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With modern technology's ability to gather and retain data, financial services businesses have increasingly found ways to take advantage of their large reservoirs of customer information. Not only can they enhance customer service by tailoring services and communications to customer preferences, but they can benefit from sharing that information with affiliated companies and others willing to pay for customer lists or targeted marketing compilations. Although some consumers are pleased with the wider access to information about available services that information sharing among financial services providers offers, others have raised privacy concerns, particularly with respect to secondary usage. The United States has no general law of financial privacy. The U.S. Constitution, itself, has been held to provide no protection against governmental access to financial information turned over to third parties. United States v. Miller , 425 U.S. 435 (1976). This means that although the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires a search warrant for a law enforcement agent to obtain a person's own copies of financial records, it does not protect the same records when they are held by financial institutions. State constitutions and laws may provide greater protection. At the federal level, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. Sections 3401-3422, provides a measure of privacy protection by setting procedures for federal government access to customer financial records held by financial institutions. There is no general federal regime covering how non-public personal information held in the private sector may be disclosed or must be secured. The major law which deals with this subject with respect to financial companies is Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA; P.L. 106-102 ), which is discussed in a separate section of this report. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. Sections 1681 to 1681x, predates GLBA. It establishes standards for collection and permissible purposes for dissemination of data by consumer reporting agencies. It also gives consumers access to their files and the right to correct information therein. Another law, which predates GLBA, is the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1693a to 1693r, which describes the rights and liabilities of consumers using electronic funds transfer systems. These rights include the ability of consumers to have financial institutions identify the circumstances under which information concerning their accounts will be disclosed to third parties. With the passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments of 1996, P.L. 104-208 , Div. A, Tit. II, Subtitle d, Ch. 1, Section 2419, 110 Stat. 3009-452, adding 15 U.S.C. Section 1681t(b)(2), companies may share with other entities certain customer information respecting transactions and experience with a customer without any notification requirements. Other customer information, such as credit report or application information, may be shared with other companies in the corporate family if the customers are given "clear and conspicuous" notice about the sharing and an opportunity to direct that the information not be shared; that is, an "opt out." Under Section 214 of P.L. 108-159 , 117 Stat. 1952, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACT Act), subject to certain exceptions, affiliated companies may not share customer information for marketing solicitations unless the consumer is provided clear and conspicuous notification that the information may be exchanged for such purposes and an opportunity and a simple method to opt out. Among the exceptions are solicitations based on preexisting business relationships; based on current employer's employee benefit plan; in response to a consumer's request or authorization; and as required by state unfair discrimination in insurance laws. The 2003 amendments also require the agencies to conduct regular joint studies of information sharing practices of affiliated companies and make reports to Congress every three years. Title V of GLBA ( P.L. 106-102 ) contains the privacy provisions enacted in conjunction with 1999 financial modernization legislation. These privacy provisions preempt state law except to the extent that the state law provides greater protection to consumers. The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Title X of P.L. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), makes the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is located within the Federal Reserve System, the major rulemaking and enforcement authority for federal consumer protection laws, including the GLBA privacy provisions. As originally enacted, GLBA allocated rulemaking and enforcement authority to an array of federal and state financial regulators. GLBA requires that federal regulators issue rules that call for financial institutions to establish standards to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records. It prohibits financial institutions from disclosing nonpublic personal information to unaffiliated third parties without providing customers the opportunity to decline to have such information disclosed. Also included are prohibitions on disclosing customer account numbers to unaffiliated third parties for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing through electronic mail. Under this legislation, financial institutions are required to disclose, initially when a customer relationship is established and annually, thereafter, their privacy policies, including their policies with respect to sharing information with affiliates and non-affiliated third parties. Under Section 503(c) of GLBA, as added by Section 728 of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, P.L. 109-351 , the federal functional regulators were required to propose model forms for GLBA privacy notices. On March 29, 2007, the agencies issued a notice proposing a model form. They subsequently published final amendments to their regulations incorporating a model privacy form which financial institutions may use to disclose their privacy policies. Initially, regulations implementing GLBA's privacy requirements were the product of joint rulemaking and were found in various sections of the Code of Federal Regulations . They became effective on November 13, 2000. Identity theft and pretext calling guidelines were issued to banks on April 6, 2001. Insurance industry compliance has been handled on a state-by-state basis by the appropriate state authority. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) approved a model law respecting disclosure of consumer financial and health information intended to guide state legislative efforts in the area. The establishment of the CFPB as authorized by Dodd-Frank has meant the transfer from the other federal agencies of much of the rulemaking authority for GLBA's privacy provisions. The CFPB promulgated an interim final rule. One of the indications of the public's interest in preserving the confidentiality of personal information conveyed to financial service providers was the negative reaction to what became an aborted attempt by the federal banking regulators to promulgate "Know Your Customer" rules. These rules would have imposed precisely detailed requirements on banks and other financial institutions to establish profiles of expected financial activity and monitor their customers' transactions against these profiles. Even before the "Know Your Customer" Rules and enactment of GLBA, depository institutions and their regulators had been increasingly promoting industry self-regulation to instill consumer confidence and forestall comprehensive privacy regulation by state and federal governments. One of the federal banking regulators, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, for example, issued an advisory letter regarding information sharing. To some participants in the financial services industry, preemptive federal legislation is preferable to having to meet differing privacy standards in every state. With respect to information sharing among affiliated companies, FCRA, as amended by the FACT Act, does not entirely preempt state law; its preemption runs only to the extent of affiliate sharing of consumer report information. GLBA also leaves room for more protective state laws. Another incentive for a nationwide standard has been the requirements imposed upon companies doing business in Europe under the European Commission on Data Protection (EU Data Directive), an official act of the European Parliament and Council, dated October 24, 1995 (95/46/EC). This imposes strict privacy guidelines respecting the sharing of customer information and barring transfers, even within the same corporate family, outside of Europe, unless the transfer is to a country having privacy laws affording similar protection as does Europe. Revision of European Union data protection law may be on the near horizon. In January 2012, the European Commission released a draft legislative proposal for consideration by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. It is aimed at updating the legal protection the European Union affords to personal data in view of challenges accompanying advances in technology and arising in the increasing pervasiveness of online environments. U.S. companies operating in Europe are likely to be monitoring the progress of any changes to the European data protection regime. The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (Institute) is already on record as having "deep concerns" about one aspect of the Commission's Draft Regulation, its authorization of third parties to bring litigation to seek remedies and damages to protect the rights of others. To the Institute, this is analogous to what it deems to be the faults of class action lawsuits in the United States, encouraging plaintiff's attorneys to initiate and promote costly and abusive litigation that does not serve the ends of justice. On July 21, 2011, the CFPB began operations, assuming, among other things, authority to issue regulations and take enforcement actions under enumerated federal consumer protection laws, including both FCRA and GLBA. The CFPB has primary enforcement authority over non-depository institutions (subject to certain exceptions) and over depository institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. Although depository institutions with assets of $10 billion or less are now subject to the CFPB's rules, enforcement remains with the "prudential regulators," subject to certain prerogatives of the CFPB. Given the CFPB's predominant role in implementing the GLBA privacy regime and increasing attention to the problem of Internet data security, Congress is likely to scrutinize how the CFPB implements such programs by (1) identifying any problems arising in the transfer of regulatory power from the financial institution prudential regulators and the FTC to the CFPB; (2) monitoring the CFPB's rulemaking efforts to determine whether any newly issued rules unreasonably increase the regulatory burden on struggling institutions; (3) evaluating any effect on financial institutions operating nationwide stemming from application of non-preempted state laws; and (4) examining issues that may arise in connection with the increasing use by banks of social media both to communicate with customers and for marketing purposes. Recently, the CFPB announced that it was proposing to amend Regulation P, Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, to permit financial institutions to satisfy GLBA's annual privacy notice requirement in situations in which customers would not need the notice to avail themselves of an opt-out right. Under the proposal, financial institutions could satisfy the requirement for an annual notice without a separate mailing. They would be required to post the notice separately and continuously on a website page and to include it, at least once a year, in other communications with customers. Moreover, the proposal would require covered businesses choosing not to send annual privacy notices to use a model privacy disclosure form and to provide a dedicated telephone number for customers to call to request mailed copies of the privacy policy. The 113 th Congress has two bills that would eliminate GLBA's requirement for an annual privacy notice under certain circumstances. H.R. 749 would eliminate the annual notice requirements for financial institutions if their privacy policies have not changed from their last disclosure notice and they share nonpublic personal information only pursuant to certain permissible exceptions to GLBA's prohibitions. S. 635 would eliminate the annual notice requirements for financial institutions if their privacy policies have not changed from their last disclosure notice and they share nonpublic personal information only pursuant to certain permissible exceptions to GLBA's prohibitions and otherwise provide customers access to their most recent disclosure in electronic or other form. Other bills, H.R. 3990 , S. 1193 , S. 1897 , and S. 1995 , would require commercial concerns to secure personal information and to provide notification of data breaches. Exemptions are provided for financial institutions covered by the GLBA privacy provisions.

One of the functions transferred to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) under P.L. 111-203, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), is authority to issue regulations and take enforcement actions under the two major federal statutes that specify conditions under which customer financial information may be shared by financial institutions: Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA, P.L. 106-102) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Possible topics for congressional oversight in the 113th Congress include (1) the transition of power from the financial institution prudential regulators and the Federal Trade Commission to the CFPB; (2) CFPB's interaction with other federal regulators and coordination with state enforcement efforts; and (3) the CFPB's success at issuing rules that adequately protect consumers without unreasonably increasing the regulatory burden on financial institutions. GLBA prohibits financial institutions from sharing nonpublic personally identifiable customer information with non-affiliated third parties without providing customers an opportunity to opt out and mandates various privacy policy notices. It requires financial institutions to safeguard the security and confidentiality of customer information. FCRA regulates the credit reporting industry by prescribing standards that address information collected by businesses that provide data used to determine eligibility of consumers for credit, insurance, or employment and limits purposes for which such information may be disseminated. One of its provisions, which became permanent with the enactment of P.L. 108-159, permits affiliated companies to share non-public personal information with one another provided the customer does not choose to opt out. The creation of CFPB alters the regulatory landscape for these laws. It has primary enforcement authority over non-depository institutions (subject to certain exceptions) and over depository institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. For depository institutions with assets of $10 billion or less, the CFPB's rules apply but enforcement authority remains with the banking regulators, subject to certain prerogatives of the CFPB. In the first session of the 113th Congress, the House passed H.R. 749, which would eliminate the GLBA requirement for an annual privacy notice if the financial institution has not changed its policies and practice with respect to sharing nonpublic personal information since its last disclosure. A similar bill, S. 635, would require that any financial institution eliminating its annual privacy notice must provide electronic access to its privacy policies. Several bills that require data breach notifications, H.R. 3990, S. 1193, S. 1897, and S. 1995, provide exemptions for financial institutions covered by the GLBA privacy provisions. For further information, see CRS Report R41338, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title X, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31666, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Rights and Responsibilities, by [author name scrubbed].

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of private-sector employee benefit plans. One of the primary goals in enacting ERISA was to "protect ... the interests of participants and ... beneficiaries" of employee benefit plans, and assure that participants receive promised benefits from their employers. To this end, ERISA "provid[es] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." An integral part of ERISA's enforcement scheme is ERISA Section 502(a), which allows private parties as well as government entities to bring various civil actions to enforce provisions of ERISA. In general, ERISA regulates two types of pension plans, defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. A defined benefit plan is a plan under which an employee is promised a specified future benefit, traditionally an annuity beginning at retirement. In a defined benefit plan, the employer bears the investment risk and is responsible for any shortfalls. By contrast, a defined contribution plan provides each participant with an individual account that accrues benefits based on amounts contributed to the account by both the employer and the employee. The employee bears the investment risk, and thus the value of the account at the time of retirement is unknown. ERISA subjects both defined benefit and defined contribution plans to a number of requirements, including requirements for fiduciary responsibility. Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA authorizes the Secretary of Labor, a participant, a beneficiary, or a plan fiduciary to bring a civil action caused by a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 409 of ERISA. That section makes a plan fiduciary personally liable for breaches against an ERISA plan, and a breaching fiduciary must make good to the plan "any losses to the plan resulting from a breach" and restore to the plan any profits made from using the assets of the plan in improper ways. It also subjects such a fiduciary to other relief as a court may deem appropriate, including removal of the fiduciary. One controversial issue with respect to breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA is that while an individual plaintiff ( e.g. , a plan participant) may bring a civil action under Section 502(a)(2), the Supreme Court has found that any recovery must "inure[] to the benefit of a plan as a whole." In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell , the Supreme Court ruled that a plan beneficiary could not bring a civil action for monetary damages against a plan fiduciary who had been responsible for the improper processing of a benefit claim. The plaintiff in Russell , who was disabled with a back ailment, alleged that she was injured when her employer's disability committee terminated her disability benefits. The Court rejected the beneficiary's claim, explaining ERISA Section 409 did not authorize a beneficiary to bring a claim against a fiduciary for monetary damages. Based on the text of Section 409 and the legislative history of ERISA, the Court opined that relief for an individual beneficiary was not available under Section 409 based on the idea that a plaintiff could only recover losses on behalf of the entire plan. In LaRue , the plaintiff, a participant in a 401(k) plan administered by his former employer, requested that plan administrators change an investment in his individual account. The plan administrators failed to make this change, and the individual's account allegedly suffered losses of approximately $150,000. LaRue brought an action against his former employer and the 401(k) plan, claiming the plan administrator breached his fiduciary duty by neglecting to properly follow the investment instructions. LaRue brought a claim in district court under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), which permits a participant to bring a civil action to enjoin any act or practice which violates ERISA or the terms of the plan, or obtain "appropriate equitable relief" for these violations. The participant argued that because the defendants failed to invest the money as he directed, his account was depleted and he was entitled to receive "make-whole" or "other equitable relief" under Section 502(a)(3). The district court dismissed the participant's claims, holding that because the defendant did not possess any of the funds belonging to the participant, the relief the participant sought was monetary damages, and this remedy was not available to the plaintiff as "equitable relief" under Section 502(a)(3). LaRue appealed the decision, arguing to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that he should be able to recoup losses under both 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(2) of ERISA. The court affirmed the district court's decision with regard to Section 502(a)(3), finding that the make-whole relief the participant sought could not be characterized as "equitable" relief. With regard to Section 502(a)(2), the court found that because the argument regarding Section 502(a)(2) was raised for the first time on appeal, the argument was waived. However, the court did discuss the merits of the Section 502(a)(2) claim. Relying on the Russell case, the Fourth Circuit held that LaRue's claim failed because Section 502(a)(2) provides remedies only for an entire plan, not for an individual's account. The court focused on the idea that the loss was personal to the defendant and was suffered by him alone. While the court acknowledged that the participant's plan account was indeed part of the "entire plan," the court found no basis to interpret the statute in this manner, and claimed that such an interpretation could undermine Congress's intent to limit the scope of relief under ERISA. Given that the plaintiff sought to recover losses only for himself, the participant could not sue under Section 502(a)(2). The Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's decision with respect to Section 502(a)(2), finding that "although §502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant's individual account." The Department of Labor, writing an amicus brief in LaRue , had argued for this result. In explaining the holding, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, distinguished LaRue from the Russell case in two ways. First, the Court explained that the type of fiduciary misconduct occurring in LaRue violated "principal statutory duties" imposed by ERISA that "relate to the proper plan management, administration, and investment of fund assets." Conversely, in Russell , the fiduciary's breach ( i.e. , a delay in processing a benefit claim) fell outside of these principal duties. Second, the Court found that in Russell, the emphasis placed on protecting the "entire plan" from fiduciary breach under Section 409 applies to defined benefit plans, which were the norm at the time of the case. However, as the Supreme Court noted in LaRue , defined contribution plans are more popular today, and the "entire plan" language in Russell does not apply to these plans. The Court explained that for defined benefit plans, fiduciary misconduct would not affect an individual entitlement to a benefit unless the misconduct detrimentally affected the entire plan. By contrast, "for defined contribution plans ... fiduciary misconduct need not threaten the solvency of the entire plan to reduce benefits below the amount that participants would otherwise receive." The Court went on to note that "whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the kinds of harms that concerned the draftsmen of §409." Although all of the justices agreed on the outcome of the LaRue case, they disagreed as to the reasoning behind it. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that it is "at least arguable" that a claim such as the one made in LaRue should be evaluated not as a breach of fiduciary duty claim, but as a claim for benefits brought under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. Justice Roberts pointed to the fact that allowing a Section 502(a)(1)(B) action to be brought as a claim under Section 502(a)(2) could allow plaintiffs to circumvent certain protections that exist for plan administrators under Section 502(a)(1)(B). For example, as Justice Roberts pointed out, most courts recognize that before a plaintiff can bring a claim for benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B), that a plaintiff has to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the plan before filing suit. The extra protections for a plan and its administrators, Justice Roberts explains, encourage employers and others to offer benefits to employees. Justice Thomas, writing a separate concurrence joined by Justice Scalia, found the majority's reliance on "trends in the pension market" and the "concerns of ERISA's drafters" to be misplaced. Justice Thomas concluded that the participant had a legitimate claim based on the "unambiguous text" of Sections 409 and 502(a)(2). Justice Thomas articulated that losses to the participant's individual 401(k) account were losses to the plan, because assets in the participant's account were plan assets. A defined contribution plan, the Justice points out, is not a "collection of unrelated accounts." These plans are "essentially the sum of [their] parts" and that losses to an individual account must be losses to the plan under ERISA. As has been pointed out, the LaRue case affirmed that individuals participating in defined contribution plans may bring a claim in the event that a plan fiduciary's inappropriate actions create losses to an individual's account. While some commentators praised the LaRue decision for offering protection to individuals in 401(k) plans, others have suggested that the case will likely lead to an increase in litigation of claims by 401(k) participants who have suffered individual account losses. One question arising from the LaRue decision is the implications of Justice Roberts's concurrence. Courts may be faced with the issue of whether the availability of relief under Section 502(a)(1)(B) affects a participant's ability to bring a claim under Section 502(a)(2). Another question is whether, under Section 502(a)(2), a participant is required to exhaust administrative remedies provided by a plan before filing suit. This question was raised in a footnote in the majority opinion, but was not answered by the Court.

In LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates , a participant in a 401(k) plan requested that plan administrators change an investment in his individual account. The plan administrators failed to make this change, and the individual's account allegedly suffered losses. The participant brought an action against his former employer and the 401(k) plan, claiming the plan administrator breached his fiduciary duty by neglecting to properly follow the investment instructions. At issue in the LaRue case was whether an individual could bring an action under ERISA to recover the losses. The Supreme Court held that a plan participant in a 401(k) plan could sue a plan fiduciary under Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA to recover losses caused by a fiduciary breach that only affected his individual account. This report discusses breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA Section 502(a)(2) and the LaRue case, and will be updated as events warrant.

The Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency charged with improving the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives. IHS provides health care for approximately 2.2 million eligible American Indians/Alaska Natives through a system of programs and facilities located on or near Indian reservations, and through contractors in certain urban areas. IHS provides services to members of 573 federally recognized tribes. It provides services either directly or through facilities and programs operated by Indian tribes or tribal organizations through self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts authorized in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). The Snyder Act of 1921 provides general statutory authority for IHS. In addition, specific IHS programs are authorized by two acts: the Indian Sanitation Facilities Act of 1959 and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA). The Indian Sanitation Facilities Act authorizes the IHS to construct sanitation facilities for Indian communities and homes. IHCIA authorizes programs such as urban health, health professions recruitment, and substance abuse and mental health treatment, and permits IHS to receive reimbursements from Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and third-party insurers. Finally, the Public Health Service Act provides funds for the Special Diabetes Program for Indians grants administered by IHS. The IHS has three major sources of funding, described here in order of magnitude: (1) discretionary appropriations, (2) collections, and (3) mandatory appropriations. Unlike most agencies within HHS, which receive their appropriations through the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations act, the IHS receives its discretionary appropriations through the Interior/Environment appropriations act. IHS's discretionary appropriations are divided into three accounts: (1) Indian Health Services, (2) Contract Support Costs, and (3) Indian Health Facilities. As a second source of funding, IHS collects and expends funds received as payment for health services provided. IHS has the authority to receive payments from other federal programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, CHIP, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. IHS also receives payments from state programs (such as workers compensation) and from private insurance. IHS, under its IHCIA collection authority, is able to retain these payments to increase services available to its beneficiaries. In addition to these collections, IHS collects rent from facilities it owns. The third and smallest source of IHS funding is a mandatory appropriation of $150 million annually to support the Special Diabetes Program for Indians. This mandatory funding was extended through FY2019 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123 ). The President's budget request proposes to shift the FY2019 appropriation to discretionary funding. Table 1 presents IHS's funding from FY2014 through the proposed President's FY2019 budget submission. The table generally shows increases in both appropriated funds and funds collected by IHS through FY2018. The table presents IHS's three budget accounts—Indian Health Services, Contract Support Costs, and Indian Health Facilities—and the funds collected and allocated to programs under these accounts. Collections and proposed and actual mandatory funding are subtracted from program-level funding to show the agency's discretionary budget authority. Although appropriations for IHS have increased over time, the FY2018 appropriation represents a larger increase than in prior years. In particular, the FY2018 appropriation included increases for a number of programs funded under the Indian Health Facilities account, which includes maintenance and improvement and construction of new facilities. In addition, the FY2018 appropriation increased funding for mental health and alcohol and substance abuse services, provided new funding for the Indian Health Care Improvement Fund, and included language to require IHS to conduct an analysis of IHS locations and services relative to the IHS user population. The FY2019 President's request represents a decrease from FY2018 levels for a number of IHS programs and activities. However, final FY2018 appropriations had not been enacted during the period in which the FY2019 President's request was being formulated. While the total request for IHS represents a decrease from FY2018-enacted levels, it represents an increase from FY2017-enacted levels and the FY2018 annualized continuing resolution levels that were in place at the time the FY2018 request levels were being determined. IHS facilities collect payments from third-party payors for services provided to IHS beneficiaries who are also enrolled in other programs. These collections are an important source of IHS's clinical services (see Table 1 ). Medicaid is the largest source of IHS's collections—accounting for approximately 68% of all third-party collections in FY2017, the most recent year of final data available—followed by Medicare (21% in FY2017) and private insurance (9% in FY2017). Beginning in FY2014, IHS began receiving payments from the VA for services provided to IHS beneficiaries who were also enrolled in the VA (these payments were 2% of all of IHS's third-party collections in FY2017).

The Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency charged with improving the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives. IHS provides health care for approximately 2.2 million eligible American Indians/Alaska Natives through a system of programs and facilities located on or near Indian reservations, and through contractors in certain urban areas. IHS provides services to members of 573 federally recognized tribes. It provides services either directly or through facilities and programs operated by Indian tribes or tribal organizations through self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts authorized in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). The IHS has three major sources of funding: (1) discretionary appropriations, (2) collections, and (3) mandatory appropriations. Unlike most agencies within HHS, which receive their appropriations through the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations act, IHS receives its discretionary appropriations through the Interior/Environment appropriations act. IHS's discretionary appropriations are divided into three accounts: (1) Indian Health Services, (2) Contract Support Costs, and (3) Indian Health Facilities. IHS collects payments for the health services it provides. IHS, unlike other federal agencies, has the authority to receive payments from other federal programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and the Department of Veterans Affairs for the health services it provides to IHS beneficiaries who are also enrolled in those programs. IHS also receives payments from state programs (such as workers' compensation) and from private insurance. In addition to these payments, IHS collects rent from facilities it owns. Since FY1998, IHS has received a mandatory appropriation each fiscal year to support the Special Diabetes Program for Indians. This funding source was most recently extended in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which provided mandatory appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019. The President's budget requests that these funds be moved to discretionary appropriations in FY2019. This fact sheet focuses on the funding that IHS has received between FY2014 and FY2019 (proposed).

Over the years, research has consistently shown that children with health insurance coverage have better access to health care services and a regular health care provider, which in turn results in better health outcomes. According to the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS, often called the March Supplement), in 2010, 90.0% of children had health insurance and 10.0% were uninsured. Similarly, in 2009, 10.2% of children were uninsured. While overall 10.0% of children are uninsured, the uninsured rate among children varies in different segments of the population. For example, older children are more likely to be uninsured compared with younger children, and Hispanic children have twice the uninsured rate compared with non-Hispanic children. State factors, such as eligibility levels for public programs (e.g., Medicaid) and a state's health insurance market, also affect the health insurance status of children. The CPS data show that the uninsured rate among children across the states ranges from 17.3% in Texas to 3.2% in Massachusetts. Children who have health insurance have either private insurance, public coverage, or both. Private insurance includes employer-sponsored insurance and nongroup insurance (insurance purchased in the individual market); public coverage includes Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and any other means-tested public programs, as well as Medicare and military health care (e.g., TRICARE and Veterans Administration [VA] Health Care). Children may have more than one source of coverage, and those coverage types could be different. For example, a child could have employer-sponsored insurance, a type of private insurance, and Medicaid, a type of public coverage. In 2010, 59.9% of children had private insurance and 37.2% had public coverage. Sources of health insurance coverage vary according to a child's demographic and family characteristics. For example, in 2010, children living in families with incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level (FPL) were more likely to have public coverage and less likely to have private insurance compared with children living in families with higher incomes. This report presents estimates of health insurance coverage of children under age 19 in the United States. Table 1 and Table 2 show children's health insurance coverage by selected demographic and family characteristics at the national level. Table 3 shows state-level estimates of private insurance, public coverage, and the uninsured rate, and Figure 1 is a map showing uninsured rates across states. Figure 2 examines the population of uninsured children at the national level. Figure 3 examines national trends in children's health insurance status from 2000 to 2010. The estimates in this report are based on data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and is representative of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the United States. The CPS is used primarily to collect employment data, but it also collects information on health insurance status, income, and poverty. Approximately 100,000 addresses constitute the sample households to be interviewed. The CPS sample is designed to represent the nation, states, and other specified geographies (e.g., regions). All estimates in this report at the national level are created using the most recent annual CPS data (representing data from 2010), as well as historical annual data from previous years. All estimates in this report at the state level are created using three-year averages of the three most recent years of CPS data (representing data from 2010, 2009, and 2008). The U.S. Census Bureau recommends using three-year averages of CPS data to examine state-level estimates because of the survey's small sample sizes in many states. Insurance status differs according to children's demographic characteristics (age, race, ethnicity, and citizenship status). A child's likelihood of being uninsured varies by these demographic characteristics. For example, older children are more likely to be uninsured compared with younger children. As shown in Table 1 , while 11.8% of children aged 13 to 18 years were without insurance, 9.1% of children under six years old lacked any source of health insurance. Further, insurance status varies among children of different races, with children who report their race as only black being the most likely to be uninsured, and children who report two or more races the least likely to be uninsured. Hispanics are twice as likely to be uninsured compared with non-Hispanic children, and non-citizen children are almost four times more likely to be uninsured compared with citizen children. For those children who have insurance, the source of coverage also varies by demographic characteristics, as discussed below. As age increases, children are more likely to have private insurance and less likely to have public coverage. Slightly over half (54.3%) of children under age six had private insurance, and 43.8% had public coverage. In comparison, nearly two-thirds of children aged 13 to 18 had private insurance and under one-third (30.2%) had public coverage. The higher rate of private coverage among older children does not off-set the lower rate of public coverage; children aged 13 to 18 are more likely to be uninsured compared with children under age six and children aged 6 to 12. Examining differences in race show that children who report their race as black alone are less likely to have private insurance, and more likely to have public coverage. Children who report their race as white alone or "other alone" (Asian alone, Native American alone, Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander alone, or some other race alone) have similar rates of coverage. In both categories, nearly two-thirds of children have private insurance, and about one-third have public coverage. Among children who report two or more races, over half (55.7%) have private insurance and 46.3% have public coverage. The only available ethnicity breakdown in the CPS is Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and the question is asked independently of race (i.e., a child who is Hispanic could report any race). Looking at ethnicity, two-thirds of non-Hispanic children have private insurance compared with 37.9% of Hispanic children; however, only one-third of non-Hispanic children have public coverage, whereas 50.9% of Hispanic children have public coverage. Similar percentages of non-citizen children have private insurance (35.5%), public coverage (33.4%), and are uninsured (34.9%). In contrast, 60.6% of citizen children have private insurance, and 37.3% have public coverage. Compared with citizen children, non-citizen children are almost four times more likely to be uninsured . Whether or not children have insurance is also affected by family characteristics. Table 2 shows health insurance coverage of children by family characteristics at the national level in 2010. Generally, as family income increases, the percentage of uninsured children decreases—the uninsured rate for children in families with income below 100% FPL is over four times the rate for children in families with income equal to or greater than 400% FPL. Looking at family composition, children who live in families with two parents have the lowest uninsured rate (8.1%), followed by children who live with a single mother (10.9%) and children who live with a single father (16.0%). A quarter of children who do not live with a parent are uninsured. Family characteristics can also affect the source of coverage among children with health insurance, as discussed below. For example, whether a child qualifies for a program such as Medicaid is in part dependent on family income. As family income increases, the rate of private insurance increases, the rate of public coverage decreases, and the uninsured rate decreases. For example, 16.3% of children in families with income below 100% FPL had private insurance, compared with 92.1% of children in families with income equal to or greater than 400% FPL. The rates of public coverage ranged from 72.7% among children in families with income below 100% FPL to 10.4% among children in families with income equal to or greater than 400% FPL. Among children who live with two parents, 71.1% have private insurance, compared with 47.1% of those who live with a single father and 38.4% of those who live with a single mother. A smaller percentage of children who live with two parents have public coverage compared with children who live either with a single father or a single mother. Overall, children who live with at least one parent are more likely to have private insurance and less likely to have public coverage compared with children who are not living with a parent. Nationwide, health insurance coverage of children is related to children's demographic characteristics and family characteristics. Regional and state variation in coverage of children is likely also affected by these characteristics. Geographic variation may be also affected by a state's health insurance market and by state policies, such as eligibility criteria for a state's Medicaid program or its CHIP. Figure 1 shows a map of the uninsured by state, and Table 3 show state-level estimates of health insurance coverage of children. The estimates presented are an average of three years of CPS data, representing data collected in 2008-2010. The U.S. Census Bureau recommends using a three-year average when using the CPS to compare coverage across states because of the survey's small sample size in some states. Figure 1 shows how the uninsured rates compare across states. The four states with the highest uninsured rates, 15.0% or higher, are Texas, Nevada, Florida, and Arizona. The four states with the lowest uninsured rates, less than 5.0%, are Massachusetts, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Generally, states with the lowest uninsured rates for children are located in the Midwest and Northeast; states with the highest uninsured rates are located in the South and West. Table 3 provides estimates of private insurance, public coverage, and the uninsured for children, with percentage rankings by state. The five states with the highest percentage of children covered by private insurance were New Hampshire (80.1%), Utah (76.8%), Connecticut (74.8%), North Dakota (74.3%), and Wisconsin (74.0%). The five states with the highest percentage of children covered by public coverage were the District of Columbia (50.6%), Mississippi (47.7%), Arkansas (47.4%), New Mexico (44.8%), and Vermont (43.9%). As noted in the preceding discussion, health insurance coverage of children is likely influenced by children's demographic and family characteristics as well as state-specific factors (e.g., eligibility criteria for programs such as Medicaid). Figure 2 shows the characteristics of children who are uninsured and characteristics of all children at the national level in 2010. Figure 2 illustrates that some characteristics of uninsured children are different from the characteristics of the total population of children ("all children"). Compared with all children, children who lack health insurance are more likely to be Hispanic, non-citizens, live in families with low income, and not live with a parent. Hispanic children represent 23.1% of all children, but they represent nearly 40% of uninsured children. Non-citizen children represent 2.7% of all children, and 9.7% of uninsured children. Children living in families with income below 100% FPL represent 21.9% of all children, and 35.2% of uninsured children. In contrast, children living in families with income equal to or greater than 400% FPL represent 27.3% of all children and 9.7% of uninsured children. Children not living with at least one parent represent 4.3% of all children and 10.9% of uninsured children. Examining children's health insurance coverage over time is one way to assess how economic conditions and program changes (i.e., changes to CHIP eligibility) affect children's coverage. Figure 3 shows national-level estimates of children who were uninsured and who had private insurance and public coverage between 2000 and 2010. The percentage of children who were uninsured fluctuated slightly during the period, between 2000 and 2010, decreasing 1.1 percentage points, from 11.1% to 10.0%. The slight fluctuations of the percentage of children who were uninsured were likely affected by the larger changes in the percentage of children who had private health insurance and those who had public coverage over the time period. In 2000, 71.2% of children had private health insurance, but by 2010, the percentage dropped to 59.9%, a nearly 16% decline in private health insurance coverage for children. Over that same period, the percentage of children with public coverage increased from 23.7% in 2000 to 37.2% in 2010, a 57% increase in public coverage for children. Periods of economic recessions, as denoted by the gray bars in Figure 3 , may provide additional insight into changes in children's health insurance coverage during those periods.

In 2010, 90% of children had health insurance coverage in the United States, and 10% of children were uninsured. Among children with coverage, private health insurance, including employer-sponsored insurance and nongroup insurance, was the predominant source of coverage, followed by public coverage, including Medicaid and other means-tested public programs (e.g., the State Children's Health Insurance Program—CHIP), as well as Medicare and military health care. These estimates, and the estimates detailed in this report, are from the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS, commonly known as the March Supplement). The CPS is representative of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the United States. National-level estimates in this report are created using the most recent CPS data, representing data from 2010, as well as historical data from previous years. State-level estimates are created using a three-year average of CPS data (representing data from 2008 to 2010), which provide reliable state estimates. The national-level estimates provide only a limited understanding of the health insurance coverage of children under age 19. To better understand this population, the report provides an analysis of the variation in coverage by selected demographic and family characteristics, including age, race, ethnicity, citizenship status, poverty status, and family composition. For example, in 2010, non-citizen children, Hispanic children, and children not living with at least one parent/guardian were more likely to be uninsured compared with other children. Another important factor affecting uninsurance rates among children is the variation across states. During the 2008-2010 period, the percentage of uninsured children ranged from a high of 17.3% in Texas to a low of 3.2% in Massachusetts. Not only does coverage vary by states, but the source of insurance coverage also varies by states. The percentage of children covered by private health insurance ranged from 80.1% in New Hampshire to 46.9% in Mississippi, and the percentage of children covered by public coverage ranged from 50.6% in the District of Columbia to 18.3% in Utah. Finally, examining changes in coverage and source of coverage over time provides additional insight into insurance and sources of coverage for children. Between 2000 and 2010, the uninsured rate among children decreased by about 1 percentage point, while the percentage of children with private insurance decreased by more than 11 percentage points and the percentage with public coverage increased by 13.5 percentage points. As Congress focuses on allocating limited resources to programs such as Medicaid and CHIP, a deeper understanding of the characteristics of uninsured children may prove useful to inform this discussion.

The nation has had a long history of guest worker programs targeted at the agricultural industry, which have enabled farmers to temporarily import foreign workers to perform seasonal jobs without adding permanent residents to the U.S. population. Unsuccessful attempts were made during the past few Congresses to amend the H-2A program, the only means currently available to employers who want to legally utilize aliens in temporary farm jobs. Recent interest among some Members of Congress in a broad-based guest worker program has renewed efforts to enact legislation that relates specifically to the agricultural sector. The elements of the debate concerning an agricultural guest worker program have changed very little over the years. Its principal points are twofold: whether there is an adequate supply of workers in the United States to fulfill the widely fluctuating labor requirements of some farmers; and whether the temporary admission of aliens to perform seasonal farm jobs adversely affects the labor market prospects of domestic workers. Growers of perishable, labor-intensive crops (e.g., fruit, vegetable, and horticultural specialty products) whose demand for directly hired and contract workers typically peaks during the harvest season argue that they need access to foreign labor because insufficient U.S. workers are available at that time. They assert that importing workers to perform seasonal farm tasks does not harm U.S. workers because the two groups do not compete. In other words, they contend that domestic workers are largely unwilling to perform the farm work in question—even if higher wages were offered them. Domestic workers, it is claimed, have more attractive alternatives to seasonal farm employment (e.g., nonfarm jobs arguably are less strenuous and dirty as well as more stable and prestigious). Without access to foreign labor, grower advocates maintain that crops could not be harvested; consumer prices would rise due to the reduced supply of U.S.-grown produce; and the nation would become more dependent on low-wage foreign competitors for a portion of its food supply. Farm worker advocates contend that if growers raised wages and improved working conditions, more domestic workers would be willing to accept seasonal farm employment. They assert that the employment and wage prospects of domestic workers are depressed by additions to the U.S. labor supply through guest worker programs. It is argued that these programs also harm similarly employed U.S. workers by weakening incentives to develop and adopt innovations that improve their working conditions and labor-saving technologies that increase their productivity (and hence, the wages of a smaller workforce). Opponents of temporary alien worker programs further declare that growers prefer foreign over domestic workers because the former are not covered by the same laws as domestic workers (e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Unemployment Insurance, and Social Security); are less demanding due to lower wages and poorer working conditions in their home countries; and are easier to control because they cannot easily work for another U.S. employer if the grower terminates them. The remainder of this report focuses on the impact an agricultural guest worker program might have on U.S. workers. The adequacy of the domestic supply of farm workers is addressed in another CRS Report. Fundamentally, the debate over the effect on U.S. workers of temporarily admitting foreign workers centers on whether an increase in the supply of labor reduces the wages and employment of domestic workers. Economic theory can help clarify this debate. Before the entrance of foreign workers to the U.S. labor market, the amount of labor that domestic workers are willing to supply to employers is represented by the curve labeled S1 in Figure 1 . It is upward sloping because workers are willing to supply more labor services in response to higher wages. Employers' demand for labor is represented by the curve labeled D, which slopes downward because employers are willing to employ more workers at lower wages. Equilibrium in this labor market occurs at point A, where those willing to work for wage W 1 equals employer willingness to hire at that wage. In the absence of foreign labor, then, U.S. farm employment is equal to E 1 and U.S. farm workers' wage rate is equal to W 1 . The addition of foreign workers expands the total quantity of labor at any given wage rate. This is represented by the rightward shift of the supply curve to S2, with the additional labor represented by the difference between S1 and S2. This increase in the labor force will only find employment if the wage falls, for only at a lower wage will employers be willing to hire more workers. Thus, equilibrium after the importation of labor occurs at point B, where the wage rate of domestic and alien farm workers drops to W 2 and employment of domestic and alien farm workers expands to E 2 . In summary, the theory of supply and demand predicts that the wage rate for all workers falls from W 1 to W 2 after the entrance of foreign workers to the U.S. labor market. As a result of the drop in wages, total employment expands from E 1 to E 2; domestic employment contracts from E 1 to E 3 ; and alien worker employment is equal to E 2 minus E 3 . Because the lower wage (W 2 ) makes farm work less rewarding, some domestic workers likely will look for jobs outside the agricultural sector. Employment of domestic farm workers accordingly will decline (from E 1 to E 3 ). While the total employment of foreign workers (E 2 minus E 3 ) expands, a portion is at the expense of the farm jobs formerly held by domestic workers (E 1 minus E 3 ). This is called the displacement effect . The size of the displacement effect depends on the shape of the labor demand and domestic labor supply curves. Along with lower domestic employment in agriculture, the presence of foreign farm workers reduces the amount of wages that accrues to domestic farm workers. Because the addition of foreign workers also expands output, agricultural prices are expected to fall and thereby benefit U.S. consumers including domestic farm workers. Authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act at Section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(A) as modified by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. 99-603 ), the H-2A program was begun in 1952. It allows an unlimited number of foreign workers to temporarily enter the United States to fill seasonal farm jobs at employers who demonstrate the existence of labor shortages by undertaking recruitment efforts prescribed by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). Principally East Coast growers of perishable labor-intensive crops, who largely did not utilize the Bracero program, were the original applicants for H-2A workers. The H-2A program "was able to escape the heavy criticism levelled against the Bracero program primarily by keeping a low profile." In other words, there were a great many more braceros than H-2A workers when both the Bracero program (1942-1964) and H-2A program (1952-present) were in effect. (The Bracero program is discussed below.) Despite increases in H-2A worker certifications issued by the U.S. Department of Labor in recent years, the number of H-2A workers remains quite small compared to the nearly 1 million hired farm and agricultural service workers employed in 2008. Thus, even if the labor certification process has not operated as intended—to protect similarly employed U.S. workers—the H-2A program's low utilization suggests that its overall impact on the domestic farm labor force has been minimal. However, the reliance on the H-2A program of tobacco, fruit (e.g., apple, peach, and tomato), vegetable (e.g., onion and squash), and grain growers in some states (e.g., North Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, Idaho, California, and Texas) might have had a more substantial effect on domestic farm workers in certain local labor markets. Some proposals to modify the H-2A program either by legislation or regulation might make it easier for growers to temporarily employ foreign workers. Farmers, as a consequence, would likely import more H-2A workers than they had previously. Given authorized aliens' potentially greater share of the hired and contract farm labor force as a result of changes to guest worker policy, it appears that the effects of the Bracero program on domestic farm workers are more relevant than the (unquantified) effects of the H-2A program. At its peak in 1956, the Bracero program allowed some 445,000 Mexican workers to take temporary jobs in the U.S. agricultural industry. The few studies that tried to empirically estimate the labor market impact of the Bracero program are examined below. Morgan and Gardner examined a seven-state area, in which more than 90% of braceros had been employed, to estimate the impact of the program on the wage and employment levels of hired farm labor. Its effect was found to be consistent with economic theory: the Bracero program increased total farm employment, reduced employment of domestic farm workers, and lowered the farm wage rate. Morgan and Gardner concluded that the wage loss to all nonbracero farm workers was 6% to 7% of total wages paid to farm workers in the bracero-using states between 1953 and 1964, or some $139 million per year (in 1977 dollars). U.S. farmers were found to have gained from the program by being able to hire about 120,000 more workers at 15-20 cents less per hour than they would have in the program's absence. Such a large employment response (about 26%) to a much smaller decrease in wages (less than 9%) is consistent with the informal observation that braceros were a substitute for mechanization, notably in High Plains cotton, and that the end of the program substantially accelerated the mechanization of Texas cotton. This is also the period in which the tomato harvester came into widespread use in California. Wise examined the experience in California for two heavily bracero-dependent crops to determine whether U.S. workers would accept farm jobs if wages were raised. He estimated that a small increase in wages would bring about a larger increase in the supply of domestic farm workers: in winter melon production, a 1% increase in wages was associated with a 2.7% increase in the domestic supply of labor; in strawberry production, a 1% increase in wages was related to a 3.4% increase in the domestic labor supply. Similarly, Mason found that a small increase in wages paid by the formerly bracero-dominated pickle industry in Michigan induced a larger increase in U.S. workers willing to pick the crop. At least for the mid-to-late 1960s, then, these findings appear to refute the notion that increased agricultural wages would not have prompted many more domestic workers to accept farm employment . Wise additionally found that termination of the Bracero program led to a decrease in total employment, an increase in U.S. farm worker employment, and an increase in wages on strawberry and melon farms in California. More precisely, he estimated that without bracero labor from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, domestic farm worker employment in California would have been between 51% (in strawberry production) and 261% (in melon production) higher, and wages would have been between 12% (in strawberry production) and 67% (in melon production) higher. While Mason estimated that shortly after the Bracero program's demise farm wages rose significantly in Michigan, he was unable to determine how much the absence of bracero labor or other variables contributed to the increase. In contrast, Jones and Rice found that the trend in farm wages did not change significantly in four southwestern states between the 1954-1964 bracero period and the 1965-1977 post-bracero period. Although the latter study would imply that the Bracero program's end did not have an impact on farm wages, the lack of a discernible wage effect might be explained by the replacement of braceros with unauthorized aliens—which effectively would have left the supply of labor little changed . In summary, the limited empirical research on the impact of the Bracero program on U.S. workers suggests that while the program successfully expanded the supply of temporary farm labor, it did so at the expense of domestic farm workers as measured by their reduced wages and employment. Although the magnitudes of these adverse effects might differ today depending on the extent to which U.S. farm labor and product markets have changed over time, their direction likely would be the same.

Guest worker programs are meant to assure employers (e.g., fruit, vegetable, and horticultural specialty growers) of an adequate supply of labor when and where it is needed while not adding permanent residents to the U.S. population. They include mechanisms such as the H-2A program's labor certification process to avoid adversely affecting the wages and working conditions of comparable U.S. workers. If changes to the H-2A program or creation of a new agricultural guest worker program led growers to employ many more aliens, the effects of the Bracero program might be instructive: although the 1942-1964 Bracero program succeeded in expanding the farm labor supply, studies estimate that it also harmed domestic farm workers through reduced wages and employment. The magnitudes of these adverse effects might differ today depending upon how much the U.S. farm labor and product markets have changed over time, but their direction likely would be the same.

The growth of China and India as large consumers of energy, coupled with an inability to develop reliable and affordable alternatives to oil and natural gas, has led to the belief that the power to ensure access to international energy resources has shifted from energy consumers to energy producers. Since 2005 Russia has several times drastically raised the price of its natural gas supplies to European countries as a means to squeeze them economically and politically. These actions also underscored the shift towards the ability of energy producers to exert pressure on countries dependent upon them for supplies. The United States and its European allies are discussing the appropriate institutions and policies for ensuring energy security. The Bush Administration introduced a discussion of energy security at NATO in February 2006, with the support of key allies. At the same time, EU governments view energy security in a broad manner, and most believe that political and economic measures are the first steps to ensure access to energy resources. Most EU members are also members of NATO, and the two organizations may handle energy security in a complementary manner. Most European countries are heavily reliant upon imported energy. Today, EU countries as a whole import 50% of their energy needs, a figure expected to rise to 70% by 2030. Russia is a key supplier of oil and natural gas. Germany imports 32% of its energy from Russia. Poland imports two-thirds of its natural gas needs from Russia, and 97% of its oil. As a whole, EU countries import 25% of their energy needs from Russia. In one estimate, by 2030 EU countries will import 40% of their gas needs from Russia, and 45% of their oil from the Middle East. In addition, oil in particular is found largely in unstable areas of the world such as the Middle East, a factor in U.S. and European concerns over energy security. European governments view energy security primarily in an economic and political context. The EU floated a proposal meant to build interdependence between EU members and Russia to secure reliable energy supplies from Russia. The EU has discussed with Russia a structured arrangement in which Russia would sell energy not only to its principal customers in central and eastern Europe, but to more distant customers in western Europe. In return, the EU is asking Moscow to allow European companies to develop Russian energy reserves. But Russia has rejected key elements of this proposal. Moscow for the most part has not allowed foreign ownership of its pipelines, and has squeezed out some foreign companies that were developing its energy reserves. At the same time, it has secured access to some European markets, for example, through agreements to sell gas to Hungary and France. Russia has taken steps to build its leverage in European energy markets. In December 2007, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to build a new gas pipeline around the Caspian Sea. The new pipeline would send Central Asian natural gas to the Russian energy grid; Russia has repriced such gas, from another pipeline, twofold before selling it to European customers. The United States and some EU governments have sought instead a trans-Caspian Sea pipeline that would bypass the Russian grid, and provide natural gas more cheaply to Europe, thereby diminishing as well greater potential Russian leverage tied to the supply of energy. Russia has also discussed linking its natural gas supply grid to that of Algeria, which also supplies gas to Europe. EU energy commissioner Andris Piebalgs has charged that the two governments may be planning to develop an energy cartel that would further weaken competitive pricing. To prevent impediments to competition and to improve energy security, the EU Commission is urging new infrastructure, including terminals to receive liquified natural gas; construction of new pipelines from the Caspian region and North Africa; and single European energy grids for continental electricity and natural gas markets to challenge the grip of national energy firms on their national markets. The Commission has also recommended that companies producing raw energy not be allowed to own distribution networks, a step intended to encourage competition. Some EU governments, such as France, have large public entities that own both the sources of energy and the distribution network, and oppose this proposal. Should the EU eventually adopt the Commission's proposal, Russian efforts to buy parts of the European energy grid might be set back. Few observers believe that Moscow's pricing agreements for its gas exports to its neighbors indicate that the market process is working successfully. Some EU officials contend that Russia needs European (and other) firms' good will and continued investment in its decaying energy infrastructure to maintain existing production and develop its oil and gas reserves to sell energy products abroad. Some European and U.S. officials believe that Germany may become too reliant on Russian energy supplies and move away from its EU partners and the United States. East European states in particular, once in Moscow's sphere, believe that they could find themselves unable to ensure reliable and affordable energy supplies from Gazprom, the powerful state-controlled Russian energy company. They point to the former Schroeder government's deal with Gazprom to involve German companies in the development of a Russian-German gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea as a special arrangement that appears to promise a supply to Germany that other states might not enjoy. Some governments believe that Russia has little interest in market forces in the energy sector. In this view, Russia seeks high energy prices to maximize profits. These governments note that the Russian government has a prevailing control over Gazprom, hardly a model of capitalist entrepreneurship, and that Gazprom was behaving like a monopoly in ratcheting up the price of natural gas to its neighbors. Knowing that Ukraine, for example, had no reliable alternatives for gas supply, Gazprom raised prices threefold and threatened a sixfold rise. Gazprom also controls the transit of non-Russian energy supplies to Ukraine, and threatened rapid rises in transit fees as well. Russia has temporarily followed similar policies towards Georgia, Lithuania, and Belarus. Political motives seem apparent in such policies. In 2003, Putin himself said that Gazprom is a "powerful political and economic lever of influence over the rest of the world." In December 2007, Putin designated Dimitri Medvedev, the president of Gazprom, as his successor as Russian president, a move that could signal continuation of Russia's aggressive energy policy. Some U.S. officials believe that NATO could play a role in building international political solidarity in the event of a deliberate disruption of energy flows. NATO's military capability could be severely limited should Russia or other suppliers cut European energy supplies in a crisis. To counter such a move, NATO might coordinate policies among member states and with non-member partner governments to share resources and to bring an end to an energy disruption. NATO might also provide security for infrastructure in energy-producing states facing unrest. Iran has threatened to use its energy reserves to attain political objectives. In response to possible sanctions due to its refusal to comply with requirements by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its nuclear program, Iran has threatened to cut off or limit its energy supplies to buyers. Beyond deliberate policies affecting energy security, there are many countries in Central Asia and the Middle East that are unstable, have a need for new energy infrastructure investment, and have insecure transportation systems due to political unrest. Some of these countries are in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, or desire a closer association with NATO. NATO member states increasingly believe that the alliance must be a global player with global partners. This trend is evident in Afghanistan, for example, where Australia and New Zealand are expending resources to bring stability through NATO's International Security Assistance Force, even though the two countries are not NATO members. NATO's role in energy security could be complementary to the EU's effort to strengthen market forces and interdependence in the international energy sector. U.S. officials agree with their EU counterparts that market forces can lead to greater energy security. Diversification of supply, for example, through building more pipelines that are secure, is one course of action. Turkey could play a major role, as key pipelines under discussion originating in the Caspian region may cross its territory, thereby avoiding the Russian energy grid. Joint investment efforts to build such pipelines in and with energy producers such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan could be an important step in this direction. Both countries are members of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and are seeking closer relations with the United States and its allies. Development of more liquified natural gas (LNG) transport and reception facilities from distant suppliers, such as Nigeria, into Europe could be another course of action. Coupled with the development of new oil and gas pipelines could be an offer from NATO (and/or EU) members to provide security for energy infrastructure in periods of unrest or conflict in supplier and transit countries. NATO governments (although not NATO as a whole) have already been involved in military efforts to secure energy resources. The first Gulf War, while not a NATO operation, involved key member states such as the United States, France, Britain, and Italy that sought not only to liberate Kuwait but also to ensure that Iraq did not control Kuwaiti oil and threaten Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers. NATO governments also took part in a military operation in the 1980s explicitly designed to secure the supply of oil. Operation Earnest Will was an effort, primarily by NATO states, to protect tanker traffic in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Beginning in 1984, Iran first, and then Iraq, attacked neutral oil tankers to cut off the other's means of financial support. Iran attacked Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers in those two countries' own waters to ensure that all Gulf states understood that none was secure. The Soviet Union, followed shortly thereafter by the United States, made offers to the Kuwaitis, who lost the most tankers, to reflag their vessels under the USSR and the U.S. flags, an offer that was accepted. After Iraqi aircraft attacked the USS Stark in 1987, killing 37 sailors, the Reagan Administration formed a coalition of like-minded states, above all from NATO, to protect tanker traffic in the Gulf. Britain, France, and the Netherlands were important participants in Operation Earnest Will . The allies captured Iranian vessels mining shipping lanes in the Gulf, and engaged in firefights with Iranian troops using oil platforms to fire on ships. In February 2006, NATO governments discussed a range of potential actions in the event of future disruption of oil supplies caused by military action. Some member states reportedly raised the possibility of protecting tanker traffic and oil platforms in periods of conflict, and using satellites to monitor developments in areas where energy resources come under threat. The 110 th Congress has shown strong interest in energy security. Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 ), which will raise vehicle fuel efficiency standards and require increased use of alternative fuels, both means to ensure greater energy security. In November 2006 Senator Lugar gave a speech in which he urged that energy security be raised to an Article V, or mutual security, issue. House and Senate committees are expected to hold hearings on energy security, with attention to NATO's possible role, in the second session of the 110 th Congress. NATO is attempting to become a global security organization, concentrating on protection of the interests of the United States and its Canadian and European partners, but also engaging non-member states as global partners. NATO's role in energy security remains uncertain, however, as some individual members may prefer a greater role for the EU. A political role in energy security for NATO seems most likely in the near future. Under NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004, the allies have begun discussions with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates to build practical cooperation in the security field, including the fight against terrorism. Some Middle Eastern governments are concerned about terrorist attacks on their oil facilities, but it is not publicly known whether NATO has discussed this issue with the four governments. Partnership for Peace countries, such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, that are important energy producers often seek ways to associate themselves more closely with NATO, in part to diminish Russian influence on their soil, in part to develop reliable partners in an unstable region. It is possible that NATO will seek ways to provide security for the energy infrastructure of such countries. At the same time, the EU may encourage its member states to invest more heavily in that infrastructure. There is division in the EU over management of the Union's growing dependence on Russian oil and gas. Several states, led by Poland, wish to engage NATO more fully in ensuring energy security in this relationship. While in the early stages of discussion, Poland is exploring a role for NATO and the United States, perhaps only diplomatically, in which U.S. leverage on Moscow could be an element for encouraging responsible Russian behavior and deflecting any Russian attempt to divide the Europeans. Most EU governments clearly prefer that market forces secure access to energy. A well-structured commercial partnership with Russia might be one mark of such a policy. Another would be the effort of the EU3 (Germany, France, and Britain) and the United States to curtail Iran's nuclear program. The EU3 desire completion of that effort in the UN before there is any discussion of a military organization like NATO assuming responsibility for a broader policy of energy security. In addition, some NATO partner governments in Central Asia and the Middle East might be reluctant to accept allied assistance in securing the resource that is central to their survival. The belief is widespread in the Middle East that the United States invaded Iraq in part to secure access to its oil. There might be popular opposition to any NATO effort to secure energy infrastructure in some of these countries. Moreover, the United States has been unable to provide full security to pipelines in Iraq, and NATO might have similar difficulties in partnership countries. Russia is also a factor. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan depend upon Russia as a transit country for their pipeline shipments to the west, and could be subject to Moscow's pressure to spurn NATO proposals of assistance.

Energy security is of increasing importance to the United States and its European allies, as some energy producers are using oil and gas for political leverage. Although most European allies believe that a market solution exists to ensure security of energy supplies, NATO has begun to discuss the issue as an allied concern. This report will be updated periodically. See also CRS Report RL33636, The European Union ' s Energy Security Challenges , by [author name scrubbed]. (Note: this study was originally a memorandum for Senator Richard Lugar and is printed as a CRS report with his permission.)

This report examines scenarios in which international trade could be heavily controlled or limited due to an avian flu pandemic. Each of the scenarios presented depicts the possibility that imports of goods into the United States could be curtailed due to the avian flu. Some experts argue that these scenarios are not likely to occur, because they believe that the United States would probably not implement a general ban on the importation of goods from affected regions. It is believed that such a ban would not prevent transmission of the avian flu to the United States, because there is little evidence that inanimate objects could transmit the disease. Furthermore, opponents to a general ban on imports argue that such actions could unnecessarily cause economic and social hardship. The United States depends on global trade for necessities such as food, energy, and medical supplies. Also, some observers point out that the nature of the "just-in-time" global economy is such that the United States does not stockpile these and other necessities. Finally, the World Health Organization does not recommend quarantining any individual country or closing international borders at any phase of an avian influenza pandemic. If international borders are not closed to human passage, then it follows that there will probably not be direct trade restrictions. While some experts believe that a general ban on imports either globally or from affected regions is highly unlikely, others contend that the strategy cannot be totally ruled out, particularly since there is already a U.S. ban on imports of poultry products from certain H5N1 (highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza)-affected countries and regions. Some experts argue that it may be possible to transmit the virus through any object that has had contact with infected feces, blood, or other bodily fluids. Some policy analysts predict that if the H5N1 virus were to become a pandemic with human-to-human transmission, then the United States might control the movement of people across its borders to slow the virus' arrival on U.S. soil. This could involve limiting airline passenger flights into the country, but it could also mean limiting entry of cargo ships due to a fear of transmission from ship operators or stowaway birds. These types of restrictions may result in a de facto import ban. Some experts believe these restrictions are unnecessary and potentially harmful, but they might nevertheless be implemented to give the appearance of strong preventative actions, in response to public concerns or political factors. Many believe that if such restrictive measures were adopted, they would likely be short-lived. Once the pandemic reached the United States, such measures would appear to serve little further purpose and could be abandoned. A more likely scenario is that a supply-side constraint in the exporting country would limit U.S. imports. Pandemic-affected countries could curtail their exports, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Governments may nationalize assets and stop export operations. An outbreak may also constrain production and key export infrastructure through excessive worker absences, to the point where exporting becomes difficult and is involuntarily slowed or halted. Such a slowdown in commerce could cause price increases or temporary shortages in certain goods within the United States, depending on the duration and breadth of the slowdown. It could exacerbate the effects of slowed production and distribution networks within the United States, leading to decreased demand and supply and a recession. Several studies have been undertaken to estimate the effects of a pandemic on the U.S. and global economy. According to one study, a mild pandemic could reduce global economic output by $330 billion, or 0.8% of global gross domestic product (GDP). The same study estimates that a pandemic of the worst case scenario severity could reduce global economic output by $4.4 trillion, or 12.6% of global GDP. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that a severe influenza pandemic might cause a decline in U.S. GDP of about 4.25%, and that a milder pandemic might cause a decline of about 1%. Other studies have found both greater and lesser economic effects, depending on the methodology and data used. Different studies also disagree on the extent to which international trade would be disrupted by an avian flu pandemic. This section considers the potential economic and trade effects on the United States of import disruptions from countries affected by avian flu, either as a result of border closings in the United States or supply side constraints in the exporting country or region. Only countries with human avian flu cases confirmed by the World Health Organization (WHO) from January 2004 to January 2008 are considered, because these countries are arguably more likely to experience trade disruptions due to avian flu. The relative likelihood of import disruptions from one country or region over another is not considered, because it is too difficult to ascertain. As seen in Table 1 , the United States imports far more from China than any other country that has thus far reported confirmed human cases of the avian flu. In fact, China is the largest source of U.S. imports overall, accounting for over 16% of total U.S. imports in 2007. Therefore, if imports from China were disrupted on a large scale over a long time period, it could have a significant effect on the U.S. economy. However, a short-lived disruption in imports from China may not cause an immediate crisis. Forty-four percent of U.S. imports from China are in the category of machinery or electronic machinery, and include items such as computers, televisions, and parts. A disruption in imports of these items could have implications for the domestic electronics market, but it may have a less severe effect on the U.S. economy as a whole. One import category of special concern is medical supplies; the United States imported over $5 billion in optical and medical instruments from China in 2007, representing 10% of such U.S. imports. Many, but not all, products in this category are considered essential medical equipment. For example, China was the second-largest supplier (after Mexico) of respirator equipment to the United States, supplying over 13% of U.S. respirator equipment imports. China has also been an important supplier of bandages (41% of U.S. imports in 2007), boxed first aid kits (53%), clinical thermometers (50%), orthopedic appliances (9%), and syringes (13%). Some observers recommend that U.S. hospitals stockpile essential supplies to take a possible avian flu pandemic into account, especially considering that medical supplies are sourced from potential avian flu hot spots. Many of these essential medical supplies are reportedly not manufactured in the United States. Almost 15% (about $1.5 billion) of fish and seafood imports into the United States are from China, second only to Canada ($1.9 billion). It is not clear whether a trade disruption with China alone would have a great impact on the U.S. food supply, since the United States also imports food from other countries and regions, in addition to having domestic production. Although the United States imports a great deal from China, many of these products originate elsewhere, and only their final stage of production takes place in China. For some items, production could possibly be shifted to another location if a long-term trade disruption were to occur. However, shifting production in the global supply chain may have great costs or not be feasible for other reasons. Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam have similar patterns of exports to the United States, although in different volumes. Among countries with confirmed human avian flu cases, Thailand is the second largest supplier of U.S. imports. However, Thailand's total 2007 exports to the United States were just under $23 billion, and it ranked 18 th out of all exporters to the United States, with 1.2% of the U.S. import market. Indonesia and Vietnam were ranked 26 th and 31 st , respectively, with $14 billion and $11 billion in 2007 U.S. imports. Like China, Thailand's main exports to the United States are electrical machinery and machinery, comprising about 44% of Thailand's exports to the United States. Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam all export large quantities of fish to the United States. Thailand is the largest exporter of prepared crustaceans and mollusks (the second largest is China), and the second largest exporter of fresh crustaceans to the United States (after Canada). Indonesia and Vietnam are the third and fifth largest suppliers of prepared crustaceans, and the fourth and third largest suppliers of fresh crustaceans to the United States. Thailand and Indonesia also export optical and medical instruments to the United States, ranking 21 st and 28 th , respectively, in 2007 U.S. imports. The United States imports medical supplies such as dialysis instruments, diagnostic instruments, syringes, needles, and ultrasound devices from Thailand and Indonesia. In analyzing the trade data, it appears that if trade were disrupted between the United States and any one of Thailand, Indonesia, or Vietnam, the effects would probably be minimal. However, if U.S. trade was disrupted with all three countries and China (considered more likely under a flu pandemic), the U.S. supply of seafood and medical supplies could be impaired. Reduced seafood imports could increase not only the price of seafood, but it could cause increased demand and possible price increases in substitute goods. The impact of reduced medical supply imports could be more severe, possibly resulting in a shortage of certain medical supplies, since substitutes are generally not readily available. Oil comprised 95% ($10.8 billion) of U.S. imports from Iraq in 2007, representing 3% of U.S. oil imports. Iraq is the ninth-largest oil exporter to the United States. If oil imports from Iraq were to stop, the reduced supply of oil could cause domestic energy prices to increase. However, there are many factors determining domestic energy prices, and other events could overshadow, exacerbate, or offset any disruption of trade with Iraq due to an avian flu pandemic. Egypt, Turkey, and Azerbaijan all primarily export oil to the United States, though not in significant amounts relative to total U.S. oil imports. In 2007, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Turkey ranked 27 th , 33 rd , and 49 th , respectively, in exports of oil to the United States. Turkey's main export to the United States was stone for monuments and construction, with 14% of the U.S. import market. Cambodia's and Azerbaijan's overall exports to the United States are relatively small and would likely have little impact on the U.S. economy if they were to be disrupted. The United States is the largest global producer and exporter of poultry, and the second-largest global producer and exporter of eggs. In 2005, U.S. farm sales of poultry were $23.3 billion, while U.S. imports of poultry were only $130 million. In 2007 the U.S. exported $3.3 billion in poultry, up from $2.2 billion in 2006. Poultry exports to China have increased exponentially, from $15.7 million in 2004 to $578.4 million in 2007. China is the second-largest importer of U.S. poultry, after Russia. Almost all U.S. poultry and egg imports are from Canada, which has not been affected by the highly pathenogenic avian influenza, H5N1. Some observers argue that as long as the United States remains unaffected by avian influenza the U.S. poultry industry may be positively affected by outbreaks of avian influenza elsewhere, as it may increase demand for U.S. poultry exports. On the other hand, news about avian influenza cases in other countries could reduce consumer demand for all poultry, even if it is considered influenza-free. If the United States were to shut its borders to trade completely, the impact could range from moderate to severe, depending on how long the restrictions were in place. A very short-term trade shutdown of just a few days may not have significant long term effects. As an example, in the days following September 11 th , 2001, shipments to the United States were slowed dramatically (though not stopped entirely) because of tightened security at the borders. Once the borders were effectively reopened business resumed with little if any economic impact from the slowdown in trade. A longer trade shutdown could have greater implications, both domestically and globally. Much would also depend on how Wall Street reacted. A sharp fall in financial markets would be likely, but the question is how resilient the U.S. economy would be. Many countries rely on the United States as an export market. The loss of that market even temporarily could cause economic hardships around the world and contribute to the beginning of a possible global economic slowdown. The United States is a large economy and does not rely on trade to the same extent as smaller economies, but it is not self-sufficient. There could possibly be an oil shortage, and energy prices could increase. Oil might not be available to all who need it. This would have implications for the rest of the economy, as transportation costs increase and cause price increases for goods across the economy. Also, many U.S. businesses rely on imports, both for intermediate goods and consumer products. It is difficult to determine which individual products could be in short supply, because many consumer goods that are generally not considered imported products depend on imports at some stage of their production. Also, some consumer goods that are imported have substitutes that may be produced in the United States. Finally, trade disruptions would account for only part of the economic impact of an avian flu pandemic. Other domestic and international economic events could have more severe impacts, which could be compounded by disruptions in global trade.

Concerns about potential disruptions in U.S. trade flows due to a global health or security crisis are not new. The possibility of an avian flu pandemic with consequences for global trade is a concern that has received attention recently, although some experts believe there is little cause for alarm. Experts disagree on the likelihood of an avian flu pandemic developing at all. This report considers possible trade disruptions, including possible impacts on trade between the United States and countries and regions that have reported avian influenza infections. These trade disruptions could include countries banning imported goods from infected regions at the onset of a pandemic, de facto bans due to protective health measures, or supply-side constraints caused by health crises in exporting countries.

More than 20 federal entities conduct water-related research and development and collect and disseminate water information and data. Whether coordination of federally funded water research would produce greater benefits for the nation is the policy question at the center of H.R. 1145 , the National Water Research and Development Initiative Act of 2009. According to a 2004 report by the National Research Council, Confronting the Nation's Water Problems: The Role of Research , real levels of total federal spending on water research have remained constant at $700 million annually (in 2000 dollars) since the mid-1970s. The report notes, however, that water research funding has not paralleled the growth in federal budget outlays or in gross domestic product. Also, the topical balance of the federal research portfolio has shifted to a greater focus on water quality and away from research on water supply augmentation and conservation and social science topics (e.g., water demand, water law, and institutional topics). While other legislation addresses changing specific water research programs and activities at individual agencies, H.R. 1145 would require coordination of the federal water research that is spread across more than 20 federal entities. H.R. 1145 would formally establish a federal interagency committee to coordinate federal water research. The interagency committee, with input from an advisory committee, would develop a four-year plan for priority federal research topics, and the President would annually report to Congress on progress on the plan. The bill also would establish a National Water Initiative Coordination Office that would function as a clearinghouse for technical and programmatic information, support the interagency committee, and disseminate the findings and recommendations of the interagency committee. The bill would essentially codify the Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality (SWAQ), which was not created by statute, that has been operating since 2003. For more information on SWAQ, which is located within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), see the later section of this report on " Water Research Coordination and Strategy ." As the primary federal science agency for water resource information, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) monitors the quantity and quality of water in rivers and aquifers, assesses the sources and fate of contaminants in aquatic systems, develops tools to improve the application of hydrologic information, and disseminates products of its efforts to the public. The National Weather Service in the Department of Commerce and the Natural Resource Conservation Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) combine their data with USGS data to forecast water supplies and floods. Many other federal agencies collect water data and conduct monitoring in support of their own missions and projects. For example, as part of its reservoir operations in support of its navigation and flood damage reduction missions in many basins, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) in the Department of Defense collects runoff data and monitors water quality and other environmental health parameters in order to comply with federal environmental statutes. Technological advances, events, and climate change also are increasing the role of some agencies, which previously were less engaged, in performing and using water resources research. For example, data produced by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is increasingly informing analyses of domestic and international water resources. Similarly, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data and modeling is increasingly used in the analyses of potential water resource implications of a changing climate. For water quantity technology research and development activities, programs of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation support much of the federal desalination and water reuse research, while the Corps performs more infrastructure and engineering research. The Department of Energy and its labs conduct research that also has water applications, such as innovative desalination and membrane technologies. Water quantity management and control research is also conducted by USDA agencies, and smaller amounts through the National Science Foundation (NSF), USGS, and NOAA. The U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), agencies in the USDA, and the USGS conduct much of the federal research related to water quality. The National Science Foundation (NSF) and the USGS through its Water Resource Research Institutes in each state support a wide array of technical water quality, quantity, and social science research. Because of the integrative nature of ecosystem restoration research, many federal agencies support it, including Reclamation, the Corps, USGS, EPA, USDA agencies, and the NSF. According to the aforementioned 2004 NRC report, funding for "water supply augmentation and conservation" research and "water quantity management and control" research by federal agencies totaled, respectively, $14.5 million and $45.6 million in FY2000. In the past, the federal government has invested more in these areas; most notably, in the late 1960s, federal research in water supply augmentation, particularly research on desalination, was funded annually at approximately $120 million (in 2000 dollars). While water supply research declined over time, other research areas have increased in prominence; for example, federal research funding for water quality management and protection totaled $191.2 million in FY2000. According to the 2004 NRC report, "the topical balance of the federal water resources research portfolio has changed ... such that the present balance appears to be inconsistent with current national priorities." The report continues: Research on social science topics such as water demand, water law, and other institutional topics, as well as on water supply augmentation and conservation, now garners a significantly smaller proportion of total water research funding than it did 30 years ago.... [I]t becomes clear that significant new investment must be made in water use and institutional research topics if the national water agenda is to be addressed adequately. (p. 9) H.R. 1145 lists research outcomes to target in the proposed four-year plan. As passed by the House, the bill lists 25 research outcomes. These encompass data and evaluation goals (e.g., a water census, use assessment, regional assessment, rural assessment, energy-water assessment); classes of technologies (e.g., water monitoring, treatment and efficiency to increase supplies, information technologies); science improvements (e.g., hydrologic prediction, ecosystem services and needs); and social sciences analyses and conflict resolution development. In trying to achieve the research outcomes listed in H.R. 1145 , implementation of the plan that the bill envisions could be seen as limiting agencies' discretion in how to prioritize research funding in their mission areas and reducing the agencies' flexibility to respond to evolving research needs. Whether or not reduced discretion is desirable depends on stakeholders' perspectives and opinions on the current makeup of the federal research portfolio. Groups that support the existing level of research on topics not addressed in the research outcomes in H.R. 1145 may be concerned that if additional water research funds are not forthcoming, then enactment and implementation of H.R. 1145 may reduce research on these topics. A counter-argument is that by establishing priorities for the federal water research portfolio, limited federal funds would be focused on achieving broader national priorities. In addition to supporting a shift in the federal water research portfolio, the NRC report stated: "Coordination of the water resources research enterprise is needed to make deliberative judgments about the allocation of funds and scope of research, to minimize duplication where appropriate, to present Congress and the public with a coherent strategy for federal investment, and to facilitate the large-scale multiagency research efforts" (p. 11). Starting in 2003, the Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality revived a dormant role of coordinating water research for the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). SWAQ began operating within the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) as part of the NSTC. SWQ has functioned as a forum for federal agencies to share information on their respective research and data programs. (See the Appendix for the membership of SWAQ.) H.R. 1145 would codify SWAQ into a formal interagency committee, with an OSTP chair. A September 2007 report by SWAQ, A Strategy for Fed e ral Science and Technology to Support Water Availability and Quality in the United States , stated: "Given the importance of sound water management to the Nation's well-being, it is appropriate for the Federal government to play a significant role in providing information to all on the status of water resources and to provide the needed research and technology that can be used by all to make informed water management decisions" (p. 7). H.R. 1145 attempts to coordinate federal water research in order for the federal government to more effectively perform the role described in the SWAQ report. While the NRC stated the benefits of a coordinated research program, a concern is that the increased focus on the outcomes identified in the bill might result in a shift away from other research areas that are central in the roles of some agencies. For example, much of the EPA's research is in support of its regulatory role; that is, it has performed little treatment technology research and development in recent years. Some stakeholders may be concerned that, unless additional funds are made available for water research, enactment of H.R. 1145 may result in a shift in research funding away from regulatory-focused research, toward more technology research and development. The broadening of the desired outcomes in H.R. 1145 during House Science Committee markup to include water quality provisions reflects that concern and also interest in furthering water quality research. Whether some of the bill's provisions as passed by the House call for research, programs, and studies that may partially duplicate current efforts is another concern. For example, H.R. 1145 would require the EPA to establish a wastewater and stormwater reuse technology demonstration program; the Bureau of Reclamation has an ongoing research and demonstration program of some wastewater reuse technologies. H.R. 1145 would not increase the authorized funding levels for federal research activities. Instead, it is focused on improving coordination in setting agency research agendas, increasing transparency in water research budgeting, and reporting on progress toward the research outcomes specified in the bill. Some stakeholders may question whether additional transparency and information alone (without increased funding) would result in significant changes to the status quo. Membership in SWAQ has represented the following departments, agencies, and offices: Department of Agriculture Agricultural Research Service Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service Economic Research Service Forest Service Natural Resources Conservation Service Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Atmospheric Research National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Department of Defense U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation Fish and Wildlife Service National Park Service U.S. Geological Survey Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Office of Science Department of State Environmental Protection Agency Office of Research and Development Office of Water National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Science Foundation Tennessee Valley Authority Executive O ffice of the President Office of Management and Budget Office of Science and Technology Policy

H.R. 1145, the National Water Research and Development Initiative Act of 2009, would formally establish a federal interagency committee to coordinate federal water research. Federal water research currently averages roughly $700 million annually. The proposed interagency committee, with input from an advisory committee, would develop a four-year plan for priority federal research topics, then require the President to annually report to Congress on progress in achieving the plan's research outcomes. A version of the committee, the Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality (SWAQ), which was not created by statute, has been operating since 2003 within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) as part of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The bill also would establish a National Water Initiative Coordination Office that would function as a clearinghouse for technical and programmatic information, support the interagency committee, and disseminate the findings and recommendations of the interagency committee. As passed by the House, H.R. 1145 would authorize $10 million over five years for improving coordination of water resources research and related outreach activities with the public and research institutions. The bill is focused on improving coordination in the establishment of agency research agendas, increasing the transparency of water research budgeting, and reporting on progress toward research outcomes specified in the bill. H.R. 1145 would not increase the authorized funding levels for performing federal research activities. Water research is conducted in numerous federal agencies because water plays many different roles in the economy, public health, and ecosystems. Many of the issues facing the nation's water resources are cross-cutting, such as climate change and the energy-water nexus (e.g., the role of water in producing fuels and electricity). Drivers for improved coordination include an interest in more effectively addressing these complicated water topics, as well as interest in avoiding duplication, facilitating exchange of results, and having a more focused research strategy. Technological advances, events, and climate change also are increasing the role of some agencies, which previously were less engaged, in performing and using water resources research. A concern with more coordination is that, if enacted, the bill may result in a shift in research funding away from some current research topics. Specifically, some stakeholders may be concerned that, unless additional funds are made available for water research, the focus on technology and water supply in H.R. 1145 may move research funds away from water quality and research supporting agencies' regulatory roles. During the House Science Committee markup, research outcomes for the plan were added that address water quality topics. Another concern is whether some of the bill's provisions as passed by the House call for research, programs, or studies that may partially duplicate current research. Whether a more effective portfolio of water research can be achieved through the transparency and information pursued in H.R. 1145 (without increased research and demonstration funding) remains uncertain.

Crime is ordinarily proscribed, tried, and punished according to the laws of the place where it occurs. American criminal law applies beyond the geographical confines of the United States, however, under certain limited circumstances. A surprising number of federal criminal statutes have extraterritorial application, but prosecutions have been relatively few. This may be because when extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction does exist, practical and legal complications, and sometimes diplomatic considerations, may counsel against its exercise. Legislative Powers : The Constitution does not forbid either congressional or state enactment of laws that apply outside the United States. Nor does it prohibit either the federal government or the states from prosecuting conduct committed abroad. In fact, several passages suggest that the Constitution contemplates the application of American law beyond the geographic confines of the United States. It speaks, for example, of "felonies committed on the high seas," "offences against the law of nations," "commerce with foreign nations," and of the impact of treaties. Limitations : Nevertheless, the powers granted by the Constitution are not without limit. The clauses enumerating Congress's powers carry specific and implicit limits that govern the extent to which the power may be exercised overseas. Other limitations appear elsewhere in the Constitution, most notably in the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment. A related due process challenge is based on notice. It is akin to the concerns over secret laws and vague statutes, the exception to the maxim that ignorance of the law is no defense. Conceding this outer boundary, however, the courts fairly uniformly have held that questions of extraterritoriality are almost exclusively within the discretion of Congress; a determination to grant a statutory provision extraterritorial application—regardless of its policy consequences—is not by itself constitutionally suspect. For this reason, the question of the extent to which a particular statute applies outside the United States has generally been considered a matter of statutory, rather than constitutional, construction. General rules of statutory construction have emerged that can explain, if not presage, the result in a given case. The first of these rules holds that a statute that is silent on the question of its application abroad will be construed to have only domestic application unless there is a clear indication of some broader intent. At least until recently, the second rule of construction stated that the nature and purpose of a statute may provide an indication of whether Congress intended a statute to apply beyond the confines of the United States. Although hints of it can be found earlier, the rule was first clearly announced in United States v. Bowman . The Supreme Court's emphatic endorsement of the domestic presumption in a civil context in Morrison cast some doubt on Bowman 's continued vitality. Early indications were that the courts and commentators were unwilling to go that far. The Court in RJR Nabisco , another civil case, however, may have changed that. In RJR Nabisco , the Court seemed to take direct aim at Bowman without naming it. There may be some real question of the extent to which the Court still considers Bowman good law. The final rule declares that unless a contrary intent is clear, Congress is assumed to have acted so as not to invite action inconsistent with international law. International law supports rather than dictates decisions in the area of the overseas application of American law. Neither Congress nor the courts are bound to the dictates of international law when enacting or interpreting statutes with extraterritorial application. Yet Congress looks to international law when it evaluates the policy considerations associated with legislation that may have international consequences. For this reason, the courts interpret legislation with the presumption that Congress or the state legislature intends its laws to be applied within the bounds of international law, unless it indicates otherwise. Congress has expressly provided for the extraterritorial application of federal criminal law most often by outlawing various forms of misconduct when they occur "within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." The obligations and principles of various international treaties, conventions, or agreements to which the United States is a party supply the theme for a second category of federal criminal statutes with explicit extraterritorial application. Members of another category of explicit extraterritorial federal criminal statutes either cryptically declare that their provisions are to apply overseas or describe a series of jurisdictional circumstances under which their provisions have extraterritorial application, not infrequently involving the foreign commerce of the United States in conjunction with other factors. The Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco did endorse implied extraterritoriality in the case of "piggyback" statutes—conspiracy, attempt, aiding and abetting, among them—whose provisions are necessarily predicated on some other crime and whose overseas application matches that of its predicates. Federal crimes committed abroad present investigators and prosecutors with legal, practical, and often diplomatic obstacles that can be daunting. With respect to diplomatic concerns, the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law observes: It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent. Thus, while a state may take certain measures of nonjudicial enforcement against a person in another state, ... its law enforcement officers cannot arrest him in another state, and can engage in criminal investigation in that state only with that state's consent. Failure to comply can result in strong diplomatic protests, liability for reparations, and other remedial repercussions, to say nothing of the possible criminal prosecution of offending foreign investigators. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Agreements : Congress has endorsed diplomatic efforts to increase multinational cooperative law enforcement activities. The United States has over 70 mutual legal assistance treaties in force. They ordinarily provide clauses for locating and identifying persons and items; service of process; executing search warrants; taking witness depositions; persuading foreign nationals to come to the United States voluntarily to present evidence here; and forfeiture-related seizures. Cooperative Efforts : American law enforcement officials have historically used other, often less formal, cooperative methods overseas to investigate and prosecute extraterritorial offenses. Over the last few decades the United States has taken steps to facilitate cooperative efforts. In addition to the more traditional presence of members of the Armed Forces and State Department personnel and contractors, federal civilian law enforcement agencies have assigned an increasing number of personnel overseas. Search and Seizure Abroad : Overseas cooperative law enforcement assistance occasionally has Fourth Amendment implications. The Supreme Court's United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez decision makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search of the overseas property of foreign nationals unless the property owner has some "previous significant voluntary connections with the United States." The Fourth Amendment's application abroad to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals with significant connections to the United States is less clear. Prior to Verdugo-Urquidez , neither the Fourth Amendment nor its exclusionary rule were considered applicable to foreign searches and seizures conducted by foreign law enforcement officials, except under two circumstances. The first covered foreign conduct that "shocked the conscience of the court." The second reached foreign searches or seizures in which U.S. law enforcement officials were so deeply involved as to constitute "joint ventures" or some equivalent level of participation. Since Verdugo-Urquidez , the courts have held as a general rule the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to searches or seizures of U.S. citizens by foreign officials in other countries, but have continued to acknowledge the "joint venture" and "shocked conscience" rarely found exceptions to the general rule. Nevertheless, "the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard applies to United States officials conducting a search affecting a United States citizen in a foreign country." On the other hand, even under such circumstances, "a foreign search is reasonable if it conforms to the requirements of foreign law," and "such a search will be upheld under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when United States officials reasonably rely on foreign officials' representations of foreign law." Self-Incrimination Overseas : Like the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and its attendant Miranda warning requirements do not apply to statements made overseas to foreign officials subject to the same "joint venture" and "shocked conscience" exceptions. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda requirements do apply to custodial interrogations conducted overseas by American officials regardless of the nationality of the defendant. As a general rule to be admissible at trial in this country, however, any confession or other criminating statements must have been freely made. Statute of Limitations: 18 U.S.C. Section 3292 and Related Matters : As a general rule, prosecution of federal crimes must begin within five years. Federal capital offenses, certain federal sex offenses, and various violent federal terrorist offenses, however, may be prosecuted at any time. Prosecution of nonviolent federal terrorism offenses must begin within eight years. Moreover, the statute of limitations is suspended or tolled during any period in which the accused is a fugitive. Whatever the applicable statute of limitations, Section 3292 authorizes the federal courts to suspend it in order to await the arrival of evidence requested of a foreign government. Extradition : Extradition is perhaps the oldest form of international law enforcement assistance. It is a creature of treaty by which one country surrenders a fugitive to another for prosecution or service of sentence. The United States has bilateral extradition treaties with roughly two-thirds of the nations of the world. Treaties negotiated before 1960 and still in effect reflect the view then held by the United States and other common law countries that criminal jurisdiction was territorial and consequently extradition could not be had for extraterritorial crimes. Subsequently negotiated agreements either require extradition regardless of where the offense occurs, permit extradition regardless of where the offense occurs, or require extradition where the extraterritorial laws of the two nations are compatible. More recent extradition treaties address other traditional features of the nation's earlier agreements that complicate extradition, most notably the nationality exception, the political offense exception, and the practice of limiting extradition to a list of specifically designated offenses. As an alternative to extradition, particularly if the suspect is not a citizen of the country of refuge, foreign authorities may be willing to expel or deport him under circumstances that allow the United States to take him into custody. In the absence of a specific treaty provision, the fact that the defendant was abducted overseas and brought to the United States for trial rather than pursuant to a request under the applicable extradition treaty does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction to try him. Venue : Federal crimes committed within the United States must be tried where they occur. Crimes committed outside the United States are tried where Congress has provided. Congress has enacted both general and specific venue statutes governing extraterritorial offenses. Section 3238, the general provision, permits the trial of extraterritorial crimes either (1) in the district into which the offender is "first brought" or in which he is arrested for the offense; or (2) prior to that time, by indictment or information in the district of the offender's last known residence, or if none is known, in the District of Columbia. The phrase "first brought" as used in Section 3238 means "first brought while in custody." As the language of the section suggests, venue for all joint offenders is proper wherever venue for one of their number is proper. Courts are divided over whether Section 3238 may be applied even though venue may have been proper without recourse to its provisions. Testimony of Witnesses Outside the United States: Federal courts may subpoena a U.S. resident or national found abroad to appear before it or the grand jury. They ordinarily have no authority to subpoena a foreign national located in a foreign country. Mutual legal assistance treaties and similar agreements generally contain provisions to facilitate a transfer of custody of foreign witnesses who are imprisoned overseas and in other instances to elicit assistance to encourage foreign nationals to come to this country and testify voluntarily. Unable to secure the presence of foreign witnesses located aboard, federal courts may authorize depositions to be taken abroad, under "exceptional circumstances and in the interests of justice," and under even more limited circumstances, they may admit such depositions into evidence in a criminal trial. When a deposition is taken abroad, the courts prefer that the defendant be present, that his counsel be allowed to cross-examine the witness, that the deposition be taken under oath, that a verbatim transcript be taken, and that the deposition be captured on videotape; but they have permitted depositions to be admitted into evidence at subsequent criminal trials in this country, notwithstanding the fact that one or more of these optimal conditions are not present. In nations whose laws might not otherwise require, or even permit, depositions under conditions considered preferable under U.S. law, a treaty provision sometimes addresses the issue. National Security Concerns : When witnesses and other evidence are located abroad, a defendant's statutory and constitutional rights may conflict with the government's need for secrecy for diplomatic and national security reasons. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure entitles a defendant to disclosure of any of his statements in the government's possession, but the prosecution's case may have evolved from foreign intelligence gathering. The Sixth Amendment assures a criminal defendant of "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor," but providing a witness who is also a terrorist suspect and in federal custody may have an adverse impact on the witness's value as an intelligence source. The Sixth Amendment promises a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him, even a witness who presents classified information to the jury. Congress has provided the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) as a means of accommodating the conflict of interests. The CIPA permits the court to approve prosecution-prepared summaries of classified information to be disclosed to the defendant and introduced in evidence, as a substitute for the classified information. The summaries, however, must be an adequate replacement for the classified information, because ultimately the government's national security interests "cannot override the defendant's right to a fair trial."

Criminal law is usually territorial. It is a matter of the law of the place where it occurs. Nevertheless, a number of American criminal laws apply extraterritorially outside of the United States. Application is generally a question of legislative intent, express or implied. There are two exceptions. First, the statute must come within Congress's constitutional authority to enact. Second, neither the statute nor its application may violate due process or any other constitutional prohibition. Claims of implied extraterritoriality must overcome additional obstacles. Federal laws are presumed to apply only within the United States, unless Congress clearly provides otherwise. Moreover, the courts will also presume that Congress intends its statutes to be applied in a manner that does not offend international law. Historically, in order to overcome these presumptions, the lower federal courts have read certain vintage Supreme Court cases broadly. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, however, suggest a far more restrictive view. Although the crimes over which the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction may be many, so are the obstacles to their enforcement. For both practical and diplomatic reasons, criminal investigations within another country require the acquiescence, consent, or preferably the assistance, of the authorities of the host country. The United States has mutual legal assistance treaties with several countries designed to formalize such cooperative law enforcement assistance. It has agreements for the same purpose in many other instances. Cooperation, however, may introduce new obstacles. Searches and interrogations carried out jointly with foreign officials, certainly if they involve Americans, must be conducted within the confines of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. And the Sixth Amendment imposes limits upon the use in American criminal trials of depositions taken abroad. The nation's recently negotiated extradition treaties address some of the features of earlier agreements which complicate extradition for extraterritorial offenses, that is, dual criminality requirements; reluctance to recognize extraterritorial jurisdiction; and exemptions on the basis of nationality or political offenses. To facilitate the prosecution of federal crimes with extraterritorial application Congress has enacted special venue, statute of limitations, and evidentiary statutes. To further cooperative efforts, it enacted the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act, P.L. 111-79, which authorizes federal courts to issue search warrants, subpoenas, and other orders to facilitate criminal investigations in this country on behalf of foreign law enforcement officials. This report is an abridged version of a report, which with citations to authority, footnotes, attachments, and bibliography, appears as CRS Report 94-166, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle.

Digital radio broadcasting was introduced in the 1980s as a European research project, leading to the adoption of a European standard called Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB), updated in 2006 to DAB+. DAB/DAB+ standards are compatible with many digital cellphone standards, notably digital GSM, massively deployed as the European standard beginning in the early 1990's. Digital radio broadcasts over cell phones became available in Europe in the late 1990's. By 2000, the DAB radio standard and GSM had converged and DAB radio chips were incorporated into some handsets to provide radio listening as a feature. For example, a digital phone from Nokia, with a tuner installed could, be converted into a radio by downloading software onto the phone, and adding an antenna (connected to the charger connection) and headphones (connected to the audio jack). With the introduction of smartphones, the conversion from phone to radio became more straightforward for the consumer, as discussed in the following paragraphs. In the United States, digital broadcast radio was authorized by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 2002 as HD Radio, a trademark of iBiquity Digital Corporation. HD Radio is iBiquity's core business. Radio stations that broadcast HD Radio pay fees to iBiquity. In 2011, an analysis by Pew Research identified 2,103 HD Radio stations, approximately 13% of all radio stations, noting that the number appeared to have plateaued. For 2012, Pew reported that the number of radio stations dropping HD Radio was greater than the number of stations adopting it. iBiquity reported "close to 2,100" HD Radio stations as of September 2014. The FCC reported 15,433 licensed radio stations (AM, FM, or HD channels) as of September 2014. iBiquity also markets digital radios and radio chips; the primary consumer market is for car radios. As the chips it developed for digital car radios became smaller, iBiquity began to explore the possibility of including them in iPods or smartphones, promoting the radio chips to the wireless industry at a 2010 conference of the CTIA, a major wireless industry association. A dongle for iPod or iPhone (iOS operating system) had been introduced in 2009 by at least one manufacturer to provide an external HD Radio connection. HD Radio dongles for wireless mobile devices using iOS or Android operating systems are available from several manufacturers through sources such as Amazon.com or BestBuy and similar retailers. They are activated by downloading and accepting an HD Radio app. In 2014, the BBC launched a campaign, the "Universal Smartphone Radio Project," to expand the market for digital radio listeners by adding an FM/DAB/Internet chip to smartphones. The BBC reportedly is leading an industry coalition that includes the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and Commercial Radio Australia. In the United States the FM/DAB/Internet chip for smartphones is marketed as NextRadio. It was introduced in the United States by Emmis Communications in 2013. NextRadio is enhanced through cloud services provided by TagStation. NextRadio requires a smartphone with the customized chip and radio tuner and uses an app that makes it possible to listen to over-the-air radio while connected to the Internet, providing a number of interactive features. There are approximately 32 devices currently available in the United States with NextRadio pre-installed. The business case for marketing radio/phone combinations is straightforward for the radio industry: increase radio listeners—and advertising revenue—by reaching potential new audiences through their cellphones. Radio reached 92% of all Americans over age 12 in 2012 (roughly 250 million people), a market penetration virtually unchanged in a decade. At the end of 2013, there were 175 million active smartphones in the United States. Among adults (18+), 56% had smartphones. Demographically, smartphone owners tend to be younger, with higher income and education levels than other cell phone owners. A study projecting smartphone use in the United States shows the number of users rising from 62.6 million in 2010 to 220 million in 2018. Research conducted with the support of NAB indicated significant interest in NextRadio among survey participants: smartphone users 18 to 49 years old. The corresponding market demand has not yet materialized, however. About 6.5 million NextRadio-enabled smartphones were in circulation by late 2014, most of them purchased with a Sprint subscription. Of these phones, 1.25 million had been activated for NextRadio, that is, either the pre-loaded app was activated by a Sprint subscriber, or a separately purchased app was downloaded and activated after the purchase of the smartphone. Emmis Communications, which provided the market data, forecast that the number of activated NextRadio smartphones would rise to 14.5 million by mid-2015, based on the number of new smartphones coming to market that will be compatible with NextRadio. Emmis has a three-year agreement (extending into 2016) with Sprint that requires the carrier to preload the NextRadio application on at least 30 million smartphones sold through its network. In return, Emmis contracted to pay Sprint $15 million per year over the life of the contract, plus certain revenue sharing. The agreement between Emmis and Sprint does not limit the ability of NextRadio LLC to place the NextRadio application on FM-enabled devices on other wireless networks. Through August 31, 2014, the NextRadio application had not generated a material amount of revenue. The radio industry continues to work with other leading United States network providers, device manufacturers, regulators and legislators to cause FM tuners to be enabled in all smartphones. Emmis granted the U.S. radio industry (as defined in the funding agreements) a call option on substantially all of the assets used in the NextRadio and TagStation businesses in the United States. The call option may be exercised in August 2017 or August 2019 by paying Emmis a purchase price equal to the greater of (i) the appraised fair market value of the NextRadio and TagStation businesses, or (ii) two times Emmis' cumulative investments in the development of the businesses. The business case for wireless carriers to include FM radio is more complex. As subscribers switch to smartphones, wireless service providers have the opportunity to include NextRadio as a product enhancement. Although the radio access is free to listeners, the interactive services delivered over the Internet may be billable by the wireless service as data traffic. Decisions may be influenced by broader strategies for building customer bases and adding new features. From the perspective of its customers, Sprint views the broadcast radio feature as providing another entertainment choice for its subscribers. T-Mobile, however, is expanding its offer of free music streaming (no data charges) as a means of attracting new subscribers for its mobile services. Other carriers may consider music streaming as a source of income and may not wish to install a radio-based competitor. Reportedly, Apple will pre-install the app for its music streaming service, Beats, in iPhones and iPads beginning in 2015, possibly boosting interest in streaming music. Some research shows that trends favor Internet streaming over radio, although radio remains an important source for information and entertainment. Additionally, carriers may need to consider whether a market commitment to provide over-the-air radio could constrain development of other chip-based services in the future. The smartphones arriving on the market today rely on fourth-generation standards but, by 2020, many industry leaders are predicting a transition to fifth-generation technologies. 5G devices may be substantially re-engineered to take advantage of new wireless network capabilities. As Emmis noted in the above-quoted filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the broadcasting industry is lobbying regulators and legislators in support of including NextRadio chips in smartphones. The basis of the industry campaign, as expressed by NAB, is the value of radio information in times of disaster. The topic of using radio-enabled cellphones for emergency alerts in the United States has periodically been considered by policy makers in the field of emergency communications, but no specific actions have been taken to include this technology in emergency planning. Instead, emergency planning at the federal level has focused on improving the communications capabilities for wireless messages based on the Internet Protocol (IP). As discussed in the 2014 National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), IP-enabled networks permit the interconnection and management of emergency alerts and information across a wide choice of devices, including smartphones, electronic signs, Next Generation 9-1-1 services, and the Emergency Alert System (EAS). A goal of the NECP and emergency planners at all levels is to provide important information to as many people as possible, in a timely manner. To that purpose, federal, state, local, and tribal agencies are using communications technologies to connect to many types of devices. The reasoning, discussed in the 2014 NECP, is that if people are most readily reached by, for example, social media, then alerts must be delivered by social media. The number of active smartphone social network users in the United States was estimated at 97.9 million users in 2013 and is projected to grow to 160.5 million by 2017. The backbone of the United States' Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a network of high-power AM radio broadcast stations that broadcast alerts across wide areas. These stations are referred to as Primary Entry Point stations because they are the point of entry for emergency alerts and warnings. These alerts are in turn picked up and distributed across the country by additional radio stations, television, most cable systems, and other media, as required by the FCC. Since 2009, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) has been enhancing the PEP backbone to reach 90% of the country's population. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) jointly administers EAS with the FCC, in cooperation with the National Weather Service (NWS), an organization within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The NOAA/NWS weather radio system—referred to as National Weather Radio—is the primary source for alerts and warnings over EAS. Measures to improve NWR and related networks are ongoing. For example, FEMA is developing the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) to meet requirements for an alert system as specified by an Executive Order issued by President George W. Bush. When completed, IPAWS should be able to accept any legitimate alert or action announcement, verify it, and relay it to wide variety of communications devices. Legislation passed in 2006 set in motion requirements for delivering alerts to cellphones, now known as Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA). WEA uses the IPAWS network to deliver geographically targeted messages to cellphones over commercial wireless networks. Radio-enabled cellphones are able to receive WEA messages as well as radio broadcast alerts. Similarly, over-the-air TV broadcasts might be delivered to mobile devices (typically tablets) that have been enabled through the addition of a dongle. With an increasing number of people relying on mobile devices connected to the Internet as their primary source of information, the reliability of these networks has become a concern for policy makers. At the federal level, for example, the FCC has undertaken a number of actions intended to improve wireless network reliability. Rapid advancements in wireless technologies are resolving many of the network vulnerabilities identified by the FCC and other federal agencies. For example, the industry is stepping up the installation of small-scale networks that reduce reliance on vulnerable high-site towers, and is investing in new standards that allow networks to use each other's capacity. A new chip that may be introduced in 2015 has numerous applications that will not rely on cell towers. For example, one application being developed for this chip is planned to handle wireless connections for 1 million people congregated at Times Square on New Year's Eve. Continued improvements in emergency communications infrastructure and management are key goals of the NECP. For example, policies need to be developed that will accelerate the transition from analog to digital technologies for 9-1-1 calls. How responses are managed is also under study. Immediately after the Boston Marathon bomb attack in April 2013, for example, fearful that a cellphone signal might trigger another bomb, authorities ordered that wireless phone networks be turned off. This practice is being reconsidered given the ubiquity of cellphones for communications and their use for WEA.

The concurrent developments of digital radio broadcasting and digital cellular networks have enabled hybrid products that incorporate over-the-air broadcasting into cellphones. A recent introduction (2013) is a hybrid radio/smartphone with Internet connectivity, marketed in the United States as NextRadio. NextRadio uses a chip that receives analog FM and digital radio, with enhancements such as customized radio listening; the primary radio connection is over-the-air, not through Internet streaming. On the assumption that radio broadcasting is more accessible and reliable than communications over wireless networks with Internet connectivity, some broadcasting industry leaders have proposed that FM radio chips be required—or at least encouraged—for smartphones as part of the nation's emergency communications preparedness. To give perspective on the proposal for widespread deployment of FM radio chips in smartphones as an emergency preparedness measure, this report provides information on consumer and industry trends in radio and wireless network communications. It also provides a brief overview of the role of technology in disseminating emergency alerts and information.

Americans have long been of mixed mind about advertising. On the one hand, advertising is beneficial insofar as it provides information. On the other hand, advertising (be it private or governmental) often attempts to persuade individuals to alter their behaviors. Unease with advertising can be magnified if the advertiser is the government, especially if an advertisement conflicts with widely held beliefs about government. Many Americans believe that government was established to protect liberty, and that the essence of liberty is the freedom to think and live as one pleases (provided one does not harm others). Many individuals also believe that government should not needlessly or wantonly spend taxpayer money, and that citizens should be thrifty and self-reliant. In light of these beliefs, it is not surprising that controversies have arisen around government advertisements that have attempted to dissuade individuals from using marijuana, have promoted the use of social service programs, are viewed as overly expensive or wasteful, or are perceived as possibly misleading. However, not all government advertising is controversial. Few complain when the government advertises federal agency job openings, competitions for federal contracts, or the sale of surplus government property. These sorts of advertisements likely are viewed as part of government's duty to truthfully inform the public about its activities. As one of the Hoover Commission task forces wrote a half-century ago, Apart from his responsibility as spokesman, the department head has another obligation in a democracy: to keep the public informed about the activities of his agency. How far to go and what media to use in this effort present touchy issues of personal and administrative integrity. But of the basic obligation [to inform the public] there can be little doubt. Additionally, some government advertising has been mandated by law. For example, Congress established the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign in a 1997 appropriations act ( P.L. 105-61 ; 111 Stat. 1272; 22 U.S.C. 1708). This statute directed the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to produce media campaigns to discourage illicit drug use. And not all advertisements that tell people what to do are ill regarded. Few have criticized government advertising campaigns that have encouraged citizens to buy war bonds or avoid inadvertently setting forest fires. The federal government's expenditures on advertising are difficult to ascertain. There are at least two reasons for this: (1) there is no government-wide definition of what constitutes advertising and (2) there is no central authority to which agencies are required to report advertising-related expenditures. Absent an agreed-upon definition of "advertising" or a government-wide reporting system for advertising expenses, agencies have had great discretion to budget their in-house advertising-related costs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO, then the General Accounting Office) brought this to congressional attention in 1977 after being asked to estimate government-wide advertising expenses: There is no requirement that agencies identify advertising costs within their budgets. Also, budgeting of these costs varies by agency. For example, military recruiting advertising is budgeted under Operations and Maintenance for each of the military departments, and Energy Research and Development Administration recruiting is budgeted under Program Direction, Program Support. Energy Research and Development Administration public information is budgeted under … Program Support. The challenges of defining advertising and, therefore, advertising expenses are significant. Hypothetical examples can be illustrative of the challenges. An agency's "communications specialist" draws up a press release touting his or her agency's policy achievements of the past year, e-mails copies of it to newspaper editors around the country, and holds subsequent telephone interviews with reporters. An agency hires a private advertising firm to help it work with Ad Council to produce a public service announcement that discourages dangerous behaviors that inflict large costs on society and the government. The announcement is run on radio and television stations at no cost to the agency, and the agency's head delivers public speeches on the subject in 10 cities throughout the United States. The questions these examples provoke include the following: Do these activities constitute advertising? Or might any of these examples be more accurately characterized as public notification, media relations, or public education activities? How should an agency account for the government employee time and agency resources (in-house expenses) related to these activities? In accounting for costs, should an agency also tabulate any benefits (or return on investment) of the communications? Despite these challenges, an estimate of the federal government's expenditures on contracts for advertising services can be derived from utilizing data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). The FPDS has some significant limitations as a data source for agency advertising expenditures. The FPDS does not include expenditures by the legislative or judicial branches or the U.S. Postal Service. Moreover, the FPDS does not include any agency in-house expenses related to advertising. Finally, without agreement among agencies over what constitutes advertising, any contracting data drawn from FPDS must be viewed with considerable caution. According to FPDS data, federal agencies spent $892.5 million on contracts for "advertising services" in FY2013. ( Figure 1 ) The five agencies that spent the most for advertising service contracts in FY2013 were the Department of Defense: $419.0 million; the Department of Health and Human Services: $197.4 million; the Department of Education: $128.8 million; the Department of Veterans Affairs: $61.8 million; and the Department of Transportation: $43.0 million. Generally speaking, there are few government-wide restrictions on government advertising. Furthermore, no single agency is charged with tracking and overseeing the advertising expenditures of federal agencies. Some restrictions on agencies' advertising expenditures may be found in annual appropriations acts, the U.S. Code , and the Code of Federal Regulations . For example, the Department of Defense has been prohibited from using appropriated funds to pay the costs of advertising by any defense contractor (10 U.S.C. 114 amendments); and 7 C.F.R. 12 contains guidelines for government advertisements promoting blueberries, honey, and mohair, among other agricultural products. For many decades, annual Treasury appropriations laws have contained prohibitions on the use of funds for the purpose of "publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the Congress." A fuller statement of the limitations on government advertising may be found in GAO's Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Volume I . Though not an independent source of legal authority, Principles does provide some guidance as to what may be viewed as improper and/or illegal agency use of appropriated funds for agency activities that might be construed as advertising. Principles begins with the 1919 federal anti-lobbying law (18 U.S.C. 1913) that prohibits agencies from using government funds to pay for advertisements that are designed to sway Members of Congress. Principles also describes the prohibitions against "publicity and propaganda" included in appropriations acts since 1949, the limitations on informational activities by agencies, and the prohibition of government use of "publicity experts." Principles notes, Whether an agency's appropriations are available for advertising, like any other expenditure, depends on the agency's statutory authority. Whether to advertise and, if so, how far to go with it are determined by the precise terms of the agency's program authority in conjunction with the necessary expense doctrine and general restrictions on the use of public funds such as the various anti-lobbying statutes. Under the "necessary expense doctrine," an agency may use a general appropriation to pay any expense that is (1) necessary or incidental to the achievement of the underlying objectives of the appropriation, (2) not prohibited by law, and (3) not otherwise provided for by statute or appropriation. "Thus," GAO explains, "the Navy could exercise its statutory authorization to promote safety and accident prevention by procuring book matches with safety slogans printed on the covers and distributing them without charge at naval installations." The Department of Justice is responsible for prosecutions under the aforementioned 1919 anti-lobbying law. Otherwise, oversight, investigation, and enforcement of appropriate practices regarding government advertising falls to agencies' inspectors general, GAO, and Congress. It is unclear how vigorously the limits on government advertising are being enforced. It does not appear that the Department of Justice has indicted anyone for lobbying with appropriated funds. GAO has issued comptroller general opinions that fault agency use of appropriated funds for advertising. However, GAO reviews of agency advertising result only after congressional request, and its opinions are advisory—they do not have the force of law. Primary oversight of government agency advertising has been exercised by Congress. In recent years, it has examined some large advertising campaigns, often when some Members of Congress have perceived the advertisements as being overly promotional of a policy or program.

Government advertising can be controversial if it conflicts with citizens' views about the proper role of government. Yet some government advertising is accepted as a normal part of government information activities. It is difficult to calculate the amount of funds spent by the federal government on advertising each year. The reasons for this include (1) there is no government-wide definition of what constitutes advertising and (2) there is no central authority to which agencies are required to report advertising expenses. However, an estimate of the federal government's expenditures on contracts for advertising services can be derived from data in the Federal Procurement Data System. According to these data, federal agencies spent $892.5 million on advertising services in FY2013. Agencies' discretion to advertise is limited primarily by restrictions imposed by Congress in authorization and appropriations statutes and by the principles set forth in volume 1 of the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) Principles of Federal Appropriations Law. Any oversight of government advertising expenditures rests with agencies' inspectors general, GAO, and Congress.

In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford signed the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq .; TSCA), giving the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to regulate production and use of industrial chemicals not otherwise regulated in U.S. commerce. Thirty-five years of experience with TSCA implementation and enforcement have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions in Title I. Based on hearing testimony, stakeholders generally agree that TSCA needs to be updated, although there is disagreement about the extent and nature of any proposed revisions. Democrats introduced legislation to amend TSCA Title I in the 111 th Congress ( S. 3209 and H.R. 5820 ), but Congress did not vote on either bill. Those previous bills proposed generally similar changes to TSCA that were summarized in CRS Report R41335, Proposed Amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA): Senate and House Bills Compared with Current Law . On April 14, 2011, Senator Frank Lautenberg introduced similar, but not identical, legislation ( S. 847 ) in the 112 th Congress. To date, no other legislation has been introduced that would amend core provisions of TSCA Title I. Therefore, this report compares key provisions of S. 847 , as introduced, with provisions of TSCA Title I (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. ) that would be affected if S. 847 becomes law. These provisions are summarized in Tables 1 through 5. New provisions that would be added to the end of TSCA Title I by S. 847 —for example, those related to reduced use of animals for toxicity testing—are summarized in Table 6 . S. 847 would not affect Titles II through VI of TSCA, nor would it change the basic organization of TSCA Title I. For example, provisions related to testing would still be in Section 4, requirements for notifying EPA when a new chemical or new use is proposed would still be in Section 5, and regulatory authorities would remain in Section 6. Also unaffected would be changes to TSCA Title I that were enacted during the 110 th Congress, such as a provision that bans exports of elemental mercury. However, S. 847 would amend or delete most of the original Title I provisions and would make substantial additions to current law. Some key changes are summarized below. S. 847 , as introduced, directs the EPA Administrator to establish varied or tiered minimum data set requirements for different chemical substances or categories of substances. Manufacturers would be given a specified period of time to produce and submit data meeting the minimum data requirements for chemicals that are already in commerce and for any new chemicals that they propose to manufacture. Data sets would have to be submitted within five years of the date of enactment of S. 847 . Current law does not routinely require submission of data for chemicals, but EPA has the authority to require data submission if it promulgates a rule based on a finding that a chemical "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" and the agency demonstrates a data need. S. 847 directs the EPA Administrator to prioritize all chemicals already in commerce for evaluation and risk management by establishing a list that "contains the names of the chemical substances that … warrant placement within 1 of 3 priority classes … and identifies the priority class to which each listed chemical substance or category of chemical substance has been assigned by the Administrator." Priority class 1 chemicals would be defined as those "... that the Administrator determines require immediate risk management." The Administrator would be required to place between 20 and 30 chemicals in this category, and the data set for a high-priority chemical would have to be submitted within 18 months of its placement on the priority class 1 list. Priority class 2 chemicals would be defined as those "that the Administrator determines require safety standard determinations … based on any more-than-theoretical concern, that there is uncertainty as to whether a chemical substance would satisfy the safety standard." Priority class 3 chemicals would be defined as those "that the Administrator determines require no immediate action." Chemicals are not prioritized under current law. The Senate bill would establish a health-based safety standard for chemical use that protects vulnerable populations: manufacturers would be required to produce scientific data demonstrating "there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result to human health or the environment from aggregate exposure to the chemical substance." S. 847 would prohibit manufacture, processing, and distribution of any chemical substance for any use that had not been included in the safety determination issued for that chemical. Moreover, an exemption from a prohibition would be allowed for a particular use only if: it were "in the paramount interest of national security"; lack of the chemical use "would cause significant disruption in the national economy"; the use were essential or critical and there were no safer feasible alternative; or the chemical use, relative to alternatives, provided a benefit to health, the environment, or public safety. In contrast, current law allows manufacture of and commerce in a chemical unless EPA promulgates a rule including a finding that a chemical presents or will present an "unreasonable risk" to human health or the environment. If EPA demonstrates that a risk associated with a chemical is unreasonable (relative to the benefits provided by the chemical and the estimated risks and benefits of any alternatives), the Agency is required to regulate, but only to the extent necessary to reduce that risk to a reasonable level and using "the least burdensome" restriction. S. 847 would expedite regulatory action, relative to the process under current law, by authorizing EPA in some cases to issue administrative orders instead of rules (which must be promulgated under current law), exempting certain EPA decisions from judicial review, and removing certain TSCA requirements that are in addition to requirements specified in the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) for notice and comment rulemaking. The scope of EPA oversight also would be expanded by S. 847 . As introduced, the bill includes language that allows EPA to define various distinct forms of substances that are the same in terms of molecular identity but differ in structure and function, such as manufactured nanoscale forms of carbon and silver. The introduced bill also broadens the scope of environmental risks that EPA may manage to include risks found in the indoor environment; currently, TSCA applies only to chemicals in the ambient environment. S. 847 also would appear to more clearly authorize EPA control of risks posed by articles containing a substance. The proposed amendments to TSCA would increase public access to information about EPA's decisions, as well as to some information about chemicals that currently is treated as confidential business information. S. 847 would authorize EPA activities not currently authorized under TSCA to allow implementation of three international agreements pertaining to persistent organic pollutants and other hazardous chemicals. For example, the proposal would authorize EPA to regulate chemicals manufactured solely for export. The authority provided by the bill would be specific to three international agreements, rather than more generally authorizing regulatory activity to implement any ratified international agreement concerning chemicals. The bill would prohibit production and use of chemicals when it was inconsistent with U.S. obligations under any of the three international agreements after they had entered into force for the United States. For more information about these agreements, see CRS Report RS22379, Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs): Fact Sheet on Three International Agreements . The effect of TSCA on state and local chemical laws would be modified by S. 847 , as introduced. Current law, TSCA Section 18, generally does not preempt state laws. However, if EPA requires testing of a chemical under section 4, no state may require testing of the same substance for similar purposes. Similarly, if EPA prescribes a rule or order under section 5 or 6, no state or political subdivision may have a requirement for the same substance to protect against the same risk unless the state or local requirement is identical to the federal requirement, is adopted under authority of another federal law, or generally prohibits the use of the substance in the state or political subdivision. TSCA authorizes states and political subdivisions to petition EPA, and authorizes EPA to grant petitions, by rule, to exempt a law in effect in a state or political subdivision under certain circumstances. A petition may be granted if compliance with the requirement would not cause activities involving the substance to be in violation of the EPA requirement, and the state or local requirement provides a significantly higher degree of protection from the risk than the EPA requirement does, but does not "unduly burden interstate commerce." S. 847 would simplify this section of TSCA. An amended TSCA would not preempt laws relating to a chemical substance, mixture, or article unless compliance with both federal and the state or local law were impossible. Several new provisions are included in S. 847 . One provision, for example, would require definition and listing of localities with populations that are "disproportionately exposed" to toxic chemicals. EPA would be directed to develop an action plan to reduce exposure in such "hot spots." EPA would be required to establish a program to create market incentives for the development of safer alternatives to existing chemical substances that reduce or avoid the use and generation of hazardous substances. The program would be required to expedite review of a new chemical substance if an alternatives analysis indicated it was a safer alternative, and to recognize a substance or product determined by EPA to be a safer alternative. Another provision would direct the EPA Administrator to coordinate with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to conduct a biomonitoring study to determine whether a chemical that research had indicated may be present in human biological substances and that may have adverse effects on human development in fact was present in pregnant women and infants. If the chemical were found to be present, manufacturers and processors would have to disclose to EPA, commercial customers, consumers, and the general public all known uses of the chemical and all articles in which the chemical was expected to be present. Children's environmental health also is addressed by the bill. It would establish a children's environmental health research program at EPA and an advisory committee to provide independent advice relating to implementation of TSCA and protection of children's health. S. 847 , as introduced, also establishes at least four research centers to encourage the development of safer alternatives to existing hazardous chemical substances. "Green chemistry and engineering" also would be promoted through grants. Finally, S. 847 would direct EPA to minimize use of animals in toxicity testing. An advisory committee would be established to publish a list of testing methods that reduce use of animals. This provision aims to expedite development of so-called "alternative testing methods," which have been under development for many years, but remain a minor component of toxicity testing programs. Tables 1 through 6 summarize these and other selected provisions of S. 847 .

