunities http://www1.eere.energy.gov/cleancities/financial_opps.html This website presents information about incentives for alternative fuels and advanced technologies. A link to "Government Sources" provides information about funding opportunities through federal grant-making agencies (Grants.gov), Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) Program, and various EPA programs. A link to "Solicitations" provides information about business funding opportunities that cover a variety of changing topics that have included plug-in hybrid vehicles, hydrogen vehicles, and transportation planning. Clean Cities Coordinators are available to help with funding applications. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Energy Efficient Mortgages Program http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/eem/energy-r.cfm HUD's website provides information on Energy Efficient Mortgages. These mortgages can help homeowners finance the cost of adding energy-efficiency features to new or existing housing as part of their Federal Housing Authority-insured home purchase or refinance. Alliance to Save Energy (ASE) Home and Vehicle Tax Credits http://www.ase.org/content/article/detail/2654 ASE's website organizes information into categories on energy efficiency incentives for home improvements, hybrid vehicles, and solar energy. The site includes details on eligible equipment, credit limits, and credit expiration dates. This section covers websites that list and describe state and local incentives available to support energy efficiency and renewable energy. Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) http://www.dsireusa.org/ DSIRE's website is sponsored by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC). IREC is a nonprofit organization focused on standards, guidelines, and other activities to support renewable energy. This site contains information about various types of energy efficiency and renewable energy financial incentives provided by state and local governments and utility companies. Summary data is accessed through a national map—and several additional special topic maps—that are linked to data on each state. Alternatively, the data can be searched by technology (solar, wind, geothermal), sector (residential, commercial/industrial, government, utility), and incentive type (tax credits, bonds, grants, loans), and eligible and implementing sectors. The site is updated weekly. Also, the homepage includes a map-link to a list of federal incentives. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) State Activities and Weatherization Assistance http://www.eere.energy.gov/weatherization/ DOE's website on the Weatherization Assistance Program has information about how to apply for weatherization funding assistance. The site also has a "state activities" link, which provides information about state-level energy assistance programs. The following are links to resources by type of renewable energy. Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Energy Efficiency (DSIRE). Incentive for Biomass http://www.dsireusa.org/ Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center. State and Federal Incentives and Laws http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/progs/fed_summary.php/afdc/US/0 Environmental Protection Agency. Funding Database Biomass/Biogas http://www.epa.gov/chp/funding/bio.html Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Energy Efficiency (DSIRE). Incentives for Geothermal Heat Pumps and Geothermal Electric http://www.dsireusa.org/ Geothermal Heat Consortium – GeoExchange.org. New Federal Tax Credits for Geothermal Heat Pump Systems http://www.geoexchange.org/component/content/article/90-new-federal-tax-credits-.html Alliance to Save Energy. Energy-Efficiency Home and Vehicle Tax Credits. Solar Energy and Fuel Cell http://www.ase.org/content/article/detail/2654#fuelcells_solar Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Energy Efficiency (DSIRE). Incentives for Solar Technology http://www.dsireusa.org/ Energy Star. Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy. Tax Incentives for Solar Energy Systems http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=products.pr_tax_credits#s4 Solar Energy Industries Association. Solar Bills/Legislation http://www.seia.org/cs/solar_bills Solar Energy Industries Association. Frequently Asked Questions on the Solar Investment Tax Credit http://www.seia.org/galleries/pdf/ITC_Frequently_Asked_Questions_10_9_08.pdf Tax Incentives Assistance Project. Consumer Tax Incentives. Solar Energy Systems http://www.energytaxincentives.org/consumers/ Tax Incentives Assistance Project. Businesses Tax Incentives. Solar Energy Systems http://www.energytaxincentives.org/business/renewables.php American Wind Energy Association. Legislative Affairs http://www.awea.org/legislative/ Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Energy Efficiency (DSIRE). Incentives for Wind http://www.dsireusa.org A number of CRS reports provide information about federal energy efficiency and/or renewable energy incentives: CRS Report R40412, Energy Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) CRS Report RL33831, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 110 th Congress CRS Report RL33578, Energy Tax Policy: History and Current Issues CRS Report RL34162, Renewable Energy: Background and Issues for the 110 th Congress CRS Report RL32979, Alcohol Fuels Tax Incentives CRS Report R40168, Alternative Fuels and Advanced Technology Vehicles: Issues in Congress CRS Report R40110, Biofuels Incentives: A Summary of Federal Programs CRS Report RS22558, Tax Credits for Hybrid Vehicles CRS Report RS22351, Tax Incentives for Alternative Fuel and Advanced Technology Vehicles CRS Report RL33883, Issues Affecting Tidal, Wave, and In-Stream Generation Projects CRS Report RL34546, Wind Power in the United States: Technology, Economic, and Policy Issues Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) http://www.cfda.gov/ The CFDA is the primary source of federal grants program information, although actual funding depends upon annual congressional budget appropriations. The CFDA is available on the Internet. Many federal grants do not provide funding directly to individuals, but rather to states, local governments, universities, and tribal entities. Check the "applicant eligibility" section in the CFDA program description to see who may apply. Individuals may be eligible to apply for funds after they have been distributed at the state and local level, through their state energy offices or other contact listed in the CFDA program description. Grants.gov http://www.grants.gov Federal grant funding opportunities are also posted on the website Grants.gov. Grants.gov enables grant seekers to electronically find and apply for competitive grants from all federal agencies. CRS Report RL34035, Grants Work in a Congressional Office CRS Report RL32159, How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal CRS Report RL34012, Resources for Grantseekers

The following list of authoritative resources is designed to assist in responding to a broad range of constituent questions and concerns about renewable energy and energy efficiency tax incentives. Links are provided for the following: the full text of public laws establishing and extending federal renewable energy and energy efficiency incentives; federal, state, and local incentives resources; incentive resources grouped by technology type (solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass); CRS reports on this topic; and federal grants information resources. The last section of this report includes tables displaying popular incentives, the corresponding U.S. Code citations, and current expiration dates of those incentives. This list reflects information that is currently available. It will be updated regularly as other relevant material becomes available.

The Reclamation Fund was established in 1902 as a special fund within the United States Treasury to aid the development of irrigation on the arid lands of western states. It originated as a revolving fund supported by the proceeds of the sale of land and water in the western United States. Over time it, has been amended to receive proceeds from a number of disparate sources, including power generation and mineral leasing. Since the mid-1990s, balances in the Reclamation Fund have increased significantly as appropriations made from the fund have not kept pace with receipts coming in to the fund. As of the end of FY2011, the fund had a balance in excess of $9.6 billion. Barring major changes by Congress in the form of increased appropriations from the fund or a redirection of its receipts, the fund's balance is expected to continue to increase. This report provides general background information on the Reclamation Fund, including a short history of the fund and trends in its deposits and appropriations. It includes a brief analysis of the issues associated with using the current surplus balance for other means. The Reclamation Act of 1902 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to construct irrigation works in western states and established the Reclamation Fund to pay for these projects. The Reclamation Fund was established as a special fund within the U.S. Treasury and was designated to receive receipts from the sale of federal land in the western United States. All moneys received from the sale and disposal of public lands in … [the western United States.] … shall be, and the same are hereby, reserved set aside, and appropriated as a special fund in the Treasury to be known as the "reclamation fund, " to be used in the examination and survey for and the construction and maintenance of irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands in the said States and Territories, and for the payment of all other expenditures provided for in this Act. The 1902 act made funding from the Reclamation Fund available for the purposes outlined in the legislation without further appropriation by Congress. This requirement was later revised in the Reclamation Extension Act (1914) to limit Reclamation's expenditures for carrying out the 1902 act to only those items for which funds are made available annually by Congress. Between 1902 and 1910, the Reclamation Service (later changed to the Bureau of Reclamation) authorized 24 projects across the West, and the balance in the fund reached as much as $68 million. However, by 1910, estimates indicated that anticipated income and repayments would not be adequate to carry on the authorized construction program, and funds were borrowed from the U.S. Treasury on multiple occasions. In the act of June 25, 1910, Congress authorized an advance of $20 million to the Reclamation Fund from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. Congress authorized an additional advance of $5 million from the General Fund in the act of March 3, 1931. These funds were eventually reimbursed in 1938 under the Hayden-O'Mahoney Amendment, which among other things directed the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer funding accruing to the western states from lands within naval petroleum reserves. The Reclamation Fund was not adequate to fund many of Reclamation's large investments in water infrastructure. Dating to the late 1920s, Congress directed that the General Fund (in lieu of the Reclamation Fund) finance part or all of some of Reclamation's largest construction projects. By the end of the 1930s, most major Reclamation projects under construction were financed by the General Fund of the Treasury. For instance, the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 provided that construction of Hoover Dam would be financed from the General Fund of the Treasury rather than the Reclamation Fund. In the 1950s and 1960s, other large, multiple-purpose Reclamation projects were built with support from the General Fund. Among these projects were those authorized in the Colorado River Storage Project Act (P.L. 485, which authorized Glen Canyon Dam, built in 1956) and the Colorado River Basin Project Act (P.L. 90-537, which authorized the Central Arizona Project in 1968). The Reclamation Fund was originally established to serve as a "revolving" fund, but this concept proved impractical over time. When the fund was created, it was expected that project repayment and receipts from the sale of public lands (under the original statute, the fund receives 95% of these proceeds) would finance expenditures on new or ongoing projects. As previously noted, around 1910 Congress recognized that the existing Reclamation Fund revenue stream was inadequate to finance ongoing expenditures. Congress made the fund subject to annual appropriations in 1914, and directed additional receipts toward the Reclamation Fund over time, including those from revenues associated water and power uses and from sales, leases, and rentals of federal lands and resources (e.g., oil, gas, and minerals) in the 17 western states. Of these, natural resource royalties and power revenues (discussed below) have proven to be the most significant sources of revenue for the Reclamation Fund. Receipts from natural resource royalties were initiated in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. These receipts, which include 40% of the royalty payments received by the federal government for the production of oil, gas, coal, potassium, and other minerals on federal lands, currently generate the most revenue for the Reclamation Fund (see Figure 1 ). In recent years, these receipts have increased significantly (see the section, " Recent Trends "). Hydropower receipts were authorized to be received by the Reclamation Fund through the aforementioned Hayden-O'Mahoney Amendment, enacted on May 9, 1938. The amendment provided that revenues associated with irrigation projects' power features be deposited into the Reclamation Fund. The practical function of the change was to secure for the fund power revenues from large projects then under construction, such as Coulee Dam, Shasta Dam, and Parker Dam. An additional significant source of revenues into the Reclamation Fund is sales of water contracts, which was authorized by Congress in 1920. The primary sources of revenue for the Reclamation Fund are summarized below in Table 1 . Congress makes appropriations from the Reclamation Fund in annual appropriations acts. Appropriations from the Reclamation Fund are typically made for three separate accounts: the Bureau of Reclamation's Water and Related Resource account, the Bureau of Reclamation's Policy and Administration account, and the Western Area Power Administration's (WAPA's) Construction, Rehabilitation, and Operation and Maintenance account. Funds are made available from the Reclamation Fund only for projects authorized under the fund. Funds have been provided to WAPA since 1978, when the power marketing function of Reclamation was transferred to the Department of Energy. Appropriations are typically provided in annual Energy & Water Development Appropriation bills. After the early financial issues between the Reclamation Fund's establishment in 1902 and the supplemental funding from the General Fund in the 1930s, the fund maintained a relatively stable balance until the early 1990s. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the fund's balance began to increase significantly as revenues from power sales and natural resource royalties significantly exceeded appropriations from the fund. For every year since FY1994, receipts going into the Reclamation Fund have exceeded appropriations made from it by more than $100 million, and in some years receipts have exceeded appropriations by more than $1 billion. The exception to this trend was FY2009, when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) appropriated funding for Reclamation from the Reclamation Fund. As of the end of FY2012, the fund had a balance in excess of $10.8 billion. Trends in the Reclamation Fund from 1990 to 2010 are summarized below in Figure 1 . Receipts deposited into the Reclamation Fund are derived from five general categories: natural resource royalties, sales of federal land, hydropower receipts, timber sales receipts, and other proprietary receipts. Of these, natural resource royalties and hydropower revenues make up the majority of incoming receipts. From FY1990 to FY2011, an average of 87% of the Reclamation Fund's receipts came from these two sources. In recent years, even more receipts have come from these sources. From FY2006 to FY2011, an average of 91% came from the two sources (79% from natural resource royalties and 11% from hydropower receipts). A breakdown of the fund's receipts in FY2012 is provided in Figure 2 . Limited data is available on the source (by state) of the receipts going into the Reclamation Fund for various purposes. For the largest portion of revenues, mineral royalties (which accounted for approximately 79% of all receipts in the last five years), CRS estimates that from FY2006 to FY2011, an average of 93% of the receipts from onshore public mineral leasing came from five western states: Wyoming, New Mexico, Colorado, California, and Utah. Two states, Wyoming and New Mexico, accounted for about 64% of these receipts. For power revenues, Reclamation reported that the majority come from power generated on the Columbia River, the Central Valley Project, the Parker-Davis Project, and the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program. On average, this power generated about 16% of Reclamation Fund revenues between 2000 and 2010. The increasing balance of the Reclamation Fund has caused some to call for directing these funds for new purposes or to supplement ongoing authorized expenditures. Such a change could take one or more forms, each of which may have an associated budget scoring impact. For instance, Congress could increase appropriations from the Reclamation Fund in annual discretionary appropriations, but such an increase would have to compete with other appropriations (including General Fund appropriations) subject to congressional 302 (b) allocations. Separately, Congress could dedicate a stream of revenue from the Reclamation Fund for a subset of projects and make it available, with or without further appropriations (i.e., discretionary funding or mandatory funding) required. Congressional PAYGO requirements may necessitate offsets in spending corresponding to some of these changes. Some, including water users and others benefitting from Reclamation projects, note that the Reclamation Fund was intended to benefit water resource projects in western states, and spending its balance on the fund's intended purposes is a logical use of the fund. However, others may view other potential uses of the fund's surplus as being more pressing in the current fiscal climate. These same interests argue that the large increases to mineral receipts were not foreseen when those disbursements were originally authorized, and may advocate for redirecting surplus balances to debt reduction or the states. A change to the Reclamation Fund enacted by Congress in 2009 provides an example of the challenges associated with dedicating Reclamation Fund balances toward a particular purpose. In Title X of the Omnibus Lands Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-11 ), Congress redirected a portion of Reclamation Fund receipts for Indian water rights settlement projects. The bill established a separate fund (known as the Reclamation Water Settlements Fund) in the Treasury and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer into the new fund up to $120 million annually between FY2020 and FY2034 that would otherwise go to the Reclamation Fund. Significantly, the law directed that this funding be made available without further appropriation. However, in this case, the appropriation was made outside of the congressional scoring window for PAYGO costs, and thus did not require an offset. More recently, a bill in the Senate in the 113 th Congress, the Authorized Rural Water Projects Completion Act ( S. 715 ), proposes to establish a new fund for rural water projects (similar to the Water Settlements Fund referenced above) that would receive, without further appropriation, approximately $80 million per year in funding that would otherwise revert to the Reclamation Fund. In contrast to the aforementioned water settlements fund, some of this funding would be redirected to projects over the next 10 years.

The Reclamation Fund was established in 1902 to fund the development of irrigation projects on arid and semiarid lands of the 17 western states. It originated as a revolving fund for construction projects and was supported by the proceeds of the sale of land and water in the western United States. Over time, it was amended to receive proceeds from a number of other sources. It is currently derived from repayments and revenues associated with federal water resources development as well as the sales, rentals, and leases (including natural resource leasing) of federal land in the western United States. Portions of the fund's balance are appropriated annually by Congress for multiple purposes, including some of the operational expenditures of the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the Power Marketing Administrations. Through FY2012, collections deposited into the Reclamation Fund totaled more than $40 billion, while total appropriations from the fund totaled more than $30 billion. The Reclamation Fund did not finance all Reclamation investments in the western United States. As a result of limited funding availability, a number of large dams and other Reclamation investments were financed by the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. Notwithstanding advances to the Reclamation Fund by Congress in 1910 and 1931, deposits into and appropriations out of the fund have been roughly equal over time. From the 1940s until the 1990s, the fund maintained a small, relatively stable balance. Beginning in the mid-1990s, balances in the fund began to increase significantly as receipts from mineral leasing and power sales increased, while appropriations from the fund largely remained static. At the end of FY2012, the fund had a balance of more than $10.8 billion, and it is expected to continue to grow. Receipts deposited into the Reclamation Fund are made available to Reclamation by Congress through annual discretionary appropriations bills, which are subject to congressional budgetary allocations. Some have proposed that Congress appropriate some portion of the surplus balance in the Reclamation Fund to reclamation activities in western states, including new water storage projects or the rehabilitation of existing projects. These interests argue that the Reclamation Fund was set up to benefit western states and should now be used to increase investments in these areas. As the balance of the Reclamation Fund continues to increase, Congress may reevaluate the Reclamation Fund's status, including its financing of new or ongoing activities. The Omnibus Lands Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-11) included provisions that will transfer $120 million per year from the fund from FY2020 through FY2034, without further appropriation, to a separate fund that provides for Indian Water Settlement construction projects. In the 113th Congress, a bill before the Senate (S. 715) proposes to redirect funding that would otherwise go to the Reclamation Fund for the construction of rural water projects. Major changes to the Reclamation Fund may have scoring implications in the annual budget and under congressional pay-as-you-go rules.

The Federal Employee Dental and Vision Benefits Enhancement Act of 2004 was enacted on December 23, 2004, requiring the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish arrangements under which supplemental dental and vision benefits are available to federal employees, Members of Congress, annuitants, and dependents. OPM established the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP), with coverage first available on December 31, 2006. Enrollees are responsible for 100% of the premiums, and OPM does not review disputed claims. Employees who are eligible to enroll in the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program, whether or not they are actually enrolled, may enroll in FEDVIP. Annuitants, survivor annuitants, and compensationers (someone receiving monthly compensation from the Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation program) may also enroll in FEDVIP. Eligible family members include a spouse, unmarried dependent children under age 22, and continued coverage for qualified disabled children 22 years or older. Former spouses receiving an apportionment of an annuity, deferred annuitants, and those in FEHB temporary continuation of coverage are not eligible to enroll in FEDVIP. There are four nationwide dental plans, and three additional dental plans that are only available regionally. The nationwide plans also provide coverage overseas. There are three vision plans, which all provide both nationwide and overseas coverage. Eligible individuals may enroll in a FEDVIP plan during the standard open season for FEHB plans (for 2008 coverage, open season is from November 12 through December 10, 2007). Individuals may change plans during open season each year, or following a qualifying life event. As with FEHB, new employees have 60 days to enroll. FEDVIP enrollment can be done through the Internet at http://www.BENEFEDS.com , or, for those without Internet access, by calling 1-877-888-FEDS. Individuals may choose a self-only, self +1, or a family plan. This set of options differs from the FEHB plans, which only allow for two choices: a self-only or a family plan. Individuals who choose to enroll in FEDVIP are not required to enroll in both a dental and a vision plan; they may choose only one type of coverage or both. Individuals are not required to enroll in the dental plan offered by their FEHB plan; for example, an individual whose health insurance is provided by GEHA may enroll in MetLife's dental plan and in Blue Cross Blue Shield's vision plan. However, any coverage for dental and/or vision services provided under the individual's FEHB plan is the primary source of coverage, and the FEDVIP supplemental dental and vision plans pay secondary. Additionally, active workers (not annuitants) may still contribute to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA) to cover any qualified unmet medical expenses, such as dental copayments or deductibles. Premiums vary by plan, by whether the enrollment includes other family members, and by residency (for dental plans only). Unlike nationwide FEHB plans, individuals enrolled in a FEDVIP dental plan pay different premiums depending on where they live in the country or overseas. Active employees pay FEDVIP premiums on a pre-tax basis (called premium conversion). However, unlike FEHB plans, employees may not opt out of premium conversion. Pre-tax premiums are not available to annuitants, survivor annuitants, or compensationers. While there are no preexisting condition exclusions for this coverage, there are waiting periods for orthodontia. Individuals must be in the same plan for the entire waiting period, and switching to a new plan may require beginning the waiting period over again. There are no waiting periods for vision services. While the statutes allow for more stringent waiting periods for individuals who do not enroll at their first enrollment opportunity, the brochures for 2008 do not indicate that plans have imposed additional restrictions. Enrollees will pay less out-of-pocket costs if they use in-network services. For 2008, the four nationwide dental plans are Aetna, GEHA, MetLife, and United Concordia. Both GEHA and MetLife have two options—a high and a standard option. There are also three regional plans: Triple-S (covering Puerto Rico), GHI (covering New York and parts of Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and New Jersey), and CompBenefits (covering 19 states, Washington, D.C., and parts of Maryland). Only the nationwide plans also provide coverage overseas. The benefits provided by these plans include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Class A (Basic) services—oral examinations, prophylaxis, diagnostic evaluations, sealants, and X-rays; (2) Class B (Intermediate) services—restorative procedures such as fillings, prefabricated stainless steel crowns, periodontal scaling, tooth extractions, and denture adjustments; (3) Class C (Major) services—endodontic services such as root canals, periodontal services such as gingivectomy, major restorative services such as crowns, oral surgery, and bridges, and prosthodontic services such as complete dentures; and (4) Class D (Orthodontic) service. Premiums for these plans vary by geographic area. For example, an Aetna enrollee in Washington, D.C., will pay a monthly premium of $28.97 for self-only coverage. Monthly premiums for Aetna's plan range from $26.35 to $36.83, depending on where the enrollee resides. For all dental plans, self + 1 premiums are approximately twice the plan's self-only premium, and family premiums are about three times the plan's self-only premium. Thus, comparing plan premiums is slightly more complex than comparing nationwide FEHB plan premiums, for which everyone in the same self-only plan pays the same premium, regardless of where they live, and for which there is no self + 1 option. Similar to the FEHB program, premiums also vary by high or standard options. Table 1 , below, compares the national dental plans, including the monthly premiums for the Washington, D.C., area. Monthly self-only premiums range from $22.71 for MetLife's standard plan to $37.90 for GEHA's high option plan. Only Aetna had no premium increase over last year, with other plans increasing self-only premiums from about $1 per month (GEHA high option, with about a 2% increase) to $4.50 per month (United Concordia, with about a 15% increase) per month. The percentage of services covered by a plan varies by class of service, with only GEHA's standard plan requiring a copayment for preventive services. Enrollees who choose out-of-network services pay their coinsurance plus any amount over the plan's payment. The United Concordia plan pays only for emergency out-of-network services. All of the plans cover underserved areas, as well as those overseas. The plans also impose an annual benefit limit for total Class A through C services of $1,200 for all plans, except MetLife's high option plan with a $3,000 limit. There is a lifetime orthodontia limit, which is $1,500 for all plans, except MetLife's high option plan, which has a $3,000 limit. For 2008, the three vision plans are FEP BlueVision (Blue Cross and Blue Shield), Spectera, and Vision Service Plans (VSP). Each of these plans has both a high and a standard option, and also provides both nationwide and overseas coverage. Annual premiums for the three plans are similar; annual self-only coverage is $71.76 for Spectera, $99.36 for VSP, and $103.20 for FEP BlueVision's plan. The high-option plans cost about $20 to $40 more per year. Premiums for self + 1 plans are about double the costs of self-only plans, and premiums for family plans are about triple the costs. For 2008, Spectera had a very small premium increase (for self-only standard coverage, premiums increased by $0.20 per month, and high plan premiums increased by $0.39 per month, each about a 5% increase). The other vision plans' premiums remained the same. The more significant differences are found in benefits and network limitations. For example, under the FEP BlueVision plan, enrollees must stay in-network for covered services, with two exceptions: those who living in a limited access area or those who receive services overseas. Enrollees are responsible for any difference between the amount billed by the provider and the actual plan payment. Spectera and VSP both allow for reimbursement for visits to out-of-network providers. Generally, covered services are limited to eye exams, a choice between lenses for glasses or contacts, and extra discounts and savings on non-covered services, such as progressive lenses and additional glasses. The services are provided according to a schedule, such as eye exams every 12 months and new frames every 24 months. Additionally, plans cover low vision coverage on a limited basis. As shown in Table 2 , an individual enrolled in either of Spectera's plans could have an exam and new lenses and frames once during the course of a year. The copayment would be $10 for the exam and $10 for the lenses, or $25 for both lenses and frames, if new frames were purchased. Spectera's standard option includes scratch-resistant coating and polycarbonate lenses, and the high option also covers basic progressive lenses, tinted lenses, and UV coating. Plan brochures provide more detail on the differences between the standard and high options. The choice of covered frames is also limited. For those using services outside the network, the plans provide a schedule of payments. Enrollees may opt for contact lenses in lieu of glasses, subject to each plan's limits (i.e., generally a limit on disposable contacts, supplying only enough for part of the year). Several factors should be considered in deciding whether or not to enroll in FEDVIP, including (1) coverage of these services in a FEHB plan—more likely for those enrolled in a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), (2) likelihood of using services covered by the plans, and (3) placing the same dollar amount that would be used toward dental and/or vision benefits premiums in an FSA (available to employees and not annuitants). Each prospective enrollee must weigh these considerations and others against his or her own level of risk aversion, as well as the fact that the individual pays 100% of the premium. Under the FEDVIP program, any coverage provided by an individual's FEHB health plan is primary, and the FEDVIP plans are the secondary payers. However, generally, the nationally available FEHB plans, have limited dental and vision coverage. This year, GEHA added limited vision coverage under its plans, offering an annual eye exam with a $25 copayment. GEHA, similar to some of the other national plans, has an arrangement with certain providers for discounted eyewear, but the enrollee would still be responsible for 100% of the discounted cost. In contrast, some of the FEHB HMO-type plans offer more comprehensive dental and vision benefits. Some high-deductible plans also provide some coverage. It is important to compare FEHB coverage to determine if also enrolling in FEDVIP is beneficial. While some enrollees know that they will use services, such an individual who wears glasses or a dependent who will need orthodontics, some services cannot be as easily predicted, such as an individual needing a root canal. Individuals must weigh their expected benefits against the premiums. For example, an individual who wears glasses, has a yearly eye exam, and uses a provider in-network may find that paying the premium will result in lower costs than paying for each of these services separately, even with pre-tax FSA funds for employees. On the other hand, an individual who does not wear glasses may not benefit from vision supplemental insurance. There is not, however, a one-to-one correlation between buying any insurance and the expectation of using the services. There is still a large share of unknown risk that any insurance protects against, so that some individuals may find themselves using services that they did not anticipate using. Both FEDVIP premiums and FSA contributions are pre-tax for employees, so that they may decide to enroll in one, none, or both. (Annuitants can not contribute to an FSA or pay premiums with pre-tax dollars.) Enrollees who choose both can use funds in the FSA for any copayments, coinsurance amounts, deductibles, amounts exceeding annual or lifetime maximums, or amounts above the plan's payment for out-of-network services. Some individuals may decide that they prefer to only contribute to an FSA and not enroll in either the dental or vision plan, and instead use their FSA funds to pay for any dental or vision expenditures. While using FSA funds provides the most flexibility, it may be that the dental and vision premiums cover more than the same dollars in the FSA. Individuals who are not sure they will use the services provided under FEDVIP can "wait and see," and if they do not use dental or vision services, they can use the FSA dollars for other qualified medical expenses. Others may choose to enroll only in FEDVIP and minimize their out-of-pocket expenditures by staying in-network. Decisions about FEDVIP and FSA can be revisited every year during open season.

The Federal Employee Dental and Vision Benefits Enhancement Act of 2004 was enacted on December 23, 2004 ( P.L. 108-496 ), directing the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish a supplemental dental and vision benefits program. OPM created the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP), with coverage first available on December 31, 2006. Enrollees are responsible for 100% of premiums and may choose a self-only, self + 1, or family plan. Coverage for dental and/or vision services provided through Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) plans is the primary source of coverage, and the supplemental dental and vision plan is secondary. Employees may still contribute to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA) to cover any qualified unmet medical expenses.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provided $7.2 billion primarily for broadband grant and loan programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The ARRA directed broadband grant and loan funding in the following way: $4.35 billion to NTIA/DOC for a competitive broadband grant program including broadband infrastructure grants, competitive grants for expanding public computer capacity, and grants to encourage sustainable adoption of broadband service. The NTIA grant program is called the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program (BTOP). $2.5 billion to RUS/USDA for broadband grants, loans, and loan/grant combinations. The law states that 75% of the area to be served by an eligible project must be a rural area. A rural area is defined as any area not located within a city, town, or incorporated area that has a population of greater than 20,000 inhabitants; or not located within an urbanized area contiguous and adjacent to a city or town that has a population of greater than 50,000 inhabitants. The RUS broadband grant and loan program is called the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP). Subsequently, P.L. 111-226 (the education jobs and Medicaid funding bill), signed into law on August 10, 2010, rescinded $302 million of unobligated BTOP money from NTIA. There were two rounds of ARRA broadband funding. The first funding round was announced with the release of a Notice of Funds Availability (NOFA) on July 1, 2009. The second funding round NOFAs were released on January 15, 2010. The ARRA mandated that all funding be obligated and awarded by September 30, 2010. As of October 1, 2010, all ARRA broadband funds have been awarded. This report focuses on the distribution of ARRA broadband funding. The following presents a breakdown of applications and awards data as of October 1, 2010. The first funding round was announced with the release of a Notice of Funds Availability (NOFA) on July 1, 2009. Broadband grants and loans fell into several first round project categories. For BTOP, projects could be: last mile , defined as any broadband infrastructure project the predominant purpose of which is to provide broadband service to end users; middle mile , defined as a broadband infrastructure project that does not predominantly provide broadband service to end users and may include interoffice transport, backhaul, Internet connectivity, or special access (up to $1.2 billion in grants available for infrastructure consisting of last mile and middle mile projects); public computer centers , which provide broadband access to the general public or a specific vulnerable population (up to $50 million in grants available); or sustainable broadband adoption , which demonstrate a sustainable increase in demand for and subscribership to broadband services (up to $150 million in grants available). For BIP, projects could be: last mile remote area , where "remote area" is a rural unserved area at least 50 miles from a nonrural area (up to $400 million in grants available); last mile nonremote area (up to $800 million in loans and loan/grant combinations available); or middle mile (up to $800 million in loans and loan/grant combinations available). On September 9, 2009, NTIA and RUS released data on applications received during the first round application period. In total, over 2,200 applications requested nearly $28 billion in funding for proposed projects reaching all 50 states, five territories, and the District of Columbia. The total amount of federal funding requested was seven times the amount available in the first funding round. Table 1 provides a breakdown of first round applications data with respect to program and project category. On January 15, 2010, NTIA and RUS released NOFAs announcing the second and final round of ARRA broadband funding. A total of $4.8 billion was made available, consisting of $2.6 billion for BTOP and $2.2 billion for BIP. Based on the agencies' experiences with the first round, and drawing on public comments collected from a November 16, 2009, Joint Request for Information (RFI), both NTIA and RUS streamlined the application process and made significant changes to how the second round of BTOP and BIP would be structured and conducted. Highlights included the following: Unlike the first round, each agency had its own separate NOFA, and applicants had the option of applying to either BTOP or BIP, but not to both. NTIA/BTOP primarily focused on middle mile broadband infrastructure projects, while RUS/BIP focused primarily on last mile projects. BTOP reoriented its infrastructure program towards Comprehensive Community Infrastructure (CCI) grants, which support middle mile projects serving anchor institutions such as community colleges, libraries, hospitals, universities, and public safety institutions. BIP eliminated the "Remote Last Mile" project category, and offered a standard grant/loan combination (75% grant/25% loan) for all last mile and middle mile projects (unless waivers were sought). The first round requirement that eligible infrastructure projects must cover "unserved" or "underserved" areas was eliminated. In the second round, BIP projects were required to cover an area that is at least 75% rural and that does not have High Speed Access broadband service at the rate of 5 Mbps (upstream and downstream combined) in at least 50% of its area. Eligible BTOP projects required only an applicant that is an eligible entity, a fully completed application, and a nonfederal match of 20% or more. However, during the application evaluation, factors such as unserved and underserved areas, remoteness, and delivered speed were considered. BIP added three new grant programs: Satellite Projects, Rural Library Broadband, and Technical Assistance. RUS published a separate Request for Proposals for each of these programs. On April 7, 2010, NTIA announced it had received 867 applications for second round funding, totaling $11 billion in requested federal funding. The applications broke down as follows: 355 applications requesting a total of $8.4 billion for Comprehensive Community Infrastructure, 251 applications requesting $1.7 billion for Sustainable Broadband Adoption, and 261 applications requesting $0.922 billion for Public Computer Centers. On April 16, 2010, RUS announced it had received a total of 776 applications requesting nearly $11.2 billion in federal funds. Of that total, RUS received 30 middle mile applications requesting a total of $845.88 million. Combined, NTIA and RUS received 1643 applications in the second round, requesting a total of $22.2 billion in federal funds. This is 26% less than the number of applications received by both agencies in the first round, and 21% less than the amount of federal funding requested in the first round. Additionally, on August 30, 2010, RUS announced it received 27 applications for Satellite Projects, 51 applications for Technical Assistance, and 2 applications for Rural Library Broadband. As of October 1, 2010, all BTOP and BIP award announcements were complete. In total, NTIA and RUS announced awards for 553 projects, constituting $7.5 billion in federal funding. This included 233 BTOP projects (totaling $3.9 billion) and 320 BIP projects (totaling $3.6 billion). Of the $7.5 billion total announced, $6.2 billion was grant funding, and $1.3 billion was loan funding. The following is a breakdown of awards data by project category and program, broadband technology deployed, and state-by-state distribution of funding. Awards data are derived from NTIA and RUS press releases, BTOP project information, the BIP Round Two Application Directory, BIP awards reporting publications, and the Broadband USA applications database. Table 2 and Table 3 provide breakdowns of awards data by project category and program. Of all broadband infrastructure funding, about half (51%) was awarded to middle mile projects (includes Comprehensive Community Initiative and public safety grants), and 49% was awarded to last mile projects (includes satellite grants). Middle mile projects are predominantly (but not exclusively) BTOP, while last mile projects are predominantly BIP. Given that only BIP offered loan funding, it is not surprising that the vast majority of loan funding (93%) was awarded to last mile projects. Deployment of broadband infrastructure can encompass a number of different types of technologies, including fiber, wireless, cable modem, DSL, satellite, and others. Table 4 shows that of all infrastructure projects funded, 56% are fiber projects. Additionally, given that most of the projects involving multiple technologies involve a deployment of both fiber and wireless technologies, it would be accurate to state that projects involving fiber account for about two-thirds of all infrastructure projects. Of last mile project technologies, 47% are fiber, 23% are DSL, 17% are wireless, 6% are multiple, 3% are cable modem, 1% are satellite, and the rest were unable to be determined from the public information that was released. Table A-1 in the Appendix shows a state-by-state breakdown of BTOP and BIP funding, while Table A-2 shows per capita funding by state. Funding is associated with a state based on the service area covered by the project. For BTOP grants, amounts shown may include the NTIA-estimated per-State share of any awards that impact multiple states. Table A-3 lists both NTIA and RUS multistate awards. With the broadband awards process concluded, NTIA and RUS move towards monitoring and overseeing the progression of the funded projects. Projects must be substantially completed within two years and fully completed within three years. In its FY2011 budget proposal, the Administration requested $23.7 million for NTIA to continue operating its grant management office. The Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extension Act, 2011 ( P.L. 111-322 ), which funds the federal government through March 4, 2011, includes a $20 million addition to the Salaries and Expenses account which can be used for BTOP oversight. Meanwhile, NTIA has awarded a $5 million, four-year contract to Potomac, MD-based ASR Analytics to measure the impact of BTOP grants on broadband availability, adoption, and on economic and social conditions in areas served by grantees. Funding for the award was obtained through the Department of Interior's National Business Center. The 112 th Congress is likely to provide oversight on NTIA and RUS efforts to monitor the funded projects. In the longer term, the FCC's National Broadband Plan has recommended an expansion of federal funding for broadband deployment in unserved areas. To the extent that Congress may consider whether broadband grant and loan programs should be continued, modified, reduced, expanded, or eliminated, the funding patterns and trends that emerged during rounds one and two, as well as the ultimate successes and failures of funded BTOP and BIP projects, could provide insights into whether and how such programs might be addressed, and how these or similar programs might be fashioned within the context of a national broadband policy.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided $7.2 billion primarily for broadband grant and loan programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The NTIA grant program is called the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program (BTOP). The RUS broadband grant and loan program is called the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP). As of October 1, 2010, all BTOP and BIP award announcements were complete. In total, NTIA and RUS announced awards for 553 projects, constituting $7.5 billion in federal funding. This included 233 BTOP projects (totaling $3.9 billion) and 320 BIP projects (totaling $3.6 billion). Of the $7.5 billion total announced, $6.2 billion was grant funding, and $1.3 billion was loan funding. This report focuses on the distribution of ARRA broadband funding with respect to project category, broadband infrastructure technology deployed, and state-by-state distribution. Of all broadband infrastructure funding, about half was awarded to middle mile projects and half was awarded to last mile projects. Deployment of broadband infrastructure can encompass a number of different types of technologies, including fiber, wireless, cable modem, DSL, satellite, and others. Projects involving fiber accounted for about two-thirds of all infrastructure projects. The 112th Congress is likely to provide oversight on NTIA and RUS efforts to monitor the funded projects. In the longer term, the FCC's National Broadband Plan has recommended an expansion of federal funding for broadband deployment in unserved areas. To the extent that Congress may consider whether broadband grant and loan programs should be continued, modified, reduced, expanded, or eliminated, the funding patterns and trends that emerged during rounds one and two, as well as the ultimate successes and failures of funded BTOP and BIP projects, could provide insights into whether and how such programs might be addressed, and how these or similar programs might be fashioned within the context of a national broadband policy.

The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a small, intra-theater airlifter being procured by the Army and Air Force. Small airlifters have filled niche roles for the Department of Defense (DOD) over the past several decades, flying missions to deliver time-sensitive cargo, transport important personnel, evacuate casualties, and resupply austere operating locations. During the Vietnam War, the Air Force flew C-123 Providers while the Army used C-7 Caribous for intra-theater airlift. A source of inter-service tension, C-7 ownership transferred to the Air Force in 1966, but the Air Force continued to fly them attached to Army units. With funding scarce after Vietnam, the Air Force retired both the C-7 and C-123 without replacement. In the 1980s, the Air Force bought 18 C-23 Sherpas to move supplies between European bases. After the Cold War, six Sherpas were transferred to the Army before 40 more were acquired and assigned mostly to Army National Guard units. In 1991, the Air Force purchased 10 C-27A Spartans for operations around Howard AFB, Panama, but these aircraft were retired in 1999 after the base closed. Today, some assert operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed Army transport helicopters, amplified weaknesses of the Sherpa fleet the Army inherited, and exposed a capability gap within DOD. Some also foresee a persistent need for small tactical airlifters for homeland defense and disaster relief. Table 1 summarizes characteristics for some tactical transport aircraft. In 2004, the DOD began to consider options to meet Army requirements for intra-theater airlift. The Army's Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) program gained DOD approval in March 2005 with plans for an initial purchase of 33 FCAs. FCA was intended to replace aging C-23s, C-26 Metroliners , and some C-12 Hurons ; reduce reliance on ground convoys in Iraq and Afghanistan; and decrease the heavy workload of the Army's CH-47 Chinook helicopters. A rift over FCA between the Army and Air Force began to surface in 2005. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper replied to a reporter's FCA question with, "you don't need to go out and buy yourself an Air Force—we've got one." In September 2005, the Air Force expressed interest in developing a small intra-theater airlifter of its own—the Light Cargo Aircraft (LCA). Air Force interest continued in 2006 with officials envisioning 100-150 LCAs. In December 2005, DOD noted the similarities between the FCA and LCA programs and merged them into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program with the Army designated as lead. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff signed an agreement to jointly develop command and control, sustainment, training, and acquisition strategies for the JCA. Industry teams competed four aircraft for the JCA contract: L-3 Communications, Alenia Aeronautica, and Boeing offered the C-27J. Raytheon and European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) Company's CASA North America proposed the C-295 and CN-235. Lockheed Martin competed the C-130J. In November 2006, after the C-130J was eliminated from competition for failing to meet required navigational capabilities, Lockheed Martin protested the decision. Likewise, when the C-27J won the JCA competition in June 2007, Raytheon contested DOD's evaluation of competing aircraft. The Government Accountability Office denied both protests, and subsequently L-3 Communications was awarded a $2.04 billion firm-fixed price contract to build up to 78 C-27Js (54 Army, 24 Air Force). The rift between the Army and Air Force mentioned above reflects differences in their overall approaches to the intra-theater airlift mission, as well as continued debate from many others, including Congress, over the roles and missions of each service. The following sections address these differences. Joint doctrine does allow each service component to maintain a small fleet of aircraft to meet service-specific needs. The Army states that it plans to use JCA for "direct support" of its ground operations by providing "on-demand transport of time-sensitive/mission-critical cargo and key personnel to forward deployed Army units operating in a Joint Operations Area." The Army primarily views JCA as on-call airlift directly tied to the tactical needs of ground commanders, sometimes referred to as transporting cargo the "last tactical mile." In 2005, the Army completed a proposal, validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), that acknowledged a need for more airlift of time-critical cargo. By April 2007, updates to this JROC approval reflected a joint requirement for up to 75 aircraft. Rand analysts suggested the optimal airlift fleet should be structured to meet "the most serious threats to vital national interest ... and consists of several types of aircraft" with a "variety of operational characteristics," and should avoid specialization that "jeopardizes the ability of the overall force to perform its most critical missions." The Air Force, which is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping to perform airlift, views the JCA mission, including delivery of time-sensitive/mission-critical Army cargo, as its role. The Air Force says it will use JCA to provide "general support" airlift for all users. Joint publications define this as "the airlift service provided on a common basis for all DOD agencies and, as authorized, for other agencies of the U.S. Government" and assigns mission responsibility to U.S. Transportation Command. Under this construct, the Air Force allocates available aircraft to all users in accordance with a Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) priorities; the stated goal is efficient use of every aircraft for multiple tasks. In 2007, Rand conducted an Intra-theater Airlift Force Mix Analysis (IAFMA) for the Air Force to determine the optimum composition of the Air Force's intra-theater airlift fleet. While most details were classified, the study determined that C-27s were an efficient complement to other intra-theater platforms, but were not as cost-effective as operating the same number of C-130Js. The Air Force has requested further study on possible mission activity where the C-27 may be more cost-effective, as well as comparisons to precision airdrop systems (see next section) and recapitalizing CH-47s and/or C-23s. In addition, tactical airlift requirements are part of the Mobility Capability/Requirements Study (MCRS), currently in progress and due for release in 2009. JCA critics state that DOD already has sufficient options for tactical airlift. Some suggest the Air Force could have a more versatile system by diverting funds planned for JCA into procuring larger tactical airlift models such as C-130s and C-17s, a view backed up by the IAFMA results. Others assert that the Army's helicopter modernization program may require a 50% larger budget between 2007-2030 compared with 1986-2005 and suggest the Army could better use JCA dollars by modernizing its helicopter fleet. Accordingly, the services are also pursuing a Joint Heavy Lift program that would replace current large-helicopter fleets and could perform this "last tactical mile" mission. A separate (but related) possibility for accomplishing this mission is a precision airdrop system. Several systems currently in use, or under development, combine cargo platforms, steerable parachutes, and GPS receivers that allow cargo airdrops from high (and relatively safe) altitudes, to deliver supplies and vehicles with pinpoint accuracy and with no runway needed. Some Members have questioned the merit of splitting tactical airlift between the Army and Air Force, while others have expressed strong support for this approach. Historically, the Army has argued for ownership of a small fleet of tactical airlifters. Field commanders often state they need the responsiveness that "direct support" airlift provides to counter unforeseen contingencies. Critics characterize this approach as inefficiently creating "two air forces." Others state that the JCA simply maintains the status quo in roles and missions. For example, it is argued that "direct support" Army transport helicopters, performing time-sensitive or mission-critical movement of passengers and cargo, create a battlefield synergy between efficiency and effectiveness in conducting the joint fight. Further, some point out that the Army is responsible for sustaining soldiers within its Joint Operating Areas and believe the Army should be able to procure and use the most efficient vehicles (truck, helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft) to perform this task. The crux of the roles and missions debate, however, is command and control of these aircraft. Advocates of placing all JCAs into the Air Force point out that presently a JFC can apportion tactical airlift into a "direct support" role whenever it is needed. The Air Force has an extensive command and control architecture already established for the air mobility mission in any theater. Centralized control of all air assets is the primary tenet of this construct. Army commanders, however, normally function in an environment of decentralized control that would allow them to instantly task their own assets, but may leave the aircraft idle when not needed. The Army proposes that its aircraft would be made available to the common-user airlift pool when not needed in a "direct support" role, but it is not clear that it is committed to obtaining the necessary command and control systems architecture mentioned above to ensure the aircraft are both visible and usable by a joint commander. Lastly, critics may question the Air Force's long-term commitment to the "direct support" role, pointing out the Air Force has retired its last four small tactical airlift aircraft without replacement. When asked about his preference in the JCA debate, General Norton Schwartz, then Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, questioned whether the Air Force was willing to support the Army in the manner the Army wants to be supported. For example, he asked, "is the Air Force willing to attach tactical airlifters to an Army brigade commander when required?" The President requested $264.2 million to procure seven C-27Js for the Army, $5.4 million for advanced procurement for the Air Force, $3 million for Army Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E), and $26.8 million for Air Force RDT&E. The 2009 Defense Authorization Act supported the Army portions of the request, but cut all of the advance procurement funds and $10 million of RDT&E funds from the Air Force request. House authorizers ( H.Rept. 110-652 ) pointed to the results of the aforementioned IAFMA as one cause for removing funds and questioned the lack of analysis done to justify Air Force procurement of JCA. Appropriators ( P.L. 110-329 ) also supported the Army funding while removing the Air Force advance procurement funds and $10 million in RDT&E money that was "unexecutable." The President requested $157 million for Army procurement and $42.3 million for Air Force RDT&E. House authorizers ( H.Rept. 110-146 ) supported the request but stipulated that DOD could not obligate funds until requirements analysis was complete. Senate authorizers ( S.Rept. 110-77 ) also supported the funding request, but transferred funds from the Army into the Air Force's procurement account and questioned the Army's need for an organic fixed-wing airlift fleet, stating If there were a pattern of the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) providing support that did not match the priorities of the joint forces land component commander (JFLCC), that would certainly argue for intervention of the joint forces commander to correct the situation. It would not be a persuasive argument that the JFLCC should have his own air force. The 2008 Defense Authorization Act restored Army procurement funds, but directed DOD to conduct a roles and missions review ( P.L. 110-181 ). Appropriators supported the President's request for procurement but cut $21.3 million from RDT&E as an "unjustified request" ( P.L. 110-116 ). The President requested $109.2 million for Army procurement and $15.8 million for Air Force procurement. Authorizers supported the request but transferred procurement funding to the Air Force's account ( P.L. 109-364 ). Appropriators cut funding for Army JCA to $72.2 million and transferred Air Force procurement dollars into the Air Force's RDT&E account ( P.L. 109-289 ). Echoing comments from the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill, Senate appropriators ( S.Rept. 109-292 ) expressed a desire for additional analyses of intra-theater airlift requirements. The President requested $4.9 million for JCA lead procurement, and both authorizers ( P.L. 109-148 ) and appropriators ( P.L. 109-163 ) fully supported the request.

Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a joint acquisition program between the Army and Air Force intended to procure a commercial off-the-shelf aircraft capable of meeting Army and Air Force requirements for intra-theater airlift. The C-27J Spartan, built by L-3 Communications, was awarded the JCA contract in 2007. This is an update of a report by [author name scrubbed] and will be updated as conditions warrant.

Fidel Castro ceded provisional control of the government and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) to his brother Raúl on July 31, 2006, because of poor health. While initially many observers forecast Raúl's assumption of power as temporary, it soon became clear that a permanent succession of political power had occurred. Fidel's health improved in 2007, but his condition remained weak, and most observers believed that he would not resume his role as head of the Cuban government. That proved true when on February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not accept the position of President of the Council of State when Cuba's legislature, the National Assembly of People's Power, was scheduled to meet on February 24, 2008, to select from among its ranks the members of the 31-member Council. Many observers expected Raúl to be selected by the legislature to be the next President, a role that he held provisionally for the previous 19 months. Even before Fidel provisionally stepped down from power in July 2006, a communist successor government under Raúl was viewed as the most likely political scenario. As First Vice President of the Council of State, Raúl had been the officially designated successor pursuant to Article 94 of the Cuban Constitution, and in the past, Fidel publicly endorsed Raúl as his successor as head of the PCC. Moreover, Raúl's position as head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), which essentially controls Cuba's security apparatus, made him the most likely candidate to succeed Fidel. So while it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother officially on February 24, 2008, what was surprising was the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council of State's First Vice President. A physician by training, Machado is 77 years old, and is part of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution. He has been described as a hard-line communist party ideologue, and reportedly has been a close friend and confident of Raúl's for many years. Machado's position is significant because it makes him the official successor to Raúl, according to the Cuban Constitution. Many observers had expected that Carlos Lage, one of five other Vice Presidents on the Council of State, would have been chosen as First Vice President. He was responsible for Cuba's economic reforms in the 1990s, and at 56 years of age, represents a younger generation of Cuban leaders. While not rising to First Vice President, Lage nevertheless retained his position as a Vice President on the Council of State, and also will continue to serve as the Council's Secretary. Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of the Council, increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio Casas Regueiro, 72 years of age, who already was on the Council, became one of its five vice presidents. Most significantly, Casas, who had been first vice minister in the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country's new Minister of the FAR, officially replacing Raúl in that position. Casas also is chairman of GAESA (Grupo de Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military's holding company for its extensive businesses. Two other military appointments to the Council were Gen. Alvaro López Miera, the army's chief of staff, and Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frías, who commanded the Western army, one of Cuba's three military regions. What is notable about Cuba's political succession from Fidel to Raúl is that it has been characterized by political stability. There has been no apparent evidence of rivalry or schisms within the ruling elite that have posed a threat to Raúl's new position. In the aftermath of Fidel initially stepping down in 2006, Raúl mobilized thousands of reservists and military troops to quell a potential U.S. invasion. He also reportedly dispatched undercover security to likely trouble spots in the capital to deal with any unrest, but the streets remained calm with a sense of normalcy in day-to-day Cuba. As Raúl stepped into his new role as head of government, a number of observers predicted that he would be more open to economic reform than Fidel, pointing to his past support for opening up farmers' markets in Cuba and the role of the Cuban military in successfully operating economic enterprises. Many have speculated that Cuba under Raúl might follow a Chinese or Vietnamese economic model. To date, however, there have not been any significant economic changes to indicate that Cuba is moving in the direction of a Chinese model. Nevertheless, with several minor economic policy changes undertaken by Raúl, there are some signs that more substantial economic changes could be coming. Under Raúl, the Cuban government has paid off its debts to small farmers and raised prices that the state pays producers for milk and meat; customs regulations have been relaxed to allow the importation of home appliances, DVD players, VCRs, game consoles, auto parts, and televisions; and private taxis have been allowed to operate without police interference. In a speech on Cuba's July 26, 2007 revolutionary anniversary, Raúl acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to satisfy basic needs, and maintained that structural and conceptual changes were necessary in order to increase efficiency and production. He also called for increased foreign investment. For some, Raúl's call for structural changes was significant, and could foreshadow future economic reforms such as allowing more private enterprise and a shift away from state ownership in some sectors. In his first speech as President in February 2008, Raúl promised to make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential reevaluation of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity. Cuban public expectations for economic reform have increased. In the aftermath of Raúl's July 2007 speech, thousands of officially-sanctioned meetings were held in workplaces and local Communist Party branches around the country where Cubans were encouraged to air their views and discuss the future direction of the country. Complaints focused on low salaries and housing and transportation problems, and some participants advocated legalization of more private businesses. Raised expectations for economic change in Cuba could increase the chance that government actually will adopt some policy changes. Doing nothing would run the risk of increased public frustration and a potential for social unrest. Increased public frustration was evident in a clandestine video, widely circulated on the Internet in early February, of a meeting between Ricardo Alarcón, the head of Cuba's legislature, and university students in which a student was questioning why Cuban wages are so low and why Cubans are prohibited from visiting tourist hotels or traveling abroad. The video demonstrates the disillusionment of many Cuban youth with the dismal economic situation and repressive environment. Several factors, however, could restrain the magnitude of economic policy change in Cuba. A number of observers believe that as long as Fidel Castro is around, it will be difficult for the government to move forward with any major initiatives that are viewed as deviating from Fidel's orthodox policies. Other observers point to the significant oil subsidies and investment that Cuba now receives from Venezuela that have helped spur Cuba's high economic growth levels over the past several years, and maintain that such support lessens the government's impetus for economic reforms. Another factor that bodes against rapid economic policy reform is the fear that it could spur the momentum for political change. Given that one of the highest priorities for Cuba's government has been maintaining social and political stability, any economic policy changes are likely to be smaller changes introduced over time that do not threaten the state's control. While some degree of economic change under Raúl Castro is likely over the next year, few expect there will be any change to the government's tight control over the political system, which is backed up by a strong security apparatus. Some observers point to the reduced number of political prisoners, from 283 at the end of 2006 to 230 as of mid-February 2008, as evidence of a lessening of repression, but dissidents maintain that the overall situation has not improved. For example, the government arbitrarily detained more than 300 people for short periods in 2007. Of the 75 activists imprisoned in March 2003, 55 remain jailed; four were released on February 16, 2008, but sent into forced exile to Spain. Some observers contend that as the new government of Raúl Castro becomes more confident of ensuring social stability and does not feel threatened, it could move to soften its hard repression, but for now the government is continuing its harsh treatment of the opposition. The selection of José Ramón Machado as First Vice President also appears to be a clear indication that the Cuban government has no intention of easing tight control over the political system. Cuba's peaceful political succession from one communist leader to another raises questions about the future direction of U.S. policy. Current U.S. policy can be described as a dual-track policy of isolating Cuba through comprehensive economic sanctions, including restrictions on trade and financial transactions, while providing support to the Cuban people through such measures as funding for democracy and human rights projects and U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-114 ) sets forth a number of conditions for the suspension of the embargo, including that a transition Cuban government: does not include Fidel or Raúl Castro; has legalized all political activity; has released all political prisoners; and is making progress in establishing an independent judiciary and in respecting internationally recognized human rights. The actual termination of the embargo would require additional conditions, including that an elected civilian government is in power. The dilemma for U.S. policy is that the legislative conditions could keep the United States from having any leverage or influence as events unfold in a post-Fidel Cuba and as Cuba moves toward a post-Raúl Cuba. The Bush Administration has made substantial efforts to prepare for a political transition in Cuba. In 2004 and 2006, the Administration's Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba prepared two reports detailing how the United States could provide support to a Cuban transition government to help it respond to humanitarian needs, conduct free and fair elections, and move toward a market-based economy. A criticism of the reports, however, has been that they presuppose that Cuba will undergo a rapid democratic transition, and do not entertain the possibility of reform or economic change under a communist government. On the basis of these reports, critics maintain that the United States may be unprepared to deal with alternative scenarios of Cuba's political transition. Over the past several years Congress has often debated policy toward Cuba, with one or both houses at times approving legislative provisions that would ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. President Bush has regularly threatened to veto various appropriations bills if they contained provisions weakening the embargo, and ultimately these provisions have been stripped out of final enacted measures. In 2007, the lack of any significant policy changes in Cuba under Raúl appeared to diminish the impetus in Congress for any major change in policy toward Cuba, although Raúl's official installation as President could alter that. Since assuming power, Raúl Castro has made several public offers to engage in dialogue with the United States that have been rebuffed by U.S. officials who maintain that change in Cuba must precede a change in U.S. policy. In an August 2006 interview, Raúl asserted that Cuba has "always been disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane," but at the same time he expressed strong opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he described as "arrogant and interventionist." In response, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002, that the Administration was willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba were to begin a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush Administration remains prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo if Cuba is prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the creation of independent organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward free and fair elections. Raúl Castro reiterated an offer to negotiate with the United States in a December 2006 speech. He said that "we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the longstanding dispute between the United States and Cuba, of course, provided they accept, as we have previously said, our condition as a country that will not tolerate any blemishes on its independence, and as long as said resolution is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect." More recently, in his July 26, 2007 speech, Raúl reiterated for the third time an offer to engage in dialogue with the United States, and strongly criticized U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba. This time, Raúl pointed to the future of relations with the next U.S. Administration, and stated that "the new administration will have to decide whether it will keep the absurd, illegal, and failed policies against Cuba, or accept the olive branch that we extended." He asserted that "if the new U.S. authorities put aside arrogance and decide to talk in a civilized manner, they will be welcome. If not, we are willing to deal with their hostile policies, even for another 50 years if necessary." A U.S. State Department spokesman responded that "the only real dialogue that's needed is with the Cuban people." In the aftermath of Fidel's announcement that he would step down as head of government, U.S. officials maintained there would be no change in U.S. policy. In the context of Raúl Castro's succession, there are two broad policy approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a stay the course or status-quo approach that would maintain the policy of isolating the Cuban government with economic sanctions; and an approach aimed at influencing Cuban government and society through an easing of sanctions and increased contact and engagement. Advocates of continued sanctions argue that the Cuban government under Raúl Castro has not demonstrated any willingness to ease repression or initiate any political or economic openings. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez asserts that "the succession from Fidel to Raúl is a preservation of dictatorship" and that "the regime needs to have a dialogue with the Cuban people before it has one with the United States." Other supporters of current policy maintain that easing economic sanctions would prolong the communist regime by increasing money flowing into its state-controlled enterprises, while continued sanctions would keep up the pressure to enact deeper economic reforms. Those advocating an easing of sanctions argue that the United States needs to take advantage of Cuba's political succession to abandon its long-standing sanctions-based policy that they maintain has had no practical effect in changing the policies of the Cuban government. They argue that continuing the status quo would only serve to guarantee many more years of hostility between Cuba and the United States, and reduce the chances for positive change in Cuba by slowing the pace of liberalization and reform. Others argue that the United States should work toward engaging and negotiating with Cuba in order to bring incremental change because even the smallest reforms can help spur popular expectations for additional change.

Cuba's political succession from Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl has been characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. On February 24, 2008, Cuba's legislature selected Raúl as President of the 31-member Council of State, a position that officially made him Cuba's head of government and state. Most observers expected this since Raúl already had been heading the Cuban government on a provisional basis since July 2006 when Fidel stepped down as President because of poor health. On February 19, 2008, Fidel had announced that he would not accept the position of President of the Council of State. Cuba's stable political succession from one communist leader to another raises questions about the future direction of U.S. policy, which currently can be described as a sanctions-based policy that ties the easing of sanctions to democratic change in Cuba. For developments in U.S. policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report RL33819, Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress; and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. For background and analysis in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's stepping down from power in July 2006, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba's Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches.

The 110 th Congress will consider several measures that bear directly on funding for the programs and activities of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The 109 th Congress adjourned without completing action on the FY2007 agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5384 ), which funds most of USDA for the current year. The 110 th Congress is expected to combine all unfinished appropriations bills into either an omnibus spending bill or a year-long continuing resolution that likely would hold spending at close to FY2006 levels for most discretionary programs. These funding decisions for FY2007 might intersect with congressional consideration of the FY2008 budget and appropriations, which begins shortly after the release of the Administration's budget request in early February 2007. Of interest to agriculture is the FY2008 budget resolution, whereby Congress will establish a blueprint for all federal spending over a multi-year period, which could set the fiscal parameters of the next omnibus farm bill, to be debated in 2007. (See CRS Report RL33412, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2007 Appropriations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33037, Previewing a 2007 Farm Bill , by [author name scrubbed] et al.) The 109 th Congress debated extensively whether a multi-billion dollar emergency disaster assistance package should be enacted to compensate farmers for 2005 and 2006 production losses caused by natural disasters. In the final week of the 109 th Congress, an amendment ( S.Amdt. 5205 ) that would have provided an estimated $3.8 billion in supplemental disaster aid was defeated during debate on the FY2007 agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5384 ). The amendment was supported by numerous farm groups primarily in response to a severe drought in the Plains states. Opposing the amendment were the Administration and fiscal conservatives in Congress, who insisted that any assistance needed to be offset with other spending reductions. In the 110 th Congress, supporters have introduced a package of assistance ( S. 284 ) that is similar to S.Amdt. 5205 . A series of severe winter storms in late 2006 and early 2007 could broaden the scope of proposed assistance to include 2007 production losses. (See CRS Report RS21212, Agricultural Disaster Assistance , by [author name scrubbed].) Since most provisions of the current omnibus farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 , the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002) expire in 2007, the 110 th Congress will be making decisions about the content of a new farm bill. Commodity price and income support policy—namely, the methods, levels, and distribution of federal support to producers of farm commodities—is traditionally the most contentious component of a farm bill. However, other food and agricultural issues, notably those surrounding conservation, rural development, trade, domestic food assistance, and biofuels, also will be debated. A key question for the 110 th Congress will be whether to extend farm support programs as currently designed, or to adopt different approaches given the pressures of tight federal spending constraints, concerns about the distribution of farm program benefits, and the threat of potential World Trade Organization (WTO) challenges to farm price and income support spending. (See CRS Report RL33037, Previewing a 2007 Farm Bill , by [author name scrubbed] et al.) The 110 th Congress will continue to monitor the Administration's participation in the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which has focused on agricultural trade liberalization. Negotiations were indefinitely suspended in July 2006 when a compromise agreement on reducing subsidies or expanding market access for agricultural products could not be reached. While a new multilateral trade agreement may not be in place before Congress takes up the 2007 farm bill, a new farm bill will nevertheless have to contend with existing WTO commitments in agriculture and possible challenges to U.S. subsidies in WTO dispute settlements. (See CRS Report RL33144, WTO Doha Round: The Agricultural Negotiations , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) Meanwhile, the 110 th Congress will consider bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded with Colombia, Peru, and Panama, which are expected to boost U.S. agricultural exports. Separate bilateral agreements with other countries, including Malaysia and South Korea, are also being negotiated. Congress also might consider the extension of Trade Promotion Authority, which provides for expedited consideration of trade agreements and expires June 30, 2007. Other ongoing trade issues of interest to Congress include barriers to agricultural trade (see CRS Report RL32809, Agricultural Biotechnology: Background and Recent Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33472, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Concerns in Agricultural Trade , by [author name scrubbed]); the scope of restrictions that should apply to agricultural sales to Cuba (see CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation , by [author name scrubbed]); and funding for U.S. agricultural export and food aid programs (see CRS Report RL33553, Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programs , by [author name scrubbed]). In March 2005, a WTO appellate panel ruled against the United States in a dispute settlement case brought by Brazil, stating that elements of the U.S. cotton program are not consistent with U.S. trade commitments. In response, Congress authorized the elimination of the Step-2 cotton program, effective August 1, 2006. Following the indefinite suspension of the WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in July 2006, Brazil has pressed for further reductions in U.S. cotton support in response to the panel ruling. Consequently, additional permanent modifications to U.S. farm programs may still be needed to fully comply with the "actionable subsidies" portion of the WTO ruling. Some policymakers are concerned that a successful challenge of the cotton program in the WTO could have implications for the other farm commodity support programs. For example, on January 8, 2007, Canada requested consultations with the United States on U.S. domestic corn subsidies, as the first step in pursuing a WTO challenge. Any changes to farm commodity programs ultimately will be decided by Congress, most likely in the context of the 2007 farm bill. (See CRS Report RS22187, Brazil ' s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program: A Brief Overview , by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RL33853, Canada ' s WTO Case Against U.S. Agricultural Support , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS22522, Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO: A Brief Overview , by [author name scrubbed].) Although not as energy-intensive as some industries, agriculture is a major consumer of energy—directly, as fuel or electricity, and indirectly, as fertilizers and chemicals. By raising the overall price structure of production agriculture, sustained high energy prices could result in significantly lower farm and rural incomes, and are generating considerable concern about longer-term impacts on farm profitability. Agriculture also is viewed as a potentially important producer of renewable fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel, although farm-based energy production remains small relative to total U.S. energy needs. Current law requires that biofuels use grow from 4 billion gallons in 2006 to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. This standard, along with tax credit incentives, is expected to encourage significant increases in U.S. ethanol production. Although the increased use of corn for energy improves the prices and income of corn growers, some policymakers are concerned that higher prices for corn will add to livestock grower feed costs. (See CRS Report RL32712, Agriculture-Based Renewable Energy Production , by [author name scrubbed].) Spending for conservation programs, which help producers protect and improve natural resources on some farmed land and retire other land from production, has grown rapidly since the 2002 farm bill. This growth in spending reflects the expanded reach of conservation programs, which now involve many more landowners and types of rural lands. One topic that continues to attract congressional interest is implementation of the Conservation Security Program, enacted in 2002. Some stakeholders have questioned why USDA has implemented the program in only a few watersheds, and why Congress has limited funding even though the program was enacted as a true entitlement. The environmental, conservation, and agriculture communities have started to identify conservation policy options that might be considered in the next farm bill. (See CRS Report RL33556, Soil and Water Conservation: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is recognized as a national security threat. "Food defense"—protecting the food supply against possible attack—has received increased attention since 2001. Through increased appropriations, laboratory and response capacities are being upgraded. National response plans now incorporate agroterrorism. Yet some in Congress want additional laws or oversight to increase the level of food defense, particularly regarding interagency coordination, response and recovery leadership, and ensuring adequate border inspections. (See CRS Report RL32521, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness , by [author name scrubbed] . ) Approximately 76 million people get sick and 5,000 die from food-related illnesses in the United States each year, it is estimated. Congress frequently conducts oversight and periodically considers legislation on food safety and could do so again. Some Members continue to be interested in such issues as whether appropriate resources and safeguards are in place to limit microbiological contamination of fresh meat, poultry, and produce; the need, if any, for stronger enforcement or recall authority; the regulation of bioengineered foods; human antimicrobial resistance (which some link partly to misuse of antibiotics in animal feed); and interest among some in reorganizing food safety authorities and responsibilities, possibly under a single agency. (See CRS Report RL32922, Meat and Poultry Inspection: Background and Selected Issues , by [author name scrubbed].) Since 2003, highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) has spread from Asia into Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; however, no cases of H5N1 have been found yet in the United States. Because avian flu is highly contagious in domestic poultry and can be carried by wild birds, USDA advocates stringent on-farm biosecurity. Controlling avian flu in poultry is seen as the best way to prevent a human pandemic from developing. Congress has responded to the threat by providing emergency and regular appropriations for surveillance, both domestically and internationally, and holding hearings covering the animal disease and food safety. Further funding will be necessary for surveillance, vaccine stockpiles, and first responder equipment. (See CRS Report RL33795, Avian Influenza in Poultry and Wild Birds , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].) Many believe that U.S. agricultural producers and food processors should improve their ability to identify and trace their products (including animals) through the food chain, whether to facilitate the removal of contaminated products, quickly contain animal disease outbreaks, enable consumers to verify labeling claims, and/or for country of origin labeling (COOL). One issue is whether a more universal animal identification system should be mandated and who should pay. Another is mandatory COOL for fresh red meats, produce, and peanuts, which Congress required in the 2002 farm bill but has since delayed, until September 30, 2008. ( H.R. 357 would require mandatory COOL implementation on September 30, 2007.) While some want COOL to be implemented, others would prefer voluntary labeling. (See CRS Report RS22526, Animal Agriculture: Selected Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].) The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an independent federal agency that regulates the futures trading industry. The CFTC is subject to periodic reauthorization; current authority expired on September 30, 2005. Congress traditionally uses the reauthorization process to consider amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which provides the basis for federal regulation of commodity futures trading. Among the issues in the debate are (1) regulation of energy derivatives markets, where some see excessive price volatility and a lack of effective regulation; (2) the market in security futures, or futures contracts based on single stocks, where cumbersome and duplicative regulation is blamed for low trading volumes; (3) the regulatory status of foreign futures exchanges selling contracts in the United States; and (4) the legality of futures-like contracts based on foreign currency prices offered to retail investors. (See CRS Report RS22028, CFTC Reauthorization , by [author name scrubbed] . ) Hired farmworkers are an important component of agricultural production. Some of these laborers are under guest worker programs, which are meant to assure employers (e.g., fruit, vegetable, and horticulture growers) of an adequate supply of labor when and where it is needed while not adding permanent residents to the U.S. population. The connection between farm labor and immigration policies is a longstanding one, particularly with regard to U.S. employers' use of workers from Mexico. The 109 th Congress considered the issue without resolution as part of a larger debate over initiation of a broad-based guest worker program, increased border enforcement, and employer sanctions to curb the flow of unauthorized workers into the United States. (See CRS Report 95-712, The Effects on U.S. Farm Workers of an Agricultural Guest Worker Program , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL30395, Farm Labor Shortages and Immigration Policy , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32044, Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest Worker Programs , by [author name scrubbed].)

