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Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. , the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. . Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified They harbor the “priming” that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life

central to our approach is a blurring of wartime and peacetime violence Close attention to the “little” violences produced in structures of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons it is absolutely necessary to make existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. an even greater risk lies in in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices daily enacted by “ordinary” citizens These are “invisible” genocides because they are right before our eyes and war crimes are ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically in the extreme context of war it is essential that we exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity of ordinary people, to enforce genocidal like crimes There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence mass violence is socially incremental and often experienced as expected, routine They harbor the priming that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

<h4><strong>Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4</p><p></strong>(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first</p><p>This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). <u>Absolutely <mark>central</mark> <mark>to our approach</mark> <mark>is a blurring of</mark> categories and distinctions between <mark>wartime and peacetime violence</mark>. <mark>Close attention to the “little” violences produced in</mark> the <mark>structures</mark>, habituses, and mentalites <mark>of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities</mark>.</u> More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. <u>The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which <strong><mark>humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons</strong></mark> and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder.</u> We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, <u><mark>it is absolutely necessary to make</mark> just such <mark>existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times.</u></mark> Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and <u>there is), <mark>an even greater</mark> <mark>risk</mark> <mark>lies in</mark> failing to sensitize ourselves, <mark>in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices</mark> and sentiments <mark>daily enacted</mark> as normative behavior <mark>by “ordinary”</mark> good-enough <mark>citizens</mark>. Peacetime crimes</u>, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), <u>constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”</u> to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. <u><mark>These are “invisible” genocides</mark> not <mark>because they are</mark> secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.</u> As Wittgenstein observed<u>, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are <mark>right before our eyes and</mark> therefore taken for granted.</u> In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. <u>Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that <mark>war crimes are</mark> merely <mark>ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically</mark> and dramatically <mark>in the extreme context of war</u></mark>. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. <u>The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? </u>What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end <u><mark>it is essential that we</mark> recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to <mark>exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the</mark> less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded <mark>everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts</mark> <mark>and policies</mark> <mark>possible</u></mark> (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. <u>Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency”</u> (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” <u><mark>Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence</mark> <mark>allows us to see the capacity</mark> and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - <mark>of ordinary people,</mark> the practical technicians of the social consensus, <mark>to enforce genocidal</mark>-<mark>like</mark> <mark>crimes</mark> against categories of rubbish people. <mark>There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life</mark>. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.</u> Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence<u>. <mark>Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence</mark> and genocide.</u> But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. <u>Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.</u> It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting <u>that <mark>mass violence</mark> is part of a continuum, and that it <mark>is socially incremental and often experienced</mark> by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - <mark>as expected, routine</mark>, even justified</u>. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. <u><mark>They harbor the</u></mark> early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the <u>“<mark>priming</mark>”</u> (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) <u><mark>that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life</u></mark> and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).</p>

Contention 2 is the Illegal market

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

A

Navy

1

George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

KrMa

Dartmouth KrMa

Da.....

Kr.....

Jo.....

Ma.....

Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Dehydration isn’t painful, nurses have positive view of it

Andrews and Levine 89

Andrews and Levine 89 Maria R. Andrews, MS, RD, VA Medical Center in Wilkes Barre, PA; Department of Human Ecology, Levine AM, Alan M. Levine, PhD, RD, Foods and Nutrition Program at the Department of Human Ecology, The American Journal of Hospice Care [1989, 6(1):31-34], “Dehydration in the terminal patient: perception of hospice nurses”, http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/2713109 //jchen

Recent discussion about the care of the terminally ill patient has focused on the appropriateness of withholding and withdrawing food and fluid and on the discomfort of the dehydrated state. Evidence is mounting that suggests that dehydration in this group of people is not painful, The scores for the degree of positive perception of dehydration are compared for the experienced and nonexperienced groups of nurses This study suggests that those hospice nurses who have observed terminal dehydration have a more positive perception of this state than those who have not.

Recent discussion about the care of the terminally ill patient has focused on the appropriateness of withholding and withdrawing food and fluid and on the discomfort of the dehydrated state. Evidence is mounting that suggests that dehydration in this group of people is not painful, but rather may be more comfortable than hydration by means of IV fluids or enteral and parenteral feedings. This study examines the relationship between the experience of hospice nurses in observing terminal dehydration and their perception of this state. The scores for the degree of positive perception of dehydration are compared for the experienced and nonexperienced groups of nurses. This study suggests that those hospice nurses who have observed terminal dehydration have a more positive perception of this state than those who have not.

<h4><strong>Dehydration isn’t painful, nurses have positive view of it</h4><p>Andrews and Levine 89</p><p></strong>Maria R. Andrews, MS, RD, VA Medical Center in Wilkes Barre, PA; Department of Human Ecology, Levine AM, Alan M. Levine, PhD, RD, Foods and Nutrition Program at the Department of Human Ecology, The American Journal of Hospice Care [1989, 6(1):31-34], “Dehydration in the terminal patient: perception of hospice nurses”, http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/2713109 //<u>jchen</p><p>Recent discussion about the care of the terminally ill patient has focused on the appropriateness of withholding and withdrawing food and fluid and on the discomfort of the dehydrated state. Evidence is mounting that suggests that dehydration in this group of people is not painful,</u> but rather may be more comfortable than hydration by means of IV fluids or enteral and parenteral feedings. This study examines the relationship between the experience of hospice nurses in observing terminal dehydration and their perception of this state. <u>The scores for the degree of positive perception of dehydration are compared for the experienced and nonexperienced groups of nurses</u>. <u>This study suggests that those hospice nurses who have observed terminal dehydration have a more positive perception of this state than those who have not.</p></u>

Case

2NC Link Debate

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

N

Navy

5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

KrMa

Dartmouth KrMa

Da.....

Kr.....

Jo.....

Ma.....

Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Low probability impacts should not be evaluated-- even if there’s some risk, policy decisions can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities

Rescher 03

Rescher 03 (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 49-50)

Problems with the DA—

<h4>Low probability impacts should not be evaluated-- even if there’s some risk, policy decisions can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities</h4><p><strong>Rescher 03</strong> (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 49-50)</p><p>Problems with the DA—</p>

2AC

Case

Framing

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Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

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gambling regulations are a TINY part of banking costs—they have to deal with the housing market, investment globally, and currency trade

<h4>gambling regulations are a TINY part of banking costs—they have to deal with the housing market, investment globally, and currency trade</h4>

WTO

Banks

AT: Inevitable

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Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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The United States should remove criminal and civil penalties on prostitution in the United States. The United States should extend labor regulations to prostitution. Employers of sex workers engaged in prostitution should be required to negotiate working conditions with their employers.

<h4>The United States should remove criminal and civil penalties on prostitution in the United States. The United States should extend labor regulations to prostitution. Employers of sex workers engaged in prostitution should be required to negotiate working conditions with their employers.</h4>

1AC

Prostitution 1AC

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NYU Itliong-Zhan

Glass, Thoma

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non-compliance inev

Ikenson 13

Daniel J. Ikenson 13, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house

U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final DSB ruling the U S remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers restrictions on Antigua’s gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. , U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues

U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and violate WTO rules more than any other government the U S remains out of compliance in subsidies to cotton farmers country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the Byrd Amendment antidumping measures, and several other issues U.S. trade partners have retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues

Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction. U.S. policies have been the subject of more World Trade Organization disputes (119, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies. No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruling — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, the United States remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues, some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. In some of these cases, U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, yet the non-compliance continues as though the United States considers itself above the rules.

<h4>non-compliance inev </h4><p>Daniel J. <strong>Ikenson 13</strong>, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house</p><p>Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction.</p><p><u><mark>U.S. policies have been the subject of more</u> <u>W</u></mark>orld <u><mark>T</u></mark>rade <u><mark>O</u></mark>rganization <u><mark>disputes</u></mark> (<u><strong><mark>119</u></strong></mark>, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) <u><mark>and</mark> have been found to <mark>violate WTO rules more</mark> frequently <mark>than any other government</mark>’s policies</u>. <u>No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final</u> WTO Dispute Settlement Body (<u>DSB</u>) <u>ruling</u> — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>remains out of compliance in</mark> cases involving U.S. <mark>subsidies to cotton farmers</u></mark>, <u>restrictions on Antigua’s </u>provision of<u> gambling services, <mark>country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the </mark>so-called <mark>Byrd Amendment</mark>, a variety of <mark>antidumping measures, and <strong>several other issues</u></strong></mark>, <u>some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. </u>In some of these cases<u>, <mark>U.S. trade partners <strong>have</strong></mark> either <strong><mark>retaliated</strong>, or been authorized to</mark> <mark>retaliate</u></mark>, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, <u><mark>yet</u></mark> the <u><mark>non-compliance continues</u><strong></mark> as though the United States considers itself above the rules.</p></strong>

1NC

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Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat

Bobbitt

1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO) 1NC Security K Ban CP Politics 2NR K

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Contracting solves certainty- provides safe harbor

Kleiman 2013 (Mark, professor of public policy at UCLA, “Federalism and cannabis policy: the terms of a bargain,” August 23rd, http://www.samefacts.com/2013/08/drug-policy/federalism-and-cannabis-policy-the-terms-of-a-bargain/)

Kleiman 2013 (Mark, professor of public policy at UCLA, “Federalism and cannabis policy: the terms of a bargain,” August 23rd, http://www.samefacts.com/2013/08/drug-policy/federalism-and-cannabis-policy-the-terms-of-a-bargain/)

I offer two alternatives to the options as to how the federal government can deal with state-level cannabis legalization. Washington and Colorado would like the feds to let their new commercial systems operate the Controlled Substances Act orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials in enforcing the law, and authorizes contractual arrangements with states formal deals in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off state-licensed businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal but formalize a program of selective enforcement that would give state licensees an effective safe harbor.

two alternatives the Controlled Substances Act orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials contractual arrangements” with states in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal, but formalize selective enforcement that would give state licensees a safe harbor

The Journal of Drug Policy Analysis has just published a new paper (behind a paywall) in which I offer two alternatives to the options currently in public discussion as to how the federal government can deal with state-level cannabis legalization. This fall, Washington and Colorado intend to start licensing businesses to produce and sell cannabis under voter-passed initiatives, even though the stuff remains illegal under federal law. The federal government has not yet said what it plans to do about it, and its three obvious options – acquiescing, cracking down, and muddling through – all have fairly serious drawbacks. A number of what Keith calls Formerly Important Persons have demanded that the feds crush the state-legal Colorado and Washington markets. Since every participant in those markets needs a license, that wouldn’t be hard to do: any federal judge would cheerfully enjoin someone applying for license to commit a federal felony from doing so. But the state-legal commercial markets represent only one of three systems that can deliver cannabis to customers. The loosely-regulated “medical marijuana” markets would be a far tougher nut for the feds to crack. And the purely illicit system, which handles the vast bulk of transactions today, is way too big for 4000 DEA agents to suppress without help. More than 90% of arrests for growing and dealing marijuana are made by state and local cops. So the feds need state and local authorities in Washington and Colorado to maintain pressure on illegal growing. Constitutionally, the states have no mandate to even have drug laws, let alone enforce them. In this case, federalism is more than a legal doctrine: it’s a brute fact. So: Washington and Colorado would like the feds to let their new commercial systems operate. And the feds would like Washington and Colorado to suppress production for out-of-state sale. When each of two parties has something the other wants, that’s the basis for a bargain. And the Controlled Substances Act (Sec. 873, if you’re keeping score at home) orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials in enforcing the law, and authorizes him, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” to enter into “contractual arrangements” with states and localities. The paper proposes that he use that authority to make formal deals with Colorado and Washington in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off state-licensed businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade. That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal, but it could formalize a program of targeted, selective enforcement that would give state licensees an effective safe harbor.

<h4>Contracting solves certainty- provides safe harbor</h4><p><strong>Kleiman 2013</strong> <u><strong>(Mark, professor of public policy at UCLA, “Federalism and cannabis policy: the terms of a bargain,” August 23rd, http://www.samefacts.com/2013/08/drug-policy/federalism-and-cannabis-policy-the-terms-of-a-bargain/)</p><p></u></strong>The Journal of Drug Policy Analysis has just published a new paper (behind a paywall) in which <u>I offer <mark>two alternatives</mark> to the options </u>currently in public discussion <u>as to how the federal government can deal with state-level cannabis legalization. </u>This fall, Washington and Colorado intend to start licensing businesses to produce and sell cannabis under voter-passed initiatives, even though the stuff remains illegal under federal law. The federal government has not yet said what it plans to do about it, and its three obvious options – acquiescing, cracking down, and muddling through – all have fairly serious drawbacks. A number of what Keith calls Formerly Important Persons have demanded that the feds crush the state-legal Colorado and Washington markets. Since every participant in those markets needs a license, that wouldn’t be hard to do: any federal judge would cheerfully enjoin someone applying for license to commit a federal felony from doing so. But the state-legal commercial markets represent only one of three systems that can deliver cannabis to customers. The loosely-regulated “medical marijuana” markets would be a far tougher nut for the feds to crack. And the purely illicit system, which handles the vast bulk of transactions today, is way too big for 4000 DEA agents to suppress without help. More than 90% of arrests for growing and dealing marijuana are made by state and local cops. So the feds need state and local authorities in Washington and Colorado to maintain pressure on illegal growing. Constitutionally, the states have no mandate to even have drug laws, let alone enforce them. In this case, federalism is more than a legal doctrine: it’s a brute fact. So: <u>Washington and Colorado would like the feds to let their new commercial systems operate</u>. And the feds would like Washington and Colorado to suppress production for out-of-state sale. When each of two parties has something the other wants, that’s the basis for a bargain. And <u><mark>the Controlled Substances Act</u></mark> (Sec. 873, if you’re keeping score at home) <u><mark>orders the Attorney General to cooperate with state and local officials</mark> in enforcing the law, and authorizes</u> him, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” to enter into “<u><mark>contractual arrangements</u>” <u>with states</u></mark> and localities. The paper proposes that he use that authority to make <u>formal deals</u> with Colorado and Washington <u><mark>in which the Justice Department would agree to keep hands off</mark> state-licensed <mark>businesses in return for the states’ active help in suppressing interstate trade</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>That wouldn’t make the state-authorized activity legal</u></strong>, <u><strong>but</u></strong></mark> it could <u><strong><mark>formalize</mark> a program of</u></strong> targeted, <u><strong><mark>selective enforcement</mark> <mark>that would give state licensees</mark> <mark>a</mark>n effective <mark>safe harbor</mark>.</p></u></strong>

Counteradvocacy

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NYU Dellamore-Kuzmenko

Glass, Weddington

1AC - mass mobilization against incarceration - marijuana 1NC - Reg-spec T States CP Academy K Treaties DA 2NC - K CP 1NR - T DA 2NR - T K

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Planning for the future is futile. Only embracing the negativity projected onto the queer reveals the recurring violence of reproductive futurism. Refuse futurism to set the queer free of the figural Child, and the violent future it both replicates and intends.