Thirty-five years of experience implementing and enforcing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions. Stakeholders appear to agree that TSCA needs to be updated, although there is disagreement about the extent and nature of any proposed revisions. S. 847 in the 112th Congress legislation would amend core provisions of TSCA Title I. This report compares key provisions of S. 847, as introduced, with current law (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.). Generally, S. 847 would increase the amount of information about chemical toxicity and usage that chemical manufacturers and processors would be required to submit to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and would facilitate EPA regulation of toxic chemicals. The bill directs EPA to establish, by rule, varied or tiered minimum data set requirements for different chemical substances or categories of substances. Data would be required from chemical manufacturers and processors for all chemicals within five years of the date of enactment of S. 847, earlier for high-priority chemicals. All chemicals already in commerce are to be placed on a list and prioritized by EPA into three groups based on the need for risk management. A chemical must be included in the highest priority class if it "is, or is degraded and metabolized into, a persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic substance with the potential for widespread exposure to humans or other organisms." EPA is required to determine whether chemicals in the top two priority classes, as well as all new chemicals, meet a stringent new safety standard, given the imposition of any needed restrictions on manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal. The bill would prohibit any activities with respect to an evaluated chemical substance that the EPA had not specifically allowed in the safety standard determination. In contrast, current law authorizes data collection from manufacturers only if exposure is expected to be substantial or if EPA determines that a chemical may pose an unreasonable risk. TSCA as currently written allows all chemicals to enter and remain in commerce unless EPA can show that a chemical poses "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." EPA then must regulate to control unreasonable risk, but only to the extent necessary using the "least burdensome" means of available control. This TSCA standard has been interpreted to require cost-benefit balancing. S. 847 also would add new sections to TSCA. Of particular significance is a section authorizing actions that would allow U.S. implementation of three international agreements, which the United States has signed but not yet ratified. Other new sections would provide authority for EPA to support research in so-called "green" engineering and chemistry, promote alternatives to toxicity testing on animals, encourage research on children's environmental health, and require biomonitoring of pregnant women and infants. A "hot spots" provision would require EPA to identify locations where residents are disproportionately exposed to pollution and to develop strategies for reducing their risks. Key provisions of S. 847 are compared with current law in Tables 1 through 6.

In snap elections on October 21, 2007, Poles turned out the rightist Law and Justice (PiS) party, which had ruled the country for a tumultuous 15 months. Led by identical twins Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski, who served as Prime Minister and President, respectively, PiS had held a slight lead in early polls, but an unusually strong performance by opposition leader Donald Tusk in a nationally televised debate with Jaroslaw on October 15 apparently convinced many Poles that they should turn the reins of government over to Tusk and his party. On election day, Tusk's center-right Civic Alliance (PO) won a 41.5% plurality; PiS captured 32%, while the Left and Democrats (LiD) picked up 13%, and the Polish Peasants' Party received 8.9%. The vote, held a full two years ahead of schedule, was prompted by the collapse of the PiS-led government. After the late 2005 elections, the Kaczynskis' party had ruled together with the populist-nationalist Self Defense (SO) party, and the League of Polish Families (LPR), an ultra-conservative party aligned with the Catholic church. The two smaller parties had at times blocked PiS initiatives. The coalition was dissolved in early August 2007, when members of SO withdrew from the government after their leader, Andrej Lepper, was fired from his cabinet post on bribery charges. When LPR also left the coalition, PiS was left with just 150 members in the 460-seat lower house of parliament, and decided to call elections in hopes of strengthening its mandate. The decision to hold early elections proved to be a political miscalculation by Jaroslaw, who underestimated popular dissatisfaction with his government and the consequent determination of Poles to oust PiS. Turnout on election day was 55.3%—the largest since the end of the communist era. This unprecedented voter participation, particularly by young people, is considered to have been a key factor. Although PiS received more votes in 2007 than it had in the 2005 elections, the increase came largely at the expense of its former coalition partners, SO and LPD, neither of which managed to pass the 5% threshold necessary for representation in parliament. In addition, the increase in PiS votes was more than offset by the big jump in turnout—15% over earlier elections. Tusk's party won 209 seats, and its coalition partner, the centrist Polish Peasants Party, took 31; together, they hold a comfortable majority in parliament, and Tusk was sworn in as Prime Minister in November 2007. However, the new government will likely face staunch resistance on some issues from President Lech Kaczynski, whose term runs until 2010. Since a 60% vote is necessary to override a presidential veto, the government may need occasional help from the leftist LiD. Some analysts believe that the elections reflected a tug-of-war between the emerging liberal (i.e., free-market) Poland, embodied by Tusk's PO, and the Poland of "social solidarity," which advocates continued government intervention in the economy represented by PiS. However, on a practical level, many Poles believed that, rather than addressing needed reforms, PiS had embarrassed Poland internationally and had wasted precious time and resources in its hunt to expose members of the so-called Uklad —the "web" of former communist elites that the Kaczynski brothers were convinced had manipulated successive governments from behind the curtain since 1989. In addition, PiS's conduct during the campaign was criticized by both domestic and international media. The Financial Times , for example, claimed that the former ruling party " ... resorted to blatant abuse of power: dominating state television, threatening opponents with legal action and using confidential police files to blacken rivals' reputations." During October presidential debates, Tusk asserted that "Poles at home and abroad feel ashamed for the last two years." Some have argued that PO's approach to governance—and to international relations—likely will differ more in style than in content from the outgoing regime. PO's coalition partner, the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), is a centrist party that seeks to advance rural interests. Some analysts have predicted that the coalition partners might disagree on domestic proposals such as social security reforms and the introduction of a flat tax, and over international issues, such as acceptance of proposed reductions in the EU's Common Agricultural Policy budget. Poland's economy is among the most successful transition economies in east central Europe; most of the post-1989 governments have generally supported free-market reforms. Today the private sector accounts for over two-thirds of economic activity. In recent years, Poland has enjoyed rapid economic development, and the economy has performed well in spite of the political turmoil. GDP grew by 6.2% in 2006, around 6.6% in 2007, and is predicted to rise by 5.2% in 2008. The employment picture has brightened; though still high at 11.4% in December 2007, joblessness is at its lowest level in several years. Analysts attribute the reduction to improved job prospects and also to the emigration of 1-2 million Polish workers, mainly to other EU countries. Despite its center-right label, PiS was characterized as having somewhat statist economic policies. For example, it espoused that "national champions" in certain sectors be identified and nurtured. In addition, PiS sought to revise the previous, leftist government's reforms that had introduced greater flexibility in the labor code. However, some observers contend that economic policy generally did not appear to be a priority for PiS, perhaps because most of the major indicators were positive. PO is often referred to in the media as "business-friendly." In fiscal policy, the new government may seek to curtail certain subsidies and redirect spending toward such areas as education. For now, it has apparently backed away from its campaign promise to institute a flat tax, as has been done in other countries in the region; such a plan would have encountered resistance from the PSL. Instead, the government has opted to reduce tax brackets from three to two. PO has also announced that it will seek to move ahead with the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and to install competent managers—rather than political cronies—in firms that remain under government control. Energy is one area where PO will maintain some of the policies instituted by PiS. Although PO is reportedly encouraging the resumption of privatization in the sector—which PiS resisted—it will continue the policy of seeking to reduce dependence upon Russia, which supplies a large part of Poland's gas and oil. For example, the PiS government instituted talks with Norway over laying a pipeline and constructing LNG (liquefied natural gas) terminals on the Baltic coast. In addition, Poland and the Baltic states are exploring a joint nuclear power project. Over the past three years, Poland has contributed a significant number of troops to the U.S.-led operation in Iraq. Observers note that the deployment is providing the Polish military with invaluable experience, not the least of which includes commanding a multinational division. However, Poland's presence in Iraq remains unpopular at home—a recent poll showed 85% opposition to the deployment. To date, 21 Polish soldiers have died in Iraq. During the fall election campaign, candidate Tusk pledged to pull out Polish troops if elected; Jaroslaw Kaczynski countered that Poles were not "deserters or cowards." On December 18, 2007, the new government requested that Poland's 900-troop presence in Iraq be extended until October 2008, at which time the soldiers would be withdrawn. Poland also has 1200 soldiers in Afghanistan—the new government proposes an additional 400 be dispatched there, although polls show clear public disapproval of the mission. Poland has been a member of the European Union (EU) since May 2004 and has already experienced economic benefits from membership, particularly in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, Poland was not reluctant to assert itself in a number of issue areas before joining the EU, and was even less hesitant to do so when it became a member. Some analysts view the Poland-EU dynamic as the most important foreign policy issue for the last government, as it highlighted the inward-turning, populist tendencies of PiS. During its relatively short tenure, the Kaczynski government clashed with fellow EU member states on a number of issues, including energy, banking rules, voting rights, the death penalty, and Russia. In turn, Poland's EU partners back Poland on some issues, such as the meat ban, but not on others. Poland's intransigence during the negotiations over the EU reform treaty drew strong criticism. According to the Financial Times , Jean-Claude Junker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, "said Poland's stance at [the June 2007] summit was 'very near to having been unacceptable.'" There may have been some political backlash to behavior of the PiS government as Poles became increasingly aware of the benefits of belonging to the EU—not only of the generous subsidies, but also of unimpeded travel and trade; a post-election poll showed 72% approval of EU membership. Prime Minister Tusk has indicated that he intends to consult more closely with fellow members on EU matters. However, although the tone of its debates with the EU may become less confrontational, Poland's new government will continue to staunchly defend Warsaw's perceived interests vis-a-vis Brussels. For example, the Polish Peasants Party reportedly will be negotiating budget reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, and will seek to fend off cuts in subsidies. Nevertheless, according to one analyst, Poland's new government "will think twice before vetoing EU decisions." The new government is set to cast a wider net internationally than its predecessor. At a recent meeting with foreign diplomats in Warsaw, Tusk indicated that, in addition to working more closely with the EU, his government will explore opportunities for greater regional cooperation through such forums as the Weimar Triangle (Poland-France-Germany), and the Visegrad Group (Poland-Slovakia-Hungary-Czech Republic). Poland may also seek to cooperate on energy matters with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. Finally, the Prime Minister announced he will travel to South America in 2008. Under the Kaczynski government, Poland's bilateral relations with Germany and Russia became strained at times. Poland raised alarm in the EU and NATO after Russia temporarily cut gas supplies to Ukraine and other states in 2006 and 2007. Many Poles were incensed over the Russo-German agreement to construct a natural gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, rather than overland, through the Baltic states and Poland. During the 2005 presidential campaign, Lech Kaczynski said that, if elected, he would maintain a "firm but friendly" relationship with Russia. He also reminded Poles of the devastation wrought by Germany during World War II, but denied that raising this issue was an attempt to influence the election outcome. In mid-2006, Lech cancelled his attendance at a regional summit meeting after the German government, citing freedom of the press, declined to apologize for a German newspaper article satirizing the Kaczynski brothers. Prime Minister Tusk has sought to effect a speedy improvement in relations with the two countries. In December, he traveled to Germany, where he met with Chancellor Angela Merkel. He also recruited Holocaust survivor and former foreign minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski as an advisor, and tasked him with mending ties with Berlin. Several important bilateral issues, such as the proposed pipeline, are still pending, but the new government appears to believe they can be better solved through cooperation rather than confrontation. In his first major post-election address, Tusk mentioned the need for greater dialog with Russia. After the new government was settled in, two actions seemed to signal an improvement in relations: in late November, the Tusk government dropped Poland's objection to Russia joining the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, and the following month Russia announced that it would lift its two year-old restrictions on the importation of Polish meat. Poland and the United States have historically close relations. Under successive governments since 9/11, Warsaw has been a reliable supporter and ally in the global war on terrorism and, as noted earlier, has contributed troops to the U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Poland also has cooperated with the United States on "such issues as democratization, nuclear proliferation, human rights, regional cooperation ... and UN reform." During Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski's September 2006 visit to Washington, D.C., Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the two countries as "the best of friends." One month later, however, Tusk accused Kaczynski of servility toward the United States. Immediately after the elections, Tusk said he hoped for "better cooperation with the United States in which Poland will be a true partner." Tusk highlighted two areas in particular: the Iraq conflict (see above) and missile defense. Early in 2007, the Bush Administration began formal negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic over a plan to establish missile defense facilities on their territory to protect against missiles from countries such as Iran; the plan would entail placing radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor launchers in Poland. Some Poles believe their country would risk being targeted by rogue state missiles and terrorist attacks because of the presence of the U.S. interceptors on their soil. In addition, many Poles are concerned over Russia's vehement objections to the proposal. Former Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski reportedly pressed for a special security guarantee from the United States, as well as for Patriot missiles to shield Poland against short- and medium-range missiles. In July 2007, President Kaczynski stated that a missile defense agreement "is largely a foregone conclusion," prompting some critics to fault him for approving the U.S. plan without having ensured that Poland's interests would be sufficiently addressed. After the elections, Tusk was more circumspect about the plan, and there were indications that his government might wish to delay an agreement until after the November 2008 U.S. elections. On February 2, 2008, during a visit by now-Foreign Minister Sikorski to Washington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of State Rice voiced support for strengthening Poland's air defenses. Although there was said to be agreement "in principle" on the missile defense issue, it is not expected that an accord will be signed when Prime Minister Tusk visits the United States in March. Finally, some Poles have argued that, despite the human casualties and financial costs their country has borne in Iraq and Afghanistan, their loyalty to the United States has gone largely unrewarded. Many have hoped that the Bush Administration would respond favorably by providing increased military assistance and particularly by changing its visa policy, which currently requires Poles to pay a $100 non-refundable fee, and then submit to an interview at a U.S. embassy or consulate—requirements that are waived for most western European countries, which qualify to be included in the Visa Waiver Program.

After a governmental deadlock caused by intra-coalition squabbling, Poland held snap parliamentary elections on October 21, 2007; the vote was seen by many as a referendum on the governing style and policies of the then-ruling Law and Justice party. Under that government, the presidency and prime minister's post were held by twin brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Their government's nationalist policies caused controversy domestically and in the international arena as well. Many observers believe that under the new center-right Civic Alliance-led government, domestic policies will change more in tone than in substance. Poland's relations with neighboring states and the European Union are expected to improve, but ties with the United States may become more complicated. This report may be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report RS22509, Poland: Background and Policy Trends of the Kaczynski Government, by [author name scrubbed].

The dispute in Gonzales v. Raich involved a conflict between California's Compassionate Use Act and the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). In August 2002, after federal agents seized and destroyed the respondent's medicinal marijuana plants, suit was brought in the Northern District of California seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief against the U.S. Attorney General preventing the prosecution of medicinal users pursuant to the CSA. Respondents argued that "as applied" to their specific situations the CSA exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, was unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the respondents could not establish a likelihood of success on the merits. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison , ( Lopez/Morrison ) held that, "as applied" to the respondents, the CSA exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. In so holding, the court constructed a narrow affected class of activity, namely, the "intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance with state law." With this narrowly defined class of activity, the court proceeded to apply the four factor Lopez/Morrison test. With respect to the first factor—whether or not the activity is commercial or economic in nature—the court concluded that the narrow class of activity in this case could not be considered commercial or economic in nature. The court next considered whether the CSA contains an express jurisdictional element that would limit its reach to those cases that substantially affect interstate commerce. With no stated analysis, and apparently persuaded by the reasoning of a district court opinion, the court concluded that "[n]o such jurisdictional hook exists in the relevant portions of the CSA." With respect to whether the legislative history contains congressional findings regarding the effects on interstate commerce, the court was able to cite findings relating to the effect that intrastate drug trafficking activity would have on interstate commerce. While admitting that the legislative history lends support to the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause, the court proceeded to diminish the importance of these findings by arguing that they were not specific to either marijuana or the medicinal use of marijuana, but rather related to the general effects of drug trafficking on interstate commerce. In addition, the court referred to language in Morrison , discussing the limited role of congressional findings. Moreover, the court referenced Ninth Circuit precedent concluding that the first and fourth prongs of the Morrison test—whether the statute regulates an economic enterprise and whether the link is attenuated—are the most significant factors to the analysis. Finally, with respect to whether the link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is attenuated, the court expressed doubt that the interstate effect of homegrown medical marijuana is substantial. Citing authority questioning the validity of the federal government's claim of an effect on interstate commerce, the court concluded that "this factor favors a finding that the CSA cannot constitutionally be applied to the class of activities at issue in this case." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically on the question of whether the power vested in Congress by both the "Necessary and Proper Clause," and the "Commerce Clause" of Article I includes the power to prohibit the local growth, possession, and use of marijuana permissible as a result of California's law. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and held that Congress's power to regulate commerce extends to purely local activities that are "part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." In reaching its conclusions, the Court relied heavily on its 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn , which held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act's federal quota system applied to bushels of wheat that were homegrown and personally consumed. Wickard stands for the proposition that Congress can rationally combine the effects that an individual producer has on an interstate market to find substantial impacts on interstate commerce. The Court pointed to numerous similarities between the facts presented in Raich and those in Wickard . Initially, the Court noted that because the commodities being cultivated in both cases are fungible and that well-established interstate markets exist, both markets are susceptible to fluctuations in supply and demand based on production intended for home-consumption being introduced into the national market. According to the Court, just as there was no difference between the wheat Mr. Wickard produced for personal consumption and the wheat cultivated for sale on the open market, there is no discernable difference between personal home-grown medicinal marijuana and marijuana grown for the express purpose of being sold in the interstate market. Thus, the Court concluded that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that "leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions." Respondents argued that Wickard was distinguishable because in the case of wheat the activity involved was purely commercial, and the evidence clearly established that the aggregate production of wheat had a significant effect on the interstate market. Conversely, respondents claimed that the activity at issue in Raich is non-commercial—the respondents had never attempted to sell their marijuana—and Congress had made no finding that the personal cultivation and use of medicinal marijuana has a substantial effect on the interstate marijuana market. The Court, however, noted that the standard for assessing the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, is not whether the activity at issue, when aggregated, substantially affects interstate commerce; but rather, whether there exists a "rational basis" for Congress to have concluded as such. The Court, applying this deferential standard, concluded that "Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA." Moreover, the Court affirmed that "Congress was acting well within its authority to 'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper' to 'regulate Commerce ... among the several States.'" Despite having concluded that under the "rational basis test" Congress had acted within its constitutional authority when it enacted the CSA and applied it to intrastate possession of marijuana, the Court nevertheless had to distinguish Lopez and Morrison , the Court's more recent Commerce Clause decisions. The Court concluded that the CSA, unlike the statutes in either Lopez (Gun Free School Zones Act) or Morrison (Violence Against Women Act), regulated activity that is "quintessentially economic," therefore, neither Lopez or Morrison cast any doubts on the constitutionality of the statute. The Court specifically rejected the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit, concluding that "Congress acted rationally in determining that none of the characteristics making up the purported class, whether viewed individually or in the aggregate, compelled an exemption from the CSA; rather, the subdivided class of activities defined by the Court of Appeals was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme." In supporting its conclusions, the Court noted that, by characterizing marijuana as a "Schedule I" narcotic, Congress was implicitly finding that it had no medicinal value at all. In addition, the Court returned to the fact that medicinal marijuana was a fungible good, thus making it indistinguishable from the recreational versions that Congress had clearly intended to regulate. According to the Court, to carve out medicinal use as a distinct class of activity, as the Ninth Circuit had done, would effectively make " any federal regulation (including quality, prescription, or quantity controls) of any locally cultivated and possessed controlled substance for any purpose beyond the 'outer limits' of Congress'[s] Commerce Clause authority." Moreover, the Court held that California's state law permitting the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes cannot be the basis for placing the respondent's class of activity beyond the reach of the federal government, due to the Supremacy Clause, which requires that, in the event of a conflict between state and federal law, the federal law shall prevail. Finally, the Court responded to the respondent's argument that its activities are not an "essential part of a larger regulatory scheme" because they are both isolated and policed by the State of California and they are completely separate and distinct from the interstate market. The Court held that not only could Congress have rationally rejected this argument, but also that it "seem[ed] obvious" that doctors, patients, and caregivers will increase the supply and demand for the substance on the open market. In sum, the Court concluded that the case for exemption can be distilled down to an argument that a locally grown product used domestically is immune from federal regulation, which has already been precluded by the Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn . Justice O'Connor's dissent focused on the lack of evidence indicating that medicinal marijuana users have a discernable or significant effect on the interstate market which Congress sought to regulate. Moreover, Justice O'Connor, emphasizing the system of "joint sovereignty" espoused by James Madison, argued that this overreaching by the federal government deprives the States of their ability to make their own independent political judgments with respect to the validity of medicinal marijuana laws. Both Justice Scalia's concurring opinion and Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion focused on the scope and import of the "Necessary and Proper" clause. Justice Scalia's opinion argued that because Congress could rationally have concluded that regulating such intrastate activity would have undercut its objective of prohibiting the sale of marijuana on the interstate market, it was necessary to extend the scope of the CSA to encompass this behavior. On the other hand, Justice Thomas's dissent argues that the "Necessary and Proper Clause" as originally understood cannot be used to expand the scope of Congress's enumerated powers. According to Justice Thomas, by allowing Congress to regulate such intrastate, non-commercial activity the Court has effectively granted the federal government a general police power over the entire country that subverts the Constitution's basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.

In Gonzales v. Raich , the Supreme Court was presented with a conflict between California's state law, permitting the medicinal use of marijuana, and the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The Ninth Circuit had found the federal law unconstitutional "as applied," concluding that its enforcement against medicinal users was beyond Congress's enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would substantially affect conditions in the interstate market. The Court, in reaching its decision, specifically relied on Wickard v. Filburn (1942), which held that Congress could aggregate the impact of individual actors on the interstate market to find a substantial impact on interstate commerce.

In an effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate billions of dollars in improper payments made by federal agencies each year, Congress passed the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) in 2002. IPIA established an initial framework for identifying, measuring, and reporting on improper payments at each agency. Under IPIA, an improper payment is defined as a payment that should not have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. This definition includes payments made to ineligible recipients, duplicate payments, payments for a good or service not received, and payments that do not account for credit for applicable discounts. In FY2010, Congress amended IPIA to require improvements in agency improper payments estimation and reporting processes, among other changes. Under IPIA, as amended, agencies are required to identify programs susceptible to significant improper payments, to estimate the amount of improper payments issued under those programs, and to notify Congress of the steps being taken to address the root causes of the improper payments. Generally, a program is deemed susceptible to "significant" improper payments if it has (1) improper payments that exceed both $10 million and 2.5% of total program payments, or (2) more than $100 million in total improper payments. For FY2013, agencies determined that 85 programs were susceptible to significant improper payments, and that those programs issued more than $106 billion in improper payments that year. Since FY2004, when agencies first began reporting improper payments, the government has identified approximately $800 billion in erroneous payments. Table 1 shows annual improper payment amounts for the 85 risk-susceptible programs from FY2004 through FY2013. The data in Table 1 show that the amount of improper payments reported was relatively flat through FY2007, after which it increased rapidly—nearly tripling by FY2010—and has then slowly declined. The increase in improper payments between FY2007 and FY2010 can be partially attributed to the inclusion of new programs. A number of programs with billions of dollars in annual outlays lacked valid improper payments estimates and did not begin reporting until FY2008. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) first reported on Medicaid, for example, in FY2008, estimating $19 billion in improper payments out of $178 billion in outlays that fiscal year. In addition, government expenditures for public assistance increased between FY2007 and FY2010 as the economy weakened, which further increased the amount of improper payments issued under many risk-susceptible programs. Expenditures under the Medicare Fee-for-Service program, for example, increased from $276 billion in FY2007 to $326 billion in FY2010, while the program's improper payments increased from $11 billion to $30 billion during that same time. As suggested in the previous section, a relatively small number of programs with annual improper payments of $1 billion or more account for a significant portion of the government's total improper payments. With this in mind, in November 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13520, which required the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to work with agencies to identify "high priority" programs (those which account for the "highest dollar value or majority of improper payments" across the government), establish annual targets for reducing improper payments under high priority programs, and submit a report to the agency's inspector general that detailed how the agency planned to meet those targets. The executive order also required agencies to publish data on improper payments estimates and targets for the high priority programs they administer. In response to E.O. 13520, OMB created a central website, PaymentAccuracy.gov, which includes data for all high priority programs, as the executive order required. OMB also revised OMB Circular A-123, Appendix C, to incorporate the new requirements for high priority programs. Under the revised circular, a program is deemed high priority if it has reported more than $750 million in improper payments in the most recent fiscal year; not reported an improper payments amount for the most recent fiscal year, but has reported more than $750 million in improper payments in a previous fiscal year; or not yet reported on improper payments for the program as a whole, but has determined that the total amount of improper payments for program components that have been measured exceeds $750 million. As of July 2014, OMB had identified 13 high priority programs, 12 of which reported improper payment amounts for FY2013. According to OMB, data on the one high priority program that has not yet reported any improper payments amounts, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), may be available at the end of FY2014 when a valid error rate is anticipated to be established. Five other high priority programs did not begin reporting improper payments data in FY2004, as required under IPIA, due to difficulties developing estimates. These programs were the National School Lunch Program, which first reported improper payment amounts for FY2007; Medicaid, Medicare Part C, and Pell Grants, each of which first reported for FY2008; and Medicare Part D, which first reported improper payment amounts for FY2011. Data on high priority programs are thus incomplete, as the number of programs reporting improper payments amounts and rates varied over time. Table 2 , below, identifies the amount of improper payments issued by each high priority program from FY2004 through FY2013. The data in Table 2 show that 12 high priority programs issued $738 billion in improper payments in the past 10 fiscal years. The data also show that a subgroup of four of the high priority programs—Medicare Fee-for-Service, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, and Medicare Advantage—accounted for a large proportion of the government's total improper payments each of those years. In FY2013, those four programs accounted for $77 billion of the government's total improper payments of $106 billion. Restated, four programs accounted for an estimated 73% of all of the government's improper payments in the most recent fiscal year for which data are available. Three of those programs have seen their improper payments increase significantly since they first started reporting: improper payments for the Medicare Fee-for-Service program increased 64%, EITC 50%, and Medicare Advantage 71%. Overall, just 2 of the 12 high priority programs that have reported improper payments data so far, Medicaid and Rental Housing Assistance, have seen a decrease in the amount of annual improper payments between their first year of reporting and FY2013. Taken as a whole, high priority programs have accounted for a large percentage of the government's total annual improper payments each fiscal year. As Table 3 shows, high priority programs accounted for 85% to 96% of the improper payments reported by agencies annually from FY2004 through FY2013. The data in Table 3 show that after some fluctuation during the first five years of reporting, high priority programs have accounted for a relatively stable portion of the government's total improper payments. Between FY2004 and FY2008, high priority programs accounted for as much as 96% and as little as 85% of the government's total improper payments, a variance of 11 percentage points. By comparison, between FY2009 and FY2013, high priority programs accounted for as much as 95% and as little as 92% of the government's total improper payments—a variance of 3 percentage points. The first five years of reporting may have displayed greater variance because three new high priority programs were added during that time, while one new high priority program was added between FY2009 and FY2013. When new programs begin reporting data it may take time for agencies to refine their improper payments estimates. This could, in turn, increase year-to-year variations in total improper payments—variations that should theoretically diminish over time as agencies develop more accurate measures. Should the current trend continue into future fiscal years, high priority programs would account for 9 out of every 10 dollars reported as improper payments. OMB's guidance on high priority programs was intended to focus agency efforts on the subset of programs with the highest dollar amounts of improper payments. As the data in Table 4 show, however, the results have been mixed. While some high priority programs have seen a steady decline in their improper payments error rates, others have shown little or no improvement—and some have seen their error rates increase over time. The data show that the government-wide error rate has decreased steadily over the past five fiscal years. In FY2013, the government-wide error rate stood at 3.5%, a decline from its peak of 5.4% in FY2009. Notably, the error rate declined every year between FY2009 and FY2013, which may indicate that agency efforts to address the root causes of improper payments are yielding lasting results. The data also indicate, however, that several high priority programs have shown little or no improvement. The error rate for EITC—by far the highest of any high priority program—has remained virtually unchanged over 10 years of reporting. In FY2004, EITC's error rate stood at 24.5%, and at the end of FY2013 it stood at 24.0%. Two other high priority programs ended FY2013 with the same error rates that they had 10 years ago—Medicare Fee-for-Service (10.1%) and Retirement, Survivors, and Disability Income RSDI (0.3%). Moreover, the error rates for two high priority programs have increased over time. The error rate for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) increased from 7.3% in FY2004 to 8.1% in FY2013, and the error rate for Medicare Part D increased from 3.2% in FY2011—the first year it was reported—to 3.7% in FY2013. With regard to the latter program, only three years of data are available so a sustained trend is not yet established. The error rates for six high priority programs have decreased over time. For two of these programs, however, reduced error rates may not indicate improved program management. The error rate for Unemployment Insurance (UI) decreased from 10.3% in FY2004 to 9.3% in FY2013—but exceeded 10.0% in each of the intervening years. The FY2013 error rate may therefore be an anomaly. Similarly, the National School Lunch Program has reported a small reduction in its error rate over seven years, dropping from 16.3% in its first year of reporting (FY2007) to 15.7% in FY2013. This equates to an average reduction of one-tenth of one percentage point per year. At that rate, it would take more than 50 years for the program's error rate to reach single digits. By contrast, four high priority programs showed consistent, sustained reductions in their error rates. The error rate for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) fell from 6.6% in FY2004 to 3.4% in FY2013, and Medicaid's fell from 10.5% in FY2008—its first reporting year—to 5.8% in FY2013. In addition, the error rate for the Pell Grants program was cut in half between FY2004 and FY2013, and the error rate for the Rental Housing Assistance program declined from 6.9% to 4.9% over that same period. In sum, while the government-wide error rate has fallen each of the past four fiscal years, there has been little progress made reducing the error rates for a number of high priority programs. As a consequence, 10 years after agencies first reported improper payment rates and amounts, the government still issues more than $100 billion a year in improper payments.

The Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002 defines improper payments as payments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. This definition includes payments made to ineligible recipients, duplicate payments, payments for a good or service not received, and payments that do not account for credit for applicable discounts. Since FY2004, federal agencies have been required to report on the amount of improper payments they issue each year and take steps to address the root causes of the problem. The data show a significant increase in improper payments from FY2007 ($42 billion) to FY2010 ($121 billion), followed by a slight decrease through FY2013 ($106 billion). The increase in improper payment amounts may be partially attributed to an increase in the number of programs reporting between FY2007 and FY2010, as well as increased federal expenditures for many programs during that same timeframe. The data also show that a small subset of programs has accounted for 85% to 96% of the government's total improper payments each year. With that in mind, President Obama signed E.O. 13520 in 2009, which requires agencies to take additional measures with regard to these "high priority" programs. Notably, the executive order requires agencies to identify high priority programs, develop detailed plans for reducing related improper payments, and establish annual goals against which progress could be measured. Agencies have identified 13 high priority programs and all but one of them have been reporting data for several years. The data on high priority programs present mixed results. Four high priority programs showed sustained improvement over time, as indicated by steadily decreasing error rates, while four others reported little or no improvement in their error rates. Of the four remaining high priority programs that have reported data, error rates increased for two and slightly decreased for two others. Without further progress in reducing the error rates among high priority programs the government's total amount of improper payments may continue to exceed $100 billion per fiscal year, as it has since FY2009.

On September 5, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an Obama Administration initiative, was being rescinded. A related memorandum released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that same day rescinded the 2012 memorandum that established the DACA process. DACA was created to provide temporary relief from removal from the United States for individuals without a lawful immigration status who were brought to the United States as children and met other criteria. Under the DACA process, both initial grants of deferred action and renewals are issued for a period of two years. In addition to rescinding the 2012 DACA memorandum, the September 2017 memorandum states that DHS will "execute a wind-down" of DACA, during which it will "adjudicate certain requests for DACA and associated applications meeting certain parameters." These requests include initial and renewal requests for DACA accepted by DHS by September 5, 2017, and renewal requests from current DACA beneficiaries whose benefits will expire between September 5, 2017, and March 5, 2018, and whose renewal requests are accepted by DHS by October 5, 2017. The memorandum also states that DHS will not terminate previously issued grants of deferred action or employment authorization "solely based on the directives in this memorandum." To provide context for the Trump Administration's rescission of DACA and possible congressional action, this report addresses frequently asked questions about the DACA initiative. The DACA initiative was announced by former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano in a June 15, 2012, DHS memorandum entitled, "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children." The DACA initiative was not established by executive order. The eligibility criteria are under age 16 at the time of entry into the United States; under age 31 on June 15, 2012; continuous residence in the United States for at least five years before June 15, 2012 (that is, since June 15, 2007); physical presence in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making the request for consideration of deferred action; not in lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012; not convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors, and not otherwise a threat to national security or public safety; and in school, graduated from high school or obtained general education development certificate, or honorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces or the Coast Guard. In addition, an individual must be at least age 15 to request DACA, unless he or she is in removal proceedings or has a final removal order or voluntary departure order. An individual must have filed the following three forms with DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization Form I-765WS, Worksheet The individual also should have submitted evidence that he or she met the DACA eligibility requirements (see " What are the eligibility requirements for consideration of DACA? "). Yes. The fees, which most recently totaled $495, consisted of a Form I-765 filing fee of $410 and biometric services fee of $85. There were limited fee exemptions available. An individual must have requested and received a fee exemption before submitting a DACA request without a fee. Yes. The biographic and biometric information submitted by applicants is checked against databases maintained by DHS and other federal agencies. According to DHS, information provided in a DACA request generally "will not be proactively provided to other law enforcement entities (including ICE and CBP) for the purpose of immigration enforcement proceedings unless the requestor poses a risk to national security or public safety" or meets certain criteria. At the same time, DHS maintains the following: This policy, which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. No. USCIS's decision on a DACA request is discretionary. The period has closed. USCIS stopped accepting initial DACA requests as of September 5, 2017. However, the agency will reportedly adjudicate initial requests for DACA accepted by that date. Individuals granted deferred action may receive work authorization if they can demonstrate an economic necessity for employment. Previously, an individual granted deferred action under DACA who wanted to travel outside the United States could apply to USCIS for advance parole. Advance parole is permission for a foreign national to re-enter the United States after temporarily traveling abroad. USCIS, however, is no longer approving advance parole requests associated with DACA. At the same time, the September 2017 DHS memorandum stated that DHS "will generally honor the validity period for previously approved applications for advance parole." DACA recipients, like other foreign nationals without lawful immigration status, are barred from receiving federal public benefits with the exception of certain forms of short-term, emergency assistance. No. DACA recipients are not granted a lawful immigration status and are not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status. During the period of deferred action, however, the DACA recipient is in a period of stay authorized by DHS. Presumably, yes. According to DHS, the agency "will continue to exercise its discretionary authority to terminate or deny deferred action at any time when immigration officials determine termination or denial of deferred action is appropriate." The DACA recipient must satisfy the following criteria: the individual did not depart from the United States on or after August 15, 2012, without first obtaining advance parole (see " Are DACA recipients allowed to travel outside the United States? "); the individual has continuously resided in the United States since submitting his or her latest approved DACA request; and the individual has not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors, and is not a threat to national security or public safety. According to DHS, it will accept renewal requests from eligible DACA recipients until October 5, 2017 (see " Introduction "). To request a renewal of deferred action under DACA, an individual must file the following three forms with DHS/USCIS: Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization Form I-765WS, Worksheet The forms are available on the USCIS website, http://www.uscis.gov . An individual requesting a DACA renewal does not have to submit any documents that he or she previously provided to USCIS in connection with an approved DACA request. However, the individual does have to submit any new documents related to removal proceedings or criminal history. USCIS will request additional documentation from the individual, if needed. There is a total fee of $495, consisting of a Form I-765 filing fee of $410 and biometric services fee of $85. No. The decision on a request to renew DACA is discretionary, as it is on an initial DACA request. No. An individual granted deferred action (an initial grant or a renewal) is not given a lawful immigration status and is not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status (see " Are DACA recipients granted lawful immigration status? "). An individual who loses DACA would no longer have the protection from removal that DACA provides. Whether or not the U.S. government would take steps to remove that individual from the country is a separate issue. As of March 31, 2017, a total of 787,580 initial DACA requests and 799,077 renewal requests had been approved. Of all the initial DACA requests accepted by USCIS for consideration and decided by March 31, 2017 , approximately 92% were approved and 8% were denied, terminated, or withdrawn. For renewal requests accepted and decided by March 31, 2017, the approval rate was approximately 99% and the denial/termination/withdrawal rate was 1%. No legislation on DACA has been enacted. During the 113 th Congress, however, the House of Representatives passed a bill ( H.R. 5272 ) to prohibit using federal funds to process DACA applications. That bill read, in part: No agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government may use Federal funding or resources after July 30, 2014— (1) to consider or adjudicate any new or previously denied application of any alien requesting consideration of deferred action for childhood arrivals, as authorized by Executive memorandum dated June 15, 2012 and effective on August 15, 2012 (or by any other succeeding Executive memorandum or policy authorizing a similar program).... Several bills have been introduced in the 115 th Congress to provide different forms of immigration protection to unauthorized childhood arrivals who satisfy specified eligibility criteria. Some of these bills, including the Bar Removal of Individuals who Dream and Grow our Economy (BRIDGE) Act ( S. 128 / H.R. 496 ) and the Securing Active and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Act ( S. 127 ), would provide temporary protection from removal and employment authorization to eligible individuals. Other measures, including the Encourage New Legalized Immigrants to Start Training (ENLIST) Act ( H.R. 60 ), the Recognizing America's Children Act ( H.R. 1468 ), the American Hope Act of 2017 ( H.R. 3591 ), and the Dream Act of 2017 ( S. 1615 / H.R. 3440 ), would establish pathways for eligible individuals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). (These measures bear similarities to Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act bills introduced in past Congresses.) Legislation known as the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act was introduced in past Congresses. This legislation sought to establish a process for eligible unauthorized individuals who entered the United States as children to obtain LPR status. DREAM Act provisions were introduced both as stand-alone bills and as parts of larger immigration reform bills. Although DREAM Act legislation has never been enacted, some measures have seen legislative action. For example, in the 111 th Congress, the House approved DREAM Act language as part of an unrelated bill, the Removal Clarification Act of 2010 ( H.R. 5281 ). In the 113 th Congress, the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), which incorporated DREAM Act language in its legalization provisions.

On September 5, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy, an Obama Administration initiative, was being rescinded. A related memorandum released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that same day rescinded the 2012 memorandum that established DACA and described how DHS would "execute a wind-down of the program." According to the September 2017 memorandum, DHS will continue to adjudicate certain DACA requests and will not terminate previously issued grants of deferred action or employment authorization "solely based on the directives in this memorandum." DACA was established in June 2012, when DHS announced that certain individuals without a lawful immigration status who were brought to the United States as children and met other criteria would be considered for temporary relief from removal. To request DACA (initial or renewal), an individual has to file specified forms with DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and pay associated fees. USCIS's decision on an initial DACA request or a renewal request is discretionary. DACA recipients are not granted a lawful immigration status and are not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status. They are, however, considered to be lawfully present in the United States during the period of deferred action. Cumulatively, through March 31, 2017, USCIS approved 787,580 initial DACA requests and 799,077 renewal requests. The overall approval rates for DACA requests accepted and decided by March 31, 2017, were approximately 92% for initial requests and 99% for renewals. To date, Congress has considered, but never enacted, legislation on the DACA initiative. Several bills introduced in the 115th Congress would provide different forms of immigration protection to unauthorized childhood arrivals who satisfy specified eligibility criteria. Some of these bills would provide temporary protection from removal and employment authorization to eligible individuals, while other measures would establish pathways for eligible individuals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). This report provides answers to frequently asked questions about the DACA initiative.

The responsibility to protect federal buildings was established in the Federal Works Agency in June 1948. Specifically, Congress authorized the Federal Works Administrator to appoint uniformed guards as special policemen with the responsibility of "the policing of public buildings and other areas under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency." The special policemen were given the same responsibility as sheriffs and constables on federal property to enforce the laws enacted for the protection of persons and property, and to prevent "breaches of peace, suppress affrays or unlawful assemblies." On June 30, 1949, the Federal Works Agency was abolished, and all of its functions, including the protection of federal buildings, were transferred to the General Services Administration (GSA). In September 1961, Congress authorized the GSA Administrator to appoint non-uniformed special policemen to: conduct investigations in order to protect property under the control of GSA; enforce federal law to protect persons and property; and make an arrest without a warrant for any offense committed upon federal property if a policeman had reason to believe the offense was a felony and the person to be arrested was guilty of the felony. The GSA Administrator formally established the Federal Protective Service (FPS) in January 1971 through GSA Administrative Order 5440.46. FPS, as an official GSA agency, continued to protect federal property and buildings with both uniformed and non-uniformed policemen. FPS was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and placed within the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), with enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107 - 296 ). The act required the DHS Secretary to "protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal Government (including any agency, instrumentality, or wholly owned or mixed ownership corporation thereof) and persons on the property." Under current statutory provisions FPS officers are authorized to: enforce federal laws and regulations to protect persons and federal property; carry firearms; make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of an officer or for any federal felony; serve warrants and subpoenas issued under the authority of the United States; conduct investigations, on and off federal property, of offenses that may have been committed against the federal property or persons on the property; and carry out other activities for the promotion of homeland security as the DHS Secretary may prescribe. According to the DHS Inspector General (DHS IG), contract guard services "represent the single largest item in the FPS operating budget, with an estimated FY2006 budget of $487 million." FPS currently uses approximately 15,000 contract security guards who, along with approximately 950 FPS law enforcement officers, provide security and law enforcement coverage to all GSA owned and operated federal property. FPS contract security guard responsibilities include federal building access control, employee and visitor identification checks, security equipment monitoring, and roving patrols of the interior and exterior of federal property. Within the National Capital Region (NCR), contracts with 54 private security guard companies provide approximately 5,700 guards to protect 125 federal facilities. FPS issues task orders to contract security guard services that detail terms and conditions under which the contract security guard services are to be provided. Some of these task orders include the identification of buildings requiring protection, specific guard post locations, the hours and days of the week each post is to be staffed, whether security guards are to be armed, and the number of guards at each post. FPS requires that security guard contractors ensure that their guards are qualified by undergoing background checks. They must possess required licenses, certifications, and permits. Additionally, companies that employ contract security guards must comply with performance requirements that include items such as guard appearance, work hours, supervision, equipment, and record keeping. Contract security guards are also required to undergo training and pass an FPS administered written examination. The required training, licenses, certification, and permits include but are not limited to the following tasks and skills: background investigation; contractor provided basic training; contractor provided refresher training; Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) training and certification; domestic violence prevention certification; FPS provided orientation training; contractor provided firearms training; firearms qualification; annual firearms re-qualification; medical screening; first aid certification; drug screening; written exam; state weapons permit; expandable baton certification; and use of magnetometers and X-ray machine. Following the 2006 audit of the NCR's FPS security guard contracts, the DHS IG concluded that FPS has become increasingly reliant on its contract guard force, is not adequately monitoring its security guard contracts, and that contract violations in the NCR exist. Some of the contract violations included unarmed guards working at armed posts, a guard with felony convictions being employed by one contractor, and guards without the required security clearances. Additionally, the DHS IG reported that "these lapses in contractor oversight can result in the government paying for services it did not receive, loss of monies resulting from contract deductions due to nonperformance, and placing FPS-protected facilities, employees, and facility visitors at risk." The ICE Assistant Secretary, Julie L. Myers, received the DHS IG audit prior to its release in October 2006, and formally responded to the audit's findings and recommendations. She asserted, for example, that ICE and FPS will improve their monitoring of the contract security guard program by increasing the number of ICE and FPS employees trained to oversee the program, will provide them with better training, and will use the tracking mechanisms to ensure contract security guard quality assurance. To address issues associated with the management of FPS security guard contracts, Congress enacted P.L. 110 - 356 (the Federal Protective Service Guard Contracting Reform Act of 2008) which requires the DHS Secretary, acting through the Assistant Secretary of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to establish guidelines that prohibit convicted felons—who own contract security guard businesses—from being awarded federal security guard contracts. Additionally, 18 months after the enactment of these guidelines, the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy is to report to Congress on establishing similar guidelines for all of the federal government. In FY2009 the physical security of federal property is being maintained solely by contract security guards. DHS intends for FPS to continue maintaining security policy and standards, conducting building security assessments, and monitoring federal agency compliance with security standards. Also, in FY2009, the FPS continues to provide law enforcement and security services at National Security Special Events (NSSE) that may increase threats at or in the vicinity of federal facilities. Such events included the 2008 Democratic and Republican National Nominating Conventions, and the inauguration of President Barack Obama. Additionally, the Administration, in the FY2010 budget request, proposes to transfer FPS from ICE to the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS. In FY2007, the Administration realigned its workforce and reduced the number of FPS law enforcement officers and investigators. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, issued in June 2008, stated that FPS's staff decreased by approximately 20%, from about 1,400 employees at the end of FY2004 to approximately 1,100 employees at the end of FY2007. According to the GAO, this reduction in FPS's staff resulted in the reduction of security at federal facilities and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks. Finally, GAO stated that the decision by FPS to eliminate proactive security patrols at federal facilities resulted in FPS law enforcement personnel not being able to conduct security operations. Such operations involve inspecting suspicious vehicles, monitoring suspicious individuals, or detecting and deterring criminal activity in and around federal buildings. In July 2009, GAO issued another report that found that FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan to guide its workforce planning efforts. This included processes for training, retention, and staff development. GAO also found that the majority of FPS "customers" did not rely on FPS in emergency situations. On January 3, 2007, the National Association of Security Companies (NASCO) established and hosted the first meeting of its Federal Protective Service Working Group. NASCO reportedly established this working group in response to the increased use of contract security guards by DHS for the physical security of federal property. This working group is to begin the task-analysis process for security guards and law enforcement officers for federal and commercial markets to provide basic "best practices" guidelines for security. NASCO states that the three primary goals of the working group are to establish the security guard definition, to identify security functions and tasks, and to validate these functions for contract and training requirements. To address the issues identified by the GAO and FPS's reduction in its workforce, the 110 th Congress enacted P.L. 110 - 329 (the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009) which requires the Office of Management and Budget and DHS to fully fund FPS operations through the collection of security fees paid by federal departments and agencies. The security fee is intended to ensure that FPS maintains not fewer than 1,200 full-time equivalent staff and 900 full-time equivalent police officers, inspectors, area commanders, and special agents. The Administration states that the transfer of FPS to NPPD will allow ICE to focus its law enforcement operations on protecting the nation by targeting the people, money, and materials that support terrorists and criminals relating to the nation's borders. Also, the Administration states that FPS should be transferred to NPPD given the directorate's responsibility of implementing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). This proposal is based primarily on: 1) to allow ICE to focus its operations on border security; and 2) to reinforce, or "solidify" NPPD's role in infrastructure protection. Both of these reasons may be considered valid considering the increased congressional and national interest in ICE and border security, and, to what appears to be, a logical location for DHS's infrastructure protection law enforcement agency. Conversely, one could argue that NPPD does not include any other law enforcement operational entity that has a similar infrastructure protection responsibility. Only the Senate-passed version of H.R. 2892 propose to transfer FPS to NPPD.

The Federal Protective Service (FPS)—within U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is responsible for protecting federal government property, personnel, visitors, and customers, including property leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS currently employs over 15,000 contract security guards to protect federal property. DHS continued the use of contract security guards to focus FPS activities on maintaining security policy and standards, conducting building security assessments, and monitoring federal agency compliance with security standards in FY2009. P.L. 110-329 (the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009) included provisions on FPS maintaining a certain number of police officers. The 110th Congress also enacted P.L. 110-356 (the Federal Protective Service Guard Contracting Reform Act of 2008) which addressed the issue of awarding federal contracts to privately owned contract security guard businesses. The 111th Congress has yet to take any legislative action on FPS, however, the Administration's FY2010 budget request proposes to transfer FPS from ICE to the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS, which the Senate-passed version of H.R. 2892 supports. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

Broadcasters are currently transmitting analog TV signals using radio frequency channels that will be vacated as they switch to digital broadcast technology. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 , Title III) requires broadcasters to end analog broadcasting by February 17, 2009, freeing the spectrum—usually referred to as the 700 MHz band —for other uses. Some of the channels have been assigned for public safety communications; licenses for a few channels have been auctioned; and the remaining licenses are slated for auction no later than January 2008. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has assigned a value of about $12.5 billion for the auction; many industry estimates are significantly higher. Funds from the auction will initially be deposited in a fund created for that purpose, the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is responsible for managing the fund and for disbursements, which total approximately $10 billion. The Deficit Reduction Act allocates $7.363 billion of auction proceeds toward closing the budget deficit, to be paid to the U.S. Treasury on September 30, 2009. Nine programs authorized by the act to receive auction funds are: a program that would expend up to $1,500 million on coupons for households toward the purchase of TV set top boxes that can convert digital broadcast signals for display on analog sets; a grant program of up to $1,000 million for public safety agencies to deploy systems on 700 MHz spectrum they will receive as part of the transition; payments of up to $30 million toward the cost of temporary digital transmission equipment for broadcasters serving the Metropolitan New York area; payments of up to $10 million to help low-power television stations convert full-power broadcast signals from digital to analog; a program funded up to $65 million to reimburse low-power television stations in rural areas for upgrading equipment; up to $106 million to implement a unified national alert system and $50 million for a tsunami warning and coastal vulnerability program; contributions totaling no more than $43.5 million for a national 911 improvement program; and up to $30 million in support of the Essential Air Service Program. For some of these programs, the NTIA is authorized to borrow money from the Treasury, to be repaid from auction proceeds. One of the first steps the FCC takes in preparing for an auction is to develop a band plan that allocates the spectrum for specific purposes (for example, high-speed transmission, which benefits from bandwidth of at least 10 MHz per license) and to decide the number of licenses and the geographic coverage for each license (for example, 200 licenses for metropolitan areas). These decisions begin the process of shaping the auction: the size of the bandwidth has an impact on the type of service it can be used for, and the geographic coverage of licenses can be used to encourage, for example, small companies seeking a local license or large companies seeking to expand their national coverage by acquiring a regional or national license. The FCC also establishes criteria for participation in the auction, for example, requiring documentation of financial resources. It also draws up service rules, which are a statement of the regulator's expectations for how the license will be used. Service rules usually include a timetable for putting the license to use, that is, the rules impose deadlines for the license-holder to build out a network so that a specified number of people or areas are served. The FCC makes its proposed plans known through a series of notices, which are made available for public comment, before announcing its decision about the auction in a final Report and Order. The rules for the auction of licenses in the 700 MHz band are in a Second Report and Order adopted July 31, 2007. Key points are summarized below. The process of preparing rules for the 700 MHz Band auction attracted more debate than usual for a number of reasons. One reason for interest in the spectrum is that the airwaves used for TV have good propagation qualities, able to travel far and to penetrate building walls easily. The proposals for service rules that will provide the framework for licensee business models have dominated the controversy over the preparations for the auction of the 700 MHz airwaves. Some observers have called this the "100-year auction," because the decisions about its service rules could have a significant impact on spectrum management and the wireless industry for decades to come. Public safety groups have been assigned 24 MHz of spectrum in the 700 MHz band that will become fully available once broadcasters have vacated the band. The licenses for this spectrum were assigned for public safety use by Congressional mandate, in 1997, and are not slated for auction. Provisions in the auction rules, however, provide for a new, interoperable communications network for public safety users to be shared with commercial users. A national license for 10 MHz, designated as Upper Block D, will be auctioned under service rules that will require working with a Public Safety Licensee to build and manage a shared network. The Public Safety Licensee will be assigned a single, national license for part of the 24MHz assigned for public safety use. The two licensees will be required to work together under a Network Sharing Agreement that they will negotiate, subject to FCC approval. The Public Safety Spectrum Trust has requested the preparation of a Statement of Requirements that will be made available to potential bidders for Block D. This document outlines public safety expectations for the network, its operation and security, the types of devices it will support, and other technical and administrative requirements. A partnership would give some public safety agencies access to private-sector capital and expertise to build the network; there is currently no federal plan to assist in building a nationwide, interoperable network. Although public safety users would be charged for access to the network, proponents of the plan argue that overall costs will be less than if the network were purely for public safety, because of greater economies of scale. Several companies associated with Silicon Valley and Internet ventures petitioned the FCC to set aside a block of spectrum as a national license that would be used for open access, which was defined as open devices, open applications, open services, and open networks. The FCC has ruled that it will auction licenses for 22 MHz of spectrum with service rules requiring the first two criteria: open devices and open applications. There will be 12 regional licenses that will require winning bidders to allow their customers to choose their own handsets and download programs of their choice, subject to reasonable conditions needed to protect the network from harm. If these licenses are not sold, subject to a minimum price, the licenses will be put on the block a second time, without the open platform requirement. Proponents of wholesaling argue that only an open network that anyone can use—not just subscribers of one wireless company—can provide consumer choice. If successful, an open network would allow customers to choose their own wireless devices without committing to a service plan from a single provider. Such a model challenges the business plans of the large wireless companies, the incumbents, that rely on contracts for a specific wireless device to tie their customers to them. Not only do service contracts between consumers and wireless companies limit the customer's choice of wireless devices, but also, carriers are increasingly blocking access to certain services. This contract-driven business model is often referred to as a walled garden. A wholesale network could provide more market opportunities for new wireless devices, especially wireless devices that could provide unrestricted access to the Internet. Wireless incumbents, in particular, have challenged the concepts of open access and wholesaling. They, and others, claim that the unproven nature of a wholesale business model makes it risky and that therefore the auctionable licenses would be devalued. They argue that imposing requirements that would create a wholesale network introduces an extra level of regulatory oversight, covering such areas as handset compatibility, applications standards, market access regulation, and interconnection rules. The band plan for the auction reflects several changes to the plan originally proposed by the FCC. The changes make it possible to create licenses for 62 MHz of spectrum at 700 MHz instead of 60 MHz. In the Lower 700 MHz band, the FCC has allocated 12 MHz for local area licenses, known as Cellular Market Areas, or CMAs. There will be 734 CMA licenses for auction. There will also be 176 licenses offered for broader Economic Areas, or EAs, also using 12 MHz of the Lower 700 MHz band. Some commentators believe that the conditions placed on the licenses in the Upper 700 MHz Band will divert bidding activity to the lower part of the band, possibly driving up the prices of these licenses. In this case, some of the smaller companies may be outbid in their efforts to obtain CMA licenses. All of the commercial licenses have what the FCC describes as "stringent" performance requirements, in particular for what are referred to as build-out rules. Winning bidders in the upcoming auctions will have a short time to provide service, based on geographical or population parameters, or risk forfeiting licenses. For example, the CMA and EA licensees in the Lower 700 MHz band must cover at least 35% of the geographic area within four years and 70% of the area by the end of ten years, the term of the license. The regional license-holders in the Upper 700 MHz band must have built a network that will reach 40% of the population in their license area within four years, and 75% by the end of the license term. Failure to meet these interim guidelines will result in a reduction of the license term, from ten to eight years, accelerating the build-out schedule. Licensees that fail to meet the final deadline will forfeit that part of the license that has not met build-out requirements. The FCC will reclaim the spectrum and make it available to others. Rules for the auction cover minimum opening bids, reserve prices and other procedures. One decision is to use "blind bidding." Recent auctions have had open bidding, where all participants knew not only the amounts of competing bids but also the names of their competitors. With anonymity, bidders will not be able to cooperate to exclude a third-party, which allegedly occurred during the AWS-1 auction. The FCC has also said that it will permit package bidding, also known as combinatorial bidding. In a package auction, bidders may make a single bid for a group of licenses, instead of competing for each license individually. Package bidding is believed to favor new entrants and larger companies by allowing them to acquire licenses for the coverage that meets their business needs in a manner that is more efficient and less risky. In attempting to acquire, for example, national coverage, by winning many auction licenses, a bidder risks winning some of the licenses, but not enough of the licenses to support its business plan. A successful package bid eliminates a number of licenses from the general bidding process, reducing the supply of licenses open for bids from small players that are seeking only one or two licenses. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103-66 ) amended the Communications Act of 1934 with a number of important provisions affecting the availability of spectrum licenses. The Licensing Improvement section of the act laid out the general requirements for the FCC to establish a competitive bidding methodology and consider, in the process, objectives such as the development and rapid deployment of new technologies. The law prohibited the FCC from making spectrum allocations decisions based "solely or predominately on the expectation of Federal revenues...." The Emerging Telecommunications Technologies section directed the NTIA to identify not less than 200 MHz of auctionable radio frequencies used by the federal government that could be transferred to the commercial sector. The FCC was directed to allocate and assign these released frequencies over a period of at least 10 years, and to reserve a significant portion of the frequencies for allocation after the ten-year time span. Similar to the requirements for competitive bidding, the FCC was instructed to ensure the availability of frequencies for new technologies and services, and also the availability of frequencies to stimulate the development of wireless technologies. The FCC was further required to address "the feasibility of reallocating portions of the spectrum from current commercial and other non-federal uses to provide for more efficient use of spectrum" and for "innovation and marketplace developments that may affect the relative efficiencies of different spectrum allocations." The Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1) auction that was concluded in September 2006 is one result of spectrum reassignment as required in this section. Subsequent modifications of the Communications Act have not substantively changed the above-noted provisions regarding spectrum allocation. It appears that, in 1993, Congress foresaw that inclusive policies for access to airwaves would have to take into account developments in technology and cultural changes that were, at the time, glimpsed but not fully imagined.

The United States, like most of the world, is moving to replace current television technology with a new, technically superior format generally referred to as digital television (DTV). As part of this transition, Congress has acted to move television broadcasters out of radio spectrum currently used for the old, analog technology. The vacated radio frequencies are now scheduled for release in accordance with provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ), which sets a February 2009 date for the release of the spectrum. Auctions for commercial uses of the spectrum are scheduled to begin on January 24, 2008. About $10 billion of the auction proceeds has been designated for specific purposes by the act. On July 31, 2007, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced the rules for the auction of airwaves now used for analog TV broadcasting (700 MHz). Because the decisions the FCC makes in setting up an auction of spectrum licenses can shape the bidding process and the eventual outcome of the auction, the FCC typically finds itself under pressure to set requirements that favor specific interests or policy goals. The preparations for the upcoming auction have been particularly fraught with controversy. The propagation characteristics of the spectrum are such that it is considered ideal for wireless broadband. For this and other reasons, control of this spectrum is sought not only by the incumbent wireless companies wishing to expand their capacity but also by companies eager to apply next-generation technologies for new business models. The auction rules introduce two innovative business models for spectrum management and assignment that represent departures from past policy. One model requires a shared network to accommodate both public safety and commercial users in a partnership. The other innovative model designates spectrum licenses for a network that could be managed to accept any suitable wireless device. The decisions the FCC has made for this auction—and by extension for spectrum policy—have framed a new debate about access to the airwaves, the nature of competition in the wireless industry, and wireless access to the Internet.

In recent years attention has been focused by international organizations and non-governmental organizations in various fora on the issue of international small arms and light weapons transfers (SA/LW) to less-developed nations undergoing civil conflicts. Views expressed by these groups have raised the interest of governments in examining the implications of the international trade in such weapons, particularly, illicit trading. International actions to deal with the small arms and light weapons trade generally have developed slowly in view of widely divergent views among nations concerned or affected by this trade, either as a recipient or supplier. Congressional interest in the subject resulted in a mandate to the State Department to provide a comprehensive report addressing significant policy questions regarding the international proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This report, formally submitted to Congress in October 2000, provided the first major overview of key views of the U.S. government on this topic. The central elements of U.S. policy regarding international transfers of small arms and light weapons began to develop in the 1990's as part of overall U.S. policy toward conventional arms transfers generally. For its part, the United States, while recognizing that nations have a legal right to acquire weapons, including small arms, for legitimate self-defense purposes, also recognizes that there have been civil conflicts in various less developed nations and regions that have been exacerbated by ready access to small arms and light weapons. The U.S. government wants to deal, in a practical and effective way with the problem of international small arms and light weapons trafficking in regions of conflict, while continuing to recognize the "legitimacy of legal trade, manufacturing, and ownership of arms." To date, the United States Government has taken the position that illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons poses the greatest threat to regional security in less-developed areas of the world undergoing civil strife. Thus, the United States believes that combating the illicit weapons trade should be the focal point of international efforts. U.S. diplomacy has been directed to achieving that outcome. Illicit trafficking includes illegal sales to insurgent groups and criminal organizations, illegal diversion of legitimate sales or transfers, and black market sales in contravention of embargoes or national laws. The re-circulation of small arms and light weapons from one conflict to another, and illegal domestic manufacturing of these items are also considered elements of illicit trafficking. The United States has adopted a multi-pronged approach in its diplomacy to combat illicit small arms trafficking. The first element of United States policy is to attempt to curb black market or unauthorized transfers of small arms to zones of conflict, to terrorists, to international criminal organizations, and to drug traffickers. The second is to attempt to raise the arms export standards of other nations to U.S. standards. The third is to streamline and strengthen United States export procedures to improve accountability without interfering with the legal trade in and transfer of arms. The fourth is to support the destruction of excess stockpiles of small arms, particularly in regions where conflicts have ended. As U.S. Ambassador Donald J. McConnell has summarized the U.S. perspective: "Ultimately, simple "one size fits all" solutions are ineffective in dealing with the complex, often region-specific problems caused by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Focused efforts to identify and curb the sources and methods of the illicit trade via robust export controls, law enforcement measures, and efforts to expeditiously destroy excess stocks and safeguard legitimate government stocks from theft or illegal transfer are the best ways to attack the problem. " The U.S. State Department has reported that currently as many as seventy nations produce small arms and light weapons, many through licensing arrangements with other producers. These weapons are generally inexpensive and require minimal maintenance and training to operate. The foreign small arms and light weapons trade, whether it is legal or illegal, does not lend itself to easy monitoring. There is a lack of global standards generally and there are widely differing standards among nations on how to monitor and regulate this trade. Definitions of what items should be covered are also a source of difficulty. While the export licensing and monitoring laws, regulations and procedures of the United States are widely acknowledged to be the most transparent, comprehensive, and stringent in the world, in many countries arms transfers that would be illegal in the United States are not prohibited as a matter of law or regulation. Small arms and light weapons are easily concealed, thus making it relatively easy for corrupt officials to permit illicit trafficking or for criminals to transfer these weapons, especially in nations that lack the human and financial resources needed for adequate inspections and export/import controls. Routes used for smuggling excess weapons into zones of conflict are chosen specifically to defy discovery and monitoring. Furthermore, poorer nations desperate for hard currency are tempted to market excess weapons to secure this revenue. And the widespread availability of these weapons further complicates establishment of control measures. According to the State Department, available rough estimates indicate that the overall number of small arms and light weapons in circulation globally range from 100 to 500 million and up. Efforts to obtain precise data on totals regarding these weapons and their sources, whether legal or illegal, is generally guesswork. The United States has been active in international efforts to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. On November 15, 1997, the United States and 27 other nations signed the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms. This convention, which will be legally binding on its adherents, includes provisions to establish a system to license and track firearms sales in states of the Western Hemisphere, to enhance information exchanges on this trade among adherent states, and to mark firearms to facilitate their global tracing. This convention has not been ratified by many of its key signatories. It was submitted to the U.S. Senate in April 1998. It is still pending before that body. On December 17, 1999, the United States and the European Union signed a "Statement of Common Principles on Small Arms and Light Weapons." This statement contains a pledge by the parties to observe restraint in their export policies and to harmonize these policies and procedures governing small arms. This statement also included a commitment to plan together for a United Nations small arms conference aimed at "achieving tangible results...including an Action Plan for the international community to deal with the problem." The United States has also provided resources to assist other nations destroy their excess weapons stocks. The State Department cites U.S. assistance, through contributing experts and funds, in the destruction of small arms and light weapons and ammunition in Liberia, Kuwait, Haiti, Panama, Mali, Albania, and the former Yugoslavia. The United States has also facilitated an agreement among 10 nations in Southeastern Europe to seize and destroy illicit and surplus arms in that region. The United States continues to participate in international fora aimed at addressing various issues associated with the international small arms and light weapons trade. It actively pursued its principal policy goals at the United Nations Conference on the "Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons In All Its Aspects," held July 9-20, 2001 at United Nations Headquarters in New York City. The program of action agreed to at this conference is non-binding on any state. It encourages nations to ensure that manufacturers use markings on small arms and light weapons to facilitate the tracing of illicit weapons transfers. It also encourages nations to establish procedures to monitor legal sales, transfer and stockpiling of small arms and light weapons, and urges governments to make the illegal manufacture, trade and possession of such weapons a criminal offense. The U.N. Conference further agreed to hold a follow-up conference to review measures undertaken to achieve the above goals. On June 26, 2006, the United Nations began a conference aimed at reviewing the progress made in implementation of the previously agreed program of action to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. This conference met through July 7, 2006. The conference was unable to agree on an outcome document. The United States Representative to the conference stated on July 7, 2006, that the United States would continue to provide assistance to those nations seeking to implement the program originally agreed upon in 2001. He noted that it was the intent of the United States to continue its efforts in the areas of transport controls, export controls, and marking and tracing. It further "intended to expand its efforts in Africa and Eastern Europe." Other conference participants expressed similar commitments in support of the 2001 program of action.

This report provides general background on U.S. policy regarding the international trade in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). It outlines major questions associated with the international trade in these items, and reviews United States efforts to assist in controlling the illicit transfers of these items. This report will be revised as developments warrant.

On January 11, 2007, at 5:28 pm EST, the PRC conducted its first successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, launching a ballistic missile armed with a kinetic kill vehicle (not an exploding conventional or nuclear warhead) to destroy the PRC's Fengyun-1C weather satellite at about 530 miles up in low earth orbit (LEO) in space. The PLA conducted the test near China's Xichang Space Center in Sichuan province. The weapon under development was fired from a mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). China reportedly used a two-stage, solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile that was launched from a TEL. A U.S. intelligence official testified to Congress that the U.S. designation of this ASAT weapon is SC-19. A National Security Council spokesman issued the White House's public response on January 18, stating that "China's development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area." He stated that the PRC used a land-based, medium-range ballistic missile. He also noted that the United States and other countries responded with formal protests to China. Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the European Union reportedly also issued concerns. Russia downplayed the test. China did not give advance warnings and its Foreign Ministry did not issue a public statement until January 23, saying that China calls for the peaceful use of space and that the test was not aimed at any country. The critical challenge in the short term is posed by the space debris resulting from the PRC's intentional destruction of a satellite. It was the first such destruction of a satellite since the ASAT tests conducted during the Cold War by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Since then, neither the United States nor Russia has destroyed satellites in space, while many more civilian and military satellites have been used by countries and companies. In LEO (up to 2,000 km, or 1,242 miles altitude), reconnaissance and weather satellites, and manned space missions (including the International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and China's manned flights) are vulnerable to the increase in space debris resulting from China's satellite destruction. This debris cloud (estimated at 950 pieces 4 inches or bigger plus thousands of smaller pieces) threatens space assets in LEO, according to the Johnson Space Center. The Director of Space Operations at the Air Force said that his staff tracked about 14,000 particles before January 11, and that number increased to about 15,000. The Commander of the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) testified that the last U.S. kinetic ASAT test occurred in 1985 and at the lower altitude of LEO, and even so, the debris took over 20 years to come down out of space and burn up in the atmosphere. China's test was in the upper altitude of LEO and the resulting debris is seen as a threat to space assets for more than 20 years. According to the Air Force Space Command, the space debris increased the collision risk for about 700 spacecraft. China has known about international concerns about space debris. Its "Space White Paper" of October 2006 stated that China has "actively participated" in the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, initiated a Space Debris Action Plan, and increased international exchanges on space debris research. The longer-term implications concern some questions about China's capability and intention to attack U.S. satellites. Whereas the Secretary of Defense has reported publicly to Congress since 1998 that China's military has been developing an ASAT capability, some observers doubted the Pentagon's assertions. China's January 2007 test confirmed China's long-suspected program to develop ASAT weapons, a program that could potentially put at risk U.S. military and intelligence satellites that are needed to provide tracking and targeting for rapid reaction or other operations. China demonstrated a limited capability to use a missile to launch a kinetic kill vehicle to destroy one of its own satellites in LEO under testing conditions that it controlled. The mobility of this ASAT weapon under development also could present challenges for U.S. tracking and warning time. Aside from developing and testing this ASAT capability, China does not have enough satellite interceptors, although it can produce enough of them by 2010 to destroy most U.S. satellites in LEO with little warning, estimates the Defense Department. Also, the ASAT test did not threaten the U.S. missile defense system. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified to Congress that the test demonstrated China's capability "to eventually deploy an ASAT system that could threaten U.S. satellites." Threat consists of capabilities and intentions, stressed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, at a news conference on March 7, 2007. He visited China on March 22-26, and reported that the intention of the ASAT test remained unclear. China has not explained how it intends to use this ASAT weapon that has been tested. Various comments by PLA officers and PRC civilian analysts have justified the ASAT test as needed to counter perceived U.S. "hegemony" in space and target the vulnerability of U.S. dependence on satellites. A PLA Air Force colonel wrote in late 2006 that U.S. military power, including long-range strikes, have relied on superiority in space and that leveraging space technology can allow a rising power to close the gap with advanced countries more rapidly than trying to catch up. A PRC specialist at Fudan University indicated that China's ASAT program is developed partly to maintain China's nuclear deterrence, perceived as undermined by U.S. space assets. An analyst at the PLA's Academy of Military Science argued that China does not have a clear space deterrence theory and that China likely seeks a limited capability to counter U.S. dominance in space and reduce the likelihood of U.S. attacks against space assets. Some news reports speculated that this ASAT test surprised U.S. intelligence. Although China's test confirmed long-standing Defense Department reporting about China's counter-space program, some warnings seemed inconsistent with China's January 2007 kinetic kill ASAT test. In the three annual reports on the PLA from 2004 to 2006 (required by the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act), the Secretary of Defense reported to Congress that China could destroy or disable satellites in space "only" by launching a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle "armed with a nuclear weapon." However, the Pentagon's 2003 report warned that China was developing a "direct-ascent ASAT system" that could be fielded between 2005 and 2010. Also, U.S. intelligence reportedly knew about the PLA's previous tests and preparations for this latest ASAT test. A number of U.S. intelligence agencies had a "full court press underway" to monitor the ASAT test on January 11, and it was the fourth test that the United States monitored using missile-warning satellites. China conducted three previous tests in this weapon program between September 2004 and February 2006, according to a U.S. official. Despite foreign protests, China did not issue an official statement until January 23, 12 days after the ASAT test. China's Foreign Ministry simply stated that its "experiment" did not target or threaten any country and that China opposes the weaponization of space or an arms race in space. Beijing's lack of a prepared explanation and delay in issuing a statement raised questions about whether the top leaders approved the PLA's ASAT tests, coordinated between the Foreign Ministry and the PLA, miscalculated foreign responses, or approved the ASAT program and anticipated criticisms but decided anyway to test. Adding to concerns about China's intentions, the ASAT test did not come at a time of bilateral tensions. After the U.S.-China summit in April 2006, NASA and the STRATCOM proposed civilian and military space contacts with China, and NASA's Administrator visited China in September 2006. In this debate, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley questioned whether China's leaders knew about the PLA's ASAT test in advance, suggesting that U.S. protests sought to compel top ruler Hu Jintao to become directly involved or responsible. However, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless called the speculation "farfetched," since Hu is the Central Military Commission Chairman (as well as Communist Party General-Secretary and PRC President). China could have signaled a perceived self-confidence in countering U.S. forces in a possible conflict over Taiwan or another area of dispute. Then-Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral William Fallon, said that the PLA was trying to counter U.S. military power in a possible conflict over Taiwan. Also, the ASAT weapon demonstration was undeniably traced to the PLA. Morever, the January 2007 test followed sudden changes made by the PLA Air Force in its control of airspace and flight routes near Shanghai, including a rare shutdown of the busy Pudong airport, in November and December 2006. PRC officials and scholars have been warning that 2007 is a critical year with potential crises in the Taiwan Strait, citing their concerns about perceived pro-independence moves by Taiwan's president. The PLA Air Force's actions and ASAT test could have signaled to Washington to heed Beijing's words about Taipei. Some in China argued that the new U.S. National Space Policy prompted China's test, while U.S. officials have contended that, regardless, China has developed a range of counter-space weapons to challenge U.S. space dominance. News reports stressed a hardline tone of the policy (signed by President Bush in August 2006, with a public version issued in October 2006), which stated opposition to new space arms control and denial of the use of space to adversaries "hostile" to U.S. interests. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph contended that the United States does not monopolize space or deny access to space for peaceful purposes. He characterized the space policy as responding to "growing threats" from a number of countries that "are exploring and acquiring capabilities to counter, attack, and defeat U.S. space systems," when the United States is more dependent on space than other nations. Even before issuance of the U.S. space policy, China conducted three previous tests of this direct-ascent ASAT weapon and, by September 2006, China had used a ground-based laser to illuminate a U.S. satellite in several tests of a system to "blind" satellites. Before and after this latest ASAT test, PRC military and civilian analysts have voiced concerns about China's perceived vulnerability against U.S. dominance in military and space power. After the test, a Senior Colonel of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences said that "outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime" and that "if there is a space superpower, it's not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one." In wake of the ASAT weapon test, the PRC's military and civilian analysts argued that the PRC's "peaceful" motive for the test was to prompt the United States to engage in space arms control. At the United Nations in October and December 2006, the United States was the only country to vote against a resolution on the "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" (PAROS), adopted by the General Assembly. However, PAROS seeks to prevent the weaponization of outer space, and even if there were such an agreement, it would not ban the type of land-based ASAT weapon (not space-based weapon) that China tested. A former PLA officer at China's Arms Control and Disarmament Association noted that the Foreign Ministry's silence about the test was "baffling" and that "if it is a negotiating chip, it's illogical not to come out and announce something." China's Foreign Ministry had not prepared any explanation for the ASAT test, and its short statement of January 23 did not mention arms control. It was at a regular news conference a week later that the ministry called for a "legal document." Indeed, China had already subtly shifted its stance on space arms control at the United Nations, dropping an original call for not testing, deploying, or using on land, at sea, or in the atmosphere any weapons for warfighting in outer space. The PRC's ASAT test raised an issue of whether there are benefits in talking with China and other countries about an arms control agreement (such as PAROS), a code of conduct, or other security-building measures. China's ASAT test did not violate any existing arms control treaty, although it broke a voluntary moratorium since the 1980s on such destruction of a satellite. A middle-ground view between seeking and rejecting sweeping arms control suggested that there could be a narrowly-targeted ban on kinetic ASAT weapons that create space debris. In contrast, the Bush Administration objected to the implication that China's ASAT test was another reason to pursue outer space arms control, noting that PAROS would not ban China's ground-launched ASAT activities. Also, the Administration decided not to send demarches to dissuade China from such testing. An issue is whether to lodge a diplomatic protest to China for any future test. It is questionable that China's leaders would heed U.S.-only objections to a PLA program. Still, some urge a new strategic dialogue, given concerns about China's miscalculations and crisis-management. Regarding other policies, General Pace visited China in March, continuing to pursue military-to-military ties. However, the ASAT test likely affected debates in Congress about whether to relax legal restrictions for contacts with the PLA (a debate prodded by PACOM) and whether to resume commercial satellite deals (such as space launches). There also is an issue about whether to continue or suspend bilateral space cooperation proposed in 2006 by STRATCOM, which could include talks on collision avoidance, signals interference, and station keeping (maneuvering satellites). For other responses, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on March 28, 2007, the STRATCOM Commander urged support for programs for space situational awareness and Prompt Global Strike. (See CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33601, U.S. Military Space: Status of Selected Programs ; and CRS Report RL33067, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].)

On January 11, 2007, the People's Republic of China (PRC) conducted its first successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in destroying one of its own satellites in space. The test raised international concerns about more space debris. Longer-term, the test raised questions about China's capability and intention to attack U.S. satellites. The purpose of this CRS Report, based on open sources and interviews, is to discuss that ASAT test by China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and issues about U.S. assessments and policies. This report will not be updated.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation are often referred to with the abbreviation PAS. This report identifies, for the 113 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. It excludes appointments to regulatory boards and commissions as well as to independent and other agencies, which are covered in other CRS reports. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) ( http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ ) , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointments-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . Table 1 summarizes appointment activity, during the 113 th Congress, related to full-time PAS positions in the 15 executive departments. President Barack H. Obama submitted 273 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 273 nominations, 162 were confirmed; 8 were withdrawn; and 103 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate has varied widely. Some nominations were confirmed within a few days, others were confirmed within several months, and some were never confirmed. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 113 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For confirmed nominations, a mean of 119.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92.0. Under Senate Rules, nominations not acted on by the Senate at the end of a session of Congress (or before a recess of 30 days) are returned to the President. The Senate, by unanimous consent, often waives this rule—although not always. This report measures the "days to confirm" from the date of receipt of the resubmitted nomination, not the original. Each of the 15 executive department profiles provided in this report is divided into two parts: (1) a table listing the organization's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 113 th Congress and (2) a table listing appointment action for vacant positions during the 113 th Congress. Data for these tables were collected from several authoritative sources, as listed earlier. In each department profile, the first of these two tables identifies, as of the end of the 113 th Congress, each full-time PAS position in that department and its pay level. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule. As of the end of the 113 th Congress, these pay levels ranged from level I ($201,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($147,200) for lower-ranked positions. The second table, the appointment action table, provides, in chronological order, information concerning each nomination. It shows the name of the nominee, position involved, date of nomination or appointment, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation. It also notes actions other than confirmation (e.g., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). The appointment action tables with more than one nominee to a position also list statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. Each appointment action table provides the average days to confirm in two ways: mean and median. Although the mean is a more familiar measure, it may be influenced by outliers in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. For a small number of positions within a department, the two tables may contain slightly different titles for the same position. This is because the title used in the nomination the White House submits to the Senate, the title of the position as established by statute, and the title of the position used by the department itself are not always identical. The first table listing incumbents at the end of the 113 th Congress uses data provided by the department itself. The second table listing nomination action within each department relies primarily upon the Senate nominations database of the LIS. This information is based upon the nomination sent to the Senate by the White House. Any inconsistency in position titles between the two tables is noted in the notes following each appointment table. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. The table also includes the mean and median values for the "days to confirm" column. Table A-2 provides summary data for each of the 15 executive departments identified in this report. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each department. It also provides the mean and median values for the numbers of days taken to confirm nominations within each department. A list of department abbreviations can be found in Appendix B . Appendix A. Presidential Nominations, 113 th Congress Appendix B. Abbreviations of Departments

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone, or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 351 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 113 th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments. Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix. During the 113 th Congress, the President submitted 273 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 273 nominations, 162 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 103 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 119.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92.0. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) ( http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ ) , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). This report will not be updated.

The Conservation Reserve Program began in 1985 as a program designed to remove highly erodible croplands from current crop production. It was established by the Food Security Act of 1985 and has been expanded and extended by subsequent legislation. The program provides for "annual rental payments" to land owners or operators who agree to enroll their qualifying land in the program. Enrollment requires them to remove land from production and, generally, refrain from using the land commercially. They must also follow an approved conservation plan. In return, they receive annual payments. These payments are referred to as "rent" in the statute, regulations, and contracts. However, from the beginning, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has treated this income as self-employment income for those who continued to farm other land connected to the CRP land. Although the IRS initially treated the payments as rental income for those not otherwise engaged in farming, and, therefore, not subject to self-employment tax, that treatment has changed over the years. In 2006, the IRS issued a proposed revenue ruling that would treat virtually all CRP annual payments as self-employment income. Net self-employment income is subject to a 15.3% self-employment tax. Since CRP annual payments are also subject to income tax, the total tax an individual must pay on CRP payments is generally between about 25% and 56% of the total received if the CRP payments are subject to self-employment tax. Several bills have been introduced in recent Congresses to completely exclude CRP payments from self-employment income. Most were simply referred to committee, and no hearings were held. During the first session of the 110 th Congress, two similar bills were introduced. Again, they were referred to committee. However, in S. 2242 , the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007, the issue was approached in a different manner. This approach has been adopted in H.R. 2419 —the "Farm Bill." Rather than exempting all CRP payments from self-employment tax, while still including them for income tax, the Farm Bill provides two alternatives that would provide some relief to taxpayers. The first offers an optional tax credit in lieu of CRP payments. The second explicitly exempts CRP payments from self-employment tax for certain taxpayers. CRP annual payments would remain subject to income tax for all recipients. The credit would be subject to neither income nor self-employment taxes. As proposed in the Farm Bill, participants in the CRP could elect to receive an annual tax credit rather than receiving the annual rental payments. This credit would be subject to neither income nor self-employment tax. Those who did not elect to receive the credit would continue to receive the annual rental payments. The amount of the credit would be the same as the amount of the annual rental payment each electing participant would otherwise have received. The credit could be used to offset current year's taxes, but would not be refundable. However, any excess could be carried forward and used against tax in future years. The credit would not be allowed as either an original credit or as a carryforward in any fiscal year after FY2012. Early termination of a CRP contract generally involves repayment of all payments received from the program since the beginning of the contract. The proposed credit would be treated differently—it would be recaptured only on a prorated basis for the fiscal year in which the contract was terminated and the credit allowed. The Farm Bill would exclude CRP payments from self-employment income for those receiving regular retirement benefits from Social Security as well as those receiving Social Security disability benefits. It is silent as to the treatment of CRP payments received by all others. Given the current position of the IRS, it seems likely that this silence would result in these payments being considered self-employment income for all others. The committee report for the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007, in addressing that act's identical provision, stated, "The treatment of conservation reserve program payments received by other entities is not changed." A tax credit reduces taxes dollar-for-dollar. Most tax credits are not refundable and no current tax credit is subject to federal income tax or self-employment tax. In this regard, the proposed credit is no different. It is different than most credits, however, because it can be carried forward to a subsequent tax year if not used in full in the current one. Those opposing the proposed credit may argue that it is regressive in nature in that it will provide the most benefit to those whose income is highest. This benefit could occur in two different ways. Since the credit would not be subject to either income or self-employment taxes, those in the higher tax brackets would receive a greater tax benefit from nontaxability than would those in lower tax brackets. Additionally, those with higher income would be more likely to have tax liabilities that equal or exceed the credit amount. Because of the time value of money, those who are able to fully use the credit will receive a greater value from the credit than those who must carry part of the credit forward to a subsequent year. Those in favor of the credit may point out that no one is forced to take the credit and no one is prevented from doing so. This allows all parties to examine their own situations and determine whether the credit is more beneficial to them than is the direct annual payment. Arguably, even those who cannot use the credit in full in the first year may still derive more net benefit from the credit than they would from the direct payment since they would have to pay income tax on that direct payment and in many cases would also have to pay self-employment tax. Thus, even those in the 10% marginal tax bracket could realize greater benefit from the credit than direct payment if they were able to use at least 75% of the credit in the initial year. Other arguments in favor of the credit may come from those who believe that the IRS's treatment of CRP payments as self-employment income is wrong or has been expanded too far. They may also argue that the credit provides an incentive needed to encourage enrollment in the CRP. The committee report indicates that the reason for the change in the law is to provide additional incentives "to encourage eligible producers to establish long-term, resource conserving covers on eligible farmland." On the other hand, the effect on the credit if a contract is terminated early is rather mild when compared to the total repayment requirement for regular CRP payments; so it is arguable that the credit might encourage people to enroll, but might not encourage them to remain enrolled long term. Some may argue that there is no need for further incentives since there has been a competitive bidding process under which applicants have tried to assure acceptance of their bids by offering their land in return for annual payments below the allowed rental values. However, rising commodity prices may reduce interest in participating in the CRP. Unlike earlier proposed legislation that would have excluded all CRP payments from self-employment income, the Farm Bill would exclude only those payments received by retirees and the disabled. Even these would be limited to those individuals who were receiving benefits from either regular retirement or disability under the Social Security Act. Both regular retirement benefits and disability benefits received from Social Security have links to other "earned income" received. In the case of regular retirement benefits received prior to reaching "full retirement" age, the benefits are reduced by $1 for every $2 by which the recipient's earned income exceeds a statutory annual limit. Receipt of disability benefits from Social Security is predicated on a disability that prevents the recipient from any work that would result in earned income. If CRP payments were excluded from the definition of income subject to self-employment tax for those receiving regular Social Security retirement benefits, some might argue that many recipients would receive a double benefit: they would not be required to pay self-employment tax on the income, and the income would not reduce their benefits. A further argument might be made that those receiving Social Security disability benefits would also be receiving a double benefit: they would not be required to pay self-employment tax on the income and the income could not be considered evidence of an ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. In each case, Social Security beneficiaries would be exempt from funding the program under which they receive benefits. Others may argue that excluding CRP payments from self-employment income for Social Security beneficiaries complies with the rationale behind the IRS's position in an early private letter ruling —those who are retired are not in the trade or business of farming simply by virtue of having land enrolled in the CRP. The committee report sheds no light on the considerations behind this provision in the Farm Bill. It says only that "[t]he Committee believes that the correct measurement of income for [self-employment tax] purposes in the cases of retired or disabled individuals does not include conservation reserve program payments." The report does not explain why the payments are specifically excluded only for retirees and the disabled, nor does it explain why they are specifically excluded only for those receiving benefits from Social Security. For FY2008 through FY2012, this provision, if enacted, would assure CRP participants of a choice in the taxation of their CRP benefits. They could choose the nonrefundable credit and shield their benefits from both income and self-employment tax, but potentially postpone or even eliminate some of the benefit if their tax liability does not equal or exceed their credit. They could choose to receive full payment benefits each year, pay income and self-employment tax on those benefits, and possibly generate future Social Security benefits. The bill does not, however, assure participants a similar choice beyond 2012, nor does it clarify whether CRP annual payments generally should be treated as self-employment income—an issue that has not yet been addressed by Congress.

The Internal Revenue Service considers payments received under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) self-employment income even though they are called "annual rental payments," and rental income from real property is generally excluded from self-employment income. Bills have been repeatedly introduced before Congress to statutorily exclude the CRP payments from self-employment tax, but these bills generally have died in committee. In the 110 th Congress, the Senate passed H.R. 2419 , which contains a provision that would exclude the payments from self-employment income in some, but not all, cases. Unlike most previously introduced legislation, it would also provide a tax credit as an optional alternative to the current annual rental payments. This credit would be subject to neither income tax nor self-employment tax.

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates contributions and expenditures for federal election campaigns. The term "hard money," which is not statutorily defined, typically refers to funds raised and spent in accordance with the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of FECA. Unlike soft money, which will be discussed in the next section, hard money may be used "in connection with" or "for the purpose of influencing" federal elections. Under FECA, hard money restrictions apply to contributions from and expenditures by any "person," as defined to include "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons," but not including the federal government. FECA provides that a "person" is limited to contributing no more than $2,000 per candidate, per election (adjusted for inflation to $2,300 for the 2007-2008 election cycle); $25,000 per year to a national committee of a political party (adjusted for inflation to $28,500 for the 2007-2008 election cycle); and $5,000 per year to PACs (limits on contributions by and to PACs are not adjusted for inflation). FECA further provides that an "individual" is subject to an aggregate limit on all contributions per two-year election cycle (encompassing all contributions to federally registered candidates, parties, and PACs): $95,000 per two-year election cycle, with sub-limits: (a) $37,500 to all candidates and (b) $57,500 to all PACs and parties (no more than $37,500 of which is to state and local parties and PACs). As indexed for inflation, the 2007-2008 election cycle limit is $108,200, with sub-limits: (a) $42,700 to all candidates and (b) $65,500 to all PACs and parties (no more than $42,700 of which is to state and local parties and PACs). In interpreting such statutory provisions, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has consistently found that the act's definition of "person" includes unincorporated Indian tribes, thereby subjecting tribes to the $2,300 per candidate per election limit, the $28,500 per year limit to a national party, and the $5,000 per year limit to PACs. On May 15, 2000, however, the FEC found that whereas an unincorporated Indian tribe is considered a "person" under FECA, it is not considered an "individual" and therefore is not subject to the aggregate election-cycle limit. As a result of that ruling, it appears that an Indian tribe, by making, for example, an unlimited number of $2,300, $28,500, and $5,000 contributions, could significantly exceed the $108,200 aggregate election-cycle limit applicable to "individuals." FECA also prohibits corporations, labor unions, and national banks from using their treasury funds to make contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections. Such entities may, however, participate in financing federal elections by establishing separate segregated funds, also known as political action committees (PACs), which are permitted to raise voluntary contributions for use in federal elections. PAC contributions are subject to limitations under FECA, as are contributions from individual citizens and political parties. Generally, as most Indian tribes are unincorporated, they are not subject to the FECA ban on the use of corporate treasury funds for contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections. Accordingly, most tribes may make contributions in federal elections directly from their tribal funds, without establishing a PAC. This appears to facilitate the ability of Indian tribes to make federal election contributions. That is, while current law limits contributions to a PAC to $5,000 per year from any source, a tribe may acquire a large amount of funds for use in federal elections more directly (i.e., from its own tribal funds, including, for example, income from tribal enterprises, so long as those enterprises are neither incorporated nor government contractors). In one key respect, the FEC treats Indian tribes differently than PACs. Although a 1978 FEC ruling had required Indian tribes making contributions to comply with the periodic reporting requirements of FECA, this requirement was explicitly superceded by a 1995 agency ruling. Although contributions from tribes must be reported by recipients, one must view the FEC filings of candidates, PACs, and parties in order to track the funds given by an Indian tribe, as well as the IRS filings by section 527 political organizations. PoliticalMoneyLine found that some $25 million was donated for 2000-20005 federal elections by 212 federally recognized Indian tribes, and that the reporting was made under almost 2,000 different variations of their names. Thus, the ability to track the flow of election-related money from Indian tribes is more difficult than it is for other large entities. Several observations may be made about the ability of Indian tribes to spend money in federal elections compared with that of other interest groups, which typically operate through PACs. Like other interest groups, Indian tribes are subject to no aggregate limit on their total federal election contributions (only individual citizens are subject to this limit). Unlike an interest group PAC, however, an Indian tribe may have a more readily available pool of funds that could be used in federal elections, that is, its own tribal funds, as opposed to a fund solely comprised of contributions that are subject to limitations and source restrictions. This advantage, however, may be somewhat offset by the $5,000 per candidate, per election limit applicable to a PAC, which typically qualifies as a "multicandidate committee," compared with the $2,300 per candidate, per election limit applicable to all other persons, including Indian tribes. (In one apparent anomaly in FECA, a multicandidate committee may only contribute $15,000 per year to the national committee of a political party, whereas any other person, including an Indian tribe, may contribute $25,000, or $28,500 in the 2007-2008 election cycle, adjusted for inflation.) While "soft money" is not expressly defined in federal election law and regulation, strictly speaking, it refers to funds that are not regulated by FECA (i.e., hard money). It may refer to corporate and labor treasury funds that cannot legally be used in connection with federal elections, but can be used for other specified purposes. Sometimes referred to as nonfederal funds, prior to the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 ( P.L. 107-155 ; March 27, 2002), "soft money" often referred to non-FECA funds raised by the national committees of the two major political parties. BCRA put an end to this practice by prohibiting national parties from raising funds not subject to FECA, whether from individual citizens, corporations, labor unions, or Indian tribes. Even after the enactment of BCRA, however, spending on issue advocacy communications remains a prominent soft money activity. Issue advocacy communications are generally paid for by a group, such as a for-profit or nonprofit corporation or labor union, for advertisements (typically broadcast on radio or television) that could be interpreted to favor or disfavor certain candidates, while also serving to inform the public about a policy issue. Prior to BCRA, issue advocacy communications were generally unregulated by FECA. Therefore, Indian tribes (like corporations, labor unions, and individuals) could spend unlimited amounts of money on such communications. With the enactment of BCRA, certain issue ads are now regulated. BCRA created a new term in federal election law, "electioneering communication," which describes a political ad that "refers" to a clearly identified federal candidate, is broadcast within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, and if for House and Senate elections, is "targeted to the relevant electorate," (i.e., is received by 50,000 or more persons in the state or district where the respective House or Senate election is occurring). BCRA prohibits the financing of such communications with union or certain corporate funds. Furthermore, for permissible "electioneering communications," federal election law requires disclosure of disbursements over $10,000 for such communications, including identification of each donor of $1,000 or more. Therefore, while corporations and labor unions are prohibited from engaging in "electioneering communications," it appears that most Indian tribes, as unincorporated entities, may continue to finance such communications, subject to the disclosure requirements.

Under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Indian tribes are subject to contribution limits applicable to "persons," as defined by the act. For the 2008 election cycle, these limits include $2,300 per election to a candidate, $28,500 per year to a political party's national committee, and $5,000 per year to a political action committee (PAC). The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has found, however, that FECA's $108,200 election cycle aggregate limit applicable to "individuals," as defined by the act, does not apply to Indian tribes (similar to FECA's treatment of other interest groups that operate through PACs and are also not subject to an aggregate limit). In addition, as most Indian tribes are unincorporated, they are not subject to the FECA ban on use of corporate treasury funds for contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections. Hence, unlike corporations, most Indian tribes are not required to establish PACs in order to participate in federal elections. As the result of an FEC ruling, unlike PACs, Indian tribes are also not required to disclose the amounts and recipients of any contributions they make. With regard to unregulated soft money, Indian tribes may spend unlimited amounts of money on issue advocacy communications. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 made several significant changes to FECA, including increasing certain contribution limits from their previous levels. BCRA also prohibited any "person," which includes Indian tribes, from making soft money donations to political parties. While FECA prohibits corporations and unions from paying for broadcast issue advertisements that refer to federal candidates within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, labeled by BCRA as "electioneering communications," unincorporated Indian tribes are not subject to such a prohibition. However, if an Indian tribe sponsors an electioneering communication, regardless of its incorporation status, it is subject to disclosure requirements, including the identification of disbursements and donors over certain dollar amounts.

Throughout the first session of the 110 th Congress, the Senate considered four nominations to the six-seat FEC. Nominees Robert D. Lenhard (D), Hans A. von Spakovsky (R), and Steven T. Walther (D) served in recess appointments at the agency during that time and until their appointments expired at the end of the first session. The fourth nominee, David M. Mason (R), served at the agency since 1998 and was renominated (although his re-nomination was withdrawn in May 2008, as was von Spakovsky's). Throughout the first session of the 110 th Congress, the von Spakovsky nomination generated controversy. In particular, some Senators and others debated von Spakovsky's actions on voting rights issues while serving at the Justice Department. Much of a June 13, 2007, Senate Rules and Administration Committee hearing and subsequent markup focused on von Spakovsky. On September 26, 2007, after being unable to reach agreement on reporting the nominations individually, the committee reported all four nominees en bloc without recommendation. In the closing days of the first session, the Senate was unable to reach a compromise over the nominees, including whether they should be considered on the floor separately or as a group. The apparent stalemate over the nominations continued into the second session of the 110 th Congress. The Lenhard, Mason, von Spakovsky, and Walther nominations remained pending in the Senate early in the second session of the 110 th Congress, but because the three recess appointments expired at the end of the first session, just two commissioners—Mason (R) and Ellen L. Weintraub (D)—remained in office. Both were previously confirmed by the Senate and could continue serving in holdover status following expired terms. Few developments occurred in early 2008. However, additional nomination activity took place beginning in April. First, Lenhard requested that his nomination be withdrawn. Second, on May 6, 2008, President George W. Bush made three new nominations to the FEC and withdrew Mason's re-nomination. Donald F. McGahn II (R), an election lawyer, was nominated to the Mason seat. At the same time, the President withdrew Lenhard's name and nominated Cynthia L. Bauerly (D), a Senate staffer, to that seat. Caroline C. Hunter (R), then a member of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), was nominated to the FEC seat formerly held by Michael E. Toner. (Toner resigned from the Commission in 2007.) On May 16, 2008, von Spakovsky requested that his nomination be withdrawn. On May 22, 2008, following a hearing the previous day, the Senate Rules and Administration Committee favorably reported the Bauerly, Hunter, and McGahn nominations. Also on May 22, 2008, the White House announced the President's intention to nominate Matthew S. Petersen (R), a Senate staffer, to the seat formerly held by von Spakovsky. Walther's nomination also continued to remain pending. On June 24, 2008, the Senate confirmed Bauerly, Hunter, McGahn, Petersen, and Walther. The five new commissioners joined Ellen Weintraub, who continues to serve at the FEC in holdover status. FEC appointments issues remained quiet until April 2009, when the terms of Commissioners McGahn and Walther expired. They joined Commissioner Weintraub in holdover status. As Table 1 shows, even with three expired terms, six commissioners remain in office. (The FEC would not lose its policymaking quorum until fewer than four commissioners remained in office.) On May 1, 2009, President Obama announced his intention to nominate Service Employees International Union (SEIU) associate general counsel John J. Sullivan to the Commission. The Senate received the nomination on May 4. Sullivan would replace Commissioner Weintraub. Even a two-member Commission was not halted entirely. FECA does not appear to require a four-commissioner majority to permit the FEC to carry out basic information-gathering functions, such as requiring written reports, gathering evidence in enforcement cases, and authorizing subpoenas. With fewer than four commissioners, agency staff and remaining commissioners could also continue to provide general information, and to prepare for a repopulated Commission. Existing campaign law and regulations remained in effect. In addition, in December 2007, when the FEC still had five commissioners, the Commission voted to amend its rules of internal procedure to permit remaining commissioners to execute some duties. Revisions to the FEC's so-called "Directive 10" permit the Commission to continue meeting with fewer than four members to: approve general public information, such as educational guides; appoint certain staff; and approve other basic administrative and employment matters. FECA requires affirmative votes from at least four commissioners to: (1) make, amend, or repeal rules, (2) approve enforcement actions, (3) initiate, or defend itself in, certain court actions, (4) issue advisory opinions, (5) develop forms, (6) conduct hearings and investigations, and (7) refer cases of apparent criminal conduct to law enforcement. FECA also requires a minimum four-vote majority to administer at least some elements of the presidential public financing program, including certifying payments to eligible candidates. The Federal Election Commission was without a quorum of four commissioners for more than six months in 2008. Commission staff and the remaining two commissioners continued to provide information to the regulated community and to prepare for additional commissioners. In the interim, however, the absence of a quorum at the FEC delayed administering aspects of the presidential public financing program, rulemakings, and enforcement actions. Immediate issues facing the repopulated Commission included rulemaking to implement portions of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), pending enforcement cases and advisory opinion requests, and administering the presidential public campaign financing program. The Commission also needed to respond to ongoing litigation surrounding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. During 2009, the Commission continued to work through these and other issues that arose before, during, and after the shutdown. The loss of a policymaking quorum would not occur again unless fewer than four commissioners were in office. Nonetheless, the 2008 "shutdown" may continue to be of interest to the 111 th Congressional consideration of oversight or appropriations issues.

Three recess appointments to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) expired at the end of the first session of the 110th Congress, leaving the agency with just two commissioners. Because the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) requires that at least four commissioners vote affirmatively to execute some of the agency's major functions, the FEC was unable to issue regulations, approve enforcement actions, and administer aspects of the presidential public campaign financing program. The Commission also could not issue advisory opinions. Existing campaign finance law and regulations remained in effect. Remaining commissioners and staff continued routine business. On June 24, 2008, the Senate confirmed five nominees to the FEC. Those five commissioners joined a sixth member who continued to serve in holdover status. Therefore, the Commission was restored to full decision-making strength. By the end of April 2009, the terms of three commissioners (total) had expired, but because commissioners may continue to serve in holdover status, six members remained in office. Examining the Commission's operating status and its backlog from 2008 may be an oversight or appropriations issue of interest to the 111th Congress. CRS Report R40091, Campaign Finance: Potential Legislative and Policy Issues for the 111th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], discusses other recent campaign finance developments, including FEC issues.) Although the loss of the Commission's policymaking quorum has now been resolved, this report will be updated occasionally to reflect subsequent developments.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), about 1.4% of surveyed children living in the United States between the ages of 1 and 5 years had an unacceptably high level of lead in their blood (i.e., 10 micrograms or more of lead per deciliter [i.e., one-tenth of a liter] of blood) between 1999 and 2004. Elevated blood-lead levels may result in learning disabilities, reduced intellectual ability, or other problems. The National Toxicology Program is evaluating the health effects of even lower levels of exposure to lead. Poor children are at special risk because elevated blood-lead levels are more prevalent among children from families with lower incomes, and inadequate nutrition can increase lead absorption by the body. The current incidence of elevated blood-lead levels is much less than it was between 1991 and 1994, when CDC estimated that 4.4% of children between 1 and 5 years of age had elevated lead levels. The drop in blood-lead levels since 1994 may have resulted, at least in part, from the success of federal, state, and local programs aimed at reducing childhood exposure to sources of lead, including house dust containing lead-based paint (LBP) from deteriorated or abraded surfaces of walls, door jambs, and window sashes. It is not necessary for a child to eat paint chips to become poisoned: normal hand-to-mouth behavior in a lead-contaminated home can deliver enough lead to damage the developing nervous system of a child under the age of seven years. Many buildings constructed prior to 1978, when the lead content of interior paint was restricted to current levels, still contain LBP, although most of the lead is found in the existing 18.4 million homes constructed prior to 1960. About 23 million U.S. homes have significant lead-based paint hazards, according to the 2011 American Healthy Homes Survey. Several options are available for LBP risk management in housing. Complete removal of LBP from the interior surfaces of a residence by a qualified contractor provides the best protection for children. Removal, however, can be very costly and therefore could result in fewer residences being remediated. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) estimated in 1999 an average cost of $9,000 per dwelling for an inspection, risk assessment, and full abatement when HUD procedures were followed. The total cost of inspecting and abating hazards in all 18.4 million homes that were constructed prior to 1960 and were in existence at that time was estimated to be about $16.6 billion per year for 10 years. At the end of that period, all homes constructed prior to 1960 would have been renovated or demolished. If only 2.3 million low-income housing units were fully abated, the estimated cost would be $2.1 billion per year. Alternatively, all homes constructed prior to 1960 could be inspected and homes with LBP hazards, such as loose or peeling paint, could be managed with interim measures to reduce exposure at a cost of about $2,500 per unit. For example, LBP could be covered over with lead-free paint. According to HUD, because only about one-third of the units would present LBP hazards in need of control, the estimated total cost of interim measures over 10 years would be approximately $1.84 billion per year. At the end of that period (i.e., in the year 2010), the houses constructed prior to 1960 would be lead-safe, but maintenance would have to continue for houses not abated or demolished. If interim measures were applied only to low-income housing, HUD estimated the total cost to be $230 million per year. Abatement of hazards also produces qualitative and quantitative benefits: according to the economic analysis conducted for the 1999 rule by HUD, the primary quantitative benefit of reducing LBP hazards derives from higher intelligence quotient (IQ) levels and associated increases in lifetime earnings of children who avoid lead exposure. HUD estimated that when a child's blood-lead concentration increases by one microgram of lead per deciliter of blood, average lifetime earnings are reduced by between $544 (present value in 1999, discounted at 7%) and $2,367 (present value in 1999, discounted at 3%), due to reduced cognitive ability. The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, as amended (LBPPPA, 42 U.S.C. 4822), is the basis for federal regulation of LBP hazards. It directs HUD to establish procedures to eliminate "as far as practicable" LBP hazards in all public housing and private housing constructed prior to 1978 that receive federal financial assistance. The act requires periodic risk assessments and interim measures to reduce identified LBP hazards in such housing. In addition, the act requires inspection for LBP hazards prior to federally funded rehabilitation or renovation. LBP hazards must be reduced in projects receiving less than $25,000 in federal funds and eliminated if a project receives at least $25,000 in federal funds. Risk assessments, inspections, and interim and permanent measures to reduce or eliminate LBP hazards are eligible rehabilitation expenses for federal funds. The federal government, acting through HUD, pays for the construction and renovation (including LBP detection and abatement) of public housing, using funds available through the Public Housing Capital Fund grant program to carry out the requirements of the LBPPPA. Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) administer public housing programs locally. Some PHAs are units of general local government. In such cases, local government may be responsible for implementing HUD's LBP testing and abatement regulations in public housing. There are no federal mandates related to LBP in privately owned housing unless it receives federal financial assistance in some form. There are, however, EPA (40 C.F.R. Part 745) and HUD (24 C.F.R. Part 35) rules governing the manner in which home renovations and inspections are conducted by contractors. These rules require training and certification of contractors and prohibit certain practices (such as dry scraping or high-temperature heat guns) that would increase the risk of exposure to lead-based paint. The Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992) authorizes federal grants to state and local governments that choose to establish LBP poisoning prevention programs targeted at low-income residents in private housing. Grants may be used to conduct risk assessments and to remove, immobilize, or otherwise reduce the LBP hazard, with particular attention to hazards to children living in housing constructed prior to 1978. Congressional authorization for these grants expired September 30, 1994, but Presidents have continued to request funds, and Congress has continued to appropriate them. For FY2001 through FY2012, Congress appropriated funds for state and local grants to reduce lead-based paint hazards, as shown in Figure 1 . Since FY1992, Congress has appropriated more than $1.5 billion for these Title X grants to state and local governments to assess and reduce LBP risks in private housing for low-income residents. In addition, Congress has appropriated roughly $400 million, also under Title X, for related LBP abatement by nongovernmental organizations and for training, certification, and research programs. In FY2003, Congress established a third parallel demonstration program for LBP abatement targeted at major urban areas with "the highest lead paint abatement needs" based on "the number of occupied pre-1940 units of rental housing" and "a disproportionately high number of documented cases of lead-poisoned children." Congress appropriated between $45 million and $50 million annually through FY2012 for these urban areas. In 2000, President Clinton's Task Force on Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children released Eliminating Childhood Lead Poisoning: A Federal Strategy Targeting Lead Paint Hazards , which aimed to eliminate LBP hazards to children by 2010. The strategy recommended that the federal government provide funding through grants to control LBP using interim measures in the 2.3 million units of privately owned, low-income housing that were constructed prior to 1960 and that were not receiving federal assistance (and therefore were not covered by HUD regulations). Assuming that some of the cost could be met by state, local, or private funding, leveraged by federal funding, the task force recommended a 50% increase in federal grant funding under the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act, from $60 million in FY2000 to $90 million for FY2001. As shown in Figure 1 , Congress met that goal in FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005, but did not maintain that level of funding in subsequent years, with the exception of FY2010, when ordinary appropriations were supplemented by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-5 . Nevertheless, over 20 years Congress has appropriated roughly $2.0 billion to address LBP hazards in target housing ($1.5 billion through the state and local grant program, and $0.5 billion through the urban area abatement grants), an amount that appears to be in the same order of magnitude as the amount recommended by the President's Strategy, assuming that the 1999 HUD estimates were accurate for interim abatement of low-income housing constructed prior to 1960. The President's task force also suggested exploring the use of financial incentives, such as tax credits or deductions, to reduce LBP hazards in housing for (1) additional low-income families not served by HUD grants and (2) moderate-income families with young children. In the 112 th Congress, H.R. 3325 would have required the Director of HUD's Office of Healthy Homes and Lead Hazard Control to lead a federal initiative to support healthy housing and eradicate housing-related health hazards. Congress did not act on this proposal. Also in the 112 th Congress, H.R. 5911 / S. 2148 would have amended provisions of TSCA imposing the renovation, repair, and painting requirements, but neither chamber acted on this proposal. In the 111 th Congress, S. 1245 would have provided owners of residential properties built before 1960 with a tax credit for LBP abatement costs. Similar proposals were introduced in previous Congresses. No such legislation has been enacted. A more general expansion of mandates as well as grant eligibility for housing with lead-based paint was proposed in the 110 th Congress. S. 2244 would have required "a seller or lessor of housing to: (1) conduct a risk assessment or inspection for the presence of lead-based paint hazards ...; (2) disclose to the purchaser or lessee the results of such inspection or assessment and hazard control measures carried out; (3) remediate any lead-based paint hazards found; and (4) include in any contract for the purchase or lease of housing documentation of any inspection, risk assessment, or hazard control measure." In addition, S. 2244 would have authorized grant expenditures for lead hazard reduction in housing for the elderly or persons with disabilities and for dwellings with no bedrooms, housing categories that currently are excluded from the lead hazard reduction grant program. Finally, the bill would have directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to require the conduct of lead hazard control measures during weatherization projects. None of these provisions was enacted.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), about 1.4% of surveyed children living in the United States between the ages of 1 and 5 years have an unacceptably high level of lead in their blood (i.e., 10 micrograms or more of lead per deciliter of blood), which may result in learning disabilities, reduced intellectual ability, or other problems. Poor children are at special risk because elevated blood-lead levels are more prevalent among children from families with lower incomes, and inadequate nutrition can increase lead absorption by the body. Many sources of lead exposure have been eliminated or reduced, but an important remaining source of lead exposure today is house dust containing lead-based paint (LBP) from deteriorated or abraded surfaces of walls, door jambs, and window sashes, or from home renovations that release LBP. Many buildings constructed prior to 1978, when the lead content of interior paint was restricted to current levels, still contain LBP, but most LBP is found in homes constructed prior to 1960. The federal Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (LBPPPA), as amended, directs the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to regulate, and authorizes funding for, the detection and control of LBP hazards in housing that receives federal assistance. There are no federal mandates related to LBP in privately owned housing unless it receives federal financial assistance in some form. However, the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992; P.L. 102-550) directs the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require training and certification in LBP safe work practices for contractors engaged in home renovations and repairs of homes constructed prior to 1978. In addition, Title X authorizes federal grants through HUD to state and local governments for LBP hazard reduction in privately owned housing that does not receive federal assistance. Congress annually considers funding for these lead hazard reduction grant programs, all of which target older (pre-1978) housing for low-income residents.