A number of issues of interest to U.S. agriculture are expected to be addressed by the 110th Congress. At the top of the agenda, Congress will be considering the unfinished business of FY2007 funding levels for U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs and activities in the annual agriculture appropriations bill. Separately, attempts might be made to reconsider a multi-billion dollar emergency farm disaster assistance package that was debated but not passed in the 109th Congress. Since most provisions of the current omnibus farm bill expire in 2007, the 110th Congress will be making decisions about the content of a new farm bill. Commodity price and income support policy is usually the focus of a farm bill, but other agricultural issues, such as conservation, rural development, trade, and biofuels also will be debated. Other agricultural issues likely to be either considered or monitored by the 110th Congress include multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations; concerns about agroterrorism, food safety, and animal and plant diseases; federal energy policy; agricultural marketing matters; the reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and farm labor issues. This report will be updated as significant developments ensue.

The 8 th Amendment, applicable to the federal government and to the states through the 14 th Amendment, bars the use of "excessive sanctions" in the criminal justice system. It states specifically that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Underlying this provision is the fundamental "precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that only "the worst of the worst" may be executed for their crimes. However, the Court has provided minimal guidance for the "worst of the worst" category of offenders and/or offenses. The Court has held that the death penalty is a disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional, punishment for some non-homicide crimes. In more recent cases, the Court reinforced and refined its proportionality analysis utilizing an "evolving standards of decency" standard. Using this standard, the Court found that the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders and the mentally retarded is unconstitutional. In Coker v. Georgia , the Court held that the state may not impose a death sentence upon a rapist who does not take a human life. The Court announced that the standard under the 8 th Amendment was that punishments are barred when they are "excessive" in relation to the crime committed. A "punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it: (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." According to the Court, to ensure that applying these standards not be or appear to be the subjective conclusion of individual Justices, attention must be given to objective factors, predominantly "to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence—history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions...." While the Court thought that the death penalty for rape passed the first test, it felt it failed the second. Georgia was the sole state providing for death for the rape of an adult woman, and juries in at least nine out of 10 cases refused to impose death for rape. Aside from this view of public perception, the Court independently concluded that death is an excessive penalty for an offender who rapes but does not kill, stating that rape cannot compare with murder "in terms of moral depravity and of injury to the person and the public." Although the Court in Coker did not explicitly hold the death penalty unconstitutional for all crimes not involving homicide, many have read the decision as such, since the Court based its holding largely on the distinction between crimes that cause death and crimes that do not. The Court reasoned that because the crime of rape does not result in death, punishing rape by death would be unconstitutionally excessive. The Court utilized the same type of proportionality analysis in Enmund v. Florida by applying its reasoning from Coker to hold that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the crime of felony/murder, imposed on the getaway driver in a robbery gone wrong, because robbery, like rape, "does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life." The Court stated that "[a]s was said of the crime of rape in Coker , we have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is 'unique in its severity and irrevocability,' is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such, does not take human life." Thus, the Court seemed to say that for a crime to be proportional to the punishment of death, the crime committed must cause death. Since Coker and Enmund , the Court has refined its proportionality analysis, first articulated in Weems v. United States , to determine which punishments are unconstitutionally excessive. In Weems , the Court explained that the cruel and unusual punishment clause is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." As such, in determining what is constitutional under the 8 th Amendment, the Court generally looks to "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The "evolving standards of decency" principle appears to be a flexible rule of construction intended to evolve with societal norms as they develop so that the Court may reflect these norms in its constitutionality review. This principle now appears to be the primary framework within which the Court reviews constitutional claims challenging the application of the death penalty. The Court employed this framework in both Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons , cases that narrowed the category of offenders eligible for capital punishment to exclude the mentally retarded and juvenile offenders. The Court's methodology in deciding these cases had a different focus from its prior jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of capital statutes. In both Roper and Atkins , the Court examined objective indicia of national consensus to determine whether the "evolving standards of decency" demonstrated that the death penalty was unconstitutional under the circumstances. In Atkins and Roper , the Court employed a three-part analysis to determine whether, under "evolving standards of decency," imposing the death penalty would have been so disproportionate as to be "cruel and unusual" under the 8 th Amendment. In both cases, the Court first looked for a national consensus as evidenced by the acts of the state legislatures. The Court then assessed the proportionality of the punishment to the relevant crimes, considering whether the death penalty was being limited, as required, to the most serious classes of crimes and offenders, and whether its application would serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. Lastly, the Court looked to international opinion to inform its analysis. On May 22, 2007, in Louisiana v. Kennedy , the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Coke r prohibiting the death penalty does not apply when the victim is a child under the age of 12. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the aggravated rape of his 8-year-old stepdaughter. The Louisiana court explained that capital sentences for rape of a child were justifiable under the 8 th Amendment. In reaching its conclusion, the court followed the 8 th Amendment framework set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons , first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the Court would find the punishment excessive. The Louisiana court determined that because five states had adopted similar laws in the past decade, the national trend was toward capital punishment for child rape. Moreover, the court held that because children are uniquely vulnerable, permitting the death penalty for child rape is not unduly harsh, and is proportionate to the crime. On January 4, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it would examine the constitutionality of permitting the execution of a child molester who did not kill his victim. In Kennedy v. Louisiana , a divided Court held, by a vote of 5 to 4, that capital punishment for a defendant convicted of a non-homicide child rape is unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that such a punishment would be excessive, violating the 8 th Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Following the standard set forth in Atkins and Roper , the Court rested its decision on several rationales. First, there is a national consensus against the imposition of the death penalty for child rape. Second, evolving standards of decency require that the categories of capital offenses not be expanded, but rather be reserved for the most heinous crimes. Lastly, imposition of capital punishment for the non-homicide crime of child rape does not fulfill the death penalty's social purposes of retribution and deterrence. In determining objective indicia of national consensus regarding capital punishment for non-homicide child rape, the Court looked at legislative enactments and state practices with respect to executions. The Court noted that while six states have made child rape a capital offense, 44 states and the federal government had not. According to the Court, the relatively small number of states which make child rape a capital offense is analogous to the activity in Enmund , where the Court found a national consensus against the death penalty for felony/murder despite eight jurisdictions allowing capital punishment. In addition, the Court noted that Louisiana was the only state since 1964 to sentence a defendant to death for child rape. The Court rejected Louisiana's contention that the Coker decision itself deterred states from adopting capital child rape statutes and thereby influenced the Court's view of a developing national consensus. The Court explained that several state courts recognized that Coker ' s holding was limited to the crime of rape against an adult woman and did not expressly prohibit imposition of capital punishment for child rape. Moreover, the Court noted that the state failed to cite any reliable data to support its assertion. The Court also concluded that the absence of executions for rape or any other non-homicide crime since 1964 demonstrated that there is a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape. As such, the Court determined that, viewed in its totality, the limited number of states authorizing the death penalty for child rape, as well as the absence of executions for rape or any other non-homicide crime since 1964, demonstrates a national consensus against capital punishment for child rape. After looking at objective evidence of a national consensus, the Court moved to a subjective analysis. While the Court acknowledged that rape is a heinous crime causing traumatic and long-lasting anguish which is exacerbated when the victim is a child, it "does not follow though, that capital punishment is a proportionate penalty for the crime." The Court reasoned that the evolving standards of decency require restraint in the application of capital punishment. As such, capital punishment should be reserved for a narrow category of crimes and/or offenses. The Court acknowledged the reprehensibility of the crime of rape. However, the Court reasoned that child rape cannot be compared to murder in terms of "severity and irrevocability." The majority found that imposition of the death penalty for non-homicide child rape would be counterproductive to the goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. As for retribution, the Court questioned whether the death penalty for non-homicide crimes balances the wrong done to the victim. The Court concluded that there was no evidence that a child rape victim's hurt would be diminished when the law allows capital punishment for the perpetrator. Instead, it reasoned that it is likely there would be additional harm as minors would be forced to endure the stressors of reliving the traumatic events repeatedly. In addition, the Court noted systematic concerns in prosecuting child rape cases, including the problem of "unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony" that may lead to "wrongful execution" in some cases. The majority felt that allowing capital punishment for the crime of child rape had additional negative implications that are counterproductive to the goal of deterrence. For example, victims may be "more likely to shield the perpetrator from discovery, thus increasing underreporting." In addition, punishing child rape with death may remove a strong incentive for the rapist to spare the victim's life. In its analysis, the Court distinguished child rape from other death-eligible crimes because it is a crime against an individual person. It ruled that the death penalty should not be permitted when the victim's life was not taken. However, the Court did not address, and consequently left open, the possibility of imposing the death penalty for non-homicide crimes against the state, such as treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity. Justice Alito, writing for the dissent, expressed the view that the majority's decision conflicts with the original meaning of the 8 th Amendment and ignores the moral depravity of the crime. In addition, he felt that the small number of states which enacted child rape statutes was not based on a national consensus against execution of child rapists, but rather on the broad dicta presented in Coker . Also, he felt that the 8 th Amendment protects an accused's right, and does not authorize the majority to strike down criminal laws on the ground that they are not in the best interest of crime victims or society at large.

In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, held that the 8th Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in the victim's death. The Court established a bright-line rule regarding the constitutionality of imposing capital punishment for a non-homicide crime against an individual. After reviewing the history of the death penalty for other non-homicide crimes against individuals, state legislative enactments, and jury practices since 1964, the Court concluded that there was a national consensus against the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of child rape. Based on precedent as well as other subjective factors, the Court concluded that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for such a crime. The immediate effect of this decision is to invalidate statutes authorizing the death penalty for non-homicide cases of child rape.

Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation. Congress exercises this power largely through its standing committee system. However, oversight, which dates to the earliest days of the Republic, also occurs in a wide variety of congressional activities and contexts. These include authorization, appropriations, investigative, and legislative hearings by standing committees; specialized investigations by select committees; and reviews and studies by congressional support agencies and staff. Congress's oversight authority derives from its "implied" powers in the Constitution, public laws, and House and Senate rules. It is an integral part of the American system of checks and balances. Underlying the legislature's ability to oversee the executive branch are democratic principles as well as practical purposes. John Stuart Mill, the British Utilitarian philosopher, insisted that oversight was the key feature of a meaningful representative body: "The proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government." As a young scholar and future President, Woodrow Wilson—in his 1885 treatise, Congressional Government —equated oversight with lawmaking, which was usually seen as the supreme function of a legislature. He wrote, "Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration." The philosophical underpinning for oversight is the Constitution's system of checks and balances among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. James Madison, known as the "Father of the Constitution," described the system in Federalist No. 51 as establishing "subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner that each may be a check on the other." Oversight, as an outgrowth of this principle, ideally serves a number of overlapping objectives and purposes: improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of governmental operations; evaluate programs and performance; detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary and capricious behavior, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct; protect civil liberties and constitutional rights; inform the general public and ensure that executive policies reflect the public interest; gather information to develop new legislative proposals or to amend existing statutes; ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent; and prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and prerogatives. In sum, oversight is a way for Congress to check on, and check, the executive branch. Although the Constitution grants no formal, express authority to oversee or investigate the executive or program administration, oversight is implied in Congress's impressive array of enumerated powers. The legislature is authorized to appropriate funds; raise and support armies; provide for and maintain a navy; declare war; provide for organizing and calling forth the national guard; regulate interstate and foreign commerce; establish post offices and post roads; advise and consent on treaties and presidential nominations (Senate); and impeach (House) and try (Senate) the President, Vice President, and civil officers for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Reinforcing these powers is Congress's broad authority "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The authority to oversee derives from these constitutional powers. Congress could not carry them out reasonably or responsibly without knowing what the executive is doing; how programs are being administered, by whom, and at what cost; and whether officials are obeying the law and complying with legislative intent. The Supreme Court has legitimated Congress's investigative power, subject to constitutional safeguards for civil liberties. In 1927, the Court found that, in investigating the administration of the Department of Justice, Congress was considering a subject "on which legislation could be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit." The "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution also allows Congress to enact laws that mandate oversight by its committees, grant relevant authority to itself and its support agencies, and impose specific obligations on the executive to report to or consult with Congress, and even seek its approval for specific actions. Broad oversight mandates exist for the legislature in several significant statutes. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601), for the first time, explicitly called for "legislative oversight" in public law. It directed House and Senate standing committees "to exercise continuous watchfulness" over programs and agencies under their jurisdiction; authorized professional staff for them; and enhanced the powers of the Comptroller General, the head of Congress's investigative and audit arm, the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510) authorized each standing committee to "review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration and execution" of laws under its jurisdiction; increased the professional staff of committees; expanded the assistance provided by the Congressional Research Service; and strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities of GAO. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93 - 344 ) allowed committees to conduct program evaluation themselves or contract out for it; strengthened GAO's role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary, and program-related information; and upgraded GAO's review capabilities. Besides these general powers, numerous statutes direct the executive to furnish information to or consult with Congress. For example, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103 - 62 ) requires agencies to consult with Congress on their strategic plans and report annually on performance plans, goals, and results. In fact, more than 2,000 reports are submitted each year to Congress by federal departments, agencies, commissions, bureaus, and offices. Inspectors general (IGs), for instance, report their findings about waste, fraud, and abuse, and their recommendations for corrective action, periodically to the agency head and Congress. The IGs are also instructed to issue special reports concerning particularly serious and flagrant problems immediately to the agency head, who transmits them unaltered to Congress within seven days. Inspectors general also communicate with Members, committees, and staff of Congress in other ways, including testimony at hearings, in-person meetings, and written and electronic communications. The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106 - 531 ), moreover, instructs the IGs to identify and describe their agencies' most serious management and performance challenges and briefly assess progress in addressing them. This new requirement is to be part of a larger effort by individual agencies to consolidate their numerous reports on financial and performance management matters into a single annual report. The aim is to enhance coordination and efficiency within the agencies; improve the quality of relevant information; and provide it in a more meaningful and useful format for Congress, the President, and the public. In addition to these avenues, Congress creates commissions and establishes task forces to study and make recommendations for select policy areas that can also involve examination of executive operations and organizations. There is a long history behind executive reports to Congress. Indeed, one of the first laws of the First Congress—the 1789 Act to establish the Treasury Department (1 Stat. 66)—called upon the Secretary and the Treasurer to report directly to Congress on public expenditures and all accounts. The Secretary was also required "to make report, and give information to either branch of the legislature ... respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office." Separate from such reporting obligations, public employees may provide information to Congress on their own. In the early part of the 20 th century, Congress enacted legislation to overturn a "gag" rule, issued by the President, that prohibited employees from communicating directly with Congress (5 U.S.C. 7211 (1994)). Other "whistleblower" statutes, which have been extended specifically to cover personnel in the intelligence community ( P.L. 105 - 272 ), guarantee the right of government employees to petition or furnish information to Congress or a Member. Chamber rules also reinforce the oversight function. House and Senate rules, for instance, provide for "special oversight" or comprehensive policy oversight, respectively, for specified committees over matters that relate to their authorizing jurisdiction. House rules also direct each standing committee to require its subcommittees to conduct oversight or to establish an oversight subcommittee for this purpose. House rules also call for each committee to submit an oversight agenda, listing its prospective oversight topics for the ensuing Congress, to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which reports the oversight plans to the House, and the Committee on House Administration. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, which have oversight jurisdiction over virtually the entire federal government, furthermore, are authorized to review and study the operation of government activities to determine their economy and efficiency and to submit recommendations based on GAO reports to the House and the Senate, respectively. In addition, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee may conduct an investigation of any matter. For any investigation it does conduct, the committee shall provide its findings and recommendations to any other standing committee that has jurisdiction over the matter. Oversight occurs through a wide variety of congressional activities and avenues. Some of the most publicized are the comparatively rare investigations by select committees into major scandals or into executive branch operations gone awry. Cases in point are temporary select committee inquiries into: Homeland Security matters following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; China's acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapons information, in 1999; the Iran-Contra affair, in 1987; intelligence agency abuses, in 1975-1976, and "Watergate," in 1973-1974. The precedent for this kind of oversight actually goes back two centuries: in 1792, a special House committee investigated the ignominious defeat of an Army force by confederated Indian tribes. By comparison to these select panel investigations, other congressional inquiries in recent Congresses—into intelligence information and its sharing among federal agencies prior to the 9/11 attacks, U.S. intelligence about weapons of mass destruction before the invasion of Iraq, Whitewater, access to Federal Bureau of Investigation files, and campaign financing—have relied for the most part on standing committees. The impeachment proceedings against President Clinton in 1998 in the House and in 1999 in the Senate also generated considerable oversight. It not only encompassed the President and the White House staff, but also extended to the office of independent counsel, prompted by concerns about its authority, jurisdiction, and expenditures. Although such highly visible endeavors are significant, they usually reflect only a small portion of Congress's total oversight effort. More routine and regular review, monitoring, and supervision occur in other congressional activities and contexts. Especially important are appropriations hearings on agency budgets as well as authorization hearings for existing programs. Separately, examinations of executive operations and the implementation of programs—by congressional staff, support agencies, and specially created commissions and task forces—provide additional oversight. Senate Rule XXII, paragraph 2. U.S. Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Manual, Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the United States Senate , S.Doc. 110-1, 110 th Congress, 2 nd session, prepared by Matthew McGowan under the direction of Howard Gantman, Staff Director (Washington: GPO, 2008), sec. 22.2. Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990). [author name scrubbed], "Congressional Oversight of the Presidency," Annals , vol. 499, Sept. 1988, pp. 75-89. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). [author name scrubbed], "Legislative Oversight," Congressional Procedure and the Policy Process (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005), pp. 274-297. Arthur M. Schlesinger and Roger Bruns, eds., Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792-1974 , 5 vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1975). Charles Tiefer, "Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure," Administrative Law Review, vol. 50, Winter 1998, pp. 199-216. U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, "Oversight," History of the House of Representatives, 1789-1994 , H.Doc. 103-324, 103 rd Congress, 2 nd session (Washington: GPO, 1994), pp. 233-266. U.S. General Accounting Office, Investigators' Guide to Sources of Information, GAO Report OSI-97-2 (Washington: 1997). CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual , by [author name scrubbed] et al. CRS Report R41079, Congressional Oversight: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL32525, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Video Series, Congressional Oversight (2004), dealing with tools and techniques, avenues and approaches, and authorities and assistance; on seven videos (MM70003-MM70009), available by calling [phone number scrubbed].

Congressional oversight of policy implementation and administration has occurred throughout the history of the United States government under the Constitution. Oversight—the review, monitoring, and supervision of operations and activities—takes a variety of forms and utilizes various techniques. These range from specialized investigations by select committees to annual appropriations hearings, and from informal communications between Members or congressional staff and executive personnel to the use of extra-congressional mechanisms, such as offices of inspector general and study commissions. Oversight, moreover, is supported by a variety of authorities—the Constitution, public law, and chamber and committee rules—and is an integral part of the system of checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches. This report will be updated as events require.

The invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, was the largest air, land, and sea invasion ever undertaken, including over 5,000 ships, 10,000 airplanes, and over 150,000 American, British, Canadian, Free French, and Polish troops. There are no exact figures for the total number of D-Day participants nor exact casualty figures. Some historians estimate that more than 70,000 Americans and more than 80,000 combined British, Canadian, Free French, and Polish troops participated, including 23,000 men arriving by parachute and glider. According to estimates from the National D-Day Memorial Museum, the Allied forces suffered 9,758 casualties, of which 6,603 were Americans. The Jubilee of Liberty Medal was first awarded in June 1994 to American servicemen for their participation in the Battle of Normandy. The medals were minted at the request of the Regional Council of Normandy to be presented to veterans attending the 50 th anniversary of the D-Day landing on June 6, 1994. Eligible veterans included all who served in Normandy from June 6 to August 31, 1944, comprising land forces, off-shore supporting personnel, and airmen flying cover overhead. The only stipulation was that the medal be presented during an official ceremony, and the veteran be present to accept. On the front of the medal is inscribed, "Overlord 6 Juin 1944" on the upper part of the medal, with the flags of the allied nations and the names of the landing beaches completing the face of the medal. On the reverse side is the Torch of Freedom surrounded by the device of William the Conqueror 'Diex Aie' ("God is with us" in Norman French). Unfortunately, these medals are no longer being awarded by the French government. All medals to commemorate the 50 th anniversary ceremony on June 6, 1994, have been distributed by the French government. Additional medals for those veterans who were unable to attend the anniversary ceremony were later distributed through the Association Debarquement et Bataille de Normandie 1944 in France, which is now defunct. Some Members of Congress have awarded the Jubilee of Liberty Medals to U.S. veterans who were unable to attend the ceremony in France on June 6, 1994. These medals were obtained either from the Association Debarquement et Bataille de Normandie 1944 or from a commercial source. Commercially-minted Jubilee of Liberty Medals are being manufactured by Sims Enterprises, a private company in Kansas, that is selling these medals at a cost of $17 for each individual medal (includes shipping and handling ) or $13 each for orders of 10 or more medals (plus an additional charge for shipping). Please note: This company is not affiliated with either the French or U.S. governments. Veterans are asked to send copies not the originals of their service record for verification; copies will not be returned unless specifically requested along with the medals. For additional information, please contact Sims Enterprises, 617 Main Street, Newton, KS 67114; Tel: [phone number scrubbed]. The French government is no longer distributing the Jubilee of Liberty medals. Instead, the government of France is distributing a "Thank-You-America Certificate 1944-1945" for U.S. veterans. According to a letter sent in December 2000 by former Ambassador of France to the United States, His Excellency François Bujon de l'Estang, to then Secretary of Veterans Affairs Hershel W. Gober, the government of France is issuing a certificate to recognize the participation of American and allied soldiers who participated in the Normandy landing and subsequent battles leading to the liberation of France. Veterans who served on French territory and in French territorial waters and airspace, from June 6, 1944, to May 8, 1945, are still eligible. The certificate will not be issued posthumously. In agreement with the U.S. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the French Consulates General and state veterans affairs offices, veterans service organizations, and veterans associations will identify eligible veterans, review and certify the applications, prepare the certificates, and organize the ceremonies to present the certificates. D-Day participants living in Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia may obtain applications for certificates from the French embassy in Washington, DC, or directly from the Internet at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2000/ww2/index.asp . French Consulate/"Thank-You-America" 4101 Reservoir Road Washington, DC 20007 Tel: [phone number scrubbed] Fax: [phone number scrubbed] D-Day veterans living in other states may wish to contact the nearest French consulate listed below. The American Battle Monuments Commission's Web page on the Normandy Cemetery at http://www.abmc.gov/cemeteries/cemeteries/no.php has information on the cemetery and links on how to locate those interred at American World War II cemeteries overseas. The National D-Day Museum in New Orleans, Louisiana, at http://www.ddaymuseum.org provides historical information on events from D-Day as well as information on annual commemorative events. The website of the National D-Day Memorial in Bedford, Virginia, at http://www.dday.org includes information on the memorial, local events, and tours. The official website in English of the Comité Régional de Tourisme de Normandie lists various D-Day tours in the region as well as general tourist information at http://www.normandy-tourism.org/gb/16tours/index.html . The official site of the Western France Tourism Board offers information on tours and travel in the region by clicking on "Normandy" at http://www.westernfrancetouristboard.com .

This report details the Jubilee of Liberty Medal awarded to U.S. veterans by the French government to commemorate the 50 th anniversary of the invasion of Normandy by the Allied forces on June 6, 1994 (D-Day). These medals are no longer distributed by the French government. Included is information on how to obtain this medal from a commercial source and how U.S. veterans may obtain an official "Thank-You-America 1944-1945" certificate of participation from the French government. This report will be updated as needed.

The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan (Central States) is a multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plan and is projected to become insolvent by 2026 and then will be unable to pay benefits. On September 26, 2015, Central States submitted an application to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to reduce benefits to two-thirds of the plan participants. Multiemployer pension plans are sponsored by two or more employers in the same industry and are maintained under collective bargaining agreements. Participants continue to accrue benefits while working for any participating employer. Multiemployer pension plans pool risk to minimize financial strain if one or more employers withdraw from the plan. However, in recent years, an increasing number of employers have left multiemployer pension plans, either voluntarily or through employer bankruptcy. As a result of withdrawals and declines in the value of plan assets (such as those that occurred during the 2008 financial market decline), there are insufficient funds in the plan from which to pay benefits to some participants who worked for employers that have withdrawn from the plan. Central States is one of the largest multiemployer DB pension plans and is the largest (by number of participants) among plans that may be eligible to reduce benefits as a result of the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act (MPRA), enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ). Table 1 contains information about the Central States plan from its most recent Form 5500 annual disclosure, which is a required disclosure that pension plans must file with the U.S. Department of Labor. A multiemployer DB pension plan is considered insolvent when it no longer has sufficient resources from which to pay any benefits to participants. Central States has indicated that it is likely to become insolvent by 2026. MPRA allows certain multiemployer plans that are expected to become insolvent to apply to Treasury for authorization to reduce benefits to participants in the plan, if the benefit reductions can restore the plan to solvency. The reductions may include both active participants (e.g., those still working) and those in pay status (e.g., those who are retired and receiving benefits from the plan). Prior to the passage of MPRA, under the anti-cutback provision in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA, P.L. 93-406 ), pension plans generally did not have the authority to reduce participants' benefits. By reducing benefits to participants in the immediate term, the plan expects to avoid insolvency and therefore ensure that future retirees will be able to receive plan benefits. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was established by ERISA to insure participants in single-employer and multiemployer private-sector DB pension plans. PBGC indicated that in FY2015 it covered about 10.3 million participants in about 1,400 multiemployer DB pension plans. When a multiemployer DB pension plan becomes insolvent, PBGC provides financial assistance to the plan to pay participants' benefits. When a multiemployer plan receives financial assistance from PBGC, the plan must reduce participants' benefits to a maximum per participant benefit. The maximum benefit is $12,870 per year for an individual with 30 years of service in the plan. The benefit is lower for individuals with fewer than 30 years of service in the plan. However, if Central States (or another large multiemployer plan) were to become insolvent, PBGC would likely be unable to provide sufficient financial assistance to pay participants' maximum insured benefit. PBGC's multiemployer program receives funds from premiums paid by participating employers ($212 million in FY2015) and from the income from the investment of unused premium income ($68 million in FY2015). Premium revenue is held in a revolving fund, which is invested in Treasury securities. PBGC's multiemployer program does not receive any federal funding. If the amount of financial assistance exceeds premium revenue, PBGC would pay benefits from the revolving fund. If PBGC were to exhaust the funds in the revolving fund, PBGC would be able to provide financial assistance equal only to the amount of premium revenue. If a large plan such as Central States were to become insolvent, PBGC would only be able to pay financial assistance equal to the amount of its premium revenue. Participants in multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC would not receive 100% of their promised benefits. In the event of PBGC's insolvency, financial assistance from Treasury is not assured. ERISA states that "the United States is not liable for any obligation or liability incurred by the corporation." As shown in Table 1 , Central States paid $2.8 billion in benefits in 2014. If PBGC were required to provide financial assistance to the Central States plan, it is likely that PBGC would quickly become insolvent. Participants in plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC would likely see their benefits greatly reduced. The coalition of multiemployer pension plan stakeholders that formulated the proposal to reduce participants' benefits assumed that Congress would not authorize financial assistance for PBGC. Table 2 summarizes the financial position of PBGC's multiemployer program. The value of PBGC's expected future assistance to Central States is included as a liability for PBGC. Under MPRA, only plans in critical and declining status may cut benefits. One criterion for a plan to be in critical status is that the plan's funding ratio must be less than 65%. A plan is in declining status if the plan actuary projects the plan will become insolvent within the current year or, depending on certain circumstances as specified in MPRA, within either the next 14 or 19 years. MPRA requires that plans demonstrate that benefit reductions are distributed equitably. It lists a number of factors that plans may, but are not required to, consider. These factors include the age and life expectancy of the participant; the length of time an individual has been receiving benefits; the type of benefit (such as early retirement, normal retirement, or survivor benefit); years to retirement for active employees; and the extent to which participants are reasonably likely to withdraw support for the plan, which could cause employers to withdraw from the plan. MPRA requires that benefit reductions be made only to the extent that the plan will be restored to solvency. It also requires that an individual's benefit be reduced to no less than 110% of the PBGC maximum guarantee. For example, with the maximum guarantee for an individual with 30 years of service in a plan being $12,870 per year, a participant whose benefit is suspended would have to receive a benefit of at least $14,157. The PBGC maximum guarantee is less than $12,870 for individuals with fewer than 30 years of service in a plan. In addition, disabled individuals and retirees aged 80 or older may not have their benefits reduced. The benefits of individuals between the ages of 75 and 80 may be reduced, but to a lesser extent than those younger than 75. A provision in MPRA requires plans that meet specific conditions to reduce benefits in a specified manner. This provision only applies to the Central States plan. The Central States application for benefit reductions lists three tiers of benefits. Tier 1 includes benefits for participants who worked for an employer that withdrew and failed to pay, in full, the required payments to exit the plan (known as withdrawal liability). Tier 2 includes all other benefits not attributable to either Tier 1 or Tier 3. Tier 3 includes benefits for individuals who worked for an employer that (1) withdrew from the plan, (2) fully paid its withdrawal liability, and (3) established a separate plan to provide benefits in an amount equal to benefits reduced as a result of the financial condition of the original plan. Tier 3 includes only benefits for participants who worked for United Parcel Service (UPS), are receiving benefits from the Central States plan, and for which the UPS plan would be required to offset any benefit reductions. Central States indicated that there are 100,377 Tier 1 participants, 322,560 Tier 2 participants, and 48,249 Tier 3 participants. The total amount of proposed benefit reductions will be $1.9 billion in Tier I; $7.1 billion in Tier 2; and $2.0 billion in Tier 3. Central States has also indicated that its proposed benefit reductions are equitable and in accordance with the provisions of MPRA. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of the proposed benefit reductions in Central States. About two-thirds of the participants in the plan are facing benefit reductions. Central States submitted its proposal to reduce participants' benefits on September 25, 2015. Treasury held a comment period on Central States' application from October 23, 2015, to December 7, 2015. On December 10, 2015, Treasury extended the deadline for comments until February 1, 2016. In addition, Treasury has been holding conference calls and hosting regional public meetings with affected participants. Treasury is currently evaluating Central States' application. Under MPRA, Treasury must approve or deny the application within 225 days of receipt, which is May 7, 2016. In general, the Secretary of the Treasury must approve the application for benefit suspensions if Central States' financial condition (such as the plan being in critical and declining status) and proposed benefit suspensions meet the criteria specified in MPRA (such as the benefit suspensions being equitably distributed and no benefit suspensions for participants aged 80 and older). MPRA requires the Treasury to accept the plan sponsor's determinations with respect to the criteria for the benefit suspensions and may reject the application [only] if the plan sponsor's determinations were "clearly erroneous." In general, Treasury is required to administer a vote of plan participants not later than 30 days after it approves an application for benefit reductions. Unless a majority of all plan participants and beneficiaries reject the proposal, benefit reductions would go into effect. If a majority of plan participants reject the proposal to reduce benefits, the plan sponsor may submit a new proposal to the Treasury to suspend benefits. Under MPRA, if Treasury determines that a plan is systematically important then Treasury may permit (1) the benefit suspensions to occur regardless of the participant vote or (2) the implementation of a modified plan of benefit suspensions to take effect, provided the modified plan would enable the pension plan to avoid insolvency. A systemically important plan is a plan that PBGC projects would require more than $1.0 billion in future financial assistance in the event of the plan's insolvency. At the end of FY2013, PBGC indicated the present value of future financial assistance to Central States to be $20.2 billion. Treasury would most likely determine that Central States is a systematically important plan. In the 114 th Congress, a number of bills have been introduced that would affect potentially insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans. H.R. 2844 / S. 1631 . Representative Marcy Kaptur and Senator Bernie Sanders introduced companion legislation, the Keep Our Pension Promises Act, on June 19, 2015, that would, among other provisions, repeal the benefit suspensions enacted in MPRA. H.R. 4029 / S. 2147 . Representative David Joyce on November 17, 2015, and Senator Rob Portman on October 7, 2015, introduced companion legislation, the Pension Accountability Act, that would (1) change the participant vote to approve a plan to reduce benefits from a majority of plan participants to a majority of participants who vote and (2) eliminate the ability of systematically important plans to implement benefit suspensions regardless of the outcome of the participant vote.

Under the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act (MPRA), enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) on December 16, 2014, certain multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans that are projected to become insolvent and therefore have insufficient funds from which to pay benefits may apply to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to reduce participants' benefits. The benefit reductions can apply to both retirees who are currently receiving benefits from a plan and current workers who have earned the right to future benefits. On September 25, 2015, the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan (Central States) applied to the Treasury to reduce benefits to plan participants in order to avoid becoming insolvent. At the end of 2014, Central States had almost 400,000 participants, of whom about 200,000 received $2.8 billion in benefits that year. The plan reported $18.7 billion in assets that was sufficient to pay 53% of promised benefits. In its application to reduce benefits, Central States projects that it will become insolvent in 2026. If Central States does not reduce participants' benefits and the plan becomes insolvent, then the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) would provide financial assistance to the plan. PBGC is an independent U.S. government agency that insures participants' benefits in private-sector DB pension plans. Multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC are required to reduce participants' benefits to a maximum of $12,870 per year in 2016. However, the insolvency of Central States would likely result in the insolvency of PBGC, as PBGC would likely have insufficient resources from which to provide financial assistance to Central States to pay 100% of its guaranteed benefits. Treasury is not obligated to provide financial assistance if PBGC were to become insolvent. Under MPRA, participants' benefits in the Central States plan could be reduced to 110% of the PBGC maximum guarantee level. However, participants aged 80 and older, receiving a disability pension, or who are receiving a benefit that is already less than the PBGC maximum benefit would not receive any reduction in benefits. Central States' application for benefit reductions indicates that about two-thirds of participants would receive reductions in benefits. About 185,000 (almost 40%) participants would receive at least 30% or higher reductions in their benefits. Treasury is currently reviewing Central States' application and must approve or deny the application by May 7, 2016. If Central States' financial condition and proposed benefit suspensions meet the criteria specified in MPRA, then Treasury must approve the application for benefit reductions. The plan has proposed to begin implementing the benefit reductions beginning in July 2016. If Treasury approves a plan's application to reduce benefits, it must also obtain the approval of the plan's participants via a vote of plan participants. However, MPRA requires Treasury to designate certain plans as systematically important if a plan is projected to require $1 billion or more in financial assistance from PBGC. Plans that are labelled systematically important may implement benefit suspensions regardless of the outcome of the participant vote. Central States is likely a systematically important plan. Legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would affect potentially insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans. H.R. 2844 and S. 1631, the Keep Our Pension Promises Act, would, among other provisions, repeal the benefit reductions enacted in MPRA. H.R. 4029 and S. 2147, the Pension Accountability Act, would change the criteria of the participant vote and would eliminate the ability of systematically important plans to implement benefit suspensions regardless of the participant vote.

Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, issued by HHS to implement section 264 of HIPAA (42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2), regulates the use and disclosure of protected health information. On September 4, 2005, Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt declared a federal public health emergency for Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas. To allow health care providers in affected areas to care for patients without violating requirements of HIPAA, Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program, the HHS Secretary waived certain provisions. Specifically with respect to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the Secretary waived the imposition of sanctions and penalties arising from noncompliance with the following provisions: (1) requirements to obtain a patient's agreement to speak with family members or friends or to honor a patient's request to opt out of a facility directory (45 C.F.R.164.510); (2) the requirement to distribute a notice of privacy practices (45 C.F.R.164.520); and (3) the patient's right to request privacy restrictions or confidential communications (45 C.F.R.164.522). In the first Hurricane Katrina bulletin issued by HHS (HIPAA Privacy and Disclosures in Emergency Situations), the Department emphasized that the HIPAA Privacy Rule "allows patient information to be shared to assist in disaster relief efforts, and to assist patients in receiving the care they need." The bulletin states that under the rule, health care providers can share patient information to provide treatment and seek payment for health care services; to identify, locate, and notify family members, guardians, or anyone responsible for the individual's care of the individual's location, general condition, or death; with anyone as necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the public, consistent with applicable law and the provider's standards of ethical conduct. In addition, health care facilities maintaining a patient directory can tell people who call or ask about individuals whether the individual is at the facility, their location in the facility, and general condition. On September 9, HHS issued Hurricane Katrina Bulletin #2. Because the medical and prescription records of many evacuees were lost or inaccessible, and because health plans and health care providers were working with other industry segments to gather and provide this information, Bulletin #2 provides guidance on how the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to these activities and describes the HHS Office for Civil Rights' enforcement approach in light of these emergency circumstances. Bulletin #2 discusses the use and disclosure of prescription and medical information by entities managing information on behalf of covered entities ("business associates"). In general, business associates are permitted to make disclosures "to the extent permitted by their business associate agreements with the covered entities, as provided in the Privacy Rule." The bulletin provides that covered entities or their business associates may provide health information on evacuees to another party for that party to manage the health information and share it as needed for providing health care to the evacuees. Where a covered entity provides protected health information to another for this purpose, the Privacy Rule requires the covered entity to enter into a business associate agreement with this party. If the business associate, rather than the covered entity itself, is providing this information to another party that is acting as its agent, the covered entity's business associate must enter into an agreement to protect health information with this party. Sample business associate agreement provisions are attached to the bulletin. On the subject of enforcement, HHS noted that Section 1176(b) of the Social Security Act provides the agency may not impose a civil money penalty where the failure to comply is based on reasonable cause and is not due to willful neglect, and the failure to comply is cured within a 30-day period. HHS noted its authority to extend the period within which a covered entity may cure the noncompliance "based on the nature and extent of the failure to comply." HHS, in determining whether reasonable cause exists for a covered entity's failure to meet requirements and in determining the period within which noncompliance must be cured, announced that it "will consider the emergency circumstances arising from Hurricane Katrina, along with good faith efforts by covered entities, its business associates and their agents, both to protect the privacy of health information and to appropriately execute the agreements required by the Privacy Rule as soon as practicable." Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, the federal government began a pilot test of KatrinaHealth.org , an electronic health record (EHR) online system, sharing prescription drug information for most of the hurricane evacuees with health care professionals. The launch of KatrinaHealth.org was possible in part because of plans already made and actions taken by the Administration, the Congress, foundations, and the private sector to implement electronic health records (EHRs) as part of the national health information infrastructure. President Bush and the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, and Veterans Affairs (HHS) have focused on the importance of transforming health care delivery through the improved use of health information technology (HIT). Philanthropies such as California Health Care Foundation, Robert Wood Johnson, the Markle Foundation, and others have provided funding, leadership, and expertise to this effort. In the private sector, the medical and nursing informatics, and the medical and nursing professional societies, have also been involved. Electronic health records are controversial among many privacy advocates and citizens who are concerned about information security and the potential for the exploitation of personal medical information by hackers, companies, or the government, and the sharing of health information without the patients' knowledge. Privacy advocates, in general, support the development of an interoperable national health information network built on the concepts of patient control, privacy, and participation. The Department of Health and Human Services has formed agreements with two organizations to plan and promote the widespread use of electronic health records in the Gulf Coast region as it rebuilds. The agreements supplement recently announced contracts to certify electronic health records, develop interoperability standards, evaluate variations among privacy and security requirements across the country, and create prototypes for a nationwide health information network. The Southern Governors Association will form the Gulf Coast Health Information Task Force, which will bring together local and national resources to help area health-care providers convert to electronic medical records. The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals will develop a prototype of health information sharing and electronic health record support that can be replicated in the region. The effort will not be connected with http://katrinahealth.org/ , which is not expected to be a long-term undertaking. On September 22, 2005, KatrinaHealth.org [ http://www.katrinahealth.org ], a secure online service, was launched to enable authorized healthcare providers to electronically access medication and dosage information for evacuees from Hurricane Katrina to renew prescriptions, prescribe new medications, and coordinate care. The website KatrinaHealth.org was available for a 90-day period. KatrinaHealth.org was a completely new, secure online service created in three weeks to help deliver quality care and avoid medical errors. The data contain records from 150 zip codes in areas hit by Katrina. At its launch, prescription drug records on over 800,000 people from the region could be searched by health care professionals. The information was compiled and made accessible by private companies, public agencies, and national organizations, including medical software companies; pharmacy benefit managers; chain pharmacies; local, state, and federal agencies; and a national foundation. The effort to create KatrinaHealth.org was facilitated by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information, Department of Health and Human Services. With the assistance of federal, state, and local governments, KatrinaHealth.org was operated by private organizations, such as the Markle Foundation. Under ordinary circumstances, HIPAA privacy rules would require formal, written "business associate agreements" among KatrinaHealth.org participants before they could exchange medical information. Reportedly, many of the participants had such agreements or were able to obtain them rapidly. In addition, HHS's second bulletin clarified that considering the emergency circumstances, organizations that did not comply with the business associate requirements would not be penalized as long as they showed good faith efforts to protect the privacy of health information and to appropriately execute the agreements required by the Privacy Rule as soon as practicable. The data or prescription information for KatrinaHealth.org was obtained from a variety of government and commercial sources. Sources include more than 150 private and public organizations' electronic databases from commercial pharmacies, government health insurance programs such as Medicaid, and private insurers such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association of America, and pharmacy benefits managers in the states affected by the storm. Key data and resources were contributed by the American Medical Association (AMA), Gold Standard, the Markle Foundation, RxHub and SureScripts. Data contributors also include the Medicaid programs of Louisiana and Mississippi; chain pharmacies (Albertsons, CVS, Kmart, Rite Aid, Target, Walgreens, Wal-Mart, Winn Dixie); and Pharmacy Benefit Managers (RxHub, Caremark, Express Scripts, Medco Health Solutions)). Federal agencies involved include the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs. The information in KatrinaHealth.org did not exist in a central database, rather access was provided to a mix of data sets. Some of the information from chain pharmacies was aggregated while other available information was not. Licensed doctors and pharmacists, anywhere in the United States, treating evacuees from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, were eligible to use KatrinaHealth. Patients were not permitted access to the prescription information at the online site. Authorized clinicians and pharmacists using the system could view evacuees' prescription histories online, obtain available patient allergy information and other alerts, view drug interaction reports and alerts, see therapeutic duplication reports and alerts, and query clinical pharmacology drug information. The system was only accessible to authorized health care professionals and pharmacists, who provided treatment or supported the provision of treatment to evacuees. To ensure that only authorized physicians used KatrinaHealth.org, the AMA provided physician credentialing and authentication services. The AMA validated the identity of health care providers, a key step in ensuring patient confidentiality and security. The National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA) authenticated and provided access for independent pharmacy owners. SureScripts provided these services for chain pharmacies on behalf of the National Association of Chain Drug Stores (NACDS). When treating an evacuee, an authorized user of KatrinaHealth.org was prompted to enter the evacuee's first name, last name, date of birth, pre-Katrina residence zip code and gender. If the evacuee's information was available in KatrinaHealth.org, the health provider would link to the following information: quantity and day supply; the pharmacy that filled the script (if available); the provider that wrote the script; and drug information, such as indication and dosage, administration and interactions. Tools to prevent unauthorized access, and audit logs of system access and records access were maintained and reviewed. The site provided "Read Only" access and information in the system could not be modified or other wise changed. The developers acknowledged that KatrinaHealth.org did not contain information on every Katrina evacuee from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama; that the information on each evacuee's prescription history might be incomplete; and that the data might contain errors or omissions or duplication. Users of KatrinaHealth were encouraged to review the data with the patient. According to the developers, privacy and security concerns were central to the design of KatrinaHealth.org. Only authorized users could access the site. Highly sensitive personal information was filtered out to comply with state privacy laws. Medication information about certain sensitive health care conditions (HIV/AIDS, mental health issues, and substance abuse or chemical dependencies) was not available. Health privacy advocates argued that evacuees should have had the option to opt out of the site and that the site should not become permanent. In June 2006, The Markle Foundation released a report titled "Lessons From KatrinaHealth." The report provides recommendations to ensure that medical records can be accessed and prescriptions provided quickly in a future disaster. The recommendations include engaging in advance planning, taking advantage of existing resources, addressing system and electronic health record design issues, integrating emergency systems, creating systems that are simple to access, improving communication strategies, and overcoming policy barriers to working together.

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, the federal government began a pilot test of KatrinaHealth.org, an online electronic health record (EHR) system that shared prescription drug information for hurricane evacuees with health care professionals. The website was available for a 90-day period. To allow health care providers in affected areas to care for patients without violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Leavitt waived certain provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and issued guidance to clarify situations where the HIPAA privacy rule allows information sharing to assist in disaster relief efforts and with patient care. This report discusses HHS's waiver of certain provisions of the HIPAA privacy rule and guidance issued by HHS with respect to the use and disclosure of protected health information under the HIPAA Privacy Rule in response to Hurricane Katrina. It also briefly discusses the development of electronic health records (EHRs) and provides a brief overview of KatrinaHealth.org. This report will be updated.

Congress approved legislation in 1972 to adjust Social Security benefits for inflation automatically (P.L. 92-336). However, the formula for calculating the new cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) was flawed. Although intended to provide inflation adjustments only to people already receiving benefits, each increase for current beneficiaries also raised the initial benefits of future beneficiaries. The formula assumed that wages would continue to rise faster than prices, as they had in the past. However, the high inflation and unemployment in the 1970s resulted in higher-than-intended increases for beneficiaries affected by the new formula, and lower-than-expected revenues for Social Security. If the erroneous formula had not been changed, future beneficiaries could have received initial benefits that exceeded their pre-retirement earnings—higher than Congress intended and higher than payroll taxes could finance. As part of the 1977 Amendments ( P.L. 95-216 ), Congress corrected the error in the benefit formula in the 1972 Amendments by creating a new formula in which initial benefit levels are indexed to wages, then increased by inflation after the initial year. Without the 1977 Amendments, the system would have become insolvent within five years. The correction to the benefit formula resulted in different treatment for all Social Security beneficiaries depending on year of birth, as described in the following section. The erroneous benefit formula created by the 1972 Amendments affected people who turned 62 in 1972 or later—that is, individuals born in 1910 and later. This is because the formula used to calculate Social Security retirement benefits is based on the year an individual reaches the earliest age of eligibility, which is age 62. When the error in the benefit formula was corrected in the 1977 Amendments, benefits for people who were already eligible for retirement benefits were left unchanged. As a result, beneficiaries born between 1910 and 1916—the seven years prior to the notch—were allowed to receive unintentional windfall benefits for the rest of their lives. The 1977 Amendments corrected the error in the Social Security benefit formula, starting with individuals born in 1917. As a result, the benefits of people who were born during the notch years are lower than those of the beneficiaries who came just before them. To ease the transition to the new, corrected formula, Congress phased in the change for people born from 1917 through 1921—the notch babies. For many who retired during in this phase-in period, however, the transition formula did not lessen the differential between their benefits and the windfall benefits received by people born in earlier cohorts. Figure 1 shows inflation-adjusted initial monthly benefit amounts for average wage earners born from 1900 to 1965. The notch babies' birth years are shown in yellow. The term "notch" originated from graphs such as this one, where the lines representing the benefit levels of notch babies dip below the lines representing the benefit levels of individuals born immediately before and soon after. Many notch babies actually receive higher real benefits than people who were born after they were, all else equal. For example, people born in 1917 receive higher average monthly benefits than people born in 1922 (the first year the correct formula was fully phased in). As shown in Figure 1 , an average wage earner born in 1917 would receive a monthly benefit of $1,166 (in 2007 dollars), while an average wage earner born in 1922 would receive a monthly benefit of $1,080. In addition, most notch babies have significantly higher replacement rates than people born after they were, all else equal. A replacement rate is one way of measuring the adequacy of a person's post-retirement income; it is a comparison between a person's income before and after retirement. This report calculates replacement rates in the same way as the Social Security Administration (SSA) actuaries, which is to show the proportion of beneficiaries' average indexed earnings replaced by their initial Social Security benefits. In 2007, the estimated replacement rate for an average wage earner retiring at age 65 was 40%. In drafting the 1972 Amendments, Congress intended to maintain replacement rates at roughly 40%, but the double-indexing error caused replacement rates to rise above 50% before the error was fixed, as shown in Figure 2 below. The notch babies' replacement rates are higher than most beneficiaries born after they were—particularly in comparison to current and future beneficiaries, whose replacement rates are declining as the full retirement age increases. Benefits for people born in 1922 and later are calculated using the new, corrected formula established by the 1977 Amendments. This formula is currently being used to calculate the annual initial retirement benefit. In 1992, Congress voted to establish a 12-member commission to study the notch issue. The Commission on the Social Security "Notch" Issue released its report on December 31, 1994. Its principal conclusion was that the "benefits paid to those in the 'Notch' years are equitable, and no remedial legislation is in order." Its report states that "the uneven treatment between those in the 'Notch' years and those just before them was magnified by the decision of Congress to fully grandfather" people born before 1917 under the old law. It further states that "in retrospect" Congress "probably should have" limited the benefits of those whose benefits were calculated using the erroneous formula in the 1972 Amendments, but that it was too late to do so given their advanced age. Among advocacy groups, support for legislation to increase benefits for notch babies has been limited. The lead proponent of such legislation is the TREA Senior Citizens League (TSCL). Some Members have complained that TSCL has misled seniors about the issue in mailings that solicit money. A few veterans' groups and grassroots notch groups also have supported notch legislation. Most other organizations representing older Americans, led by AARP, have opposed notch legislation. The AFL-CIO, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Taxpayers Union also have come out in opposition, as did the Carter, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush Administrations. The Clinton Administration, the George W. Bush Administration, and, to date, the Obama Administration have taken no position. One lesson from the experience of the notch babies is that almost any change to Social Security benefits can create a notch. Whenever benefits increase or decrease at some specific point along a continuum—most commonly a point defined by date of birth, income, or assets—a notch or "cliff" can result at the point on the continuum where the benefits rise or fall. For example, if benefits are increased for everyone born before (or after) a certain date, a downward notch in benefits will occur for beneficiaries whose date of birth is after (or before) that date. Notches are quite common in means-tested programs, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), in which benefits are conditioned on having income or assets under a certain threshold. For example if an aged or disabled person who lives alone has no other income and has assets of less than $2,000, he or she is eligible for a federal SSI benefit of $674 per month in 2011. If he or she has assets of $2,001, then the individual is ineligible for benefits in that month. An alternative to creating a "notch" or "cliff" in benefits would be to phase in the change in benefits over a range, whether it be a range of birth years, a range of income, or a range of assets. The disadvantages of phasing in changes in benefit levels over a range of birth years, income or assets, are that it can target the desired change less precisely and can sometimes raise the total cost of the program. Take, for example, a hypothetical proposal to reduce the deficit of the Social Security trust funds by reducing the benefits of all old-age beneficiaries born after 1969 by 10%. This would create a notch based on one's date of birth. Other things being equal, two retired workers with identical career average earnings who were born one day apart on December 31, 1969 and January 1, 1970, respectively, would have benefits that would differ by 10%. Another alternative would be to phase in the change over a range of birth years. This would replace the notch with a slope. Depending on the specifics of the phase-in, the approach could result in total expenditures that are higher or lower. For example, if the reduction were phased in at the rate of one percentage point per year, beginning with a 1% reduction for those born after December 31, 1960, a 2% reduction for those born after December 31, 1961, etc., there would be no notch, and savings would be greater than under the original proposal. On the other hand, the reduction could be phased in at 1% per year beginning with those born after December 31, 1969. This, too, would eliminate the notch, but total savings would be less than under the original proposal. In summary, a notch or cliff in benefits is a common consequence of conditioning the amount of benefits (or taxes) on an individual's location along a continuum based on date of birth, income, or assets. Notches can be eliminated by phasing in the change in benefits or taxes, but only at the cost of either targeting the change in benefits or taxes less precisely or spending more or less than would occur with a notch or cliff. Over the years, many bills have been introduced in Congress to increase benefits for notch babies, but there has been little legislative action on them. In past Congresses, various attempts were made to gain support for discharge petitions to force the House Ways and Means Committee to report out a bill, but the sponsors were unable to get enough signatures. Notch legislation, however, did reach the Senate floor a number of times.

Some Social Security beneficiaries who were born from 1917 to 1921—the so-called notch babies—believe they are not receiving fair Social Security benefits. (The Social Security Administration (SSA) and a 1994 commission on the notch issue define the notch period as 1917 to 1921, though some advocates define the period as 1917 to 1926.) The notch issue resulted from legislative changes to Social Security during the 1970s. The 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act first established cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for Social Security. This change was intended to adjust benefits for inflation automatically, but an error caused benefits to rise substantially faster than inflation. Congress corrected the error in the 1977 Amendments. However, benefits for those born from 1910 to 1916 were calculated using the flawed formula, giving them unintended windfall benefits. The notch babies, born from 1917 to 1921, became eligible for benefits during the period in which the corrected formula was phased in. For many who retired during in this phase-in period, however, the transition formula did not lessen the differential between their benefits and the windfall benefits received by people born in earlier cohorts. Some notch babies feel it is unfair that their benefits are lower than those received by the older individuals who received the windfall, and also that the transition formula did not do enough to make up the difference. A number of legislative attempts have been made over the years to give notch babies additional benefits, but none have been successful. A congressionally mandated commission studied the issue and concluded in its 1994 report that "benefits paid to those in the 'Notch' years are equitable, and no remedial legislation is in order." Any future change to the Social Security benefit formula has the potential to create a notch. This is an important consideration as lawmakers consider changes to ensure long-term system solvency.

Private individuals and firms, often called "contractors" and "subcontractors," have transported mail between postal facilities since at least 1792 (1 Stat. 233), and according to the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), contractors have delivered mail to homes and businesses since 1900. Today, contractors transport mail between postal facilities via land, air, water, and rail. One type of land (i.e., "surface") mail transportation contract is the "highway contract route" (HCR). HCR contracts come in three subtypes. "Transportation" contracts have private "suppliers" transport mail between postal facilities. "Combination" contracts require suppliers to make a small number of mail deliveries in the course of transporting mail between the USPS's facilities. "Contract delivery service" (CDS) contracts compensate suppliers for collecting and delivering mail in rural areas. This latter subtype of contract became the focus of controversy in 2007. The National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), the union for mail delivery persons, and the USPS signed a collective bargaining agreement in autumn 2006. The agreement covered a wide range of compensation and workplace matters. It included two memoranda of understanding (MOUs) concerning contracting letter carrier work. The MOUs established a six-month moratorium on any new contracting of mail carrier work in post offices employing city carriers. They also pledged the NALC and USPS to create a joint USPS-NALC committee to review existing policies and practices concerning the contracting out of mail delivery. The Committee shall seek to develop a meaningful evolutionary approach to the issue of subcontracting, taking into account the legitimate interests of the parties and relevant public policy considerations. The National Rural Letter Carriers Association (NRLCA), which represents rural delivery persons, also reached a collective bargaining agreement with the USPS in 2006. Its Article 32 carries the following language on the use of contractors to deliver mail: The Employer will give advance notification to the Union at the national level when subcontracting which will have a significant impact on bargaining unit work is being considered and will meet to consider the Union's views on minimizing such impact. No final decision on whether or not such work will be contracted out will be made until the matter is discussed with the Union [....]No expansion of the Employer's current national policy on the use of contract service in lieu of rural carriers will be made except through the provisions of this Article, which are intended to be controlling. The parties recognize that individual problems in this area may be made the subject of a grievance. In 2007, representatives of both NALC and NRLCA alleged that the USPS was expanding its use of CDS carriers. William Young, then-president of the NALC, called upon Congress to "stop the cancer of contracting out before it spreads." Members of the NALC picketed the USPS's national headquarters and post offices in Florida and New Jersey. The USPS denied the unions' accusation, and argued that contract mail delivery was "not new." The USPS also stated that its contracts with the postal unions recognize the USPS's authority to use contractors. Nevertheless, the USPS further noted that "cost pressures, competition, and a changing marketplace demand cost-effective options from the Postal Service." Subsequently, a 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that the average annual cost of delivery by a city carrier was nearly twice that of a CDS carrier. Some Members of the 110 th Congress expressed concern about the USPS's practice of hiring contractors to collect and deliver mail. On March 28, 2007, Representative Albio Sires introduced H.Res. 282 , which expressed "the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States Postal Service should discontinue the practice of contracting out mail delivery services." H.Res. 282 was referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HCOGR) and was cosponsored by 256 Members. Not quite two months later, Senator Tom Harkin introduced S. 1457 on May 23, 2007. The bill would have forbidden the USPS from entering "into any contract ... with any motor carrier or other person for the delivery of mail on any route with 1 or more families per mile." The bill would have permitted all existing CDS contracts to remain in effect and to be renewed. S. 1457 was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and had 38 cosponsors. The HCOGR's Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia considered the issue at April and July hearings. Both the NALC and the NRLCA said that contractors should not be trusted to deliver the mail. Three Members present at the July hearing spoke of contractors delivering mail in suburban and city locations, including the Bronx of New York. The NALC stated that private employers—unlike the USPS—are not required to give preference to veterans in hiring. The USPS testified that it was not replacing career carriers with contractors, and that it assigned only new delivery routes to contractors. John Potter, then-Postmaster General, declared that the USPS had "made a commitment for the life of this agreement [with the NALC] not to contract out any city delivery in big cities" and to work with both unions on the use of contractors in suburban and rural areas. The use of contractors to deliver mail also was discussed at a Senate hearing. After lengthy negotiations, the NALC and the USPS signed an MOU in October 2008. This agreement extended through the life of the collective bargaining agreement the moratorium against new CDS contracts in post offices employing city carriers. Additionally, the MOU required any new deliveries to be assigned according to geographic boundaries agreed upon by the NALC, NRLCA, and USPS. That same year, the NRLCA and the USPS worked out their differences over the use of private mail delivery contractors via the grievance process set forth in the NRLCA-USPS collective bargaining agreement. In November 2010, the NRLCA-USPS collective bargaining agreement expired. A year later, the NALC-USPS contract expired. Whether the mail contracting MOUs remain in force is unclear. The USPS and the two unions had negotiations and entered mediation. Unable to settle their differences, the parties went to binding arbitration. The USPS and the NRLCA completed binding arbitration in July 2012. The previous collective bargaining agreement's language regarding the hiring of private contractors to deliver mail was not altered, leaving it unclear whether the USPS and NRLCA have come to a working agreement on this particular issue. The USPS and the NALC entered binding arbitration in June 2012. Arbitration of the USPS-NALC agreement likely will be completed in the coming months. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 (PRA; P.L. 91-375; 84 Stat. 725) replaced the U.S. Post Office Department with the USPS, an independent establishment of the executive branch (39 U.S.C. 201). The PRA requires the USPS to "maintain an efficient system of collection, sorting, and delivery of the mail nationwide" (39 U.S.C. 403(b)(1)). To this end, the PRA provides the USPS with considerable discretion over its operations. 39 U.S.C. 5005 authorizes the USPS to "obtain mail transportation service ... by contract from any person or carrier for surface and water transportation under such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate." Additionally, Congress provided the USPS with the authorities to (1) "enter into and perform contracts" (39 U.S.C. 401); (2) "provide for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of mail" (39 U.S.C. 404(a)(1)); and (3) "establish mail routes and authorize mail transportation service thereon" (39 U.S.C. 5203(a)). However, the PRA also carries provisions relating to USPS employee compensation. For one, the PRA sets a compensation and benefits floor: It shall be the policy of the Postal Service to maintain compensation and benefits for all officers and employees on a standard of comparability to the compensation and benefits paid for comparable levels of work in the private sector of the economy (39 U.S.C. 1003(a)). Additionally, letter carriers are civil servants and, under the PRA, are entitled to wages established through contracts collectively bargained by the USPS and postal unions (39 U.S.C. 1001(b) and 39 U.S.C. 1201 et seq.). The NALC has contended that the USPS's use of CDS carriers instead of USPS mail carriers "violates the spirit of the nation's basic postal law." Using contractors, the union has said, circumvents the collective bargaining process and opens the door for the USPS to replace all career mail carriers with contractors. Hence, the PRA's provisions regarding the USPS's authority to contract and operate an "efficient" system of mail may be at tension with the statute's provision on USPS employee compensation. Between 1998 and 2012, the number of carrier routes served by CDS carriers increased from 5,424 to 9,991, or 84.2% ( Table 1 ). Similarly, over the past 15 years the number of delivery points served by CDS carriers has increased from 1,828,257 to 2,680,140, or 46.6% ( Table 3 ). However, throughout this period, the USPS career city and rural carriers delivered mail on the vast majority of postal carrier routes—not less than 95.6% ( Table 2 ). City and rural carriers also have served at least 98% of the nation's delivery points ( Table 4 ). Thus, although the USPS has increased its use of CDS carriers to deliver mail, these contractors serve on 4.4% of all routes and deliver mail at 2% of all delivery points. Additionally, the data show a shift between the portions of the total routes and deliveries handled by city and rural letter carriers. The percentage of routes served by rural carriers has grown from 26.5% to 32.4%, while the percentage of routes served by city carriers has declined from 71.2% to 63.2%. Additionally, the percentage of delivery points served by rural carriers has increased from 25.4% to 30.7%; whereas the percentage of delivery points served by city carriers has decreased from 73.0% to 67.3%. Current postal law requires the USPS to operate an "efficient" system of mail and provides the USPS with various authorities to achieve this objective. However, the law also sets a pay and compensation floor for USPS employees and requires the USPS to collectively bargain with its employees. These aspects of postal law come into conflict in the matter of the USPS using private persons or firms to deliver mail. The data above indicate that the USPS has increased its use of contractors over the past 15 years. Yet, the data also indicate that contractors serve only a very small percentage of carrier routes and deliver to very few homes and businesses. Whether the use of private persons and firms to deliver mail will arise as an issue of interest to Congress is unclear. The USPS, NALC, and NRLCA may settle the matter through arbitration and ensuing memoranda of understanding. In the event that the use of contractors cannot be settled through the parties themselves, there are at least two broad perspectives that might be taken on the situation. First, it might be argued that Congress should take no action. Historically, Congress has not enacted specific policies concerning the extent of the USPS's use of contractors to deliver mail. It has left the matter to be decided by the Postal Service and its letter carrier unions through collective bargaining and the grievance process. Congress may continue this practice, reasoning that the USPS has legitimate grounds to pursue cost-savings via the use of contractors. Indeed, it might be further contended that the use of contractors to deliver mail is in keeping with long-time USPS practices. Contractors have been used to collect, transport, sort, and deliver mail; and machines built by private firms do much of the mail sorting work once performed by USPS employees. Letter carriage would not appear to be an inherently governmental function under current procurement policy, so the USPS should be free to outsource this work as it deems proper. Second and alternately, Congress may choose to intervene, viewing the issue as involving an unintended conflict arising out of two national policies—USPS operational efficiency and the rights of unionized, federal employees. From this perspective, it could be argued that the USPS is supposed to be a self-supporting agency; but that does not necessitate that the USPS should be permitted to outsource however much postal work it chooses. It might be further argued that there is a positive societal benefit in the federal government hiring individuals (often minorities and veterans) and compensating them well. Thus, Congress might either ban the practice of using contractors to deliver mail (or perform other mail-movement activities); or it could limit the amount of mail delivery work performed by contractors—perhaps by capping the percentage of routes served by non-USPS employees. Were Congress either to ban or limit the use of contractors, it might wish to consider helping the USPS recoup any lost savings by providing it with additional authorities to increase its revenues or decrease its operating costs.