Edelman ’04 , p. 2-7

Edelman ’04, English prof at Tufts, Ph.D and M. Phil from Yale, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, p. 2-7

But what helped him most in these public appeals on behalf of children is impossible to refuse. logic compels us to submit to the framing of political debate as defined by the terms of what this book describes as reproductive futurism: terms that , impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering un thinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations. however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention. ow could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side at all necessarily constrains one to take the side by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children,” the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure. the pervasive invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value and propose against it the impossible project of queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests a refusal Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable political future, far from per perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form. Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane And the trump card of affirmation Always the question: if not this, what? — I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured , I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act taking the Symbolic’s negativity to the very letter of the law attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws —even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.’ The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social by figuring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social—and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms , the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as “the letter It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears us al . It is to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures that shape them. queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the letter’s cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, queer theory marks the “other” side of politics: the “side” where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves; the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good

appeal on behalf of children is impossible to refuse terms of reproductive futurism: impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving the absolute privilege of heteronormativity , by casting outside the political domain, queer resistance to this principle . politics however radical the attempt to produce a more desirable social order remains conservative insofar as it works to authenticate social order, to transmit to the future That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics How could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children queerness attains its ethical value insofar as it accept its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure. the impossible project of queer oppositionality would oppose itself to the logic of opposition Rather than rejecting, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might consider embracing it. Not in the hope of forging some more perfect social order such hope would only reproduce the mandate of futurism, but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane structuring optimism of politics , is always, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act taking the Symbolic’s negativity can expose , the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; order can access jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy onto the queer. . The embrace of queer negativity can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social by figuring a refusal in the value of futurity the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social subject that politics affirms queer theory marks the “other” side of politics: the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good

But what helped him most in these public appeals on behalf of America’s children was the social consensus that such an appeal is impossible to refuse. Indeed, though these public service announcements concluded with the sort of rhetorical flourish associated with hard-fought political campaigns (“We’re fighting for the children. Whose side are you on”), that rhetoric was intended to avow that this issue, like an ideological Möbius strip, only permitted one side. Such “self-evident” one-sidedness— the affirmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the Child whose innocence solicits our defense— is precisely, of course, what distinguishes public service announcements from the partisan discourse of political argumentation. But it is also, I suggest, what makes such announcements so oppressively political— political not in the partisan terms implied by the media consultant, but political in a far more insidious way: political insofar as the fantasy sub- tending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought. That logic compels us, to the extent that we would register as politically responsible, to submit to the framing of political debate —and, indeed, of the political field—as defined by the terms of what this book describes as reproductive futurism: terms that , impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering un thinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations. For politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention. Even proponents of abortion rights, while promoting the freedom of women to control their own bodies through reproductive choice, recurrently frame their political struggle, mirroring their anti-abortion foes, as a “fight for our children — for our daughters and our sons,” and thus as a fight for the future.’ What, in that case, would it signify not to be “fighting for the children” How could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side at all necessarily constrains one to take the side by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends? Impossibly, against all reasons my project stakes its claim w the very space that politics” makes unthinkable: the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their pre supposition that the body politic must survive. Indeed, at the heart of my polemical engagement with the cultural text of politics and the politics of cultural texts lies a simple provocation: that queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children,” the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism. The ups and downs of political fortune may measure the social order’s pulse, but queerness, by contrast, figures, outside and beyond its political symptoms, the place of the social order’s death drive: a place, to be sure, of abjection expressed in the stigma, sometimes fatal, that follows from reading that figure literally, and hence a place from which liberal politics strives—and strives quite reasonably, given its unlimited faith in reason—to disassociate the queer. More radically, though, as I argue here, queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure. To make such a claim I examine in this book the pervasive invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value and propose against it the impossible project of queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests a refusal —the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes queer theory—of every substantialization of identity, which is always oppositionally defined and, by extension, of history as linear narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in which meaning succeeds in revealing itself—as itself—through time. Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable political future, far from per perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form. Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order—such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer—but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: if not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or “position” whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible — to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism— I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured. To toe contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that’s always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic’s undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for “none of the above,” for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law’s foundational act, its self- constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic’s negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. In contrast to what Theodor Adorno describes as the “grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and substantial,” the queerness of which I speak would deliberately sever us from ourselves, from the assurance, that is, of knowing ourselves and hence of knowing our “good.”4 Such queerness proposes, in place of the good, something I want to call “better,” though it promises, in more than one sense of the phrase, absolutely nothing. ¡ connect this something better with Lacan’s characterization of what he calls “truth,” where truth does not assure happiness, or even, as Lacan makes clear, the good.5 Instead, it names only the insistent particularity of the subject, impossible fully to articulate and “tend[ing] toward the real.” Lacan, therefore, can write of this truth: The quality that best characterizes it is that of being the true Wunsch, which was at the origin of an aberrant or atypical behavior. We encounter this Wunsch with its particular, irreducible character as a modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible form. The Wunsch does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws —even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.’ Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the “aberrant or atypical,” to what chafes against “normalization,” finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself. For by figuring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical access to meaning, the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social—and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms. Divesting such politics of its thematic trappings, bracketing the particularity of its various proposals for social organization, the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as “the letter’ It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee. To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears—and thereby bears down on— us all. It is, rather, to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures that shape them. If it aims effectively to intervene in the reproduction of such a reality—an intervention that may well take the form of figuring that reality’s abortion— then queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the letter’s cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself. As a particular story, in other words, of why storytelling tells, one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, queer theory, as I construe it, marks the “other” side of politics: the “side” where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves; the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good. The rest of this book attempts to explain the implications of this assertion, but first, let me sketch some connections between politics and the politics of the sign by establishing the psychoanalytic context within which my argument takes shape.

<h4>Planning for the future is futile. Only embracing the negativity projected onto the queer reveals the recurring violence of reproductive futurism. Refuse futurism to set the queer free of the figural Child, and the violent future it both replicates and intends. </h4><p><strong>Edelman ’04</strong>, English prof at Tufts, Ph.D and M. Phil from Yale, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive<u><strong>, p. 2-7</p><p></strong>But what helped him most in these public <mark>appeal</mark>s<mark> on behalf of</u></mark> America’s <u><mark>children</u></mark> was the social consensus that such an appeal <u><mark>is impossible to refuse</mark>.</u> Indeed, though these public service announcements concluded with the sort of rhetorical flourish associated with hard-fought political campaigns (“We’re fighting for the children. Whose side are you on”), that rhetoric was intended to avow that this issue, like an ideological Möbius strip, only permitted one side. Such “self-evident” one-sidedness— the affirmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the Child whose innocence solicits our defense— is precisely, of course, what distinguishes public service announcements from the partisan discourse of political argumentation. But it is also, I suggest, what makes such announcements so oppressively political— political not in the partisan terms implied by the media consultant, but political in a far more insidious way: political insofar as the fantasy sub- tending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought. That <u>logic compels us</u>, to the extent that we would register as politically responsible, <u><strong>to submit to the framing of political debate</u></strong> —and, indeed, of the political field—<u>as defined by the <mark>terms of</mark> what this book describes as <strong><mark>reproductive futurism: </mark>terms that , <mark>impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving </mark>in the process <mark>the absolute privilege of heteronormativity </mark>by rendering un thinkable<mark>, by casting outside the political domain, </mark>the possibility of a <mark>queer resistance to this</mark> organizing <mark>principle</mark> of communal relations<mark>.</p><p></u></strong></mark>For <mark>politics</mark>, <u><mark>however radical the </mark>means by which specific constituencies <mark>attempt to produce a more desirable social order</mark>, <mark>remains</u></mark>, at its core, <u><mark>conservative insofar as it works to</mark> affirm a structure, to <mark>authenticate social order, </mark>which it then intends <mark>to transmit to the future</mark> in the form of its inner Child</u>. <u><mark>That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics</mark>, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention.</u> Even proponents of abortion rights, while promoting the freedom of women to control their own bodies through reproductive choice, recurrently frame their political struggle, mirroring their anti-abortion foes, as a “fight for our children — for our daughters and our sons,” and thus as a fight for the future.’ What, in that case, would it signify not to be “fighting for the children” <mark>H<u>ow could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side</mark> at all necessarily constrains one to take the side by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that <mark>returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends</u></mark>? Impossibly, against all reasons my project stakes its claim w the very space that politics” makes unthinkable: the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their pre supposition that the body politic must survive. Indeed, at the heart of my polemical engagement with the cultural text of politics and the politics of cultural texts lies a simple provocation: that <u><mark>queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children</mark>,” the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism</u>. The ups and downs of political fortune may measure the social order’s pulse, but queerness, by contrast, figures, outside and beyond its political symptoms, the place of the social order’s death drive: a place, to be sure, of abjection expressed in the stigma, sometimes fatal, that follows from reading that figure literally, and hence a place from which liberal politics strives—and strives quite reasonably, given its unlimited faith in reason—to disassociate the queer. More radically, though, as I argue here, <u><mark>queerness attains its ethical value</mark> precisely <mark>insofar as it</mark> accedes to that place, <mark>accept</mark>ing <mark>its</mark> <mark>figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure.</mark> </p><p></u>To make such a claim I examine in this book <u>the pervasive invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value and propose against it<mark> the impossible project of queer oppositionality</mark> that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that <mark>would oppose itself to the logic of opposition</mark>. This paradoxical formulation suggests a refusal</u> —the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes queer theory—of every substantialization of identity, which is always oppositionally defined and, by extension, of history as linear narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in which meaning succeeds in revealing itself—as itself—through time. <u>Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable political future, far from per perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form. </p><p><strong><mark>Rather than rejecting, </mark>with liberal discourse, <mark>this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might</u></strong></mark>, as I argue, <u><strong>do better to <mark>consider </mark>accepting and even <mark>embracing it.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>Not in the hope of forging </mark>thereby <mark>some more perfect social order</u></mark>—<u><mark>such</mark> a <mark>hope</mark>, after all, <mark>would only reproduce the</mark> constraining <mark>mandate of futurism,</mark> just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer</u>—<u><strong><mark>but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane</u></strong></mark>. <u>And the trump card of affirmation</u>? <u>Always the question: if not this, what?</u> Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or “position” whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible — to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism<u>— I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured</u>. To toe contrary<u>, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic</u>. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that’s always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic’s undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for “none of the above,” for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law’s foundational act, its self- constituting negation. <u>The <mark>structuring optimism of politics</mark> to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification<mark>, is always, </mark>I would argue,<mark> a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act</u></mark>. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that <u><mark>taking the Symbolic’s negativity</mark> to the very letter of the law</u>, that <u>attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses</u>, that <u>turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us</u>. <u>Or better: <mark>can expose </mark>the constancy<mark>, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; </mark>even if that <mark>order can access</mark> its constant access to <mark>jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy </mark>of access <mark>onto the queer.</mark> </p><p></u>In contrast to what Theodor Adorno describes as the “grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and substantial,” the queerness of which I speak would deliberately sever us from ourselves, from the assurance, that is, of knowing ourselves and hence of knowing our “good.”4 Such queerness proposes, in place of the good, something I want to call “better,” though it promises, in more than one sense of the phrase, absolutely nothing. ¡ connect this something better with Lacan’s characterization of what he calls “truth,” where truth does not assure happiness, or even, as Lacan makes clear, the good.5 Instead, it names only the insistent particularity of the subject, impossible fully to articulate and “tend[ing] toward the real.” Lacan, therefore, can write of this truth:</p><p>The quality that best characterizes it is that of being the true Wunsch, which was at the origin of an aberrant or atypical behavior. </p><p>We encounter this Wunsch with its particular, irreducible character as a modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible form. The Wunsch<u> does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws —even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.’</p><p></u>Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the “aberrant or atypical,” to what chafes against “normalization,” finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good<mark>. <u>The embrace of queer negativity</mark>, then, <mark>can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value,</mark> instead, <mark>resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social</u></mark>, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself.</p><p>For <u><mark>by figuring a refusal</mark> of the coercive belief <mark>in the</mark> paramount <mark>value of futurity</u></mark>, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical access to meaning, <u><mark>the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the </mark>social—and by extension, of the <mark>social subject</mark>; a faith <mark>that politics</mark>, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly <mark>affirms</u></mark>. Divesting such politics of its thematic trappings, bracketing the particularity of its various proposals for social organization<u>, the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as “the letter</u>’ <u>It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee</u>. <u>To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears</u>—and thereby bears down on— <u>us al</u>l<u>. It is</u>, rather, <u>to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures that shape them.</u> If it aims effectively to intervene in the reproduction of such a reality—an intervention that may well take the form of figuring that reality’s abortion— then <u>queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the letter’s cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself</u>. As a particular story, in other words, of why storytelling tells, <u>one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, <mark>queer theory</u></mark>, as I construe it, <u><mark>marks the “other” side of politics: </mark>the “side” where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves;<mark> the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good</u><strong></mark>. The rest of this book attempts to explain the implications of this assertion, but first, let me sketch some connections between politics and the politics of the sign by establishing the psychoanalytic context within which my argument takes shape.</p></strong>

1AC

Prostitution 1AC

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Binghamton Cepin-Sehgal

Baker, Webster Dunn

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The illegal market is also a threat to public health – spreads antibiotic-resistant bacteria

Kelly 13

Kelly 13 Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis

Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries

Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV Transplant tourism harms global public health policies transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders

[*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 Transplant tourism also harms global public health policies. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 Additionally, transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. n75 Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders upon returning to their home countries. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77

<h4>The illegal market is also a threat to public health – spreads antibiotic-resistant bacteria</h4><p><strong>Kelly 13</strong> Emily Kelly, Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Spring, 2013 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317 NOTE: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN TRAFFICKING CRISIS: SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING THE HEART OF THE MATTER lexis</p><p> [*1324] With regard to recipients, the dangers of receiving medical care in developing countries can outweigh the benefits of life-saving transplant tourism. n66 <u><mark>Because governmental disease control agencies do not monitor underground organ trafficking, recipients risk contracting infectious diseases like West Nile Virus and HIV</u></mark>. n67 Tragically, transplant tourists also have "a higher cumulative incidence of acute [organ] rejection in the first year after transplantation." n68 <u><mark>Transplant tourism</u></mark> also <u><mark>harms global public health policies</u></mark>. n69 Most notably, the underground market impedes the success of legal organ donation frameworks. n70 For example, Thai patients have difficulty accessing health care because local doctors are preoccupied with the lucrative practice of treating transplant tourists. n71 In 2007, China banned transplant tourism because wealthy foreigners--rather than the 1.5 million Chinese on the waiting list--received an overwhelming amount of organ transplants. n72 Grisly tales of transplant tourism and conspiracy theories surrounding organ theft may also discourage individuals from agreeing to altruistic donation upon death out of fear that their bodies may be exploited. n73 This further contributes to the global organ shortage and exacerbates the underlying causes of OTC trafficking. n74 <u>Additionally, <mark>transplant tourism and broader medical tourism facilitate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria</mark>.</u> n75 <u><mark>Because such bacteria are frequently found in hospitals, tourists are easily exposed and transmit these unique strains across borders</mark> upon returning to their home countries</u><strong>. n76 As a result of these effects, transplant tourism has drawn increasing attention to the root of the problem: organ shortages. n77</p></strong>

Contention 2 is the Illegal market

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Navy

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George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

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Dehydration isn’t painful, nurses have positive view of it

Andrews and Levine 89

Andrews and Levine 89 Maria R. Andrews, MS, RD, VA Medical Center in Wilkes Barre, PA; Department of Human Ecology, Levine AM, Alan M. Levine, PhD, RD, Foods and Nutrition Program at the Department of Human Ecology, The American Journal of Hospice Care [1989, 6(1):31-34], “Dehydration in the terminal patient: perception of hospice nurses”, http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/2713109 //jchen

Recent discussion about the care of the terminally ill patient has focused on the appropriateness of withholding and withdrawing food and fluid and on the discomfort of the dehydrated state. Evidence is mounting that suggests that dehydration in this group of people is not painful, but rather may be more comfortable than hydration by means of IV fluids or enteral and parenteral feedings. This study examines the relationship between the experience of hospice nurses in observing terminal dehydration and their perception of this state. The scores for the degree of positive perception of dehydration are compared for the experienced and nonexperienced groups of nurses. This study suggests that those hospice nurses who have observed terminal dehydration have a more positive perception of this state than those who have not.