This report provides war casualty statistics. It includes data tables containing the number of fatalities and the number of wounded among American military personnel who served in principal wars and combat actions from 1775 to the present. It also includes information such as race and ethnicity, gender, branch of service, and, in some cases, detailed information on types of casualties and causes of death. Casualty statistics for wars that ended long ago are updated periodically, sometimes yearly. These updates almost always reflect the identification of remains of persons previously listed as missing in action and the reclassification of those persons as dead. Other reasons, much less frequent, include the discovery of errors in casualty records for individuals or categories such as race and ethnicity. U.S. casualty statistics are information on war fighters who have fallen in global or regional conflicts involving the United States. The data are gathered on deceased, wounded, ill, or injured active duty U.S. military personnel and Guard/Reservists. The Defense Casualty Analysis System (DCAS) is maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Casualty statistics for conflicts prior to the Persian Gulf War (Desert Shield and Desert Storm) are updated periodically by the DCAS of the DMDC. Casualty figures for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) are updated daily. Links to the sources for casualty figures appear below each table in this report. Table 1 lists casualty statistics for battles, attacks, or operations for which the Congressional Research Service (CRS) receives numerous requests. Tables 9 through 11 provide casualty statistics for OEF, which began on October 7, 2001, and was primarily conducted in Afghanistan. U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan ended on December 31, 2014. Data for OEF are updated on a daily basis. Daily casualty summaries are available at DOD's website: http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf . Tables 10, 11, 13, 14, 16 , and 17 provide ethnicity statistics for OEF, OIF, and OND. A U.S. Office of Management and Budget mandate, Directive No. 15, requires all federal record keeping and data presentation to use race and ethnicity categories. For further explanation, see Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1997-10-30/pdf/97-28653.pdf . Tables 12 through 14 provide casualty statistics for OIF, which began on March 20, 2003. Major combat operations ended on September 1, 2010. These statistics include casualties that occurred between March 19, 2003, and August 31, 2010, in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Prior to March 19, 2003, casualties in these countries were considered OEF. Personnel injured in OIF who died after September 1, 2010, will be included in OIF statistics. Tables 15 through 17 provide casualty statistics for Operation New Dawn (OND). Following the end of combat operations in Iraq (OIF) on September 1, 2010, use of the term Operation New Dawn began on the same day. Casualties occurred between September 1, 2010, and December 31, 2011, in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Personnel injured in OND who die after December 31, 2011, will be included in OND statistics. Table 18 lists casualties published by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Historian's Office. In response to congressional requests, CRS includes Coast Guard casualty data as provided by USCG in addition to DOD data. The USCG, although an armed service, was an agency under the jurisdiction of several federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). The Coast Guard remained under USDOT until February 2003, when it was placed within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In an address to the American people on September 10, 2014, President Barack Obama described a four-part strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Subsequently, on September 22, 2014, the President authorized U.S. Central Command to carry out military actions against the ISIL terrorists. Tables 19 through 21 provide casualty statistics for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Casualties include those that occurred in Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the Mediterranean Sea east of 25° longitude, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. In a press statement released by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) on December 28, 2014, then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced that the United States had officially concluded Operation Enduring Freedom and added that the follow-on mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), would begin on January 1, 2015. As part of OFS, U.S. forces would remain in Afghanistan to participate in a coalition mission to advise, train, and assist local forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations against the remnants of Al Qaeda. Tables 22 through 24 provide casualty statistics for OFS. This section provides total casualty statistics for fallen U.S. servicemembers by conflict (WWI to Global War on Terror) and by state and territory.  The data on World War I are taken from Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015, by Michael Clidfelter, 4th ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2017), p. 433. The data on World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, respectfully, are taken from the U.S. National Archives. The Persian Gulf War data are provided by the U.S. Department of Defense, and are current as of June 2017.  The data for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); Operation New Dawn (OND); Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), respectively, are available from the Defense Casualty Analysis System website at https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties.xhtml . This section provides information on authoritative sources for statistics; demographic indicators by conflict; websites for additional sources of research; and other publications including related CRS reports. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provides detailed historical tables as well as annual statistics on active duty military deaths. DMDC also lists names of the fallen for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Inherent Resolve, and Operation Freedom's Sentinel. https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties.xhtml The Office of the Historian, U.S. Coast Guard, provides a historical table listing the number of U.S. Coast Guardsmen who served and the number of casualties incurred in conflicts from the War of 1812 to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Click on "What wars & other conflicts did the Coast Guard participate in?" https://www.history.uscg.mil/Frequently-As ked-Questions/ The Congressional Research Service receives many requests for lists of war dead. Names of the fallen are often engraved on memorials, mentioned in tributes, or used for other ceremonial purposes. The names of U.S. military personnel killed in major wars and other combat actions are published in the following sources: Soldiers of the Great War, Volume 1-3 from the collection of the Harvard University Library. Available through the Internet Archive at https://archive.org/details/SoldiersOfTheGreatWarV1 . The American Battle Monuments Commission's (ABMC's) "Burials and Memorializations" webpage lists the names of servicemembers buried or memorialized in ABMC cemeteries overseas. The database allows searching by name, conflict (beginning with World War I), branch of service, unit number, state of entry, cemetery or memorial, and date of death. http://www.abmc.gov/database-search The National Archives' Online Public Access catalog allows the public to search the archives' military personnel casualty lists. The site may be accessed by clicking on "Military Personnel" under the heading for "Genealogy/Personal History" at https://aad.archives.gov/aad/ . ABMC's "Burials and Memorializations" webpage lists the names of servicemembers buried or memorialized in ABMC cemeteries overseas. The database allows searching by name, conflict (beginning with World War I), branch of service, unit number, state of entry, cemetery or memorial, and date of death. http://www.abmc.gov/database-search The National Archives publishes casualty lists that may be searched by home state of record. http://www.archives.gov/research/military/korean-war/casualty-lists/state-level-alpha.html ABMC's "Burials and Memorializations" webpage lists the names of servicemembers buried or memorialized in ABMC cemeteries overseas. The database allows searching by name, conflict (beginning with World War I), branch of service, unit number, state of entry, cemetery or memorial, and date of death. http://www.abmc.gov/database-search The National Archives publishes casualty lists that may be searched by home state of record. http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-lists/state-level-alpha.html ABMC's "Burials and Memorializations" webpage lists the names of servicemembers buried or memorialized in ABMC cemeteries overseas. The database allows searching by name, conflict (beginning with World War I), branch of service, unit number, state of entry, cemetery or memorial, and date of death. http://www.abmc.gov/database-search The National Archives publishes casualty lists that may be searched by home state of record. http://aad.archives.gov/aad/display-partial-records.jsp?f=4773&mtch=385&q=persian+gulf+war&cat=GP21&dt=2514&tf=F&bc=sl The National Archives publishes casualty lists that may be searched by home state of record. http://aad.archives.gov/aad/display-partial-records.jsp?s=4772&dt=2514&tf=F&bc=%2Csl%2Cfd&q=Operation+Enduring+Freedom&btnSearch=Search&as_alq=&as_anq=&as_epq=&as_woq= The National Archives publishes casualty lists that may be searched by home state of record. http://aad.archives.gov/aad/display-partial-records.jsp?s=4772&dt=2514&tf=F&bc=%2Csl%2Cfd&q=Operation+Iraqi+Freedom&btnSearch=Search&as_alq=&as_anq=&as_epq=&as_woq= DPAA's mission is to "Provide the fullest possible accounting for our missing personnel to their families and the nation" by locating the remains, repatriating, or determining the whereabouts of missing Americans. Currently, 82,708 Americans are missing from World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, Vietnam, and the Iraq and other conflicts. Names of those who have been accounted for can be found on the DPAA's "Recently Accounted For" webpage at http://www.dpaa.mil/Our-Missing/Recently-Accounted-For/ . Lists of casualties that are not available from a central source may in some cases be available at the state level from each state's or commonwealth's adjutant general's office or from military history detachments, military museums, state libraries, or archives. The National Guard Association, at https://www.ngaus.org/states-territories/state-association-directory , provides links to contacts for National Guard information in all 50 states as well as District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. U.S. Casualty Status is a daily update of casualties published by DOD for OEF, OIF, OND, OIR, and OFS. http://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf DOD News Releases contain daily news, including military personnel fatalities by name under the heading "Casualty Releases." The archive located on the right sidebar dates to October 1994. http://www.defense.gov/releases/ CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS22452, A Guide to U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42738, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017 , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21405, U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts , by [author name scrubbed].

This report provides U.S. war casualty statistics. It includes data tables containing the number of casualties among American military personnel who served in principal wars and combat operations from 1775 to the present. It also includes data on those wounded in action and information such as race and ethnicity, gender, branch of service, and cause of death. The tables are compiled from various Department of Defense (DOD) sources. Wars covered include the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam Conflict, and the Persian Gulf War. Military operations covered include the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission; Lebanon Peacekeeping; Urgent Fury in Grenada; Just Cause in Panama; Desert Shield and Desert Storm; Restore Hope in Somalia; Uphold Democracy in Haiti; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); Operation New Dawn (OND); Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). Starting with the Korean War and the more recent conflicts, this report includes additional detailed information on types of casualties and, when available, demographics. It also cites a number of resources for further information, including sources of historical statistics on active duty military deaths, published lists of military personnel killed in combat actions, data on demographic indicators among U.S. military personnel, related websites, and relevant Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports.

The Senate's emphasis on individual and minority rights, reflected in both its standing rules and chamber custom, can make it challenging for the chamber to achieve its various goals in a timely manner. For this reason, the Senate routinely chooses to set aside its standing rules by unanimous consent. This is done formally through UC agreements, which in many cases outline the terms under which specific legislation will be considered. Under recent practice, these UC agreements sometimes include a provision imposing a 60-vote requirement for approval of amendments or legislation, instead of the simple majority vote ordinarily required in the Senate. These amendments or measures are sometimes of a controversial nature with potential to be subjected to extended consideration or even a filibuster. By incorporating a 60-vote threshold, such UC agreements avoid the multiple requirements associated with Senate Rule XXII, both for invoking cloture and for consideration under cloture. Such UC agreements ensure that a measure will not be successful without the same level of super-majority support that would be required for cloture by stipulating that if the 60-vote threshold is not reached, the matter will be disposed of. As with all UC agreements, once agreed to, they can be altered only by the adoption of a further UC agreement. Several possible effects could result from the Senate choosing to impose a 60-vote threshold for the passage of legislation. First, for cases in which a large majority of Senators is in favor of or opposed to the question, the time that would ordinarily be required to invoke cloture can be avoided. Once a cloture petition has been submitted, it must lay over until the second calendar day that the Senate is in session before a vote on cloture occurs. For a cloture vote to be successful, in most cases three-fifths of all Senators must vote in the affirmative (i.e., 60 votes if there are no vacancies). If the cloture vote is successful, another 30 hours of consideration are in order before a vote on the underlying business must occur. Incorporating the 60-vote threshold into a UC agreement allows the Senate to bypass these time consuming requirements. Second, for cases in which a large majority either in favor of or against the question cannot be assumed, the 60-vote threshold accomplishes the same purpose as a filibuster by preventing or delaying passage, but without requiring the Senate to engage in extended debate. Thus, surrendering the right to filibuster may be more palatable if Senators are confident a measure will not pass without super-majority support. Another reason that a 60-vote threshold might be included in a UC agreement is that it presents Senators with an opportunity to vote directly on the underlying policy issue. Votes on cloture often fail and consequently a vote on the actual measure or amendment may never occur. The 60-vote threshold in a UC agreement has the effect of bypassing the procedural vote to grant Senators a direct vote on the policy issue at hand. Lastly, in many of these 60-vote threshold UC agreements, it is a pair (or group) of amendments or measures that are jointly held to the 60-vote requirement. Many of the pairs (or groups) are competing options for the same policy issue. This allows the Senate to debate and choose between contending alternatives in a timely and controlled manner. Although examples of UC agreements placing a similar 60-vote threshold provisions can be found dating from at least the early 1990s, the practice has increased in frequency over the last four years. Unanimous consent agreements that impose a 60-vote threshold may be agreed to at any time, either in advance, or during consideration. It is notable that unlike Senate rules requiring super majorities, which typically are framed in terms of a fraction either of the membership or those voting (e.g., two-thirds, three-fifths), these UC agreements explicitly state the number of votes required. Given that practices generally specify disposition for a question that achieves a majority vote, but not a super-majority vote imposed by unanimous consent, the language of these UC agreements typically provides for disposition of the amendment or measure if it fails to achieve the required 60 votes. Typically, the matter is withdrawn, but it could alternately be laid on the table or returned to the calendar For example, in one UC agreement, the Senate agreed that "... two amendments be subject to a 60 affirmative vote threshold, and that if neither achieves that threshold, then it be withdrawn." Unanimous consent agreements including a 60-vote threshold may be used not just to avoid the steps associated with invoking cloture, but also to avoid a separate vote on waiving a point of order raised under the Congressional Budget Act. In the Senate, most points of order under the Budget Act may be waived by a vote of at least three-fifths of all Senators duly chosen and sworn (60 votes if there are no vacancies). In one UC agreement, the Senate agreed to a 60-vote threshold for the passage of a conference report stipulating that a vote on the waiving of a Budget Act point of order also be treated as a simultaneous vote on adoption.

The Senate frequently enters into unanimous consent agreements (sometimes referred to as "UC agreements" or "time agreements") that establish procedures for the consideration of legislation that the Senate is considering or will soon consider. In recent practice, such unanimous consent agreements have sometimes included a provision that would require a 60-vote threshold to be met for amendments or legislation to be considered agreed to, rather than the simple majority ordinarily required. These amendments or measures may be of a controversial nature with the potential for causing a filibuster. By incorporating a 60-vote threshold, such UC agreements avoid the multiple requirements imposed by Senate Rule XXII for invoking cloture, while preserving the same requirement for super-majority support. This report will be updated each session of Congress.

Recent high energy prices, concerns over energy security, and the desire to promote rural business and to reduce air pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions have sparked congressional interest in promoting greater use of alternatives to petroleum fuels. Biofuels—transportation fuels produced from plant and animal materials—have attracted particular interest. Ethanol and biodiesel, the two most widely used biofuels, receive significant federal support in the form of tax incentives, loan and grant programs, and regulatory programs. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. 109-58 ) established a renewable fuel standard (RFS). This initial RFS required the increasing use of renewable fuel in gasoline, starting at 4.0 billion gallons in 2006 and increasing to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. However, the RFS was significantly expanded on December 19, 2007, when President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). Instead of requiring 5.4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2008, the new law requires 9.0 billion gallons. Further, the 2007 law requires that the RFS be expanded to 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 2022, as compared to an estimated 8.6 billion gallons under EPAct. Although this is not an explicit ethanol mandate, it is expected that much of this requirement will be met using corn-based ethanol. The U.S. ethanol industry expanded rapidly in response to EPAct, outpacing the required growth in the earlier RFS and leading some proponents of corn-based ethanol to support an increase in the mandated levels of the RFS. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill, P.L. 110-246 ) promotes the development of cellulosic ethanol production through new tax credits, reduces slightly the blender's tax credit for corn-derived ethanol beginning in 2009, and continues the tariff on imported ethanol. It also expands research on agricultural renewable energy and encourages infrastructure development needed for cellulosic ethanol production. During the final months of the farm bill debate, both food and fuel prices increased dramatically, and the role of corn-based ethanol in food price inflation became the subject of intense debate. Because of the rapid expansion of U.S. corn ethanol capacity—as of December 2008, existing capacity was an estimated at 10.4 billion gallons per year, while an additional 1.8 billion gallons was under construction —some are concerned that the United States will soon reach the limit of ethanol that can be produced from corn. Critics of corn-based ethanol argue that the industry does not need continued government support, and that current corn demand for ethanol is putting a strain on corn and other grain markets, leading to increases in other commodity prices, such as livestock feed, which then leads to higher dairy and meat prices. Critics also argue that the environmental costs of corn-based ethanol may outweigh the benefits. Proponents of corn-based ethanol production assert that increased acreage and upward-trending yields will enable corn producers to satisfy the demand for corn for feed, fuel, and exports. Advanced biofuels based on non-food feedstocks are generating much interest. Feedstocks that could be grown on marginal land with reduced inputs compared with corn would solve the food versus fuel issue, it has been argued. However, biofuels that rely on other sources of biomass, including agricultural wastes, municipal solid waste, and dedicated non-food energy crops such as perennial grasses, fast-growing trees, and algae are still years from commercial production. Nonetheless, this interest has led to proposals to support and/or mandate biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch through explicit requirements, research, development and extension funding, and/or tax incentives. Non-corn biofuels could include fuels produced from cellulosic material (such as perennial grasses), ethanol produced from sugarcane or beets, and biodiesel or renewable diesel produced from vegetable or animal oils. Under EISA, eligible corn-based ethanol production is capped at 15 billion gallons beginning in 2015. Starting in 2009, the RFS will require that an increasing amount of the mandate be met through the use of "advanced biofuels"—biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch. Currently, cellulosic ethanol is not produced on a commercial scale. As of July 2008, there was one commercial-scale refinery under construction, with two demonstration-scale plants and three pilot-scale plants completed. Industry sources expect commercial production of cellulosic ethanol to begin in 2010 or 2011. In January 2009, USDA announced funding for a cellulosic biofuels plant under the Biorefinery Program with projected output of 20 million gallons annually, beginning in 2010. The RFS mandates cellulosic ethanol production of 100 million gallons in 2010. For more information on cellulosic ethanol, see CRS Report RL34738, Cellulosic Biofuels: Analysis of Policy Issues for Congress , by Tom Capehart. The following table provides a side-by-side comparison of biofuels-related provisions in EISA with the enacted farm bill—the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. President Bush signed EISA on December 19, 2007, and the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 became law on June 18, 2008, after President Bush's veto was overridden by both the Senate and the House. Both bills cover a wide range of energy and agricultural topics in addition to biofuels. The table is organized in the same order as EISA, followed by provisions that are exclusively in the enacted farm bill. Key biofuels-related provisions of EISA and the 2008 farm bill include: a major expansion of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ) [EISA]; expansion and/or modification of tax credits for ethanol [farm bill]; grants and loan guarantees for biofuels (especially cellulosic) research, development, deployment, and production [EISA, farm bill]; studies of the potential for ethanol pipeline transportation, expanded biofuel use, market and environmental impacts of increased biofuel use, and the effects of biodiesel on engines [EISA, farm bill]; expansion of biofuel feedstock availability [farm bill]; reauthorization of biofuels research and development at the U.S. Department of Energy [EISA] and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency [farm bill]; and reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol, a new production tax credit for cellulosic ethanol, and continuation of the import duty on ethanol [farm bill].

The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140), also known as the 2007 energy bill, significantly expands existing programs to promote biofuels. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246), also known as the 2008 farm bill, contains a distinct energy title (Title IX) that covers a wide range of energy and agricultural topics with extensive attention to biofuels, including corn-starch based ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel. Research provisions relating to renewable energy are found in Title VII and tax provisions are found in Title XV of the farm bill. Key biofuels-related provisions of EISA and the 2008 farm bill include: a major expansion of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) [EISA]; expansion and/or modification of tax credits for ethanol [farm bill]; grants and loan guarantees for biofuels (especially cellulosic) research, development, deployment, and production [EISA, farm bill]; studies of the potential for ethanol pipeline transportation, expanded biofuel use, market and environmental impacts of increased biofuel use, and the effects of biodiesel on engines [EISA, farm bill]; expansion of biofuel feedstock availability [farm bill]; reauthorization of biofuels research and development at the U.S. Department of Energy [EISA] and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency [farm bill]; and reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol, a new production tax credit for cellulosic ethanol, and continuation of the import duty on ethanol [farm bill]. This report includes information from CRS Report RL34130, Renewable Energy Policy in the 2008 Farm Bill, by Tom Capehart, and CRS Report RL34136, Biofuels Provisions in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140), H.R. 3221, and H.R. 6: A Side-by-Side Comparison, by [author name scrubbed].

RS21714 -- Generals and Flag Officers: Senior Military Officer Confirmations January 20, 2004 The role of the Senate in confirming senior military officer promotions and appointments stems directly from the U.S. Constitution. Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Adviceand Consent of theSenate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Counsels, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all OtherOfficers of theUnited States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." Generals and FlagOfficers (Admirals), fall into the category of "all Other Officers of the United States" and require Senateconfirmation. Othermilitary officers also require Senate confirmation, but this report, will focus on the process for the military's highestranking leaders-- one-star through four-star officers. (2) Since the early 1990s, the Senate has become increasingly vigilant in examining senior military officer misconduct and ensuring thatthe nominees they confirm meet the highest standard of accountability. During the mid-1990s, numerous hearingsand debatesensued about the suitability for promotion of many senior military officers. A heightening of Senate scrutiny canbe traced to notableconfirmation cases which included the following: In 1992, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) vote to not awardThomas J. Hickey the retirement rank of Air Force Lieutenant General due to his failure to implement key directivesto solidify theintegrity of the Air Force promotion selection process; (3) in 1994, the debate over the retirement grade of Air Force LieutenantGeneral Buster C. Glosson, who was accused of improperly attempting to prejudice a promotion board; (4) and in 1994, thecontroversy over the retirement rank of Navy Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, because of his alleged responsibility forthe TailhookConvention scandal (5) in 1991 and a perceived lackof effort to integrate women into the Navy. (6) Today, Senate scrutiny of the leadership accountability of senior military officers remains vigorous. During the March 2003hearings regarding the sexual assault scandal at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Senator John W. Warner noted thatthe situation"demand(s) a deliberate critical examination and appropriate measure of accountability when a command fails insome key aspect ofits mission, particularly when personnel charged to a commander's care have been harmed". (7) This comment and other similarstatements made by Senators may be a signal that a new standard of accountability may continue to take shape inthe Senate in thecoming years. The key to this new standard may be the striking of a balance between congressional oversight, theSenate role to"advise and consent," and DOD transparency in disclosing senior military officer adverse information during theconfirmationprocess. During the confirmation process, it is DOD policy to inform the President and the SASC of adverse information concerning thenominated senior military officers. Personnel actions involving General and Flag Officers that require Senateconfirmation includenominations, appointments, reappointments, extensions, assignments, reassignments, promotions, and retirements. DOD Instruction1320.4 describes the procedures used to process these personnel actions. To comprehend these procedures, it mayhelp to understandtwo terms defined by the instruction: Adverse Information : Any substantiated adverse finding or conclusion from anofficially documented investigation or inquiry. Alleged Adverse Information : Any allegation of conflict of interest, failure to adhereto required standards of conduct, abuse of authority, misconduct or information serving as the basis for anincomplete or unresolvedofficial investigation or inquiry into a possible conflict of interest or failure to adhere to standards of conduct ormisconduct. It is also helpful to understand the difference between promotions and appointments. In general, military officers are selected forpromotion to one- or two-star rank by a centralized ad hoc selection board of general/flag officers. Candidates forthree- andfour-star appointments are not considered by a centralized board, but instead nominated by a Service Secretarythrough the Secretaryof Defense. For reappointments to another three- or four-star position, the Senate is required to reconfirm thepersonnel action, evenif no promotion is involved. According to Title 10, Section 1370 of the United States Code, GFO retirements mustalso beindividually confirmed by the Senate. DOD Instruction 1320.4 identifies how adverse information is considered by board members during one- and two-star centralizedpromotion boards. Section 615, Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, closely governs the procedures used by themilitary to consideradverse information during the promotion process by giving specific guidance on the type of information that maybe furnished toboard members. Specifically, information about a particular officer may be furnished to a selection board only ifthe informationexists in official military records (personnel folders, investigative records, etc.). Additionally, it must be determinedby a ServiceSecretary to be "substantiated, relevant information" that could "reasonably and materially affect the deliberations"of the selectionboard. The law also mandates that before adverse information about an officer is furnished to a board, theinformation must be madeavailable to the officer and that the officer must be given a reasonable opportunity to submit comments to the board. The DOD instruction also directs that for all GFO promotions and appointments, the Service Secretary review all official DODinvestigation records to confirm that each candidate meets prescribed standards of conduct. This internal reviewis usually led by theGeneral Counsel of the respective military department. Records reviewed by each service include files from theInspector General,military criminal investigation units, and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) organizations. For promotionsto one-star, aService Secretary directs a review of all adverse information covering the last 10 years of an officer's career toidentify negativetrends. For two-, three- and four-star personnel actions, the review includes any new adverseinformation since the individual's lastSenate confirmation. Once the review is completed, the Service Secretary considers the adverse information, if any,and decides ifhe or she will support the nomination. If so, the Secretary will forward a nomination package identifying theproposed promotion orappointment to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Force Management Policy(ASD/FMP). According to DODI 1320.4, if the Secretary of Defense supports a senior military officer nomination submitted by a ServiceSecretary and if no adverse information exists on the nominee, the Secretary of Defense will endorse the nominationpackage andforward it to the President with the following certification: All systems of records, to include EEO files and the Public Disclosure Report (forone-star nominations only), maintained in the DOD that pertain to this officer have been examined. The filescontain no adverseinformation about this officer since his last Senate confirmation. Further, to the best of my knowledge, there is noplanned orongoing investigation or inquiry into matters that constitute alleged adverse information on the part of thisofficer. If the Secretary of Defense supports the nomination, but adverse information exists, the Secretary identifies the information in aseparate summary included with the nomination package submitted to the President. The summary outlines theadverse information,identifies the investigative agency, discloses findings, describes corrective actions taken, and explains why DODleaders continue tosupport the nomination. Forty-eight hours after the President signs a nomination list, the White House Clerk will forward the list to the Senate Clerk. DODPublic Affairs will announce a Presidential nomination as soon as possible after Presidential signature and militarydepartmentcoordination. After a nomination reaches the Senate, ASD(FMP) is the primary DOD conduit to discuss adverseinformation oralleged adverse information with SASC members or staff. But, this does not prohibit the military services fromcommunicatingdirectly with the SASC, or other Senators or staff, about a nomination. If a nomination package signed by thePresident containsadverse information, ASD(FMP) will send a letter to the Chairman of the SASC, advising him of the information. Normally, DODwill not report alleged adverse information or other unsubstantiated allegations to theSenate. However, in extraordinary casesinvolving an allegation, which is receiving significant media attention or when the SASC brings an allegation tothe attention ofDOD, a summary of the unsubstantiated allegation is provided. ASD(FMP) also monitors the names on a nomination list to determine if new adverse information exists. ASD(FMP) initiatesmonthly checks with each service and DOD IG on all nominations that have been received by the Senate, but havenot yet beenconfirmed. If, after a nomination reaches the Senate, and adverse information or alleged adverse information isidentified by DOD,the cognizant military department will notify ASD(FMP) within 5 business days. ASD(FMP) will advise the SASCof theinformation and will request that the nomination be held in abeyance until the matter is resolved. When theinvestigation or inquiryis completed on an officer whose nomination is on hold at the SASC, and the allegation is substantiated, therespective ServiceSecretary and the Secretary of Defense will decide if they still support the nomination. If support continues, thenthe nominationpackage will be resubmitted for re-approval by the President. If the President also continues to support thenomination, thenASD(FMP) will advise the SASC to proceed with the confirmation process. If, on the other hand, based on the newadverseinformation, the DOD administration does not support the nomination, the Secretary of Defense will submit a newnominationpackage through ASD(FMP), requesting that the President withdraw the nomination from the SASC. In instanceswhere theallegation is unsubstantiated, the ASD(FMP) will advise the SASC of the outcome of the investigation or inquiryand request that thenomination process proceed. (8) DOD's primary investigative mechanism is the Inspector General (IG). Allegations of administrative misconduct are investigatedseparately from allegations of criminal misconduct. Investigations of criminal misconduct areconducted by law enforcementagencies within each service Inspector General office. Criminal misconduct includes, but is not limited to,procurement fraud,computer crimes, bribery and kickbacks, financial crimes, government purchase card crimes, medical fraud,environmental crimes,and theft. There are four Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs) within DOD: The DefenseCriminal InvestigativeService (DCIS); US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC); The Naval Criminal Investigative Service(NCIS); and theAir Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). (9) Conversely, administrative misconduct is investigated by an inquiry directorate within the respective service. Examples ofadministrative misconduct include sexual harassment, improper relationships, abuse of authority, favoritism, and misuse ofgovernment property. According to the DOD IG Semiannual Report to Congress, April-September 2003, onSeptember 30, 2003,there were 275 ongoing DOD senior officer investigations (included civilian leaders). During that six-month period,DOD reportedthat it closed 221 senior official cases, of which 32 (14%) identified misconduct to include: Misuse of governmentproperty andresources -- 35%, abuse of authority and favoritism -- 35%, improper personnel action -- 16%, sexual harassmentand improperrelationship -- 7%, and other misconduct -- 7%. Some analysts believe senior military officer confirmations will likely continue to receive increased scrutiny by some Members ofCongress. Recent hearings and statements suggest a concern in the Senate about the accountability of senior militaryofficers whofailed to promote a proper leadership climate in the organizations they commanded. An example is the scrutiny bySenators of thecontroversial circumstances surrounding the nomination of Major General Robert Clark to a three-star Armyposition. In 1991, hecame under criticism because a soldier thought to be a homosexual was killed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, duringClark's command. Although an Army investigation cleared Clark of tolerating anti-gay attitudes on the post, critics alleged that whilehe was in chargeof Fort Campbell, he permitted an atmosphere of harassment. In a press release referencing this case, SenatorEdward M. Kennedystated: "We need to hold senior commanders accountable if they allow a climate of bigotry, intimidation and fearto exist on ournation's military bases". (10) Other recent misconduct cases including the 2003 Air Force Academy sexual assault investigations, alsohint that the Senate may be poised to increase the scrutiny of senior military officer accountability duringconfirmation. Thetransparency of DOD investigations may continue to be key in this process. DOD asserts that its investigative mechanism is objective, independent, and promotes confidence in its ability to "police its own." Inthe September 2003 Semiannual Report to Congress, Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department ofDefense, states: "The trust of the American public in their government requires confidence that the institutions of their governmentare acting in theirinterest...For 25 years, Inspectors General have sought to promote integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness in theprograms andoperations of government." This analysis has identified that the DOD disclosure process appears mostly transparentand welldefined. If improvements are required or desired, they are administrative in nature. For example, the DOD 10-year"look-back" may require refinement since the scope of the policy may actually be shorter than intended. As previously discussed,the disclosureof adverse information related to one-star nominations involves a review of files ten years back. A problem maystem from currentDOD records disposition schedules, in which some services purge IG investigation reports dealing withadministrative misconductafter two years (excludes criminal investigation files). (11) The investigation reports involving the administrative misconduct are heldfor ten years only if it involves a senior military officer. As result, a complete ten-year record of past investigationsmay not beavailable when compiling a disclosure for the Senate. (12) Another weakness may exist in the DOD practice of disclosing only new adverse information since the last Senate confirmation of asenior military officer. This practice may make it difficult for the Senate to identify misconduct trends or notecommand climateissues. Additionally, DOD generally does not disclose unsubstantiated allegations unless the Secretaryof Defense deems it relevantto the deliberations. This practice may prevent the Senate from getting a full disclosure of multiple unsubstantiatedallegations andhinder Members from identifying possible negative trends. If the disclosure of adverse trends in the organizationalclimate ofmilitary bases and posts becomes more critical during the Senate confirmation process, the DOD IG SemiannualReport to theCongress is one possible tool that may facilitate transparency into any developing trends. The report currentlyprovides meaningfulstatistical information concerning senior official inquiries, but may need to present a more rigorous analysis of anydeveloping trendsin command climate investigations. The addition of such an analysis to the report may allow Members to conductconfirmation andoversight functions more effectively.

This report describes the Department of Defense (DOD) process which discloses to theSenate adverse information about senior military officers awaiting confirmation of a General or Flag Officer (GFO)personnel action,such as a promotion or appointment. It also describes the DOD mechanism used to investigate administrative orcriminalmisconduct of Generals and Flag Officers (Admirals). Finally, the report analyzes trends in the way the Senatescrutinizes seniormilitary leaders during the confirmation process, especially if these leaders failed to promote a proper leadershipclimate in theorganizations they commanded. This report will be updated, as needed. (1)

RS20985 -- Stewardship Contracting for Federal Forests Updated April 10, 2003 Procurement contracts are used by federal agencies to perform a wide variety of tasks, and could be used for many forest stewardshipservices. Typically, a contract proposal identifies the tasks to be performed: the unmerchantable trees or underbrushto be cut and thetreatment of the cut (and possibly additional) materials -- left as is, piled and burned, lopped and scattered toaccelerate rotting or forprescribed burning, or even removed from the site. It is also possible, though not commonly used, to specify thedesired resultingcondition of the area to be treated, rather than specifying the tasks to be performed. Currently, federal agenciesaward contracts to thelowest bidder; however, Congress could specify other factors to consider -- for example, local employment orquality of a bidder'spast performance -- in directing or further authorizing procurement contracting for stewardship services. In addition, some have suggested that any commercially valuable material could be collected under a procurement contract and soldseparately, at least by the Forest Service. (4) Thisapproach, commonly known as log sales, is common in Europe and has beendiscussed sporadically for the national forests for at least 40 years. The authorization for Forest Service timber salesalso permits logsales, but the agency has not used this authority extensively. Advantages of Traditional Procurement Contracting. The principal advantage ofusing current contracting methods for forest stewardship is that it is the system the federal agencies currently usefor procuring mostservices. It is a simple, straightforward approach, well-known to agency personnel and to the potential privatecontractors, andnumerous private contractors exist to bid on such contract proposals. Another advantage of using the current contracting system is the opportunity for congressional control and oversight. Annual budgetjustifications for forest stewardship, under the current structure or a new structure designed to enhance oversightof federal foreststewardship, could give Congress a way to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of agency efforts, while theappropriations for suchefforts could be targeted to areas of greatest need. Limitations of Traditional Service Contracting. One major limitation of usingtraditional service procurement contracting for federal forest stewardship is the potentially enormous federalexpenditures on such aprogram. The Forest Service has identified 36 million federal acres of frequent-fire forest ecosystems, and 39million federal acres ofother forest ecosystems, as having a high risk of significant ecological damage from catastrophic wildfires due toaccumulations ofexcess biomass. (5) With treatment costs averagingabout $300 per acre (ranging from $100 to $1,000), (6) treating these 75 millionacres could cost more than $20 billion -- possibly less but also possibly substantially more. If the lands at moderaterisk of ecologicaldamage from catastrophic wildfires -- another 90 million federal acres of frequent-fire forest ecosystems and 66million federal acresof other forest ecosystems -- are also to be treated, the total cost for all 231 million federal acres could be around$70 billion. Suggested modifications to traditional service procurement contracting for forest stewardship could also hamper efforts at improvingfederal forest health. Using resulting desired conditions (instead of tasks to be performed) would probably bestimprove foreststewardship, because it would focus on what's left on the site, rather than on the activities performed or on thebiomass (wood)removed from the site. However, no standardized measures of desired forest conditions for contracting (or forreporting on agencystewardship efforts) have been developed, making this approach difficult to implement. In addition, proponentsadvocate separate logsales for any commercially valuable wood to be removed. However, log values often depend on how the log is cut(log lengths andlocations of major knots); the independence of the service contractors from the potential log purchasers would bedifficult to assure,but important to avoid possible conflicts-of-interest; and the agency has little experience with log sales. Thus,traditional serviceprocurement contracting has limitations for improving federal forest health. Most observers believe that, to improve forest health, it is necessary to combine various activities ( e.g. , salvage sales withmixed-species planting, or prescribed burning after precommercial thinning). (7) Because of this need and the high cost of manyactivities, some have proposed a different approach to contracting for forest stewardship: trading goods(commercially valuabletimber) for services (other activities in the same area). Called land management service contracts, stewardshipcontracts, end-resultscontracts, and other terms, these goods-for-services contracts are essentially highly modified timber sales, wheretimber purchasers arerequired to perform other, typically related, services ( e.g. , precommercial thinning or watershedrestoration), and in return pay less forthe timber harvested. Various federal laws prohibit federal agencies from retaining and using the receipts from selling assets ( e.g. , from timber sales)without congressional authorization. A few pilot tests of goods-for-services contracts were authorized in theFY1992 and FY1993Interior Appropriations Acts ( P.L. 102-154 and P.L. 102-381 , respectively). In 1998, Congress established a broader test of goods-for-services contracting. Section 347 of the FY1999 Interior AppropriationsAct ( P.L. 105-277 ) authorized 28 "stewardship end result contracting demonstration projects" with substantialdirection on thelocations and procedures to be followed. Another 28 projects were authorized in the FY2001 InteriorAppropriations Act ( P.L.106-291 ), and 28 more in the FY2002 Interior Appropriations Act ( P.L. 107-63 ). Goods-for-services stewardship contracting was considered in the 2002 Farm Bill. The House-passed version of H.R. 2646 would have authorized goods-for-services contracting for the Forest Service through FY2007, without limitson numbers of suchcontracts (although limited by appropriations), but otherwise consistent with �347 of the FY1999 InteriorAppropriations Act. TheSenate-passed version would have authorized 28 contracts consistent with �347 (through FY2006), but would haverequired that 14 ofthose contracts be traditional service contracts with separate log sales, and would have required reports comparingthe twoapproaches. The differences could not be resolved, and the final bill ( P.L. 107-171 ) included no provision ongoods-for-servicescontracting. Following the severe 2002 fire season, President Bush proposed goods-for-services stewardship contracting as a way to reduce forestfuels in his Healthy Forests Initiative. (8) The Senatedebated stewardship contracting as part of wildfire management funding in theFY2003 Interior Appropriations Act ( H.R. 5093 ). The protracted debate over this and other provisions toenact much ofthe Healthy Forests Initiative eventually forestalled action on the bill, and Interior appropriations were containedin continuingresolutions without such provisions. Finally, Interior appropriations for FY2003 were enacted as Division F of P.L.108-7 , theConsolidated Appropriations Resolution. Section 323 amended �347 of the FY1999 Interior Appropriations Actin several ways: it authorized "stewardship end result contracting" through FY2013; it extended the program to BLM lands as well as to the national forests; it deleted "demonstration" from the provision; it modified one of the identified goals to remove "noncommercial" from cutting or other objectives;and it authorized the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to select a contracting officer withoutconstraints. (9) The goods-for-services demonstration projects, and the general expectations of the approach, have been modified timber sales toallow the agencies to impose non-timber harvesting requirements on the purchasers. However, no provision in thestatute directlyspecifies commercial timber sales and harvesting. Rather, the statute authorizes removing vegetation and applyingthe value oftimber or other forest products removed to offset the cost of services received. It is not clear whether stewardshipcontracts could beused in areas where commercial timber harvesting is prohibited by statute or administrative decision. Advantages of Goods-For-Services Contracting. One possible advantage ofgoods-for-services contracting is greater efficiency, and thus lower cost, in forest stewardship activities. The desiredservices mayrequire some of the same equipment as timber harvesting and removal, and the same personnel might be used forboth tasks. Relyingon the same equipment and personnel for multiple tasks on a site seems likely to reduce the total cost of performingthe tasks. Thus,one contractor and one contract for multiple, related tasks that encompass both sale of goods and performance ofservices might bemore efficient than multiple, independent, traditional contracts for the tasks. Some proponents also claim that goods-for-services contracting is beneficial because it is off-budget financing for forest stewardship. Concerns over the adequacy of appropriations for forest stewardship have led some to search for alternative fundingmechanisms, andgoods-for-services contracting is one approach that has been proposed. Essentially, the federal agencies would beable to buystewardship services with timber assets, as part of modified timber sale contracts, instead of with appropriations. Limitations of Goods-For-Services Contracting. One limitation of using goods-for-services contracts to improve forest stewardship may be higher contracting costs from combining severalactivities in onecontract. One observer noted that the Forest Service procedures for the pilot tests of goods-for-services contractingwere acomplicated combination of traditional service contracting with standard timber sale contracting: "The result is anextremelycumbersome process which requires more up-front effort than if the activities were done separately" (10) -- and thus higher costs thanfor two separate contracts. This critic also suggested that a longer-term authorization and simpler contractingprocedures were neededto realize the benefits of goods-for-services contracting; the provision as enacted at least provides the longer-termauthorization. Another possible limitation is that, in bypassing the annual appropriations process, goods-for-services contracting is likely to receiveless congressional oversight and control. Other congressionally authorized federal "off-budget" financingmechanisms (technically,permanent appropriations of receipts for specific purposes), such as the Forest Service's Knutson-Vandenberg (KV)Fund and brushdisposal funds, have received very little congressional oversight. The agencies might be able to usegoods-for-services contracting formany years with little or no public participation in or congressional control over its use. Some interests have questioned the appropriateness of goods-for-services contracting generally. Observers have noted thatexchanging goods for services creates an incentive for managers to increase the sale of goods (timber) to generatevalue to provideservices ( e.g. , precommercial thinning). In another context, the incentive to increase timber sales togenerate value to provide services-- mitigating and enhancing other resource values in timber sale areas under the KV Fund -- has been described as"perverseincentives," where managers support an allegedly environmentally damaging activity (timber harvests) to generatefunds to be usedfor environmental restoration, including to mitigate damage caused by generating the funds. (11) Exchanging timber for foreststewardship activities might create similar incentives, especially when the needed stewardship activities for wildfireprotectioninvolve cutting and removing non-commercial woody biomass on or near the ground (since timber harvestingexacerbates the wildfirethreat in the short run by bringing combustible and quickly decaying material, such as tree limbs and tops, to groundlevel). Inaddition, dominant or exclusive use of goods-for-services contracts would emphasize stewardship on lands withcommercial timber,and might limit the opportunities for stewardship on other federal forests that need treatment. Finally, some observers have questioned whether a broad-scale, long-term program was appropriate. Two proponents have noted thatthe success of goods-for-services contracts has been difficult to evaluate. (12) Others have concluded that the goods-for-services pilotprojects provide "an important experimental opportunity to test alternative contracting arrangements under 'realworld' conditions." (13) However, although there were tests in the early 1990s and in several recent years, the effectiveness and efficiencyofgoods-for-services stewardship contracting has not been evaluated in an independent audit.

Many forests, especially the national forests, are widely thought to have unnaturallyhighamounts of dead and dying trees, dense undergrowth, and dense stands of small trees. This biomass can exacerbateinsect and diseaseinfestations and wildfire threats. Because much of this biomass has little or no commercial value, some haveproposed stewardshipcontracting to reduce these threats. Two approaches have been suggested: traditional service procurement contractsand contracts thatinclude exchanging goods (timber) for stewardship services. Congress authorized goods-for-services contractingthrough FY2013 byamending a previous pilot program in the FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations law. This report discusses theadvantages and limitationsof each of these approaches. It provides background on the issue and is unlikely to be updated.

In June 2009, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Ricci v. DeStefano , a case involving allegations of reverse discrimination by a group of white firefighters who challenged city officials in New Haven, Connecticut, over their refusal to certify a promotional test on which black and Hispanic firefighters had performed poorly relative to white firefighters. In a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the city's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The case has drawn considerable attention, not only because of the controversial nature of the reverse discrimination allegations but also because the Court reversed a decision by a three-judge appellate panel that included Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who was, at the time, a nominee for the Supreme Court and who has since become a member of the Court. In 2003, the City of New Haven administered an examination to determine which firefighters would qualify for promotion to lieutenant and captain positions over the following two years and the order in which they would be considered for promotion. Of the 77 candidates who took the lieutenant examination, 43 were white, 19 were black, and 15 were Hispanic; 25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics passed the exam. Based on the number of lieutenant positions available, the top 10 candidates, all of whom were white, were eligible for promotion. Of the 41 candidates who took the captain examination, 25 were white, 8 were black, and 8 were Hispanic; 16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics passed the test. Based on the number of captain positions available, the top 9 candidates, 7 of whom were white and 2 of whom were Hispanic, were eligible for promotion. Confronted with the significant racial disparity revealed by the test results, city officials held a series of public meetings to determine whether to certify the exam. Some firefighters, claiming that the statistical disparity demonstrated that the test was racially discriminatory, threatened to sue if the city made promotions based on the test results. Other firefighters argued that the test was fair and threatened to sue if the city denied promotions to the candidates who had performed well. Ultimately, the city declined to certify the exam, and a group primarily composed of white firefighters sued, claiming that the city's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court sided with the City of New Haven, holding that the "[d]efendants' motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact ... does not ... as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent, and therefore such evidence is insufficient for plaintiffs to prevail on their Title VII claim." Likewise, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, ruling that the city's attempt to remedy the disparate impact of the test did not constitute an intent to discriminate against the non-minority firefighters and that the rejection of the test results did not amount to an unlawful racial classification because all applicants were treated the same with respect to the administration and invalidation of the tests. Subsequently, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that included Judge Sonia Sotomayor issued a one-paragraph affirmation of the "well-reasoned opinion" of the district court, noting that because the city, "in refusing to validate the exams, was simply trying to fulfill its obligations under Title VII when confronted with test results that had a disproportionate racial impact, its actions were protected." Neither Judge Sotomayor nor the other judges provided additional insight into their legal reasoning in the decision. The Supreme Court granted review in order to consider the Title VII and equal protection claims at issue in the case. Under Title VII, two different types of discrimination are prohibited. The first is disparate treatment, which involves intentional discrimination, such as treating an individual differently because of his or her race. The second type of prohibited discrimination is disparate impact, which involves a neutral employment practice that is not intended to discriminate but that nonetheless has a disproportionate effect on protected individuals. An employer may defend against a disparate impact claim by showing that the challenged practice is "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity," although a plaintiff may still succeed by demonstrating that the employer refused to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer's legitimate needs. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." To maintain an equal protection challenge, government action must be established; that is, it must be shown that the government, and not a private actor, has acted in a discriminatory manner. Although the Fourteenth Amendment requires equal protection, it does not preclude the classification of individuals. A classification will not offend the Constitution unless it is characterized by invidious discrimination. Over the years, the Court has interpreted the equal protection clause in a way that requires different degrees of scrutiny for such classifications, depending on the category of persons affected. Under the strict scrutiny test, which is the most stringent form of review and applies to classifications based on race, the government must show that the classification drawn by a statute is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. The question that arose in Ricci was whether the city's failure to certify the test results violated Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment or the constitutional requirement for equal protection. The firefighters who sued argued that the city's refusal to promote them constituted discrimination on the basis of race in violation of both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. City officials defended their actions, arguing that the city was attempting to comply with Title VII and avoid a lawsuit when it refused to certify test results that had a disparate impact on minority firefighters. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the dispute. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the white firefighters, holding that the city had violated Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment when it discarded the test results. According to Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, the city's rejection of the racially disparate exam results was, despite its seemingly well-intentioned attempt to avoid disparate impact liability, an explicitly race-based decision that would violate the disparate treatment prohibition in the absence of a valid defense. In order to reconcile what the majority viewed as two competing provisions of Title VII, the Court established a new standard ─ imported from its equal protection jurisprudence ─ for evaluating when attempts to avoid disparate impact liability excuse what otherwise would be prohibited disparate treatment under Title VII. According to the Court, "before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action." The Court explained: Applying the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to Title VII gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in the name of compliance with the other only in certain, narrow circumstances. The standard leaves ample room for employers' voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme and to Congress's efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination. And the standard appropriately constrains employers' discretion in making race-based decisions: It limits that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when there is a provable, actual violation. Applying this new standard, the Court found that the city did not have a strong basis in evidence to conclude that the promotion examination would constitute a disparate impact violation. Although the minority firefighters could have established a prima facie case of disparate impact based on the statistical results of the test, such a showing is not sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII. Rather, the city would have been liable only if the tests were not job-related and consistent with business necessity or if a less discriminatory alternative that would have met the fire department's needs was not adopted. The Court held that there was no evidence that the tests were not job-related or that there was a less discriminatory test available and therefore the city lacked a strong basis in evidence for believing that it would be subject to disparate impact liability. Because the case was ultimately decided on statutory grounds, the Court did not reach the constitutional question related to the firefighters' Equal Protection claim. Two justices filed concurring opinions in the case. Justice Scalia, writing for himself, indicated that Title VII's disparate impact provisions may warrant closer constitutional scrutiny. Although Justice Scalia agreed that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional question in the current case, he noted that the Court's "resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection?" Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion in which he was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. The primary purpose of Justice Alito's opinion appeared to be to rebut several arguments made by the dissenting Justices, particularly the dissent's interpretation of the evidentiary record. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, criticized the Court's opinion, arguing that it failed to recognize the "centrality of the disparate-impact concept to effective enforcement of Title VII" and the legacy of race discrimination in the firefighting profession. In addition, the dissenting justices, disagreeing with the notion that Title VII's disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions stand in conflict, rejected the Court's newly established "strong basis in evidence" standard. Rather, the dissenting justices would have held that an employer who discards a policy or practice that has a disparate impact does not violate Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment, as long as the employer has good cause to believe the policy or practice is not a business necessity. Because "New Haven had ample cause to believe its selection process was flawed and not justified by business necessity," the dissenting justices would have held that the city did not violate Title VII. In the wake of the Court's ruling, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, to which the case had been remanded for entry of judgment, issued an order instructing state officials to promote the firefighters who had sued. The Court's decision in Ricci is likely to affect the workplace in several different ways. Although employees will still be able to bring Title VII disparate impact claims against their employers, the decision will make it more difficult for employers to voluntarily comply with Title VII by altering employment policies or practices that have an unintentionally discriminatory effect. Perhaps more importantly, the decision also signals that laws that prohibit disparate impact discrimination may face increasing constitutional scrutiny in the future, a trend that could fundamentally alter the current structure of Title VII and several other civil rights laws, as well as significantly limit the ability of employees to sue for unintentional discrimination. In addition, the Ricci decision has implications for Congress. Since Ricci was decided on statutory grounds, legislators who disagree with the Court's interpretation could introduce legislation that overturns the new "strong basis in evidence" standard or that provides an exception to the statutory prohibition against disparate treatment in the case of disparate impact. Such congressional action is not uncommon, particularly in the civil rights context. For example, the 111 th Congress recently passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which superseded the Court's 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. The difficulty for Congress, however, is that such legislation could potentially be subject to constitutional challenge if it offends the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against disparate treatment and fails to pass the strict scrutiny test. Finally, as noted above, the Court's ruling in Ricci overturned a Second Circuit decision in which Judge Sotomayor participated. Although the Court's ruling did not appear to significantly affect her nomination, it is important to note that this new standard was not in effect when the Second Circuit issued its decision in the Ricci case and therefore could not have been applied by Judge Sotomayor or her colleagues at the time that they ruled in the case.

This report discusses Ricci v. DeStefano, a recent Supreme Court case involving allegations of reverse discrimination by a group of white firefighters who challenged city officials in New Haven, Connecticut, over their refusal to certify a promotional test on which black and Hispanic firefighters had performed poorly relative to white firefighters. In a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the city's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The case has drawn considerable attention, not only because of the controversial nature of the reverse discrimination allegations but also because the Court reversed a decision by a three-judge appellate panel that included Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who was, at the time, a nominee for the Supreme Court and who has since become a member of the Court.

The extended appropriations process for FY2011 began with the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget requested in February 2010 and culminated with the enactment of P.L. 112-10 on April 15, 2011. During that time, Congressional debate centered around two proposals, H.R. 1 , which was approved by the House on February 19, 2011, and S.Amdt. 149 , offered as a substitute proposal during Senate consideration of H.R. 1 . Although both proposals were rejected by the Senate on March 9, they were viewed by some as the starting point of final negotiations between House and Senate leaders that eventually led to the compromise embodied by P.L. 112-10 . Between the start of FY2011 on October 1, 2010, and the enactment of P.L. 112-10 on April 15, 2011, the federal government was funded through a series of resolutions continuing funding at FY2010 levels, with adjustments and exceptions. This report is intended to facilitate comparative analysis of the key proposals in the now completed FY2011 appropriations process. The report begins with a brief analysis of how each proposal could be expected to impact the federal budget deficit, which was a consideration of great importance to many lawmakers. This is followed by a table depicting discretionary funding levels provided in each of the three proposals by appropriations subcommittee and bill title, and comparing the FY2010 and FY2011 enacted appropriations. The table reflects the most recent estimates of FY2011 appropriations, which remain subject to change. This will be the final update of this report. A key issue in the FY2011 appropriations debate was the impact of discretionary federal spending on the nation's budget deficit. The budget deficit represents the level of spending, as measured by outlays, in excess of revenues. Appropriations acts, like those detailed in this report, provide budget authority. The outlays for a fiscal year result from the budget authority provided in that fiscal year as well as some budget authority provided in previous fiscal years. Included in the outlay level are all types of spending (i.e., emergency, non-emergency, overseas contingency operations) occurring during the fiscal year. Under the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) March 2011 baseline, the last CBO baseline estimate published prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-10 , the budget deficit for FY2011 was estimated at $1,399 billion. In that baseline, CBO assumes a full-year continuation of funding in FY2011 at roughly FY2010 levels. The proposals analyzed in this report provide annualized discretionary outlay levels as follows: FY2011 President's Budget (February 2010)—$1,415 billion CBO Baseline—$1,361 billion H.R. 1 —$1,356 billion S.Amdt. 149 —$1,372 billion P.L. 112-10 —$1,365 billion H.R. 1 , the proposal which proposed the greatest reduction to budget authority relative to current levels, would result in a discretionary outlay level that is $5 billion under the CBO March 2011 baseline level of discretionary outlays. This reduction in discretionary outlays comprises 0.4% of the deficit estimated under the CBO baseline. Savings from other proposals that would produce smaller reductions in discretionary outlays would correspondingly represent a smaller fraction of the CBO March 2011baseline deficit. The proposal that was ultimately enacted, P.L. 112-10 , is expected to result in a discretionary outlay level that is $4 billion above the CBO March 2011 baseline level of discretionary outlays. Some reductions in discretionary spending could also affect the level of mandatory or net interest spending or the amount of revenue collected, potentially impacting the ultimate deficit level for FY2011. For a more detailed look at the broad budgetary impact on FY2011 spending proposals, see CRS Report R41771, FY2011 Appropriations in Budgetary Context , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. The table below is intended to provide a sense of how funding for federal departments and agencies would be impacted by the different proposals, rather than the impact of each proposal on overall budget numbers. The data represent discretionary appropriations as provided in the respective proposals, by bill title. The final column compares the FY2010 and FY2011enacted funding levels. The title and bill totals do not include scorekeeping adjustments. Rescissions of prior year funding are noted as separate line items and are not deducted from the title totals.

FY2011 funding levels were not enacted in the 111th Congress. Thus, the debate over FY2011 appropriations continued into the 112th Congress and FY2011 spending proposals became a key focal point in the budget debates between the now-Republican-controlled House of Representatives and the Obama Administration. This report was originally intended to facilitate comparison of three key spending proposals for FY2011—the Administration's budget request, H.R. 1, and S.Amdt. 149 to H.R. 1—to FY2010 enacted funding levels. It has been updated to include the enacted FY2011 appropriations in P.L. 112-10. The report begins with a brief analysis of how each proposal could be expected to impact the federal budget deficit. The bulk of the report consists of a funding table that details the recommended discretionary appropriations in these proposals, by subcommittee and bill title, and compares the enacted FY2010 and enacted FY2011 appropriations. More detailed analysis of individual appropriations measures can be found at CRS.gov. This is the final update of this report.

The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) establishes requirements and a framework to ensure that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state and local governments, and the private sector will work together to control and, if necessary, respond to releases of hazardous chemicals to the environment. This report describes key provisions of EPCRA. In addition, it provides several references for more detailed information about the act, and a table that cross-references sections of the U.S. Code with corresponding sections of the act. The report highlights key provisions rather than providing a comprehensive inventory of the act's numerous sections, and addresses authorities and limitations imposed by the statute, rather than the status of implementation or other policy issues. The sudden, accidental release in December 1984 of methyl isocyanate in an industrial incident at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, and the attendant loss of thousands of lives and widespread injuries motivated many in Congress to support legislation to reduce the risk of chemical accidents in the United States. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (42 U.S.C. 11001-11050) was enacted in 1986 as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ( P.L. 99-499 ). EPCRA established state commissions and local committees to develop and implement procedures for coping with releases of hazardous chemicals, and mandated annual reporting to government officials on environmental releases of such chemicals by the facilities that manufacture or use them in significant amounts. EPA facilitates planning, enforces compliance when necessary, and provides public access to information about environmental releases of toxic chemicals. EPCRA established a national framework for EPA to mobilize local government officials, businesses, and other citizens to plan ahead for possible chemical accidents in their communities. Subtitle A requires local planning to respond to sudden releases of chemicals that might occur in the event of a spill, explosion, or fire. It is intended to ensure that responsible officials will know what hazardous chemicals are used or stored by local businesses and will be notified quickly in the event of an accident. Under Section 301, each state is required to create a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), to designate emergency planning districts, and to establish local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) for each district. Section 302 requires EPA to list extremely hazardous substances and to establish threshold planning quantities for each substance. Originally, Congress defined chemicals as "extremely hazardous substances" if they appeared on a list EPA published in November 1985 as Appendix A in "Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program Interim Guidance." However, EPA has authority to revise the list, and the threshold quantities of chemicals. Based on listing criteria, the intent appears to be to include only chemicals in quantities that could harm people exposed to them for only a short period of time. The law directs each facility to notify the LEPC for its district if it stores or uses any "extremely hazardous substance" in excess of its threshold planning quantity. Section 303 directs LEPCs to work with facilities handling specified "extremely hazardous substances" to develop response procedures, evacuation plans, and training programs for people who will be the first to respond in the event of an accident. Upon request, facility owners and operators are required to provide an LEPC with any additional information that it finds necessary to develop or implement an emergency plan. Section 304 requires that facilities immediately report a release of any "extremely hazardous substance" or any "hazardous substance" (a much broader category of chemicals defined under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Section 102(a)) that exceeds the reportable quantity to appropriate state, local, and federal officials. Releases of a reportable quantity of a "hazardous substance" also must be reported to the National Response Center under CERCLA Section 103(a). (For more on CERCLA, see CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], which includes a summary of CERCLA.) Subtitle B establishes various reporting requirements for facilities. The information collected may be used to develop and implement emergency plans, as well as to provide the public with general information about chemicals to which they may be exposed. The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OSHAct) requires most employers to provide employees with access to a material safety data sheet (MSDS) for any "hazardous chemical." This "right-to-know" law for workers aims to ensure that people potentially exposed to such chemicals have access to information about the potential health effects of exposure and how to avoid them. EPCRA, Section 311, requires facilities covered by OSHAct to submit an MSDS for each "hazardous chemical" or a list of such chemicals to the LEPC, the SERC, and the local fire department. EPA has authority to establish categories of health and physical hazards and to require facilities to list hazardous chemicals grouped by such categories in their reports. An MSDS need only be submitted once, unless there is a significant change in the information it contains. An MSDS must be provided in response to a request by an LEPC or a member of the public. "Hazardous chemicals" are defined by the Code of Federal Regulations , Title 29, at Section 1910.1200(c). EPCRA, Section 312, requires the same employers to submit annually an emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form to the LEPC, SERC, and local fire department. These forms must provide estimates of the maximum amount of the chemicals present at the facility at any time during the preceding year; estimates of the average daily amount of chemicals present; and the general location of the chemicals in the facility. Information must be provided to the public in response to a written request. EPA is authorized to establish threshold quantities for chemicals below which facilities are not required to report. Section 313 mandates development of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a computerized EPA database of "toxic chemical" releases to the environment by manufacturing facilities. It requires manufacturing facilities that manufacture, use, or process "toxic chemicals" to report annually to EPA on the amounts of each chemical released to each environmental medium (air, land, or water) or transferred off-site. EPA makes TRI data available in "raw" and summarized forms to the general public. The public may obtain specific information (e.g., about a particular manufacturing facility) by submitting a request in writing to EPA. EPA distributes written and electronic, nationwide and state-by-state summaries of annual data. Raw data and summaries also are available over the Internet. EPCRA, Section 313, generally requires a report to EPA and the state from each manufacturer with 10 or more employees and who either uses 10,000 pounds or manufactures or processes 25,000 pounds of any "toxic chemical" during the reporting year. However, EPA may adjust (and has adjusted in the past) these thresholds for classes of chemicals or categories of facilities. EPCRA enumerates the following data reporting requirements for each covered chemical present at each covered facility: whether it is manufactured, processed, or otherwise used, and the general category of use; the maximum amount present at each location during the previous year; treatment or disposal methods used; and the amount released to the environment or transferred off-site for treatment or disposal. EPCRA requires reporting by manufacturers, which the law defines as facilities in Standard Industrial Classification codes 20 through 39. The law authorized EPA to expand reporting requirements to additional industries. EPA promulgated a rule May 1, 1997, requiring reports on toxic releases from seven additional industrial categories, including some metal mining, coal mining, commercial electric utilities, petroleum bulk terminals, chemical wholesalers, and solvent recovery facilities (62 Federal Register 23834). The original statute specified 313 "toxic chemicals" or categories of chemicals for which reporting was required, but EPCRA gave EPA authority to add or delete chemicals from the list either on its own initiative, or in response to citizen petitions. EPA has removed more than 15 and added a few hundred so that the current list includes 666 individual chemicals. The listing criteria specified in Section 313(d)(2) authorize EPA to add a chemical when it is "known to cause or can reasonably be anticipated to cause" the following: "significant adverse acute human health effects at concentration levels that are reasonably likely to exist beyond facility site boundaries as a result of continuous, or frequently recurring, releases"; in humans—cancer, birth defects, or serious or irreversible chronic health effects; or "because of—i) its toxicity, ii) its toxicity and persistence in the environment, or iii) its toxicity and tendency to bioaccumulate in the environment, a significant adverse effect on the environment of sufficient seriousness, in the judgment of the Administrator, to warrant reporting under this Section." Subtitle C contains various general provisions, definitions, and authorizations. Section 322 authorizes reporting facilities to withhold the identity of a chemical if it is a trade secret, and they follow procedures established by EPA. Special provisions are made in Section 323 for informing health professionals of a chemical identity that has been withheld to protect confidential business information, if the information is needed to diagnose or treat a person exposed to the chemical. Section 324 directs EPA, governors, SERCs, and LEPCs to make emergency response plans, MSDSs, lists of chemicals, inventory forms, toxic chemical release forms, and follow-up emergency notices available to the general public. Section 325 establishes civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for noncompliance with mandatory provisions of the act. Citizens are given the authority to bring civil action against a facility, EPA, a governor, or an SERC by Section 326. Chemicals being transported or stored incident to transport are not subject to EPCRA requirements, according to Section 327. Section 328 authorizes EPA to issue regulations. Definitions are provided in Section 329. Section 330 authorizes to be appropriated "such sums as may be necessary" to carry out this title. Gray, Peter L. EPCRA: Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act . Basic Practice Series. Chicago, IL, ABA Publishing, 2002. 156 p. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. 20 1 0 TRI National Analysis . Available at http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/tri10/nationalanalysis/index.htm , visited April 5, 2012. Wolf, Sidney M. 1996. "Fear and Loathing about the Public Right To Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act." Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law , v. 11, n. 2, pp. 217-325.

This report summarizes the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the major regulatory programs that mandate reporting by industrial facilities of releases of potentially hazardous chemicals to the environment, as well as local planning to respond in the event of significant, accidental releases. The text is excerpted, with minor modifications, from the corresponding chapter of CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], which summarizes major environmental statutes. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (42 U.S.C. 11001-11050) was enacted in 1986 as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (P.L. 99-499). In Subtitle A, EPCRA established a national framework for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to mobilize local government officials, businesses, and other citizens to plan ahead for chemical accidents in their communities. EPCRA required each state to create a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), to designate emergency planning districts, and to establish local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) for each district. EPA is required to list extremely hazardous substances, and to establish threshold planning quantities for each substance. The law directs each facility to notify the LEPC for its district if it stores or uses any "extremely hazardous substance" in excess of its threshold planning quantity. LEPCs are to work with such facilities to develop response procedures, evacuation plans, and training programs for people who will be the first to respond in the event of an accident. EPCRA requires that facilities immediately report a sudden release of any hazardous substance that exceeds the reportable quantity to appropriate state, local, and federal officials. Subtitle B directs covered facilities annually to submit information about the chemicals that they have present to the LEPC, SERC, and local fire department. In addition, manufacturers and other facilities designated by EPA must estimate and report to EPA annually on releases from their facilities of certain toxic chemicals to the land, air, or water. EPA must compile those data into a computerized database, known as the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Generally, all information about chemicals that is required to be reported to LEPCs, SERCs, or EPA is made available to the general public, but EPCRA authorizes reporting facilities to withhold the identity of a chemical if it is a trade secret. Citizens are given the authority to bring civil action against a facility, EPA, a governor, or an SERC for failure to implement EPCRA requirements.

On March 4, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in King v. Burwell . A final decision is expected by the end of June. The central issue in the case is whether the Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) gave authority to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to make premium tax credits available to eligible individuals in every state (including the District of Columbia) or just the states that chose to establish their own health insurance exchanges (state-based exchanges, or SBEs). While the direction and scope of the Court decision is not known, if the Court decides that tax credits may be made available only in SBEs, such a decision may lead to the loss of tax credits in a majority of states where the federal government established the exchanges (federally facilitated exchanges, or FFEs). Given that several million individuals currently receive tax credits through FFEs, the Court decision could have major implications for individual consumers, exchanges, insurers, and other stakeholders. Loss of premium tax credits would directly affect the affordability of health insurance for the consumers who no longer have the credits. Some individuals may choose to drop coverage as a consequence or seek more affordable insurance, if available. Others may be motivated to continue to purchase coverage, even without a subsidy, either because the credit amounts they received were minimal or they have serious health care needs. Insurers may decide to change plan offerings or discontinue offering individual health insurance policies in a given state in anticipation of a reduction in overall enrollment. Consumers and insurers that continue to participate in exchanges and the market outside of exchanges may see premiums increase in response to the changes to the insurance risk pool . These consumer and insurer actions may, in turn, motivate Congress, the Administration, and/or states to address perceived adverse effects of the Court decision and address other related issues, such as the tax credit program's interaction with the ACA's other coverage provisions. Given that a Court decision favoring the plantiffs would directly affect the health insurance options of millions of consumers, which, in turn, may motivate insurers, legislators, and policymakers to act, this report provides the time frame in which decisions concerning exchanges and health insurance more broadly may occur, given current regulations and guidance. To the extent that consumers and others (referred to as stakeholders in this report) may be motivated to respond to the Court decision (and respond to other stakeholder actions), this report provides a timeline that identifies selected 2015 dates related to exchange establishment and operation, legislative calendars, and regulation of the individual health insurance market, among other issues. The report concludes with a table that augments the 2015 timeline by identifying relevant sources of information, such as statutory or regulatory citations related to exchanges. While this information may be useful to set parameters around certain stakeholder actions, this report is not meant as a guide to decisionmaking, nor does it attempt to identify all possible stakeholder responses to the upcoming Court decision. While CRS does not predict a particular direction of the Court decision, certain underlying assumptions were made to simplify identification of important dates. Those assumptions include no retroactive effect of the decision and no delay for when the decision would go into effect. As indicated above, the direction and scope of the Court decision is not known. Implications of the decision beyond issues related to private health insurance are outside the scope of this report. Moreover, the Court decision may maintain the status quo. Nonetheless, legislators and policymakers may be interested in addressing other issues related to the credits or the ACA more broadly. The dates and potential stakeholder actions included in this report may still apply under such a scenario. The potential for the Court decision to affect a number of different stakeholders reflects the current structure of the private market for health insurance and the interplay among key participants in the overall market. At the most basic level, the health insurance "market" works like any other market: with sellers and buyers of products. In this case, insurers sell health insurance plans for purchase by consumers and employers. The market for health insurance, like other forms of insurance, is regulated primarily at the state level. However, the federal government has expanded its role in the regulation of this industry, most recently with the enactment and continuing implementation of the ACA. The ACA itself contains multiple provisions that impose requirements on most of these stakeholders, create new stakeholders (e.g., exchanges), and link requirements across stakeholders. The stakeholders are identified below, and their role in or potential to affect the private health insurance market is briefly described. To the extent any of the stakeholders respond to the Court's decision, their motivation and ability to do so is subject to a variety of parameters, including requirements and flexibilities under current law and the actions taken by other stakeholders. For example, if a state wanted to change its exchange type (i.e., from an SBE to an FFE or vice versa), it must follow a set process. The process includes submitting required documents to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) by certain dates and, in some cases, enacting a state law indicating that the activity is allowed by the state. Congress may be motivated to respond to the Court's decision through legislation. Consumers are expected to comply with the terms of their health insurance coverage, such as paying premiums. Changes to the conditions under which the consumer obtains health insurance may result in changes in how and whether consumers obtain coverage. Employers that are considered large are expected to comply with the ACA's employer mandate. The penalty associated with noncompliance is triggered only if an employee receives a premium tax credit. HHS , as the entity primarily responsible for issuing exchange-related regulations and guidance, defines the parameters under which all exchanges operate. For example, HHS is responsible for determining the process by which a state can elect to operate a state-based exchange. Additionally, HHS administers the federally facilitated exchanges. Health i nsurance e xchanges (also referred to as marketplaces), whether state-based or federally facilitated, are expected to operate within the parameters established under the ACA and its implementing regulations, such as adhering to the annual and special open enrollment periods set in regulations. However, the ACA and its implementing regulations give exchanges some discretion over certain operational decisions, particularly with respect to how exchanges interact with insurers. Private h ealth i nsurers offering coverage through exchanges must ensure that the coverage they offer complies with state and federal regulations and all exchange-related requirements, whether set by HHS or the exchange. States , in general, have the authority to regulate their private health insurance markets. Depending on the state, the authority may be more or less under the control of the state legislature. With respect to exchanges, a state that elects to operate an exchange must do so within established exchange parameters. These parameters are included in statute and described in regulations and guidance issued by HHS. The Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision in King v. Burwell by the end of its term in June 2015. Figure 1 and Table 1 show selected activities currently required to be carried out by one or more of the stakeholders and the time frame in which the activities are expected to occur. These activities are not dependent on the Court decision ; instead, they represent the current status of regulations, guidance, and other time-sensitive rules that stakeholders may consider if and when they decide to respond to the decision.

The Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision in King v. Burwell by the end of June. The central issue in the case is whether the Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) gives authority to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to make premium tax credits available to eligible individuals in every state (including the District of Columbia) or just the states that choose to establish their own health insurance exchanges (state-based exchanges, or SBEs). As of the date of this report, the direction and scope of the Court decision is unknown. However, it is generally agreed that a Court decision favoring the plaintiffs would affect the health insurance options of millions of consumers, as loss of premium tax credits would affect the affordability of health insurance for the consumers who no longer have the credits. Such a decision and its effects may motivate insurers, consumers, legislators, and others (referred to as stakeholders in this report) to act. To the extent stakeholders are motivated to respond to the Court's decision, this report provides a timeline that identifies selected 2015 dates related to exchange establishment and operation, legislative calendars, and regulation of the individual health insurance market, among other issues. This information may be useful for setting parameters around potential stakeholder actions.

DLA Troop Support's Clothing and Textile Directorate (C&T) supplies more than 8,000 different items ranging from uniforms and body armor to tents and canteens. Many C&T products, such as uniforms, are unique to the military. The Directorate collaborates with military service customers and private vendors to design and test uniforms. C&T also identifies, tests, and approves commercial items for military use, including sweatshirts, gloves, and blankets, and supplies special purpose clothing, wet weather clothing, chemical suits, and field packs. DOD offers the following guidance on the management of military uniform procurement: Section 850 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 ( P.L. 105-85 ) requires that any notice of agency requirements or notice of an agency solicitation for contracts be provided through a single, government-wide point of entry. The Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) site is the electronic, government-wide entry point for information on all federal government contracts over $25,000; DOD Instruction 4160.1-R, DOD Supply Chain: Materiel Management Regulation, which describes the process of materiel management within the DOD supply chain system; and DOD Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and Textiles (Class II), which outlines the authority, policy, and responsibilities for the management of the DOD clothing and textiles, and directs the establishment of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board. In addition, military uniforms are procured in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), DLA's own internal regulations, the Berry Amendment, and the Buy American Act (BAA). The Berry Amendment (Title 10 U.S.C. 2533a), which dates from the eve of World War II, was established for a narrowly defined purpose: to ensure that U.S. troops wore military uniforms wholly produced in the United States and that U.S. troops were fed food products wholly produced in the United States. There are exceptions to the Berry Amendment that waive the domestic source restrictions. One such exception allows DOD to purchase specialty metals and chemical warfare protective clothing from countries where the United States has entered into reciprocal procurement memoranda of understanding (MOUs). A Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum of May 1, 2001, stated that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Secretaries of the military services have the authority to determine that certain items under the Berry Amendment are not available domestically in quantities or qualities that meet military requirements. Such decisions are called "domestic nonavailability determinations" or DNADs. This authority may not be re-delegated. Use of DNADs requires an analysis of the alternatives and certification of the process. Military uniforms are generally procured through competitive contracts. C&T maintains access to a variety of supplies and uniform-related products. C&T specialists may also procure textiles and materials directly from the textile industry, and then provide textiles and materials to the contractors. The materials may be used to manufacture additional uniforms and related products, often achieving higher quality and substantial savings over purchased, finished generic products. According to a GAO report on DOD's ground combat uniforms, DLA managed eight uniforms for the military services as of 2010. Vendors and customers may review current solicitations in FedBizOpps, the online source for all federal government procurement opportunities. DLA has established an automated system to provide contractors with the ability to conduct detailed searches for solicitations and contract awards. DLA Troop Support's Clothing & Textiles supply chain has established a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week Customer Contact Center as the point for all customer inquiries. Prospective bidders should obtain specifications prior to submitting an offer. According to DFARS Parts 204, 212, and 252, contractors must first register in the Central Contractor Registration (CCR) prior to the administration of contract awards, basic ordering agreements, or blanket purchase agreements, unless the award results from a solicitation issued on or before June 1, 1998. DLA has stated on its website that price is not always the sole determination in contract awards, as described here. Many of our acquisitions (most notably our negotiated acquisitions) involve a review of a contractor's technical capability; corporate experience; quality; past performance and surge capability (as well as price). This methodology is used because it makes good business sense and ensures reliable contractors with proven performance records will deliver quality products at the lowest possible costs. This concept, known as Best Value, is defined as any competitive negotiated acquisition where the contracting officer uses discriminating factors, in addition to price, in the evaluation of proposals and award of a contract. Within DLA Troop Support, this would encompass virtually all our awards with the exception of low price, technically acceptable source selection and sealed bidding. Section 352 of 113-66, the NDAA for FY2014, requires all military services to adopt and field a joint combat camouflage uniform by October 1, 2018. The provision appears below. (a) Establishment of Policy- It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense shall eliminate the development and fielding of Armed Force-specific combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms in order to adopt and field a common combat and camouflage utility uniform or family of uniforms for specific combat environments to be used by all members of the Armed Forces. (b) Prohibition- Except as provided in subsection (c), after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of a military department may not adopt any new camouflage pattern design or uniform fabric for any combat or camouflage utility uniform or family of uniforms for use by an Armed Force, unless— (1) the new design or fabric is a combat or camouflage utility uniform or family of uniforms that will be adopted by all Armed Forces; (2) the Secretary adopts a uniform already in use by another Armed Force; or (3) the Secretary of Defense grants an exception based on unique circumstances or operational requirements. (c) Exceptions- Nothing in subsection (b) shall be construed as— (1) prohibiting the development of combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms for use by personnel assigned to or operating in support of the unified combatant command for special operations forces described in section 167 of title 10, United States Code; (2) prohibiting engineering modifications to existing uniforms that improve the performance of combat and camouflage utility uniforms, including power harnessing or generating textiles, fire resistant fabrics, and anti-vector, anti-microbial, and anti-bacterial treatments; \(3) prohibiting the Secretary of a military department from fielding ancillary uniform items, including headwear, footwear, body armor, and any other such items as determined by the Secretary; (4) prohibiting the Secretary of a military department from issuing vehicle crew uniforms; (5) prohibiting cosmetic service-specific uniform modifications to include insignia, pocket orientation, closure devices, inserts, and undergarments; or (6) prohibiting the continued fielding or use of pre-existing service-specific or operation-specific combat uniforms as long as the uniforms continue to meet operational requirements. (d) Registration required- The Secretary of a military department shall formally register with the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board all uniforms in use by an Armed Force under the jurisdiction of the Secretary and all such uniforms planned for use by such an Armed Force. (e) Limitation on Restriction- The Secretary of a military department may not prevent the Secretary of another military department from authorizing the use of any combat or camouflage utility uniform or family of uniforms. (f) Guidance Required- (1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance to implement this section. (2) CONTENT- At a minimum, the guidance required by paragraph (1) shall require the Secretary of each of the military departments— (A) in cooperation with the commanders of the combatant commands, including the unified combatant command for special operations forces, to establish, by not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, joint criteria for combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms, which shall be included in all new requirements documents for such uniforms; (B) to continually work together to assess and develop new technologies that could be incorporated into future combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms to improve war fighter survivability; (C) to ensure that new combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms meet the geographic and operational requirements of the commanders of the combatant commands; and (D) to ensure that all new combat and camouflage utility uniforms and families of uniforms achieve interoperability with all components of individual war fighter systems, including body armor, organizational clothing and individual equipment, and other individual protective systems. (g) Repeal of Policy- Section 352 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. 111-84 , 123 Stat. 2262; 10 U.S.C. 771 note) is repealed. Section 352 of P.L. 111-84 , the NDAA for FY2010, contained several provisions of importance to the procurement of military uniforms. Section 352 (a) established the U.S. policy on ground combat and camouflage uniforms; Section 352(b) required the Comptroller General to perform an assessment of the current military uniforms in use and report to Congress; Section 352(c) required the Comptroller General to perform an assessment of military ground combat uniforms and camouflage utility uniforms and submit a report to within 180 days of the bills enactment; and Section 352(d) required the military service heads to develop joint requirements for camouflage uniforms. In the report to Congress, GAO made the following observations, as described here. Although the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps stated that they have established certain requirements for combat clothing, performance standards were mixed and not specific to the combat environment. The effectiveness of the camouflage was not one of the operational criteria used to measure performance. Military service officials stated that the ground combat uniforms, protective gear, and body armor were interoperable; however, there were no criteria to regularly test the interoperability and thus officials were reliant on feedback from the users to gauge interoperability. Production and procurement costs for ground combat uniforms account for about 95% of the costs of ground combat uniforms. GAO reports that DOD officials stated that " ... supporting a variety of uniforms in any combat theater of operations does not place additional logistics requirements on the distribution system; rather, the additional logistical requirements are primarily found in storage costs in the United States." Military service officials reported that it is unlikely that the services would choose to wear the same ground camouflage uniform because the uniform is a service-specific measure of pride, individuality and uniqueness. Reportedly, the Marine Corps System Command officials stated that Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 771 prohibits a member of one military service from wearing the uniform or a distinctive part of the uniform belonging to a different military service. Officials from the military services and the U.S. Central Command reportedly do not collect data that would permit an assessment of the risks associated with wearing different uniforms during combat operations. Maintaining flexibility in determining uniform selection is important and based on operational needs. GAO revisited the military uniform issue in 2012 to determine the extent to which DOD had issued guidance to provide a consistent decision process to ensure that new camouflage uniforms met operational requirements and, also, to determine the extent to which the military services have used a joint approach to develop appropriate criteria, ensure equivalent protection, and manage uniform costs. GAO concluded that DOD had not met the statutory requirement to develop joint criteria, nor had the services sought opportunities to reduce clothing costs and collaborate on uniform inventory costs. Section 839 of P.L. 113-66 would have required that the initial military footwear issued to enlisted military personnel be procured in accordance with the provisions of the Berry Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 2533a. The provision appears below. (a) Requirement- Section 418 of title 37, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: (d)(1) In the case of athletic footwear needed by members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps upon their initial entry into the armed forces, the Secretary of Defense shall furnish such footwear directly to the members instead of providing a cash allowance to the members for the purchase of such footwear. (2) In procuring athletic footwear to comply with paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense shall comply with the requirements of section 2533a of title 10, without regard to the applicability of any simplified acquisition threshold under chapter 137 of title 10 (or any other provision of law). (3) This subsection does not prohibit the provision of a cash allowance to a member described in paragraph (1) for the purchase of athletic footwear if such footwear— (A) is medically required to meet unique physiological needs of the member; and (B) cannot be met with athletic footwear that complies with the requirements of this subsection.'. (b) Certification- The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not take effect until the Secretary of Defense certifies that there are at least two sources that can provide athletic footwear to the Department of Defense that is 100 percent compliant with section 2533a of title 10, United States Code.

Military uniforms are procured through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), an agency of the Department of Defense (DOD). DLA is DOD's largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support for the United States military services, civilian agencies, and foreign countries. With headquarters in Fort Belvoir, VA, DLA operates three supply centers: DLA Aviation, DLA Land and Maritime, and DLA Troop Support. Military uniforms are procured through DLA Troop Support in Philadelphia, PA. DLA Troop Support is responsible for procuring nearly all of the food, clothing, and medical supplies used by the military, including about 90% of the construction material used by troops in the field, and repair parts for aircraft, combat vehicles, and other weapons system platforms. According to DLA Troop Support's website, "Each year, DLA Troop Support supplies and manages over $13.4 billion worth of food, clothing and textiles, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and construction and equipment supplies in support of America's warfighters worldwide and their eligible dependents." Within DLA Troop Support, the Clothing and Textile (C&T) Directorate supplies more than 8,000 different items ranging from uniforms to footwear and equipment. According to DLA Troop Support, in FY2012, C&T sales of clothing, textiles, and equipment to military personnel worldwide surpassed $1.9 billion. Legislative initiatives that affect the procurement of military uniforms were enacted in several bills, among them: Section 822 of P.L. 112-81, the NDAA for FY2012; Section 821 of P.L. 111-383, the Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011; and Section 352 of P.L. 111-84, the NDAA for FY2010. Section 352 of P.L. 113-66 requires all military services to use a joint combat camouflage uniform, while Section 839 of H.R. 1960, the proposed House-version of the NDAA for FY2014, would have, if enacted, required that the initial military footwear issued to enlisted military personnel conform to the provisions of the Berry Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 2533a.

Since 1988, Congress has passed several laws concerning television reception via satellite: the 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA, P.L. 100-667 ), amendments to the act in 1994, the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (SHVIA, P.L. 106-113 ) , and the most recent law, the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act (SHVERA). SHVERA was passed as Division J of Title IX of the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4818 , P.L. 108-447 ) in December 2004. A number of changes were made to provisions affecting consumers who receive analog "distant network signals" and "local-into-local" network signals. Three factors are important in understanding the eligibility criteria for these different signals: signal strength, distant and local signals, and unserved households. Signal strength can be visualized as two concentric circles around a TV station's transmitter. Points in the inner circle close to the transmitter can receive a strong, "Grade A" television broadcast signal, via an over-the-air antenna (rooftop or "rabbit ears"). Points in the outer circle can receive a weaker, "Grade B" signal. Beyond the outer circle, where no signal can be received, are "white areas." Over-the-air signal strength is the guiding factor in determining which households are eligible to receive distant network signals via satellite. A network broadcast signal is one received by a household located within a network television affiliate's local area. When retransmitted by satellite back into the same local area, such signals are called "local-into-local." A distant network signal is one received from outside the local network affiliate's area. It is referred to as a distant network signal because it originates in one place and is received in another. Local-into-local signals were first offered to satellite television subscribers in 1999 under the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA). It permitted, but did not require, satellite television companies to offer local-into-local signals. Subscribers who were eligible for distant network signals under SHVIA could also receive local-into-local, if offered in their area. Households are generally defined as either "served" or "unserved" under SHVERA based on the signal strength they can receive. Under the law, only unserved households are eligible to receive distant network television signals via satellite. "Unserved" households include those that are unable to receive a "grade B" signal via an over-the-air antenna; or were "grandfathered" per a May 1998 federal court ruling; (see below) have satellite TV dishes mounted on a recreational vehicle or commercial truck (that are not fixed dwellings). In the late 1990s, some satellite television companies broadcast distant network signals to subscribers who were not eligible to receive them. Broadcasters filed suit against those satellite television companies. In May 1998, a federal court ruled that a company called PrimeTime 24 had violated the Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA) by retransmitting broadcast network television signals to both served and unserved households. The court ruled in favor of the broadcasters, meaning that many satellite TV subscribers would have lost access to distant network signals. However, Congress was debating satellite TV legislation (SHVIA) at the time and chose to allow some of those subscribers—called "grandfathered subscribers"—to continue to receive the signals for five more years (until December 31, 2004). Under SHVIA, subscribers receiving distant network signals could also subscribe to local-into-local when it became available. In 2004, Congress again deliberated satellite TV legislation, ultimately passing SHVERA. Sections 103 and 204 of SHVERA differentiated three groups of subscribers: grandfathered, other, and future subscribers. In areas where local-into-local service was available, some had to choose between distant network signals or local-into-local. Each subscriber's situation was unique, complicating efforts to understand how the new provisions affected a particular household. This group consists of households that had been receiving distant network signals illegally per the 1998 Miami court ruling. Under SHVERA, if local-into-local was offered in their area, or became available later, this group was required to choose between retaining distant network signals or receiving local-into-local signals within 60 days of being notified by their satellite company. They could no longer receive both. This group consists of households who received distant network signals legally. Under SHVERA, if a satellite company offered local-into-local in a subscriber's area on January 1, 2005, these subscribers could receive both distant network signals and local-into-local signals. If a satellite company did not offer local-into-local service in the subscriber's area on January 1, 2005, but it became available later, the subscriber would then have to choose between distant network signals or local-into-local. This group consists of households that subscribe to satellite television after December 8, 2004, the date of enactment of SHVERA. If local-into-local service is offered in their area, they may not receive distant network signals. If local-into-local is not offered when they subscribe, and they are eligible for distant network signals (i.e. they are "unserved"), they may receive distant network signals until such a time as local-into-local is offered. To summarize, if local-into-local is offered in a particular area: subscribers who were receiving distant network signals at the time SHVERA was enacted (December 8, 2004), because they were grandfathered in, could continue to receive distant network signals, but could not receive local-into-local at the same time. They had to choose one or the other. subscribers who are receiving distant network signals because they cannot get a grade B signal may continue to receive distant network signals if their satellite TV provider was not offering local-into-local on January 1, 2005. If local-into-local becomes available after January 1, 2005, they will have to choose between distant network signals and local-into-local. subscribers to satellite television after the date of enactment of SHVERA (December 8, 2004) may receive distant network signals if they are eligible for them and local-into-local is not offered. If local-into-local later becomes available, they must subscribe to local-into-local. As noted above in the section " Unserved Households ," EchoStar Communications, also known as the DISH Network, was charged with violating the Satellite Home Viewer Act in 1998. EchoStar chose to defend its actions, and the company's distant network signals have been unaffected during the eight years the issue has been litigated. In May 2006, an Atlanta appeals court ordered a permanent injunction on EchoStar's carriage of all distant signals, including those provided to eligible consumers who cannot receive a grade B signal. In order to avoid a circumstance in which customers would lose access to distant signals they were eligible to receive, negotiations were undertaken between EchoStar and the four major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX) to set the terms under which EchoStar could continue to carry those signals for eligible customers. A negotiated settlement was reached with three networks, but not with FOX. EchoStar claims that FOX chose not to negotiate a settlement because it is part of a vertically integrated company that is a partial owner of DirecTV, which would stand to gain customers at the expense of EchoStar if EchoStar's eligible customers could no longer receive distant FOX signals. FOX, on the other hand, counters that it was involved in this litigation for five years before its parent company took operational control of DirecTV, and having won the case in court, had no responsibility to negotiate a settlement that differed from the court's decision. On October 20, 2006, a Florida district court upheld the injunction and voided the proposed settlement reached by ABC, CBS, NBC, and EchoStar. The court set December 1, 2006, as the effective date of signal cutoff. Seven pieces of legislation were introduced that would have lessened the impact of the injunction ( S. 4067 and H.R. 6402 , S. 4068 and H.R. 6340 , S. 4074 , S. 4080 and H.R. 6384 ), but none were passed before the December deadline.

In 2004, Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act, SHVERA, as part of the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). Among its many provisions, the law modified subscriber eligibility for distant and local analog broadcast network television signals. Some satellite television subscribers had to choose between either local or distant broadcast network signals instead of receiving both. This report explains the provisions in SHVERA, and outlines subsequent court decisions involving direct broadcast satellite providers, including EchoStar Communications. It will be updated as necessary.

The salaries of Members of Congress and certain high-level federal officials (those paid at EX Level II) have, until recently, generally been in parity since the Executive Schedule was established in 1964. The Member salaries were in parity with those of district judges from 1955 to 1969 and have been again since 1987. During the period 1969 to 1987, Member pay was often in parity with the pay of federal appellate judges. There is no constitutional or statutory requirement (other than the provision of law establishing the commission procedure discussed below) that the salaries of federal executive branch officials and federal Justices and judges be limited by the salaries of Members of Congress, or that Member pay be limited by the salaries of these federal executive and judicial officials. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 includes two provisions under which pay rates for Members, the Vice President, federal officials paid under the EX, and certain federal Justices and judges can be set. The first of these provisions provides for a quadrennial review of the salaries of federal officials by a Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation. The commission is to make recommendations to the President. The law requires the commission and the President to submit recommendations to Congress providing that the salaries of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Vice President of the United States, and the Chief Justice of the United States shall be equal; Majority and Minority Leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and Level I of the Executive Schedule (Cabinet officers) shall be equal; and Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, Delegates to the House, Judges of the U.S. District Courts, Judges of the United States Court of International Trade, and Level II (Deputy secretaries of departments, secretaries of military departments, and heads of major agencies) of the Executive Schedule shall be equal. Although the law establishes the salary parity stated above upon quadrennial review, it is unclear what effect, if any, the provision has, since the commission has never been activated. The commission was initially funded in the 1993 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, but that appropriation was rescinded in the 1994 act. A second provision in the Ethics Reform Act establishes an annual salary adjustment procedure for the Members, the Vice President, federal officials paid under the EX, and federal Justices and judges. The adjustment is based on the percentage change in the wages and salaries (not seasonally adjusted) for the private industry workers element of the Employment Cost Index (ECI), minus 0.5% (December indicator). It becomes effective at the same time as, and at a rate no greater than, the annual base pay rate adjustment for federal white-collar civilian employees under the General Schedule (GS). The adjustment cannot, however, be less than zero or greater than 5%. While this provision of the Ethics Reform Act sets the rate of the judicial pay adjustment, a 1981 law provides that any salary increase for Justices and judges must be "specifically authorized by Act of Congress hereafter enacted." The Member pay raise becomes effective automatically unless Congress statutorily denies an increase or revises the adjustment, or the annual base pay adjustment for GS employees is established at a rate less than the scheduled increase for Members, in which case Members would be paid the lower rate. The pay adjustment for federal officials paid under the EX also takes effect automatically unless Congress takes similar action. Such congressional action has generally occurred during consideration of the appropriations bill that funds the Department of the Treasury and General Government. Most recently, this occurred in the 105 th Congress (1999) when Members voted to deny themselves and federal executive and judicial officials a pay adjustment. Similar action occurred in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. There have been instances in which pay parity could have been, but was not, broken. In the 103 rd Congress, for example, the Representatives and Senators passed legislation to forgo their pay adjustment for 1994. Because base pay for the GS was not increased in 1994, the Members and federal executive and judicial officials did not receive a pay raise in January 1994. If GS base pay had been adjusted and these officials had received a pay adjustment in that year, pay parity would have been severed because of the action of the Members to deny themselves a pay increase. A provision to cut FY2000 spending across the board by 0.97% and to include Member pay in that reduction, if enacted in the 106 th Congress, would have resulted in lower salaries for Members, but not for federal executive and judicial officials. During the first session of the 109 th Congress, the Senate agreed to a provision that would have denied Members of Congress a pay adjustment in January 2006. On October 18, 2005, during consideration of H.R. 3058 , Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2006, the Senate agreed, on a 92 to 6 vote (No. 256), to an amendment ( S.Amdt. 2062 ) offered by Senator Jon Kyl to forgo the Member pay adjustment. The House version of the bill did not include this provision and it was not included in the enacted legislation. The Members received the 1.9% pay adjustment granted to the executive and judicial officials in January 2006. In January 2007, however, while the Vice President and federal officials paid on the EX received a 1.7% pay increase, Members of Congress and Justices and judges did not receive the pay increase. Section 115 of P.L. 110-5 , the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2007, enacted on February 15, 2007, denied the Members a pay adjustment. Justices and judges did not receive a pay adjustment in 2007 because it was not authorized by Congress. S. 197 , to provide the authorization, passed the Senate by unanimous consent on January 8, 2007, and was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, but no further action occurred. Likewise, in January 2010, the Vice President and federal officials paid on the EX schedule received a 1.5% pay increase. Members of Congress and Justices and judges did not receive the pay increase. Section 103 of Division J of P.L. 111-8 , the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY2009, denied the Members a pay adjustment in 2010. Justices and judges did not receive a pay adjustment because Congress did not authorize it as required by law. S. 1432 , to provide the 2010 authorization, was reported to the Senate by the Committee on Appropriations ( S.Rept. 111-43 ) on July 9, 2009, but no further action occurred. The pay adjustment for Members of Congress, federal officials paid on the EX schedule, and Justices and judges required under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 would have been 0.9% in January 2011, the same as the January 2011 base pay adjustment required under the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990, for federal civilian white-collar employees paid under the General Schedule (GS). P.L. 111-165 , enacted on May 14, 2010, denied Members of Congress a pay adjustment in FY2011. The Vice President, federal officials paid on the EX schedule, and Justices and judges also did not receive a pay adjustment in January 2011 because GS base pay was not adjusted. The Budget of the U.S. Government included President Barack Obama's order to freeze pay for senior political officials—the Vice President; individuals serving in Executive Schedule (EX) positions or in positions whose rate of pay is fixed by statute at an EX level and serving at the pleasure of the President or other appointing official; a chief of mission or ambassador at large; a noncareer appointee in the Senior Executive Service; any employee whose rate of basic pay (including locality payments) is at or above EX level IV who serves at the pleasure of the appointing official; and senior White House staff with salaries of more than $100,000. The budget also reiterated that the policy prohibiting political appointees from receiving bonuses continued. The pay adjustment for Members of Congress, federal officials paid on the EX schedule, and Justices and judges required under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 would have been 1.3%. This adjustment would have been limited to 1.1%, the January 2012 base pay adjustment required under the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 for federal civilian white-collar employees paid under the GS. Under Title I, Section 1(a)(2) of P.L. 111-322 , enacted on December 22, 2010, GS base pay is frozen through December 31, 2012, so Members of Congress, the Vice President, federal officials paid on the EX schedule, and Justices and judges will not receive a pay adjustment in January 2012, as any pay increase for these officials cannot be at a rate that is greater than the annual base pay rate adjustment for federal white-collar civilian employees under the GS. Several reports over the last few years have recommended that salary adjustments for Members and federal executive and judicial officials be determined separately. For example, the 2000 annual report on the federal judiciary recommended a 9.6% adjustment in judicial salaries, disengagement from the Member salary adjustment, and automatic pay adjustments under the Ethics Reform Act. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist stated that "because Judges are appointed for life and expected to remain on the bench, increases in judicial compensation should not be tied to increases for non-career public servants." In a 2003 report, the National Commission on the Public Service, citing "the compelling need to recruit and retain the best people possible" to serve as executive branch officials and on the federal judiciary, also recommended separate salary adjustments. As an interim step toward implementation of its recommendations, the commission stated that "Congress should grant an immediate and significant increase in judicial, executive, and legislative salaries to ensure a reasonable relationship with other professional opportunities," and "Its first priority in doing so should be an immediate and substantial increase in judicial salaries." Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., reiterated the commission's recommendations in the 2005 annual report on the federal judiciary. His 2006 annual report focused solely on the issue of judicial pay. Discussing the effects of inadequate salaries (increased by "only occasional and modest cost-of-living adjustments") on the federal judiciary, the Chief Justice stated these concerns: An important change is taking place in where judges come from—particularly trial judges. In the Eisenhower Administration, roughly 65% came from the practicing bar, with 35% from the private sector. Today the numbers are about reversed—roughly 60% from the private sector, less than 40% from private practice. It changes the nature of the federal judiciary when judges are no longer drawn primarily from among the best lawyers in the practicing bar. Inadequate compensation directly threatens the viability of life tenure, and if tenure in office is made uncertain, the strength and independence judges need to uphold the rule of law—even when it is unpopular to do so—will be seriously eroded. The dramatic erosion of judicial compensation will inevitably result in a decline in the quality of persons willing to accept a lifetime appointment as a federal judge. Our judiciary will not properly serve its constitutional role if it is restricted to (1) persons so wealthy that they can afford to be indifferent to the level of judicial compensation, or (2) people for whom the judicial salary represents a pay increase.... a judiciary drawn more and more from only those categories would not be the sort of judiciary on which we have historically depended to protect the rule of law in this country. The Federal Judicial Fairness Act of 2009, S. 2725 , was introduced, but saw no further action, in the 111 th Congress. Introduced by Senator Dianne Feinstein on November 3, 2009, and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the bill would have repealed the provision of law, codified at 28 U.S.C. §461 note, that requires Congress to specifically authorize any salary increases for Justices and judges. It also would have amended 28 U.S.C. §461(a) to provide that Justices and judges would receive the same overall average percentage pay adjustment as is authorized each year for the General Schedule (GS), the pay schedule that covers federal white-collar civilian employees in pay grades GS-1 through GS-15.

The salaries of Members of Congress, certain high-level federal officials (those paid at Level II of the Executive Schedule (EX)), and certain federal Justices and judges have, until recently, generally been in parity for many years. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 provides for annual pay adjustments to be established for the Members, the Vice President, federal officials paid under the EX Schedule, and federal Justices and judges. The act also requires a Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation and the President to recommend salaries in parity for these federal government positions. The commission has never been activated, and, thus, such recommendations have never been made. This report will be updated as events dictate.

Medicaid was established in 1965 to provide basic medical services to certain low-income populations. It is a means-tested entitlement program that financed the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports, to more than an estimated 72 million people in FY2012. The estimated annual cost to the federal and state governments for Medicaid was roughly $432 billion in FY2011. Each state designs and administers its own version of Medicaid under broad federal rules. State variability is the rule rather than the exception in terms of eligibility levels, covered services, and how those services are delivered and reimbursed. Not everyone enrolled in Medicaid has access to the same set of services. Different eligibility classifications determine available benefits, as described below. This report begins with a summary of major Medicaid eligibility pathways. Then traditional Medicaid benefits and benchmark coverage are described. The final section provides an analysis of state experiences with benchmark benefit packages as of late 2012. Additional CRS resources on the Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program are provided at the end of this report. Historically, eligibility for Medicaid was subject to "categorical restrictions" that generally limited coverage to the elderly, persons with disabilities, members of families with dependent children, certain other pregnant women and children, among others. Recent changes in federal law established Medicaid eligibility for poor non-elderly, childless adults who do not fit into these traditional categories. In addition, to qualify for Medicaid, applicants must have income (and sometimes assets) that meet financial requirements. These financial criteria are typically tied to certain federal cash assistance program rules or to specific percentages of the federal poverty level (FPL). Below is a description of services available for Medicaid beneficiaries by eligibility classification. First, "categorical needy" individuals represent the vast majority of people enrolled in Medicaid, most of whom receive traditional Medicaid benefits (described in more detail below). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) requires that a newly established categorically needy group consisting of poor nonelderly, non-pregnant adults with income below 133% FPL receive Medicaid benchmark benefits, an alternative to traditional Medicaid benefits. However, on June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius . The Court held that the federal government cannot terminate current Medicaid federal matching funds if a state refuses to expand its Medicaid program to include non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with income under 133% of the federal poverty level. If a state accepts the new ACA Medicaid expansion funds, it must abide by the new expansion coverage rules, but based on the Court's opinion, it appears that a state can refuse to participate in the expansion without losing any of its current Medicaid matching funds. Other benefit rules apply to individuals classified as "medically needy," including people who meet the main categorical restrictions described above but may have higher income. States electing the medically needy option must provide coverage to certain pregnant women and children under age 18. For the medically needy, states may offer a more restrictive benefit package than is available to most categorically needy individuals. Finally, states also use the authority in Section 1115 of the Social Security Act to tailor benefits to state-specified subpopulations that can include both currently authorized groups and/or new groups not specified in federal statute. Each such waiver delineates the unique terms and conditions that are negotiated between a given state and the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Table 1 provides examples of Medicaid benefits available by selected eligibility classifications. As illustrated, different Medicaid subpopulations may have access to benefit packages that can be quite varied. Additional details are described further below. Like eligibility, under traditional Medicaid, states must cover certain benefits, while other services may be offered at state option. Examples of benefits that are mandatory for most Medicaid groups (i.e., categorically needy populations) include inpatient hospital services, physician services, laboratory and x-ray services, early and periodic screening, diagnostic and treatment services (EPSDT) for individuals under 21, nursing facility services for individuals aged 21 and over, and home health care for those entitled to nursing facility care. Examples of optional benefits for such Medicaid groups include prescribed drugs, physician-directed clinic services, services of other licensed practitioners (e.g., chiropractors, podiatrists, psychologists) services, nursing facility services for individuals under age 21, physical therapy, and prosthetic devices. Table 2 provides additional information for selected optional benefits covered by most states under the traditional Medicaid program. The breadth of coverage for a given benefit can and does vary from state to state, even for mandatory benefits. In general, in defining a covered benefit, federal guidelines require that (1) services be sufficient in amount, duration and scope to reasonably achieve their purpose; (2) the amount, duration, and scope of services must be the same statewide; and (3) with some exceptions, beneficiaries must have freedom of choice of providers among health care practitioners or managed care entities participating in Medicaid. States can modify these rules via existing waiver authority provided in Section 1115 of the Social Security Act. As an alternative to providing all the mandatory and selected optional benefits under traditional Medicaid, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. 109-171 ) gave states the option to enroll state-specified groups in benchmark and benchmark-equivalent benefit packages. These plans can exist in sub-state areas and can be limited to specific subpopulations. States can require "full benefit eligibles" (or specific subgroups of these individuals) to enroll in Medicaid benchmark benefits. A full benefit eligible is someone who is eligible for all the mandatory and optional services that a state covers under its traditional Medicaid program. Medically needy and certain spend-down populations (e.g., individuals whose Medicaid eligibility is based on a reduction of countable income for costs incurred for medical or remedial care) are excluded from the definition of a full benefit eligible. Specific groups are exempt from mandatory enrollment in benchmark benefit packages (e.g., those with special health care needs such as disabling mental disorders or serious and complex medical conditions). Table 3 provides a description of each of these exempted populations. These exempted groups may get traditional Medicaid benefits or may be offered voluntary enrollment in benchmark benefit plans. In such cases, states must describe the differences between traditional Medicaid and benchmark plans to these beneficiaries in order to facilitate an informed choice. In general, benchmark benefit packages may cover fewer benefits than traditional Medicaid, but there are some requirements, such as coverage of EPSDT and transportation to and from medical providers (as per a 2010 regulation ), that might make them more generous than private health care insurance. The benchmark options include the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard provider plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), a plan offered to state employees, the largest commercial health maintenance organization (HMO) in the state, and other Secretary-approved coverage appropriate for the targeted population. Benchmark-equivalent coverage must have the same actuarial value as one of the benchmark plans identified above. Such coverage must include (1) inpatient and outpatient hospital services; (2) physician services; (3) lab and x-ray services; (4) emergency care; (5) well-child care, including immunizations; (6) prescribed drugs; (7) mental health services; and (8) other appropriate preventive care (designated by the Secretary). Such coverage must also include at least 75% of the actuarial value of coverage under the applicable benchmark plan for vision care and hearing services (if any). For children under age 21 in one of the major mandatory and optional Medicaid eligibility groups, benchmark and benchmark-equivalent coverage must include EPSDT. Also, Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in such coverage must have access to services provided by rural health clinics and federally qualified health centers. Starting in 2014, both benchmark and benchmark-equivalent packages must cover at least the essential health benefits that will also apply to plans in the private individual and small group health insurance markets. The 10 essential health benefits include (1) ambulatory patient services, (2) emergency services, (3) hospitalization, (4) maternity and newborn care, (5) mental health and substance use disorder services (including behavioral health treatment), (6) prescribed drugs, (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, (8) lab services, (9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and (10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care. Many of these essential health benefits are currently coverable under benchmark packages. All benchmark plans must also cover family planning services and supplies. The federal mental health parity requirements, as established in the Public Health Service Act (Section 2726), generally require that, under a given insurance plan, coverage of mental health services (if offered) should be on par with coverage of medical and surgical services in terms of the treatment limitations (e.g., amount, duration and scope of benefits), financial requirements (e.g., beneficiary co-payments), in- and out-of-network covered benefits, and annual and lifetime dollar limits. Managed care plans under both traditional Medicaid and benchmark packages must comply with all federal mental health parity requirements. Benchmark packages that are not managed care plans are only required to comply with federal requirements for parity in treatment limitations and financial requirements. However, these plans are deemed to comply with federal mental health parity requirements if they offer EPSDT, which they are statutorily required to cover. As noted above, states have had the authority to implement benchmark benefit packages in their Medicaid programs since the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. A summary of state and territory experiences with benchmark benefits as of December 2012 is provided in Table 4 . Of the 12 states and one territory (Guam) with approved benchmark plans, 10 had only one such plan and 3 (Idaho, Kentucky, and Wisconsin) had more than one benchmark plan. The type of benchmark used in 10 states and Guam was classified as secretary-approved, which generally means the benefit plan was tailored to the targeted population(s) to be enrolled. Missouri had a plan classified as benchmark-equivalent to the FEHBP Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard option preferred provider organization (PPO). One of Kentucky's plans was identified as benchmark-equivalent to a state employee health plan. Wisconsin provided coverage offered through the state's largest health maintenance organization (HMO), the United Health Care Choice Plus Plan, for pregnant women, newborns and infants. In selected counties, this state also provided Medicaid state plan services to certain foster care children using both managed care and a medical home arrangement. In eight states (Connecticut, District of Columbia, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) and Guam, benchmark plans were available statewide. In other states (Idaho, Kentucky, New York, and Washington), benchmark plans were limited to sub-state areas, such as specific counties or cities. The state-level details with respect to the covered services offered through Medicaid benchmark plans were quite varied, at least in part reflecting the populations to be enrolled in these plans and the unique objectives of each state. Preventive and primary care services (e.g., nutrition counseling, smoking cessation services, weight management counseling, dental care for adults) were covered in several states. Support services designed to facilitate independent living in community-based settings for individuals with disabilities and/or the elderly were components of benchmark plans in a few states. There was also considerable state-level variation in other benchmark plan characteristics. Across the 18 state/plan combinations shown in Table 4 , there was an even split between benchmark programs for which enrollment was mandatory versus voluntary. There was also quite a bit of variation in terms of the type of service delivery systems utilized. Fee-for-service alone (8 of 18 state/plan combinations) or in conjunction with some type of managed care arrangement (6 of 18 state/plan combinations) were the two most common service delivery system designs. It is unclear how these state experiences with Medicaid benchmark plans to date will influence the design of such benefit packages in 2014 among states that choose to cover the new optional group of non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level. It is likely that states with no such experience will look to those states that have implemented benchmark packages for lessons learned in order to make choices tailored to their given circumstances and resources. CRS Report RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer CRS Report R41210, Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Provisions in ACA: Summary and Timeline CRS Report R40226, P.L. 111-3: The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 CRS Report R41600, Home and Community-Based Services Under Medicaid

The Medicaid program, which served 72 million people in FY2012, finances the delivery of a wide variety of preventive, primary, and acute care services as well as long-term services and supports for certain low-income populations. Benefits are available to beneficiaries through two avenues. First, the traditional Medicaid program covers a wide variety of mandatory services (e.g., inpatient hospital services, lab/x-ray services, physician care, nursing facility care for persons aged 21 and over), and other services at state option (e.g., prescribed drugs, physician-directed clinic services, physical therapy, prosthetic devices) to the majority of Medicaid beneficiaries across the United States. Within broad federal guidelines, states define the amount, duration, and scope of these benefits. Thus, even mandatory services are not identical from state to state. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. 109-171) created an alternative benefit structure for Medicaid. Under this authority, states may enroll certain Medicaid subpopulations into benchmark benefit plans that include four choices: (1) the standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield preferred provider plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, (2) a plan offered to state employees, (3) the largest commercial health maintenance organization in the state, and (4) other coverage appropriate for the targeted population, subject to approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), benchmark benefits have taken on a new importance in the Medicaid program. As per the ACA, a new mandatory group of non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level will be eligible for Medicaid beginning in 2014, or sooner at state option. (For more information about a Supreme Court ruling regarding this group, see CRS Report RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer.) These individuals will be required to enroll in benchmark plans rather than traditional Medicaid (with some exceptions for subgroups with special medical needs). However, to date, only a handful of states have experience administering these plans, nearly all of which have been tailored to specific subpopulations. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that coverage expansion provisions in the ACA would increase enrollment by about 7 million in FY2014, rising to 11 million by FY2022 in both the Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Programs (Congressional Budget Office, Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent Supreme Court Decision, July 2012). Many of these new enrollees will get benchmark benefits. To assist Congress in evaluating the current scope of benefits available under Medicaid, this report outlines the major rules that govern and define both traditional Medicaid and benchmark benefits. It also compares the similarities and differences between these two benefit package designs.