Recently, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has been in negotiations with the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) and National Rural Letter Carriers Association (NRLCA). One issue that may or may not be settled is the Postal Service's use of non-USPS employees (i.e., contractors) to deliver mail. If the parties cannot come to a satisfactory arrangement, Congress may be approached to consider the matter. Contractors have delivered mail to homes and businesses since 1900. Controversy over this practice arose in 2007 when the NALC alleged that the USPS had expanded the use of contractors into city areas at the expense of unionized membership. Congress held hearings on the matter, and legislation was introduced in both houses. The USPS and NALC came to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in October 2008 to govern the practice, which appeared to quell the controversy. However, the issue was reopened when USPS's collective bargaining agreements with the NRLCA and the NALC expired in 2010 and 2011, respectively. At present, it is unclear whether the parties have come to mutually agreeable arrangements concerning the use of contactors to deliver mail. By law, the USPS is obliged to provide for an "efficient" system of mail delivery. Federal statute provides the USPS with considerable freedom to enter into contracts with private parties. Wage-earning contractors cost less to employ than wage- and benefits-earning USPS employees. However, federal law also requires the USPS to collectively bargain its employees' compensation. Thus, a conflict arises between these competing legal imperatives when the USPS employs a contractor to perform work that was or could be performed by a postal employee. The USPS has increased its use of contractors in recent years, but USPS employees continue to serve 98% of all U.S. homes and businesses. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

To be legally obscene, and therefore unprotected by the First Amendment, pornography must, at a minimum, "depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct." The Supreme Court has created the three-part Miller test to determine whether a work is obscene. The Miller test asks (a) whether the "average person applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. In Pope v. Illinois , the Supreme Court clarified that "the first and second prongs of the Miller test—appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness—are issues of fact for the jury to determine applying contemporary community standards." However, as for the third prong, "[t]he proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole." In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades , the Supreme Court held that material is not obscene if it "provoke[s] only normal, healthy sexual desires." To be obscene it must appeal to "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion." The Communications Decency Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104 - 104 , § 507) expanded the law prohibiting interstate commerce in obscenity (18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465) to apply to the use of an "interactive computer service" for that purpose. It defined "interactive computer service" to include "a service or system that provides access to the Internet." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). These provisions were not affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU declaring unconstitutional two provisions of the CDA that would have restricted indecency on the Internet. In Reno , the Court noted, in dictum, that "the 'community standards' criterion as applied to the Internet means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message." This suggested that, at least with respect to material on the Internet, the Court might replace the community standards criterion, except perhaps in the case of Internet services where the defendant makes a communication available only to subscribers and can thereby restrict the communities in which he makes a posting accessible. Subsequently, however, the Court held that the use of community standards does not by itself render a statute banning "harmful to minors" material on the Internet unconstitutional. Child pornography is material "that visually depict[s] sexual conduct by children below a specified age." It is unprotected by the First Amendment even when it is not obscene (i.e., child pornography need not meet the Miller test to be banned). The reason that child pornography is unprotected is that it "is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.... Indeed, there is no serious contention that the legislature was unjustified in believing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to halt the exploitation of children by pursuing only those who produce the photographs and movies." Federal law bans interstate commerce (including by computer) in child pornography (18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A), defines "child pornography" as "any visual depiction" of "sexually explicit conduct" involving a minor, and defines "sexually explicit conduct" to include not only various sex acts but also the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2256. In 1994, Congress amended the child pornography statute to provide that "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person" "is not limited to nude exhibitions or exhibitions in which the outlines of those areas were discernible through clothing." 18 U.S.C. § 2252 note. Then, in the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), Congress enacted a definition of "child pornography" that included visual depictions that appear to be of a minor, even if no minor was actually used. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). The statute thus banned visual depictions using adult actors who appear to be minors, as well as computer graphics and drawings or paintings done without any models. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , the Supreme Court declared the CPPA unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited pictures that were not produced with actual minors. Child pornography, to be unprotected by the First Amendment, must either be obscene or depict actual children engaged in sexual activity (including "lascivious" poses), or actual children whose images have been "morphed" to make it appear that the children are engaged in sexual activity. The Court observed in Ashcroft that statutes that prohibit child pornography that use real children are constitutional because they target "[t]he production of the work, not the content." The CPPA, by contrast, targeted the content, not the means of production. The government's rationales for the CPPA included that "[p]edophiles might use the materials to encourage children to participate in sexual activity" and might "whet their own sexual appetites" with it, "thereby increasing ... the sexual abuse and exploitation of actual children." The Court found these rationales inadequate because the government "cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts" and "may not prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed 'at some indefinite future time.'" The government also argued that the existence of "virtual" child pornography "can make it harder to prosecute pornographers who do use real minors," because, "[a]s imaging technology improves ... it becomes more difficult to prove that a particular picture was produced using actual children." This rationale, the Court found, "turns the First Amendment upside down. The Government may not suppress lawful speech as a means to suppress unlawful speech." In response to Ashcroft , Congress enacted Title V of the PROTECT Act, P.L. 108 - 21 (2003), which prohibits any "digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." It also prohibits "a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that ... depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and is obscene or lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. It also makes it a crime to advertise, promote, present, distribute, or solicit any material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material is child pornography that is obscene or that depicts an actual minor. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109 - 248 ) amended 18 U.S.C. § 2257, which requires by producers of material that depicts actual sexually explicit conduct to keep records of every performers' name and date of birth; it also enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2257A, which requires essentially the same thing with respect to simulated sexual conduct. The Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110 - 358 , Title I) and the Enhancing the Effective Prosecution of Child Pornography Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110 - 358 , Title II) expanded existing law by, among other things, making it applicable to intrastate child pornography violations that affect interstate or foreign commerce. P.L. 110 - 358 was signed into law on October 8, 2008. The Federal Communications Commission defines "indecent" material as material that "describe[s] or depict[s] sexual or excretory organs or activities" in terms "patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast media." Indecent material is protected by the First Amendment unless it constitutes obscenity or child pornography. Except on broadcast radio and television, indecent material that is protected by the First Amendment may be restricted by the government only "to promote a compelling interest" and only by "the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." The Supreme Court has "recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards." There are federal statutes in effect that limit, but do not ban, indecent material transmitted via telephone, broadcast media, and cable television. There are also many state statutes that ban the distribution to minors of material that is "harmful to minors." Material that is "harmful to minors" under these statutes tends to be defined more narrowly than material that is "indecent," in that material that is "harmful to minors" is generally limited to material of a sexual nature that has no serious value for minors. The Supreme Court has upheld New York's "harmful to minors" statute. In 1997, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 that would have prohibited indecent communications, by telephone, fax, or e-mail, to minors, and would have prohibited use of an "interactive computer service" to display indecent material "in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age." This latter prohibition would have banned indecency from public (i.e., non-subscription) websites. The CDA was succeeded by the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), P.L. 105 - 277 (1998), which differs from the CDA in two main respects: (1) it prohibits communication to minors only of "material that is harmful to minors," rather than material that is indecent, and (2) it applies only to communications for commercial purposes on publicly accessible websites. "Material that is harmful to minors" is defined as material that (A) is prurient, as determined by community standards, (B) "depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors," sexual acts or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast, and (C) "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors." COPA never took effect because, in 2007, a federal district court found it unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction against its enforcement; in 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that COPA "does not employ the least restrictive alternative to advance the Government's compelling interest" and is also vague and overbroad. In 2009, the Supreme Court declined to review the case. In 2003, at the Golden Globe Awards, the singer Bono, in response to winning an award, said, "this is really, really f[***]ing brilliant." The FCC found the word to be indecent, even when used as a modifier, because, "given the core meaning of the 'F-Word,' any use of that word or a variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation." The question arises whether this ruling is consistent with the First Amendment, in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has left open the question whether broadcasting an occasional expletive would justify a sanction. In 2006, the FCC took action against four other television broadcasts that contained fleeting expletives, but on June 4, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found "that the FCC's new policy regarding 'fleeting expletives' is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act." The Supreme Court, however, reversed, finding that the FCC's explanation of its decision was adequate; it left open the question whether censorship of fleeting expletives violates the First Amendment. In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned the FCC's fine against CBS broadcasting station affiliates for broadcasting Janet Jackson's exposure of her breast for nine-sixteenths of a second during a SuperBowl halftime show. The court found that the FCC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding the incident indecent; the court did not address the First Amendment question. The Supreme Court, later, vacated and remanded the Third Circuit's decision in light of its ruling in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC , discussed above. CIPA restricts access to obscenity, child pornography, and material that is "harmful to minors," and so is discussed here separately. CIPA amended three federal statutes to provide that a school or library may not use funds it receives under these statutes to purchase computers used to access the Internet, or to pay the direct costs of accessing the Internet, and may not receive universal service discounts, unless the school or library enforces a policy to block or filter minors' Internet access to images that are obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors; and enforces a policy to block or filter adults' Internet access to visual depictions that are obscene or child pornography. It provides, however, that filters may be disabled "for bona fide research or other lawful purposes." In 2003, the Supreme Court held CIPA constitutional. A plurality opinion acknowledged "the tendency of filtering software to 'overblock'—that is, to erroneously block access to constitutionally protected speech that falls outside the categories that software users intend to block." It found, however, that, "[a]ssuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional difficulties, any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software disabled." The plurality also found that CIPA does not deny a benefit to libraries that do not agree to use filters; rather, the statute "simply insist[s] that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized."

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The First Amendment applies to pornography, in general. Pornography, here, is used to refer to any words or pictures of a sexual nature. There are two types of pornography to which the First Amendment does not apply, however. They are obscenity and child pornography. Because these are not protected by the First Amendment, they may be, and have been, made illegal. Pornography and "indecent" material that are protected by the First Amendment may nevertheless be restricted in order to limit minors' access to them.

This report provides an overview of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), as well as a discussion of several court cases that have clarified the statute's requirements. Under FERPA, educational agencies and institutions that receive federal funds must provide parents with access to the educational records of their children. Access must be provided within a reasonable time, but no later than forty-five days after a request to access education records has been made. In addition, the statute provides parents with an opportunity to challenge the content of their children's education records in order to ensure that the records are not inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of a student's privacy rights. Under the statute, education records are defined to include those records, files, documents, and other materials that contain information directly related to a student and that are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution. Education records may also include videotape and products of other media. However, education records do not include any of the following: (1) records of educational personnel that are in the sole possession of the maker and not accessible to anyone other than a substitute; (2) records maintained by a law enforcement unit of an educational agency or institution for purposes of law enforcement; (3) employment records; or (4) medical records for students who are age eighteen or older. The parents of a student may exercise rights granted by FERPA until the student reaches the age of eighteen or attends an institution of postsecondary education. At that point, the rights defined by FERPA are transferred from the parents to the student. However, FERPA provides that certain types of information shall not be available to students in institutions of postsecondary education. Such students shall not have access to their parents' financial records. Letters and statements of recommendation submitted prior to the enactment of FERPA must also remain confidential if the letters are not used for other purposes. Finally, recommendations regarding admission to any educational agency or institution, employment application, and the receipt of an honor must remain confidential if the student has signed a waiver of his right of access. In addition to requirements regarding access to educational records, FERPA prohibits educational agencies or institutions that receive federal funds from having a policy or practice of releasing the education records of a student without the written consent of his parents. In addition, each educational agency or institution must maintain a record that identifies those individuals, agencies, or organizations that have requested or obtained access to a student's education records. It is important to note that consent is not required for the release of education records to certain individuals and organizations. These exceptions to FERPA's general prohibition against nonconsensual disclosure of educational records are described in detail below, as are controversial 2011 regulations that, among other things, permit educational agencies and institutions to disclose personally identifiable information to third parties under limited circumstances. Under FERPA, education records may be released without consent to certain school or government officials, including the following: school officials with a legitimate educational interest in the records; school officials at a school to which a student intends to transfer, as long as the parents are notified of the transfer; authorized representatives of the Comptroller General of the United States, the Secretary of Education, or state educational authorities in connection with an audit and evaluation of federally supported education programs or in connection with the enforcement of federal requirements that relate to such programs; authorized representatives of the Attorney General for law enforcement purposes; in connection with a student's application for, or receipt of, financial aid; state and local officials pursuant to a state statute that requires disclosure concerning the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released; and persons designated in a federal grand jury subpoena or any other subpoena issued for a law enforcement purpose. In addition, a new exception was added in 2013 to allow nonconsensual disclosure to a caseworker or other state, local, or tribal child welfare agency official with legal responsibility for the care or protection of the student. Education records may also be released without consent to certain third parties other than school or government officials. For example, education records may also be released to accrediting organizations to carry out their accrediting functions, and to the parents of a dependent student. Organizations conducting studies for the purpose of developing, validating, or administering predictive tests, administering student aid programs, and improving instruction may also access education records. However, such studies must be conducted in a manner that does not reveal the personal identification of students and their parents, and the education records must be destroyed when they are no longer needed. In 2001, the definition of "education records" and the requirements related to the release of such records was the subject of review in a Supreme Court case, Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo , that considered whether peer grading and the practice of calling out grades in class resulted in an impermissible release of education records. The plaintiff argued that the grades on student-graded assignments were education records maintained by students acting for an educational institution and that students should not be allowed to call out the grades they recorded in class because education records may not be released without consent. The school district, on the other hand, maintained that FERPA's definition of "education records" covered only institutional records or materials maintained in a permanent file, such as final course grades, standardized test scores, attendance records, and similar information, but not student homework or classroom work. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the grades on peer-graded student assignments were not education records, identifying two statutory explanations for its decision. First, the Court determined that student assignments are not "maintained" within the meaning of FERPA's definition of "education records" because neither the teacher nor the students maintain the grades of a recently corrected assignment in a manner that reflected a common understanding of when something is "maintained." As the Court observed, the word "maintain" suggests records that "will be kept in a filing cabinet in a records room at the school or on a permanent secure database.... " Second, the Court concluded that student graders are not "person[s] acting for" an educational institution for purposes of FERPA's definition of "education records." The Court found that the phrase "acting for" does not suggest students, but rather connotes agents of the school, such as teachers, administrators, and other school employees. Moreover, the Court maintained that correcting a classmate's work could be viewed as being part of an assignment: "It is a way to teach material again in a new context, and it helps show students how to assist and respect fellow pupils." The Court did not interpret FERPA to prohibit such educational techniques, and noted that the logical consequences of finding peer-graded assignments to be education records would seem unbounded. Absent prior notice from a parent, an educational agency or institution may release directory information without consent. FERPA defines directory information to include the following: "the student's name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the student." An agency or institution compiling directory information must give public notice of the categories of information it has designated as "directory information," and must allow a reasonable period of time after the issuance of such notice to permit a parent to inform the agency or institution that parental consent must be given before the release of any or all of the directory information. In 2011, the Department of Education (ED) issued new regulations that expanded the definition of directory information to include a student identification number displayed on a student identification card or badge. Under the new regulations, parents may not opt out or otherwise prevent an educational agency or institution from requiring students to wear badges or cards that are designated as directory information. Under another important exception to the general prohibition against nonconsensual release of educational records, such records may be released in connection with an emergency if the records are necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other persons. In the wake of the shootings at Virginia Tech, there have been several attempts to clarify FERPA's health or safety exception. For example, under amendments to the Higher Education Act made in 2008, ED is required to provide guidance clarifying rules regarding disclosure when a "student poses a significant risk of harm to himself or herself or to others, including a significant risk of suicide, homicide, or assault." Such guidance must clarify that institutions that disclose such information in good faith are not liable for the disclosure. In addition, ED issued regulations that contain similar clarifications regarding disclosure requirements in the event of a threat to health or safety. FERPA does not restrict postsecondary institutions from disclosing certain information about student misconduct and from identifying student drug and alcohol violations. For example, a postsecondary institution may disclose to an alleged victim of any crime of violence or nonforcible sex offense the final results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by the institution against the alleged perpetrator. Likewise, an institution may disclose to anyone the final results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted against a student who is an alleged perpetrator of any crime of violence or nonforcible sex offense if the institution determines as a result of the proceeding that the student committed a violation of the institution's rules or policies with respect to such crime or offense. It is important to note that amendments made to the Higher Education Act in 2008 essentially override FERPA's optional disclosure rule by requiring institutions of higher education to disclose to the alleged victim of any crime of violence or a nonforcible sex offense the results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by the institution against a student who is the alleged perpetrator of such a crime or offense. If the alleged victim is deceased as a result of such crime or offense, the next of kin of such victim shall be treated as the alleged victim for purposes of disclosure. In addition, FERPA permits a postsecondary institution to disclose to a parent or legal guardian of a student information regarding any violation of any federal, state, or local law, or any rule or policy of the institution, governing the use or possession of alcohol or a controlled substance. However, disclosure is permitted only when the student is under the age of twenty-one and the institution determines that the student committed a disciplinary violation with respect to the use or possession of alcohol or a controlled substance. In 2001, FERPA was amended to allow the Attorney General (AG) or certain employees designated by the AG to seek access to education records that are relevant to an authorized investigation or prosecution of a terrorism-related offense or an act of domestic or international terrorism. These records may be disseminated and used as evidence in an administrative or judicial proceeding. To obtain access to the records, the AG or his designee must submit a written application to a court for an order requiring an educational agency or institution to release the records. The application must certify that there are specific facts that give reason to believe that the education records are likely to contain relevant information, and the court shall issue the order if it finds that the application includes this certification. Education records disclosed pursuant to a court order are not subject to FERPA's requirement that educational agencies and institutions maintain records identifying entities that have requested or obtained access to a student's education records. In 2011, ED issued a final rule amending the FERPA regulations. Designed to allow increased data sharing, the rule was intended, in part, to facilitate the development of statewide longitudinal data systems (SLDS). According to ED, "Improved access to data will facilitate States' ability to evaluate education programs, to ensure limited resources are invested effectively, to build upon what works and discard what does not, to increase accountability and transparency, and to contribute to a culture of innovation and continuous improvement in education." The new regulations make a number of changes, including, but not limited to permitting educational agencies and institutions to disclose personally identifiable information to authorized third parties for purposes of conducting audits or evaluations of federal- or state-supported education programs or enforcing compliance with federal requirements related to such programs; allowing student identification numbers to be designated as directory information for purposes of display on a student identification card or badge; and adding new enforcement mechanisms for violations of the act. The changes regarding release of personally identifiable information and directory information have proved to be somewhat controversial. Indeed, privacy advocates have raised concerns, noting that the changes may pose increased risks to student privacy, and one organization—the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)—filed a lawsuit alleging that the regulations exceed the agency's statutory authority and are contrary to existing law. Although the lawsuit was recently dismissed for procedural reasons, other legal challenges to the rules may emerge in the future. Under FERPA, educational agencies and institutions found to have a policy of denying parental access to a student's education records or releasing a student's education records without written consent may be denied federal funds. The Secretary of Education is authorized to deal with violations of the act and to establish or designate a review board for investigating and adjudicating FERPA violations. The Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO), which acts as a review board, permits students and parents who suspect a violation to file individual written complaints. If a violation is found after investigation, the FPCO will notify the complainant and the educational agency or institution of its findings and identify the specific steps that the agency or institution must take to comply with FERPA. If the agency or institution fails to comply within a reasonable period of time, the Secretary may either withhold further payments under any applicable program, issue a complaint to compel compliance through a cease-and-desist order, or terminate eligibility to receive funding. In Gonzaga University v. Doe , the Court considered whether a student could enforce the provisions of FERPA by suing an institution for damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which provides a remedy for violations of federally conferred rights. The respondent, a former student at Gonzaga, planned to teach in the Washington state public school system after graduation. Washington required new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from a dean of their graduating college or university, but the respondent was denied such an affidavit after Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist informed the state agency responsible for teacher certification of allegations involving sexual misconduct by the respondent. The respondent sued Gonzaga, alleging a violation of section 1983 for the impermissible release of personal information to an unauthorized person under FERPA. The Court found that FERPA creates no personal rights that may be enforced under section 1983. The Court noted that unless Congress expresses an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights, federal funding provisions, like those included in FERPA, provide no basis for private enforcement under section 1983. The respondent had argued that as long as Congress intended for a statute to "benefit" putative plaintiffs, the statute could be found to confer rights enforceable under section 1983. The Court disagreed: "it is the rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests,' that may be enforced under the authority of that section." The Court also observed that FERPA's nondisclosure provisions had an aggregate focus and were not concerned with the needs of any particular person. By having such a focus, the provisions could not be understood to give rise to individual rights.

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 guarantees parental access to student education records, while limiting the disclosure of those records to third parties. The act, sometimes referred to as the Buckley Amendment, was designed to address parents' growing concerns over privacy and the belief that parents should have the right to learn about the information schools were using to make decisions concerning their children. No substantial legislative changes have been made to FERPA since 2001, but in 2011, the Department of Education (ED) issued controversial new regulations that, among other things, permit educational agencies and institutions to disclose personally identifiable information to third parties for purposes of conducting audits or evaluations of federal- or state-supported education programs. These regulations are discussed below, as is a recently dismissed lawsuit challenging ED's new rules.

This report provides an overview of the major issues which have been raised recently in the Senate and in the press concerning the constitutionality of a Senate filibuster (i.e., extended debate) of a judicial nomination. The Senate cloture rule (Rule XXII, par. 2) requires a super-majority vote to terminate a filibuster. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President is to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, ... appoint" judges, does not impose a super-majority requirement for Senate confirmation. Since it has the effect of requiring a super-majority vote on a nomination, because it usually requires the votes of 60 Senators to end a filibuster, it has been argued that a filibuster of a judicial nomination is unconstitutional. In the absence of (1) any constitutional provision specifically governing Senate debate and (2) any judicial ruling directly on point, and given the division of scholarly opinion, this report will examine the issues but will not attempt a definitive resolution of them. The framers of the Constitution were committed to majority rule as a general principle. However, no provision of the Constitution expressly requires that the Senate and the House act by majority vote in enacting legislation or in exercising their other constitutional powers. There is a provision specifying that "a majority of each [House] shall constitute a quorum to do business." There are also a few provisions dictating that the Senate or House muster a two-thirds extraordinary majority to transact certain business of an exceptional nature. Although there is no constitutional provision requiring that the Senate act by majority vote in instances not governed by one of the provisions mandating an extraordinary majority, "the Senate operates under 'a majority rule' to transact business—a majority of the Senators voting, a quorum being present—with the exceptions set forth in the Constitution and the rules of the Senate." The Supreme Court has found that "the general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body," except when there is a specific constitutional limitation. However, the Court has also found that the Constitution, history, and judicial precedents do not require that a majority prevail on all issues. Does the commitment of the framers to majority rule as a general principle, the fact that the Senate usually operates pursuant to majority rule, and the enumeration in the Constitution of certain extraordinary majority voting requirements mean that any exception to majority rule other than the enumerated ones is unconstitutional? Is there any constitutional defense to be offered for a Senate filibuster? Article I, Section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution authorizes "each House [to] determine the rules of its proceedings.... " The rule-making power has been construed broadly by the courts. It has been argued that the rule-making power and historical practice are the foundation for the filibuster, and that Article I, Section 5, permits the Senate to adopt procedures unless they conflict with a constitutional prohibition. Supporters of the filibuster have contended that Senate rules are not in conflict with the Constitution because the rules require 60 votes to end debate on a nomination, not to confirm a nominee, and that therefore the Senate rules are not unconstitutional because they are not at odds with the few constitutional provisions in which the framers specified a particular type of majority. Opponents of the filibuster have claimed that Senate rules violate the constitutional principle of majority rule and in effect impose an extraordinary majority requirement for confirmation of nominees that is at odds with the Appointments Clause. Several factors have the effect of entrenching the filibuster. First, Senate Rule XXII, par. 2 (the cloture rule) applies, inter alia , to amendments to the Senate rules. (A vote of three fifths of the entire Senate is usually required to invoke cloture. A vote of two thirds of the Senators present and voting is required to invoke cloture on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules.) Second, Senate Rule V, par. 2, provides that "the rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules." And third, because the Senate is a continuing body, its rules "are not newly adopted with each new session of Congress." Because the cloture rule may be applied to debate on a proposal to change the filibuster rule, it has been argued that the filibuster rule unconstitutionally interferes with the right of a majority to exercise the constitutional rulemaking authority by majority vote. However, supporters of the filibuster have contended that "there is no constitutional directive against entrenchment," and that the reference to "each House" in the rule-making clause (Article I, Section 5), authorizing each House to "determine the rules of its proceedings," means the House and Senate separately (not the Congress), and does not mean that one session of the Senate is barred from binding the next session. The entrenchment issue has given rise to a suggested scenario under which a simple majority might vote in favor of an amendment to the filibuster rule, a point of order might be raised asserting that a majority vote is sufficient to cut off debate on the amendment and to pass it (because the two-thirds requirement is unconstitutional), the matter would be referred by the Vice President to the Senate, and the point of order would be sustained by a simple majority of the Senate. A judicial appeal might ensue. Senators have considered changing Senate rules or practice by invoking the "constitutional" or "nuclear" option, terms that refer to various types of proceedings. This option was a focal point of a recent bipartisan agreement. The filibuster of a judicial nomination raises constitutional issues, particularly separation of powers ones, not posed by the filibuster of legislation. These issues should be considered in light of the pertinent language of the Constitution and the intent of the Framers. The Appointments Clause provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.... " There are three stages in presidential appointments by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. First, the President nominates the candidate. Second, the President and the Senate appoint the individual. And third, the President commissions the officer. It is noted that the Appointments Clause is in Article II of the Constitution, which sets forth the powers of the President. The power of appointment is one of the executive powers of government. "... [T]he power of appointment by the Executive is restricted in its exercise by the provision that the Senate, a part of the legislative branch of the Government, may check the action of the Executive by rejecting the officers he selects." The language of the Appointments Clause is ambiguous. It does not specify procedures or time limits applicable in confirmation proceedings, and it does not require that the Senate take a final vote on a nomination. "There is little evidence indicating the exact meaning of 'advice and consent' intended by the Framers.... Records of the constitutional debates reveal that the Framers, after lengthy discussions, settled on a judicial selection process that would involve both the Senate and the President. This important governmental function, like many others, was divided among coequal branches to protect against the concentration of power in one branch." The Senate's role of advice and consent was intended as a safeguard against executive abuses of the appointment power. Citing the language of the Appointments Clause and the intent of the Framers, supporters and critics of filibusters of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a majority of Senators has a constitutional right to vote on a nomination. If the Senate filibusters a judicial nomination, the President has "countervailing powers," including the ability to make a recess appointment, which does not require Senate confirmation but which is only temporary, expiring at the end of the next session of Congress. Because recess appointments deny the Senate the opportunity to consider the appointees, they raise separation of powers questions about the roles of the President and the Senate in the appointments process. Special issues are raised by recess appointments of Article III judges. The independence of such judges is generally guaranteed by their life tenure. However, "a recess appointee lacks life tenure.... As a result, such an appointee is in theory subject to greater political pressure than a judge whose nomination has been confirmed." The constitutionality of the filibuster has been challenged in court, and such litigation raises justiciability issues. In a number of cases, the courts have shown a reluctance to interpret the rules of either House or to review challenges to the application of such rules. However, the case law is not entirely consistent, and it has been suggested that a court will be more likely to reach the merits if a rule has an impact on parties outside the legislative sphere. Standing and the political question doctrine would be the primary justiciability issues raised by a court challenge to the filibuster rule. Standing is a threshold procedural question which turns not on the merits of the plaintiff's complaint but rather on whether he has a legal right to a judicial determination of the issues he raises. To satisfy constitutional standing requirements, "'[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'" It has been suggested that those who might have standing to challenge the rule would include a judicial nominee not confirmed because of a filibuster; the President; and Senators who are part of a majority in favor of a nomination, but who cannot obtain the necessary votes to invoke cloture or to change the filibuster rule, who might allege a dilution of their voting strength. A nominee might have suffered a personal injury, caused by a filibuster, which might be remedied if the filibuster were declared unconstitutional. The standing of the President and of Senators raises more difficult questions than does the standing of a nominee. In Raines v. Byrd , the Court reviewed historical practice and concluded that constitutional disputes between the branches have generally not been resolved by the judiciary in cases brought by Members of Congress or presidents. Because the constitutionality of the filibuster is an issue in contention between the branches, the courts, applying Raines , might not accord standing to Senators or President Bush. Other issues, under Raines , arise in regard to the standing of Senators. Under Raines , to challenge executive branch action or the constitutionality of a public law, a Member must assert a personal injury or an institutional injury amounting to nullification of a particular vote. In regard to the filibuster dispute, it is questionable whether a Senator has suffered either a personal injury or an institutional one that has the effect of nullifying a particular vote. Under Raines , the availability of some means of legislative redress precludes a finding of nullification, and a court might find that the possibility of amending the filibuster rule is a means of legislative redress, even though a proposed amendment to the rule could itself be the subject of a filibuster. Judicial review is not available where the matter is considered to be a political question within the province of the executive or legislative branch. "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; ... or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.... " The rule-making clause (Article I, Section 5, clause 2) is a textual commitment of authority to each House to make and interpret its own rules of proceedings. Notwithstanding this textual commitment, the political question doctrine will not preclude judicial review where there is a constitutional limitation imposed on the exercise of the authority at issue by the political branch. It might be argued that the political question doctrine bars judicial review of the constitutionality of the filibuster rule because the rulemaking clause permits the Senate to make its own rules, and the Constitution does not expressly limit debate. On the other hand, it might be argued that the political question doctrine does not preclude judicial review because the exercise of the rulemaking power is restricted since the entrenchment of the filibuster may be at odds with "constitutional principles limiting the ability of one Congress to bind another." The question of the constitutionality of the Senate filibuster of a judicial nomination has divided scholars and has not been addressed directly in any court ruling. The constitutionality of the filibuster of a judicial nomination turns on an assessment of whether the Senate's power to make rules governing its own proceedings is broad enough to apply the filibuster rule to nominations. Supporters and critics of the filibuster of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a simple majority of Senators has a constitutional right to proceed to a vote on a nomination. The constitutionality of the filibuster might be challenged in court, but it is uncertain whether such an action would be justiciable.

The Senate cloture rule requires a super-majority vote to terminate a filibuster (i.e., extended debate). The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President is to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, ... appoint" judges, does not impose a super-majority requirement for Senate confirmation. Critics of the Senate filibuster argue that a filibuster of a judicial nomination is unconstitutional in that it effectively requires a super-majority vote for confirmation, although the Appointments Clause does not require such a super-majority vote. It has been argued that the Senate's constitutional power to determine the rules of its proceedings, as well as historical practice, provide the foundation for the filibuster. The question of the constitutionality of the filibuster of a judicial nomination turns on an assessment of whether the Senate's power to make rules governing its own proceedings is broad enough to apply the filibuster rule to nominations. Several factors have the effect of entrenching the filibuster (i.e., making it possible to filibuster a proposed amendment to the rules). Supporters and critics of the filibuster of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a simple majority of Senators has a constitutional right to proceed to a vote on a nomination. The constitutionality of the filibuster might be challenged in court, but it is uncertain whether such an action would be justiciable (i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution). Standing and the political question doctrine would be the primary justiciability issues raised by a court challenge to the filibuster rule. (Note: This report was originally written by [author name scrubbed], Legislative Attorney.)

On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court agreed to review Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. EPA , setting the stage for the Court's first pronouncements in a global warming case. In the decision below, the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to EPA's denial of a rulemaking petition under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The denied petition, filed by numerous states and environmental groups, requested EPA to impose limits on four pollutants emitted by new motor vehicles, owing to the alleged contributions of those emissions to global warming. In resolving the case, the Court might address, among other things, Article III standing doctrine; whether the CAA reaches the global warming impacts of motor vehicle emissions; and the latitude allowed an agency to inject policy considerations into its decisions when the governing statute makes no mention of them. In 1999, some 20 non-profit groups petitioned EPA to regulate emissions of "greenhouse gasses" (GHGs)—specifically, CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons—from new motor vehicles. The petition cited the agency's alleged mandatory duty to do so under CAA section 202(a)(1), which directs the EPA Administrator to prescribe emission standards for "any air pollutant" from new motor vehicles "which, in his judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Petitioners argued that the GHGs above are "air pollutants" within the meaning of the CAA, citing the EPA General Counsel's opinion to that effect from 1998. In addition, they contended, EPA already has made findings that GHGs from motor vehicles "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare," a standard that does not require complete certainty. Further, the CAA's definition of "welfare" includes effects on "weather" and "climate." Thus, they concluded, EPA not only may, but must , regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202(a)(1). In 2003, after receiving almost 50,000 comments, EPA denied the petition. Much of its rationale followed a new EPA General Counsel opinion, issued the same day, reversing the 1998 General Counsel opinion by denying that GHGs are "air pollutants" under the CAA. In support of non-coverage, the new opinion made arguments drawing on both the CAA and other sources. As for CAA-based arguments, the new opinion points out that although three provisions in the 1990 CAA amendments expressly touch on global warming, none of them authorizes regulation; instead they seek to learn more about the problem. Moreover, the CAA contains a separate program explicitly addressing stratospheric ozone depletion, showing that Congress understands the need for specifically tailored solutions to global atmospheric issues such as global warming, rather than leaving such issues to the general regulatory structure in the CAA. As for arguments based outside the CAA, the new opinion contends that various congressional enactments from 1978 to 1990 reveal a Congress interested in developing a foundation for considering whether future legislative action on global warming was warranted. Also, the conclusion of the 1998 General Counsel memorandum that GHGs are "air pollutants" under the CAA was rendered prior to a key Supreme Court decision in 2000. That decision, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp ., held that when Congress makes facially broad grants of authority to agencies, they must be interpreted in light of the statute's purpose, structure, and history. This decision suggests, argued the new opinion, that the CAA should not be read to delegate an authority of such profound economic significance as the power to address global warming in so cryptic a fashion as CAA section 202. Beyond the above issues of CAA authority, EPA disagreed as a matter of Bush Administration policy with the mandatory-standards approach urged by petitioners. Not surprisingly, EPA, in rejecting the petition, endorsed President Bush' non-regulatory approach to global warming. EPA's denial of the section 202 petition in 2003 was challenged in the D.C. Circuit by twelve states (CA, CT, IL, MA, ME, NJ, NM, NY, OR, RI, VT, WA), three cities (New York, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.), two U.S. territories (American Samoa and Northern Mariana Islands), and several environmental groups. Opposing the suit, besides EPA, were ten state intervenors (AK, ID, KS, MI, ND, NE, OH, SD, TX, UT), plus several automobile- and truck-related trade groups. In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. EPA , in July 2005, a split panel rejected the challenge. The two judges supporting rejection, however, did so for different reasons. Judge Randolph, author of the lead opinion, bypassed the standing issue and assumed arguendo that EPA has CAA authority to regulate GHG emissions. He then proceeded to resolve whether EPA properly exercised its discretion in choosing not to wield that authority. As to this discretion issue, recall that CAA section 202(a)(1) directs the EPA Administrator to prescribe standards for any motor vehicle emissions that " in his judgment " cause harmful air pollution. Judge Randolph read "in his judgment" broadly to allow EPA consideration of not only "scientific uncertainty" about the effects of GHGs but also "policy considerations" that justified not regulating. Thus, EPA in his view was entitled to rely, as it did, on such factors as the existence of efforts to promote fuel cell and hybrid vehicles, and the fact that new motor vehicles are but one of many sources of GHG emissions, making regulation of vehicle GHG emissions an inefficient piecemeal approach to global warming. He concluded that EPA had properly exercised its 202(a)(1) discretion in denying the petition for rulemaking. By contrast, Judge Sentelle, the other judge supporting rejection of the petition, did not shy away from the standing question. Finding that petitioners had not suffered the requisite injury required for standing, he endorsed rejection of the petition. Finally, Judge Tatel in dissent asserted that at least one petitioner had standing. Massachusetts, he said, had shown the possibility of harm from global-warming-caused rising sea levels. On the merits, he held first that EPA has authority under section 202(a)(1) to regulate GHG emissions, noting the section's coverage of " any air pollutant." Second, he concluded that EPA's 202(a)(1) discretion does not extend to policy considerations, as Judge Randolph held, but relates exclusively to whether the emissions cause harmful air pollution. That being so, he concluded that EPA had not presented a lawful explanation of its decision not to regulate and would have remanded the petition denial to the agency. Judge Tatel, joined by Judge Rogers, also dissented from the court's later rejection (4-3) of the petitioners' request for rehearing en banc. On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. To divine how the Supreme Court might decide the case, one should start with the petition for certiorari's statement of the questions presented by the case and EPA's version of the questions presented in its brief in opposition. The standing issue. Standing is a ubiquitous threshold issue in global warming litigation, given the difficulty faced by plaintiffs in showing that their specific injuries were caused by the particular actions of the defendants in the case. Commonwealth of Massachusetts fits the mold. Petitioners, EPA argues, cannot establish two of the three elements of Article III standing: causation and redressability. As to causation, EPA describes petitioners' declarations as saying only that GHGs emitted from many different sources all over the world cause global warming. However, it points out, to have standing, petitioners must assert that the subject matter of this case—emissions of GHGs from new motor vehicles in the U.S.—causes or meaningfully contributes to their injuries. As to redressability, EPA argues that petitioners' declarations do not establish that a mere reduction in the specified GHGs will be sufficient to eliminate or reduce the injury they will suffer. The petitioners do not include standing among the questions presented and thus do not address it. The CAA authority issue. Should the Court get past the standing issue, the opening question on the merits goes to EPA authority: did Congress in section 202(a)(1) empower EPA to regulate new motor vehicle emissions based on their global warming effects? Petitioners argue that the CAA text could hardly be plainer. Section 202(a)(1), they note, requires EPA to promulgate emission standards for "any air pollutant" that causes endangerment. And the CAA definition of "air pollutant" as any "physical" or "chemical" substance that enters the ambient air surely includes GHGs. Finally, there is nothing special, petitioners assert, about the kind of harm GHGs produce that places them beyond the CAA, since section 202(a)(1) is triggered by endangerment of "welfare," a term defined by the act to include effects on "climate." The EPA General Counsel memorandum's effort to avoid this obvious textual mandate on the basis of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp , petitioners say, misreads that decision. In response, EPA notes that the authority question was not addressed by the majority judges below (nor by any other court) and that the Supreme Court rarely addresses an issue without the benefit of lower court explication. Thus, the agency contends, the Court should resolve this case on either standing grounds or the "in his judgment" issue (below). If the Court reaches the authority question, EPA maintains, Brown & Williamson counsels that the CAA be read as a whole, and doing so shows that the act does not confer authority on EPA to regulate emissions for the purpose of reducing global warming. The "in his judgment"/policy considerations issue. This question asks whether, as Judge Randolph found below, EPA may decline to issue the emission standards here for policy reasons not enumerated in CAA section 202(a)(1). Petitioners, of course, argue to the contrary. The "in his judgment" phrase in 202(a)(1), they say, refers only to the EPA Administrator's judgment whether public health or welfare may reasonably be anticipated to be endangered by the pollution—not to the many other considerations, many of a policy nature, that EPA cited in rejecting the petition to the agency. Section 202(a)(1)'s narrow focus is made all the more clear, argue petitioners, by the contrast with other provisions in section 202 that do mention factors other than endangerment of public health or welfare. "By allowing EPA to import into section 202(a)(1) policy factors not mentioned there," argue petitioners, "the appeals court has sanctioned a large-scale ... shift of power from Congress ... to the agency." In response, EPA's brief stressed one particular reason the agency had cited for rejecting the rulemaking petition: the assertedly uncertain state of the scientific record on global warming and EPA's desire to have the benefit of ongoing research. Surely, EPA's brief argues, the "in his judgment" phrase in section 202(a)(1) allows EPA to consider those factors in deciding whether to make an endangerment finding. EPA also points out the particular deference that courts owe agencies as to their decisions whether to grant rulemaking petitions. The federal brief, however, contains little discussion of the several policy factors on which the EPA General Counsel memorandum and Judge Randolph relied, and that, arguably, is the nub of the issue. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Commonwealth of Massachusetts was an unusual one for the Supreme Court to accept, given that few of the factors that have traditionally interested the Court in hearing a case are present. There is no split in the circuits, and the decision has little precedent value in that no rationale commanded the support of a majority of the D.C. Circuit judges. To be sure, however, cases presenting issues of unusual importance, as Commonwealth of Massachusetts assuredly does, are more likely to be accepted. Given that the Court has accepted the case, the three issues above suggest some ways the Court could rule. First, it could find that the petitioners lack standing. Environmental interests and standing doctrine have long had a tumultuous relationship in the Supreme Court, and the nature of global warming exacerbates the difficulties. As in the acid rain and toxic-exposure cases of decades ago, global warming is said to be caused by multiple actors (millions of GHG emitters around the globe) whose actions, possibly combined with natural phenomena, intermix in complex ways to cause adverse effects after a very long time. Linking a particular cause and a particular effect in this context may be quite difficult. Certainly Justice Scalia, the leader of the Court's efforts to narrow standing in a series of 1990s decisions, would be inclined to rule against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts petitioners on standing grounds. Alternatively, the Supreme Court might use the case to clarify when a court may, as Judge Randolph did, bypass its general edict that jurisdictional issues such as standing be addressed first, in order to decide the case on an easy merits issue. If the standing hurdle is surmounted, petitioners' case still could fall on either of the statutory issues raised in the briefs: whether "any air pollutant" includes emissions regulated on the basis of their global warming effects and whether "in his judgment" allows EPA considerations of factors other than those going to whether the pollutant endangers public health or welfare. In addition, there is an issue, sometimes raised in administrative law cases, whether the EPA Administrator has a mandatory duty to issue the "judgment" that triggers section 202(a)(1) regulation once he comes into possession of data allowing him to make it. Because this issue has not been raised by the parties, one suspects the Supreme Court will not address it. In sum, there are multiple ways the Court could resolve Commonwealth of Massachusetts or remand to the D.C. Circuit for that court to resolve. It is highly unlikely that the litigation will result in a direct judicial order to EPA to regulate new-motor-vehicle GHG emissions; at most, if petitioners win, one or another court will require additional determinations by the agency. Should regulation of motor-vehicle GHG emissions be the ultimate result, however, it would increase the pressure on EPA to regulate the GHG emissions of stationary sources (powerplants and factories) as well. A decision by the Supreme Court is expected by June 2007.

On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court agreed to review Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. EPA, a global warming-related case. In the decision below, the D.C. Circuit rejected 2-1 a challenge to EPA's denial of a petition under the Clean Air Act requesting the agency to limit four pollutants emitted by new motor vehicles, owing to their alleged contribution to global warming. In resolving the case, the Court might address, among other things, Article III standing doctrine; whether the Clean Air Act reaches the global warming impacts of motor vehicle emissions; and the latitude allowed an agency to inject policy considerations into its decisions when the governing statute makes no mention of them. It is unlikely, even should petitioners in the Supreme Court gain a favorable ruling, that the case will result in a direct order by the Court that EPA regulate the global warming impacts of auto emissions.

When a Senator introduces a bill or joint resolution, the measure is usually referred to committee, pursuant to provisions of Senate Rules XIV, XVII, and XXV. When the House informs the Senate that it has passed a bill or joint resolution that was introduced in the House, and the Senate receives the measure, the measure is also usually referred to a Senate committee. (Senate rules contain procedures for processing concurrent and simple resolutions (Rule XIV, paragraph 6), treaties (Rule XXX), and nominations (Rule XXXI), which are not covered in this report.) Senate Rule XIV, paragraph 2 requires that bills and resolutions have three readings before passage, and that they be read twice before being referred to committee. (The "third reading" occurs before a vote on final passage.) Although a Senator may demand (under paragraph 2) that the readings occur on three different legislative days, bills and joint resolutions may be read twice on the same day "for reference" (referral) if there is no objection (under paragraph 3). Most bills and resolutions are read twice and referred to committee on the same day that they are introduced by a Senator or received from the House. The Senate may, however, use provisions of Senate Rule XIV to bypass referral of a bill or joint resolution to a Senate committee in order to have the measure placed directly on the Senate Calendar of Business. The calendar's General Orders section lists measures eligible for Senate floor consideration. Broadly, the two purposes of preventing the referral of a bill or joint resolution to a committee and placing it directly on the calendar are (1) to facilitate the full Senate's opportunity to consider the measure; or (2) to bypass a committee's potential inaction or, to the measure's sponsor, potential hostile action. Although placing a bill or joint resolution directly on the calendar does not guarantee that the full Senate will ever consider it, the measure is available for floor consideration and certain procedural steps, such as committee reporting or discharging a committee from a bill's consideration, and procedural requirements, such as the two-day availability of a committee report, may be obviated. In this report, the terms bill ( s ) or measure ( s ) refer to bills and joint resolutions. Senate Rule XIV, paragraph 4, states: "... every bill and joint resolution introduced on leave, and every bill and joint resolution of the House of Representatives which shall have received a first and second reading without being referred to a committee, shall, if objection be made to further proceeding thereon, be placed on the Calendar ." ( Emphasis added .) Therefore, through objection, a bill or joint resolution after two readings is prevented from being referred to committee and is placed directly on the calendar. It is usually the majority leader (or another Senator in his stead), acting on his own or at the request of any other Senator, who objects to "further proceeding"—committee referral—on a measure. For example, this procedure was used to place S. 1035 directly on the calendar. On April 21, 2015, the presiding officer recognized Majority Leader McConnell for this colloquy with the chair: Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I understand that there is a bill at the desk, and I ask for its first reading. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the bill by title for the first time. The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A bill ( S. 1035 ) to extend authority relating to roving surveillance, access to business records, and individual terrorists as agents of foreign powers under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and for other purposes. Mr. McCONNELL. I now ask for a second reading and, in order to place the bill on the calendar under the provisions of rule XIV, I object to my own request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection having been heard, the bill will be read for the second time on the next legislative day. In the next edition of the Senate's Calendar of Business on April 22, this action was recorded in the section Bills and Joint Resolutions Read the First Time. The measure was pending at the desk (of the presiding officer). Since objection had been heard to the second reading, the presiding officer recognized Majority Leader McConnell the next legislative day, April 22: Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I understand there is a bill at the desk due for a second reading. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the bill by title for the second time. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill ( S. 1035 ) to extend authority relating to roving surveillance, access to business records, and individual terrorists as agents of foreign powers under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and for other purposes. Mr. McCONNELL. In order to place the bill on the calendar under the provisions of rule XIV, I object to further proceedings. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection having been heard, the bill will be placed on the calendar. S. 1035 had received its second reading, but there was objection to further proceeding on referral of the bill to committee. The presiding officer, under Rule XIV, ordered that the bill be placed on the Senate Calendar. In the calendar beginning April 23, S. 1035 appeared as Calendar Order No. 60 in the section General Orders, with other measures eligible for floor consideration. This same procedure is followed to have House-passed bills and joint resolutions placed directly on the Senate Calendar. Bills and joint resolutions are also sometimes placed on the calendar by unanimous consent. (For a fuller examination of the Senate's use of the Rule XIV procedure and other procedures and actions to bypass committees, and also both to bypass committees and pass legislation, see CRS Report RS22299, Bypassing Senate Committees: Rule XIV and Unanimous Consent , by Michael L. Koempel.)

When a Senator introduces a bill or joint resolution, or a House-passed bill or joint resolution is received in the Senate from the House, the measure is often referred to committee, pursuant to provisions of Senate Rules XIV, XVII, and XXV. The Senate may, however, use provisions of Senate Rule XIV to bypass referral of a bill or joint resolution to a Senate committee, and have the measure placed directly on the Senate Calendar of Business. Although placing a bill or joint resolution directly on the calendar does not guarantee that the full Senate will ever consider it, the measure is available for floor consideration and certain procedural steps or requirements may be obviated. Such procedural steps include committee reporting or discharging a committee from a bill's consideration, and such procedural requirements include the two-day availability of a committee report. Senate rules contain procedures for processing concurrent and simple resolutions, treaties, and nominations, which are not covered in this report. A Senator may also offer a germane, relevant, or nongermane amendment to a measure pending on the Senate floor, in addition to or instead of introducing a bill or joint resolution. Amendments are also not covered in this report. This report will not be updated again in the 115th Congress unless Senate procedures change. For a fuller examination of the Senate's use of the Rule XIV procedure and other procedures and actions to bypass committees, and also both to bypass committees and pass legislation, see CRS Report RS22299, Bypassing Senate Committees: Rule XIV and Unanimous Consent, by Michael L. Koempel.

Afghanistan has been a central U.S. foreign policy concern since American forces, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, helped lead a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored it. Since then, the United States, along with NATO and other international partners, has deployed tens of thousands of troops and provided tens of billions of dollars in development assistance. The overarching goal of this effort is to support the elected Afghan government and bolster its security forces against a resilient insurgency by the Taliban and others, including (since 2014) an active affiliate of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh ). After an Afghan opposition coalition known as the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban government out of Kabul with the help of American airpower and a small number of U.S. special forces, the U.N. convened Afghan leaders in Bonn, Germany to lay out a roadmap for the creation of a democratic government in Afghanistan. Taliban representatives were not invited to participate in the meetings in Bonn. That conference established an interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai, and called for a June 2002 emergency loya jirga (a traditional Afghan consultative assembly). Another loya jirga was convened in late 2003 to endorse a new constitution, which was ratified in January 2004. Afghanistan held its first presidential election in October 2004, and Karzai was elected with 55% of the vote. The first parliamentary elections followed in September 2005. Sporadic Taliban attacks continued during this time, with U.S. intelligence collecting evidence of an "organized Taliban revival" by early 2004. Under intense U.S. pressure most Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters had fled into Pakistan, where they helped to inspire an Islamist insurgency that would later drive the Pakistani state into full-scale crisis. At the same time as they battled Al Qaeda and other Islamist militants at home, Pakistan's security institutions aided the Afghan Taliban, including by providing safe haven to much of its leadership, a legacy of Pakistan's formal recognition of the group from 1996 to 2001. By 2007, despite nascent democratic development and improvements in most Afghans' quality of life, the American effort in Afghanistan, once described as "the good war," appeared "off course," with security deteriorating, narcotics production increasing, and levels of Taliban violence steadily rising. In response, President Barack Obama increased the number of American forces (from approximately 36,000 in February 2009 to a high of about 100,000 in 2011) as part of an effort to combat the Taliban insurgency and increase the capacity of the Afghan government and security forces. Most security metrics improved during the "surge," but uncertainty rose as Afghan forces took the lead for security nationwide (in mid-2013) amidst a steady drawdown of U.S. and international forces as part of a planned withdrawal. That uncertainty was compounded by the 2014 presidential election, which was marred by widespread allegations of fraud and was only resolved with the creation of a fragile unity government formed after months of U.S. mediation. Still, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2003-2014) mission was replaced by Resolute Support Mission (RSM, 2015-present) at the end of 2014 as scheduled. The killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour (successor to original Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who died of natural causes in 2013) in a May 2016 U.S. airstrike in Pakistan demonstrated continued Taliban vulnerabilities to U.S. military and intelligence capabilities. At the same time, the Taliban expanded their control and influence in rural areas while pressuring urban centers (as evidenced by their brief seizure of the provincial capital of Kunduz in 2015). President Donald Trump expressed few policy positions on Afghanistan during the 2016 presidential campaign, though he had previously conveyed skepticism about the American effort there. After months of debate within the Administration, President Trump announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia in a nationwide address on August 21, 2017. The strategy features a tougher line against Pakistan and a larger role for India; no set timetables; expanded targeting authorities for U.S. forces; and around 3,000 additional troops, bringing the total number of U.S. forces in the country to approximately 14,000-15,000 (about 8,500 of which are part of RSM). President Trump, who criticized his predecessor's use of "arbitrary timetables," did not specify what conditions on the ground might necessitate or allow for alterations to the strategy going forward. Some have characterized the Trump strategy as "short on details" and serving "only to perpetuate a dangerous status quo." Others welcomed the strategy, contrasting it favorably with proposed alternatives such as a full withdrawal of U.S. forces, which President Trump described as his "original instinct," or a strategy that relies heavily on contractors. More than a year after President Trump's speech, it remains unclear to what extent the new strategy has changed dynamics on the ground in Afghanistan. While U.S. officials continue to publicly express optimism, the extent of territory controlled or contested by the Taliban has steadily grown in recent years by most measures. In its July 30, 2018, report, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that the share of districts under government control or influence remains at 56%, tied for the lowest level recorded in the two years SIGAR has tracked that metric, with 14% under insurgent control or influence, and the remaining 30% contested. While most Taliban gains have been in sparsely populated rural or mountainous areas, the group has also been able to contest urban centers; militants have briefly overrun two provincial capitals in 2018 thus far (Farah in May, Ghazni in August). Additionally, the Taliban have demonstrated an ability to conduct operations in different parts of the country simultaneously and inflict significant casualties on Afghan forces, though the U.S. military classified those figures and various other metrics related to ANDSF performance in 2017. Reflecting the Trump Administration's reported frustration with the 17-year-old U.S. war effort, 2018 has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity that may portend progress toward peace talks. Most importantly, the Trump Administration is reportedly considering direct talks with the Taliban in what would represent a significant change in American policy. Other reports, which U.S. officials have not denied, indicate that at least some preliminary discussions between U.S. and Taliban officials have already taken place. However, the Afghan government, or some of its members, may be opposed to any negotiation with the Taliban in which they are not the lead interlocutor, and the Taliban's own stance on negotiations is unclear. Ongoing disputes between Afghan leaders may worsen in advance of long-delayed and already controversial parliamentary elections, set for October 2018, and the presidential election slated for April 2019. In the decade before the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, Afghanistan was not a major focus of congressional attention. Since then, Congress has taken an active role in shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. Major initiatives and areas of congressional interest are described below. U.S. military forces deployed into Afghanistan under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40 ), which allows the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11, 2001, attacks as well as any entities that harbored them. The Taliban regime collapsed after about two months of major combat operations. U.S. operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the local Islamic State affiliate continue under that resolution, though Members have proposed a range of measures to replace the 2001 AUMF with a new authorization that could alter U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, as outlined in the chart below. After the fall of the Taliban, U.S. efforts shifted quickly to providing humanitarian support to the Afghan people, stabilizing the country, and building up a democratic Afghan government. One of the most important congressional measures in this regard was the 2002 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA, P.L. 107-327 ), which authorized a total of $3.8 billion in humanitarian, developmental, counter-narcotics, and security assistance over four years. The act contains a number of provisions directing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and establishing congressional oversight thereof; many of these provisions anticipate additional congressional directives enacted in subsequent years. Such provisions include the authorization of funds for specific purposes (including the creation of positions within executive branch agencies; see below); regular notification and reporting requirements; and subjecting aid to Afghanistan to the same conditions as assistance provided under other pieces of legislation, like the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export and Control Act of 1976. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 largely overshadowed the war in Afghanistan, and much of the legislative attention to Afghanistan in the subsequent several years came in bills and legislative provisions that treated the two wars together. As conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated, however, congressional attention returned to Afghanistan and some Members sought to scrutinize the U.S.-led international project there more closely. Congress mandated a number of reports, which remain among the most important sources for information on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. One of the most significant congressional oversight actions was the 2008 establishment of a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), modeled in part on a similar office overseeing Iraq. Congress directed that SIGAR publish quarterly reports detailing the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated for Afghan reconstruction. Congress also required periodic audits and investigations of specific projects and funds. The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) added more reporting requirements. Section 1230 of the Act directed the President, through the Department of Defense, to submit a biannual report on "Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan." The first report was submitted under that title in June 2009. In the FY2015 NDAA ( P.L. 113-291 ), Congress required a report on "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," among other reporting requirements, and biannual reports have been submitted under that title since June 2015 (most recently on July 3, 2018). In addition to these ongoing reports, Congress has regularly mandated the submission of one-time reports on specific issues in appropriations and defense authorization bills. Individual report directives proposed to and included in legislation in the 115 th Congress can be found below. Congress has appropriated $126.3 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan s ince FY2002 , according to SIGAR's July 30, 2017 quarterly report. During the Karzai administration, the United States and oth e r international donors "increasingly sought to condition assist ance funds for Afghanistan… as a result of inadequate reforms." A 2014 report by m ajority s taff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also recommended that "a higher proportion of U.S. assistance should be conditioned based on specific reforms by the Afghan government." Accordingly, Congress has imposed a number of directives and conditions on the use of both security and development assistance to Afghanistan (e.g. , Economic Support Fund, ESF, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE) for a number of years. Most of those statutory conditions have been enacted through appropriations measures. As outlined below, FY 2019 appropriations bills would prohibit the use of funds for activities that involve individuals suspected of involvement in corruption, narcotics trafficking, or human rights violations . A dditionally, they would require the Secretary of State to certify that the Afghan government is governing democratically , protect ing women's rights, and publicly reporting its national budget (among other conditions) before obligating funds . T here are a number of additional conditions on U.S. assistance not specific to Afghanistan, such as the Leahy Laws prohibiting security assistance to foreign security forces that have perpetrated a gross violation of human rights. S ome have suggested that Afghan forces may have committed such violations . Congress has also played an important role in shaping the bureaucratic structures within the executive branch that are responsible for U.S. policy on Afghanistan. In the 2002 AFSA, Congress authorized the creation of a "coordinator" for Afghanistan and U.S. assistance there, to serve at the rank of ambassador. In 2007, the House passed a bill that would have authorized a Senate-confirmed special envoy to promote cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The George W. Bush Administration described the section authorizing the special envoy as "significantly objectionable," and the Senate did not take up the bill." In 2009, however, the Obama Administration created a similar position under State Department general authorities by appointing Richard Holbrooke as the first Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). Various congressional proposals in recent years would have statutorily authorized, altered the mission of, required reporting on, or otherwise addressed the office, which the Trump Administration closed in September 2017. Other congressional measures have sought to condition, limit, or end the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan. While no measure limiting or terminating the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan has ever passed either chamber, support for such proposals in the House of Representatives generally seems to have grown from 2009 to 2014, the period when most of these measures were introduced. House bills calling for a "responsible end to the war in Afghanistan," for example, attracted 33 cosponsors in 2010 and 72 cosponsors in 2011; NDAA amendments that would have cut off funding for U.S. operations (other than the withdrawal of U.S. forces) attracted 113 and 153 votes in 2012 and 2014, respectively. Since the Trump Administration's announcement of the South Asia strategy in August 2017, congressional interest in Afghanistan seems to have increased, with some Members assessing the new strategy, events on the ground, and broader U.S. foreign and domestic policy interests as they relate to Afghanistan. The table below provides summaries and information on the status of proposed and enacted Afghanistan-related legislation in the 115 th Congress.

For nearly two decades, Congress has shaped the U.S. approach to Afghanistan and the ongoing conflict there. This product provides a summary of legislative proposals considered in the 115th Congress that relate to U.S. policy in Afghanistan. These address a number of issues, including the following. The size, mission, and other aspects of the U.S. troop presence in the country. Types of information that the executive branch provides to Congress, largely as part of regular reporting requirements. The role of women in Afghan society, government, and the military. The purposes for U.S. aid, and conditions under which it can be obligated. The overall U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, including prospects for a negotiated settlement. Regional dynamics, including the role of Russia in Afghanistan. While Pakistan is a key player in the Afghan conflict, the measures described in this report do not include any primarily related to Pakistan, though many such proposals reference the war in Afghanistan. This report also does not include legislative proposals related to special immigrant visas for Afghan nationals who work for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan. For more on that program, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs, by Andorra Bruno. For more information on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief, by Clayton Thomas.

During the Obama Administration, the two federal agencies primarily responsible for administering the private health insurance provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) within the Treasury Department—took a series of actions to delay, extend, or otherwise modify the law's implementation. This report discusses selected administrative actions taken by CMS and the IRS through February 2015 to address ACA implementation. The report is no longer being updated and is available primarily for reference purposes. Table 1 summarizes the more significant administrative actions taken, all of which focused on implementation of the ACA's complex set of interconnected provisions to expand private insurance coverage for the medically uninsured and underinsured. These actions were not the result of a single policy decision. Instead, they represented many separate decisions taken by the Obama Administration to address a variety of factors affecting the implementation of specific provisions of the law. The Administration announced a series of delays and other changes before and during the first (i.e., 2014) open enrollment period and the problematic launch of the federal—and some state-run—exchanges. The second (i.e., 2015) open enrollment period that closed on February 15, 2015, experienced far fewer administrative and technical problems. Other administrative actions largely focused on the ACA's tax provisions. The 2014 tax filing season (deadline April 15, 2015) was the first one in which individuals were required to indicate on their tax return whether they had health insurance coverage that meets the ACA's standards. Those without coverage risked being penalized unless they could claim an exemption. In addition, everyone who enrolled in coverage for 2014 through an exchange and received advance payments of the premium tax credit had to file a federal tax return in which they reconciled those payments with the actual tax credit to which they were entitled. In compiling the table, CRS made decisions about which administrative actions to include, and which ones to leave out. Generally, CRS included the more significant actions that had been the subject of debate among health policy analysts and, in many instances, the target of criticism by opponents of the ACA. It is important to keep in mind that the table is not—nor was it intended to be—a comprehensive list of ACA-related administrative actions. The table entries, which are grouped under general topic headings, are not organized in any particular priority order. Each entry includes a brief summary of the action and some accompanying explanatory material and comments to help provide additional context. Where available, links are provided to relevant regulatory and guidance documents online. Readers are encouraged to review these documents for more details about each action, including the motivation and legal authority for taking it. A companion CRS report summarizes all the legislative actions taken by the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the ACA. Perhaps the most controversial administrative action taken by the Administration was its decision to delay enforcement of the ACA's "employer mandate." On July 9, 2013, the IRS announced that it would not take any enforcement action against employers who fail to comply with the law's employer mandate until the beginning of 2015 (see Table 1 ). This ACA provision, which took effect on January 1, 2014, requires employers with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) to offer their full-time workers health coverage that meets certain standards of affordability and minimum value. Those employers who do not provide such coverage risk having to pay a penalty if one or more of their employees obtain subsidized coverage through an exchange. The IRS subsequently announced that employers with at least 50 but fewer than 100 FTEs will have an additional year to comply with the employer mandate (see Table 1 ). According to the Administration, these actions were taken after it was concluded that the ACA's employer mandate could not be enforced until the related requirement that employers report the coverage they offer to their employees had been fully implemented. The IRS indicated that it would work with stakeholders to simplify the reporting process consistent with effective implementation of the law. Other controversial administrative actions include those taken in response to the decision by insurers to cancel individual and small-group health plans that do not meet the ACA's new standards for health insurance coverage, which also took effect on January 1, 2014. On November 14, 2013, the Administration notified state insurance commissioners of the option to delay enforcement of certain health insurance reforms under the ACA. It encouraged state officials to permit insurers to renew noncompliant policies in the individual and small-group market for policy years starting between January 1, 2014, and October 1, 2014. The Administration subsequently extended this policy for two years. Thus, at the option of state regulators, insurers could continue to renew noncompliant policies at any time through October 1, 2016 (see Table 1 ). The Administration was criticized for creating numerous special enrollment periods that enable individuals to enroll in an exchange plan outside the annual open enrollment period. Individuals can qualify for a special enrollment period as a result of a variety of events that affect their ability to obtain or maintain health insurance coverage (e.g., moving, losing job-based coverage, gaining legal U.S. residency). Special enrollment periods were also established for individuals unable to begin or complete the process of enrolling in an exchange plan before the end of the open enrollment period because of technical problems or other circumstances. State-run exchanges were encouraged to adopt special enrollment periods similar to the ones established for federally facilitated exchanges. In addition, the Administration established numerous hardship exemptions from the ACA's "individual mandate" penalty. Under the law, most U.S. citizens and legal residents are required to maintain ACA-compliant health coverage beginning in 2014. Those without coverage for three or more consecutive months are subject to a penalty unless they meet one of the statutory exemptions, or qualify for one of the health coverage-related or hardship exemptions established by CMS. In some instances the hardship exemption is tied to qualifying for a special enrollment period. For example, individuals who qualified for a special enrollment period to finish enrolling in an exchange plan after the 2014 open enrollment period closed on March 31, 2014, were granted a hardship exemption so that they would not be penalized for being uninsured for the first four months of the year (see Table 1 ). Opponents of the ACA, who believe that the law is fundamentally flawed, argued that some of the Obama Administration's actions were effectively rewriting the ACA in an effort to make it work and add to the public's confusion about the law. The ACA's critics asserted that the actions taken by the Administration to delay enforcement of the employer mandate were illegal and raised concerns that the President was not upholding his constitutional duty to faithfully execute federal law. The Administration countered that its actions were not a refusal to implement and enforce the ACA as written. Instead, they represented temporary corrections necessary to ensure the effective implementation of a very large and complex law. Agency officials pointed to a number of factors that made it difficult to meet various ACA deadlines. Those factors included a lack of appropriations to help fund implementation activities, technological problems including the poorly managed launch of the websites for the federally facilitated exchanges and some state-run exchanges, and the need to phase in the various interconnected parts of the law so as to avoid unnecessary disruption of employment and insurance markets. Regarding the delay of the employer mandate, the Administration said that its actions were no different from those taken by previous administrations faced with the challenges of implementing a complicated law. The Administration noted that its decision to grant employers "transition relief," taken pursuant to administrative authority under the Internal Revenue Code to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations" to administer tax laws, was part of an established practice to provide relief to taxpayers who might otherwise struggle to comply with new tax law. Notwithstanding the Administration's arguments, critics question whether some of the recent delays of ACA provisions exceed the executive's traditional discretion in enforcing law to the point that they represent a blatant disregard of the law. For example, they argue that the decision to encourage states to allow insurers to renew noncompliant policies for people who want to keep their current plans directly contravenes provisions of the ACA that had become politically inconvenient. On July 30, 2014, the House voted 225-201 to approve a resolution ( H.Res. 676 ) authorizing Speaker John Boehner, on behalf of the House, to sue the President or other executive branch officials for failing to "to act in a manner consistent with [their] duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to implementation of the [ACA]." The Speaker indicated that any such lawsuit would specifically challenge the Administration's delay of the ACA employer mandate. "In 2013, the President changed the health care law without a vote of Congress, effectively creating his own law by literally waiving the employer mandate and the penalties for failing to comply with it," said Mr. Boehner. A lawsuit was filed on November 21, 2014, consisting of two counts. First, it claimed that the Administration had violated the Constitution by delaying the ACA employer mandate. Second, the lawsuit challenged the ACA's cost-sharing subsidies. These are paid to insurance companies to reduce the out-of-pocket health care costs of certain individuals and their families receiving premium tax credits. Unlike the premium tax credits, for which the ACA provided a permanent appropriation, the lawsuit argues that the law did not appropriate any funding for the cost-sharing subsidies.