<h4><strong>Dehydration isn’t painful, nurses have positive view of it</h4><p>Andrews and Levine 89</p><p>Maria R. Andrews, MS, RD, VA Medical Center in Wilkes Barre, PA; Department of Human Ecology, Levine AM, Alan M. Levine, PhD, RD, Foods and Nutrition Program at the Department of Human Ecology, The American Journal of Hospice Care [1989, 6(1):31-34], “Dehydration in the terminal patient: perception of hospice nurses”, http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/2713109 //jchen</p><p>Recent discussion about the care of the terminally ill patient has focused on the appropriateness of withholding and withdrawing food and fluid and on the discomfort of the dehydrated state. Evidence is mounting that suggests that dehydration in this group of people is not painful,</strong> but rather may be more comfortable than hydration by means of IV fluids or enteral and parenteral feedings. This study examines the relationship between the experience of hospice nurses in observing terminal dehydration and their perception of this state. <strong>The scores for the degree of positive perception of dehydration are compared for the experienced and nonexperienced groups of nurses</strong>. <strong>This study suggests that those hospice nurses who have observed terminal dehydration have a more positive perception of this state than those who have not.</p></strong>

Case

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Navy

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Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

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It's unkown whether incentives will increase donations

Gill 14

Gill 14 John S. Gill, MD, MS, University of British Columbia et al (6 others) Am J Kidney Dis. 2014;63(1):133-140 Financial Incentives to Increase Canadian Organ Donation:Quick Fix or Fallacy?

Pragmatic Considerations It is unknown whether financial incentives will increase the number of organs available for transplantation The extent of crowding out also is unknown. For example, it is unknown whether the introduction of financial incentives for one type of donation (ie, living donation) also would compromise existing unpaid deceased donations.

It is unknown whether financial incentives will increase the number of organs available for transplantation The extent of crowding out also is unknown. For example, it is unknown whether the introduction of financial incentives for one type of donation (ie, living donation) also would compromise existing unpaid deceased donations.

http://www.ajkd.org/article/S0272-6386%2813%2901226-2/abstract link to pdf Pragmatic Considerations It is unknown whether financial incentives will increase the number of organs available for transplantation in Canada. According to the crowding out motivation theory, payment for organs could compromise intrinsic motivation and decrease existing organ donations for which no payment currently is provided.18 The proposed standards for a regulated system of financial incentives excludes payment for directed donations to guard against the risk of corruption, increasing the likelihood that adoption of financial incentives could crowd out existing unpaid donations.2 The extent of crowding out also is unknown. For example, it is unknown whether the introduction of financial incentives for one type of donation (ie, living donation) also would compromise existing unpaid deceased donations.

<h4>It's unkown whether incentives will increase donations </h4><p><strong>Gill 14</strong> John S. Gill, MD, MS, University of British Columbia et al (6 others) Am J Kidney Dis. 2014;63(1):133-140 Financial Incentives to Increase Canadian Organ Donation:Quick Fix or Fallacy?</p><p>http://www.ajkd.org/article/S0272-6386%2813%2901226-2/abstract link to pdf</p><p><u>Pragmatic Considerations</p><p><mark>It is unknown whether financial incentives will increase the number of organs available for transplantation</mark> </u>in Canada. According to the crowding out motivation theory, payment for organs could compromise intrinsic motivation and decrease existing organ donations for which no payment currently is provided.18 The proposed standards for a regulated system of financial incentives excludes payment for directed donations to guard against the risk of corruption, increasing the likelihood that adoption of financial incentives could crowd out existing unpaid donations.2 <u><mark>The extent of crowding out also is unknown. For example, it is unknown whether the introduction of financial incentives for one type of donation (ie, living donation) also would compromise existing unpaid deceased donations.</p></u></mark>

2AC

Counterplan

Theirs

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Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

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We solve the aff – revolution doesn’t hinge on legal praxis but on unveiling the unquestioned assumptions behind it

Kelly 2009

Kelly 2009 (Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault )

I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking accepted practices are based Foucault's approach here answers two possible errors one to think that practice occurs without significant influence from theory the other to impose our theory without heeding the practical realities practice without strategic analysis is no good Foucault radically traverses the theory/practice dichotomy moreover by conceiving of thought as itself a form of practice, albeit a highly specific one which relates to other practices in specific ways Thought is not discourse, not a violence we do to things per se It's rather in the order of a preparation for such a violence, a step further away from things than language s relation is in a sense the opposite of that of language, in that where language is an irruptive intervention into the world, thought is a kind of withdrawal from it Foucault articulates an account of how epistemic change occurs, in which, between the codes which establish how a given culture divides up the world and the highest level philosophies which sanctify the bases of the culture is the domain in which culture deviates from the codes to the extent that its fundamental principles are called into question

I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions of established, unexamined ways of thinking accepted practices are based Foucault radically traverses the theory/practice dichotomy moreover by conceiving of thought as itself a form of practice Foucault articulates an account of how epistemic change occurs, in which, is the domain in which culture deviates from the codes to the extent that its fundamental principles are called into question

Regarding the role of critique apropos of political practice, reflecting on the efficacy of his work in the light of the victory of the Left in the 1981 French national elections, Foucault said: I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation. A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking accepted practices are based. We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social and stop regarding that essential element in human life and social relations—I mean thought—as so much wind. (EW3 456) Foucault's approach here answers two possible errors: one to think that practice occurs without significant influence from theory (call this spontaneism), the other to impose our theory without heeding the practical realities. Deleuze refers to both these meta-theoretical errors in passing in conversation with Foucault in 1972, when he says that previous models were either of theory having to be created by practice or that theory was what had to be put into practice (FL 74; DEI 1175). Foucault avoids the first error by insisting on the necessity of critique, that practice without strategic analysis is no good, and the second by refusing to prescribe what should be done. Foucault radically traverses the theory/practice dichotomy moreover by conceiving of thought as itself a form of practice, albeit a highly specific one which relates to other practices in specific ways. Utopias, plans, critique, all involve thought, but in different modalities with different relations to other practices. Here we see Foucault's materialism of the incorporeal at work, seeing thought itself as material qua practice (OT 328). Thought is not discourse, not a violence we do to things per se (see Chapter 1). It's rather in the order of a preparation for such a violence, a step further away from things than language. Like language, it still has a fundamental connection to non-linguistic reality, but its relation is in a sense the opposite of that of language, in that where language is an irruptive intervention into the world, thought is a kind of withdrawal from it: Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (EW1 117)" How is it possible to step back from things and reconsider them? On what basis can we proceed? We have already had Foucault's answer in our examination in Chapter 1 of Foucault's notion of a pure experience of things to be ordered as the basis for discursive mutation. As we saw there, albeit from a different angle, in the preface to The Order of Things, Foucault articulates an account of how epistemic change occurs, in which, between the codes which establish how a given culture divides up the world and the highest level philosophies which sanctify the bases of the culture, is the domain in which culture deviates from the codes to the extent that its fundamental principles are called into question. At that point, as we have seen, this culture then finds itself faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain unspoken order; the fact, in short, that order exists. As though emancipating itself to some extent from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids, the culture superimposed on them another kind of grid which neutralized them, which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its primary state. It is on the basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid. It is on the basis of this order, taken as a firm foundation, that general theories as to the ordering of things, and the interpretation that such an ordering involves, will be constructed. Thus, between the already "encoded" eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself. . . . This middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this experience of order in its pure primary state always plays a critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more 'true' than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being. (OT xx-xxi)

<h4>We solve the aff – revolution doesn’t hinge on legal praxis but on unveiling the unquestioned assumptions behind it</h4><p><strong>Kelly 2009</strong> (Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault )</p><p>Regarding the role of critique apropos of political practice, reflecting on the efficacy of his work in the light of the victory of the Left in the 1981 French national elections, Foucault said:</p><p><u><mark>I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation</u></mark>.</p><p><u>A <mark>critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions</mark>, of familiar notions, <mark>of established, unexamined ways of thinking accepted practices are based</u></mark>.</p><p>We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social and stop regarding that essential element in human life and social relations—I mean thought—as so much wind. (EW3 456)</p><p><u>Foucault's approach here answers two possible errors</u>: <u>one to think that practice occurs without significant influence from theory</u> (call this spontaneism), <u>the other to impose our theory without heeding the practical realities</u>. Deleuze refers to both these meta-theoretical errors in passing in conversation with Foucault in 1972, when he says that previous models were either of theory having to be created by practice or that theory was what had to be put into practice (FL 74; DEI 1175). Foucault avoids the first error by insisting on the necessity of critique, that <u>practice without strategic analysis is no good</u>, and the second by refusing to prescribe what should be done.</p><p><u><mark>Foucault radically traverses the theory/practice dichotomy moreover by conceiving of thought as itself a form of practice</mark>, albeit a highly specific one which relates to other practices in specific ways</u>. Utopias, plans, critique, all involve thought, but in different modalities with different relations to other practices.</p><p>Here we see Foucault's materialism of the incorporeal at work, seeing thought itself as material qua practice (OT 328). <u>Thought is not discourse, not a violence we do to things per se</u> (see Chapter 1). <u>It's rather in the order of a preparation for such a violence, a step further away from things than language</u>. Like language, it still has a fundamental connection to non-linguistic reality, but it<u>s relation is in a sense the opposite of that of language, in that where language is an irruptive intervention into the world, thought is a kind of withdrawal from it</u>:</p><p>Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (EW1 117)"</p><p>How is it possible to step back from things and reconsider them? On what basis can we proceed? We have already had Foucault's answer in our examination in Chapter 1 of Foucault's notion of a pure experience of things to be ordered as the basis for discursive mutation. As we saw there, albeit from a different angle, in the preface to The Order of Things, <u><mark>Foucault articulates an account of how epistemic change occurs, in which,</mark> between the codes which establish how a given culture divides up the world and the highest level philosophies which sanctify the bases of the culture</u>, <u><mark>is the domain in which culture deviates from the codes to the extent that its fundamental principles are called into question</u></mark>. At that point, as we have seen,</p><p>this culture then finds itself faced with the stark fact that there exists, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain unspoken order; the fact, in short, that order exists. As though emancipating itself to some extent from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids, the culture superimposed on them another kind of grid which neutralized them, which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its primary state. It is on the basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid. It is on the basis of this order, taken as a firm foundation, that general theories as to the ordering of things, and the interpretation that such an ordering involves, will be constructed. Thus, between the already "encoded" eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself. . . . This middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this experience of order in its pure primary state always plays a critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more 'true' than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being. (OT xx-xxi)</p>

Case

2NC K

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Navy

5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

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Individual sectors won’t cause recession

Rocky Mountain News 98

Rocky Mountain News 98 Rocky Mountain News 9/29/98, lexis

For a recession growth has to decline steadily for at least six months; the entire economy, not just individual sectors, has to be affected; and the decline has to be steep, not just changes of a few percentage points

For a recession growth has to decline steadily for at least six months; the economy, , has to be affected; and the decline has to be steep, not just a few percentage points

Those same economists think there's nothing to keep the economy from continuing on its roll, at least in the near future. For a recession to take place, according to its economic definition, growth has to decline steadily for at least six months; the entire economy, not just individual sectors, has to be affected; and the decline has to be steep, not just changes of a few percentage points.

<h4><u><strong>Individual sectors won’t cause recession</h4><p>Rocky Mountain News 98</p><p></u></strong>Rocky Mountain News 9/29/98, lexis</p><p>Those same economists think there's nothing to keep the economy from continuing on its roll, at least in the near future. <u><mark>For a recession</u></mark> to take place, according to its economic definition, <u><mark>growth has to decline steadily for at least six months; <strong>the </mark>entire<mark> economy, </mark>not just individual sectors</strong><mark>, has to be affected; and the decline has to be steep, not just</mark> changes of <mark>a few percentage points</u></mark>.</p>

WTO

Banks

AT: Inevitable

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Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

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This plan creates the best possible conditions for sex workers

Leigh ’12

Leigh ’12, Carol Leigh, director of the Bay Area Sex Workers Advocacy Network, “Labor Laws, Not Criminal Laws, Are the Solution to Prostitution” http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/19/is-legalized-prostitution-safer/labor-laws-not-criminal-laws-are-the-solution-to-prostitution

The recent Canadian court decision helps establish social justice for sex workers in Canada. The court ruled against laws that put prostitutes at risk by preventing them from working indoors, screening clients or hiring bodyguards The United States should follow Canada's lead. Now, when a sex worker is raped, she or he is unlikely to go to the police, fearing arrest. Exploitation and danger are exacerbated when sex work is criminalized. Studies consistently show a reduction in violence when sex work is legal decriminalization is only a starting place In New Zealand, commercial sex is regulated not by criminal law, but by civil codes, business regulations and the range of fair labor protections. Prostitution prohibition campaigns often associate legal prostitution with increased trafficking. But academics, journalists and activists have debunked these claims as inaccurate the “Swedish model expose them to greater danger as they drive sex workers underground let us reject antique moralism that protected women from sex itself and used public order laws to control the poor

recent Canadian court decision helps establish social justice for sex workers The court ruled against laws preventing them from working indoors, screening clients or hiring bodyguards The U S should follow Canada's lead Now, when a sex worker is raped, she or he is unlikely to go to the police, fearing arrest Exploitation and danger are exacerbated Studies consistently show a reduction in violence when sex work is legal decriminalization is only a starting place In New Zealand commercial sex is regulated by civil codes, business regulations and labor protections prohibition campaigns often associate legal prostitution with trafficking But academics, journalists and activists have debunked these claims the “Swedish model expose them to greater danger as they drive sex workers underground

The recent Canadian court decision helps establish social justice for sex workers in Canada. The court ruled against laws that put prostitutes at risk by preventing them from working indoors, screening clients or hiring bodyguards. The decision also clarifies pimping laws so sex workers can enter business relationships, rent apartments, etc. An upcoming Canadian case challenges communication laws that endanger street workers. The United States should follow Canada's lead. Now, when a sex worker is raped, she or he is unlikely to go to the police, fearing arrest. Rapists are well aware of that vulnerability, even claiming to target sex workers because they know we have no recourse. Exploitation and danger are exacerbated when sex work is criminalized. Studies consistently show a reduction in violence when sex work is legal. Of course, decriminalization is not the answer to all the problems. It’s only a starting place, so that sex workers can begin to protect themselves, organize and advocate. In New Zealand, commercial sex is regulated not by criminal law, but by civil codes, business regulations and the range of fair labor protections. Prostitution prohibition campaigns often associate legal prostitution with increased trafficking. But academics, journalists and activists have debunked these claims as manipulative, inaccurate and unscientific. Contemporary prohibitionists prescribe the “Swedish model,” which criminalizes clients of sex workers. Although such laws are promoted as a solution to violence against prostitutes in Sweden, well-documented and independent studies have shown that these laws expose them to greater danger as they drive sex workers underground. Contrary to popular stereotypes, sex workers are valuable members of our communities who contribute a great deal to their families, and to the economy of their countries. Accepting this would create a practical and fair approach to sex worker safety, and let us reject antique moralism that protected women from sex itself and used public order laws to control the poor.