The United States has seen continued growth of electronic card payments (and a simultaneous decrease in check payments). From 2009 through 2012, debit card transactions have outpaced other payment forms. When a consumer uses a debit card in a transaction, the merchant pays a "swipe" fee, also known as the interchange fee. The interchange fee is paid to the consumer's bank that issued the debit card, covering the bank's costs to facilitate the transaction. Prior to 2010, the policy debate about interchange fees was motivated by concerns that the interchange fees received by banks were not being set by competitive market forces. A competitive market arguably would drive down swipe fees, which would benefit merchants and ultimately consumers. Alternatively, debit card issuers and networks had argued that a percentage of the interchange fees were being rebated to consumers in the form of consumer reward programs that were also beneficial to merchants. Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (Title X of P.L. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act), known as the Durbin Amendment, authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to mandate regulations to ensure that any interchange transaction fee received by a debit card issuer is reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer. The Durbin Amendment allows the Federal Reserve to consider the authorization, clearance, and settlement costs of each transaction when setting the interchange fee. The Durbin Amendment allows the interchange fee to be adjusted for costs incurred by debit card issuers to prevent fraud. By statute, debit card issuers with less than $10 billion in assets are exempt from the regulation, which means that smaller financial institutions may receive a larger interchange fee than larger issuers. The Durbin Amendment also prohibits network providers (Visa, MasterCard, etc.) and debit card issuers from imposing restrictions that would override a merchant's choice of the network provider through which to route transactions. On June 29, 2011, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule implementing the Durbin Amendment by Regulation II, which includes a cap on the interchange fee for large issuers. The final rule went into effect on October 1, 2011. H.R. 10 , the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, would repeal the Durbin Amendment. Specifically, Section 735 of the Financial CHOICE Act would repeal Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. On May 4, 2017, H.R. 10 was ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee. This report begins with a description of the debit payments process and network pricing for the four-party system and the three-party system. It summarizes the requirements of Regulation II, which implements the Durbin Amendment. The report concludes with a discussion of some implications of Regulation II for merchants, consumers, and banks as well as with some recent observations. This section outlines the four-party and three-party network systems prior to implementation of the Durbin Amendment. The three-party system is explained for illustrative purposes, but implementation of the Durbin Amendment only applies to the four-party network where an interchange fee exists. Network providers, such as MasterCard and Visa, facilitate the interactions of four parties under a business model referred to as a "four-party system," consisting of the cardholder, the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer. (See Figure 1 below, which illustrates the payment distribution. ) When a debit card is used in a transaction, the merchant pays a fee that is collected by the merchant's bank (the acquirer). For example, a debit cardholder makes a $100 purchase, the merchant retains $98.57 and pays $1.43 (merchant discount fee) to process the transaction. The $1.43 is distributed among the acquirer, the cardholder's bank (the issuer) that issued the debit card, and the network provider that links the acquirer and issuer. Prior to the Durbin Amendment, the network provider might retain 10 cents, the acquirer might receive 30 cents, and the issuer could be paid $1.03. The $1.03 paid to the issuer is known as the interchange reimbursement or "swipe" fee. This fee may cover some or all of the costs to process the debit card transaction (authorization, clearing, and settlement); fraud prevention and investigation; and other fees, such as customer service, billing and collections, compliance, network connectivity fees, and network servicing fees. Any fee compensation received by the network provider, the acquirer, or the issuers in excess of their respective total costs would be considered profit. Network providers enter into contractual arrangements with issuers and acquirers rather than deal directly with merchants and customers. Network providers can set the interchange fees to encourage issuers' greater issuance of payment cards, which in turn generates more transactions over their networks. Issuers may choose to rebate some of their interchange fee profits to cardholders in the form of reward points, which may entice greater debit card use. Consequently, some financial institutions may have greater ability to negotiate interchange fees with the network providers, especially if they have a large number of customers who frequently use debit cards. Merchants' billing, however, suggests that acquirers may also influence the merchant discount fees. Some merchants may be billed by their acquirers, and such invoices would include the fees payable to the both issuers and acquirers; network providers may send separate invoices for their fees. Hence, determining how much price-setting influence over merchant discount fees that is ascribed to the network provider relative to the acquirer is challenging and may vary. In addition to setting the interchange fees, merchants have historically had to abide by various association rules or contractual restraints; however, not all rules mentioned below necessarily appear in all merchant contracts. For example, no surcharge rules forbid merchants to levy surcharges when cardholders use debit cards, which prevents merchants from passing any of the merchant discount fees directly to cardholders. The honor-all-cards rules require merchants to take any cards that bear the network association's brand name, which means merchants cannot turn away credit or signature debit cards that may have higher merchant discount fees if the association's name appears on the card. Moreover, merchants are prohibited from offering discounts for the use of particular types of cards, which is known as the non-differentiation rule. Merchants are also required to accept these cards at all of their outlets, which is referred to as the all-outlets rule. Association rules prevent merchants from passing on to customers the costs to use cards, which arguably would discourage card use. The ability of merchants to pass such costs on indirectly to customers, however, may vary from product to product. There is no explicit interchange fee in the three-party system. For example, American Express model is a three-party system that consists of the cardholder, the merchant, and the network provider, which serves as both the acquirer and issuer; the three-party system is illustrated in Figure 2 below. American Express enters directly into contractual arrangements with merchants and customers; in this arrangement, American Express is the network provider, acquirer, and the issuer. American Express links directly to the merchant and the customer, meaning that there is no explicit interchange fee paid to a customer's bank. This feature limits regulators' ability to enforce the interchange fee restrictions on firms that operate under a three-party system business model. The Federal Reserve acknowledged that, for purposes of the final rule, three-party systems are not payment card networks. Hence, the Durbin Amendment does not apply to the three-party model. On June 29, 2011, the Federal Reserve issued Regulation II, a final rule, which capped the interchange fee received by large issuers (with $10 billion or more in assets) to 21 cents plus 0.05% of the transaction. The Federal Reserve also allowed for a 1 cent adjustment if the issuer implements fraud-prevention standards. Regulation II was implemented after the Federal Reserve conducted a survey in the form of public comments to obtain transaction cost information. Although some merchants argued that the Federal Reserve had set the interchange fee cap at a level higher than allowed by statue, the final rule was upheld. Regulation II does not regulate the merchant discount fee charged to the merchant by the network provider or acquirer ; it only limits the amount of the merchant discount fee that can be remitted in the form of interchange fee revenue t o covered institutions . Consequently, a two-tiered interchange fee system exists, meaning that institutions exempted from Regulation II may receive revenues consistent with interchange fees set above the cap. Some network providers did agree to implement a two-tiered interchange pricing system. The final rule also gives merchants the ability to route transactions to multiple network providers. Every issuer regardless of size is required to link with at least two unaffiliated network providers, thereby allowing merchants to choose the network provider with the lowest fees to process their debit card transactions. Mandatory compliance dates for network providers and issuers were October 1, 2011, and April 1, 2012, respectively. Economists have questioned the sustainability of a two-tiered interchange pricing system over time. The ability to charge different prices for the same service usually occurs when the supplier of a service can separate its customers into different market segments. By contrast, Regulation II separates the suppliers (issuers) of the same service into separate groups rather than the customers (merchants). Because merchants now have more choice over the processing of debit transactions, network providers may be more responsive to merchant pressures to lower merchant discount fees instead of pressures by smaller issuers to remit higher interchange fees. Consequently, the increased competition for merchant business could undermine the two-tiered interchange system over time, resulting in lower debit interchange revenues for exempt issuers. Furthermore, if interchange revenues for smaller issuers were to decline over time, the losses could be material, especially if their processing costs are higher relative to those of large issuers. Hence, declining profit margins from this line of business could possibly result in greater financial distress particularly for depository institutions that are increasingly sensitive to noninterest or fee income. Numerous pricing arrangements among thousands of exempt institutions under $10 billion and data limitations increase the difficulty to monitor whether this trend is emerging. Debit card issuers covered by Regulation II had expected to lose interchange fee income under the regulated cap, but the evidence has been uneven particularly for those institutions that process large volumes of debit card operations. Some covered institutions initially experienced declines in debit interchange revenues shortly after rule implementation, but they have since seen some gradual increase over time, which is consistent with the reported growth of debit card transactions since 2009. By contrast, some covered institutions saw an initial increase in interchange revenues but have since seen some gradual decline over time. Generally speaking, the amount of interchange revenue also reflects the amount of transactions, which depends upon economic activity. In other words, lower revenues that would have been anticipated in light of the interchange fee cap may have been offset by a rise in the quantity of debit transactions as the economy continued its recovery from the 2007-2009 recession. Hence, comparisons of the interchange revenues pre- and post-implementation of Regulation II are challenging because both the interchange fees and debit transactions likely changed simultaneously over the period. Many banks covered by the Durbin Amendment eliminated their debit card rewards programs after Regulation II's implementation; however, this response eliminates one mode for attracting (checking account) deposits to fund loans. Offering checking accounts with direct deposit, automated bill paying, and debit card services help depository institutions attract customers that are likely to use additional financial products, including loans. When customers use a variety of financial products and services, depository institutions may cross-subsidize their costs and financial risks more effectively. Hence, some financial institutions entered into partnerships with merchants sponsoring customer reward programs to help facilitate the attraction of deposits. Customers receive rewards for shopping with a particular merchant and paying for their purchases using electronic payment cards (i.e., credit, debit, or prepayment card) associated with participating banks. Merchants that were paying fees above the regu lated interchange fee had expected to benefit from the rule. Evidence from a 2015 study, however, suggests that the regulation has had a limited and unequal impact in terms of reducing merchants' costs. Because algorithms consisting of multiple factors were used to set individual merchant discount fees prior to implementation of the final rule, the magnitude of influence associated with the interchange fee cap is less likely to be uniform across the vast array of merchant discount fees. Furthermore, whether any change in consumer prices occurred as a result of merchants rebating any lower merchant discount fee savings back to their customers is likely to be indeterminate. Merchant pricing strategies are generally designed to cover production costs, achieve marketing objectives, and increase profitability. Hence, the correlation strengths among changes in interchange fees, merchant discount fees, and consumer prices are difficult to isolate and observe. Over the long run, other factors aside from the allocation of swipe fee revenues would be expected to influence the structure of the payments system. For example, technological developments over time may allow consumers to submit payments directly to other consumers or small businesses via alternative payment systems. Greater competition from nonbank institutions may result in fewer financial transactions being processed by U.S. banking institutions. Hence, interchange fee revenues generated for issuers belonging to four-party network systems are constantly susceptible to future financial market innovations.

The United States has seen continued growth of electronic card payments (and a simultaneous decrease in check payments). From 2009 through 2012, debit card transactions have outpaced other payment forms. When a consumer uses a debit card in a transaction, the merchant pays a "swipe" fee, which is also known as the interchange fee. The interchange fee is paid to the card-issuing bank (i.e., the consumer's bank that issued the debit card) as compensation for facilitating the transaction. Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (or Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-203), also known as the Durbin Amendment, authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations to ensure that the amount of any interchange transaction fee received by a debit card issuer is reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer. The Federal Reserve may consider the authorization, clearance, and settlement costs of each transaction when it sets the interchange fee. The Durbin Amendment allows the interchange fee to be adjusted for costs incurred by debit card issuers to prevent fraud. Debit card issuers with less than $10 billion in assets are exempt by statute from the regulation, which means that smaller financial institutions may receive a larger interchange fee than larger issuers. The legislation also prohibits network providers (e.g., Visa and MasterCard) and debit card issuers from imposing restrictions that would override a merchant's choice of the network provider through which to route transactions. On June 29, 2011, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule implementing the Durbin Amendment by Regulation II, which includes a cap of 21 cents plus 0.05% of the transaction (and an additional 1 cent to account for fraud protection costs) on the interchange fee for large issuers. The rule went into effect on October 1, 2011. Merchants expected to benefit from the Durbin Amendment by having to pay a lower swipe fee. Large debit card issuers expected to lose revenue under the regulated cap. Many small debit card issuers that were exempt from the rule had also opposed the Durbin Amendment given concerns about the feasibility of a sustainable two-tiered interchange pricing system. Since implementation of the rule, merchants have seen a limited and unequal impact on the amount they pay in swipe fees. Likewise, the impact of Regulation II has been uneven for covered institutions. Institutions not covered by the Regulation II have reportedly observed minimal change in revenues generated by debit transactions. H.R. 10, the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, would repeal the Durbin Amendment. Specifically, Section 735 of the Financial CHOICE Act would repeal Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. On May 4, 2017, H.R. 10 was ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee.

RS20762 -- Election Projections: First Amendment Issues Updated January 23, 2001 Media projections are speech, and the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It ispossible, however, though by no means certain, that Congress could limit the right of broadcast radio and televisionstations to report election result projections. This is because the Supreme Court, citing "spectrum scarcity," i.e. , the limited number of availablebroadcast frequencies, has "permitted more intrusive regulationof broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media." Turner Broadcasting System v. FederalCommunications Commission , 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994). But torestrict broadcast radio and television, but not cable television and the Internet, would seem to go only a small waytoward banning media election projections. A statute that restricted speech of media other than broadcast radio and television, if challenged, would be subject to "strict scrutiny" by the courts. This meansthat the courts would uphold it only if the government proves that it is necessary "to promote a compelling interest"and is "the least restrictive means to furtherthe articulated interest." Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal CommunicationsCommission , 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Would there be a "compelling interest" in prohibiting media projections? Though there might be a compelling interest in preventing the media from interferingwith elections so as potentially to affect the outcome, it seems questionable whether election projections, if theyare understood by potential voters to be merelyprojections, could be said to interfere with elections. Voters who hear or read such projections presumably knowthat they are only projections, and that their votescould still make a difference in the election. If they decide that that difference is not significant enough to makeit worth their while to vote, then they have made afree choice. The Supreme Court has written in another context: "The First Amendment directs us to be especiallyskeptical of regulations that seek to keep peoplein the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. RhodeIsland , 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996). If there is concern that some potential voters might be misled by projections to think that the winner of an election has been determined, then Congress might beable to require that disclosures accompany projections. Although the First Amendment protects the right not tospeak as well as the right to speak, the courtsmight view compelled disclosures in this case as serving a compelling interest in protecting the right to vote. In the seemingly unlikely event that a court were to find a compelling interest in prohibiting media election result projections, then the government would stillhave to show that there was no less restrictive means to further that interest. Making this determination would entailconsideration of other proposals to deal withthe perceived problem. The purpose of legislation banning exit polling within a prescribed distance from the polls would be to make exit polling more difficult. In Burson v. Freeman ,504 U.S. 191 (1992), the Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee statute that prohibited the solicitation of votes and thedisplay or distribution of campaign materialswithin 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. The Court recognized that this statute both restricted politicalspeech, to which the First Amendment "has itsfullest and most urgent application," and "bar[red] speech in quintessential public forums," the use of which forassembly and debate "has, from ancient times,been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." Id . at 196, 197. Further, thestatute restricted speech on the basis of its content, as itrestricted political but not commercial solicitation, and therefore was not "a facially content-neutral time, place, ormanner restriction." Id . at 197. The Court therefore subjected the Tennessee statute to strict scrutiny, which means that it required the state to show that the regulation serves a compelling stateinterest and "is necessary to serve the asserted interest." Id . at 199. Although applying strict scrutinyusually results in a statute's being struck down, in this casethe Court concluded "that a State has a compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and undueinfluence," and "in preserving the integrity of itselection process." Id . Or, more simply, in preventing "two evils: voter intimidation and election fraud." Id . at 206. The next question, then, was whether a100-foot restricted zone is necessary to serve this compelling interest. The Court, noting that "all 50 States limitaccess to the areas in or around polling places,"said that, though it would not specify a precise maximum number of feet permitted by the First Amendment, 100feet "is on the constitutional side of the line." Id .at 206, 211. In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro , 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988), decided prior to Burson , the Ninth Circuit struck down a Washington statute that prohibited exitpolling within 300 feet of a polling place. The court granted that "[s]tates have an interest in maintaining peace,order, and decorum at the polls and 'preservingthe integrity of their electoral processes.'" Id . at 385. But the court found that "the statute is notnarrowly tailored to advance that interest," because it prohibitsnondisruptive as well as disruptive exit polling. Id . "Moreover, the statute is not the least restrictivemeans of advancing the state's interest. The statute isunnecessarily restrictive because [another Washington statute] already prohibits disruptive conduct at the polls,"and "that several other less restrictive means ofadvancing this interest exist: for example, reducing the size of the restricted area; requiring the media to explain thatthe exit poll is completely voluntary;requiring polling places to have separate entrances and exits, . . . or prohibiting everyone except election officialsand voters from entering the polling room." Id . This reasoning of the Ninth Circuit may no longer stand after the Supreme Court's decision in Burson . As for the statute's being unnecessary because anotherstatute already prohibited disruptive conduct, the Court in Burson found that "[i]ntimidation andinterference laws [ i.e. , laws that prohibit only disruptive conduct]fall short of serving a State's compelling interests because they 'deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts'to impede elections." 504 U.S. at 206-207. As for there being a less restrictive means to preserve the integrity of the electoral process, the Court in Burson did not require the state to provide "factual findingto determine the necessity of [its] restrictions on speech." 504 U.S. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rather, it foundthat "the link between ballot secrecy andsome restricted zone surrounding the voting area . . . is common sense." Id . at 207. But the plaintiffs in Munro also "argue[d] that the statute is unconstitutional for another reason: that the stated purpose for the statute of protecting order at thepolls was a pretext, and that the state's true motive was to prevent the media from broadcasting election resultsbefore the polls closed." Id. at 386. The courtfound "that, assuming that at least one purpose of the statute was to prevent broadcasting early returns, the statuteis unconstitutional because this purpose isimpermissible . . . . [A] general interest in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify speechregulation." Id . at 387. "In addition," the courtsaid, even if this were a permissible purpose, "the statute is not narrowly tailored to protect voters from thebroadcasting of early returns. Election-daybroadcasting is only one use to which the media plaintiffs put the information gathered from exit polling . . ." Id . at 387-388. The information is also used toanalyze the results of elections, and prohibiting exit polling prohibits speech involving such other uses of theinformation. Reading Munro together with Burson suggests that Congress could prohibit the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within100 feet (or some other reasonable distance) of the entrance to a polling place, but could not prohibit exit pollingfor the purpose of preventing voters fromreceiving media projections. Any limit on exit polling would seem permissible only to the extent it could bejustified as part of a general restriction on interferingwith voters before they vote. In Burson , the Court found that the Tennessee statute'srestriction could be limited to voter solicitation, and need "not restrict othertypes of speech, such as charitable and commercial solicitation or exit polling, within the 100-foot zone." 504 U.S.at 207. But the Court did not say that a statutecould not also restrict other types of speech, if it could demonstrate that doing so was necessary to servea compelling governmental interest. A post- Burson court of appeals case found greater justification for restricting campaigning than for restricting exit polling, because, "[w]hile there is no evidenceof widespread voter harassment or intimidation by exit-pollers, there is evidence that poll workers do create theseproblems." Schirmer v. Edwards , 2 F.3d 117,122 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1017 (1994). The court distinguished Munro on this basis, and upheld a 600-foot campaign-free zone. If Congress could not ban media projections outright, could it prohibit government officials from releasing ballot counts to the media? Could Congress, that is,deny media access to ballot counts, either when the polls have not closed in the jurisdiction whose votes are beingcounted, or when the polls have not closedacross the nation? The purpose of restricting access in the latter case would be to prevent potential voters in statesin western time zones from being influenced bylearning the results in states in eastern time zones. The First Amendment, the Supreme Court has written, goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members ofthe public may draw." Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. "In a variety of contexts this Court hasreferred to a First Amendment right to 'receiveinformation and ideas.'" Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , 448 U.S. 555, 575-576 (1980). Nevertheless, although "news gathering is not without its First Amendmentprotections"( Branzburg v. Hayes , 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972)), these protections are not generally as greatas are protections from censorship. The Court has heldthat the First Amendment does not prevent prison officials from prohibiting "face-to-face interviews between pressrepresentatives and individual inmates." Pellv. Procunier , 417 U.S. 817, 819 (1974). In so holding, the Court did not find it necessary for the government to establish a compelling need to justify the prohibition, as the government in the ordinarycase must to justify statutes that censor speech. Rather, the Court "balance[d] First Amendment rights" againstgovernmental interests such as "the legitimatepenological objectives of the corrections system" and "internal security within the corrections facilities," taking intoaccount available alternative means ofcommunication. Id . at 824, 822, 823. Furthermore, the Court wrote, although the First Amendmentbars the "government from interfering in any way with a freepress," it does not "require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members ofthe public generally." Id . at 834, 833. If Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the release of ballot counts, and it were challenged as unconstitutional, the court presumably would apply the sort ofbalancing test it used in Pell v. Procunier to reach a decision. It would assess the importance of denyingmedia access to ballot counts, perhaps consideringwhether media projections, or learning the results in other states, tend to mislead potential voters, or whetherpotential voters are merely making free choices aboutthe importance of their vote in light of status of the election at the time they hear a media projection or the resultin another state. A court might also evaluate the efficacy of prohibiting the release of ballot counts, considering, for example, whether, if denied access to ballot counts, the mediamight nevertheless make projections based merely on exit polls, which might be more misleading than those basedon ballot counts. Finally, a court mightconsider whether Congress could accomplish its goal by alternative means that would restrict speech less. Anexample might be to require that projections beaccompanied by disclosure of the information on which the projection is based. Whether or not there is a First Amendment barrier to banning exit polling within a prescribed distance from the polls, or to prohibiting the release of ballot counts,there is still the question of Congress's power to regulate in this area. Congress has clear power to regulate Houseand Senate elections, but less clear power toregulate presidential elections, aspects of which the Constitution vests in the states. For additional information onthis subject, see CRS Report RL30747 , Congressional Authority to Standardize National Election Procedures , by [author name scrubbed].

Media projections may be based both on exit polls and on information acquired as toactual ballot counts. The FirstAmendment would generally preclude Congress from prohibiting the media from interviewing voters after they exitthe polls. It apparently would also precludeCongress from prohibiting the media from reporting the results of those polls. Congress, could, however, ban votersolicitation within a certain distance from apolling place, and might be able to include exit polling within such a ban. It also might be able to deny media accessto ballot counts, either when the polls havenot closed in the jurisdiction whose votes are being counted, or when the polls have not closed across the nation.

Fast-track is an expedited procedure for congressional consideration of certain trade agreements. This process is tied to the President's authority provided by Congress to enter into trade agreements to reduce U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers with other countries. The fast-track authority provides that Congress will consider trade agreement implementing bills within mandatory deadlines, with a limitation on debate, and without amendment, as long as the President meets prescribed requirements set out by law. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-316), Congress delegated renewable authority to the President to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions. The Trade Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-618 ) expanded this authority to include negotiations of nontariff trade barriers, but required more extensive reporting and consultations between Congress and the President during trade negotiations. This act also had a provision under which Congress would consider implementing bills for trade agreements under expedited congressional procedures, known as fast-track. Table 1 shows how Congress renewed fast-track authority on particular dates. In the years following the expiration of fast-track authority in 1994, there were several legislative proposals to reauthorize the trade authority procedures; these bills, including H.R. 2621 in the 105 th Congress, did not pass. In the 107 th Congress, several legislative proposals on trade promotion authority (TPA) were considered. The original House version of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act ( H.R. 3005 ) passed by one vote on December 6, 2001 (215-214). Another bill, H.R. 3009 , was amended several times in the House and the Senate to include additional trade issues. Following House and Senate negotiations and agreement to the conference report for H.R. 3009 , the President signed H.R. 3009 , as P.L. 107-210 , the Trade Act of 2002, on August 6, 2002. This major piece of trade legislation has the TPA provisions in Title XXI, Section 210l, as the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. TPA procedures apply to implementing bills for trade agreements entered into before July 1, 2007. Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four proposed U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) were signed in time to be considered by Congress under TPA procedures in the 110 th Congress; the U.S. FTAs were negotiated separately with the countries of Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. The implementing legislation for the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement was passed by Congress and signed by the President on December 14, 2007 ( P.L. 110-138 ). Also in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 5724 was introduced as implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. On April 10, 2008, the House passed H.Res. 1092 , relating to H.R. 5724 ; this resolution provided a rule that disallowed the use of time limitations for consideration of the implementing bill. No further legislative action on H.R. 5724 occurred in the 110 th Congress. In the 111 th Congress, no legislation for the three proposed U.S. trade agreements (with the countries of Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) was introduced. The fate of the three FTAs is uncertain in the 112 th Congress. More detailed information on congressional and executive procedures for TPA and free trade agreements can be found in the "Resources for Additional Information," at the end of this report. In Table 1 , some of the listed bills focus solely on fast-track trade negotiating authority or TPA. Other bills are major landmarks of trade legislation , of which fast-track is only one of many trade provisions. These major trade acts, in boldface, include the Trade Act of 1974, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and the Trade Act of 2002. Congress has applied fast-track legislative procedures to approve several reciprocal bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Table 2 lists the uses of fast-track procedures in the implementation of trade agreements from 1979 to the present. The table does not include the implementing legislation for the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement ( H.R. 2603 enacted as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001); Congress did not consider this bill under fast-track procedures. In the 108 th Congress, implementing legislation for free trade agreements was passed under fast-track procedures on four separate bills: H.R. 2738 , the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed on September 3, 2003 ( P.L. 108-77 ). On the same day, H.R. 2739 , the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law ( P.L. 108-78 ). H.R. 4759 , the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement Act, was signed by the President on August 3, 2004 ( P.L. 108-286 ). On August 17, 2004, H.R. 4842 , the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law ( P.L. 108-302 ). In the 109 th Congress, implementing legislation for three free trade agreements was passed under fast-track procedures on three separate bills: H.R. 3045 , the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (CAFTA-DR), was signed by the President on August 2, 2005 ( P.L. 109-53 ). H.R. 4340 , the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law on January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). H.R. 5684 , the U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law on September 26, 2006 (P.L. 109-283). Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four proposed FTAs (with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) were signed in time to be considered by Congress under TPA procedures in the 110 th Congress. H.R. 3688 , the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, was passed by the House on November 8, 2007, and by the Senate on December 4, 2007. This bill was signed into law on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-138). In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 5724 was introduced to implement the proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. H.Res. 1092 was introduced as a rule change for consideration of H.R. 5724 only; this resolution disallowed the use of time limitations for consideration of the implementing bill under fast-track procedures. H.Res. 1092 passed the House on April 10, 2008 (224-195). No further legislative action on H.R. 5724 occurred in the 110 th Congress. In the 111 th Congress, no implementing legislation for the three proposed FTAs (with the countries of South Korea, Colombia, and Panama) was introduced. In the 112 th Congress, the fate of the three proposed FTAs is uncertain. CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31356, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report 97-896, Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than as Treaties , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41544, Trade Promotion Authority and the Korea Free Trade Agreement , by [author name scrubbed]. Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) website, with a section on "Trade Agreements" discussing the status of U.S. trade agreements and negotiations, at http://www.ustr.gov/ trade-agreements/ , and information on "Free Trade Agreements" at http://www.ustr.gov/ trade-agreements/ free-trade-agreements/ .

This report profiles significant legislation, including floor votes, that authorized the use of presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—previously known as fast-track trade negotiating authority—since its inception in 1974. The report also includes a list of floor votes since 1979 on implementing legislation for trade agreements that were passed under TPA fast-track procedures. Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four free trade agreements (FTAs) were signed in time to be considered under TPA expedited procedures in the 110th Congress. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act was passed by Congress (H.R. 3688) and signed into law as P.L. 110-138 on December 14, 2007. The legislative future of three proposed U.S FTAs (with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) is uncertain. For further discussions of TPA or fast-track legislative activity, the report lists CRS reports and Internet resources. This report will be updated as events warrant in the 112th Congress.

Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides tax-exempt status to "political organizations," while the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates "political committees." The definitions of the two terms are similar, but they do not perfectly coincide. The term "political organization" includes entities intending to influence federal, state, and local elections, along with the selection of non-elective offices. The term "political committee" is narrower, covering only those entities participating in federal election activities. While political committees are a type of political organization, not all political organizations are political committees. In general, Section 527 political organizations are required to report tax-related information to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Other information, such as disclosure of contributions and expenditures, is reported to either the IRS or the Federal Election Commission (FEC) depending on whether the political organization is also a political committee. Those that are political committees report to the FEC; while political organizations that are not political committees report to the IRS. Section 527 political organizations include the entities colloquially known as "527s" or "527 groups" that have been controversial during recent election cycles. These groups, which benefit from Section 527 tax-exempt status, seemingly intend to influence federal elections in ways that may place them outside the FECA definition of "political committee." Because these groups are not registered as political committees under FECA, they are required to report information to the IRS, instead of the FEC. The following chart compares the timing of election activity reporting requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code and the Federal Election Campaign Act. No legislation has yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress that would amend the timing of the reporting requirements in the IRC or FECA. In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 1204 (527 Transparency Act of 2007) would have no longer allowed Section 527 political organizations to file the periodic contribution and expenditure reports with the IRS on a non-monthly basis. Instead, all political organizations that report to the IRS would have been required to file monthly reports, in addition to pre-election, post-general election, and year-end reports. An organization that failed to file in a timely fashion would have faced a penalty equal to 30% of the expenditures and contributions that were not adequately reported, with the organization's managers jointly and severally liable for the penalty. Additionally, contributions to that organization would have been subject to the gift tax. The organizations would have been required to notify their contributors about the failure within 90 days of the IRS's final determination that the failure had occurred. Finally, the bill would have required that the reports be simultaneously filed with the FEC.

One way that federal law regulates groups participating in election activities is by requiring them to report information on such things as their contributions and expenditures. Reporting requirements are imposed on "political organizations" by the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and "political committees" by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). Some of the requirements are similar; in which case, entities are generally subject to either the ones in the IRC (and report to the Internal Revenue Service) or those in FECA (and report to the Federal Election Commission). Included in the entities that report to the IRS are those colloquially known as "527s" or "527 groups." No legislation has yet been introduced in the 111th Congress that would affect the timing of the reporting requirements under the IRC or FECA.

In addition to the Senate and House of Representatives, the legislative branch bill typically funds Joint Items, including the Joint Economic Committee, Joint Committee on Taxation, Office of the Attending Physician, and Office of Congressional Accessibility Services; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance (OOC); Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); and Open World Leadership Center. Table 1 provides information on the enacted funding levels provided for the legislative branch from FY2008 to FY2019. The table includes annual and supplemental appropriations, rescissions, and the FY2013 sequestration. Figure 1 shows the distribution of budget authority across the legislative branch in FY2019. Table 2 provides information on funding levels for the Senate, House of Representatives, and legislative branch agencies in recent years as well as the requested, House-passed, Senate-passed, and enacted levels for FY2019. The FY2019 legislative branch budget request of $4.960 billion was submitted on February 12, 2018, prior to the enactment of FY2018 funding on March 23, 2018. Agency assessments for FY2019 may subsequently have been revised—for example, to account for items funded or not funded in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Subsequent discussions may vary from the levels or language included in the budget request due to this timing. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change. The House passed H.R. 5895 , which contained funding for the legislative branch, on June 8, 2018. The Senate passed H.R. 5895 , as amended ( S.Amdt. 2910 ), on June 25, 2018. The Senate agreed to the conference report ( H.Rept. 115-929 ) on H.R. 5895 on September 12, 2018. The House agreed to the conference report on September 13, 2018. H.R. 5895 was signed into law on September 21, 2018 ( P.L. 115-244 ; the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019). The President has no formal role in the development of the legislative branch budget request, even though it is included in the President's annual budget request documents. By long-standing law and practice, the legislative branch request and any supplemental requests are submitted to the President and included in the budget without change. While the executive branch budget submissions generally involve interaction between an agency and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the legislative branch requests do not. The executive branch does not review or maintain documentation in support of the legislative branch requests. Since FY1976, the legislative branch as a proportion of total discretionary budget authority has averaged approximately 0.40%. The maximum level, 0.48%, was in FY1995 and the minimum, 0.31%, was in FY2009. Discretionary budget authority is provided and controlled by the annual appropriations acts. Since FY1976, the legislative branch as a proportion of total budget authority has averaged 0.17%. The maximum level, 0.23%, was in FY1977, and the minimum, 0.11%, was in FY2017. Total budget authority includes both budget authority controlled by the annual appropriations acts and budget authority controlled by previous laws, including entitlements. No, salaries for Members of Congress are neither funded nor increased in the legislative branch bill. Member salaries have been included as mandatory spending since FY1983, and the amount of potential Member pay adjustments is calculated pursuant to the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which established a formula based on changes in the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The adjustment automatically takes effect unless (1) Congress statutorily prohibits the adjustment; (2) Congress statutorily revises the adjustment; or (3) the annual base pay adjustment of General Schedule (GS) federal employees is established at a rate less than the scheduled increase for Members, in which case the percentage adjustment for Member pay is automatically lowered to match the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. Members of Congress last received a pay adjustment in January 2009. Since then, the compensation for most Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico has been $174,000. The maximum potential January 2019 member pay adjustment was 2.3%, or $4,000. The FY2019 act included a provision prohibiting this adjustment. As in prior years, the Member pay adjustment prohibition was included in the legislation as introduced, and no separate votes were held on the pay issue. Although discussion of Member pay is often associated with appropriations bills, these bills do not contain language funding or increasing Member pay, and a prohibition on the automatic annual Member pay adjust ments could be included in any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill. For a list of the laws that have previously contained provisions prohibiting the annual pay adjustments, see "Table 3. Legislative Vehicles Used for Pay Prohibitions, Enacted Dates, and Pay Language" in CRS Report 97-1011, Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Actions and Historical Tables , by Ida A. Brudnick. In contrast, the salaries and benefits for legislative branch employees are provided by the legislative branch appropriations acts, although they generally do not address pay adjustments. The House and Senate both consider funding levels for the legislative branch agencies and joint entities. By long-standing tradition, however, the House bill does not propose funding levels for Senate items, including the account that funds the Senate and the Senate office buildings account within the Architect of the Capitol. Similarly, the Senate does not comment on House items, including the account that funds the House or the House office buildings account within the Architect of the Capitol. The House, Senate, and conference reports on legislative branch appropriations bills regularly contain language illustrating the deference of each chamber to the internal practices of the other. If comparing the House and Senate bill totals, or the total provided to the Architect of the Capitol at different stages of consideration, adjustments may be necessary to address any omissions due to this practice.

This report responds to frequently asked questions about legislative branch appropriations. Frequently asked questions include the items that are funded within this bill; development, presentation, and consideration of the legislative branch budget requests; the legislative branch budget in historical perspective; and recent actions. The House and Senate considered FY2019 legislative branch funding during 2018: The FY2019 legislative branch budget request of $4.960 billion was submitted on February 12, 2018. The budget request levels were developed prior to the enactment of full-year appropriations for FY2018. Agency assessments for FY2019 may subsequently have been revised—for example, to account for items funded or not funded in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Subsequent discussions may vary from the levels or language included in the budget request due to this timing. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change. H.R. 5895, which contained funding for the legislative branch, was passed by the House on June 8, 2018 (212-179, Roll No. 257). Senate consideration of H.R. 5895 began June 18, 2018, and the Senate agreed to S.Amdt. 2910. H.R. 5895, as amended, passed the Senate on June 25, 2018 (86-5, Record Vote No. 139). The Senate agreed to the conference report (H.Rept. 115-929) on September 12, 2018 (92-5, Record Vote Number 207). The House agreed to the conference report on September 13, 2018 (377-20, Roll No. 399). H.R. 5895 was signed into law on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244; the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019). The FY2019 act provides $4.836 billion for the legislative branch, an increase of $136.0 million (+2.9%) from the FY2018 enacted level. For additional information, including information on the most recent legislative branch appropriations bills, see CRS Report R45214, Legislative Branch: FY2019 Appropriations, by Ida A. Brudnick and Sarah J. Eckman.

The major U.S. interests in the Southwest Pacific are preventing the rise of terrorist threats,working with and maintaining the region's U.S. territories, commonwealths, and military bases(American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Reagan Missile Test Site onKwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands), and enhancing U.S.-Australian cooperation in pursuingmutual political, economic, and strategic objectives in the area. (1) In a hearing before theSubcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on International Relations (July23, 2002), several key issues were raised regarding U.S. interests in the Southwest Pacific. Theseinclude the vulnerability of small Pacific Island nations and "failed states" to transnational crime,including money laundering and drug trafficking; the threat of infiltration by terrorist groups orindividuals; and environmental problems. Many analysts have posited a link between politicalinstability and poverty in many Pacific Island nations and their attraction to organized crime andterrorists. (2) Since the end of World War II, the United States has commanded unimpeded military accessto the Southwest Pacific, although its involvement in the region, with the exception of its militarybases on Guam and Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands), has been low key. The United Statesdiplomatic presence and foreign aid fell during the 1990s, except for its economic assistance to theFreely Associated States of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. The United States hasincreasingly relied upon Australia to promote shared strategic interests as well as political andeconomic stability in the region. Until recently, Australia was careful not to intervene directly indomestic political upheavals. (3) Instead, it pursued a strategy of greater cooperation and regionalassistance through participating in Pacific Island organizations such as the South Pacific Forum,extending bilateral assistance, and promoting public and private sector reforms. (4) The Australian government under Prime Minister John Howard has been a forceful advocateof a more interventionist strategy in a region where political and economic conditions havedeteriorated, especially after the Bali terrorist bombing of September 2002. As part of its effort topromote regional stability and prevent Pacific island nations from becoming havens for transnationalcrime and terrorism, Australia, along with New Zealand and other Pacific Island nations, hasdeployed troops in East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Other initiativesinclude heading the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat through an Australian diplomat, Greg Urwin;financing a police training center in Fiji that would train officers from the Pacific Islands fordomestic and regional operations; (5) conditioning bilateral assistance on improved governance; andpromoting the creation of a federation of small Pacific Island nations that would pool nationalresources and share governmental responsibilities and services in order to make them viablestates. (6) For the most part, Pacific Island nations reportedly have accepted Australia's leadership asnecessary and agreed to the focus on security adopted by Australia and the United States. Themutual emphasis on security was reflected in the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security adoptedby the Pacific Islands Forum in August 2002, in which members agreed that law enforcementcooperation should remain an important focus for the region. (7) In October 2003, leaders from13 Pacific Island nations and Hawaii gathered at the East-West Center in Honolulu to discussregional security issues and meet with President Bush. President Bush told regional leaders that theUnited States would share intelligence to help them meet their security needs. (8) In recent years, Australia has been reorienting its foreign and defense policies, reemphasizingthe importance of the United States to Australia. Australia's external orientation has shifted froman emphasis on Asian engagement, under the leadership of former Labor Prime Minister PaulKeating and his Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, to renewed emphasis on the United States allianceunder current Liberal Prime Minister John Howard who has been in office since 1996. PrimeMinster Howard has taken the position that Australia does not have to choose between its history andits geography, meaning that it can have close ties with Europe and America while also enjoyingproductive relationships with Asian states. This shift in relative emphasis came about for a numberof reasons, including the reluctance of the Australian people to see themselves as Asian; a reluctanceof Asian states, such as Malaysia, to think of Australia as part of Asia; diminished potential rewardsof Asian engagement in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997; and renewed importance toAustralia of the strategic relationship with the United States as a result of the war against terror. The Howard Government's support of the United States in the war against terror has broughtthe United States and Australia closer together as Australia invoked the ANZUS alliance in the wakeof the 9/11 attacks to help the United States. Australia maintained its tradition of fighting alongsidethe United States, as it did in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam and the first Gulf War, by committingtroops to recent United States operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. By doing so, in an internationalenvironment that was largely unwilling to supply combat troops in support of the United States inIraq, Australia, along with Britain, drew attention to itself as a loyal ally. This policy of support forthe United States was continued by the Howard Government despite significant opposition to the warin Australia. The Bush Administration recognized Australia's value to the United States and the AsiaPacific region in the following statement: Australia has long been a steadfast ally and partner, andrecent events have only magnified the value of our alliance with it. The key role that Australia'sbrave forces played in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its commitment to a leading role in regionalsecurity, only demonstrate Australia's growing importance. (9) To complement its strong political and strategic ties with the United States, Australia is seeking afree trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. (10) A fifth round of FTA negotiations were held in December of2003. While Australia has hosted joint early warning, communications and intelligence facilitiesfor decades, it may play an increasingly important strategic role as the United States seeks toredeploy its Asia-Pacific force structure. This would be part of the Department of Defense plansreportedly to effect "the greatest change in the U.S. overseas military posture in 50 years." (11) Positioning of Americanforces in Australia has been discussed in the past. In 1996, then Commandant of the United StatesMarine Corp, General Krulak advocated expanding joint training and the pre-positioning of militarysupplies in Australia. (12) More recently, Australia has been discussed as a potential site for an expanded American militarypresence to be better situated to fight the war on terror. (13) The Department of Defense is reportedly developing a new"overseas basing strategy to support current and future U.S. defense requirements." (14) Australian Prime MinisterHoward reportedly has stated that he would consider allowing an additional American militarypresence in Australia. In June 2003, Australian Defense Minister Hill stated that Australia was readyto expand joint exercises, allow the United States unilaterally to conduct training in Australia, andenhance facilities for United States naval crews to rotate through Australia. (15) The opposition LaborParty views these measures as unnecessary. (16) The United States and Australia conduct many joint military exercises and Australiapurchases much of its military equipment from the United States. U.S. Pacific Commander Adm.Fargo has pointed to the importance of maintaining interoperability with Australia across "the fullspectrum of contingency operations" while describing Australia as the "southern anchor of oursecurity architecture in the region." (17) The Australian government has also supported American plansto develop a missile defense system though this view is not necessarily shared by the Labor Partyopposition. (18) To meetits expanding military commitments, which are in part driven by alliance considerations, Australiaannounced in May 2003 that defense spending would increase over the next several years. Government officials projected defense spending to rise from AS$13.3 billion in 2001/2002 toAS$15 billion in 2003/2004. (19) Furthermore, the recent appreciation of the Australian dollarrelative to the United States dollar will increase the buying capacity of the government budget forprocurement. Australia took the lead in addressing the humanitarian crisis in East Timor that followed the1999 referendum for independence from Indonesia. After the referendum, local militias, whichfavored continued association with Indonesia, attacked pro-independence East Timorese. By leadingan international peacekeeping coalition to East Timor, Australia lessened pressure on the UnitedStates to become more extensively involved. Australia's subsequent involvement in East Timor has helped East Timor develop into an independent, viable state, though negotiations continue for a fullagreement on how to divide the oil and gas resources that lie beneath the Timor Sea. ConoccoPhillips, an American corporation, stated in June 2003 that it was moving forward with a $1.5 billionliquefied-natural-gas development in the Bayu-Undan area of the Timor Sea that separates EastTimor from Australia. (20) Australia, along with New Zealand, continues to play a constructive role in the cease fire andpeace process on Bougainville, where the two nations have helped restore order and improve theprospects for a lasting agreement between the people of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. Australia became involved in the Peace Monitoring Group in 1997, that was intended to support theimplementation of the Burnham Peace process negotiated in New Zealand by the Bougainvilleindependence movement and the Papua New Guinea government. (21) Recent events in the Solomon Islands point to a renewed commitment by Australia topromote stability in its region that is inspired by the need to prevent failed states in the age ofterrorism. Inter-communal strife in the Solomon Islands reduced it to a virtual failed state by 2003. In response, Australia, along with New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, dispatched aforce of 2,300 troops to reinstate the rule of law and good governance as part of the RegionalAssistance Mission. This was done largely to reduce the prospect that the Solomons would becomean ungoverned area from which transnational crime, and potentially terrorists, could operate or drawsupport. (22) Australiahas also proposed the establishment of a region-wide police force to more effectively police theregion. Australia's renewed activism in the Pacific is not universally accepted. Some in Australiaand the region are concerned that it could mark a return to neo-colonial activity by Australia in thearea. (23) China has become increasingly active -- diplomatically and economically -- in the SouthwestPacific. Some analysts suggest that its current involvement could result in strategic benefits forChina in the long term. While the United States does not maintain an embassy in several PacificIsland countries, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has opened embassies in all countries withwhich it has diplomatic relations and has provided bilateral assistance and high-profile visits -- withlittle criticism of their internal policies. The PRC has provided funding, materials, labor, andtechnical assistance for infrastructure projects (roads, airports, sports stadiums, governmentcomplexes, hotels, mining operations) and financed the Pacific Trade Office in Beijing to promotetrade and investment between China and Pacific Island states. Over 3,000 Chinese state and privatecompanies reportedly have invested $800 million in the Southwest Pacific. (24) Although China is stillnot a major bilateral aid donor in the region, it has become the second largest aid donor to PapuaNew Guinea, the most populous Pacific Island nation. According to some foreign affairs analysts, China's aims have been two-fold. First, Chinahas attempted to thwart Taiwanese diplomatic efforts in the region. Taiwan has actively courted theregion, establishing diplomatic relations with four Pacific Island states at China's expense -- Palau,the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands. Taiwan has offered these and other PacificIsland countries economic and development assistance -- helping to build or provide hospitals,airports, copra processing equipment, ships, grants and loans. So eager are some states for assistancethat they often switch allegiances without warning or threaten to change sides. Nauru, for example,which recognized China over Taiwan in July 2002, reportedly threatened to renew ties with Taiwana year later -- until China agreed to extend more loans to the island nation. (25) In November 2003,Kiribati established ties with Taiwan, despite having diplomatic relations with China since 1980 andrenting land to the PRC for a space tracking station. (26) Second, some experts argue, China has hoped to raise its diplomatic and, ultimately, strategicinfluence in the region and its shipping lanes. The PRC reportedly has occasionally applieddiplomatic or economic pressure on Pacific Island countries to oppose actions of Taiwan or Australiain the region or to influence voting in the United Nations. According to one account, for example,the Vanuatu government publicly expressed reservations about the Australian-led peacekeepingmission in the Solomon Islands following a visit by its prime minister to Beijing. (27) Although China does notpossess a "blue water" navy capable of challenging the U.S. in the region, some experts assert thatit plans to develop one. China reportedly has provided "modest" military support -- training andnon-combat defense supplies rather than weapons -- to Pacific Island countries that possess militaryforces -- Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Tonga. Since 1997, China has operated a satellitespace-tracking station on Tarawa Atoll in the Republic of Kiribati. Some analysts argue that the basecould be used for monitoring U.S. missile defense tests at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. While not opposing the U.S. and Australian presence in the region, many Pacific Islandscountries have been attracted to China as an "anti-colonial" power, welcomed the aid and attentionfrom China and Taiwan, and appreciated China's relative support on some issues such as the globalwarming treaty (Kyoto Protocol) to reduce greenhouse emissions. Some regional analysts, Membersof Congress, and leaders of Australia have advocated stronger roles for the United States, Australia,and Japan in the Southwest Pacific as counterweights to growing Chinese influence. (28) Figure 1. Map of the Southwest Pacific

The major U.S. interests in the Southwest Pacific are preventing the rise of terrorist threats,working with and maintaining the region's U.S. territories, commonwealths, and military bases(American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Reagan Missile Test Site onKwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands), and enhancing U.S.-Australian cooperation in pursuingmutual political, economic, and strategic objectives in the area. The United States and Australiashare common interests in countering transnational crime and preventing the infiltration of terroristorganizations in the Southwest Pacific, hedging against the growing influence of China, andpromoting political stability and economic development. The United States has supported Australia'sincreasingly proactive stance and troop deployment in Pacific Island nations torn by political andcivil strife such as East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Australia may playa greater strategic role in the region as the United States seeks to redeploy its Asia-Pacific forcestructure. This report will be updated as needed.

States that choose to cover pregnant women through the §1115 waiver authority must submit a proposal to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for approval. States with approved §1115 demonstration programs define the available pregnancy-related services in their waiver terms and conditions agreements. States that opt to extend SCHIP coverage to unborn children must submit an SPA to CMS for approval specifying the pregnancy-related services. Under the SCHIP SPA option, covered services must be related to the pregnancy or to conditions that could complicate the pregnancy, including those for diagnosis or treatment of illnesses or medical conditions that might threaten the health of the unborn child. Care after delivery for the mother, such as postpartum services, is generally not covered as part of the title XXI SPA option. Although CMS requires the care to be directed at the unborn child, the SCHIP unborn child SPA option effectively enables states to provide prenatal care to pregnant women including those with incomes at or above the Medicaid income eligibility thresholds and for individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid (or SCHIP) for other reasons, such as immigration status or incarceration. Finally, for the family coverage option, pregnancy-related benefits are those offered by participating private health plans. Table 1 summarizes the variation in pregnancy coverage among states with §1115 waivers and those using the SCHIP unborn child SPA option. As of October 2007, 17 states offered pregnancy-related services using SCHIP funds. Of those, 12 states extended coverage through unborn child SCHIP SPAs and 6 states used the §1115 waiver authority (Rhode Island extends coverage to pregnant women through both authorities). The highest upper-income eligibility thresholds for pregnant women and/or unborn children under SCHIP was 300% FPL in California. Seven states established upper-income limits at 200% FPL. Four states exceeded 200% FPL, and six states set maximum income levels below 200% FPL. Of the 12 states that offer pregnancy-related services to unborn children under the SCHIP SPAs, all but Tennessee extended coverage to the unborn children of undocumented aliens who otherwise would not have access to federally funded pregnancy-related services, except through emergency Medicaid. Two states used SCHIP SPAs to extend coverage to the unborn children of incarcerated women who are otherwise ineligible for SCHIP coverage. Covered services under the §1115 waiver programs and the SCHIP SPAs generally consisted of comprehensive pregnancy-related services including prenatal care, labor and delivery services, and access to some form of coverage during the postpartum period. However, the length of coverage (e.g., prenatal period through labor and delivery, or prenatal period through 60 days postpartum period) and financing streams for the care associated with each of these pregnancy phases varied across states. For example, some states offered coverage from conception through 60 days postpartum care (financed with SCHIP funds), whereas others segmented the coverage to include prenatal care (financed with SCHIP funds), labor and delivery (financed with emergency Medicaid funds), and postpartum care (financed with state-only funds). In these states, program specialists pointed out that the pregnancy-related care is seamless to the mother despite the administrative complexities required of the state to submit claims under multiple funding streams. Three states indicated that the coverage offered to pregnant women and/or unborn children was comprehensive and not limited to pregnancy-related services. An additional four states specified that the available care included pregnancy-related care and associated health services including, for example, medically necessary dental or mental health benefits as long as the care was necessary to promote the health of the unborn child. Postpartum care differs among states that chose to extend pregnancy coverage under the §1115 waiver authority as compared with those that offered coverage to unborn children under the SCHIP unborn child SPAs. There were 15 states that offered 60 days of postpartum care to at least some of their eligible populations, including each of the 6 states that offered pregnancy coverage under the §1115 waiver authority. Among the SCHIP SPA states, five states financed 60 days of postpartum care with state-only funds. Four SCHIP SPA states extended 60 days of postpartum care using SCHIP funds. CMS permitted this financing arrangement despite the fact that the unborn child regulation clearly states that federal SCHIP-financed care ends with the birth of the child. The reason CMS permits this is because the state has a global rate for their pregnancy services that includes the cost of prenatal care, labor and delivery, and 60 days of postpartum care. One SCHIP SPA state provided SCHIP-financed postpartum care through the end of the month that the child was delivered because those services have already been paid for under the monthly managed care capitation payment. Two SCHIP SPA states did not offer any form of care for the mother after the birth of the child except in the case of an emergency during which the mother would have access to emergency Medicaid services. Finally, two states (one §1115 waiver state and one SCHIP SPA state) provided access to extended family planning services and supplies as a part of their postnatal care benefit.

The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) does not include pregnancy status among its eligibility criteria and does not cover individuals over age 18. Under SCHIP, states can cover pregnant women aged 19 and older in one of three ways: (1) states may apply for waivers of program rules to extend coverage to adults such as pregnant women (§1115 waiver authority); (2) states may provide health benefits coverage, including prenatal care and delivery services, to unborn children through an SCHIP state plan amendment (SPA) as permitted through regulation (Federal Register, vol. 67, no. 191, Wednesday, October 2, 2002, Rules and Regulations); or (3) states may offer a "family coverage option" that allows them to provide coverage under a group health plan that may include maternity care to adult females in eligible families. Section 2105(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allows states to cover entire families including parents if the purchase of family coverage is cost-effective when compared with the cost of covering only the targeted low-income children in the families involved, and would not substitute for other health insurance coverage. E-mail correspondence (from June 7, 2007) with Kathleen Farrell, the CMS Director of the SCHIP program, indicates that New Jersey and Massachusetts are the only states with operational family coverage variance programs. As of October 2007, 17 states offered pregnancy-related services using SCHIP funds. Of those, 6 states used the §1115 waiver authority and 12 states extended coverage through unborn child SPAs (Rhode Island extends coverage to pregnant women through both authorities). This report summarizes the variation in pregnancy coverage and the financing streams associated with such coverage among these states. This report will be updated as state activity warrants.

Doping in sport involves the use of substances or methods that artificially enhance athletic performance. Although doping is not a new phenomenon, policymakers remain concerned about the health effects and ethical implications associated with the continued use of performance-enhancing substances in competitive sports. Anti-doping rules have been in place for various sports and in various countries since at least the 1920s, but many claim that the enforcement of anti-doping rules is fundamentally limited by a lack of uniform standards across sports and across countries. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport, adopted in 2005 by UNESCO, is the most recent response to such criticism. It seeks to harmonize anti-doping commitments for sport. Eighty-seven states are parties, or States Parties , to the Convention as of July 2008. The field of international anti-doping policy has undergone several rapid transformations in the past decade. The International Olympic Committee (IOC), the umbrella organization for all participants in the Olympic Movement and whose authority includes sport doping regulation, leads the international campaign against sport doping. In 1999, the IOC created the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as the first independent entity to monitor and enforce international anti-doping activities for non-professional sports. One of WADA's first achievements was to develop an international framework for harmonizing anti-doping policies, rules, and regulations among international amateur sport organizations and public authorities, called the World Anti-Doping Code (the Code). As a non-governmental foundation, however, WADA cannot legally bind governments to its policies, including the Code. In 2003, 191 countries, including the United States, signed the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport. The Copenhagen Declaration is a political statement of intent to identify the Code as the "foundation in the world wide fight against doping in sport," ensure that national anti-doping policies conform with the Code, and acknowledge the role of WADA in coordinating and standardizing international anti-doping efforts according to the Code. UNESCO's 2005 International Convention Against Doping in Sport further institutionalizes anti-doping norms among State Parties. States Parties to the Convention are required to harmonize national laws, regulations, policies, and administrative practices with the "principles" of the Code. This includes restricting availability of prohibited substances, applying WADA's standards for granting therapeutic use exemptions, funding domestic anti-doping test programs, supporting the sanctioning of doping violators, promoting anti-doping research and education, and facilitating international anti-doping cooperation by supporting and funding WADA. Every two years, States Parties are also required to provide the Conference of Parties with status reports on their compliance with the Convention. States Parties are the sole voting members of the Convention's Conference of Parties. WADA is an advisory organization to the Conference of Parties. U.S. ratification does not require changes to domestic laws nor additional funding contribution levels to WADA and domestic anti-doping programs. Further, the Convention does not apply to U.S. professional sport associations and institutions. The Administration states that ratification of this treaty is a priority. On February 6, 2008, the President transmitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Upon the President's transmittal of the Convention to the Senate for consideration, the White House Press Secretary released a statement justifying the need for ratification, stating that it would "solidify our Nation's place as a leader in the worldwide effort to rid athletics of cheating through chemistry." Many, including Members of Congress, argue that international commitments to anti-doping can help set a positive example for elite and aspiring athletes and help discourage their use of performance-enhancing substances. A major impetus for U.S. action on ratifying this treaty stems from a concern that lack of ratification would result in a ban from hosting and participating in some international competitions, including future Olympic Games. The IOC requires that governments become a party to the International Convention Against Doping in Sport by January 1, 2009—and failure to do so would result in those countries being barred from participation in future games and could also affect a city's bid for hosting the 2016 Olympics. Chicago is the U.S. Olympic Committee's candidate for the 2016 Games. The IOC plans to announce its selection for the 2016 Olympics in October 2009. On August 4, 2008, President Bush signed the instrument of ratification for the treaty. Prior to this date, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the treaty on May 22, 2008. On June 24, 2008, the committee approved the treaty by voice vote, and the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification on July 21, 2008 (Senate Congressional Record, Page S6980), subject to an understanding, a declaration, and a condition. The understanding states that the treaty does not obligate the U.S. government to provide funding to WADA. The declaration limits the definition of an athlete for the purposes of doping control to those that the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) determines is subject to WADA. The condition states that the text of amendments to the treaty's annexes be transmitted to Congress within 60 days after an amendment occurs. Since its creation in October 2000, the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) has implemented and enforced the Code for Olympic sports in the United States. In 2006, USADA reported spending $5.9 million on anti-doping test expenses, primarily for Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan American Sports. Professional sport associations and leagues, including Major League Baseball and the National Football League, do not fall under the jurisdiction of federal regulation and adhere to their own anti-doping policies, testing requirements, and penalties. The U.S. Office on National Drug Control Policy, the lead policy office for national drug control programs, identifies the elimination of doping in sport as a goal in its 2008 National Drug Control Strategy document. To this end, several national laws proscribe many substances identified by the Code. The Controlled Substances Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), prohibits the production, movement, import, distribution, and sale of many of the substances identified in the Code's "List of Prohibited Substances and Methods." Substances on the Code's list that are not subject to the Controlled Substances Act are subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), which restricts their use to legitimate medical activities. In addition, the U.S. government commits law enforcement resources to investigate doping cases. In one example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in conjunction with other law enforcement entities, participated in a two-year international steroid trafficking investigation ending in 2007, called Operation Raw Deal, which resulted in 124 arrests and the seizure of 11.4 million steroid dosage units, $6.5 million, 25 vehicles, three boats, and 71 weapons. USADA and U.S. agencies support anti-doping research and education. USADA budgets approximately $2 million per year in support of research related to the deterrence of the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports, and in 2006, spent approximately $1.3 million in education. Combined, anti-doping research and education programs accounted for approximately 27% of USADA's expenses in that year. Other anti-doping research is funded through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, DEA, and U.S. Department of Education. The Administration demonstrates its support for international efforts to combat doping in sport through its participation in several multilateral anti-doping venues. As a signatory to the 2003 Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport, the U.S. government formally recognized the role and importance of WADA in harmonizing international anti-doping standards. The U.S. government is also a member of WADA's Foundation Board and Executive Committee, and Congress regularly appropriates funding to support WADA. In FY2008, Congress appropriated $1.7 million to WADA. The United States also participates in anti-doping activities through the Council of Europe, the Caribbean Community, and the Americas Sports Council, the latter an informal governmental organization designed to combat doping in sport in North, South, and Central America. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport does not apply to U.S. professional sports. Some athletes of U.S. professional teams, however, may already follow the Code—whose guidelines the Convention embraces—when they participate in international tournaments under the jurisdiction of organizations that already implement the Code. This has already been the case, for example, when National Basketball Association or National Hockey League players participate in the Olympic Games or World Championships. Article 20 of the Convention, however, requires that States Parties encourage professional sports associations and institutions to develop anti-doping principles consistent with the Code. Many observers argue that the value of international anti-doping efforts, including the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, are limited by a lack of effective anti-doping tests that can positively identify prohibited substances. Historically, the search for better methods to detect doping substances has lagged behind the discovery and use of new, undetectable substances. For example, though the use of anabolic steroids was already reportedly "widespread" by the early 1970s, a reliable test method for detecting them was not found until 1974, and they were only added to the IOC's list of prohibited substances in 1976. More recently, anti-doping efforts suffered setbacks related to the use of designer, or synthetic, steroids that have proven difficult to detect. New concern currently surrounds the possibility of "gene doping," whereby genetic therapies may be used to enhance athletic performance. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport requires States Parties to adhere to the principles of the Code. Some observers, however, question whether the Code sufficiently protects athletes who may be accidentally implicated in a doping violation. These critics argue that the Code imposes excessively stringent punishments, including potentially career-ending suspensions, that offer little distinction between intentional doping and the detection of trace levels of prohibited substances originating from the consumption of contaminated or mislabeled nutritional supplements. Some of these concerns may be addressed in revised version of the Code, which will go into effect January 1, 2009. Further, some question the legitimacy of WADA as an authority in international anti-doping policy, accusing WADA of not being sufficiently transparent in its decision making and resistant to outside scrutiny. Some critics have also questioned WADA procedures for handling drug testing samples and avoiding contamination, as well as for dealing with false positives and other potential testing mistakes. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport commits States Parties to funding WADA and domestic anti-doping tests. Although ratification of the Convention does not impose new costs upon the U.S. government, it would commit the United States to continuing such funding in the future. Some critics argue that the cost of anti-doping activities, especially legal costs of adjudicating doping cases, outweighs the benefits of deterring the use of performance-enhancing substances in sport. USADA's legal expenses, for example, represented more than 15% ($1.8 million) of its total expenses in 2006. Already in 2008, USADA has sought more than $1 million in external financial support from WADA for its legal case against U.S. cyclist Floyd Landis, who was stripped of the 2006 Tour de France title for a doping violation.

The International Convention Against Doping in Sport seeks to harmonize anti-doping commitments for non-professional sports at the international level. This Convention, adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2005, entered into force on February 1, 2007. On July 21, 2008, the Senate approved the treaty for ratification (Treaty Doc 110-14), subject to an understanding, a declaration, and a condition. President George W. Bush signed the instrument of ratification for the treaty on August 4, 2008. Issues that may continue to arise as policymakers evaluate the treaty include its relationship to anti-doping regulations in professional sports and the legitimacy and effectiveness of current international anti-doping activities. U.S. ratification does not require changes to current federal laws.

Member offices vary in their priorities and activities, but in addition to working on legislation, oversight, and other policy-related items, offices are commonly expected to provide constituent services. A broader discussion of constituent service and its relation to other commonly held views of Members' responsibilities can be found in CRS Report RL33686, Roles and Duties of a Member of Congress: Brief Overview . The expectation of constituent service has existed since the earliest Congresses. Requests for assistance with Revolutionary War pensions and other matters led the House, in 1794, and the Senate, in 1816, to establish select committees for private claims. Today, many similar matters would be considered constituent service. Often, constituents contact congressional offices and initiate requests. A constituent may contact a Member office requesting basic information about a government entity or process. Sometimes, a congressional office is one of several places a constituent can turn to. Other programs, opportunities, or services may require a Member office to serve as an intermediary. Each Member office chooses how to engage with constituents and how to allocate resources in support of these activities. Additional information about the use of official office resources in the House and Senate is available in CRS Report RL30064, Congressional Salaries and Allowances: In Brief . Constituent service can present an opportunity for Member offices to engage in outreach and provide education about federal government functions and services. Member offices will often post constituent service links on their official websites, or may mention available services in their newsletters or other constituent communications. Requests from constituents may also provide feedback for Members of Congress about how government programs are working and what issues could be addressed through formal oversight or legislation. As one former House Member observed, "You learn more about the job by doing constituent service work than anything else.... It tells you whether or not the legislation is doing what it is supposed to do." The following sections provide a brief overview of many common constituent services provided by congressional offices. It is not intended to be an exhaustive or a prescriptive list, as Member offices are largely able to shape their own constituent service operations to suit their own representational priorities or the needs of their constituents. References to additional CRS products or other resources are also provided, when available. Sometimes constituents seek information about the federal government. Small business owners, for example, may want to know about federal contracting opportunities or the procurement process. Parents of college-age students may have questions about federal financial aid. In these instances, Member offices largely relay publicly accessible information, such as websites, office locations, phone numbers, or forms, to their constituents. Offices may offer some additional explanation about how a particular agency or process works, or provide broad-based information about the federal government. Member offices commonly refer constituents to the appropriate government agencies, and sometimes compile and provide website links or reference materials in their offices to assist with these inquiries. The CRS casework web page (available to congressional offices at http://www.crs.gov/resources/casework ) provides examples of links to websites that congressional offices may find useful for these types of requests, including tools to locate federal government loans or benefit programs, and foreign-language versions of government websites. Casework refers to the response or services that Members of Congress provide constituents seeking assistance, often with a federal agency. Each Member office has considerable discretion in how it defines and approaches casework, subject to House or Senate rules and statute. Some congressional offices may consider as casework their liaison activities between the federal government and local governments or businesses concerned with the effects of federal legislation or regulation. An office's casework definition may include other constituent services, including those that are listed separately here, like grants work or U.S. service academy nominations. Common requests for casework involve applications for Social Security, veterans', or other federal benefits; obtaining a missing record or payment from a federal agency; or assistance with immigration matters. Members and staff are limited in how much they can directly intervene in an agency's decisionmaking process on behalf of a particular case, but federal agencies are often responsive to congressional concern. When contacting federal agencies on behalf of constituents, Member offices can generally ask for information related to a case, urge prompt consideration, arrange for interviews or appointments, express judgements, or call for reconsideration of an administrative response. For additional information, see CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources , CRS Report R44696, Casework in Congressional Offices: Frequently Asked Questions , and CRS Video WVB00093, Introduction to Congressional Casework . Federal grants may be available for state or local governments, nonprofit community organizations, research entities, and small businesses. Those seeking grants often approach Member offices for information and assistance. Federal grants are not benefits or entitlements provided directly to individuals; they often are awarded to state or local governments, which may sub-award them to other community organizations. Direct involvement by a Member office in the grant-awarding process is limited, but Member offices can often provide information or refer grant seekers to other sources. For example, to assist grant seekers, congressional offices can develop working relationships with grants officers in relevant federal or state departments and agencies. Congressional offices may compile information about available grants or host workshops to educate constituents about federal assistance. Given the competition for, and limitations of, federal grants, Member offices sometimes provide constituents with information about developing grant proposals or identifying alternative funding options. For more information on how congressional offices approach grants work, see CRS Report RL34035, Grants Work in a Congressional Office . Other CRS resources contain information that may be of use to grant-seekers who approach a congressional office, including CRS Report RL34012, Resources for Grantseekers , and CRS Report RL32159, How to Develop and Write a Grant Proposal Additional background information on how federal grants are administered can be found in CRS Report R42769, Federal Grants-in-Aid Administration: A Primer , and CRS Report R40638, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues . Detailed information on specific types of grant programs, including community services block grants, federal housing assistance programs, rural development programs, and student financial aid, is available on the CRS grants and federal assistance web page (available to congressional offices at http://www.crs.gov/resources/grants ). Business owners seeking federal government contract opportunities may also contact Members of Congress. Member offices have no direct role in selecting federal contractors, nor can they offer any preferential treatment to companies seeking to do business with the federal government. Member offices can, however, provide information about business registration requirements, opportunities, and the federal contracting or procurement process to interested constituents. For more background information, see CRS Report RS22536, Overview of the Federal Procurement Process and Resources . Most congressional offices offer internship opportunities, which must, under House and Senate rules, be primarily educational in nature. Interns can provide additional, temporary assistance in an office, but their roles cannot supplant the duties of a regular staff member. Within the parameters set by the House and Senate rules, each Member office has considerable discretion to determine, among other things, how many (if any) interns it has, length of internships, office location in which interns will work, qualifications, and compensation. For more information on internships in Congress, see CRS Report R44491, Internships in Congressional Offices: Frequently Asked Questions . Constituents may also be interested in internships elsewhere in the federal government, and more information on these opportunities is available in CRS Report 98-654, Internships, Fellowships, and Other Work Experience Opportunities in the Federal Government . College-age students who want to apply to the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA), or the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) must receive an official nomination, which can be obtained from a Member office. The number of nominations from each state, territory, or district is set by statute; the number of nominations available to a Member office can be further affected by the number of currently enrolled students from an area or nominations made by a preceding Member for the current admissions cycle. Nominations typically must be submitted to the service academies by January 31 for the academic year that begins the following July. Offices can largely establish their own criteria and processes for making nominations, which may include additional deadlines, application materials, or interviews with candidates. For more information, see CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management . Pages have served in Congress since the early 1800s, typically working as messengers. Today the Senate Page Program is generally open to 16- or 17-year-old high school juniors and is administered by the Senate Sergeant at Arms. Senators may sponsor interested high school students, who then compete for a limited number of positions. The page program runs four sessions each year—fall, spring, and two during summer. Lodging, schooling, and meals are provided. More information is available in CRS Report 98-758, Pages of the United States Congress: History and Program Administration . K-12 students from participating House districts can compete in the annual Congressional App Challenge. Students design and submit their own software application, individually or in groups of up to four. Work on the app may begin before the competition, and submissions are usually accepted between July and November each year. Winners are typically announced in early December. For more information and resources, House offices can refer to https://housenet.house.gov/serving-constituents/congressional-app-challenge-cac . High school students from participating House districts are eligible for the Congressional Art Competition, also known as An Artistic Discovery. A winning piece of visual artwork is chosen from each district and displayed for a year in the Capitol. Updated rules are usually released in January of each year; current rules are available to House offices at https://housenet.house.gov/serving-constituents/art-competition . Winners chosen by House Member offices often must be submitted by early the following May. For more information, see CRS Report R42487, The Congressional Arts Caucus and the Congressional Art Competition: History and Current Practice . Any visitor can receive a free guided tour of the U.S. Capitol from the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC). Same-day tour passes are often available at the CVC information desks, and reservations for individuals or groups can be made online up to three months in advance at http://www.visitthecapitol.gov/plan-visit/book-tour-capitol . Sample itineraries for visitors are also provided by the Architect of the Capitol at https://www.aoc.gov/itineraries-visits-capitol-hill . Many Member offices also provide their own tours of the Capitol for constituents, which can be customized to reflect local or other interests. These staff-led tours may also visit some areas of the Capitol that the CVC tour does not. Access to the Capitol Dome, however, is not permitted, unless a special tour is requested from CVC staff and a Member of Congress accompanies the group. The CVC regularly hosts tour training classes for congressional staff, and can provide routes, guidelines, and accessibility information. The House and Senate libraries, historian offices, and the Library of Congress may also be able to provide additional information of interest for staff giving tours. The CVC does not distribute gallery passes for the House or Senate chambers. Constituents usually receive these from a Member office. An office can obtain passes by presenting a written request, signed by the Member, to the chamber's Sergeant at Arms or appointments desk. Public requests for free, self-guided White House tours must be submitted through a Member of Congress. A "tour coordinator" for each congressional office registers with the White House Visitors Office and submits constituent tour requests through an online portal. Requests for constituent tours must be received at least 21 days in advance, but can be sent up to three months prior. More information is available for House offices at https://housenet.house.gov/serving-constituents/dc-visitors/white-house-tours . Some Member offices provide additional information about Washington, DC, attractions or tour itineraries. With the exception of the White House, congressional requests for tours are not usually required for most sites of interest to visitors, including the Library of Congress, U.S. Supreme Court, national monuments, or Smithsonian Institution museums and sites. Federal government sites generally are free of charge and open to visitors on a first-come, first-served basis; some provide tours and others are self-guided. Timed-entry tickets are required for some popular attractions, however, and small service fees may apply to make reservations in advance. Members of Congress may write letters recognizing constituents' public distinctions or achievements, subject to House or Senate franking rules. Some common reasons for recognition include public office appointments or elections; acts of heroism or citizenship; or key awards or honors. Through local news and networks, Member offices can sometimes identify individuals they wish to recognize. Member offices may also encourage constituents to notify them of possible recipients. Constituents are often interested in obtaining a U.S. flag flown over the Capitol; requests from individuals seeking a flag must be submitted to the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) by a Member of Congress. Flags are available in several sizes and must be purchased by the constituent, along with a certificate fee if the flag is flown over the Capitol. Requests typically must be made at least two weeks in advance. Constituents can request that a flag be flown on a certain date, but no date guarantees can be made, due to weather and a varying volume of requests. See http://www.aoc.gov/flags or contact the AOC for more information on the flag program. The White House Greetings Office has provided greetings to U.S. citizens commemorating certain occasions, like birthdays, weddings, anniversaries, and Boy Scout or Girl Scout awards. Member offices sometimes submit requests to the White House on behalf of constituents; these requests typically must be made at least six weeks in advance of an occasion.

Constituent service encompasses a wide array of non-legislative activities undertaken by Members of Congress or congressional staff, and it is commonly considered a representational responsibility. Member offices vary in their priorities, activities, and scope of constituent service, but most offices try to assist with certain requests when possible. Member offices have engaged in constituent service activities since the earliest Congresses. Depending on what the constituent is seeking, requests may be addressed by a Member's Washington, DC, office, or by a Member's district or state office. Many constituents contact congressional offices to initiate their own requests, but Members of Congress may also engage in outreach to let constituents know of the ways in which a Member office might be able to assist them. Members of Congress often post constituent service links on their official websites and may mention constituent services in newsletters, in other communications, or at events. These activities can help facilitate a lasting connection between Member offices and constituents, and they may also provide feedback for Members of Congress about how government programs or legislation are affecting a district or state. A congressional office is sometimes one of several places a constituent can turn to. Other programs, opportunities, or services may require a Member office to serve as an intermediary. Constituent service activities can be simple, like relaying contact information for a local federal office, or more complex, like providing internships or casework assistance. Limited office resources, along with House and Senate rules, may affect what level of assistance a congressional office is able to provide. This report provides an overview of common constituent services provided by Member offices, along with references to additional CRS products or other relevant resources. The activities discussed in this report are divided into the following four categories: Help with Government Opportunities for Students Assisting with Washington, DC, Visits Commemorations and Recognitions The report is intended to provide guidance for Member offices regarding constituent service, but it is not intended to be an exhaustive nor a prescriptive list of activities. Within the parameters set by the House and Senate rules, Member offices may largely shape their own constituent service operations to suit their own representational priorities and the needs of their constituents.

RS21683 -- Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003 November 28, 2003 Expanded eligibility to exclude gain from the sale of a principal residence (sec. 101). Under section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), an eligible taxpayer may exclude fromgross incomeup to $250,000 ($500,000 if married filing jointly) of the gain realized from the sale of his or her principal residence. One eligibilityrequirement is that the taxpayer must have used the property as a principal residence for at least two of the five yearspreceding thedate of sale. The Act amends section 121 so that a taxpayer may elect to suspend the five-year period for up to tenyears during thetime that the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse is on qualified official extended duty. (1) Qualified duty is serving for more than 90days or an indefinite period at a duty station that is at least 50 miles from the residence or while residing underorders in Governmentquarters. The new rule applies to sales and exchanges made after May 6, 1997. Since taxpayers are generally unableto amendreturns more than three years after the original filing date or two years after the tax was paid, (2) the Act grants taxpayers one year tofile for a refund even though it may otherwise be barred. The one-year period began on November 11, 2003. Exclusion of the military death benefit from gross income (sec. 102). Under IRC� 134, qualified military benefits are excluded from gross income. The exclusion is limited to benefits that (1) aremade on accountof the taxpayer's status or service as a member of the Armed Forces and (2) were excusable on September 9, 1986. Any benefitincrease after September 9, 1986 is included in income, unless it is a cost-of-living adjustment or similar increase. The death gratuitypayment made to the survivors of members of the Armed Forces who die while on active duty is a qualified militarybenefit. (3) Thepayment was $3,000 on September 9, 1986 and it was later increased to $6,000. Thus, prior to the Act, the $3,000increase wasincluded in income. The Act makes two changes related to the death gratuity payment. First, the benefit is increased from $6,000 to $12,000. Second,the entire payment, including any future increases, is excluded from gross income. The changes apply for all deathsoccurring afterSeptember 10, 2001. Exclusion of payments made to offset the negative effect of base closure on housing values (sec.103). Under the Homeowners Assistance Program found in 42 U.S.C. � 3374, the Department of Defensemay offerpayments to members of the Armed Forces whose housing values have decreased due to military base realignmentor closure. Priorto the Act, such payments did not qualify for exclusion from gross income. The Act amends IRC � 132 so thatpayments made afterNovember 11, 2003 are nontaxable fringe benefits, subject to limitation by 42 U.S.C. � 3374(c). Expanded eligibility for tax-related deadline extensions (sec. 104). Under IRC �7508(a), individuals serving in a Presidentially-declared combat zone are allowed extra time to complete a varietyof tax-relatedactivities, including filing returns and paying taxes. The Act expands the group of taxpayers eligible for theextensions to individualsserving in a contingency operation as determined under 10 U.S.C. � 101(a)(13). Examples of contingency operationsincludeoperations where members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in hostilities against a foreign enemyand operationsduring national emergencies that require the call up of members of the Armed Forces. The new rule applies for anyperiod forperforming an act that did not expire before November 11, 2003. Expanded eligibility for tax-exempt status for military organizations (sec. 105). Under IRC � 501, military organizations may qualify for tax-exempt status if (1) at least 75% of the members arepast or presentmembers of the Armed Forces and (2) substantially all of the other members are cadets or spouses, widows, orwidowers of past orpresent members of the Armed Forces or of cadets. The Act eases the "substantially all" requirement by allowingancestors or linealdescendants of past or present members of the Armed Forces or of cadets to be included. The change applies totaxable years afterNovember 11, 2003. Clarification of treatment of dependent care assistance programs (sec.106). Thetax treatment of payments made to members of the Armed Forces under dependent care assistance programs hasbeen unclear. TheAct amends IRC � 134 to make it clear that these payments are subject to exclusion as a qualified military benefit. Thus, if apayment meets the qualifications in section 134, it may be excluded from income. The change applies for taxableyears afterDecember 31, 2002. Tax favored status for distributions to military academy attendees from education savings accounts(sec. 107). Under IRC � 530(d), a portion of a distribution made from a Coverdell education savingsaccount thatexceeds the taxpayer's educational expenses is included in gross income and penalized by an additional tax. TheAct exemptsdistributions made to attendees of military academies from the additional tax. The exemption is limited to theattendee's "advancededucation costs" that are described in 10 U.S.C. � 2005(e)(3). The change applies for taxable years after December31, 2002. Deduction for overnight travel expenses of National Guard and Reserve members (sec.109). Prior to the Act, overnight travel expenses of National Guard and Reserve members weredeductible only bytaxpayers who itemized their deductions, subject to the limitation on miscellaneous itemized deductions. The Actcreates anabove-the-line deduction for these expenses. The expenses are limited to the general Federal per diem rate and mustbe incurredwhile the reservist is serving more than 100 miles from home. (4) The change applies to expenses paid or incurred after December 31,2002. Suspension of tax-exempt status for terrorist organizations (sec. 108). The Actsuspends the tax-exempt status or the application for such status for any organization that is either (1) designateda terroristorganization by executive order or under authority found in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the InternationalEmergencyEconomic Powers Act, or the United Nations Participation Act or (2) designated by executive order as supportingterrorism orengaging in terrorist activity. No deduction is allowed for any contribution to the organization during thesuspension. Thesuspension lasts until the designation is rescinded under the authority by which it was made. No challenges to thesuspension,designation, or denial of a deduction are allowed in any proceeding concerning the tax liability of the organizationor anothertaxpayer. The new rules apply to all designations, whether made before, on or after November 11, 2003. Tax relief for astronauts killed in the line of duty (sec. 110). The Act provides taxrelief to astronauts who die in the line of duty after December 31, 2002. (5) First, astronauts are not subject to the income tax in theyear of death and in earlier years beginning with the taxable year prior to that in which the mortal injury occurred. (6) If the taxliability for those years, disregarding the exemption, is less than $10,000, then the taxpayer is treated as having madea tax paymentin the final taxable year that is equal to $10,000 less the liability. Further, the Act excludes employee death benefitpayments fromthe astronaut's income (7) and applies reduced estatetax rates to the astronaut's estate. (8) Extension of customs user fees (sec. 201). The authorization for the customs userfees found in 19 U.S.C. � 58c(j)(3) is extended from March 31, 2004 to March 1, 2005.

The Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, H.R. 3365, became P.L.108-121 on November 11, 2003. The Act provides various types of tax relief to members of the Armed Forces. Additionally, theAct suspends the tax-exempt status of organizations involved in terrorist activities, offers tax relief to astronautswho die in the lineof duty, and extends the authorization for certain customs user fees.

The benefits of greater educational attainment that accrue to individuals are both monetary (e.g., higher earnings) and nonmonetary (e.g., better health). The benefits of additional years of schooling extend beyond individuals and their families. These societal benefits also are of a pecuniary (e.g., greater economic growth) and nonpecuniary (e.g., increased civic involvement) nature. Partly because of the spillover of benefits from individuals to society, Congress has enacted measures to encourage more of the nation's population to enroll in postsecondary educational institutions (e.g., Pell Grants, education tax provisions). This report focuses specifically on differences over time in selected labor market outcomes of individuals associated with their educational attainment. Workers with more education historically have had higher annual earnings on average than workers with less education. In 2007, the latest year for which data are available, a worker with a bachelor's degree earned 2.66 times the amount earned by a worker who had not graduated from high school ($57,181 and $21,484, respectively). As also can be seen from the columns labeled "current dollars" in Table 1 , the importance of educational attainment to earnings has increased over the years. The wage premium of workers with a bachelor's degree compared to workers with some college courses or an associate degree grew by 13 percentage points from 51% on average in the first eight years of the 1980s to 64% on average in the first eight years of the 2000s. The payoff to graduating as opposed to not graduating from high school similarly increased by 14 percentage points from an average of 33% in the earlier period to 47% thus far in the current decade. The wage gap between workers with postsecondary education short of a four-year college degree and high school graduates also widened, but by 3 percentage points, from 10% on average in 1980-1987 to 13% in 2000-2007. All workers generally have seen their standard of living increase over the years, but their wages have been more insulated from rising prices the greater their educational attainment. The growth in earnings of individuals who did not graduate from high school just slightly outpaced the rise in the Consumer Price Index between 1987 and 2007, which would have increased their purchasing power by $839. The real (inflation-adjusted) value of wages paid to workers with a high school diploma or some college or associate degree held up much better against price increases over the 20-year period. They could have bought an additional $4,224 and $4,486, respectively, in goods and services. Bachelor's degree holders fared the best: the purchasing power of their 2007 paychecks was $11,477 greater than their 1987 paychecks. (See columns labeled "2007 dollars" in Table 1 .) The real average annual earnings of four-year college graduates have grown fairly steadily and very substantially over the years, while those of workers with a high school degree or less have fluctuated and not risen to as great a degree. This disparate pattern has sparked still ongoing concern about the extent of wage inequality in U.S. society. The annual earnings differences by level of education presented in Table 1 can be expected to produce even larger disparities after years spent in the labor force. According to a 2002 Census Bureau study, high school dropouts employed full-time year-round (i.e., at least 35 hours a week at least 50 weeks a year) over a 40-year working life might earn a total of $1.0 million in 1999 dollars. Similarly employed high school graduates might earn $1.2 million, and those with some college courses or an associate degree might earn $1.5-$1.6 million. College graduates employed full-time year-round throughout their working lives were estimated to earn considerably more, $2.1 million on average. As educational attainment increases, the likelihood of unemployment decreases. In 2008, for example, the unemployment rate of workers age 25 and older was 9.0% if they lacked a high school diploma, 5.7% if they were high school graduates, 4.6% if they took some postsecondary courses or obtained an associate degree, and 2.6% if they had at least a bachelor's degree. Unlike the previously examined increase over time in the educational wage premium, relative unemployment rates by educational attainment generally have been stable since 1978. The risk of displacement is lower and the likelihood of reemployment is higher for long-tenured workers with at least a bachelor's degree compared to other workers. Workers with a four-year college degree or more were laid off from long-held jobs at a below-average rate from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, while the displacement rate of workers with a high school diploma or less usually equaled the average rate. Workers with more years of schooling who were displaced from full-time jobs had a higher rate of reemployment in full-time jobs than displaced workers with fewer years of education. For example, 72% of workers with an advanced degree and 63% of workers with a bachelor's degree displaced from full-time jobs in the January 2003 to December 2005 period were reemployed in full-time jobs in January 2006; comparable reemployment rates were 57% among displaced high school graduates and 39% among displaced workers who did not enter or complete high school. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projects that employment in occupations typically requiring at least a bachelor's degree will increase by 15.3% between 2006 and 2016, well above the all-occupations average of 10.5%. The nearly five million new jobs estimated to be available to persons with at least a four-year college degree could account for almost one-third of all jobs projected to be added to the economy in the ten-year period. Many of the estimated five million new jobs are in professional occupations. Some professional specialties—computer software engineers (applications), computer systems analysts, and network systems and data communications analysts; elementary and postsecondary school teachers; and accountants and auditors—not only are projected to be among the fastest growing fields but also among those adding the largest number of positions through 2016. Occupations that usually require little or no postsecondary education are projected to grow at a comparatively slow rate, but these less skilled comparatively low-paying jobs (e.g., retail salespersons, food preparation and serving workers, general office clerks, home health aides) nonetheless rank among those estimated to experience the largest numerical increases in employment between 2006 and 2016.

The amount of education in which individuals invest greatly influences their labor market outcomes. For example, highly educated workers on average are better paid than other workers. Four-year college graduates also are less at risk of unemployment; if they should lose their jobs, these displaced workers are more likely than others to find new jobs. The importance of educational attainment to earnings levels has grown over time as well. Concern about the extent of wage inequality in U.S. society arose in part because of the comparatively large increases in real (inflation-adjusted) earnings of workers with at least a bachelor's degree.

Following the death of a worker beneficiary or other insured worker, Social Security makes a lump-sum death benefit payment of $255 to the eligible surviving spouse or, if there is no spouse, to eligible surviving dependent children. In 2016, such payments were made for about 782,300 deaths, for a total of about $204 million in benefit payments. The death payment was capped at $255 in 1954, and since 1982, almost all payments have equaled $255, so the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the benefit now declines each year. Monthly survivors benefits were not included in the original Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271), but the program did include a lump-sum benefit that would be paid if a worker died before the retirement age of 65. That provision provided some benefits to families who otherwise would have paid Social Security taxes but received no benefits. The benefit equaled 3.5% of the worker's covered earnings—those earnings that were subject to the Social Security payroll tax. Those payments were made from 1937 through 1939. When monthly survivors benefits were added to the program in 1939 via the Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379), a limited version of the lump-sum death benefit was retained. It was paid only when no survivors benefits were paid on the basis of the deceased worker's earnings record. When made, the payment equaled six times the primary insurance amount (PIA). The payment was made to a family member or to an individual who helped pay for the funeral. In 1950, eligibility for the payment was expanded to include cases where survivors benefits were also paid "so that survivors benefits need not be diverted for payment of burial expenses of an insured worker." The benefit was therefore paid in nearly every death of a Social Security-insured worker. The 1950 legislation (P.L. 81-734) also sharply increased the PIA (and therefore increased regular monthly benefit levels). To maintain the lump-sum benefit steady at the level before 1950, the formula was changed to equal three times the PIA, rather than six times. The Social Security Amendments of 1954 (P.L. 83-761) kept the formula of three times the PIA but capped the benefit at $255, which was approximately three times the maximum PIA payable under Social Security in 1952. By 1974, the minimum PIA had reached $85, or one-third of the $255 cap, so the lowest possible lump-sum benefit also reached $255. As a result, the lump-sum death payment has been unindexed since 1973, and nearly all lump-sum benefits have been $255 since (because some payments are based on PIAs from earlier years, some payments were slightly lower). In 1974, the average payment per worker was $254.64, and payments have averaged $255 since 1982. Currently, the payment may be lower if the deceased was covered by a foreign system with which the United States has an agreement to integrate benefits, known as a totalization agreement. Finally, in 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 ( P.L. 97-35 ) restricted eligibility for the lump-sum payment to limited categories of survivors. That change reduced the number of payments made by nearly half, from 1.57 million in 1980 to about 808,000 in 1982. If a surviving spouse is living with the worker at the time of death, the benefit is paid to the spouse. If the worker and the spouse were living apart, the spouse could still receive the lump-sum death payment if the spouse was already receiving benefits based on the worker's record or became eligible for survivors benefits upon the worker's death. If there is no eligible spouse, the benefit is paid to a child (or children) who is receiving or is eligible to receive monthly benefits on the worker's record. If there are multiple eligible children, the benefit is split evenly among them. When there are no eligible survivors, no death benefit is paid. In 2016, the Social Security Administration (SSA) paid about $204 million in lump-sum benefits for 782,300 deaths. Because the $255 payment was split between multiple recipients in some cases, the agency made a total of 821,575 payments. The number of payments is projected to remain at about the same level during the next few years; thus total spending will also remain at approximately the same dollar level. For most deaths, no lump-sum death benefit is paid. In 2016, fewer than 42% of the deaths among insured workers resulted lump-sum death benefit payments. One possible reason was that, for many deaths, there was no eligible family member to receive the death payment. The real value of the lump-sum death benefit has declined significantly since it was introduced. For example, in 1954, the average lump-sum nominal death benefit per worker was $208, which would have been equivalent to about $1,800 in 2016 dollars. In recent decades, inflation has caused the real value of the $255 payment to continue to decline, as shown in Figure 1 . Total spending on the lump-sum death benefit as a share of total Social Security benefit payments has generally been declining over the years since 1937 (see Figure 1 ). In the 1960s, the lump-sum death benefit accounted for more than 1% of Social Security benefit outlays, but that share declined to about 0.38% in 1980. In 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ( P.L. 97-35 ), which restricted eligibility for the lump-sum payment to limited categories of survivors, decreased the total lump-sum death benefit by nearly half from $394 million in 1980 to $203 million in 1982. Consequently, the share of lump-sum death benefit to total Social Security benefits further dropped to 0.15% in 1982. Since then, the share has declined steadily and reached about 0.03% in 2016. Under current law, the share will likely continue to decrease as payments on the lump-sum death benefit remain relatively stable and payments on other benefits continue to increase steadily. The share of the total lump-sum death benefit to total Social Security benefits (indexed to wages) have declined faster than the real value of the lump-sum death benefit (indexed to prices), mainly because Social Security benefits are linked to national wage levels, which are increasing faster than price levels. SSA estimated in 2016 that the annual administrative costs of the lump-sum death benefit were about $10 million. SSA also projected that more lump-sum death benefits would be paid out as the number of baby boomer deaths increases; SSA projects that in 2024, almost 900,000 lump-sum death benefits will be paid out, costing $217 million. Over the years, various proposals would have changed or eliminated the death benefit. In 1979, President Carter's budget described it as "largely an anachronism" and proposed replacing it with a similar benefit that would be paid only if the deceased or the surviving spouse were eligible for Supplemental Security Income, a program that provides cash benefits to aged, blind, or disabled persons with limited income and assets. Under that proposal, only about 30,000 recipients would have received a benefit each year. The 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security recommended that the benefit be increased to three times the PIA, but no more than $500. A significant minority of the council favored the Carter proposal of targeting the benefit to those with the greatest need, but with a higher benefit of perhaps $625. The council found that the benefit "provides valuable assistance at a time of special financial need. The monthly survivors benefits under Social Security are designed to meet regular recurring costs, whereas the lump-sum death payment is designed to meet the expenses of a final illness and funeral." In 2014, the median cost of an adult funeral with viewing and burial was around $7,200, and the lump-sum death benefit was fixed at $255 per worker. Although the benefit was once linked to burial expenses and is sometimes still referred to as a "burial benefit," it no longer has any legal connection with funeral expenses. President Bush's FY2007 budget proposed eliminating the benefit, arguing that it "no longer provides meaningful monetary benefit for survivors" and that it results in high administrative costs. The $15 million estimated annual administrative cost at the time was about 7% of lump-sum death benefit outlays. Administrative costs for the entire Social Security program are less than 1% of benefit outlays. Some proposals would have increased the benefit. For example, in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 341 proposed expanding eligibility for the benefit to insured workers upon the death of their uninsured spouses. In the 111 th Congress, the Social Security Death Benefit Increase Act of 2010 ( H.R. 6388 ) would have increased the benefit from $255 to $332, and the BASIC Act ( H.R. 5001 ) would have increased it to 47% of the worker's PIA. In the 114 th Congress, the Social Security Lump-Sum Death Benefit Improvement and Modernization Act of 2015 ( H.R. 1109 ) proposed an increase of the benefit to $1,000. In addition, in the 115 th Congress, H.R. 5302 and S. 1739 (BASIC Act) proposed to increase the lump-sum death benefit to 50% of the worker's PIA. None of these proposals have been enacted into law.

When a Social Security-insured worker dies, the surviving spouse who was living with the deceased is entitled to a one-time lump-sum death benefit of $255. If they were living apart, the surviving spouse can still receive the lump sum under certain conditions. If there is no such spouse, the payment can be made to a child who meets certain requirements. In the majority of deaths, however, no payment is made. The lump-sum death benefit was once an important part of Social Security benefits to survivors. Between 1937 and 1939, the lump-sum was the only benefit available to survivors of insured workers who died before 65 years old, and before 1952, the $255 amount was greater than three times the maximum monthly benefits payable under Social Security. However, because the lump-sum death benefit has been capped at $255 for the past eight decades, inflation has eroded its value. At the same time, the real value of other Social Security benefits has increased. The total payment on lump-sum death benefits in 2016 was about $204 million, less than 0.03% of total Social Security (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) benefit payments. The erosion of the value of the lump-sum death benefit has brought about various proposals to change it, including some recent congressional proposals that would have increased the benefit amount. Several presidential budget proposals have also proposed changes, ranging from eliminating the provision to changing eligibility rules. None of these proposals were enacted into law.

In response to concern about the U.S. government's inability to close or consolidate unneeded military facilities, Congress in 1988, and again in 1990, enacted statutory provisions establishing a process intended to insulate base closings from the "political" considerations that are part of the regular lawmaking process. Pursuant to these provisions, in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission recommended the closure and realignment of more than 100 defense facilities throughout the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) formally asked Congress to provide it with statutory authority to conduct another round of base closures and realignments in 2015, but no round was authorized. Under the BRAC process, the final recommendations of a bipartisan commission are submitted to Congress and automatically take effect unless Congress passes and the President signs legislation disapproving the recommendations within a stated time period. To ensure that Congress can promptly act if it so chooses, the BRAC procedure includes special "fast track" or expedited legislative procedures laying out the terms for House and Senate consideration of legislation striking down the BRAC Commission's report. Such "fast track" procedures have governed congressional consideration of the five previous rounds of base closures and are included in the DOD's recent request to Congress for authority to pursue a 2015 BRAC round. Under the parliamentary procedures laid out in the BRAC process, a package of suggested base closures and realignments is to be implemented by the Secretary of Defense unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval rejecting the entire package within the 45-day period beginning on the date of the President's submission of the package to Congress or the sine die adjournment of the session, whichever occurs earlier. Congressional consideration of such a BRAC resolution of disapproval is governed not by the standing rules of the House and Senate but by special expedited parliamentary procedures laid out in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended ( P.L. 101-510 , 10 U.S.C. 2687 note). The procedures have the same force and effect as standing House and Senate rules and exempt the joint resolution of disapproval from many of the time-consuming steps and obstacles that apply to most measures Congress considers. For example, the procedure dictates when a joint resolution may be introduced, specifies its text, limits committee and floor consideration of the measure, prohibits amendments and other motions, and establishes an automatic "hook-up" of joint resolutions passed by both chambers. This report outlines the "fast track" parliamentary procedures that have governed congressional consideration of the recommendations of the BRAC commission in prior rounds and have been included in the DOD's recent requests for authority to conduct a BRAC round. This section describes the parliamentary procedures that have governed congressional consideration of recent BRAC Commission reports and were included in a legislative proposal DOD recently submitted to Congress requesting authority for a BRAC Commission round in 2015. Ordinarily, Members of the House and Senate may introduce legislation at any time that their chamber is in session during the two-year Congress. Under the BRAC procedure, however, a qualifying joint resolution of disapproval must be introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date the President transmits a certified BRAC report to Congress. Such a joint disapproval resolution may be introduced by any Member in either chamber, and when it is, it is referred to the House or Senate Committee on Armed Services. There is no limit to the number of disapproval resolutions that can be introduced, and in prior rounds, multiple disapproval resolutions have been introduced, aimed at the same BRAC report. Provisions are included in the BRAC procedure specifying the text of the disapproval resolution. These are meant to make it clear exactly which legislation is eligible to be considered under the expedited procedures. The joint resolution of disapproval may not contain a preamble. The title of the measure is to read: "Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission." The text of the joint resolution after the resolving clause is to read: "That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on ______," with the appropriate date filled in the blank. With certain exceptions—for example, when time limits are placed on the sequential referral of a bill by the Speaker—Congress generally does not mandate that a committee act on a bill referred to it within a specified time frame or at all. The BRAC procedure, however, places deadlines on the Committees on Armed Services to act and creates a mechanism to take the resolution away from them if they do not. These expediting provisions are intended to make it impossible for a joint resolution of disapproval to be long delayed or blocked outright in committee. As noted, upon introduction, a joint resolution of disapproval is referred to the House or Senate Committee on Armed Services. The committee may choose to report such a resolution but may not amend it. If the committee does not report a joint resolution of disapproval by the end of a 20-day period beginning on the date the President transmits the BRAC report to Congress, the panel is automatically discharged from its further consideration, and the measure is placed directly on the House's Union Calendar or the Senate's Calendar of Business, as appropriate. Under the terms of the BRAC procedure, an Armed Services Committee must report just one resolution of disapproval; if multiple joint resolutions of disapproval are introduced by several Members and referred to committee, the panel must report only one resolution or a substitute for it within the 20-day time frame to forestall the automatic discharge of all of the others. On or after the third day following the day the House or Senate Armed Services Committee reports a joint resolution or is discharged from its consideration, any Member may move in chamber to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution. The BRAC law stipulates, however, that a Member must first, on the preceding calendar day, have given notice of his or her intention to offer the motion to proceed. This notice can be avoided in the House of Representatives if the motion is being made at the direction of the committee of referral. The motion can be made even if the body has previously rejected an identical motion to the same effect. This provision serves as incentive for the chamber to get to a vote on the underlying joint resolution of disapproval; if a motion to proceed is defeated, supporters can simply re-offer it until it passes or force the chamber to expend time and energy disposing of repeated motions. Points of order against the resolution and its consideration are waived. In the Senate, under most circumstances, a motion to proceed to the consideration of a measure is debatable. Under the BRAC procedure, however, the motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution of disapproval is not debatable in either chamber, and it cannot be amended or postponed. Appeals of the decision of the chair relating to consideration of the joint resolution are decided without debate. If the motion is adopted, the chamber immediately considers the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business. Once a chamber has chosen to take up the joint resolution by adopting the motion to proceed, consideration of the measure is, in a sense, "locked in." It remains the unfinished business of the chamber until disposed of. Other business cannot intervene, the joint resolution cannot be laid aside, and it must be disposed of before other business can be taken up. In the absence of a special rule dictating otherwise, the standing rules of the House of Representatives generally call for measures to be debated in the House under the one-hour rule. In the Senate, debate is usually unlimited except by unanimous consent, by the invocation of cloture, or by some other special procedure, such as the statutory rules governing the consideration of budgetary legislation. In keeping with its "fast track" nature, floor consideration of a BRAC joint resolution of disapproval is limited in both houses. Debate in a chamber on the joint resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals connected with it, is limited to not more than two hours, equally divided. A non-debatable motion to further limit debate is also in order. The BRAC procedure limits Members' ability to delay consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval by barring amendments and motions that would ordinarily be permissible under the House and Senate's standing rules. Amendments to the measure, a motion to postpone its consideration, or motions to proceed to the consideration of other business are not permitted. A motion to recommit the joint resolution to committee is not in order, nor is a motion to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed to or disagreed to. It is virtually impossible from a parliamentary standpoint to avoid a final vote on a joint disapproval resolution once a chamber has decided to take it up. At the conclusion of debate and after a single quorum call (if requested), without intervening motion, a chamber immediately votes on passage of the joint resolution of disapproval. Passage of the joint resolution is by simple majority in each chamber, although, in the likely event the disapproval resolution is subsequently vetoed by the President, a two-thirds vote in each chamber would then be required to override the veto. If, before voting upon a disapproval resolution, either chamber receives a joint resolution passed by the other chamber, that engrossed joint resolution is not referred to committee. Instead, the second chamber proceeds to consider its own joint resolution as laid out above up until the point of final disposition, when they will lay it aside, take up the joint resolution received from the first chamber, and vote on it. After the second chamber votes on the first chamber's joint resolution, it may no longer consider its own version. This provision is included to avoid the need to reconcile differences between the chambers' versions or expend time choosing whether ultimately to act upon the House or Senate joint resolution. For a joint resolution of disapproval to become law, it must be signed by the President or enacted over his veto. The BRAC procedure does not include expedited provisions governing House and Senate consideration of a joint disapproval resolution vetoed by the President. Such a veto message would be considered pursuant to the regular procedures of each house. The fact that an expedited legislative procedure is contained in statute does not mean that another law must be enacted to alter it. Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution gives each chamber of Congress the power to determine the rules of its proceedings; as a result, statutory expedited procedures such as those governing BRAC can (like all rules of the House or Senate) be set aside, altered, or amended by either chamber at any time. As several House Parliamentarians have observed, a chamber may "change or waive the rules governing its proceedings. This is so even with respect to rules enacted by statute." These changes can be accomplished, for example, by the adoption of a special rule from the House Committee on Rules, by suspension of the rules, or by unanimous consent agreement. Instances of this ability to "rewrite" expedited procedure statutes have occurred during consideration of base closure joint resolutions of disapproval. For example, in the 101 st Congress, Representative George E. Brown Jr. introduced H.J.Res. 165 , a joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. Under the terms of the 1988 BRAC statute, the House Committee on Armed Services had to report a joint disapproval resolution prior to March 15, 1989, or see it be automatically discharged of its further consideration. The statute further permitted any Member, at any time three days after this report or discharge, to make a motion to proceed to the immediate consideration of the resolution. The House, however, "rewrote" these statutory terms as they related to the consideration of H.J.Res. 165 . On March 21, 1989, Representative Les Aspin asked unanimous consent that, notwithstanding the provisions of the BRAC law, it not be in order to move to proceed to the consideration of H.J.Res. 165 prior to April 18, 1989. Still later, on April 11, 1989, a second unanimous consent request laid aside not only the terms of the BRAC expedited procedure statute but those of Representative Aspin's March 21 unanimous consent request as well. As noted above, the House again agreed to lay aside certain provisions of the BRAC statute that governed its consideration of the 2005 round of closures. On September 29, 2005, the House adopted H.Res. 469 , which stated that, despite the BRAC statute's provision permitting any Member to make a motion to proceed to the consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval, that motion "shall be in order only if offered by the Majority Leader or his designee." The Senate has also overridden the BRAC fast-track procedure by unanimous consent. On September 15, 1993, the Senate agreed to a unanimous consent agreement governing the subsequent consideration of S.J.Res. 114 , disapproving the recommendations of the 1993 BRAC Commission. This consent agreement limited debate on the disapproval resolution to one hour (instead of two as provided for in the statute) and permitted the Senate to consider separate legislation in the midst of its consideration of the joint disapproval resolution. In a sense, then, the expedited procedures in the BRAC statute establish a default set of parliamentary ground rules for consideration of a disapproval resolution; these provisions can be tailored by Members in either chamber to meet specific situations or for their convenience. Table 1 lists all joint resolutions of disapproval introduced in Congress relating to prior BRAC rounds and their disposition.

In 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission was authorized by law to recommend the disposal of unneeded defense facilities throughout the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) formally asked Congress to provide it with statutory authority to conduct another round of base closures and realignments in 2015, but no new round was authorized. Under the terms of the statutes that authorized these previous BRAC rounds, the BRAC Commission's recommendations automatically take effect unless, within a stated period after the recommendations are approved by the President and submitted to the House and Senate, a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted rejecting them in their entirety. Congressional consideration of this disapproval resolution was governed not by the standing rules of the House and Senate but by special expedited or "fast track" parliamentary procedures laid out in statute. This report describes these expedited parliamentary procedures and explains how they differ from the regular legislative processes of Congress. The report will be updated as needed.

O n July 9, 2018, President Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to succeed Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who is scheduled to retire from active status on July 31, 2018. Judge Kavanaugh has served as an appellate judge for the D.C. Circuit since his appointment by President George W. Bush on May 30, 2006. He has also sat, by designation, on judicial panels for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Eighth Circuit), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit), and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. During his tenure on the bench, Judge Kavanaugh has adjudicated more than 1,500 cases, almost all while a member of either a three-judge or en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit considers far fewer cases each year than other federal appellate courts. But in part because of the D.C. Circuit's location in the nation's capital and the number of statutes providing it with special or even exclusive jurisdiction to review certain agency actions, legal commentators generally agree that the D.C. Circuit's docket, relative to the dockets of other circuits, contains a greater percentage of nationally significant legal matters. Cases adjudicated by the D.C. Circuit are more likely to concern the review of federal agency action or civil suits involving the federal government than cases adjudicated in other circuits, while the D.C. Circuit docket has a lower percentage of cases involving criminal matters, prisoner petitions, or civil suits between private parties. Unlike the Supreme Court, which enjoys "almost complete discretion" in selecting its cases, the federal courts of appeals are required to adjudicate many cases as a matter of law and, as a result, tend to hear "many routine cases in which the legal rules are uncontroverted." Arguably indicative of the nature of federal appellate work, the vast majority of cases decided by three-judge panels of federal courts of appeals are issued without a dissenting opinion. However, while the vast majority of cases adjudicated by the D.C. Circuit are decided without a dissenting opinion, perhaps because of the nature of the D.C. Circuit's docket, a greater percentage of the court's decisions draw a dissenting opinion relative to its sister circuits. This report provides tabular listings of 306 cases in which Judge Kavanaugh authored a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. Arguably, these written opinions provide the greatest insight into Judge Kavanaugh's judicial approach, as a judge's vote or decision to join an opinion authored by a colleague may not necessarily represent full agreement with a colleague's views. Accordingly, this report does not include cases in which Judge Kavanaugh sat on a reviewing judicial panel, but is not credited as the author of an opinion. For example, instances where Judge Kavanaugh was part of a panel that issued a per curiam opinion, in which no particular judge was credited as an author, are omitted from this report. This report also does not attempt to identify the various rulings made by circuit panels on procedural issues in the midst of the appeal (e.g., granting a litigator's request for an extension of time to file a brief). Finally, the report does not address subsequent legal proceedings that may have occurred after a cited decision was issued, except to note where Westlaw or Lexis editors have indicated that a decision was subsequently abrogated, affirmed, reversed, or vacated by the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit. The opinions discussed in this report are categorized into three tables: Table 1 identifies 148 opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh on behalf of a unanimous panel; Table 2 contains 47 controlling opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh in which one or more panelists wrote a separate opinion; and Table 3 lists 111 cases where Judge Kavanaugh wrote a concurring or dissenting opinion, including cases where Judge Kavanaugh wrote both the majority opinion and a separate concurrence. A concurring opinion is identified as a "concurrence in the judgment"—that is, an opinion where the author agrees with the ultimate conclusion reached by the majority but not the manner in which it was reached—only when the concurrence is expressly labeled as such. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order based on where the case appears in the Federal Reporter . In each instance, the key ruling or rulings of the case are succinctly described. A glossary of common abbreviations for statutes, agencies, and Supreme Court cases referenced in the tables is attached as an Appendix . Judicial opinions discussed in this report are categorized using the following legal subject areas: Administrative Law (77 cases) Communications Law (14 cases) Antitrust Law (4 cases) Bankruptcy Law (1 case) Business & Corporate Law (6 cases) Civil Rights Law (24 cases) Contracts Law (7 cases) Criminal Law & Procedure (45 cases) Elections Law (7 cases) Energy & Utilities Law (17 cases) Environmental Law (33 cases) Federal Courts & Civil Procedure (covering matters such as standing, justiciability, civil procedure, legal ethics, and the admission of evidence in noncriminal proceedings) (53 cases) Indian Law (2 cases) Firearms Law (1 case) Freedom of Religion (4 cases) Freedom of Speech (including the right to petition) (13 cases) Food & Drug Law (including agriculture) (7 cases) Government Operations (concerning the structure and functions of executive and legislative branch entities) (18 cases) Healthcare Law (14 cases) Immigration Law (3 cases) Intellectual Property Law (4 cases) International Law (6 cases) Labor & Employment Law (38 cases) Military & Veterans Law (6 cases) National Security (17 cases) Pensions & Benefits Law (6 cases) Privacy & Records (15 cases) Securities Law (7 cases) Tax Law (8 cases) Torts (10 cases) Transportation Law (17 cases) Workers' Compensation & Social Security (5 cases) Where appropriate, up to three subject areas are identified as primarily relevant to a particular case. The goal of the subject matter listing is to provide those interested in particular issues concerning Judge Kavanaugh a means to identify key judicial opinions he authored in a given subject area. However, the list above is not an exhaustive accounting of all possible legal subjects addressed in Judge Kavanaugh's judicial writings. Moreover, categorization of a case under a particular legal subject area does not necessarily mean other categories are wholly inapplicable. For example, several listed cases that concern challenges by wartime detainees held at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are solely categorized under the legal subject area of "National Security," though the cases may touch on other issues, such as "Federal Courts & Civil Procedure" (because detainee challenges concern judicial review of executive discretion in wartime matters) or "Administrative Law" (because the cases involve review of determinations made through an administrative process employed by the U.S. military to assess whether a person is properly detained). Accordingly, while the categories used in this report may prove helpful to readers seeking to locate judicial opinions by Judge Kavanaugh concerning certain legal topics, these categories do not necessarily capture the full range of legal issues those opinions address. While this report identifies and briefly describes opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh during his tenure on the federal bench, it does not analyze the implications of those opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters will be discussed in a forthcoming CRS report. The cases included in this report were compiled by searching all federal cases in the LexisAdvance legal database for "writtenby(Kavanaugh)." A search was then conducted of all federal cases in the Westlaw legal database using "wb(Kavanaugh)" as a cross-check because editors of different legal databases may vary in how they identify cases. These search results were then compared to the listing of authored opinions submitted by Judge Kavanaugh to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. These results were last compared on July 23, 2018. Not every identified result proved relevant. Moreover, in a handful of cases, an opinion authored by Judge Kavanaugh was subsequently republished with minimal, and sometimes only stylistic, changes. In cases where there are little, if any, substantive changes between two versions of a judicial opinion, only the most recent published version is listed. On the other hand, if there is a meaningful substantive difference between the two versions, both are included. Ultimately, this methodology was used to identify 306 cases in which Judge Kavanaugh is credited authoring an opinion: 301 cases decided by the D.C. Circuit and 5 cases decided on three-judge district court panels (Judge Kavanaugh is not credited as an author of any opinions issued by Eighth or Ninth Circuit panels on which he served). APA – Administrative Procedure Act AUMF – 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Chevron – Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Nat'l Resources Def. Council 467 U.S. 837 (1984) CAA – Clean Air Act CFPB – Consumer Financial Protection Bureau CIA – Central Intelligence Agency DHS – Department of Homeland Security Dodd-Frank Act – Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act DOT – Department of Transportation EPA – Environmental Protection Agency ERISA – Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 FAA – Federal Aviation Administration FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation FCC – Federal Communications Commission FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission FOIA – Freedom of Information Act HHS – Department of Health and Human Services IRS – Internal Revenue Service NLRA – National Labor Relations Act NLRB – National Labor Relations Board Title VII – Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

On July 9, 2018, President Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to succeed Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who is scheduled to retire from active status on July 31, 2018. Judge Kavanaugh has served as a judge on the D.C. Circuit since May 30, 2006. He has also sat, by designation, on judicial panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and also served on three-judge panels of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. During his tenure on the bench, Judge Kavanaugh has adjudicated more than 1,500 cases, almost all while a member of either a three-judge or en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit. In part because of the D.C. Circuit's location in the nation's capital and the number of statutes providing it with special or even exclusive jurisdiction to review certain agency actions, legal commentators generally agree that the D.C. Circuit's docket, relative to the dockets of other circuits, contains a greater percentage of nationally significant legal matters. Cases adjudicated by the D.C. Circuit are more likely to concern the review of federal agency action or civil suits involving the federal government than cases adjudicated in other circuits, while the D.C. Circuit docket has a lower percentage of cases involving criminal matters, prisoner petitions, or civil suits between private parties. Arguably, Judge Kavanaugh's authored opinions provide the greatest insight into the nominee's judicial approach, as a judge's vote or decision to join an opinion authored by a colleague may not necessarily represent full agreement with a colleague's views. This report provides a tabular listing of 306 cases in which Judge Kavanaugh authored a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. The opinions are categorized into three tables: Table 1 identifies 148 opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh on behalf of a unanimous panel; Table 2 contains 47 controlling opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh in which one or more panelists wrote a separate opinion; and Table 3 lists 111 cases where Judge Kavanaugh wrote a concurring or dissenting opinion (decisions where Judge Kavanaugh wrote both the controlling opinion and a separate concurrence are included in this final table). Opinions are identified and briefly discussed in each table in reverse chronological order based on where the case appears in the Federal Reporter. The opinions are also categorized by their primary legal subjects (e.g., administrative law, criminal law & procedure, environmental law, federal courts & civil procedure, labor & employment law, and national security). While this report identifies and briefly describes judicial opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh during his time on the federal court, it does not analyze the implications of his judicial opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters will be discussed in a forthcoming CRS report. Key CRS products related to the Supreme Court vacancy and Judge Kavanaugh's nomination are collected in CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10160, Supreme Court Nomination: CRS Products, by [author name scrubbed].