During the Obama Administration, the two federal agencies primarily responsible for administering the private health insurance provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) within the Treasury Department—took a series of actions to delay, extend, or otherwise modify the law's implementation. This report summarizes selected administrative actions taken by CMS and the IRS through February 2015 to address ACA implementation. The report is no longer being updated and is available primarily for reference purposes. A companion product—CRS Report R43289—summarizes all the legislative actions taken by the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the ACA. The most significant administrative action was the decision by the IRS to delay implementation of the law's "employer mandate." This ACA provision, which took effect on January 1, 2014, requires employers with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) to offer their full-time workers health coverage that meets certain standards of affordability and minimum value. Those employers who do not provide such coverage risk having to pay a penalty if one or more of their employees obtain subsidized coverage through an exchange. The IRS announced that it would not take any enforcement action against employers who fail to comply with the law's employer mandate until the beginning of 2015. Subsequently, the agency announced that employers with at least 50 but fewer than 100 FTEs would have an additional year to comply with the employer mandate. Other controversial administrative actions include those taken in response to the decision by insurers to cancel individual and small-group health plans that do not meet the ACA's standards for health insurance coverage, which also took effect on January 1, 2014. Opponents of the ACA argued that these administrative actions were an attempt to rewrite the law in order to make it work. They asserted that some of the Administration's actions were illegal and raised concerns that the President was not upholding his constitutional duty to faithfully execute federal law. The Administration countered that its actions were authorized by federal law and represented temporary corrections necessary to ensure the effective implementation of a very large and complex act. On July 30, 2014, the House approved a resolution (H.Res. 676) authorizing Speaker John Boehner, on behalf of the House, to sue the President or other executive branch officials for failing to "to act in a manner consistent with [their] duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to implementation of the [ACA]." A lawsuit was filed on November 21, 2014, consisting of two counts. First, it claimed that the Administration had violated the Constitution by delaying the ACA employer mandate. Second, the lawsuit challenged the Administration's authority to pay cost-sharing subsidies, arguing that the law had not appropriated any funding for them.

This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973 through 2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. Federal statute provides that the Director of the FBI is to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. When there is a vacancy or an anticipated vacancy, the President begins the appointment process by selecting and vetting his preferred candidate for the position. The vetting process for presidential appointments includes an FBI background check and financial disclosure. The President then submits the nomination to the Senate, where it is referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Committee on the Judiciary usually holds hearings on a nomination for the FBI Director. The committee may then vote to report the nomination back to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Once reported, the nomination is available for Senate consideration. If the Senate confirms the nomination, the individual is formally appointed to the position by the President. Prior to the implementation of the current nomination and confirmation process, J. Edgar Hoover was Director of the FBI for nearly 48 years. He held the position from May 10, 1924, until his death on May 2, 1972. The current process dates from 1968, when the FBI Director was first established as a presidentially appointed position requiring Senate confirmation in an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The proposal for a presidentially appointed Director had been introduced and passed in the Senate twice previously, but had never made it through the House. Floor debate in the Senate focused on the inevitable end of Hoover's tenure (due to his advanced age), the vast expansion of the FBI's size and role under his direction, and the need for Congress to strengthen its oversight role in the wake of his departure. In 1976, the 10-year limit for any one incumbent was added as part of the Crime Control Act of 1976. This provision also prohibits the reappointment of an incumbent. As with the previous measure, the Senate had introduced and passed this provision twice previously, but it had failed to pass the House. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn. Due to a 2011 statute allowing for the reappointment of a specific incumbent, two of the eight confirmed nominations were of the same person, Robert S. Mueller III. Each of these nominations is shown in Table 1 and discussed below. L. Patrick Gray III. On the day after the death of long-time Director J. Edgar Hoover, L. Patrick Gray was appointed acting Director. President Richard M. Nixon nominated Gray to be Director on February 21, 1973. Over the course of nine days, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the nomination. Although Gray's nomination was supported by some in the Senate, his nomination ran into trouble during the hearings as other Senators expressed concern about partisanship, lack of independence from the White House, and poor handling of the Watergate investigation. The President withdrew the nomination on April 17, and Gray resigned as acting Director on April 27, 1973. Clarence M. Kelley. Clarence M. Kelley was the first individual to become FBI Director through the nomination and confirmation process. A native of Missouri, Kelley was a 21-year veteran of the FBI, becoming chief of the Memphis field office. He was serving as Kansas City police chief when President Nixon nominated him on June 8, 1973. During the three days of confirmation hearings, Senators appeared satisfied that Kelley would maintain nonpartisan independence from the White House and be responsive to their concerns. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary approved the nomination unanimously the following day. He was sworn in by the President on July 9, 1973. Kelly remained FBI Director until his retirement on February 23, 1978. Frank M. Johnson Jr. With the anticipated retirement of Clarence Kelley, President Jimmy Carter nominated U.S. District Court Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. of Alabama, on September 30, 1977. Johnson faced serious health problems around the time of his nomination, however, and the President withdrew the nomination on December 15, 1977. William H. Webster. In the aftermath of the withdrawn Johnson nomination, President Carter nominated U.S. Court of Appeals Judge William H. Webster to be Director on January 20, 1978. Prior to his service on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Webster had been U.S. Attorney and then U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. After two days of hearings, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary unanimously approved the nomination and reported it to the Senate. The Senate confirmed the nomination on February 9, 1978, and Webster was sworn in on February 23, 1978. He served as Director of the FBI until he was appointed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in May 1987. William S. Sessions. On September 9, 1987, President Ronald W. Reagan nominated William S. Sessions, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court of Western Texas, to replace Webster. Prior to his service on the bench, Sessions had worked as chief of the Government Operations Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and as U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas. Following a one-day hearing, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary unanimously recommended confirmation. The Senate confirmed the nomination, without opposition, on September 25, and Sessions was sworn in on November 2, 1987. Sessions was the first of two FBI Directors to be removed from office. President William J. Clinton removed Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, citing "serious questions ... about the conduct and the leadership of the Director," and a report on "certain conduct" issued by the Office of Professional Responsibility at the Department of Justice. Some Members of Congress questioned the dismissal, but they did not prevent the immediate confirmation of Sessions's successor. Louis J. Freeh. President Clinton nominated former FBI agent, federal prosecutor, and U.S. District Court Judge Louis J. Freeh of New York as FBI Director on July 20, 1993, the day following Sessions's removal. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held one day of hearings and approved the nomination. The nomination was reported to the full Senate on August 3, and Freeh was confirmed on August 6, 1993. He was sworn in on September 1, 1993, and served until his voluntary resignation, which became effective June 25, 2001. Robert S. Mueller III. On July 18, 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Robert S. Mueller III to succeed Freeh. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held two days of hearings, and the nomination was reported on August 2, 2001. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on the same day by a vote of 98-0. Mueller had served as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California in San Francisco, and as the Acting Deputy U.S. Attorney General from January through May 2001. The former marine had also been U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts and served as a homicide prosecutor for the District of Columbia. Under President George Bush, Mueller was in charge of the Department of Justice's criminal division during the investigation of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the prosecution of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. From 1973 through 2016, Mueller was the only FBI Director to be appointed to more than one term. P.L. 112-24 , enacted on July 26, 2011, allowed the incumbent Director to be nominated for, and appointed to, an additional two-year term. After the bill was signed, Mueller was nominated for this second term by President Barack Obama, and he was confirmed the following day by a vote of 100-0. Mueller's two-year term expired on September 4, 2013. James B. Comey Jr. As Mueller's unique two-year term drew to a close, President Obama nominated James B. Comey Jr. to succeed him. Comey had previously served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, from January 2002 to December 2003, and as Deputy Attorney General, from December 2003 to August 2005. The President submitted Comey's nomination on June 21, 2013. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the nomination on July 9 and voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate on July 18. The Senate confirmed the nomination by a vote of 93-1 on July 29. Comey began his term of office on September 4, 2013. Comey was removed from office by President Donald J. Trump on May 9, 2017. Christopher A. Wray. Seven weeks after Comey was removed from office, President Trump nominated Christopher A. Wray to succeed him. From 1997 until 2005, Wray served in several leadership positions at the Department of Justice, including Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. He later worked in private practice at a law firm. The President submitted Wray's nomination on June 26, 2017. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the nomination on July 12 and voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate on July 20. The Senate confirmed the nomination by a vote of 92-5 on August 1. Wray began his term of office on August 2, 2017. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., February 28, 1973; March 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21, and 22, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1973. —.—. Executive Session, Nomination of L. Patrick Gray, III to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hearing. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., April 5, 1973. Unpublished. —.—. Nomination of Clarence M. Kelley to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., June 19, 20, and 25, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1973. —.—. Nomination of William H. Webster, of Missouri, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 95 th Cong., 2 nd sess., January 30 and 31, 1978; February 7, 1978. Washington: GPO, 1978. —.—. Nomination of William S. Sessions, of Texas, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 100 th Cong., 1 st sess., September 9, 1987. S.Hrg. 100-1080. Washington: GPO, 1990. —.—. Nomination of Louis J. Freeh, of New York, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 103 rd Cong., 1 st sess., July 29, 1993. S.Hrg. 103-1021. Washington: GPO, 1995. —.—. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Robert S. Mueller, III to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 107 th Cong., 1 st sess., July 30-31, 2001. S.Hrg. 107-514. Washington: GPO, 2002. —.—. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of James B. Comey, Jr., to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 113 th Cong., 1 st sess., July 9, 2013. S.Hrg. 113-850. Washington: GPO, 2017. —.—. Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director . Hearing. 93 rd Cong., 2 nd sess., March 18, 1974. Washington: GPO, 1974. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director . Report to accompany S. 2106 . 93 rd Cong., 2 nd sess. S.Rept. 93-1213. Washington: GPO, 1974. —.—. William H. Webster to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany the nomination of William H. Webster to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 95 th Cong., 2 nd sess., February 7, 1978. Exec. Rept. 95-14. Washington: GPO, 1978. —.—. William S. Sessions to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany the nomination of William Sessions to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100 th Cong., 1 st sess., September 15, 1987. Exec. Rept. 100-6. Washington: GPO, 1987. —.—. A Bill to Extend the Term of the Incumbent Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany S. 1103 . 112 th Cong., 1 st sess., June 21, 2011. S.Rept. 112-23 . Washington: GPO, 2011.

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutory basis for the present nomination and confirmation process was developed in 1968 and 1976, and has been used since the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn by the President before confirmation. The position of FBI Director has a fixed 10-year term, and the officeholder cannot be reappointed, unless Congress acts to allow a second appointment of the incumbent. There are no statutory conditions on the President's authority to remove the FBI Director. From 1973 through 2017, two Directors were removed by the President. President William J. Clinton removed William S. Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, and President Donald J. Trump removed James B. Comey from office on May 9, 2017. Robert S. Mueller III was the first FBI Director to be appointed to a second term, and this was done under special statutory arrangements. He was first confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2001, with a term of office that expired in September 2011. In May 2011, President Barack Obama announced his intention to seek legislation that would extend Mueller's term of office for two years. Legislation that would allow Mueller to be nominated to an additional, two-year term was considered and passed in the Senate and the House, and President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 112-24) on July 26, 2011. Mueller subsequently was nominated and confirmed to the two-year term, and he served until September 4, 2013. This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the FBI Director, briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973-2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports.

Federal civilian employees may be compensated for periods of illness, disability, or injury through one of three systems: paid sick leave, disability retirement, or workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained at work. In most cases, short-term illness or injury is compensated through paid sick leave. A federal employee who experiences a permanent disability can take a disability retirement before reaching the statutory retirement age. Disability retirement benefits differ between the two federal retirement systems: the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). Federal employees hired before 1984 are covered by CSRS and those who were hired in 1984 or later are covered by FERS. Employees enrolled in CSRS do not pay Social Security taxes and do not earn Social Security benefits while employed by the federal government. Employees enrolled in FERS pay Social Security taxes and earn Social Security benefits. Until the age of 62, disability retirement annuities under FERS are offset in part by the amount of Social Security benefits the annuitant receives. Workers who experience short-term illnesses or injuries can use paid sick leave to take time off from work. Federal employees accrue sick leave at the rate of 4 hours for each two-week pay period up to a total of 104 hours (13 days) per year. Unused sick leave continues to accrue without limit throughout a federal employee's career. If an employee has exhausted his or her accrued sick leave balance, the worker's employing agency can advance up to 30 days of sick leave per year. Ill or injured workers who have exhausted their accrued sick leave but who expect to be able to return to work can use their accrued annual leave or, in some cases, can take leave without pay until they have recovered and can return to work. The federal government does not offer short-term disability insurance to workers who have exhausted their accrued sick leave and annual leave. The Federal Employees Leave Sharing Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-566 ) authorizes a voluntary leave bank program through which federal agencies may allow employees to donate unused annual leave to employees who have exhausted their accrued sick leave. Employees cannot donate unused sick leave. When a worker covered by CSRS or FERS retires, any unused sick leave that he or she has accrued is added to the employee's length of service for purposes of computing the employee's annuity. A federal employee enrolled in CSRS is eligible for a disability retirement if he or she has completed at least five years of creditable civilian service; the employee has a disability that results in deficient performance, conduct, or attendance or that is incompatible with the individual continuing to perform useful and efficient service in his or her job; a physician certifies that the disability is expected to last a year or more; the worker's employing agency is unable to accommodate the disability in the worker's current job or in an existing vacant position at the same grade or pay and in the same commuting area; and an application for disability retirement is filed with the employing agency before separation or with the Office of Personnel Management within one year of the date of separation from employment. Unlike the eligibility requirements for benefits under the Social Security Disability Insurance Income (SSDI) and Supplemental Security (SSI) programs, eligibility for a CSRS disability retirement annuity does not require the employee to be disabled for any employment in the national economy. Instead, to be eligible for a CSRS disability retirement annuity, the employee must be unable to perform the job to which he or she was assigned or a job at the same pay in the same commuting area. Unless the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) certifies that the individual's disability is permanent, an employee who has retired due to disability is required to undergo periodic medical reevaluations until the age of 60. If the individual recovers, disability annuity payments continue temporarily while the individual seeks reemployment. The disability annuity terminates at the earliest of (1) the date on which the individual is reemployed by the government, (2) one year from the date of a medical examination showing that the individual has recovered from the illness or disability, or (3) six months from the end of the calendar year in which the individual demonstrates that his or her earning capacity has been restored. The individual's earning capacity is deemed to have been restored if, in any calendar year, his or her income from wages, self-employment, or both is equal to at least 80% of the current rate of pay for the position he or she occupied immediately before retiring. Under CSRS, a disabled worker is eligible for a retirement annuity equal to the greater of (1) the annuity that he or she would receive under the regular retirement formula, or (2) a minimum benefit that is the lesser of 40% of the average of the employee's highest three consecutive years of basic pay ("high-three" pay), or the annuity that would be paid if the employee continued working until the age of 60 at the same high-three pay, including in the annuity computation the number of years of service and the years between the date of retirement and the date on which the individual would reach the age of 60. The method of computing a CSRS disability retirement annuity assures that an employee will not receive a larger annuity through a disability retirement than he or she would receive from having worked to the minimum age and years of service required for a normal retirement. In general, a worker who becomes disabled after 22 or more years of federal service will receive an annuity computed under the regular CSRS annuity formula, regardless of his or her age. Because CSRS has been closed to new entrants since 1984, most federal employees covered by CSRS now have 30 or more years of service. Under CSRS, a regular retirement annuity for 30 years of service would replace 56.25% of the worker's high-three average pay. A federal employee covered by CSRS can take regular retirement with an immediate, unreduced annuity at the age of 55 or later with at least 30 years of service, at the age of 60 or later with at least 20 years of service, or at the age of 62 with at least five years of service. CSRS retirement annuities are indexed annually to the rate of growth of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), regardless of whether the individual retired due to disability or under normal retirement rules. A federal employee who is enrolled in FERS must have completed at least 18 months of service to be eligible for a disability retirement. All other eligibility rules for disability retirement under FERS are the same as under CSRS. Federal employees enrolled in FERS also are covered by Social Security, and the amount of a disability annuity under FERS is offset until the age of 62 by a portion of any Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefit that the individual receives. Federal employees covered by FERS who apply for disability retirement also must apply for Social Security disability benefits. Eligibility for Social Security disability benefits requires a determination by the Social Security Administration that the individual is unable to perform substantial gainful activity in any job in the national economy. Therefore, an individual covered by FERS may be determined to be disabled for purposes of his or her job with the federal government, but not with respect to other employment. In such a case, the individual would be eligible to receive a FERS disability annuity but be ineligible for SSDI. A federal employee who is disabled under both the FERS and Social Security statutes would be eligible to receive both a FERS disability annuity and a Social Security benefit, subject to the provisions of federal law integrating the two benefits. For federal employees under 62 years of age, the FERS disability retirement annuity in the first year of disability is 60% of the individual's high-three average pay minus 100% of any Social Security benefit that he or she is receiving. In years after the first year of disability, the FERS disability annuity is 40% of the individual's high-three average pay minus 60% of any Social Security benefit that he or she is receiving. The FERS disability annuity remains at that level—adjusted annually by the FERS cost-of-living adjustment—until the individual reaches the age of 62. When a FERS disability annuitant reaches the age of 62, the FERS annuity is adjusted to the amount that the individual would have received if he or she had continued to work until the age of 62. This ensures that an individual who retires from federal employment as the result of disability does not receive a higher annuity after this age than he or she would have received as the result of taking a normal retirement. The adjusted annuity at the age of 62 is equal to 1.0% of the individual's high-three average pay (increased by the FERS cost-of-living adjustments since the date of the disability retirement) multiplied by the sum of years of service performed before the date of disability retirement plus the number of years since that date. If the total number of years is 20 or more, the annuity is 1.1% of high-three average pay multiplied by this number of years. If an employee covered by FERS becomes disabled at the age of 62 or later, his or her FERS annuity is computed under the regular FERS retirement rules. In most cases, the adjusted FERS benefit payable at the age of 62 will be lower than the annuity that was paid before age 62. However, at the age of 62 and later, the offset to the FERS annuity for any Social Security benefits that the individual may be receiving will cease. Also, a worker who was receiving a FERS annuity but was not eligible for SSDI can apply for Social Security retired worker benefits at the age of 62, provided that he or she has completed the required 40 quarters of employment covered by Social Security. The Social Security benefit will compensate in part for the reduction in the FERS annuity. FERS disability annuities are adjusted for inflation beginning in the second year of payment. If the CPI has increased by 2.0% or less during the year ending on September 30, the FERS cost-of-living adjustment in the following January is equal to the percentage change in the CPI. If the CPI has increased by more than 2.0% but less than 3.0%, the FERS COLA is 2.0%. If the CPI has increased by 3.0% or more, the FERS COLA is one percentage point less than the increase in the CPI. FERS retirement benefits consist of the FERS annuity, Social Security, and the Thrift Savings Plan. P.L. 108-92 (October 3, 2003) changed the computation of the FERS annuity for federal employees who are injured on the job. An injured employee cannot contribute to Social Security or to the Thrift Savings Plan while receiving workers' compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Social Security taxes and TSP contributions must be paid from earnings , and workers' compensation payments are not classified as earnings under either the Social Security Act or the Internal Revenue Code. As a result, the employee's future retirement income from Social Security and the TSP may be reduced. P.L. 108-92 increased the FERS basic annuity from 1.0% of the individual's high-three average pay to 2.0% of high-three average pay for the duration of the period when the individual received workers' compensation. This is intended to replace income that may have been lost from lower Social Security benefits and reduced income from the TSP. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) provides benefits to federal employees who suffer a partial or total disability as the result of an injury incurred at work. In the event of the worker's death as the result of an on-the-job injury, FECA pays benefits to the worker's surviving dependents. FECA pays benefits only in the case of an illness, injury, or disability that is determined to be work-related. Federal workers are covered by FECA immediately upon employment. FECA benefits consist of cash compensation, payment of medical expenses related to the illness or injury, vocational rehabilitation assistance, and payment for attendant care services. The cash payment is calculated as a percentage of average annual earnings prior to the individual's injury or death. FECA benefits are indexed annually to the rate of growth of the CPI. FECA benefits are not subject to income taxes. FECA cash compensation equals two-thirds of lost earning capacity if the worker has no dependents or three-fourths of lost earning capacity if the worker has dependents. FECA payments may not exceed 75% of the maximum rate of pay for grade GS-15 of the general schedule, and in case of total disability, may not be less than the minimum pay for the GS-2 pay grade. FECA cash benefits continue as long as the disability lasts. Compensation does not end when the individual reaches retirement age. An injured employee may elect to receive a disability retirement annuity instead of FECA benefits, but may not receive both simultaneously. If an employee covered by FERS elects to receive FECA compensation, it will be reduced by the amount of any Social Security benefits that are based on the period of his or her federal employment. An election between FECA and a disability retirement annuity may be changed at any time. For certain listed injuries, minimum cash benefits are provided, regardless of how long the disability lasts. In case of injuries resulting from a specific incident, the employee's full pay continues for the term of the disability up to a maximum of 45 days, after which regular FECA compensation payments begin if the disability continues. If a federal employee dies from a work-related injury, FECA pays cash compensation to the worker's surviving dependents. A surviving spouse receives annual compensation equal to 50% of the worker's last annual rate of pay. Benefits terminate if the surviving spouse remarries before age 60, although in the event of remarriage before the age of 60, the surviving spouse is paid a lump sum equal to two years of benefits. If the worker had both a spouse and dependent children, the spouse's benefit is equal to 45% of the worker's last annual rate of pay, and each dependent child receives a benefit equal to 15% of pay, up to a maximum family benefit equal to 75% of pay. If the worker had dependent children but no spouse, the compensation is equal to 40% of pay for one child and an additional 15% for each additional child up to a maximum of 75% of pay. A dependent child's benefit ends at the age of 19, unless he or she is incapable of self-support due to disability. In some cases, other surviving dependent relatives, including parents, siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren may be eligible for compensation, according to the extent of their financial dependence on the deceased worker. Section 651 of P.L. 104-208 , the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997, authorizes the heads of federal agencies to pay a gratuity payment of up to $10,000 to the executor of the estate of a federal employee who dies as the result of injury sustained in the performance of official duties after August 1, 1990.

Paid sick leave, disability retirement, or workers' compensation may provide benefits for federal civilian employees during periods of illness, disability, or workplace injury, respectively. Federal civilian employees earn 13 days of paid sick leave per year. Sick leave can be used because of the worker's own illness or injury or to care for an ill or injured family member. A worker's employing agency can advance up to 30 additional days of sick leave to an employee who has exhausted his or her accrued sick leave. A federal worker with a long-term disability can separate from service through a disability retirement. A federal employee who sustains a disabling injury on the job can receive benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), the workers' compensation program for federal employees. FECA benefits consist of cash compensation, payment of medical costs related to the injury, vocational rehabilitation assistance, the cost of attendant care services, and burial benefits. A disabled federal employee may not receive a disability retirement annuity and FECA benefits simultaneously.

On June 2, 2014, the United States Supreme Court overturned Carol Bond's conviction under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act as a matter of congressional intent rather than Congress's constitutional authority. The Court concluded that Congress could not have intended the Act to reach "run of the mill" local crimes like Mrs. Bond's. It had been anticipated that the Court might take the opportunity to clarify the scope of Congress's legislative authority under the treaty power. It elected instead to emphasize, for purposes of statutory interpretation, the Constitution's structural constraints on federal intrusions into the domain of the states. On numerous occasions, Carol Bond, a microbiologist, coated the car door handles and mailbox of her husband's paramour with a mixture of toxic chemicals. Although Mrs. Bond's efforts were clumsily done, the victim did on one such occasion sustain a minor chemical burn on her thumb. Mrs. Bond was eventually implicated and indicted in federal court for possession and use of a chemical weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 229(1)(a). Reserving the right to appeal, she pled guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment for six years. On appeal, Mrs. Bond argued that the implementing statute under which she was convicted was either unconstitutional or inapplicable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initially ruled that she lacked standing to raise the constitutional issue, since the Tenth Amendment exists for the protection of state, not individual, rights. The Supreme Court disagreed and returned the case to the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. Mrs. Bond's constitutional claim was grounded on the argument that the legislation is an intrusion upon sovereign prerogatives of the states with respect to local criminal offenses. The government has responded that (1) the authority to negotiate and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention comes within the President's constitutional treaty making power; (2) enactment of legislation to implement the Convention comes within Congress's authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the President's treaty making power; and (3) Mrs. Bond's conduct was condemned by a literal reading of the implementing legislation's criminal proscriptions. To prevail on her constitutional challenge, Mrs. Bond needed to reconcile her position with the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland. In Missouri v. Holland , state officials sought to enjoin federal enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which they argued constituted an intrusion on state authority in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Prior to ratification of the treaty, lower federal courts had held that the Tenth Amendment limited Congress's constitutional authority to enact a similar measure. The state argued that the treaty could not vest Congress with legislative power that would otherwise rest beyond its constitutional reach. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, began with the observation that it was "not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article II, §2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly.... If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, §8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government." The treaty collided with no explicit constitutional prohibition. The only question was whether the treaty was "forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment." Justice Holmes did not suggest that the question might never be answered in a state's favor; only that the state's interest was insufficient in the case before the Court. Missouri claimed exclusive authority over the birds within its domain. The treaty protected birds with international migratory habits, threatened with extinction by virtue of the hunting practices in some of the states they traversed. The federal interest was substantial, and Missouri's interest was not enough to cast doubt on the validity of the treaty or its implementing statute. Although the Court in Holland identified no Tenth Amendment-implicit, contextual limits on Congress's legislative authority, it has done so in other cases. Thus, the Court has held that Congress may not "commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Moreover, it has been said that legislation cannot be considered Necessary and Proper, if it fails to recognize the contextual limitations that flow from the Constitution's presumption of dual federal-state sovereignty. All of which proved to be of no avail for Mrs. Bond in the Third Circuit. The court concluded that the Convention was a proper subject for the President's treaty making power. Moreover, "with practically no qualifying language in Holland to turn to, [appellate courts] are bound to take at face value the Supreme Court's statement that 'if the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute ... as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government,'" federalism concerns notwithstanding. A concurring member of the panel, however, expressed the hope that the Supreme Court would "flesh out the most important sentence in the most important case about the constitutional law of foreign affairs, and in doing so, clarify (indeed curtail) the contours of federal power to enact laws that intrude on matters so local that no drafter of the Convention contemplated their inclusion in it." Mrs. Bond contended that the focus of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its implementing legislation are so distinct that Congress could not have intended them to apply to her conduct. The nature of the statute made her claim creditable; its breadth made it difficult. The United States signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction (the Convention) in Paris on January 13, 1993. The President supplied a capsulized description of the Convention when he transmitted it to the Senate: The convention will require States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under the observations of international inspectors; subject States Parties' citizens and businesses and other nongovernmental entities to its obligations; subject States Parties' chemical industry to declarations and routine inspection; and subject any facility or location in the State Party to international inspection to address other States Parties' compliance concerns. The Convention requires signatories to condemn within their jurisdictions those activities it has agreed to forego. More specifically, "each State Party is prohibited from ... (b) Using chemical weapons under any circumstances , including retaliatory use (which many countries protected under the Geneva Protocol of 1925).... " Each nation must establish corresponding restrictions upon individuals and entities found within its own jurisdiction. That is, "each State Party must ... (c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) above to any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law." The Senate did not readily give its advice and consent on the Convention. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held six days of hearings towards the close of the 103 rd Congress. The committee heard further witnesses during the 104 th , and issued a favorable executive report under which the Senate's advice and consent would have been subject to 7 conditions and 11 declarations. Even so, the Convention apparently lacked the votes, for it was never brought to the floor. Pressed by time deadlines within the Convention during the 105 th Congress, the Senate discharged the Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of the Convention. The Senate only then gave its advice and consent subject to page after page of conditions—none of them addressed to the criminal penalties which the Convention obligated the United States to enact with respect to the use of chemical weapons. Implementing proposals appeared in both the House and Senate shortly thereafter. The Senate held hearings and passed an amended version of its bill. A year later, the proposal that became the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act was tucked in towards the end of the 900-plus-page Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations measure. Throughout the ratification debate, the principal concerns were the protection of United States businesses subject to international inspection and doubts that the pact would lead to international chemical weapons disarmament. The need to protect American industry during the international inspection process drove the compromises necessary for Senate passage of implementing legislation. There can be little doubt, however, that Mrs. Bond's conduct fell within a literal reading of the implementing legislation. The legislation outlaws knowingly using a chemical weapon. A chemical weapon is any toxic chemical, and a toxic chemical is any chemical that "can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals." The legislation does establish several exceptions, such as the exceptions for possession by members of the Armed Forces or the exceptions for use for peaceful purposes "related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity." Neither these nor any of the other exceptions, however, seem to fit Mrs. Bond's conduct. On appeal, the Third Circuit conceded that the implementation legislation's "breadth is certainly striking, seeing as it turns each kitchen cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a potential chemical weapons cache." Nor was it impressed with the government's decision to press prosecution. Yet at the end of the day, Mrs. Bond's conduct satisfied the statute's broadly drafted elements. The Third Circuit affirmed her conviction and set the stage for Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Mrs. Bond's conviction must be overturned. For a majority of the Court, the primacy of the states over criminal matters provided a presumption of statutory construction that could not be rebutted in Mrs. Bond's case. For the three concurring Justices—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—the constitution does not permit the federal government to outlaw Mrs. Bond's conduct based on the treaty power. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, began his analysis with a reminder that the federal government may exercise only those legislative powers which can be traced to a specific grant in the Constitution, and, more importantly, that the states are the residual domain of criminal law. The Constitution grants the federal government no power to enact and enforce general criminal laws, although it may enact and apply specific prohibitions incidental to the powers which it has been given, such as the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce or the power to implement treaties. Before considering Mrs. Bond's constitutional challenges, the Court thought it prudent to determine whether the federal government enjoyed statutorily authority to prosecute her. Yet, it interpreted the statute using constitutional principles: These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal statute. In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—"chemical weapon"—being defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute's expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States. The Court felt Congress gave no such indication. In fact, the statute's language and context convey a different message. The statute speaks of chemical weapons, not the household chemicals an expansive reading would encompass. The context reflects an international concern that nations or their agents might develop and maintain the capacity to engage in chemical warfare, not that individuals would use the materials at hand to settle a domestic dispute. "In sum," said the Court, "the global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon. There is no reason to suppose that Congress—in implementing the Convention on Chemical Weapons—thought otherwise." Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito agreed that Mrs. Bond's conviction should be overturned, but on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, wrote that the statute clearly outlawed Mrs. Bond's conduct. He characterized the majority opinion as rewriting the statute, yet leaving it in a form in which its exact prohibitions cannot be discerned. For Justice Scalia, the treaty making power is the power to make treaties, not to implement them. The authority to implement a treaty must come from one of the other enumerated powers. The government asserted that the treaty-making power authorized the statute under which Mrs. Bond was convicted. In the eyes of the concurring Justices, it did not, and it could not. Justice Thomas offered a separate concurrence to emphasize that in his mind "the Treaty Power can be used to arrange intercourse with other nations, but not to regulate purely domestic affairs." Justice Alito joined much of Justice Thomas's concurrence and expressed the view "that the treaty power is limited to agreements that address matters of legitimate international concern.... But insofar as the Convention may be read to obligate the United States to enact domestic legislation criminalizing conduct of the sort at issue in this case, which typically is the sort of conduct regulated by the States, the Convention exceeds the scope of the treaty power." A majority of the Supreme Court preferred not to use Mrs. Bond's conviction as a vehicle to define the scope of Congress's legislative authority under the treaty power. It may be that there is no majority view of the scope of the treaty power. It may be that a majority would prefer to clarify the scope of treaty power without having to find that the federal government has overstepped its constitutional bounds. It may be that a majority considered the Bond case an aberration, and found the fact pattern of "this curious case" ill-suited to demonstrate the bounds of the treaty power. It may be a majority of the Court finds the Missouri v. Holland declaration a satisfactory statement of the law. It may be a majority preferred to resolve the case on statutory grounds so as not to call in question other treaty implementing legislation. It may be, as Court opinion stated, that a majority would simply prefer to resolve cases using principles of statutory rather than constitutional construction, whenever possible. It may be that several of these factors were in play. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the Third Circuit's opinion has been reversed, and the case remanded there for disposition consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.

The Chemical Weapons Convention obligates the United States to outlaw the use, production, and retention of weapons consisting of toxic chemicals. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act outlaws the possession or use of toxic chemicals, except for peaceful purposes. In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not intended the Act to reach a "run of the mill" assault case using a skin irritating chemical. Carol Anne Bond, upon discovering that her husband had impregnated another woman, repeatedly dusted the woman's mail box, front door knob, and car door handles with a toxic chemical. Mrs. Bond was indicted in federal court and pled guilty to possessing a chemical weapon in violation of Section 229 of the Act, but reserved the right to appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected her constitutional challenge. A concurring member of the panel, however, urged the Supreme Court to clarify the nearly century-old pronouncement in Missouri v. Holland, "if the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute ... as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government." The concurring judge observed that, "since Holland, Congress has largely resisted testing the outer bounds of its treaty-implementing authority. But if ever there was a statute that did test those limits, it would be Section 229. With its shockingly broad definitions, Section 229 federalizes purely local, run-of-the mill criminal conduct.... Sweeping statutes like Section 229 are in deep tension with an important structural feature of our Government: The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law." The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the treaty power issue. Instead, it ruled Congress did not intend the Act to apply to Mrs. Bond's conduct. The Convention did not require a criminal statute sweeping enough to encompass Mrs. Bond's conduct. If Congress intended to reach that deeply into an area within the primacy of the state authority, the Court said, its intention would have to more apparent. Three concurring members of the Court would have held that the federal government lacked the constitutional authority under the treaty power to punish Mrs. Bond. The question of whether application of the statute might be sustained under the Commerce Clause was not before the Court.

Over the past several years, the United States has become increasingly integrated with the world economy. In 2007, the United States was the world's largest exporter (at $1.6 trillion) and largest importer of goods and services (at $2.4 trillion). From 1960 to 2007, U.S. exports of goods and services as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 4.9% to 12.2%, while imports rose from 4.3% to 17.0%. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) projects that by the year 2037, U.S. exports and imports as a percent of GDP will total 39.5% and 33.8%, respectively (see Figure 1 ). U.S. economic integration with the world has greatly changed the nature and complexity of U.S. trade flows. For example, many U.S. firms have shifted production abroad to take advantage of lower costs with some production sold locally and some exported, including to the United States. In addition, many firms in the United States import inputs (such as auto parts) to produce finished goods (such as cars). Trade in services, while much smaller than merchandise trade, is becoming an increasingly important component of U.S. trade. Many commercial activities in the United States that impact trade are not always reflected in U.S. trade data. For example, many U.S. companies design and develop products that are manufactured overseas, such as in China. Frequently, a significant share of the value added to these products (and profits) accrue to U.S. firms and workers, while only a small part of the value added accrues to where the products are made. Finally, over the past several years, a significant level of U.S. trade (especially imports) has shifted away from developed countries (such as Western Europe and Japan) to developing countries (especially those in Asia, such as China). From 1985 to 2007 the share of U.S. merchandise exports to developing countries rose from 33% to 49%, while the share of U.S. merchandise imports from these countries rose from 35% to 57%. Financial flows play a critical role in the U.S. global economic integration. In 2007, the United States was the largest cumulative source of foreign direct investment (FDI) around the world at $2.6 trillion and was the largest cumulative destination of FDI at $1.8 trillion. FDI plays a critical role for many U.S. firms attempting to sell their goods and services in foreign markets. Many companies set up subsidiaries abroad in order to tailor products and services to suit each country's specific tastes or standards (or because of lower costs). These overseas subsidiaries often import machinery, parts, and other inputs from the parent company in the United States and thus help generate U.S. exports. FDI in the United States helps create employment (about 5.1 million jobs in 2005 by majority-owned nonbank U.S. affiliates of foreign companies). According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. affiliates of foreign firms accounted for 20% of U.S. exports and 25% of U.S. imports in 2005. In addition, foreign investment has gone into U.S. securities, such as U.S. Treasury securities, which is used to finance U.S. budget deficits. This investment helps to fund the shortfall in U.S. domestic savings relative to its investment needs and enables the United States to enjoy healthier economic growth and relatively lower interest rates. As of March 2008, foreign investors owned 51.4% of privately-held U.S. debt (at $2.4 trillion). A major concern for many U.S. policymakers and economists is the size and growth of the U.S. trade deficit. The current account balance (the broadest measurement of trade flows because it includes merchandise trade, services trade, investment income and unilateral transfers) went from a $2.9 billion surplus in 1991 to a $738.6 billion deficit in 2007. The deficit reflects the high level of foreign savings the United States must obtain to fund its investment needs. Many mainstream economists contend that free trade is a win-win situation because it enables countries to focus on producing goods they are relatively more efficient at (comparative advantage) and trading for those goods they are less relatively efficient at producing. This enables countries to consume more goods than they could if they were self-sufficient. However, some observers of trade contend that this simple explanation of trade does not always apply in today's global economy where the factors of production (including capital and technology) are internationally mobile. They argue that U.S. trade with some countries, especially those with low wages but high productivity levels (such as India and China), may not always produce net benefits for the United States if such countries are able to gain a comparative advantage in more advanced goods and services over the United States. Another argument is that, in some cases, the benefits of trade in the United States may mainly accrue to upper income groups, while mainly hurting income-competing firms and lower income groups (through job losses and depressed wages). For example, a factory in the United States may be closed and workers laid off because it is no longer competitive. The U.S. company might relocate production to another country, such as or Mexico. Profits from this venture would accrue mainly to company officials and stockholders of the company. The laid off factory workers may find new jobs, but they may not always pay as well as the previous ones. Other economists counter that raising productivity, innovation, and education and training levels are keys to ensuring U.S. global competitiveness and high paying jobs. They further contend that the United States cannot isolate itself from the global economy, and that protectionist measures to try to restrict imports that negatively affect certain domestic industries will adversely affect other industries and have a net negative impact on the U.S. economy. Most trade analysts on both sides of the free trade argument contend that some sort of assistance and/or retraining should be afforded to workers that are displaced by trade (although opinions differ as to what extent that assistance should be given). U.S. post-World War II trade policy under various presidential administrations has had several interrelated objectives. One has been to secure open markets for U.S. exports. A second has been to protect domestic producers from foreign unfair trade practices and from rapid surges in fairly traded imports. A third has been to control trade for foreign policy and national security reasons. A fourth objective has been to help foster global trade to promote world economic growth. In fulfilling these objectives, U.S. policymakers have employed an array of policy tools. One set of tools are multilateral and bilateral/regional negotiations and agreements. The United States has been a major player in establishing a multilateral system of rules on trade. It was a leader in nine rounds of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including the current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round, that have expanded the coverage of multilateral trade rules and that led to the establishment in 1995 of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, progress in the DDA has been slow at best as WTO members have found it difficult to reach consensus on some basic issues, such as reducing tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in agriculture, manufactured goods, and services. These difficulties have generated debate over the future role of multilateral negotiations and the WTO itself as a tool of trade policy. U.S. trade negotiations have become increasingly dominated by bilateral and regional negotiations to establish free trade agreements (FTAs). To date the United States has FTAs in effect with 14 countries, and FTAs with three other countries pending. Some experts and other observers view the FTAs as a building block to broader, multilateral negotiations. Others consider them an unhelpful roadblock that undermines the multilateral system (because they may lead to trading blocs and trade diversion). In general, support for FTAs in the United States and elsewhere may be waning, in part due to growing uncertainty and skepticism regarding the benefits of trade liberalization among some policymakers and various segments of the population. A second group of trade policy tools are trade remedies– measures applied primarily against imports to alleviate or "remedy" the price impact of unfairly traded imports and of some fairly traded imports. Trade remedies include antidumping (AD) measures and countervailing (CV) measures applied in the form of extra duties on imports that are, respectively, sold at less than fair market value or have benefitted from foreign government subsidies, as determined by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), and that cause or threaten to cause material injury to the U.S. industry, as determined by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). These measures are the most frequently used trade remedies. A more powerful, yet less frequently used, trade remedy is the escape clause or safeguard measure. Safeguards, sometimes called section 201 measures, are applied in the form of higher duties or quotas, on imports that are trade fairly but enter at such rapid rates as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. They are applied to the imports of the product from all countries. As a result, safeguards have a potentially powerful impact. The cause and injury thresholds that petitioners must meet before receiving trade remedy relief are much higher than for AD and CV measures. In addition, they require presidential approval. As a result, safeguards are not as frequently applied as other trade remedies and even less so than in the past. Section 301 and its derivatives are another set of trade remedies that are part of trade policy "toolbox" but infrequently used. Section 301 (of the Trade Act of 1974) authorizes the USTR to apply sanctions against a trading partner that uses unfair trade practices against U.S. exports. A related provision, called "Special 301" requires the USTR to identify countries that fail to protect the rights of U.S. owners of intellectual property and to apply sanctions if the trading partner does not improve IPR protection. Some U.S. trading partners have criticized the "aggressive" U.S. use of trade remedies, particularly AD and CV measures (which some claim are protectionist). The European Union and Japan, for example, successfully challenged the U.S. practice of "zeroing" when calculating "fair value" in AD cases. Many WTO members have also argued that trade remedy practices should be reviewed and revised as part of the Doha Development Agenda round. Congress has mandated, as part of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), that the President shall not enter into any trade agreement that weakens U.S. trade remedy laws. Besides trade agreements and trade remedies, U.S. policymakers use other tools to achieve various policy objectives. For example, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Export-Import Bank and other agencies operate programs to promote U.S. exports of manufactured goods and agricultural products. The Commerce Department and Labor Department administer Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs for firms (Commerce) and workers (Labor) that are negatively affected by trade in order to help them adjust. In addition, U.S. trade preference programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), allow certain products imported from eligible developing countries to enter the United States duty free. These programs are designed to encourage economic development in those countries. Furthermore, sometimes trade is used to achieve overtly foreign policy goals. For example, the U.S. Government controls exports of some high technology to prevent it from getting into the hands of adversaries. It also restricts trade with states deemed to be detrimental to U.S. national interests, such as Burma, Cuba, and North Korea. The direction of U.S. trade policy is likely to be a hotly contested issue among U.S. policymakers over the next several years. Challenges include reaching a consensus on how to lower the U.S. trade deficit (without slowing the economy), the design and funding of programs to assist displaced workers, the extent U.S. trade remedy laws should be used to respond to unfair trade practices (without becoming protectionist), policies the federal government can initiate to help the U.S. economy become more globally competitive, strategies the United States can take to induce other countries to lower their trade barriers (multilaterally in the WTO and/or bilaterally through FTAs), and the extent that trade policy should be used to promote environment (e.g., global climate change) and worker rights. Reaching a consensus on these issues within Congress, as well as between Congress and the Administration, will likely prove difficult since the stakeholders of trade are widespread and diverse (e.g., in terms of whether free trade benefits them or hurts them), and because there are differing opinions over the effects trade has on the U.S. economy, as well as different views over which trade policies are effective in promoting U.S. trade goals. One of the biggest challenges for the next President and Congress will be whether TPA, which expired in July 2007, should be renewed, thus enabling the President to pursue additional bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements. Some policymakers oppose extending TPA, contending that trade liberalization has had little positive impact on the U.S. economy and has hurt some U.S. workers, while others have argued that failure to renew TPA will undermine U.S. leadership on free trade and will enable other countries (such as China) to form trade blocs that exclude the United States, thus putting U.S. exporting firms at a disadvantage.

The United States has become increasingly integrated with the rest of the world economy. This integration has offered benefits and presented challenges to U.S. business, agriculture, labor, and consumers. Those who can compete in the more integrated economy have enjoyed opportunities to broaden their success, while those who are challenged by increased foreign competition have been forced to adjust and some have exited the market or relocated overseas. Some observers contend that, in order to remain globally competitive, the United States must continue to support trade liberalization policies, while assisting those hurt by trade. Others have raised doubts over whether free trade policies benefit the U.S. economy (e.g., some blame such policies for the large U.S. trade deficit, declining wages, and growing income disparity). Many contend that trade liberalization works only when everyone plays by the rules and have urged the aggressive enforcement of U.S. trade laws to address unfair trade practices. Still others maintain that such issues as labor rights, the environment, and climate change should be linked to trade policies. These competing views are often reflected in the struggle between Congress and the Executive branch in shaping U.S. trade policy. This report provides an overview and background on the debate over the future course of U.S. trade policy and will be updated as events warrant.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to elementary and secondary education. Title I-A is the largest program in the ESEA, funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. Title I-A is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. The ESSA made few changes to the Title I-A formulas. These changes took effect in FY2017. This report provides final FY2016 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. For a general overview of the Title I-A formulas, see CRS Report R44164, ESEA Title I-A Formulas: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. For a more detailed discussion of the Title I-A formulas, see CRS Report R44461, Allocation of Funds Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Under Title I-A, funds are allocated to LEAs via state educational agencies (SEAs) using the four Title I-A formulas. Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of the formulas. In FY2016, about 43% of Title I-A appropriations were allocated through the Basic Grants formula, 9% through the Concentration Grants formula, and 24% each through the Targeted Grants and EFIG formulas. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public elementary and secondary education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. Under three of the formulas—Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants—funds are initially calculated at the LEA level. State grants are the total of allocations for all LEAs in the state, adjusted for state minimum grant provisions. Under EFIG, grants are first calculated for each state overall and then are subsequently suballocated to LEAs within the state using a different formula. Final FY2016 grants included in this report were calculated by ED. The percentage share of funds allocated under each of the Title I-A formulas was calculated by CRS for each state by dividing the total grant received by the total amount allocated under each respective formula. Table 1 provides each state's grant amount and percentage share of funds allocated under each of the Title I-A formulas for FY2016. Total Title I-A grants, calculated by summing the state level grant for each of the four formulas, are also shown in Table 1 . Overall, California received the largest total Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion) and, as a result, the largest percentage share (11.98%) of Title I-A grants. Wyoming received the smallest total Title I-A grant amount ($34.8 million) and, as a result, the smallest percentage share (0.24%) of Title I-A grants. In general, grant amounts for states vary among formulas due to the different allocation amounts for the formulas. For example, the Basic Grant formula receives a greater share of overall Title I-A appropriations than the Concentration Grant formula, so states generally receive higher estimated grant amounts under the Basic Grant formula than under the Concentration Grant formula. Among states, Title I-A grant amounts and the percentage shares of funds vary due to the different characteristics of each state. For example, Texas has a much larger population of children included in the formula calculations than North Carolina and, therefore, received a higher estimated grant amount and larger share of Title I-A funds. Within a state, the percentage share of funds allocated may vary by formula as certain formulas are more favorable to certain types of states (e.g., EFIG is generally more favorable to states with comparatively equal levels of spending per pupil among their LEAs). If a state's share of a given Title I-A formula exceeds its share of overall Title I-A funds, this is generally an indication that this particular formula is more favorable to the state than formulas for which the state's share of funds is below its overall share of Title I-A funds. For example, Florida and Nevada received a substantially higher percentage share of Targeted Grants than of overall Title I-A funds, indicating that the Targeted Grants formula is more favorable to them than other Title I-A formulas may be. At the same time, both states received a smaller percentage share of Basic Grants than of overall Title I-A funds, indicating that the Basic Grants formula is less favorable to them than other Title I-A formulas may be. In states that received a minimum grant under all four formulas (Alaska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming), the shares under the Targeted Grants and EFIG formulas are greater than under the Basic Grants or Concentration Grants formulas, due to higher state minimums under these formulas. If a state received the minimum grant under a given Title I-A formula, the grant amount is denoted with an asterisk (*) in Table 1 .

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others. This report provides final FY2016 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2016 Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion or 11.98% of total Title I-A grants). Wyoming received the smallest FY2016 Title I-A grant amount ($34.8 million or 0.24% of total Title I-A grants).

T he manner in which staff are deployed within an organization may reflect the missions and priorities of that organization. In Congress, employing authorities hire staff to carry out duties in Member-office, committee, leadership, and other settings. The extent to which staff in those settings change may lend insight into the Senate's work over time. Some of the insights that might be taken from staff levels include an understanding of the division of congressional work between Senators working individually through their personal offices, or collectively, through committee activities; the relationship between committee leaders and chamber leaders, which could have implications for the development and consideration of legislation, the use of congressional oversight, or deployment of staff; and the extent to which specialized chamber administrative operations have grown over time. This report provides staffing levels in Senators', committee, leadership, and other offices since 1977. No Senate publication appears to officially and authoritatively track the actual number of staff working in the chambers by office or entity. Data presented here are based on staff listed by chamber entity (offices of Senators, committees, leaders, officers, officials, and other entities) in Senate telephone directories. Figure 1 displays overall staffing levels in the Senate. Table 1 in the " Data Tables " section below provides data for all staff listed in chamber directories in the Senate through 2016. Joint committee staff data from the Senate for panels that met in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016) are provided in Table 7 . This report provides data based on a count of staff listed in the Senate telephone directories published since 1977. Like most sources of data, telephone directory listings have potential benefits and potential drawbacks. Telephone directories were chosen for a number of reasons, including the following: telephone directories published by the Senate are an official source of information about the institution that are widely available; presumably, the number of directory listings closely approximates the number of staff working for the Senate; while arguably not their intended purpose, the directories provide a consistent breakdown of Senate staff by internal organization at a particular moment in time; and the directories afford the opportunity to compare staff levels at similar moments across a period of decades. At the same time, however, data presented below should be interpreted with care for a number of reasons, including the following: There is no way to determine whether all staff working for the Senate are listed in the chambers' telephone directories. If some staff are not listed, relying on telephone directories is likely to lead to an undercount of staff. In particular, staff working in Senators' state offices were not listed until 1987. This likely led to an undercount of staff, and makes comparisons pre-1987 and post-1987 difficult. It is not possible to determine if staff who are listed were actually employed by the Senate at the time the directories were published. If the directories list individuals who are no longer employed by the Senate, then relying on them is likely to lead to an overcount of staff. The extent to which the criterion for inclusion in the directories for the Senate has changed over time cannot be fully determined. Some editions of the directory do not always list staff in various entities the same way. This may raise questions regarding the reliability of telephone directory data as a means for identifying congressional staff levels within the Senate over time. Some Senate staff may have more than one telephone number, or be listed in the directory under more than one entity. As a consequence, they might be counted more than once. This could lead to a more accurate count of staff in specific entities within the Senate, but multiple listings may also lead to an overcount of staff working in the chamber. Chamber directories may reflect different organizational arrangements over time for some entities. This could lead to counting staff doing similar work in both years in different categories, or in different offices. It appears that the Senate telephone directories started listing Senate staff working in Senators' state offices in 1987. Given the lack of consistent staff data from Senators' offices prior to 1987, comparisons between data from those offices from 1977-1986 and 1987-2016, as well as any analysis of total staffing levels in the Senate before 1987, would be incomplete. Staff levels from committees, leadership, and officers and officials, however can be evaluated across the entire 1977-2016 time period. Additionally, analysis of total staffing levels, as well as staff distribution, since 1987 is discussed below. In the Senate, the number of staff has grown steadily, from 4,916 in 1987 to 5,749 in 2016, or 16.94%. Each year since 1987, the number of Senate staff has grown by an average of 29 individuals, or 0.58%. From 1977 to 1986, excluding congressional staff from state offices, the number of staff in the Senate has grown steadily from 3,397 in 1977 to 4,180 in 1986, or 23.05%. Figure 1 displays staff levels in six categories (Senators' DC offices, Senators' state offices, total staff in Senators' offices, committees, leadership, and officers and officials) since 1977. Figure 2 provides the distributions among categories of offices from 1987 to 2016. Table 1 in the " Data Tables " section, below, provides detailed staff levels in those categories. Staff in Senators' offices grew from 2,068 in 1977 to 2,474 in 1986, or 19.63%. Due to the addition of staff in Senators' state offices, comparisons of total staff before 1986 to after are not possible. But staff in Senators' Washington, DC, offices continued to grow. In 2016, there were 2,342 staff in Senators' DC offices, an increase of 13.25% from the 1977 level, 2,068. Staff in Senators' offices, including state-based staff, have grown from 3,286 in 1987 to 4,120 in 2016, or 25.38%. Senators' office staffs have grown as a proportion of overall Senate staff over time. In 1987, Member-office staff comprised 66.84% of Senate staff. The proportion grew to 67.51% in 1990, and 72.96% in 2000, before dropping slightly to 71.66% in 2016. Most of the growth in Senators' staffs since 1987 appears to have been among state-based staff, which nearly doubled in size from 935 in 1987 to 1,778 in 2016. More staff work in Washington, DC, offices than in state offices, but the percentage of Senators' staff based in states has grown steadily since 1987, while the number of staff in Senators' Washington, DC, offices has remained relatively flat. In 2016, 56.84% of staff listed in the Senate telephone directory as working in Senators' offices did so in Washington, DC, down from a high of 72.18% in 1988. Table 2 in the " Data Tables " section below provides the number of staff working in Senators' offices in Washington, DC, and state offices. Senate committee staff levels have shown the smallest change among Senate staff categories, increasing from 1,084 in 1977 to 1,153 in 2016, or 6.37%. Change among Senate committee staff may be characterized in three stages: an increase during 1977-1980 (20.57%); a period of decline in 1980-1999 (-27.93%); and a period of growth from 1999 to 2016 (22.40%). Between 1987 and 2016, committee staff comprised a decreasing proportion of Senate staff, falling from a peak of 23.39% of Senate staff in 1987 to a low of 17.49% of staff in 1995. The proportion of Senate committee staff grew to 20.06% in 2016, still below its 1987 peak. In the " Data Tables " section below, three tables provide staff levels in various Senate committees. Table 3 provides data for 2007-2016; data for 1997-2006 are available in Table 4 , Table 5 provides data for 1987-1996, and data for 1977-1986 are in Table 6 . Totals for each year, which include Senate joint committee staff found in Table 7 , are provided in Table 1 . The number of staff in Senate leadership offices grew from 44 in 1977 to 160 in 2016. The majority of the growth in leadership staff occurred between 1977 and 1981, from 44 to 119, or 170.45%. The number of leadership staff peaked in 2012 at 234. As a proportion of Senate staff, leadership employees were 2.69% in 1987 and 2.78% in 2016. Staff working in the offices of Senate officers and officials has grown 57.21% since 1977. Staff levels have grown from 201 in 1977 to 316 in 2016, but were characterized by sharp decreases in 1988, from 1998-2001, in 2012, and in 2016. Despite the growth, Senate officers and officials' staff decreased as a proportion of Senate staff, falling from 7.08% in 1987 to a low of 5.21% in 2012. In 2016, the proportion of officers and officials' staff was 5.50%. Since 1987, the number of staff working for the Senate has grown. There have been increases in the number of staff working in Senate leadership offices, and larger increases in the staffing of officers and officials through 2015, though 2016 saw a dip in those numbers. Staff working for Senators have shifted from committee settings to leadership settings or the personal offices. Some of these changes may be indicative of the growth of the Senate as an institution, or the value the chamber places on its various activities. One example that may be an indication of institutional development arguably is found in the growth of the number of staff working in leadership and officers and officials' offices. A potential explanation for these changes may be found in what some might characterize as an ongoing professionalization and institutionalization of congressional management and administration. Some note that as organizations such as governing institutions develop, they identify needs for expertise and develop specialized practices and processes. In Congress, some of those areas of specialization arguably include supporting the legislative process through the drafting of measures, oversight and support of floor activities, and the management of legislation in a bicameral, partisan environment. Another potential explanation related to a more institutionalized, professionalized Congress could be the demands for professional management and support. This could arise as a result of congressional use of communications technologies, and the deployment of systematic, professionalized human resources processes, business operations, and financial management. Consequently, increased specialized support of congressional legislative and administrative activities may explain increases among staff working for chamber leaders, and officers and officials. In another example, the distribution of staff working directly for Senators has shifted from committee settings to personal office settings. Staff in Member offices has grown while staff in Senate committees has decreased, both in real numbers and in percentage of total staff. This may represent a shift from collective congressional activities typically carried out in committees (including legislative, oversight, and investigative work) to individualized activities typically carried out in Senators' personal offices (including direct representational activities, constituent service and education, and political activity).

The manner in which staff are deployed within an organization may reflect the missions and priorities of that organization. This report provides staffing levels in Senators' Senate committee, leadership, and other offices since 1977. From 1977 to 1986, Senate staff, excluding state-based staff, increased from 3,397 to 4,180, or 23.05%. From 1987 to 2016, all Senate staff grew from 4,916 to 5,749, or 16.94%. The changes in both time periods were characterized in part by increases in the number of staff working in chamber leadership offices, and, prior to 2016, increases in the staffing of chamber officers and officials. Additionally, staff working for Members have shifted from committees to the personal offices of Members. Since 2010, however, staff working for the Senate has decreased 6.79%. Some of these changes may be indicative of the growth of the Senate as an institution, or the value the chamber places on its various activities. This report is one of several CRS products focusing on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report RL34545, Congressional Staff: Duties and Functions of Selected Positions, by R. Eric Petersen; CRS Report R43947, House of Representatives Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016, by R. Eric Petersen and Amber Hope Wilhelm; CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen; CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen; CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen; and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen.

RS21948 -- The Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis Updated February 11, 2005 The fundamental responsibility of intelligence services is to provide information to support policymakers and military commanders. In reviewing theperformance of the U.S. Intelligence Community prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11Commission, the National Commissionon Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, concluded that greater coordination of the nation's intelligence effortis required to enhance thecollection and analysis of information. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new position ofNational Intelligence Director (NID)be established to ensure greater inter-agency coordination. A number of legislative proposals were introduced in2004 to establish such an officeseparate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (1) The NID was envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as having a number of budgetary and managerial responsibilities. (2) In addition, the occupant of theposition would "retain the present DCI's role as the principal intelligence adviser to the president." (3) The Commission also envisioned that the NIDwho would "be confirmed by the Senate and would testify before Congress, would have a relatively small staff ofseveral hundred people, taking theplace of the existing community management offices housed at the CIA." (4) The Commission adds, however, that "We hope the president will cometo look directly to the directors of the national intelligence centers [the National Counterterrorism Center, and othercenters focusing on WMDproliferation, international crime and narcotics, and China/East Asia] to provide all-source analysis in their areasof responsibility, balancing theadvice of these intelligence chiefs against the contrasting viewpoints that may be offered by department heads atState, Defense, Homeland Security,Justice, and other agencies." (5) There is some debate whether the 9/11 Commission envisioned the NID as having the responsibility for coordinating national intelligence estimatesand other community products. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has been responsible for providingintelligence to the President, to theheads of departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and seniormilitary commanders, and "whereappropriate" the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof. The statute provides that "suchnational intelligence should betimely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligencecommunity." (6) Draft legislation inthe fall of 2004 did include the assignment of responsibilities for preparing national intelligence estimates to theDNI. On December 17, 2004, the President approved the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter the "Intelligence ReformAct")( P.L. 108-458 ). The Act incorporated many of the proposals of the 9/11 Commission, including theestablishment of a Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) separate from the Director of the CIA. Although most of the debates prior to passage of thelegislation addressed the DNI'sresponsibilities for managing the intelligence budget, the Act also made a number of changes affecting thepreparation of analytical products forconsumers at the highest levels of government. The DNI will serve as head of the Intelligence Community and asthe principal adviser to thePresident and the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters relatedto the national security. (7) Under the new legislation, the Office of the DNI will include the National Intelligence Council (NIC), composed of senior analysts within theIntelligence Community and substantive experts from the public and private sector. (8) The members of the NIC "shall constitute the seniorintelligence advisers fo the Intelligence Community for purposes of representing the views of the [I]ntelligence[C]ommunity within the United StatesGovernment." The members of the NIC are to be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of the DNI. The Intelligence Reform Act, provides that the DNI, when appointed, will be responsible for NIEs and other analytical products prepared under theauspices of the NIC. The three statutory responsibilities of the NIC have been to: produce national intelligence estimates for the Government, included, whenever the Council considers appropriate, alternativeviews held by elements of the intelligence community; evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements andresources of such collection and production; and otherwise assist the [DNI] in carrying out responsibilities established in law. (9) The DCI historically, and the DNI in the future, has a unique responsibility for the quality of intelligence analysis for consumers at all levels ofgovernment. While a number of agencies produce analytical products, the most authoritative intelligence productsof the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity are published under the authority of the DCI and potentially the DNI. NIEs are the primary, but not thesole, form in which theIntelligence Community forwards its judgments to senior officials, and they are the only one prescribed in statute. NIEs are produced at the NIC'sinitiative or in response to requests from senior policymakers. NIEs are sometimes highly controversial. They are designed to set forth the best objective judgments of the Intelligence Community, but theyoccasionally are more closely related to policy rationales than some analysts would prefer. An NIE produced inOctober 2002 on Iraq's ContinuingPrograms for Weapons of Mass Destruction has been much criticized; a more recent NIE on prospects for Iraq hasbeen the source of significantmedia attention. (10) Although the importance of particular NIEs to specific policy decisions may be debatable, (11) the NIE process provides a formal opportunity fortheIntelligence Community's input to policy deliberations. Arguably, it is the responsibility of policymakers to seekthe input of the IntelligenceCommunity, but most observers would argue that the DNI should not be reticent in presenting intelligenceinformation and judgments on majorpolicy issues when difficult decisions are under consideration. The most recent chairman of the NIC is Ambassador Robert L. Hutchings, who had previously served in the State Department and in academicinstitutions. (12) In addition, there are senioranalysts, known as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), for Africa, East Asia, Economics and GlobalIssues, Europe, Intelligence Assurance, Latin America, Military Issues, Near East and South Asia, Russia andEurasia, Transnational Threats,Warning, and Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation. The NIOs, who do not receive Senate confirmation,come from a variety ofgovernment agencies, inside and outside the Intelligence Community, and from the private sector. National Intelligence Officers supervise the production of NIEs and other community-wide products. Typically, an analyst in one agency isdesignated by the relevant NIO to prepare a draft analytical product; the draft then is reviewed by relevant analyststhroughout the Community. Subsequently, if approved by the leadership of the Intelligence Community (the National Foreign Intelligence Board)and the DCI, the draft has beencirculated to policymakers in the Executive Branch and, on occasion, to Members of Congress. NIEs set forth thebest information and judgments ofthe Intelligence Community and are usually directed at significant issues that may require policy decisions. The NIOs have worked for the DCI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community rather than in his capacity as director of the CIA. (In thefuture they will report to the DNI.) Thus, NIEs and related analytical products have not been CIA products; theyhave represented the consolidatedviews of the Intelligence Community (with alternative views held by elements of the Intelligence Community noted,in accordance with the statutorymandate (13) ). It may be reasonably assumed that the NIC will continue to depend heavily on the resources of the CIA. The CIA contains the most extensiveanalytical capability across the board on all subjects that might concern national policymakers, as well asconsiderable capability to support militarycommanders and mid-level desk officers. The CIA was originally designed to be "central," without obligations tosupport departmental objectives ashas been considered to be the case with the intelligence arms of the military services and the State Department. Insome areas, however, otheragencies have more extensive capabilities and can make an equal or greater contribution to NIEs and other productsdesigned to express thejudgments of the entire Intelligence Community. Some critics, moreover, charge that CIA on occasion developsan agency "position" that tends todiscourage alternate perspectives. (14) On many topics, there are inevitably different perspectives, and according to many observers, policymakers are best served by rigorous presentationsof alternative positions. (15) At the same time,however, some NIEs reflect an effort to craft language that all agencies can agree on and thus to avoidairing differences that might draw agencies into policy arguments between and among government departments. Agency managers understand thattoo close involvement in a policy argument by intelligence analysts can make their analyses unwelcome across theboard. In addition, they wellunderstand that analysis is an uncertain science and art and that even the best analysts can miss developments thatloom large in retrospect and leavetheir agencies open to harsh criticism or retribution. Concern is often expressed about the extent to which intelligence products can become "politicized," i.e., be drafted to support or undermine certainpolicy options. A charge of politicization is difficult to prove and is often dependent upon a reader's subjectiveviewpoint. Most observers believethat analysts make a conscientious effort to avoid policy advocacy, but note that they are fully aware of policydisputes and may have their own viewsthat may, subconsciously or otherwise, influence their products. There is, according to some observers, a tendencyto avoid making intelligencejudgments that directly conflict with policy options that have been chosen. Observers caution that placingintelligence analysis at the center of policydisputes can undermine the effectiveness of the analytical contribution; they suggest that intelligence can best serveby informing policy debates, butanalysts cannot be expected to provide definitive judgments that will resolve disputes that may involve a myriadof different factors, some farremoved from intelligence questions. In addition, observers note that it should be recognized that policymakingsometimes involves makingjudgments based on incomplete intelligence or on a willingness to accept risks and uncertainties beyond the ken ofanalysts. Analysis can have asubjective quality to some degree and can be undermined by unreasonable expectations. The Intelligence Reform Act provides several provisions designed to ensure that analysis is well-prepared and not politicized. In addition to havingauthority to establish an Office of Inspector General, the DNI is to assign an individual or entity to ensure thatagencies conduct alternative analysesof information and conclusions in intelligence products (section 1017). The DNI is also to assign an individual orentity to ensure that intelligenceproducts are "timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based on all sources of availableintelligence, and employ the standards ofproper analytic tradecraft" (section 1019). Another section requires that the DNI assign an individual to addressanalysts' concerns about "real orperceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligenceanalysis" (section 1020). Left uncertain are responsibilities for preparing the written brief on current intelligence that is prepared daily for the President and a very few othersenior officials. The President's Daily Brief (PDB), along with the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) thathas a somewhat widerdistribution, have been prepared by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and are considered that directorate's"flagship products." Nonetheless,should the DNI be responsible for daily substantive briefings at the White House rather than the CIA Director, itmight be considered appropriate thatthe DNI staff draft the PDB and the SEIB, based on input from the CIA and other agencies. The number of analystswho actually prepare thePBD/SEIB is not large, but their work reflects ongoing analysis in the CIA and other parts of the IntelligenceCommunity. Some might argue,moreover, that close and important links between CIA desk-level analysts and the PDB would be jeopardized shouldthe briefs be prepared outside ofthe CIA. In addition, there are myriads of other analytical products: reports, memoranda, briefings, etc. that are prepared on a routine basis. The IntelligenceReform Act does not transfer extensive analytical efforts to the NID; leaving such duties to existing agencies; theNIC will be responsible forassessments that set forth the judgments of the Intelligence Community as a whole. The Intelligence Reform Act provides that the DNI will assume responsibilities for managing the NIC. The DNI will be support by the NIC staff(probably numbering less than 100 positions). This gives the DNI the capability to oversee the preparation of NIEsand to ensure that the views of allagencies have been taken into consideration in inter-agency assessments. A major change will be the fact that theNIOs and their staff will work forone person (the DNI) while CIA analysts will report to a separate Director of the CIA. Congress may ultimatelyassess whether these changes, as theyare implemented, have improved the efforts of the Intelligence Community and its analytical products. The future responsibility for the production and presentation of the PDB/SEIBs is uncertain. They are currently prepared by CIA's Directorate ofIntelligence, and that responsibility could be continued. On the other hand, if the DNI, rather than the CIA Director,is to conduct the daily briefingfor the President and senior White House officials, it might be argued that the DNI and the DNI's immediate staffshould have responsibility for thedocument that provides the basis for the daily briefings.