<h4>This plan creates the best possible conditions for sex workers</h4><p><strong>Leigh ’12</strong>, Carol Leigh, director of the Bay Area Sex Workers Advocacy Network, “Labor Laws, Not Criminal Laws, Are the Solution to Prostitution” http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/19/is-legalized-prostitution-safer/labor-laws-not-criminal-laws-are-the-solution-to-prostitution</p><p><u>The <mark>recent Canadian court decision helps establish social justice for sex workers</mark> in Canada. <mark>The court ruled against laws </mark>that put prostitutes at risk by <mark>preventing them from working indoors, screening clients or hiring bodyguards</u></mark>. The decision also clarifies pimping laws so sex workers can enter business relationships, rent apartments, etc. An upcoming Canadian case challenges communication laws that endanger street workers. <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should follow Canada's lead</mark>. <mark>Now, when a sex worker is raped, she or he is unlikely to go to the police, fearing arrest</mark>.</u> Rapists are well aware of that vulnerability, even claiming to target sex workers because they know we have no recourse. <u><mark>Exploitation and danger are exacerbated</mark> when sex work is criminalized. <mark>Studies consistently show a reduction in violence when sex work is legal</u></mark>. Of course, <u><mark>decriminalization</u></mark> <u><mark>is</u></mark> not the answer to all the problems. It’s <u><mark>only a starting place</u></mark>, so that sex workers can begin to protect themselves, organize and advocate. <u><mark>In New Zealand</mark>, <mark>commercial sex is regulated</mark> not by criminal law, but <mark>by civil codes, business regulations and</mark> the range of fair <mark>labor protections</mark>.</u> <u>Prostitution <mark>prohibition campaigns often associate legal prostitution with</mark> increased <mark>trafficking</mark>. <mark>But academics, journalists and activists have debunked these claims</mark> as</u> manipulative, <u>inaccurate</u> and unscientific. Contemporary prohibitionists prescribe <u><mark>the “Swedish model</u></mark>,” which criminalizes clients of sex workers. Although such laws are promoted as a solution to violence against prostitutes in Sweden, well-documented and independent studies have shown that these laws <u><mark>expose them to greater danger as they drive sex workers underground</u></mark>. Contrary to popular stereotypes, sex workers are valuable members of our communities who contribute a great deal to their families, and to the economy of their countries. Accepting this would create a practical and fair approach to sex worker safety, and <u>let us reject antique moralism that protected women from sex itself and used public order laws to control the poor</u>.</p>

1AC

Prostitution 1AC

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-tournament-Round1.docx

A

tournament

1

NYU Itliong-Zhan

Glass, Thoma

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The WTO is dead already – aff can’t solve

Donnan 8/1

Donnan 8/1, Shawn, Financial Times' World Trade Editor, “WTO plunged into crisis as doubts grow over its future,” August 1st, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bac249d0-198c-11e4-9745-00144feabdc0.html

Azevêdo the new head of the W T O announced The WTO is back Azevêdo was speaking too soon. the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis, after India blocked the centrepiece of the Bali deal Azevêdo is now facing doubts about the future of his organisation There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations However, the Bali agreement already amounted to a rescue operation and its failure bodes badly for the system. There is significant dysfunction India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement The Doha round was launched in 2001 and has since repeatedly broken down Putting it back on track would mean tackling much knottier issues such as agricultural subsidies in a new climate of distrust Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation its future looks bleak if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years there are going to be more and more disputes that cannot be resolved [at the WTO

the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis after India blocked the Bali deal the Bali amounted to a rescue operation its failure bodes badly for the system There is significant dysfunction Doha has repeatedly broken down Putting it back would mean tackling knottier issues such as ag subsidies in a climate of distrust its future looks bleak more and more disputes cannot be resolved [at the WTO

Roberto Azevêdo, the new head of the World Trade Organisation, struck a triumphal tone in Bali last December when he announced that the body’s 159 members had reached the first global agreement in its 18-year history. “The WTO is back!” the visibly sleep-deprived Brazilian told delegates, drawing cheers from all around. Mr Azevêdo, it turns out, was speaking too soon. Seven months later, the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis, after India’s new government this week blocked the centrepiece of the Bali deal: a seemingly benign arrangement to reduce customs red tape around the world. As a result, Mr Azevêdo is now facing doubts about both the future of his organisation and, more broadly, the liberal vision of a multilateral trading system that has guided the postwar era in the global economy. The WTO, which took over in 1995 from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has grown out of the agreements struck at Bretton Woods in the US in 1944, which sought to keep world leaders from repeating the protectionist mistakes of the 1930s. There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations. The government in New Delhi has already sought to play down the implications of its stand. Announcing the failure to reach a compromise to members on Thursday, Mr Azevedo urged them to use the August break to ponder the future and return in September with ideas. However, the Bali agreement already amounted to a rescue operation and its failure bodes badly for the system. “There is an element of significant dysfunction that you can’t hide,” said one senior official on Friday. India had originally given its blessing to the deal. But that was before a new government, led by Narendra Modi, came to power two months ago. New Delhi has in recent weeks insisted it wants to renegotiate deadlines set in Bali in order to bring forward negotiations to update the WTO rules that apply to subsidies it gives to farmers as part of a massive government programme to provide cheap food to poor people. In an effort to get what it wanted, India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement from making the July 31 deadline set in Bali for its implementation. The failure to meet the deadline means the WTO’s members are even less likely to meet another in December to come up with a plan to deliver the rest of the Doha round of negotiations for a global trade deal. The Doha round was launched in 2001 and has since repeatedly broken down as a result of the failure of rich countries, such as the US, and emerging economies, like China and India, to narrow their differences. Putting it back on track would mean tackling much knottier issues such as agricultural subsidies in a new climate of distrust, say diplomats. The irony is that India and other developing countries are likely to suffer most from any collapse of the Doha round, say trade analysts. The US, EU and other key players such as Japan all have big regional trade initiatives under way, and are likely to find moving on much easier than India or smaller and more vulnerable states. Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation. The text to do so has already been drafted and translated into three languages. Up to 60 countries have indicated they are keen to see it implemented. But that is a narrower issue than what happens next at the WTO. Negotiations such as those now under way between the EU and US or between the US and 11 other countries to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership are increasingly focused on more complex, non-tariff barriers to trade. In Brussels and Washington, negotiators are also starting to tackle how to guarantee the free flow of data across borders or ease the way for the global supply chains so vital to modern business. These are discussions that are years beyond what is on the agenda at the WTO. The WTO will not come crashing down tomorrow, says Kimberly Elliott, a trade analyst at the Center for Global Development think-tank in Washington. But its future looks bleak if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years. While many celebrate the WTO’s place as a venue for settling disputes, that function will be eroded if it is not updating its rules to reflect new issues. Without any progress in negotiations, “there are going to be more and more disputes that cannot be resolved [at the WTO],” said Ms Elliott.

<h4>The WTO is dead already – aff can’t solve</h4><p><strong>Donnan 8/1</strong>, Shawn, Financial Times' World Trade Editor, “WTO plunged into crisis as doubts grow over its future,” August 1st, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bac249d0-198c-11e4-9745-00144feabdc0.html</p><p>Roberto <u>Azevêdo</u>, <u>the new head of the W</u>orld <u>T</u>rade <u>O</u>rganisation, struck a triumphal tone in Bali last December when he <u>announced</u> that the body’s 159 members had reached the first global agreement in its 18-year history. “<u>The WTO is back</u>!” the visibly sleep-deprived Brazilian told delegates, drawing cheers from all around. Mr <u>Azevêdo</u>, it turns out, <u>was speaking too soon.</u> Seven months later, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis</strong></mark>, <mark>after India</u></mark>’s new government this week <u><mark>blocked the</mark> centrepiece of the <mark>Bali deal</u></mark>: a seemingly benign arrangement to reduce customs red tape around the world. As a result, Mr <u>Azevêdo is now facing doubts about</u> both <u>the future of his organisation</u> and, more broadly, the liberal vision of a multilateral trading system that has guided the postwar era in the global economy. The WTO, which took over in 1995 from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has grown out of the agreements struck at Bretton Woods in the US in 1944, which sought to keep world leaders from repeating the protectionist mistakes of the 1930s. <u>There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations</u>. The government in New Delhi has already sought to play down the implications of its stand. Announcing the failure to reach a compromise to members on Thursday, Mr Azevedo urged them to use the August break to ponder the future and return in September with ideas. <u>However, <mark>the Bali</mark> agreement already <mark>amounted to a rescue operation</mark> and <mark>its</mark> <mark>failure bodes badly for the system</mark>. </u><strong>“<u></strong><mark>There is</u></mark> an element of <u><strong><mark>significant dysfunction</u></strong></mark> that you can’t hide,” said one senior official on Friday. India had originally given its blessing to the deal. But that was before a new government, led by Narendra Modi, came to power two months ago. New Delhi has in recent weeks insisted it wants to renegotiate deadlines set in Bali in order to bring forward negotiations to update the WTO rules that apply to subsidies it gives to farmers as part of a massive government programme to provide cheap food to poor people. In an effort to get what it wanted, <u>India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement</u> from making the July 31 deadline set in Bali for its implementation. The failure to meet the deadline means the WTO’s members are even less likely to meet another in December to come up with a plan to deliver the rest of the Doha round of negotiations for a global trade deal. <u>The <mark>Doha</mark> round was launched in 2001 and <mark>has</mark> since <mark>repeatedly broken down</u></mark> as a result of the failure of rich countries, such as the US, and emerging economies, like China and India, to narrow their differences. <u><mark>Putting it back</mark> on track <mark>would mean tackling</mark> much <mark>knottier issues such as ag</mark>ricultural <mark>subsidies</mark> <mark>in a</mark> new <mark>climate of distrust</u><strong></mark>,</strong> say diplomats. The irony is that India and other developing countries are likely to suffer most from any collapse of the Doha round, say trade analysts. The US, EU and other key players such as Japan all have big regional trade initiatives under way, and are likely to find moving on much easier than India or smaller and more vulnerable states. <u>Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation</u>. The text to do so has already been drafted and translated into three languages. Up to 60 countries have indicated they are keen to see it implemented. But that is a narrower issue than what happens next at the WTO. Negotiations such as those now under way between the EU and US or between the US and 11 other countries to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership are increasingly focused on more complex, non-tariff barriers to trade. In Brussels and Washington, negotiators are also starting to tackle how to guarantee the free flow of data across borders or ease the way for the global supply chains so vital to modern business. These are discussions that are years beyond what is on the agenda at the WTO. The WTO will not come crashing down tomorrow, says Kimberly Elliott, a trade analyst at the Center for Global Development think-tank in Washington. But <u><strong><mark>its future looks bleak</strong></mark> if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years</u>. While many celebrate the WTO’s place as a venue for settling disputes, that function will be eroded if it is not updating its rules to reflect new issues. Without any progress in negotiations, “<u>there are going to be <mark>more and more disputes</mark> that <mark>cannot</mark> <mark>be resolved [at the WTO</u></mark>],” said Ms Elliott.</p>

1NC

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Navy

4

Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat

Bobbitt

1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO) 1NC Security K Ban CP Politics 2NR K

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Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change

Bewley-Taylor et al 2014

Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)

All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection

The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection

All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection.

<h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></strong></mark>.</p>

Off

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NYU Dellamore-Kuzmenko

Glass, Weddington

1AC - mass mobilization against incarceration - marijuana 1NC - Reg-spec T States CP Academy K Treaties DA 2NC - K CP 1NR - T DA 2NR - T K

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Infectious disease risks extinction Franca et al. 13 (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress, infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival. Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such as the bubonic–pneumonic plague, Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), and the present pandemic of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, in addition to reemerging diseases like dengue fever, the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.

Franca et al. 13 [5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.

<h4>Infectious disease risks extinction </h4><p><strong>Franca et al. 13</strong> (R. Franca, Department of Pharmacology, School of Medicine of Ribeirao Preto, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, C. C. de Silva, Department of General Biology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, S.O. De Paula, Laboratory of Molecular Immunovirology, Federal University of Vicosa, Brazil, “Recent Advances in Molecular Medicine Techniques for the Diagnosis, Prevention, and Control of Infectious Diseases,” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, submitted November 26, 2012, published January 22, 2013, pg. 1)In recent years we have observed great advances in our ability to combat infectious diseases. Through the development of novel genetic methodologies, including a better understanding of pathogen biology, pathogenic mechanisms, advances in vaccine development, designing new therapeutic drugs, and optimization of diagnostic tools, significant infectious diseases are now better controlled. Here, we briefly describe recent reports in the literature concentrating on infectious disease control. The focus of this review is to describe the molecular methods widely used in the diagnosis, prevention, and control of infectious diseases with regard to the innovation of molecular techniques. Since the list of pathogenic microorganisms is extensive, we emphasize some of the major human infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, rotavirus, herpes virus, viral hepatitis, and dengue fever). As a consequence of these developments, infectious diseases will be more accurately and effectively treated; safe and effective vaccines are being developed and rapid detection of infectious agents now permits countermeasures to avoid potential outbreaks and epidemics. But, despite considerable progress<u>, <mark>infectious diseases remain a strong challenge to human survival</u>.</mark> Introduction Despite the great advances in medicine, particularly in new therapeutic drugs, diagnostic tools, and even ways to pre- vent diseases, the human species still faces serious health problems. <u>Among these problems, those that draw the most attention are infectious diseases, especially in poor regions. <mark>An important feature of infectious disease is its potential to arise globally, as exemplified by known devastating past and present pandemics such</mark> as the bubonic</u>–pneumonic <u>plague,</u> Spanish flu (1918 influenza pandemic), <u>and the present pandemic of</u> human immunodeficiency virus <u>(<mark>HIV)</mark>,</u> in which an estimated 33.3 million persons were living with the HIV infection worldwide at the end of 2009 [1–3]. In addition, other non-viral diseases are significant public health problems, as exemplified by tuberculosis (TB). This infectious disease accounts for one third of the world’s bacterial infections (TB infected), and in 2010 a total of 8.8 million people worldwide became sick with TB [1, 4]. In recent years, new forms of infectious diseases have become significantly important to medical and scientific communities; these forms are now widely known as emergent and re-emergent infectious diseases. With the appearance of new transmissible diseases, such as SARS, West Nile and H5N1/H1N1 Influenza viruses, <u><mark>in addition to reemerging diseases</mark> like dengue fever, <mark>the concerns about a global epidemic are not unfounded</mark> </u><strong>[5]. Moreover, in the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, parasitic infections are a common cause of death. Since one of the major characteristics of infectious diseases is its inter-individual transmission, advances in personal protection, effective public policy, and immunological procedures are efficient means of controlling the spread of these diseases. Thus, improvement of pre-existing technologies commonly used to monitor, prevent, and treat infectious diseases is of crucial importance not only to the medical community, but also to humankind.</p></strong>

Contention 2 is the Illegal market

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George Mason Call-Mohney

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Demanding the future stops here may seem politically self-destructive; however, this act establishes an anti-politic divorced from the futurity of the Child. Anything else retains the structural position of the queer—denying the negativity of queerness only shifts the figural burden of queerness onto someone else. We do not promise a better future or a brighter tomorrow, but an end to the sacralization of the Child and the ensuing sacrifice of the queer.