The Americans with Disabilities Act, often described as the most sweeping nondiscrimination legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides protections against discrimination for individuals with disabilities. Due to concern about the spread of highly contagious diseases such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), questions have been raised about the application of the ADA in such situations. The threshold issue when discussing the applicability of the ADA is whether the individual in question is a person with a disability. Generally, individuals with serious contagious diseases would most likely be considered individuals with disabilities. However, this does not mean that an individual with a serious contagious disease would have to be hired or given access to a place of public accommodation if such an action would place other individuals at a significant risk. Such determinations are highly fact specific and the differences between the contagious diseases discussed by the courts (e.g., HIV infection, tuberculosis, and hepatitis) and pandemic influenza may give rise to differing conclusions. Each contagious disease has specific patterns of transmission that affect the magnitude and duration of a potential threat to others. The starting point for an analysis of rights provided by the ADA is whether an individual is an individual with a disability. The term "disability," with respect to an individual, is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph(3))." The ADA was amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-325 , to expand the interpretation of the definition of disability from that of several Supreme Court decisions. Although the statutory language is essentially the same as it was in the original ADA, P.L. 110-325 contains new rules of construction regarding the definition of disability, which provide that the definition of disability shall be construed in favor of broad coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the act; the term "substantially limits" shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act; an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities to be considered a disability; an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would have substantially limited a major life activity when active; the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, except that the ameliorative effects of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered. Generally, individuals with serious contagious diseases would most likely be considered individuals with disabilities. However, what is defined as a "serious" contagious disease is fact specific. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has indicated that individuals infected with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza virus would not be individuals with disabilities. However, if the disease were to become more severe, an infected individual might be considered to be an individual with a disability under the ADA. The EEOC guidance does not delineate when the illness would be serious enough to be encompassed by the ADA. Even if a contagious disease is serious and an infected individual is covered by the ADA, if that individual poses a direct threat to others, he or she would not necessarily have to be hired or given access to a place of public accommodation. Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employment discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities, specifically states that "the term 'qualifications standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) is required to publish, and update, a list of infectious and communicable diseases that may be transmitted through handling the food supply. Similarly, title III, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and services operated by private entities, states: "Nothing in this title shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Although title II, which prohibits discrimination by state and local government services, does not contain such specific language, it does require an individual to be "qualified" and this is defined in part as meeting "the essential eligibility requirements of the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities...." Contagious diseases were discussed in the ADA's legislative history. The Senate report noted that the qualification standards permitted with regard to employment under title I may include a requirement that an individual with a currently contagious disease or infection shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace and cited to School Board of Nassau County v. Arline , a Supreme Court decision concerning contagious diseases and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Similarly, the House report of the Committee on Education and Labor reiterated the reference to Arline and added "[t]hus the term 'direct threat' is meant to connote the full standard set forth in the Arline decision." The Department of Justice issued amended regulations for titles II and III of the ADA which were published in the Federal Register on September 15, 2010. Although these regulations did not directly address contagious diseases, they did contain some revised language concerning the direct threat exception. Both the title II and title III regulations provide that public entities or places of public accommodations are not required to permit an individual to participate in services or activities when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat, both titles require "an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: The nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk." Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794, in part prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability in any program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. Many of the concepts used in the ADA originated in Section 504, its regulations, and judicial interpretations. The legislative history of the ADA, as discussed above, specifically cited to the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 504 in Arline which held that a person with active tuberculosis was an individual with a disability but may not be otherwise qualified to teach elementary school. Footnote 16, which was referenced in the ADA's legislative history, states in relevant part that "a person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk." The Court in Arline examined the standards to be used to determine if an individual with a contagious disease is otherwise qualified. In most cases, the Court observed, an individualized inquiry is necessary in order to protect individuals with disabilities from "deprivation based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks." The Court adopted the test enunciated by the American Medical Association (AMA) amicus brief and held that the factors which must be considered include "findings of facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm." The Court also emphasized that courts "normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials" and that courts must consider whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee. Arline was remanded for consideration of the facts using this standard and the district court held that since the teacher had had negative cultures and the possibility of infection was "extremely rare," the school board must reinstate her or pay her salary until retirement eligibility. The Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott , addressed the ADA definition of individual with a disability and held that the respondent's asymptomatic HIV infection was a physical impairment impacting on the major life activity of reproduction thus rendering the HIV infection a disability under the ADA. The Court also addressed the question of what is a direct threat, finding that the ADA's direct threat language codified the Court's decision in Arline. In Bragdon the plaintiff, an individual with asymptomatic HIV infection, sought dental treatment from the defendant and was told that she would be treated only in a hospital, not in the office. The plaintiff, Ms. Abbott, filed an ADA complaint and prevailed at the district court, court of appeals and the Supreme Court on the issue of whether she was an individual with a disability but the case was remanded for further consideration regarding the issue of direct threat. The Supreme Court provided some guidance regarding the direct threat issue in Bragdon stating that "the existence, or nonexistence, of a significant risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence." Dr. Bragdon had the duty to assess the risk of infection "based on the objective, scientific information available to him and others in his profession. His belief that a significant risk existed, even if maintained in good faith, would not relieve him from liability." On remand for consideration of the direct threat issue, the first circuit court of appeals held that summary judgment was warranted, finding that Dr. Bragdon's evidence was too speculative or too tangential to create a genuine issue of fact. Both Arline and Bragdon dealt with the issue of whether an individual was a direct threat to others. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Echazabal , the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether an individual was a threat to himself and held unanimously that the ADA does not require an employer to hire an individual with a disability if the job in question would endanger that individual's health. The ADA's statutory language provides for a defense to an allegation of discrimination that a qualification standard is "job related and consistent with business necessity." The act also allows an employer to impose as a qualification standard that the individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace but does not discuss a threat to the individual's health or safety. The ninth circuit in Echazabal had determined that an employer violated the ADA by refusing to hire an applicant with a serious liver condition whose illness would be aggravated through exposure to the chemicals in the workplace. The Supreme Court rejected the ninth circuit decision and upheld a regulation by the EEOC that allows an employer to assert a direct threat defense to an allegation of employment discrimination where the threat is posed only to the health or safety of the individual making the allegation. Justice Souter found that the EEOC regulations were not the kind of workplace paternalism that the ADA seeks to outlaw. "The EEOC was certainly acting within the reasonable zone when it saw a difference between rejecting workplace paternalism and ignoring specific and documented risks to the employee himself, even if the employee would take his chances for the sake of getting a job." The Court emphasized that a direct threat defense must be based on medical judgment that uses the most current medical knowledge. The lower courts have dealt with a number of direct threat cases under the ADA. Although a comprehensive survey of these cases is beyond the scope of this report, they have involved a number of types of disabilities as well as varying occupations and accommodations. The disabilities at issue have often involved AIDS or HIV infection or mental illness but have also included hepatitis, and other conditions. The various occupations have included public health care workers, public safety officers, transportation operators, food handlers, and industrial workers.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq., provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Due to concern about the spread of highly contagious diseases such as pandemic influenza and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), questions have been raised about the application of the ADA in such situations. Generally, individuals with serious contagious diseases would most likely be considered individuals with disabilities. However, this does not mean that an individual with a serious contagious disease would have to be hired or given access to a place of public accommodation if such an action would place other individuals at a significant risk. Such determinations are highly fact specific and the differences between the contagious diseases may give rise to differing conclusions since each contagious disease has specific patterns of transmission that affect the magnitude and duration of a potential threat to others.

The potential for biomass to meet U.S. renewable energy demands has yet to be fully explored. Non-food and other types of biomass (e.g., manure) have traditionally been considered by some as waste material and as such have been deposited in landfills, used for animal feed, or applied to crop production lands. However, high fuel prices, environmental concerns, and sustainability issues have led policy makers to create legislation that would encourage conversion of biomass into liquid fuels (e.g., ethanol, biodiesel), electricity, or thermal energy. Over the last five years, there has been increasing interest in cellulosic biomass (e.g., crop residues, prairie grasses, and woody biomass) because it does not compete directly with crop production for food—although it may compete for land—and because it is located in widely dispersed areas. Classification of biomass as an energy resource has prompted the investigation of its use for purposes additional to liquid fuel (e.g., on-site heating and lighting purposes, off-site electricity). Biomass is organic matter that can be converted into energy. Common examples of biomass include food crops, crops for energy (e.g., switchgrass or prairie perennials), crop residues (e.g., corn stover), wood waste and byproducts (both mill residues and traditionally noncommercial biomass in the woods), and animal manure. Over the last few years, the concept of biomass has grown to include such diverse sources as algae, construction debris, municipal solid waste, yard waste, and food waste. Some argue that biomass is a renewable resource that is widely available, that may be obtained at minimal cost, and that may produce less greenhouse gas than fossil fuels under certain situations. Others contend that biomass has seen limited use as an energy source thus far because it is not readily available as a year-round feedstock, is often located at dispersed sites, can be expensive to transport, lacks long-term performance data, requires costly technology to convert to energy, and might not meet quality specifications to reliably fuel electric generators. Woody biomass has received special attention because of its widespread availability, but to date has been of limited use for energy production except for wood wastes at sawmills. Wood can be burned directly, usually to produce both heat or steam and electricity (called combined heat and power, or CHP), or digested to produce liquid fuels. Biomass from forests, as opposed to mill wastes, has been of particular interest, because it is widely accepted that many forests have excess biomass (compared to historical levels) called hazardous fuels that can contribute to catastrophic wildfires. Removing these hazardous fuels from forests could reduce the threat of catastrophic wildfires, at least in some ecosystems, while providing a feedstock for energy production. The term biomass was first introduced by Congress in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-620 ) as a type of alternate fuel. However, the term was first defined in the Energy Security Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-294 ), in Title II, Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels, as "any organic matter which is available on a renewable basis, including agricultural crops and agricultural wastes and residues, wood and wood wastes and residues, animal wastes, municipal wastes, and aquatic plants." The Energy Security Act of 1980 contained two additional definitions for biomass, excluding aquatic plants and municipal waste, in Title II, Subtitle C, Rural, Agricultural, and Forestry Biomass Energy. Three pertinent laws contain biomass definitions: the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill, P.L. 110-246 ); the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ); and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05, P.L. 109-58 ). The term is mentioned several times throughout the three acts, but is not defined for each provision of the law. In some cases, an individual law has multiple biomass definitions related to various provisions. For example, one definition is included in the 2008 farm bill and three are provided in EISA. EPAct05 has six biomass definitions. The tax code contains four additional definitions. In total, 14 biomass definitions have been included in legislation and the tax code since 2004. Table 1 includes definitions from the three laws and from the tax code, and contains additional comments. The definitions are built into the many provisions and programs that may support research and development, encourage technology transfer, and reduce technology costs for landowners and businesses. Thus, because the various definitions determine which feedstocks can be used under the various programs, the definitions are critical to the research, development, and application of biomass used to produce energy. Of the many biomass definitions, two may be considered by policy makers, scientists, and program managers as the most comprehensive for energy production purposes: the definition in Title IX of the 2008 farm bill and the definition in Title II of EISA. Both laws provide an extensive definition for renewable biomass, but each law defines renewable biomass somewhat differently. The recognition of biomass as renewable means that biomass is considered by some to be an infinite feedstock that may be replenished in a short time frame. Both definitions consider crops, crop residues, plants, algae, animal waste, food waste, and yard waste, among other items, as appropriate biomass feedstock. Whether the biomass is grown on federal lands is an important distinction between the two definitions for renewable biomass. The 2008 farm bill includes biomass from federal lands as a biofuel feedstock. In contrast, to be eligible for the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) under EISA, biomass cannot be removed from federal lands, and the law excludes crops from forested lands. In the 113 th Congress, there was some congressional discussion and legislation to expand the EISA definition to include biomass from federal lands to better meet the RFS biofuels usage mandate. None of the legislation was enacted. EISA expanded the RFS and restricted the definition of biomass. As described above, the renewable biomass definition for the RFS under EISA excludes biomass removed from federal lands and crops from forested lands as biofuel feedstocks. Advocates for this definition include groups who favor minimal land disturbance (for ecological reasons as well as to sustain sequestered carbon) and are concerned that incentives to use wood waste might increase land disturbance, especially timber harvesting on federal lands. Opponents of this definition include groups who seek to use materials from federal lands and other forested lands (i.e., not tree plantations) as a source of renewable energy while possibly contributing to long-term, sustainable management of those lands. Advocates of the renewable biomass definition in the 2008 farm bill include groups who seek to use the potentially substantial volumes of waste woody biomass from federal lands and other (non-plantation) forest lands (e.g., waste from timber harvests, from pre-commercial thinnings, or from wildfire fuel reduction treatments) as a source of renewable energy. Opponents include groups who seek to preserve forested land and federal land, and who are concerned that incentives for using wood waste would encourage activities that could disturb forest lands, possibly damaging important wildlife habitats and water quality, as well as releasing carbon from forest soils. It is not clear whether the biomass definitions in the 2008 farm bill and in EISA constitute a barrier to biomass feedstock development for conversion to liquid fuels. Concerns for some landowners and business entities that wish to enter the biomass feedstock market include economic stability, risk/reward ratio, revenue generation, land use designation, and lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, the feedstock development potential of woody biomass varies by region. For example, biomass stock tends to be located on private forest land in the southeastern United States and on federal land in the western United States. Different regions may require different resources to develop a robust biomass feedstock market. There is mixed support for biomass use, including its feedstock development. Recent agricultural and energy legislation has incorporated provisions and established programs to promote the development and use of biomass as a renewable energy source. For example, in the 113 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 2 , which would have allowed Indian tribes, from FY2014-FY2018, to carry out demonstration projects to promote biomass energy production on Indian forest land and in nearby communities by providing tribes with reliable supplies of woody biomass from federal lands. However, there also have been efforts in Congress to stall or prevent the use of biomass for energy production, which in turn would impact biomass feedstock development. For instance, there were repeated attempts to eliminate certain portions of the Renewable Fuel Standard ( H.R. 4849 ; 113 th Congress). Further, the House initially passed an FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 3979 ; 113 th Congress) that would have prohibited the Department of Defense (DOD) from large-scale purchases of biofuels unless they are cost-competitive, and would have also required DOD to provide a business case analysis to Congress before constructing a biofuel refinery. The provisions were significantly modified in a later version of the bill that passed both chambers and was signed into law ( P.L. 113-291 ). The success of the provisions and programs that support biomass as a renewable feedstock will be partly determined by landowner participation rates. Participation rates may depend on the definition provided in the legislation that authorizes financial and technical support. Landowners are eligible to receive financial or technical assistance for biomass feedstock development based on the renewable biomass definition for a specific program. One program that may have the potential to increase the level of private landowner participation in the biomass feedstock market is the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP), established in Section 9011 of the 2008 farm bill. BCAP, administered by the USDA Farm Service Agency, is intended to support the establishment and production of eligible crops for conversion to bioenergy. The definition for biomass contained in legislation determines what sources of material are deemed eligible as biomass and which lands are eligible for biomass removal for inclusion in the RFS and for treatment in the tax code. The biomass definition in legislation influences decisions on the types of crops grown, where they are grown, and their potential preferred energy uses, among other things. Biomass definitions typically contain three components: agriculture (e.g., crops), forestry (e.g., slash, pre-commercial thinnings), and waste (e.g., food, yard). Multiple biomass definitions can be included in a single piece of legislation to meet the requirements of associated programs or provisions. Environmental groups, private entities aspiring to participate in biomass-to-energy initiatives, and federal agencies that administer biomass-to-energy programs are likely to closely monitor biomass definitions proposed during future farm bill and energy debates in Congress. Biomass debate and action in the 113 th Congress was minimal, although bills were introduced to modify its definition ( H.R. 4426 , H.R. 4956 , H.R. 3084 , S. 1267 ). Further, debates about the definition of biomass were not as extensive in the 113 th Congress as they were in previous Congresses (e.g., 111 th Congress). Forthcoming congressional consideration of energy issues, particularly legislation involving the Renewable Fuel Standard or energy tax incentives, may prompt further discussion about the biomass definition in the 114 th Congress.

The use of biomass as an energy feedstock has regularly been presented as a potentially viable alternative to address U.S. energy security concerns, foreign oil dependence, and rural economic development, and as a tool to possibly help improve the environment (e.g., through greenhouse gas emission reduction). Biomass (organic matter that can be converted into energy) may include food crops, crops grown specifically to produce energy (e.g., switchgrass or prairie perennials), crop residues, wood waste and byproducts, and animal manure. Most legislation involving biomass has focused on encouraging the production of liquid fuels from corn. Efforts to promote the use of biomass for power generation have focused on wood, wood residues, and milling waste. Comparatively less emphasis has been placed on the use of non-corn-based biomass feedstocks—other food crops, non-food crops, crop residues, animal manure, and more—as renewable energy sources for liquid fuel use or for power generation. This is partly due to the variety, lack of availability, and dispersed location of non-corn-based biomass feedstock. The technology development status and costs to convert non-corn-based biomass into energy are also viewed by some as obstacles to rapid technology deployment. To aid in understanding the role of biomass as an energy resource, this report investigates the characterization of biomass in legislation. For over 30 years, the term biomass has been a part of legislation enacted by Congress for various programs, indicating some interest by the general public and policy makers in expanding its use. Biomass-related legislation has provided financial incentives to develop technologies that use biomass. How biomass is defined influences decisions about the types of crops that are grown, where they are grown, and potential preferred energy uses, among other things. There have been 14 biomass definitions included in legislation and in the tax code since 2004. Future discussions about energy—particularly legislation involving the Renewable Fuel Standard, energy tax incentives, or tribal biomass demonstration projects—may prompt further discussion about the definition of biomass. For example, one point of contention regarding the biomass definition and the Renewable Fuel Standard is whether the term should be defined to include biomass from federal lands. Some argue that removal of biomass from these lands may lead to ecological harm. Others contend that biomass from federal lands can aid the production of renewable energy to meet certain mandates (e.g., the Renewable Fuel Standard) and that removal of biomass can enhance forest protection from wildfires. Bills introduced in the 113th Congress (e.g., H.R. 4426, H.R. 4956, H.R. 3084, S. 1267) would have modified the biomass definition. However, little legislative action occurred regarding the definition of biomass in the 113th Congress. This report lists biomass definitions enacted by Congress in legislation and the tax code since 2004, and discusses the similarities and differences among the definitions.

The United States Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon overturned a federal appellate court decision which had held that officials in the City of Ontario, California engaged in an unconstitutional search and seizure when they acquired and read the contents of messages sent to and from a city police officer's city-provided pager. "Though the case touches issues of far-reaching significance, the Court conclude[d] it can be resolved by settled principles determining when a search is reasonable." The City of Ontario assigned Sergeant Jeff Quon and several other SWAT team members two-way text messaging pagers in 2001. The City's contract with the service provider, Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., set a limit of 25,000 characters for each pager. Arch Wireless assessed addition charges for use beyond the 25,000 character limit. Although it had no written policy on use of the pagers as such, the City did have a written policy concerning computer, Internet and e-mail practices. Under the policy the use of City equipment was limited to official business; it also informed employees that use would be monitored and that "users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources." Officers were told that the e-mail policy applied to use of the pagers. When the City began to incur charges because the 25,000 character limit on pager use had been exceeded, its initial reaction was to assume the excess was attributable to personal use. Rather than try and sort out official from unofficial use, the lieutenant with administrative responsibility over pager use told individual officers that they would have to pay for the excess charges assessed against their pagers. On several occasions, Sergeant Quon was told he had exceeded his monthly limit, and he paid the charges for the excess use. Thereafter, the Chief of Police became concerned and asked Arch Wireless to supply the City with transcripts of the messages sent from, and received by, pagers that had exceeded the monthly 25,000 character limit. After examining the contents of the messages sent to and from Sergeant Quon's pager, the City determined that some were highly personal messages between Sergeant Quon and either his wife (who was also a police officer) or his girl friend (who was a police dispatcher). Sergeant Quon, Jerilyn Quon (his wife), April Florio (his girl friend), and Steve Trujillo (his fellow SWAT team officer) sued Arch Wireless, the City, and the Chief of Policy, alleging, among other things, violations of the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) and of the Fourth Amendment. Under the Fourth Amendment, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The district court's analysis of Quon's Fourth Amendment challenge began with the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v. Ortega . There, the Justices of the Supreme Court had all agreed that Dr. Ortega, a physician in a public hospital, had a reasonable expectation of privacy of his office, and that the Fourth Amendment applied notwithstanding his government employment. There the consensus ended. A majority of the Court felt the lower court had used the wrong standard to assess whether hospital officials had unreasonably searched Dr. Ortega's office, but they did not agree among themselves on what that the standard should be. Articulating the standard subsequently followed in the lower federal courts and joined by three other members of the Court, Justice O'Connor observed that in "the case of searches conducted by a public employer," the test must begin with a "balanc[ing of] the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace." In that context, the otherwise applicable warrant requirement might be dispensed with, since "requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome." As for the ordinarily applicable probable cause requirement, the 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the . . . probable cause requirement impracticable'. . . [P]ublic intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standards of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable." The four dissenting Justices agreed Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and files, but they saw no "special need" sufficient to dispense with the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements. The ninth Justice, Justice Scalia, felt that government employment gave rise to a special needs analysis. He disagreed with the standard announced in the Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, but agreed that the case should be returned to the lower courts for a special needs assessment of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Subsequent lower federal appellate courts adopted the standard of the O 'Connor plurality in public employee cases, see e.g ., The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment applies to "searches and seizures by government employers or supervisors of the private property of their employees." O'Connor v. Ortega , 480 U.S. 709 (1987). With respect to the scope of Fourth Amendment rights in the workplace, however, the Court added that "[t]he operational realities of the workplace ... may make some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable." Id . at 717 . Practices and procedures of a particular office or legitimate regulations may reduce the expectation of privacy that government employees enjoy in their workplace. Id. The circumstances of a particular case matter a great deal, and each Fourth Amendment claim in this context has to be examined on its own. "Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 718. Once an employee demonstrates a reasonable expectation of privacy, he must then demonstrate that the search was unreasonable. "[P]ublic employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances." This standard has two requirements: First, the search must have been "justified at its inception," and second, it must have been "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 726. In a number of special needs cases decided after O 'Connor , however, the Supreme Court made it clear that a search need not be the least intrusive possible in order to considered reasonable in scope. The police officers sued alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act as well as violations of the Fourth Amendment. The district court found no violation of the Stored Communications Act. As for Quon's Fourth Amendment allegations, it held that while the officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text messages, the City's intrusion was reasonable in its inception and scope. Finally, the court concluded that had there been a Fourth Amendment violation, the Chief of Police would not have been entitled to qualified immunity. The court of appeals found little in the district court opinion with which it could agree. The officers did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the search had been unreasonable both with respect to Sergeant Quon and to those who participated in his pager conversations. The Chief of Police, however, was entitled to qualified immunity. Moreover, the Stored Communications Act had been violated. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) permits providers of remote computing service to disclose the content of stored communications to subscribers, e.g., the City, without the consent of the participants in the communication. Those who provide electronic communications services , in contrast, enjoy no such prerogative. Since Arch Wireless provided electronic communications services under its pager contract, when it "knowingly turned over the text-messaging transcripts to the City, which was a 'subscriber,' not an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, it violated the SCA." The court felt the officers might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their pager messages in the same way they might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their mail or e-mail. The lieutenant in charge of use of the pagers asserted that he would not audit pager use and separate personal from official use, as long as officers paid for exceeding their character limit. Thus, on a number of occasions when Sergeant Quon had exceeded his limit, he paid for the overuse, and his account had gone unaudited. "Under these circumstances," the court declared, "Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages archived on Arch Wireless's server." That expectation might still have been required to yield in the face of a City purpose reasonable in its inception and scope, but the court decided that was not the case. The Ortega plurality opinion had said a search was reasonable in scope when its methods were "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of" the purpose for the search. The Quon purpose – ensuring that officers would not have to pay for work-related expenses – was reasonable. The court concluded that in view of its purpose, the scope of the search – reading all of the text messages to see if any were private – was excessively intrusive, and hence unreasonable when there were less intrusive means at hand. The Quon court's decision was both criticized and defended in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit's decision not to reconsider the decision en banc. Judge Ikuta and several of his colleagues argued that the panel decision erred both in its determination that the officers had a justifiable expectation of privacy in their text messages and that the scope of the department's search was unreasonable. From their perspective, the officers could have no such expectation of privacy in messages transmitted on City-owned equipment whose use they had been told was for official business only, and whose use could, and likely would, be monitored and reviewed. They also called the panel to task for the line it drew between "excessively intrusive searches" (which are unreasonable) and "least intrusive means" of conducting a search (which reasonableness does not require). They point out that the "Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected a 'least intrusive means' analysis for purposes of determining the reasonableness of a search in a 'special needs' context." The author of the panel decision responded that the officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the "policy – formal or informal – that [the Department] established and enforced." He further asserted that the panel had not endorsed a "least intrusive means" requirement, but had instead "mentioned other ways the OPD could have verified the efficacy of the 25,000-character limit merely to illustrate . . . that the search was 'excessively intrusive' under [ O 'Connor ], when measured against the purpose of the search. . . ." The debate in the Ninth Circuit appears to have been limited to the application of O 'Connor . The panel found that the Stored Communications Act outlawed handing over the transcripts of the officer's pager messages to the City. The judges who dissented from the denial of rehearing raised no objection to that finding. Neither side apparently paused to consider whether the protection of the Stored Communications Act enhanced the Sergeant Quon's reasonable expectation of privacy. Nor did either side comment upon the panel's fleeting and somewhat cryptic resolution of the Fourth Amendment claims of the others who participated in Sergeant Quon's pager conversations. Rather than continue with an O 'Connor official work-place analysis, the panel used the standards employed to assess the Fourth Amendment implications of searches and seizures in an electronic context: We see no meaningful difference between the e-mails at issue in Forrester and the text messages at issue here. Both are sent from user to user via a service provider that stores the messages on its servers. Similarly, as in Forrester , we also see no meaningful distinction between text messages and letters. As with letters and e-mails, it is not reasonable to expect privacy in the information used to 'address' a text message, such as the dialing of a phone number to send a message. However, users do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their text messages vis-a-vis the service provider. [Because Jeff Quon's reasonable expectation of privacy hinges on the OPD's informal policy regarding his use of the ODP-issued pagers, see infra pages 909-10, this conclusion affects only the rights of Trujillo, Florio, and Jerilyn Quon]. . . . Had Jeff Quon voluntarily permitted the Department to review his text messages, the remaining Appellants would have no claims. Nevertheless, the OPD surreptitiously reviewed messages that all parties reasonably believed were free from third-party review. As a matter of law, Trujillo, Florio, and Jerilyn Quon had a reasonable expectation that the department would not review their messages absent consent form either a sender or recipient of the text messages. Quon v. Arch W i reless Operating Co., Inc ., 529 F.3d at 905-906 (footnote 6 of the court's opinion in brackets). The Supreme Court agreed unanimously that the City search was reasonable and that the contrary Ninth Circuit determination should be overturned. The Court began its analysis by assuming, without deciding, that "[f]irst, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to him by the City; second, petitioners' review of the transcript constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and third, the principles applicable to a government employer's search of an employee's physical office apply with at least the same force when the employer intrudes on the employee's privacy in the electronic sphere." Because the City had a legitimate work-related reason to conduct its search, the Court concluded that it was reasonable under either the O'Connor standard – that of Justice Scalia (a search that would be considered reasonable in a private-employer context) or that of the O'Connor plurality (a work-related purpose for a search not excessive in scope). The Court felt no obligation to address any separate claims the officers who had communicated with Sergeant Quon might have, because they had rested their claims on the reasonableness of the search of his communications. The Court left for another day two thorny issues it might have reached. The first involves the standard used to decide the extent to which public employees and those who communicate with them enjoy Fourth Amendment protection in the public work place – i.e., endorsement of the O'Connor plurality test, the Scalia test, or a third test for when government employees have a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of work place privacy. The expectation of privacy test of the O 'Connor plurality, previously used by the lower federal courts, is difficult to apply. Although the Court declined to endorse it, it did not replace it. The second issue involves when a communication – wire, oral, or electronic – should be understood to have been searched or seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and how Fourth Amendment principles applicable to tangible property should be applied to such communications.

In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court held that officials had acted reasonably when they reviewed transcripts of messages sent to and from Sergeant Quon's city-issued pager in order to determine whether service limits on the pager's use should be increased. The Court assumed, without deciding, that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes, but found that the search of the transcripts was reasonable. In O'Connor v. Ortega, the Court had earlier split over the question of what test should be used to assess the reasonableness of a search of a public employee's work space. A plurality favored one test (work-related purpose for a search not excessively intrusive in scope); Justice Scalia another (search that would be considered reasonable in a private-employer context). In Quon, the Court declined to resolve the issue, but concluded that the search at issue was reasonable under either test.

Since the inception of a national currency in 1862, the authority to determine the form and tenor of currency has been vested in the Secretary of the Treasury. This includes the current currency, Federal Reserve notes, which are issued under the authority of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, by the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. All U.S. currency is produced by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, an operating bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department. Only portraits of a deceased individual may appear on U.S. currency and each bill has the inscription "In God We Trust." In addition, the notes all have a letter and serial number. The current individuals on U.S. currency were determined by a citizens panel in the late 1920s. Currently, seven denominations are issued: $1, $2, $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100. The notes have the portraits of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Jackson, Ulysses Grant, and Benjamin Franklin respectively. Four denominations have not been printed since 1946: the $500 (William McKinley), $1,000 (Grover Cleveland), $5,000 (James Madison), and $10,000 (Salmon Chase). The Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to change the design of Federal Reserve notes with the exception of the dollar bill. The Treasury Department has initiated several currency design changes since 1996 as part of an ongoing effort to deter counterfeiting but the individuals chosen in the 1920s have remained on the notes. The Coinage Act of 1792 established the United States Mint, adopted the dollar as the standard monetary unit, and authorized U.S. coins. The mix, composition, and design of U.S. coins have changed over time. The design, composition, weight, and fineness of U.S. coins are determined by statute. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to change the design of an existing coin only after 25 years from the adoption of the design for that coin. The Mint, an operating bureau of the Treasury Department, makes all U.S. coins. Six denominations are currently minted. All carry the inscription "In God We Trust," and, with the exception of one version of the dollar coin, all portray the image of a past U.S. President. The Abraham Lincoln penny (one cent) was introduced in 1909, the Thomas Jefferson nickel (five cents) was introduced in 1938, the Franklin D. Roosevelt dime (10 cents) was introduced in 1946, the George Washington quarter (25 cents) was introduced in 1932, the John F. Kennedy half-dollar (50 cents) was introduced in 1964, the Sacagawea dollar was introduced in 2000, and the Presidential dollar coin series began in 2007. There have been several recent coinage design changes, but only the dollar coin has experienced a change in the individual portrayed. All of the portrait changes were authorized by law. The redesigns were undertaken as part of an effort to revitalize the circulating dollar coin. The Susan B. Anthony dollar coin was authorized by P.L. 95-447 , enacted on October 10, 1978. The 2000 Sacagawea Golden Dollar was authorized by P.L. 105-124 , enacted on December 1, 1997. The new one-dollar coin was a major redesign of the Susan B. Anthony dollar minted in 1979-1981 and 1999. The Susan B. Anthony dollar was not popular with the public and was never widely used. A major criticism of the Anthony dollar was that it resembled the quarter too closely in size, appearance, and color. The Sacagawea dollar is golden in color and has a distinctive edge. The Presidential $1 Coin Act ( P.L. 109-145 ) was enacted on December 22, 2005, to promote additional public interest in dollar coins. The act authorized the minting of four coins each year (beginning in 2007) featuring the images of the nation's Presidents in the order they served. The Sacagawea coin will continue to be minted. During the 20 th century, three Presidents, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, were honored shortly after their deaths by their images being placed on circulating U.S. coins. Each circumstance was different. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the nation's only President elected to four terms. He was first elected in 1932. President Roosevelt died while serving his fourth term on April 12, 1945. The second World War was coming to an end. Congress and the American public wanted a memorial to the President. Before Congress acted with legislation, the Treasury Department announced plans to place Roosevelt's image on the dime. The image on the obverse side of the dime at that time was a winged liberty head "Mercury." The Mercury dime was first issued in 1916, so the 25-year requirement had been met and the Treasury could act without legislation. The dime was chosen as a tribute because President Roosevelt had helped to establish the "March of Dimes" fundraising campaign to combat polio. The President had himself suffered from polio. The new design was completed and the new dime was minted by January 30, 1946, the late President's birthday and the date for the kick off of the 1946 March of Dimes campaign. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was elected to office in 1960. On November 22, 1963, the President was assassinated. Many memorials and tributes to President Kennedy were planned after his death; the idea to place his likeness on a coin was an early suggestion. In December of 1963, President Johnson sent a message to Congress requesting legislation to authorize the minting of 50-cent coins with the image of President Kennedy. The image on the obverse side of the half dollar at that time was of Benjamin Franklin. The likeness of Benjamin Franklin had been on the coin since 1948, so the 25-year requirement had not been met. There was some debate in Congress about removing Benjamin Franklin's image and whether more time should pass before the decision was made to put President Kennedy's image on a coin. Nevertheless, legislation ( H.R. 9413 ) was quickly passed in both the House and Senate. On December 30, 1963, P.L. 88-256 was enacted authorizing the coinage of the Kennedy half dollar. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was a two-term President first elected in 1952. President Eisenhower had been the commanding general of the victorious forces in Europe during World War II. The President died on March 28, 1969. At the time of his death, there was no circulating dollar coin. The previous dollar coin was minted between 1921 and 1935. It was called the Peace dollar; the obverse side had the image of the Statue of Liberty's head. Legislation (H.R. 14127) to place the likeness of President Eisenhower on a dollar coin was introduced in the fall of 1969. The legislation was passed as Title II of the omnibus Bank Holding Company Act, P.L. 91-607, enacted on December 31, 1970. Debate about the coin addressed its composition and specifically whether to include any silver. Old silver dollars were taken out of circulation because their metal value had become greater than their face value. Title II provided for the coinage of completely silverless coins for all circulating denominations. It did permit the minting of silver-clad coins for sale to collectors. Many tributes and memorials have been proposed to honor President Reagan. Several years before his death, a private group (the Ronald Reagan Legacy Project) was formed to honor the legacy of President Reagan. One goal of the project is to name "significant public landmarks" after the 40 th President in more than 3,000 counties nationwide. Some of the landmarks already named required federal legislation to re-name them. The project is in favor of redesigning circulating currency to incorporate the likeness of the late President. Legislation introduced in previous Congresses did not pass. Legislation introduced in the 111 th Congress, H.R. 4705 , would change the $50 note. H.R. 4705 , the President Ronald Reagan $50 Bill Act, was introduced on February 25, 2010, by Representative Patrick T. McHenry and others, and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services. The bill would redesign the $50 note by replacing the portrait of President Ulysses S. Grant with the image of President Reagan. President Grant was a two-term Republican President first elected in 1868. President Grant is best known as the Union general who lead the North to victory over the Confederate South during the American Civil War. To date hearings have not been held on the current legislation. The Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to make the proposed change without federal legislation. Several issues have been raised in the past concerning the proposals to redesign currency to commemorate President Reagan and these concerns are likely to be raised again. Some may characterize the legislation as premature. Placing the image of President Reagan on currency might invite a partisan fight. In addition, because the portraits on the U.S. currency have been consistent since the 1920s, there may be concern that a Reagan note would cause confusion and be assumed to be counterfeit. Finally, President Reagan's image will eventually be on the dollar coin as part of the ongoing Presidential dollar coin series.

President Ronald W. Reagan, the 40th President of the United States, died on June 5, 2004. Since President Reagan's death, there have been several attempts to pass legislation that would place the likeness of President Reagan on U.S. coin or currency. Similar action was taken after the death of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy. The portrait of President Roosevelt was placed on the dime, President Kennedy's portrait was placed on the half dollar, and President Eisenhower's portrait was placed on a dollar coin. Current legislation (H.R. 4705, the President Ronald Reagan $50 Bill Act) would place the likeness of President Ronald W. Reagan on the circulating $50. This report discusses the history of the current design of the circulating coin and currency and the statutory requirements for the designs and portrait changes. It reviews what was done after the deaths of the three other Presidents. It concludes with a discussion of the current proposal and describes possible issues raised by the legislation. This report will be updated as warranted by events.

The tax rates which determine investment activity are marginal tax rates on new investment. They are calculated by projecting the path of a new investment and discounting the flow of income and taxes. They take into account the effects of statutory tax rates, depreciation rules, investment subsidies, and inflation. The method is to compare the internal rate that discounts the flow to the current value of investment with taxes (the after-tax return) and the rate without taxes (the pre-tax return); the difference between these rates divided by the pre-tax return is the effective tax rate. Table 1 shows the estimated tax rates from 1953 to 2005. Column 2 presents estimates of the corporate firm-level tax; if depreciation were allowed at economic rates and there were no subsidies, this rate would equal the corporate statutory tax rate. Column 3 reports estimates of the total rate on corporate investment, accounting for the deductibility of interest at the firm level and the taxation of interest, dividends, and capital gains at the individual level, as well as depreciation and subsidies. Column 4 presents the estimated rates for unincorporated business (proprietorships and partnerships). These business tax rates reflect investments in equipment, structures, and inventory. Column 5 presents estimated tax rates for owner-occupied housing, which is normally close to zero because of the exclusion of implicit net rent from income. Column 6 provides a weighted economy-wide tax rate. As shown in Table 1 , tax rates for business investment fell from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s, reflecting more accelerated depreciation, investment credits, and lower statutory tax rates. Rates rose towards the end of the 1960s with the repeal of the investment credit, which was restored in 1971 and led to lower rates. Rates then began to rise in the mid-1970s as inflation resulted in a smaller value of depreciation deductions by firms; inflation also caused the penalty for not deducting mortgage interest for non-itemizers to become more severe. Increases in depreciation and lower rates adopted in 1981, which were followed by more restrictive depreciation but lower corporate and individual rates in 1986 and slowing inflation, led to lower tax rates in the 1980s and 1990s. The most recent reductions in tax rates arose from the lower tax rates adopted in the 2001-2003 legislation, the adoption of bonus depreciation in 2002 which was expanded in 2003, and the lower rates on dividends and capital gains adopted in 2003. These changes resulted in a historically low tax rate. The tax rate rose in 2004 due to higher inflation rates, and rose again in 2005 due to the end of bonus depreciation. Lower rates on capital gains are technically temporary (expiring in 2010), but may be made permanent. The tax rates in Table 1 do not account for the tax benefits to investments through pensions and individual retirement accounts (where tax rates are generally effectively zero); about half of passive income (interest, dividends, and capital gains on stock) is received in tax exempt form. These provisions affect marginal tax rates only if they affect the return to the marginal saving decision. Many investments in these forms are made up to the maximum contribution limit, many pension plans are not under individual control, and even where investments are not at the limit all marginal investments may still not flow through the tax-favored account. All of these factors suggest not including these tax benefits in marginal calculations. However, there is probably some marginal effect, and if the individual income tax rate on these passive forms of income is set to one half of its value to reflect the share of non-taxed investment returns, tax rates would be reduced substantially—by about eight percentage points without the lower rates (particularly on dividends and capital gains) enacted recently; about six percentage points otherwise. The basic formula for calculating the effective tax rate is , where r is the pre-tax return, or internal discount rate for an investment with no taxes, and R is the after-tax discount rate that discounts all flows to the cost of the investment with taxes. For a business depreciable investment, the relationship between r and R, with R the firm's discount rate, derived from an investment with geometric depreciation and continuous time, is the standard formula: (1) where u is the firm's statutory tax rate (either the individual or corporate rate), is the economic depreciation rate, z is the present discounted value of depreciation deductions, k is the investment tax credit, and a is a determinant of the basis adjustment, set at one, 0.5, and zero if there is a full basis adjustment (i.e. depreciation allowed only on cost net of the credit), half basis adjustment, or no basis adjustment respectively. The formula in (1) is applied to obtain firm-level tax rates (the firm-level corporate rate in column 2 and the non-corporate rate in column 4), with R a weighted average of the after-tax real interest rate where I is the interest rate and is the inflation rate and the required real return on equity before individual tax. Debt is weighted one-third. In the case of total corporate tax rates in column 3, the pre-tax return R is derived from equation (1) but is compared with the return after personal taxes to individuals (the same discount rate used for non-corporate business), a weighted average of the after-tax real return on debt , where t is the individual tax rate, and the after-tax return on corporate equity (which is net of taxes on capital gains and dividends). In the case of the firm level corporate tax rate in the second column of Table 1 , R is the discount rate of the corporate firm (before personal level taxes). The tax rate for owner-occupied housing omits the effect of depreciation and taxes on profit—the pre tax return is simply , where f is the debt share, n is the share of investments with individuals who itemize on their tax returns, p is the property tax rate, and R is the after-tax discount rate. If all mortgage interest deductions were allowed, but no property tax deductions, the tax rate would be zero because there is no tax on the imputed net rent. A slight positive or negative tax may arise because of the inability to deduct mortgage interest by non-itemizers and the ability to deduct property taxes by itemizers. The mathematical formulas and assumptions used to calculate tax rates, including depreciation methods and lives, investment credits, inflation rates, and statutory tax rates, as well as the tax rates themselves for 1953-1989, can be found in [author name scrubbed], The Economic Effects of Taxing Capital Income , Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994, Appendix B, pp. 287-301. The statutory tax rates, interest and inflation rates for 1953-1989 are in Table 2.1, p. 20. Tax rates for 1990-2005 incorporate a number of assumptions and tax law changes. These include the increase in the tax life for structures from 31.5 to 39 years in 1993, the lowering of the capital gains tax rate to 20% in 1997, the introduction of bonus depreciation (expensing of a share of investment) at 30% for 2002 and 50% for 2003 and 2004, and the reduction in the tax rate for capital gains and dividends from 20% and the regular tax rate respectively to 15%. Individual and corporate statutory tax rates and inflation and interest rates are reported in Table 2 for 1990-2005. The pattern of change in individual tax rates is based on the rate reported for the NBER simulation model, which can be found at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/mrates/mrates3.html , visited November 20, 2003. Tax rates are assumed to continue at the current year's rate; slightly lower rates would occur for 2001 and 2002 if the permanent long term rates enacted in 2001 were assumed, although rates might also rise due to real bracket creep as well. Inflation rates are a 1/3 weight of the prior year and a two-thirds weight of the current year. The interest rate is the Baa Bond rate.

Effective marginal tax rates on investment are forward-looking estimates that project over the lifetime of an investment what share of the return will effectively be paid in taxes. These rates can differ significantly from average tax rates measured by dividing tax liability by income, because they are affected by timing. Effective tax rates fell from the early 1950s through the mid-1960s, rose until the early 1980s, and then dropped. They have stayed about the same until relatively recently, when they fell to an all-time low with bonus depreciation, relief of double tax on dividends, and lower marginal tax rates. The end of bonus deprecation and higher inflation rates increased the tax rates in the past two years. This report will be updated as warranted.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. What a court determines to be "reasonable" depends on the nature of the search and its underlying governmental purpose. This report provides an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding , which addressed the strip search of a 13-year-old middle school student. In October 2003, Savana Redding was a 13-year-old student at Safford Middle School. At the time, Kerry Wilson was Safford Middle School's assistant principal. Wilson confiscated four prescription strength ibuprofen, a single over-the-counter naproxen pain reliever, and a day planner from another student, Marissa Glines. Inside the day planner were multiple knives and lighters, and a cigarette. Glines indicated that she had received the pills and the day planner from Redding. The pills were not allowed on school premises without prior approval. A week prior to this incident, a different student told Wilson that students were carrying weapons on the school premises and dealing pills, and that he had become ill after taking a pill that he had received from a classmate. Wilson ordered Redding into his office and showed her the day planner with the contraband inside. Redding admitted that the planner was hers, but said that she had allowed Glines to borrow it a few days before. Redding denied ownership of the knives, lighters, and cigarette that were in the planner. Wilson then asked Redding about the pills and informed her that he had been told that Redding had been distributing these pills to other students. Redding told Wilson that she did not know anything about the pills and denied distributing them to others. Wilson then asked if he could search through Redding's book bag, which Redding allowed. A female assistant and Wilson searched the bag, but did not find any prohibited items. Wilson then ordered Redding to go to the nurse's office for the nurse and female assistant to search Redding's clothes for other pills. The two female school employees searched her outerwear and eventually had Redding remove her clothes down to her bra and underwear, at which point they required Redding "to pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree." During the conduct of this search, the employees found no pills. Redding's mother subsequently sued the school and the three school employees involved, claiming they violated Redding's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Eight justices held that the search resulted in a violation of Savana Redding's Fourth Amendment rights. Generally speaking, the government is required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain warrants based on probable cause in order to effectuate constitutional searches and seizures. An exception to ordinary warrant requirements has gradually evolved, however, for cases where a "special need" of the government, unrelated to criminal law enforcement, is found by the courts to outweigh any "diminished expectation" of privacy invaded by a search. Even in circumstances where warrantless searches are permitted, they ordinarily "must be based on 'probable cause' to believe that a violation of the law has occurred." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has determined that neither a warrant nor probable cause is invariably required. In such situations, a Fourth Amendment standard based on a balancing test has been crafted by the Court. This "special needs" approach appears to confer optimal power on the government to search where "compelling" reason exists and correspondingly warrants less protection to the individual's "diminished expectation of privacy." In New Jersey v. T.L.O. , the Court found that students are one group of individuals which has a "diminished expectation of privacy." In that case, the Court held that, for searches conducted by school officials in the school setting, "a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause." The Court went on to apply a "reasonable suspicion" standard for such a search and stated "[a search] will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." To determine if there is reasonable suspicion to warrant a school search, the courts generally look to three different factors: (1) "the degree to which known facts imply prohibited conduct"; (2) "the specificity of the information received"; and (3) "the reliability of its source." However, these factors "do not rigidly control," rather they are "fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which they are being assessed." The Court went on: Perhaps the best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component of probable cause for a law enforcement officer's evidence search is that it raise a 'fair probability' or a 'substantial chance' of discovering evidence of criminal activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing. Applying these standards, the Court held that the school's search of Redding's book bag and outer clothing was in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. The school had reasonable suspicion Redding was involved in pill distribution as a result of Gline's possession of banned pills; Gline's accusation of Redding; Redding's acknowledged ownership of the day planner; and circumstantial evidence that Redding had been involved in alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking at a school dance a month or two before. Additionally, the search of Redding's book bag and outer clothing were conducted in "relative privacy ... and [were] not excessively intrusive.... " The search became constitutionally unreasonable when it went beyond Redding's outerwear and ultimately led to Redding being required to shake and pull out her bra and underwear. The fact that the two school employees present testified that they did not see Redding's private areas was immaterial to the Court. It stated: The very fact of [Redding's] pulling her underwear away from her body in the presence of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy support the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of the school authorities.... Redding's subjective belief that the search was scary and humiliating was reasonable, as it was "consistent [with] the experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure." In addition, Wilson knew that the pills found on Glines were common pain relievers, the strongest of which were equivalent to two Advil. There was no indication that the pills were being distributed in mass quantities or that single students were receiving a large number of pills. Additionally, there was no evidence supporting the belief that Redding was hiding pills in her underwear. Thus, the Court concluded, "[w]e think that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable." The Safford Court makes clear that, while students enjoy diminished privacy expectations and school administrators have a lower level of suspicion to eclipse, there are limits to when and how searches may be conducted in the school setting. However, ascertaining if a school administrator has encroached upon those constitutional limits will depend largely on the facts of the case.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. What a court determines to be "reasonable" depends on the nature of the search and its underlying governmental purpose. This report provides an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, which addressed the constitutionality of a strip search of a 13-year-old middle school student. Based on the facts of the case, the Court held that the school's search of a student's book bag and outer clothing was in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. However, as a result of a number of factual deficiencies, the search became constitutionally unreasonable when it went beyond the student's outerwear and ultimately led to the student being required to shake and pull out her bra and underwear. For a discussion of drug testing in public schools, see CRS Report RL34624, Governmental Drug Testing Programs: Legal and Constitutional Developments, by [author name scrubbed].

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which is an agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce, tracks major economic indicators, most notably gross domestic product (GDP). Other BEA indicators include items such as personal income and outlays, and corporate profits. These indicators together comprise what are known as BEA's " National Economic Accounts ," or "National Income and Product Accounts" (NIPA). Gross Domestic Product is a comprehensive measure of U.S. economic output. It measures the value of the goods and services produced by the U.S. economy in a given time period and includes total spending by consumers total investment by businesses total spending by government net exports (exports minus imports) Current GDP News Release Historical and Detailed NIPA Interactive Tables A Primer on GDP and the National Income and Product Accounts Personal income is a measure of income received by individuals from wages, salaries, dividends, interest, and other forms. Personal outlays consist of personal consumption of goods and services and also include transfer payments. The components include disposable income (total personal income minus personal current taxes) transfer receipts (payments by governments and businesses to individuals and nonprofit institutions serving individuals) consumption expenditures (goods and services purchased by persons) savings Current Personal Income and Outlays News Release Historical and Detailed NIPA Interactive Tables The Census Bureau reports on household income data that are collected from several major surveys and programs. Guidance on the differences between these sources of income data can be found on the bureau's website. Two of these data sources are described below. The Census Bureau's annual American Community Survey (ACS) collects income data from a sample of the U.S. population, including median household data, data on income distribution, and the poverty rate. Data can cover one or five years. One-year estimates are more current but use a smaller sample size. Five-year estimates are less current but use larger sample sizes and are considered more reliable. The following are examples of commonly requested ACS data: U.S. Median Income in the Past 12 Months from the 2017 ACS 1-Year EstimatesU.S. Income Distribution for Households and Families in the Past 12 Months from the 2017 ACS 1-Year Estimates Another program, the Current Population Survey (CPS), is a survey conducted by the Census for Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and provides estimates on income, poverty, and health insurance coverage. Inflation is the overall increase in the prices of goods and services in the economy. A frequently cited measure of inflation is the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is a BLS program that tracks changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services. The information provided by BLS goes beyond just CPI and includes producer prices, import/export prices, and employment cost trends. Overview of BLS Statistics on Inflation and Prices The Consumer Price Index program produces monthly data on changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services. Current CPI News ReleaseCurrent CPI Tables (from the current news release) Historical CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U)CPI Databases The Producer Price Indexes (PPIs) measure the average change over time in the selling prices received by domestic producers for their output. Current PPI News ReleaseCurrent PPI Tables (from the current news release) Historical and Detailed Tables The International Price Program (IPP) produces Import/Export Price Indexes (MXP), which contain data on changes in the prices of nonmilitary goods and services traded between the United States and the rest of the world. Current MXP ReleaseCurrent MXP Tables (from the current news release) Historical and Detailed Tables Employment Cost Trends (ECT) produce quarterly indexes measuring change over time in labor costs and quarterly data measuring level of average costs per hour worked. Current ECT News ReleaseCurrent ECT Tables (from the current news release) Historical and Detailed Tables Few economic indicators are as closely watched as measures of employment. In its monthly news release, BLS provides national totals of the number of employed and unemployed. This release includes the results from both a household survey and a business establishment survey. These data are presented as both seasonally and not seasonally adjusted. Current Monthly News Release—Employment SituationEmployment Statistics Tables (from the current news release) Historical Labor Force Data (household survey) Historical Establishment-Based Data BLS also provides tables showing different characteristics of employed and unemployed persons, and persons not in the labor force. These statistics are available on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Historical data are also available. Labor Force Statistics Tables—Survey of HouseholdsLabor Force Statistics Tables—Survey of Business Establishments Labor productivity relates output to the labor hours used in the production of that output. Two BLS programs produce labor productivity and costs (LPC) measures for sectors of the U.S. economy. Current News Release—Productivity and CostsLPC Tables The value of a U.S. dollar relative to foreign currencies is determined in foreign exchange markets, and its value affects prices and economic activity in the United States. The Federal Reserve provides a brief overview on how the foreign exchange value of the dollar relates to Federal Reserve policy. Measures the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar versus various currencies and indices. Current ReleaseHistorical Releases A collection of interest rates provided by the Federal Reserve, current to today's market. Daily RatesWeekly, Monthly and Historical Rates (from the Data Download Program) Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District (The Beige Book)Economic Data ReleasesFederal Reserve Bank of St. Louis "FRED" Economic Data U.S. Economy at a GlanceCurrent Releases U.S. Economy at a GlanceDatabases, Tables, and Calculators by Subject Current Economic Indicator Releases Economic Indicators Since 1948 Data Release Dates Schedules of News Releases Economic Indicator Release Schedule Economic Indicators Calendar Federal Receipts and Outlays (yearly) Federal Debt (monthly) Money Stock Measures (weekly) Consumer Credit (current release) Interest rates (daily) New Residential Construction (monthly) Advance Monthly Retail Trade Report (monthly) Wholesale Trade: Sales and Inventories (monthly) A statistic that, combined with others, shows the relative health of the economy. Real gross domestic product (GDP). Other important indicators include reports on personal income and employment. Several agencies release data, including the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of the Census, and the Office of Management and Budget. The frequencies with which data are released vary by agency and type of economic indicator. See " Economic Indicator Release Dates " (in " Related Resources ") for details. A change in the trend of the economy (from expansion to recession, for example) is often announced only after several months of data are released. A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion. Expansion is the normal state of the economy; most recessions are brief and they have been rare in recent decades. Recessions are dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a private research institute. A popular definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth, but recessions are not officially defined by the NBER using this definition. Additional Information from NBER: U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contraction (Recessions)Most recent recession (December 2007-June 2009) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis—GlossaryFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco—Glossary of Economic TermsThe Economist—Economic Terms A-ZOxford Reference—A Dictionary of Economics CRS In Focus IF10408, Introduction to U.S. Economy: GDP and Economic Growth , by Jeffrey M. Stupak and Mark P. Keightley CRS In Focus IF10477, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Inflation , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10557, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Productivity , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10411, Introduction to U.S. Economy: The Business Cycle and Growth , by Jeffrey M. Stupak, CRS In Focus IF10443, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Unemployment , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10501, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Personal Income , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10963, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Personal Saving , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10569, U.S. Economy in a Global Context , by Jane G. Gravelle CRS Report R44543, Slow Growth in the Current U.S. Economic Expansion , by Mark P. Keightley, Marc Labonte, and Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS Report R44705, The U.S. Income Distribution: Trends and Issues , by Sarah A. Donovan, Marc Labonte, and Joseph Dalaker CRS Report RL30344, Inflation: Causes, Costs, and Current Status , by Marc Labonte CRS Report RL30354, Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Conditions , by Marc Labonte

An understanding of economic indicators and their significance is seen as essential to the formulation of economic policies. These indicators, or statistics, provide snapshots of an economy's health as well as starting points for economic analysis. This report contains a list of selected authoritative U.S. government sources of economic indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), income, inflation, and labor force (including employment and unemployment) statistics. Additional content includes related resources, frequently asked questions (FAQs), and links to external glossaries.

Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the European threat environment has changed dramatically. NATO no longer needs a static, layered defense of ground forces to repel a large-scale Soviet invasion. Instead, the alliance must address new and different threats for which NATO would face far less warning time, yet more complex circumstances, than a conventional assault; these might include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and ethnic strife. As conflicts from the Balkans to Afghanistan have demonstrated, the alliance must be able to prepare for security contingencies requiring the rapid deployment of more agile forces distant from the treaty area. During NATO's air war against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, U.S. aircraft flew a disproportionately large share of the combat sorties. The Kosovo action exposed a great disparity in defense capabilities between the United States and its allies. That gap, along with the transformation of the overall threat environment, prompted the development of two parallel and, it was hoped, complementary transatlantic security initiatives aimed at, among other things, bridging the technology gap between U.S. and European forces. The Balkans conflicts of the 1990s motivated the European Union (EU) to speed the construction of a European defense arm, called the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). One aspect of ESDP is the development of rapid reaction forces to undertake several military tasks—including humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management—in which other countries, including the United States, might choose not to participate. To achieve this, the EU states in 1999 set forth "headline goals" for creating a 60,000-strong crisis management force that would be deployable within two months and sustainable for one year. In 2004, Brussels announced the planned formation of 13, 1500-troop battlegroups that would be available for rapid deployment to crisis areas. Also that year, the EU created the European Defense Agency, intended to help coordinate the development of European defense capabilities. In January 2007, the EU stated that the battlegroups were fully operational. The other significant change occurred at NATO's Washington, D.C. summit in April 1999, when the alliance launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The Initiative was intended not only to improve NATO's ability to fulfill NATO's traditional Article 5 (collective defense) commitments, but also to prepare the alliance to meet emerging security challenges that may require a variety of types of missions, both within and beyond NATO territory. To accomplish these tasks, the alliance must ensure that its troops have the appropriate equipment, supplies, transport, communications, and training. Accordingly, DCI aimed to improve NATO core capabilities by listing 59 "action items" in five categories: mobility and deployability; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability; and consultation, command and control. Before long, however, analysts realized that DCI was not meeting its goals because the changes that had been agreed to required most countries to increase their defense spending. Most, however, did not. The aftermath of September 11 further highlighted allied military limitations vis-a-vis the United States. NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the United States initially relied mainly on its own military, accepting only small contingents of special forces from a handful of other countries; allied combat and peacekeeping forces entered the fray in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been defeated. Analysts believe that the allies were not invited to contribute because they lacked many of the military capabilities—airborne refueling, air transport, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and night vision equipment—necessary to conduct a high-tech campaign designed to achieve a swift victory with minimum civilian and U.S. casualties. Lack of interoperability was also an issue. NATO sought to address the perceived problems of DCI at its November 2002 meeting in Prague by approving the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). Like DCI, PCC seeks to improve members' operational capabilities to address evolving defense needs. Analysts describe PCC as an attempt to resuscitate DCI, which foundered because it was too broad and diffuse. PCC is also intended to improve upon DCI in light of the security threat that emerged on September 11. In an effort to combat terrorism, it emphasizes air lift, secure communications, PGMs, and protection against weapons of mass destruction. NATO officials point out, however, that PCC differs from DCI in several important ways: PCC is focused on a smaller number of goals, emphasizes multinational cooperation and specialization, requires specific commitments from member states, and was designed with a particular force in mind: the NATO Response Force (NRF). PCC calls for alliance members to make commitments to bolster their capabilities in eight specific areas: (1) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; (2) intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; (3) air-to-ground surveillance (AGS); (4) command, control, and communications; (5) combat effectiveness; (6) strategic air and sea lift; (7) air-to-air refueling; and (8) deployable combat support and combat service support units. PCC also places greater emphasis on multinational commitments and pooling of funds than did DCI; this enables smaller countries to combine resources to purchase hardware that would be unaffordable for each alone. The Netherlands, for example, volunteered to lead a group of countries buying conversion kits to transform conventional bombs into PGMs. Germany managed a consortium that will acquire strategic air transport capabilities, while Spain headed another group that would lease tanker aircraft. Norway and Denmark coordinated procurement of sealift assets. The Czech Republic has concentrated on countering the effects of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In addition, PCC recognizes the value of role specialization, or niche capabilities. This concept is especially important to the new member states. Romania, for example, can offer alpine troops, Hungary has a skilled engineering corps on call, and the Czech and Slovak Republics have units trained in countering the effects of chemical and biological weapons. PCC is also much more specific in its requirements of commitments than was DCI. Defense officials argue that DCI was loaded down with too many vague requirements and that many countries contented themselves by picking the low-hanging fruit, acquiring the less costly materiel. PCC is drafted to extract specific, quantifiable commitments from member states; at Prague, the alliance approved a package of proposals from individual countries obliging them to acquire specific equipment. Unlike Washington and Prague, subsequent NATO summits in Istanbul (2004), Riga (2006), and Bucharest (2008) did not result in new initiatives setting out extensive programmatic objectives for enhancing the alliance's capabilities. At the conclusion of the Istanbul summit, the member heads of state and government in their Final Communiqué reaffirmed their commitment to improving NATO capabilities through PCC, a task they referred to as "a long-term endeavor." The summit declaration stated that PCC implementation was progressing and singled out for praise the multinational cooperative efforts to acquire lift, refuellers, and AGS. The leaders agreed to "further the transformation of our military capabilities to make them more modern, more usable and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions." They also urged some nations to reorient their national resources toward investments in deployable capabilities. Finally, the leaders approved the creation of a NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program as an important element of force protection. In the final communiqué of their November 2006 Riga summit, NATO leaders stated their intention to continue building on their work on capabilities at Prague and Istanbul. After describing the status of several alliance missions, they declared that force adaptation and support for expeditionary operations should proceed and laid out a pared-down list of key activities. They noted that progress toward one major goal—beefed up airlift capacity—had been achieved through two cooperative initiatives: 1) the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, under which several countries committed to buying Airbus A400M cargo planes by 2010 have, in the interim, chartered Antonov transporters from Ukraine; and 2) the creation of a NATO Strategic Airlift Capability, under which 15 member states and one partner (Sweden) agreed to pool funds to purchase three or four C-17 aircraft; the planes will be staffed by international crews and will be available for NATO, EU, UN, or other international operations, military or humanitarian. The communiqué also reported progress on key capabilities in other areas, including special operations, networking, intelligence sharing, AGS, missile defense, and anti-CBRN capabilities. The 2008 Bucharest summit declaration did not mention PCC, but referred instead to the more general Comprehensive Political Guidance, agreed to at Riga. The Guidance "provides a framework and political direction for NATOs continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10 to 15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence." In light of NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan, the Bucharest declaration also stressed the urgency of acquiring specific capabilities such as strategic and intra-theater airlift and communications, and pointed toward a possible future NATO missile defense system. It also once more encouraged member states to bolster defense spending. To meet the goals of PCC, the European allies need to restructure and modernize their militaries and address deficiencies in equipment procurement and in R&D programs. However, this implies increased defense spending, requiring a reversal of the trend of the past decade: between 1992 and 1999, defense expenditures by European NATO countries fell 22%. Although the United States also cut back on defense during that period, it still spends a much higher share of GDP on defense than most other NATO countries, and has boosted defense outlays significantly in recent years. While France and the UK have increased their spending, Germany, with the second-largest military in the alliance, has drastically reduced its military budget. Most assessments of the progress of PCC are classified. A late-2005 NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA) report noted that it was difficult to gauge the progress of PCC because of incomplete information, mainly stemming from a lack of transparency on force goals of member states. Nevertheless, the study noted progress in several areas, including sealift, anti-CBRN and in equipping aircraft with PGMs. In April 2008, another NPA report providing an overview of the current state of play of efforts to improve alliance capabilities. It highlighted other initiatives NATO has undertaken to acquire expeditionary assets, singling out in particular airlift, special forces and information superiority, noting that "operations in Afghanistan are serving as the principal driver for capability requirements today." It also reemphasized the continuing utility of asset pooling and specialized "niche" capabilities. Reading between the lines of NATO publications and statements, some analysts sense that there have been real improvements in boosting capabilities. For example, at their June 2005 meeting, NATO defense ministers issued a communiqué stating that PCC had "brought some improvements in capabilities, but critical deficiencies persist, particularly in support for our deployed forces." One year later, however, the ministers' statement was more sanguine, noting progress in a number of areas and indicating that they had "provided further guidance on the way ahead." Shortly before the Riga summit, the alliance issued a media summit guide stating that "[b]y the end of 2008, over 70 per cent of the 460 or so [PCC] commitments made by Allies will have been fulfilled. Most of the remainder will be completed by 2009 and beyond." However, a 2008 National Defense University study characterized the results of PCC as "mixed." The Riga final communiqué noted that NATO is involved in six missions and operations on three continents. Some analysts conclude that the capabilities debate has increasingly been driven by the experience of NATO forces in these missions as military leaders assess their earlier goals in light of actual operations, especially in Afghanistan. This is particularly the case with special forces and with strategic lift, which one observer has termed "potentially the alliance's Achilles heel of capabilities." In addition, U.S. NATO Ambassador Victoria Nuland has noted that increased operational tempo demonstrates the need for greater spending on new military assets. Because NATO operates under a consensus rule, the fact that the alliance adopted both DCI and PCC implies that all member states agreed to the need to strengthen capabilities of an expeditionary nature. Some critics, however, have questioned the two initiatives, arguing that NATO already enjoyed vastly superior technological prowess vis-à-vis countries other than the United States, and that the alliance's military capabilities—whatever their shortcomings—are more than sufficient to address any threat. Others are skeptical of the possible motives behind the push for more advanced capabilities; they contend that massive defense spending increases are unnecessary and wasteful, and that PCC merely serves to boost sales for high-technology arms and equipment manufacturers. Finally, some analysts have challenged the significance of the capabilities gap between the United States and its NATO allies. Supporters, meanwhile, also have expressed reservations. Some question whether member states, particularly the Europeans, will approve sufficient funding in their defense budgets to make the required changes. This has increasingly been the case for countries that have made significant contributions to overseas NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan. Unless military budgets are increased substantially, the costs of deployment, maintenance, and equipment replacement will likely displace expenditures for modernization. It has also been suggested that the capabilities requirements effectively raise the bar for new members of the alliance. Finally, some analysts insist that DCI and PCC need to be viewed in the context of the traditional debate over NATO burdensharing. Shortly after the Prague summit, Jiri Sedivy, director of Prague's Institute of International Relations noted that "[p]eople talk about new members like the Czech Republic not contributing enough to NATO, but what they don't realize is that the Western Europeans have failed to keep their promises since the 1950s." By focusing on specific, agreed-upon military capability requirements, the alliance hopes to end-run this decades-old problem.

With the end of the Cold War, NATO began to reassess its collective defense strategy and to anticipate possible new missions. The conflicts in the Balkans highlighted the need for more mobile forces, for greater technological equality between the United States and its allies, and for interoperability. In 1999, NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), an effort to enable the alliance to deploy troops quickly to crisis regions, to supply and protect those forces, and to equip them to engage an adversary effectively. At its 2002 summit, NATO approved a new initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), touted as a slimmed-down, more focused DCI, with quantifiable goals. Analysts cautioned that the success of PCC would hinge upon increased spending and changed procurement priorities, particularly by the European allies. At NATO's 2004 Istanbul summit and its 2006 Riga summit, the alliance reaffirmed the goals of PCC. The 2008 Bucharest summit declaration did not mention PCC, but, in light of NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan, stressed the urgency of acquiring specific capabilities such as airlift and communications. Congress may review the alliance's progress in boosting NATO capabilities. This report will not be updated. See also CRS Report RS22529, The NATO Summit at Riga, 2006, by [author name scrubbed].

Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, savings and loan institutions (thrifts) faced a constellation of developments that would challenge their financial viability. The developments included (1) high and volatile interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which increased the thrifts' interest rate risk; (2) the phase out and elimination of the Federal Reserve's Regulation Q (a regulation that had placed limits on the interest rates that banks and thrifts could pay), which encouraged the emergence of new instruments such as money market funds that hurt thrift industry profitability; (3) state and federal deregulation of depository institutions, which enabled thrifts to get involved in new but potentially riskier markets; and (4) reductions in regulatory capital requirements, which allowed thrifts to use alternative accounting procedures that increased their reported levels of capital. Collectively, the developments had negative impact on the thrift industry: by 1986, 441 thrifts with $113 billion in assets were found to be insolvent. To help remedy the thrift industry's problems and restore the public's flagging confidence, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA, P.L. 101-73 ). Enacted in August 1989, FIRREA's principal thrust was the creation of a program to close and clean up insolvent thrifts who collectively held billions of dollars in deposits insured at the time by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). The vehicle created by FIRREA to conduct the cleanup was the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Principal funding for the RTC came from an off-budget entity, the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP), a FIRREA-created public-private partnership, which was apart from but was operated by the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System, a federal entity that supplies credit reserves to thrift institutions (similar to what the Federal Reserve does for commercial banks). REFCORP issued about $30 billion in noncallable, zero coupon, 30 and 40 year U.S. Treasury bonds to fund the RTC, The interest payments on those bonds were largely funded by a FIRREA-directed annual payment of $300 million from the member banks of the FHLB and taxpayer dollars. In addition to the $30 billion from REFCORP, the RTC received $18.8 billion from the U.S. Treasury, and $1.2 billion from Federal Home Loan member banks, giving it a total of about $50 billion in initial funding. Subsequent legislation increased RTC's funding, which would eventually total about $105.1 billion. As directed by FIRREA, the board of directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also assumed the role of the RTC's board. FIRREA also established an RTC Oversight Board whose mandate was to oversee the development of RTC policy. The Oversight Board also oversaw the RTC's budget, and monitored its use of taxpayer funds. The board, however, was not to be involved in detailed RTC operational issues, such as matters pertaining to individual transactions. As specified by FIRREA, the Oversight Board had five members, three of whom were federal officials: the Secretary of the Treasury (who served as the board's chairman), the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The two remaining members were nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In 1991, motivated by a number of issues, including the RTC's need for interim funding and concerns that its dual board structure was cumbersome and inefficient (for example, the Oversight Board had to approve policies recommended by the RTC/FDIC board), Congress passed the RTC Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991 ( P.L. 102-233 ). Among other things, the law replaced the Oversight Board with what has been described as a more limited and less intrusive Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board (TDPO), which included the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board but not the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The law also removed the FDIC's board from it role as the RTC's board; and it replaced the FDIC as the RTC's manager with the RTC's Chief Executive Officer (also was also a member of the TDPO). The process of closing or resolving individual thrifts involved one of three alternatives: (1) some thrifts were sold to a healthy acquirer, which involved the RTC paying another institution to buy the insolvent thrift, with most of its assets intact; (2) some thrifts were to be shut down with their depositors being paid off and with the RTC retaining all of its assets for later sale; and (3) some thrifts were shut down with their deposits being transferred to another institution. Because deposits are liabilities (they represent claims on the institution by depositors), the RTC was required to pay the institution receiving the deposits. But because the expected value to the new firms of the customers who owned the deposits often exceeded the face value of the deposits, the RTC frequently paid less than face value for the depository accounts. The assets that the RTC controlled for thrifts in conservatorship or for thrifts in the later receivership phase took a variety of forms, including cash, mortgages, loans, securities (including some below-investment grade securities known as junk bonds), land, commercial properties, and houses. FIRREA required the RTC to utilize the services of private-sector companies in managing and disposing of assets whenever possible. Initially, the agency faced significant criticism that it was not resolving failed thrifts at a rate that kept pace with the growing number of thrifts in conservatorship. The RTC responded to the criticism with a concerted effort to resolve troubled thrifts at a faster rate. That effort, however, added greatly to the agency's collection of assets, especially problem assets. Soon, concerns over the pitfalls of dumping assets with often little regard for the low values they fetched were superseded by concerns, including some from members of Congress, that a faster approach to asset disposal was needed if the agency was going to complete its mission. In mid-1990, the agency began conducting bulk sales of packaged assets, a contrast to its initial approach of selling assets one by one. Although the bulk sale strategy was criticized for fostering a lack of competition among bidders (including the provision of "sweetheart deals" to some large investors), possibly lowering asset sale prices due to discounts and thus undermining some real estate markets, the criticism was overshadowed by the agency's need to rid itself of assets. In some of its auctions of non-performing loans, the RTC packaged assets by product, geographic location and collateral type, some packages being as small as a few thousand dollars, others in the tens of millions, with average packages running between $3 million and $4 million. Other bulk packages were less diversified and very asset-specific, consisting of single-property types such as hotels or motels. Equity Partnerships. At times, however, the bulk asset sales faced market pricing that was considerably less than the agency desired. To help address such shortcomings, the agency pioneered "equity partnerships" to help liquidate some of the packages of its real estate and financial assets. While the strategy employed a number of different structures, all of the equity partnerships involved a private sector partner acquiring a partial interest in a pool of assets, controlling the management and sale of the assets in the pool, and making distributions to the RTC based on the RTC's retained equity interest. Commercial Mortgages and Securitization . The RTC is widely regarded as a pioneer in the securitization of complex securitized instruments backed by commercial and multi-family loans, commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which constituted a significant share of the agency's assets. Initially, the CMBS were reportedly difficult to sell due in part to the fact that the huge losses that had occurred in the value of commercial mortgages was a major factor in the thrifts' troubles. Eventually, however, sales of the CMBS reportedly became quite healthy, and the innovative approach to asset disposal would later earn the RTC praise. The RTC Completion Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103-204 ) terminated the RTC as of December 31, 1995. All of its remaining assets, liabilities, and duties were transferred to the FDIC. In the end, the RTC orchestrated the closing of 747 thrifts, more than 25% of the industry. It was also responsible for selling more than $450 billion of their real estate and disposing of 95% of their overall assets with a recovery rate of more than 85%. Estimates of the direct and indirect cost of the entire RTC thrift resolution process have ranged from $100 billion to as high as $500 billion, with the most widely and recently reported estimate in the area of $150 billion (the majority being taxpayer financed), an amount said to be below original estimates.

In a 1989 legislative response to financial troubles in the thrift industry, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA, P.L. 101-73) was enacted: FIRREA's principal mission was to conduct a partially tax-payer funded program to address the troubles of the nation's many insolvent thrifts. To do so, it established a new entity, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), whose mission was to address troubled thrifts by arranging their sale to other institutions or shuttering them and disposing of their assets. The RTC would eventually obtain $105 billion in funding but a major part of its principal funding came from an off-budget entity, the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP). REFCORP was created by FIRREA as a public-private partnership, which acquired the funds that it would provide to the RTC through proceeds from its sale of U.S. Treasury bonds. During its years of operation, 1989 to 1995, the RTC was alternately criticized for dumping thrift assets and for taking too much time to dispose of them. It subsequently began selling block assets, it partnered with private entities in the joint ownership of some assets, and it issued securities backed by commercial mortgages. When shut down in 1995, the RTC had closed 747 insolvent thrifts and recovered about 85% of the value of the assets it had seized. Estimates vary but several observers cite direct and indirect governmental costs totaling about $150 billion for the undertaking.

Radio frequency spectrum allocation policy within the United States is coordinated primarily through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)—for private use, including state and local public safety wireless communications—and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)—for federal use. Spectrum management goals include balancing diverse concerns such as technical quality, economic benefit, fairness, access, security, and global competitiveness. Many economic models for providing the "highest and best use" for spectrum exist and have been tried, both in the United States and worldwide. Spectrum for what is widely described as "prime" frequencies (300 MHz - 3000 MHz) is judged by many to be the most commercially desirable and is widely sought after at auction. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that auction proceeds for fiscal years 2007-2011 will total $28 billion. Current broadcast and wireless communications technology requires the assignment of specific frequencies to prevent interference among transmissions. Preventing interference while fostering spectrum policies that promote public benefits and economic growth have been key bulwarks of spectrum policy and management for the FCC since its creation. Using auctions as a market-driven approach to spectrum allocation is a fairly recent innovation. The Communications Act of 1934, as modified primarily by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, governs spectrum allocation and auction requirements in the United States. It directs the FCC to hold auctions and to deposit the proceeds in the general fund of the Treasury. Spectrum policy that designates auction proceeds for specific uses is a departure from this requirement. Whenever spectrum reallocation is desirable or necessary because of changes in technology, spectrum value, or other factors, some mechanism—such as a trust fund—might be considered a component of spectrum management and policy in order to compensate organizations that cannot recover costs through pricing. On the assumption that spectrum reallocation is an integral part of spectrum management, and recognizing that relocation costs can climb to billions of dollars in some sectors, the need to create reimbursement programs could be considered part of spectrum policy. The purpose of the Spectrum Relocation Fund is to create a mechanism whereby federal agencies can recover the costs of moving from one spectrum band to another. The interest in relocating federal users—and accelerating the process by assuring reimbursement for the costs of moving—centers on valuable spectrum (relative to auction prices for comparable spectrum in the United States and other countries) now used by federal agencies, especially the Department of Defense. In particular, spectrum in bands within the 1710-1850 MHz range is sought by wireless telecommunications companies to facilitate the implementation of next-generation wireless technologies. including high-speed mobile services (3G). After much study, the NTIA and the FCC, aided by an Intra-Government 3G Planning Group, announced plans that would transfer spectrum in the 1710-1755 MHz range from federal agencies and make it available to the private sector through spectrum auctions conducted by the FCC. As part of the effort, the need was identified for new legislation that would permit affected federal agencies to recover costs directly from these auction proceeds. To meet this need, in mid-2002 the Department of Commerce proposed the creation of a Spectrum Relocation Fund. This fund could provide a means to make it possible for federal agencies to recover relocation costs directly from auction proceeds when they are required to vacate spectrum slated for commercial auction. In effect, successful commercial bidders cover the costs of relocation. To accomplish the NTIA and FCC goals required modification of the Communications Act of 1934, to permit the agencies direct access to auction funds. This was accomplished with the passage of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, Title II of P.L. 108-494 , in 2004. Among key provisions of the act were requirements that the auctions must recoup at least 110% of the projected costs, and that unused funds would revert to the Treasury after eight years. Specific frequencies mentioned included not only the 1710-1755 MHz band but also other federally used frequencies scheduled for reallocation and possible auction. The Communications Act of 1934 was therefore amended to create a Spectrum Relocation Fund within the Treasury to hold auction proceeds as designated. The fund is administered by the Office of Management and Budget. Following procedures required by the act, the FCC scheduled an auction for Advanced Wireless Services (AWS), designated Auction 66, which was completed on September 18, 2006. The AWS auction attracted nearly $13.9 billion in completed bids, substantially above the cost established by the NTIA of almost $936 million for the move. The FCC ruled that auction winners wishing to put acquired licenses to immediate use would in most cases be able to share with current federal users under guidance from the FCC. At a Washington, DC, conference in September 2007, John Kneuer, Director of the NTIA at the time, told the audience that there were some "issues" on relocating federal users to clear space for commercial license-holders. To facilitate the clearing of spectrum for revenue-generating auctions, the 109 th Congress included measures in a budget reconciliation bill to create a fund to hold the proceeds from Congressionally mandated auctions of licenses in the 700 MHz band. The fund and disbursements are administered by the NTIA, which is directed in the act to make specific disbursements. These are: $7,363 million from the auction of spectrum licenses at 700 MHz is slated go to reduce the budget deficit as specified in H.Con.Res. 95 up to $1,500 million on coupons for households toward the purchase of TV set top boxes that can convert digital broadcast signals for display on analog sets; a grant program of up to $1,000 million to improve communications capabilities for public safety agencies; payments of up to $30 million toward the cost of temporary digital transmission equipment for broadcasters serving the Metropolitan New York area; payments of up to $10 million to help low-power television stations purchase equipment that will convert full-power broadcast signals from digital to analog; a program funded up to $65 million to reimburse low-power television stations in rural areas for upgrading equipment from analog to digital technology; up to $106 million to implement a unified national alert system and $50 million for a tsunami warning and coastal vulnerability program; contributions totaling no more than $43.5 million for a national 911 improvement program established by the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004; and up to $30 million in support of the Essential Air Service Program. The NTIA was authorized to finance some of the programs through loans from the Treasury, secured by the expected proceeds of the auction required by the law. Some of the funding provisions were later amended as regards timing of payments and use of funds but the amounts were not changed. Total legislated disbursements are slightly more than $10 billion, to stay within an estimate of auction revenue of approximately $12 billion, as originally provided by the Congressional Budget Office. There is no provision in the act for disbursing auction proceeds beyond that amount, although all the "proceeds (including deposits and upfront payments from successful bidders) from the use of a competitive bidding system under this subsection with respect to recovered analog spectrum" are to be deposited into the fund. Any additional disbursements from the fund would be treated as new costs by the Congressional Budget Office and would score as needing to be offset. Absent new legislation, the surplus in the fund will be deposited in the Treasury as general revenue. The fund, however, has no sunset date. The auction, Auction 73, concluded on March 18,2008; it grossed $19,592,420,000. The Public Safety Interoperability Implementation Act ( H.R. 3116 , Representative Stupak) would establish a separate fund within the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund that would be used for public safety communications grants. This separate fund would receive the proceeds remaining from the auction required by the Deficit Reduction Act, after the payments required by the act had been made. It would also receive up to half of the net proceeds of future auctions, although this share could be reduced. In addition a total of $1.5 billion would be authorized for appropriations over three years, beginning with FY2008. The grant program would be administered by the NTIA with a board created for that purpose, with five members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. Grants would go for communications critical to public safety, with a preference for programs providing broad-based interoperability. The bill was introduced July 19, 2007. The Reliable, Effective, and Sustained Procurement of New Devices for Emergency Responders (RESPONDER) Act of 2008 ( S. 3465 , Senator Wicker) would create a First Responders Interoperable Device Availability Trust Fund to provide grants to purchase interoperable radios for the new public safety network proposed for some of the channels being released in the transition to digital TV. The network plan is linked to the auction of a remaining block of analog spectrum, known as the D Block. The RESPONDER Act would place the entire net proceeds of the D Block Auction in the Trust. Additional funds would come from a percentage of future auctions. Auction authority for the Federal Communication Commission would be extended to assure the continuation of revenue-producing auctions. The bill was introduced September 10, 2008. The Spectrum Relocation Improvement Act of 2008 ( H.R. 7207 , Representative Inslee) would require that federal agencies covered by the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act provide detailed, publicly available information about the spectrum relocation plans and timelines covered under the act. In particular the availability of frequencies for shared use would be documented. To be eligible to receive payments from the Spectrum Relocation Fund, agencies would be required to complete the transition within a specified time period, to report on progress, and to comply with other requirements stated in the bill.

Congress has acted to create two special funds to hold the revenue of certain spectrum auctions for specific purposes. These funds represent a departure from existing practice, which requires that auction proceeds be credited directly to the Treasury as income. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171, Title III) required the auctioning of licenses for spectrum currently used by TV broadcasters for analog transmissions. It established the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund to receive this auction revenue and use some of the proceeds for the transition to digital television, public safety communications, and other programs. The Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act (P.L. 108-494, Title II) established a Spectrum Relocation Fund to hold the proceeds of certain spectrum auctions for the specific purpose of reimbursing federal entities for the costs of moving to new frequency assignments. The spectrum being vacated by federal users has been sold for commercial use. Passage of the Spectrum Enhancement Act set a precedent in national policy for spectrum management by linking spectrum auction proceeds to specific funding programs. Among bills related to special funds that were introduced during the 110th Congress are: the Spectrum Relocation Improvement Act of 2008 (H.R. 7207, Inslee): the RESPONDER Act of 2008 (S. 3465, Wicker); and The Public Safety Interoperability Implementation Act (H.R. 3116, Stupak).

The TANF block grant is a fixed amount of funding paid to each state based on a formula. States design and administer benefits and services funded by TANF and have wide latitude in their use of block grant funds. States are required to share a portion of the cost of TANF benefits and services by expending some of their own funds on TANF-related benefits and services through a "maintenance of effort" requirement. TANF is the major federal-state program providing cash assistance to needy families with children. While federal TANF grants help fund this cash assistance, states determine eligibility rules and benefit amounts which vary greatly among the states. There are no federal rules regarding eligibility and benefits for ongoing cash welfare, other than the requirement that it be paid to families with children that meet a financial test of economic need. Table 1 provides some basic information on cash welfare benefits in the states affected by Hurricane Katrina and some of their neighboring states. It shows both the maximum monthly benefit amount paid to a family of three as of January 2005 and the average number of families that received cash assistance in June 2006. The maximum monthly benefit is generally the amount paid to a family with no other income sources. TANF cash assistance benefits in this region are relatively low compared with those paid in other regions and states. For example, the comparable maximum cash welfare grant paid in New York City in January 2005 was $691 per month and the maximum cash welfare grant paid to a family of three in the urban areas of California was $723 per month. TANF imposes some requirements on states with respect to families receiving cash assistance. The purpose of the requirements is to ensure that receipt of cash welfare is temporary and to encourage movement off the rolls and into work. TANF requires that a specified percentage of its caseload be engaged in work or job preparation activities, limits federally-funded assistance to five years, and requires that cash assistance recipients cooperate with child support enforcement rules (establish paternity and assign child support to the state). TANF also gives authority to states to pay "emergency assistance" benefits. Emergency benefits are those that: are considered "nonrecurrent, short-term benefits;" are designed to deal with a specific crisis situation or episode of need; are not intended to meet recurrent or ongoing needs; and will not extend beyond four months. Families receiving such emergency benefits are not subject to the same requirements (i.e, work requirements and time limits) as are families that receive cash assistance. As with cash welfare, states determine eligibility for and the scope of emergency benefits provided to low-income families with children. In addition to ongoing cash welfare and emergency aid, TANF can fund a wide range of other social services for low-income families with children, such as child care, transportation aid, family preservation and support services, and similar types of services. As with ongoing cash welfare and emergency assistance, states determine eligibility and the scope of benefits provided to needy families with children. Welfare programs are not usually associated with responses to natural disasters. However, the scope of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of families, the strain placed on human service agencies responding to this displacement, plus the flexibility allowed states to design programs under TANF, made the block grant a potential source of help to the victims of this disaster. While TANF funding is flexible and provides states with options to help needy families, the legislation passed by Congress and signed by the President addressed some policy considerations. TANF block grants are fixed amounts determined by formula in federal law, and absent federal legislation benefits paid by a host state to evacuees would come from that host state's TANF allocation. P.L. 109-68 allowed states to draw from the TANF contingency fund to provide 100% federal funding for certain benefits paid to families that evacuated hurricane-damaged areas. Funding was capped at 20% per year of the host state's annual block grant. In FY2006, a total of $48.4 million was drawn from the TANF contingency fund to provide short-term benefits for evacuees. Table 2 shows TANF contingency fund grants for evacuees of hurricane-damaged areas. The fixed TANF block grants do not adjust for changes in the circumstances of a state. Though TANF did contemplate extra funding in the case of a recession, it has no mechanism to increase funding in the event of a natural disaster. P.L. 109-68 provided extra funding for FY2005 and FY2006 for the three hurricane-damaged states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, an extra 20% of the damaged state's block grant. TANF recipients who receive ongoing cash assistance are subject to certain requirements, such as time limits and work requirements. For FY2005 and FY2006, P.L. 109-68 waived penalties on the states for failure to meet state work requirements as well as the penalty for having more than 20% of its caseload on the rolls for more than five years (the TANF time limit). It also gives the authority to states to provide short-term, nonrecurring benefits for evacuee families receiving benefits in other states and families in hurricane damaged states, to meet subsistence needs and not have that time count for purposes of work requirements or time limits.

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states to help them fund a wide variety of benefits and services to low-income families with children. TANF is best known for funding cash welfare benefits for families with children, but the block grant may also fund other benefits and services such as emergency payments, child care, transportation assistance, and other social services. Welfare programs are not usually associated with responses to natural disasters. However, the scope of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of families, the strain placed on responding human service agencies, plus the flexibility allowed states to design programs under TANF, made the block grant a potential source of help to the victims of this disaster. P.L. 109-68 provided some additional TANF funds and waived certain program requirements for states affected by Katrina. Under that act, all states were provided capped funding to aid evacuees from hurricane-damaged states. This report will be not be updated.

T he Economic Development Administration (EDA) was created pursuant to the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, with the objective of fostering growth in economically distressed areas characterized by high levels of unemployment and low per-capita income levels. Federally designated disaster areas and areas affected by military base realignment or closure (BRAC) are also eligible for EDA assistance. EDA provides grants for public works, economic adjustment in case of natural disasters or mass layoffs, technical assistance, planning, and research. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ) appropriated $250 million in total funding for EDA, including $213 million in support of EDA programs and activities, and $37 million for salaries and expenses. On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, P.L. 114-113 , which appropriated $261 million in total funding for EDA, including $222 million for EDA programs and activities and $39 million for salaries and expenses. Total funding for FY2016 was 4.4% ($1.1 million) higher than the amount appropriated for FY2015. FY2016 appropriations included a significant increase ($5 million) in the amount of funds targeted to assist coal mining communities and a modest increase ($2 million) in funding for Planning Assistance. The increased funding for coal-impacted communities and planning assistance was offset by a reduction ($10 million) in the amount appropriated for Economic Adjustment Assistance and the zeroing out of funding for activities supporting innovative manufacturing. The program received an appropriation of $4 million in FY2015. The Obama Administration's FY2016 budget request, which was released on February 2, 2015, proposed an increase in total EDA funding from $250 million in FY2015 to $273 million in FY2016, a 9.2% increase. In addition, the Administration's request called for shifts in funding priorities. Specifically, the Administration's budget request proposed the following: Reduced funding for what is EDA's most highly funded program, public works grants. The Administration recommended $14 million less for these grants than the $99 million that was appropriated in FY2015. Greater emphasis on projects intended to support job creation through regional innovation clusters by requesting an appropriation of $25 million for such activities, which was $15 million more than was appropriated for these activities in FY2015. Significant increases in funding for the Economic Adjustment Assistance, research and evaluation, and planning grants programs, including proposed increases of 17.8%, 100%, and 31.7% respectively for the three programs. A significant increase, 23%, in funding for salaries and expenses. The Administration's budget request for each EDA program is listed in Table 1 along with the recommended amounts proposed by the House and Senate, and the enacted amount included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, P.L. 114-113 . The Administration's EDA budget justification document for FY2016 sought to recast EDA assistance in the context of global economic competition and the promotion of sustainable economic development. The Administration's emphases on promoting interagency coordination of resources and on the implementation of regional innovation strategies were among the primary reasons the Administration requested an $8 million increase in funding for its most flexible program, Economic Adjustment Assistance grants. The $9.5 million increase in requested funding for planning grants was another example of the Administration's attempt to coordinate and promote sustainable economic development. The increase in appropriations for planning grants would have been used to fund 16 previously unfunded Economic Development Districts (EDD) and to "conduct a one-time refresh" of each EDD's Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS),which is a required element for establishing eligibility for EDA's Public Works and Economic Adjustment Assistance grants. Additional funding for planning grants would have been used to help EDDs incorporate new components of the CEDS that focus on economic resiliency and coordination with other federal, state, and local resources. According to the Obama Administration, one manifestation of EDA's effort to promote interagency coordination is the central role it plays in the Administration's Partnerships for Workforce and Economic Revitalization Plus (POWER+) initiative, an interagency effort intended to coordinate competitively awarded federal grant assistance to communities experiencing economic disruption as a result of changes in the power sector and coal industry. The effort was intended to assist affected communities diversify their economic base, create sustainable high-paying jobs, attract new economic investments, and provide job training and reemployment services to dislocated workers in affected areas. On May 27, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee reported an original measure, H.R. 2578 , the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill for FY2016 (CJS). On June 3, 2015, the House passed H.R. 2578 by a vote of 242-183. The bill, as passed by the House, would have frozen EDA appropriations at their FY2015 levels, rejecting the Administration's request for an increase in overall funding and a shift in funding priorities. The bill would have appropriated $250 million for EDA, including $213 million for EDA activities and programs, and $37 million for salaries and expenses. The bill reflected slightly different funding priorities from those of the previous year. The bill proposed increasing funding for assistance to coal communities by $5 million and would have established assistance to these communities as a stand-alone program rather than a set-aside under the Economic Adjustment Assistance program while eliminating $4 million in funding for Innovative Manufacturing grants. (See Table 1 for a complete breakdown by program.) The report ( H.Rept. 114-130 ) accompanying the bill directed EDA to allocate at least $15 million to assist communities affected by job losses in the coal mining industry as part of the Administration's POWER+ initiative. The report included language directing EDA to give priority to coal mining communities that had not yet developed a CEDS when awarding POWER+ funding. The funds would have been used to begin the CEDS planning process. The report directed EDA, within 90 days of enactment of H.R. 2578 , to submit to the House Committee on Appropriations a report on the government-wide effort to assist coal mining communities as part of the POWER+ initiative, including descriptions of EDA's and other federal agencies' past efforts and future plans to assist coal communities. In addition, the House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the bill included language admonishing EDA on its slow implementation of the Innovative Manufacturing loan guarantee program. The report noted that although the program had received funding as far back as FY2012, EDA had not yet issued loan guarantees, but noted that the agency expected to issue its first loan guarantee during the second quarter of FY2016. The report directed EDA to provide the committee with periodic updates on the status of the program, including a written report within 60 days following enactment of the act. The report also included language directing EDA to use its Regional Innovation Program (RIP) funds to support university- and state-sponsored incubator programs. On June 16, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. 2578 , the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill for FY2016. The Senate Appropriations Committee rejected the Administration's proposed increase in funding for EDA programs and recommended freezing total funding at the FY2015 total of $250 million, including $213 million for EDA programs and $37 million for salaries and expenses. The Senate bill did not include funding for coal mining communities and innovative manufacturing. Instead, the bill recommended a $3 million increase in funding for Economic Adjustment Assistance grants. The report ( S.Rept. 114-66 ) accompanying the bill directed EDA to set aside, within the Economic Adjustment Assistance account, up to $10 million for regional innovation grants, $2 million for innovative energy efficiency grants, $3 million for Economic Adjustment Assistance grants awarded to communities within the Appalachian Regional Commission, and $3 million in grant assistance for communities within the boundaries of the Delta Regional Authority. The report accompanying the Senate bill directed EDA to continue to ensure that RIP grants were awarded to multiple grantees across a diverse geographic area. Like its House counterpart, the Senate report encouraged EDA to fund university-based incubators with priority going to incubator projects where states had made a significant investment in establishing an incubator program. The report also would have set aside $2 million in RIP funding for "cluster grants to support nonprofit, job-creating, revolving, equity-based seed capital funds." In addition to identifying funding priorities and set-asides within various EDA programs, the report accompanying the Senate Appropriations Committee reported version of the CJS bill included two additional directives for EDA: The committee encouraged EDA to assist communities potentially affected by nuclear power plant closures identify best practices that may be implemented to mitigate the impact of such closures. The committee also admonished the agency for the delay in delivering a plan, mandated in FY2015, that identify how better to use existing programs to assist various types of distressed communities and encourage manufacturing investments. Congress did not pass the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill for FY2016, before the beginning of 2016 fiscal year on October 1, 2015. On September 30, 2015, Congress passed and the President signed P.L. 114-53 , an act providing for continuing appropriations from October 1, 2015, to December 11, 2015. The act included provisions allowing departments and agencies, including EDA, to expend federal funds during this period at a rate as outlined in the department or agency's FY2015 appropriations act. The Continuing Appropriations Act also prohibited the use of funds for activities that were not funded in FY2015. Congress passed two additional continuing resolutions that extended the period covered by a continuing resolution: P.L. 114-96 , to cover the period through December 16, 2015, and P.L. 114-100 , to extend the period covered to December 22, 2015. On December 18, 2015, Congress approved, and the President signed into law P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, providing appropriations for a number of federal agencies and departments, including the programs and activities of the Economic Development Administration, for the remainder of FY2016. The act included $261 million for EDA, including $222 million for programs and activities and $39 million for salaries and expenses. EDA's FY2016 appropriations included a 50% increase (from $10 million to $15 million) in the amount of funds targeted to assist coal mining communities as part of the Administration POWER+ initiative. The act also included a $2 million increase in funding for planning assistance to EDA-designated economic development districts charged with developing Comprehensive Economic Development Strategies (CEDS). The increased funding for coal-impacted communities and planning assistance was offset by a $10 million reduction in the amount appropriated for Economic Adjustment Assistance and the zeroing out of appropriations for activities supporting innovative manufacturing. That program received an appropriation of $4 million in FY2015. In addition, P.L. 114-113 included a provision rescinding $10 million in EAA unobligated balances from prior year appropriations.

The Economic Development Administration was created pursuant to the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, with the objective of fostering growth in economically distressed areas characterized by high levels of unemployment and low per-capita income levels. EDA, an agency within the Department of Commerce, is the primary federal agency charged with implementing and coordinating federal economic development policy. For FY2016, the Obama Administration requested significant increases in funding for EDA activities and salaries and expenses. Under the Administration's proposal, EDA funding would have increased by 9.2%, from $250 million to $273 million over the last fiscal year, including significant increases in funding for the following: salaries and expenses, from $37 million to $45.5 million; regional Innovation Program grants, from $10 million to $25 million; economic Adjustment Assistance, from $45 million to $53 million; and Planning Grants, from $30 million to $39.5 million. On June 3, 2015, the House approved its version of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act for FY2016, H.R. 2578. The bill rejected the Administration's proposed funding increases. Instead, the bill recommended freezing total EDA funding at the FY2015 level of $250 million. The bill also recommended a $5 million increase in funding for coal mining communities (above the amount set aside under the Economic Adjustment Assistance) while recommending eliminating $4 million in funding for Innovative Manufacturing. On June 16, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. 2578. This bill also rejected the Administration's proposed increases in funding and, like its House counterpart, would have frozen total funding for EDA at the FY2015 level of $250 million. The bill would have shifted funding priorities, eliminating $4 million in funding for Innovative Manufacturing, transferring $10 million in Assistance to Coal Mining Communities from a set-aside under the Economic Adjustment Assistance program to a stand-alone program, and increasing funding for Economic Adjustment Assistance by $3 million, from $45 million in FY2015 to $48 million for FY2016. Unable to reach agreement on a final appropriations for FY2016 for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act for FY2016, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions providing funding for government operations through December 22, 2015. On December 18, 2015, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, P.L. 114-113, which appropriated $261 million in total funding for EDA, including $222 million for EDA programs and activities and $39 million for salaries and expenses. Total funding for FY2016 was 4.4% ($141 million) higher than the amount appropriated for FY2015, including a $5 million increase in the amount of funds targeted to assist coal mining communities and a $2 million increase in funding for Planning Assistance. The increased funding for coal-impacted communities and planning assistance was offset by a $10 million reduction in the amount appropriated for Economic Adjustment Assistance and the elimination of $4 million funding for activities supporting innovative manufacturing.

Congressional and consumer interest in passenger natural gas vehicles (NGVs) has grown in recent years, especially in response to higher gasoline prices, concerns over the environmental impact of petroleum consumption for transportation, and policy proposals such as the "Pickens Plan." Although natural gas passenger vehicles have been available for years, they have been used mostly in government and private fleets; very few have been purchased and used by consumers. Larger NGVs—mainly transit buses and delivery trucks—also play a role in the transportation sector, especially due to various federal, state, and local incentives for their use. However, high up-front costs for new NGVs, as well as concerns over vehicle performance and limited fuel infrastructure, have led to only marginal penetration of these vehicles into the personal transportation market. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that there were roughly 114,000 compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles in the United States in 2009, and roughly 3,000 liquefied natural gas (LNG) vehicles. Roughly two-thirds of NGVs are light-duty (i.e., passenger) vehicles. This compares to roughly 235 million conventional (mostly gasoline) light-duty vehicles. Further, of the roughly 11.6 million new light-duty vehicles sold in 2009, only about 400 (0.004%) were NGVs. For model year (MY) 2012, only two passenger NGVs are available from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for purchase by consumers—the CNG-fueled Honda Civic GX and the Vehicle Production Group MV-1 —although some companies convert vehicles to CNG before they are sold (usually as fleet vehicles). While the current purchase prices for NGVs exceed those of conventional vehicles, much of this difference can be made up over the life of the vehicle in fuel cost savings. For example, the incremental price between a conventional Honda Civic EX and a natural gas-powered Honda Civic GX is over $5,000. Through 2010 some of this difference was made up through a tax credit for the purchase of new alternative fuel vehicles, but that tax credit has since expired. It should be noted that with higher production, this incremental cost should decrease, but the likely extent of that decrease is unclear. Since the number of natural gas refueling stations is limited—only about 400 publicly available nationwide, compared to roughly 120,000 retail gasoline stations —the purchaser of a new NGV might also choose to install a home refueling system. According to Consumer Reports and Natural Gas Vehicles for America (NGVAmerica), a FuelMaker Phill system costs between $3,400 and $4,500 plus installation. However, through the end of 2011 a taxpayer could offset $1,000 of this by claiming a tax credit for installing new alternative fuel refueling infrastructure. Offsetting the higher up-front costs are likely annual fuel savings in switching from gasoline to natural gas. Using average retail gasoline and residential natural gas prices from January 2011, annual fuel cost savings could be roughly $600. Assuming a 3% discount rate, the payback period for the CNG vehicle and home refueling system is more than 17 years. Given that this is roughly the median survival age for new passenger vehicles, this payback period may or may not be acceptable to that consumer. Assuming a smaller differential between natural gas and gasoline prices, or other factors (e.g., the expiration of tax incentives), can significantly increase this payback period; assuming a larger difference in fuel prices (as was the case in spring 2011), assuming a smaller discount rate, or assuming incremental natural gas vehicle prices decrease in the future, this payback period could be shorter. In addition to the life-cycle cost difference between CNG and conventional vehicles, there are other costs and benefits associated with NGVs that may not have a defined market price tag. For example, any reduction in petroleum dependence (beyond the per-gallon cost savings) is not represented in the above payback period estimate. Some consumers may place a value on displacing petroleum consumption, and thus imports. Further, NGVs in general have lower pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions than comparable gasoline vehicles, although this may or may not be true for specific vehicles and pollutants. A key potential benefit raised by proponents of NGVs is that while the United States imports the majority of the petroleum it uses, most natural gas is domestically produced. Further, domestic output is higher than once thought, mainly due to recent growth in unconventional natural gas sources (e.g., coal mine methane, shale gas). But there are also several potential and measurable drawbacks to NGVs, many related to vehicle performance and acceptability. For example, CNG engines tend to generate less power for the same size engine than gasoline engines. Thus NGVs tend to have slower acceleration and less power climbing hills. Also, because CNG has a lower energy density than gasoline, CNG vehicles tend to have a shorter range than comparable gasoline vehicles. In addition, for passenger vehicles, the larger natural gas storage tanks often occupy space that would otherwise be used for cargo—generally in the trunk of a sedan and in the bed of a pickup truck. Again, these considerations may or may not play into a individual purchaser's decision, but could affect the overall marketability of the vehicles. A key question raised by those interested in the expansion of natural gas for automobiles is whether existing vehicles can be converted to operate on natural gas. From a technical feasibility standpoint, there are few problems with converting a vehicle to operate on natural gas. Most existing engines can operate on the fuel, and most conversions involve changes to the fuel system, including a new fuel tank, new fuel lines, and modifications to the vehicle's electronic control unit. Until recently, when EPA reduced restrictions, converting an existing vehicle was more problematic from a practical standpoint. In the United States, NGV conversions—or any other fuel conversion—can potentially run afoul of the Clean Air Act (CAA). All new vehicles (gasoline or otherwise) must pass rigorous tests to prove they will meet emissions standards over the life of the vehicle. These tests tend to be very expensive, although the marginal cost spread over a full product run—thousands to hundreds of thousands of vehicles—is minimal. After a vehicle has been certified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), any changes to the exhaust, engine, or fuel systems may be considered tampering under the CAA. Section 203(a)(3)(A) states that it is prohibited for any person to remove or render inoperative any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance with regulations under this title prior to its sale and delivery to the ultimate purchaser, or for any person knowingly to remove or render inoperative any such device or element of design after such sale and delivery to the ultimate purchaser. EPA generally interprets this to mean that any change to a vehicle's engine or fuel systems that leads to higher pollutant emissions constitutes "tampering" under Section 203. In 1974, EPA issued guidance ("Memorandum 1A") to automaker and auto parts suppliers on what constituted tampering in terms of replacement parts under routine maintenance. The guiding principle EPA has used in enforcing the anti-tampering provisions for alternative fuel conversions is that such changes are allowed as long as the dealer has "reasonable basis" to believe that emissions from the vehicle will not increase after the conversion. Instead of requiring all converted vehicles to undergo testing equivalent to new vehicle testing, EPA allowed vehicle converters flexibility in certifying their emissions. However, in the 1990s, EPA received data from the National Renewable Energy Lab that many vehicles converted to run on natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and certified under the flexibility provisions might be exceeding emissions standards. Therefore, in 1997 EPA issued an addendum to Memorandum 1A tightening the testing standards for these conversions. The original decision required compliance with new testing procedures starting in 1999. Subsequent revisions extended the deadline through March 2002. Under guidance from the 1990s and 2000s, certifying vehicle conversions could be very expensive for small producers, since each vehicle needed to be independently certified. For example, a converter needed to test the emissions of the conversion of specific "engine families" (e.g., MY2008 Ford Vehicles with 4.6L V8 engines). Each different engine/emissions system combination was tested independently (e.g., MY2009 vehicles, or vehicles with different engines). Therefore, the production and use of universal "conversion kits" was effectively prohibited under the EPA enforcement guidance. NGVAmerica estimated that it could cost as much as $200,000 to design, manufacture, and certify a conversion for a single engine family under the then-current guidance. On April 8, 2011, EPA issued final regulations on alternative fuel vehicle conversions. The regulations provide new flexibility for converters to certify that their conversions do not violate the CAA anti-tampering provisions. Most notably, while most requirements for conversions of "new and relatively-new" remain relatively unchanged—these vehicles must still generally go through all new vehicle testing—EPA has relaxed requirements for "intermediate age" vehicles and "outside of useful life" vehicles. EPA estimates that the total certification costs (emissions testing, administrative costs, etc.) will be reduced for all three classes of vehicles. Cost reductions for intermediate age and outside of useful life vehicles could be dramatic. For older vehicles, less detailed testing is required—much of the savings comes from minimal testing of the on-board diagnostic (OBD) system for older vehicles. Another key flexibility for all groups is that while EPA's certification expires after one year, EPA has determined that, assuming conditions do not change significantly (e.g., the conversion kit is not modified after the system is certified), EPA's waiver of the anti-tampering provisions remains in effect. There may be other issues with the expiration of the certification, but conversions would not run afoul of the CAA. Some have questioned whether a vehicle conversion would void the original manufacturer's warranty. However, only those vehicle systems directly modified by the conversion would raise warranty concerns. In those cases, the conversion manufacturer's warranty would cover the modified systems. For systems not affected by the conversion (e.g., suspension, climate control), the original manufacturer's warranty would still apply. Several bills have been introduced in recent years to promote NGVs and NGV infrastructure. Most notably in the 112 th Congress, the New Alternative Transportation to Give Americans Solutions Act (Nat Gas Act) of 2011 ( H.R. 1380 and S. 1863 ) would provide a wide range of incentives. The Nat Gas Act would reinstate the tax credit for the purchase of NGVs (which expired at the end of 2010), significantly expand the tax credit for the installation of natural gas refueling infrastructure, and extend both credits through 2016. The bill would also provide a tax credit to automakers who produce NGVs, and would authorize grants to those automakers to develop natural gas engines. Higher gasoline prices and concerns about U.S. oil dependence have raised interest in NGVs. Energy policy proposals such as the Pickens Plan have further raised interest in these vehicles. However, currently the number of new passenger vehicles capable of operating on natural gas is relatively low, and there are limited opportunities for converting existing gasoline vehicles to run on natural gas. The market for NGVs will likely remain limited unless the differential between natural gas and gasoline prices remains high in order to offset the higher purchase price for a natural gas vehicle or if new incentives are established to decrease the differential in initial vehicle purchase prices. New EPA regulations on NGV conversions could help promote the expansion of NGVs by lowering the cost of entry for conversion companies.

Higher gasoline prices in recent years and concerns over U.S. oil dependence have raised interest in natural gas vehicles (NGVs). Use of NGVs for personal transportation has focused on compressed natural gas (CNG) as an alternative to gasoline. Consumer interest has grown, both for new NGVs as well as for conversions of existing personal vehicles to run on CNG. This report finds that the market for natural gas passenger vehicles will likely remain limited unless the price for natural gas remains substantially lower than gasoline to offset the higher purchase price for an NGV. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated new regulations in April 2011 on alternative fuel vehicle conversions—including natural gas conversions. The new regulations allow greater flexibility for conversion companies to certify that their conversions do not lead to higher emissions—flexibility that could lead to significantly lower compliance costs. This could help spur the proliferation of natural gas conversions, especially for older vehicles.