The 9/11 Commission made a number of recommendations to improve the quality ofintelligenceanalysis. A key recommendation was the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position tomanage the national intelligenceeffort and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President -- along with a separate director of the CentralIntelligence Agency. Subsequently, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, made the DNI theprincipal adviser to the President onintelligence and made the DNI responsible for coordinating community-wide intelligence estimates. Some observersnote that separating the DNIfrom the analytical offices may complicate the overall analytical effort. This report will be updated as newinformation becomes available.

Section 2 would have addressed the problem of regional shortages of petroleum and natural gas products by amending the Clayton Act to make it unlawful for "any person to refuse to sell, or to export or divert, existing supplies of petroleum, gasoline, or other fuel derived from petroleum or natural gas with the primary intention of increasing prices or creating a shortage in a geographic market." The provision set out the circumstances that were to be considered by a court in determining whether the actions made unlawful were done "with the intent of increasing prices or creating a shortage...." Sections 3-5 would have imposed review, reporting, and study requirements on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Attorney General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Section 3 would have required the FTC and the Attorney General, to (1) conduct a study of section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18), the so-called antimerger section, in order to determine "whether [that] section ... should be amended to modify how that section applies to persons engaged in the business of exploring for, producing, refining ... or otherwise making available petroleum, gasoline or other fuel derived from petroleum or natural gas"; and, within 270 days of S. 2557 's enactment, (2) report to Congress the study's findings, "including recommendations and proposed legislation, if any." The report was to be based, in addition to the parties' own study of section 7 of the Clayton Act, on the Section 4-required GAO study. Section 4 would have required the GAO, within 180 days of enactment, to evaluate "the effectiveness of divestitures required under" consent decrees entered into within the past 10 years between either the FTC or the Department of Justice and "persons engaged in" the same segments of the petroleum or natural gas industries as those subject to study (as noted above) by the Attorney General and the FTC. The GAO study, was to have been submitted to Congress, the Attorney General, and the FTC, within 180 days of S. 2557 's enactment. Further, section 4 of S. 2557 would have required that the Attorney General and the FTC, in addition to reviewing the report for purposes of their report to Congress mandated in section 3(b) of S. 2557 , also "consider whether any additional action is required to restore competition or prevent a substantial lessening of competition occurring as a result of any transaction that was the subject of the [GAO] study...." Section 5 would have required the Attorney General and the FTC to establish a "joint federal-State task force" with any state Attorney General who chose to participate, to investigate information sharing (including [that facilitated] through the use of exchange agreements and commercial information services), among persons [described in the mandates for the above-cited studies, and] (including any person about which the Energy Information Administration collects financial and operating data as part of its Financial Reporting System). Section 6 would have created the "No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2006" ("NOPEC") as an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7) by inserting new provisions to make illegal, and an antitrust violation, actions by "any foreign state, or any instrumentality or agent of any foreign state, … to act collectively or in combination with any other foreign state, ... or any other person, whether by cartel or any other association or form of cooperation or joint action—" to engage in certain, specified actions with respect to natural gas or petroleum products, including those to (1) limit either "the production or distribution," (2) "set or maintain the price of," or (3) "take any [other] action in restraint of trade"— if any of those actions "has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on" U.S. commerce. Pursuant to proposed section 8(c) of the Sherman Act, the doctrine of sovereign immunity would not protect any foreign state from "the jurisdiction or judgments" of U.S. courts in any action brought on account of conduct alleged to be in violation of the foregoing prohibitions. Proposed section 8(d) would prohibit use of the act of state doctrine as a court's rationale for "declin[ing] ... to make a determination on the merits in an action brought under this section." The final provisions of section 6 would add language to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a), which lists exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, to clarify that sovereign immunity does not apply in instances "in which [an] action is brought under section 8 of the Sherman Act." Technical matters concerning references to existing statutes or to statutory provisions (several of which have been renumbered in the past several years, including editorial renumbering after enactment) are best addressed by the Senate Office of Legislative Counsel. Similarly, that Office might also best provide U.S. Code citations to accompany the statutory section references so as to clarify exactly which provisions are being named, amended, or added. In addition, that Office's familiarity with legislative drafting considerations should enable them to suggest the most advantageous placement of proposed provisions. Making it unlawful for "any person to refuse to sell, export or divert, existing supplies of petroleum..." would likely be challenged by those who would note that the courts, beginning with the Supreme Court's 1919 decision in United States v. Colgate & Co., have long acknowledged the right of an individual businessman to do business, or not, with whomever he likes, and on whatever terms and conditions he deems acceptable: In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade" —in other words, collusion. Section 2 prohibits "monopolization" or "attempted monopolization"—which may entail unilateral, "guilty behavior" by either a would-be monopolist in his quest to become one (attempt), or an existing monopolist acting to maintain his monopoly position by other than the "superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" which served to create the monopoly in the first place. Presently, absent either the collusion (joint action) made unlawful by section 1 of the Sherman Act, or the "guilty behavior" which might constitute violation of section 2, there is not any statutory constraint on unilateral business decisions, and the courts have been reluctant to infer one. The Federal Trade Commission has released two reports—in July 2005 and March 2006 - concerning the gasoline industry. The former "analyze[d] in detail the multiple factors that affect supply and demand—and thus prices for gasoline ...; the latter, an interim report, was produced in response to Congressional directives, and outlines the Commission's rationale and methods for combining the mandated studies. Tasking the FTC with the study and reporting requirements contained in sections 3 and 4, in addition to those contained in other legislation, might result in the Commission's inability to conduct timely enforcement activities and/or continue its program to monitor "weekly average gasoline and diesel prices in 360 cities nationwide to find and, if necessary, recommend appropriate action on pricing anomalies that might indicate anticompetitive conduct." Provisions similar to the NOPEC provisions of S. 2557 , an apparent attempt to nullify the courts' refusal, in 1979, to sanction a suit against OPEC by the International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), would not necessarily accomplish the presumed goal of precluding OPEC's influence on gasoline prices. First, a provision that would add language to the Sherman Act to make certain actions unlawful under that statute, may be redundant: those actions taken abroad by a non-sovereign that have the requisite effect on U.S. commerce are already reachable under the U.S. antitrust laws, even absent specific statutory authorization. As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1945: We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357, .... On the other hand , it is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize. In addition, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 contains a commercial activity exception to the general rule that a foreign state is protected from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. There is no sovereign immunity, according to existing statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2)), in circumstances in which the [judicial] action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States; S. 2557 , for example, would have stated specifically that actions brought pursuant to the Sherman Act do not trigger sovereign immunity, but the provision did not define OPEC as a "country" for purposes of the act; such a lack could present a problem for two reasons. The S. 2557 language did not, seemingly, add meaningfully to the general "commercial activity exception" language of FSIA. The IAM's unsuccessful attempt to use FSIA to sue OPEC for, inter alia , price fixing under the antitrust laws is a useful illustration; it foundered for reasons that do not seem to have been remedied by the bill's proposed statutory provisions. The district court found that because OPEC was not a country, FSIA was inapplicable, and no action could be brought against OPEC under it. Further, and perhaps more important, the court found that the "indirect purchaser" doctrine denied the IAM standing to sue (477 F.Supp. at 560-61). Congress has not granted indirect purchasers standing under the federal antitrust laws, although several states have done so with regard to their own antitrust laws. Although proposed section 8(e) of the Sherman Act would allow suits to be brought by the Attorney General, it would not alter a current prohibition on private actions—the indirect purchaser doctrine. Affirming the district court's dismissal of the IAM suit, the appeals court reasoning was based on non-FSIA, non-antitrust factors, and couched in language that does specifically mention the act of state doctrine, indicating the questionable effectiveness of proposed section 8(d)'s direction that courts not "decline, based on the act of state doctrine, to make a determination on the merits in an action brought on this section." While the case is formulated as an anti-trust action, the granting of any relief would in effect amount to an order from a domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its chosen means of allocating and profiting from its own valuable natural resources. On the other hand, should the court hold that OPEC's actions are [antitrust] legal this "would greatly strengthen the bargaining hand" of the OPEC nations in the event that Congress or the executive chooses to condemn OPEC's actions.

This report addresses one of several approaches to the issue of rising gasoline prices put forward in the 109th Congress. S. 2557 was introduced on April 6, 2006, by Senator Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, reported by that committee on April 27, but was not scheduled for floor action. The bill sought to amend the antitrust laws to accomplish four things. Mitigate regional shortages of petroleum and natural gas products Mandate federal agency reviews to (a) fine-tune the statutory provision most concerned with mergers (Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, which makes unlawful any merger or acquisition in or affecting commerce that may "substantially" lessen competition or "tend to create a monopoly" in any line or commerce in any section of the country) so that it would be particularly applicable to mergers in the oil and gas industry, and (b) examine the effectiveness of the divestiture remedy for mergers in that industry Establish a federal-state task force to examine information-sharing in the oil and gas industries; and Make U.S. antitrust law applicable to certain actions carried out by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of private-sector employee benefit plans. While ERISA does not require an employer to offer employee benefits, it does mandate compliance with its provisions if such benefits are offered. Besides the regulation of pension plans, ERISA also regulates welfare benefit plans offered by an employer to provide medical, surgical and other health benefits. ERISA applies to health benefit coverage offered through health insurance or other arrangements (e.g., self-funded plans). Health plans, like other welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA, must comply with certain standards, including plan fiduciary standards, reporting and disclosure requirements, and procedures for appealing a denied claim for benefits. However, these health plans must also meet additional requirements under ERISA. This report discusses some of these additional requirements for group health plans, as well as health insurance issuers that provide group health coverage. As enacted in 1974, ERISA's regulation of health plan coverage and benefits was limited. However, beginning in 1986, Congress added to ERISA a number of requirements on the nature and content of health plans, including rules governing health care continuation coverage, limitations on exclusions from coverage based on preexisting conditions, parity between medical/surgical benefits and mental health benefits, and minimum hospital stay requirements for mothers following the birth of a child. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) added a new Part 6 to Title I of ERISA, which requires the sponsor of a group health plan to provide an option of temporarily continuing health care coverage for plan participants and beneficiaries under certain circumstances. Under ERISA section 601, a plan maintained by an employer with 20 or more employees must provide "qualified beneficiaries" with the option of continuing coverage under the employer's group health plan in the case of certain "qualified events." A qualifying event is an event that, except for continuation coverage under COBRA, would result in a loss of coverage, such as the death of the covered employee, the termination (other than by reason of the employee's gross misconduct) or reduction of hours of the covered employee's employment, or the covered employee becoming entitled to Medicare benefits. Under section 602 of ERISA, the employer must typically provide this continuation coverage for 18 months. However, coverage may be longer, depending on the qualifying event. Under ERISA 602(1), the benefits offered under COBRA must be identical to the health benefits offered to "similarly situated non-COBRA beneficiaries," or in other words, beneficiaries who have not experienced a qualifying event. The health plan may charge a premium to COBRA participants, but it cannot exceed 102% of the plan's group rate. After 18 months of required coverage, a plan may charge certain participants 150% of the plan's group rate. However, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 includes provisions to subsidize health insurance coverage through COBRA. ARRA provides for COBRA premium subsidies of 65% to help the unemployed afford health insurance coverage from their former employer. The subsidy is available for up to nine months to those individuals who meet the income test and who are involuntarily terminated from their employment on or after September 1, 2008, and before January 1, 2010. For more information on the COBRA premium subsidies, see CRS Report R40420, Health Insurance Premium Assistance for the Unemployed: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) added a new Part 7 to Title I of ERISA to provide additional health plan coverage requirements. Other federal legislation amended Part 7 of ERISA to require plans that offer specific health benefits to meet certain standards. The requirements of Part 7 generally apply to group health plans, as well as health insurance issuers that offer group health insurance coverage. HIPAA was enacted in 1996 in part to "improve the portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets." One of the ways that HIPAA implements this goal is by amending ERISA, as well as other federal laws, to limit the circumstances under which a group health plan or insurer providing group health coverage may exclude a participant or beneficiary with a preexisting condition from coverage. A preexisting condition exclusion under a group health plan or group health insurance coverage can be applicable to an individual as a result of information relating to an individual's health status before the effective date of coverage, such as a condition identified as a result of a pre-enrollment questionnaire, a physical examination given to the individual, or review of medical records relating to the pre-enrollment period. Under Section 701 of ERISA, as created by HIPAA, an exclusion period for an individual's preexisting condition may be applied if medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recommended or received within the six months before the enrollment date in the plan. This exclusion from coverage cannot be for more than 12 months after an employee enrolls in a health plan (or 18 months for late enrollees). Further, this 12-month period must be reduced by the number of days that an individual has "creditable coverage," with no significant break in this coverage. A significant break is a 63-day continuous period in which the individual had no creditable coverage after the termination of prior health coverage and before the enrollment date of the new coverage. In other words, if an individual maintains certain creditable coverage, the individual cannot be subject to an exclusion period when moving from one group health plan to another. HIPAA prohibits plans and insurers from imposing preexisting condition exclusions under certain circumstances. For instance, pre-existing condition exclusion may not be imposed for any conditions relating to pregnancy. Similarly, newborns and adopted children cannot be subject to a preexisting condition exclusion if they were covered under "creditable coverage" within 30 days after birth or adoption, and there has not been a gap of more than 63 days in this coverage. HIPAA also requires health plans to provide a special enrollment opportunity to allow certain individuals to enroll in a health plan without waiting until the plan's next regular enrollment season. For example, special enrollment rights must be extended to a person who becomes a new dependent through marriage, birth, adoption or placement for adoption, or to an employee or dependent who loses other health coverage. Effective April 1, 2009, the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 amended ERISA to provide that group health plans must permit employees and dependents who are eligible for, but not enrolled in, coverage under the terms of the plan to enroll in two additional circumstances: (1) the employee's or dependent's coverage under Medicaid or SCHIP is terminated as a result of loss of eligibility, or (2) the employee or dependent becomes eligible for a financial assistance under Medicaid or SCHIP, and the employee requests coverage under the plan within 60 days after eligibility is determined. Under these two circumstances, an employee must request coverage within 60 days after termination of Medicaid or SCHIP coverage, or becoming eligible for this coverage. HIPAA also created ERISA Section 702, which provides that a group health plan or health insurance issuer may not base coverage eligibility rules on certain factors, including health status (physical or mental), claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, or disability. In addition, a health plan may not require an individual to pay a higher premium or contribution than another "similarly situated" participant, based on these health-related factors. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), passed in the 110 th Congress, amended Section 702 of ERISA to prevent certain types of genetic discrimination. Under this section, a health plan may not adjust premiums or contribution amounts for an entire group covered by the plan on the basis of genetic information. "Genetic information," as defined by the act, includes information about a genetic test of an individual or a family member of an individual, the manifestation of a disease or disorder in the family members of an individual, as well as request for, or receipt of, genetic services. GINA restricts a health plan from requiring or requesting an individual or a family member of an individual to undergo a genetic test. The act includes an exception to this provision, under which a health plan may request a genetic test for research purposes, but only if certain conditions are met. Further, GINA prohibits a plan from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information for underwriting purposes or with respect to an individual prior to the individual's enrollment in the plan. The amendments made by GINA apply to health plans for plan years beginning after May 21, 2009. HIPAA also added Section 703 of ERISA, which provides that certain health plans covering multiple employers cannot deny an employer (whose employees are covered by the plan) coverage under the plan, except for certain reasons, such as an employer's failure to pay plan contributions. In 1996, Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA), which added section 712 of ERISA to create certain requirements for mental health coverage, if this coverage was offered by a health plan. Under the MHPA, health plans are not required to offer mental health benefits. However, plans that choose to provide mental health benefits must not impose lower annual and lifetime dollar limits on these benefits than the limits placed on medical and surgical benefits. The MHPA allows a plan to decide what mental health benefits are to be offered; however, the parity requirements do not apply to substance abuse or chemical dependency treatment. Certain plans may be exempt from the MHPA. Plans covering employers with 50 or fewer employees are exempt from compliance. In addition, employers that experience an increase in claims costs of at least 1% as a result of MHPA compliance can apply for an exemption. Recently, Congress enacted legislation which expands the MHPA's requirements. The new requirements apply to group health plans for plan years beginning after October 3, 2009. These requirements, included as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, expand the parity requirements under the current version of the MHPA for mental health and substance use disorder coverage if such coverage is offered by a group health plan. In general, the act amends section 712 of ERISA, as well as other federal laws, to require parity between mental health/substance use disorder benefits and medical/surgical benefits in terms of the predominant (1) financial requirements and (2) treatment limitations imposed by a group health plan. As defined by the act, financial requirements include requirements such as deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance and out-of-pocket expenses; treatment limitations include limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or any other limits on the duration or scope of treatment. The parity requirements of the act apply to mental health and substance use disorder benefits as defined by the health plan or applicable state law. Health plans may qualify for an exemption from the parity requirements if it is actuarially determined that the implementation of the act's requirements would cause a plan to experience an increase in actual total costs of coverage that exceed 2% of the actual total plan costs during the first plan year, or exceed 1% of the actual total plan costs each subsequent year. In 1996, Congress passed the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act (NMHPA), which amended ERISA and established minimum hospital stay requirements for mothers following the birth of a child. In general, the NMHPA prohibits a group health plan or health insurance issuer from limiting a hospital length of stay in connection with childbirth for the mother or newborn child to less than 48 hours, following a normal vaginal delivery, or to less than 96 hours, following a cesarean section. The Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act, enacted in 1998, amended ERISA to require group health plans providing mastectomy coverage to cover prosthetic devices and reconstructive surgery. Under section 713 of ERISA, this coverage must be provided in a manner determined in consultation between the attending physician and the patient. On October 9, 2008, President Bush signed legislation, known as "Michelle's Law," that extends the ability of dependents to remain on their parents' plan for a limited period of time during a medical leave from full-time student status. The act requires group health plans and health insurance issuers that provide group health coverage to continue coverage for a child dependent on a medically necessary leave of absence for a period of up to one year after the first day of the leave of absence or the date on which such coverage would otherwise terminate under the terms of the plan, whichever is earlier. A dependent child for purposes of the act is a dependent under the terms of the plan who was both enrolled in the plan on the first day of the medically necessary leave of absence and as a full-time student at a postsecondary education institution until the first day of the medically necessary leave of absence. Michelle's law applies to plan years beginning on or after October 9, 2009 (one year after enactment), and to medically necessary leaves of absence beginning during such plan years.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) sets certain federal standards for the provision of health benefits under private-sector, employment-based health plans. These standards regulate the nature and content of health plans and include rules on health care continuation coverage as provided under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), guarantees on the availability and renewability of health care coverage for certain employees and individuals, limitations on exclusions from health care coverage based on preexisting conditions, and parity between medical/surgical benefits and mental health benefits. This report discusses these health benefit requirements under ERISA.

The United States remains the only major industrialized country in which a nonmetric measurement system is predominantly employed. Thus, while miles, pounds, and degrees Fahrenheit (i.e., the English system of measurement) are widely used in the United States, kilometers, grams, and degrees Celsius are favored throughout the rest of the industrialized world. Voluntary use of the metric system, also known as the International System of Units or SI, has been legal in the United States since 1866, and certain segments of society (particularly scientists and industries involved in international trade) have embraced metric units for many years. Calls for widespread metric conversion intensified during the mid-1960s, particularly after the United Kingdom began its conversion from the English system to metric. In 1968, Congress passed the Metric Study Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-472) which authorized a three-year Department of Commerce study on the feasibility of metric conversion in the United States. The study concluded that conversion to the metric system was in the best interests of the Nation, particularly in view of the increasing importance of technology and international trade to the U.S. economy. In 1975, the Metric Conversion Act ( P.L. 94-168 ) was passed by Congress. The Act established a U.S. Metric Board whose purpose was to coordinate and plan a process of voluntary metric conversion throughout the Nation. However, there appeared to be widespread public antipathy to conversion to the metric system and the Metric Board's efforts were largely ignored (and in some instances, vociferously opposed) by the American public. In 1982, the Metric Board was abolished by the Reagan Administration. By the late 1980s, however, concern over U.S. industrial competitiveness in world markets led Congress to again encourage metric conversion, this time by requiring federal agencies to go metric in their respective activities. Section 5164 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-418 ) amended the Metric Conversion Act of 1975 to designate the metric system as the "preferred system of weights and measures for United States trade and commerce." The amended Act required all federal agencies to begin using the metric system in procurements, grants, and other business-related activities, except when such use is impractical or is likely to cause significant inefficiencies or loss of markets to U.S. firms. Agencies were also required to report annually to Congress on actions taken to implement fully the metric system of measurement. As follow-up to P.L. 100-418 , Executive Order 12770 ("Metric Usage in Federal Government Programs"), issued in 1991 by President Bush, further required federal agencies to formulate and implement metric conversion plans. Federal agencies were initially slow in responding to the metric conversion mandate. A March 1990 General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that most federal agencies had not shown a commitment to metric conversion. After Executive Order 12770 was issued, agency compliance measurably improved. A Committee Print issued December 1993 by the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, reported that 29 out of 36 federal agencies had reported their metric activities to Congress (as required by P.L. 100-418 ). The study concluded that a "general commitment toward converting to the metric system by each federal government agency reporting appears clearly evident." Meanwhile, a January 1994 GAO report on metric conversion found that while federal preparations for metric conversion were well underway, basic problems limited federal metric procurement; grants and other business activities showed mixed progress; and federal agencies indicated a need for greater support from the private sector and the public. The Metric Program at the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for coordinating the metric transition activities of all federal agencies. NIST chairs the Interagency Committee on Metric Policy (ICMP) and is required by Executive Order 12770 to report to the President annually regarding metric conversion progress made by individual federal agencies. The most recent report, the 1993 Metric Progress Report, concluded that metric conversion progress among agencies is widely variable, and depends upon the metric readiness of the industries a particular agency's programs affect, budget limitations, and the amount of visible high level leadership within the agency. Notable examples of metric conversion activities in the federal government include: the proposed metric conversion of federal highways (discussed below), a requirement that all new federal building construction projects be conducted in metric units, and a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule requiring consumer product packaging to be labeled with dual (English and metric) units. Other agencies, however, have determined it unfeasible or unpractical to convert particular activities to metric at this time. The GAO found that "[metric conversion] problems encountered by federal agencies frequently involve opposition from the private sector or the public. Generally speaking, the more directly a proposed conversion affects the private sector or the public, the greater the resistance." Thus, for example, the Secretary of Agriculture has granted a general exemption from metric conversion for projects or programs that directly affect individual farmers or farm programs. The National Weather Service in the Department of Commerce, while gathering all of its data in metric units, converts back to the inch-pound system before providing its data to the public. An issue that has received much attention from congressional policy makers and the public is the proposed metric conversion of the federal highway system. On June 11, 1992, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) announced its metric conversion policy, which stipulated that all highway construction plans, specifications, and estimates be prepared in metric units of measurement by September 30, 1996. After that date, Federal Aid Highway Program funds would not be authorized for nonmetric projects, unless a specific exception was issued by FHWA. Many state highway agencies have been working with FHWA and the American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials (AASHTO) to meet the September 30, 1996, deadline for metric conversion. However, on November 28, 1995, the President signed the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 ( P.L. 104-59 ), which provides that before September 30, 2000, the Secretary of Transportation shall not require any state to use or plan to use the metric system with respect to designing or advertising, or preparing plans, specifications, estimates or other documents for a federal-aid highway project. Legislation introduced into the 104 th Congress by Representative Duncan ( H.R. 3617 ), and reintroduced into the 105 th Congress by Representative Bachus ( H.R. 813 ) and Senator Baucus ( S. 532 ) would indefinitely remove the federal mandate for metric conversion in federal highway projects (see discussion in next section of this report). The issue of highway sign conversion was considered separately from FHWA's overall metric conversion policy, and was not subject to the September 30, 1996 deadline. On August 31, 1993, the FHWA announced in the Federal Register a solicitation of public comments on options it was considering for "coordinating an orderly transition of distance, weight, and speed traffic control sign legends from English to metric units." In response to the FHWA notice, a series of bills were introduced in Congress which sought to prohibit the use of federal funds for metric conversion of highway signs. Additionally, Department of Transportation Appropriation bills for FY1994 ( P.L. 103-122 ), FY1995 ( P.L. 103-331 ), and FY1996 ( P.L. 104-50 ) specifically prohibited use of appropriated funds for metric conversion of highway signs. On June 27, 1994, the FHWA announced its decision in the Federal Register not to require the implementation of metric signs until "at least after 1996, or until further indication of the intention of Congress on this subject is received." The FHWA stated that one of the factors in its decision was "a possible future congressional restriction on using Federal funds for metric signs." Accordingly, the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 ( P.L. 104-59 ) prohibits FHWA from requiring the states to expend any federal or state funds for metric conversion of highway signs. Meanwhile, an April 1996 Battelle study commissioned by FHWA has estimated that the cost of metric highway sign conversion could range from $15.6 million for routine replacement, to $826 million for dual posting. Similar to the metric provisions of the National Highway System Designation Act, much of the metric-related legislation introduced in the 104 th Congress sought to limit metric conversion activities in the federal government, particularly in cases where the federal government is seen to be imposing metric conversion mandates on the States. Section 302 of the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 ( P.L. 104-4 ), signed into law on March 22, 1995, directed the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) to study specific federal mandates, including "requirements of the departments, agencies, and other entities of the federal government that state, local, and tribal governments utilize metric systems of measurement." On January 24, 1996, the ACIR issued its preliminary report on federal mandates. The Commission identified FHWA metric conversion requirements for federal highway construction as a federal mandate, and recommended the repeal of "requirements that state and local governments convert to metric on a Federal timetable as a condition of receiving Federal aid." Metric proponents have objected to the ACIR findings, asserting that metric conversion has already been implemented by most states, that the metric system is becoming increasingly accepted by the construction community, and that metric conversion costs constitute a tiny percentage of total federal highway funds received. Other legislation in the 104 th Congress sought to amend the Metric Conversion Act. The Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 ( P.L. 104-66 ), which was signed into law on December 21, 1995, repeals section 12 of the Metric Conversion Act requiring federal agencies to report to the Congress on their metric conversion activities. A further amendment to the Metric Conversion Act was included in Department of Commerce dismantling legislation, which was attached to the House version of the debt limit extension bill ( H.R. 2586 , subsequently vetoed by the President). This provision would have repealed the provision of the Metric Conversion Act which requires federal agencies to use the metric system in their procurements, grants, and other business-related activities. Additionally, the Metric Program at NIST would have been abolished. Finally, a bill passed by the 104 th Congress ( P.L. 104-289 ) sought to curb some federal agency requirements that businesses convert their modular construction products to a hard metric specification in order to supply federal construction contracts. While the vast majority of products procured for federal construction are soft converted (which means that an existing product is relabeled in metric units but does not change size), some modular products are required in hard metric sizes in order to be dimensionally coordinated with other building components. A hard metric conversion requires, in addition to the expression of the dimensions of a product in metric units, a physical change in the dimension of that product in order to conform to a rounded metric unit. Certain construction materials industries (primarily makers of concrete masonry block and recessed lighting fixtures) objected to hard metric requirements, arguing instead for soft metric conversion. The Savings in Construction Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-289 ), signed into law on October 11, 1996, applies only to concrete masonry units and recessed lighting fixtures. The law prohibits federal agencies from specifying hard metric dimensions for concrete block and lighting fixtures, unless certain criteria are met, including a determination by the agency that the costs of the modular metric components are estimated to be equal to or less than the total installed price of using non-hard metric products. Additionally, P.L. 104-289 directs each executive agency awarding construction contracts to designate a metrication ombudsman who will respond to industry complaints and concerns regarding construction metrication issues. In the 105 th Congress, metric related legislation remains focused on the federal highway construction issue. H.R. 813 (introduced by Representative Bachus) would remove the extended deadline of September 30, 2000 from the National Highway System Designation Act ( P.L. 104-59 ), thereby indefinitely prohibiting FHWA from requiring the states to convert their federal highway projects to metric units. Section 303 of the Surface Transportation Authorization and Regulatory Streamlining Act ( S. 532 , introduced by Senator Baucus), contains identical language. Similarly, there are plans in the House to attach such language to legislation reauthorizing the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). Proponents of removing the federal mandate for metric conversion cite the costs of conversion experienced by highway contractors, and maintain that metric conversion decisions should be left to the states. Opponents of H.R. 813 , including the Department of Transportation, point out that over 40 states are already surveying and designing their new projects in metric units, and that states have spent nearly $71 million to convert standard plans, specifications, and computer programs. Removing the federal mandate, they argue, would create confusion in the highway construction industry, and reverse progress that most states have already made in converting to the metric system.

The United States remains the only major industrialized country in which a nonmetric measurement system is predominantly employed. Section 5164 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) amended the Metric Conversion Act to require federal agencies to use the metric system in their activities. Legislation in the 104th and 105th Congress limits federal metric conversion activities, particularly in instances where states, local governments, and the private sector may be required to convert to the metric system in order to participate in federally funded programs.

As attention continues to focus on juvenile offenders, some question the way in which they are treated in the U.S. criminal justice system. Since the late 1960s, the juvenile justice system has undergone significant modifications as a result of United States Supreme Court decisions, changes in federal and state law and the growing perception that juveniles were increasingly involved in more serious and violent crimes. As a result, federal and state juvenile justice systems have focused less on rehabilitation and more on punishment, which may have significant ramifications for juvenile offenders once they reach adulthood. For example, recidivist statutes such as the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) impose mandatory minimums based on prior convictions, including juvenile adjudications. As such, adult criminal defendants are exposed to longer terms of imprisonment based on prior juvenile misconduct. Despite this shift in focus to one more closely resembling the adult criminal justice system, juvenile offenders are not generally afforded the full panoply of rights provided to adult criminal defendants. The establishment of a juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899 marked the first statewide implementation of a separate judicial framework whose sole concern was the problems and misconduct of children. The juvenile court was designed to be more than a court for children. The underlying theory behind a separate juvenile court system was that the state has a duty to assume a custodial and protective role over individuals who cannot act in their own best interest. As such, the separate system for juvenile offenders was predicated on the notion of rehabilitation—not punishment, retribution, or incapacitation. Because the juvenile court focused on protection rather than punishment, the juvenile proceeding was conceptualized as a civil proceeding (not a criminal one), with none of the trappings of an adversarial proceeding. By the mid-20 th century, questions arose regarding the fairness and efficacy of the juvenile justice system and its ability to effectively rehabilitate young offenders. Concerns that the differences between the adult and juvenile systems were illusory prompted the need to preserve the legal rights of children adjudicated in the juvenile justice system. As such, state courts began to expand the legal rights of juvenile offenders. The emerging focus on juveniles' rights in the state courts prompted intervention from the U.S. Supreme Court, which had traditionally deferred to the states. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Court examined the due process rights of minors in four landmark cases: Kent v. United States , In re Gault , In re Winship , and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania . Through these cases, the Court left an indelible mark on the juvenile justice system by restricting the discretion of juvenile court judges and enumerating the constitutional rights retained by juveniles during adjudication. These decisions resulted in a hybrid juvenile justice system that renders some of the procedural rights afforded to adult criminal defendants. Some argue that this hybrid system blurs the historical distinction between the juvenile justice and adult criminal systems. The Court first recognized that the U.S. Constitution guaranteed juveniles due process rights in Kent v. United States . In Kent , the Court reviewed a District of Columbia case in which the petitioner challenged the validity of the juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction over him, on the ground that the procedure used by the court in reaching its decision constituted a denial of due process of law. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the waiver of jurisdiction was a "critically important" stage in the juvenile process and must be attended by minimum requirements of due process and fair treatment required by the Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching its decision, the Court expressed concern that the non-criminal nature of the juvenile proceeding was an invitation to "procedural arbitrariness" including broad judicial fact-finding. In In re Gault , the Court held that the informal procedures of juvenile courts amount to a denial of juveniles' fundamental due process rights. Although the Court recognized that juvenile courts were attempting to help juveniles, it reasoned that this worthy purpose failed to justify informal procedure, particularly when a juvenile's liberty was threatened. After a thorough examination of the history of the juvenile court system, the Court reiterated much of the criticism it raised in Kent , specifically expressing concern about the juvenile court's informality and the broad discretion of its judges. To ensure that juveniles receive the essentials of fair treatment during an adjudicatory hearing, the Court found that juveniles were entitled to certain due process rights afforded to adult criminal defendants under the U.S. Constitution. These rights include the right to reasonable notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right against self-incrimination. In In re Winship , the Court continued to expand the rights of juveniles by holding that the state must show proof beyond a reasonable doubt to adjudicate a minor as delinquent for an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. The state of New York charged Samuel Winship with delinquency for stealing $112 from a woman's pocketbook in a furniture store. Having already established that juvenile proceedings must conform to due process and fair treatment, the Court considered a single issue: whether due process and fair treatment require a state to demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt to hold a juvenile accountable for committing an adult criminal act. Although a New York juvenile court found Winship to be delinquent under a statute that required the state to show guilt merely by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court reversed, emphasizing that criminal charges have always required a higher burden of persuasion than civil cases. The Court expressly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is charged. Finding that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to the reasonable doubt standard, the Court stated, "[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in fact-finding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child." The Court rejected the state's argument that the delinquency adjudication is a civil proceeding that did not require due process protections, calling this argument the "civil label of convenience." By 1970, the Supreme Court had ruled that the due process notion of fundamental fairness entitled juveniles to various procedural protections in juvenile court. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania , the Court held that juveniles do not have a fundamental right to a jury trial when being adjudicated in the juvenile justice system. McKeive r was a consolidation of three similar appeals involving minors adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court by judges who had rejected their requests for a jury to serve as fact-finder at their hearing. The Court narrowed the issue presented to whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensured the right to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a juvenile court delinquency proceeding. After reviewing its previous juvenile court jurisprudence, the Court first considered whether the right to a jury was automatically guaranteed to minors by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although it had never expressly characterized juvenile court proceedings as criminal prosecutions within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, the Court reiterated that the juvenile court system reflected many of the adult criminal court's punitive aspects. However, a plurality of the Court rejected the argument that adjudicatory proceedings were substantively similar to criminal trials, reasoning that a jury trial was only constitutionally required if due process required fact-finding by a jury. In support of its conclusion that a jury is unnecessary for fair fact-finding, the plurality noted that equity cases, workmen's compensation cases, probate matters, deportation cases, and military trials, among others, had been traditionally decided by judges without juries. In reaching its decision, the Court expressed doubt as to whether imposing such a right would improve the fact-finding ability of juvenile courts. In addition, the Court reasoned that imposing such a right would jeopardize the unique nature of the juvenile system and blur the distinctions between juvenile court and adult criminal court. To do so would make the juvenile system obsolete. The plurality's holding signaled the Court's return to the more paternalistic approach it had rejected in its previous opinions and marked the end of the era of expansion of procedural rights in juvenile adjudications. Arguably, the absence of a jury trial requirement in adjudicatory proceedings presents a host of questions that may warrant a reexamination of the issue. First, some are likely to argue that the increasingly punitive nature of cases adjudicated in the juvenile justice system calls into question the validity of the Court's reasoning underlying its holding in McKeiver that juveniles are not entitled to the right to a jury trial. When the Court decided McKeiver , it did so to maintain the civil and rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice system. At the time of the decision, juvenile adjudication hearings were closed to the public, the system was informal, and the records of the juvenile adjudications were confidential and not relied on in criminal prosecutions. Currently, some juvenile adjudication hearings are open to the public, the system is more formal and adversarial, and juvenile adjudications are frequently used in criminal prosecutions for sentence enhancement. From their perspective, the civil and rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice system has shifted to a more punitive one which more closely resembles the adult criminal justice system. Central to the McKeiver ' s holding was the Court's conclusion that juries were not essential to accurate fact-finding. However, this premise may be called into question in light of the Court's reemphasis on the importance of a jury. In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized and emphasized the important role that juries play in criminal proceedings. In Duncan v. Louisiana , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to jury trial is fundamental and guaranteed by due process. In Williams v. Florida , the Court reaffirmed that the "purpose of the jury trial ... is to prevent oppression by the Government." The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the superiority of group decision-making over individual judgments in Ballew v. Georgia , which defined the constitutional minimum number of jurors that a state must empanel in a criminal prosecution. In Ballew , the Court, relying on empirical data, found that a jury composed of less than six members was less likely to foster effective group deliberation and more likely to lead to inaccurate fact-finding and incorrect application of the community's common sense to the facts. In addition, the court concluded that a smaller panel could increase the risk of convicting an innocent person. More recently, the Court has stressed the constitutional necessity of juries, rather than judges, making factual determinations upon which sentences are based. The Court's reasoning in Ballew and subsequent cases regarding fact-finding by juries during sentencing may call into question the Court's conclusion in McKeiver that a jury would not improve the fact-finding ability and fairness of juvenile courts. An argument can also be made that the absence of a jury trial in the adjudicatory process could lead to inequities in other criminal proceedings. For example, recidivist statutes such as the Armed Career Criminal Act impose mandatory minimums based on prior convictions, which by definition include juvenile adjudications. As such, adult criminal defendants are subjected to longer terms of imprisonment based on prior juvenile misconduct. Some state and lower federal courts have found that equating juvenile adjudications with a conviction as a predicate offense for the purposes of state recidivism statutes subverts the civil nature of the juvenile adjudication to an extent that makes it fundamentally unfair and, thus, violative of due process. One way to remedy the perceived inequities in using non-jury juvenile adjudication as sentence enhancements, critics of the current system maintain, might be to grant juveniles a right to a jury trial during adjudicatory hearings.

As more attention is being focused on juvenile offenders, some question whether the justice system is dealing with this population appropriately. Since the late 1960s, the juvenile justice system has undergone significant modifications resulting from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, changes in federal and state law, and the growing belief that juveniles were increasingly involved in more serious and violent crimes. Consequently, at both the federal and states levels, the juvenile justice system has shifted from a mostly rehabilitative system to a more punitive one, with serious ramifications for juvenile offenders. Despite this shift, juveniles are generally not afforded the panoply of rights afforded to adult criminal defendants. The U.S. Constitution requires that juveniles receive many of the features of an adult criminal trial, including notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and double jeopardy. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that juveniles do not have a fundamental right to a jury trial during adjudicatory proceedings. The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the right to an impartial jury trial in criminal prosecutions. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this right is fundamental and guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court has since limited its holding in Duncan to adult defendants by stating that the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally required for juveniles in juvenile court proceedings. Some argue that because the Court has determined that jury trials are not constitutionally required for juvenile adjudications, courts should not treat or consider juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal proceedings. In addition, some argue that the use of non-jury juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal proceedings violates due process guarantees, because juvenile justice and adult criminal proceedings are fundamentally different. Has the juvenile justice system changed in such a manner that the Supreme Court should revisit the question of jury trials in juvenile adjudications? Are the procedural safeguards in the juvenile justice system sufficient to ensure their reliable use for sentence enhancement purposes in adult criminal proceedings? To help address these questions, this report provides a brief background on the purpose of the juvenile system and discusses procedural due process protections provided by the Court for juveniles during adjudicatory hearings. It also discusses the Court's emphasis on the jury's role in criminal proceedings and will be updated as events warrant.

As the complexities of the problems facing America have increased, Congress has responded the way hundreds of their constituents have, by going back to school. Early organization and orientation have provided Members a "leg up" in addressing pressing needs. When the first Congress convened over 200 years ago, farmers and soldiers, journalists and scientists, carpenters and statesmen travelled from throughout the colonies to New York to take the oath of office as Members of the first Congress. They adopted rules, organized the structure of their chambers, and began legislating, each in accordance with the Member's own individual understanding of just how to do that and how to be both a representative and a legislator, that is, how to be a Member of Congress. There was no specific precedent to follow, no educational institution to attend to explore the intricacies of the legislative process, no classes to take to practice the politics of bicameralism and bipartisanship, no management consultant to teach them how to administer their offices. And so, these Members, and the hundreds who followed them, learned on the job, learned from their predecessors and each other, and learned from their mistakes. As the nation grew and prospered, and the number of Members increased with "manifest destiny," it became clear that "on the job training" was no longer sufficient. The issues were becoming more complex, the procedures more intricate. In the early 1970s, nearly 200 years after the first Members arrived to legislate, Congress began to consider formalizing its pre-Congress preparations, both structural and educational. The belief seemed to be that the sooner the organizational decisions were made and the structure was in place, the faster the start Members would have in solving the problems of the day. As well, the more Members knew about the intricacies and complexities of those problems, the more sophisticated the deliberations would be, the sooner those deliberations could begin, and the more comprehensive and appropriate the eventual response would be. Accordingly, in 1974, pursuant to the adoption of H.Res. 988 (93 rd Congress), the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, the House authorized early organizational meetings for its Members. The Senate followed suit soon thereafter. Speaker Carl Albert and Minority Leader Gerald Ford agreed that during the transition time between Congresses, preparation for the next Congress would be of invaluable help in reducing the organizational and legislative congestion that normally accompanies the start of a Congress. Prior to the convening of a new Congress (somewhere between November 13 and December 20 of any even-numbered year), Democratic party caucuses or Republican party conferences may be called by the majority and minority leaders after consultation with the Speaker. If done, the business is, among other things, to choose party leaders, committee leaders, and committee members. As well, Members can pick up political tips, technical and administrative lessons, policy facts, figures and interpretations, and a sense of the informal "rules of the game." Members-elect receive travel and per diem allowances, while reelected Members receive travel allowances if the House has adjourned sine die . Both groups are expected to attend. In the past four decades, these meetings have become more formalized, more comprehensive, more valued, and more necessary. In fact, these sessions go far beyond those envisioned in 1974. Now, not only are there meetings for making organizational decisions, but also ones for educational purposes. Now, not only are they for Members, but some are for Members and staff together while others are for staff only. Some are for Members and their spouses, some even are limited to spouses of newly elected Members. Now, not only are they sponsored by the party caucus and conferences, but by the respective campaign committees, the House Administration and Senate Rules and Administration Committees, Harvard University's Institute of Politics, the Congressional Management Foundation, the Congressional Research Service, the Heritage Foundation, and numerous informal groups both on and off the Hill. Now, not only are they held in Washington, DC, but in Cambridge, MA, Annapolis, MD, and Williamsburg, VA, as well. Each is well attended. The educational sessions available range from legislative procedures, both in committee and on the floor, to how to hire a staff, and how to construct an office budget. They cover the broad range of current issues from defense to the environment to agriculture, from the specifics of a particular weapons system to the best method of reducing the federal deficit. They are taught by current Members, former Members, government practitioners, and academic experts. They focus on the substance of issues, previous attempts at legislative changes, the Administration's position, and the outlook for action in the current Congress. Numerous interest groups provide information for consideration, as does the party leadership. The organizational sessions serve as the first introduction to Congress and to each other for the new Members and attest to the value and intent of the early meetings envisioned in 1974. Accordingly, before the end of the year, class officers are elected, party leaders selected, and chamber officers, such as the chaplain, chosen. Regional representatives to steering and policy committees, designees to the committees on committees, and other party officials are named. Chairmen of selected committees are elected and members of those committees are often chosen. Each of these actions is then subject only to official ratification at the start of the Congress. Room selection drawings and room assignments are also accomplished during these sessions. Each January of a recent odd-numbered year, Congress has begun work earlier than it used to. Both chambers immediately make remaining committee assignments, while committees hold their organizational sessions to establish subcommittees, make subcommittee assignments, hire staff, and adopt committee rules. Accordingly, when the scores of measures introduced on the first day are referred to committee, Congress is ready to get to work on its legislative agenda without having to spend time on organizational and administrative matters.

Since the mid-1970s, the House and Senate have convened early organization meetings in November or December of even-numbered years to prepare for the start of the new Congress in January. The purposes of these meetings are both educational and organizational. Educational sessions range from legislative procedures and staff hiring to current issues. Organizational sessions elect class officers, party leaders, and chamber officers; name committee representatives and other party officials; and select committee chairmen and often committee members. Such actions are officially ratified at the start of the new Congress.

B eginning in late 2005, the New York Times reported that the federal government had "monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people in the United States without warrants." Subsequently, President George W. Bush acknowledged that, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, he had authorized the National Security Agency to conduct a Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) to "intercept int ernational communications into and out of the United States" by "persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations" based upon his asserted "constitutional authority to conduct warrantless wartime electronic surveillance of the enemy." Now discontinued, the TSP appears to have been active from shortly after September 11, 2001, to January 2007. After the TSP activities were concluded in 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act (PAA, P.L. 110-55 ), which established a mechanism for the acquisition, via a joint certification by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), but without an individualized court order, of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States. This temporary authority ultimately expired after approximately six months, on February 16, 2008. Several months later, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, which created separate procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States under a new Title VII of FISA. Title VII of FISA was reauthorized in late 2012; this authority now sunsets on December 31, 2017. Significant details about the use and implementation of the Section 702 of Title VII, which provides procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons, became known to the public following reports in the media beginning in summer 2013. According to a partially declassified 2011 opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the National Security Agency (NSA) collected 250 million Internet communications per year under Section 702. Of these communications, 91% were acquired "directly from Internet Service Providers," using a mechanism referred to as "PRISM collection." The other 9% were acquired through what NSA calls "upstream collection," meaning acquisition while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to another. Like its predecessor in the PAA, Section 702 permits the AG and the DNI to jointly authorize targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, but is limited to targeting non-U.S. persons. Once authorized, such acquisitions may last for periods of up to one year. Under Subsection 702(b) of FISA, such an acquisition is also subject to several limitations. Specifically, an acquisition may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States; may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; may not intentionally target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States; and must be conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Acquisitions under Section 702 are also geared towards electronic communications or electronically stored information. This is because the certification supporting the acquisition, discussed in the next section, requires the AG and DNI to attest that, among other things, the acquisition involves obtaining information from or with the assistance of an electronic communication service provider. This would appear to encompass acquisitions using methods such as wiretaps or intercepting digital communications, but may also include accessing stored communications or other data. Such a conclusion is also bolstered by the fact that the minimization procedures required to be developed under Section 702 reference the minimization standards applicable to physical searches under Title III of FISA. Section 702 requires the joint AG/DNI authorization to be predicated on either the existence of a court order approving of a joint certification submitted by the AG and DNI, or a determination by the two officials that exigent circumstances exist. The certification is not required to identify the individuals at whom such acquisitions would be directed. Rather, the certification must attest, in part, that targeting procedures are in place that have been approved, have been submitted for approval, or will be submitted with the certification for approval by the FISC, that are reasonably designed to ensure that an acquisition is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, and to prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication where the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States. The applicable targeting and minimization procedures are subject to judicial review by the FISC, but the court is not required to look beyond the assertions made in the certification. Generally, if the certification and targeting and minimization procedures meet the statutory requirements and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a FISC order approving them will be issued prior to implementation of the acquisition of the communications at issue. If the FISC finds deficiencies in the certification, targeting procedures, or minimization procedures, the court will issue an order directing the government to, at the government's election and to the extent required by the court's order, correct any such deficiency within 30 days, or cease the implementation of the authorization for which the certification was submitted. In the absence of a court order described above, the AG and DNI may also authorize the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be non-U.S. persons abroad if they determine that exigent circumstances exist which would cause the loss or delay of important national security intelligence. A certification supporting such acquisition is required to be submitted to the FISC as soon as practicable, but no later than seven days after the determination of exigency has been made. Collection of information is permitted during the period before a certification is submitted to the FISC. In 2015, Congress included an amendment to FISA in the USA FREEDOM Act ( P.L. 114-23 ), to facilitate the continued surveillance of a target that was believed to be abroad, but is later found to be within the United States. As noted above, Section 702 originally did not permit surveillance of persons reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of acquisition. As amended by the USA FREEDOM Act, surveillance of a non-U.S. person may continue for 72 hours after the target is reasonably believed to be within the United States, if a lapse in surveillance of the target poses a threat of death or serious bodily harm. A traditional FISA order for electronic surveillance must be obtained to continue surveillance after that period. Upon enactment of Title VII, a number of organizations brought suit challenging the joint authorization procedure for surveillance of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be abroad. The suit alleged that this authority violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. In order to establish legal standing to challenge Title VII, the plaintiffs had argued that the financial costs they incurred in order to avoid their reasonable fear of being subject to surveillance constituted a legally cognizable injury. However, on February 26, 2013, in Clapper v. Amnesty International , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not suffered a sufficiently concrete injury to have legal standing to challenge Title VII. Because the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, it did not decide the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claim. In August 2013, the Obama Administration partially declassified several opinions of the FISC regarding collection activities under Section702. The first of these opinions, dated October 3, 2011, evaluated the targeting and minimization procedures proposed by the government to deal with new information regarding the scope of "upstream collection," in which communications are acquired from Internet traffic that is in transit from one unspecified location to another. Specifically, the government had recently discovered that its upstream collection activities had acquired unrelated international communications as well as wholly domestic communications due to technological limitations. After being presented with this new information, the FISC found the proposed minimization procedures to be deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds. With respect to the statutory requirements, the FISC noted that the government's proposed minimization procedures were focused "almost exclusively" on information that an analyst wished to use and not on the larger set of information that had been acquired. Consequently, communications that were known to be unrelated to a target, including those that were potentially wholly domestic, could be retained for up to five years so long as the government was not seeking to use that information. The court found that this had the effect of maximizing the retention of such information and was not consistent with FISA's mandate to minimize the retention of U.S. persons' information. The FISC also held that the proposed minimization procedures did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment. The FISC found that, under the facts before it, the balance required under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test did not favor the government, particularly in light of the statutory deficiencies. Following the FISC's determination that the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the government presented revised minimization procedures to the FISC, and the court approved those procedures on November 30, 2011. The revised minimization procedures addressed the court's concerns by requiring the segregation of those communications most likely to involve unrelated or wholly domestic communications; requiring special handling and markings for those communications which could not be segregated; and reducing the retention period of upstream collection from five years to two. With these modifications, the court found that the balancing test required under the Fourth Amendment supported the conclusion that the search was constitutionally permissible. While the Clapper Court dismissed the case on standing grounds, the Supreme Court did so in part relying on the fact that a criminal defendant could potentially have standing to challenge Section 702. At least five criminal defendants have been notified by the government that incriminating evidence was gathered pursuant to Section 702. Several of these defendants have moved to suppress such evidence, arguing that it was gathered unconstitutionally. The defendants in these cases raise Fourth Amendment challenges as well as alleging that Section 702 violates Article III of the Constitution, which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" or "controversies." None of the courts to address these claims has ruled in favor of the defendants. Two cases involving criminal defendants are currently pending before the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits, while a third is proceeding to trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to conduct a Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) to "intercept international communications into and out of the United States" by "persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations." After the TSP activities were concluded in 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act (PAA, P.L. 110-55 ), which established a mechanism for the acquisition, via a joint certification by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), but without an individualized court order, of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States. This temporary authority ultimately expired after approximately six months, on February 16, 2008. Several months later, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-261 ), which created separate procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States under a new Title VII of FISA. Title VII of FISA was reauthorized in late 2012 ( P.L. 112-238 ); this authority now sunsets on December 31, 2017. Significant details about the use and implementation of Section 702 of Title VII, which provides procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons who are abroad, became known to the public following reports in the media beginning in summer 2013. According to a partially declassified 2011 opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the National Security Agency (NSA) collected 250 million Internet communications per year under Section 702. Of these communications, 91% were acquired "directly from Internet Service Providers," using a mechanism referred to as "PRISM collection." The other 9% were acquired through what NSA calls "upstream collection," meaning acquisition while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to another. In 2015, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act ( P.L. 114-23 ) to reauthorize and amend various portions of FISA. While most of the amendments dealt with portions of FISA that were unrelated to Section 702, the act did include authority to continue surveillance of a non-U.S. person for 72 hours after the target is reasonably believed to be within the United States, but only if a lapse in surveillance of the target would pose a threat of death or serious bodily harm. A traditional FISA order for electronic surveillance must be obtained to continue surveillance after that period.

Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Part A of the program, the Hospital Insurance program, covers hospital services, up to 100 days of post-hospital skilled nursing facility services, post-institutional home health visits, and hospice services. Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance program, covers a broad range of medical services including physician services, laboratory services, durable medical equipment, and outpatient hospital services. Part B also covers some home health visits. Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage, or MA) provides private plan options, such as managed care, for beneficiaries who are enrolled in both Parts A and B. Part D provides optional outpatient prescription drug coverage. In general, the total payment received by a provider for covered services provided to a Medicare beneficiary is composed of two parts: a program payment from Medicare plus any beneficiary cost-sharing that is required. (The required beneficiary out-of-pocket payment may be paid by other insurance, if any.) Medicare has established specific rules governing its program payments for all covered services as well as for beneficiary cost sharing as described below. Medicare has established specific rules governing payment for covered services. For example, the program pays for most acute inpatient and outpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, and home health care under a prospective payment system (PPS) established for the particular service; under PPS, a predetermined rate is paid for each unit of service such as a hospital discharge or payment classification group. Payments for physician services, clinical laboratory services, and certain durable medical equipment covered under Part B are made on the basis of fee schedules. Certain other services are paid on the basis of reasonable costs or reasonable charges. In general, the program provides for annual updates of the program payments to reflect inflation and other factors. In some cases, these updates are linked to the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) or to a provider-specific market basket (MB) index which measures the change in the price of goods and services purchased by the provider to produce a unit of output. However, updates to the physician fee schedule are determined by a statutory formula, known as the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system, which links annual updates to how cumulative actual expenditures compare with a cumulative expenditures target. In addition to premiums, there are two aspects of beneficiary payments to providers: required cost-sharing amounts (coinsurance, copayments, or deductibles) and the amounts that beneficiaries may be billed over and above Medicare's recognized payment amounts for certain services. Almost all persons age 65 and over are automatically entitled to premium-free Medicare Part A, as they, or their spouse, have at least 40 quarters of Medicare covered employment. For Part A, coinsurance and deductible amounts are established annually; these payments include deductibles and coinsurance for hospital services, coinsurance for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), no cost sharing for home health services, and nominal cost sharing for hospice care. For Part B, beneficiaries are generally responsible for monthly premiums, which range from $104.90 to $335.70 in 2013 (depending on the beneficiary's income), a $147 deductible in 2013 (updated annually by the increase in the Part B premium), and a coinsurance payment of 20% of the established Medicare payment amounts. For Part C, cost sharing is determined by the private plans. Through 2005, the total of premiums for basic Medicare benefits and cost sharing (deductibles, coinsurance, and co-payments) charged to a Part C enrollee could not exceed actuarially determined levels of cost sharing for those same benefits under original Medicare. This meant that plans could not charge a premium for Medicare-covered benefits without reducing cost-sharing amounts. Beginning in 2006, the constraint on a plan's ability to charge a premium for basic Medicare benefits was lifted. The bidding mechanism established by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) allows plans to charge a premium to cover basic Medicare benefits if the costs to the plan exceed the maximum amount the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will pay for Medicare-covered benefits. The MMA eliminated the explicit inverse relationship between cost sharing for basic Medicare benefits and a premium for basic Medicare benefits. Aggregate enrollee cost sharing under Part C is now only constrained by the actuarial value of cost sharing under original Medicare. However, also beginning in 2006, the Secretary has expanded authority to negotiate or reject a bid from a managed care organization in order to ensure that the bid reasonably reflects the plan's revenue requirements. The base beneficiary premium under part D for 2013 is $31.17 per month; however, actual premiums vary by plan and are increased for beneficiaries with incomes above specified thresholds, similar to Part B premiums. Part D cost sharing includes a deductible, co-payments, and catastrophic limits on out-of-pocket spending. For most services, there are rules on amounts beneficiaries may be billed over and above Medicare's recognized payment amounts. Under Part A, providers agree to accept Medicare's payment as payment in full and cannot bill a beneficiary amounts in excess of the coinsurance and deductibles. Under Part B, providers and practitioners are subject to limits on the amounts they can bill beneficiaries for covered services depending on their participation status in the Medicare program. A participating physician agrees to accept the approved fee schedule amount as payment in full (assignment) for all services delivered to Medicare beneficiaries, of which 80% is paid by the Medicare program and the beneficiary is responsible for the 20% coinsurance plus any unmet deductible. Physicians who do not agree to accept assignment on all Medicare claims in a given year are referred to as nonparticipating physicians . Nonparticipating physicians may or may not accept assignment for a given service. If they do not, they may charge beneficiaries more than the fee schedule amount on nonassigned claims; for physicians, these balance billing charges are subject to certain limits. Assignment is mandatory for some providers, such as nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and clinical laboratories; these providers can only bill the beneficiary the 20% coinsurance and any unmet deductible. For other Part B services, such as durable medical equipment, assignment is optional; providers may bill beneficiaries for amounts above Medicare's recognized payment level and may do so without limit. Because of its rapid growth, both in terms of aggregate dollars and as a share of the federal budget, the Medicare program has been a major focus of legislative attention, as outlined below. With a few exceptions, savings in program spending have been achieved largely through reductions in the updates to provider payments, primarily hospitals, physicians, and MA plans. However, even when payments are frozen (as has been the case in some years with payments to acute care hospitals, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, long term care hospitals, and with the physician fee schedule), Medicare spending continues to increase each year as the number of beneficiaries increases, and the number and complexity of services becomes greater. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 as amended, ACA), is estimated to achieve substantial program savings through, permanent reductions in the maximum amount paid to MA plans, and reductions in the annual updates to Medicare's fee-for-service (FFS) providers (other than physicians' services), among other provisions. The anticipated savings from payment changes to FFS providers is substantially due to the application of a productivity adjustment. (Productivity, in general, is a measure of output produced relative to the amount of work required to produce it.) The ACA productivity adjustment marks a departure from most previous legislative actions to reduce Medicare program spending in two specific respects. First, it is a permanent, rather than time-limited, adjustment to (non-physician) payment updates. Second, in general, it specifies that the adjustment allows for negative payment updates and as such, payment rates for a year may be less than for a preceding year. At the time of passage, the ACA was estimated to achieve net Medicare savings of approximately $430 billion over the 10-year budget window (FY2010-FY2019), based on a CRS analysis of the Congressional Budget Office estimates for provisions affecting the Medicare program. Though the ACA payment changes to Medicare providers and plans is expected to slow the growth in Medicare spending and extend the solvency of the Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Fund, some have suggested that such a policy may not be sustainable in the long run, "without unprecedented improvements in health care provider productivity." Once the impact of the provider payment changes from the ACA is known, Congress may wish to revisit the issue of the productivity adjustments to determine whether rates are much higher or much lower than originally estimated. As in the case of physician payment updates, it is unclear whether Congress will allow providers to be paid less than in a previous year under this new provision. In addition, the ACA created an Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), and charged it with developing proposals to "reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare" if spending goes above targets specified in the statute. IPAB is prohibited from recommending changes that would reduce payments to certain providers before 2020 and is also prohibited from recommending changes in premiums, benefits, eligibility, and taxes or other changes that would result in rationing. Unlike other agencies that advise Congress, IPAB's recommendations are to be automatically implemented unless Congress acts. Congress can alter the Board's proposals, within limitations, or discontinue the automatic implementation of proposals. The Board is to be appointed by the President in consultation with congressional leadership and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It is to submit its first set of recommendations to the President and to Congress, if required, by January 15, 2014. However, the CBO has projected that the IPAB trigger may not be activated in the near future. Provisions in the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 , BCA) impact Medicare payments in 2013. The BCA established a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction and tasked it with providing to Congress by November 23, 2011 recommendations on ways to reduce the deficit over the subsequent 10 years. When the Committee did not provide the recommendations, this triggered a government-wide sequestration process to reduce Federal spending beginning in 2013. Payments for most Medicare benefits will be subject to a maximum 2% reduction each year from March 2013 through 2021. Starting April 1, 2013, for payments made to providers and suppliers under Medicare Parts A and B, the percentage reduction applies to individual payments for items and services provided. In the case of Medicare Parts C and D, reductions are made to the monthly payments made to the private plans that administer these parts of the program. Certain parts of Medicare, however, are exempt from sequestration. These include (1) the Part D low-income subsidies; (2) the Part D catastrophic subsidy; and (3) Qualified Individual (QI) premiums. Outlays for certain Medicare administrative expenditures (non-benefit spending) are not subject to the 2% limit. Provider-specific sequestration adjustments are not reflected in the tables that follow because they are temporary adjustments to payment systems. In addition, the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (TPTCCA, P.L. 112-78 ), the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (MCTRJCA, P.L. 112-96 ), and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) extended certain time-limited payment adjustments to specified Medicare providers. This report provides a guide to Medicare payment rules by type of benefit. The information is presented through a series of tables, each representing a provider type, such as physicians, or Medicare Advantage plans. The first column in each table lists the type of payments that may be received by the provider (e.g., the separate operating and capital payments paid to short-term general hospitals under the prospective payment system as described in Medicare Payment Policies ( Table 1 ), or lists subcategories of providers under the general provider category (such as the different types of non-physician providers that are all listed in Table 7 ). The second column of each table discusses the general policy for determining payments while column three describes how the general payment amounts are updated, or adjusted each year (e.g., amounts may be updated by a measure of inflation, economy-wide productivity, or statutorily specified reductions to updates). The final column presents the most recent update amounts. A complete list of acronyms used in this report is included the Appendix . This report is updated to reflect the most recent legislative changes to the program and payment updates available through January 2013. The following table includes health care acronyms used in this report. It also includes acronyms for laws that have amended Medicare since 1997.

Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Part A of the program, the Hospital Insurance program, covers hospital, post-hospital, and hospice services. Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance program, is optional and covers a broad range of complementary medical services including physician, laboratory, outpatient hospital services, and durable medical equipment. Part C provides private plan options for beneficiaries enrolled in both Parts A and B. Part D is an optional outpatient prescription drug program. Medicare has established specific rules for payment of covered benefits. Some, such as physician services and most durable medical equipment, are based on fee schedules. A fee schedule is a list of Medicare payments for specific items and services, which are calculated according to statutorily specified formula and take into account the actual amount of care provided. Many services, including inpatient and outpatient hospital care, are paid under different prospective payment systems (PPSs). A prospective payment system is a method of paying hospitals, or other providers, amounts or rates of payment that are established in advance for a defined period and are generally based on an episode of care, regardless of the actual amount of care used. Other payments are based, in part, on a provider's bid (an estimate of the cost of providing a service) relative to a benchmark (the maximum amount Medicare will pay). Bids and benchmarks are used to determine payments in Medicare Parts C and D. Payments for some items of durable medical equipment in specified locations are also based on the bids of competing providers. In general, the program provides for annual updates to these payment amounts. The program also has rules regarding the amount of cost sharing, if any, that beneficiaries can be billed in excess of Medicare's recognized payment levels. Unlike other services, Medicare's outpatient prescription drug benefit can be obtained only through private plans. Further, while all Part D plans must meet certain minimum requirements, they differ in terms of benefit design, formulary drugs, premiums, and cost-sharing amounts. Medicare payment policies and potential changes to these policies are of continuing interest to Congress. The Medicare program has been a major focus of deficit reduction legislation since 1980. In each Congress since the 105th Congress, laws have been passed to both increase, but more often slow, the rate of growth of payments to Medicare providers and private plans. Perhaps of particular interest in the 113rd Congress is the update to the Medicare physician fee schedule. The method for updating the physician fee schedule amount, known as the sustainable growth rate (SGR), would have resulted in negative updates for physician payments in recent years, except that Congress has stepped in to stop the updates. Physician payment rates, which would have fallen 26.5% in the absence of congressional action, are frozen through December 31, 2013. Under current law, Medicare physician fee schedule payments are to be reduced by 24.4% beginning January 2014. This report provides an overview of Medicare payment rules by type of service, outlines current payment policies, and summarizes the basic rules for payment updates. In addition to the payment information provided in the tables of this report, Medicare is subject to a maximum 2% payment reduction due to sequestration. This report will be updated twice a year to reflect recent fiscal year and calendar year changes, and will be updated to reflect the details of how the 2% reduction in payments will be applied.

RS20798 -- Taiwan: Findings of a Congressional Staff Research Trip, December 2000 January 31, 2001 Background. Elected in March 2000 with 39% of the popular vote, (1) Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian hassince faced an uncooperative legislature and has endeavored to establish a firm grip on his government. Chen'sDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP) currentlyholds only 67 seats in Taiwan's 225-member legislature, the Legislative Yuan. The Nationalist Party, orKuomintang (KMT), which lost the presidential election- the first time it has not ruled the Republic of China (ROC) - holds a plurality of 109 seats. Together, threeopposition parties - the KMT, the New Party, and thePeople First Party (PFP) - which tend to be economically and politically conservative compared to the DPP andmore inclined to consider eventual unificationwith China, have blocked, thwarted, and defied many of Chen Shui-bian's policies. Because the DPP lacksadministrative experience, many leadership postswithin the government remain filled by KMT members. Chen Shui-bian has faced several contentious issues during his first several months as President. These include: an economic downturn; labor demonstrations; Chen's anti-corruption campaign aimed at KMT vote-buying and gang-related politics ("black gold"); and PremierChang Chun-hsiung's announcement that workon Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plant, a project begun by the previous KMT government, would be halted. Opposition members have threatened to introducemotions of no confidence in Premier Chang and to recall President Chen. However, they have recently backeddown, partly in response to public demands toreduce political deadlock. Research Trip Findings. Taiwan's democracy is experiencing a period of rancor and instability as it undergoesa process of political maturation. Some Taiwanese government and party officials repeated the saying that "theDPP has not yet learned how to rule while theKMT has not yet learned how not to rule." The congressional staff delegation observed severalimportant features of Taiwan's "transition politics." One, thepolitical system lacks institutions for moderating partisanship and facilitating the transfer of power. For example,few formal and informal procedures andprecedents have been established for divided government. Two, Taiwanese political parties do not have experienceforming coalitions and creating stableparliamentary majorities. Three, voter identification tends to be unstable and unpredictable. A DPP representativeexplained that political personalities, ratherthan party ideologies, drive Taiwanese politics. An American observer stated that intra-party factionalism furtherdestabilizes Taiwanese politics. Four, the massmedia, though "free," lack traditions of objective reporting. A spokesperson for the Government Information Officestated that most mass media in Taiwan,including newspapers and television, are government- or party-affiliated and politically-biased. (2) There are no firm indications about how Taiwan's political parties will fare in the December 2001 legislative elections, although no party is expected to attain amajority in the Legislative Yuan. According to an American observer at the American Chamber of Commerce(AmCham) in Taipei, while the KMT continues towield economic clout and political influence, its popularity has continued to wane for several reasons: it has notdemocratized from within, expanded its partybase, created a compelling alternative vision for the country, or produced a charismatic leader. Background. President Chen faces some troubling economic indicators. At the end of 2000, Taiwan's stockmarket had fallen by more than 50% since Chen's election and unemployment had reached a 15-year high. (3) Taiwanese investment in the People's Republic ofChina (PRC) nearly doubled in 2000, which resulted in the transfer of many skilled and high tech jobs to themainland. According to some estimates,non-performing loans have reached 12-17 percent of all Taiwan bank loans. (4) Research Trip Findings. An expert at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which conducts U.S.-ROCrelations, stated that the notion of a "troubled" Taiwanese economy is more a perception than a reality. Nonetheless,AIT officials envisioned several long-termtrends that would challenge the Taiwanese economy. These include declining exports to the United States,increasing imports from abroad if Taiwan joins theWTO, (5) greater economic competition from China,the loss of global competitive advantage of some Taiwanese export items, and falling consumer demand athome. Some American and Taiwanese economic analysts viewed China as the key to Taiwan's continueddevelopment. They told the delegation that the PRC'saccession to the WTO and direct trade, transportation, and communication between the mainland and Taiwan wouldfurther open China to Taiwanese investmentand exports. Because of a common language and culture, Taiwanese investors and traders on the mainland alreadyhave an edge over their American, Japanese,and European counterparts. However, ROC government officials stated that some restrictions on investment inmainland China were necessary in order to helppreserve Taiwanese technological superiority, economic autonomy, and political leverage. DPP Policy. The platform of the DPP has long advocated independence for Taiwan. (7) However, in hisinauguration speech of May 20, 2000, Chen Shui-bian promised that, as long as the PRC did not use military forceagainst Taiwan, he would not declareindependence. (8) Analysts have posited several factorsand considerations that may explain Chen's break from past positions and pro-independence members inhis party, including Chen's pragmatic nature, pressure from the PRC, Taiwanese public opinion, and U.S.-Chinarelations. Opposition Party Efforts. While President Chen and the PRC government have made little progress in breakingthe impasse on opening formal talks, many opposition lawmakers - up to one-third of the legislature - reportedlyhave gone to Beijing to engage in informaldiscussions on cross-strait issues. They and the PRC government have appeared eager both to resume the dialoguethat broke off in 1995 and to underminePresident Chen's role in the process. (9) Chen Shui-bianhas expressed a willingness to resume cross-strait talks, but without agreeing to the PRC's "one-Chinaprinciple" as a starting point. By contrast, opposition leaders have been more accepting of the "one-China" principleas a basis of negotiations. (10) Research Trip Findings. Taiwanese and American political experts told the delegation that following the March2000 presidential election, both the DPP and the KMT have taken more conciliatory stances toward the mainland. The KMT has downplayed former PresidentLee Teng-hui's suggested "state-to-state" framework for negotiations. The DPP has conveyed greater acceptanceof the idea that some political accommodationwith the PRC is inevitable, while the independence faction within the party has been marginalized. Severalgovernment officials privately suggested that VicePresident Annette Lu, an ardent member of the independence faction, does not enjoy widespread public support. An official at the ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) stated that DPP and KMT positions on cross-straitissues have converged somewhat. Both partiessupport the "status quo" - a position of neither independence nor unification - for the time being. Both put forthdemocratization on the mainland as a conditionfor substantive moves toward greater political ties or unification. A DPP authority on international affairs cautioned,however, that the maintenance of Taiwan'ssovereignty is still a central goal of the party. He suggested that sovereignty could be achieved in two ways -through independence or a cross-strait politicalarrangement that is mandated by the Taiwanese electorate. Background. Despite the uncertain and often tense political atmosphere, cross-strait economic ties have grownconsiderably since the late 1980s. Bilateral trade was worth $25.8 billion in 1999, up 14.5 percent from 1998. Inthe first half of 2000, cross-strait trade increased29%. According to PRC data, Taiwan is China's largest source of imports. Taiwanese firms have invested anestimated $40 billion in more than 40,000enterprises on the mainland. Some analysts report that business interests on both sides of the strait are pursuinggreater economic cooperation in preparation forPRC and ROC accession to the WTO. (11) Research Trip Findings. Taiwanese leaders explained that growing economic ties with the mainland havecreated a dilemma for the new government. On the one hand, the mainland economy provides ample opportunitiesfor Taiwanese businesses. Economicinterdependence may also discourage the PRC from using force against Taiwan. On the other hand, Taiwaneseofficials worried, increased investment may causeTaiwan to lose jobs and technological know-how to the mainland. Furthermore, if the Taiwanese economy wereto become too intertwined with that of themainland, it may become vulnerable to economic shocks on the mainland or Taiwan may become beholden to PRCpolitical demands. Nonetheless, the DPP hascautiously encouraged greater trade and investment. President Chen has considered easing existing restrictions onTaiwanese businesses, which apply tolarge-scale investment, construction, and high tech manufacturing on the mainland. On January 2, 2001, the Chenadministration formally opened two ROCoffshore islands to trade and travel with the mainland as a precursor to broader direct links. (12) Research trip findings. (13) Officials of the ROC government and military establishment discussed military andpolitical solutions to the cross-strait tensions. Officials at the Ministry of National Defense raised several concerns. First, they articulated Taiwan's requirementsfor more sophisticated U.S. armaments in general. (14) Second, Taiwanese military leaders discussed their inability to fully utilize some U.S. hardwarebecause ofthe need for components, military training, and joint exercises. Third, they expected the PRC-Taiwan dialogue toresume within two years and help diffusetensions. Fourth, they expressed the desire not to unnecessarily aggravate strains in U.S.-PRC relations. ROC defense officials asserted that a mainland military attack was possible but not likely in the short-term. They stated, on the one hand, that the PRC still lackedthe capability to successfully invade the island. Furthermore, one official contended, although the PRC carried outmilitary exercises on a frequent basis, not all ofthem constituted preparation for an attack. An ROC general maintained that although the PRC White Paper ofFebruary 2000 added a condition for the PRC's useof force - Taiwan's "refusal" to enter into negotiations - it did not indicate greater imminence than before of amainland attack. On the other hand, Taiwanesedefense leaders argued that currently the mainland could pressure Taiwan through conducting missile tests, shootingdown Taiwanese fighters or sinking its ships,or taking over offshore islands. An American military specialist in Taipei concurred that although the ROC'sequipment and training were still superior to themainland's, a PRC missile attack could "wreak havoc" on the island and China's capabilities were expected toimprove substantially over the next five years. However, AIT officials suggested that the mainland's military buildup was not the only factor influencing the PRC's actions toward Taiwan. First, the PRCleadership is likely split between hardline and liberal factions. Second, the PRC leadership is torn betweenconflicting goals: the PRC government's antipathytoward foreign interference in China's "domestic affairs" and frequent exploitation of Chinese nationalism may fuelmilitaristic behavior; China's emphasis oneconomic development and aspirations for international prestige may discourage a military solution. Thus,considerations of coercive actions against Taiwan maybe checked by their perceived economic and political costs. AIT officials described the critical U.S. policyobjectives as encouraging liberal forces in PRCpolitics and raising the economic and political as well as military costs to the PRC of using force against Taiwan. Two trends have helped to stabilize PRC-Taiwan relations in the short term. First, the development of real political competition in Taiwan has encouraged themajor parties to appeal to the center of the political spectrum. Democratic politics has given strong voice sinceChen's election to the current majority view thatthe status quo in cross-strait relations should be maintained. Although Beijing, the DPP, and opposition parties maydisagree about means and objectives, thestatus quo at least allows for future talks on the issue. The timing of negotiations, however, may depend upon theoutcome of the December 2001 legislativeelections. Second, cross-strait economic ties, which have been bolstered by the prospect of WTO membership forboth sides, have raised the economic andpolitical costs of a military conflict for Beijing and Taipei. Other factors may add to tensions in the future. PRC foreign policy mishaps or social unrest stemming from economic reforms may trigger renewed governmentemphasis on Chinese nationalism. China's military modernization also bears watching.

This report summarizes findings from a congressional staff trip to Taiwan (Republicof China), December 10-17,2000, with supplemental material from other sources. The staff delegation met with Taiwan government andmilitary officials, political party representatives,leading private citizens, and United States officials and business persons in Taipei, the capital. The findings includemajor factors that have shaped relationsbetween Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) since Chen Shui-bian's election as President of Taiwanin March 2000. Taiwan's democratization andthe growth of cross-strait economic ties have, in some respects, helped to stabilize relations in the short run. Taiwan's legislative elections in December 2001 willlikely focus largely on domestic issues; its impact on cross-strait relations is uncertain. Chinese nationalism andmilitary modernization in the PRC will likelycontinue to contribute to tensions. This report will not be updated.

The National Weather Service (NWS), at the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce, has statutory authority for weather forecasting and for issuing storm warnings (15 U.S.C. §313). The NWS provides weather, water, and climate forecasts and warnings for the United States, its territories, adjacent waters, and ocean areas. The 114 th Congress has expressed its interest in improving forecasts and warnings to protect life and property in the United States from severe weather events through its role in oversight, appropriations, and the authorization of language regarding NWS. NWS is one of several line offices within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). In 2014, NWS restructured its organization structure, which is reflected in its annual congressional budget justifications since then. This report includes tables that summarize appropriated funding for NWS, and the programs within NWS that generate forecasts and warnings, and the funding for NWS in its restructured accounts since FY2014. The report also includes a table with a brief summary and analysis of various bills introduced in the 114 th Congress that would have some bearing, directly or indirectly, on NWS operations. To date, none of the bills has been enacted. NWS's core mission is to provide weather forecasts and warnings for protection of life and property. Apart from the budget for procuring weather satellites, NWS received the most funding of any agency or program within the FY2016 budget for NOAA. Prior to FY2015, NWS's Local Warnings and Forecasts (LW&F) program received approximately 70% of NWS funding each year (from FY2009 through FY2014, see Table 1 ), suggesting that short-term weather prediction and warning is a high priority for NWS and for NOAA, in accord with NOAA's statutory authority. The 122 NWS weather forecast offices distributed throughout the United States provide the forecasts and warnings familiar to most people (see box below). Starting in FY2015, NWS restructured its programs, spreading out the LW&F activities among five separate subprograms. The restructuring makes it difficult to compare funding for LW&F activities prior to FY2015 with funding for forecast and warning activities after FY2014. According to NOAA, the restructuring was "part of a broader effort to align the NWS budget to function and link to performance." Also, NOAA cited two reports that included recommendations for realigning and restructuring its operations. NOAA stated that its commitment to forecasts and warnings continues: "NWS is dedicated to serving the American public by providing a broad spectrum of weather, climate, and hydrological forecast guidance and decision support services. NWS strives to meet society's need for weather and hydrological forecast information." Table 2 displays NWS funding in the restructured accounts for FY2014 through the FY2017 proposed budget. It also shows the percentage of total NOAA funding represented by each account within NWS. As stated above, the restructuring makes it difficult to compare LW&F funding prior to FY2015 with the restructured accounting; however, total NWS funding as a percentage of total NOAA funding appears to have dropped by a percentage point or two in the last few years. The proposed budget for NWS in FY2017 is nearly $5 million less than the enacted budget in FY2016, whereas total proposed spending for NOAA in FY2017 represents an increase of slightly more than 1% over the FY2016 enacted figure. Both the House and the Senate appropriations committees have reported FY2017 appropriations bills that would fund NOAA, including NWS, for FY2017. Reports accompanying each appropriation bill contain language that may influence NWS operations in FY2017 and beyond. In addition, several bills were introduced in the 114 th Congress that, if enacted, could affect NWS. Some of the bills focus on single topics, such as increasing the number of Doppler radar stations across the country. Other bills would address a broader array of programs within NOAA and NWS. Several bills may affect NWS only indirectly, such as those that would authorize strategies to improve resilience to extreme weather events. Table 3 lists legislation introduced in the 114 th Congress that may affect NWS and briefly summarizes relevant provisions. Many different components and programs within NOAA contribute to NWS's mission of providing weather forecasts and warnings. Several of the bills listed in Table 3 indicate congressional interest in some of those components and programs, such as the research programs within the office of Oceans and Atmospheric Research at NOAA, and in the challenge of improving the integration of research results into operational weather forecasting (e.g., H.R. 1561 , S. 1331 ). Several of the bills are more narrowly focused, such as those that would require additional Doppler radars to provide coverage for large population centers or state capitals (e.g., H.R. 3538 , H.R. 5089 , S. 2058 ) or those that would require additional personnel at NWS forecast offices (e.g., S. 1573 ). NOAA weather satellites are also critical components of the NWS's core mission, and Congress has been concerned about possible gaps in coverage and about the future of the weather satellite programs. Congress has expressed concern about the future of the weather satellite program in annual appropriations bills and accompanying reports and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future, as the budget for satellite acquisitions continues to be a major component of overall NOAA annual spending. Furthermore, Congress likely will continue to introduce legislation that would shape NWS operations, directly or indirectly, in an overall effort to improve NWS's ability to provide forecasts and warnings for protection of life and property in the United States.

The mission of the National Weather Service (NWS) is to provide weather forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property. Apart from the budget for procuring weather satellites, NWS received the most funding (about $1.1 billion) of any office or program within the FY2016 budget for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The largest fraction of the NWS budget has been devoted to local forecasts and warnings, suggesting that short-term weather prediction and warning is a high priority for NWS and for NOAA, in accord with NOAA's statutory authority. Starting in FY2015, NWS restructured its programs, spreading out the local warning and forecast activities among five separate subprograms. The restructuring makes it difficult to compare funding for local warning and forecast activities prior to FY2015 with funding for forecast and warning activities after FY2014. According to NOAA, the restructuring was "part of a broader effort to align the NWS budget to function and link to performance." Several bills introduced in the 114th Congress would directly or indirectly affect NWS if enacted. Some of the bills focus on single topics, such as increasing the number of NWS-operated Doppler radar stations across the country (e.g., H.R. 3538, H.R. 5089, S. 2058). Other bills would address a broader array of programs within NOAA and NWS (e.g., H.R. 1561, S. 1331, S. 1573). Several bills may affect NWS only indirectly, such as those that would authorize strategies to improve resilience to extreme weather events (e.g., H.R., 2227, H.R. 2804, H.R. 3190). Other bills relate to NOAA weather satellites, which are critical components of NWS's mission to provide weather forecasts and warnings (e.g., S. 1331). Congress has been concerned about possible gaps in coverage and the future of the weather satellite programs. The 114th Congress has expressed its interest in improving forecasts and warnings to protect life and property in the United States from severe weather events through its role in oversight, appropriations, and the authorization of language regarding NWS. To date, none of the bills introduced in the 114th Congress has been enacted. However, Congress likely will continue to introduce legislation in the future that would shape NWS operations, directly or indirectly, in an effort to improve forecasts and warnings.

On June 11, 2009, in response to the global spread of a new strain of influenza, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza pandemic alert to phase 6, which indicates the start of an actual pandemic. This change reflects the spread of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus, not its severity. Although currently the pandemic is of moderate severity with the majority of patients experiencing mild symptoms and making a rapid and full recovery, this experience could change. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has often been described as the most sweeping nondiscrimination legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, public accommodation and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications for individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, the ADA's purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." The application of the ADA to an influenza pandemic is uncharted territory since the most recent previous influenza pandemic was in 1969, before the 1990 enactment of the ADA, and before the 1973 enactment of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was the model for the ADA. The starting point for an analysis of rights provided by the ADA is whether an individual is an individual with a disability. The term "disability," with respect to an individual, is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph(3))." The ADA was amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-325 , to expand the interpretation of the definition of disability from that of several Supreme Court decisions. Although the statutory language is essentially the same as it was in the original ADA, P.L. 110-325 contains new rules of construction regarding the definition of disability, which provide that the definition of disability shall be construed in favor of broad coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the act; the term "substantially limits" shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act; an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities to be considered a disability; an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would have substantially limited a major life activity when active; the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, except that the ameliorative effects of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered. The findings of the ADA Amendments Act include statements indicating that the Supreme Court decisions in Sutton v. United Airlines and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams , as well as lower court cases, have narrowed and limited the ADA from what was intended by Congress. P.L. 110-325 specifically states that the current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations defining the term "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" are "inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard." The codified findings in the original ADA are also amended to delete the finding that "43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities." This finding was used in Sutton to support limiting the reach of the definition of disability. The ADA Amendments Act states that the purposes of the legislation are to carry out the ADA's objectives of the elimination of discrimination and the provision of "'clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination' by reinstating a broad scope of protection available under the ADA." P.L. 110-325 rejected the Supreme Court's holdings that mitigating measures are to be used in making a determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity as well as holdings defining the "substantially limits" requirements. The substantially limits requirements of Toyota as well as the EEOC regulations defining substantially limits as "significantly restricted" are specifically rejected in the new law. The statutory definition of disability does not discuss pandemic influenza. How, then, would this definition apply in the context of an influenza pandemic? Specifically, are individuals infected with a pandemic influenza virus considered to be individuals with disabilities? There is not a clear-cut answer to these questions, but the EEOC has indicated that currently individuals infected with the H1N1 virus would not be individuals with disabilities. However, if the disease were to become more severe, an infected individual might be considered to be an individual with a disability under the ADA. On September 23, 2009, the EEOC issued proposed regulations under the ADA Amendments Act. The proposed regulations do not specifically discuss whether influenza is a disability; however, the comments to the proposed regulations state that certain types of impairments are usually not disabilities. These include "broken limbs that heal normally, sprained joints, appendicitis, and seasonal or common influenza." Pandemic influenza is not discussed. The appendix to the existing regulations contains similar language, but simply refers to "influenza," not "seasonal or common influenza." Thus, both current and proposed ADA regulations leave unanswered the application of the definition of disability to pandemic influenza. However, on October 5, 2009, EEOC issued a technical assistance document regarding workplace pandemic preparedness and the ADA that contains a fact-based analysis. The document indicates that EEOC believes that an individual infected with the H1N1 virus would not be an individual with a disability if the illness is similar to seasonal influenza, or the 2009 spring/summer H1N1 virus. However, if the illnesses were more serious, they might be considered disabilities under the ADA. Despite the fact that currently an individual infected with the H1N1 virus would not be considered an individual with a disability, the EEOC states that "employers should allow employees who experience flu-like symptoms to stay at home." Although the EEOC guidance indicates that the current situation with the H1N1 virus would not make an infected individual an individual with a disability under the ADA, the possibility of such coverage for a more serious illness is raised. However, the EEOC guidance does not delineate when the illness would be serious enough to be encompassed by the ADA. Generally, individuals with long-term contagious diseases would be considered individuals with disabilities. In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court held that HIV infection was a physical impairment that was a substantial limitation on the major life activity of reproduction. It might be argued that an individual who is infected with a pandemic influenza virus and who manifests long-term symptoms would have a substantial limitation on a major life activity. Whether an individual infected with serious pandemic influenza is an individual with a disability is dependent on an individualized determination. This may turn on the severity of the particular infection and whether an individual had any long-lasting residual effects from the infection. In addition, the enactment of P.L. 110-325 , with its requirement that the definition of disability be construed broadly, makes it more likely that a disability will fall within the purview of the ADA. It should also be noted that the third prong of the definition of disability protects individuals who are "regarded as" having a disability and would appear to be the most applicable in situations such as quarantines, since individuals who are quarantined may not be infected. P.L. 110-325 amended the ADA definition of "regarded as" providing that an individual meets the requirement of being "regarded as" having a disability "if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity." The "regarded as" prong does not apply to transitory and minor impairment. A transitory impairment is defined as an impairment with an actual or expected duration of six months or less. Therefore, it would appear to be difficult to find that an individual who has been quarantined is an individual with a disability under the "regarded as" prong. Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination, and specifically provides that no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures; the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees; employee compensation; job training; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The term employer is defined as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees. The ADA limits an employer's ability to make disability-related inquiries or to require medical examinations. Prior to an offer of employment, all disability-related inquiries and medical examinations are prohibited. After a conditional job offer, but prior to the commencement of employment, an employer may make disability-related inquiries and conduct medical examinations as long as this is done for all entering employees in the same job category. After an employee begins work, an employer may make disability-related inquiries and conduct medical examinations only if they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Any medical information an employer obtains as a result of these actions must be treated as a confidential medical record. If an inquiry is not about a disability or likely to elicit information about a disability, the ADA's prohibition on disability-related inquiries does not apply. The EEOC technical assistance document regarding workplace pandemic preparedness and the ADA discusses disability-related inquiries in the context of a pandemic, noting that "asking an individual about symptoms of a cold or the seasonal flu is not likely to elicit information about a disability." An inquiry that seeks to determine if an individual would be in a high-risk group for pandemic influenza due to a chronic health condition like asthma would not be permitted prior to a pandemic. Similarly, such an inquiry would not be permitted during a pandemic where the illness, as is currently the case, is generally moderate or mild. However, such inquiries may be made if public health officials find that the illness caused by the pandemic is generally severe. Any disclosures of medical information by an employee must be kept confidential. For an ADA employment-related issue, if the threshold issues of meeting the definition of an individual with a disability and involving an employer employing over 15 individuals are met, the next step is to determine whether the individual is a qualified individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job. Title I defines a "qualified individual with a disability." Such an individual is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such person holds or desires." The EEOC states that a function may be essential because (1) the position exists to perform the duty, (2) there are a limited number of employees available who could perform the function, or (3) the function is highly specialized. It is a defense to a charge of discrimination that an alleged application of a qualification standard has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. A qualification standard may include a requirement that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals. "Direct threat" is defined as meaning "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." EEOC states that the severity of the illness is the determinate of whether pandemic influenza rises to the level of a direct threat, and that this determination is to be based on assessments by CDC or public health authorities. Currently, the H1N1 influenza virus is not seen as posing such a threat. The ADA requires the provision of reasonable accommodation unless the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. "Reasonable accommodation" is defined in the ADA as including making existing facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to vacant positions, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, adjustment of examinations or training materials or policies, provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations. The EEOC interprets reasonable accommodation as including work at home and the use of paid or unpaid leave. During a pandemic, reasonable accommodations must continue to be provided unless these constitute an undue hardship. For example, if employees are asked to telework to reduce the spread of the virus, an employee with a disability who needs an accommodation at work, such as a screen-reader, must be provided that same accommodation during telework, barring undue hardship. "Undue hardship" is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense." Factors to be considered in determining whether an action would create an undue hardship include the nature and cost of the accommodation, the overall financial resources of the facility, the overall financial resources of the covered entity, and the type of operation or operations of the covered entity. The EEOC has provided detailed guidance on reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, which, in part, discusses the use of paid or unpaid leave as a form of reasonable accommodation. It is important to note that the third prong of the ADA's definition of disability, being "regarded as" having a disability, does not require the provision of reasonable accommodation. As a practical matter, this would mean that the provision of telework for individuals who are quarantined or subject to a "snow day" would not be required under the ADA, even if an individual were to meet the requirements of the third prong of the definition.

On June 11, 2009, in response to the global spread of a new strain of influenza, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza pandemic alert to phase 6, which indicates the start of an actual pandemic. This change reflects the spread of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus, not its severity. Although currently the pandemic is of moderate severity with the majority of patients experiencing mild symptoms and making a rapid and full recovery, this experience could change. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities and protects applicants and employees from discrimination based on disability. The application of the ADA's nondiscrimination mandates during an influenza pandemic is uncharted territory since the most recent previous influenza pandemic was in 1969, before the 1990 enactment of the ADA. Currently, an individual infected with the H1N1 virus would most likely not be considered an individual with a disability; however, if the H1N1 virus were to mutate to cause more severe illness, such an infection may be considered a disability. The ADA prohibits employers from making certain disability-related inquiries and, currently, this prohibition might be interpreted to apply to inquiries about whether an employee would be in a high-risk group for pandemic influenza. The ADA also requires that employers provide reasonable accommodation for individuals with disabilities, and during a pandemic these accommodations would continue to be applicable unless they constitute an undue hardship.

The idea of using the tax code to achieve energy policy goals and other national objectives is not new but, historically, U.S. federal energy tax policy promoted the exploration and development—the supply of—oil and gas. The 1970s witnessed (1) a significant cutback in the oil and gas industry's tax preferences, (2) the imposition of new excise taxes on oil (some of which were subsequently repealed or expired), and (3) the introduction of numerous tax preferences for energy conservation, the development of alternative fuels, and the commercialization of the technologies for producing these fuels (renewables such as solar, wind, and biomass, and nonconventional fossil fuels such as shale oil and coalbed methane). Comprehensive energy policy legislation containing numerous tax incentives, and some tax increases on the oil industry, was signed on August 8, 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). The law, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, contained about $15 billion in energy tax incentives over 11 years, including numerous tax incentives for the supply of conventional fuels, as well as for energy efficiency, and for several types of alternative and renewable resources, such as solar and geothermal. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ), enacted in December 2006, provided for one-year extensions of some of these provisions. But some of these energy tax incentives expired on January 1, 2008, while others are about to expire at the end of 2008. In early December 2007, it appeared that congressional conferees had reached agreement on another comprehensive energy bill, the Energy Independence and Security Act ( H.R. 6 ), and particularly on the controversial energy tax provisions. The Democratic leadership in the 110 th Congress proposed to eliminate or reduce tax subsidies for oil and gas and use the additional revenues to increase funding for their energy policy priorities: energy efficiency and alternative and renewable fuels, that is, reducing fossil fuel demand rather than increasing energy (oil and gas) supply. In addition, congressional leaders wanted to extend many of the energy efficiency and renewable fuels tax incentives that either had expired or were about to expire. The compromise on the energy tax title in H.R. 6 proposed to raise taxes by about $21 billion to fund extensions and liberalization of existing energy tax incentives. However, the Senate on December 13, 2007, stripped the controversial tax title from its version of the comprehensive energy bill ( H.R. 6 ) and then passed the bill, 86-8, leading to the President's signing of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 ), on December 19, 2007. The only tax-related provisions that survived were (1) an extension of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act surtax for one year, raising about $1.5 billion; (2) higher penalties for failure to file partnership returns, increasing revenues by $655 million; and (3) an extension of the amortization period for geological and geophysical expenditures from five to seven years, raising $103 million in revenues. The latter provision was the only tax increase on the oil and gas industry in the final bill. Those three provisions would offset the $2.1 billion in lost excise tax revenues going into the federal Highway Trust Fund as a result of the implementation of the revised Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards. The decision to strip the much larger $21 billion tax title stemmed from a White House veto threat and the Senate's inability to get the votes required to end debate on the bill earlier in the day. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid's (D-Nev.) effort to invoke cloture fell short by one vote, in a 59-40 tally. Since then, the Congress has tried several times to pass energy tax legislation, and thus avoid the impending expiration of several popular energy tax incentives, such as the "wind" energy tax credit under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §45, which, since its enactment in 1992, has lapsed three times only to be reinstated. Several energy tax bills have passed the House but not the Senate, where on several occasions, the failure to invoke cloture failed to bring up the legislation for consideration. Senate Republicans objected to the idea of raising taxes to offset extension of expiring energy tax provisions, which they consider to be an extension of current tax policy rather than new tax policy. In addition, Senate Republicans objected to raising taxes on the oil and gas industry, such as by repealing the (IRC) §199 deduction, and by streamlining the foreign tax credit for oil companies. The Bush Administration repeatedly threatened to veto these types of energy tax bills, in part because of their proposed increased taxes on the oil and gas industry. Frustrated with the lack of action on energy tax legislation over the last two years, House Democrats introduced and approved several such bills, such as H.R. 5351 , which was approved by the House on February 27, 2008. House Speaker Pelosi and other Democrats sent President Bush a letter February 28, 2008, urging him to reconsider his opposition to the Democratic renewable energy plan, arguing that their energy tax plan would "correct an imbalance in the tax code." At this writing, a renewed legislative effort is being made to enact energy tax legislation, although the two chambers were moving in different directions on how to bring the legislation to the floor. In the House, energy tax provisions are part of H.R. 6899 , House Democratic leadership's latest draft of broad-based energy policy legislation, the Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act. Passed on September 16, 2008, the bill would expand oil and gas drilling offshore by allowing oil and gas exploration and production in areas of the outer continental shelf that are currently off limits, except for waters in the Gulf of Mexico off the Florida coast. Under the bill, states could allow such drilling between 50 and 100 miles offshore, while the federal government could permit drilling from 100 to 200 miles offshore. Revenue from the new offshore leases would be used to assist the development of alternative energy, and would not be shared by the adjacent coastal states. The bill would also repeal the current ban on leasing federal lands for oil shale production if states enact laws providing for such leases and production. H.R. 6899 also would enact a renewable portfolio standard, a requirement that power companies generate 15% of their energy from renewable sources by 2020. The energy tax provisions in H.R. 6899 (Title XIII, the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2008) are largely the same as those in H.R. 5351 , an approximately $18 billion energy tax package that was approved by the House on February 27, 2008. They also include some of the measures in H.R. 6049 , another energy tax bill that was also approved by the House. H.R. 5351 is, in turn, a smaller version of the energy tax title that was dropped from H.R. 3221 in December 2007, but larger than the $16 billion bill approved by the Ways and Means Committee in 2007 ( H.R. 2776 ). However, because H.R. 6899 incorporates some of the incentives of H.R. 6049 , its total cost is higher than the cost of H.R. 5351 : about $19 billion over 10 years, instead of $18 billion. H.R. 6899 includes several tax incentives for renewable energy that would reduce revenue by an estimated $19 billion over 10 years. At a cost of $6.9 billion over 10 years, it extends a renewable energy production tax credit, covering wind facilities for one additional year, through 2009, and certain other renewable energy production for three years, through 2011, while capping credits for facilities that come into service after 2009. The bill extends for eight years, through 2016, a credit for investing in solar energy and fuel cells, at a cost of $1.8 billion. It also extends the energy-efficient commercial building deduction for five years, the credit for efficiency improvements to existing homes for one year, and a credit for energy-efficient appliances for three years. The measure provides for the allocation of $2.625 billion in energy conservation bonds, $1.75 billion in clean renewable energy bonds, and $1.75 billion in energy security bonds to finance the installation of natural gas pumps at gas stations; all would be tax-credit bonds, which provide a tax credit in lieu of interest, and projects financed through the bonds would have to comply with Davis-Bacon requirements. It also creates a new tax credit for plug-in electric vehicles, an accelerated recovery period for smart electric meters and grid systems, and provides $1.1 billion in tax credits for carbon capture and sequestration projects. The tax title also includes one non-energy tax subsidy: a $1.1 billion provision to restructure the New York Liberty Zone tax incentives to allow for new transportation projects. H.R. 6899 is fully offset, raising $19 billion in taxes, including many of the same energy tax increases on oil companies also previously approved by the House. The energy tax provisions in H.R. 6899 are entirely offset, mainly by denying the IRC §199 manufacturing deduction to certain major integrated oil companies (including oil companies controlled by foreign governments—including CITGO ) and freezing the deduction for all other oil and gas producers at the current rate of 6%. Earlier §199 repeal proposals had been criticized for seeking to end the deduction only for U.S.-based major companies, while exempting Venezuelan-controlled CITGO because, not being a crude oil producer, it does not meet the definition of a "major integrated oil and gas producer." The entire provision would raise $13.9 billion over 10 years. Additional revenue—about $4.0 billion over 10 years—would come from a provision to streamline the tax treatment of foreign oil-related income so it is treated the same as foreign oil and gas extraction income. In addition to the H.R. 6899 , the Republican leadership in the House has introduced its own energy tax bill, H.R. 6566 , which also extends and expands some of the energy tax incentives and contains no tax increases (offsets). The energy tax provisions in this bill are, however, smaller and somewhat narrower than those in H.R. 6899 . In the Senate, legislative efforts on energy tax incentives and energy tax extenders center around S. 3478 , the Energy Independence and Investment Act of 2008, a $40 billion energy tax bill offered by Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and ranking Republican Charles Grassley. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said on September 12 that S. 3478 is "must-pass" legislation. Reid told reporters the energy tax package, which includes extensions of tax incentives for renewable energy, should be prioritized even ahead of the broader energy policy bills being considered, and the rest of the non-energy tax extenders package. Reid said he hopes to bring the bill to the floor during the week of September 15, but noted that the schedule depends on whether Senate Republicans will agree to move to the legislation. While most of the tax incentives in the bill are extensions of existing policy and are not controversial, the legislation would need to be paid for through new sources of revenue. One proposed offset—which has been previously blocked by Republicans—would repeal the IRC §199 manufacturing deduction for the five major oil and gas producers, raising $13.9 billion over 10 years. The bill also would be paid for through a new 13% excise tax on oil and natural gas pumped from the Outer Continental Shelf, a proposal to eliminate the distinction between foreign oil and gas extraction income and foreign oil-related income, and an extension and increase in the oil spill tax through the end of 2017. In total, tax increases on the oil and gas industry would account for $31 billion of the $40 billion total cost of the legislation. The final major offset would come from a requirement on securities brokers to report on the cost basis for transactions they handle to the Internal Revenue Service, a provision expected to raise about $8 billion in new revenues over 10 years. The tax offsets, or tax increases in S. 3478 are not without controversy, however, particularly the repeal of the IRC §199 manufacturing deduction for the five major oil and gas producers, as discussed previously. Several times the House has approved energy tax legislation, and several times in the Senate such legislation failed a cloture vote and thus could not be brought to the floor for debate. As noted above, Republicans have in the past objected to the idea of raising taxes to offset extension of expiring energy tax provisions, which they consider to be an extension of current tax policy rather than new tax policy. In addition, some Senate Republicans have objected to raising taxes on the oil and gas industry, particularly by repealing the IRC §199 deduction. The Bush Administration threatened to also veto any energy tax bill that would increase taxes on the oil and gas industry. At this writing, it appears that inclusion of the §199 deduction repeal as an offset might preclude the energy tax bill from coming to the Senate floor—some believe that it would fail another cloture vote—so this provision might not survive the process. Finally, the debate in the Senate over energy tax incentives and energy tax extenders is seen as potentially involving three other separate proposals: (1) The Gang of 20 proposal or "New Energy Reform Act of 2008"(this has not yet been introduced); (2) A Bingaman/Baucus bill (also not formally introduced); and (3) the Republican "Gas Price Reduction Act" (introduced by Senator McConnell as Senate Amendment 5108). A side-by-side comparison of H.R. 6899 and S. 3478 is in Table 1 . Revenue estimates were generated by the Joint Committee on Taxation.

The Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 6899, was introduced on September 15, 2008, and approved by the House on September 16, 2008. This plan allows oil and gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), and it incorporates most of the energy tax provisions from an energy tax bill, H.R. 5351, and some of H.R. 6049, both of which were previously approved by the House of Representatives but failed to be taken up by the Senate. In the Senate, legislative efforts on energy tax incentives and energy tax extenders center around S. 3478, the $40 billion energy tax bill offered by Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and ranking Republican Charles Grassley, and supported by Senate Democratic leadership. In the Senate, controversy over tax increases on the oil and gas industry, particularly over proposed repeal of the tax code's §199 deduction for the major integrated oil companies, continues; it remains unclear whether an energy tax bill with this provision will pass a cloture vote to limit debate, and thus be taken up. This report is a side-by-side comparison of energy tax bills H.R. 6899 and S. 3478.

Over the past several years, the number of aliens who unlawfully reside in the United States has grown significantly, from an estimated 3.2 million in 1986 to more than 11 million in 2005. Although the federal government is responsible for regulating the entry and removal of aliens from the United States, the impact of unauthorized immigration has arguably been felt most directly in the communities where aliens settle. The response of states and localities to the influx of illegal immigrants has varied. On one end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions have actively sought to deter the presence of illegal immigrants within their territory. Some jurisdictions have assisted federal authorities in apprehending and detaining unauthorized aliens, including pursuant to agreements (287(g) agreements) with federal immigration authorities enabling respective state or local law enforcement agencies to carry out various immigration enforcement functions. More controversially, some jurisdictions have sought to deter illegal immigration by imposing their own restrictions upon unauthorized aliens' access to housing, employment, or municipal services. Moving toward the middle of the spectrum, some states and localities communicate with federal immigration enforcement officers under limited circumstances (e.g., after arresting an unauthorized alien for a criminal offense), but for various reasons do not take a more active role in deterring illegal immigration. At the other end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions have been unwilling to assist the federal government in enforcing measures that distinguish between legal and non-legal residents of the community. Some of these jurisdictions have adopted formal or informal policies limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities. This latter category of jurisdictions is sometimes referred to as "sanctuary cities." Although this term is not defined by federal statute or regulation, it has been used by some in reference to "jurisdictions that may have state laws, local ordinances, or departmental policies limiting the role of local law enforcement agencies and officers in the enforcement of immigration laws." The very existence of "sanctuary cities" has been the subject of considerable controversy. Supporters argue that immigration enforcement is the responsibility of the federal government, and that local efforts to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens would undermine community relations, disrupt municipal services, interfere with local enforcement, or violate humanitarian principles. Opponents of sanctuary policies argue that they encourage illegal immigration and undermine federal enforcement efforts. The primary federal restrictions on state and local sanctuary policies are § 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104 - 193 ) and § 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104 - 208 ). PRWORA § 434 proscribes any prohibition or restriction placed on state or local governments to send or receive information regarding immigration status of an individual to or from federal immigration authorities. IIRIRA § 642 is broader in scope. It bars any prohibition on a federal, state, or local governmental entity or official's ability to send or receive information regarding immigration or citizenship status to or from federal immigration authorities. The statute also provides that no person or agency may prohibit a federal, state, or local government entity from (1) sending information regarding immigration status to, or requesting information from, federal immigration authorities; (2) maintaining information regarding immigration status; or (3) exchanging such information with any other federal, state, or local government entity. The constitutionality of the foregoing provisions was challenged by the City of New York. The mayor of the City of New York had issued an Executive Order prohibiting any city officer or employee, in most circumstances, from transmitting information regarding immigration status to federal immigration authorities. This Executive Order was in direct conflict with both PRWORA § 434 and IIRIRA § 642. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in New York v. United States ( City of New York ) that PRWORA § 434 and IIRIRA § 642, on their face, do not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine under the Tenth Amendment. The anti-commandeering doctrine prohibits the federal government from commandeering either a state's legislature (e.g., by requiring that a state enact particular regulatory standards ) or its executive officers (e.g., by requiring that state officers directly participate in enforcing federal law ) to achieve federal goals. While this might mean that Congress cannot directly compel states to collect and share information regarding immigration status with federal immigration authorities, merely prohibiting states and localities from blocking their agents from sharing with the federal government information already in their possession may be permissible, according to the Second Circuit, absent specific proof of greater interference with state and local functions. Although several localities reportedly have adopted formal or informal policies limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities, the precise number is unclear. In 2006, Congress required the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of Justice to study and report on whether states and localities receiving federal compensation for incarcerating criminal aliens were cooperating with federal immigration enforcement efforts. Among other things, the OIG was required to determine whether any states or localities receiving compensation were in violation of the information-sharing requirements of IIRIRA § 642. In a January 2007 report, the OIG stated that auditors were able to locate an official "sanctuary" policy for only two jurisdictions that received at least $1 million in SCAAP [State Criminal Alien Assistance Program] funding, the State of Oregon, which received $3.4 million, and the City and County of San Francisco, which received $1.1 million and has designated itself as a "City and County of Refuge." We also located an Executive Order issued by the Mayor of the City of New York limiting the activities of local law enforcement agencies and officers in the enforcement of immigration law. However, in each instance the local policy either did not preclude cooperation with ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] or else included a statement to the effect that those agencies and officers will assist ICE or share information with ICE as required by federal law. The OIG report identified two jurisdictions receiving at least $1 million in SCAAP funding that had official sanctuary policies, but it concluded that neither violated federal law. The OIG estimate of jurisdictions with policies in direct violation of IIRIRA § 642, however, is not comprehensive. While the OIG report indicated that few, if any, jurisdictions that received at least $1 million in SCAAP funding during FY2005 had formal policies violating IIRIRA § 642, the report did not identify, for example, whether any jurisdictions receiving less the $1 million were in violation of federal law. Although IIRIRA § 642 prohibits states and localities from barring the transfer or maintenance of information regarding immigration status, it does not require entities to collect such information in the first place. Reportedly, some states and localities seeking to limit assistance to federal immigration authorities have barred agencies or officers from inquiring about persons' immigration status, a practice sometimes described as a "don't ask, don't tell" approach. Though this method does not directly conflict with federal requirements that states and localities permit the free exchange of information regarding persons' immigration status, it results in specified agencies or officers lacking any information about persons' immigration status that they could share with federal authorities. In the 110 th Congress, several bills were introduced that attempted to limit formal or informal sanctuary policies and induce greater sharing of immigration information by state and local authorities. Some proposals would have mandated that directors of state and local law enforcement agencies report any immigration information collected in the course of the directors' normal duties to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and would have made compliance with this requirement a condition for continued funding under the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). Other proposals would have required state and local law enforcement officers to provide information to the Secretary of Homeland Security concerning apprehended aliens who are believed to have committed a violation of U.S. immigration laws, and would have provided grants to those agencies that had policies for assisting in the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws. Some proposals would have made compliance with IIRIRA § 642 a requisite for a state or locality to receive specified federal grants or funding. These proposals were not enacted into law. Bills have been introduced in the 111 th Congress to modify requirements on states and localities concerning the sharing of immigration-related information with the federal government. H.R. 150 , the Illegal Alien Crime Reporting Act of 2009, introduced by Representative Walter B. Jones, would bar any state or subdivision thereof from receiving funds under any program or activity administered by the Department of Homeland Security, unless the state reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation certain immigration-related information regarding persons who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of a crime by the state. S. 95 , introduced by Senator David Vitter, would prohibit any funds appropriated for the Community Oriented Policing Services Program from being used in contravention of IIRIRA § 642. H.R. 264 , the Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2009, introduced by Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee, would repeal IIRIRA § 642 and PRWORA § 434, thereby permitting states and localities to restrict the sharing of immigration-related information with federal authorities.

Controversy has arisen over the existence of so-called "sanctuary cities." The term "sanctuary city" is not defined by federal law, but it is often used to refer to those localities which, as a result of a state or local act, ordinance, policy, or fiscal constraints, place limits on their assistance to federal immigration authorities seeking to apprehend and remove unauthorized aliens. Supporters of such policies argue that many cities have higher priorities, and that local efforts to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens would undermine community relations, disrupt municipal services, interfere with local law enforcement, or violate humanitarian principles. Opponents argue that sanctuary policies encourage illegal immigration and undermine federal enforcement efforts. Pursuant to § 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193) and § 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208), states and localities may not limit their governmental entities or officers from maintaining records regarding a person's immigration status, or bar the exchange of such information with any federal, state, or local entity. Reportedly, some jurisdictions with sanctuary policies take a "don't ask, don't tell" approach, where officials are barred from inquiring about a person's immigration status in certain circumstances. Though this method does not directly conflict with federal requirements that states and localities permit the free exchange of information regarding persons' immigration status, it results in specified agencies or officers lacking information that they could potentially share with federal immigration authorities. In the 110th Congress, several bills were introduced that attempted to limit formal or informal sanctuary policies and induce greater sharing of immigration information by state and local authorities. Bills have also been introduced in the 111th Congress to restrict or expand states and localities' information-sharing requirements.

Recognizing the risk that a standing army could pose to individual civil liberties and the sovereignty retained by the several states, but also cognizant of the need to provide for the defense of the nation against foreign and domestic threats, the framers of the Constitution incorporated a system of checks and balances to divide the control of the military between the President and Congress and to share the control of the militia with the states. This report summarizes the constitutional and statutory authorities and limitations relevant to the employment of the armed forces to provide disaster relief and law enforcement assistance. Congress has the constitutional power to raise, support, organize and regulate the armed forces, art. I, §8, cls. 11-14. These clauses do not expressly limit Congress as to how, when, or where it might employ the armed forces, although presumably such use must be in furtherance of other constitutional powers. Congress is also empowered to provide for calling forth the militia to execute federal law and to suppress insurrections, §8, cl. 15, and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and to govern them when they are employed in the service of the United States, §8, cl. 16. Once the army is raised or the militia called forth, the President serves as their Commander-in-Chief, art. II, §2, cl. 1. And of course, the President is vested with the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," art. II, §2, cl. 3. Congress has delegated to the President the authority to use the armed forces to respond to a variety of domestic crises, and Presidents have asserted some inherent authority to use the military even without express statutory authorization. Under the Constitution, states retain the primary responsibility and authority to provide for civil order and the protection of their citizens' lives and property. However, the Constitution provides that the federal government is responsible for protecting the states against invasion and insurrection, and, if the state legislature (or the governor, if the legislature cannot be convened) requests it, protection against "domestic Violence," art. IV, §4. States may not keep their own standing armies, art. I, §10, cl. 3, but they retain the authority to call forth their militias to suppress insurrections or quell civil disturbances, subject to any restraints imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional powers. Congress has complete authority over federal lands, military installations, and similar areas, art. I, §8, cl. 17. The Constitution does not explicitly bar the use of military forces in civilian situations or in matters of law enforcement, but the United States has traditionally refrained from employing troops to enforce the law except in cases of necessity. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. §1385, punishes those who, "except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully use[] any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws.... " The act does not apply to the Navy or Marines and does not prohibit activities conducted for a military purpose (base security or enforcement of military discipline) that incidentally benefit civilian law enforcement bodies. The act does not apply to the National Guard unless it is employed in federal service. Questions arise most often in the context of assistance to civilian police. At least in this context, the courts have held that, absent a recognized exception, the PCA is violated (1) when civilian law enforcement officials make "direct active use" of military investigators, (2) when the use of the military "pervades the activities" of the civilian officials, or (3) when the military is used so as to subject citizens to the exercise of military power that is "regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature." Congress has provided for a number of statutory exceptions to the PCA by explicitly vesting law enforcement authority either directly in a military branch (e.g, the Coast Guard) or indirectly by authorizing the President or another government agency to call for assistance in enforcing certain laws. Congress has delegated authority to the President to call forth the military during an insurrection or civil disturbance, 10 U.S.C. §§331-335. Section 331 authorizes the President to use the military to suppress an insurrection at the request of a state government, which is meant to fulfill the federal government's responsibility to protect states against "domestic violence" (although the term "insurrection" is arguably much narrower than the phrase "domestic violence"). Section 332 delegates Congress's power under the Constitution, art. I, §8, cl. 14, to the President, authorizing him to determine that "unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States" and to use the armed forces as he considers necessary to enforce the law or to suppress the rebellion. Section 333 permits the President to use the armed forces to suppress any "insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy" if law enforcement is hindered within a state, and local law enforcement is unable to protect individuals, or if the unlawful action "obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws." This section was enacted to implement the Fourteenth Amendment and does not require the request or even the permission of the governor of the affected state. The Insurrection Act has been used to send the armed forces to quell civil disturbances a number of times during U.S. history, most recently during the 1992 Los Angeles riots and during Hurricane Hugo in 1989, during which widespread looting was reported in St. Croix, Virgin Islands. If the President decides to respond to such a situation, generally upon the recommendation of the Attorney General and, if necessary, the request of the governor, he must first issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse within a limited time, 10 U.S.C. §334. If the situation does not resolve itself, the President may issue an executive order to send in troops. Congress has also authorized the armed forces to share information and equipment with civilian law enforcement agencies, 10 U.S.C. §§371-382, although prohibiting the use of armed forces personnel to make arrests or conduct searches and seizures. Department of Defense (DOD) regulations assert another exception that does not rest on statutory authority, but is available in very limited circumstances and covers "Actions that are taken under the inherent right of the U.S. Government ... to ensure the preservation of public order and to carry out governmental operations within its territorial limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law, by force, if necessary." The emergency power, according to DOD directives, is available to protect federal property and functions, and to authorize prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disaster, or calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation. Ordinarily, the implementation of such operations must be authorized by executive order, but DOD officials and military commanders may take emergency action without prior authorization in cases where "sudden and unexpected civil disturbances (including civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such calamity endangering life) occur, if duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization by the President." The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§5121, et seq.) authorizes the President to make a wide range of federal aid available to states that are stricken by a natural or man-made disaster. It provides statutory authority for employing the U.S. armed forces for domestic disaster relief. Permitted operations include debris removal and road clearance, search and rescue, emergency medical care and shelter, provision of food, water, and other essential needs, dissemination of public information and assistance regarding health and safety measures, and the provision of technical advice to state and local governments on disaster management and control. The authority does not constitute an exception to the PCA. In the event of a disaster that results in the wide-scale deterioration of civil law and order, the authority to employ active duty troops to perform law enforcement functions must be found elsewhere. The Stafford Act does not authorize the use of federal military forces to maintain law and order. Federal forces would have no authority, for example, to act as traffic controllers or provide security for facilities used in the relief efforts, unless such activities serve a valid military purpose. Patrolling in civilian neighborhoods for the purpose of providing security from looting and other activities, would not be permissible, although patrolling for humanitarian relief missions, such as rescue operations and food delivery (which may have the incidental benefit of deterring crime) would not violate the PCA. Military resources may be employed in the following situations. Upon the request of the governor, the President may task DOD to provide any emergency work the President deems essential for the preservation of life and property in the immediate aftermath of an incident that may ultimately qualify for assistance under a declaration. Such assistance is available for up to ten days prior to a presidential declaration of an emergency or a major disaster, 42 U.S.C. §5170b(c). Emergency work can include the clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and the restoration of essential public facilities and services, 42 U.S.C. §5170(c)(6)(B). The provision is designed for instances where communications problems impede the ability to meet the prerequisites for declaring an emergency or major disaster or the ability to coordinate the work through FEMA. Unless the President determines that a disaster implicates preeminently federal interests, the declaration of an emergency under the Stafford Act requires that the governor of the affected state first make a determination that the situation is of such severity and magnitude that the state is unable to respond effectively without federal assistance, which determination must include a detailed definition of the type and amount of federal aid required, 42 U.S.C. §5191. The governor must also implement the state's emergency response plan, for example, by activating the state's National Guard units under state control (in which case the PCA does not apply to them), and provide information regarding the resources that have been committed. The prerequisites for a major disaster declaration are similar to those for an emergency, 42 U.S.C. §5170. The governor must first execute the state's emergency plan and make a determination that state capabilities are insufficient to deal with the circumstances. However, the governor need not specify which forms of assistance are needed. The governor must provide information regarding the resources that have been committed and certify that the state will comply with cost sharing provisions under the Stafford Act. There is no provision for the declaration of a major disaster without the governor's request. If the governor activates Guard units and keeps them under state control, those units are not restricted by the PCA. If the state's National Guard units are called into federal service to respond to an emergency or a major disaster, their role is restricted to the disaster relief operations authorized under the Stafford Act. DOD doctrine allows commanders to provide resources and assistance to civil authorities without or prior to a declaration under the Stafford Act when a disaster overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities and necessitates immediate action "to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage." Immediate response actions can include the types of activities authorized under the Stafford Act, including, at the request of civil authorities, rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment, restoration of essential public services, debris removal, controlling contaminated areas, safeguarding and distributing food and essential supplies, and supplying interim emergency communications. The controlling directive does not require a request from state or local officials, but states that "DoD Components shall not perform any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary on a temporary basis under conditions of Immediate Response. Any commander who is directed, or undertakes, to perform such functions shall facilitate the reestablishment of civil responsibility at the earliest time possible." The immediate response authority is not provided for in any statute, but is said to have deep historical roots. While the immediate response authority does not constitute an exception to the PCA, in some cases it may appear so. The potential exists for a disaster relief situation, under which DOD invokes the immediate response authority, to rapidly deteriorate into a civil disturbance. Law enforcement activities in connection with a civil disturbance are an exception to the PCA. Therefore, DOD would be able to assist civil authorities with both disaster relief and law enforcement, simultaneously, under separate authorities. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake is a noted example of a simultaneous natural disaster/civil disturbance. The commanding general of the Pacific Division, on his own initiative, deployed troops to assist civil authorities to stop looting and protect federal buildings, while also assisting firefighters in battling the raging fire.

Natural disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy, raise questions concerning the President's legal authority to send active duty military forces into a disaster area and the permissible functions the military can perform to protect life and property and maintain order. The Stafford Act authorizes the use of the military for disaster relief operations at the request of the state governor, but it does not authorize the use of the military to perform law enforcement functions, which is ordinarily prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. However, the President may invoke other authorities to use federal troops to aid in the execution of the law, including the Insurrection Act. This report summarizes the possible constitutional and statutory authorities and constraints relevant to the use of armed forces, including National Guard units in federal service, to provide assistance to states when a natural disaster impedes the operation of state and local police.

The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill funds agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the more controversial agencies represented in the bill is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI). This report analyzes FY2011 appropriations and gives a brief review of the agency's appropriation enacted for FY2010 ( P.L. 111-88 ). For FWS in FY2011, the Administration requests $1.64 billion, down 0.3% from the FY2010 level of $1.65 billion. By far the largest portion of the FWS annual appropriation is the Resource Management account, for which the President requests $1.27 billion, down 0.07% from the FY2010 level of $1.27 billion. Among the programs included in Resource Management are Endangered Species, the Refuge System, Law Enforcement, and Climate Change Adaptive Science Capacity. Only a few FWS issues that may arise in an appropriations context seem predictable at this early phase of the appropriations cycle. One possibility may be the management of certain California water projects. The Bureau of Reclamation has faced many legal challenges in its role as a water resources manager in California. Among them are lawsuits challenging how Reclamation operations may affect several species listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Over a year ago both FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued separate biological opinions (BiOps) for Central Valley Project (California) water operations, holding that certain actions by Reclamation would jeopardize listed species. Under the ESA, these BiOps provided alternatives to avoid jeopardy or adverse modification of habitat designated as critical to the listed species. In addition, the BiOps provided incidental take statements (ITSs) that authorized takes of listed species that might result even though the action agency followed the BiOp, the alternatives, and any mitigation recommended by FWS or NMFS. Some of the actions in the alternatives may result in restricting water supplies to certain water users in central and southern California. The agricultural users are in regions of California that are also heavily affected by the general downturn in the economy and loss of jobs in the building construction industry. Various California water interests support restricting or modifying the implementation of the BiOps to provide more water for agriculture. Others in the area point to the need for maintaining water in streams not only for listed species but also for commercial fisheries and water quality. While the shape of the congressional response is unclear, FWS appropriations might become a vehicle for an amendment to address California long-standing water issues. Funding for the endangered species program is part of the Resource Management account, and is one of the perennially controversial portions of the FWS budget. The Administration's FY2011 request is $181.3 million, an increase from the FY2010 enacted level of $179.5 million. (See Table 2 .) For FY2010, the House Appropriations Committee's report encouraged FWS to address a backlog of candidate species awaiting listing decisions; the Administration's request proposed a decrease in this program for FY2011. The Senate Appropriations Committee's FY2010 report urged improvement in the consultation program to address past deficiencies. The FY2010 conference report set aside $2.5 million in the consultation program to improve monitoring and record-keeping. The Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund also benefits conservation of species that are listed, or proposed for listing, under the Endangered Species Act, through grants to states and territories. The President proposes to leave the program at the FY2010 level. In total, the two endangered species programs would increase by 1%. The Administration requested $499.5 million for FY2011 for refuge operations and maintenance, a 1% decrease from the FY2010 level of $502.8 million. Costs of operations have increased on many refuges, partly due to special problems such as hurricane damage and more aggressive border enforcement, but also due to increased use, invasive species control, maintenance backlog and other demands. Refuge funding was not keeping pace with new demands, and these demands, combined with the rising costs of rent, salaries, fuel, and utilities, led to cuts in funding for programs to aid endangered species, reduce infestation by invasive species, protect water supplies, address habitat restoration, and ensure staffing at the less popular refuges. While some increases were provided to address these problems in recent years, the FY2009 stimulus law provided additional funding to address these concerns. Some observers contend that the system's problems are ongoing and will be significant after the stimulus funding is exhausted. Balanced against these concerns is congressional interest in general deficit reduction. The Administration requests $63.3 million for nationwide law enforcement, a decrease of 4% from the FY2010 level of $65.8 million. Nationwide law enforcement covers border inspections, investigations of violations of endangered species or waterfowl hunting laws, and other activities. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provided FWS with $165.0 million for Resource Management and $115.0 million for Construction, using nearly identical criteria for project selection. Obligation authority for these funds ceases on October 1, 2010. According to FWS, "[t]o complete this work, we plan to hire local laborers, building contractors, companies and other entities to do the maintenance, repairs, retrofits, and construction." Refuges are among the biggest beneficiaries within FWS of the stimulus funding, and the refuge maintenance backlog could be affected substantially. Improvements in energy conservation at refuge visitor centers are also being funded, as are habitat improvements, such as removal of invasive species, and recovery of protected species. For FY2011, the Administration requests $28.8 million for Climate Change Planning and Adaptive Science Capacity, an increase of 44% over the FY2010 level of $20.0 million. Part of the funding would support work with partners at federal, state, tribal, and local levels to develop strategies to address climate impacts on wildlife at local and regional scales. The remainder would be used to support cooperative scientific research on climate change as it relates to wildlife impacts and habitat. Both portions would support and work through a network of new Landscape Conservation Cooperatives (LCCs) to ameliorate the effects of climate change. The LCCs are an amalgam of research institutions, federal resource managers and scientists, and lands managed by agencies at various levels of government. The additional funding is intended to increase the network of LCCs from 9 to 12, with an eventual goal of 21 LCCs. The Administration requests $106.3 million for land acquisition, an increase of $20.0 million (19%) from the FY2010 enacted level of $86.3 million. See Table 1 . As compared to recent years, the request and the FY2010 level both devote a somewhat higher percentage (80% and 77% respectively) of the funding to acquisition of land for specified federal refuges, rather than for closely related functions (e.g., acquisition management, land exchanges, emergency acquisitions, and purchase of inholdings). This program is funded with appropriations from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. Under the Migratory Bird Conservation Account (MBCA), FWS (in contrast to the other three federal lands agencies) has a source of mandatory spending for land acquisition. The MBCA does not receive funding in annual Interior appropriations bills. The account is permanently appropriated, with funds for FY2011 estimated at $58.0 million, derived from the sale of duck stamps to hunters and recreationists, and import duties on certain arms and ammunition. This estimate is $14.0 million above the previous year, and is based in part on the assumption that Congress approves a proposed increase in the price of duck stamps from $15 to $25. The National Wildlife Refuge Fund (also called the Refuge Revenue Sharing Fund) compensates counties for the presence of the non-taxable federal lands of the NWRS. A portion of the fund is supported by the permanent appropriation of receipts from various activities carried out on the NWRS. However, these receipts are not sufficient for full funding of amounts authorized in the formula, and county governments have long urged additional appropriations to make up the difference. For FY2011, the Administration requests $14.1 million, down 3% from the FY2010 level of $14.5 million. With refuge receipts, the FY2010 appropriation was estimated to fund about 36% of the authorized payment level. A projected increase in receipts, combined with the appropriation of $14.1 million, would increase the payment to 38% of the authorized level in FY2010. The Multinational Species Conservation Fund generates considerable constituent interest despite the small size of the program. It benefits Asian and African elephants, tigers, rhinoceroses, great apes, and marine turtles. The President requests $10.0 million for FY2011, a 13% decrease from the FY2010 level of $11.5 million. See Table 3 . The President also requests $4.0 million for the Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, down 20% from the FY2010 level of $5.0 million. State and Tribal Wildlife Grants help fund efforts to conserve species (including nongame species) of concern to states, territories, and tribes. The grants have generated considerable support from these governments. The program was created in the FY2001 Interior appropriations law ( P.L. 106-291 ) and further detailed in subsequent Interior appropriations laws. (It has no separate authorizing statute.) Funds may be used to develop state conservation plans as well as to support specific practical conservation projects. A portion of the funding is set aside for competitive grants to tribal governments or tribal wildlife agencies. The remaining portion is for grants to states. A state's allocation is determined by formula. The Administration's request for FY2011 is $90.0 million, identical to the FY2010 level. See Table 1 , above. The FY2010 appropriations law included language reducing the required state match from 50% to 25% for planning grants. (Because the entire program is part of annual appropriations bills, the change would apply only to that year's appropriation.) It also reduced the required state share of implementation grants from 50% to 35%, to encourage more states to participate. The Administration proposal for FY2011 would return the latter figure to a minimum of 50% from the states for implementation, and allow grants to be distributed to more projects. CRS Report R40185, The Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the 111 th Congress: Conflicting Values and Difficult Choices , by [author name scrubbed] et al. CRS Report RS21157, International Species Conservation Funds , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For general information on the Fish and Wildlife Service , see its website at http://www.fws.gov/ .