Edelman ’04

Edelman ’04, English prof at Tufts, Ph.D and M. Phil from Yale, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, p. 35-31

Queerness is never a matter of being or becoming but, embodying the Real internal to the Symbolic jouissance enjoyment a movement beyond pleasure and pain violent passage beyond the bounds of identity, meaning, and law. jouissance dissolves investments, undoing the consistency of a social reality that relies on identifications The death drive manifests itself, in jouissance jouissance tears the fabric of Symbolic reality as we know it, unraveling the solidity of every object, including the object as which the subject necessarily takes itself, jouissance evokes the death drive that always insists as the void in and of the subject, beyond its fantasy of self- realization, beyond the pleasure principle. Bound up with the death drive is the Child enacting of repetition that fixes identity through identification with the future of the social order Bound up is the figure of the queer, embodying that order’s traumatic encounter with its own inescapable failure, its encounter with the illusion of the future as suture to bind the constitutive wound of the subject’s subjection to the signifier queer sexualities, in extricable from the emergence of the subject in the Symbolic, mark the place of the gap in which the Symbolic confronts what its discourse is in capable of knowing, which is also the place of a jouissance the queer may provide the Symbolic with a sort of necessary reassurance by seeming to give a name to what, as Real, remains unnameable. But repudiations of that figural identity, reflecting a liberal faith in the abstract universality of the subject, though better enabling the extension of rights to those who are still denied them, must similarly reassure by attesting to the seamless coherence of the Symbolic whose dominant narrative would thus supersede the corrosive force of queer irony. If the queer’s abjectified difference, that is, secures normativity’s identity, the1 queer’s disavowal of that difference affirms normativity’s singular truth,, For every refusal of the figural status to which queers are distinctively called reproduces the triumph of narrative as the e9onzatwai of irony, as the logic of a temporality that always serves to “straighten” it out, and thus proclaims the universality of reproductive futurism. Such refusals perform, despite themselves, subservience to the law that effectively imposes politics as the only game in town, exacting as the price of admission the subject’s (hetero)normalization, which is accomplished, regardless of sexual practice or sexual “orientation,” through compulsory abjuration of the future-negating queer. It may seem the Symbolic can only win but that would ignore the correlative fact that it also can only lose. For the division on which the subject rests can never be spirited away and the signifying order will always necessitate the production of some figural repository for the excess that precludes its ultimate realization of the One De-idealizing the metaphorics of meaning on which heteroreproduction takes its stand, queerness exposes sexuality’s inevitable coloration by the drive: its insistence on repetition, its stubborn denial of teleology, its resistance to determinations of meaning and its rejection of spiritualization through marriage to reproductive futurism Queerness as name may well reinforce the Symbolic order of naming, but it names what resists, as signifier, absorption into the Imaginary identity of the name Empty, excessive, and irreducible, it designates the letter animating futurity as a name for the death drive that always informs the Symbolic order, it also names the jouissance forbidden by, but permeating, the Symbolic order itself. By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive those of us in habiting the place of the queer may be able to cast off that queerness but only by shifting the figural burden of queerness to someone else The structural position of queerness and the need to fill it remain. By choosing to accept that position we might undertake the impossible project of imagining an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification which can only return us, byway of the Child, to the politics of reproduction Queerness thus comes to mean nothing for both: for the right wing the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification. reason must fail Sexuality refuses demystification as the Symbolic refuses the queer; for sexuality and the Symbolic become what they are by virtue of such refusals. Beyond the resonance of fantasy lies neither law nor reason The sacralization of the Child thus necessitates the sacrifice of the queer. Queers must respond by insisting on our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear any way in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child fuck Annie ; fuck Laws fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. We might like believe that generous contributions to lobbying groups or generous participation in activist groups or generous doses of legal savvy and electoral sophistication, the future will hold a place for us a place at the political table that won’t have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no future at all Those queered by the social order that projects its death drive onto them are no doubt positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy that so defines them. But they’re positioned as well to recognize the irreducibility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to the logic of social organization as such. Acceding to this figural identification with the undoing of identity which is also toy with the disarticulation of social and Symbolic form, might well be described as “politically self-destructive But politics and the self as mere prosthesis maintaining the future for the figural Child are what queerness, again as figure, necessarily destroys—necessarily insofar as this “self” is the agent of reproductive futurism and this “politics” the means of its promulgation as the order of social reality , political self-destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life. , if the jouissance , intrinsic to queer (non)identity annihilates the jouissance that works to consolidate identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction then the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive ‘we’re led on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and the political order it enforces, that we are “not the signifier of what might become a new form of ‘social organisation,’ we do not intend a new politics a better society a brighter tomorrow since all of these fantasies reproduce the past through displacement, in the form of the future We choose not to choose the Child it delights in that mortality as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as pro-life. we must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we’re condemned should we speak them or not the Child as futurity’s emblem must die the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. And so what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively—to insist that the future stop here.

Queerness is a matter of embodying the Real internal to the Symbolic jouissance dissolves the consistency of a social reality that relies on identifications the Child, enacting repetition fixes identity through identification Bound up is the figure of the queer, embodying that order’s traumatic encounter with its own inescapable failure queer sexualities mark the place of the gap in which the Symbolic confronts what its discourse is in capable of knowing the Symbolic can only lose the division on which the subject rests can never be spirited away signifying order will always necessitate the production of some figural repository for the excess that precludes its ultimate realization of the One Queerness it names what resists, as signifier, absorption into the Imaginary identity of the name it also names the jouissance forbidden by, but permeating, the Symbolic order By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive those of us in habiting the place of the queer may be able to cast off that queerness but only by shifting the figural burden of queerness to someone else structural position of queerness and the need to fill it remain. By choosing to accept that position we might undertake the impossible project of imagining an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification which can only return us, to the politics of reproduction reason must fail Sexuality refuses demystification Beyond the resonance of fantasy lies neither law nor reason Queers must respond by saying explicitly what Law and the Symbolic order hear any way in each expression of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child fuck Laws We might believe that in activist groups or and electoral sophistication, the future will hold a place for us But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no future at all Acceding to this figural identification with the undoing of identity , might be described as “politically self-destructive But politics and the self as mere prosthesis maintaining the future for the Child are what queerness necessarily destroys the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend the place of the death drive against the cult of the Child we do not intend a new politics a better society a brighter tomorrow since all of these fantasies reproduce the past through displacement, in the form of the future We choose not to choose the Child the Child as futurity’s emblem must die the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. And so what is queerest about us to insist that the future stop here

Queerness, therefore, is never a matter of being or becoming but, embodying the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order. One name for this unnameable remainder, as Lacan describes it, is jouissance, sometimes translated as “enjoyment”: a movement beyond the pleasure principle, beyond the distinctions of pleasure and pain, a violent passage beyond the bounds of identity, meaning, and law. This passage, toward which the pulsion of the drives continuously impels us, may have the effect, insofar as it gets attached to a particular object or end, of congealing identity around the fantasy of satisfaction or fulfillment by means of that object At the same time, however, this jouissance dissolves such fetishistic investments, undoing the consistency of a social reality that relies on Imaginary identifications, on the structures of Symbolic law, and on the paternal metaphor of the name.28 Hence, for Lacan there is another name that designates the unnameability to which jouissance would give us access: “Behind what is named, there is the unnameable,” he writes. “It is in fact because it is unnameable, with all the resonances you can give to this name, that it is akin to the quintessential unnameable, that is to say to death.” The death drive, therefore, manifests itself, though in radically different guises, in both versions of jouissance. To the extent that jouissance, as fantasmatic escape from the alienation intrinsic to meaning, lodges itself in a given object on which identity comes to depend, it produces identity as mortification, reenacting the very constraint of meaning it was intended to help us escape. But to the extent that it tears the fabric of Symbolic reality as we know it, unraveling the solidity of every object, including the object as which the subject necessarily takes itself, jouissance evokes the death drive that always insists as the void in and of the subject, beyond its fantasy of self- realization, beyond the pleasure principle. Bound up with the first of these death drives is the figure of the Child, enacting a logic of repetition that fixes identity through identification with the future of the social order. Bound up with the second is the figure of the queer, embodying that order’s traumatic encounter with its own inescapable failure, its encounter with the illusion of the future as suture to bind the constitutive wound of the subject’s subjection to the signifier, which divides it, paradoxically, both from and into itself. In the preface to Homographesis I wrote that the signifier “gay,” understood “as a figure for the textuality, the rhetoricity, of the sexual... designates the gap or incoherence that every discourse of ‘sexuality’ or ‘sexual identity’ would master.” Extending that claim, I now suggest that queer sexualities, in extricable from the emergence of the subject in the Symbolic, mark the place of the gap in which the Symbolic confronts what its discourse is in capable of knowing, which is also the place of a jouissance from which it can never escape. As a figure for what it can neither fully articulate nor acknowledge, the queer may provide the Symbolic with a sort of necessary reassurance by seeming to give a name to what, as Real, remains unnameable. But repudiations of that figural identity, reflecting a liberal faith in the abstract universality of the subject, though better enabling the extension of rights to those who are still denied them, must similarly reassure by attesting to the seamless coherence of the Symbolic whose dominant narrative would thus supersede the corrosive force of queer irony. If the queer’s abjectified difference, that is, secures normativity’s identity, the1 queer’s disavowal of that difference affirms normativity’s singular truth,, For every refusal of the figural status to which queers are distinctively called reproduces the triumph of narrative as the e9onzatwai of irony, as the logic of a temporality that always serves to “straighten” it out, and thus proclaims the universality of reproductive futurism. Such refusals perform, despite themselves, subservience to the law that effectively imposes politics as the only game in town, exacting as the price of admission the subject’s (hetero)normalization, which is accomplished, regardless of sexual practice or sexual “orientation,” through compulsory abjuration of the future-negating queer. It may seem, from within this structure, that the Symbolic can only win; but that would ignore the correlative fact that it also can only lose. For the division on which the subject rests can never be spirited away and the signifying order will always necessitate the production of some figural repository for the excess that precludes its ultimate realization of the One. In apolitical field whose limit and horizon is reproductive futurism, queerness embodies this death drive, this intransigent jouissance, by figuring sexuality’s implication in the senseless pulsions of that drive. De-idealizing the metaphorics of meaning on which heteroreproduction takes its stand, queerness exposes sexuality’s inevitable coloration by the drive: its insistence on repetition, its stubborn denial of teleology, its resistance to determinations of meaning (except insofar as it means this refusal to admit such determinations of meaning), and, above all, its rejection of spiritualization through marriage to reproductive futurism. Queerness as name may well reinforce the Symbolic order of naming, but it names what resists, as signifier, absorption into the Imaginary identity of the name. Empty, excessive, and irreducible, it designates the letter, the formal element, the lifeless machinery responsible for animating the “spirit” of futurity. And as such, as a name for the death drive that always informs the Symbolic order, it also names the jouissance forbidden by, but permeating, the Symbolic order itself. By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive, and hence our disidentification from the promise of futurity, those of us in habiting the place of the queer may be able to cast off that queerness and enter the properly political sphere, but only by shifting the figural burden of queerness to someone else. The structural position of queerness, after all, and the need to fill it remain. By choosing to accept that position, however, by assuming the “truth” of our queer capacity to figure the undoing of the Symbolic, and of the Symbolic subject as well, we might undertake the impossible project of imagining an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification (the politics aimed at closing the gap opened up by the signifier itself), which can only return us, byway of the Child, to the politics of reproduction. For the liberal’s view of society, which seems to accord the queer a place, endorses no more than the conservative right’s the queer ness of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer. While the right wing imagines the elimination of queers (or of the need to confront their existence), the left would eliminate queerness by shining the cool light of reason upon it, hoping thereby to expose it as merely a mode of sexual expression free of the all-pervasive coloring, the determining fantasy formation, by means of which it can seem to portend, and not for the right alone, the undoing of the social order and its cynosure, the Child. Queerness thus comes to mean nothing for both: for the right wing the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification. But this is where reason must fail. Sexuality refuses demystification as the Symbolic refuses the queer; for sexuality and the Symbolic become what they are by virtue of such refusals. Ironically— but irony, as I’ve argued, always characterizes queer theory—the demystification of queerness and so, by extension, of sexuality itself, the demystification inherent in the position of liberal rationality, could achieve its realization only by traversing the collective fantasy that invests the social order with mean: ing by way of reproductive futurism. Taken at its word, that is, liberalism’s abstract reason, rescuing queerness for sociality, dissolves, like queerness, the very investments on which sociality rests by doing away with its underlying and sustaining libidinal fantasies. Beyond the resonance of fantasy, after all, lies neither law nor reason. In the beyond of demystification, in that neutral, democratic literality that marks the futurism of the left, one could only encounter a queer dismantling of futurism itself as fantasy and a derealization of the order of meaning that futurism reproduces. Intent on the end, not the ends, of the social, queerness insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to imagine, can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social order itself. The sacralization of the Child thus necessitates the sacrifice of the queer. Bernard Law, the former cardinal of Boston, mistaking (or maybe understanding too well) the degree of authority bestowed on him by the signifier of his patronymic, denounced in 1996 proposed legislation giving health care benefits to same-sex partners of municipal employees. He did so by proclaiming, in a noteworthy instance of piety in the sky, that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish the marital bond. “Society,” he opined, “has a special interest in the protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage.”31 With this fatal embrace of a futurism so blindly committed to the figure of the Child that it will justify refusing health care benefits to the adults that some children become, Law lent his voice to the mortifying mantra of a communal jouissance that depends on the fetishization of the Child at the expense of whatever such fetishization must inescapably queer. Some seven years later, after Law had resigned for his failure to protect Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state-recognized same-sex unions as parodic versions of authentic families, “based on individual egoism” rather than genuine love. Justifying that condemnation, he observed, “Such a ‘caricature’ has no future and cannot give future to any society.”3 Queers must respond to the violent force of such constant provocations not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order’s coherence and integrity, but also by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear any way in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. We might like believe that with patience, with work, with generous contributions to lobbying groups or generous participation in activist groups or generous doses of legal savvy and electoral sophistication, the future will hold a place for us—a place at the political table that won’t have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed or the bar or the baths. But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no future at all; that the future, as Annie’s hymn to the hope of “Tomorrow” understands, is “always/ A day/ Away.” Like the lovers on Keats’s Grecian urn, forever “near the goal” of a union they’ll never in fact achieve, we’re held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself, constrained to pursue the dream of a day when today and tomorrow are one. That future is nothing but kid stuff, reborn each day to screen out the grave that gapes from within the lifeless letter, luring us into, ensnaring us in, reality’s gossamer web. Those queered by the social order that projects its death drive onto them are no doubt positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy that so defines them. But they’re positioned as well to recognize the irreducibility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to the logic of social organization as such. Acceding to this figural identification with the undoing of identity, which is also toy with the disarticulation of social and Symbolic form, might well be described, in John Brenkman’s words, as “politically self-destructive.” But politics (as the social elaboration of reality) and the self as mere prosthesis maintaining the future for the figural Child), are what queerness, again as figure, necessarily destroys—necessarily insofar as this “self” is the agent of reproductive futurism and this “politics” the means of its promulgation as the order of social reality. But perhaps, as Lacan’s engagement with Antigone in Seminar7 suggests, political self-destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life. If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cub the thread of futurity, if the jouissance, the corrosive enjoyment, intrinsic to queer (non)identity annihilates the fetishistic jouissance that works to consolidate identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction, then the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive ‘we’re led on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and the political order it enforces, that we, as Guy Hocquenghem made clear, are “not the signifier of what might become a new form of ‘social organisation,’ that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past through displacement, in the form of the future. We choose, instead, not to choose the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective identification with an always impossible future. The queerness we propose, in Hocquenghem’s words, “is unaware of the passing of generations as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about ‘sacrifice now for the sake of future generations’ . . . lit) knows that civilisation alone is mortal.” Even more: it delights in that mortality as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as pro-life. It is we who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we’re condemned should we speak them or not: that we are the advocates of abortion; that the Child as futurity’s emblem must die; that the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. Our queerness has nothing to offer a Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the negativity that pierces the fantasy screen of futurity, shattering narrative temporality with irony’s always explosive force. And so what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively—to insist that the future stop here.