Taxpayers are seen as more likely to pay taxes on income if the realization of that income has been communicated to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To encourage compliance with tax laws, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) includes a number of information reporting requirements regarding payments that may result in taxable income for the payee. One such reporting requirement, contained in IRC § 6041(a), applies to certain payments made by persons in the course of a trade or business. Under IRC § 6041(a), if the total amount of payments made to a single payee over a year equals at least $600, the payer is required to file an information return with the IRS providing information identifying the payer, the payee, and the total amounts paid to that payee over the past calendar year. The information returns required to be filed under IRC § 6041 are typically versions of Form 1099. A copy of this information return must also be provided to the payee. Although payees may receive copies of information returns, payees are not required to file any information returns under IRC § 6041. Section 6041 was amended twice in 2010: once by § 9006 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and a second time by § 2101 of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. Both amendments were subsequently repealed by the Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011. As a result, the information reporting requirements have been restored to their pre-PPACA scope. They may, however, be subject to stronger enforcement as a result of a surviving provision of the Small Business Jobs Act that revised the penalties for failing to file an accurate 1099 with the IRS or failing to provide an accurate copy of that form to the payee. This report briefly discusses the procedures and penalties under current law applicable to the information reporting requirements under IRC § 6041, and also briefly describes recent amendments that have been repealed. For a more detailed discussion of the repealed amendments, including responses to them by various stakeholders, see CRS Report R41504, 1099 Information Reporting Requirements and Penalties as Modified by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. The procedures for filing information returns with the IRS were not changed by either PPACA or the Small Business Jobs Act; therefore, the repeal of the amendments to § 6041 has no effect on those procedures. The deadline for filing an information return with the IRS is February 28 of the year following the calendar year in which payments were made, or March 31 if filed electronically. Copies of information returns must be provided to payees no later than January 31 of the year following the calendar year in which the payments were made. Information returns must accurately identify both the payer and the payee of the payments as well as the total amount paid. The payees are required to provide their names, addresses, and taxpayer identification numbers to payers in order to facilitate information reporting. The information return must include all of these as well as the address and telephone number of the payer. It is the payer's obligation to request information from the payee, and the payee is required to provide it. The payer may use Form W-9 to request the information from U.S. persons. If the payee does not provide a taxpayer identification number, the payer is generally required to collect backup withholding from payments due to the payee. For 2010-2012, the backup withholding rate is 28%. A payee is subject to a penalty of $50 for each failure to provide the correct taxpayer identification number to a payer who has requested it. The IRS recently promulgated regulations governing the reporting of credit card and third party network transactions. These regulations are not affected by the repeal described above, and create an exception to the information reporting requirements of § 6041. For payments made after December 31, 2010, Treasury Regulation § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv) states that any transaction that is subject to reporting under § 6050W, without regard to the third party network de minimus threshold, will not be reported under § 6041. Thus, if payments are made by credit card or through a third party network, the payer generally will not be required to report them on an information return. Both the failure to submit an accurate information return to the IRS and the failure to provide a copy of the information return to the payee are subject to monetary penalties assessed by the IRS. As a unique information return is required with respect to each payee, penalties are assessed on each deficient information return. Both § 6721 (pertaining to failure to file accurate returns with the IRS) and § 6722 (pertaining to failure to provide payees with correct copies of the information returns) of the IRC have been amended by the Small Business Jobs Act to revise the amounts of the penalties. Section 6722 has been amended to change the structure of the penalty so that it is similar to the structure of the § 6721 penalty. In so doing, the effect is that the amended penalty may be lower than it previously would have been where corrective action is taken. The changes to both sections are scheduled to become effective for returns required to be filed after December 31, 2010. Thus, the new penalty amounts are expected to apply to returns that report payments made during calendar year 2010. For information returns that are due before the amendments take effect, the penalty for failing to file a correct and timely return with the IRS is $50 for each defective return not to exceed $250,000 for a single payer. If the deficiency is corrected within 30 days of the due date, the penalty is reduced to $15 per return, not to exceed $75,000. If corrected later than 30 days, but before August 1, the penalty is $30 per return, not to exceed $150,000. No penalty will be assessed against a person if defects are corrected by August 1, and the total number of defective returns does not exceed the greater of 10 or one-half percent of the total number of information returns required to be filed by the person. Some small businesses may be able to take advantage of reduced ceilings on aggregate penalties for payers with gross receipts of less than $5 million. For these payers, the ceilings are $100,000 (for uncorrected violations), $25,000 (if corrected within 30 days), and $50,000 (if corrected after 30 days, but on or before August 1). Higher penalties may also be assessed where persons intentionally disregard their duty to file an information return. (See Table 1 .) Failure to provide a correct and timely statement to a payee is also subject to a $50 penalty per return, not to exceed $100,000 per payer. Higher penalties may also be assessed where persons intentionally disregard their duty to provide a payee with a copy of an information return. (See Table 2 .) Section 2102 of the Small Business Jobs Act modified the penalties for failing to provide information returns to the IRS or to the appropriate payee in a timely fashion. These amendments have not been repealed by the 112 th Congress. The penalties for failing to file information returns with the IRS were increased across the board, as described in Table 1 . These amounts will also be updated in 2017, and every five years after, to account for inflation. Section 2102 of the Small Business Jobs Act also modified the penalty scheme for failures to provide copies of information returns to payees. As described in Table 2 , the amended penalties mirror the amounts that would be assessed for a failure to file information returns with the IRS and are similarly indexed for inflation. In addition to raising the base penalty, the amendments also provide reduced penalties if corrective actions are taken. Because the prior penalty scheme did not take corrective action into account, penalties under the amended provision may actually be less than what would have been assessed under the old scheme if corrective action is taken. It is a misdemeanor for any person to willfully fail to make an information return as required by law. Persons convicted of this offense may be punished by a fine of up to $25,000, imprisonment for up to one year, or both. A willful violation occurs when there is "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." However, a violation that results from a good-faith misunderstanding of the requirements of the IRC is not a willful violation, as that term has been interpreted by the courts. Neither the Small Business Jobs Act nor PPACA changed the criminal penalties applicable to the willful failure to make an information return. Section 6041 was amended twice in 2010: once by § 9006 of PPACA and a second time by § 2101 of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. Both amendments were subsequently repealed by the Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011. Each repealed amendment is described below. For a more detailed discussion of the repealed expansions, including responses to them by various stakeholders, see CRS Report R41504, 1099 Information Reporting Requirements and Penalties as Modified by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For payments made after December 31, 2011, § 9006 of PPACA amended the reporting requirement in IRC § 6041 in two principal ways. First, payments to corporations would no longer be automatically exempt from reporting requirements by virtue of the payee's corporate status, superseding existing regulations to the contrary. Second, the types of payments that could trigger the reporting requirement were expanded to include amounts paid in consideration of property and other gross proceeds. Although now repealed, the effect of this amendment would have been to require those engaged in a trade or business to report a broader range of payments made to a broader range of payees in order to encourage the voluntary reporting of taxable income and also to facilitate the enforcement and collection of taxes on income that is not voluntarily reported. Section 2101 of the Small Business Jobs Act expanded the payers who would be required to comply with the section's reporting requirements to include landlords. Generally, those receiving rental income from real estate have not been considered to be engaged in a trade or business; however, the recent amendment of § 6041 would have changed this. Solely for purposes of § 6041(a), most landlords would have been considered to be engaged in the trade or business of renting real estate and, therefore, might have been required to file Forms 1099 to report payments made in conjunction with their rental properties.

Taxpayers are seen as more likely to report items of income on their tax returns if they know that a third party has reported it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); if follows, therefore, that expanding information reporting requirements under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) can improve the collection of federal tax revenue. However, as those requirements are expanded, those who must comply with the requirements generally will face an increased administrative burden. This tension between the desire to improve tax compliance and the concomitant burden imposed on taxpayers was recently highlighted after expansions of the reporting requirements in IRC § 6041 were met by protests that the changes imposed too great a burden, particularly on small businesses. As a result of these objections, the expansions to the information reporting requirement were repealed shortly after they were enacted. IRC § 6041 requires payments totaling at least $600 in a single calendar year to a single recipient to be reported to the IRS. The required return is generally a Form 1099, which is prepared by the entity making the payment and identifies to whom payment was made, the amount of the payment, and the general reason for the payment. The form is filed with the IRS and a copy is provided to the payee. The form is required only when the payer is considered to be engaged in a trade or business and has made the payment in connection with that trade or business. The scope of IRC § 6041 was expanded by both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-240). Section 9006 of PPACA would have made payments to corporations and payments for goods or other property subject to reporting. Section 2101 of the Small Business Jobs Act would have made most landlords subject to the reporting requirements of IRC § 6041. The expansions made by both bills were subsequently repealed by the Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-9). The Small Business Jobs Act also increased the penalties for failure to file an information return (IRC § 6721) and the penalties for failing to provide a copy of the information return to the payee (IRC § 6722). These changes have not been repealed and will apply to any information returns required to be filed after December 31, 2010.

On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States." Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding whether, and to what extent, federal agencies will withhold federal grant funds that would have otherwise been awarded to a designated "sanctuary jurisdiction." Under the EO, the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) is directed to designate a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction at his discretion, and to the extent consistent with law, for those jurisdictions found to have willfully refused to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373, "Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding potential restrictions of federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. Legal questions about how the EO can be construed and questions involving what constitutes a sanctuary jurisdiction have been raised and are discussed in other CRS products. This report discusses several questions that might be raised regarding the implementation of the executive order by federal grant-making agencies (also known as "federal awarding agencies) and the impact on federal grant funding for designated sanctuary jurisdictions. The EO directs the Attorney General and the Secretary to ensure that designated sanctuary jurisdictions are not eligible for federal grants, except for those grants deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary. Several questions may arise regarding grant-related implementation of the EO, including what constitutes a federal grant, which federal grant programs are affected, whether and how grant recipients residing in a sanctuary jurisdiction might be affected, how the EO will be implemented through the administration of federal grant programs, and when grant funding might be affected. One critical element in determining the impact of the EO on federal grant funding to designated sanctuary jurisdictions is how a federal grant is defined. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines a federal grant award as, "the federal financial assistance that a non-federal entity receives directly from a federal awarding agency or indirectly from a pass-through entity." Federal grant awards are generally provided through execution of a grant agreement or a cooperative agreement that sets forth the terms and conditions of the award. Two federal sources provide detail on federal grant outlays. The FY2017 Historical Tables of the Budget of the United States Government includes data on total outlays for grants to state and local governments. This data includes outlays that "constitute income to state and local governments to help finance their services and their income transfers for payments for individuals." The estimated FY2017 outlays for grants to state and local governments are $596.7 billion. OMB issues uniform guidance to federal agencies on government-wide policies and procedures for the awarding and administration of grants and agreements under 2 C.F.R., Grants and Cooperative Agreements . In addition, the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance lists at least 998 federal programs defined as project grants, formula grants or cooperative agreements. The EO directs the Attorney General and the Secretary to utilize their discretion in ensuring that sanctuary jurisdictions are not eligible for federal grants, which will presumably require the Attorney General and the Secretary to define "federal grant." The determination of which federal grant programs are affected will be based on how the Attorney General and the Secretary define "federal grants" and which programs are exempted based upon a determination by the Attorney General or the Secretary that the program provides grant funding for law enforcement purposes. A broad interpretation of "federal grant" could include any federal grant outlay to designated sanctuary jurisdictions regardless of which federal agency administers the grant program. A more narrow interpretation of the definition of "federal grant" could limit the affected grant programs to those programs directly administered by the Attorney General and the Secretary. Additionally, the way the EO is implemented by the federal agencies could potentially affect the scope of the impact of the EO. The EO states that designated sanctuary jurisdictions are not eligible for federal grants with certain exemptions, but does not provide sufficient detail regarding what a "sanctuary jurisdiction" is to enable a determination regarding which federal grant recipients might be impacted. Federal grant awards are not always provided based upon a designation of the recipient as a "city" or a "state." In some cases, federal grant awards are provided to communities meeting certain characteristics, such as "entitlement communities" that are provided funding under the Community Development Block Grant. This raises the question of whether federal grant recipients who reside in a designated sanctuary jurisdiction, such as an entitlement community, would also be deemed ineligible. Additionally, it is unclear how grant funding would be affected if only a portion of a city or state falls within a designated sanctuary jurisdiction, particularly in areas where cities and communities encompass a regional area where there are shared services and shared responsibilities for implementing federal laws. For example, federal grant applicants might include a county, a city designated as a sanctuary jurisdiction that resides in the county, and a non-sanctuary jurisdiction suburb outside the city but within the county. Since there is no uniform set of characteristics defining grant recipients, it is likely that there will be implementation issues in applying a designation of a sanctuary jurisdiction to every federal grant program. Federal agencies have broad authority to administer federal grant programs within statutory parameters. This authority includes evaluating grant applicant eligibility and imposing conditions and terms on federal grant awards. The EO specifies that designated sanctuary jurisdictions become ineligible for federal grants. Under existing OMB guidance, federal agencies are required to conduct a review of the eligibility of the potential grant recipient prior to making a federal award. This evaluation includes a review of the risks posed by the grant application, including, "the applicant's ability to effectively implement statutory, regulatory, or other requirements imposed on non-federal entities." At the federal awarding agency's discretion, the "other requirements imposed on non-federal entities" could possibly be interpreted to include compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. Should that be the case, designated sanctuary jurisdictions could be deemed ineligible for the federal grant programs administered by that federal agency. However, it is also possible that the federal agencies might utilize their discretion in administering the grant program to more narrowly interpret the "other requirements" to mean only those requirements that directly relate to the specific grant program. It is conceivable that this "relationship test" could be inconsistently applied across federal agencies and programs unless clear guidance is provided by the Attorney General and the Secretary. This potential for inconsistency may be attributed to the decentralized structure of federal grant-making laws and correspondingly decentralized ways in which federal agencies administer grant programs. Pursuant to OMB guidance, federal awarding agencies must "manage and administer the federal award in a manner so as to ensure that federal funding is expended and associated programs are implemented in full accordance with U.S. statutory and public policy requirements: including, but not limited to, those protecting public welfare, the environment, and prohibiting discrimination." Additionally, OMB guidance as promulgated in 2 C.F.R. states that: Federal awarding agencies must incorporate the following general terms and conditions either in the federal award or by reference, as applicable ... [n]ational policy requirements. These include statutory, executive order, other Presidential directive, or regulatory requirements that apply by specific reference and are not program-specific. As a consequence of this guidance, all federal awarding agencies would be expected to incorporate an executive order into the awarding of federal grant funds. The issuance of the EO could be interpreted as a national policy requirement and therefore, pursuant to OMB guidance, all federal awarding agencies would be required to incorporate compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373 into the conditions of the federal grant awards. Federal awarding agencies are also required to impose general terms and conditions on federal grant recipients through grant agreements and cooperative agreements. Should federal agencies implement the EO by conditioning federal grant awards, the funding would still be awarded to a designated sanctuary jurisdiction, but once the federal grant award period has expired, the grantee would be evaluated to determine compliance with all of the conditions of the grant award. Should the grantee be found to be noncompliant with any of the conditions, including potentially 8 U.S.C. 1373, then that determination could potentially affect their eligibility for subsequent federal grant awards. Federal grants are awarded through execution of a grant agreement or a cooperative agreement. The terms and conditions of a grant agreement are set at the time the grant agreement is initially executed. Federal agencies would therefore likely incorporate changes to the conditions of the grant award for grant agreements executed after the EO was issued. Given that federal agencies have yet to award all of the FY2017 appropriated grant funds, the implementation of the EO could include FY2017 appropriations. Because of the complexity of implementing a centralized policy such as the EO through the decentralized structure of federal grants administration practices, there is uncertainty in determining the impact of the EO on federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. The impact could be affected by the discretion exercised by the Attorney General and the Secretary in defining a "federal grant," determining which programs are exempted because of providing necessary funding for law enforcement purposes, and determining what constitutes a "sanctuary jurisdiction." The impact of the EO on federal grant funding could also be affected by how federal grant awarding agencies utilize discretion in administering the grant programs, including review of eligibility and conditioning federal grant awards

On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States." Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding whether, and to what extent, federal agencies will withhold federal grant funds that would have otherwise been awarded to a designated "sanctuary jurisdiction." Under the EO, the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) is directed to designate a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction at his discretion, and to the extent consistent with law, for those jurisdictions found to have willfully refused to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373, "Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding potential restrictions of federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. This report discusses several questions that might be raised regarding the implementation of the executive order by federal grant-making agencies (also known as "federal awarding agencies") and the impact on federal grant funding for designated sanctuary jurisdictions. Because of the complexity of implementing a centralized policy such as the EO through the decentralized structure of federal grants administration practices, there is uncertainty in determining the impact of the EO on federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. This could be affected by the discretion exercised by the Attorney General and the Secretary in defining a "federal grant," determining which programs are exempted because of providing necessary funding for law enforcement purposes, and determining what constitutes a "sanctuary jurisdiction." The impact of the EO on federal grant funding could also be affected by how federal grant awarding agencies utilize discretion in administering the grant programs, including review of eligibility and conditioning federal grant awards.

This report provides a brief analysis of selected "general oversight provisions" in the House- and Senate-passed versions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1 , 111 th Congress). The analysis is included in a side-by-side discussion of similar provisions in each bill. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple agencies or programs. Therefore, oversight-related provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation, such as appropriations set-asides, are excluded from the report's scope. Several other topics also are excluded, including the following: provisions addressing the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009, in the House-passed version (Division A, Title 1, Part 4, Sec. 1261 et seq.); prohibitions on the use of funds for casinos, golf courses, etc. (Senate-passed version, Division A, Title XVI, Section 1609; House-passed version, Division A, Title I, Section 1109); provisions related to program-specific program evaluations (e.g., in the House-passed version, Division A, Title IX, Subtitle B, Department of Health and Human Services Prevention and Wellness Fund, "annual evaluations of programs ... in order to determine the quality and effectiveness of the programs"); and contract, grant, or cooperative agreement restrictions and prohibitions (e.g., House-passed version, Division A, Title 1, Section 1241; and Senate-passed version, Division A, Title XVI, Section 1608). On January 14, 2009, then OMB Director-designate Peter Orszag appeared before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs for a confirmation hearing. Among other things, he was asked about his plans for oversight of the economic stimulus package that was anticipated to be considered at the beginning of the 111 th Congress. Director-designate Orszag said the incoming Administration would favor creating a special oversight board. Composed of relevant inspectors general (IGs) and chaired by a newly established White House position of Chief Performance Officer (CPO), he said the board "would review problems and ... would conduct regular meetings to examine specific problems that might be identified." He also said the Administration planned "to create a website that will contain information about the contracts and include [Portable Document Format files] or contracts themselves, and also financial information about the contracts." The Obama Administration subsequently established a rudimentary Recovery.gov website in anticipation of enactment of stimulus legislation. The home page explained the Administration's intentions for the website. Check back after the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to see how and where your tax dollars are spent. An oversight board will routinely update this site as part of an unprecedented effort to root out waste, inefficiency, and unnecessary spending in our government. Numerous oversight provisions subsequently were included in economic stimulus legislation considered by the House and Senate. For example, on January 21, 2009, after markup of a draft bill by the House Committee on Appropriations, the committee issued a press release that characterized the stimulus as providing "unprecedented accountability." At the same time, concerns have been expressed about the capacity of agencies and "a depleted contracting workforce" to spend funds rapidly "while also improving competition and oversight." In addition, the question has been raised whether inspectors general and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have sufficient resources to conduct oversight of the stimulus legislation. The House of Representatives passed its version of the bill on January 28, 2009. The Senate passed its version on February 10, 2009. As of February 12, the House and Senate were negotiating differences in the two versions of the stimulus legislation. In the event of a crisis to which Congress, the President, and federal agencies feel compelled to respond, several challenges present themselves in the short term. Among these in the present context is the question of how to balance speed with prudence. More general challenges in formulating a response to a crisis include how to reconcile values of transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Oftentimes in such circumstances, agencies and policy makers have little time for planning or reflection. Longer-term issues include questions of how to build the capacity of federal agencies, Congress, and the President to better respond to crises. In addition, and arguably no less significant, questions arise of how to anticipate and avoid preventable crises. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, generally known as the 9-11 Commission, described an aspect of this capability as "institutionalizing imagination." Organizational, procedural, and system-related options might be explored to address any of these questions. The federal government might be viewed as a system of "nested" oversight, with multiple entities engaging in simultaneous oversight activity. Congress oversees the President and agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an entity within the Executive Office of the President. Inspectors general and congressional support agencies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) provide assistance to Congress, agencies, and the President with oversight. In turn, within the executive branch, OMB has a statutory responsibility to provide management leadership for many agencies, including monitoring and oversight of their activities. Agencies oversee their own activities through organizational and procedural arrangements, often as Congress has mandated via statute. Viewed together, for example, GAO may attempt to oversee OMB's oversight of an agency's oversight of a funding recipient. Throughout, tools such as monitoring, analysis, and evaluation may be utilized. In developing an overall oversight framework, there also are multiple perspectives on the potential objectives of oversight. These include the following: compliance with applicable laws and regulations (e.g., adherence to legal requirements and avoidance of fraud); implementation that is faithful with congressional intent, when an agency or the President exercises discretion; avoidance of mismanagement (e.g., adherence to sound management practices); avoidance of undesired bias in funding allocations and policy execution (e.g., fair allocation of resources and fair implementation of policy, with intended equity); effectiveness of funded activities (e.g., achievement of programmatic missions and purposes); and efficiency of funded activities (e.g., minimization of avoidable "waste" and unnecessary redundancy). Outside of the legislative branch, it remains to be seen how implementing agencies, nonfederal recipients of funds (e.g., state governments), OMB, a proposed oversight board, and IGs will approach these perspectives on oversight. Table 1 provides a brief analysis of selected general oversight provisions in the House- and Senate-passed versions of economic stimulus legislation. Bolded text refers to citations within each bill. It should be noted that references to "the Act" within each bill generally refer to either Division A or Division B of the bill, not to the entire bill.

This report provides a brief analysis of selected "general oversight provisions" in the House- and Senate-passed versions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, 111th Congress). The analysis is included in a side-by-side discussion of similar provisions in each bill. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple agencies or programs. Therefore, oversight-related provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation, such as appropriations set-asides, are excluded from the report's scope. General oversight provisions in the House- and Senate-passed bills provide for, among other things, an oversight board composed of executive branch officials, several reporting requirements, and increased resources for agency inspectors general (IGs). In the context of crises, several oversight issues may arise. In the short term, these include questions of how to balance speed with prudence, and more general challenges of how to reconcile values of transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Longer-term issues include questions of how to build the capacity of federal agencies, Congress, and the President to better respond to crises. In addition, and arguably no less significant, questions arise of how to anticipate and avoid preventable crises. The federal government might be viewed as a system of "nested" oversight, with multiple entities engaging in simultaneous oversight activity. Congress oversees the President and agencies, for example, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Inspectors general and congressional support agencies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) provide assistance to Congress, agencies, and the President with oversight. In turn, within the executive branch, OMB has a statutory responsibility to provide management leadership for many agencies and oversees their activities. Agencies oversee their own activities through organizational and procedural arrangements. Throughout, tools such as monitoring, analysis, and evaluation may be utilized. In developing an overall oversight framework, there also are multiple perspectives on the potential objectives of oversight. These include compliance with applicable laws and regulations (e.g., adherence to legal requirements and avoidance of fraud); implementation that is faithful with congressional intent, when an agency or the President exercises discretion; avoidance of mismanagement (e.g., adherence to sound management practices); avoidance of undesired bias in funding allocations (e.g., fair allocation of resources and implementation of authorities, with intended equity); effectiveness of funded activities (e.g., achievement of programmatic missions and purposes); and efficiency of funded activities (e.g., minimization of avoidable "waste" and unnecessary redundancy). This report will be updated as events warrant.

Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizes the largest grant program in the ESEA, funded at $14.9 billion in FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). After calculating grants, ED provides each state with information on the grants calculated for LEAs in it. The state then makes specific adjustments to the grant amounts, including reserving funds for administration and school improvement and determining grants for charter schools that are their own LEAs. After making adjustments to the grant amounts calculated by ED, the state then provides funds to the LEAs. The LEAs, in turn, distribute funds to schools, often based on the percentage of children in each school eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. The ESSA made few changes to the Title I-A formulas. Changes to the Title I-A formulas under the ESSA will take effect beginning in FY2017. This report provides a general overview of the key components of each of the four formulas used to allocate Title I-A funds and changes to these factors made by the ESSA. Table 1 provides a summary of these components or "factors." Under Title I-A, funds are allocated to LEAs via state educational agencies (SEAs) using four different allocation formulas specified in statute: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of these formulas. In FY2016, about 43% of Title I-A appropriations will be allocated through the Basic Grants formula, 9% through the Concentration Grants formula, and 24% through each of the Targeted Grants and EFIG formulas. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant and "hold harmless" provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. As discussed previously, under Title I-A funds are allocated to LEAs via SEAs under four different formulas. Under the Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grant formulas, funds are initially calculated at the LEA level, and state total grants are the total of allocations for LEAs in the state, adjusted to apply state minimum grant provisions. Under the EFIG formula, allocations are first calculated for each state overall, with state totals subsequently suballocated to LEAs using a different formula. That is, under EFIG a state grant amount is affected by the formula child count within the state relative to the formula child count in other states. Subsequently, LEAs within each state compete with each other for grants, and these grants are determined, in part, based on how an LEA's formula child count compares to that of other LEAs in the same state. Under the other three Title I-A formulas, grants are initially determined at the LEA level, so each LEA competes for funding against all other LEAs nationwide. Although the allocation formulas have several distinctive elements, the primary factors used in all four are a formula child count and an expenditure factor. The formula child population used to determine Title I-A grants for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico consists of children ages 5 to 17 (1) in poor families, according to estimates for LEAs from the Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program; (2) in institutions for neglected or delinquent children or in foster homes; and (3) in families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) payments above the poverty income level for a family of four (hereinafter referred to as TANF children). Children in poor families account for about 97% of the total formula child count. Each element of the formula child count is updated annually. The formula child rate is the percentage of children ages 5 to 17 residing in a given LEA who are formula children. It is calculated by dividing the number of formula children in an LEA by the number of children ages 5 to 17 who reside in the LEA. The latter child count is determined based on SAIPE data. The expenditure factor for all four Title I-A formulas is equal to state average per pupil expenditure (APPE) for public K-12 education, subject to a minimum and a maximum percentage of the national average, further multiplied by 0.40. State APPE is subject to a minimum of 80% and a maximum of 120% of the national APPE for Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants. That is, if a state's APPE is less than 80% of the national APPE, the state's APPE is automatically raised to 80% of the national APPE. If a state's APPE is more than 120% of the national APPE, the state's APPE is automatically reduced to 120% of the national APPE. For EFIG, the minimum and maximum thresholds for state APPE relative to national APPE are 85% and 115%, respectively. After adjustments, should they be needed, a state's APPE is multiplied by 0.40 as specified in statute. Both the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas include weighting schemes to increase aid to LEAs with the highest concentrations of formula children. In general, children counted in the formulas are assigned weights on the basis of (1) each LEA's formula child rate (commonly referred to as percentage weighting) and (2) each LEA's number of formula children (commonly referred to as number weighting). Under both percentage weighting and number weighting, a weighted formula child count is produced and the higher of the two weighted counts is used to determine LEA grant amounts. As a result, the higher an LEA's formula child count or formula child rate is, the higher its grants per child counted in the formula will be. All four formulas contain hold harmless provisions to prevent large decreases in LEA grant amounts from year to year, assuming appropriations are sufficient to provide hold harmless amounts. Assuming appropriations are sufficient, a Title I-A hold harmless amount is the minimum percentage of an LEA's prior-year grant that the LEA will receive in the current year. Under all four formulas, LEAs with a relatively high percentage of formula children receive a higher hold harmless level. More specifically, the hold harmless rate under each formula is 85% of the previous-year grant if the LEA's percentage of formula children is less than 15%, 90% if the LEA's percentage of formula children is at or above 15% and less than 30%, and 95% if the LEA's percentage of formula children is at or above 30%. In order to benefit from the hold harmless provisions under each formula, an LEA must meet the eligibility requirements for the specific formula. The exception to this requirement is that LEAs that met the eligibility requirements to receive a Concentration Grant but fail to meet the requirements in a subsequent year will continue to receive a grant based on the hold harmless provisions for four additional years. All four formulas have state minimum grant provisions. Minimum grant amounts for each formula are calculated in part or wholly based on a percentage of the level of appropriations provided to each formula. This percentage is higher under the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas than it is under the Basic and Concentration Grant formulas. The EFIG formula includes two factors used to determine state level grants that are not included in any of the other three formulas—the effort factor and the equity factor. The effort factor for each state is based on APPE for public K-12 education compared to personal income per capita (PCI) for each state compared to the nation as a whole. In general, the effort factor benefits states that have a relatively high level of spending on education relative to their PCI in their state. Similar to the expenditure factor, the effort factor is also bounded but with more narrow bounds of 0.95 and 1.05. These relatively narrow bounds minimize the influence of the effort factor in the determination of state grants. The effort factor is the same for all LEAs in a given state. The equity factor for each state is determined based on variations in APPE among the LEAs in the state. The application of the equity factor results in higher grants to states with less variation in APPE among their LEAs and lower grants to states with greater variation in APPE among their LEAs. That is, the equity factor favors states with more equitable APPE among their LEAs. In addition to determining state grant amounts, the equity factor is also used in the determination of LEA weighted student counts. Depending on a state's equity factor, one of three sets of weights is used in determining an LEA's weight formula child count. While the use of the equity factor in determining state grants rewards states where APPE among LEAs is more equitable, at the LEA level, higher weights are used in determining weighted student counts for LEAs in states where APPE among LEAs is less equitable. Within a state with more variation in APPE among its LEAs, this results in higher grants for LEAs with a relatively high number of formula children or a relatively high formula child rate relative to what would be provided if only a single set of weights was used. Conversely, the lower the variation in APPE among LEAs in a given state, the lower the weights used to determine weighted formula child counts. Thus, in a state with less variation in APPE among its LEAs, the use of the weights produces smaller differences in the weighted formula child counts of LEAs with a relatively high number of formula children or a relatively high formula child rate as compared with other LEAs in the state; thereby, lessening the differences in grant per formula child to each LEA in that state relative to grants that are provided to states in which APPE among LEAs is less equitable. Unlike other federal elementary and secondary education programs, most Title I-A funds are subsequently allocated to individual schools by formula, although LEAs retain substantial discretion to control the use of a significant share of Title I-A grants at a central district level. While there are several rules related to school selection, LEAs must generally rank their public schools by their percentages of students from low-income families, and serve them in rank order. All participating schools must generally have a percentage of children from low-income families that is higher than the LEA's average, or 35%, whichever of these two figures is lower, although LEAs have the option of setting school eligibility thresholds higher than the minimum in order to concentrate available funds on a smaller number of schools. The ESSA includes a requirement that all Title I-A appropriations not provided for the Basic Grants and Concentration Grant formulas be equally divided between the Targeted Grants and EFIG formulas. Appropriators have provided funding for the Title I-A formulas in this manner for the past several years at their discretion. Beginning in FY2017, the ESSA will increase the set asides made by ED for the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and the Outlying Areas and state set asides for school improvement. Before Title I-A grants are allocated to states and LEAs, ED sets aside funds for grants to the BIE and Outlying Areas. In FY2017, this set-aside will increase from 1.0% to 1.1% provided this does not reduce the total amount of funds available for state grants below the level of funding available in FY2016. As with the current allocation process ED will then allocate grants to states and provide each state with information on the grants calculated for LEAs in it. The state will then make specific adjustments to the grant amounts, including reserving funds for school improvement. Currently, there are two sources of ESEA funds for school improvement: (1) a reservation of 4% of the funds received by the state under Title I-A, and (2) the School Improvement Grants (SIG) program. While funded in FY2016, the ESSA eliminated the authorization for the SIG program. Beginning in FY2017, under the Title I-A program states will be required to reserve the greater of (1) 7% of their Title I-A funds or (2) the amount the state reserved under Title I-A for school improvement in FY2016 plus the amount the state received under the SIG program for school improvement. The ESSA also altered the grant allocation process for schools. As previously discussed, LEAs must generally rank their public schools by their percentages of students from low-income families, and serve them in rank order. This must be done without regard to grade span under current law for any eligible school attendance area in which the concentration of children from low-income families exceeds 75%. Below this point, an LEA can choose to serve schools in rank order at specific grade levels (e.g., only serve elementary schools in order of their percentages of children from low-income families). Beginning in FY2017, LEAs will have the option to serve elementary and middle schools with more than 75% of their children from low-income families and high schools with more than 50% of their children from low-income families before choosing to serve schools in rank order by specific grade levels.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of these formulas. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant and "hold harmless" provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. This report provides a general overview of the key components of each of the formulas.

Under the ADA, individuals with disabilities may not "be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." In the context of public transportation, the statute requires transportation entities to offer supplemental "paratransit" service for people with disabilities. The statute provides, it shall be considered discrimination . . . for a public entity which operates a fixed route system . . . to fail to provide . . . paratransit [services] . . . that are sufficient to provide to such individuals a level of service (1) which is comparable to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system; or (2) in the case of response time, which is comparable, to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system. All public entities operating a "fixed-route system" are subject to the ADA's complementary paratransit requirements. The ADA defines "fixed-route system" as "a system of providing designated public transportation on which a vehicle is operated along a prescribed route according to a fixed schedule." A public entity is any state or local government, any department or instrumentality of a state or local government, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and certain commuter authorities. Also, the subcontractors of such public entities are subject to these obligations, even if the subcontractors are private entities. The Department of Transportation first promulgated regulations to implement the ADA's public transportation provisions on September 6, 1991. Under these regulations, "each public entity operating a fixed route system" (excluding commuter bus, commuter rail, and intercity rail systems) must provide "comparable" paratransit service for individuals with disabilities. Paratransit service, generally defined, is responsive, accessible origin-to-destination transportation service that is an alternative to a fixed-route system. It is important to note that paratransit requirements do not authorize public entities to supercede the ADA's other non-discrimination provisions. Although the regulations obligate entities to offer paratransit service, the regulations also forbid entities from requiring their customers with disabilities to utilize the paratransit services instead of the services available to the general public. Specifically, transportation entities "shall not, on the basis of disability, deny to any individual with a disability the opportunity to use the entity's transportation service for the general public, if the individual is capable of using that service." Furthermore, entities shall not require that individuals with disabilities sit in specific seats or be accompanied by an attendant. The statutory language provides little guidance regarding the required scope of paratransit service. It merely requires entities to offer a level of service that is "comparable" to the level of service offered to the general public. The ADA therefore required the Department of Transportation to develop minimum service criteria to "determine the level of services" sufficient to be "comparable" with services offered to individuals without disabilities. Note that the regulations do not prohibit public entities from offering paratransit services that exceed these minimum service requirements. The regulations require entities to provide paratransit service to all "paratransit-eligible" individuals, including non-resident visitors "who present documentation that they are ADA paratransit eligible." An individual is paratransit-eligible if he or she is an individual with a disability who meets the requirements for one of three categories. The first eligibility category includes individuals who are unable, as a result of a physical or mental impairment, to board and ride accessible fixed-route transit systems. Department commentary accompanying the final rule shows that the department intended this first category to especially target individuals who are unable to "navigate the system." The second eligibility category includes individuals who are able to use accessible vehicles but whose fixed-route system lacks accessible vehicles. Finally, the third eligibility category includes individuals "who ... [have] specific impairment-related condition[s] which ... prevent[s] such individual[s] from traveling to a boarding location or from a disembarking location on such system." The regulations also require entities to provide paratransit service to one individual accompanying each paratransit-eligible individual. This accompanying-individual allowance does not address assistance by personal care attendants; rather, it enables individuals with disabilities to travel with a friend or family member for pleasure. Thus, if the individual with a disability requires a personal care attendant, an accompanying individual shall also be provided service. The regulation regarding minimum service times implements the ADA's "comparable" requirement in a straightforward manner. It provides that public entities must offer paratransit services for the same time frame for which they offer fixed-route transportation service to the general public. The regulations allow entities to charge a higher fare to paratransit riders than they charge to general riders; however, the fare charged to paratransit riders cannot exceed twice the amount charged to an individual for a similar trip on the general, fixed-route transportation service. Likewise, the entity cannot charge "premiums" above this amount unless the premium is charged for services that exceed the minimum service requirements mandated by the regulations. Under the regulations, entities must provide paratransit service in all areas within three quarters of a mile of the fixed-route service. For bus systems, this requirement refers to three-quarters of a mile on either side of the fixed-route corridor and includes "small areas not inside any of the corridors but which are surrounded by corridors." For rail systems, this requirement refers to a three-quarter-mile radius surrounding each rail station. The regulations require that all paratransit service be "origin-to-destination" service. The department intentionally left ambiguous whether "origin-to-destination" service means door-to-door or curb-to-curb service, preferring to leave that specific "operational decision" to local-level decision-makers. However, in later guidance documents, the department has clarified that it would be inappropriate for an entity to "establish an inflexible policy that refuses to provide service to eligible passengers beyond the curb in all circumstances." Multiple regulations govern entities' obligations regarding the time it takes to respond to an individual's request for paratransit service. One response-time regulation, the next-day service requirement, provides a bright-line rule: it requires transportation entities to provide paratransit services for the day after a paratransit-eligible person has requested them. That regulation further states that, although entities can negotiate pick-up times, they cannot move the requested time by more than one hour. A second Department of Transportation regulation, which governs "capacity constraints," seems to allow for flexibility in the next-day service provision requirement. It provides an exclusive list of ways in which entities cannot limit the availability of complementary paratransit service, thereby suggesting that other manners of limiting the service are acceptable. Specifically, this "capacity constraints" regulation prohibits limiting paratransit service in any of the following ways: "(1) [r]estrictions on the number of trips an individual will be provided; (2) [w]aiting lists for access to the service; or (3) [a]ny operational pattern or practice that significantly limits the availability of service to ADA paratransit eligible persons." This regulation also provides examples of discriminatory "patterns or practices," including "(A) [s]ubstantial numbers of significantly untimely pickups for initial or return trips; (B) [s]ubstantial numbers of trip denials or missed trips; [and] (C) [s]ubstantial numbers of trips with excessive trip lengths." At least one court has interpreted the department's multiple regulations regarding paratransit response times as being somewhat in tension. In Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transportation Authority , the Second Circuit—relying on Department of Transportation commentary accompanying these regulations, an agency opinion letter addressed to the court, and opinion letters issued by the Federal Transit Administration's Office of Civil Rights—interpreted the next-day service requirement (49 C.F.R. §37.131(b)) as imposing an affirmative obligation on public entities to plan, design, and implement a paratransit service that meets 100% of demand and accounts for fluctuations in demand over time. Additionally, it interpreted the more flexible "capacity constraints" regulation as functioning to give entities practical flexibility when situations arise for which advance planning is difficult. Therefore, the court held that a transportation provider cannot be held liable for failing to meet 100% of demand for paratransit services unless the failure results in denying a number of paratransit-eligible riders "sufficient to constitute a pattern or practice." In Anderson , plaintiffs argued that the Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation Authority (RGRTA), a public entity for purposes of the ADA, violated the ADA when it denied them and other disabled riders paratransit services scheduled a day or more in advance. RGRTA admitted denying rides requested a day or more in advance by paratransit-eligible riders but claimed that it denied the rides because it encountered "not unusual" constraints on capacity. The court held that RGRTA had violated the ADA because RGRTA's organizational records showed that RGRTA had anticipated an increased demand for paratransit services and yet failed to plan or change its operations in order to meet that demand. Similarly, in Martin v Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority , plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Atlanta Mass Transit Authority (MARTA), alleging in part that MARTA discriminated against riders with disabilities by failing to provide adequate paratransit service. The Martin court held that the plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood on the success of the merits for their paratransit claim, because "operational patterns and practices in MARTA's paratransit service [had] significantly limited the availability of service to paratransit eligible persons in violation of the ADA." According to the court, MARTA's troubling practices included changing "ready times" without properly notifying riders and charging riders for paratransit service even when the driver arrived more than thirty minutes after the scheduled "ready time." In sum, the available case law interpreting the paratransit response time regulations appears to suggest that under the next-day service requirement entities must plan to meet 100% of demand for next-day service to paratransit riders. However, the case law also suggests that under the capacity constraints regulation entities can be held liable for failing to provide next-day service only if such a failure results in one of the three situations—waiting lists, restricting rides for an individual person, or a discriminatory "pattern or practice"—as enumerated in 49 C.F.R. §37.131(f). The ADA limits its paratransit requirement by waiving the obligation in cases where providing such a service would impose an "undue financial burden" on an entity. The regulations delineate 10 factors for the Federal Transit Administration to consider when determining whether an entity is entitled to an "undue burden" waiver. These include (1) "[e]ffects on current fixed route service," (2) average number of per capita trips made by the general population as compared with the average number of per capita trips made by paratransit riders, (3) "[r]eductions in other services," (4) "[i]ncreases in fares," (5) "[r]esources available to implement complementary paratransit service," (6) "[p]ercentage of budget needed to implement the plan," (7) "current level of accessible service," (8) "[c]ooperation/coordination among area transportation providers," (9) "[e]vidence of increased efficiencies," and (10) unique circumstances in the area.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., is a broad non-discrimination statute that includes a prohibition of discrimination in public transportation. To prevent such discrimination, the ADA imposes several affirmative obligations on transportation providers, including a requirement that providers offer separate "paratransit" service, or accessible origin-to-destination service, for eligible individuals with disabilities. Under the statute, the level of such service must be "comparable" to the level of service offered on fixed route systems to individuals without disabilities. Department of Transportation regulations implement this "comparable" standard with specific requirements regarding the scope and manner of paratransit service. Regarding the time taken by providers to respond to individuals' requests for paratransit service, recent case law suggests that providers' legal obligation under the ADA and accompanying regulations is to avoid discriminatory "patterns or practices" of service. For more information on the ADA, see CRS Report 98-921, The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): Statutory Language and Recent Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

RS21462 -- Russia and the War in Iraq Updated April 14, 2003 Most discussions of Russian interests in Iraq focus on economic factors. Moscow, however, has cultivated friendly relations withBaghdad since the 1960s as part of its general strategy toward the region in connection with the Arab-Israeli conflictand the broaderCold War. The U.S.S.R. was Saddam's main arms supplier during Iraq's 1980-1988 war with Iran. Russia stillperceives itself ashaving strategic interests and an historic role in that region and does not want to be seen as betraying a long-timefriend. Nevertheless, many analysts assume that economic factors have driven Russian policy toward Iraq. Baghdad owed Moscow $7-$8billion for Soviet-era arms sales during the Iran-Iraq War. Adjusted for inflation, this debt may total $10-12 billiontoday. It is widelybelieved that one of the reasons why Russia regularly took Iraq's side in U.N. debates in the 1990s over liftingsanctions was tofacilitate debt repayment, especially as Russia was very short of hard currency. Russian oil companies havecontracts that could beworth as much as $30 billion over 20 years to develop Iraqi oil fields. In addition, Russian firms have contractsworth billions to helpmodernize Iraq's economic infrastructure. In August 2002, Iraq announced that Russian firms would receivecontracts worth $40billion over 5 years to modernize Iraq's oil, electrical, chemical, agricultural, and transport sectors. (1) Another Russian interest is the price of oil. The Russian economy is extraordinarily dependent on oil and gas exports. In 2000,Russia's oil exports earned $25.3 billion. The total Russian Federal budget in 2000 was $48 billion. The price ofoil peaked near $40per barrel ($/bbl) in early March 2003. Russia profits greatly from high oil prices, the biggest single factor behindRussian economicgrowth today. But Russian leaders fear that a post-Saddam Iraq (with the second largest proven oil reserves in theworld) mightmaximize its oil output, dramatically driving down the price of oil. Some analysts estimated that a $6/bbl fall inthe price of oil couldcut Russia's projected economic growth in 2003 in half. A sharper price drop, below $18/bbl, would severely impactRussiangovernment revenues, jeopardizing Moscow's ability to pay salaries and pensions and to fund its already meagersocial expenditures. With a Duma (lower legislative chamber) election in December 2003 and Putin expected to seek reelection in March2004, such adevelopment is dreaded in the Kremlin. (2) Many observers believe that Russian policy is also motivated by a desire to restrain U.S. global domination and rein in perceived U.S.tendencies toward unilateralism and excessive reliance on military force. The idea of a multi-polar world not totallydominated by asingle "hyper-power," in which Russia would be a major international player, still has strong appeal in Russia. Although Putin hasadopted a generally cooperative stance toward the United States, he does not want to be perceived at home as anAmerican "vassal"nor to give the Bush Administration a blank check where Russian interests are concerned. Thus, Russia may havehad an interest inprinciple in opposing "unilateral" U.S. military action in Iraq. Putin does not seek to project Russia into theforefront of ananti-American coalition. He seeks, in cooperation with traditional U.S. allies France and Germany as well as withRussian partnerssuch as China, to put some limits on U.S. power, especially its recourse to "unilateral" military force. Against Russia's economic interests in Iraq and its interest in restraining American global domination, is the strategic decision Putinmade in 2001 to reorient Russian foreign and defense policy toward broad cooperation with the United States. Putinsees Russia'seconomic reconstruction and revitalization proceeding from its integration in the global economic system dominatedby the advancedindustrial democracies - something that cannot be accomplished in an atmosphere of political/military confrontationor antagonismwith the United States. Putin therefore shifted Russian national security policy toward integration with the Westand cooperation withthe United States. (3) Most observers believe thisremains the basis of Putin's national security policy. By February 2003, Russian experts concluded that war in Iraq was virtually inevitable and Russia began evacuating its citizens. Although Russia opposed U.S. military action. it hoped to prevent this disagreement from damaging broaderbilateral relations. OnMarch 12, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov said that if war erupts, Russia "will cooperate with the UnitedStates for anearly resolution" of the conflict. "We will strive to minimize negative effects and bring the situation back topolitical and diplomaticarenas." (4) As the Bush Administration began to make clear in 2002 its determination to overthrow the regime of Iraqi President SaddamHussein, Moscow reassessed its Iraq policy. By mid-2002, some Russian officials and scholars hinted that Moscowmight not objecttoo strongly to U.S. military action against Iraq, provided that Washington did not act unilaterally and that Russianeconomic interestsin Iraq were respected. (5) These discussions werereported in the Russian and U.S. press and undoubtedly were detected in Baghdad. Iraq's announcement (August 16, 2002) of the $40 billion agreement for Russian firms to modernize Iraq'sinfrastructure may havebeen an attempt to ensure Russian political support. However, in December 2002, Iraqi authorities cancelled a $3.7billion contractwith Lukoil, Russia's largest oil company to develop the huge West Qurna oil field. Many analysts viewed this asretaliation againstLukoil, whose CEO, Vagit Alekperov, reportedly held discussions with U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abrahamand Iraqi oppositionleaders about Lukoil's future role in a post-Saddam Iraq. (6) Moscow can also be seen trying to balance its interest in preserving a major role for itself in a multi-polar world in cooperation withFrance, Germany, and China, on one hand, against its desire to avoid conflict with the United States on an issueWashington views asvital, on the other. This was demonstrated in the negotiations leading up the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC)approval of Resolution1441 (November 8, 2002), in which France took the lead in pressing the United States for concessions while Russiaplayed a moremoderate role. Many observers believed that the conclusion of Putin's balancing act would be a deal with Washington whereby Russia would agreenot to use its UNSC veto in return for U.S. guarantees of Russian economic interests in Iraq. A Russianparliamentary leader close toPutin suggested such a deal in October 2002. (7) InFebruary 2003, Boris Nemtsov, former Deputy Premier and now leader of a liberalpolitical party, wrote that, "If the Americans and British can reassure Moscow that a future Iraqi regime will not beprejudicial toRussian economic interests, they will be better placed to secure its acquiescence." (8) Putin sent his chief of staff, Aleksandr Voloshin,to Washington (February 24-25, 2003), where he met with the President, Secretary of State, and National SecurityAdvisor. TheRussian press reported his trip as, "an attempt to seal concrete economic deals in return for Russia's support orabstention on theSecurity Council." U.S. sources made a similar assessment. (9) Based on U.S. and Russian press reports and discussions with U.S. and Russian officials, it appears that the U.S. response is asfollows: Russia's economic interests in Iraq will receive due consideration. However, a) Iraq owes money to manycountries. Its debtto Russia ought not be put in a special category in preference to all others. b) U.S. oil companies, among others,have been shut out ofIraq for years. Why should Russian firms be guaranteed a special privileged place in post-Saddam Iraq, possiblyat the expense ofU.S. firms? c) Contrary to persistent Russian belief, the United States does not control the price of oil and cannotguarantee specificprice levels. U.S. officials reportedly suggested an informal "gentleman's agreement" to respect Russian economic interests in Iraq. (10) Russiawanted concrete, unequivocal guarantees. As one Russian think tank director put it, "There were talks with the U.S.about Russianeconomic interests in Iraq, but they did not succeed. There were [American] expressions of sympathy but noguarantees." (11) On February 28, 2003, the U.S. State Department designated three Chechen groups with alleged links to Al Qaeda as terroristorganizations. On March 6, the Senate unanimously approved the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and onMarch 10, SenLugar introduced a bill ( S. 580 ) to exempt Russia from the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. None of thesemoves are directly related to Iraq, except perhaps in their timing. (12) The Bush Administration also brandished sticks as well as carrots. U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow reportedly toldRussian reporters on March 12 that a Russian veto of the U.S.-backed Security Council resolution on Iraq woulddamage bilateralrelations. Vershbow mentioned cooperation on security, energy, antiterrorism, antimissile defenses, and the spaceprogram as areasthat could be adversely affected by a Russian veto of the resolution. (13) In February 2003, Russian opposition to U.S. military action against Iraq hardened. February 9-12, Putin traveled to Berlin and Parisand joined French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder in a joint declaration stating that there wasstill an alternativeto war and that Russia, France, and Germany were determined to work together to complete disarmament in Iraqpeacefully. (14) On March 2, Putin rejected regime change as a legitimate goal in Iraq. "[T]he international community cannot interfere with thedomestic affairs of any country in order to change its regime.... [T]he only legitimate goal the United Nations canpursue in thissituation is the disarmament of Iraq." (15) On March10, Foreign Minister Ivanov declared that if the U.S.-backed resolutionauthorizing war was submitted to the UNSC, Russia would vote against it." (16) Soon after the U.S.-led coalition began military operations in Iraq, Putin called the attack "a big mistake," "unjustified," and insistedthat military action be ended quickly. Russian media, like that in many other European countries, took a generallynegative attitudetoward coalition military action, emphasizing innocent civilian casualties and coalition mistakes and problems. InRussia, however,the Kremlin exercises very strong influence over the media, especially TV. Russian public opinion overwhelminglyopposed whatmost Russians saw as U.S. aggression. There were large anti-war rallies in major cities and spontaneousmanifestations ofanti-Americanism. 'There is something slightly alarming in Russia's new, more hard-line stance toward the United States over Iraq," observed the Moscow Times editorial page on February 27. "President Vladimir Putin changed the tone ... when hewarned of the dangers of U.S.and British warmongering and called on the military to be ready to defend Russia's interests. Then ... Russia, whichhad beenstraddling both sides, jumped firmly into the French and German camp." Moscow's shift suggests two questions: why the more hard-line stance toward U.S. policy on Iraq; and has Putin irrevocably "jumpedinto the French and German camp"? There are probably multiple factors behind Putin's more hard-line stance toward the United States. There is Russia's interest inpromoting a "multi-polar world" and bolstering the stature and authority of the U.N. vis-a-vis the United States. Most of Russia'spolitical elites as well as the majority of the national security establishment were hostile to the prospect of a U.S.war in Iraq. Over90% of Russians also strongly opposed the war. (17) Putin may feel that he cannot appear completely to ignore the opinions of hisgenerals and diplomats, the political establishment, and the voters. By early April, the demonstration - yet again - of America's unrivaled military capability must have been very disturbing to manyRussians, especially in view of Moscow's miserable experiences in Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen regularlyclaim that theU.S. Government is hiding its true casualty figures, which must be much higher than announced. Thewide and widening gap betweenU.S. and Russian military capabilities both embarrasses and frightens many Russians. Finally - and perhaps most important - it appears that the Bush Administration has not given Moscow the firm assurances it wantsguaranteeing Russian economic interests in Iraq. Now that the battlefield aspect of the Iraq conflict is essentially over, it remains to be seen how strong Russian opposition will be toU.S. policy in Iraq. That may depend on how Putin weighs the benefits of "principled" and domestically popularopposition to theUnited States against the costs of incurring the enmity of the Bush Administration on an issue that Bush clearlyconsiders to be ofsupreme importance. The two presidents spoke by telephone on March 18 and reportedly agreed that despitedifferences on Iraq,bilateral cooperation on other issues would be increased. On March 20, Putin criticized the U.S. attack as a"political blunder" thatcould jeopardize the international security system. At the same time, other Russian officials emphasized theimportance ofminimizing the damage in bilateral relations. U.S. Ambassador Vershbow, speaking on Russian TV on March 20,also said thatU.S.-Russian tension over Iraq would soon pass. The Russian Duma postponed action on the Strategic OffensiveReductions Treaty,citing the Iraq conflict. Several legislative leaders close to Putin, however, criticized this action as against Russianinterests andpredicted Russian approval of the treaty soon. (18)

Now that the U.S.-led coalition has overthrown Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, thequestion of Russia's position on the conflict again focuses on political and economic issues, including Russia's rolein the U.N.. President Putin still appears to be trying to balance three competing interests: protecting Russian economic interestsin Iraq;restraining U.S. global dominance; and maintaining friendly relations with the United States. This report will beupdated periodically.

Several types of investments are preferentially treated under the individual income tax, including Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), pensions, capital gains, dividends, owner occupied housing, and life insurance policy earnings. There are two types of IRAs that have the effect of exempting investment earnings from tax—the traditional (deductible) IRA and the Roth IRA. For the deductible IRA (also called a front-loaded IRA), contributions are deducted when made and withdrawals are taxed; this treatment is similar to the treatment of pensions. Eligibility for the deductible IRA is phased out as income increases for individuals who are active participants in employer pension plans. (Individuals above the income phase-out can make non-deductible contributions, with earnings taxed when withdrawn, which allows deferral, but not elimination, of taxes.) There are penalties for early withdrawal and mandatory distribution requirements. As described above, IRAs were treated the same way as pension plans, with contributions deductible and withdrawals taxable. The Roth IRA (also called a back-loaded IRA), was added as an option in 1997, when eligibility for both types of IRAs was expanded. The tax treatment of this account is similar to that of a tax exempt bond: earnings are simply not taxed. The earnings phase-outs are higher and treatment is, in general, more generous than in the case of the deductible IRA. The annual deduction limit for IRA contributions when expanded in 1997 was the lesser of $2,000 or 100% of compensation; that limit was increased under the temporary provisions of the 2001 tax cut and eventually made permanent at $5,000. The 2001 act also introduced a tax credit for contributions by low income individuals. Favorable tax treatment of pensions, namely allowing the firm to deduct contributions which are not included in employees income and exempting the earnings of pension trusts as in the case of deductible IRAs, has been in place almost since the inception of the tax law. Pensions fall into two types: defined benefit plans where payments depend on earnings and years of service at retirement, and defined contribution plans where payments depend on the amount accumulated in an account. Pensions are subject to many rules and regulations designed to ensure that tax benefits do not accrue to owners and highly compensated managers and that pension trusts are adequately funded in the case of defined benefit plans. Of course to the extent that pension assets (or IRA assets) are invested in corporate stock, tax is collected at the corporate level. Tax benefits for pension plans are much more important in dollar terms than are tax benefits for IRAs. For FY2009, according the latest Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates, employer pensions resulted in a revenue loss of $120.4 billion, with plans for self-employed individuals (called Keogh plans) costing $9.5 billion. IRAs resulted in a loss of $18.5 billion. In the case of dividends, about half of the income is not subject to tax because of tax preferred status. There are other savings and investments that receive favorable treatment under the individual income tax. Capital gains has historically been favorably treated, both through lower tax rates, deferral (taxed only when realized), and forgiveness of tax if passed on at death. Dividends are also now eligible for lower tax rates. Of course, earnings on corporate stock are taxed under the corporate tax. Owner occupied housing is also favorably treated because imputed rent is not included in income, and earnings on investments in life insurance policies are deferred and, when passed on via death benefits, exempt from tax. These tax benefits are significant as well. Lower rates for capital gains and dividends are estimated by the JCT to lose $131.0 billion in FY2009, the failure to tax gains at death $57.5 billion, and the deferral of gain for gifts $5.9 billion. While there is not a separate estimate for excluding imputed rent, the value of deducting costs (even though gross rent is not included in income) through itemized deductions is $85.2 billion for mortgage interest and $14.2 billion for property taxes. The exemption of most capital gains on homes is estimated to cost $30.1 billion. The value of deferral and forgiveness of earnings on life insurance policies is $27.5 billion. IRAs were expanded by the 2001 tax bill, H.R. 1836 , which was signed into law on June 7, 2001. IRA limits increased to $3,000 in 2002, $4,000 in 2005 and $5,000 in 2008, with indexation afterwards. Individual 50 and over had an extra $500 increase in 2002 and will have a $1,000 increase in 2008. This bill also increased contribution limits for pension plans, including 401(k) plans. Because of budget rules the tax cuts in this bill were sunsetted in 2010, but the increased limit was made permanent by the Pension Protection Act of 2006. The Pension Protection Act also allowed a rollover of IRA amounts to charity for those aged 70 and ½ without incurring tax effects. This provision expired after 2007 but may be reinstated along with other extenders. President Bush proposed in his FY2004 through FY2009 budget plans to eliminate the deductible IRA form. His proposal would rename the Roth IRAs as Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs), and also allow Lifetime Savings Accounts (LSAs). The contribution limits would be greatly increased (to $5,000 for each type of account under the most recent proposal) and the income limits would be eliminated. Individuals could roll over existing accounts into these new accounts, by paying tax on the rollovers, which would increase revenue in the short run. The latest proposal is expected to initially gain and then lose revenue, with loss in the tenth year of $.5 billion. In the long run, the provision would cost much more. His proposal would also combine a variety of employer savings accounts into a single account and simplify the rules designed to prevent discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees. This proposal might form part of an the President's proposal for fundamental tax reform. The Enron scandal and the slow recovery of the economy led to legislative proposals regarding pensions in the 107 th Congress that did not see completion and were not addressed in the 108 th Congress. However, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 eventually provided a variety of revisions and liberalizations of pension policy. The original rationale for IRAs, first introduced in 1962, was to provide parity with individuals covered by employer pensions. IRAs were made universally available in 1981, with the primary rationale to encourage savings. Income limits that disallowed deductible IRA coverage for most individuals were adopted as part of the base broadening in the 1986 Tax Reform Act; the 1997 legislation increased these limits and introduced Roth IRAs. All but the very high income individuals and couples now have access to IRAs. There has been considerable debate among economists about the effect of IRAs on savings. Some statistical studies have found powerful savings effects of IRAs and have argued that advertising of the tax benefit has caused people to save. Others have disputed the evidence from those studies and argued that there is no historical evidence of an IRA savings effect, and that economic theory does not support such an effect. Still others have argued that IRAs are less important in increasing overall savings than the more generous thrift savings accounts (e.g., 401(k) plans) provided through employers. Although the dollar contribution ceilings and income limits on IRAs keep the provision from providing benefits to very high income individuals, IRAs do generally benefit well-off individuals who are more likely to save. The evidence that lower taxes on the return to investments increase savings in general is mixed. Income and substitution effects, which in the one case lower and the other case raise savings, may net out to little or no effect, and most simple evidence suggests that savings rates do not change very much as tax rules change (although there has been a trend downward in private savings rates).

Several types of savings are eligible for beneficial treatment under the individual income tax, and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) have received considerable attention. Pension savings are actually more important in terms of revenue loss. There are other investments that are treated favorably as well. The President has proposed in a succession of budgets to significantly expand IRAs. Effects of these provisions on savings are uncertain, and, despite dollar limits on contributions and income phase outs, IRAs tend to benefit higher income individuals.

On March 31, 2015, the Supreme Court decided in Armstrong v. Exception Child Center, Incorporated , that private parties cannot seek an injunction from a federal court to prevent state Medicaid officials from implementing a state plan that may violate federal law. This report provides an overview of the decision in Armstrong , the potential implications of this decision for Medicaid, and the availability of equitable relief against state officers in federal courts generally. Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program through which the federal government provides financial assistance to states for medical care and other services for poor, elderly, and disabled individuals. Although participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, states, as a condition of participation, are required to have a plan that complies with federal Medicaid statutes and regulations in order to qualify for federal assistance. Nevertheless, states have considerable discretion in administering their Medicaid programs, which generally includes setting the payment rates at which providers are reimbursed for their services to Medicaid beneficiaries. In the context of these rate-setting determinations, providers and others have argued that reductions make reimbursement rates inadequate and have turned to the courts to challenge these reductions. When challenging these reimbursement rates, plaintiffs have often claimed that the rates violate the requirements of Section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act, often referred to as Medicaid's "equal access provision." This provision requires a state Medicaid plan to provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan…as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area .... Medicaid beneficiaries and others have claimed that because of inadequate Medicaid reimbursement rates, the requirements of the equal access provision are not met (e.g., the state did not consider, or the state plan's methods or procedures do not assure, that Medicaid payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care, or are sufficient to enlist providers to provide Medicaid services). In other words, plaintiffs have generally argued that the provider reimbursement rates are so low that they do not allow for sufficient care and services to be provided to beneficiaries, as compared to the care in that area that is available to individuals who do not participate in the Medicaid program. In determining whether a state's provider reimbursement rates violate the equal access provision, a significant threshold question arises in these cases: whether private parties can sue to enforce these federal requirements. Because the Medicaid Act contains no express language that allows private parties to challenge reimbursement rate cuts, plaintiffs desiring to challenge cuts in Medicaid payment rates under the equal access provision have sought out other legal vehicles to bring their claims. Historically, plaintiffs had brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows individuals to sue local governments and state and local officers in order to redress violations of federal law. Based on this cause of action, plaintiffs have alleged that state Medicaid officials violated their federal rights because the reimbursement rates did not comply with the requirements of the equal access provision. Multiple courts found that Medicaid providers and beneficiaries could enforce the equal access provision by bringing an action under Section 1983. However, in 2002, the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe restricted plaintiffs' ability to bring an action under Section 1983. As the Court explained in Gonzaga , "we now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under Section 1983." In the wake of Gonzaga , most appellate courts held that the equal access provision is not privately enforceable under Section 1983. Thus, in light of the Gonzaga decision, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have sought other legal avenues for challenging Medicaid reimbursement rates. Plaintiffs have also sought to enforce federal laws against state officials through an equitable cause of action first recognized by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young , under which "federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal law." In Young , the Court upheld a federal circuit court's order enjoining the Minnesota attorney general from enforcing railroad rates set by a state commission under Minnesota law. The basis for the injunction in this case was the determination that the Minnesota railroad rate scheme violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, and was therefore unconstitutional. Although actions under Ex parte Young are frequently permitted, the Court has found that the availability of an equitable remedy had been foreclosed by Congress. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida , the Court noted that "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations" and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young. Therefore, the fact that Congress had specified a detailed process by which tribes were to enforce their rights against a state under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) indicated that Congress intended to preclude tribal litigants from seeking to enforce those same provisions through Ex parte Young. Following the narrowing of Section 1983 remedies in the wake of Gonzaga , private plaintiffs have sought to enjoin state officials that they believe are in violation of federal Medicaid requirements under Ex parte Young . In 2012, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the availability of such a remedy in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California . While the case was pending, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved the modifications to California's Medicaid program. In light of this "different posture," a majority of the Court voted to remand the case to the Ninth Circuit to determine what effect, if any, the administrative action should have on the question of whether a cause of action is available under the Supremacy Clause. Four Justices dissented from the majority opinion. In the dissent's view, the administrative actions by CMS "have no impact on the question" of the availability of a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. Upon reaching that question, the dissent would have held that the Supremacy Clause does not provide an independent cause of action where Congress has declined to provide a private right of action to enforce a federal statute. During the October 2014 term, the Supreme Court was again presented with the question posed by Douglas , namely, whether the Supremacy Clause independently provides a cause of action to prevent state officials from violating a federal statute. The facts of this case, Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Incorporated , are similar to the facts of Douglas . In Armstrong , Idaho's reimbursement rates for providers of "habilitation services" were challenged by providers of these services. As in Douglas , the Armstrong plaintiffs argued that the rates were in violation of the equal access provision required under Medicaid. However, in contrast to Douglas , Idaho's rates had already received approval from CMS. Therefore, Armstrong presented an opportunity for the Court to squarely address the question presented in Douglas , but without the risk of intervening administrative action requiring a remand to the lower courts. In answer to that question, a majority of the Court held that the Supremacy Clause did not provide a cause of action for private parties to enforce the Medicaid equal access requirement. While recognizing that federal courts are empowered to enjoin state enforcement actions that are preempted by federal law, the majority held that this power is not derived from the Supremacy Clause, but from courts' inherent equitable powers. The Supremacy Clause merely provides a "rule of decision" when courts are confronted with a conflict between state and federal law. But, the authority to resolve that conflict must come from another source, such as a statutory cause of action created by Congress or the equitable powers of the judiciary. With respect to whether the courts could enjoin Idaho's implementation of its Medicaid rates as a form of equitable relief, the majority found that Congress had foreclosed such an option for the plaintiffs. This holding was grounded on two main observations. First, a separate enforcement mechanism had been provided by Congress in the form of the withholding of federal funds from a noncompliant state Medicaid plan. Second, the majority found the terms of the equal access provision to be judicially unadministrable. In particular, the majority stated, It is difficult to imagine a requirement broader and less specific than §30(A)'s mandate that state plans provide for payments that are "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care," all the while "safeguard[ing] against unnecessary utilization of . . . care and services." Explicitly conferring enforcement of this judgment-laden standard upon the Secretary alone establishes, we think, that Congress "wanted to make the agency remedy that it provided exclusive," thereby achieving "the expertise, uniformity, widespread consultation, and resulting administrative guidance that can accompany agency decisionmaking," and avoiding "the comparative risk of inconsistent interpretations and misincentives that can arise out of an occasional inappropriate application of the statute in a private action." Four Justices dissented in Armstrong , arguing that while the Supremacy Clause may not provide the plaintiffs with a cause of action, the evidence of congressional intent to foreclose equitable relief was insufficient. In particular, the dissent argued that the agency enforcement mechanism in Medicaid was not the type of "detailed remedial scheme" that had previously been relied upon by the Court to deny equitable relief. In addition to concerns about the weight given to alternative enforcement mechanisms in this case, the dissent may also have disagreed with the burden the majority required the plaintiffs to meet before they would be allowed to seek equitable relief. Specifically, the dissent observed that equitable preemption actions differ from suits brought by plaintiffs invoking 42 U. S. C. §1983 or an implied right of action to enforce a federal statute. Suits for "redress designed to halt or prevent the constitutional violation rather than the award of money damages" seek "traditional forms of relief." By contrast, a plaintiff invoking §1983 or an implied statutory cause of action may seek a variety of remedies—including damages—from a potentially broad range of parties. Rather than simply pointing to background equitable principles authorizing the action that Congress presumably has not overridden, such a plaintiff must demonstrate specific congressional intent to create a statutory right to these remedies. In other words, the dissent would appear to view equitable relief as a "traditional" and "background" form of relief that Congress must affirmatively foreclose, rather than a legislatively created cause of action that Congress must affirmatively create. The dissent further stated that "For these reasons, the principles that we have developed to determine whether a statute creates an implied right of action, or is enforceable through §1983, are not transferable to the Ex parte Young context." The immediate effect of the Armstrong decision would appear to be the insulation of state Medicaid programs and officials from suits brought by private parties, such as beneficiaries or providers, alleging violations of federal Medicaid requirements. Without a private avenue of enforcement directly against states, future litigation will likely focus on federal actions to approve state plans, possibly as actions seeking review of a final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. Though the availability of such a cause of action may not be in doubt, whether the level of review in the context of such an action is sufficient may be a topic of future debate. As noted by Justice Breyer in his concurrence in Armstrong , The law may give the federal agency broad discretionary authority to decide when and how to exercise or to enforce statutes and rules. As a result, it may be difficult for respondents to prevail on an APA claim unless it stems from an agency's particularly egregious failure to act. But, if that is so, it is because Congress decided to vest broad discretion in the agency to interpret and to enforce §30(A). The potential significance of Armstrong beyond the Medicaid program also remains to be seen. The Court's decision could inform future litigation brought by a private party seeking to compel state officials to comply with other federal statutes, particularly where those statutes provide mechanisms for federal agencies to enforce their requirements. Additionally, the decision may inform the drafting and consideration of legislation in Congress, insofar as the opinion clarifies the analysis and presumptions the Court will utilize when considering whether equitable relief has been foreclosed.

On March 31, 2015, the Supreme Court decided in Armstrong v. Exception Child Center, Incorporated, that private parties cannot seek an injunction from a federal court to prevent state Medicaid officials from implementing a state plan that may violate Medicaid's equal access requirement under federal law. Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program through which the federal government provides financial assistance to states for medical care and other services for poor, elderly, and disabled individuals. States have considerable discretion in administering their Medicaid program, which generally includes setting the payment rates at which providers are reimbursed for their services to Medicaid beneficiaries, but must comply with certain federal requirements. One such requirement, known as equal access, requires rates to be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services under Medicaid will be at least comparable to those available to the general population. In Armstrong, providers of certain Medicaid services challenged the state's reimbursement for those services, and sought to enjoin the state from implementing the reduced rates. A majority of the Court held that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution did not provide a private right of action against state officials that are allegedly violating, or planning to violate, federal law. Further, the existence of an administrative enforcement scheme conducted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services counseled against allowing an action against the state to proceed in equity. Four Justices dissented, and would have permitted the plaintiffs to seek equitable relief from the courts to enjoin the state. Without a private avenue of enforcement directly against states, future litigation will likely focus on federal actions to approve state plans, possibly as suits seeking review of a final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. The potential significance of Armstrong beyond the Medicaid program remains to be seen, but could inform future litigation brought by a private party seeking to compel state officials to comply with other federal statutes, or the drafting and consideration of legislation in Congress, insofar as the opinion clarifies the analysis and presumptions the Court will utilize when considering whether equitable relief has been foreclosed.

Introduced in each of the last several congressional sessions, the Student Non-Discrimination Act (SNDA) would prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in public elementary and secondary schools. The stated purpose of the legislation ( H.R. 846 / S. 439 in the 114 th Congress) is to ensure that students are free from discriminatory conduct such as harassment, bullying, intimidation, and violence. SNDA appears to be patterned on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs or activities, although SNDA does differ from Title IX in several important respects. In the 113 th Congress, SNDA was included as part of legislation to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Similar legislation to reauthorize the ESEA is pending in the 114 th Congress, and it is possible that SNDA could be incorporated into one of these bills during the legislative process. This report begins by discussing current laws that prohibit discrimination in education, and continues with an analysis of the specific provisions contained in SNDA, including provisions relating to coverage, prohibited acts, and enforcement and remedies under the proposed legislation. Under current law, no civil rights statute explicitly prohibits discrimination in schools on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, although there are several civil rights statutes that bar discrimination in education on other grounds. In addition to Title IX, the applicable federal civil rights statutes that currently prohibit discrimination in schools include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs or activities; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in federally funded programs or activities; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by state or local governments; Title IV of the CRA, which bars discrimination in public schools on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin; and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, which prohibits states from denying equal educational opportunities based on race, color, sex, or national origin. The last two statutes were largely designed to combat segregation in public schools. Although none of these civil rights statutes explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, there may be instances in which such discrimination may also be a form of sex discrimination that violates Title IX. In the employment context, the Supreme Court has recognized that sex discrimination may encompass same-sex sexual harassment, meaning that sex discrimination is prohibited even if the harasser and victim are members of the same sex. The Court has also ruled that gender stereotyping is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex. Therefore, if a student who is gay or transgender is being harassed because of a failure to conform to gender stereotypes, such harassment is prohibited by Title IX. It is important to note, however, that Title IX prohibits sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination only when it constitutes a form of sex discrimination. Thus, the statute does not prohibit all forms of sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination or harassment of students, and SNDA appears to be designed to fill this gap. In 2010, the Department of Education (ED) issued guidance that discusses when student bullying or harassment may violate federal education anti-discrimination laws and that clarifies a school's obligation to combat such bullying or harassment. The guidance includes a discussion of when bullying or harassment that targets lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender students may be a form of sex discrimination that violates Title IX. Like Title IX, SNDA would apply to public elementary and secondary schools, as defined in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Charter schools, which are considered to be public elementary and secondary schools under ESEA, would also be covered. However, unlike Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination in all educational programs that receive federal funding, including institutions of higher education and vocational schools, SNDA's coverage would not extend beyond the elementary and secondary education level. If enacted, SNDA would prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in public elementary and secondary schools, as well as discrimination based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of a person with whom a student associates. Although such provisions regarding an individual's "perceived" status or association with a protected individual are without parallel in Title IX, the difference might be attributed to the fact that an individual's sex, unlike sexual orientation or gender identity, is generally evident to the casual observer. Under SNDA, "sexual orientation" would be defined to mean homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality, while "gender identity" would be defined to mean the gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual's designated sex at birth. Like Title IX, SNDA's prohibition against sex discrimination would extend to all education "programs or activities" operated by recipients of federal funds. As a result, the scope of SNDA could potentially be quite broad. Under Title IX, the prohibition against sex discrimination in education programs or activities has been interpreted to include discrimination on the basis of sex in student admissions, recruitment, scholarship awards and tuition assistance, housing, access to courses and other academic offerings, counseling, financial assistance, employment assistance to students, health and insurance benefits and services, athletics, and all aspects of education-related employment, including recruitment, hiring, promotion, tenure, demotion, transfer, layoff, termination, compensation, benefits, job assignments and classifications, leave, and training. Presumably, SNDA's prohibition on sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination could be interpreted to cover a similarly broad range of education programs or activities. In addition, SNDA would expressly prohibit harassment on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of a student or of a person with whom the student associates or has associated. Such harassment would include conduct that is "sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from a program or activity of a public school or educational agency, or to create a hostile or abusive educational environment ... including acts of verbal, nonverbal, or physical aggression, intimidation, or hostility.... " Although Title IX does not have an explicit prohibition against such harassment, the statute has been interpreted to prohibit such activity. Thus, SNDA's express prohibition against harassment appears to be patterned on the current legal standards for harassment under Title IX, as developed by the courts and implementing agencies. For more information on sexual harassment in the schools, see CRS Report RL33736, Sexual Harassment: Developments in Federal Law , by [author name scrubbed]. As is generally common under federal civil rights laws, SNDA would also prohibit retaliation against individuals who oppose conduct prohibited by the act. This prohibition appears to be patterned on the anti-retaliation provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. Unlike Title VII and SNDA, Title IX does not contain an express statutory prohibition against retaliation. Nevertheless, the federal courts have interpreted Title IX to prohibit retaliatory conduct. In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education , the Court held that Title IX not only encompasses retaliation claims, but also is available to individuals who complain about sex discrimination, even if such individuals themselves are not the direct victims of sex discrimination. Reasoning that "Title IX's enforcement scheme would unravel" "if retaliation were not prohibited," the Court concluded that "when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX." If enacted, SNDA would also specify that the legislation shall not be construed to invalidate or limit the rights, remedies, procedures, or legal standards under other federal, state, or local laws, and would clarify that the requirements of the act are in addition to those imposed by Title IX, Title VI, and the ADA. Finally, SNDA would also state that nothing in the act shall be construed to alter legal standards or rights available under other federal laws that protect freedom of speech and expression, nor to affect legal standards and rights available to religious and other student groups under the First Amendment to the Constitution and the Equal Access Act. For more on this provision, see CRS Report R42626, Religious Discrimination in Public Schools: A Legal Analysis , by [author name scrubbed]. Under SNDA, each federal agency that provides federal financial assistance to education programs or activities would be responsible for ensuring compliance with the act by recipients of such assistance. As is generally standard with statutes that govern the provision of federal financial assistance, an agency would have the authority to terminate such assistance to recipients who fail to comply with the act's requirements. However, SNDA, like Title IX, would include a provision that limits termination of assistance to the particular entity that is out of compliance, as well as to the particular program in which noncompliance has been found. SNDA would also require federal agencies that terminate funding to file a report regarding the grounds for its actions. In addition to enforcement by federal agencies, SNDA would provide a private right of action allowing individuals to sue in federal court for violations of the act. Individuals would not be required to exhaust administrative remedies before suing, and they would be entitled to appropriate relief, including, but not limited to, equitable relief, compensatory damages, cost of the action, and remedial action, as well as attorney's fees. Aside from attorney's fees, the statutory language of Title IX does not expressly provide for similar rights and remedies. However, the statute has been interpreted to include such rights and remedies. Indeed, in an early Title IX case, the Supreme Court held that the statute provides student victims with an avenue of judicial relief. In Cannon v. University of Chicago , the Court ruled that an implied right of action exists under Title IX for student victims of sex discrimination who need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , the Court held that damages were available to a student who had been sexually harassed by her teacher if she could prove that the school district had intentionally violated Title IX. After Franklin , the appropriate standard for measuring a school district's liability for sexual harassment of a student by a teacher remained unsettled until the Supreme Court ruling in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District . In Gebser , the Court determined that a school district will not be held liable under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student if the school district did not have actual notice of the harassment and did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the misconduct. Likewise, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education , decided in 1999, addressed the standard of liability that should be imposed on school districts to remedy student-on-student sexual harassment. In Davis , the Court held where officials have "actual knowledge" of the harassment, where the "harasser is under the school's disciplinary authority," and where the harassment is so severe "that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school," the district may be held liable for damages under Title IX. For more information about judicial rulings related to Title IX, see CRS Report RL30253, Sex Discrimination and the United States Supreme Court: Developments in the Law , by [author name scrubbed]. In addition, SNDA would waive the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination within any state program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. The Eleventh Amendment provides states with immunity from claims brought under federal law in both federal and state courts. Although Congress may waive the states' sovereign immunity by "appropriate" legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the scope of congressional power to create a private right of action against the states for monetary damages has been substantially narrowed by a series of Supreme Court decisions. Taken together, these decisions restrict the ability of private individuals to take the states to court for federal civil rights violations. They may not, however, apply to states' voluntary acceptance of federal benefits that are expressly conditioned on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. "Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions." Thus, when a statute enacted under the Spending Clause conditions grants to the states upon an unambiguous waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, as SNDA proposes, at least one federal court has determined that "the condition is constitutionally permissible as long as it rests on the state's voluntary and knowing acceptance of it." It is important to note, however, that this area of the law is relatively undeveloped and may evolve as more legal challenges arise. As noted above, there are certain circumstances in which discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in federally funded education programs or activities may currently be prohibited by Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination. Indeed, both ED and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have taken an active role in pursuing enforcement efforts in such circumstances. These efforts have resulted in a number of settlements in recent years. For example, in a 2013 case involving Arcadia Unified School District, a transgender male student alleged that the school district had violated Title IX by denying him access to facilities consistent with his male gender. Under an agreement reached with ED and DOJ, the school district will work with a consultant to support and assist the district in creating a safe, nondiscriminatory learning environment for students who are transgender or do not conform to gender stereotypes; amend its policies and procedures to reflect that gender-based discrimination, including discrimination based on a student's gender identity, transgender status, and nonconformity with gender stereotypes, is a form of discrimination based on sex; and train administrators and faculty on preventing gender-based discrimination and creating a nondiscriminatory school environment for transgender students. Additionally, the district will take a number of steps to treat the student like all other male students in the education programs and activities offered by the district. Likewise, in J.L. v. Mohawk Central School District , DOJ intervened in a lawsuit filed by a transgender male student who alleged that the school district had violated Title IX and the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution by failing to take action to remedy harassment based on gender stereotypes. The school district and DOJ eventually reached a court-approved settlement agreement that provided a number of remedies to address discrimination on the basis of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orientation. Despite the anti-discrimination protections that may be available in Title IX cases such as these, it is important to note that not all instances of sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination will be deemed to be a form of sex discrimination prohibited by federal law. SNDA therefore appears to be designed to offer protection in cases in which such discrimination is not currently prohibited under Title IX.

Introduced in each of the last several congressional sessions, the Student Non-Discrimination Act (SNDA) would prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in public elementary and secondary schools. The stated purpose of the legislation (H.R. 846/S. 439 in the 114th Congress) is to ensure that students are free from discriminatory conduct such as harassment, bullying, intimidation, and violence. SNDA appears to be patterned on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs or activities, although SNDA does differ from Title IX in several important respects.

In 2015, 9.5 million workers were self-employed, making up 6.4% of all workers. Yet the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program does not provide benefits to the self-employed. To be eligible for UC benefits, individuals generally must be able, available, and actively seeking work in wage and salary jobs. The Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) program offers an exception to this eligibility framework. It pays a weekly SEA allowance, which is identical in amount and duration to what an individual would have received as a regular UC benefit. Unlike regular UC, however, SEA waives state requirements that individuals be actively searching for wage and salary jobs. Instead, UC-eligible individuals participate in self-employment activities and must meet additional requirements, including being determined likely to exhaust their UC benefits. SEA allowances are available to individuals who are eligible for unemployment benefits and who meet certain other requirements. SEA is one of three programs operating within UC that focuses on the reemployment of UC beneficiaries. The other two UC reemployment service programs include the Short-Term Compensation (STC) program and the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) program. In participating states, STC programs provide pro-rated unemployment benefits to workers whose hours have been reduced in lieu of a layoff, thereby retaining workers. WPRS requires all states to establish systems to identify UC claimants likely to exhaust benefits and refer them to various types of reemployment services (e.g., orientation, assessment, counseling, placement services, a job search workshop, and referral to training). Thus, in addition to the job-sharing of STC and the profiling of WPRS, SEA attempts to reemploy UC beneficiaries through self-employment. Although SEA offers this alternative route out of unemployment, participation in the program by states and unemployed workers is low, partly as a result of a budget neutrality requirement. P.L. 103-182 , the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, created the SEA program in 1993. P.L. 105-306 , the Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments Act of 1998, made the program permanent. The SEA program is financed—as is the case with UC, in general—by federal taxes on employers under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes on employers under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). The operation of SEA programs in states may not cost more than what would have been spent if a state had not participated in the program (i.e., budget neutrality). Moreover, the number of individuals participating in the SEA program in states may not exceed 5% of all UC beneficiaries. P.L. 112-96 , the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, authorized the expansion of SEA to permit states to set up SEA programs available to certain claimants in the Extended Benefit (EB) and temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) programs. P.L. 112-96 also provided $35 million in grants to states for FY2012 and FY2013 for the purposes of establishing or improving administration of SEA programs for regular UC, EB, or EUC08 claimants as well as promoting and enrolling eligible individuals. To participate in a state SEA program, workers do not need to be actively searching for jobs. Rather, SEA beneficiaries must engage in full-time activities related to the establishment of a business and becoming self-employed. To be eligible for a SEA allowance, workers must meet the following requirements: Eligible for UC Permanently laid off from previous job Identified as likely to exhaust UC benefits Participating in self-employment activities including entrepreneurial training, business counseling, and technical assistance States identify UC claimants likely to exhaust benefits through the same worker profiling mechanism used in the WPRS program. As described above, the WPRS program establishes a targeting system to deliver a variety of reemployment services to unemployed workers deemed at risk of benefit exhaustion. Weekly SEA allowances are the same in amount and duration as a qualifying individual's regular UC benefit. Participants in state SEA programs for UC claimants are not eligible for the temporary, now-expired EUC08 program or the permanent EB program, both of which may provide additional weeks of benefits for unemployed workers. As described below in the section on " SEA Expansion Under P.L. 112-96," however, SEA allowances for certain claimants of EB (and EUC08 when it was authorized) may be available in states that have established SEA programs for EB (or EUC08 when it was authorized). In 2016, 10 states have active SEA programs for UC claimants (authorization for the SEA program in New York is scheduled to expire December 7, 2017). In four of these states (Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont), however, there were no SEA participants in 2015. In addition, one state (Louisiana) has the authority in law for SEA, but does not have an active program. Details are provided in Table 1 . Nationally, 6.4% of all workers are self-employed (9.5 million workers). Some studies suggest that workers may be more likely to move into self-employment during economic recessions and to move out of self-employment during periods of economic growth. Yet, as described below, participation in SEA is low. Less than 1% of UC claimants participate in the program; in large part, because few states have active programs. Additional reasons for this low participation most likely include barriers at both the state and individual levels. Under current law, no more than 5% of individuals receiving regular UC benefits in a state may participate in the program. The authorizing legislation also requires that a SEA program be budget neutral. State SEA programs may not incur additional costs above what the state would have spent on the regular UC program. Despite this budget neutrality stipulation, states are required to provide entrepreneurial training, business counseling, and technical assistance to SEA participants. Most state unemployment agencies partner with the relevant agency responsible for employment and training programs or Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) to provide SEA training and services. According to one estimate, SEA program administration may cost $300-$600 per participant and entrepreneurial program services may cost $200-$1,200 per participant. States must locate non-UC funds to pay for these SEA-specific costs. Thus, not only is participation in SEA capped, but states must seek out their own money to finance program administration and training. Both of these issues likely contribute to low SEA participation rates. In addition to state-level barriers, there are individual-level barriers that may explain why unemployed workers do not participate in SEA programs, even if they are available. First, SEA participation generally makes workers ineligible for other unemployment benefits (i.e., EB [and EUC08 when authorized], as described above). Therefore, individuals may prefer to access the additional income support rather than participate in SEA. Also, the recent recession and current economic climate provide a challenging environment for starting a new business. As a result of these restrictions and challenges, the number of individuals participating in state SEA programs for UC claimants is relatively small. In 2015, there were only 2,217 SEA participants nationwide. Table 2 presents data on SEA participants by state for recent years. Under P.L. 112-96 , states are authorized to set up SEA programs for individuals who (1) have at least 13 weeks of remaining benefit entitlement through the EB program (or EUC08 program, when it was authorized) and (2) are participating in entrepreneurial training activities. To set up a SEA program for EB claimants, states must enact state legislation. In states that establish SEA programs for EB, individuals may not participate unless the state UC agency has an expectation that the individual has a remaining EB entitlement of at least 13 weeks. Because authorization for the EUC08 expired the week ending on or before January 1, 2014 (i.e., December 28, 2013, or December 29, 2013, in New York State), states may no longer set up SEA programs for any claimants in the EUC08 program. Participation in SEA programs for EB claimants (and EUC08 claimants when EUC08 was authorized) is capped at 1% in each state for each program. SEA benefits available to EB claimants (and EUC08 claimants prior to EUC08 expiration) are paid in the same amount as UC benefits and participants are exempt from any work availability and work search requirements. An individual receiving these SEA benefits may stop participation and receive any remaining EB (or EUC08 benefits when authorized). P.L. 112-96 also provided $35 million in SEA grant funding for FY2012 and FY2013 to be distributed to states based on applications to the U.S. DOL. These funds could have been used for the purposes of establishing or improving administration of SEA programs for regular UC, EB, or EUC08 claimants as well as promoting and enrolling eligible individuals. These grant funds were to be distributed to states with approved applications based on the percentage of unemployed individuals in that state relative to the percentage of unemployed individuals in all states. Prior to the authorization of SEA, two self-employment demonstration projects were conducted in the early 1990s in Massachusetts and Washington. Findings from this pilot are generally positive. Researchers concluded that the self-employment demonstration projects increased the likelihood of self-employment and the amount of time participants were employed. In addition, the demonstration evaluation determined that the structure of the Massachusetts program, which became the model for the future SEA program authorization, was a cost-effective approach to promoting reemployment among workers. The most recent, comprehensive evaluation of state SEA programs for UC claimants was completed in 2001. This study provides details on the state SEA programs established between 1995 and 1999 as well as SEA program participants. It also evaluates SEA program outcomes using survey data in three states: Maine, New Jersey, and New York. Based on a group comparison between SEA participants and SEA-eligible (but non-participating) individuals, the study highlights several positive outcomes. First, the analysis concludes that SEA participants were 19 times more likely than eligible non-participants in sample states to be self-employed at any point after their period of unemployment. Second, the study finds that SEA program participants were four times more likely to have obtained any type of employment (i.e., self-employment or wage/salary employment) than eligible non-participants. Finally, SEA program participants reported high levels of satisfaction with self-employment and the training they received as part of the SEA program. The evaluation also has several limitations. Because the study failed to use a randomized, experimental design, the findings may be due not only to the impact of the SEA program, but also to unobserved differences between SEA participants and eligible non-participants. Additionally, this study was conducted during a time of relatively low unemployment in the three target states. Consequently, it remains unknown how SEA program participants might fare under different economic circumstances or state contexts. Although not an analysis of SEA programs specifically, results from a 2008 evaluation of Project GATE (Growing America Through Entrepreneurship) also shed light on the impact of self-employment support for unemployed workers. Project GATE was a federally funded demonstration project implemented in seven sites in three states (Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Maine) between 2003 and 2005. Designed to help individuals start or expand their own businesses, Project GATE provided self-employment training and other services. Although SEA programs are available only to eligible UC claimants likely to exhaust their unemployment benefits, Project GATE was designed for a wider population (i.e., anyone interested in starting or growing a small business). Researchers conducted an impact analysis of one subgroup of Project GATE participants composed of recent unemployment benefit claimants in Minnesota, providing a parallel with SEA participants. This analysis finds both positive and negative outcomes for these Project GATE participants. For this subgroup of recent UC benefit claimants, participation in Project GATE increased the probability of owning a business and being employed. Yet, participants in this SEA-like program earned less in wage and salary jobs and earned no more in self-employment than non-participants. Finally, for recent unemployment benefit claimants, Project GATE increased the duration of unemployment benefit receipt by about three weeks.

Self-employment is one potential pathway to exit a spell of unemployment. The regular Unemployment Compensation (UC) program generally requires unemployed workers to be actively seeking work and to be available for wage and salary jobs as a condition of eligibility for UC benefits. These requirements constitute a barrier to self-employment and small business creation for unemployed workers who need income support. The Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) program, however, provides an avenue for combining income support during periods of unemployment with activities related to starting one's own business. Thus, within the joint federal-state UC program, the SEA program focuses on the reemployment of UC beneficiaries. State SEA programs help unemployed workers generate their own jobs through small business creation. SEA waives state UC work search requirements for those individuals who are working full time to establish their own small businesses. SEA provides a weekly allowance in the same amount and for the same duration as regular UC benefits. It is available only to individuals who would otherwise be entitled to UC benefits and have been determined likely to exhaust their UC benefits. Despite the unique configuration of SEA, which pairs self-employment activities and income support, participation in the program by states as well as unemployed workers is limited. Currently, only 10 states have active SEA programs for UC claimants, and in one of these states—New York—authorization for the SEA program is scheduled to expire December 7, 2017. In part, the small-scale nature of the program is likely due to the authorizing legislation requirement that SEA be budget neutral; that is, no UC funds may be used to provide self-employment training. P.L. 103-182, the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, created the SEA program on December 8, 1993. It was permanently authorized by P.L. 105-306, the Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments Act, which was signed on October 28, 1998. Like the rest of UC, the SEA program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). Most recently, provisions in P.L. 112-96, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, gave states the authority to expand SEA participation to certain claimants in the Extended Benefit (EB) and temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) programs.

Congressional interest in oil spill legislation has historically waxed and waned. Recent oil spills led some Members of the 112 th Congress to express an increased level of interest in oil spill legislation. On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred at the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in 11 fatalities. The incident disabled the facility and led to a full evacuation before the platform sank into the Gulf on April 22, 2010. A significant release of oil at the sea floor was soon discovered. According to the National Incident Command's Flow Rate Technical Group estimate, the well released approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels) of oil before it was contained July 15, 2010. The 2010 Gulf oil spill and two pipeline spills—an Enbridge pipeline in Michigan (2010) and an ExxonMobil pipeline in Montana (2011) —continued to generate some interest in a variety of oil spill-related issues. This report identifies legislation that addresses oil spill-related issues. For this report, oil spill-related issues include oil spill policy matters that concern prevention, preparedness, response, liability and compensation, and Gulf of Mexico restoration. In the context of this report, oil spill issues do not generally include matters pertaining to offshore leasing and drilling. For the most part, the underlying statutes for these oil spill-related provisions are found in either the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its amendments, or the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and its amendments. Table 1 provides a list of acronyms used in the report. Table 2 identifies enacted oil spill legislation. Table 3 (House proposals) and Table 4 (Senate proposals) provide a snapshot of oil spill-related bills in the 112 th Congress, many of which were (at least in part) offered in response to issues raised by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Some of the bills are similar (if not identical) to proposals from the 111 th Congress. (See Text Box below.) Other bills reflect recommendations by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. The 112 th Congress enacted two statutes with oil spill-related provisions. First, on January 3, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-90 (the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011), which includes, among other provisions, the following: increases the maximum amount of civil penalties for violations of safety requirements; authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to require the installation of automatic and remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly constructed transmission pipelines; directs the Secretary of Transportation to submit a report analyzing leak detection systems and issues involved in requiring them. Based on this analysis (and after a review period by Congress), the Secretary of Transportation may issue leak detection requirements; and requires the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to review whether current regulations are sufficient to regulate pipelines transmitting "diluted bitumen," and analyze whether such oil presents an increased risk of release. Second, on July 6, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-141 (MAP-21). That act included a subtitle referred to as the RESTORE Act. A detailed summary of that act is provided below. The bills included in the following tables below are not an exhaustive list of bills that may have some impact on oil spill policy. For example, some Members offered proposals that sought to spur offshore oil exploration and development. As highlighted below, one enacted bill included such a provision and several other such bills passed the House: P.L. 112-74 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (signed December 23, 2011), included a provision that amends the Clean Air Act (CAA), transferring air emission authority in the OCS off Alaska's north coast from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the Department of the Interior (DOI). H.R. 1230 (passed the House May 5, 2011) would have directed the DOI Secretary to conduct four oil and gas lease sales—three in the Gulf of Mexico and one off the coast of Virginia—within specific time frames. H.R. 1229 (passed the House May 11, 2011) would have amended the permit process time frame and change the venue for judicial review. H.R. 1231 (passed the House May 12, 2011) would have directed the DOI Secretary to make certain areas of OCS available for leasing based on estimates of oil and gas resources. H.R. 2021 (passed the House June 22, 2011) would have amended the CAA to modify the definition of OCS source, to exclude counting support vessel emissions, and to eliminate Environmental Appeal Board authority over exploration permits. In contrast, some Members introduced bills that would have prohibited oil and gas development in particular areas. The focus of these proposals generally involves environmental protection, particularly oil spill prevention. As such, these latter proposals are included in the tables below, but the former proposals are not. The bills identified in the tables are listed in (descending) order by bill number. The RESTORE Act establishes the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund in the General Treasury. Eighty percent of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 311 penalties paid by responsible parties in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill provide the revenues for the fund. Amounts in the fund will be available for expenditure without further appropriation. The act directs the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate implementing regulations concerning trust fund deposits and expenditures. Based on this and other provisions, the act appears to give the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to determine how much money from the trust fund should be expended each fiscal year. In the provisions of the act that concern fund distributions, the act includes the phrase: "Of the total amounts made available in any fiscal year from the Trust Fund …" Another section gives the Secretary authority to stop expending funds to particular entities (e.g., states), if the Secretary determines funds are not being used for prescribed activities. The amount of revenue that would be available to finance the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund is uncertain. Some identified responsible parties, including BP, have entered in civil and/or criminal settlements with the federal government (see Text Box below). However, BP has not resolved its potential CWA civil penalties, which, as discussed below, could be substantial. CWA Section 311 authorizes certain civil judicial penalties to the owner, operator, or person in charge of a vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility for violations of that provision. A civil judicial penalty applies to a violation of the CWA prohibition on discharging oil into navigable waters of the United States. The monetary penalty for this violation may be up to $37,500 per day of violation, or up to $1,100 per barrel discharged. If the violation is deemed a result of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the penalty is not less than $140,000 for the violation, nor more than $4,300 per barrel discharged. No such negligence determination has been made in connection with the 2010 oil spill. According to the most recent estimate from the federal government, the 2010 oil spill resulted in a discharge of approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels) in the Gulf of Mexico. However, the responsible parties are reportedly disputing this estimate. Moreover, an estimated 17% of the 4.9 million barrels did not enter the Gulf environment, but was directly recovered from the wellhead by BP. It is unknown whether this portion of the oil will be counted in a potential CWA penalty determination. The $1,100 to $4,300 per-barrel range is the basis of the oft-cited judicial penalty range for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill: $4.5 billion to $21.5 billion. The low end of this range is achieved by multiplying 4.1 million barrels (amount of discharge after removing the 17% directly captured by BP) by $1,100/ barrel. The upper end of the range is achieved by multiplying 4.9 million barrels (total discharge amount) by the maximum penalty of $4,300/barrel, which presumes a determination of either gross negligence or willful misconduct. In addition, when determining the amount of the judicial penalty, CWA Section 311(b)(8) states that "the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, the Secretary [of Homeland Security], or the court, as the case may be," must consider the following factors: 1. the seriousness of the violation or violations, 2. the economic benefit to the violator, if any, resulting from the violation, 3. the degree of culpability involved, 4. any other penalty for the same incident, 5. any history of prior violations, 6. the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge, 7. the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and 8. any other matters as justice may require. Therefore, the judicial civil penalty for the incident could be less than the low end of the above range ($4.5 billion), even if gross negligence or willful misconduct is determined. The act distributes monies from the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund to various entities through multiple processes. All of the funds—not counting authorized administrative activities—would support activities in one or more of the five Gulf of Mexico states. The majority of the funds (65%) is allocated directly to the states (or political subdivisions), with certain conditions. The different fund allotments and their conditions are discussed below and illustrated in Figure 1 . The largest portion of the fund (35%) is divided equally among the five Gulf of Mexico states: Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The act has further requirements for specific distributions to political subdivisions in Florida and Louisiana. In Florida, 75% of its share will be distributed to the "8 disproportionately affected counties." In Louisiana, 30% of its share goes to individual parishes based on a statutory formula. The act stipulates that the state (or county) funding must be applied toward one or more of the following 11 activities: 1. Restoration and protection of the natural resources, ecosystems, fisheries, marine and wildlife habitats, beaches, and coastal wetlands of the Gulf Coast region. 2. Mitigation of damage to fish, wildlife, and natural resources. 3. Implementation of a federally approved marine, coastal, or comprehensive conservation management plan, including fisheries monitoring. 4. Workforce development and job creation. 5. Improvements to or on state parks located in coastal areas affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 6. Infrastructure projects benefitting the economy or ecological resources, including port infrastructure. 7. Coastal flood protection and related infrastructure. 8. Planning assistance. 9. Administrative costs (limited to not more than 3% of a state's allotment). 10. Promotion of tourism in the Gulf Coast Region, including recreational fishing. 11. Promotion of the consumption of seafood harvested from the Gulf Coast Region. To receive its share of funds, a state must meet several conditions, including a certification (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) that, among other things, funds are applied to one of the above activities and activities are selected through public input. In addition, states must submit a multiyear implementation plan, documenting funded activities. The act distributes 30% of its trust fund monies to a newly created Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council. The Council is composed of high-level officials from six federal agencies and the governor (or his/her designee) from each of the five Gulf states. Based on its Comprehensive Plan, the Council will finance ecosystem restoration activities in the Gulf Coast region. The act directs the Council to disburse 30% of the trust fund monies to the five Gulf states. The Council is to develop a distribution formula based on criteria listed in the act. In general, the criteria involve a measure of shoreline impact; oiled shoreline distance from the Deepwater Horizon rig; and coastal population. CRS is not aware of an authoritative source that has estimated how much each state would receive under these criteria. To receive funding, each state must submit a plan for approval to the Council. State plans must document how funding will support one or more of the 11 categories listed above. However, only 25% of a state's funding can be used to support infrastructure projects in categories 6 and 7 above. The act establishes the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring, and Technology (GCERSOMT) program, funded by 2.5% of monies in the trust fund. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Administrator will implement the program, which will support marine research projects that pertain to species in the Gulf of Mexico. The act disburses 2.5% of monies in the trust fund to the five Gulf states to establish—through a competitive grant program—"centers of excellence." The centers would be nongovernmental entities (including public or private institutions) in the Gulf Coast Region. Finally, interest earned by the trust fund would be distributed as follows: 50% would fund the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council, so it can "carry out the Comprehensive Plan." 25% would provide additional funding for the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring, and Technology program mentioned above. 25% would provide additional funding for the centers of excellence research grants mentioned above.

Recent oil spills, including the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, generated an increased level of interest in oil spill legislation during the 112th Congress. This report identifies enacted and proposed legislation from the 112th Congress that pertains to oil spill-related issues. For this report, oil spill-related issues include oil spill policy matters that concern prevention, preparedness, response, liability and compensation, and Gulf of Mexico restoration. In the context of this report, oil spill issues do not generally include matters pertaining to offshore leasing and drilling. The 112th Congress enacted two statutes that contain oil spill-related provisions. On January 3, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-90 (the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011), which increases civil penalties for violating safety requirements and requires automatic and remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly constructed transmission pipelines; directs the Department of Transportation to analyze leak detection systems, and after a review by Congress, issue requirements based on this analysis; and requires the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to review whether current regulations are sufficient to regulate pipelines transmitting "diluted bitumen," and analyze whether such oil presents an increased risk of release. On July 6, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-141 (MAP-21), which includes a subtitle referred to as the RESTORE Act. The RESTORE Act establishes the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund in the General Treasury. Eighty percent of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act Section 311 penalties paid by responsible parties in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill will provide the revenues for the fund. Amounts in the fund will be available for expenditure without further appropriation. The RESTORE Act distributes monies to various entities through multiple processes: 35% divided equally among the five Gulf of Mexico states to be applied toward one or more of 11 designated activities; 30% provided to a newly created Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council to finance ecosystem restoration activities in the Gulf Coast region; 30% disbursed by the Council to the five Gulf states, based on specific criteria: shoreline impact; oiled shoreline distance from the Deepwater Horizon rig; and coastal population. Each state must submit a plan for approval, documenting how funding will support one or more of the 11 designated activities; and 5% to support marine research and related purposes.

Section 1. Short Title. The act may be cited asthe "Class Action Fairness Act of 2005." This section also states that it amends title 28 of the UnitedStates Code. Section 2. Findings and Purposes of the Act. Theact sets out Congress' findings describing in essentially these words the: (1) circumstances in whichclass actions are valuable to our legal system; (2) abuses of the class action process that have harmedclass members with legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly, adversely affectedinterstate commerce, and undermined public respect for our judicial system; (3) the manner by whichclass members have been harmed by a number of actions taken by plaintiffs' lawyers, which providelittle or no benefit to class members as a whole, including (i) plaintiffs' lawyers receiving large fees,while class members are left with coupons or other awards of little or no value, (ii) unjustifiedrewards made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members, and (iii) confusingpublished notices that prevent class members from being able to fully understand and effectivelyexercise their rights; (4) abuses in class actions which undermine the national judicial system, thefree flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framersof the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are (i) keeping cases of nationalimportance out of federal court, (ii) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias againstout-of-state defendants, and (iii) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other statesand bind the rights of the residents of those states. The act's stated purposes are to (1) ensure prompt and fair recovery of legitimate class actionclaims; (2) reflect the purpose behind the Constitution's diversity jurisdiction clause; and (3) toencourage commercial innovation and consumer-friendly prices. Section 3. Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights and ImprovedProcedures for Interstate Class Actions. S. 5 would add five newsections to 28 U.S.C. which are intended to provide greater protections for class members. Inparticular, section 3 would add the following: Section 1711-Class action definitions (1) Class Action-The term is defined to include any civil action filed in federal district courtunder Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as actions filed under similar rulesin state court that have been removed to federal court. (2) Class Counsel-The term is defined as "the persons who serve as the attorneys for the classmembers in a proposed or certified class action." (3) Class Members-The term is defined as "the persons (named or unnamed) who fall withinthe definition of the proposed or certified class in a class action." (4) Plaintiff Class Action-The term is defined as "a class action in which class members areplaintiffs." (5) Proposed Settlement-The term is defined as "an agreement regarding a class action thatis subject to court approval and that, if approved, would be binding on some or all class members." Section 1712-Judicial scrutiny of coupon and other noncashsettlements This provision is aimed at certain proposed settlements of class actions, in which theplaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant work out a settlement that provides class members withessentially valueless coupons while rewarding the lawyers with substantial attorneys' fees. Toaddress this problem, this section provides that a judge may approve a proposed settlement underwhich the class would receive noncash benefits or would otherwise be required to expend funds inorder to obtain part or all of the proposed benefits only after a hearing to determine whether, andmaking a written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members. In doing so, the judge on the motion of any party may receive expert testimony as to the coupons'value. It would require that attorneys fees be based either (a) on the value of the coupons actuallyredeemed by class members in contingent fee cases; (b) on the hours reasonably billed in presentingthe class action; or (c) on the value of the coupons redeemed and, to the extent a settlement provides,for equitable relief on a reasonable hourly rate and total. Attorneys fees coupon calculations couldnot be based on unredeemed coupons, although with court approval the value of unredeemedcoupons could be distributed for charitable purposes specified in the settlement agreement. Section 1713-Protection against loss by classmembers This provision provides that a judge may not approve a class action settlement in which theclass member will be required to pay attorney's fees that would result in a net loss to a class memberunless the court determines in a writing finding that the benefits to the class member substantiallyoutweigh the monetary loss. Section 1714-Protection against discrimination based on geographic location This provision provides that a settlement may not award some class members a largerrecovery than others solely because the favored members of the class are located closer to thecourthouse in which the settlement is filed. Section 1715. Notifications to appropriate federal and stateofficials This provision requires defendants to notify the appropriate state and federal official of theparticulars of any class action settlement and delays the effective date of the settlement until 90 daysafter they have done so. The appropriate federal officials include the Attorney General and in thecase of financial institutions the federal regulatory authorities. State officials entitled to noticeinclude the authorities with regulatory jurisdiction over a defendant in any state in which anymember of the class resides. Should a defendant fail to comply with the notification requirements,any individual class member would be free to walk away from his obligations under the settlementagreement. Section 4. Federal District Court Jurisdictionof Interstate Class Actions. Article III of the Constitution protects out-of-statelitigants against the prejudice of local courts by allowing for federal diversity jurisdiction when theplaintiffs and defendants are citizens of different states. However, under current law, federaldiversity jurisdiction for a class action does not exist unless every member of the class is a citizenof a different state from every defendant, and every member of the class is seeking damages inexcess of $75,000. (9) Thissection would change the law by providing additional protection for out-of-state litigants by creatinga minimal diversity rule for class actions and by determining satisfaction of theamount-in-controversy requirement by looking at the total amount of damages at stake. Under the proposal, federal district courts receive original jurisdiction over any class actionin which the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $5,000,000 and in which(A) "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant;" (B)"anymember of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and anydefendant is a citizen of a State;" or (C) "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a Stateand any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state." This rule holds trueif less than one-third of the plaintiffs and the primary defendants come from the state where the suitis filed; has no application if two-thirds or more of the plaintiffs and a primary defendant come fromthe state where the suit is filed; and applies at the discretion of the federal court if more thanone-third but less than two-thirds of the plaintiffs and the primary defendants come from the statewhere the suit is filed. (10) In the exercise of their discretion, the federal courts must consider: -- "Whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest" -- "Whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which theaction was originally filed" -- In the case of a class action originally filed in a State court, "whether the class actionhas been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction" -- "Whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the classmembers, the alleged harm, or the defendants" -- "Whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filedin all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than thenumber of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members ofthe proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States" -- "Whether ...1 or more class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf ofthe same or other persons have been filed." This section contains a similar class action definition as section 3, defining a class action as(A) any civil action filed pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a similar statestatute or rule. It also deems to be class actions certain other types of civil actions: (1) an action thatasserts claims seeking monetary relief on behalf of 100 or more persons, in which the claims involvecommon questions of law or fact and are to be jointly tried; but not (2) an action on behalf of thegeneral public pursuant to state statute. (11) Again, in order that actions lacking national implications remain in state court, the minimaldiversity rule does not apply in any action where "(A) two-thirds or more of the members of allproposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State inwhich the action was originally filed; (B) the primary defendants are States, State officials, or othergovernmental entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief; or (C)the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less than 100." (12) Section 5. Removal of Interstate Class Actions to Federal DistrictCourt. Under existing federal law, civil actions filed in state court, which mighthave been filed in federal court, can be removed to federal court under some circumstances, see 28U.S.C. 1441 et. seq. Section 5 would permit removal from state court of minimum diversity casesthat section 4 would permit to have been filed originally in federal court. It would allow class actionlawsuits to be removed from state court to federal court by any defendant without the consent of anyof the other defendants. (13) Section 6. Report on Class Action Settlements. This provision directs the Judicial Conference of the United States with the assistance of the Directorof the Federal Judicial Center and the Director of the Administrative Officer of the United StatesCourts to report to the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives within 12months of the enactment with recommendations on the best practices to further ensure fairness inclass action settlements with regard to class members and attorneys' fees which should appropriatelyreflect the extent and success of the attorneys' efforts. Section 7. Enactment of Judicial ConferenceRecommendations. This section, which perhaps survives through a scrivener'serror, first appeared in bills introduced early in 2003 and was designed to accelerate the effectivedate of class action reform amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see H.Rept. 108-144 , at 45 (2003). Those amendments, then scheduled to become effective onDecember 1, 2003, did in fact become effective on that date. In its current form the section appearssimply redundant, for it provides that those amendments to Rule 23 shall become effective onDecember 1, 2003, or upon enactment of S. 5 , whichever comes first. Section 8. Rulemaking Authority of Supreme Court andJudicial Conference. This section provides that nothing in this act shall restrict theauthority for the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court to propose and prescribe the generalrules of practice and procedure for the federal courts. Section 9. Effective Date. This section providesthat the legislation applies to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment. Although balanced by the enhanced class member protection features, the jurisdictional andremoval components of S. 5 are much like its antecedents in the 106th, 107th, and 108thCongresses. Proponents argue: Class action process has been manipulated in recent years; (14) U.S. companies have been flooded with labor and employment litigation, muchof which has been entirely without merit; (15) Proposed changes in the law will increase sanctions against lawyers who bringfrivolous claims to court. (16) Opponents object that they: Would clog an already overburdened federal court system and slow the paceof certifying class action cases; (17) Are inconsistent with the principles of federalism; (18) Would make consumer and public interest litigation more difficult to bring,more expensive, and more burdensome. (19)

S. 5 , the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 has three main sections: (1) anamendment to the federal diversity statute; (2) a provision regarding removal; and (3) a consumerclass action "bill of rights." It would control and restrict class action lawsuits by shifting some ofthe suits from state to federal courts. This would be achieved by creating federal jurisdiction overclass action suits when the total amount in dispute exceeds $5,000,000 and when any plaintiff livesin a state different from that of any defendant. The bill would treat certain "mass actions" with morethan 100 plaintiffs as class actions for purposes of jurisdiction. S. 5 would requirejudges to review all settlements based on the issuance of coupons to plaintiffs and limit attorney'sfees to the value of the coupon settlements actually received by class members. It would also requirecareful scrutiny of "net loss" settlements in which class members ultimately lose money. Thelegislation would ban settlements that award some class members a larger recovery because they livecloser to the court. It would allow federal courts to maximize the benefits of class actionsettlements. Among other things, S. 5 would also require that a notice of proposedsettlements be provided to the appropriate state and federal officials such as the state attorneysgeneral. It was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee without amendment. On February10, 2005, the Senate passed S. 5 (72-26) without amendment. On February 17, 2005,the House also passed S. 5 without amendment, 279-149 and it is expected to be signedby the President.

As parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other Members with respect to customs duties and import charges, internal taxes and regulations, and other trade-related matters. Thus, whenever a WTO Member accords a benefit to a product of one country, whether it is a WTO Member or not, the Member must accord the same treatment to the like product of all other WTO Members. Free trade agreements (FTAs) are inconsistent with this obligation because of the favorable treatment granted by FTA parties to each other's goods. FTAs, however, have generally been viewed as vehicles of trade liberalization; therefore, the GATT contains an exception for such agreements. Article XXIV of the GATT requires that parties must notify the WTO of these agreements, which are then subject to WTO review. The exception applies both to completed FTAs as well as to the interim agreements leading to their formation. The increasing number of regional agreements and the substantial amount of trade covered by them led GATT parties to try to strengthen the existing multilateral discipline during the GATT Uruguay Round. GATT parties have never expressly disapproved an FTA, despite misgivings about the consistency of particular provisions with GATT requirements. The Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV (the 1994 Understanding) attempts to increase multilateral surveillance over regional trade arrangements by "clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or enlarged agreements, and improving the transparency of all XXIV agreements." In 1996, WTO Members created the permanent Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), which conducts reviews of new and existing FTAs and studies the overall impact of such agreements on the world trading system. Further improvement in this area is also a part of the negotiating mandate for the WTO Doha Round. On December 14, 2006, the WTO General Council established a new transparency mechanism for FTAs which, among other things, provides for early notification of FTA negotiations. To comply with Article XXIV, FTAs must meet four fundamental requirements: (1) duties and other restrictive commercial regulations must be eliminated; (2) substantially all trade must be covered; (3) external tariffs and commercial regulations—that is, measures applicable to nonparties—may not be higher or more restrictive than those in effect before the FTA or interim agreement was formed; and (4) interim agreements must contain a plan and schedule to achieve these goals within a reasonable period of time. Even though the GATT requires that FTAs eliminate tariffs and restrictive regulations, it allows FTA parties to apply tariffs, restrictions, and GATT-inconsistent measures imposed under specified GATT articles, "where necessary." WTO Members entering into an FTA or an interim agreement must promptly notify the WTO and provide information that will enable reports and recommendations to be made to WTO Members. FTA agreements have traditionally been examined by ad hoc working parties that prepare reports on their findings and present them to WTO Members for consideration. The 1994 Understanding provides that working parties will report to the WTO Council on Trade in Goods, which will make appropriate recommendations to WTO Members. Under Article XXIV, paragraph 10, WTO Members may, by a two-thirds vote, approve proposals that do not fully comply with Article XXIV, providing they lead to the formation of an FTA as contemplated by the Article. Parties to a noncomplying agreement may also seek a waiver of obligations under Article IX of the WTO Agreement, which allows waivers in "exceptional circumstances" if agreed to by three-fourths of WTO Members. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which also contains a general MFN obligation, provides an exception for trade liberalizing regional service agreements, so long as barriers and other restrictions on trade in services be eliminated immediately or within a reasonable time frame and, the agreement provides substantial sectoral coverage. In addition, nonparties must not be subject to higher or more restrictive trade in services barriers as a result of the agreement. Finally, parties to the agreement must notify the Council for Trade in Services of the existence of such an agreement and, if implementing on a time frame, report periodically to the Council. The GATS also contains an exception for agreements establishing full integration of the parties' labor markets, provided that the agreements exempt citizens of parties from residency and work permit requirements. One of the most problematic aspects of Article XXIV, particularly as it applies to the exclusion of economic sectors from FTAs, is the meaning of the term "substantially all trade." The term has not been defined either by GATT Parties acting jointly or by GATT working parties, whose reports have tended to be inconclusive. The 1994 Understanding does not expressly define the term; however, the preamble states that the trade expansion to which regional agreements contribute "is increased if the elimination between the constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector is excluded." In examining whether FTAs comply with this obligation, working parties have taken into account both quantitative and qualitative factors. The working parties did express concerns regarding the exclusion of certain agricultural trade in the U.S. FTAs with Israel and Canada, but neither panel recommended the disapproval of the FTAs, and both reports were subsequently adopted. Article XIX of the GATT, as expanded upon in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, allows parties to impose temporary restrictions on imports in the event of import surges. Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement states the general rule that a WTO Member "may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has determined ... that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products." Article XIX is not listed as an FTA exception in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b), and the Safeguards Agreement leaves open the question of the relationship of safeguards to FTAs. WTO Members have expressed differing views on the subject, arguing that (1) safeguards may not be imposed against FTA partners because such measures are not exempted in paragraph 8(b); (2) safeguards must be applied on an MFN basis, in part because of the requirement in Article 2.2 of the Safeguards Agreement that a safeguard "be applied to a product being imported irrespective of source"; and (3) safeguards are allowed among FTA parties so long as third-party rights are not infringed. While not ruling on the relationship of Article XXIV to the imposition of safeguards, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have identified a requirement of "parallelism" in the Safeguards Agreement dictating that if serious injury were to be based on all imports, including those from the FTA, the safeguards should apply to the same imports. For example, in the WTO challenge to the now-removed safeguard on steel imports imposed by the United States in March 2002, the panel, as upheld by the Appellate Body, faulted the United States for including the imports of affected products from U.S. FTA partners in its investigation of whether increased imports were the cause of serious injury, while excluding these countries' imports from the remedial safeguard without providing a "reasoned and adequate" explanation for why the imports covered by the safeguard alone satisfied the requirements for imposing the measure. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as U.S. FTAs with Israel, Canada, Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman and Peru, and the Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), contain safeguards provisions for originating goods. Safeguards provisions are also included in recently signed FTAs with Colombia, Panama and the Republic of Korea, all of which are awaiting approval by Congress. The 1994 Understanding on Article XXIV, at paragraph 12, provides that WTO dispute settlement procedures may be invoked with respect to matters arising under Article XXIV provisions relating to free-trade areas and interim agreements. The provision clarifies that the review provisions of Article XXIV are not the only vehicle for examining the compatibility of FTAs with GATT rules. WTO dispute settlement is also available with respect to all obligations under the GATS. Both the U.S.-Israel FTA and the U.S.-Canada FTA were presented to the GATT Contracting Parties as interim agreements for the formation of a free-trade area. The NAFTA, and FTAs with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, and the DR-CAFTA were submitted both as free trade and services agreements. A draft report on NAFTA was issued for consideration by the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements in September 2000. The United States has also entered into FTAs with Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea. While implementing legislation for the FTAs with Oman and Peru has been enacted into public law, neither FTA has yet entered into force. Implementing legislation for the FTA with Colombia was introduced April 8, 2008 ( H.R. 5724 ; S. 2830 ), but expedited legislative procedures that would have applied to the bill were suspended by the House on April 10, 2008 ( H.Res. 1092 ). Implementing bills for the FTAs with Panama and South Korea have not yet been introduced. The Administration has also begun negotiating FTAs with Thailand, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

World Trade Organization (WTO) members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other members with respect to tariffs and other trade matters. Free trade agreements (FTAs) are facially inconsistent with this obligation because they grant countries who are party to the agreement more favorable trade benefits than those extended to other trading partners. Due to the prevailing view that such arrangements are trade-enhancing, Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains a specific exception for FTAs. The growing number of regional trade agreements, however, has made it difficult for the WTO to efficiently monitor the consistency of FTAs with the provided exemption. Negotiations on rules for regional trade agreements are part of the WTO Doha Round; separately, the WTO General Council in December 2006 established a new transparency mechanism for FTAs which provides for early notification by WTO Members of FTA negotiations. The United States is presently a party to nine bilateral or regional trade agreements. While Congress has approved FTAs with Oman and Peru FTAs, these have not yet entered into force. In addition, the Administration has entered into FTAs with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea FTAs, all of which are pending approval by Congress. Implementing legislation for the FTA with Colombia was introduced April 8, 2008 (H.R. 5724, S. 2830), but expedited legislative procedures that would have applied to the House bill were suspended by the House on April 10, 2008 (H.Res. 1092). The Administration has also been involved in FTA negotiations with several other countries, including Thailand, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and the South African Customs Union. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate or labor union treasury funds from being spent for "electioneering communications." BCRA defines "electioneering communication" as any broadcast, cable, or satellite transmission made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election (sometimes referred to as the "blackout periods") that refers to a candidate for federal office and is targeted to the relevant electorate. In a 2003 decision, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Section 203 of BCRA against a First Amendment facial challenge even though the provision regulates not only campaign speech or "express advocacy," (speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate), but also "issue advocacy," (speech that discusses public policy issues, while also mentioning a candidate). Specifically, the Court determined that the speech regulated by Section 203 was the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. On July 26, 2004, Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a corporation that accepts contributions from other corporations, began broadcasting advertisements exhorting viewers to contact Senators Feingold and Kohl to urge them to oppose a Senate filibuster to delay and block consideration of federal judicial nominations. WRTL planned to run the ads throughout August 2004 and to finance them with its general treasury funds, thereby running afoul of Section 203, as such ads would have been broadcast within the 30-day period prior to the September 14, 2004, primary. Anticipating that the ads would be illegal "electioneering communications," but believing that they nevertheless had a First Amendment right to broadcast them, WRTL filed suit against the FEC, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that Section 203's prohibition was unconstitutional as applied to the ads and any future ads that they might plan to run. Just prior to the BCRA 30-day blackout period, a three-judge district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that McConnell v. FEC left no room for such an "as-applied" challenge. Accordingly, WRTL did not broadcast its ads during the blackout period, and the district court subsequently dismissed the complaint in an unpublished opinion. On appeal, in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL I), the Supreme Court vacated the lower court judgment, finding that by upholding Section 203 against a facial challenge in McConnell, "we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges." On remand, after permitting four Members of Congress to intervene as defendants, the three-judge district court granted WRTL summary judgment, determining that Section 203 was unconstitutional as applied to WRTL's ads. It concluded that the ads were genuine issue ads, not express advocacy or its "functional equivalent" under McConnell , and held that no compelling interest justified their regulation. The FEC appealed. In a 5 to 4 decision, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) , affirming a lower court ruling, the Supreme Court found that Section 203 of BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the WRTL ads, and that they should have been permissible to broadcast. In a plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito—Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas —the Court announced that "[b]ecause WRTL's ads may reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate, we hold they are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore, fall outside the scope of McConnell ' s holding." In determining the threshold question, as required by McConnell, of whether the ads were the "functional equivalent" of speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office or genuine issue advocacy, the Court observed that it had long recognized that the practical distinction between campaign advocacy and issue advocacy can often dissolve because candidates, particularly incumbents, "are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions." Nonetheless, the Court stated, its jurisprudence in this area requires it to make such a distinction, and "[i]n drawing that line, the First Amendment requires ... err[ing] on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it." In WRTL II, the FEC appealed the lower court ruling arguing that in view of the fact that McConnell had already held that Section 203 was facially valid, WRTL—and not the government—should bear the burden of demonstrating that BCRA is unconstitutional as applied to its ads. Rejecting the FEC's contention, the Court pointed out that Section 203 burdens political speech and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the Court determined that the FEC—not the regulated community—had the burden of proving that the application of Section 203 to WRTL's ads furthered a compelling interest, and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. As it had already ruled in McConnell that Section 203 "survives strict scrutiny to the extent it regulates express advocacy or its functional equivalent," the Court found that in order to prevail, the FEC needed to show that the WRTL ads it sought to regulate fell within that category. On the other hand, if the speech that the FEC sought to regulate is not express advocacy or its functional equivalent, the Court cautioned that the FEC's task is "more formidable" because it must demonstrate that banning such ads during the blackout periods is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, a conclusion that no precedent has reached. In response to the FEC's and the dissent's argument that McConnell established a test for determining whether an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy, that is, "whether the ad is intended to influence elections or has that effect," the Court disagreed, finding that it had not adopted any type of test as the standard for future as-applied challenges. Instead, the Court found that its analysis in McConnell was grounded in the evidentiary record, particularly studies showing "that BCRA's definition of Electioneering Communications accurately captures ads having the purpose or effect of supporting candidates for election to office." Hence, when the McConnell Court made its assessment that the plaintiffs in that case had not sufficiently proven that Section 203 was overbroad and could not be enforced in any circumstance, it did not adopt a particular test for determining what constituted the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. Indeed, the Court held, the fact that in McConnell it looked to such intent and effect "neither compels nor warrants accepting that same standard as the constitutional test for separating, in an as-applied challenge, political speech protected under the First Amendment from that which may be banned." Accordingly, the Court turned to establishing the proper standard for an as-applied challenge to Section 203 of BCRA, finding that such a standard "must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communication rather than amorphous considerations of intent and effect," involving "minimal if any discovery" so that parties can resolve disputes "quickly without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation," and eschewing "'the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors,' which 'invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal.'" In summation, the Court announced that the standard "must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech." Taking such considerations into account, the Court held that [A] Court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Under this test, WRTL's three ads are plainly not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. First, their content is consistent with that of a genuine issue ad: The ads focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the public to contact public officials with respect to the matter. Second, their content lacks indicia of express advocacy: The ads do not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger; and they do not take a position on a candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office. Moreover, the Court cautioned, contextual factors "should seldom play a significant role in the inquiry." Although courts are not required to ignore basic background information that provides relevant contextual information about an advertisement—such as whether the ad describes a legislative issue that is under legislative consideration—the Court found that such background information "should not become an excuse for discovery." In applying the standard it developed for as-applied challenges to the ads that WRTL sought to broadcast, the Court determined that the FEC had failed to demonstrate that such ads constituted the functional equivalent of express advocacy because they could reasonably be interpreted as something other than a vote for or against a candidate. The Court's established jurisprudence has recognized the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in elections, which has been invoked in order to justify contribution limits and, in certain circumstances, spending limits on electioneering expenditures that pose the risk of quid pro quo corruption. In McConnell, the Court noted, it had applied this interest in justifying the regulation of express advocacy and its functional equivalent, but in order to justify regulating WRTL's ads, "this interest must be stretched yet another step to ads that are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy." In strongly worded opposition to extending the application of this governmental interest yet again, the Court announced, "[e]nough is enough." The WRTL ads are not equivalent to contributions—they are political speech—and the governmental interest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption cannot be used to justify their regulation. The Court also announced that the discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be relevant to an election: "Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor." In an equally strongly worded dissent, Justice Souter—with whom Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined—argued that WRTL II overruled that portion of McConnell v. FEC upholding Section 203 of BCRA against a facial constitutional challenge. Among other points in opposition to the Court's ruling, the dissent observed that Section 203 was less restrictive than the Court's opinion would indicate in that it did not effect a complete ban on corporate and labor union funds being spent on electioneering communications. Indeed, the dissent remarked, quoting McConnell , "'corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads [in the runup period] by simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a segregated [PAC] fund.'" Moreover, the dissent added, a nonprofit corporation, regardless of its source of funding, may communicate its criticism or support of a particular candidate within days of an election by speaking via a newspaper ad or on a website and, in accordance with earlier Court precedent, may use its general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications so long as it does not finance such ads with funding from business corporations and unions. Of particular significance, the dissent cautioned that it is possible, based on the reasoning of the Court's ruling, that even advertisements containing express words of advocacy—known as "magic words"—could now escape regulation under Section 203. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in WRTL II , application of the federal law prohibiting corporate and labor union treasury funds from being spent on ads that are broadcast 30 days before a primary and 60 days before a general election has been limited. That is, only those ads that are susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than an exhortation to vote for or against a candidate can be regulated. While the Court's ruling was careful not to overrule explicitly McConnell v. FEC where it upheld this portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), WRTL II seems to indicate that the FEC's ability to regulate the "electioneering communication" ban has nonetheless been circumscribed. In a case currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) , the constitutionality of the BCRA "electioneering communication" provision is once again under consideration. On March 24, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in this case and again on September 9, after ordering the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Court should overrule its earlier holdings in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC addressing the facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA, the "electioneering communication" prohibition. A decision in this case is expected in early 2010.

Voting 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2007 decision FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) held that a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibiting corporate or labor union treasury funds from being spent on advertisements broadcast within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. sought to run. While not expressly overruling its 2003 ruling in McConnell v. FEC, which upheld the BCRA provision against a First Amendment facial challenge, the Court limited the law's application. Specifically, it ruled that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy and, therefore, cannot be regulated. In a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the constitutionality of the BCRA "electioneering communication" provision is once again under consideration. On March 24, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in this case and again on September 9, after ordering the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Court should overrule its earlier holdings in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC addressing the facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA, the "electioneering communication" prohibition. A decision in this case is expected in early 2010.

In September 2014, the Obama Administration announced a new Central American Minors (CAM) refugee program: We are establishing in-country refugee processing to provide a safe, legal and orderly alternative to the dangerous journey that children are currently undertaking to join relatives in the United States.... These programs will not be a pathway for children to join undocumented relatives in the United States . The "children" referenced are minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, who accounted for the surge in unaccompanied alien child arrivals in the United States between FY2012 and FY2014 that peaked in the summer of 2014. The establishment of in-country processing represents an effort by the Obama Administration to discourage children from attempting dangerous trips to the United States, by enabling at least some of them to be considered for refugee status at home. In-country refugee processing refers to the processing of prospective refugees by the U.S. government from within their countries of origin for admission to the United States. In addition to the new CAM program, several ongoing in-country refugee processing programs are operating in FY2015. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee, in part, as a foreign national who has experienced, or has a well-founded fear of, persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from abroad. They may legally live and work in the United States. After one year, they may apply to adjust to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, subject to a set of requirements. Typically, a refugee being considered for resettlement in the United States is outside his or her country of origin (in a host county) and is referred to the U.S. program by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The first part of the INA definition of a refugee (INA §101(a)(42)(A)) states that the term means: any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The INA also provides for the processing of refugees in their countries of origin for purposes of admission to the United States in some cases, as reflected in the second, alternate part of the definition of a refugee (INA §101(a)(42)(B)): in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Both the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have key roles in the U.S. refugee admissions process. DOS is responsible for overseas processing of refugees. Generally, it arranges for a nongovernmental organization (NGO), an international organization, or U.S. embassy contractors to manage a Resettlement Support Center (RSC) that assists in refugee processing. RSC staff members conduct pre-screening interviews of prospective refugees and prepare cases for submission to DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which is responsible for adjudicating refugee cases. These adjudications are handled by USCIS officers in the Refugee Corps, who make determinations about whether an individual qualifies for refugee status and is otherwise admissible to the United States. In order to be eligible for refugee status in the United States, an individual must satisfy the INA definition of a refugee, among other requirements (see " Refugee Admissions "). In accordance with this definition, a prospective refugee is required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion), typically on an individual basis. Over the years, the United States has utilized in-country refugee processing to address particular refugee populations and situations. Decisions about establishing in-country processing programs involve a range of considerations; these include key considerations of foreign policy, diplomacy, and security, which are beyond the scope of this report. DOS has described in-country refugee processing as an "extraordinary" measure. For example, in 2002, in response to recommendations to establish in-country processing in Haiti, the department wrote: We do not believe that the extraordinary remedy of an in-country refugee processing program for Haitians is appropriate at this time. Given the level of economic desperation in Haiti, an in-country program is likely to attract many more ineligible than eligible applicants. We believe that existing protection options for Haitians who may be at risk of persecution or torture are sufficient. In annual presidential determinations on refugee admissions, Presidents have specified, in accordance with INA §101(a)(42)(B), persons in certain groups who, if otherwise qualified, may be considered for refugee admission to the United States within their countries of origin. A group commonly specified in presidential determinations issued in the 1980s, for example, was "present and former political prisoners and persons in imminent danger of loss of life, and their family members, in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean." Since the late 1980s, presidential determinations on refugee admissions have typically specified three or four groups as being eligible for in-country processing. These groups often included persons in Cuba, the (former) Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Since the presidential determination for FY2005, the in-country processing list has also included the following: "In exceptional circumstances, persons identified by a United States Embassy in any location." In-country processing programs for the following designated groups operated in FY2014 and continue to operate in FY2015: Persons in an independent state of the former Soviet Union or of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania who are Jews or Evangelical Christians, or who participate in the religious activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and who have close family in the United States. Persons in Cuba who are "human rights activists, members of persecuted religious minorities, former political prisoners, forced-labor conscripts, and persons deprived of their professional credentials or subjected to other disproportionately harsh or discriminatory treatment resulting from their perceived or actual political or religious beliefs." Persons in Iraq who are or were employed in Iraq by the U.S. government, a U.S. media or nongovernmental organization, or a U.S. government-funded contractor or grantee, and specified family members; and persons who are beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions filed by family members in the United States. (This group is sometimes referred to as "Iraqis associated with the United States.") In exceptional circumstances, persons identified by a U.S. Embassy in any location. For FY2015, the Obama Administration has established a new in-county processing program for the following persons: Minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with a parent who is lawfully present in the United States. Under this program, a parent who is lawfully present in the United States can request a refugee resettlement interview for an unmarried child in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. Establishing in-country processing in these countries is an effort to "reduce unlawful and dangerous migration to the United States." As described by DOS, "the program will provide certain vulnerable, at-risk children an opportunity to be reunited with parents lawfully resident in the United States." It is not known how many Central American minors will be considered for refugee admission under this program. In-country refugee processing is related to another feature of the U.S. refugee admissions system: processing priorities. As noted, DOS is responsible for overseas refugee processing, which is conducted through a system of three priorities for admission. The priorities provide access to U.S. resettlement consideration. Priority 2, the priority relevant to in-country processing, covers groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States. It includes specific groups that may be defined by their nationalities, clans, ethnicities, or other characteristics. Some Priority 2 groups are processed in their countries of origin (these are the in-country processing groups enumerated above), while other Priority 2 groups are processed outside their countries of origin. In-country refugee processing programs have come about in different ways, in some cases in connection with legislation. For example, the in-country processing program for Iraqis associated with the United States grew out of provisions in the 2008 Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. This act both delineated a Priority 2 group for Iraqis associated with the United States and provided for the processing of group members in Iraq as well as in other countries for admission to the United States as refugees. Congress played a different role in the in-country processing group designation for persons in an independent state of the former Soviet Union or of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania who are Jews or Evangelical Christians, or who participate in the religious activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In 1989, it enacted a provision known as the Lautenberg Amendment as part of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriations act. The Lautenberg Amendment provided for the establishment of categories of Soviet nationals who would be subject to special rules about refugee determinations. The legislation was silent about where to process Lautenberg category cases; in-country processing of Soviet cases was an Administrative decision. Not all Lautenberg categories, however, are processed in-country. In 2004, the Lautenberg language was amended to add a new provision known as the "Specter Amendment," which required the designation of categories of Iranian nationals, specifically religious minorities, who would be subject to the Lautenberg rules on refugee determinations. These Iranian cases are processed in Austria and Turkey. For the most part, as noted, prospective refugees are required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the protected grounds on an individual basis (see " Adjudicatory Standard in Refugee Determinations "). This same general adjudicatory standard applies to refugee cases processed inside or outside countries of origin. Cases falling within a Lautenberg Amendment category (see " Designation of In-Country Processing Groups "), however, are an exception (whether processed inside or outside the refugee applicant's country of origin). Applicants under the Lautenberg standard are required to: establish that they are members of a protected category, assert a fear of persecution on one of the protected grounds, and assert a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution. In asserting a credible basis for concern, applicants may assert, for example, actual past persecution or discriminatory actions taken against them personally, or acts of persecution taken against similarly situated individuals. In considering in-country refugee processing by the U.S. government, it is important to keep in mind how this mechanism fits into the larger scheme of the U.S. refugee admissions program. The INA definition of a refugee makes provision for in-country processing "in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation ... may specify." Over the years, Administrations—either on their own or prompted by Congress—have used this authority in limited cases. The 2002 remarks by the State Department about Haiti cited above suggest that some relevant considerations include likely effectiveness and the existence of sufficient alternatives. Relatedly, in-country processing programs are typically aimed at particular groups within a country and may require applicants to have some type of connection to the United States. For example, the new in-country processing program for certain minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras requires the minors to have a lawfully present parent in the United States. Given such limitations, as important as in-country programs may be to prospective beneficiaries, out-of-country processing remains the norm.

The Obama Administration has established a new refugee program for certain minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with a parent who is lawfully present in the United States. Created in response to the FY2012-FY2014 surge in unaccompanied child arrivals to the United States from these countries, the Administration has described the new Central American Minors (CAM) program as providing an alternative to a dangerous journey to the United States. The CAM program is an in-country refugee processing program, which means that eligible minors will be processed by the U.S. government from within their countries of origin for possible admission to the United States as refugees. Under the program, a parent who is lawfully present in the United States can request a refugee resettlement interview for an unmarried child in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee, in part, as a foreign national who has experienced, or has a well-founded fear of, persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from abroad. Typically, a refugee being considered for resettlement in the United States is outside his or her country of origin (in a host country). The INA, however, also authorizes the President, after appropriate consultation with Congress, to specify groups for in-country refugee processing. Since the late 1980s, Presidents typically have specified three or four groups as being eligible for in-country processing in a fiscal year. In addition to the new CAM program, there are several ongoing in-country refugee processing programs operating in FY2015. These previously established programs are for designated groups in an independent state of the former Soviet Union or of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania; in Cuba; and in Iraq, as well as, in exceptional circumstances, for persons identified by a U.S. embassy in any location. This report supplements CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, which provides a broader look at the U.S. refugee program.

Explosives can remain "live" in munitions and present a safety risk for many years, even decades, after their military use has ceased, especially if munitions are buried and thereby protected from degradation. Munitions used in training exercises do not always detonate upon impact and can burrow beneath the surface where they can remain buried. Munitions that remain on the surface also can be difficult to locate and recover, especially on ranges with dense vegetation that may conceal munitions. The disposal of munitions also can present lingering safety risks if munitions are not properly neutralized and are left intact. Sites where munitions were meant to be destroyed in bulk by open burning or open detonation in earthen pits frequently contain some live munitions. In such cases, certain munitions may not detonate and may be buried by the explosive force of other munitions. In addition to the more immediate safety risks from explosives, chemical constituents in munitions can leach into the environment and present potential health risks if a "pathway" of exposure is present through the air, soil, groundwater, or surface water. Long-term exposure to contaminants can increase the risks of certain health effects, depending on the nature of a particular contaminant and the duration and concentration of exposure. For example, perchlorate is a common substance used in munitions. There has been increasing attention to the potential health risks of this substance in conjunction with efforts to regulate exposure through drinking water. (See CRS Report RS21961, Perchlorate Contamination of Drinking Water: Regulatory Issues and Legislative Actions , by [author name scrubbed].) For many years, DOD addressed potential risks from munitions on former training ranges and disposal sites without a consolidated effort in place to track progress and costs. In response to concerns among states, communities, and environmental organizations about the adequacy of these efforts, Congress included provisions in Sections 311 and 312 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 ( P.L. 107-107 ), requiring DOD to establish a comprehensive program to identify, investigate, and clean up munitions on former U.S. military training ranges in the United States, including U.S. territories. These provisions also require the cleanup of discarded munitions that were not properly disposed of in the United States, and the cleanup of contaminants leached from munitions into the environment. DOD established a Military Munitions Response Program within its Defense Environmental Restoration Program to fulfill these requirements. Section 312 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 ( P.L. 107-314 ) later required DOD to appoint a single official to manage these efforts. In accordance with the above authorities, the Military Munitions Response Program addresses the cleanup of former training ranges and munitions disposal sites on both active and closed military installations in the United States. The cleanup of operational training ranges is administered separately as an operation and maintenance activity on an installation-by-installation basis. Relatively little cleanup is performed on operational ranges as long as they remain operational. DOD generally clears munitions from its operational ranges to the extent necessary for the safety of military personnel to gain access to those lands for training. Once munitions are removed from an operational range, they are subject to federal regulations that govern their disposal. More extensive cleanup of operational ranges can be required if contaminants leached from munitions migrate off-site and present potential risks to adjacent populations. The authorities for the Military Munitions Response Program also do not extend to training ranges at U.S. military installations located in other nations. The Status of Forces Agreement between the U.S. government and the government of each nation in which U.S. forces are stationed (i.e., the host nation) generally governs the cleanup of munitions and other hazardous contamination. Under these agreements, the extent to which the U.S. government is held responsible for cleanup at U.S. military installations abroad can vary widely from one nation to another. Although the above laws authorized the investigation and cleanup of former military training ranges and munitions disposal sites in the United States, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly referred to as Superfund) generally governs the degree of cleanup at individual sites, and how cleanup is accomplished. CERCLA also specifies that requirements of the Solid Waste Disposal Act must be met, which generally applies to disposal facilities operated with permits issued under that latter statute. These laws generally require cleanup decisions to be based on potential risks, and allow multiple types of actions to address those risks, rather than one approach. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states are responsible for overseeing DOD's efforts to clean up munitions and related contamination to ensure that applicable requirements of the above statutes are met. The degree of cleanup required can vary considerably from site to site, depending on the pathways of exposure that would result from the current or anticipated land use, and the means to prevent exposure. For example, munitions may be cleared to a certain depth beneath the surface at some sites, whereas surface clearance only may be performed at others. Regardless of the depth of clearance, removal of a munition often is accomplished not by transporting it from the site, but by detonating it in place, referred to as "Blow in Place" (BIP). Because of the sensitivity of munitions to disturbance, detonation in place often is a safer way to eliminate the explosive risk, rather than unearthing a munition and transporting it elsewhere for disposal. In some cases, restrictions on public access are used to manage potential risks, allowing munitions to be left in place. For example, access restrictions are used at many sites where clearing vegetation to locate munitions would destroy wildlife habitat or plant species protected by federal or state law. As indicated in Table 1 , DOD had identified 3,537 sites as of the end of FY2007 on former training ranges and munitions disposal sites in the United States that warranted investigation to determine whether munitions and related contamination were present. Nearly half of these potentially contaminated lands are located on Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), decommissioned before the first consolidated Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round in 1988. Many of the FUDS sites are from the World War II era and earlier. Installations closed under the BRAC rounds contained the least number of sites. Most of the other sites are located on active military installations. In October 2005, DOD promulgated regulations for prioritizing response actions among munitions sites, based primarily on potential risks. Numerous factors determine the degree of risks at an individual site, such as the type of munitions present, whether munitions are located at or below the surface, the accessibility of a site, the proximity of munitions to populated areas, human health and environmental risks from potential exposure to munitions contaminants, and whether cultural or ecological resources are present. Of the sites identified so far, planned response actions were complete at 920 sites as of the end of FY2007. DOD deemed that response actions likely would not be needed at 470 sites because munitions were not known or suspected to be present, or potential risks were thought to be low enough not to warrant a response. Response actions were under way or planned at 1,113 sites. DOD had not completed or begun its evaluation of potential risks at 1,034 sites. Therefore, much remained uncertain about potential risks at those locations and the actions and funding needed to address those risks. Funding for the Military Munitions Response Program comes out of multiple defense appropriations accounts. Which account funds a particular site depends on whether the installation is active or closed, and which military branch has jurisdiction over the site. There are five Defense Environmental Restoration Accounts. Three of these accounts are reserved mainly for active installations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A fourth account is reserved for defense-wide sites administered primarily by the Defense Logistics Agency. A fifth account is dedicated to FUDS sites, administered by the Army Corps of Engineers. Two BRAC accounts currently fund cleanup at bases closed under each BRAC round. All of these accounts also fund the cleanup of other hazards at non-munitions sites. DOD is responsible for prioritizing and allocating monies appropriated to each account to meet competing cleanup needs among contaminated sites. As indicated in Table 2 , the amount DOD spent from the above accounts as of the end of FY2007 for the cleanup of munitions was 6% of the total costs that DOD estimated would be needed to complete cleanup at all sites it had identified at that time. The table shows amounts spent on the cleanup of munitions back to FY1997. Prior to that time, the costs to clean up munition sites were not broken out from the costs to clean up other hazards at non-munitions sites. The lack of a breakout of costs for each type of site prior to FY1997 makes it difficult to determine the total funds DOD has expended on munitions cleanup historically. DOD spent a total of $1.24 billion from FY1997 through FY2007 on the cleanup of munitions and related contamination at former training ranges and munitions disposal sites it had identified. DOD estimated that another $19.23 billion would be needed from FY2008 into the future to complete outstanding cleanup actions planned at that time. Cleanup at FUDS sites accounts for 68% of the estimated future costs. Cleanup at active installations accounts for 27% of the estimated future costs. Although BRAC sites account for only 5% of the estimated future costs, communities seeking redevelopment of these properties have emphasized the importance of funding needs at these sites to make them safe for civilian reuse. (See CRS Report RS22065, Military Base Closures: Cleanup of Contaminated Properties for Civilian Reuse , by [author name scrubbed].) The above site status and costs focus on the cleanup of former training ranges and munitions disposal sites on land. Munitions also are known or suspected to be present in underwater areas adjacent to some training ranges. In some cases, obsolete or damaged munitions were dumped offshore. Submerged munitions generally have received less attention than munitions on land because of the perceived lower risks of human exposure. Locating and removing munitions underwater also presents greater challenges, making it a more difficult and costlier undertaking than cleanup on land. Challenges arising from the cleanup of munitions can be multiplied several times when munitions are found underwater. In some cases, removing munitions from underwater areas could present greater risks than leaving the munitions in place and warning individuals to avoid them. Although the cleanup of munitions in underwater areas has received less attention, there has been rising concern about potential risks, especially in coastal areas where DOD disposed of surplus or damaged munitions. The U.S. Armed Forces disposed of many of these weapons during the World War II era. In response to requirements in Section 314 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 ( P.L. 109-364 ), DOD has released more recent information on the past disposal of chemical weapons off U.S. shores. Congress also has funded a pilot program to identify chemical weapons at known disposal sites off the coast of Hawaii. While concern about potential risks has heightened, locating the weapons at these and other sites would be challenging. The exact coordinates of offshore disposal sites are uncertain, and ocean currents could have moved the weapons over time. If found, removing the weapons could present other obstacles. Members of Congress, states, communities, and environmental organizations have expressed concern about the adequacy and pace of the cleanup of munitions and related contamination at the current inventory of sites, and have questioned whether munitions may be present at other sites not yet identified. The capability of current technologies to locate and neutralize munitions efficiently and effectively also has been an issue. The cleanup of FUDS sites has caused the greatest concern among the public. Many of these properties ceased to be used for military purposes decades ago and have been put to a variety of civilian uses, including residential use in some cases. Potential risks on these lands have motivated desires for greater funding to speed the pace of cleanup. The challenge of cleaning up munitions on closed bases awaiting reuse has motivated interest in greater funding to speed the pace of economic redevelopment to replace lost jobs. There has been less concern among the public about munitions sites on active installations, primarily because these sites pose little, if any, immediate safety risks to the general civilian population. However, some communities adjacent to active installations have expressed concern about health risks from potential exposure to munitions contaminants that may migrate off-site through groundwater. Some also have questioned whether DOD's estimates of future costs reflect actual funding needs. Uncertainties about the degree of cleanup that will be required at many sites make it challenging to accurately estimate the outstanding costs to complete cleanup. DOD estimates cleanup costs based on its current knowledge of individual site conditions, and its assumptions about the response actions that will be required to close out these sites. DOD revises its cost estimates as more is learned about the type and extent of contamination present at each location, and the actions that federal and state regulators will require to address potential risks. In effect, these estimates are "moving targets" that change as more information becomes available to project the costs of future actions. Considering that many sites are not evaluated and that additional sites could be identified in the future, DOD's most recent assumptions of the resources that may be necessary to address cleanup challenges could differ from what may be required. Actual costs could be higher than estimated, if more munitions and contamination are discovered than expected, and more extensive cleanup is needed than anticipated. New or more stringent cleanup standards also could cause costs to rise. Whether more attention is given to munitions in underwater areas is another factor that could contribute to the possible need for greater resources to meet cleanup needs. On the other hand, the development of more cost-effective technologies to locate and neutralize munitions, and clean up related contamination, could help to control costs. The effect of inflation over time also could cause actual costs to differ from current estimates. In carrying out its statutory authorities, DOD continues to work with federal and state regulators to determine the degree of cleanup that is warranted to protect human safety, health, and the environment. As this process unfolds, more information will become available to assess the resources needed to address potential risks, both in terms of appropriations by Congress and the capabilities of munitions cleanup technologies.

How to address safety, health, and environmental risks from potential exposure to abandoned or discarded military munitions has been a long-standing issue. There has been particular concern among the public about such risks at older decommissioned military properties that have been in civilian use for many years, and at closed military bases still awaiting redevelopment. Many of these properties contain former training ranges and munitions disposal sites where the extent of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and related environmental contamination is not fully understood. The approval of another round of military base closings in 2005 raised additional concerns about munitions risks on certain bases, and whether cleanup challenges may limit their civilian reuse. This report discusses the potential hazards of military munitions and related contamination, the authorities of the Department of Defense (DOD) to address these hazards, the status and costs of cleanup efforts, and issues for Congress.

One of the most lively debates among economists and policymakers during the 1980s was the relationship between the federal budget deficit and the international trade deficit. When the dust settled those arguing that the two deficits should move together seemed to have carried the day, although doubters remained. This prediction was based on mainstream macroeconomic theory. As the 1990s unfolded, the two deficits did not move together. As the federal budget deficit came down as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP), the trade deficit rose as a fraction of GDP. Is this evidence inconsistent with theory? The analysis will suggest that the answer is no. There are other forces besides the federal budget deficit that can influence the U.S. trade deficit. They were not decisive during the 1980s. They appear to have been operative during the 1990s. With the onset of the recession in 2001 and subsequent move to expansion, the coincident shift back to budget deficit, the two deficits began to move together again. Mainstream macroeconomic theory explains the twin deficit phenomenon as follows. An increase in the federal budget deficit (measured as an increase in the structural deficit as a percent of full employment GDP) will— all else held constant both in the United States and abroad —put upward pressure on U.S. interest rates, raising them above comparable rates abroad. This occurs because the position of the government's budget influences the national saving rate. When the structural budget deficit shrinks, the government adds to the national saving supplied by households and businesses and interest rates fall. When the structural budget deficit grows, it represents a claim on those savings, and interest rates must rise for the market to remain in equilibrium. In a world in which U.S. assets are good substitutes for foreign assets, foreign investors will be tempted to buy more of the now higher yielding American assets. Before they can buy these assets, they must first purchase dollars. Thus, the net demand for dollars in the foreign exchange market rises and the dollar increases in value and it is said to appreciate. Dollar appreciation reduces the price of foreign goods and services in America and increases the price of American goods and services abroad. The net result is that Americans spend more on foreign goods and services (the value of American imports rise) and foreigners spend less on American goods and services (the value of U.S. exports fall). If the trade accounts were in balance to begin with, the United States now has a trade deficit. And, indeed, the data during the 1980s, shown on Table 1 , conform to what the theory predicts. The full employment or structural deficit rose from 0.6% of full employment GDP in 1981 to an expansion high of 4.8% in 1986, a rise of 4.2 percentage points. The trade balance rose over this period from a surplus of 0.2% of GDP to a deficit of 2.5% of GDP, a rise of 2.7 percentage points (thus, the rise in the trade deficit was about 59% of the rise in the structural budget deficit). Further, as the structural budget deficit fell from 4.7% of GDP in 1986 to 2.2% in 1989, the last full year of the 1982-1990 economic expansion, a fall of 2.5 percentage points, the trade deficit fell from 2.5%, of GDP to 1.1% of GDP, a fall of 1.4 percentage points (or about 56% of the decline in the structural budget deficit). As seen in Table 2 , events subsequent to the recession in 2001 have mirrored the 1980s experience: as the budget deficit rose, the trade deficit rose. This occurred despite a major easing in monetary policy by the Federal Reserve which should have discouraged foreign capital from coming to the United States. However, unlike the 1980s, in this episode, the growth of the trade deficit is coincident with a fall in the international exchange value of the dollar which should signal a net decrease in the inflow of foreign capital. And, indeed, during 2002-2004 the inflow of private capital did abate. The trade deficit did not fall because the decrease in the inflow of private capital was offset by the inflow of official capital (from foreign central banks and treasuries). If the twin deficits theory is correct, it has an adverse implication for the efficacy of fiscal policy as a stimulus tool. In the mainstream model, policy induced increases in the structural budget deficit (through tax cuts or increases in government spending) boost aggregate spending by generating more government spending than the government's revenue intake. This outcome is predicated on the absence of foreign capital mobility. But if foreign capital flows are highly sensitive to changes in interest rates, then any increase in aggregate spending caused by the larger budget deficit would be largely offset by an increase in the trade deficit caused by the upward pressure placed on interest rates by the budget deficit. In other words, tax cuts or increases in government spending would not have much effect on the short-run growth in output and employment under this view. Before looking at developments during the late 1990s, it should be noted that mainstream macroeconomic theory has never excluded an independent causal role for international capital movements. That is, international capital movements can occur independent of any change in the federal budget deficit. Foreign capital may come to the Untied States for a variety of circumstances unrelated to the pressures the federal budget deficit puts on U.S. interest rates. A change in U.S. tax law which increases the after tax rate of return on capital could attract foreign funds even if it had no effect on the federal budget deficit. Rising prospects for profit because of boom conditions in the U.S. economy or an increase in productivity could increase domestic investment relative to GDP, and could attract foreign capital even as the federal budget moves toward balance or into surplus. Similarly, fears of inflation, currency devaluation, or political repression could induce foreigners to seek the safety of U.S. assets. Moreover, if a falling federal deficit in the United States occurs with the onset of an economic downturn abroad such that yields on foreign assets fall relative to comparable U.S. yields, the emerging differential in favor of the United States could serve as a magnet attracting additional capital that could forestall a fall in the trade deficit or lead to a rise in that deficit. In this instance, it would be possible to have a falling budget deficit and a rising trade deficit. Other possibilities also suggest themselves. The data on Table 2 show a very different pattern in the last half of the 1990s from the twin deficits of the 1980s. As the structural budget deficit fell from 2.0% of GDP in 1995 to a surplus of 1.1% of GDP in 2000 (a shift of 3.1 percentage points), the last full year of the 1991-2001 expansion, the trade deficit rose over the same period from 0.9% to 3.9% of GDP (a shift of 3 percentage points). These data show clearly that changes in the magnitude and direction of the net inflow of foreign capital can occur independently of changes in the federal budget deficit. The data in themselves do not explain why these movements occur, however. Yet, there are some interesting clues in the data on domestic investment that suggest at least a proximate explanation for why the two deficits have not moved in the same direction in the 1990s. The data in Table 3 report real gross domestic investment as a fraction of real GDP during the years 1983-1989 (the expansion of the 1980s) and 1995-2007. There is a noticeable difference between these two expansions. Unlike 1983-1989, real gross domestic investment during the 1990s expansion was a rapidly rising fraction of GDP. The increase was especially strong in the period 1995-2000. The increase in desired investment, motivated by the increase in productivity and the related rise in the real rate of return on American capital in the last half of the 1990s, served as a magnet for attracting foreign capital to the United States. And this increased inflow of foreign capital (saving) made possible the additional investment in the United States. Upward pressure on U.S. interest rates was the proximate cause of the inflow of capital, and resulting trade deficit, in both the 1980s and late 1990s. The difference between the two periods was what caused the pressure on interest rates. In the 1980s, the upward pressure came from the rise in the structural budget deficit. In the 1990s, it came from the increased productivity and related rise in the profitability of private investment. An interesting aspect of both historical periods is that policymakers in the United States have managed to bring the U.S. economy to full employment with large and even growing trade deficits. These trade deficits have not hampered the overall creation of jobs. They have, however, influenced the nature of job creation since they alter the composition of U.S. output, away from export and import-competing industries toward industries the demand for whose output is sensitive to interest rates. During the 1980s, a lively debate occurred, the outcome of which was a convincing case linking the growth in the structural measure of the federal budget deficit with the growth of the trade deficit (with cause and effect running from budget deficit to trade deficit via interest rates and dollar appreciation). Lost in the "small print" of this debate was that the budget deficit is not the exclusive determinant of net capital flows and trade deficits. International capital flows into and out of the United States can move in directions contrary to the movements in the position of the federal budget. They depend not only on economic conditions in the United States, but on similar conditions and decisions made abroad. During the 1990s, the U.S. trade deficit did not moved in concert with the structural (or even the actual) measure of the federal budget deficit (both absolutely and as a fraction of GDP). Beginning in 1995, real gross domestic investment rose as a fraction of real GDP reflecting the increase in productivity and related increase in the real rate of return on American capital. This increase served to attract private capital to the United States. Thus, the trade deficit rose even as the budget deficit fell. During the recovery that began in the fourth quarter of 2001 and the subsequent expansion, a rising structural budget deficit and the recovery of private investment spending once again attracted foreign capital to the United States, although in this episode the proportion of the inflow coming from foreign official sources (central banks and treasuries) has been especially important during 2002-2004 and 2006-2007. If the twin deficits theory is correct, it has an adverse implication for the efficacy of fiscal policy as a stimulus tool. It suggests that when international capital flows are highly mobile, the effect of policy induced increases in the structural budget deficit (through tax cuts or increases in government spending) on short-run output growth and employment would be largely offset by increases in the trade deficit.

In the 1980s expansion, the trade deficit and budget deficit moved together. This pattern re-emerged in the recession and subsequent expansion beginning in 2001. This is the opposite of what happened in the last half of the 1990s, when the budget deficit fell as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP) and the trade deficit rose sharply as a fraction of GDP. From this experience it is clear that international capital flows, which drive the net balance of trade, do not depend solely on movements in the budget deficit. During the last half of the 1990s, real gross domestic investment rose as a fraction of real GDP. This resulted from the rise in U.S. productivity and the related rise in the real yield on U.S. assets. This drew in additional private capital from abroad. If the twin deficits theory is correct, it has an adverse implication for the efficacy of fiscal policy as a stimulus tool. It suggests that in an environment of highly mobile international capital, the effect of policy induced increases in the structural budget deficit (e.g., tax cuts) on short-run economic growth would be largely offset by increases in the trade deficit. The experience during both the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates that a large and growing trade deficit need not be an impediment to overall job creation even though it may have had an effect on the type of jobs that were created since it affected the composition of U.S. output. This report will be updated periodically.

The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. According to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), in the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), 888 pieces of legislation received House floor action. This report provides a statistical snapshot of the forms, origins, and party sponsorship of these measures and of the parliamentary procedures used to bring them to the chamber floor during their initial consideration. Legislation is introduced in the House or Senate in one of four forms: the bill (H.R. / S.), the joint resolution (H.J.Res. / S.J.Res.), the concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. / S.Con.Res.), and the simple resolution (H.Res. / S.Res.). Generally speaking, bills and joint resolutions can become law, but simple and concurrent resolutions cannot; they are used instead for internal organizational or procedural matters, or to express the sentiment of one or both chambers. In the 112 th Congress, 888 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 602 were bills or joint resolutions and 286 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 68% to 32%, respectively. Of the 888 measures receiving House floor action in the 112 th Congress, 783 originated in the House and 105 originated in the Senate. It is generally accepted that the House considers more legislation sponsored by majority party Members than measures introduced by minority party Members. This was born out in practice in the 112 th Congress. As is reflected in Table 1 , 74% of all measures receiving initial House floor action in the last Congress were sponsored by Members of the Republican Party, which had a majority of seats in the House. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are considered, 72% of measures receiving House floor action in the 112 th Congress were sponsored by Republicans, 27% by Democrats, and .004% by political independents. The ratio of majority to minority party sponsorship of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 112 th Congress varied widely based on the parliamentary procedure used to raise the legislation on the House floor. As is noted in Table 2 , 67% of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by Republicans, 32% by Democrats, and less than 1% by political independents. That measures introduced by Members of both parties were considered under Suspension is unsurprising in that (as is discussed below) Suspension of the Rules is the parliamentary procedure which the House generally uses to process non-controversial measures for which there is wide bipartisan support. In addition, passage of a measure under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, in practice, usually requires the affirmative votes of at least some minority party Members. The ratio of party sponsorship on measures initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House was far wider. Of the 137 measures the Congressional Research Service (CRS) identified as being initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule in the 112 th Congress, 134 were sponsored by majority party Members. The breakdown in party sponsorship on measures initially raised on the House floor by unanimous consent was uneven, with majority party Members sponsoring slightly over half of the measures brought up in this manner. The following section documents the parliamentary mechanisms that were used by the House to bring legislation to the floor for initial consideration during the 112 th Congress. In doing so, it does not make distinctions about the privileged status such business technically enjoys under House rules. Most appropriations measures, for example, are considered "privileged business" under clause 5 of House Rule XIII (as detailed in the section on " Privileged Business " below). As such, they do not need a special rule from the Rules Committee to be adopted for them to have floor access. In actual practice, however, in the 112 th Congress, the House universally provided for the consideration of these measures by means of a special rule, which, in general, could also provide for debate to be structured, amendments to be regulated, and points of order against the bills to be waived. Thus, appropriations measures considered in the 112 th Congress are counted in this analysis as being raised by special rule, notwithstanding their status as "privileged business." In recent Congresses, most legislation has been brought up on the House floor by Suspension of the Rules, a parliamentary device authorized by clause 1 of House Rule XV, which waives the chamber's standing rules to enable the House to act quickly on legislation that enjoys widespread, even if not necessarily unanimous, support. The main features of the Suspension of the Rules procedure include (1) a 40-minute limit on debate, (2) a prohibition against floor amendments and points of order, and (3) a two-thirds vote of Members present and voting for passage. The suspension procedure is in order in the House on the calendar days of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, during the final six days of a congressional session, and at other times by unanimous consent or special order. In the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), the House Republican leadership announced additional policies related to their use of the Suspension of the Rules procedure which restrict the use of the procedure for certain "honorific" legislation, generally require measures considered under Suspension to have been available for three days prior to their consideration, and require the sponsor of the measure to be on the floor at the time of a measure's consideration. These policies continue in force in the 113 th Congress (2013-2014). In the 112 th Congress, 473 measures, representing 53% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought up using the Suspension of the Rules procedure. This includes 435 bills or joint resolutions and 38 simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 72% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 112 th Congress came up by Suspension of the Rules. Eighty-five percent of measures brought up by Suspension of the Rules originated in the House. The remaining 15% were Senate measures. House rules and precedents place certain types of legislation in a special "privileged" category, which gives measures of this kind the ability to be called up for consideration when the House is not considering another matter. Bills and resolutions falling into this category that saw floor action in the 112 th Congress include the following: Order of Business Resolutions: Procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules affecting the "rules, joint rules, and the order of business of the House" are, themselves, privileged for consideration under clause 5 of House Rule XIII. Order of business resolutions are commonly known as "special rules," and are discussed below in more detail. Committee Assignment Resolutions: Under clause 5 of House Rule X and the precedents of the House, a resolution assigning Members to standing committees is privileged if offered by direction of the party caucus or conference involved. Correcting Enrollments: Under clause 5 of House Rule XIII, resolutions reported by the Committee on House Administration correcting errors in the enrollment of a bill are privileged. Providing for Adjournment: Under Article I, Section 5, clause 4, of the Constitution, neither house can adjourn for more than three days without the consent of the other. Concurrent resolutions providing for such an adjournment of one or both chambers are called up as privileged. Questions of the Privileges of the House: Under clause 2 of House Rule IX, resolutions raising a question of the privileges of the House, affecting "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings," are privileged under specific parliamentary circumstances described in the rule. Such resolutions would include the constitutional right of the House to originate revenue measures. Bereavement Resolutions: Under House precedents, resolutions expressing the condolences of the House of Representatives over the death of a Representative or of a President or former President have been treated as privileged. Measures Related to House Organization: Certain organizational business of the House, such as resolutions traditionally adopted at the beginning of a session notifying the President that the House has assembled, electing House officers, as well as concurrent resolutions providing for a joint session of Congress, have been treated as privileged business. In the 112 th Congress, 207 measures, representing 23% of the measures receiving floor action, came before the House on their initial consideration by virtue of their status as "privileged business." All but three of these 207 measures were non-lawmaking forms of legislation, that is, simple or concurrent resolutions. Of the three bills or joint resolutions receiving action, two were joint disapproval resolutions privileged by statute, and one was a Senate bill formally rejected by the House as a question of the privileges of the House. The most common type of measure brought up in the House as "privileged business" during the 112 th Congress was special orders of business (special rules) reported by the Rules Committee, followed by resolutions assigning Representatives to committee. A special rule is a simple resolution that regulates the House's consideration of legislation identified in the resolution. Such resolutions, as noted above, are sometimes called "order of business resolutions" or "special orders." Special rules enable the House to consider a specified measure and establish the terms for its consideration. For example, how long the legislation will be debated, what, if any amendments may be offered to it, and whether points of order against the measure or any amendments to it are waived. Under clause 1(m) of House Rule X, the Committee on Rules has jurisdiction over the "order of business" of the House, and it reports such procedural resolutions to the chamber for consideration. In current practice, although a relatively small percentage of legislation comes before the House via special rule, most measures that might be characterized as significant, complicated, or controversial are brought up in this way. In the 112 th Congress, 137 measures, or 15% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought before the chamber under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the House. Of these, 124 (91%) were bills or joint resolutions and 13 (9%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 21% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 112 th Congress came up by Special Rule. Ninety-nine percent of the measures considered under a special rule during the 112 th Congress originated in the House, 1% being Senate legislation. As is noted above, all but three measures brought before the House using this parliamentary mechanism was sponsored by a majority party Member. In current practice, legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members. Long-standing policies announced by the Speaker regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose. Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction. In the 112 th Congress, 64 measures, or 7% of all legislation identified by LIS as receiving House floor action, were initially considered by unanimous consent. Of these, 33 (52%) were bills or joint resolutions and 31 (48%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 5% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 112 th Congress came up by unanimous consent. Of the measures initially considered by unanimous consent during the 112 th Congress, 64% originated in the House. Clause 5 of House Rule XV establishes special parliamentary procedures to be used for the consideration of private legislation. Unlike public legislation, which applies to public matters and deals with individuals only by classes, the provisions of private bills apply to "one or several specified persons, corporations, [or] institutions." When reported from House committee, private bills are placed on a special Private Calendar established by House Rule XIII. The consideration of Private Calendar measures is in order on the first and (if the Speaker of the House so chooses) third Tuesday of a month. On those days, the Private Calendar is "called" and each measure on it is automatically brought before the House in order. Private bills are considered under a set of procedures known as the "House as in Committee of the Whole," which is a hybrid of the procedures used in the full House and those used in the Committee of the Whole. Under these, private bills may be debated and amended under the five-minute rule, although in practice, they are almost always passed without debate or record vote. In the 112 th Congress, seven measures were brought to the floor via the call of the Private Calendar. The House of Representatives has established special parliamentary procedures that might be used to bring legislation to the chamber floor dealing with the business of the District of Columbia, a discharge process to force consideration of measures triggered by a petition signed by a numerical majority of the House, and a procedure known as the Calendar Wednesday procedure. These procedures are rarely used, and no legislation was brought before the House in the 112 th Congress by any of these three parliamentary mechanisms.

House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures that, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), received action on the House floor in the 112th Congress (2011-2012) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration. In the 112th Congress, 888 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 602 were bills or joint resolutions and 286 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 68% to 32%. Of these 888 measures, 783 originated in the House and 105 originated in the Senate. During the same period, 53% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure; 23% came to the floor as business "privileged" under House rules and precedents; 15% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House; and 7% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. Seven measures, representing approximately 1% of legislation receiving House floor action in the 112th Congress, were processed under the procedures associated with the call of the Private Calendar. When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 72% of such measures receiving initial House floor action in the 112th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure; 21% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House; and 5% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. Around 1% of lawmaking forms of legislation received House floor action via the call of the Private Calendar and an even smaller fraction of lawmaking measures were "privileged" under House rules. The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 112th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Sixty-seven percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All but three of the 137 measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for conducting agricultural research at the federal level, and for providing partial support for cooperative research, extension, and post-secondary agricultural education programs in the states. This mission area of USDA is called Research, Education, and Economics (REE). In addition to research in the biological sciences, the mission also includes substantial economic data collection and analysis. The state partners are the colleges of agriculture at land grant universities in 50 states and eight U.S. territories, with their affiliated state agricultural experiment stations, schools of forestry and veterinary medicine, and cooperative extension. There also are 18 historically black land grant colleges of agriculture (the 1890 institutions) and more than 30 Native American colleges that gained land grant status in 1994 (referred to as the tribal colleges). Small grant programs have supported agricultural education at Hispanic-serving institutions, and at Alaskan and Hawaiian native-serving institutions. The omnibus farm bill enacted May 22, 2008, also extends eligibility for certain research, education, and extension programs to non-land grant institutions that offer degree programs in agriculture. USDA differs from other federal research agencies in allocating the majority of its annual research appropriation directly to in-house research (ARS, ERS, and NASS). Most federal science agencies primarily fund extramural research through a competitive, peer-reviewed grant process. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has recommended for more than a decade that at least 35% of total USDA research money be distributed competitively. When the Academy first made its recommendation in 1989, it determined that less than 6% of USDA's research funding was competitively awarded. In FY2006 it was approximately 14%, according to CRS calculations. The primary and longest-standing mechanisms for distributing annual federal appropriations to the colleges of agriculture at the state land grant universities are contained in the Hatch Act of 1887 (for cooperative research) and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 (for extension activities). Formulas set forth in each of these acts determine how annual federal appropriations are divided among states. The majority of funding for state-level programs, however, comes from state appropriations, competitive grants from USDA and other federal agencies, and private industry. States are required to match Hatch and Smith-Lever formula funds; most states appropriate three to four times the federal allotment. Nonetheless, despite the fact that federal formula funds represent only a small percentage of total funding at the state level, they traditionally have been viewed by state research and extension directors as a very reliable source of support for their core programs. Congress has set the policies and authorized the funding for USDA's research, education, and extension programs as part of omnibus farm bills since 1977. Permanent authority for most of the programs resides in older laws, but the farm bill renews the authorization for appropriations. To address the challenges posed by the perceived need to increase competitive grants in agriculture, several major proposals released in advance of congressional debate on the research title recommended significant changes in how ARS and CSREES are structured and administered. In the comprehensive farm bill proposal that USDA released in February 2007, the Administration proposed to rename the Research, Education, and Economics mission area the Office of Science, and to merge ARS and CSREES into a single agency conducting both intramural and extramural programs under the leadership of a Chief Scientist. The proposal called for the current formula-funded authorities to be retained. ERS and NASS would be the other two agencies also under the Office of Science. The Administration maintained that an integration of budgets and programs would provide more efficient and effective program implementation and resource allocation. In its call for a unified budget and a single scientific agency, this proposal mirrored some of the key aspects of the land grant system's CREATE-21 proposal (see below). In Section 7404 of the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ), Congress commissioned a task force "to conduct a review and evaluation of the merits of establishing one or more National Institutes focused on disciplines important to the progress of food and agricultural sciences," among other things. The task force recommendations, released in July 2004, called for the formation of a National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA) within USDA "to supplement and enhance, not replace, the existing research programs." The task force conceived of the NIFA as a separate entity solely for awarding competitive peer-reviewed grants, and called for an annual budget for the institute to build to $1 billion over a five-year period. The task force proposal was reflected in companion House and Senate bills prior to congressional activity on drafting a farm bill ( H.R. 2118 (C. Peterson)/ S. 971 (Bond)). The bills would have provided mandatory funds for the NIFA starting at $245 million in FY2008 and increasing to $966 million by FY2012. The National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC) put forth a comprehensive recommendation for reorganizing the REE system after a nationwide deliberative process within the land grant system. These proposals were reflected in H.R. 2398 (Barrow)/ S. 1094 (Stabenow). The key provisions included (1) putting all of USDA's intramural and extramural research, education, and extension agencies (including the research arm of the Forest Service) under one administrative body, working with a unified budget; (2) providing $200 million annually in mandatory funds and substantial annual increases in appropriated funds (to 171.5% of the current level of $2.67 billion) in FY2012; and (3) providing opportunities for minority and smaller schools, both land grant and non-land grant, to expand their capacity for agricultural research, education, and extension. The NASULGC proposal, called CREATE-21, was widely but not unanimously endorsed by the colleges of agriculture at the land grant universities. In June 2008, the 110 th Congress completed action on the 2008 omnibus farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 . This enacted legislation included aspects of proposed changes to the research title of the House-passed ( H.R. 2419 ) and Senate-passed farm bill (introduced as a substitute amendment to H.R. 2419 ). Both the House and Senate bills drew heavily on the recommendations of USDA and NASULGC. The House version called for creating, within the Office of the Under Secretary for Research, Education, and Economics, an overall coordinating organization known as the National Agricultural Research Program Office (NARPO) with six specialized directors. NARPO's six subject-area directors would work with the existing National Agricultural Research, Extension, Education, and Economics Advisory Board to coordinate and plan both the capacity and competitive programs of the REE agencies. The directors of NARPO would become the primary program leaders, incorporating the duties of the currently separate ARS and CSREES national program staffs. Additionally, the House bill called for establishing a National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) within CSREES that would oversee extramural competitive research grants only. NIFA would merge USDA's two major competitive grant programs—the National Research Initiative (NRI) and the Initiative for Future Agriculture and Food Systems (IFAFS). The NRI portion of the combined program would focus on fundamental, basic research, and receive 60% of the available funding. The IFAFS portion would focus on applied, integrated research, education, and extension projects, and receive 40% of the available funding. The title would reauthorize appropriations for the NRI at $500 million annually through FY2012, and provide for the transfer of IFAFS's mandatory funding. The House bill, in support of a more centralized administration of the agencies, called for the President to submit a unified annual budget reflecting the total amount requested for each of two categories of mission area programs. The first category, called capacity-building programs, included all of the formula-funded programs, support for research at the tribal colleges, the 1890 colleges, the Hispanic-serving institutions, and other selected programs. The second budget category, called competitive programs (administered by the new NIFA), reflected the total amount requested for all programs that distribute funds through peer-reviewed, competitive processes. The House bill provided a substantial amount of mandatory research funding, totaling $865 million over the five-year life of the farm bill. The existing Organic Research and Extension Initiative received $25 million in total mandatory funds for FY2008-FY2012 and $25 million in annual appropriations authority for FY2009-FY2012. A new Specialty Crop Research Initiative received a total of $215 million in mandatory funds in addition to annual appropriations authority of $100 million for FY2008-FY2012. The effort to improve the safety of fresh cut produce was provided an additional total of $25 million in mandatory funds to supplement the annual appropriation. Also, the House bill preserved mandatory funding of $200 million for IFAFS for FY2010-FY2012. Discretionary programs were maintained largely as in the previous farm bill and most were authorized to receive appropriations of such sums as necessary. The Senate-passed amendment called for terminating CSREES and recasting the agency as the National Institute of Food and Agriculture. The institute was to plan, coordinate, and manage all existing extramural USDA research, education, and extension funds (competitive grants, capacity-building grants, and formula funds). The NIFA director was to report directly to the Secretary of Agriculture (not through the Under Secretary). The bill explicitly directed the Under Secretary to coordinate research between ARS and NIFA, and to recommend funding for all the programs within USDA's research mission area. The Senate bill provided $160 million in mandatory research funding over the five-year life of the farm bill. This bill reauthorized the Organic Research and Extension Initiative with $16 million in annual mandatory funds for FY2008-FY2012. A new Specialty Crop Research Initiative received $16 million in annual mandatory funds for FY2008-FY2012. Mandatory funds for the Initiative for Future Agricultural and Food Systems (IFAFS, which was to be a program within NIFA) were eliminated and replaced with annual appropriations of such sums as necessary. As with the House bill, discretionary programs were maintained largely as in the previous farm bill and most were authorized to receive appropriations of such sums as necessary. Other new provisions in the both the House and Senate bills included (1) a grant program to help non-land grant public colleges and universities improve their capacity for agricultural research, education, and outreach; (2) establishment of an endowment fund, similar to that established for the tribal colleges, to provide a continuing base of support for Hispanic-serving agricultural colleges; (3) establishment of institutional capacity-building and competitive grant programs for the Hispanic-serving colleges; and (4) a larger commitment to bioenergy and biobased products. The enacted 2008 farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 ) reorganizes the Department's Research, Education, and Economics mission area, which currently comprises four agencies that separately administer intramural and extramural programs supporting agricultural research and development (R&D). The enacted farm bill's research title (Title VII) classifies all current research, extension, and education programs into two groups—capacity programs and competitive programs—based upon the way in which their funding is distributed to recipients. Title VII creates an umbrella coordinating entity known as the Research, Education, and Extension Office (REEO) in Office of the Under Secretary for Research, Education, and Economics, and designates the Under Secretary as the Chief Scientist of USDA. The REEO will coordinate and plan both capacity and competitive programs, as well as USDA-administered intramural (Agricultural Research Service (ARS)) and extramural programs. Extramural programs (both capacity and competitive), currently administered by the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES)), will be transferred to a new National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA), and CSREES will cease to exist on October 1, 2009. Within the new NIFA, the existing National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program (NRI) will be expanded into an Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI). It will incorporate the purposes of the former Initiative for Future Agriculture and Food Systems (IFAFS), whose authority the new farm bill repeals. The enacted 2008 farm bill also makes changes regarding how some research contracts and grants are awarded, and increases the emphasis on the need for a competitive bid process. For example, the enacted bill switches certain Smith-Lever 3(d) special emphasis extension funds from being awarded on a formula basis to competitive bid. Also, in general, the farm bill increases money mostly for research programs that are competitively awarded, such as programs for specialty crops, biomass, and organic production, and also for beginning farmer research programs. These changes reflect statements in the conference committee's manager's report noting that "the Managers recognize the numerous benefits of competitive research programs and have supported the expansion of funding for these programs." The manager's report also "encourage[s] the Department to make every effort to increase support for competitive programs while maintaining the needs of capacity and infrastructure programs when making budgetary decisions." The Appendix compares the agricultural research, extension, and education policies set in the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ) with the provisions in the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2419 , and the enacted Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 ).

The 110th Congress passed an omnibus farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) to authorize and direct the implementation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) major programs across the spectrum of its mission areas through FY2012. The enacted bill reorganizes the Department's Research, Education, and Economics mission area, which currently comprises four agencies that separately administer intramural and extramural programs supporting agricultural research and development (R&D). The research title of P.L. 110-246 (Title VII) classifies all current research, extension, and education programs into two groups—capacity programs and competitive programs—based upon the way in which their funding is distributed to recipients. Title VII creates an umbrella coordinating entity known as the Research, Education, and Extension Office (REEO) in the Office of the Under Secretary for Research, Education, and Economics, and designates the Under Secretary as the Chief Scientist of USDA. The REEO will coordinate and plan both capacity and competitive programs, as well as USDA-administered intramural (Agricultural Research Service (ARS)) and extramural programs. Extramural programs (both capacity and competitive), currently administered by the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES)), will be transferred to a new National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA), and CSREES will cease to exist on October 1, 2009. Within the new NIFA, the existing National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program (NRI) will be expanded into an Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI). It will incorporate the purposes of the former Initiative for Future Agriculture and Food Systems (IFAFS), whose authority the new farm bill repeals. The House and Senate versions of the farm bill would have provided $865 million and $160 million, respectively, in mandatory funding for certain research programs over the five-year life of the bill. The enacted bill provides a total of $333 million in mandatory funds for (1) a new specialty crop research initiative ($230 million); (2) research on fresh produce food safety ($25 million); and (3) organic agriculture research ($78 million). The enacted farm bill research title includes major initiatives to provide capacity-building support to Hispanic-serving agricultural colleges and to make them eligible to receive funding through a wider range of grant programs. This report will not be updated.

Periods of high oil prices are usually associated with reduced economic growth, a deteriorating foreign trade balance, and rising prices. High gasoline prices, the most tangible result of high oil prices for consumers, reduce discretionary family income and influence decisions with respect to automobile choice and use. However, for companies involved in the oil industry, high oil prices generally result in expanding revenues and cash flow, and in some cases, record profit levels. While the oil industry is composed of hundreds of firms of various sizes doing business in different aspects of the oil supply chain, many characterize the industry through the performance of the five major integrated oil companies: ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP plc, Royal Dutch Shell plc, and ConocoPhillips. These companies are involved in all aspects of the oil supply chain from exploration and production through transportation, refining, and retail marketing, both in the United States and globally. They are also very large relative to the rest of the industry, and large even when compared to the economy as a whole; in 2011 their revenues were equivalent to over 10% of U.S. gross domestic product. This report examines the financial performance of the five major oil companies for the period 2007-2011. Both the sources and uses of revenue and profit are analyzed. The recent behavior of oil prices and company profits have led to changes in the structure of the market for oil in the United States which could have implications for gasoline prices and availability, and energy security. These issues are also analyzed in this report. The price of oil is determined in the world market. However, there is not one price of oil, but many. Crude oil is quality graded by its specific gravity and its sulfur content. Differences in quality of crude oil give rise to different prices for crude oil. Two types of crude oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent, play the role of reference crude oils. Their prices are standards against which other grades of crude oil prices are set. Although both the spot and futures prices of the reference crude oils are widely publicized, they do not necessarily represent the real prices of crude oil paid by refiners, or received by producers. The delivered price of crude oil also depends on its location. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes an oil price data set called the Refiners Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil, which represents the actual cost to refiners of crude oil. Table 1 shows these data for the period 2007-2011. The data in Table 1 show the escalating price of oil from 2007 to 2008, reflecting the tight global market which was characterized by minimal excess capacity availability and rapidly growing demand in the emerging economies, especially China. The price of oil declined in the later months of 2008, and remained generally lower than 2008 levels through 2010, reflecting both consumers' response to the high prices of 2008 and the recession which began in December 2007. The high prices observed in 2011 are related to numerous actual and potential market disruptions on the supply side. The withdrawal of Libyan crude oil during the civil war in that country, and the Iranian threat to close the key transit point, the Strait of Hormuz, to oil trade are key examples. Table 1 also shows that domestic crude oil is generally purchased at a higher price than imported crude, but this is likely due to quality differences rather than strict nationality characteristics. The reversal of the domestic/foreign price relationship in 2011 is likely related to the effects of the withdrawal of Libyan crude oil from the market, as none of the crude from that country typically is exported to the United States, but was used mostly in Europe. The total revenues of the five major oil companies followed the pattern of oil price movements set out in Table 2 . Revenues increased by 24% from 2007 to 2008, as oil prices increased by 38%. From 2008 to 2009 revenues declined by 36% as oil prices fell by 36%. As the price of oil recovered by 28% from 2009 to 2010, the five firms' revenues increased by 26%. 2011 brought a further 35% increase in oil prices, driving up the revenues of the five firms by 25%. While total revenues for the five companies exhibited noticeable swings from 2007 to 2011, the business interests and activities of the companies with respect to production were stable. Tables 3 and 4 show the production of crude oil and natural gas for the five companies for the years 2007 to 2011. The incentive of higher and/or rising oil prices in 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 did not result in observably higher production by the five major oil companies. Similarly, the disincentive of lower and/or falling oil prices did not result in observably lower production by the companies. Several possible explanations could exist for this apparent lack of response to market signals. For example, the companies could be making exploration and production decisions based on an internal planning price which might be different and more stable than the market price. The companies may be unsuccessful in finding and developing new production resources, except perhaps in volumes just sufficient to replace expended reserves and to keep production relatively constant. This lack of success might be due to geologic, political, or economic factors. The five major oil companies seemingly have not behaved in accord with market economic theory with respect to output adjustments in relation to changing prices. That theory depends on the responsiveness of firms to price signals to expand output in times of higher and/or rising prices, and to provide reductions in output during lower and/or falling prices. In this way, price volatility in the market is reduced while keeping supply matched to demand. The oil market, with characteristics of low price elasticity of demand and supply, demand growth which responds to income growth, substantial time lags, and long-term challenges with calls for reduced consumption and alternative products, is difficult to fit into the model of free market adjustments. Natural gas reserves, production, and consumption in the United States have increased in the last several years as the result of technologies and economics of non-conventional natural gas. Some have said the United States may have 100 years of reserves at current consumption rates, but others have been more sanguine. The big five oil companies have shown some interest in expanding their positions in the natural gas market, as suggested by the data in Table 4 . ExxonMobil increased its production of natural gas by about 41% between 2009 and 2011. The company was able to achieve this expansion through its purchase of XTO Energy Inc., which was announced in December 2009. Chevron purchased Atlas Energy Inc. in 2010 to expand its natural gas reserve holdings. The companies' enhanced positions in the natural gas markets came as the wellhead price of natural gas was volatile and declining (see Table 5 ). In accounting terms, profits are referred to as net income. Net income is total revenue minus all costs of operation, interest on debt, and taxes. Net income is the amount available to management to use for providing a return to shareholders, or pursuing strategic goals for the company. Table 6 shows the net incomes of the five major oil companies from 2007 to 2011. The data in Table 6 represent corporate earnings. Each business segment of the companies' operations contributes to the total. The most used aggregate measures of net income sources in the oil industry are the upstream (exploration and production) and downstream (refining and marketing) sectors. Net incomes of the five major oil companies generally follow the behavior of oil prices. Both 2008 and 2011 were record profit years for the industry. The two negative entries in Table 6 are unrelated to oil price volatility. ConocoPhillips' loss in 2008 was associated with its Luk Oil venture in Russia. The company's adjusted income, or net income before the impact of special items, was over $16.4 billion. BP's 2010 net income was affected by the costs to the company of the Macondo oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. BP's adjusted income in 2010 was $20.5 billion. Tables 7 and 8 show the upstream, exploration and production, and downstream, refining and marketing, net incomes of the five major oil companies. Although the five major oil companies are integrated firms, the majority of their earnings come from exploration and production activities. For example, in 2011, ExxonMobil earned about 84% of its corporate profits from upstream activities. Chevron earned 92%, and ConocoPhillips earned 66% from upstream activities in 2011. Downstream activities are important to the oil companies because crude oil itself has little consumer value. Only after refining, which breaks the crude oil down into a range of petroleum products, does value emerge. However, as shown by comparing data in Table 6 , Table 7 , and Table 8 , the major oil companies derive relatively small portions of their total net incomes from downstream activities. While the five major oil companies' downstream profits have not approached those of 2007, they have recovered from the lows of 2009. To the refining sector, the price of crude oil is a cost, and a possible deterrent, to profits. If the petroleum product markets are growing, based on rising incomes, and the sensitivity of demand to price increases is small, refiners may be able to pass on high crude oil prices directly to final consumers through product price increases, preserving profitability. If the product market is stagnant, a full pass-through of crude oil costs may not be possible. In that case, refining profits typically fall. The performance of the refining businesses of the five major oil companies in 2009 compared to 2008 is an example of the degree to which unfavorable economic conditions can reduce profitability. The high gasoline prices of 2008 coupled with the financial crisis and associated recession conspired to weaken demand in the product markets. Some analysts claim that the refining industry needs major revisions to meet future world demand patterns. Excess capacity is thought to exist in North America and Europe, and a shortage of capacity may exist in Asia. Some evidence of transition in the U.S. market has been observed. ConocoPhillips announced in 2010 a decision to split into two independent companies, ConocoPhillips, an upstream company, and Phillips 66, a downstream company. The company also plans to either sell or close its refinery in Trainer, PA. Sunoco, an independent refining and marketing corporation, has left the refining sector, to concentrate on logistics and marketing, closing and attempting to sell its two refineries in the Philadelphia area. Capital projects in the oil industry are long-term commitments. For example, it may take 5 to 10 years for full production to begin after initial analysis of an oil field has been carried out. Once the field does start producing, it will likely continue to do so for years, with little technical or economic scope for varying output to reflect then-current market conditions. Similarly, construction or expansion of a refinery may take years to complete. As a result of the lagged, long-term characteristics of exploration, production, and refining activities, capital budgets are relatively stable, showing little year on year response to changing oil prices. Political realities around the world limit the capital allocations the major oil companies can make. With most of worldwide reserves held by nations through national oil companies, the areas open to development by private firms, like the five major oil companies, are limited. Additional constraints exist with respect to the number of construction resources, drilling rigs, personnel, and other equipment and supplies available for exploration. In certain areas, at certain times, it is possible that higher capital budgets and expanded exploration and construction activities were partially consumed by higher wages and other costs, reducing the effectiveness of the capital program. Bringing new oil supplies on to the market can be a double-edged sword for oil producers. While the oil companies need to expand their reserve bases to replace losses due to production, they, like the producing countries, may find it not in their interest to expand available supply too much, too quickly. When oil supplies flood the market and excess capacity rises to excessive levels, the price of crude oil can tumble. A sharp decline in the price is not in the interest of oil company profits, or the fiscal budgets of oil exporting nations around the world. Capital expenditures are not strictly a use of net income by the oil companies, because capital expenditures are a before tax deduction from total revenues. Capital expenditures, as shown in Table 9 , generally includes exploration expenses. However, exploration expenses are not necessarily a large part of capital expenditures. For example, in 2011 exploration expenditures for the five major oil companies totaled $7.3 billion, about 5% of total capital expenditures. A part of capital investment is an offset to depreciation of existing assets, yielding net investment that is lower than the total capital expenditure. Also, capital expenditures might include acquisitions and other financial transactions which are not likely to enhance industry capacity. The five major oil companies are private firms with a responsibility to generate returns for their investors, or shareholders. The primary ways this goal can be achieved in the short term are through dividend payments and share repurchases. Dividends are a direct distribution of earnings on a per share basis. They represent the most direct return on investment. Although dividends per share are generally identical for all shares, actual percentage returns to any particular investor or owner of shares vary depending on the actual share price paid by the actual owner. Stock repurchase programs enhance shareholder value by reducing the number of shares outstanding. This increases dividends per share for any given level of net income, because there are fewer shares outstanding to allocate payment. Retired shares are usually held in the company treasury, and may generally be reissued at any time at the discretion of the management, generally without further filing or approvals required by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In effect, retired shares represent a liquid pool of potential capital that can be drawn upon by the company should attractive investment opportunities that require funding develop. The oil industry tends to become highly profitable when the price of crude oil rises. Since increases in the world price of oil tend to reflect general economic conditions, political developments, and the emergence of new markets, the increases in company profitability can be viewed as windfall gains. Alternatively, the returns in periods of high oil prices could be looked at as the other side of the lower returns earned in periods of lower prices. The price of oil has not been permanently low, or high, since the 1970s. Future changes will likely again change the industry's financial position. The capital expenditures of the companies have not succeeded in increasing their production of oil and natural gas. They have been successful in providing returns to their shareholders. To the extent that high oil prices can be expected to continue, the five major oil companies are likely to remain profitable and able to carry out their business plans. Small changes in the companies' net incomes or total revenues can be expected to only have small effects on their operations.

Periods of rising oil prices can result in reduced economic growth, rising prices, and reduced disposable incomes for consumers, as well as a deteriorating trade balance. For the oil industry, periods of high oil prices generally imply increasing cash flows and higher profits. While some view the improvement in the industries' finances under these conditions as a business return no different than those earned in other industries, others view it as a windfall, a direct transfer from consumers, without any significant additional activity attributable to the industry. Although the U.S. oil industry is composed of many firms, to many the face of the oil industry is represented by the five major firms operating extensively in the U.S. market. These firms are ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP plc, Royal Dutch Shell plc, and ConocoPhillips. Over the period 2007 to 2011, oil prices were volatile. They increased to a record peak in 2008, declined rapidly at the end of 2008 and early 2009, and increased through 2010, and remained high during 2011. The total revenues and net incomes of the five major oil companies followed a similar pattern. However, the companies' production of both crude oil and natural gas, their two key products, remained largely unchanged in the face of volatile prices, suggesting that for these firms, market price and the production of key products are not closely related. During the period 2007 to 2011, the five major companies' upstream activities of exploration and production contributed more to the total profitability of the firms than the downstream activities of refining and marketing. During the period, capital budgets were more stable than the price of oil, and the companies' exploration and production activities did little to increase their ability to produce oil or natural gas. The companies used their profits to carry out a number of activities, to include the distribution of dividends to shareholders, the repurchase of shares on the market to enhance investor holdings, and to carry out business strategies.

Congress recently completed action on the Bush Administration's FY2004 supplemental budgetrequest to fund continuing military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. (1) A majorissue in the congressional debate on this, and other such supplementals of the past, is whethermilitary and peacekeeping operations should be funded with supplemental requests or via the regulardefense appropriations process. Some Members of Congress have urged the President to include thecosts of current and future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of Defense's(DOD's) regular appropriations, arguing that these are now ongoing operations that should beplanned for and funded in the annual defense budget. Others prefer supplementals due to theunpredictability of military and peacekeeping circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thisunpredictability, they argue, makes it extremely difficult to estimate the costs of either type ofoperation in advance. This report examines 46 cases since FY1990 in which Congress approved funding for combat or peacekeeping operations using regular appropriations, supplemental appropriations, or acombination of the two. Table 1 shows that since 1990, Congress generally has funded combatoperations with supplemental appropriations. In initial post-combat peacekeeping operations,however, Congress has tended to rely on a combination of supplemental and regular appropriations. As peacekeeping operations have become ongoing, Congress has switched to using regularappropriations. Examining the funding patterns for combat operations in the First Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti,Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom shows they were all funded initially withsupplemental appropriations. In each case, the President requested supplemental funding shortlyafter operations were underway, and Congress approved the requests within months. The only exception to this pattern is Bosnia, where United States' involvement began in 1993 with a humanitarian airlift. DOD funded this airlift using resources previously appropriated byCongress in FY1993 regular appropriations. (2) InFY1995, when the United States first launchedairstrikes in support of U.N. peacekeepers, DOD used a combination of supplemental appropriationsand FY1995 regular appropriations to fund combat operations. Thus, although supplementalappropriations were not used to fund the United States' initial involvement in Bosnia, Congress didturn to supplemental appropriations to fund combat and later peacekeeping operations after the initialhumanitarian airlift. Table 1 suggests that in the past decade, Congress generally has funded combat operations withsupplemental appropriations and ongoing peacekeeping operations with regular appropriations. Eachoperation, however, has gone through an interim period of initial post-combat peacekeeping in whichCongress has used different combinations of supplemental and regular appropriations. Congress funded combat operations in Haiti and Kosovo with supplemental appropriations in FY1994 and FY1999, respectively. In both cases, Congress also used supplemental appropriationsto fund initial post-combat peacekeeping. In Haiti, Congress funded peacekeeping through theremainder of FY1994 and all of FY1995 with supplemental appropriations, and switched to regularappropriations in FY1996. Similarly, Congress funded FY1999 post-combat peacekeeping inKosovo with supplemental appropriations, and continued to fund peacekeeping in Kosovo withsupplemental appropriations in FY2000. In FY2001, however, Congress switched to using regularappropriations to fund operations in Kosovo. Regular appropriations have also been used in FY2002and FY2003 as peacekeeping has remained ongoing. FY1995 combat operations in Bosnia were funded mostly with supplemental appropriations, and since FY1999 ongoing peacekeeping operations have been funded with regular appropriations. From FY1995 to FY1998, however, a mixture of supplemental and regular appropriations was usedto fund peacekeeping operations. In FY1995 and FY1996, this mixture consisted of supplementalfunding and the use of previously appropriated funds. In FY1997 and FY1998, both supplementaland regular appropriations were used. Funding for the First Gulf War and the "No-Fly" zones established in Southwest Asia after the war underwent a transition from supplemental to regular appropriations, but it was over the courseof 11 years. The long duration of the operations and the use of some regular appropriations to fundcombat during the First Gulf War distinguish these operations from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. Operation Desert Shield for the First Gulf War was initially funded with supplemental appropriations that were included in the FY1991 continuing resolution. The next funding forOperation Desert Shield, consisting of $1 billion, was included in the FY1991 regular DefenseAppropriations Act from amounts contributed by allies. This use of regular appropriations early inthe Gulf War was contrary to the use of supplemental appropriations to fund combat operations inBosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, it may reflectcongressional use of the funding vehicle that was immediately available to cover the initial costs ofthe operation. The next and largest appropriations for the First Gulf War were included in theFY1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm supplemental, which was signed into law on March 22, 1991. The size of this supplemental appropriation ($42.6 billion) suggests that the $1 billion included inFY1991 regular appropriations was indeed an exception, rather than a significant change, to thepractice of funding combat operations with supplemental appropriations. The "No-Fly" zones (Southwest Asia operations) following the First Gulf War were funded at least partially with supplemental appropriations for 7 years, the longest use of supplementalappropriations in any of the cases examined. Unlike Kosovo and Haiti, the "No-Fly" zones did notprogress directly from supplemental to regular appropriations as they became ongoing operations. Instead, they were funded partially with supplemental appropriations in FY1992 and FY1993 andfully with supplemental appropriations in FY1994 and FY1995. In FY1996, Congress used regularappropriations to fund the "No-Fly" zones. At this point, rather than continuing to use regularappropriations, Congress returned to a combination of regular and supplemental appropriations fromFY1997 through FY1999. In FY2000 and FY2001, regular appropriations were used again. Thus, although Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the "No-Fly" zones began with supplemental appropriations and ended with regular appropriations, the 7-year interim between those pointsdiffered from the interim between combat operations and ongoing peacekeeping operations inBosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. Not only was this interim longer in the case of the "No-Fly" zones, butit also provided two instances where Congress returned to either partial or full supplemental fundingafter having used only regular appropriations during the prior fiscal year. According to the President, the United States concluded major military operations inAfghanistan in December, 2001 and in Iraq on May 1, 2003. (3) Except for funds appropriated forAfghanistan in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, both operations have beenfunded to date using supplemental appropriations, including the recently enacted FY2004supplemental. Although the President has declared the end of major combat in both operations, lowintensity conflict is still prevalent, making it unclear whether Iraq and Afghanistan can yet bereferred to as ongoing peacekeeping operations. Going forward, Congress might designate a pointat which an operation becomes ongoing, and thus merits funding in the regular appropriationsprocess. Table 1: Methods of Funding for Wars and Contingency Operations, First Persian Gulf War to Operation Iraqi Freedom Notes: Please note that certain operations,such as Operation Desert Shield, were funded more thanonce in the same fiscal year. An asterisk indicates that DOD covered some of the cost by using existing resources thatwere originally programmed for other purposes. Sources: This table was conceived of and partially assembled by [author name scrubbed] and Nina Serafino of CRS, using the cited public laws and corresponding congressional reports. Formore specific cost information on Bosnia and Southwest Asia, see CRS Report 98-823(pdf) F, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questionsand Answers by Nina Serafino. For more specific information on funding for Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20161(pdf) , Kosovo Military Operations: Costs and Congressional Action on Funding ,by [author name scrubbed]. Specific information on Persian Gulf War funding can be found in CRS Issue Brief IB91019, Persian Gulf War: U.S. Costs and Allied Financial Contributions , by[author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Congress recently completed action on the Bush Administration's FY2004 supplemental budget request to fund continuing military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. It wassigned into law, P.L. 108-106 , on November 6, 2003. A major issue in the congressional debate onthis, and other such supplementals of the past, is whether military and peacekeeping operationsshould be funded with supplemental requests or via the regular defense appropriations process. Some Members of Congress have urged the President to include the costs of current and futureoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of Defense's (DOD's) regular appropriations,arguing that these are now ongoing operations that should be planned for and funded in the annualdefense budget. Others prefer supplementals due to the unpredictability of military andpeacekeeping circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. This unpredictability, they argue, makes itextremely difficult to estimate the costs of either type of operation in advance. This report examines 46 cases since FY1990 in which Congress approved funding for combat or peacekeeping operations using regular appropriations, supplemental appropriations, or acombination of the two. The report shows that since 1990, Congress generally has funded combatoperations with supplemental appropriations. In initial stages of post-combat peacekeepingoperations, however, Congress has tended to rely on a combination of supplemental and regularappropriations. As peacekeeping operations have become ongoing, Congress has switched to usingregular appropriations.

The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (1) authorized the creation of the StrategicPetroleum Reserve (SPR) for the storage of up to 1 billion barrels of crude oil. The federalgovernment began filling the SPR in 1977, mostly with imported oil. By 1992, the SPR held 575million barrels of crude oil, and in May 2003, over a decade later, holds approximately 600 millionbarrels in reserve. Since the creation of the SPR in 1975, debate has periodically focused on theoptimal size of the SPR, specifically whether it should be expanded to 700 million or 1 billionbarrels of oil. In the 108th Congress, legislation passed by the House ( H.R. 6 ) wouldrequire the SPR to be filled to its current capacity of 700 million barrels of crude oil and providesfunding of $1.5 billion to expand the capacity of the SPR to 1 billion barrels. (2) Worldwide concern over the unstable nature of the crude oil market has led other nations to establish emergency oil stocks as part of International Energy Administration (IEA) agreements tomanage supply disruptions. For example, at the end of 1999 Japan held 315 million barrels of crudeoil, OECD Europe held 325 million barrels, South Korea held 43 million barrels, and Taiwan held13 million barrels. The U.S. is the only country in this group where security stocks are totallygovernment owned. In Japan, South Korea, and OECD Europe, the total stock is divided betweengovernment and mandated private stocks. In Taiwan, the stock is completely mandated private. (3) Although decisions on the size of the SPR and private stocks are made through very different decision processes, they are linked by the fact that both may be useful in times of supply disruption. When supply is disrupted, prices rise quickly through active futures, spot, and product markets. Higher prices give businesses an incentive to bring product to market, which mitigates potentialphysical shortages, giving policy makers time to consider an SPR draw-down. If businesses havereduced available inventories to cut costs, their ability to play this role is diminished. For thisreason, the size and availability of private stocks of crude oil is relevant to debates over the optimalsize of the SPR as well as when, and under what circumstances, to use the SPR. The case for the existence of the SPR is usually framed in a benefit/cost framework. (4) Thebenefits are typically defined as avoided costs which are then set against the real resource, oropportunity, costs of maintaining the reserve. The same approach is followed for considering marginal adjustments to the reserve, but with a focus on the additional value of avoided costsimplied by a reserve expansion set against the marginal resource cost of expanding the reserve. Although debate on the size of the SPR is normally framed in terms of millions of barrels of crudeoil held, another measure, consistent with International Energy Agency (IEA) measurement, is thenumber of days of net imports for which the reserve can substitute. Although the primary focus ofSPR usage is concerned with international oil market disruptions, the SPR could also be used intimes of emergency stemming from domestic supply disruption. The benefit of maintaining the SPR lies in avoiding the effects of severe oil price spikes and shortages that might result from supply disruptions. Significant, rapid spikes in the price of crudeoil and actual shortages can have damaging effects on the macroeconomic performance of theeconomy. Reduced economic output, leading to increased unemployment and a reduction in the rateof economic growth are possible consequences. In terms of the balance of payments, higher oilprices will mean a greater expense for oil imports, causing the balance of trade to deteriorate. The costs of the SPR are much like those of other public investment projects. The capital costof the reserve and/or expansion of the reserve, costs associated with providing for the draw of thereserve, the operations and management cost, and the cost of the oil stored in the reserve are all partof total cost. The cost of the stored oil is a real budget cost in the year of acquisition to be recoupedlater when, and if, the reserve is drawn down. Proponents of the SPR see the existence, as well as the use, of the reserve contributing to stability in the oil market. The existence of the reserve could deter some politically or economicallymotivated disruptions. If the reserve is drawn upon, it might allow affected economies time to makeother adjustments to the new market conditions, including diplomacy, which might remedy, ormitigate the underlying cause of the disruption. The existence and/or use of the reserve might calmuncertain oil markets and dampen the effect of underlying market imbalances leading to a moderatedprice spike. Those opposed to market intervention see less benefit associated with the SPR and its use. They believe that the freely functioning market can mitigate most disruptions and that governmentintervention in market processes is unlikely to enhance resource allocation. In this view, friendlysuppliers might expand short term output in case of a disruption, and higher prices will allocateavailable supplies to their most pressing needs, minimizing the effect of the supply disruption. The SPR is not a stand-alone policy for energy security. In the longer term, diversifying energy sources and improving energy efficiency, engaging in productive dialogue with oil producers andenhancing the price responsiveness of consumer demand are all important measures. In the shorterterm, encouraging fuel switching capability and demand reduction can be useful energy securitymeasures. The implicit assumption underlying the SPR debate appears to be that the stock of private oilreserves held by the U.S. petroleum industry is known, unchanging, and available to reach the marketduring a supply disruption. To put the SPR expansion issue in proper context, the optimal size ofthe SPR might be considered as part of the total stock of reserves the nation has to draw upon intimes of emergency. (5) Consider the followingextreme, hypothetical cases. If the private sector wereable, technically and economically, to run the oil production system with zero inventories, or reservestocks, every world oil market supply disruption would be quickly transmitted to the domesticconsumer market, leading to immediate shortages and price spikes. In this case, a large reserve,coupled with quick response usage rules might be required for market stability. At the otherextreme, if the oil industry found it either technologically or economically useful to hold a year'sworth of supply in reserve which it was willing to draw down as needed, there might be little needfor any government reserve. If, in reality, we are somewhere between these extremes, so might bethe requirement for the SPR, and, as a corollary, if the capability of privately held stocks varies, somust the capability of the SPR if our overall ability to meet market challenges is to remain constant. In fact, the behavior of private levels of crude oil stocks have not been constant, they have been declining. Crude oil stocks, excluding the SPR, stood at 285.1 million barrels on May 16, 2003. One year ago the stock stood at 325.6 million barrels, which implies a reduction of 12.4 percent instocks held by the nation's oil industry. (6) Figure 1 , computed by the IEA, shows the behavior of totalU.S. oil stocks, measured as days of net imports. (7) Figure 1 shows a decade long decline in the ability of industry stocks, alongwith the SPR, to replace imported oil. Several forces are at work in Figure 1 . First,the increasing dependence of the U.S. on imported oil makes a stock of any size lesscapable of replacing imports. Even if the actual stocks shown in the figure wereconstant, days of imports would decline if the quantity of oil we import rises. Table1 shows that net imports of crude oil have increased from approximately 5.7 millionbarrels per day on average in 1989 to approximately 9.0 million barrels per day onaverage in 2002. (8) This increased dependency hascontributed to the downward trendof Figure 1 . Table 1. Net Imports of Petroleum, 1989-2002 (in thousands of barrels per day) Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Monthly Energy Review, March2003 , p. 43. Secondly, as noted above, in the short term, stocks of privately held oil have declined. Figure 2 shows the behavior of U.S. stocks, measured in billions ofbarrels, in the longer term, from 1973-2002. The figure shows that non-SPR crudeoil stocks have experienced a long term decline since their peak in the mid 1970's,even though in the last two decades imports and consumption have risen. Figure 2also suggests some increased volatility in the level of privately held stocks since themid 1990's. This behavior might be expected if firms were optimizing theirinventory holdings. Additions to stock when prices of crude oil are low and drawdowns from inventory when prices are high enhance profit opportunities. (9) Trends similar to those observed in crude oil have also occurred in petroleum products. The Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc. calculates that finishedgasoline stocks fell from a 30 day stock in 1985 to an 18-19 day stock in 2001. Thistranslated into a 41 million barrel decline in gasoline stocks over the period. Anadditional complication is that gasoline is not as fungible as it once was. Differentblends of gasoline to satisfy differing air pollution standards in various parts of thecountry put further strain on a system that is reducing stocks. (10) Finally, not only privately held stocks have declined, but the privately held capacity to hold stocks has also declined. In 1990, the capacity of refineries in theU.S. to hold stocks of crude oil was 204 million barrels; by 2002 this capacity haddeclined to 183.3 million barrels, a reduction of over 10 percent. (11) This decline incapacity, coupled with the decline in held stocks, suggests that the industry might beattempting to reduce the level of inventory as a way of managing cost. Much of U.S.industry has adopted "just in time" inventory techniques as a way to lower costs andenhance efficiency. It would be consistent with this trend for the petroleum sectorto follow a similar strategy. Figure 3 represents a "break even" analysis of the relationship between totalstocks of U.S. crude oil and time, assuming that the nation has a security target ofninety days of import substitution, consistent with IEA targets. The IEA data arebased on total stocks of crude oil which ignores the lower operational inventoryconstraint for industry and, therefore, may overstate the ability of combined stocksto actually meet emergency needs. Although the IEA analysis suggests a developing problem for the U.S. in terms of replacing imported oil in times of emergency, the real situation may be even morechallenging than the IEA analysis suggests. Energy Information Administration datashows that in the fall of 2002 and again in early 2003 private stocks of crude oil werereduced to the lower operational inventory levels discussed earlier. At those timesthere were no additional crude oil reserves in the private sector in a practical sense. (12) The more the private sector economizes on crude oil stock holdings, the more likelyit is that the lower operational inventory constraint will become effective during amarket disruption, limiting the ability of industry to meet consumer demand. While private sector stocks exist primarily because of the economic andtechnological requirements of the oil industry, they have also served a publicpurpose. Private stocks have at least partially played the role of a public good. Theyhave provided benefits to the domestic oil market as a whole, as well as to policymakers as they faced difficult decisions about when, and if, to draw on the SPR. Private sector stocks are usually drawn down first, with market forces guiding thedecision. Decisions on the optimal size of the SPR may need to take into accountchanges in industry practices which might affect the ability of private stocks of crudeoil to play this role in the future. Net stocks of privately held crude oil, in many ways the first buffer between an international oil supply disruption and U.S. consumer markets, were reduced to verylow levels during the recent disruptions to the oil markets. Industry holds less stockin 2003 than it did a decade ago, even though U.S. dependence on crude oil importshas risen. The SPR currently holds approximately 600 million barrels of crude oilwhich could be used in a supply emergency. The effect of the rising dependence onimports and the reduced availability of private stocks implies that 600 million barrelsof crude oil translates into fewer days of replaced reserves.

Periodically, since the inception of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in 1975, debate has occurred concerning its optimal size. In the 108th Congress, the House has passed energy legislation( H.R. 6 ) which would require the SPR to be filled to its current capacity ofapproximately 700 million barrels and would authorize funds to further expand the capacity of thereserve to 1 billion barrels. Analysis of the SPR issue has been carried out in a benefit/cost framework in which benefits, the avoided cost to the national economy of a supply disruption, are set against the real resourcecosts associated with investing in the SPR. The role of the privately held stock of crude oil has beenlargely static in these analyses. The data show, however, that private stock behavior has beenchanging. Industry holds less crude oil, and has less capacity to hold crude oil, than a decade ago.These changes reflect a decade long strategy of reducing operating costs to remain competitive.However, oil markets face greater exposure to supply disruption today because our dependence onimported crude oil has risen substantially since 1992. The effectiveness of the SPR in providingsecurity from crude oil supply disruptions may be primarily a function of its size, but may also bedependent on the underlying stocks of crude oil held by the private sector. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has studied the behavior of crude oil stocks in the U.S. since 1989. It finds that our total stocks, measured as days of net imports that can be replaced bystock draw-down, have been declining. This trend results from the interaction of increasing importdependency, the essentially constant size of the SPR over the period, and the declining size ofprivately held stocks. The IEA concludes that with no change in any of these factors, the U.S. willno longer be able to replace ninety days of net imports from domestic stocks in 2006. Because the IEA focuses on total reserves, its analysis may overstate the ability of U.S. stocks to mitigate oil supply disruptions. This is because not all privately held oil stocks can be drawn uponwithout disrupting the functioning of the system itself. Once these lower operational inventory levelsare considered, the thinness of privately held stocks is apparent. As a result, the ability of privatelyheld stocks to provide a buffer to supply disruptions is reduced. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Companies holding licenses issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) are in a unique position when they seek to combine. In the United States, when most corporations plan to merge, the proposal is reviewed by only one of two federal agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (which agency reviews the merger proposal depends on the outcome of a process known as "clearance"). Companies holding FCC licenses, on the other hand, must obtain approval from two federal agencies in order to consummate a merger: the DOJ and the FCC. Though both agencies analyze the potential effects on competition a proposed merger may have, their processes differ, sometimes substantially. This report will focus on the FCC's authority to approve mergers and its process for reviewing these proposed transactions. The Commission has authority under Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act to review the proposed mergers of common carriers. Specifically, the Commission may disapprove proposed mergers of "common carriers engaged in wire or radio communication or radio transmission of energy" where "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." The Commission also finds authority to review mergers through its power to approve or deny the transfer of the licenses it issues under the Communications Act. Sections 214(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act require the Commission to deny the transfer of licenses if the Commission determines that the transfer is not in "the present or future public convenience and necessity" under §214(a) or is not in the "public interest, convenience and necessity" under §310(d). This standard is widely referred to as the "public interest" standard. Although the Commission has explicit authority under the Clayton Act to review the proposed mergers of certain common carriers, it does not seem to have ever utilized that authority. The Commission most often proceeds solely pursuant to the Communications Act, because that authority "necessarily subsumes and extends beyond the traditional parameters of review under the antitrust laws." Indeed, courts have "insisted that the agencies [given licensing and regulatory authority over industry] consider antitrust policy as an important part of their public interest calculus," though they are not bound by the dictates of antitrust laws. Not only must the Commission consider competitive effects in its public interest calculus, but the threshold required for a transaction to be approved is higher under the public interest standard than under traditional antitrust laws. Proposed mergers that are reviewed under the Communications Act are held to a higher standard when examining their potential competitive effects than the same proposed transaction would be under the antitrust laws. Under the Clayton Act, if the reviewing agency decides not to approve a proposed merger, the agency must either reach a remedial agreement with the parties or file suit to block the merger in federal court where the agency will bear the burden of persuading the court that the proposed merger will have substantial anticompetitive effects. Not only must the government prove that the merger will decrease competition as compared to the current market, but the government must prove that the proposed merger will substantially decrease competition. This standard seems to indicate that proposed mergers that will be competitively neutral (preserve the current level of competition) would not violate the Clayton Act. In contrast, under the license transfer provisions of the Communications Act, the parties proposing to merge (as opposed to the reviewing agency) bear the burden of persuading the Commission that the merger would enhance (rather than merely preserve) competition. This standard that suggests a competitively neutral merger (which likely would be approved under the Clayton Act) could be denied by the Commission when acting under its Communications Act authority. The Commission reasons, therefore, that a review pursuant to the Communications Act's public interest standard renders the exercise of the Commission's Clayton Act authority unnecessary. When attempting to receive approval for the transfer of relevant licenses in the context of a merger, the merging companies must submit an application for the transfer of all relevant licenses and certifications to the Commission. The Commission, after receiving input from the public, then reviews the proposed transfer to determine whether it will serve the "public interest, convenience and necessity" as required by the Communications Act. The Commission is not required to complete this review in any set period of time, but has created an "informal timeline" of 180 days for consideration of license transfers. The amount of time required to analyze license transfers is dependent upon the complexity of the proposed transaction and the intricacy of the public interest analysis it may require, and the 180-day goal is not always met. The public interest standard of the Communications Act generally is considered to be an amorphous standard, and, as noted above, is broader in scope than traditional antitrust standards. The Supreme Court has stated that the public interest standard "no doubt leaves wide discretion and calls for imaginative interpretation." The Commission, therefore, has found that the public interest standard "necessarily encompasses the broad aims of the Communications Act." Factors considered to be in the public interest may include, among other things, "a deeply rooted preference for preserving and enhancing competition in relevant markets, accelerating private sector deployment of advanced services, promoting a diversity of license holdings, and generally managing the spectrum in the public interest." The Commission also may consider whether the proposed transaction will affect the quality of communications services or will result in the provision of new or additional services to consumers. Relevant to this analysis are technological and market changes, and the nature, complexity, and speed of change of the communications industry. For each proposed license transfer, the Commission's analysis of the potential harmful competitive effects of a proposed merger largely tracks the analysis presented in the DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines. The Commission first defines the relevant product and geographic markets. After defining the markets, the participants must be defined. The Commission then analyzes the potential horizontal competitive effects within the markets, as well as the efficiencies that may be created by the proposed combination. The agency does the same for the vertical competitive effects and efficiencies. In this portion of the analysis, the Commission generally examines whether the merger will concentrate power in the hands of the merging parties in such a way that consumers could be harmed by, for example, increased prices, decreased services, or the exit of competitors from the marketplace. After evaluating potential competitive effects, the Commission examines claimed public interest benefits of a proposed transaction, such as the potential provision of new programming or services, lower prices for services, increased service coverage, etc. The public interest benefits must be transaction-specific, meaning that "the claimed benefit must be likely to be accomplished as a result of the transaction but be unlikely to be realized by other means that entail fewer anticompetitive effects." This standard does not mean that the claimed benefit must be nearly impossible absent a merger. Rather, the benefit must be unlikely to occur absent a merger. The claimed benefits must be supported by evidence and, in order to be in the public interest, the effects of the claimed benefits must flow through to consumers and not inure solely to the merging entities. The Commission weighs these benefits against the potential harms to the public interest using a "sliding scale approach." In this approach, where potential harms seem likely to occur, applicants must show that the claimed benefits are of a higher degree of magnitude and likelihood than when potential harms appear less likely. If the Commission's analysis suggests that the parties have shown that the merger, on balance, benefits the public interest, the Commission generally approves the transfer without condition. If the Commission determines that the proposed merger will harm competition or the public interest, the Commission may either designate the proposed transaction for hearing, or may negotiate with the parties to place voluntary conditions on the transaction to alleviate those harmful effects. In most instances, the Commission and the parties choose to negotiate. The Commission finds its authority to negotiate and enforce voluntary conditions on license transfers under §303(r) of the Communications Act, which grants the Commission the authority to "prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with the law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of the act, and §214(c), which grants the Commission the power to place "such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require" on the certificates the agency issues pursuant to its license transfer review authority. The parties and the Commission may agree to any condition upon the proposed transfer that is tailored to mitigate the specific harms anticipated by the Commission's review. For example, the Commission has approved license transfers to be in the public interest when conditioned upon such varied commitments as the divestiture of certain assets; the creation of new programming and a la carte options; maintenance of promised conditions to protect national security (including the citizenship status of certain key employees) where the merger involves a foreign owned corporation; temporary price freezes; compliance with increased reporting requirements; unbundling of certain services; and compliance with the Commission's "net neutrality" policy. In each of these cases, the Commission made clear that, absent these voluntary commitments, the proposed transactions would have resulted in significant public interest harms (such as monopoly power or potential to increase prices for extended periods) and the license transfer would not have been approved. Therefore, negotiation of acceptable conditions emerges as an important part of the license transfer process for many corporations seeking to combine.

With the proposed merger between Comcast and NBC/Universal announced recently, Congress has expressed an interest in the process of merger reviews at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission). This report will explain the merger review process at the FCC, as well as highlight some of the difference between the FCC's process and the more traditional antitrust merger review conducted by agencies such as the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Whenever companies holding licenses issued by the FCC wish to merge, the merging entities must obtain approval from two federal agencies: the DOJ and the FCC. The Commission and the DOJ do not follow precisely the same process or reasoning when examining the potential effects of proposed mergers. Though both agencies have the authority to proceed under the antitrust laws (as the DOJ must), the Commission generally chooses to examine proposed mergers under its Communications Act authority to grant license transfers. The act permits the Commission to grant the transfer only if the agency determines that the transaction would be in the public interest. The public interest standard is generally broader than the competition analysis authorized by the antitrust laws and conducted by the DOJ. Therefore, the Commission possesses greater latitude to examine other potential effects of a proposed merger beyond its possible effect on competition in the relevant market, and greater latitude when placing conditions upon the proposed transfer of a license than the DOJ may have when placing conditions upon the proposed merger that necessitates the license transfer.