For Fish and Wildlife Service appropriations in FY2011, the Administration requests $1.64 billion, down 0.3% from the FY2010 level of $1.65 billion. Climate change and land acquisition programs would receive notable increases; construction and funds for wetlands, neotropical migratory birds, and selected foreign species would decrease. The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill funds agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the more controversial agencies represented in the bill is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior. This report analyzes FY2011 appropriations and gives a brief review of the agency's appropriation enacted for FY2010 (P.L. 111-88). Emphasis is on FWS funding for programs of interest to Congress, now or in recent years. These include the endangered species program, global climate change, wildlife refuges, land acquisition, international conservation, and state and tribal wildlife grants. In addition, related policy issues are also considered in the funding context. Each of the related policy issues is explained in more detail in the report. For FY2010, the House passed H.R. 2996, the Interior appropriations bill, containing FWS appropriations, on June 26, 2009 (H.Rept. 111-180). The Senate passed its version of H.R. 2996 on September 24, 2009 (S.Rept. 111-38). The conference report (H.Rept. 111-316) included a Division B, providing continuing appropriations for other federal agencies and programs whose FY2010 appropriations had not yet been passed. The House and Senate both approved the conference report on October 29, 2009; the President signed the bill the following day (P.L. 111-88).

Justice Stevens has been a key figure in the Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the scope of two "companion rights": the due process right to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" determination and the right to trial by jury. The right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions is explicitly protected in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment (federal proceedings) and the Fourteenth Amendment (state proceedings). Together, those constitutional provisions require that a criminal conviction follow a jury determination of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime." Those rights have a strong legal and historical foundation. However, a question emerged regarding their application to sentencing determinations, particularly as "sentence enhancements" became a popular legislative tool: to what extent do facts taken into account during sentencing require a "beyond a reasonable doubt" determination by a jury? Justice Stevens has had a critical role in the Supreme Court's resolution of that question, in several respects. First, he asserted that the constitutional question should be addressed, describing the constitutional guarantees at issue as being of "surpassing importance." Second, along with Justice Scalia, in early cases reviewing sentencing enhancements, he indicated his broad interpretation of the jury trial and due process rights. In a concurring opinion, for example, he wrote, "I am convinced that it is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." He added that "[i]t is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Third, having persuaded five of the Court's nine justices of his views, he authored the opinion for the Court in a Apprendi v. New Jersey , the leading case in which the Court announced a broad reading of the constitutional rights at issue. Finally, he wrote for the Court in United States v. Booker , a decision applying the Apprendi holding to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Although this line of cases has resulted in closely divided opinions, the justices were not divided along typical lines. Justice Scalia has been the other justice arguing in agreement with Justice Stevens in many of the cases addressing a jury's role in criminal sentencing. In Apprendi , Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion. Justice Stevens's opinion in Apprendi was foreshadowed in several dissenting and concurring opinions in cases decided during the 1980s and 1990s. The first such case was McMillan v. Pennsylvania , decided in 1986. McMillan involved a Pennsylvania statute establishing a mandatory five-year minimum prison sentence in cases in which a judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence (a lower standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt"), that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense. The statute expressly stated that the firearm possession "shall not be an element of the crime." Instead, it stated that it "shall be determined at sentencing," indicating that it was to be removed from typical jury trial and "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirements. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the state legislature expressly designated firearm possession as a "sentencing factor," rather than "an element of the crime." The Court concluded that the state legislature had intended to create a sentencing factor which "operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it." Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, not joined by any other justice, in which he first articulated his view of the constitutional implications of sentencing statutes of this kind. "In my view," he wrote, "a state legislature may not dispense with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conduct that it targets for severe criminal penalties." His disagreement with the Court stemmed in part from his interpretation of prior precedents. He agreed with the statement from a prior case, also quoted by the majority, that "[the] applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard … has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged." However, he interpreted that holding to ensure that states have discretion regarding what conduct to criminalize, not over which conduct will be treated as a "criminal element" versus a "sentencing factor." "In my opinion," he concluded, "the constitutional significance of the special sanction cannot be avoided by the cavalier observation that it merely 'ups the ante' for the defendant." A 1998 case, Almendarez-Torres v. United States , involved a federal statute that makes it a crime to, among other things, return to the United States (without express consent of the Attorney General) after having been deported. A general provision authorizes criminal penalties of up to two years imprisonment. A second provision authorizes greater penalties in cases in which the alien was removed after a conviction for one of several specified crimes. In Almendarez-Torres , the defendant had been deported subsequent to three convictions for aggravated felonies, for which the statute increased the maximum prison sentence for reentry to 20 years. Prosecutors did not introduce the fact of the aggravated felonies at the indictment or trial phase. Nevertheless, at sentencing, the U.S. district court relied on those aggravated felony convictions to enhance the sentence. A five-justice majority on the Supreme Court framed the question on appeal as "whether [the aggravated felony provision] defines a separate crime or simply authorizes an enhanced penalty." Noting that the provision's concern is recidivism—a factor commonly weighed in sentencing decisions, it held that it is "reasonably clear" that Congress intended to "set forth a sentencing factor" rather than a "separate crime." Thus, it concluded that the statute "simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence," and thus does not require a determination by a jury. Justice Stevens and two other justices joined a dissent written by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia asserted that the Court's prior decisions made it "genuinely doubtful whether the Constitution permits a judge (rather than a jury) to determine by a mere preponderance of the evidence (rather than beyond a reasonable doubt) a fact that increases the maximum penalty to which a criminal defendant is subject." Justice Stevens wrote an opinion reiterating his view on the constitutional question the following year, in Jones v. United States . The defendant in Jones was convicted for violation of a federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119. That statute generally caps imprisonment for violations at 15 years, but a subsection increased the maximum prison term in cases in which "serious bodily injury … results." The defendant, Nathaniel Jones, was charged with carjacking, but the specific allegation that the carjacking resulted in serious bodily injury was not raised until the sentencing phase. At that time, the court found that serious bodily injury had occurred and increased Jones's sentence accordingly. No jury determinations were made on that question. The Court resolved the case on statutory grounds. In an opinion by Justice Souter, it held that the "serious bodily injury" prong, as written in the existing statute, constituted a separate criminal offense, and thus needed to be determined by a jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." It indicated that a different reading of the statute might "raise serious constitutional questions," but avoided resolving such issues because the case could be resolved on statutory grounds. In brief concurring opinions in Jones , Justices Stevens made clear that he would have reached the constitutional issues lurking in the case. Furthermore, he expressed the view that "it is unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." Justice Stevens expressed that view on behalf of the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey . In Apprendi , the Court reviewed a New Jersey statute that authorized 10- to 20-year increases in prison sentences if a defendant's actions were found by a judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have been committed with a purpose to intimidate the victim because of the victim's race or other specified characteristics. The defendant, Charles Apprendi, was found to have fired a gun into the home of an African American family. The morning of his arrest, he was alleged to have stated that "because [the family is] black in color he does not want them in the neighborhood." He later argued that his statements had been mischaracterized. In the state prosecution, Apprendi pleaded guilty to three weapon possession charges. In the plea agreement, the state reserved the right to request a sentencing enhancement based on the state's "hate crimes" statute. At sentencing, evidence was presented to support and refute Apprendi's alleged racial motivation in firing into the victims' home. Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard as directed by the state statute, the state trial judge concluded that Apprendi had acted with racial prejudice and accordingly enhanced his sentence on that basis. On appeal, Apprendi argued that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses require that the facts justifying the sentence enhancement (i.e., a motivation of prejudice) to be found by a jury using the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Both a state appellate court and the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Apprendi's argument. Relying in part on the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in Almendarez-Torres and McMillan v. Pennsylvania , they held that the "biased purpose" determination was not an element of the underlying offense and thus did not require a jury finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens asserted that the constitutional question was "starkly presented" by the facts in the case. He examined the history of the constitutional rights involved, noting that statutory sentence enhancements are a relatively new development in a landscape of constitutional rights with centuries-old foundations. He acknowledged that the history supports judges' ability to exercise discretion in sentencing. However, he argued that such discretion has generally been limited to determinations regarding an appropriate sentence within a given range; it has not historically been extended to authorize additional penalties on the basis of a new factual determination. After reviewing the history and relevant precedents, he articulated the Court's major holding: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Key cases decided after Apprendi have addressed the decision's application to sentencing guidelines. In a 2004 case, Blakely v. Washington , the defendant challenged a sentence imposed pursuant to Washington State's sentencing guidelines. He was convicted of a crime for which the guidelines designated a maximum sentence of 53 months imprisonment, but was sentenced to 90 months after the sentencing judge found that he had acted with "deliberate cruelty"—a factor for which the guidelines authorized judges to increase a sentence. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Stevens and three other justices, the Supreme Court applied Apprendi to strike down the sentencing scheme. It held that the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. One year later, Justice Stevens wrote one of two majority opinions for the Court in United States v. Booker , in which the Court addressed the question whether the Blakely holding applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The case involved a conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. At sentencing, the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had distributed additional drugs and obstructed justice, and increased the sentence on that basis. Applying Apprendi and Blakely , the Court held that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Justice Stevens characterized the holding as a reaffirmation of the Apprendi holding. His opinion again emphasized the historical importance of the constitutional rights at issue. A different majority of justices joined an opinion written by Justice Breyer. In that opinion, the Court interpreted the constitutional holding (announced in the opinion by Justice Stevens) as requiring the Court to strike down two provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act, including one which made the guidelines mandatory. That holding was based on the Court's determination of what Congress might have intended in light of the Court's constitutional holding. It concluded that Congress would not have intended the guidelines to be made mandatory in situations where a judge is constitutionally required to receive jury determinations regarding facts relevant to sentencing. Justice Stevens dissented from that opinion. He characterized the Court's invalidation of the Sentencing Act provisions as judicial overstepping, arguing that the constitutional holding in the case "does not authorize the Court's creative remedy" with regard to the Federal Sentencing Act. He asserted that "[b]ecause the Guidelines as written possess the virtue of combining a mandatory determination of sentencing ranges and discretionary decisions within those ranges, they allow ample latitude for judicial factfinding that does not even arguably raise any Sixth Amendment issue." The impact of Justice Stevens's role, and of the Apprendi case in particular, has been to limit the extent to which criminal penalties can be increased based on facts found by a judge rather than a jury. Although it remains permissible for judges to take relevant facts into consideration when rendering criminal sentences, they now may not increase sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum unless the facts supporting such an increase are found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. As can be seen in the cases applying that holding to sentencing guidelines, Justice Stevens's interpretation of the constitutional trial-by-jury and due process rights has had practical and lasting effects on criminal sentencing.

Justice Stevens has played a critical role in the Supreme Court's interpretation of a jury's role in criminal sentencing. In 2000, he wrote the majority opinion for the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, a landmark case in which the Court held that a judge typically may not increase a sentence beyond the range prescribed by statute unless the increase is based on facts determined by a jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." In 2005, he wrote one of two majority opinions in United States v. Booker, in which the Court applied the Apprendi rule to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In those two cases and in several other cases on this issue during the past few decades, Justice Stevens has been a leading voice, articulating a broad interpretation of the jury trial and due process rights at issue.

Congressional interest in the patent system has been evidenced by the recent passage of patent reform legislation by both houses of the 112 th Congress. Among the topics of legislative debate has been the presumption of validity enjoyed by issued patents. In this respect the June 9, 2011, decision of the United States Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership et al. is notable. In that decision, the Court retained current legal standards by holding that patents must be proved invalid by "clear and convincing evidence." The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the "preponderance of the evidence" s tandard, which would have made patents more vulnerable to challenge, applied in this situation. This report reviews the Microsoft v. i4i decision and its implications for innovation policy in the United States. The Patent Act of 1952 authorizes the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to review patent applications and to approve them where "the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law." Congress has established a number of patentability requirements—including novelty and nonobviousness —that USPTO examiners must evaluate in determining whether a patent should issue. To be considered novel, the invention must not be wholly anticipated by the so-called "prior art," or public domain materials such as publications and other patents. The nonobviousness requirement is met if the invention is beyond the ordinary abilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art in the appropriate field. To assess whether a particular invention meets these requirements, examiners will conduct a search of the prior art to look for relevant treatises, journal articles, and other patents. Once a patent issues, its owner gains the right to exclude others from using the claimed invention. This right can be enforced by bring a civil action for infringement in federal court. Congress provided the accused infringer with several defenses. Among them is that the patent is invalid; in other words, the USPTO should not have allowed the patent to issue at all. The patent statute provides that a "patent shall be presumed valid" and that the "burden of establishing invalidity ... rest[s] on the party asserting such invalidity." However, the patent statute does not specify how persuasive the evidence of invalidity must be in order for the judge, jury, or other finder of fact to rule in favor of the accused infringer. Under case law developed by the courts, the accused infringer must overcome the presumption of validity by persuading the factfinder of the patent's invalidity by "clear and convincing evidence." The standard of clear and convincing evidence is satisfied if the factfinder believes that a particular proposition is substantially more likely to be true than not. Stated differently, the trier of fact must have a firm belief in the factuality of that proposition. Most civil litigation proceeds under the more readily satisfied "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the factfinder must only be persuaded that the something is more likely so than not so. Patent holder i4i filed an infringement suit against Microsoft in 2007. According to i4i, Microsoft Word infringed its patent to an improved method of editing computer documents. Microsoft denied infringement and counterclaimed for a declaration of invalidity and unenforceability. With regard to its invalidity defense, Microsoft contended that i4i's sales of software known as "S4" rendered the asserted patent invalid for lack of novelty. At trial, Microsoft objected to i4i's proposed instruction that Microsoft was required to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence because the USPTO had not been aware of the S4 software when it approved i4i's patent application. Microsoft requested that the following instruction be read to the jury: Microsoft's burden of proving invalidity and unenforceability is by clear and convincing evidence. However, Microsoft's burden of proof with regard to its defense of invalidity based on prior art that the examiner did not review during the prosecution of the patent-in-suit is by preponderance of the evidence. The District Court rejected this proposal and instead instructed the jury that "Microsoft has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence." The jury found that Microsoft failed to prove invalidity and that Microsoft had willfully infringed the i4i patent. This holding was affirmed on appeal. Microsoft then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the case. According to Microsoft, the proper standard for proving invalidity should be the preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, Microsoft asserted that the preponderance of the evidence standard should apply when an invalidity defense rests on evidence that was not considered by the USPTO during examination of the asserted patent. The Supreme Court affirmed the holdings of the lower courts. Each of the eight Justices who considered the case agreed that accused infringers must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Chief Justice Roberts was recused from the case. Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor observed that section 282 of the Patent Act of 1952 establishes a presumption that a patent is valid and imposes the burden of proving invalidity on a patent's challenger, but "includes no express articulation of the standard of proof." However, judicial opinions issued prior to 1952 established that patents enjoyed "a presumption of validity, a presumption not to be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence." Justice Sotomayor therefore understood that by the time Congress enacted the 1952 Patent Act, "the presumption of patent validity had long been a fixture of the common law." The Court was therefore unable to "conclude that Congress intended to 'drop' the heightened standard of proof from the presumption simply because § 282 fails to reiterate it expressly." The Court next addressed Microsoft's argument that a preponderance of the evidence standard should apply where the evidence was not before the USPTO during the examination process. Justice Sotomayor responded that "pre-1952 cases never adopted or endorsed the kind of fluctuating standard of proof that Microsoft envisions." Justice Sotomayor further took note of the "impracticalities" of a dual standard of proof, observing that because an examiner has no duty to cite every reference considered, whether an examiner has considered a particular reference will often be "a question without a clear answer." Justice Breyer joined the Court's opinion but also wrote a separate, concurring opinion that was joined by Justices Scalia and Alito. He "emphasiz[ed] that in this area of law as in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions of law." He added that "[w]here the ultimate question of patent validity turns on the correct answer to legal questions—what these subsidiary legal standards mean or how they apply to the facts as given—today's strict standard of proof has no application." Justice Thomas also concurred in the Court's conclusion. He also believed that § 282 did not alter the judicially developed "heightened standard of proof ... which has never been overruled by this Court or modified by Congress." The distinction between "clear and convincing evidence" and a "preponderance of the evidence" may seem to be a subtle one. That interested observers from a variety of innovative industries filed numerous amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs with the Supreme Court suggests the significance of the presumption of validity, however. Many observers believe that the heightened "clear and convincing evidence" does not account for the nature of the patent acquisition process, promotes costly litigation, and enourages "patent assertion entities." Others argued that switching to a "preponderance of the evidence" standard would discount the nature of the patent litigation process, discourage investment in R&D, and ultimately discourage innovation. This report briefly reviews some of these positions. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other observers have supported a shift to the more easily satisfied "preponderance of the evidence" standard for a number of reasons. First, many observers believe that modern patent examination involves "little actual assessment of whether a patent should issue." Patent examination is conducted on an ex parte basis—that is to say, there is no adversary to present arguments to the examiner that the application should not be approved. Applicants must report the relevant prior art of which they are aware to the USPTO, but need not conduct a "due diligence" search of the literature prior to filing. The examiner is reportedly allotted approximately 18 hours to review the application. Under these circumstances, some believe that the USPTO issues many patents that would have been rejected had the agency possessed a better understanding of the prior art. In their view, the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard is inappropriate in view of these compact acquisition proceedings. Second, some commentators believe that the current standard promotes charges of patent infringement. The Honorable William Alsup, District Judge for the Northern District of California, wrote that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard provides a huge advantage for the patent holder—and it is often an unfair advantage, given the ease with which applicants and their agents can sneak undeserving claims through the PTO. Because of the burnish of this presumption, patentees can use a weak, arguably invalid patent, to force an accused infringer through years of litigation. This is more than just a nuisance. Legal defense costs run, at the low end, about three million dollars per case, and range well over ten million dollars in some actions. In the United States, the number of patent infringement suits filed annually nearly doubled between 1994 and 2004. According to the Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, patent litigation costs the economy 4.5 billion dollars annually. Finally, some believe the "clear and convincing evidence" standard promotes so-called "patent assertion entities," sometimes termed "patent trolls." The FTC has defined "patent assertion entities" as "firms whose business model primarily focuses on purchasing and asserting patents" as compared to using patent in support of manufacturing or the provision of services. Some observers believe that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard encourages aggressive licensing and litigation tactics by patent assertion entities because an accused infringer "faces an uphill battle in defending itself." In their view, the increased vulnerability of asserted patents would discourage "patent trolling." On the other hand, others support the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Microsoft v. i4i that patents must be proven invalid by "clear and convincing evidence." First, some believe that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard reflects realties of the litigation process. Patent cases are tried before federal courts of general jurisdiction and often involve juries consisting of lay persons. Many commentators believe that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard appropriately causes these decision makers to defer to a specialized agency, the USPTO, in patent matters. Some observers also believe that inventors put themselves in a vulnerable position when they patent their inventions. Whether courts ultimately uphold their patents or not, their inventions have already been disclosed to the public. As attorney Albert Walker explained in his early treatise on patent law: It is easy for a few bad or mistaken men to testify, that in some remote or unfrequented place, they used or knew a thing substantially like the thing covered by the patent, and did so before the thing was invented by the patentee. In such a case it may happen that the plaintiff can produce nothing but negative testimony in reply: testimony of persons who were conversant with the place in question, at the time in question, and did not see or know the thing alleged to have been there at that time. If mere preponderance of evidence were to control the issue, the affirmative testimony of a few persons, that they did see or know or use a particular thing at a particular time and place, would outweigh the negative testimony of many persons, that they did not see or know or use any such thing. Under this view, the presumption of validity should be a robust one so as to encourage inventors to seek patent protection. Finally, some observers believe that strong, enforceable patents are necessary to support investment in high-technology innovation. The development of cutting-edge inventions, such as new medicines, electronics, and biotechnologies, often involves considerable expense and risk. An innovative firm may be less likely to engage in such endeavors if its entire patent portfolio would become more vulnerable to challenge by competitors. These observers believe that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard promotes innovation while still allowing room for accused infringers to contest the validity of improvidently granted patents. In the Microsoft v. i4i opinion, the Supreme Court concluded: Congress specified the applicable standard of proof in 1952 when it codified the common-law presumption of patent validity. Since then, it has allowed the Federal Circuit's correct interpretation of § 282 to stand. Any recalibration of the standard of proof remains in its hands. This passage plainly provides the Court's deference to Congress on this issue. If the current "clear and convincing evidence" is deemed appropriate, then no change need be made. Alternatively, straightforward amendments to § 282 could change the standard to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The presumption of validity also arises in other contexts. For example, patent reform legislation in the 112 th Congress stipulates that in both post-grant and inter partes review proceedings before the USPTO, "the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence." The decreased evidentiary showing required before the USPTO may reflect increased legislative confidence in the patent expertise of that agency as compared to the federal courts. Although the Microsoft v. i4i opinion addressed a seemingly technical point of patent law, the implications of a shift from a "clear and convincing evidence" standard to a "preponderance of the evidence" standard were potentially significant for the nation's environment for innovation and investment. The Supreme Court's ruling leaves any possible change to patent law's presumption of validity squarely within the purview of Congress.

The June 9, 2011, decision of the United States Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership et al. rained current legal standards by holding that patents must be proved invalid by "clear and convincing evidence." The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, which would have made patents more vulnerable to challenge, applied in this situation. The decision arguably holds a number of potential implications for U.S. innovation policy, including incentives to innovate, invest, and assert patents, and leaves the question of the appropriate presumption of validity for patents squarely before Congress.

The Incompatibility Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." This provision is generally understood to ensure the separation of powers by preventing Members of Congress from serving in two government posts at one time. The prohibition on simultaneous service in multiple offices of the government prevents the individual from exercising influence of one branch while serving in the office of another. To avoid constitutional violations under the Incompatibility Clause, Members generally are required to resign their previous offices before being seated in Congress. The Incompatibility Clause often raises questions of the propriety of Members' conduct in the context of military service, particularly service in the Armed Forces Reserves, and whether service in the Reserves would disqualify the Member from simultaneously serving in Congress. The Constitution also provides that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own Members." In some cases, the House and Senate have exercised their authority under this provision to determine the eligibility of their Members to hold commissions in the military, including the Reserves. The central issue in determining whether a Member may simultaneously serve in the Reserves is whether a position in the Reserves constitutes an "Office under the United States." This issue has been litigated in the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War . The Court resolved the case on procedural grounds, finding that the Reservists Committee did not have standing to raise the matter in court, and did not address the substantive constitutional claim. Other courts have dealt with related issues, including what positions constitute offices of the United States. Although Congress has taken action in some instances of Members' service in the military and courts have resolved some related challenges related to service in the Reserves, the issue of whether a Member may serve in Congress and the Reserves simultaneously has never been clearly resolved. The U.S. Constitution provides that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own Members." Thus, Congress is empowered to determine whether a Member is eligible or qualified to serve in the seat for which he or she was elected. Because the Incompatibility Clause prohibits a Member from simultaneously serving in another office of the United States, Congress has the prerogative to determine if a Member's role in another governmental capacity would disqualify him or her from serving in Congress. Congress has acted specifically with respect to individual Members' simultaneous service and generally by enacting legislation that addresses the status of Reservists in the government. Both the House and Senate, pursuant to their constitutional power to judge the qualifications of their Members, have considered the eligibility of their Members to hold commissions in the military. The precedents seem to indicate that a Member of Congress may, upon entry into the Armed Forces by enlistment, commission, or otherwise, cease to be a Member of Congress, provided the House or Senate chooses to act. Congress's enforcement of the Incompatibility Clause appears to have first occurred in the seventh Congress, when Representative John Van Ness accepted an office in the militia during the recess between the first and second sessions. The House unanimously voted in support of a resolution that Van Ness had "thereby forfeited his right to a seat as a Member of this House." The unanimous vote was apparently intended to set "the important precedent ... to exclude even the shadow of Executive influence." In some cases, however, the House or Senate has not acted. Congress has not acted in any case of an individual Representative or Senator regarding simultaneous service in the Reserves. Although there appears to be no precedent regarding such circumstances, Congress has attempted, as discussed below, to clarify the status of Members serving as Reservists through legislation. Although Congress has considered the eligibility of several individual Members on active duty specifically and may continue to do so, it has also addressed the status of Reservists by general legislation. It appears that the question of the propriety of simultaneous service of an individual in the Congress and in the Reserves may now be clarified by 5 U.S.C. § 2105, which defines "employee" for purposes of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, which contains laws relating to government employment. Section 2105(d) provides that a Reserve of the armed forces who is not on active duty or who is on active duty for training is deemed not an employee or an individual holding an office of trust or profit or discharging an official function under or in connection with the United States because of his appointment, oath, or status, or any duties or functions performed or pay or allowances received in that capacity. Under this definition, it appears that a Member serving as a Reservist would likely not be acting in violation of the Incompatibility Clause. As a statute, § 2105(d) cannot define the terms of the Constitution and thus would not resolve the constitutional question, but it may be used as an indication of the sense of Congress regarding the status of Reservists. Because Congress has the power to determine the qualifications of its own Members, the limitations that it has imposed on what constitutes an employee holding an office of the United States may be significant to courts considering the constitutional limitations. The central issue in the debate over the legality of simultaneous service is the definition of an office of the United States. If an appointment in the Reserves is not deemed to be an office of the United States, the Incompatibility Clause would provide no basis to prohibit simultaneous service in Congress. Some have argued that the issue of simultaneous service is nonjusticiable, meaning that the issue is not one that courts should adjudicate. Under this argument, because the Constitution gives Congress the authority to judge the qualifications of its Members, courts should not weigh in on the propriety of simultaneous service. On the other hand, the courts are empowered to interpret the meaning of the Constitution and may assert that authority to hear Reservists' cases. Direct legal challenges to simultaneous service in Congress and the Reserves have not been resolved on the merits. When the issue came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973 in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War , as discussed below, the Court decided the case on procedural grounds and no opinion was issued on the substantive claims under the Incompatibility Clause. Courts have heard other cases under the Incompatibility Clause that did not directly challenge simultaneous service as an officer in the Reserves, including a 2005 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. In that case, United States v. Lane , also discussed below, the court addressed the substantive claim of whether a Member of Congress could also serve as a judge in military court proceedings under his service as a Reservist. The U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge to simultaneous membership in the Reserves and in Congress as a violation of the Incompatibility Clause in 1973. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War , an association of officers and enlisted members of the Reserves and several individual members of the association alleged that Members of Congress who simultaneously served in the Reserves were acting in violation of the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on "holding any Office under the United States" while also serving as a Member of Congress. Although the district court held and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed that "Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution renders a member of the Congress ineligible to hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve during his continuance in office," the Supreme Court reversed the decision on other grounds, finding that the committee lacked standing to raise the claim. The Court's decision has limited citizens and taxpayers from raising the issue of simultaneous service in Congress and the Reserves. The Reservists Committee asserted their claims on the basis that as citizens and taxpayers, they were injured by the threat simultaneous service created for "the possibility of undue influence by the Executive Branch, in violation of the concept of independence of Congress implicit in Art. I of the Constitution." The Court held that the alleged injury was abstract, speculative, and generalized, and therefore was not a litigable matter for the courts to decide. The government raised several arguments to support the claim that simultaneous service in Congress and the Reserves did not violate the Incompatibility Clause. First, according to the government, simultaneous service in the Reserves was not the problem intended to be addressed by the Incompatibility Clause. The "intent was to avoid the possibility of improper influences upon and corruption of members of the legislative branch that could result from the power of the executive branch to appoint members to office." Furthermore, the government argued that "the minor and infrequent contacts these Reservists have with the military authorities as a result of their membership in the Reserves pose none of the dangers of domination and corruption of the legislative branch by the executive branch that the Framers sought to guard against." To support its position, the government also cited other court cases that considered the definition of offices and officers of the United States. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an employee whose "duties were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary" was an officer of the United States. According to the Court, "the term [office] embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties." This definition was used by the U.S. Court of Claims in a case challenging the status of a Reservist. The court held that an inactive Reservist was not also an officer of the United States. The court reasoned that "an officer of the Reserve Corps has no salary or emolument of office. He is not in time of peace, except perhaps while discharging some duty to which he may have been lawfully called ..., amenable to the Army regulations or court-martial. He has no defined duties to discharge." The issue of the constitutionality of Members of Congress simultaneously serving as Reservists was again raised in 2005 in a lawsuit involving Senator Lindsey Graham, who was an officer in the U.S. Air Force Standby Reserve at the time. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force assigned Senator Graham to act as an appellate judge on the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. One of the cases assigned to Senator Graham was that of an airman convicted of a drug use violation. The airman challenged the legality of Senator Graham's service on a panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals that reviewed the appeal. When the case came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), the court limited its decision to the issue of "whether a criminal conviction and sentence, which by statute can be sustained only by an affirmative appellate decision, may be reviewed by an appellate judge who simultaneously serves as a Member of Congress." The CAAF noted that the Supreme Court has held that "the term 'officers of the United States' includes 'all persons who can be said to hold an office under the Government.'" The Supreme Court has also indicated that the distinction between officers and non-officers depends on whether the individual exercises "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." The CAAF held that under this definition, military judges are officers of the United States. The court stated that "the Incompatibility Clause—which prohibits a Member of Congress from 'holding any Office under the United States'—precludes a Member from serving as an appellate judge on a Court of Criminal Appeals—an 'office' that must be filled by an 'Officer of the United States.'" The CAAF limited its decision to whether a Member of Congress could serve as a judge in the airman's proceeding. It refused to pass judgment on whether service as a Reservist constitutes "an office of the United States for purposes of qualification to serve as a Member of Congress under the Incompatibility Clause." Thus, the court left unresolved the propriety of simultaneous service in Congress and the Reserves.

The Incompatibility Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." This provision is generally understood to ensure the separation of powers by preventing Members of Congress from serving in two government posts at one time. The prohibition on simultaneous service in multiple offices of the government prevents the individual from exercising influence of one branch while serving in the office of another. To avoid related constitutional violations, Members generally are required to resign their previous offices before being seated in Congress. The Incompatibility Clause often raises questions of the propriety of Members' conduct in the context of military service, particularly service in the U.S. Armed Forces Reserves, and whether service in the Reserves would disqualify the Member from simultaneously serving in Congress. The Constitution also provides that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own Members." In some cases, the House and Senate have exercised their authority under this provision to determine the eligibility of their Members to hold commissions in the military, including the Reserves. The central issue in determining whether a Member may simultaneously serve in the Reserves is whether a position in the Reserves constitutes an "Office under the United States." This issue has been litigated in the courts and made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War. The Court resolved the case on procedural grounds, finding that the Reservists Committee did not have standing to raise the matter in court, and did not address the substantive constitutional claim. Other courts have dealt with related issues, including what positions constitute offices of the United States. Although Congress has taken action in some instances of Members' service in the Reserves and courts have resolved some related challenges, the issue of whether a Member may serve in Congress and the Reserves simultaneously has never been clearly resolved. This report will analyze the legal issues related to Members of Congress serving in the Armed Forces Reserves during their congressional tenure. It will discuss previous congressional action regarding Members' simultaneous service as well as federal legislation addressing the status of Reservists. It will also analyze court decisions related to challenges to simultaneous service.

Turnover of membership in the House and Senate necessitates closing congressional offices. The most common reason for departure is the expiration of a Member's term of office, but a congressional office may also become vacant due to resignation, death, or other reasons. The closure of a congressional office requires an outgoing Member of Congress, or congressional officials, in the case of a deceased Member, to evaluate pertinent information regarding staff; the disposal of personal and official records; and final disposition of office accounts, facilities, and equipment. Table 1 summarizes the numbers of Members who have left or will be leaving the House and Senate after the 112 th Congress, and in the prior 10 Congresses. The House and Senate have developed extensive resources to assist Members in closing their offices. These services are typically used at the end of a Congress, when a Member's term of service ends, but most services are available to an office that becomes vacant for other reasons. This report provides an overview of issues that may arise in closing a congressional office, and provides a guide to resources available through the appropriate support offices of the House and Senate. House office closing activities are supported by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), Clerk of the House, and House Sergeant at Arms. Resources related to closing a congressional office are available to House offices through the 113 th Congress transition website on the House intranet. When it becomes known that a Senate office will be closing, the Sergeant at Arms contacts that office to initiate closing support services. The Senate Sergeant at Arms provides office closing services through an Office Support Services Customer Support Analyst (CSA) assigned to each Senate office. A CSA helps coordinate an initial closing office planning meeting between the office and all Senate support offices, and it facilitates the provision of the following: office equipment inventory reports assistance with archiving documents information on closing out financial obligations information on benefits and entitlements available to a Senator after leaving office Payroll for staff of Members who are leaving office at the conclusion of a Congress typically terminates automatically on January 2. The employing authority, a Member in the case of a personal office that is closing, determines whether outgoing staff are eligible to receive a lump sum payment for any accrued annual leave. Other potential benefits, including retirement plans, post-employment life or health insurance benefits, and student loan repayment programs, are administered through the House Office of Human Resources, according to statute and chamber regulation. The office will continue to interact with former House employees on a wide range of post-employment matters, including wage and earning statements, employee benefits, and any forms that must be completed by former employees. In addition to staff procedures to support the closing of a Representative's office, the House provides certain post-employment services to departing staff, including a résumé referral service to House staff who desire employment with Members-elect, provided by the CAO; individual outplacement and technical assistance, as well as job search strategies and transitional techniques to separating employees of the House, provided by the House Outplacement Services Resource Center; and help for affected employees focused on designing and developing a successful job search, provided by the Office of Employee Assistance. Staffs of Senators who will leave office when their term of office officially expires at noon on January 3 of the year in which such a term ends remain on the payroll until the close of business on January 2 of the year in which the Senator's term of office expires, unless terminated sooner. The Senate Disbursing Office addresses issues related to the termination of employment of departing staff and provides information on the available options to staff regarding post-employment insurance and retirement programs and other benefits. The Senate Placement Office provides application and referral service for professionals and support staff, and it can assist outgoing Senate employees who are seeking positions in new congressional offices. The departing staff who are interested in this service must complete an application form and be interviewed by a personnel specialist. Placement office personnel then review applications and send them to offices with matching available positions. According to the Clerk of the House, the files generated by a Member's congressional office and accumulated in the course of service in the House are the personal property of the Member. The House pays for point-to-point shipping of all official records and papers for departing Members of that chamber. Official papers are generally described as those materials that may be mailed under franking regulations. Other materials, including memorabilia, photographs, and documents that do not relate to official business, must be shipped or disposed of at the outgoing Member's expense. Guidance regarding records management is available from the Office of the Clerk. Shipping of records is carried out by the House CAO. The Senate Records Management Handbook notes that neither statute nor the standing rules of the Senate define which items constitute a Senator's papers. For management purposes, the Secretary of the Senate defines Senators' papers as "all records, regardless of physical form and characteristics, that are made or received in connection with an individual's career as a United States Senator." The manual notes that, by tradition and practice, any such records are the private property of the individual Senator. The principal exclusion from Senators' papers are committee records that are defined by statute and Senate standing rules to be records of the Senate. Senate office closing guidelines specify a detailed process for the handling of a Senator's records. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides courtesy storage facilities to Members of Congress for records created in Capitol Hill offices at the Washington National Records Center (WNRC) in Suitland, MD, and at regional storage facilities around the country for records generated in state or district offices. NARA courtesy storage expires at the conclusion of a Member's term of office. WNRC can be reached at 301-778-1650. Contact information for NARA regional facilities is available at http://www.archives.gov/locations/ . The House Office of Finance requests that contact information for each closing office be provided to expedite resolution of final payments to vendors. Closing offices must settle several accounts, with units of the Secretary of the Senate and the Sergeant at Arms, as well as other government agencies. The Senate Disbursing Office is authorized to withhold from Senators' pay, reimbursements, mileage, or expense money for delinquent indebtedness to the Senate. At the conclusion of a Congress, the Architect of the Capitol has in the past advised that departing Members must vacate their Washington, DC, offices not later than noon on December 1, of the second year of a Congress. A Departing Member Service Center has provided functional workspace for departing Members and staff once their office suites are vacated. The center is typically secured by the U.S. Capitol Police and has a central administrative facility that is staffed by CAO employees. Each departing Member office is assigned a single cubicle that can accommodate the Member and one other person at any given time. Each cubicle is equipped with a telephone, networked computer, and basic supplies. Senators may remain in their personal offices in Washington, DC, until their terms of office expire. Senators leasing federal office premises or commercial space in their home states must notify the General Services Administration (GSA) or private landlord in writing at least 30 days in advance of their intention to vacate the premises. The Sergeant at Arms requires that a copy of an intent to vacate letter be provided to his office at the same time it is provided to landlords. All office space must be vacated by the close of business on January 2 of the year in which the Senator's term expires. House Support Services (HSS) staff will begin scheduling final equipment inventories for the Capitol Hill offices of departing Members shortly after the November elections. GSA is responsible for performing the final inventory for the district office locations of departing Members. All furniture and equipment (including copiers, faxes, telecommunication systems, computers, personal digital assistants, and any other equipment used to support office operations), whether used in office settings, or in the residences of Members and staff, must be accounted for in those inventories. Representatives are allowed to purchase their chairs and desks only from the Washington, DC, inventory. In district offices, succeeding Members will receive all of the equipment and furniture items of the outgoing Member. If the succeeding Member chooses not to use office items of the departing Member, those items will then become available for purchase by the departing Member. Furnishings in a departing Senator's personal and Capitol offices remain in place. Keys for Capitol offices must be returned to Sergeant at Arms Capitol Facilities. The Asset Management Section of the Sergeant at Arms conducts an inventory of all office and information technology (IT) related equipment in closing offices. Telecommunications equipment must be returned to the Senate. Outgoing Senators may purchase select office equipment and non-historical furniture used in their Capitol Hill offices. Emergency equipment, including annunciators, escape hoods, emergency supply kits (go kits), and victim rescue units, will be inventoried by the Office of Security and Emergency Preparedness (OSEP). Outgoing Senators may purchase office furnishings from only one of their state offices at a price equal to the acquisition price less depreciation. A Member of Congress may leave office prior to the expiration of his or her term, due to resignation, death, or for other reasons. On the first business day after the death, resignation, or expulsion of a Member of the House, his or her office is renamed the Office of the ___ Congressional District of State/Territory. Pursuant to House Rule II, cl.2(i)(1), staff on payroll of the congressional office when the outgoing Member departs remain employed by the House, and carry out their duties under the supervision of the Clerk of the House until a successor is elected. Senate practice regarding the closing of the office of a Senator who leaves office prior to the expiration of his or her term of office varies according to the circumstances of the departure. In addition to the expiration of the regular term of office, the Senate Handbook notes that a Senate office might be closed due to the following categories: resignation termination of the service of a Senator who is appointed and who does not stand for election, or is defeated death of a Senator Employees in the personal office of a Senator who resigns are continued on the Senate payroll at their respective salaries for up to 60 days after the Senator leaves office, unless the Senator's term of office expires sooner. Employee duties are performed under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate. An amount equal to one-tenth of the official office expense account portion of the Senator's Official Personnel and Office Expense Account is available to the Secretary of the Senate to defray those expenses directly related to closing a Senator's office. Expenses are paid from the Contingent Fund of the Senate as Miscellaneous Items. Employees in the personal office of a Senator whose appointment is terminated are continued on the Senate payroll at their respective salaries for up to 30 days after the termination of the Senator's service, or until they have become otherwise gainfully employed, whichever is earlier. The office space in Washington, DC, and in the state of an appointed Senator must be vacated on the day preceding the swearing-in of the successor, if the Senate is in session. If the Senate has adjourned sine die, an appointed Senator who will not continue to serve in the Senate must vacate office facilities the day before a successor is certified, or 30 days after a successor has been elected, whichever is earlier. Employees in the personal office of a deceased sitting Senator are continued on the Senate payroll at their respective salaries for up to 60 days after the Senator's death, unless the Senator's term of office expires sooner. The Committee on Rules and Administration may extend this period in cases where it will take longer to close a deceased Senator's office. Employee duties are performed under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate. An amount equal to one-tenth of the official office expense account portion of the Senator's Official Personnel and Office Expense Account is available to the Secretary of the Senate to defray those expenses directly related to closing a Senator's office. Expenses are paid from the Contingent Fund of the Senate as Miscellaneous Items. The Senate Financial Clerk provides information concerning allowances for the operation of the deceased Senator's office during the 60-day period.

Turnover of membership in the House and Senate necessitates closing congressional offices. The closure of a congressional office requires an outgoing Member of Congress to evaluate pertinent information regarding his or her staff; the disposal of personal and official records; and final disposition of office accounts, facilities, and equipment. In the past several years, the House and Senate have developed extensive resources to assist Members in closing their offices. These services are most typically used at the end of a Congress, when a Member's term of service ends, but most of the services are available to an office that becomes vacant for other reasons. This report provides an overview of the issues that may arise in closing a congressional office, and provides a guide to resources available through the appropriate support offices of the House and Senate. This report, which will be updated as warranted, is designed to address questions that arise when a congressional office is closing. Another related report is CRS Report R41121, Selected Privileges and Courtesies Extended to Former Members of Congress , by [author name scrubbed].

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has issued guidance for federal executive branch departments and agencies on various flexibilities available to facilitate HRM for emergency situations involving severe weather, natural disaster, and other circumstances multiple times since 2001. Notably, these issuances occurred following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which occurred back-to-back in the Gulf Coast region of the United States in late summer 2005; and as part of fulfilling OPM's responsibilities under the President's national strategy on pandemic influenza in 2006. Most recently, OPM issued guidance in a memorandum titled, "Human Resources Flexibilities for Hurricane Harvey and its Aftermath," issued on August 27, 2017. The memorandum "remind[s] agencies of the wide range of Human Resources (HR) policies and flexibilities currently available to assist Federal employees." On September 1, 2017, OPM, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), established an emergency leave transfer program for federal employees who were adversely affected by Hurricane Harvey. Seven days later, on September 8, 2017, as Hurricane Irma tracked toward Florida, OPM authorized departments and agencies to hire individuals under excepted service appointments and on a temporary basis for up to one year (with an extension up to one year). The individuals "will be directly involved with the recovery and relief efforts associated with Hurricane Harvey or Hurricane Irma." Subject to guidance from the OPM Director, Federal Executive Boards (FEBs) are available to assist the agency with matters related to emergency operations, such as operations under hazardous weather conditions. The FEBs were established by a presidential memorandum issued by President John F. Kennedy in November 1961, to "provide means for closer coordination of Federal activities at the regional level." Currently, FEBs operate in 28 metropolitan areas. A goal of the FEBs is "to create effective collaboration on emergency readiness and recovery, and to educate [the] Federal workforce on issues in emergency situations." Table 1 , below, provides information on selected flexibilities related to staffing, compensation, leave transfer, and telework in Title 5 of the United States Code and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations . The table refers to several HR terms, which are explained as follows: Competitive s ervice positions are civil service positions in the executive branch, except positions which are specifically excepted from the competitive service by or under statute; positions to which appointments are made by nomination for confirmation by the Senate, unless the Senate otherwise directs; and positions in the Senior Executive Service (SES). Such positions require applicants to compete against one another in open competition based on job-related criteria to obtain employment. The positions are subject to the civil service laws codified at Title 5 of the United States Code and to oversight by OPM. Employees are to be selected from among the best-qualified candidates and without discrimination. Excepted s ervice positions are civil service positions which are not in the competitive service or the SES. Qualification standards and requirements for these positions are established by the individual agencies. The Title 5 rules on appointment (except for veterans' preference), pay, and classification do not apply. SES positions are classified above grade 15 of the General Schedule or in level IV or V of the Executive Schedule, or an equivalent position, and are not filled by presidential appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Members of the SES, among other duties, direct the work of an organizational unit and exercise important policymaking, policy-determining, or other executive functions. The Reemployment Priority List is the mechanism agencies use to give reemployment consideration to their current and former competitive service employees who will be, or were, separated by reduction in force or who are fully recovered from a compensable injury after more than one year.

Federal executive branch departments and agencies have available to them various human resources management flexibilities for emergency situations involving severe weather, natural disaster, and other circumstances. At various times, the Office of Personnel Management issued guidance on these flexibilities, which supplements the basic policies governing staffing, compensation, leave sharing, and telework in Title 5 of the United States Code and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Some examples of when issuances have occurred include following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005; in response to pandemic influenza in 2006; and in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey in 2017.

Has an attorney engaged in unethical conduct when he or she secretly records a conversation? The practice is unquestionably unethical when it is done illegally; its status is more uncertain when it is done legally. The issue is complicated by the fact that the American Bar Association (ABA), whose model ethical standards have been adopted in every jurisdiction in one form or another, initially declared surreptitious recording unethical per se and then reversed its position. Moreover, more than a few jurisdictions have either yet to express themselves on the issue or have not done so for several decades. A majority of the jurisdictions on record have rejected the proposition that secret recording of a conversation is per se unethical even when not illegal. A number endorse a contrary view, however, and an even greater number have yet to announce their position. Federal and state law have long outlawed recording the conversation of another. Most jurisdictions permit recording with the consent of one party to the discussion, although a few require the consent of all parties to the conversation. Both the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility (DR 1-102(A)(3)) and its successor, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 8.4(b)), broadly condemn illegal conduct as unethical. They also censure attorney conduct that involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." In 1974, the ABA concluded in Formal Opinion 337 that the rule covering dishonesty, fraud, and the like "clearly encompasses the making of recordings without the consent of all parties." Thus, "no lawyer should record any conversation whether by tapes or other electronic device, without the consent or prior knowledge of all parties to the conversation." The Opinion admitted the possibility that law enforcement officials operating within "strictly statutory limitations" might qualify for an exception. Reaction to the Opinion 337 was mixed. The view expressed by the Texas Professional Ethics Committee was typical of the states that follow the ABA approach: In February 1978, this Committee addressed the issue of whether an attorney in the course of his or her practice of law, could electronically record a telephone conversation without first informing all of the parties involved. The Committee concluded that, although the recording of a telephone conversation by a party thereto did not per se violate the law, attorneys were held to a higher standard. The Committee reasoned that the secret recording of conversations offended most persons' concept of honor and fair play. Therefore, attorneys should not electronically record a conversation without first informing that party that the conversation was being recorded. The only exceptions considered at that time were "extraordinary circumstances with which the state attorney general or local government or law enforcement attorneys or officers acting under the direction of a state attorney general or such principal prosecuting attorneys might ethically make and use secret recordings if acting within strict statutory limitations conforming to constitutional requirements," which exceptions were to be considered on a case by case basis. ... [T]his Committee sees no reason to change its former opinion. Pursuant to Rule 8.04(a)(3), attorneys may not electronically record a conversation with another party without first informing that party that the conversation is being recorded. Supreme Court of Tex as Prof essional Eth ics Comm ittee Opinion No. 514 (1996). A second group of states—Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, and Tennessee—concurred, but with an expanded list of exceptions, for example, permitting recording by law enforcement personnel generally, not just when judicially supervised; or recording by criminal defense counsel; or recording statements that themselves constitute crimes, such as bribery offers or threats; or recording confidential conversations with clients; or recordings made solely for the purpose of creating a memorandum for the files; or recording by a government attorney in connection with a civil matter; or recording under other extraordinary circumstances. A third group of jurisdictions refused to adopt the ABA unethical per se approach. In one form or another the District of Columbia, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin suggested that the propriety of an attorney surreptitiously recording his or her conversations where it was otherwise lawful to do so depended upon the other circumstances involved in a particular case. In 2001, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 01-422 and rejected Opinion 337 's broad proscription. Instead, Formal Op inion 01-422 concluded that: 1. Where nonconsensual recording of conversations is permitted by the law of the jurisdiction where the recording occurs, a lawyer does not violate the Model Rules merely by recording a conversation without the consent of the other parties to the conversation. 2. Where nonconsensual recording of private conversations is prohibited by law in a particular jurisdiction, a lawyer who engages in such conduct in violation of that law may violate Model Rule 8.4, and if the purpose of the recording is to obtain evidence, also may violate Model Rule 4.4. 3. A lawyer who records a conversation without the consent of a party to that conversation may not represent that the conversation is not being recorded. 4. Although the Committee is divided as to whether the Model Rules forbid a lawyer from recording a conversation with a client concerning the subject matter of the representation without the client's knowledge, such conduct is, at the least, inadvisable. There seems to be no dispute that where it is illegal to record a conversation without the consent of all of the participants, it is unethical as well. Recording requires the consent of all parties in 10 states: California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Only two states, Colorado and South Carolina, have expressly rejected the approach of the ABA's F ormal Opinion 01-422 since its release. Yet a number of other states have yet to withdraw earlier opinions that declared surreptitious records ethically suspect: Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, and Kentucky. A substantial number of states, however, agree with the ABA's F ormal Opinion 01-422 that a recording with the consent of one, but not all, of the parties to a conversation is not unethical per se unless it is illegal or contrary to some other ethical standard. This is the position of the bar in Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. In four other states—Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—comparable opinions appeared before the ABA's F ormal Opinion 01-422 was released and have never withdrawn or modified. Yet even among those that now believe that secret recording is not per se unethical, some ambivalence seems to remain. Nebraska, for example, refers to full disclosure as the "better practice." New Mexico notes that the "prudent New Mexico lawyer" hesitates to record without the knowledge of all parties. And Minnesota cautions that surreptitiously recording client conversations "is certainly inadvisable" except under limited circumstances. Although the largest block of states endorse this view, whether it is a majority view is uncertain because a number of jurisdictions have apparently yet to announce a position, for example, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Besides Rule 8.4's prohibition on unlawful, fraudulent, deceptive conduct, the Code of Professional Conduct also condemns making a false statement of material fact or law. As a consequence even when surreptitious recording is not considered a per se violation, it will be considered unethical if it also involves a denial that the conversation is being recorded or some similar form of deception. While illegality and false statements exist as exceptions to a general rule that permits surreptitious recording, evidence gathering is an exception to a general rule that prohibits such recordings. The earlier ABA opinion conceded a possible exception when prosecuting attorneys engaged in surreptitious recording pursuant to court order. Various jurisdictions have expanded the exception to include defense attorneys as well as prosecutors. Some have included use in the connection with other investigations as well. Other circumstances thought to permit a lawyer to record a conversation without the consent of all of the parties to the discussion in one jurisdiction or another include instances when the lawyer does so in a matter unrelated to the practice of law; or when the recorded statements themselves constitute crimes such as bribery offers or threats; or when the recording is made solely for the purpose of creating a memorandum for the files; or when the "the lawyer has a reasonable basis for believing that disclosure of the taping would significantly impair pursuit of a generally accepted societal good."

In some jurisdictions, it is unethical for an attorney to secretly record a conversation even though it is not illegal to do so. A few states require the consent of all parties to a conversation before it may be recorded. Recording without mutual consent is both illegal and unethical in those jurisdictions. Elsewhere the issue is more complicated. In 1974, the American Bar Association (ABA) opined that surreptitiously recording a conversation without the knowledge or consent of all of the participants violated the ethical prohibition against engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." The ABA conceded, however, that law enforcement recording, conducted under judicial supervision, might breach no ethical standard. Reaction among the authorities responsible for regulation of the practice of law in the various states was mixed. In 2001, the ABA reversed its earlier opinion and announced that it no longer considered one-party consent recording per se unethical when it is otherwise lawful. Today, this is the view of a majority of the jurisdictions on record. A substantial number, however, disagree. An even greater number have yet to announce an opinion. An earlier version of this report once appeared as CRS Report 98-251. An unabridged version of this report is available with the footnotes and attachment as CRS Report R42650, Wiretapping, Tape Recorders, and Legal Ethics: An Overview of Questions Posed by Attorney Involvement in Secretly Recording Conversation.

RS21055 -- NATO Enlargement Updated May 5, 2003 Congress is now considering enlargement of NATO, an issue addressed at the allied summit in Prague, in November 2002. During the last round of enlargement, the Senate voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998, in favor of admitting Poland, theCzechRepublic, and Hungary to NATO. (A two-thirds Senate majority is necessary to admit new states becauseenlargement isconsidered an amendment to the original North Atlantic Treaty.) Other members of the alliance followed suit, andthe threecountries became members in March 1999. It was the fourth time that NATO had admitted new states, withmembershipincreasing from the original 12 to 19 today. At the previous NATO summit in April 1999, the allies underscored that they were open to further enlargement. Theycreated a Membership Action Plan (MAP), outlining structured goals for candidates, such as ending the danger ofethnicconflict, developing a democratic society with transparent political and economic processes and civilian control ofthemilitary, and pledging commitment to defense budgets to build military forces able to contribute to missions fromcollectivedefense to peacekeeping. (1) At Prague, on November 21, 2002, the current members' heads of state designated the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania,and Estonia), Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, as prospective members. In 1998, the congressional debate over NATO enlargement covered such issues as costs, mission, and qualifications of thecandidates. The issue of costs has now seemingly been put to rest because entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, andHungary does not appear to have required extra U.S. funds. Most observers believe that the three countries havecontributedto stability in Europe, and have made significant political contributions to the alliance in such matters as enhancingNATO'sunderstanding of central and eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans, given the history of the new members'involvementwith these regions. Militarily, their contribution is less apparent; each of the three contributes forces to theNATO-led peaceoperations in the Balkans, and is building forces to defend its borders. Pentagon officials believe that Poland hasmade thegreatest strides in restructuring and modernizing its military, and that the Czech Republic and Hungary have madeconsiderably less progress. (2) It should be noted thata period of years is normally necessary to rebuild a military that has hadan authoritarian tradition and convert it to one having civilian control, purge it of old-guard elements, reform itstraining,and purchase equipment compatible with a new set of allies. There has been some sentiment that NATO should delay invitations to candidate states until democratic processes are firmlyentrenched. For example, the recent Hungarian government of Victor Orban was criticized for an ethnic "status law"thatsome interpreted as cloaking Hungarian aspirations for territory from neighboring states having Hungarianminorities. (3) Others reject such sentiments, noting that Orban was freely elected, and dismissing the status law as nothing morethan apassing example of nationalist politics before a close election. Nonetheless, it is possible that the period betweennamingcandidate states for accession negotiations at Prague in November 2002 and the moment when current NATOmembergovernments decide whether to admit those candidates (such as the vote in the U.S. Senate), could see debates overwhethereach candidate continues to meet criteria for democracy, particularly if there is an election bringing in a governmentthatmember states view as extremist. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain a provision for expelling ordisciplining amember state. Another factor for consideration could prove to be a prospective member's efforts to persuade its people that NATOmembership is desirable. Slovenia held a referendum on March 23, 2003; 66% of those voting, 66% supportedNATOmembership, despite popular opposition to the war in Iraq that approaches 80%. No other candidate state intendsto hold areferendum on NATO membership. The essence of the current enlargement debate is over qualifications, with no apparent consensus. Of an original ninecandidates, two candidates, Albania and Macedonia, did not receive invitations at Prague. (4) Each of these countries issmall, with comparably small militaries potentially capable of specialized functions, such as transport or medicalcare, forexample, but only minimally capable of building forces able to contribute to high-intensity conflict. In the view ofsomeobservers, to adhere to the letter of the military qualifications outlined in the 1999 summit communiqué,requiring newmembers to contribute to missions from peacekeeping to collective defense, would be tantamount to excluding theirentry. Many participants in the debate favor different standards that, in their view, reflect the current political situation in Europe,where Russia is no longer a military threat but ethnic conflict, nationalism, and terrorism are a danger. In suchcircumstances, they contend, political stability and a modernized military at least able to contribute to border defenseand topeace operations are an appropriate standard. Secretary of State Powell seemed to suggest such a standard in hisconfirmation hearing when he stressed a need for candidates to modernize their militaries, and to strengthen theirdemocratic structures. (5) An opposing view is that NATO should first clearly define its mission, above all with an agreement on what types ofout-of-area threats, such as terrorism, proliferation, or a disruption of the flow of oil, should be met with a possiblemilitaryresponse. At that point, enlargement should be considered, with a determination about which prospective membersmightcontribute to the mission. Some observers, also hesitant about enlargement, note that the United States flew over60 percentof combat missions in the Kosovo conflict. They prefer prospective members that could relieve the U.S. burden. Yet another view is that there is no clear dichotomy between collective defense (high-intensity conflict undertaken inresponse, for example, to the attacks of September 11, 2001) and collective security (peace operations andhumanitarianassistance). In this view, countries contributing to peace operations assist in building stable societies and preventing"blackholes," such as Bosnia or Afghanistan, where terrorism may take root. Countries involved in peace operations, then,arecontributing to the prevention of terrorism, and thereby to collective defense. The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, are affecting the enlargement debate. A likely part ofthe enlargement debate will be how prospective members might contribute to the conflict against terrorism or actto stem theflow of weapons of mass destruction. NATO seemed partially to settle one aspect of the debate over its missionshortlyafter the attacks when member states invoked Article V, the alliance's collective defense clause, to come to the aidof theUnited States in the conflict against terrorism. Previously, the European allies had resisted any statement that ArticleVshould be invoked in an out-of-area action against terrorism. At a NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik in May2002, theallies agreed that they must be able "to carry out the full range of... missions, ... to field forces wherever they areneeded,sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives." (6) However, not all member states have sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained forces for the current tasks in Afghanistanand Iraq, for example. Few allies besides the United States have special forces or mobile, large-formation combatforceswith the potential to contribute meaningfully to such conflicts. At the same time, a number of allies have anintelligencecapability, transport, medical units, and political influence that might assist in such conflicts. As the terrorism conflict unfolds, current members may examine how prospective members might be able to contribute.Contributions might include political influence and support, for example in the United Nations or with Russia orMuslimstates, and not necessarily military potential. They might also examine the level of internal security in the candidatecountries and ability to control borders, disrupt terrorist financial networks or apprehend terrorist suspects on theirsoil.Elements of the MAP that emphasize an end to corruption may be increasingly underscored, given thepost-September 11importance of preventing money-laundering, and combating a black economy. The alliance experienced sharp divisions over whether to use military force against Iraq. In January 2003, Bush Administration officials applauded the decision of the 7 candidate states (and others) to sign a letter that, in general,endorsed the U.S. position on Iraq; some candidates state representatives complained that they had been bullied bytheAdministration into signing the letter. Six of the seven candidate states joined the coalition. Slovenia was theexception,but allowed overflight by U.S. and UK forces. The failure to achieve consensus in the North Atlantic Council overhow andwhether to aid Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq exposed serious divisions in the alliance. (7) The fractious debate inthe NAC led some Administration officials and Members of Congress to raise the issue of changing NATOdecision-makingprocedures. (8) The debate over enlargement is quite different in 2001 than it was in 1998. In 1998, several European allies stronglysupported enlargement. Today, most member states couch discussion of enlargement in careful terms. Most member states agree that Slovenia is politically qualified for membership; in addition, Hungary urges Slovenia'smembership, once NATO criteria for entry are met, for strategic reasons. Hungary is not contiguous with any otherNATOstate. Slovenia's entry into the alliance would provide Hungary with a land bridge to Italy, a clear advantage givenneutralAustria's refusal during the Kosovo war to permit NATO overflights to Hungary. Slovakia is a credible candidatein someNATO capitals, given the return in September 2002 elections of key elements of its reform government. SomenorthernEuropean allies, such as Poland, strongly support membership for the Baltic states; they contend that the Baltic stateshavemet OSCE and EU political guidelines for democracy, and cite the three countries' work to build stability in theregion andto establish better relations with Russia. U.S. officials state that the Baltic states have made the most progress inmeetingMAP requirements, although there is some criticism of how Latvia has handled sensitive documents. Italy, Greece, and Turkey are strong supporters of Bulgaria's and Romania's entry. They contend that these two countriescan contribute to stability in the Balkans, where Europe's greatest security needs lie. Critics counter that RomaniaandBulgaria continue to suffer from corruption in their governing structures, and that each must make stronger effortstomodernize its military. Bulgaria has also had a succession of governments that have followed an uncertain coursetowardspolitical and economic reform. The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. Putin's softer rhetoric against NATO enlargement since theSeptember 11 terrorist attacks has allayed concerns that his government would strongly oppose enlargement. It ispossiblethat Putin now views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow's ongoing conflict in Chechnya, asmoreimportant than potential divisions with the allies over enlargement. The Duma and much of Russia's military andintelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly opposed to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to movea militaryalliance closer to their territory. Officials from allied states often counter such an argument by underscoring thatenlargement's purpose in large part is to ensure stability in Europe, and that the addition of new member statesprovidesstability, and therefore security, to Russia's west. Putin may also view the entry of Estonia and Latvia into NATO(and theEU, in 2004) as a means to protect Russian minorities in those countries, given NATO and EU strictures over thetreatmentof ethnic minorities. In the spring of 2003, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee beganhearings on enlargement. Some individual Members have expressed their views, and relevant legislation has beenintroduced. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee produced a report on enlargement, together with theResolution ofRatification (Executive Report 108-6), the instrument on which the Senate will vote to give its advice and consenttorevision of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the 107th Congress, Rep. Shimkus and others introduced H.Con.Res. 116 , which calls for NATO invitationsto the Baltic states for membership at the 2002 summit, as long as they satisfy the alliance's qualifications. It passedbyvoice vote on October 7, 2002. On October 24, 2001, legislation was introduced in both Houses supporting further enlargement. Representative Bereuterintroduced H.R. 3167 , the Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001; Speaker Hastert and others cosponsored thebill. An identical Senate bill, S. 1572 , with cosponsors including Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar,andMcCain, was also introduced. The bill recalled and approved legislation of the four previous Congresses that urgedenlargement and provided funding for particular candidates. The bill designated Slovakia as eligible to receive U.S.assistance under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of P.L. 103-447 ). This section givesthePresident authority to establish a program of assistance with a government if he finds that it meets the requirementsofNATO membership. In the 107th Congress, Representative Gallegly introduced H.Res. 468 , which described NATO as key to U.S.interests in Europe and encourages a continued path of improving relations with Russia. It strongly urged invitationstomembership for the 7 countries ultimately invited at Prague. It passed the House 358-9 on October 7, 2002. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up the Resolution of Ratification on April 30, 2003. The Resolution isthe instrument on which the Senate will vote to give its advice and consent to admission of the candidate states. TheCommittee's report accompanying the Resolution reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the candidate states,assessingtheir political, economic, and military policies. It also reviews NATO's mission and capabilities, relations withRussia, rolein the Balkan wars, and the Prague NATO summit. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has stirred NATO waters by suggesting the presence of an "old" and "new" Europe, theformer consisting of such countries as France and Germany, the latter consisting of recent new members andcandidatestates. Secretary Rumsfeld has suggested that the alliance's future belongs to the United States and the "new"Europe, withthe "old" Europe increasingly marginalized. European critics, some of them in the candidate states, oppose suchacategorization, noting that Germany has the largest economy in Europe, and that only France, with Britain, has amilitaryable to move its forces considerable distances for engagement in combat. These critics express concern that adividedNATO will not be effective in confronting threats that face each member state. (9) Accession negotiations between NATO and the candidate states were completed on March 26, 2003, and the candidate stategovernments signed protocols that have been sent to the 19 member states, each of which will follow itsconstitutionalprocedures to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to admit new members. All 19 members must agree on a prospectivemember's qualifications for it to enter NATO. The Bush Administration would like for the Senate to vote onenlargementbefore that August 2003 recess. NATO hopes to admit the successful candidates in May 2004.

This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement. The report analyzes the key military and political issues in the debate over seven prospective members named atNATO'sPrague summit. It then provides an overview of the positions of the allies and of Russia on enlargement, citing theeffectsof the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States. It concludes with a discussion of recentlegislation onenlargement. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RS21354, The NATO Summit atPrague, 2002,CRS Report RL30168, NATO Applicant States: A Status Report, and CRS Report RS21510,NATO's Decision-MakingProcedure.