<h4><strong>Demanding the future stops here may seem politically self-destructive; however, this act establishes an anti-politic divorced from the futurity of the Child. Anything else retains the structural position of the queer—denying the negativity of queerness only shifts the figural burden of queerness onto someone else. We do not promise a better future or a brighter tomorrow, but an end to the sacralization of the Child and the ensuing sacrifice of the queer.</h4><p>Edelman ’04</strong>, English prof at Tufts, Ph.D and M. Phil from Yale, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive<u>, p. 35-31</p><p><mark>Queerness</u></mark>, therefore, <u><mark>is </mark>never <mark>a matter of </mark>being or becoming but, <mark>embodying</mark> <mark>the</u></mark> remainder of the <u><mark>Real internal to the Symbolic</u></mark> order. One name for this unnameable remainder, as Lacan describes it, is <u><strong>jouissance</u></strong>, sometimes translated as “<u>enjoyment</u>”: <u>a movement beyond</u> the pleasure principle, beyond the distinctions of <u>pleasure and pain</u>, a <u>violent passage beyond the bounds of identity, meaning, and law.</u> This passage, toward which the pulsion of the drives continuously impels us, may have the effect, insofar as it gets attached to a particular object or end, of congealing identity around the fantasy of satisfaction or fulfillment by means of that object At the same time, however, this <u><mark>jouissance</mark> <mark>dissolves</u></mark> such fetishistic <u>investments, undoing <mark>the consistency of a social reality that relies on</mark> </u>Imaginary<u> <mark>identifications</u></mark>, on the structures of Symbolic law, and on the paternal metaphor of the name.28 Hence, for Lacan there is another name that designates the unnameability to which jouissance would give us access: “Behind what is named, there is the unnameable,” he writes. “It is in fact because it is unnameable, with all the resonances you can give to this name, that it is akin to the quintessential unnameable, that is to say to death.” <u>The death drive</u>, therefore, <u>manifests itself, </u>though in radically different guises,<u> in </u>both versions of<u> jouissance</u>. To the extent that <u>jouissance</u>, as fantasmatic escape from the alienation intrinsic to meaning, lodges itself in a given object on which identity comes to depend, it produces identity as mortification, reenacting the very constraint of meaning it was intended to help us escape. But to the extent that it <u>tears the fabric of Symbolic reality as we know it, unraveling the solidity of every object, including the object as which the subject necessarily takes itself,<mark> </mark>jouissance evokes the death drive that always insists as the void in and of the subject, beyond its fantasy of self- realization, beyond the pleasure principle.</p><p>Bound up with the </u>first of these<u> death drive</u>s<u> is </u>the figure of <u><mark>the Child</u>,</mark> <u><mark>enacting</u></mark> a logic <u>of <mark>repetition </mark>that <mark>fixes identity through</mark> <mark>identification</mark> with the future of the social order</u>. <u><mark>Bound up</u></mark> with the second <u><mark>is</mark> <mark>the figure of the queer, embodying that order’s traumatic encounter with its own inescapable failure</mark>, its encounter with the illusion of the future as suture to bind the constitutive wound of the subject’s subjection to the signifier</u>, which divides it, paradoxically, both from and into itself. In the preface to Homographesis I wrote that the signifier “gay,” understood “as a figure for the textuality, the rhetoricity, of the sexual... designates the gap or incoherence that every discourse of ‘sexuality’ or ‘sexual identity’ would master.” Extending that claim, I now suggest that <u><mark>queer sexualities</mark>, in extricable from the emergence of the subject in the Symbolic, <mark>mark the place of the gap in which the Symbolic confronts what its discourse is in capable of knowing</mark>, which is also the place of a jouissance</u> from which it can never escape. As a figure for what it can neither fully articulate nor acknowledge, <u>the queer may provide the Symbolic with a sort of necessary reassurance by seeming to give a name to what, as Real, remains unnameable. But repudiations of that figural identity, reflecting a liberal faith in the abstract universality of the subject, though better enabling the extension of rights to those who are still denied them, must similarly reassure by attesting to the seamless coherence of the Symbolic whose dominant narrative would thus supersede the corrosive force of queer irony. If the queer’s abjectified difference, that is, secures normativity’s identity, the1 queer’s disavowal of that difference affirms normativity’s singular truth,, For every refusal of the figural status to which queers are distinctively called reproduces the triumph of narrative as the e9onzatwai of irony, as the logic of a temporality that always serves to “straighten” it out, and thus proclaims the universality of reproductive futurism. Such refusals perform, despite themselves, subservience to the law that effectively imposes politics as the only game in town, exacting as the price of admission the subject’s (hetero)normalization, which is accomplished, regardless of sexual practice or sexual “orientation,” through compulsory abjuration of the future-negating queer.</p><p>It may seem</u>, from within this structure, that <u><mark>the Symbolic</mark> can only win</u>; <u><strong>but that would ignore the correlative fact that it also <mark>can only lose</strong></mark>. For <mark>the division on which the subject rests can never be spirited away</mark> and the <mark>signifying order</mark> <mark>will always necessitate the production of some figural repository for the excess that precludes its ultimate realization of the One</u></mark>. In apolitical field whose limit and horizon is reproductive futurism, queerness embodies this death drive, this intransigent jouissance, by figuring sexuality’s implication in the senseless pulsions of that drive. <u>De-idealizing the metaphorics of meaning on which heteroreproduction takes its stand, queerness exposes sexuality’s inevitable coloration by the drive: its insistence on repetition, its stubborn denial of teleology, its resistance to determinations of meaning </u>(except insofar as it means this refusal to admit such determinations of meaning), <u>and</u>, above all, <u>its rejection of spiritualization through marriage to reproductive futurism</u>. <u><strong><mark>Queerness </mark>as name may well reinforce the Symbolic order of naming, but <mark>it names what resists, as signifier, absorption into the Imaginary identity of the name</u></strong></mark>. <u>Empty, excessive, and irreducible, it designates the letter</u>, the formal element, the lifeless machinery responsible for <u>animating</u> the “spirit” of <u>futurity</u>. And as such, <u>as a name for the death drive that always informs the Symbolic order,<mark> it also names the jouissance forbidden by, but permeating, the Symbolic order </mark>itself.</p><p><strong><mark>By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive</u></strong></mark>, and hence our disidentification from the promise of futurity, <u><strong><mark>those of us in habiting the place of the queer may be able to cast off that queerness</u></strong></mark> and enter the properly political sphere, <u><strong><mark>but only by shifting the figural burden of queerness to someone else</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>structural position of queerness</u></mark>, after all, <u><mark>and the need to fill it remain. By choosing to accept that position</u></mark>, however, by assuming the “truth” of our queer capacity to figure the undoing of the Symbolic, and of the Symbolic subject as well, <u><mark>we might undertake the impossible project of imagining an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification</u></mark> (the politics aimed at closing the gap opened up by the signifier itself), <u><mark>which can only return us, </mark>byway of the Child,<mark> to the politics of reproduction</u></mark>. For the liberal’s view of society, which seems to accord the queer a place, endorses no more than the conservative right’s the queer ness of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer. While the right wing imagines the elimination of queers (or of the need to confront their existence), the left would eliminate queerness by shining the cool light of reason upon it, hoping thereby to expose it as merely a mode of sexual expression free of the all-pervasive coloring, the determining fantasy formation, by means of which it can seem to portend, and not for the right alone, the undoing of the social order and its cynosure, the Child. <u>Queerness thus comes to mean nothing for both: for the right wing the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification.</p><p></u>But this is where <u><mark>reason must fail</u></mark>. <u><mark>Sexuality refuses demystification</mark> as the Symbolic refuses the queer; for sexuality and the Symbolic become what they are by virtue of such refusals.</u> Ironically— but irony, as I’ve argued, always characterizes queer theory—the demystification of queerness and so, by extension, of sexuality itself, the demystification inherent in the position of liberal rationality, could achieve its realization only by traversing the collective fantasy that invests the social order with mean: ing by way of reproductive futurism. Taken at its word, that is, liberalism’s abstract reason, rescuing queerness for sociality, dissolves, like queerness, the very investments on which sociality rests by doing away with its underlying and sustaining libidinal fantasies. <u><mark>Beyond the resonance of fantasy</u></mark>, after all, <u><mark>lies neither law nor reason</u></mark>. In the beyond of demystification, in that neutral, democratic literality that marks the futurism of the left, one could only encounter a queer dismantling of futurism itself as fantasy and a derealization of the order of meaning that futurism reproduces. Intent on the end, not the ends, of the social, queerness insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to imagine, can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social order itself. <u>The sacralization of the Child thus necessitates the sacrifice of the queer.</p><p></u>Bernard Law, the former cardinal of Boston, mistaking (or maybe understanding too well) the degree of authority bestowed on him by the signifier of his patronymic, denounced in 1996 proposed legislation giving health care benefits to same-sex partners of municipal employees. He did so by proclaiming, in a noteworthy instance of piety in the sky, that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish the marital bond. “Society,” he opined, “has a special interest in the protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage.”31 With this fatal embrace of a futurism so blindly committed to the figure of the Child that it will justify refusing health care benefits to the adults that some children become, Law lent his voice to the mortifying mantra of a communal jouissance that depends on the fetishization of the Child at the expense of whatever such fetishization must inescapably queer. Some seven years later, after Law had resigned for his failure to protect Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state-recognized same-sex unions as parodic versions of authentic families, “based on individual egoism” rather than genuine love. Justifying that condemnation, he observed, “Such a ‘caricature’ has no future and cannot give future to any society.”3 <u><mark>Queers must respond</mark> </u>to the violent force of such constant provocations not only <u>by insisting on our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives</u>, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order’s coherence and integrity, but also<u> <mark>by saying explicitly what Law</mark> and the Pope <mark>and </mark>the whole of <mark>the Symbolic order </mark>for which they stand <mark>hear any way in each </mark>and every <mark>expression </mark>or manifestation <mark>of queer sexuality:</u> <u>Fuck the social order and the Child</u></mark> in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; <u>fuck Annie</u>; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net<u>; <mark>fuck Laws</u></mark> both with capital ls and with small; <u>fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.</p><p><strong><mark>We might </mark>like <mark>believe that</u></strong></mark> with patience, with work, with <u><strong>generous contributions to lobbying groups or generous participation <mark>in</mark> <mark>activist groups or </mark>generous doses of legal savvy <mark>and</mark> <mark>electoral sophistication, the future will hold a place for us</u></strong></mark>—<u>a place at the political table that won’t have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed</u> or the bar or the baths. <u><mark>But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no future at all</u></mark>; that the future, as Annie’s hymn to the hope of “Tomorrow” understands, is “always/ A day/ Away.” Like the lovers on Keats’s Grecian urn, forever “near the goal” of a union they’ll never in fact achieve, we’re held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself, constrained to pursue the dream of a day when today and tomorrow are one. That future is nothing but kid stuff, reborn each day to screen out the grave that gapes from within the lifeless letter, luring us into, ensnaring us in, reality’s gossamer web. <u>Those queered by the social order that projects its death drive onto them are no doubt positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy that so defines them. But they’re positioned as well to recognize the irreducibility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to the logic of social organization as such<strong>. <mark>Acceding to this figural identification with the undoing of identity</u></strong></mark>, <u>which is also toy with the disarticulation of social and Symbolic form<mark>, might </mark>well <mark>be described</u></mark>, in John Brenkman’s words, <u><mark>as “politically self-destructive</u></mark>.” <u><mark>But politics</u></mark> (as the social elaboration of reality) <u><mark>and the self as mere prosthesis</mark> <mark>maintaining the future for the </mark>figural <mark>Child</u></mark>), <u><mark>are what queerness</mark>, again as figure, <mark>necessarily destroys</mark>—necessarily insofar as this “self” is the agent of reproductive futurism and this “politics” the means of its promulgation as the order of social reality</u>. But perhaps, as Lacan’s engagement with Antigone in Seminar7 suggests<u>, political self-destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.</p><p></u>If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cub the thread of futurity<u>, if the jouissance</u>, the corrosive enjoyment<u>, intrinsic to queer (non)identity annihilates the</u> fetishistic <u>jouissance that works to consolidate identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction</u>, <u>then <mark>the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend </mark>on our taking seriously <mark>the place of the death drive</mark> ‘we’re led on to figure and insisting, <mark>against the cult of the Child</mark> and the political order it enforces, that we</u>, as Guy Hocquenghem made clear, <u>are “not the signifier of what might become a new form of ‘social organisation,’ </u>that <u><mark>we do not intend a new politics</u></mark>, <u><mark>a better society</u></mark>, <u><mark>a brighter tomorrow</u></mark>, <u><mark>since all of these fantasies reproduce the past through displacement, in the form of the future</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>We choose</u></strong></mark>, instead, <u><strong><mark>not to choose the Child</u></strong></mark>, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective identification with an always impossible future. The queerness we propose, in Hocquenghem’s words, “is unaware of the passing of generations as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about ‘sacrifice now for the sake of future generations’ . . . lit) knows that civilisation alone is mortal.” Even more: <u>it delights in that mortality as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as pro-life.</u> It is <u>we</u> who <u>must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we’re condemned should we speak them or not</u>: that we are the advocates of abortion; that <u><mark>the Child as futurity’s emblem must die</u></mark>; that <u><mark>the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past.</u></mark> Our queerness has nothing to offer a Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the negativity that pierces the fantasy screen of futurity, shattering narrative temporality with irony’s always explosive force. <u><mark>And so what is queerest about us</mark>, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively—<strong><mark>to insist that the future stop here</mark>.</p></u></strong>

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Medicalization controls their impacts – if they don’t solve it they don’t solve any part of the aff

Elden 2

Stuart Elden, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/2002 “The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary,http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf

Racism as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power hen coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological abnormal individuals can be eliminated the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life purer This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race In Nazism Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society

The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.2 A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’’ (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136) The shift Foucault thinks is interesting is what might be called a shift from sanguinity to sexuality: sanguinity, in that it had an instrumental role (the shedding of blood) and a symbolic role (purity of blood, differences of blood); sexuality, when mechanisms of power are directed to the body, to life. The theme of race is present in both, but in a different form (VS, 194; WK, 147). We have moved from ‘‘a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and regulations’’ (VS, 195; WK, 148). In Nazism, the two are combined. Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race. Foucault notes that there was immediate control of procreation and genetics in the Nazi regime, and that regulation, security, and assurance were imposed over the disciplined, ordered society; but at the same time, the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society. This was not simply confined to the state, nor simply to the SA or the SS, but ultimately to everyone, as, through denunciation, everyone could have this power over their neighbor (FDS, 231).