On May 10, 2010, President Obama nominated Elena Kagan to replace Justice John Paul Stevens as a member of the Supreme Court. Unlike the vast majority of other nominees to the Supreme Court, Kagan, a former dean at Harvard Law School (HLS) and current Solicitor General, has not been a member of the judiciary and therefore has never issued the judicial opinions that are a traditional source of insight into a nominee's legal views. Nevertheless, Kagan has written, contributed to, or otherwise signaled agreement with a wide array of legal documents during the course of her career, and some understanding of her views may be gleaned from these documents. During her tenure as dean of HLS, Kagan, in conjunction with 39 of her faculty colleagues at the law school, signed an amicus curi a e brief in support of the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), a consortium of law schools and faculty members who were respondents in a case before the Supreme Court concerning access by military recruiters to college campuses. " Amicus curiae " literally means "friend of the court." It is common practice for individuals or groups who are not a party to the litigation but who nonetheless have an interest in the outcome to, with the Court's approval, submit amicus briefs in support of their positions. The HLS brief was among the 28 amicus briefs filed in the case. Of these briefs, which were filed by a variety of educational, public interest, and civic associations, among others, 14 were filed on behalf of FAIR. Twelve were filed on behalf of the petitioners, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld et al., who had sought Supreme Court review after FAIR had prevailed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The remaining two briefs were filed by groups who expressed views on particular issues before the Court without taking the side of either party. At the time of the brief, FAIR was in the process of challenging the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, a federal law that requires colleges and universities that receive federal funds to give military recruiters the same access to students and campuses that is provided to other employers. Like many law schools and other academic institutions, HLS maintains a nondiscrimination policy that requires any employer that conducts on-campus recruiting to sign a document stating that it does not discriminate on various grounds, including "race, color, creed, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, marital or parental status, disability, source of income, or status as a veteran." HLS, along with many other institutions of higher education, had sought to bar military recruiters from its campus in response to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) policy, which, with certain exceptions, requires the discharge of members of the armed services who engage in specified types of homosexual conduct. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights , Inc . Congressional concerns over military access to campuses for recruiting purposes have led to the enactment of several legislative proposals over the years. Under perhaps the most well-known law, colloquially known as the Solomon Amendment, institutions of higher education risk losing certain federal funds if they deny military recruiters and ROTC access to campuses and students at institutions of higher education. Specifically, the statute prohibits an institution of higher education from receiving certain federal funds if the institution has a policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect prevents ... the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer. Meanwhile, HLS has, since 1979, maintained a nondiscrimination policy that required employers who used the school's Office of Career Services for recruitment purposes to verify that they do not discriminate on a variety of bases, including sexual orientation. Due to this policy, military recruiters instead conducted recruitment activities through a student veterans' group until 2002, when the Department of Defense (DOD) threatened to take enforcement action by withholding federal funds from the entire university. At that time, Dean Kagan's predecessor at HLS "reluctantly created an exception from the law school's general anti-discrimination policy for the military," thus allowing the military to recruit via the Office of Career Services. During her tenure as dean, Kagan continued this policy in 2003 and 2004, but in 2005 she briefly reinstated the ban on military recruiters in the wake of the Third Circuit ruling in favor of FAIR. When DOD threatened to withhold funds from Harvard University, Dean Kagan relented and once again exempted the military from HLS's nondiscrimination policy. In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling upholding the Solomon Amendment, this exemption continues in effect today. In a 2005 letter to the HLS community describing her decision, Kagan appeared to reveal her personal views on a number of issues, including her belief in a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, her condemnation of the military's DADT policy, and her respect for the military. Stating her "own views on the matter," Kagan wrote: I have said before how much I regret making this exception to our antidiscrimination policy. I believe the military's discriminatory employment policy is deeply wrong – both unwise and unjust. And this wrong tears at the fabric of our own community by denying an opportunity to some of our students that other of our students have. The importance of the military to our society – and the great service that members of the military provide to all the rest of us – heightens, rather than excuses, this inequity. The Law School remains firmly committed to the principle of equal opportunity for all persons, without regard to sexual orientation. And I look forward to the time when all our students can pursue any career path they desire, including the path of devoting their professional lives to the defense of their country. Subsequently, HLS filed its amicus brief in support of FAIR. However, unlike FAIR, which was challenging the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, Kagan and her colleagues argued that the case should be resolved on statutory grounds. Their amicus brief is discussed below. As noted above, the amicus brief signed by Kagan and her HLS colleagues argued that the dispute over the Solomon Amendment should be resolved on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. The statutory text of the Solomon Amendment bars institutions of higher education from prohibiting or preventing military recruiters from gaining access to students and campuses "in a manner that is ... equal in quality and scope" to the access provided to other employers. According to the brief, this statutory language makes clear that the Solomon Amendment would be violated only when an institution of higher education subjects the military to disfavored or unequal treatment. Thus, HLS and other schools with similar nondiscrimination policies were in compliance with the statute because these nondiscrimination policies were being applied evenly to both the military and other employers, meaning that the military was being granted access "equal in quality and scope" as the statute required. As the amici argued, These policies do not single out military recruiters for disfavored treatment: Military recruiters are subject to exactly the same terms and conditions of access as every other employer. When other recruiters have failed to abide by these tenets, they have been excluded. When military recruiters have agreed to follow them, they have been welcomed. To bolster this argument, the amicus brief reviewed the legislative history of the Solomon Amendment, noting that the statute was not intended to apply to neutral practices but rather was designed to target policies that were specifically anti-military, such as policies that expressly prohibited military recruiting or that otherwise imposed special conditions on military recruiters. Likewise, the amici criticized the government's characterization of the law as requiring nothing more than equal opportunity for military recruiters. According to the brief, the government was actually seeking special treatment for the military because "the government has chosen to enforce the Solomon Amendment as if it conferred upon the military a unique privilege—one shared by no other employer, including other agencies of the Federal Government—to disregard neutral and generally applicable rules designed to govern the conduct of all recruiters." Urging the Court to reject the government's interpretation of the statute, the amici argued that the Court should rule that "the Solomon Amendment applies only to policies that single out military recruiters for special disfavored treatment, not evenhanded policies that incidentally affect the military." Because the schools in question had not specifically barred military recruiting and had applied the nondiscrimination policy equally to all employers, the amici contended that the schools had not violated the law. According to the brief, these nondiscrimination policies are analogous to other requirements that schools establish to govern the on-campus recruiting process, such as rules regarding scheduling, communication with students, and employment offers, among others, and these requirements would be equally unlikely to violate the Solomon Amendment. Thus, "if the military fails to comply with the same evenhanded rules that govern everyone else, any resulting inability to interview is properly attributed to the government's policies or practices rather than those of the educational institution." Ultimately, the Court rejected the statutory construction articulated in HLS's amicus brief and upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. The Court's decision is discussed below. As noted above, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Ac ademic and Institutional Rights , Inc. , the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. Before reaching the constitutional question posed in the case, however, the Court first considered and rejected the statutory argument advanced in HLS's amicus brief. Specifically, the Court held that because the statute requires the military to be granted the same "access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer," the underlying rationale for granting such access is irrelevant. According to the Court, The Solomon Amendment does not focus on the content of a school's recruiting policy, as the amici would have it. Instead, it looks to the result achieved by the policy and compares the "access ... provided" military recruiters to that provided other recruiters. Applying the same policy to all recruiters is therefore insufficient to comply with the statute if it results in a greater level of access for other recruiters than for the military.... Under the statute, military recruiters must be given the same access as recruiters who comply with the policy. Turning to the constitutional question, the Court rejected FAIR's assertion that it was a violation of the First Amendment for the federal government to condition university funding on compliance with the Solomon Amendment. Previously, a divided panel of the Third Circuit agreed that the Solomon Amendment had imposed an "unconstitutional condition" by compelling the law schools to convey messages of support for the military's policy of discriminatory exclusion, but the Court reversed the lower court's decision. First, the Court was unmoved by FAIR's theory of unconstitutional conditions, largely because of fatal flaws they found in the law schools' First Amendment analysis. According to the Court, "a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly." Although "expressive conduct" may be subject to First Amendment scrutiny, the Court held that the Solomon Amendment did not impair the First Amendment rights of the objecting institutions. Requiring law schools to facilitate recruiters' access by sending out e-mails and scheduling military visits were deemed "a far cry from the compelled speech" found in earlier cases, and "[a]ccommodating the military's message does not affect the law school's speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions." Nor, the Court found, would they be endorsing, or be seen as endorsing, the military policies to which they object because "[a] law school's decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive." Second, the Court distinguished the doctrine of "expressive association," as applied by Dale v. Boy Scouts of America , a 2000 case in which the Court held that the Boy Scouts have an expressive right to exclude gay scoutmasters. Merely allowing recruiters on campus and providing them with the same services as other recruiters did not require the schools to "associate" with them. Nor did it prevent their expressing opposition to military policies in other ways. Moreover, unlike the Boy Scouts case, no group membership practices or affiliations were implicated by the Solomon Amendment. Recruiters do not become components of the law schools—like the Scout leaders there—but "are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for [a] limited purpose" and "not to become members of the school's expressive association." Finally, the Court recognized as "[beyond] dispute" that Congress has "broad and sweeping" powers over military manpower and personnel matters—"includ[ing] the authority to require campus access for military recruiters"—the exercise of which is generally entitled to judicial "deference." For these and other reasons, the Court rejected FAIR's constitutional challenge to the Solomon Amendment. At the time Kagan and her HLS colleagues participated as amici in the litigation over the Solomon Amendment, many of the nation's law schools maintained employment nondiscrimination policies and had, pursuant to such policies, barred military recruiters from their campuses in response to DOD's DADT policy. In support of other institutions that were challenging DOD's application of the Solomon Amendment, Kagan and her colleagues submitted an amicus brief in support of their position, and they argued for a decision on narrower statutory rather than constitutional grounds. The Court disagreed with this statutory interpretation, and, when FAIR lost its challenge, HLS and other institutions immediately complied with the ruling. It is important to note that it is not clear what Kagan's participation in the amicus brief portends for her actual judicial philosophy. Because the amicus brief is the product of a litigation strategy rather than an unfiltered declaration of her legal viewpoint on the Solomon Amendment issue, the focus of the amicus brief does not necessarily reveal her judicial views on this issue or related matters.

On May 10, 2010, President Obama nominated Elena Kagan to replace Justice John Paul Stevens as a member of the Supreme Court. Unlike the vast majority of other nominees to the Supreme Court, Kagan, a former dean at Harvard Law School (HLS) and current Solicitor General, has not been a member of the judiciary and therefore has never issued the judicial opinions that are a traditional source of insight into a nominee's legal views. Nevertheless, Kagan has written, contributed to, or otherwise signaled agreement with a wide array of legal documents during the course of her career, and some understanding of her views may be gleaned from these documents. During her tenure as dean of HLS, Kagan, in conjunction with 39 of her faculty colleagues at the law school, signed an amicus curiae brief in support of the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR). At the time, FAIR, which consisted of a consortium of law schools and faculty members, was in the process of challenging the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, a federal law that requires colleges and universities that receive federal funds to give military recruiters the same access to students and campuses that is provided to other employers. The brief signed by Kagan and her colleagues offered a statutory argument and did not address broader constitutional arguments. Like many law schools and other academic institutions, HLS maintains a nondiscrimination policy that requires any employer that conducts on-campus recruiting to sign a document stating that it does not discriminate on various grounds, including "race, color, creed, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, marital or parental status, disability, source of income, or status as a veteran." HLS, along with many other institutions of higher education, had sought to bar military recruiters from its campus in response to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) policy, which, with certain exceptions, requires the discharge of members of the armed services who engage in specified types of homosexual conduct. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.

RS20786 -- Hong Kong-U.S. Economic Relations Updated January 27, 2005 With a population of 6.8 million, Hong Kong is one of the world's most vibrant economies and a major center forinternational banking and foreign trade. It is utilized by many foreign companies as a gateway to markets inmainlandChina. With a per capita GDP of $27,700 on a purchasing power parity basis in 2003, Hong Kong maintains thesecond highest standard of living in Asia (after Japan); it is higher than that of many West European nations,includingGermany and the United Kingdom. Hong Kong is a member of a variety of multilateral economic organizations,suchas the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Hong Kong's economy is heavily dependent on trade. (3) In 2004, Hong Kong's merchandise exports and imports were$259 billion and $271 billion, respectively. A large share of Hong Kong's trade consists of entrepot and processingtrade, much of it involving China. (4) About 30% ofChina's trade passes through Hong Kong. Taiwan, which does notmaintain direct commercial links with China, ships most of its exports to, and imports from, China via Hong Kong. Alarge share of China's exports also pass through Hong Kong before being re-exported to other destinations. Someofthis trade consists of products made by Hong Kong firms in the Mainland, which are sent to Hong Kong for furtherprocessing before being re-exported elsewhere. Hong Kong has transferred a large share of its manufacturing basetothe Mainland. In the Pearl River Delta region (Guangdong Province, China), 50,000 Hong Kong firms employabout 6million Chinese workers, 20 times the size of Hong Kong's manufacturing workforce. As a result, the importanceofmanufacturing to Hong Kong's economy has diminished in recent years, while that of services (especially thoserelating to trade, such as banking and financial services) has increased sharply. In 2004, services exports andimportswere estimated to total $65 billion and $36 billion, respectively. Hong Kong has enjoyed relatively healthy growth over the past several years. However, in 1997 Hong Kong's economy was hit by the Asian financial crisis. Beginning in July 1997, speculative pressures on the Hong Kongdollar(which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1983) caused the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) to spend$1 billion to prop up the currency. These pressures continued, leading the HKMA in October 1997 to raise interestrates (to stop capital flight), which subsequently led to a nearly one-quarter drop in the Hong Kong stock market(theHang Seng Index) over a four-day period. In late August 1998, the Hong Kong government intervened in the stockmarket's decline by spending $15 billion to purchase shares from 33 blue-chip companies that make up the HangSengIndex, which helped raise the value of the shares by 24%. Several analysts criticized the government's intervention,arguing that it violated Hong Kong's free market principles by increasing the government's role over the economy. The Hong Kong government maintained that its intervention was a one-time event, intended to halt speculation andstabilize the stock market. (5) The effects of the Asian economic crisis on Hong Kong were significant. The economy fell into a major recession in1998: real GDP fell by 5.0%, the unemployment rate rose from 2.2% to 4.7%, and exports and imports declinedsharply. The Hong Kong economy recovered somewhat in 1999 and 2000, but was negatively affected by theterroristattacks against the United States in 2001 and by the outbreak and spread of a new and deadly virus called SevereAcuteRespiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. Hong Kong was one of the areas hardest hit areas by SARS, whichdrasticallyreduced tourism and domestic demand. By the end of June 2003, the unemployment rate rose to a record high 8.7%. Hong Kong's economy picked up sharply in 2004, due to rising exports and strong domestic demand. Real GDP grewby an estimated 7.7%; however, unemployment remained stubbornly high (see Table 1 ) Table 1. Selected Economic Data for Hong Kong, 1997-2004* *Data for 2004 are estimates. Date on unemployment is average of the last three months ending in November 2004. Sources: Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Hong Kong Census and StatisticsDepartment, the EconomistIntelligence Unit, and Global Insight. The United States is one of Hong Kong's most important economic partners. In 2003, the United States was HongKong's largest market for domestic exports (i.e., products made in Hong Kong) and its fourth-largest supplier ofimports. There are over 1,000 U.S. businesses represented in Hong Kong, including more than 400 regionaloperations; more than 50,000 U.S. citizens reside in Hong Kong. Cumulative U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI)inHong Kong at the end of 2003 was $44.3 billion. (6) Many U.S. firms and investors seeking to do business in Chinahave used Hong Kong as a base for their operations, frequently relying on Hong Kong partners to obtain the"guanxi"(connections) that are often needed to gain access to China's markets. In 2004, it is estimated that Hong Kong was the thirteenth-largest purchaser of U.S. exports ($16.0 billion) and thetwenty-seventh-largest supplier of U.S. imports ($9.3 billion). The top three U.S. exports to Hong Kong in 2005wereelectrical and electronic machinery and parts (mainly electronic integrated circuits, micro-assemblies, andsemiconductors), non-electrical machinery (such as computers and computer parts), and miscellaneous manufactureditems (mainly diamonds and jewelry). The top three U.S. imports from Hong Kong were apparel and clothing,miscellaneous manufactured commodities, and telecommunications and sound equipment (see Table2 ). Table 2. Major U.S.-Hong Kong Trade Commodities, 2000-2004 ($ in billions) SITC Classification, two-digit level. Source : U.S. Commerce Department. Date for 2004 estimated based on actual data forJan.-Nov. 2004. The United States continues to treat Hong Kong as a separate economic territory for such purposes as trade dataandexport controls. U.S. officials continue to work with Hong Kong officials to ensure that Hong Kong is not used byChina to illegally circumvent U.S. controls on exports of dual-use and other high technology products and to combatviolations of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) in Hong Kong. (7) Export Controls. The United States seeks to control exports of dual-use technologies for a variety of national security and foreign policy purposes through a complex regulatorysystem of export license requirements. Despite the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, the UnitedStatescontinues to treat Hong Kong separately from the Mainland for export control purposes (i.e., controls of U.S. exportsof dual-use items to Hong Kong are far less restrictive than those to China). Some Members of Congress haveraisedconcern that China may be using Hong Kong to acquire dual-use items that cannot be obtained directly from theUnited States, and have called for tighter controls on U.S. exports to Hong Kong. The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-383 ) requires the U.S. State Department to report periodically to Congress on conditions in Hong Kong and its relations with the United States, including cooperationinthe area of export controls. In its most recent report (April 2004), the State Department stated that "Hong Kong maintains an effective, highly autonomous, and transparent export control regime that the U.S. government hasencouraged others to emulate." However, the report stated that the growing economic integration between ChinaandHong Kong has presented new challenges to ensure effective compliance with export control regimes, and notedthatover the past two years, inspections have uncovered an increase in instances of illegal re-exports of U.S. dual-usetechnology to China. Hong Kong and U.S. officials have agreed to boost cooperation on the sharing of licensingandenforcement information and to education the Hong Kong public of export control laws. (8) IPR Protection. Over the past few years, the United States has pressed Hong Kong to improve its IPR protection regime. From April 1997 to February 1999, Hong Kong wasdesignated by U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) under Special 301 , (a provision of U.S. trade lawdealing withcountries that violate U.S. IPR) as a watch list country due to the widespread distribution and retail salein Hong Kongof pirated compact discs. (9) Hong Kong was removedfrom the Special 301 watch list after the USTR determined thatHong Kong had made significant improvements to its legal regime and enforcement efforts. The 2001 and 2002Special 301 reports listed Hong Kong as one of several trading partners in which progress in protection of IPR hadbeen made. The USTR's 2003 IPR report praised the Hong Kong government for requiring government agenciestouse only legitimate software and for its commitment to halt optical media piracy. The 2003 State Department reportstated that Hong Kong had "shut down virtually all large-scale illicit manufacturing lines," but noted deficienciesintwo areas: commercial end-use piracy and patent projection for pharmaceuticals. (10) Several international economic forecasting organizations contend that the long-term prospects for Hong Kong's economic future remain relatively positive, provided that it continues to employ free trade, market-oriented policies,and maintains its autonomy from mainland China. (11) The Economist Intelligence Unit projects that Hong Kong'seconomy will grow by 4.7% in 2005 and 3.6% in 2005, while Global Insight projects real GDP growthat 4.9% and4.4%, respectively. (12) China's accession to the WTO (which occurred in December 2001) poses both opportunities and challenges to HongKong's economy. On the one hand, the removal of trade and investment barriers by China will likely significantlyboost Hong Kong trade with, and investment in, the Mainland. Hong Kong is already by far the largest investor inChina (and China is the largest investor in Hong Kong), and hence is likely to be in the best position to takeadvantageof a more open Chinese market. In addition, China's WTO accession is expected to sharply increase its trade flows,and much of that increased trade will likely take place via Hong Kong. (13) On the other hand, a more open Chinesemarket could diminish Hong Kong's role as a middleman for foreign firms wanting to do business with theMainland,especially if foreign investors believe that the rule of law, rather than "connections," will be the primary factorgoverning business relations in China. Hong Kong's economy could also be negatively affected if China and Taiwandecide to establish direct trade links, which would likely reduce the level of trade that takes place via Hong Kong. (14)

Hong Kong is described by many observers as having the world's freesteconomy due to its low tax, free trade, and strong rule of law policies. Hong Kong is an important U.S. tradingpartnerand serves as a gateway for many U.S. companies doing business in China. For those reasons, the continuedeconomicautonomy of Hong Kong is of concern to Congress, as are a variety of trade issues such as the effectiveness of HongKong's export control regime on dual-use technologies, and protection of U.S. intellectual property rights. China. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The House of Representatives amended its internal Rules on January 4, 2007, with the adoption of H.Res. 6 , to apply greater restrictions, more transparency, and further regulation concerning the acceptance by Members and staff of "gifts" from outside, private sources, including specifically "gifts" of travel-expense reimbursements or payments provided by lobbyists, foreign agents, or their clients. Additional changes to internal House Rules on "ethics" were made by the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007," P.L. 110-81 , September 14, 2007 ( S. 1 , 110 th Congress). Under the new House Rules, in a similar manner as under the former Rules, no gifts from outside, private sources may be accepted by Members and staff unless expressly permitted by one of the provisions of the House Rules. Thus, gifts from all outside, private sources continue to be restricted and limited, with several important exceptions. Gifts with a value of under $50 may still be accepted, other than from lobbyists, foreign agents and their clients; and gifts from relatives and personal friends may continue to be accepted and exchanged. In addition, the 23 specific exceptions to the gift prohibition listed in the House Rules continue to be in force. The exception for reasonable and necessary expenses for some "officially connected" travel is also still provided, and Members and staff may continue to accept such travel expenses from many private sources, other than lobbyists, foreign agents, and certain of their clients, but with several additional restrictions, including more detailed disclosure of such travel. All private reimbursement or payment of "officially connected" travel expenses, however, must now receive prior approval from the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. The House Rules now provide a restriction on accepting most gifts from registered lobbyists, agents of foreign principals, and private organizations that employ lobbyists or foreign agents. Additionally, unlike previous rules and laws, lobbyists themselves are now expressly prohibited from offering gifts which they know should not be accepted by Members or staff under internal House Rules, and must certify in required reports to the federal government that no such gifts were offered. There still exists under House Rules a general exemption allowing the receipt of most gifts of under $50 from private sources, but this exception now applies only to gifts other than from lobbyists, foreign agents, and their private clients. Under the former Rules, this exemption had allowed Members and staff to receive a gift, such as a meal, a bottle of liquor or wine, or a ticket for entertainment, that did not exceed $49.99, even if such gift was from a lobbyist. Under the new House Rules, however, the under-$50 exception for gifts no longer applies if the gift is from a "registered lobbyist or agent of a foreign principal or from a private entity that retains or employs registered lobbyists or agents...." Members and staff may thus no longer accept most free meals paid for by lobbyists, foreign agents, or their clients (under this $50 de minimis exception), and may no longer accept tickets to sporting or entertainment events provided by lobbyists, foreign agents, or their clients, unless they pay full face value for the ticket. When Members and staff are allowed to accept gifts of tickets and passes to sporting or entertainment events under the $50 exception, or when they reimburse for the full value of the ticket, the "value" of the ticket or pass will now be determined by the actual "face value" printed on the ticket. When there is no face value on the ticket, such as in the case of passes to certain luxury boxes or suites in certain venues, then the value of ticket will now be the highest face-value price of a ticket to the same event. Under the former Rules of the House, Members or staff had been permitted, within certain limitations, to accept reasonable and necessary travel expenses from private sources when the travel was for purposes "connected" to official duties, and when the payment for the travel was not from a lobbyist or an agent of a foreign principal. The extent of travel allowed was for four days for domestic travel, and seven days for international travel (excluding travel days), and certain disclosures of the travel and expenses were required to be made within 30 days of the end of the trip. Even under the former House Rules, "officially connected" travel could not be primarily for recreational purposes, nor could a Member or staffer have received gifts of "recreational" activities of $50 or more incurred during the course of an otherwise legitimate "officially connected" trip. Although there had been criticism expressed for the lack of enforcement of the prior Rules, "officially connected" travel expenses paid for by lobbyists, and the payment by any private source of expenses of $50 or more for "recreational" activities, such as golfing, scuba diving, or jet-skiing, had been expressly prohibited on such travel. Under the amendments to the House Rules, new and additional restrictions are placed upon the acceptance from private sources of expenses for "officially connected" travel. The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has issued two documents in memorandum form concerning "officially connected" travel: "Travel Guidelines and Regulations," February 20, 2007, and "New Travel Rules for Official Connected Travel Paid for by a Private Source," March 14, 2007. In a similar manner as under the former Rules, travel under the new Rules must have a demonstrable connection and relevance to one's official duties and responsibilities. In addition to the restrictions and limitations carried forward from the former Rules, there are five substantial changes to the regulation of "officially connected" travel expenses: In addition to the past prohibition on the receipt of travel expenses or payments from registered lobbyists or foreign agents, the House Rules now also prohibit the receipt of such payments or expenses for "officially connected" travel from "a private entity that retains or employs registered lobbyists or agents of a foreign principal," except if an entity is a qualified "institution of higher education," or when provided by any entity for a one-day event when in conformance with regulations prescribed by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. An "institution of higher education," even one which retains a lobbyist, may therefore provide "officially connected" travel expenses to Members and staff for events, up to four days domestic and seven days for foreign travel, when approved by the House Committee on Standards. Additionally, any organization or entity which retains a lobbyist may sponsor a one-day event (including an overnight and, in some cases, two overnights), as long as there is only a de minimis lobbyist participation in the planning, organization, request or arrangement of the trip, and no lobbyist accompanies the Member or staffer on "any segment" of the travel. In addition to merely prohibiting a lobbyist from financing such "officially connected" travel, as in the former Rules, lobbyists or foreign agents are now not allowed to plan, organize, request, or arrange for such a trip for which a Member or employee of the House may accept expenses, unless the event is being sponsored by an institution of higher education, or when such participation concerning a one-day event is de minimis . Furthermore, a lobbyist or foreign agent is prohibited from accompanying the Member or staffer on "any segment" of a trip, except one sponsored by an institution of higher education. The new House Rules now require that Members or staff who seek to accept private expenses for "officially connected" travel, before accepting such expenses, provide to the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct a written certification from the private source of the trip that (1) the trip will not be financed by a registered lobbyist or foreign agent; (2) that this private source either does not retain a lobbyist or foreign agent, or is a qualified "institution of higher education"; (3) that this private source will not accept money earmarked directly or indirectly from another source for this trip; (4) that the travelers will not be accompanied by a lobbyist or foreign agent (except as allowed for institutions of higher education); and (5) that the trip will not be planned, organized, requested, or arranged by a lobbyist or foreign agent, except as permitted. Before accepting and participating in any such travel, the Member or employee must obtain the prior approval of the Committee for each trip, and all filings, disclosures and certifications will be made available to the public. The disclosures required after a privately financed "officially connected" trip must be filed within 15 days of the completed travel (instead of 30 days), and are to detail, in addition to the information required under the old Rules, a "description of the meetings and events attended." House Rules provide that the "necessary" expenses that may be accepted in relation to "officially connected" travel must also be "reasonable." The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has determined that the purpose of a trip must have a demonstrable connection to legislative or policy interests of Congress, and that officially connected activities must occur during each day of the trip; that transportation in coach or business class is generally "reasonable," unless there are extenuating circumstances requiring first-class or charter travel; and that lodging accommodations for trips arranged specifically for Members or staff may only be at "appropriate" facilities, considering cost, location and proximity to the officially connected events. For events arranged without regard to congressional participation, lodging and food provided for all other attendees are presumptively reasonable. For events arranged specifically for Members and staff, food costs must be reasonable, and one factor for consideration will be the per diem rates for meals for official Government travel. Expenses for such travel may be accepted only from entities that have a significant role in organizing and conducting the trip, and that also have a clear and defined interest in the purpose of the trip or events. Members or employees of the House had generally been required to reimburse the owner of private aircraft to avoid violations of House gift rules, unofficial office account rules, or federal campaign finance laws. Criticism of this practice arose, however, because Members and staff were allowed to use private, corporate aircraft for travel for "personal" or "official" purposes, while reimbursing the owner of such aircraft at rates which were, arguably, far below the fair market value for a comparable, privately chartered flight. In addition, the convenience and ease for a Member of Congress to take such a flight, and the special "access" to Members such flights provided for corporate officials and lobbyists, regardless of the amount of reimbursement from official or personal funds for the flights, concerned reformers worried about the normal gratitude that such special favors for Members might engender and the potential resulting undue influence on the Member's judgment. Under the new House Rules, Rule XXIII, cl. 15, Members and staff are now prohibited from using any funds, whether personal funds, campaign funds, or official funds, to pay for or reimburse the expenses of traveling on a private or corporate aircraft. Members and staff traveling for personal, campaign or official purposes will generally be required to fly on commercially scheduled airlines, or to charter flights from companies in that business. It appears that under existing exceptions to the gift rule, however, Members and staff can still fly on a private, corporate aircraft when the Member or staffer is to be involved in a permissible outside, business endeavor, or in employment discussions with a prospective private employer which owns the aircraft, when the private company or prospective employer normally would make such aircraft available to one involved in the business endeavor, or to one being interviewed or otherwise seeking employment. Similarly, if an aircraft is owned by an individual who provides a flight on the "basis of personal friendship" to a Member or staffer, then a flight can be accepted under such exception (with approval from the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct when the value of the flight would be in excess of $250). Members or staff may also fly on their personally owned or family owned or leased aircraft. The new House Rules, although tightening restrictions on gifts from lobbyists, foreign agents, and their clients, still allow the acceptance of private gifts under the 23 express exceptions to the gifts rule, even when certain of those gifts are from lobbyists. Under these exceptions Members and staff may continue, for example, to accept gifts from and exchange gifts with " relatives " in unlimited amounts; may accept gifts given "on the basis of a personal friendship " (even if the personal friend is a lobbyist or foreign agent); may, under the so-called reception exception , partake of "food or drink of nominal value" offered "other than as part of a meal," such as hors d'oeuvers, pastries, snacks, and drinks typically served at receptions; may continue to accept "free attendance" at " widely attended " gatherings (including meals served to all attendees), when such attendance is appropriate to one's official duties; may accept free attendance and transportation for certain charitable events ; may still accept personal hospitality of an individual (other than from a registered lobbyist or foreign agent); and may accept the receipt of such things as: bona fide noncash awards; prizes; plaques and trophies; inheritances; items of "nominal value" (such as greeting cards or baseball caps); expenses for training in certain circumstances; informational materials; promotional items of home state products; things paid for by the federal, state, or local government; expenses for outside business or employment travel; and lawful political contributions, as well as expenses for political events provided by a political organization.

On January 4, 2007, the House adopted new internal rules to prohibit the receipt of most gifts by Members and staff from lobbyists, foreign agents, and most of their private clients. Additionally, the new House Rules placed more restrictions and requirements on the acceptance from outside private sources of travel expenses for "officially connected" travel by Members and staff. Such restrictions are designed specifically to further limit the participation and involvement of lobbyists, foreign agents, or their clients in such travel events, and to provide for more transparency and disclosures of any such travel. With the passage of the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007" ( P.L. 110-81 , September 14, 2007), further ethics provisions applicable to House Members and staff were adopted.

Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States provides that "The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them." The compensation is set and adjusted by Congress. The President's salary is currently set at $400,000 and is subject to income tax. An allowance, at present $50,000, is not taxable and is to be used "to assist in defraying expenses relating to or resulting from the discharge of his official duties." Any unused amount of the allowance reverts back to the U.S. Treasury pursuant to 31 U.S.C. Section 1552. The salary and allowance provisions are codified at 3 U.S.C. Section 102. Upon leaving office, the President receives a pension that is equal to the salary for Level I of the Executive Schedule ($199,700, salary frozen at January 2010 rate). At this rate, the pension is currently $300 short of being one-half of the President's current salary. The appropriation for the compensation of the President is an account under the Executive Office of the President and is included in an annual appropriations act, which, in the 112 th Congress, is known as the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act. The compensation provision in the Constitution of the United States has been interpreted to apply to a President's current term of office. According to The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America , "an increase made after a President has been re-elected, but before the second term has begun, may apply to his salary during the second term." The compensation of the President is exempt from sequestration to reduce budgetary resources. The President's salary was established in 1789 and has been adjusted five times since—in 1873, 1909, 1949, 1969, and 1999—as shown in Table 1 , below. A brief discussion of the congressional action that resulted in the three most recent increases to the President's salary follows. Congress passed legislation (S.103) to increase the salary of the President to $100,000 per annum in 1949. This amount represented an increase of $25,000 over the previous rate of $75,000, which had been in effect since 1909. The salary became effective at noon on January 19, 1949. The next day, President Harry S. Truman was sworn in for a second term. During Senate consideration of S.103 on January 13, 1949, a short history of the proposal was provided by Senator Herbert O'Conor: The bill under consideration has been developed after more than 1 ½ years' study by a subcommittee ... appointed by the chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee in July 1947.... Following its consideration of the matter in the spring of 1948, the sub-committee submitted its recommendations to the entire Senate Committee on Civil Service. The committee then gave attention to the subject matter and reported favorably a bill, S.1537, Eightieth Congress, but insufficient time was left for the discussion of the matter in the Senate and the portion of the bill relating to the top-bracket officials was deleted when the measure was passed. After months of study the subcommittee held hearings on a proposed redraft of a bill.... Therefore, S.103 as introduced ... represents the best judgment of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee, of representatives of the executive branch, the Hoover Commission, competent persons from private industry, and representatives of the employee organizations. Pursuant to P.L. 90-206, the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries studied the pay for top positions in the three branches of government and recommended salary increases for those positions. The commission, in submitting its FY1969 report to President Lyndon B. Johnson on December 2, 1968, urged him to bring the matter of the President's salary to Congress's attention. The report stated the commission's belief "that to preserve equity and balance in the pay structure of Government the salary of the President should be changed from $100,000 to $200,000." In 1969, the salary of the President was increased to $200,000 per annum when Congress passed H.R. 10 and President Johnson signed the bill into law on January 17, 1969. The salary became effective at noon on January 20, 1969, when Richard M. Nixon was sworn in as President. With the inauguration of Mr. Nixon set to occur at that time, Congress needed to consider the legislation expeditiously or any adjustment in the salary would have been delayed at least until noon, January 20, 1973. On January 3, 1969, Speaker of the House John McCormack addressed the House and explained the scheduling of H.R. 10 on the legislative program. [I]n the case of the next president of the United States, unless something is done with reference to increasing his salary on or before January 20, even if we pass the bill later, he could not take advantage of it during his term of office for a period of 4 years. We are faced with a very practical situation here with respect to the organization of the committees. This will take time, and 12 o'clock January 20 is the deadline. So, if we are going to take any action in connection with an increase in salary for the next President of the United States, it has to be done on or before noon of January 20. If we took action afterwards, then during his term of office he could not take advantage of the increase in salary that the Congress might provide. We feel it is only fair and just. This action was initiated by the majority leader and myself in conference with the minority leader and the whip and the chairman of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and the ranking member of that committee. It was decided that every effort should be made to try to put a bill through before January 20 providing for an increase in salary for the President of the United States.... Now, next Monday is the only suspension day that we could take advantage of. So the leadership and I felt that we should do so at this opportunity. Otherwise, in spite of every effort we might make, the chances are it would be difficult to get a bill through before January 20. During consideration of H.R. 10 on January 6, 1969, House Majority Leader Carl Albert, one of the bill's sponsors, reiterated the Constitution's proviso against a sitting President's salary being increased and emphasized that the legislation "was initiated by Members of Congress and not by the President of the United States. We have not asked for a recommendation either by the present President or by the incoming President." When the Senate considered the bill on January 15, 1969, Senator Hiram Fong stated that he "wish[ed] we had more time, really, to discuss the bill, because I think the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service should discuss it thoroughly." Majority Leader Mike Mansfield responded that he agreed and then stated, "But as the Senator knows, we are stymied because following the traditions, precedents, and customs of the Senate, we could not take up proposed legislation for consideration until after the President had delivered his state of the Union message." The President's salary was increased to its current rate of $400,000 per annum when Congress passed H.R. 2490 and President William J. Clinton signed it into law on September 29, 1999. The bill, as passed by the House, included the salary provision, but the Senate-passed version did not. The conference committee adopted the House position. This action occurred more than 15 months prior to the effective date of the salary change—at noon on January 20, 2001—when George W. Bush was sworn in as President. The House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform had conducted a hearing on the President's salary on May 24, 1999. Among those testifying before the committee were a former Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson, a former Counsel to President Gerald R. Ford, and the former Chiefs of Staff to Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Ronald W. Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and William J. Clinton, each of whom expressed support for a substantial increase in the President's salary to reflect the prestige of the office and its application as a measure against which the salaries of other top officials in the government are adjusted. Other witnesses who represented public interest groups and compensation experts also testified in favor of an increase in salary to at least $400,000. The Congressional Accountability Project was the only organization that testified against the increase on the basis that it raised the cap on the salaries of the other top officials. Any legislation to increase the salary of the 44 th President (Barack H. Obama) during his current term would have to have been enacted prior to January 20, 2009, at noon, when the President was sworn in. No legislation proposing such an increase was introduced in the 110 th Congress. No legislation to increase the salary of the President who will assume office on January 20, 2013, was introduced in the 111 th Congress or has been introduced in the 112 th Congress.

The Constitution of the United States provides that "The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected.... " (Constitution of the United States, Article II, Section 1.) The amount of compensation, which is not specified in the Constitution, is set and adjusted by Congress. The President currently receives a salary of $400,000 per annum, which became effective at noon on January 20, 2001, under P.L. 106-58. (P.L. 106-58, Title VI, §644(a); September 29, 1999; 113 Stat. 430, at 478.) An expense allowance, currently set at $50,000, also is provided. This report discusses the President's compensation and the three most recent increases to the salary enacted in 1949 (81st Congress), 1969 (91st Congress), and 1999 (106th Congress). It will be revised as events dictate.

RS21794 -- Iraq Coalition: Public Opinion Indicators in Selected European Countries March 31, 2004 Following deadly terrorist attacks in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, Spanish voters ousted the incumbent conservative and U.S.-allied government in favor of the Socialist Party in parliamentary elections on March 14. Although many factors likely contributed to this outcome, one of them appears to have been the outgoing Spanishgovernment's strong support for U.S. policy in Iraq and contribution of Spanish forces to the U.S.-led coalition,despite widespread opposition at home to the war in Iraq. Socialist Party leader and Prime Minister-designateJoséLuis Rodriguez Zapatero has said he would uphold his campaign promise to withdraw Spanish troops from coalitionoperations in Iraq unless they become part of a U.N.-sanctioned force. Although no other European government has echoed Zapatero's position, this series of events has increased speculation that other coalition partners in Iraq may face similar pressures from their electorates, which couldundermine the ability of coalition governments to sustain their forces in Iraq for a long period of time. The Madridbombings, terrorism, and Iraq may become prominent issues for voters across Europe in the upcoming June 2004elections to the European Parliament. The United States, meanwhile, seeks to broaden international participationinstabilization operations in Iraq in order to relieve heavily deployed U.S. forces there, and as the United Statespreparesto turn over sovereignty to the Iraqis by July 2004. This report briefly examines selected public opinion indicators in key European countries that currently contribute tothe U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. Overall, polls over the past year show that Spain was no anomaly in terms of strongpublic opposition to military involvement in Iraq. Some European governments appeared to support U.S. policyinIraq in defiance of, rather than as a result of, public sentiment at home. The Bush Administration contends that thewar in Iraq has reduced the danger of global terrorism. However, a majority in public opinion surveys throughoutEurope contend that the war in Iraq has increased rather than diminished that threat. At the same time, some opinionsurveys show that public support across Europe for military operations in Iraq would increase substantially if theUnited Nations were to authorize or lead peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts. The survey data referenced in this report derive from several sources, as noted; as such, varying methodologies arereflected that may not permit cross-country comparisons. Most polls cited in this report were conducted prior totheMarch 11 Madrid terrorist attacks. Multiple country surveys are referenced at the end of the report. The United Kingdom and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in particular have been the most stalwart supporters of theU.S. case for going to war in Iraq and U.S.-led stabilization efforts. After the United States, Britain provides thelargest contingent of military forces Iraq (at a current strength of 8,200 troops) and commands a multinationaldivisionin southern Iraq. As the major combat phase of the war in Iraq was winding down in April 2003, a solid majority of the British expressed "approval of the military action in Iraq" (65%) and the "U.K.'s participation in it" (64%), according to asurvey released by the U.S. Department of State in May 2003. By the end of 2003, still two-thirds (66%) favoredthepresence of British forces serving in Iraq. (1) Nevertheless, criticism of the Blair government has grown, with many inBritain coming to believe that Blair had misled the public about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. (2) In March 2004, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (henceforth, the "Pew Center"), released resultsof a multinational survey taken in February 2004 that showed increasingly negative British views on Iraq. Amongthefindings of the Pew Center's study for Britain: In response to the question, Did Britain make the right or wrong decision to use military force inIraq? -- 43% said it was the right decision, and 47% said it was the wrong decision. Has the war in Iraq helped or hurt the war on terrorism? -- 36% said it helped, 50% said ithurt, and 5% said it had no effect. (A different poll taken around the same time showed that 67% said the war inIraqincreased the threat of terrorism, 9% said it decreased the threat, and 21% said it had noeffect.) (3) Who could do the best job at helping the Iraqi people form a stable government, the U.S. and its allies or the United Nations? -- 10% said the U.S. and its allies, 82% said the U.N., 4% said both, and 2%saidneither. Italy contributes the third largest national contingent of troops to Iraq, with nearly 3,000 military and paramilitarytroops serving in the U.K.-led multinational division in the south. Following the Spanish parliamentary electionsinMarch 2004, the conservative Italian government under Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi pledged to keep Italiantroops in Iraq. Berlusconi also expressed steadfast support for the Italian military role in Iraq after a November 2003suicide bomb attack on coalition forces in Iraq killed nearly 20 Italian troops, the largest single number of Italianmilitary casualties since World War II. In contrast, Italian center-left opposition party leaders have recently saidthatthey would support an end to Italy's military role in Iraq. (4) In April 2003, the Italian public seemed split on the war in Iraq. According to one poll, 55% disapproved of the war,compared with 42% who expressed support. At the same time, 55% approved of the Italian government's decisiontoopen Italian bases and airspace to coalition forces. (5) Italian polls through the rest of 2003 and early 2004 showed a consistently even split in Italian public opinion betweenthose in favor of or against withdrawing Italian troops from Iraq, with a slightly greater percentage in favor ofwithdrawal. However, polls taken after the November 2003 suicide attacks against Italian personnel in Iraqsuggesteda growing resolve to see through Italy's commitment to Iraqi stabilization rather than pull out. (6) Spain's announcement after the March 11 Madrid attacks that it would withdraw its troops from Iraq has appeared toinfluence public opinion in Italy. In a mid-March poll that asked, Do you favor or oppose a decision similartoSpain's to withdraw troops by June 30? , 67% said they were in favor versus 26% opposed. (7) A February 2004 poll from AP/Ipsos showed results in Italy similar to those in Britain on a few related questions,including: In response to the question, Has the military action in Iraq increased, decreased, or had no effect on the threat of terrorism? -- 65% said it increased the threat, 6% said it decreased the threat, 20% saidit hadno effect, and 9% said they were unsure. Poland has commanded a multinational peacekeeping division in central Iraq since late summer 2003 and contributesabout 2,500 troops to the peacekeeping operation. In the aftermath of the March 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks,Polishleaders have also pledged to keep Polish forces in Iraq "as long as needed," although President AleksanderKwasniewski publicly criticized apparent intelligence discrepancies regarding Saddam Hussein's presumed arsenalofweapons of mass destruction. Polish officials and the public at large have become increasingly concerned about thepotential for terrorist attacks at home. In addition, after the recent announcement by embattled Polish PrimeMinisterLeszek Miller that he would resign in May 2004, Polish policy on Iraq is likely to come into greater play as apoliticalissue as a new government is formed, or if early elections are held. A coalition partner in the center-left governmenthas called for a timetable for the withdrawal of Polish troops from current military operations in Iraq. The Polish polling company CBOS has run regular surveys of Poland's participation in Iraq operations. Their pollingresults have shown moderately varying levels of support for and opposition to Polish troop involvement in Iraq. Ingeneral, a slightly greater share of Poles have opposed Polish troops serving with multinational stabilization forcesinIraq. An early March 2004 poll showed that 42% of Poles backed Poland's involvement in Iraq while 53% wereopposed. A November 2003 surveyed showed that 75% of those polled said they feared Poland would become the target of aterrorist attack, several months before the Madrid bombings. (8) As noted above, the former Spanish government's staunchly pro-U.S. position on Iraq had become a prominent electoral issue even before Madrid was rocked by terrorist bombs on March 11. Spain currently has about 1,300troops serving in the Polish-led division in central Iraq. At the start of the war in Iraq in March 2003, polls showed that up to 90% of Spaniards opposed the U.S.-led war. The extent of Spanish disapproval exceeded all other major European countries, including those whose governmentsopposed the war, such as France and Germany. In the run-up to the March 2004 parliamentary elections in Spain, but before the March 11 terrorist attacks in Madrid,opinion polls showed that the party of former Prime Minister Aznar was still slightly ahead of the Socialistopposition,despite no evidence of increasing support for Aznar's policies in Iraq or suggestion that Aznar's successor as partyleader would change course on Iraq. Widespread predictions of a conservative victory (prior to March 11) suggestthatthe Iraq issue alone would probably not have determined the election outcome. Rather, the bombings themselvescoupled with the Aznar government's early response to them (including its mistaken charge against the Spanishterrorist group ETA) appear to account for the late surge among Spanish voters for the Socialists. In a poll from February 2004, 66% of those polled in Spain thought the Iraq war had increased the threat of terrorism,8% thought it had decreased, 17% said it had no effect, and 9% were not sure. In the same poll, an 85% majoritysaidthey were worried about the threat of terrorism in their home country. (9) Turkey denied permission in March 2003 for U.S. troops to open a northern front into Iraq through Turkey but Ankarahas since opened bases and airspace to U.S.-led stabilization operations. Turkey does not currently contribute troopsto coalition stabilization operations but maintains a small military presence in northern Iraq and remains highlyconcerned about instability along Turkey's southern border. U.S. officials have pressed the Turkish government tocontribute to multinational peacekeeping efforts in Iraq. Turkey was the target of two terrorist bombing attacks inNovember 2003. In the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq, overwhelmingly strong anti-war sentiment in Turkey contributed to the parliament's decision to block access to coalition forces through Turkish territory. Since then, opinion polls haveshown greater moderation of Turkish views on coalition efforts in Iraq (as well as on opinions of the United Statesingeneral). (10) However, in September 2003, stillnearly two-thirds of Turks surveyed opposed sending Turkish troops toIraq. In addition, 73% of those polled believed the United States would fail in its efforts to stabilize Iraq. (11) In the March 2004 Pew Center survey, Turks polled in May 2003 were evenly divided on whether Iraqis will be betteroff or worse off in the long run, as a result of the U.S.-led campaign to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Otherquestions from the Pew Center survey showed the following results from February 2004 polling: Did Turkey make the right or wrong decision not to use military force against Iraq? -- 72% said it was the right decision, and 22% said it was the wrong decision. Has the war in Iraq helped or hurt the war on terrorism? -- 24% said it helped, 56% said ithurt, and 8% said it had no effect. Who could do the best job at helping the Iraqi people form a stable government, the U.S. and its allies or the United Nations? -- 11% said the U.S. and its allies, 59% said the U.N., 6% said both, and 10%saidneither. Associated Press/Ipsos News Center. "Many in neighboring countries, Europe believe Iraq has increased terrorist threat," March 5, 2004. Available at http://www.ipsos-na.com . The Economist. "Those awkward hearts and minds." April 1, 2003. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. "Transatlantic Trends 2003." Available at http://www.transatlantictrends.org . Released September 4,2003. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe EverHigher, Muslim Anger Persists . Available at http://www.people-press.org . Released March 16, 2004. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research. "Opinion Analysis: Key West European still mostly negative aboutmilitary action in Iraq," May 14, 2003.

Several European countries currently contribute military forces to U.S.-ledcoalition operations to stabilize Iraq, one year after the start of the war against former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Many European governments have sent troops to Iraq despite strong domestic opposition, although the level ofopposition, as measured by opinion polls, varies from country to country and can show changes over time. TheMarch2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid and the announcement by the new Spanish government that it would likely removeSpanish troops from Iraq by July 2004 have raised questions about the sustainability of other countries' troopdeployments. This report surveys selected public opinion indicators in key European coalition countries. It maybeupdated as new polling data becomes available. See related CRS Report RL31843(pdf), Iraq: International AttitudestoOperation Iraqi Freedom and Reconstruction.

Since 2007, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has amended certain national standards for traffic signs. Among the new standards were a measurable standard for the minimum level of nighttime visibility of traffic signs and a change in the lettering of street signs. These new standards were the subject of some confusion and controversy. Some state and local agencies complained that the new standards would be relatively costly to comply with during a period when state and local finances are strained. Some agencies also confused the new nighttime visibility maintenance standard, which originally included deadlines by which agencies had to comply with the new standard, with the new sign-lettering standard, which did not have compliance deadlines. In response to the criticism, FHWA eliminated some of the nighttime visibility maintenance standard compliance deadlines. This report provides background for the nighttime visibility maintenance standard and addresses some of the issues that have been raised about this standard. In 2007, FHWA updated the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices standard governing the maintenance of the nighttime visibility (retroreflectivity) of traffic signs (§2A.08). Retroreflectivity refers to the reflection of light back from an object. With respect to traffic signs, this involves reflecting the light from car headlights so that the sign is visible to drivers at night. The 2007 amendment set a minimum level of retroreflectivity for signs and required state agencies to adopt a method to ensure that signs met that minimum. Because of its safety significance, this standard was given a deadline for compliance. Separately, in the 2009 edition of the MUTCD, FHWA updated the standard concerning the sign lettering style for names of places, streets, and highways (§2D.05). Formerly, names on signs could either be in all capital letters or have only the first letter capitalized. The new standard eliminated the option of using only uppercase letters. This standard did not have a deadline for compliance. The lettering standard applies only to signs with names of places, streets, and highways. This change was made because drivers often have only a brief time to read these signs, and studies indicate that mixed-case lettering is easier to read. State and local transportation agencies are required to implement the new lettering style only as they install new signs or replace existing signs. Some press reports have given the impression that the federal government is requiring communities to immediately begin replacing all street signs just to comply with the new lettering style standard, but this is incorrect. Earlier versions of the MUTCD had declared that "All traffic signs ... should have adequate retroreflectivity." However, there was no measurable standard for what constituted "adequate retroreflectivity." In 1985, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned FHWA to add a minimum nighttime visibility standard to the MUTCD. In 1992, Congress directed DOT to develop a minimum standard, with this provision in the FY1993 Department of Transportation (DOT) appropriations bill: SEC. 406. The Secretary of Transportation shall revise the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices to include— (a) a standard for a minimum level of retroreflectivity that must be maintained for pavement markings and signs, which shall apply to all roads open to public travel ... The reflective properties of sign materials decrease over time, due to exposure to sunlight and other factors. As the reflective materials degrade, a sign becomes harder to see at night. For many reasons, including the limited visibility available to drivers after sunset, driving at night is much more dangerous than driving during the daytime. Nighttime crash rates are estimated to be three times higher than daytime rates, and the fatality rate for nighttime driving is also higher than for daytime driving. At night, when visual cues available to drivers are much more limited, the assistance provided by traffic signs becomes more important. As an earlier version of the MUTCD put it, if a sign is necessary in the daytime, it has equal or greater value to motorists at night. Nighttime driving becomes more challenging as drivers age, because over time the lens of the eye typically become less transparent. This and other changes result in reduced sensitivity to light and reduced clarity of vision for older persons. With the aging of the U.S. population, the number of older drivers is increasing significantly. Thus, ensuring that traffic signs are easily visible to older drivers at night is becoming a more significant safety issue. But ensuring that traffic signs are easily visible at night benefits not only older drivers, but all drivers. The process of developing the new standard included FHWA-sponsored research and the development of a proposed standard based on that research by a task force appointed by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), which represents state and local transportation agencies. FHWA held workshops for representatives of state and local transportation agencies to examine the proposed new standard in the 1990s. AASHTO requested in 1998 that FHWA let it study the potential impact of the proposed new standard on state and local transportation agencies before issuing the standard. AASHTO adopted a policy resolution in 2000 requesting that agencies be given six years to implement methods to assess the nighttime visibility of signs. FHWA made further efforts to publicize the proposed standard, and then revised the proposal through the formal federal rulemaking process from 2004 through 2007, with repeated opportunities for public comment. The new standard took effect on January 22, 2008. The new standard involved two elements. First, it established measurable standards for the minimum acceptable retroreflectivity of signs. Since it is not considered feasible for agencies to regularly measure the retroreflectivity of every sign, the second element of the new standard was a requirement that agencies adopt a method by which to maintain the retroreflectivity of their street signs. To provide flexibility to agencies, the standard listed several methods that can satisfy this requirement, including visual nighttime inspection from a moving vehicle by a trained sign inspector; measurement of sign retroreflectivity using a retroreflectometer; replacement of signs based on their expected life above the minimum standard for retroreflectivity; replacement of all signs in an area, or of a given type, at specified intervals, based on the expected life above the minimum standard for retroreflectivity of the shortest-life material used on the signs in that area or of that type; replacement based on the performance of sample signs that are monitored for loss of retroreflectivity; or other methods that are developed based on engineering studies. According to the standard, an agency using a retroreflectivity assessment or management method will be in compliance even if at times individual signs did not meet the minimum retroreflectivity levels. Finally, this standard required that communities comply with the new standard by certain deadlines. There were three deadlines: January 22, 2012 (four years after adoption of the new standard)—the deadline for communities to adopt one of the methods to systematically maintain the retroreflectivity of their street signs. January 22, 2015 (seven years after adoption)—the deadline for communities to bring all of their regulatory, warning, and post-mounted guide signs (except street name signs and overhead guide signs) into compliance with the new standard. January 22, 2018 (10 years after adoption)—the deadline for communities to bring all street name signs and overhead guide signs into compliance. Generally, highway safety groups supported the standard, while state and local transportation agencies opposed the establishment of numerical minimum levels of retroreflectivity due to concerns about potential tort liability from failure to maintain a specific minimum level of retroreflectivity. They preferred that the standard be limited to establishing a management process that agencies would follow to maintain adequate nighttime visibility of signs. FHWA's final retroreflectivity standard tried to satisfy both the congressional directive to set a minimum retroreflectivity standard, by including a table of minimum numerical standards in the MUTCD, and the preferences of the state and local transportation agencies, by saying that not every sign needed to meet the minimum standard so long as agencies had a management process in place to maintain the nighttime visibility of their signs. Regarding tort liability, FHWA noted that having formally implemented a method for maintaining retroreflectivity would appear to put an agency in a better position to defend lawsuits in which inadequate sign retroreflectivity is an issue. Also, the final standard provided that agencies that have adopted an assessment or management method will be in compliance with the standard even if some signs do not meet the minimum retroreflectivity standard. There appear to be two reasons for the standard's sudden notoriety beginning in the fall of 2010. One was concern on the part of agencies about the cost of compliance. The other was that several press reports conflated the requirement for replacing signs that were no longer clearly visible at night with the entirely unrelated new standard requiring mixed-case lettering on street signs, which was added in the 2009 update of the MUTCD. Generally, federal and state laws require that each state adopt a manual of traffic control devices that meets or exceeds the standards in the federal MUTCD. The reason for these requirements is the belief that uniformity in traffic control devices promotes public safety. Most MUTCD standards, such as the lettering standard, do not have compliance deadlines. The case of the retroreflectivity maintenance standard is unusual in this respect. It was given a compliance deadline because its safety impact was considered to be significant. There are two potential enforcement mechanisms for standards in the MUTCD. First, states and local governments that are not in compliance with standards are potentially subject to having a portion of their federal transportation funding withheld. However, there is no formal enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. In fact, one report noted that "It is not uncommon for MUTCD principles to be violated (knowingly or unknowingly) in actual practice." The more significant potential enforcement mechanism for MUTCD standards is the tort liability that communities may face in the event of a lawsuit involving, in this case, a nighttime car crash in which the visibility of a street sign may be a factor. A study sponsored by DOT estimated the total additional cost to state and local governments of complying with the new standard to be $37.5 million over a 10-year period. Of this, $27.5 million would be borne by local governments, which are responsible for most traffic signs, and $11.8 million by state governments. The total cost was estimated to represent a 0.5% increase in annual sign maintenance costs for states; data to estimate the incremental impact on local government budgets were not available. The maximum cost in any one year was estimated at $4.5 million. Up to 100% of the cost of replacing traffic signs is eligible for federal funding. Most larger communities already have sign maintenance and replacement programs; for these communities, the study estimated that the impact of the retroreflectivity maintenance standard is likely to be modest. The impact may be greater in smaller communities that may never have instituted sign maintenance and replacement programs. Press reports indicate that a number of state and local highway agencies stated they estimated that their costs to comply with the new standard were much higher than the estimate in the DOT study. The methodologies by which these estimates were generated were not reported. In the controversy over the new standard, the charge was made that the new standard required agencies to replace "perfectly good" traffic signs. In part this may have resulted from the confusion of the two different traffic sign standards. If a traffic sign meets the MUTCD standard for retroreflectivity, it does not have to be replaced. If it does not meet the minimum retroreflectivity standard, then it may create a safety hazard after dark, although it may appear to be perfectly good during daylight hours. Several comments submitted during the rulemaking process described the rule as an unfunded mandate, as it would impose additional costs on state and local governments for developing sign inventories, training personnel to examine signs, and replacing signs without providing additional resources for this purpose. DOT has observed that the MUTCD already required agencies to maintain the nighttime visibility of traffic signs. The minimum retroreflectivity standard's primary impact was to establish a quantifiable level for what constitutes adequate nighttime visibility. Up to 100% of the cost of installing and replacing traffic signs can be covered by federal-aid highway funding under several programs. The annual level of federal-aid highway funding provided through the annual DOT appropriations act rose from $33.9 billion in FY2004 (when the rule was formally proposed) to $41.5 billion in FY2012, in addition to $27.5 billion provided to states and localities for highway infrastructure investment in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. DOT amended the compliance deadlines for the retroreflectivity maintenance standard (and numerous other MUTCD standards with compliance deadlines) in a May 2012 Federal Register notice. DOT extended the deadline for highway agencies to implement an assessment or management method for ensuring that their signs comply with the retroreflectivity standard to May 2014, and limited the scope of that required assessment to regulatory and warning signs, rather than all street signs. DOT also eliminated the compliance deadlines for replacement of signs that are identified as not meeting the minimum retroreflectivity level standards. Communities are still required to replace any signs that do not meet the standards. DOT said it changed the deadlines to reduce the costs and impacts of the compliance deadlines on state and local highway agencies. It noted that the original deadlines had been based on standard useful-life cycles for signs, but that varying environmental conditions meant that the actual useful life of signs varied in different areas of the country.

Traffic signs provide information to help motorists travel safely. If a sign is useful during daytime, it has equal or greater value to motorists at night, when less of the road environment can be seen. Federal regulations have long required that traffic signs be visible at night, either through the use of retroreflective materials (materials that reflect light, such as from headlights, back in the direction from which it came) or through permanent lighting illuminating the sign. These regulations are part of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), a compilation of federal regulations governing traffic control devices. Due to the costs and practical limitations on supplying electricity for lighting, agencies typically rely on retroreflective materials to make most traffic signs visible at night. Retroreflective materials lose their reflective properties over time due to weathering and other factors. This reduces the visibility of the signs at night. To promote safety, the MUTCD also requires agencies to monitor their traffic control devices and make sure they comply with the federal requirements. Thus, agencies have been required to make sure that their traffic signs are visible at night, and to replace those which are no longer visible. However, for many years there was no objective standard establishing what level of retroreflectivity was needed for a traffic sign to be visible at night. In 1992, Congress directed the federal Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop a standard for the minimum level of retroreflectivity that traffic signs (and pavement markings) must maintain. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) within DOT had already been doing research on the reflective properties of sign materials. Between 1993 and 2004 FHWA did further research and consulted with state and local transportation agencies regarding the implementation of the congressional directive. Between 2004 and 2007, FHWA completed a rulemaking to add a minimum standard for the retroreflectivity of traffic signs to the MUTCD. The new standard had three elements: it set a minimum measurable value for the retroreflectivity of traffic signs to ensure their visibility at night; it required state and local agencies to adopt a method by which to maintain the nighttime visibility of their traffic signs by 2012; and it required agencies to ensure that their signs were in compliance with the standard by 2018. In 2009, the street sign lettering standard in the MUTCD was revised. This standard did not have a compliance deadline. In 2010, several press reports conflated the new nighttime visibility standard with the new street sign lettering standard. These articles made it appear that the federal government was requiring communities to replace traffic signs just to change their lettering style. Communities also complained about the cost of the new nighttime visibility maintenance standard (though the requirement that they replace traffic signs that were no longer visible at night was not new). Thus the nighttime visibility maintenance standard came to the attention of Congress. In 2012, FHWA amended the compliance dates for the retroreflectivity standard (and several other MUTCD standards) to alleviate possible financial burdens the deadlines might have created for state and local highway agencies.

Introduction Certain workers who have experienced job loss and retirees whose private pension plans were taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) may be eligible for the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC). The tax credit's purpose is to make the purchase of health insurance more affordable for eligible individuals. The HCTC has a sunset date of January 1, 2020. This report describes the eligibility criteria for the HCTC and the types of health insurance to which the tax credit may be applied. It briefly describes the administration of the HCTC program and receipt of the credit by eligible taxpayers. The report concludes with a summary of the HCTC's statutory history. The HCTC covers 72.5% of the premium for certain types of health insurance purchased by an eligible taxpayer. The taxpayer is responsible for covering the remaining 27.5% of the premium. Eligible taxpayers are only allowed to use the HCTC toward the purchase of qualified health insurance (described below in the " Qualified Health Insurance " section). The HCTC is refundable, so taxpayers may claim the full credit amount even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. The credit also is advanceable, so taxpayers may receive the credit on a monthly basis to coincide with the payment of premiums. To claim the HCTC, taxpayers must be in one of two eligibility groups and not enrolled in (or sometimes even eligible for) certain types of health insurance. Other statutory limitations also apply. The two groups of taxpayers who are eligible to claim the HCTC are recipients of certain benefits under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program and individuals between the ages of 55 and 64 who receive payments from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). TAA is a program that provides assistance to workers who lose their jobs due to international trade. To qualify for TAA, a group of workers must petition the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to establish that their job loss was attributable to a qualified cause. If a DOL investigation confirms the workers' claim, the workers are certified as eligible for TAA benefits and services. TAA-certified workers are eligible for the HCTC on the basis of receipt of certain TAA benefits. Specifically, workers are eligible for the HCTC if they receive any of the following: Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) . TRA is a weekly cash payment for workers who are enrolled in TAA-sponsored training and have exhausted their eligibility for unemployment insurance (UI). TRA payments begin the week after a worker exhausts eligibility for UI. Workers may collect a maximum of 130 weeks of UI and TRA combined. Workers are eligible for the HCTC if they are collecting TRA or UI . Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance (RTAA) . RTAA is a wage supplement for workers aged 50 and older who were certified for TAA and subsequently secure qualified employment at a lower wage. RTAA pays 50% percent of the difference in wages for up to two years, up to a maximum total benefit of $10,000. Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA) . ATAA is a wage-insurance program similar to RTAA. ATAA existed prior to the most recent reauthorization of TAA, and a small number of workers may still be receiving benefits under ATAA. A worker is eligible for the HCTC on the first day of a month if the worker received an eligible TAA benefit "for any day in that month or the prior month." Notably, eligibility for the HCTC is limited to individuals who receive TRA, RTAA, or ATAA cash benefits. Workers who are certified as eligible for TAA but receive only other TAA benefits (such as job-search assistance) are not eligible for the HCTC. To receive a PBGC benefit, individuals must have worked for a firm whose defined-benefit pension plan was insured and then taken over by the PBGC. The agency assumes control of defined-benefit plans (pension plans that promise to pay a specific monthly benefit at retirement) when it determines that the plans must be terminated to protect the interests of participants (e.g., if benefits that were due could not be paid) or when employers demonstrate that they could not remain in business unless the plan were terminated. The PBGC uses plan assets and its own insurance reserves to pay the pensions (up to a guaranteed amount) to the former workers and their survivors. Individuals who receive PBGC-paid pensions are eligible for the HCTC, provided they are at least 55 years of age but not yet entitled to Medicare (which usually occurs at the age of 65). The HCTC program places several limitations on eligibility, even for those individuals in the two groups described above. Persons enrolled in the following are not eligible for the tax credit: a health plan maintained by the individual's employer or former employer (or by the employer or former employer of the individual's spouse) that pays 50% or more of the total premium; Medicare Part B; the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP); Medicaid; or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Similarly, to be eligible for the HCTC, individuals may not be eligible for the following: Medicare Part A; or coverage provided through the U.S. military health system (e.g., Tricare). In addition, individuals are not eligible for the HCTC if they are incarcerated or if they may be claimed as a dependent by another taxpayer. An eligible taxpayer may use the HCTC for health insurance that covers his or her spouse and any dependents who may be claimed on his or her tax return. For this purpose, children of divorced or separated parents are treated as dependents of the custodial parent. Qualifying family members face the same eligibility limitations as eligible taxpayers (i.e., they may not be enrolled in or eligible for the insurance described above). Family members may continue to receive the HCTC for up to two years after any of the following events: the qualified taxpayer becomes eligible for Medicare, the taxpayer and spouse divorce, or the taxpayer dies. An eligible taxpayer is only allowed to claim the HCTC to cover part of the premium for qualified health insurance. Statute limits qualified health insurance to 11 categories of coverage, identified as options (A) through (K). Individuals are not allowed to claim the tax credit for any other type of coverage. Four of the coverage categories are referred to as automatically qualified health plans. Individuals may elect these options without state involvement. These options (identified by their statutory letter designations) are as follows: A. Coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA; P.L. 99-272 ). I. Coverage under a group health plan available through a spouse's employer. J. Coverage under individual health insurance. K. Coverage funded by a voluntary employees' beneficiary association (VEBA). The other seven categories of coverage are known as state-qualified health plans . Individuals may choose these options only if their state has established these plans. These options (identified by their statutory letter designations) are as follows: B. State-based continuation coverage provided under a state law requiring such coverage. C. Coverage offered through a state high-risk pool (HRP). D. Coverage under a plan offered for state employees. E. Coverage under a state-based plan that is comparable to the plan offered to state employees. F. Coverage through an arrangement entered into by a state and a group health plan, an issuer of health insurance, an administrator, or an employer. G. Coverage through a state arrangement with a private-sector health care purchasing pool. H. Coverage under a state-operated plan that does not receive any federal financing. Coverage under state-qualified health plans is required to provide four consumer protections, specified in statute, to all qualifying individuals. Qualifying individuals are defined as HCTC-eligible individuals (as described above) who had three months of creditable coverage under another health plan prior to applying for a state-qualified plan and did not have a significant break in coverage (defined as 63 days or more without coverage). For such individuals, state-qualified health plans must provide the following four protections: 1. The plan must be guaranteed issue, meaning coverage may not be denied to any qualifying applicant. 2. Coverage may not be denied based on preexisting health conditions. 3. Premiums (without regard to subsidies) may not be greater for qualifying individuals than for other similar individuals. 4. Benefits for qualifying individuals must be the same as or substantially similar to benefits for others. Certain types of coverage are not considered qualified health insurance, even if they otherwise meet one of the categories listed above. Such coverage includes accident or disability income insurance, liability insurance, workers' compensation insurance, automobile medical payment insurance, credit-only insurance, coverage for on-site medical clinics, limited-scope dental or vision benefits, long-term care insurance, coverage for a specified disease or illness, hospital and other fixed indemnity insurance, and supplemental insurance. Although the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administers the HCTC program, full implementation entails the participation of several federal and state agencies. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is primarily responsible for administering the advance payment system, by providing the HCTC on a monthly basis to coincide with payment of insurance premiums. In addition, the IRS reviews tax returns on which the credit is claimed. DOL and the PBGC are responsible for helping Treasury identify who may be eligible for the credit. DOL also coordinates the One-Stop Career Center system; these centers provide a wide range of services to assist job seekers, including providing information about available benefits such as the HCTC. State-level entities include state workforce agencies (SWAs)—DOL-funded agencies that administer unemployment and TAA benefits. Other relevant state entities include the departments of insurance and health agencies. DOL requests that SWAs mail HCTC information packets to all eligible TAA beneficiaries. Included with the information packet is an HCTC eligibility certificate, a document that identifies the individual as potentially eligible for the tax credit. Similarly, the PBGC identifies beneficiaries who are potentially eligible for the HCTC and provides the beneficiaries' relevant personal information to the IRS. The IRS mails program kits to persons whose names are included on the lists provided by the SWAs and the PBGC. Eligible taxpayers with qualified health insurance may claim the tax credit when they file their tax returns for the year, or they may receive advance payments for the credit, on a monthly basis, throughout the year. Some taxpayers may choose to receive a portion of the credit through advance payments and the remainder after they file their returns. Because the HCTC is refundable, taxpayers may receive the full amount for which they are eligible, even if they have little or no tax liability. Other tax credits for which individuals are eligible have no effect on their eligibility for the HCTC, nor does the HCTC affect other credits, with one key exception: a taxpayer who chooses to receive the HCTC is prohibited from being eligible for the premium tax credit established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , as amended). The IRS published relevant summary statistics in its 2014 Statistics of Income (SOI) report. The most current SOI data about the HCTC is for tax year 2013, in which 13,693 tax returns claimed the HCTC, totaling to approximately $52.3 million. In addition, preliminary data for the 2016 filing season indicated the submission of 13,015 e-filed tax returns claiming the credit, as of March 10, 2016. Taxpayers who choose to claim the HCTC after the tax year ends must complete Form 8885 and attach it to their standard Form 1040. Taxpayers must include invoices and proof of payment for qualified health insurance. In this case, the credit amount would be used to reduce the amount of taxes owed for a given taxpayer. Because the HCTC is refundable, if the credit amount exceeds the amount of taxes owed, the excess amount is provided to the taxpayer in the form of a tax refund. To receive advance payments of the HCTC, individuals register with the HCTC program. They must be enrolled in a qualified health insurance plan when they register. The program confirms an applicant's eligibility and sends him or her an invoice for the taxpayer's share of the total monthly premium (which is 27.5% because the HCTC's subsidy rate is 72.5%). Individuals send payments for their share plus additional premium amounts for non-qualified family members (if applicable) to Treasury. Upon receipt of these premium payments, Treasury sends payment for 100% of the premium (comprised of 27.5% from the individual and 72.5% from Treasury) to the individuals' health insurance plans.

The Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) subsidizes most of the cost of qualified health insurance for eligible taxpayers and their family members. Potential eligibility for the HCTC is limited to two groups of taxpayers. One group is comprised of individuals eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) allowances because they experienced qualifying job losses. The other group consists of individuals whose defined-benefit pension plans were taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) because of financial difficulties. HCTC-eligible individuals are allowed to receive the tax credit only if they either could not enroll in certain other health coverage (e.g., Medicaid) or are not eligible for other specified coverage (e.g., Medicare Part A). To claim the HCTC, eligible taxpayers must have qualified health insurance (specific categories of coverage, as specified in statute). Several of those categories, known as state-qualified health plans, are available only after being established by state action. The HCTC is refundable, so eligible taxpayers may receive the full credit amount even if they had little or no federal income tax liability. The credit is also advanceable, so taxpayers may receive the credit on a monthly basis to coincide with the payment of premiums. The HCTC has a sunset date of January 1, 2020.

Former Prime Minister of Australia John Howard and President George W. Bush signed the U.S.-Australia Treaty on Defense Trade Cooperation in Sydney on September 5, 2007, immediately before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Proponents view the treaty as bringing what are already very close allies even closer together by facilitating defense trade between the two states and members of their respective defense industries. However, some are concerned that a treaty approach is not the best way to deal with perceived problems with arms and defense technology export controls. The treaty would ease restrictions associated with the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by creating a comprehensive framework within which most defense trade can be carried out without prior government approval. The trade must support combined U.S.-Australian counterterror operations, U.S.-Australia "research and development, production and support programs," and Australia and U.S. government-only end-uses in order to be eligible. Exports of defense articles outside the community consisting of the two governments and approved companies of the two nations would require U.S. and Australian government approval. Supporters state that the treaty will help the two nations strengthen interoperability between their military forces, help sustain them, and use defense industries in direct support of the armed forces. Many of the details of how the treaty will operate have yet to be worked out. According to press releases, "under the implementing arrangements that are contemplated by the treaty, our industries will move from the licensing regime under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, to the more streamlined procedures that will be set forth in these implementing arrangements." The treaty, which was negotiated under the former Liberal [right of center] Government that took office in 1996, would provide Australia with streamlined access to U.S. defense trade. This treaty would simplify U.S. export controls on defense articles to Australia that reportedly, along with U.S. defense industry, has been frustrated with existing restrictions. Australia and the U.S. reportedly approved 2,361 licenses and concluded 312 agreements in 2006. The treaty would also provide Australia with: operational benefits from greater access to U.S. support; improvements to military capability development due to earlier access to U.S. data and technology; cost and time savings from significant reductions in the number of licenses required for export of defense equipment; and improved access for Australian companies involved in bidding on U.S. defense requirements, or in supporting U.S. equipment in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) inventory. If passed, the treaty will likely require the enactment of enabling legislation in Australia and as a result will need the support of the newly elected government of Kevin Rudd to come into force. Key legislation that may require amendment are the Customs Act of 1901, Customs Regulations 1958, and Weapons of Mass Destruction(Prevention of Proliferation) Act of 1995. Rudd's Labor Party's sweeping victory in the November 24, 2007 election has given him a strong mandate. The Labor Party has denied election year accusations in Australia that it would in some way downgrade the Australia-U.S. alliance and stated "Labor will enhance our strategic relationship and seek to make an already special friendship even stronger and more effective." The defense trade treaty is expected to be supported by the new Prime Minister due to the large bipartisan support for the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance in Australia. While Prime Minister Rudd views the United States and the ANZUS alliance as central to Australia's security he has indicated that Australia would begin a staged withdrawal of troops from Iraq. He has also stated that under his leadership Australia would consider increasing the number of troops stationed in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Rudd has stressed that the history of the alliance is a bipartisan one that was instigated in World War II by President Roosevelt and Australian Labor Party Prime Minster John Curtin. He has also stated that "for Labor the U.S. alliance sits squarely in the centre of our strategic vision. Intelligence sharing, access to advanced technologies, systems and equipment, together with combined military exercises and training enhances Australia's national security." Rudd has been described as believing that a strong American presence in the region is crucial to regional stability and that U.S. strategic engagement in Asia is central to Australia's security. The treaty would further draw Australia into a very small circle of closely trusted allies that have stood with the United States not only in past conflicts but also in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would do this at a time when the United States is increasingly unpopular in the world. In May 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the alliance as "... one that reflects the deep bond of enduring ideals and shared history, colonial origins, democratic development, and shared political and cultural values ... ours is an alliance that remains strong...." During his September 2007 visit to Australia, Pacific Commander Admiral Timothy Keating stated, "Every war we fought for the last century, the Australians have been with us, and we have been with them ... they are members of the coalition of the committed, not just the coalition of the willing." The treaty could improve the image of the United States in Australia by demonstrating the benefits of the alliance. Australian attitudes towards the United States have changed significantly in recent years. Only 48% of Australians polled thought that the United States would be a "very close" economic partner of Australia in five to ten years as opposed to 53% that thought China would be. This is quite remarkable given that Australia is a longstanding treaty ally that has fought alongside the United States in most of America's wars and established a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States in 2005. Several factors have contributed to the decline in U.S. popularity in Australia. These include Bush Administration policies; the view that the United States is a self proclaimed world watch dog; the war in Iraq; and U.S. foreign policies. Dissatisfaction with the bilateral FTA and with the United States' position on global warming also appear to be key factors. In a recent poll sixty seven percent of Australians polled had an "unfavorable" opinion of President Bush despite former Prime Minister John Howard's close relationship with the President. Some 48% of those polled in 2007 felt that it would be better for Australia's national interest to "act more independently of the U.S." Despite these negative polling results, some 92% of Australians believe that the U.S. will be a very close or close security partner over the next decade and some 79% still believe that the U.S. alliance under ANZUS is "very important" (37%) or "fairly important" (42%) to Australia's security. It is striking that despite the decreasing popularity of U.S. foreign policy since 2001, some 74% of Australians polled still trust that the United States would come to Australia's assistance were it to be threatened by some other country. Thus, it appears that Australians draw a distinction between the current U.S. government and its policies and the long term value of the ANZUS alliance. Some have expressed concern that the treaty as proposed with Australia could lead to reduced congressional oversight. Many of those concerned with the treaty are concerned not primarily because they believe Australia would transfer military technologies to unfriendly states or entities but out of concern that the treaty could undermine existing congressional oversight as defined in ITAR. The lack of supporting implementing arrangements to accompany the treaty document is also of concern to some. In September 2007, the Australian Embassy reportedly stated that details of the implementing agreements for the treaty would be worked out in the coming months. The arrangements will: define precisely how the treaty will operate in both Australia and the United States, and how its obligations will be implemented to the mutual satisfaction of both countries. These arrangements include identifying the changes that might be needed to our legal and regulatory regimes, and putting these changes into effect. Until such time as the implementing arrangements are made known it will be difficult to comprehend the full scope of the treaty. By using a treaty, which must be ratified by the Senate, to redefine defense trade cooperation with Australia, the Administration appears to some to be putting in place an arrangement that avoids the existing regulatory structure. Proponents argue that the benefits of streamlining defense cooperation with this close ally far outweigh separation of powers concerns as well as the potential that Australia would be the source of technologies or weapons falling into unfriendly hands. The potential that third party transfers could result in the re-export of U.S. technology to potential enemies is reportedly addressed in the treaty by allowing the United States to vet such transfers. The treaty has been welcomed by representatives of the U.S. defense industry as most of Australia's key weapons systems are American-made by companies such as Boeing, Northrop, and Raytheon. Australia's defense budget has experienced a 47% real growth rate over the past 11 years. (See Table 1 with U.S. arms sales agreements and deliveries with Australia for further information.)

The United States and Australia signed a Treaty on Defense Trade Cooperation in September 2007 that would facilitate defense trade and cooperation between the two nations. On the strategic level, the treaty would further develop ties between two very close allies who have fought together in most of America's conflicts, including most recently in Iraq and in Afghanistan. This treaty is proposed at a time when the United States has found few friends that have been willing to work as closely with the United States in its efforts to contain militant anti-Western Islamists as Australia has proven to be. The treaty with Australia needs to be ratified by the U. S. Senate to come into force.

T he Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury (Title I), the Executive Office of the President (EOP, Title II), the judiciary (Title III), the District of Columbia (Title IV), and more than two dozen independent agencies (Title V). The bill typically funds mandatory retirement accounts in Title VI, which also contains additional general provisions applying to the funding provided agencies through the FSGG bill. Title VII contains general provisions applying government-wide. The FSGG bills have often also contained provisions relating to U.S. policy toward Cuba. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed in its current form since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. On February 9, 2016, then-President Obama submitted his FY2017 budget request. The request included a total of $46.5 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC. On June 15, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.R. 5485 , H.Rept. 114-624 ). Total FY2017 funding in the reported bill would have been $43.5 billion, with another $250 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5054 , H.Rept. 114-531 ), which was reported on April 26, 2016. The combined total of $43.8 billion would have been about $2.8 billion below the President's FY2017 request with most of this difference in the funding for the Department of the Treasury and the General Services Administration (GSA). After a number of amendments on the floor, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5485 on July 7, 2016. Although funding was shifted among some FSGG agencies, the overall level remained unchanged. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2017 ( S. 3067 , S.Rept. 114-280 ). S. 3067 would have appropriated $44.4 billion for FY2017, about $2.2 billion below the President's request. As with the House bill, most of this difference is due to the Treasury and GSA. With the end of FY2016 approaching and no permanent FSGG appropriations bill enacted, Congress passed, and the President signed, H.R. 5325 / P.L. 114-223 . Division C of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 9, 2016, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). The CR provides funding for most FSGG agencies at the FY2016 funding rate subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.496% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division C). It also provides appropriations in the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act for all of FY2017 (Division A), as well as emergency funds to combat the Zika virus and provide relief for flood victims in Louisiana and other affected states (Division B). In addition to the funding for FSGG agencies as described, the CR contains a number of deviations from general formula. These "anomalies" focused on funding related to the presidential transition. Two further CRs were enacted: P.L. 114-254 provided funding through April 28, 2017, and a third, P.L. 115-30 provided funding through May 5, 2017. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 244 on May 3, 2017, followed by Senate passage on May 4 and enactment on May 5. FSGG appropriations, including the CFTC, were provided in Division E. FY2017 FSGG appropriations totaled $43.3 billion, approximately $3.2 billion below the President's request. Table 1 reflects the status of FSGG appropriations measures at key points in the appropriations process. Table 2 lists the broad amounts requested by the President and included in the various FSGG bills, largely by title, and Table 3 details the amounts for the independent agencies. Specific columns in Table 2 and Table 3 are FSGG agencies' enacted amounts for FY2016, the President's FY2017 request, the FY2017 amounts from H.Rept. 114-624 and H.Rept. 114-531 , the FY2017 amounts from S.Rept. 114-280 , and the enacted FY2017 amounts from the Explanatory Statement in the Congressional Record. Although financial services are a focus of the FSGG bill, the bill does not actually include funding for the regulation of much of the financial services industry. Financial services as an industry is often subdivided into banking, insurance, and securities. Federal regulation of the banking industry is divided among the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (generally known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or CFPB). In addition, credit unions, which operate similarly to many banks, are regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). None of these agencies receives its primary funding through the appropriations process, with only the FDIC inspector general and a small program operated by the NCUA currently funded in the FSGG bill. Insurance generally is regulated at the state level with some oversight at the holding company level by the Federal Reserve. There is a relatively small Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside of the Treasury, which is funded through the Departmental Offices account, but FIO has no regulatory authority. Federal securities regulation is divided between the SEC and the CFTC, both of which are funded through appropriations. The CFTC funding is a relatively straightforward appropriation from the general fund, whereas the SEC funding is provided by the FSGG bill, but then offset through fees collected by the SEC. Although funding for many financial regulatory agencies may not be provided by the FSGG bill, legislative provisions that would affect some of these agencies have often been included. H.R. 5485 would change the funding procedure for the CFPB, with future funding to be provided by congressional appropriations rather than the current situation in which primary CFPB funding is provided through unappropriated funds transferred from the Federal Reserve. The House bill also includes other provisions that would amend the Dodd-Frank Act, such as changing the leadership of the CFPB to a five-person commission and changing the authority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Previous FSGG bills have also included similar Dodd-Frank Act changes that have proven controversial in the past. P.L. 115-31 did not include the CFPB nor the FSOC provisions from H.R. 5485 . The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reorganized their subcommittee structures in early 2007. Each chamber created a new Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee. In the House, the jurisdiction of the FSGG Subcommittee comprised primarily of agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies, commonly referred to as "TTHUD." In addition, the House FSGG Subcommittee was assigned four independent agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Subcommittee: the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). In the Senate, the jurisdiction of the new FSGG Subcommittee was a combination of agencies from the jurisdiction of three previously existing subcommittees. The District of Columbia, which had its own subcommittee in the 109 th Congress, was placed under the purview of the FSGG Subcommittee, as were four independent agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee: the FCC, FTC, SEC, and SBA. In addition, most of the agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the TTHUD Subcommittee were assigned to the FSGG Subcommittee. As a result of this reorganization, the House and Senate FSGG Subcommittees have nearly identical jurisdictions, except that the CFTC is under the jurisdiction of the FSGG Subcommittee in the Senate and the Agriculture Subcommittee in the House. Table 4 below lists various departments and agencies funded through FSGG appropriations and the names and contact information for the CRS expert(s) on these departments and agencies.

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. On February 9, 2016, then-President Obama submitted his FY2017 budget request. The request included a total of $46.5 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC. On June 15, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 5485, H.Rept. 114-624). Total FY2017 funding in the reported bill would have been $43.5 billion, with another $250 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 5054, H.Rept. 114-531), which was reported on April 26, 2016. The combined total of $43.8 billion would have been about $2.8 billion below the President's FY2017 request. After a number of amendments on the floor, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5485 on July 7, 2016. Although funding was shifted among some FSGG agencies, the overall level remained unchanged. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2017 (S. 3067, S.Rept. 114-280). S. 3067 would have appropriated $44.4 billion for FY2017, about $2.2 billion below the President's request. S. 3067 was not considered on the Senate floor during the 114th Congress. No FY2017 FSGG appropriations were enacted prior to the end of FY2016. On September 29, 2016, the President signed P.L. 114-223. Division C of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 9, 2016, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). P.L. 114-223 provided funding for most FSGG agencies at the FY2016 funding rate subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.496% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division C). This was followed by a second CR, P.L. 114-254, which provided funding through April 28, 2017, and a third, P.L. 115-30, which provided funding through May 5, 2017. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31/H.R. 244) was enacted on May 5, 2017, following House passage on May 3 and Senate passage on May 4. FSGG appropriations, including the CFTC, were provided in Division E. FY2017 FSGG appropriations totaled $43.3 billion, approximately $3.2 billion below the President's request. Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies.

The Mérida Initiative, named for the location of a March 2007 meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe Calderón of Mexico, expands bilateral and regional cooperation to combat drug trafficking organizations, gangs, and other criminal groups. The stated objective of the Mérida Initiative, according to the U.S. and Mexican government joint statement of October 2007, is to maximize the effectiveness of existing efforts against drug, human, and weapons trafficking. The joint statement highlights current efforts of both countries, including Mexico's 24% increase in security spending in 2007 and U.S. efforts to reduce weapons, human, and drug trafficking along the Mexican border. The Central America portion of the Initiative aims to support implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico and to bolster the capacity of governments to inspect and interdict unauthorized drugs, goods, arms, and people. The Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for Central American countries in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request. In the FY2009 foreign aid request, the Administration requested another $550 million for the Mérida Initiative – $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for Central American countries. All of the proposed funding has been requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, administered by the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Table 1 provides a broad summary of the types of programs to be funded by the Initiative. This is the largest category of aid in the proposed Mérida Initiative and is intended to provide equipment and technology infrastructure improvements for Mexican military and law enforcement agencies. In the FY2008 supplemental request, nearly two thirds of the requested $306.3 million for this category ($208.3 million) was requested for the procurement of eight transport helicopters, including a $24 million logistics, spare parts, and training package, for the Mexican Army and Navy; 87 handheld ion scanners for the Mexican Air Force and Army; two surveillance planes for the Mexican Navy; and equipment for two aircraft operated by the Mexican Attorney General's Office. The Administration also requested $31.5 million for the provision of inspections equipment and canine training to Mexican customs for use at points of entry. The Administration asked for $31.3 million to modernize the Mexican immigration agency's database and document verification system and to equip and train immigration agency personnel in rescue and safety techniques to be used along Mexico's southern border. The request included $25.3 million to secure communications systems among Mexican security agencies and inspection facilities for mail facilities. It contained $7.9 million to improve database interconnectivity; data management, and forensic analysis tools for Mexican intelligence agencies. The Administration also sought $2 million to expand the Mexican Attorney General Office's (PGR) support of the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS), a program aimed at identifying and prosecuting human smugglers along the U.S.- Mexico border. In the FY2009 request, the Administration placed more emphasis on assistance to non-military agencies than in the FY2008 supplemental request. The FY2009 request included $118 million to improve infrastructure and information systems at non-military agencies, including Mexico's immigration agency, the PGR, the intelligence service (CISEN), the postal service, and customs. With respect to military agencies, the FY2009 request included $100 million to support fixed wing aircraft for surveillance and counternarcotics interception missions carried out by the Mexican Navy and $20 million in gamma ray inspection equipment for use at Army checkpoints. In the FY2008 supplemental request, the Administration requested the bulk of this aid, $30 million, for the provision of inspection scanners, x-ray vans, and a canine detection team for police in Mexico's Ministry of Public Security. It requested another $6 million to provide security equipment, including armored vehicles, and bullet-proof vests, to Mexican law enforcement personnel investigating organized crime. The Administration also asked for $5 million to upgrade computer infrastructure used to counter money laundering. The FY2008 supplemental request also included $15.1 million to support the drug demand reduction efforts of Mexico's Secretariat of Health. For FY2009, The Administration requested $158.5 million in this category. Most of the assistance, $147.6 million, would go to support the Mexican federal police, which would receive: transport helicopters and maintenance support ($106 million); mobile gamma ray inspection equipment ($26 million); x-ray vans for light vehicles ($4.8 million); and, canine training ($0.75 million). The Administration requested another $10.9 million to support drug demand reduction programs. In the FY2008 supplemental request, the Administration asked for $100.6 million in this category, with some $60.7 million for an array of efforts, including revamping information management and forensics systems at Mexico's Office of the Attorney General (PGR); training in courts management, prison management, asset forfeiture, and police professionalization; support for anti-gang and anti-organized crime units; victim and witness protection program support; and extradition training. The PGR would receive $19.9 million for digitalization, database improvements, and a case management system, and $5 million in unspecified support of the its Forensic Institute. The Administration's request included $15 million to promote anti-corruption, transparency, and human rights, though support of law enforcement, court institutions, and civil society groups working to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the justice system. For FY2009, the Administration requested significantly less funding for this category, $30.7 million, with $23.4 million to improve the justice system; $8.5 million to support the PGR's Forensic Institute; and $9.4 million to support improved data collection and analysis. The FY2008 supplemental request included $37 million and the FY2009 request included $22.5 million for program support to cover the cost of U.S. personnel, administration, and budget services related to the proposed aid package. For FY2008, the Administration requested $16.6. million for this category, spread out among the seven Central American countries. The Administration proposed spending $7.5 million to support the Central American Fingerprinting Exploitation (CAFÉ) initiative to facilitate information-sharing about violent gang members and other criminals, to improve drug crime information sharing and collection, and to expand sensitive investigation police units dedicated to counternarcotics efforts. It asked for $5.3 million for programs to improve maritime interdiction capabilities and to provide technical assistance on firearms tracing, interdiction, and destruction. The Administration also proposed giving $3.8 million for port, airport, and border security, including equipment and training through the Organization of America States (OAS) Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism. For FY2009, the Administration requested $40 million in this category. More than half of that money, $25.8 million, would go to land and maritime interdiction and interception assistance, as well as to a regional arms tracking program. The FY2009 request also included $1 million to support the drug demand reduction efforts of the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and $2 million to combat currency smuggling. In the FY2008 supplemental request, the majority of proposed funding for Central America, $25.7 million, was specified for programs to improve policing and support anti-gang efforts. The Administration requested $12.6 million to implement the U.S. Strategy for Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, including support for diplomatic efforts, funding for the electronic travel document (eTD) system to provide biometric and biographic information on persons being deported from the United States, anti-gang units, and community-based prevention programs. It asked for another $11.1 million to provide specialized police training and equipment. Some $2 million would fund the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador. The Administration's request for funding in this category did not change significantly in the FY2009 budget request. The FY2009 request included $13 million to implement the U.S. anti-gang strategy, with $7.5 million of that slated for community prevention programs, up from $5 million in the FY2008 supplemental request. It also included $13 million for police modernization and technical assistance and $6 million to support the ILEA. The Administration also proposed $7.7 million in rule of law programs in the FY2008 supplemental request, including improvement of court management and prosecutorial capacity building; reforming prison management; supporting community policing programs, and providing assets forfeiture capacity training. The Administration's FY2009 budget request for this category rose to $23 million. The largest increases from the FY2008 supplemental request were for courts management programs and training to improve prosecutorial capacity. The FY2009 budget request also included $2 million for juvenile justice systems and rehabilitation programs and $1 million for programs to build public confidence in the justice system, two components not included in the FY2008 supplemental request. The FY2009 budget request included $5 million in unspecified program support. While several Members of Congress initially expressed concern that they were not adequately consulted by the Administration during the development of the Mérida Initiative, a majority have subsequently voted in support of the package. On May 14, 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved H.R. 6028 (Berman), the Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008. The bill would authorize $1.6 billion over three years, FY2008-FY2010, for both Mexico and Central America, $200 million more than originally proposed by President Bush. Of that amount, $1.1 billion would be authorized for Mexico, $405 million for Central America, and $73.5 million for activities of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to reduce the flow of illegal weapons from the United States to Mexico. Among the bill's various conditions on providing the assistance, the measure requires that vetting procedures are in place to ensure that members or units of military or law enforcement agencies that may receive assistance have not been involved in human rights violations. In terms of appropriations legislation, FY2008 supplemental funding for the Mérida Initiative was considered as part of a broader FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 (Edwards). Originally introduced June 11, 2007 as the FY2008 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, this bill subsequently became the vehicle for the second FY2008 supplemental appropriations measure. The May 15, 2008 House-amended version of the bill would have provided $461.5 million for the Mérida Initiative. Mexico would have received $400 million divided between INCLE, Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) accounts, while Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic would have received a total of $61.5 million divided between INCLE, ESF, FMF, and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) aid accounts. The Senate version of H.R. 2642 , as amended on May 22, 2008, would have provided $450 million for the Mérida Initiative, with $350 million for Mexico in the INCLE account; and $100 million for Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic divided between the INCLE and ESF accounts. On June 19, 2008, the House approved an amended version of the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 , that provides $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for Mexico and Central America. The Senate approved the compromise House version of H.R. 2642 on June 26, 2008. The bill was then signed into law by President Bush on June 30, 2008 ( P.L. 110-252 ) In the act, Mexico receives $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance, while Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic receive $65 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance. The measure has human rights conditions softer than compared to earlier House and Senate versions, largely because of Mexico's objections that some of the original conditions, particularly those in the Senate version of the bill, would violate its national sovereignty. The language in the final enacted measure reduced the amount of funding subject to human rights conditions, from 25% to 15%, removed conditions that would have required the Mexican government to try military officials accused of abuses in civilian courts and to enhance the power of its National Human Rights Commission, and softened the language in other conditions.

In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year proposal for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America aimed at combating drug trafficking, gangs, and organized crime. On May 14, 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a bill, H.R. 6028 (Berman), which would authorize $1.6 billion for the Initiative from FY2008 through FY2010. The Bush Administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for Central American countries in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request. In late June 2008, Congress appropriated $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for Mexico and Central America in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 ( P.L. 110-252 ). In the act, Mexico receives $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental assistance, while Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic receive $65 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance. The Administration has requested an additional $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for the Central American countries under the Mérida Initiative in its FY2009 budget request. This report will be updated. See also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America , by [author name scrubbed].

The forcible seizure of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s continues to be a pivotal issue in the ongoing Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Tokyo's participation in the international forum is dominated by its efforts to achieve progress on the abduction issue. While the United States is now aggressively pursuing a deal that provides energy and economic assistance to North Korea in exchange for the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, Japan has refused to contribute aid without satisfactory progress on the kidnappings. This had led to Japan's relative isolation in the multilateral talks, although better relations between new leaders in Japan and South Korea may provide some flexibility to end the impasse. U.S. interest in the abductions issue is driven by its needs for Japan's diplomatic and economic assistance in the negotiations, as well as concerns that friction in the U.S.-Japan relationship will damage one of the United States' most important alliances in the world. U.S. negotiators maintain that they strongly support Japan's position on the abductees, but also indicate that the issue will not block a nuclear deal. This stance contrasts with the pre-2007 approach of the Bush Administration, in which the abductions issue provided a platform for Tokyo and Washington's strategic priorities to converge. In the earlier Six-Party Talks, the United States and Japan joined to pressure North Korea on not only nuclear weapons, but also on human rights, refugees, and the abductions. The next several months are likely to be decisive for how the abductions issue will affect the U.S.-Japan relationship. Foremost is how progress in the Six-Party Talks proceeds: if time pressure and proliferation concerns lead the Bush Administration to accept a nuclear deal with North Korea that does not appear to enhance Japanese security, leaders in Tokyo may find it difficult to convince their citizens to steadfastly support U.S. strategic interests, including military basing. However, amid some indications that Tokyo may be reconsidering its priorities in the negotiations, a deal that extracts significant concessions from Pyongyang could reinforce the fundamentally strong U.S.-Japan alliance. In the 1980s and 1990s, circumstantial evidence began to surface that North Korean agents were responsible for the disappearance of several Japanese citizens. Isolated press reports addressed the suspicion, but the Japanese government initially dismissed the accounts and reacted slowly to the allegations. As Tokyo moved to re-establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang in the early 1990s, some Japanese politicians saw the issue as a possible obstacle to normalization, and may have suppressed information that suggested North Korea's responsibility. Unconfirmed reports from North Korean defectors emerged that Japanese nationals were held by North Korea, but the mainstream media largely ignored them. Then, in 1996, an article appeared in which a North Korean defector spoke about his experience at a "spy school" where native Japanese trained agents in Japanese language and culture. Support groups for the victims' families formed in Japan, and politicians—particularly those opposed to negotiating with Pyongyang—mobilized support in the Diet (parliament). In 1998, Pyongyang's test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile over Japan raised security fears about the threat from North Korea and made the general Japanese public more suspicious of its behavior. Eventually, the kidnappings became part of the diplomatic agenda with North Korea and, in September 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang to "resolve" the abductions issue and move toward normalizing relations. At the 2002 summit, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il admitted to and apologized for North Korean agents' abduction of 13 Japanese citizens. The kidnappings took place in Japan and Europe between 1977 and 1983. He claimed that only five remained alive. The Japanese public, shocked at the revelations, became fixated on the drama, with attention reaching its height a month later when the five abductees were returned to Japan. In May 2004, Koizumi returned to Pyongyang to secure the release of five of the abductees' children. Coverage of the abductees saturated the press, and the issue quickly became the top priority in Japan's North Korea policy. Given North Korea's record of truculence and denial, many analysts expressed surprise that Kim Jong-il admitted the kidnappings and allowed the abductees and their families to return to Japan. However, when Tokyo pressed for proof of the remaining abductees' deaths, Pyongyang produced apparently forged death certificates and traffic accident reports. When asked for physical evidence, North Korean officials provided cremated human remains that most Japanese felt to be of dubious origin (see below) and also claimed that some remains were washed away in floods. The inconsistency and apparent deception compounded the Japanese public's anger at North Korea and reinforced the views of many conservative politicians that Pyongyang should not be trusted. Because of the shaky evidence, Tokyo determined that its policy would be based on the premise that all the remaining abductees are alive. As the abductee drama has played out, three Japanese prime ministers have navigated the issue in subtly different ways, though always mindful of the emotional reaction of the public. Koizumi's bold initiative to visit Pyongyang in 2002 brought the issue to the surface, although he may not have anticipated the strong response from the public. Koizumi's position toward North Korea gradually hardened as the public's criticism of North Korea swelled and the Bush Administration indicated a reluctance to aggressively pursue a negotiated settlement with Pyongyang. His successor, Shinzo Abe, rose to prominence based on his hardline position toward North Korea, specifically on the kidnappings. Upon taking office, Abe established a headquarters in the Cabinet Secretariat to coordinate abductee affairs; led efforts to impose international and unilateral sanctions and restrictions when North Korea tested missiles and a nuclear device in 2006; and called for the immediate return and safety of all the abductees, on the assumption that all were still alive. Since assuming the premiership in 2007, Yasuo Fukuda has stated his interest in re-engaging more actively in the Six-Party Talks, but has not indicated that he will adjust Japan's policy on the abductees. Advocacy groups for the abductees note that he has retained the office that Abe created, but voice some doubt that his stance will mirror Abe's approach. Due to the overwhelming public reaction, there has been little open opposition to the official policy on the abductions. Opposition political parties have not challenged the ruling party's orthodoxy on the issue, and politicians from all parties have formed special Diet committees to indicate their support for the victims. Advocacy groups have gained particular clout as the controversy grew: the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, made up exclusively of relatives of the abducted, have become major media figures. Other groups of conservative activists, some explicitly committed to regime change in Pyongyang, have elevated their political influence and public profile. Among the most active of these are the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN). As with many popular movements, the outrage over the abductees' fates has a powerful poster child. Megumi Yokota was only 13 years old when she was reportedly snatched by North Korean agents on her way home from school. North Korean officials claimed that she committed suicide in 1993. Her case had drawn widespread media attention, both domestically and internationally, as the subject of documentaries and even an American folk song. As leaders of the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea and in frequent media appearances, Yokota's parents have become the face of the abductee cause. In 2006, President Bush invited the Yokotas to the White House, later calling the encounter "one of the most moving meetings since I've been the president." Earlier that day, Yokota's mother testified in front of a House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations joint hearing. Because of Yokota's high profile, any progress or setbacks to resolve her case is of particular symbolic importance. The public reacted with outrage when North Korea provided what they claimed were her cremated human remains to Japan, only to have Japanese officials later announce that they were not Yokota's. At the 2002 summit, North Korea relayed that Yokota had a fifteen-year-old daughter. A reunion of Yokota's parents with their granddaughter has been floated as a possible path to reconciliation, and observers maintain that any settlement of the Yokota case would make a significant impact on the public perception of the issue. As the Bush Administration has moved aggressively to reach a deal on denuclearization with North Korea in the Six-Party Talks since early 2007, distance has emerged between Washington and Tokyo. Japanese officials have expressed alarm that the United States may remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The removal, considered likely by many analysts, is one of a series of phased actions agreed to in the Six-Party Talks in exchange for Pyongyang allowing the disablement of the Yongbyon reactor and providing a declaration of nuclear programs. In the past, U.S. leaders have linked North Korea's inclusion on the list to the abduction issue, although State Department officials reportedly claim that the issue is not a legal obstacle for removal. In December 2007, the Committee on Abduction of Japanese Citizens by North Korea of Japan's Lower House adopted a resolution urging the United States to refrain from "de-listing" North Korea. The resolution read, in part, "We are concerned that if North Korea is removed from the list without repatriation of the detained victims, the Japan-U.S. alliance will be adversely affected and the Japanese people will be greatly disappointed." A U.S. decision to delist North Korea is unlikely to shake the foundations of the fundamentally strong alliance, but Japanese analysts say that the U.S.-Japan relationship could suffer in the short-term if Washington accepts a weak deal. If the Japanese public views Washington as abandoning the abductees, Japanese leaders may have difficulty convincing their public to continue to support the United States on a range of strategic interests, including the hosting and realignment of U.S. military bases in Japan. If, however, the government can point to enhanced Japanese security because of North Korean concessions on disarmament, the public may be more accepting, particularly if the United States continues to press Pyongyang for more information on the kidnappings. One of the five working groups established by the breakthrough February 13, 2007 agreement in the Six-Party Talks is dedicated to resolving Tokyo's and Pyongyang's bilateral controversies. The agreement states that the working group will hold talks to work toward the normalization of relations on the basis of settlement of "outstanding issues of concern," a phrase interpreted to mean the abductions and compensation to North Korea for Japan's colonial rule of the Korean peninsula from 1910-1945. Two rounds of consultations in Vietnam and Mongolia yielded no major progress on the stalemate. Only one other working group is dedicated to strictly bilateral issues (the U.S.-North Korean normalization process), which some say indicates the high priority of the abduction issue. On the other hand, relegation of the abductions to a separate track could demonstrate a willingness to move the rest of the process forward without satisfactory resolution of the kidnappings. Although the issue remains politically sensitive in Japan, many commentators acknowledge some degree of "abductee fatigue" among the Japanese public. Government officials and influential opinion leaders also privately voice concern that the abductee issue has led to Japan's marginalization in the multilateral negotiations on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The combination of fears of diplomatic isolation and concern about a range of security threats from North Korea may lead the defense establishment and policy elite to support any shift or adjustment to the current policy on North Korea. Fukuda's reputation as a pragmatist who places special emphasis on developing closer ties with Asian nations suggests that he would be amenable to a compromise approach to North Korea, particularly if Pyongyang indicated any movement on the issue. In addition, his rhetoric when speaking about Japan's interests in North Korea signifies a shift from Abe's singular focus on the abductions issue: Fukuda describes the kidnappings as one of three areas of concern, the others being Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs. However, Fukuda's tenuous hold on power and the threatened collapse of his ruling party have precluded any serious foreign policy initiatives. Since the Six-Party talks began, Tokyo's focus on the abductions issue has isolated it from the other parties, particularly China and South Korea. Some critics say that the abductions issue allows Japan to play the victim while refusing to take responsibility for its own historical offenses, particularly in the World War II era. Thorny historical controversies between Japan and its neighbors, however, have showed significant signs of easing in the past few years. After a period of rocky relations under Koizumi, Abe and Fukuda made strides in warming ties with Seoul and Beijing. Amid an overall detente in Sino-Japanese relations, Fukuda visited China in January 2008. When asked about the abductions issue during the visit, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly stated that "we understand Japan's position, and we are confident that a resolution can be reached through dialogue." New South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has stated explicitly that he does not intend to press Japan to apologize for historical grievances as his predecessor did. In his capacity of a Special Envoy, Lee's brother, who is also the vice speaker of South Korea's National Assembly, reportedly told Japanese officials that the new leader "understands and supports" Japan's position on the abductee issue. Lee has also indicated that he is more willing to raise human rights issues with the North than his predecessor. Most observers think it is unlikely that Chinese or South Korean negotiators will actively champion the abductees' cause, but both capitals appear to recognize the need for Japanese involvement (and funding) in any diplomatic arrangement with North Korea. Optimistic observers say that new leadership in Tokyo and Seoul, combined with Beijing's interest in maintaining smooth relations before the 2008 Summer Olympics and the Bush Administration's determination to reach a negotiated agreement this year, provide an environment ripe for a breakthrough.

The admission by North Korea in 2002 that it abducted several Japanese nationals—most of them nearly 30 years ago—continues to affect significantly the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. This report provides background information on the abductee issue, summarizes its effect on Japanese politics, analyzes its impact on U.S.-Japan relations, and assesses its regional implications. Congress has indicated considerable interest in the abductions issue. The North Korean Human Rights Act (P.L. 108-333) includes a sense of the Congress that non-humanitarian aid be contingent on North Korean progress in accounting for the Japanese abductees. A House hearing in April 2006 focused on North Korea's abductions of foreign citizens, with testimony from former abductees and their relatives. Some Members of Congress have sponsored legislation (S.Res. 399 and H.R. 3650) that support Japan's call for settlement of the abductions controversy before North Korea is removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Federal aid to communities affected by base closures and realignments covers a wide range of activities and agencies: planning and economic adjustment assistance provided by the Office of Economic Adjustment of Department of Defense (DOD), the Economic Development Administration, and the Rural Development Administration; environmental cleanup at military bases; disposal of surplus federal properties; the Federal Airport Improvement Program; community development block grants; and community service grants. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), http://www.oea.gov , is the primary source within DOD for assistance to communities affected by both increases and decreases in military spending. It also serves as a focal point for assistance from other federal agencies. The OEA has provided a total of $280 million in funding for previous BRAC rounds, primarily with the intent of preparing strategies for local development efforts and other federal funding. Over the years, the OEA has provided planning and implementation assistance to communities, regions, and states in an effort to alleviate serious economic impacts that result from defense program changes, such as base closings, expansions, and openings; contract changes affecting firms; and personnel reductions or increases at military facilities. The OEA has also maintained close working relationships with other federal agencies that have programs that can be utilized to assist communities adversely affected by defense cutbacks or realignments. By design, the OEA plays a facilitating role in the economic adjustment process. The affected community, however, must play the principal role in initiating and carrying out the adjustment and conversion plan. Currently, the OEA operates with a staff of 45 civilian and 3 military personnel. Funding for the office has been provided in the Defense Appropriations bill under the general operations and maintenance account. In previous budget estimates, the OEA has indicated that most communities affected by a BRAC round receive assistance averaging $400,000 to $500,000 a year for three to five years depending on individual circumstances. In addition, there have been a number of congressional adjustments for specific sites over the years, in amounts as high as $10,000,000 in a single year. Table 1 lists the amounts requested by the administration for OEA grants and administrative expenses, the amounts appropriated for OEA, including congressional adjustments, and the actual amounts spent by the OEA for FY1999-FY2007. Title IX of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, calls for economic adjustment grants to eligible communities to help them respond to sudden changes in economic conditions including those resulting from natural disasters, changing trade patterns and military base closures. The Economic Development Administration (EDA), http://www.eda.gov , has provided grants from their appropriated funds in excess of $640 million since the first BRAC round in 1988, as well as administering $274 million of DOD funds and $8 million from the Department of Energy for defense adjustment projects that have included some closed military bases. EDA grants are made on a cost-share basis with local governments, redevelopment agencies, and private or non-profit organizations. The grants include monies for planning and technical assistance, infrastructure improvement, and revolving loan funds for private business development. President Bush's FY2006 budget request included the "Strengthening America's Communities Initiative," which outlined substantial changes and realignment in federal economic development programs, including the EDA. Exactly what these changes might mean for assistance to BRAC communities is unclear. Congress has not acted on the President's proposals, nor set any timetable to do so. In addition to the OEA and EDA, there are a number of other federal agencies and activities that may help communities adversely affected by base closures and realignments. They include the following: DOD responsibility and funding for environmental review and cleanup at closing military facilities, which may support local jobs after a base is designated for closure but before federal land is actually transferred. Below market value transfer of land from closed military bases under the DOD's authority to make public benefit transfers and economic development conveyances. The potential transfer of military airports to civilian use under the Federal Airport Improvement Program of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The provision of financial grants to eligible communities under the Community Development Block Grants Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to promote neighborhood revitalization and community and economic development that principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons. Programs to promote economic development in rural communities with populations of less than 50,000, administered by the Rural Development Administration of the Department of Agriculture. Such assistance includes community facilities loans, rural business enterprise grants, business and industrial guaranteed loans, and intermediary relending programs. There are a number of federal programs that can provide transition assistance to workers displaced by base closures. These include various forms of transition assistance and benefits provided by DOD to its workers as well as other types of assistance available to all dislocated workers (e.g., the dislocated worker job training program of the Department of Labor, unemployment compensation, and food stamps). DOD has the authority to provide numerous incentives and transition benefits to departing military personnel. These include early retirement incentives, temporary continuation of medical care benefits, pre-separation counseling for separating service members, employment counseling and placement assistance, relocation assistance, and special GI bill education benefits. In addition, the Pentagon is also authorized to provide special benefits and incentives to civilian personnel displaced by a defense drawdown. These include advance notification of a reduction in force, pre-separation counseling, a hiring preference system (including the maintenance of a government-wide list of vacant positions) with federal agencies to re-employ qualified displaced DOD employees, financial incentives to encourage early retirement of eligible employees, and continued health insurance coverage for up to 18 months following involuntary separation. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), authorizes, among other programs, a program specifically for providing training and other services to dislocated workers. Dislocated workers are generally characterized as workers with an established work history who have lost their jobs as a result of structural changes in the economy and who are not likely to find new jobs in their former industries or occupations. The WIA program provides services to dislocated workers regardless of the cause of dislocation, and has been utilized in the past by workers affected by base closures. All WIA programs operate on a July 1 to June 30 program year (i.e., appropriations for FY2004 are for program year 2004, which is from July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005). The FY2004 appropriation for dislocated workers was $1.4 billion. This was increased to $1.5 billion for both FY2005 and FY2006. The authorization for WIA programs expired on September 30, 2003; Congress, however, has continued to fund the programs through annual appropriations. Of the funds appropriated for the dislocated worker program, approximately 80% are for formula grants to states and 20% are for a national reserve, which primarily funds National Emergency Grants (NEGs). ( NEGs are discussed below.) The governor can reserve not more than 15% of the state's formula grant for state level activities, and not more than 25% for "rapid response" activities. At least 60% must be allocated to local workforce investment boards (WIBs) by a formula prescribed by the governor. Rapid response activities are provided by specialists in the state's dislocated worker unit in the state's workforce agency as soon as possible after learning of a projected permanent closure or mass layoff. Activities include establishing onsite contact with employers and employee representatives, providing information and access to available employment and training activities, and providing assistance to the local community in developing a coordinated response and in obtaining access to state economic development assistance. In addition to rapid response activities, there are three levels of services, provided sequentially, available to dislocated workers: core, intensive, and training. To be eligible to receive intensive services, such as comprehensive assessments and development of individual employment plans, an individual must first receive at least one core service, such as job search, and have been unable to either obtain employment or retain employment that allows for self-sufficiency. To be eligible to receive training services, such as occupational skills training and on-the-job training, an individual must have received at least one intensive service, and must have been unable to obtain or retain employment. Individuals receive these services through a coordinated service delivery system called the "one-stop" system. Each one-stop system in a local area must include at least one physical center, which may be supplemented by affiliated sites. In addition to these services, local WIBs can decide whether to provide supportive services, such as transportation and child care, and need-related payments. Supportive services can be provided to individuals who are participating in core, intensive, or training services, and who are unable to obtain them through other programs. NEGs, which are funded through the 20% of the dislocated worker appropriation allotted to the national reserve, provide supplemental dislocated worker funds to state workforce agencies and local WIBs in order to meet the needs of dislocated workers and communities affected by significant dislocation events that cannot be met with the formula allotments. In its May 24, 2005 Training and Guidance Letter, DOL announced the availability of NEG funds for Phase I planning grants to states that may be affected by the 2005 BRAC. The purpose of these grants is to plan a comprehensive response to a BRAC closure or realignment. States eligible to receive the Phase I planning grants are those states listed in the Secretary of Defense's May 13, 2005 announcement of installations being recommended for closure or realignment. It is expected that no state will receive Phase I planning funds in excess of $1 million. Awards will be made in consultation with DOD. Phase II grants were made to states to provide employment and training assistance to affected workers, beginning in November 2005 when current BRAC actions were finalized. In addition to the various federal programs designed to provide transition assistance to displaced workers, a variety of other programs might also provide assistance to those affected by base closure. These include the following: Post-secondary education and training assistance for students under Title IV of the Higher Education Act ; and vocational education programs under the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act. Benefits related to past employment: Unemployment Compensation and temporary health insurance continuation. Benefits related to financial need: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Food Stamps, subsidized school meals, Medicaid and housing assistance furnished by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

On September 15, 2005, President Bush approved the list of military facilities that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended be closed or realigned in the current round of base closures, known generally as "BRAC." (See http://www.brac.gov/finalreport.asp.) The list includes 22 major base closures and 33 major realignments and would result in a net reduction of more than 8,000 military and civilian personnel. (The original BRAC list from DOD indicated a reduction of more than 26,000 personnel, but this included more than 13,000 from overseas deployments that are not included in the BRAC Commission recommendations.) On October 27, the House failed to pass H.J.Res. 65, a motion of disapproval of this list. Thus, barring some future congressional action, the recommendations will take effect over the next six years. (See CRS Report RL32216, Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round, by [author name scrubbed], for additional information on the BRAC process.) Despite the difficulties inherent in a base closure, communities near facilities on the list must now face a very high probability of life without a local military base. Recognizing that closures and realignments can have a major impact on the economies of the affected regions, Congress has created a variety of different resources available both to communities and individual workers to help mitigate the resulting economic dislocation. This report is intended to summarize these various programs. It will be updated as events warrant.