Funding for House committees (except for the Committee on Appropriations) follows a two-step process of authorization and appropriation. Operating budgets for all standing and select committees of the House (except for the Committee on Appropriations) are authorized pursuant to a chamber funding resolution, and funding is provided by annual appropriations in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill and other appropriations acts. On March 17, 2017, the House adopted H.Res. 173 , providing for the expenses of certain committees of the House of Representatives in the 115 th Congress, by voice vote. The resolution authorized a total of $266.3 million for committee expenses, $132.7 million for the first session and $133.6 million for the second session. The use of committee funds is subject to chamber rules, law, and regulations promulgated by the Committee on House Administration, the Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, and the Ethics Committee, among other House entities. These regulations may be found in a wide variety of sources, including statute, House rules, committee resolutions, the Committee Handbook, the Franking Manual, the House Ethics Manual, "Dear Colleague" letters, and formal and informal guidance. Committee funds may be used only to support the conduct of official committee business. They may not be used for personal or campaign purposes, or comingled with funds appropriated to any other source of official funds, such as the Member Representational Allowance (MRA). Information on individual committee spending is published quarterly in the Statements of Disbursement of the House . This report is organized into three sections. The first provides an overview of the committee funding process in the House and analyzes funding levels since 1996. The second reviews House floor and committee action on committee funding in the 115 th Congress. The final section provides illustrations of the rules and regulations that structure the use of committee funds, and analyzes actual committee funding spending patterns during six previous years. Contemporary funding for House committees (except for the Committee on Appropriations) follows a two-step process of authorization and appropriation. Operating budgets for all standing and select committees of the House continued or created at the beginning of a new Congress (except for the Committee on Appropriations) are authorized biennially pursuant to an omnibus committee funding resolution, and appropriations are included in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill. Pursuant to House Rule X, clause 6, the Committee on House Administration reports an omnibus resolution to authorize the expenses of each standing and select committee of the House, except the Committee on Appropriations, for each two-year Congress. For a two-year Congress, the omnibus committee funding resolution typically specifies a dollar amount limit for each committee that shall be available for its expenses (divided between the first and second sessions), in addition to a reserve fund for unanticipated expenses. This resolution does not appropriate funds; the actual appropriation for House committee expenses is provided in the annual Legislative Branch Appropriations bill. In effect, the dollar amounts specified in the omnibus committee funding resolution limit how much of the amount appropriated for committee expenses will be available for any particular committee. In preparation for the omnibus resolution, House committees (except the Appropriations Committee) are required by regulations of the Committee on House Administration to submit an operating budget request for the two years of a Congress. The chair of each committee usually introduces a House resolution with his or her committee's proposed authorization. Typically, these actions take place during late February, with committees approving their proposed budgets at a committee organizing meeting. The individual resolutions are referred to the Committee on House Administration, which may hold hearings on each committee's request. The chair and the ranking minority Member from each committee are typically the only witnesses who testify at these hearings, giving them an opportunity to explain and defend their budgets. After completion of the hearings, the chair of the Committee on House Administration introduces the omnibus funding resolution for that two-year Congress, which, after its referral to the Committee on House Administration, serves as the legislative vehicle for committee markup. The resolution is typically reported out of committee without amendment. The omnibus resolution is usually considered by the House during March of the first session of a Congress, and agreed to with little debate. Prior to this consideration, during the first three months of each new Congress, House Rule X, clause 7, authorizes interim funding for House committees based on their authorizations from the preceding Congress. Specifically, under Rule X, clause 7, between January 3 and March 31 of an odd-numbered year, a committee is authorized to spend in a single month 9% of the committee's last annual authorization. Funding for all House committees is included in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill. Line-item appropriations are not made for individual committees, except the Committee on Appropriations. Instead, funding is provided as a single total amount for all committees (except the Committee on Appropriations), under the heading "Committee Employees" and the subheading "Standing Committees, Special and Select," within the House account "Salaries and Expenses." Since authorizations for committee funds are made on a biennial, calendar-year basis and appropriations are made annually on a fiscal-year basis, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the authorization and the appropriations in any given year. For any individual biennial funding resolution, funds may be drawn from money appropriated in three different fiscal years ; for the 115 th Congress, the overlapping timelines of fiscal years, calendar years, and committee expense authorization periods are visualized in Figure 1 . Finally, although appropriations are made annually for House committee funding, the language typically states that the funding shall remain available until the end of the second calendar year of the current Congress. For example, in both FY2015 and FY2016, committee funds were appropriated to remain available until December 31, 2016. Clause 6(d) of House Rule X requires that "the minority party [be] treated fairly in the appointment" of committee staff employed pursuant to such expense resolutions. In recent years, the House majority leadership has encouraged its committee leaders to provide the minority with one-third of the committee staff and resources authorized in the biennial funding resolutions. Statements made by the chair and ranking Member of the Committee on House Administration at the beginning of its committee funding review in recent Congresses indicate a general consensus that all House committees should provide at least one-third minority staffing. Figure 2 shows the aggregate committee funding authorization level from 1996 to 2018, in both nominal and real dollars. Since 1996, aggregate committee funding has increased by slightly more than 68%, from $79.4 million in 1996 to $133.6 million in 2018, for an average annual increase of 3.1%. In constant dollars, however, aggregate funding has increased only 8.0% between 1996 and 2017, for an annual average real increase of less than four-tenths of 1%. The Committee on House Administration held a hearing on committee expense requests on February 15 and 16, 2017. Chairs and ranking Members from each standing and select committee (except the Committee on Appropriations) testified on their budget requests. Representative Gregg Harper, chair of the panel, indicated that the committee had "worked to strike the right balance" in providing funds for committees while remaining conscious of costs. During the hearing, the chairman and the ranking minority Member, Representative Robert Brady, reiterated the long-standing expectation that committee resources would reflect a distribution of two-thirds of the committee staff to the majority, and one-third to the minority, and a similar distribution of nonstaff resources. In their testimony, most committee chairs and ranking minority Members explicitly acknowledged mutually satisfactory arrangements had been reached regarding the distribution of committee staff and other resources. On March 7, 2017, H.Res. 173 , providing for the expenses of certain committees of the House of Representatives in the 115 th Congress, was introduced and referred to the Committee on House Administration. On March 8, 2017, the Committee on House Administration marked up H.Res. 173 , which was reported to the House by voice vote. In the second session of the 115 th Congress, on March 7 and June 26, 2018, the Committee on House Administration considered committee resolutions 115-9 and 115-19, respectively. These resolutions allocated funds from the reserve fund for unanticipated expenses, established by H.Res. 173 . In both instances, the committee agreed to the resolution by voice vote and without amendment. On March 17, 2017, the House agreed to H.Res. 173 by voice vote. The resolution authorized a total of $266.3 million for committee expenses, $132.7 million for the first session and $133.6 million for the second session. Appropriations for House standing and select committees are typically included annually in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill. The following amounts were appropriated for the expenses of House standing committees (except for the Committee on Appropriations) in recent appropriations bills: In FY2019, $127.9 million was appropriated in H.R. 5895 , the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019, to remain available until December 31, 2020. In FY2018, $127.1 million was appropriated in H.R. 1625 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, to remain available until December 31, 2018. In FY2017, $127.1 million was appropriated in H.R. 244 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, to remain available until December 31, 2018. In FY2016, $123.9 million was appropriated in H.R. 2029 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, to remain available until December 31, 2016. In accordance with the regulations contained in the Committee Handbook, "Committee funds are provided to pay ordinary and necessary expenses incurred by committee Members and employees in the United States." Ordinary and necessary expenses are defined as "reasonable expenditures in support of official committee business that are consistent with all applicable Federal laws, Rules of the House of Representatives, and regulations of the Committee on House Administration." All expenditures of a committee are subject to review by its committee chair. Funding "may not be used to defray any personal, political or campaign-related expenses, or expenses related to a Member's personal office." Committees may employ permanent staff, consultants, detailees, fellows, interns, temporary and shared employees, and volunteers. The terms and conditions of employment for committee staff are determined by the committee chair. Total staff ceilings for each committee are set by the Speaker. Employees of a House committee are covered by the Congressional Accountability Act. Domestic travel including transportation, lodging, and meals (excluding alcohol) is reimbursable from committee funds. Travel expenses may not be for personal or political campaign events and may not exceed 60 consecutive days. Foreign travel is coordinated through the State Department Travel Office and is subject to House Rule X, clause 8(b)(3), whereby each Member and employee on foreign travel must submit an itemized report of expenses to the committee chair. To better understand how committees have used their authorized funds, the following sections provide an analysis of annual committee expenditures during several different legislative years. Specifically, committee expenditures are analyzed to determine (1) the percentage of each committee's annual authorization that is expended, and (2) major categories of committee spending. Data on yearly committee expenditures were compiled using the quarterly Statement of Disbursements of the House , which reports all individual House expenditures disbursed during the previous quarter. Because late-arriving bills for committee expenses may be paid for up to two years following the end of a fiscal year for which funds are appropriated, obligations incurred by a committee during a particular legislative year are often paid over the course of multiple calendar years. For example, H.R. 244 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2017, provided that appropriations for House committees remain available until December 31, 2018. This would suggest that financial obligations made by committees in 2017 may be paid with remaining FY2017 appropriations through the quarter ending December 31, 2020. Consequently, the total expenditures of a committee in any given legislative year are calculated using quarterly Statement of Disbursements reports from both the year in which the committee operated, as well as subsequent years. The following analysis calculates total disbursements made for legislative years 2010 through 2015, years for which House Statements of Disbursements are available electronically, and the bulk of late-arriving bills as described above have been received. In addition, data on disbursements from a sample of earlier legislative years—1997, 1998, 2003, and 2004—are analyzed in order to detect any longer-term trends in how committee funds have been used. As shown in Figure 3 , the majority of committees between 2010 and 2015 used almost all of the funds authorized to them. Specifically, approximately 55% of committees spent 95% or more of their authorization; approximately 77% of committees spent 90% or more of their authorization; and approximately 98% of committees spent 80% or more of their authorization. House spending is categorized by the standard budget object classes used for the federal government. These include personnel compensation; personnel benefits; travel; rent, communications, and utilities; printing and reproduction; other services; supplies and materials; transportation of things; and equipment. The disbursement volumes also contain a category for franked mail. Table 1 shows percentages for each object class. The largest category of spending, accounting for approximately 91% of total committee spending during the years analyzed, was for "Personnel compensation." Beyond these staff expenses, committees spent an aggregate of 3.4% of their expenditures on "Equipment," just over 2% on "Supplies and Materials," and less than 1% on travel. The use of most committee funds on personnel is consistently true both across time and across individual committees.

Funding for House committees (except for the Committee on Appropriations) follows a two-step process of authorization and appropriation. Operating budgets for all standing and select committees of the House (except for the Committee on Appropriations) are authorized pursuant to a simple resolution, and funding is provided in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill and other appropriations acts. Subsequent resolutions may change committee authorizations. On March 17, 2017, the House adopted H.Res. 173, providing for the expenses of certain committees of the House of Representatives in the 115th Congress, by voice vote. The resolution authorized a total of $266.3 million for committee expenses, $132.7 million for the first session and $133.6 million for the second session. The use of committee funds is subject to chamber rules, law, and regulations promulgated by the Committee on House Administration, the Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, and the Ethics Committee. Committee funds may be used only to support the conduct of official business of the committee. They may not be used for personal or campaign purposes. Information on individual committee spending is published quarterly in the Statements of Disbursement of the House. This report is organized in three sections. The first provides an overview of the committee funding process in the House and analyzes funding levels since 1996. The second reviews House floor and committee action on committee funding in the 115th Congress. The final section summarizes the rules and regulations that structure the use of committee funds, and analyzes committee spending patterns during several previous years.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation are often referred to with the abbreviation PAS. This report identifies, for the 113 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other CRS reports. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointments-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . During the 113 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted 69 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 34 were confirmed, 34 were returned to the President, and 1 was withdrawn. Table 1 summarizes the appointment activity. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate varies widely. Some nominations are confirmed within a few days, others are not confirmed for several months, and some are never confirmed. For each nomination covered by this report and confirmed in the 113 th Congress, the report provides the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). The mean (average) number of days elapsed between nomination and confirmation was 123.9. The median number of days elapsed was 104.0. Under Senate Rules, nominations not acted on by the Senate at the end of a session of Congress (or before a recess of 30 days) are returned to the President. The Senate, by unanimous consent, often waives this rule—although not always. This report measures the "days to confirm" from the date of receipt of the resubmitted nomination, not the original. Agency profiles in this report are organized in two parts: (1) a table listing the organization's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 113 th Congress and (2) a table listing appointment action for vacant positions during the 113 th Congress. As mentioned earlier, data for these tables were collected from several authoritative sources. As noted, some agencies had no nomination activity during this time. In each agency profile, the first of the two tables identifies, as of the end of the 113 th Congress, each full-time PAS position in the organization and its pay level. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule, which, as of January 2014, ranged from level I ($201,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($147,200) for lower-ranked positions. The second table, the appointment action table, provides, in chronological order, information concerning each nomination. It shows the name of the nominee, position involved, date of nomination, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation, if confirmed. It also notes actions other than confirmation (i.e., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). The appointment action tables with more than one nominee to a position also list statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. Each nomination action table provides the average days to confirm in two ways: mean and median. Although the mean is a more familiar measure, it may be influenced by outliers, or extreme values, in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. In the final two rows, the table includes the mean and median values for the "days to confirm" column. Table A-2 provides summary data on the appointments identified in this report and is organized by agency type, including independent executive agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral organizations, and agencies in the legislative branch. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each agency grouping. It also includes mean and median values for the number of days taken to confirm nominations in each category. Appendix B provides a list of department abbreviations. Appendix A. Summary of All Nominations and Appointments to Independent and Other Agencies Appendix B. Agency Abbreviations

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. This report identifies all nominations that were submitted to the Senate for full-time positions in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports. Information for each agency is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each agency. Additional summary information across all agencies covered in the report appears in the appendix. During the 113th Congress, the President submitted 69 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 69 nominations, 34 were confirmed, 1 was withdrawn, and 34 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 123.9 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 104.0. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major point of contention is the question of whether action is needed to ensure unfettered access to the Internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet, to ensure equal access and non-discriminatory treatment, is referred to as "net neutrality." There is no single accepted definition of "net neutrality." However, most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network; and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. What, if any, action should be taken to ensure "net neutrality" has become a major focal point in the debate over broadband, or high-speed Internet access, regulation. As the marketplace for broadband continues to evolve, some contend that no new regulations are needed, and if enacted will slow deployment of and access to the Internet, as well as limit innovation. Others, however, contend that the consolidation and diversification of broadband providers into content providers has the potential to lead to discriminatory behaviors which conflict with net neutrality principles. The two potential behaviors most often cited are the network providers' ability to control access to and the pricing of broadband facilities, and the incentive to favor network-owned content, thereby placing unaffiliated content providers at a competitive disadvantage. In 2005 two major actions dramatically changed the regulatory landscape as it applied to broadband services, further fueling the net neutrality debate. In both cases these actions led to the classification of broadband Internet access services as Title I information services, thereby subjecting them to a less rigorous regulatory framework than those services classified as telecommunications services. In the first action, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a June 2005 decision ( National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services ), upheld the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 2002 ruling that the provision of cable modem service (i.e., cable television broadband Internet) is an interstate information service and is therefore subject to the less stringent regulatory regime under Title I of the Communications Act of 1934. In a second action, the FCC in an August 5, 2005 decision, extended the same regulatory relief to telephone company Internet access services (i.e., wireline broadband Internet access, or DSL), thereby also defining such services as information services subject to Title I regulation. As a result neither telephone companies nor cable companies, when providing broadband services, are required to adhere to the more stringent regulatory regime for telecommunications services found under Title II (common carrier) of the 1934 Act. However, classification as an information service does not free the service from regulation. The FCC continues to have regulatory authority over information services under its Title I, ancillary jurisdiction. Simultaneous to the issuing of its August 2005 information services classification order, the FCC also adopted a policy statement outlining the following four principles to "encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of [the] public Internet:" (1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice; (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of their choice (subject to the needs of law enforcement); (3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers. Then FCC Chairman Martin did not call for their codification. However, he stated that they will be incorporated into the policymaking activities of the Commission. For example, one of the agreed upon conditions for the October 2005 approval of both the Verizon/MCI and the SBC/AT&T mergers was an agreement made by the involved parties to commit, for two years, "... to conduct business in a way that comports with the Commission's (September 2005) Internet policy statement.... " In a further action AT&T included in its concessions to gain FCC approval of its merger to BellSouth to adhering, for two years, to significant net neutrality requirements. Under terms of the merger agreement, which was approved on December 29, 2006, AT&T agreed to not only uphold, for 30 months, the FCC's Internet policy statement principles, but also committed, for two years (expired December 2008), to stringent requirements to "... maintain a neutral network and neutral routing in its wireline broadband Internet access service." In perhaps one of its most significant actions relating to its Internet policy statement to date, the FCC, on August 1, 2008, ruled that Comcast Corp., a provider of Internet access over cable lines, violated the FCC's policy statement, when it selectively blocked peer-to-peer connections in an attempt to manage its traffic. This practice, the FCC concluded, "... unduly interfered with Internet users' rights to access the lawful Internet content and to use the applications of their choice." While no monetary penalties were imposed, Comcast is required to stop these practices by the end of 2008. Comcast stated that it will comply with the order, but it has filed an appeal in the U.S. DC Court of Appeals. Separately, in an April 2007 action, the FCC released a notice of inquiry (WC Docket No. 07-52), which is still pending, on broadband industry practices seeking comment on a wide range of issues including whether the August 2005 Internet policy statement should be amended to incorporate a new principle of nondiscrimination and if so, what form it should take. On January 14, 2008 the FCC issued three public notices seeking comment on issues related to network management (including the now-completed Comcast ruling) and held two (February 25 and April 17, 2008) public hearings specific to broadband network management practices. As consumers expand their use of the Internet and new multimedia and voice services become more commonplace, control over network quality also becomes an issue. In the past, Internet traffic has been delivered on a "best efforts" basis. The quality of service needed for the delivery of the most popular uses, such as email or surfing the Web, is not as dependent on guaranteed quality. However, as Internet use expands to include video, online gaming, and voice service, the need for uninterrupted streams of data becomes important. As the demand for such services continues to expand, network broadband operators are moving to prioritize network traffic to ensure the quality of these services. Prioritization may benefit consumers by ensuring faster delivery and quality of service and may be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of expanded service options. However, the move on the part of network operators to establish prioritized networks, while embraced by some, has led to a number of policy concerns. There is concern that the ability of network providers to prioritize traffic may give them too much power over the operation of and access to the Internet. If a multi-tiered Internet develops where content providers pay for different service levels, the potential to limit competition exists, if smaller, less financially secure content providers are unable to afford to pay for a higher level of access. Also, if network providers have control over who is given priority access, the ability to discriminate among who gets such access is also present. If such a scenario were to develop, the potential benefits to consumers of a prioritized network would be lessened by a decrease in consumer choice and/or increased costs, if the fees charged for premium access are passed on to the consumer. The potential for these abuses, however, is significantly decreased in a marketplace where multiple, competing broadband providers exist. If a network broadband provider blocks access to content or charges unreasonable fees, in a competitive market, content providers and consumers could obtain their access from other network providers. As consumers and content providers migrate to competitors, market share and profits of the offending network provider will decrease leading to corrective action or failure. However, this scenario assumes that every market will have a number of equally competitive broadband options from which to choose, and all competitors will have equal access to, if not identical, at least comparable content. Despite the FCC's ability to regulate broadband services under its Title I ancillary authority and the issuing of its broadband principles, some policymakers feel that more specific regulatory guidelines may be necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses; a consensus on what these should specifically entail, however, has yet to form. Others feel that existing laws and FCC policies regarding competitive behavior are sufficient to deal with potential anti-competitive behavior and that no action is needed and if enacted at this time, could result in harm. The issue of net neutrality, and whether legislation is needed to ensure access to broadband networks and services, has become a major focal point in the debate over telecommunications reform. Those opposed to the enactment of legislation to impose specific Internet network access or "net neutrality" mandates claim that such action goes against the long standing policy to keep the Internet as free as possible from regulation. The imposition of such requirements, they state, is not only unnecessary, but would have negative consequences for the deployment and advancement of broadband facilities. For example, further expansion of networks by existing providers and the entrance of new network providers, would be discouraged, they claim, as investors would be less willing to finance networks that may be operating under mandatory build-out and/or access requirements. Application innovation could also be discouraged, they contend, if, for example, network providers are restricted in the way they manage their networks or are limited in their ability to offer new service packages or formats. Such legislation is not needed, they claim, as major Internet access providers have stated publicly that they are committed to upholding the FCC's four policy principles. Opponents also state that advocates of regulation cannot point to any widespread behavior that justifies the need to establish such regulations and note that competition between telephone and cable system providers, as well as the growing presence of new technologies (e.g., satellite, wireless, and power lines) will serve to counteract any potential anti-discriminatory behavior. Furthermore, opponents claim, even if such a violation should occur, the FCC already has the needed authority to pursue violators. They note that the FCC has not requested further authority and has successfully used its existing authority, in the August 1, 2008, Comcast decision (see above) as well as in a March 3, 2005, action against Madison River Communications. In the latter case, the FCC intervened and resolved, through a consent decree, an alleged case of port blocking by Madison River Communications, a local exchange (telephone) company. The full force of antitrust law is also available, they claim, in cases of discriminatory behavior. Proponents of net neutrality legislation, however, feel that absent some regulation, Internet access providers will become gatekeepers and use their market power to the disadvantage of Internet users and competing content and application providers. They cite concerns that the Internet could develop into a two-tiered system favoring large, established businesses or those with ties to broadband network providers. While market forces should be a deterrent to such anti-competitive behavior, they point out that today's market for residential broadband delivery is largely dominated by only two providers, the telephone and cable television companies, and that, at a minimum, a strong third player is needed to ensure that the benefits of competition will prevail. The need to formulate a national policy to clarify expectations and ensure the "openness" of the Internet is important to protect the benefits and promote the further expansion of broadband, they claim. The adoption of a single, coherent, regulatory framework to prevent discrimination, supporters claim, would be a positive step for further development of the Internet, by providing the marketplace stability needed to encourage investment and foster the growth of new services and applications. Furthermore, relying on current laws and case-by-case anti-trust-like enforcement, they claim, is too cumbersome, slow, and expensive, particularly for small start-up enterprises. The 110 th Congress addressed the debate over net neutrality largely within the broader issue of telecommunications reform. Then House Telecommunications and the Internet Subcommittee Chairman Markey, a strong advocate of net neutrality legislation, introduced legislation ( H.R. 5353 ) to address this issue and held a May 6, 2008 hearing on the measure. House Judiciary Chairman Conyers introduced H.R. 5994 , a bill which establishes an antitrust approach to address anticompetitive and discriminatory practices by broadband providers as a follow-up to a March 11, 2008 hearing on net neutrality held by the House Judiciary Antitrust Task Force. A stand-alone net neutrality measure ( S. 215 ) was introduced and referred to the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee where an April 22, 2008 hearing on the "Future of the Internet" was held. No further activity was undertaken in the 110 th Congress. A consensus on this issue has not yet formed, and no stand-alone measures addressing net neutrality have been introduced in the 111 th Congress, to date. House Communications, Technology, and the Internet Subcommittee Chairman Boucher has stated that he continues to work with broadband providers and content providers to seek common ground on network management practices, and at this time, is pursuing this approach. However, the net neutrality issue has been narrowly addressed within the context of the economic stimulus package. H.R. 1 ( P.L. 111-5 ) contains provisions that require the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the FCC, to establish "... nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations" as a requirement for grant participants in the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). The law further directs that the FCC's four broadband policy principles, issued in August 2005, are the minimum obligations to be imposed. The NTIA has not, as of yet, issued these requirements.

As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major point of contention is the question of whether action is needed to ensure unfettered access to the Internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet, to ensure equal access and non-discriminatory treatment, is referred to as "net neutrality." There is no single accepted definition of "net neutrality." However, most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network; and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. Concern over whether it is necessary to take steps to ensure access to the Internet for content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, and if so, what these should be, is a major focus in the debate over telecommunications reform. Some policymakers contend that more specific regulatory guidelines may be necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses which could threaten the net neutrality concept. Others contend that existing laws and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policies are sufficient to deal with potential anti-competitive behavior and that such regulations would have negative effects on the expansion and future development of the Internet. A consensus on this issue has not yet formed, and the 111th Congress, to date, has not introduced stand-alone legislation to address this issue. However, the net neutrality issue has been narrowly addressed within the context of the economic stimulus package (P.L. 111-5). Provisions in that law require the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the FCC, to establish " ... nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations" as a requirement for grant participants in the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). This report will be updated as events warrant.

This report provides a side-by-side comparison of three bills and two proposals— H.R. 6566 , H.R. 6670 , H.R. 6709 , H.R. 6899 (the House Leadership Proposal), and the Senate Draft Proposal—which address oil and gas development in the outer continental shelf (OCS). None of the bills has passed its respective chamber. The text below provides background on the issues. The side-by-side table gives a description of selected sections of the bills. President Bush announced on June 18, 2008, that he would like to open areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for oil and gas development currently under presidential and congressional moratoria (discussed in more detail below). The President stated that he would lift the executive branch moratoria only after Congress did so legislatively. But, on July 14, 2008, President Bush reversed his position and lifted the executive ban on the OCS imposed in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush. Senator John McCain, among others, has called on Congress to lift the offshore drilling moratoria as well. Further, the Administration proposes to begin planning its next five-year leasing program that would, if approved, be implemented as early as 2010—two years ahead of schedule. The proposed new five-year program would supersede the current five-year leasing program from 2007-2012. The Administration argues that a new five-year lease program beginning in 2010 would allow any newly opened OCS areas (if the congressional moratoria is lifted this year) to be offered in a lease sale sooner than if they remained on their current schedule. Since the President lifted the executive ban, members of Congress have introduced legislation that would lift the congressional prohibition (in part or completely) against leasing and development of oil and natural gas in the OCS. The legislation section of this report summarizes several of those bills, including the House Leadership proposal ( H.R. 6899 ). Many in Congress, however, oppose lifting the offshore ban. They argue that there are still several million acres leased onshore and offshore but not yet producing and that production from these lands could increase U.S. oil supply. On September 16, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6899 by a vote of 236-189 and defeated an alternative bill, H.R. 6709 , by a vote of 191-226. How much oil could be brought into production in the short-term (from non-producing leased lands or those under the moratoria) and its impact on price is uncertain. An attempt to lift the offshore moratoria with an amendment to the FY2009 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill during the House subcommittee markup was defeated by a vote of 6-9. Meanwhile, on June 26, 2008, under suspension of the rules (which requires a two-thirds majority for passage), the House defeated a measure ( H.R. 6251 ) that would have increased rental fees on non-producing oil and gas leases, and denied new federal leases to those not diligently developing the leases they have. Oil and gas leasing has been prohibited on much of the outer continental shelf (OCS) since the 1980s. Congress has enacted OCS leasing moratoria for each of fiscal years 1982-2006 in the annual Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (now the Interior and Environment and Related Agencies Appropriations bill), allowing leasing only in the Gulf of Mexico (except near Florida) and parts of Alaska. President George H.W. Bush in 1990 issued a presidential directive ordering the Department of the Interior (DOI) not to conduct offshore leasing or preleasing activity in areas covered by the annual legislative moratoria until 2000. In 1998, President Clinton extended the offshore leasing prohibition until 2012. Proponents of the moratoria contend that offshore drilling would pose unacceptable environmental risks and threaten coastal tourism industries, whereas supporters of expanded offshore leasing counter that more domestic oil and gas production is vital for the nation's energy security. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA), as amended, provides for the leasing of OCS lands in a manner that protects the environment and returns revenues to the federal government in the form of bonus bids, rents, and royalties. OCSLA requires the Secretary of the Interior to submit five-year leasing programs that specify the time, location, and size of the areas to be offered. Each five-year leasing program entails a lengthy multistep process that includes environmental impact statements. After a public comment period, a final proposed plan is submitted to the President and Congress. The latest plan went into effect July 1, 2002. Public hearings for the 2007-2012 leasing program are underway. States and interest groups are filing comments on future lease sale areas for the 2007-2012 leasing program. States with energy development off their shores in federal waters have been seeking a larger portion of the federal revenues generated in those areas. They particularly want more assistance for coastal areas that may be most affected by onshore and near-shore activities that support offshore energy development. Proponents of these proposals look to the rates at which funds are given to jurisdictions where onshore energy development occurs on federal lands within those jurisdictions. Coastal destruction has received more attention in Louisiana—especially hard-hit by hurricanes in 2005—where many square miles of wetlands have been lost to the ocean each year. Widespread energy-related development is thought to contribute to coastal losses. Currently, the affected states receive some revenue directly from offshore oil and gas leases in federal waters under section 8(g) of OCSLA and under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006. P.L. 109-432 . This is in contrast to the 50% share of direct revenues to states that have onshore federal leases within their boundaries. Opponents point out the budget implications that would result from such a loss of federal revenues.

This report provides a side-by-side comparison of three bills and two proposals, each of which addresses oil and gas development in the outer continental shelf (OCS). None of the bills has passed its respective chamber. One of the proposals, H.R. 6899, the "Comprehensive American Energy Security and Taxpayer Protection Act," is expected to come to the House floor the week of September 15, 2008. The moratoria on oil and gas leasing in much of the OCS has become a major issue in Congress and also in the Presidential campaign. This report describes the background of OCS leasing and the various positions taken by proponents and opponents of leasing. It then compares the provisions of three bills that have been introduced with reported summaries of the House proposal and the Senate proposal, the "New Energy Reform Act of 2008." On September 16, 2008, the House passed H.R. 6899 by a vote of 236-189 and defeated an alternative bill, H.R. 6709, by a vote of 191-226.

T here are approximately 766 million acres of forestlands in the United States, most of which are privately owned (445 million acres, or 58%) by individuals, families, Native American tribes, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups (see Figure 1 ). The federal government has numerous programs to support forest management on those private forests and also public—state and local—forests. These programs support a variety of forest management and protection goals, including activities related to planning for and responding to wildfires, as well as supporting the development of new uses and markets for wood products. These programs are primarily administered by the Forest Service (FS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and often with the assistance of state partner agencies. This report describes current forestry assistance programs mostly funded and administered through the State and Private Forestry (SPF) branch of the FS. Following a brief background and overview, this report presents information on the purposes of the programs, types of activities funded, eligibility requirements, authorized program duration and funding level, and requested and enacted program appropriations. Figure 1. Forest Landownership in the Conterminous United StatesSource: CRS. Data from Jaketon H. Hewes, Brett J. Butler, and Greg C. Liknes, Forest Ownership in the Conterminous United States circa 2014 - geospatial data set, Forest Service Research Data Archive, 2017, https://doi.og/10.2737/RDS-2017-0007. Providing federal assistance for nonfederal forest landowners has been a component of USDA's programs for more than a century. Initial forestry assistance efforts began with the creation of the USDA Division of Forestry in 1881 (to complement forestry research, which began in 1876). Forestry assistance and research programs grew slowly, and in 1901 the division was upgraded to the USDA Bureau of Forestry. In 1905, the bureau merged with the Interior Department's Division of Forestry (which administered the forest reserves, later renamed national forests) and became the USDA Forest Service (FS). The FS has three primary mission areas: managing the National Forest System, conducting forestry research, and providing forestry assistance. The Senate and House Agriculture Committees have jurisdiction over forestry in general, forestry assistance, and forestry research programs. Congress authorized specific forestry assistance programs in the Clarke-McNary Act of 1924. This law guided those programs for more than half a century, until it was revised in the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978 (CFAA). The House and Senate Agriculture Committees often examine these programs in the periodic omnibus legislation to reauthorize agriculture and food policy programs, commonly known as farm bills. The 2008 farm bill established national funding priorities (conserve working forests, protect and restore forests, and enhance public benefits from private forests); enacted a standardized process for states to assess forest resource conditions and strategize about funding needs; and established, modified, and repealed specific assistance programs, among other provisions. The 2014 farm bill repealed several programs, mostly programs whose authorizations had expired or programs that had never received appropriations. The 2014 farm bill also reauthorized and modified the requirement for statewide assessments and the Office of International Forestry. Many of the agricultural programs—including two forestry programs—authorized by the 2014 farm bill are scheduled to expire at the end of FY2018 unless Congress provides for an extension or reauthorizes them. Most forestry assistance programs are administered by the FS, but the programs are typically implemented by state partners (e.g., state forestry or natural resource agencies). In these cases, the FS provides technical and financial aid to the states, which then provides information and assistance to private landowners or specified eligible entities. However, the 2008 farm bill expanded the definition of authorized conservation practices for agricultural conservation programs generally to include forestry practices, and thus direct federal financial assistance to private forest landowners may be feasible through the conservation programs. See Table 1 for a brief summary of the FS programs addressed in this report; more information on each program is available in the " Forest Service Assistance Programs " section of this report. To be eligible to receive funds for most of the programs, each state must prepare a State Forest Action Plan, consisting of a statewide assessment of forest resource conditions, including the conditions and trends of forest resources in the state; threats to forest lands and resources, consistent with national priorities; any areas or regions of the state that are a priority; and any multistate areas that are a regional priority; and a long-term statewide forest resource strategy , including strategies for addressing the threats to forest resources identified in the assessment; and a description of the resources necessary for the state forester to address the statewide strategy. The State Forest Action Plans are to be reviewed every 5 years and revised every 10 years. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 territories are covered by a State Forest Action Plan. Each state must also publish an annual funding report and have a State Forest Stewardship Coordination (FSC) Committee. Chaired by the state forester and composed of federal, state, and local representatives (including representatives from conservation, industry, recreation, and other organizations), the FSC Committee makes recommendations on statewide priorities on specific programs as well as on the development and maintenance of the State Forest Action Plan. The forestry programs may provide technical assistance, financial assistance, or both. Technical assistance includes providing guidance documents, skills training, data, or otherwise sharing information, expertise, and advice broadly or on specific projects. Technical assistance may also include the development and transfer of technological innovations. Financial assistance is typically delivered through formula or competitive grants (with or without contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (with varying levels of matching contributions from recipients). As an example, the Forest Health Protection program provides both types of assistance: financial assistance in the form of funding for FS to perform surveys and to control insects or diseases on state or private lands (with the consent and cooperation of the landowner) and technical assistance in the form of data, expertise, and guidance for addressing specific insect and disease infestations. Most—but not all—FS assistance programs are available nationally and have permanently authorized funding and without specified funding levels. No forestry assistance programs have mandatory spending; all require funding through the annual discretionary appropriations process, and are typically funded in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations acts. Most of the assistance programs are funded through the FS's State and Private Forestry (SPF) account, although some programs are funded or allocated from other accounts or programs. Some programs have been combined for funding purposes or for administrative reasons. Funding for forestry assistance programs has declined over the past 15 years, in both real and constant dollars (see Figure 2 ). The average annual appropriation over that time, from FY2004 through FY2018, was $362.7 million, with a peak of $420.5 million in FY2010 and a low of $328.9 million in FY2017. Funding increased in FY2018 to $355.1 million, but remains below the 15-year average. When adjusting for inflation, however, overall funding in FY2018 was 32% below FY2004 levels and 25% below FY2010 levels. In total, these forestry assistance programs made up 7% of the FS's total annual discretionary appropriation on average across those 15 years. The Administration requested $197.4 million in FY2019 and proposed to eliminate funding for seven of the programs and decreased funding for the others (see Table 2 for FY2014-FY2018 appropriations and the FY2019 budget request; more information on each program is available in the " Forest Service Assistance Programs " section of this report). Some FS programs have been repealed by previous farm bills, or have gone unfunded by Congress for several years. Table 3 lists these programs and the most recent congressional action. Some activities authorized by these unfunded or repealed programs may continue to be performed or provided by FS through other authorizations or funding sources. This report focuses on forestry assistance programs administered by FS. Other agencies, inside and outside of USDA, also administer programs that may have forest conservation or protection benefits. For example, the USDA Farm Services Agency (FSA) administers several programs, including the Emergency Forest Restoration program, which provides assistance to nonindustrial forest landowners to recover or restore forests following catastrophic events. The USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) administers the Healthy Forest Reserve program, which funds agreements, contracts, or easements to assist landowners with forest restoration or enhancement projects. The Department of the Interior administers a community assistance program to support collaborative community planning and projects to mitigate wildfire risk. The tabular presentation that follows provides basic information covering each of the FS forestry and fire assistance programs, including brief program description; program activities; eligibility requirements; the FS appropriations account budget line item that provides funding for the program; authorized funding levels and any funding restrictions; FY2018 funding level in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ); FY2019 funding level requested by the Administration; statutory authority, recent amendments, and U.S. Code reference; expiration date of program authority unless permanently authorized; and program's website link. Information for the following tables is drawn largely from agency budget documents and presentations, explanatory notes, and websites. Further information about these programs may be found on the FS SPF website at http://www.fs.fed.us/spf and on the "cooperative forestry" page.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has numerous programs to support the management of state and private forests. These programs are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees and are often examined in the periodic legislation to reauthorize agricultural programs, commonly known as farm bills. For example, the 2014 farm bill repealed, reauthorized, or modified many of these programs. The House version of the 2018 farm bill, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018 (H.R. 2), contains a forestry title (Title VIII) that would reauthorize, modify, and establish new forestry assistance programs. Forestry-specific assistance programs (in contrast to agriculture conservation programs that include forestry activities) are primarily administered by the USDA Forest Service (FS), with permanent authorization of funding as needed. Some programs have been combined through the appropriations process or for administration purposes. These programs generally provide technical and educational assistance such as information, advice, and aid on specific projects. Other programs provide financial assistance, usually through grants (with or without matching contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (typically through state agencies, with varying levels of contributions from recipients). Many programs provide both technical and financial assistance. Some of the assistance programs provide support for planning and implementing forestry and related land management practices (e.g., Forest Stewardship, Urban and Community Forestry). Other programs provide assistance for forest restoration projects that involve more than one jurisdiction and address regional or national priorities (e.g., Landscape Scale Restoration). Other programs provide support for protecting forestlands from wildfires, insects and diseases, and from converting forestland to nonforest uses (e.g., Community Forest and Open Space Conservation, Forest Legacy). The Forest Health program provides support for protecting both federal and nonfederal forests from continuing threats, although most of the funding goes to federal forests. Programs also exist to enhance state and rural wildfire management capabilities (e.g., State Fire Assistance and Volunteer Fire Assistance) and to promote the use of forest products (e.g., Wood Innovation). International Forestry is often included as a forestry assistance program, because it provides technical forestry help and because it is funded through the FS appropriations account for forestry assistance programs (State and Private Forestry). Most of the programs provide assistance to state partner agencies. The state agencies can use the aid on state forestlands or to assist local governments or private landowners. How the states use the resources is largely at the discretion of the states, within the authorization of each program and consistent with the national priorities for state assistance established by Congress in the 2008 farm bill. Overall funding for the Forest Service's forestry assistance programs in FY2018 was $355.1 million, an 8% increase over FY2017 funding of $328.9 million. The Trump Administration requested $197.4 million in funding for FY2019. Overall funding has declined over the past 15 years, however, in both real and constant dollars. Over that time, funding for forestry assistance programs has ranged between 5% and 9% of the total annual Forest Service discretionary appropriation.

In his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush announced a new $720 million research and development (R&D) initiative to promote hydrogen as a transportation fuel. The Hydrogen Fuel Initiative is intended to complement the FreedomCAR initiative, which focuses on cooperative vehicle research between the federal government, universities, and private industry. The FreedomCAR initiative replaced a related Clinton Administration initiative, the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), announced in 1993. While both initiatives aimed to increase fuel efficiency of the automotive fleet, FreedomCAR extended the time frame by another 10 to 15 years and focused research on hydrogen fuel cell vehicles; PNGV focused mainly on diesel-fueled hybrid vehicles. Through FY2003, the overall level of funding for PNGV- and FreedomCAR-related research at the Department of Energy (DOE) remained relatively constant, with some of the funds for hybrid vehicles transferred to fuel cell research. For FY2004, however, overall funding for research (within the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy) into hydrogen fuel, fuel cells, and vehicle technologies increased by about 30%. Some of this increase was offset by funding reductions in other programs, but the major portion of the increase was new funding. For FY2005 through FY2008, funding for hydrogen and fuel cell R&D steadily increased. However, for FY2009, the Bush Administration has requested 30% below the FY2008 appropriation for hydrogen, fuel cell, and vehicle technologies programs. Much of that decrease would be offset by an almost doubling of related basic science research. Overall, the request is roughly 4% below FY2008 levels for all related research. Most federal research on hydrogen fuel and fuel cell vehicles is overseen by two offices within the DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). The Office of FreedomCAR and Vehicle Technologies (FCVT) coordinates research on automotive fuel cells and other advanced vehicle technologies, including electric propulsion systems, vehicle systems, materials technology, and other areas. The Office of Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure Technologies (HFCIT) coordinates research on fuel cell technologies (for all applications, not solely transportation), as well as research on hydrogen fuel production, delivery and storage systems. As part of its FY2006 budget request for the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, DOE added ongoing research funded through three additional DOE offices, as well as a small amount of research funding at the Department of Transportation. The three DOE offices are the Office of Fossil Energy (FE), the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and the Office of Science (SC). Members of the partnerships include the federal government and the national laboratories, as well as universities, state governments, vehicle manufacturers, energy companies, equipment manufacturers, and industry groups. Funding for FreedomCAR and Hydrogen Fuel Initiative research (including hydrogen-related research fossil energy research, nuclear hydrogen research and basic scientific research) is included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill. Funding for these areas is shown in Table 1 . The mission of the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative is to "research, develop, and validate fuel cells and hydrogen production, delivery, and storage technologies for transportation and stationary applications." Fuel cell R&D areas include transportation systems, stationary systems, fuel processing, fuel cell components, and technology validation. The focus of hydrogen fuel R&D includes hydrogen production and delivery, fuel storage, hydrogen infrastructure, safety, codes and standards, and training and education. The FreedomCAR and the Hydrogen Fuel Initiatives have each set four goals for 2015, and share one additional goal between them. The shared goal is to produce hydrogen-fueled engine systems that achieve double to triple the efficiency of today's conventional engines at a cost competitive with conventional engines. FreedomCAR's individual goals mainly focus on reducing system costs for various technologies. The FreedomCAR goals are to develop electric drive systems with a 15-year life and significantly reduced hardware costs; advanced internal combustion engine systems with double to triple the efficiency of current systems at no greater cost and no higher emissions than conventional engine systems; electrical energy storage with improved life and lower cost than current systems; and materials and manufacturing technologies that achieve a 50% weight reduction in vehicle structure, while maintaining affordability and increasing the use of recyclable/recycled materials. The four goals for the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative focus on improvements in fuel cell technology and improvements in the storage and delivery of hydrogen fuel. The Initiative's goals are to develop hydrogen fuel cell power systems that are durable, and deliver higher efficiency at lower cost than today's systems; transportation fuel cell systems that deliver greater efficiency and lower cost, and meet or exceed emissions standards; hydrogen refueling systems that are highly efficient and deliver fuel at the market price of gasoline; and on-board hydrogen storage systems with improved energy density and cost over existing systems. The creation of FreedomCAR and the President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiatives have raised debate over several issues. These issues include the proper role of the government in R&D, as well as the proper level of funding, and concerns over energy efficiency and fuel consumption. Some environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, have criticized the initiatives. They argue that while funding has increased for efficient technologies, the initiatives do not require auto manufacturers to make fuel cell vehicles available to customers by any specific time. Also, groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council argued that the initiatives were put in place to forestall significant increases in national fuel economy standards. However, in 2007 Congress enacted more stringent fuel economy standards for passenger cars and light trucks as part of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 ). The Administration argues that the higher R&D funding will provide significant impetus for advancements in hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, and that without those advancements, the technology would be unaffordable for consumers. Further, some engineers argue that FreedomCAR's efficiency and cost goals may be difficult to attain in the time frame of the program, and that any sort of sales goal would be unrealistic. Moreover, industry groups argue that an explicit sales goal could force manufacturers to abandon R&D on other promising technologies like gasoline-electric hybrids. Even among supporters of the program, there is criticism that FreedomCAR and the President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiative are under-funded and that additional government commitments to hydrogen and fuel cells must be made. According to some proponents, these commitments could take the form of increased R&D funding, expanded demonstration programs, vehicle and fuel sales or production incentives, and other incentives to make these vehicles attractive to customers. Finally, some critics argue there are too many technical and economic hurdles to the development of affordable, practical hydrogen and fuel cell technology, especially for automobiles, and that federal research should focus on more realistic goals. In addition to DOE, other government agencies are also involved in fuel cell vehicle R&D, although this funding is considerably lower. For example, the National Automotive Center (NAC), part of the Army's Tank-Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC), coordinates fuel cell vehicle research between the Department of Defense (DOD) and private contractors, and partners with DOE, the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), academia, and industry. The appropriations processes over the next few years will directly affect the future of FreedomCAR and the President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiative. Between FY2004 and FY2008, the Administration's stated goal was a funding increase for both initiatives of $720 million above FY2003 levels for FY2004 through FY2008. In total, Congress appropriated an additional $450 million in total between FY2004 and FY2008 for hydrogen, fuel cell, and advanced vehicle programs. Congress appropriated an additional $145 million for other programs, mainly basic sciences, for a total increase of roughly $600 million over that five-year period. In addition to appropriations legislation, hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles are addressed by other recent legislation. On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). Among other provisions, P.L. 109-58 authorizes appropriations for hydrogen and fuel cell research at higher levels than requested by the President—$3.3 billion over five years. In addition to R&D funding, the bill provides tax incentives for the purchase of new fuel cell vehicles. FreedomCAR and the President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiative raise several key issues for Congressional consideration. Some of these issues are: Given rising federal deficits and the potential for increased defense costs, can the federal government afford the recent increase for hydrogen and fuel cell R&D? Should the federal government be picking hydrogen and fuel cell vehicle technologies over other technologies, such as hybrid vehicles and lean-burn engines? Would the designation of a target deadline for commercialization of fuel cell vehicles help focus the program and make better use of funding resources? Alternately, would such a deadline force manufacturers to abandon other promising technologies or create an unfair burden on the industry? Should the government focus on long-term research or should it focus on technologies closer to commercialization, or both? Is the widespread use of hydrogen and fuel cells technically and economically feasible, or is the government taking too large a risk on unproven technology?

FreedomCAR and the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative are two complementary government-industry research and development (R&D) policy initiatives that promote the development of hydrogen fuel and fuel cell vehicles. Coordinated by the Department of Energy (DOE), these initiatives aim to make mass-market fuel cell and hydrogen combustion vehicles available at an affordable cost within 10 to 15 years from the launch of the initiatives. However, questions have been raised about the design and goals of the initiatives. This report discusses the organization, funding, and goals of the FreedomCAR and Fuel partnerships, and issues for Congress.

The Florida Everglades is a unique network of subtropical wetlands that is now half its original size. The federal government has had a long history of involvement in the Everglades, beginning in the 1940s with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructing flood control projects that shunted water away from the Everglades. Many factors, including these flood control projects and agricultural and urban development, have contributed to the shrinking and altering of the wetlands ecosystem. Federal agencies began ecosystem restoration activities in the Everglades more than 15 years ago, but it was not until 2000 that the majority of restoration activities became coordinated under an integrated plan. With the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (WRDA 2000; P.L. 106-541 ), Congress approved the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) as a framework for Everglades restoration. The legislation authorized $700 million for the federal share of appropriations for initial projects. According to the process established in WRDA 2000, additional Everglades projects are to be presented to Congress for authorization as their planning is completed. Once authorized, the projects will be eligible to receive federal appropriations, but must also receive appropriations from the State of Florida in order to be completed. In WRDA 2007 ( P.L. 110-114 ), three additional projects were authorized. Indirectly related to combined federal and state work under CERP is a subset of Everglades restoration projects being undertaken by the state. These projects may contribute to Everglades restoration, but are not formally credited toward non-federal requirements under CERP. The River of Grass acquisition by the State of Florida is the most recent of these "non-CERP" projects by the state. It involves a proposed land acquisition agreement by the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) to purchase large tracts of land south of Lake Okeechobee from the U.S. Sugar Corporation. The goal of the purchase is to acquire lands that will improve water quality and help regulate outflows from Lake Okeechobee. Under the plan, SFWMD would remove U.S. Sugar land from cultivation for sugarcane and citrus farming, and use it to move, store, and treat water flowing south to the Everglades. This proposal is of interest to Congress because it could affect the state's ability to contribute funding under CERP and, as a result, has the potential to alter the schedule of work on some CERP projects. The River of Grass land acquisition dates to mid-2008, and has been revised on multiple occasions since then. In June 2008, Florida Governor Charlie Crist and the U.S. Sugar Corporation announced that the State of Florida would pursue purchasing all of the firm's agricultural lands and assets (including 187,000 acres of farmland and additional associated sugar and citrus processing facilities) at a cost of $1.75 billion. The acquired sugarcane and citrus farmland around Lake Okeechobee would be used to store and treat water flowing south toward the Everglades and eventually into Florida Bay. Based on subsequent real estate evaluations, a slightly scaled-back version of the original proposal (180,000 acres) was approved by the SFWMD Governing Board in December 2008, at an estimated cost of $1.34 billion. The land acquisition would be financed by the sale of bonds issued by SFWMD, which would be repaid from a portion of the property taxes collected by the 16 counties that comprise SFWMD. Under Florida law, these bonds are subject to judicial review to determine whether they serve a "valid public purpose." In May 2009, SFWMD announced an amended proposal that further scaled back the original proposal. (See Table A-1 .) Under the amended proposal, SFWMD would purchase 40% of the lands originally envisioned (i.e., 73,000 acres) for $536 million. Notably, U.S. Sugar would lease back some of the land sold to SFWMD for a minimum of seven years, with provisions that would allow this arrangement to be extended for up to 20 years. SFWMD would have the option to acquire the other 107,000 acres included in the initial plan at a fixed price per acre during the first three years, and at the appraised market value during the next seven years. As a result of a combination of factors, including ongoing financial difficulties, SFWMD announced in August 2010 a second amended purchase agreement. This purchase, which proposes to scale down the River of Grass acquisition yet again, was approved by the SFWMD Governing Board on August 12, 2010. Under the revised agreement, SFWMD will purchase 26,800 acres immediately at a cost of $197 million. (See Figure A-2 .) The acreage consists primarily of sugarcane and citrus acreage in Hendry and Palm Beach Counties, and the majority of it will be leased back to U.S. Sugar Corporation until restoration projects can be fully designed. The remainder of the land from the initial proposed purchases (153,200 acres) would be available for optional purchases over a 10-year period. In contrast to previous versions of the acquisition, this land would be bought directly with SFWMD funds, and will not be funded through bonds. Since late 2008, opponents have filed objections in state court to the bonds initially issued by SFWMD. These opponents claim that SFWMD did not have authority to finance the transaction because the acquisition is not a "valid public purpose." A major sugar producing firm, Florida Crystals, has argued that the purchase gives an unfair advantage to its main competitor at taxpayer expense. Additionally, the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, whose reservation lies south of U.S. Sugar lands, has argued that SFWMD is not financially able to meet the terms of the deal, which does not provide public benefits in the form of Everglades restoration. Supporters, including SFWMD and some environmental groups, argue that the land acquisition is in the public interest and will contribute significantly toward ecosystem restoration goals. On April 7, 2010, the Florida Supreme Court heard arguments from all sides on the opponents' appeal of an earlier court ruling that limits the amount of bonds the District could issue. The court's final decision could affect the latest version of the land acquisition, which will not be finalized until October 11, 2010. Several questions have been raised regarding previous versions of the proposed land acquisition by the State of Florida. Some questions center on the potential advantages and disadvantages of the land sale for restoring the Everglades, the effect of the land acquisition on Florida's role in implementing restoration projects under CERP, and the overall effect of the land acquisition on reducing excessive phosphorus in the ecosystem. Proponents of the land purchase point out several restoration benefits that they expect to result from the land acquisition. As currently proposed, the purchase would eventually take approximately 42 square miles of land in the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA) out of production. This land was chosen for its high value and ability to contribute to other restoration goals. For instance, the 17,900 acres proposed for purchase in Hendry County are noted by SFWMD to be in the C-139 basin, an area with historically high phosphorus loads. Once this land is taken out of production, lower phosphorus inputs into the ecosystem are expected. Lands taken over by SFWMD could also be used to enlarge stormwater treatment areas that mitigate phosphorus outflows coming from Lake Okeechobee. If storage structures are built on this land at some point in the future, they could allow for increased flexibility to manage water during floods and droughts, as well as for ecosystem restoration. There are several concerns associated with the proposed land acquisition. These concerns range from the location and continuity of the land parcels to the timing and benefits of the purchase itself. Most of the remaining 26,800 acres that currently are planned for purchase are in two tracts south of Lake Okeechobee, with approximately 86% of the original acreage proposed for purchase in 2008 remaining under cultivation for the foreseeable future. (See Figure A-2 .) The fragmentation of land parcels may make it difficult to achieve some of the broader restoration objectives, including the original objective to restore a flow-way south to Everglades National Park that replicates the historical flow of the "River of Grass." Additionally, some contend that the land proposed for purchase is infested with canker (typically a microbial disease that affects the woody tissue of plants), rendering it useless for restoration. Some also note that potential benefits of the land purchase in restoring the Everglades are tempered by potential delays in land transfers and the initiation of actual restoration projects. Some have pointed out that under the terms of the deal proposed with U.S. Sugar, the majority of the land proposed for immediate purchase under the River of Grass acquisition will actually stay in production. Any delay in removing this land from cultivation and beginning restoration projects will lower the overall restoration value of the land, as the current effects of farming would continue. For example, a 10-year schedule could delay freeing up land for restoration projects until 2020, after most other restoration activities are expected to be well underway. Concerns about delays in restoration and a desire for near-term progress are shared by many stakeholders. According to the National Research Council (NRC), delays in restoring the Everglades are affecting the state of the ecosystem and closing opportunities for restoration. The NRC emphasized that "unless near-term progress is made, the Everglades ecosystem may experience irreversible losses to its character and function." Some question the effect of the proposed land acquisition on the implementation of CERP. The proposed acquisition by the State of Florida is not being carried out under CERP, and according to SFWMD, the purchase will not be credited toward the 50:50 state/federal cost share mandated under CERP. While SFWMD has publicly argued for the overall benefits of the land transfer for Everglades restoration, it has not directly linked the land purchase to any existing CERP projects, and it is unclear if the purchase is intended to benefit any future CERP projects. Some contend that the current purchase (and any future purchase of option lands) could affect other Everglades restoration projects, including those federal projects that require a non-federal cost-sharing partner under CERP. In 2008, the state suspended construction on the A-1 reservoir, a CERP storage reservoir in the EAA. The decision to abandon the project along with the announcement of the original proposed River of Grass purchase caused some to conclude that the River of Grass land acquisition was replacing a CERP project, and the suspension of construction on the reservoir was at issue in a recent lawsuit before the U.S. District Court in Miami. In his March 2010 ruling in this case, Judge Federico Moreno ordered that the A-1 reservoir project be reinstated. This ruling may further constrain financing for other restoration projects. Some also note that the land purchase could indirectly affect other CERP projects by creating a funding shortfall for these projects. State funding for all restoration activities, including CERP, is expected to decline in the coming years. In light of this, some have questioned whether the proposed funding for the land acquisition deal might be better spent on CERP projects. For instance, some have noted that the L-8 reservoir (a CERP project) may be a potential item for reduction. Significantly, state funding decisions for these projects will not be finalized until the end of the current fiscal year in September 2010. It is unknown whether the state will be able to fund its cost-share requirements for all ongoing CERP projects in FY2011. Some are concerned about the effect of the proposed land acquisition on phosphorus loading into the Everglades ecosystem. As discussed earlier, the proposed land acquisition has the potential to reduce phosphorus entering the Everglades ecosystem if stormwater treatment areas are constructed and sugar and citrus farms are taken out of production. The treatment areas would capture nutrient-rich outflow and runoff from agricultural areas and Lake Okeechobee itself, thereby reducing loads into other parts of the ecosystem. The state notes that some of the areas proposed for acquisition are known for previously having high nutrient loads. However, it is unclear if the 26,800 acres currently planned for purchase are strategically located to maximize phosphorus reduction. The ability of land to reduce phosphorus depends on its proximity to flows out of Lake Okeechobee, as well as other factors. Additionally, if purchasing the land delays other restoration projects intended to reduce phosphorus, phosphorus loads might not meet previously set targets. For example, the A-1 reservoir, discussed above, is intended to capture releases of water from Lake Okeechobee and reduce phosphorus input into the Everglades ecosystem. Delaying or abandoning this project could affect phosphorus mitigation. The proposed land acquisition is an investment in restoration that may be realized over a longer time horizon than many restoration projects that are currently planned or under construction, including federally authorized CERP projects. The impact of the land acquisition on other Everglades restoration projects will depend on budgetary decisions made in late September 2010, which could potentially reduce or delay state funding for some CERP projects. Near-term delays resulting from any funding reductions for CERP projects could affect the Everglades ecosystem, including those efforts pertaining to phosphorus mitigation and planned water storage capacity. Congress may have to decide whether currently planned CERP activities should be reconsidered in light of these circumstances.

The Florida Everglades is a unique network of subtropical wetlands that is now half its original size. The federal government has had a long history of involvement in the Everglades, beginning in the 1940s with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructing flood control projects that shunted water away from the Everglades. Many factors, including these flood control projects and agricultural and urban development, have contributed to the shrinking and altering of the wetlands ecosystem. Federal agencies began ecosystem restoration activities in the Everglades more than 15 years ago, but it was not until 2000 that Congress integrated the majority of restoration activities under an integrated plan, known as the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP). The River of Grass acquisition is a proposed land acquisition by the State of Florida, which has the potential to affect the implementation of CERP. The proposal is to purchase tracts of land south of Lake Okeechobee from the U.S. Sugar Corporation. The state argues that the purchase would reduce phosphorus loads and help restore the historic north-south flow of water from Lake Okeechobee to the Everglades. Initially, acquisition of 187,000 acres was announced by Florida Governor Charlie Crist and subsequently approved by the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) in December 2008. Since then, the original proposal has been downsized on multiple occasions, both in terms of the size of the purchase and the purchase price. Most recently, a revised land purchase agreement was announced and approved by the SFWMD in August 2010. SFWMD now proposes a direct cash purchase of 26,800 acres, or approximately 14% of the original purchase proposed by the governor in 2008. The purchase would cost SFWMD $197 million. Questions have been raised regarding the proposed acquisition. Some of these questions center on potential positive and negative consequences of the land purchase agreement. These include the effectiveness of the land acquisition in reducing nutrient loads that are detrimental to the Everglades and in restoring historic flows, as well as the effect of the initiative's funding requirements on Florida's other restoration projects, including projects with a non-federal cost share requirement under CERP. Since state funding for CERP activities is expected to decline in the coming years, some have questioned whether the proposed funding for the land acquisition deal might be better spent on CERP projects. The impact of the land acquisition on CERP and other Everglades restoration projects will depend in part on budgetary decisions to be made by the state in late September 2010, which could potentially reduce or delay state funding for some CERP projects. Near-term delays resulting from any funding reductions for CERP projects may be of interest to Congress, as they would affect the overall federal effort to restore the Everglades ecosystem under CERP.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions regarding the nature of the people's right to "keep and bear arms," as guaranteed in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, has focused some interest in the extent to which firearms are protected from the reach of creditors under either federal or state laws. State laws that protect certain property from creditors' claims generally are designed to apply in non-bankruptcy contexts, but may also be used in bankruptcy. Federal law also protects certain property from creditors' claims in bankruptcy. Additionally, a debtor in bankruptcy may be able to avoid liens against exempt property if a lien impairs the exemption and is either a judicial lien or a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest. Legislation introduced in the 112 th Congress, similar to legislation passed by the House in the 111 th Congress, would have allowed a specific federal exemption for firearms and would include firearms in the definition of household goods whose exemptions could be protected from impairment by liens. A number of states provide their own exemptions for firearms. The provisions of these states are provided in Table 1 . Section 522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code addresses the extent to which an individual debtor may elect to exempt equity in certain property from becoming part of the bankruptcy estate. Property exempted from the bankruptcy estate is not available to satisfy creditors. Among the exemptions explicitly provided in the Bankruptcy Code—the federal exemptions—are a homestead exemption in the amount of $21,625, a vehicle exemption in the amount of $3,450, and exemptions for jewelry, tools of the trade, and household goods. There is also a "wildcard" exemption of $1,150 that can also be applied to any property so long as the federal exemptions are available to the debtor. To the extent allowed under state law, the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to choose between using the federal exemptions or those available under applicable state law. This is an "either/or" choice—debtors are not allowed to choose to use some state exemptions and some federal exemptions. When a petition is filed jointly by husband and wife or when the individual cases of a husband and wife are ordered to be jointly administered, each spouse must choose the same set of exemptions. However, debtors in many states have no choice to make because their state law prohibits the use of the federal exemptions. These federal exemptions are available to debtors only to the extent they are not prohibited by the applicable state. Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and 17 states allow debtors to choose between federal and state exemptions. In 2012, Virginia became the thirteenth state to provide some protection from creditors for debtors' firearms. The conditions for exempting firearms vary among the relevant states. Some states specify the number of firearms that may be exempted without regard to the value of the firearms. Other states limit the exemption to one firearm and further limit the claimed exemption by either the value of the firearm or the aggregate value of the statutorily exempt property in which the firearm is included. Oregon allows an exemption for one pistol as well as one rifle or shotgun, but limits the total exemption value of the two firearms to no more than $1,000. Several states put no limit on the number of firearms that may be exempted so long as the total value of the firearms, when aggregated with the value of certain other property is less than a specific amount. In these states, there is generally a limit to the value of each firearm. One state, Oklahoma, allows an unlimited number of firearms to be exempted so long as the total value of the firearms, alone, is no more than $2,000. In most of the states, the exemption is not controlled by the way in which the firearm is used. Several states, however, exempt only guns that are for personal use. Three of these specify that the firearms are to be "held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of [the debtor]." Oregon law specifies that the firearms must be "for the own use and defense of the citizen." Only one state, Louisiana, requires that the exempted firearm be used for business purposes. Both Montana and Nevada exempt "all arms ... required by law to be kept by any person" in addition to the one gun, selected by the debtor, that each allows. H.R. 1181 , the Protecting Gun Owners in Bankruptcy Act of 2011, was introduced on March 17, 2011, in the 112 th Congress. The bill paralleled an earlier bill passed by the House in the 111 th Congress, but not voted on by the Senate. The bill would have provided a firearms exemption that could be used in bankruptcy by a debtor who opted to use federal rather than state exemptions and was allowed to do so by the relevant state's law. The bill would have amended Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to add an exemption for the debtor's aggregate interest─up to a total value of $3,000—"in a single rifle, shotgun, or pistol or any combination thereof." The addition of this exemption would not have reduced the amount allowed for any other type of exemption under Section 522. Additionally, the bill would have amended Section 522(f)(4)(A) to include firearms in the definition of "household goods." As with the exemption for firearms, this provision would have applied to any number or combination of rifles, shotguns, and pistols so long as the aggregate value was no more than $3,000. Inclusion of firearms in the definition of household goods would not have increased the exemption available for firearms, but it would have allowed debtors to avoid liens that are nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests on those firearms, under Section 522(f)(1)(B), as they are currently able to avoid such liens on other household goods. The bill would not have changed the maximum value of household goods whose liens could be avoided in bankruptcy. The last major action on the bill was referral to the Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law for the House Judiciary Action. Currently, there has been no legislation introduced in the 113 th Congress that would provide a federal exemption under the Bankruptcy Code for firearms.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions regarding the nature of the people's right to "keep and bear arms," as guaranteed in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, has focused some interest on the extent to which firearms are protected from the reach of creditors under either federal or state laws. State laws protecting certain property from creditors' claims may be used both in and outside of the bankruptcy context. Federal law may also protect certain property from creditors' claims in bankruptcy. Although a number of states have provisions explicitly shielding firearms from the claims of creditors, there is currently no such provision in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (title 11). In the 111th Congress, legislation was passed in the House (H.R. 5827) that would have provided an explicit federal exemption in bankruptcy for a debtor's aggregate interest, up to $3,000, "in a single rifle, shotgun, or pistol, or any combination thereof." The bill also included the means for protecting firearms by including them─subject to the same value and type restrictions─in the definition of "household goods" for which nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest liens could be avoided in bankruptcy. Similar legislation was introduced in the 112th Congress: the Protecting Gun Owners in Bankruptcy Act of 2011 (H.R. 1181). The Bankruptcy Code generally provides two options for claiming exemptions in bankruptcy─either the exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. Section 522(d) or the exemptions available under state law. However, debtors may only choose to use the federal exemptions in Section 522(d) if their state specifically authorizes them to do so. Because the proposed federal exemption for firearms would be included in Section 522(d), debtors whose states do not authorize them to use the Section 522(d) exemptions would not benefit from the proposed change in exemptions. They might, however, benefit from the inclusion of firearms in the definition of household goods, because they could then have the option of freeing those firearms from liens that were based on a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest. There is great variety in the extent of the protection from creditors the states provide for firearms. The majority of states provide no explicit protection. Among the 13 states that provide protection, the conditions for providing that protection vary. Some states limit the exemption by both the number and value of the firearms; some do not limit the number but may limit either the value of each firearm or the aggregate value of all. Other states specify the type of firearms that can be exempted. In most states that allow an exemption for firearms, the exemption is not dependent upon the way in which the firearm is used. Several states, however, exempt only guns that are for personal use, and one state requires that the firearm be used for business purposes.