<h4><strong>Medicalization controls their impacts – if they don’t solve it they don’t solve any part of the aff</h4><p></strong>Stuart <strong>Elden</strong>, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/200<strong>2</strong> “The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary,http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf </p><p>The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. <mark>Racism</mark>, <mark>as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life,</mark> <mark>received</mark> their color and their <mark>justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood</mark> and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. <mark>Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race</mark>. <mark>What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power</mark> (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.2 A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But w<mark>hen coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological</mark>: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more <mark>abnormal individuals can be eliminated</mark>, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but <mark>the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life</mark> in general healthier and <mark>purer</mark> (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’’ (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). <mark>This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing</mark>. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. <mark>The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically</mark>. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that <mark>war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race</mark> (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136) The shift Foucault thinks is interesting is what might be called a shift from sanguinity to sexuality: sanguinity, in that it had an instrumental role (the shedding of blood) and a symbolic role (purity of blood, differences of blood); sexuality, when mechanisms of power are directed to the body, to life. The theme of race is present in both, but in a different form (VS, 194; WK, 147). We have moved from ‘‘a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and regulations’’ (VS, 195; WK, 148). <mark>In Nazism</mark>, the two are combined. <mark>Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race</mark>. Foucault notes that there was immediate control of procreation and genetics in the Nazi regime, and that regulation, security, and assurance were imposed over the disciplined, ordered society; but at the same time, <mark>the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society</mark>. This was not simply confined to the state, nor simply to the SA or the SS, but ultimately to everyone, as, through denunciation, everyone could have this power over their neighbor (FDS, 231).</p>

Case

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Navy

2

Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

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Link magnifier to any K of PAS – biopower doesn’t stop at the management of life, it also creates the conditions of suicide

Stoneman 5

Stoneman 5 Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd

Where I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality ucault is invested in the symbolic preservation of suicide, in deliberately belying those modes of suicidality which are the regulated result of biopower Foucault is never concerned about the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living Were he to treat the two forces (suicidal and biopolitical) contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation

Where I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality Foucault is never concerned about the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living Were he to treat the two forces contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation

Where precisely in Foucault I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in his (no doubt strategic) dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality, or the contemplation and/or completion of suicide. Like Maurice Blanchot, Foucault is invested in the symbolic preservation of suicide, in deliberately belying those modes of suicidality which are the regulated result of biopower. Where he is concerned with suicide Foucault is never concerned about suicide, about the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living, whose subjectivity consists precisely in exclusion and execration. Were he to treat the two forces (suicidal and biopolitical) contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation and commitment—which he does not precisely do. I will argue later that Blanchot, while he shares much of Foucault’s heartened attitude towards suicide, in fact provides the dialectical thinking about the subject that the discourse on what I have elected to call autodestruction in Foucault ostensibly lacks. What Blanchot’s capacious consideration of the question makes most apparent, though, is the extent to which Foucault’s calculated deferral of a dialectical consideration of suicide is precisely that, a calculation. But we must then ask, what is the object of this rhetorical and political calculation, and what are its rhetorical and political consequences?

<h4>Link magnifier to any K of PAS – biopower doesn’t stop at the management of life, it also creates the conditions of suicide</h4><p><strong>Stoneman 5</strong> Scott, “Suicide and Biopower: Foucault, Derrida, and Deconstruction,” Fall, http://www.scribd.com/doc/230752001/774-Long-Paper-Stoneman-Foucault-Derrida-and-Suicide#scribd</p><p><u><mark>Where</u></mark> precisely in Foucault <u><mark>I find the treatment of suicide too lean is in</mark> </u>his (no doubt strategic) <u><mark>dissociating of the effects of biopower from suicidality</u></mark>, or the contemplation and/or completion of suicide. Like Maurice Blanchot, Fo<u>ucault is invested in the symbolic preservation of suicide, in deliberately belying those modes of suicidality which are the regulated result of biopower</u>. Where he is concerned with suicide <u><mark>Foucault is never concerned about</u></mark> suicide, about <u><mark>the possibility that it is an event in the lives of the broke, broken and berated bound by those operations of biopower which constitute a subject whose life is inscribed not worth living</u></mark>, whose subjectivity consists precisely in exclusion and execration. <u><mark>Were he to treat the two forces</mark> (suicidal and biopolitical) <mark>contiguously, he would be forced to account for situations in which power is less troubled by than responsible for suicidal ideation</u></mark> and commitment—which he does not precisely do. I will argue later that Blanchot, while he shares much of Foucault’s heartened attitude towards suicide, in fact provides the dialectical thinking about the subject that the discourse on what I have elected to call autodestruction in Foucault ostensibly lacks. What Blanchot’s capacious consideration of the question makes most apparent, though, is the extent to which Foucault’s calculated deferral of a dialectical consideration of suicide is precisely that, a calculation. But we must then ask, what is the object of this rhetorical and political calculation, and what are its rhetorical and political consequences? </p>

Case

2NC K

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

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Navy

5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

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Economic modeling proves central purchasing would increase supply

Matas 13

Matas 13 A. J. Matas, University of Minnesota, American Journal of Transplantation 2013; 13: 1926–1927 Book Review - The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses , by T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman and Rigmar Osterkamp. Stanford University Press, 2013. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajt.12273/pdf

three economists one, David Kaserman show through economic modeling how incentives would increase both living and deceased donation their proposal a Public Monopsony for Organ Acquisition

three economis one, David Kaserman show through economic modeling how incentives would increase both living deceased donation their proposal for a Public Monopsony for Organ Acquisition

The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses was written by three economists. Given that one, David Kaserman, has previously championed incentives for donation, it is not surprising that the authors’ conclusion favors incentives. The book starts, ‘‘The organ transplantation policies by the vast majority of the world’s nations have failed.’’ That said, the authors have made a superb attempt to acknowledge and present detailed strengths of arguments both for and against incentives (1–3). Their stated goal is to focus attention on the problem and provoke further discussion of solutions. The book has excellent flow, with each of its nine chapters building on momentum from previous ones. The first chapter (Introduction) defines the problem of a global shortage of organs and outlines the format of the book; the last (Conclusions) reviews the authors’ arguments. Chapter 2 describes the evolution of transplant policies throughout the world and their almost universal basis in the concept of ‘altruism.’ Chapter 3 states the human consequences of these policies—an organ shortage with thousands of candidates dying or becoming too sick to transplant each year while waiting on the list for a transplant. Chapter 4 discusses the social costs and benefits of transplantation versus alternate therapies. As noted in previous publications, transplantation can save health care systems billions (4). Consequently, the authors believe that reforms increasing the number of transplants would be advantageous for both patient outcomes and society. They show through economic modeling how incentives would increase both living (LDs) and deceased (DDs) donation. Although cost–benefit analysis is most clear for kidneys, they note that with increased DDs, candidates on all lists could benefit. Chapter 5 outlines the consequences of a ‘‘zero (dollar/euro) point price for organs’’ and the causes of a lack of system reform. Although the authors believe that the major cause of the organ shortage is that compensation is illegal, they acknowledge other contributing factors, and comment that those opposed to incentives favor other reforms to increase donation, albeit ‘‘within the current paradigm.’’ Chapter 6 provides a history of attempts to reform the donation system to increase both living and deceased donation. The authors note that some—e.g. Spanish Model, use of ECDs—have made an impact, but a severe shortage persists. They conclude, ‘‘In our view, the introduction of more radical reforms, including [compensation for LDs and DDs], is imperative.’’ Chapter 7 addresses the moral basis of objections to compensation. The authors portray these objections realistically, stating that the organ shortage is ‘‘perhaps the most complex and morally controversial medical issue aside from abortion and euthanasia.’’ Each previously described concern is addressed; ultimately the authors believe that the possibility of saving lives outweighs any other argument. Chapter 8 provides their proposal for a Public Monopsony for Organ Acquisition (for both LDs and DDs) (4,5). Again, acknowledging counterarguments, the authorsstate, ‘‘The reformwe proposetriesto advancethe policy of preserving life while respecting important social taboos and taking seriously widely shared moral convictions.’’ Their modeling shows how a variety of incentive systems could increase both LDs and DDs, and they comment that different systems may work better for different countries.

<h4>Economic modeling proves central purchasing would increase supply</h4><p><strong>Matas 13 </strong> A. J. Matas, University of Minnesota, American Journal of Transplantation 2013; 13: 1926–1927 Book Review - The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses , by T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman and Rigmar Osterkamp. Stanford University Press, 2013. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajt.12273/pdf</p><p>The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses was written by <u><mark>three economis</mark>ts</u>. Given that <u><mark>one, David</u> <u>Kaserman</u></mark>, has previously championed incentives for donation, it is not surprising that the authors’ conclusion favors incentives. The book starts, ‘‘The organ transplantation policies by the vast majority of the world’s nations have failed.’’ That said, the authors have made a superb attempt to acknowledge and present detailed strengths of arguments both for and against incentives (1–3). Their stated goal is to focus attention on the problem and provoke further discussion of solutions.</p><p>The book has excellent flow, with each of its nine chapters building on momentum from previous ones.</p><p>The first chapter (Introduction) defines the problem of a global shortage of organs and outlines the format of the book; the last (Conclusions) reviews the authors’ arguments.</p><p>Chapter 2 describes the evolution of transplant policies throughout the world and their almost universal basis in the concept of ‘altruism.’ Chapter 3 states the human consequences of these policies—an organ shortage with thousands of candidates dying or becoming too sick to transplant each year while waiting on the list for a transplant.</p><p>Chapter 4 discusses the social costs and benefits of transplantation versus alternate therapies. As noted in</p><p>previous publications, transplantation can save health care systems billions (4). Consequently, the authors believe that reforms increasing the number of transplants would be advantageous for both patient outcomes and society. They <u><mark>show through economic modeling how incentives would increase both living</u></mark> (LDs) <u>and <mark>deceased</u></mark> (DDs) <u><mark>donation</u></mark>. Although cost–benefit analysis is most clear for kidneys, they note that with increased DDs, candidates on all lists could benefit. Chapter 5 outlines the consequences of a ‘‘zero (dollar/euro) point price for organs’’ and the causes of a lack of system reform. Although the authors believe that the major cause of the organ shortage is that compensation is illegal, they acknowledge other contributing factors, and comment that those opposed to incentives favor other</p><p>reforms to increase donation, albeit ‘‘within the current paradigm.’’ Chapter 6 provides a history of attempts to reform the donation system to increase both living and deceased donation. The authors note that some—e.g. Spanish Model, use of ECDs—have made an impact, but a severe shortage persists. They conclude, ‘‘In our view, the introduction of more radical reforms, including [compensation for LDs and DDs], is imperative.’’</p><p>Chapter 7 addresses the moral basis of objections to compensation. The authors portray these objections</p><p>realistically, stating that the organ shortage is ‘‘perhaps the most complex and morally controversial medical issue aside from abortion and euthanasia.’’ Each previously described concern is addressed; ultimately the authors believe that the possibility of saving lives outweighs any other argument. Chapter 8 provides <u><mark>their proposal</u> for <u>a Public Monopsony</mark> <mark>for Organ Acquisition</u></mark> (for both LDs and DDs) (4,5). Again, acknowledging counterarguments, the authorsstate, ‘‘The reformwe proposetriesto advancethe</p><p>policy of preserving life while respecting important social taboos and taking seriously widely shared moral convictions.’’ Their modeling shows how a variety of incentive systems could increase both LDs and DDs, and they comment that different systems may work better for different countries.</p>

2AC

Counterplan

Theirs

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx

A

Ndt

3

Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

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Specific sectors not key

Boston Globe 97

Boston Globe 97 Boston Globe 11/12/97, lexis

Cognetics measures business trends to identify the fastest-growing sectors its findings suggest analysis of sectors might be obsolete for forecasting growth. "Economic growth is no longer driven, nor even dominated, by any particular sector

Cognetics measures business trends to identify the fastest-growing sectors findings suggest analysis of sectors might be obsolete for forecasting growth. "Economic growth is no longer driven, nor even dominated, by any particular sector

That's the word from Cambridge-based Cognetics Inc., which measures business trends to identify the fastest-growing sectors or companies. Cognetics calls such companies "gazelles." The latest Cognetics report, published last week, is titled "Hot Industries" and looked at growth by individual companies between 1992 and 1996. The data, from Dun & Bradstreet, were then shuffled to show the percentage of companies in each industrial or business sector that grew fastest during that time. Only one of these industries, rubber and plastics manufacturing, can be considered a high-growth field, Cognetics said. The others have been low-growth for many years - consistent with the fact that almost no new manufacturing jobs overall have been created in the United States for 50 years. In contrast, Cognetics ranked the much-touted communications industry 44th, with 3.1 percent of companies pegged as gazelles. Health services was in 46th place, with 3.0 percent; the recreation and amusements industry was in 64th place, at 1.9 percent. Cognetics said its findings suggest analysis of entire sectors might be obsolete for forecasting growth. "Economic growth is no longer driven, nor even dominated, by any particular sector," the authors said, and local and state economic development officials could be misguided in focusing on specific sectors.

<h4><u><strong>Specific sectors not key</h4><p>Boston Globe 97</p><p></u></strong>Boston Globe 11/12/97, lexis</p><p>That's the word from Cambridge-based <u><mark>Cognetics</u></mark> Inc., which <u><mark>measures business trends to identify the fastest-growing sectors</u></mark> or companies. Cognetics calls such companies "gazelles." The latest Cognetics report, published last week, is titled "Hot Industries" and looked at growth by individual companies between 1992 and 1996. The data, from Dun & Bradstreet, were then shuffled to show the percentage of companies in each industrial or business sector that grew fastest during that time. Only one of these industries, rubber and plastics manufacturing, can be considered a high-growth field, Cognetics said. The others have been low-growth for many years - consistent with the fact that almost no new manufacturing jobs overall have been created in the United States for 50 years. In contrast, Cognetics ranked the much-touted communications industry 44th, with 3.1 percent of companies pegged as gazelles. Health services was in 46th place, with 3.0 percent; the recreation and amusements industry was in 64th place, at 1.9 percent. Cognetics said <u>its <mark>findings suggest analysis of</mark> </u>entire <u><mark>sectors might be <strong>obsolete</strong> for forecasting growth. "Economic growth is no longer driven, nor even dominated, by any particular sector</u></mark>," the authors said, and local and state economic development officials could be misguided in focusing on specific sectors.</p>

WTO

Banks

AT: Inevitable

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx

N

Navy

8

Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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It’s a dead issue---it’s been settled

Grahmann 9

Grahmann 9 – Kraig P. Grahmann, Attorney at the Law Firm of Haynes and Boone, LLP, “Betting on Prohibition: The Federal Government's Approach to Internet Gambling”, Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Spring, 7 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 162, Lexis

there is significant international pressure to take a regulatory approach But the U S settled current and potential trade disputes surrounding its prohibition of online gambling by granting concessions in other sectors to the complaining countries

there is international pressure to take a regulatory approach But the U S settled current and potential trade disputes surrounding its prohibition of online gambling by granting concessions in other sectors to complaining countries

3. WTO Issues Challenges to the United States' prohibition of Internet gambling do not just come from the domestic front--there is significant international pressure to take a regulatory approach. In 2003, before the enactment of the UIGEA, a foreign country--Antigua and Barbuda--filed a complaint against the United States with the World Trade Organization. n128 It alleges that the Wire and Travel Acts, n129 read in conjunction with the laws of several states, n130 amount to a prohibition of foreign online gaming providers in violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). n131 The WTO's Dispute Settlement Panel agreed with the complainant and determined that U.S. law at [*176] the time of the ruling prohibited certain forms of Internet gambling in a discriminatory manner. n132 Exceptions in anti-gambling laws that allow limited online betting from domestic operators under the Interstate Horseracing Act are the main source of discrimination. n133 These same exceptions are found in the UIGEA, providing a ground for foreign countries to object with the World Trade Organization to this more encompassing prohibition. n134 But the United States settled current and potential trade disputes surrounding its prohibition of online gambling by granting concessions in other sectors to the complaining countries. n135 The White House refused to disclose what those concessions were, and they are currently the subject of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. n136

<h4>It’s a dead issue---it’s been settled</h4><p><strong>Grahmann 9</strong> – Kraig P. Grahmann, Attorney at the Law Firm of Haynes and Boone, LLP, “Betting on Prohibition: The Federal Government's Approach to Internet Gambling”, Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Spring, 7 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 162, Lexis</p><p>3. WTO Issues Challenges to the United States' prohibition of Internet gambling do not just come from the domestic front--<u><mark>there is</mark> significant <strong><mark>international</strong> pressure to take a regulatory approach</u></mark>. In 2003, before the enactment of the UIGEA, a foreign country--Antigua and Barbuda--filed a complaint against the United States with the World Trade Organization. n128 It alleges that the Wire and Travel Acts, n129 read in conjunction with the laws of several states, n130 amount to a prohibition of foreign online gaming providers in violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). n131 The WTO's Dispute Settlement Panel agreed with the complainant and determined that U.S. law at [*176] the time of the ruling prohibited certain forms of Internet gambling in a discriminatory manner. n132 Exceptions in anti-gambling laws that allow limited online betting from domestic operators under the Interstate Horseracing Act are the main source of discrimination. n133 These same exceptions are found in the UIGEA, providing a ground for foreign countries to object with the World Trade Organization to this more encompassing prohibition. n134 <u><mark>But the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>settled</strong> current and potential trade disputes surrounding its prohibition of online gambling by granting concessions in other sectors to</mark> the <mark>complaining countries</u></mark>. n135 The White House refused to disclose what those concessions were, and they are currently the subject of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. n136</p>

1NC

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Navy

4

Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat

Bobbitt

1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO) 1NC Security K Ban CP Politics 2NR K

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Absent an explicit rejection of reproductive futurism there can be no meaningful reform – you should evaluate solvency around the reasons for a policy

Alexander 10, Associate Professor of Law

Alexander 10, Associate Professor of Law [2010, Michelle Alexander, is an associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer. “New Jim Crow : Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness” ProQuest ebrary, pp. 221-224]

The central question for racial justice advocates is this: are we serious about ending this system of control there is a tremendous amount of work to be done The notion that all of these reforms can be accomplished piecemeal through disconnected advocacy strategies— seems deeply misguided needed reforms have less to do with failed policies than a deeply flawed public consensus one that is indifferent, at best to the experience of poor people of color it was far more important to engage in mass mobilizations than file lawsuits, “We’re trying to win the right to vote and we have to focus the attention of the world on that. We can’t do that making legal cases We have to make the case in the court of public opinion.” King appreciated the contributions of civil rights lawyers he opposed the tendency of civil rights lawyers to identify a handful of individuals who could make great plaintiffs in a court of law, then file isolated cases what was necessary was to mobilize thousands to make their case in the court of public opinion it was a flawed public consensus— not merely flawed policy— that was at the root of racial oppression. a flawed public consensus lies at the core of the prevailing caste system When people think about crime they do not think about suburban housewives violating laws regulating prescription drugs or white frat boys using ecstasy Drug crime is understood to be black and brown it is because drug crime is racially defined in the public consciousness that the electorate has not cared much what happens to drug criminals at least not the way they would have cared if the criminals were understood to be white It is this failure that lies at the core of this system of control and every racial caste system that has existed in the United States or anywhere else in the world Those who believe that advocacy challenging mass incarceration can be successful without overturning the public consensus are engaging in fanciful thinking, a form of denial Isolated victories can be won but in the absence of a fundamental shift in public consciousness, the system as a whole will remain intact To the extent that major changes are achieved without a complete shift, the system will rebound. The caste system will reemerge in a new form, just as convict leasing replaced slavery, or it will be reborn, just as mass incarceration replaced Jim Crow. Sociologists Omi and Winant attribute the cyclical nature of racial progress to the “unstable equilibrium” that characterizes the United States’ racial order Under “normal” condition state institutions are able to normalize the organization and enforcement of the prevailing racial order and the system functions relatively automatically. Challenges to the racial order during these periods are easily marginalized or suppressed the prevailing system of racial meanings, identity, and ideology seems “natural.” When the equilibrium is disrupted the state initially resists, then attempts to absorb the challenge through a series of reforms “that are, if not entirely symbolic, at least not critical to the operation of the racial order In the ab-sence of a truly egalitarian racial consensus, these predictable cycles inevitably give rise to new, extraordinarily comprehensive systems of racialized social control One example is the infamous aftermath of the Brown v. Board of Education decision The statistics from the Southern states are truly amazing. For ten years, 1954– 1964, virtually nothing happened Across the South as a whole, a mere 1 percent of black school children were attending school with whites in 1964 Brown did not end Jim Crow; a mass movement had to emerge first one that aimed to create a new public consensus opposed to the evils of Jim Crow Brown gave critical legitimacy to the demands of civil rights activists who risked their lives to end Jim Crow and it helped to inspire the movement But standing alone, Brown accomplished for African Americans little more than Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation Those who imagine that far less is required to dismantle mass incarceration and build a new, egalitarian racial consensus reflecting a compassionate rather than punitive impulse toward poor people of color fail to appreciate the distance between King Jr.’s dream and the ongoing racial nightmare for those locked up and locked out of American society The foregoing should not be read as a call for movement building to the exclusion of reform work reform work is the work of movement building provided that it is done consciously as movement-building work If all the reforms mentioned above were actually adopted, a radical transformation in our society would have taken place. The relevant question is not whether to engage in reform work, but how. There is no shortage of worthy reform efforts it is critical to keep in mind that the question of how we do reform work is even more important than the specific reforms we seek. the way we pursue reforms does not contribute to the building of a movement to dismantle the system of mass incarceration our advocacy does not upset the prevailing public consensus that supports the new caste system, none of the reforms, even if won, will successfully disrupt the nation’s racial equilibrium Challenges to the system will be easily absorbed or deflected, and the accommodations made will serve primarily to legitimate the system, not undermine it. We run the risk of winning isolated battles but losing the larger war.

The notion that reforms can be accomplished piecemeal through disconnected advocacy strategies— seems misguided reforms have less to do with failed policies than a deeply flawed public consensus it was more important to engage in mass mobilizations We have to make the case in the court of public opinion in the absence of a fundamental shift in public consciousness, the system will rebound in a new form state institutions are able to normalize the racial order Challenges are easily suppressed these cycles give rise to new systems of racialized social control Brown did not end Jim Crow; a mass movement had to emerge first Brown gave critical legitimacy to the demands of civil rights activists the movement But standing alone, Brown accomplished little The foregoing should not be read as a call for movement building to the exclusion of reform work reform work is the work of movement building, provided that it is done consciously the question of how we do reform work is even more important than the specific reforms we seek. If the way we pursue reforms does not contribute to a movement to dismantle Challenges to the system will be easily absorbed and the accommodations will legitimate the system, not undermine it. We run the risk of winning isolated battles but losing the larger war.

The list could go on, of course, but the point has been made. The central question for racial justice advocates is this: are we serious about ending this system of control, or not? If we are, there is a tremendous amount of work to be done. The notion that all of these reforms can be accomplished piecemeal— one at a time, through disconnected advocacy strategies— seems deeply misguided. All of the needed reforms have less to do with failed policies than a deeply flawed public consensus, one that is indifferent, at best, to the experience of poor people of color. As Martin Luther King Jr. explained back in 1965, when describing why it was far more important to engage in mass mobilizations than file lawsuits, “We’re trying to win the right to vote and we have to focus the attention of the world on that. We can’t do that making legal cases. We have to make the case in the court of public opinion.” 21 King certainly appreciated the contributions of civil rights lawyers (he relied on them to get him out of jail), but he opposed the tendency of civil rights lawyers to identify a handful of individuals who could make great plaintiffs in a court of law, then file isolated cases. He believed what was necessary was to mobilize thousands to make their case in the court of public opinion. In his view, it was a flawed public consensus— not merely flawed policy— that was at the root of racial oppression. Today, no less than fifty years ago, a flawed public consensus lies at the core of the prevailing caste system. When people think about crime, especially drug crime, they do not think about suburban housewives violating laws regulating prescription drugs or white frat boys using ecstasy. Drug crime in this country is understood to be black and brown, and it is because drug crime is racially defined in the public consciousness that the electorate has not cared much what happens to drug criminals— at least not the way they would have cared if the criminals were understood to be white. It is this failure to care, really care across color lines, that lies at the core of this system of control and every racial caste system that has existed in the United States or anywhere else in the world. Those who believe that advocacy challenging mass incarceration can be successful without overturning the public consensus that gave rise to it are engaging in fanciful thinking, a form of denial. Isolated victories can be won— even a string of victories— but in the absence of a fundamental shift in public consciousness, the system as a whole will remain intact. To the extent that major changes are achieved without a complete shift, the system will rebound. The caste system will reemerge in a new form, just as convict leasing replaced slavery, or it will be reborn, just as mass incarceration replaced Jim Crow. Sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant make a similar point in their book Racial Formation in the United States. They attribute the cyclical nature of racial progress to the “unstable equilibrium” that characterizes the United States’ racial order. 22 Under “normal” conditions, they argue, state institutions are able to normalize the organization and enforcement of the prevailing racial order, and the system functions relatively automatically. Challenges to the racial order during these periods are easily marginalized or suppressed, and the prevailing system of racial meanings, identity, and ideology seems “natural.” These conditions clearly prevailed during slavery and Jim Crow. When the equilibrium is disrupted, however, as in Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement, the state initially resists, then attempts to absorb the challenge through a series of reforms “that are, if not entirely symbolic, at least not critical to the operation of the racial order.” In the ab-sence of a truly egalitarian racial consensus, these predictable cycles inevitably give rise to new, extraordinarily comprehensive systems of racialized social control. One example of the way in which a well established racial order easily absorbs legal challenges is the infamous aftermath of the Brown v. Board of Education decision. After the Supreme Court declared separate schools inherently unequal in 1954, segregation persisted unabated. One commentator notes: “The statistics from the Southern states are truly amazing. For ten years, 1954– 1964, virtually nothing happened.” 23 Not a single black child attended an integrated public grade school in South Carolina, Alabama, or Mississippi as of the 1962– 1963 school year. Across the South as a whole, a mere 1 percent of black school children were attending school with whites in 1964— a full decade after Brown was decided. 24 Brown did not end Jim Crow; a mass movement had to emerge first—one that aimed to create a new public consensus opposed to the evils of Jim Crow. This does not mean Brown v. Board was meaningless, as some commentators have claimed. 25 Brown gave critical legitimacy to the demands of civil rights activists who risked their lives to end Jim Crow, and it helped to inspire the movement (as well as a fierce backlash). 26 But standing alone, Brown accomplished for African Americans little more than Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. A civil war had to be waged to end slavery; a mass movement was necessary to bring a formal end to Jim Crow. Those who imagine that far less is required to dismantle mass incarceration and build a new, egalitarian racial consensus reflecting a compassionate rather than punitive impulse toward poor people of color fail to appreciate the distance between Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream and the ongoing racial nightmare for those locked up and locked out of American society. The foregoing should not be read as a call for movement building to the exclusion of reform work. To the contrary, reform work is the work of movement building, provided that it is done consciously as movement-building work. If all the reforms mentioned above were actually adopted, a radical transformation in our society would have taken place. The relevant question is not whether to engage in reform work, but how. There is no shortage of worthy reform efforts and goals. Differences of opinion are inevitable about which reforms are most important and in what order of priority they should be pursued. These debates are worthwhile, but it is critical to keep in mind that the question of how we do reform work is even more important than the specific reforms we seek. If the way we pursue reforms does not contribute to the building of a movement to dismantle the system of mass incarceration, and if our advocacy does not upset the prevailing public consensus that supports the new caste system, none of the reforms, even if won, will successfully disrupt the nation’s racial equilibrium. Challenges to the system will be easily absorbed or deflected, and the accommodations made will serve primarily to legitimate the system, not undermine it. We run the risk of winning isolated battles but losing the larger war.

<h4><strong>Absent an explicit rejection of reproductive futurism there can be no meaningful reform – you should evaluate solvency around the reasons for a policy</h4><p>Alexander 10, Associate Professor of Law</p><p></strong>[2010, Michelle Alexander, is an associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer. “New Jim Crow : Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness” ProQuest ebrary, pp. 221-224]</p><p>The list could go on, of course, but the point has been made. <u>The central question for racial justice advocates is this: are we <strong>serious about ending this system of control</u></strong>, or not? If we are, <u>there is a <strong>tremendous amount of work to be done</u></strong>. <u><mark>The notion that</mark> all of these <mark>reforms can be accomplished piecemeal</u></mark>— one at a time, <u><mark>through disconnected advocacy strategies— seems </mark>deeply <mark>misguided</u></mark>. All of the <u>needed <mark>reforms have less to do with failed policies than a <strong>deeply flawed public consensus</u></strong></mark>, <u>one that is <strong>indifferent, at best</u></strong>, <u>to the experience of poor people of color</u>. As Martin Luther King Jr. explained back in 1965, when describing why <u><mark>it was</mark> far <mark>more important to engage in mass mobilizations</mark> than file lawsuits,</u> <u>“We’re trying to win the right to vote and we <strong>have to focus the attention of the world on that.</u></strong> <u>We can’t do that making legal cases</u>. <u><mark>We have to make the case in the <strong>court of public opinion</mark>.”</u></strong> 21 <u>King</u> certainly <u>appreciated the contributions of civil rights lawyers</u> (he relied on them to get him out of jail), but <u>he opposed the tendency of civil rights lawyers to identify a handful of individuals who could make great plaintiffs in a court of law, then <strong>file isolated cases</u></strong>. He believed <u>what was necessary was <strong>to mobilize thousands</strong> to make their case in the court of public opinion</u>. In his view, <u><strong>it was a flawed public consensus</strong>— <strong>not merely flawed policy— that was at the root of racial oppression. </u></strong>Today, no less than fifty years ago, <u>a flawed public consensus lies at the core of the prevailing caste system</u>. <u>When people think about crime</u>, especially drug crime, <u>they do not think about suburban housewives violating laws regulating prescription drugs or white frat boys using ecstasy</u>. <u>Drug crime</u> in this country <u><strong>is understood to be black and brown</u></strong>, and <u>it is because drug crime is racially defined in the public consciousness that the electorate has not cared much what happens to drug criminals</u>— <u>at least not the way they would have cared if the criminals were understood to be white</u>. <u>It is this failure</u> to care, really care across color lines, <u><strong>that lies at the core of this system of control and every racial caste system that has existed in the United States or anywhere else in the world</u></strong>. <u>Those who believe that advocacy challenging mass incarceration can be successful without overturning the public consensus </u>that gave rise to it <u>are <strong>engaging in fanciful thinking, a form of denial</u></strong>. <u>Isolated victories can be won</u>— even a string of victories— <u>but <strong><mark>in the absence of a fundamental shift in public consciousness, </mark>the system as a whole will remain intact</u></strong>. <u>To the extent that major changes are achieved without a complete shift, <strong><mark>the system will rebound</mark>.</u></strong> <u>The caste system will <strong>reemerge <mark>in a new form</strong></mark>, just as convict leasing replaced slavery, or it will be reborn, just as mass incarceration replaced Jim Crow.</u> <u>Sociologists</u> Michael <u>Omi and</u> Howard <u>Winant</u> make a similar point in their book Racial Formation in the United States. They <u>attribute the cyclical nature of racial progress to the “<strong>unstable equilibrium</strong>” that characterizes the United States’ racial order</u>. 22 <u>Under “normal” condition</u>s, they argue, <u><mark>state institutions are able to <strong>normalize the</mark> organization and enforcement of the prevailing <mark>racial order</u></strong></mark>, <u>and the system functions relatively automatically.</u> <u><mark>Challenges </mark>to the racial order during these periods <mark>are easily</mark> marginalized or <mark>suppressed</u></mark>, and <u>the prevailing system of racial meanings, identity, and ideology seems “natural.” </u>These conditions clearly prevailed during slavery and Jim Crow. <u>When the equilibrium is disrupted</u>, however, as in Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement, <u>the state initially resists, then attempts to absorb the challenge through a series of reforms “that are, if not entirely symbolic, at least not critical to the operation of the racial order</u>.” <u>In the ab-sence of a truly egalitarian racial consensus, <mark>these</mark> predictable <mark>cycles</mark> inevitably <strong><mark>give rise to new</mark>, extraordinarily comprehensive <mark>systems of racialized social control</u></strong></mark>. <u>One example</u> of the way in which a well established racial order easily absorbs legal challenges <u>is the infamous aftermath of the Brown v. Board of Education decision</u>. After the Supreme Court declared separate schools inherently unequal in 1954, segregation persisted unabated. One commentator notes: “<u>The statistics from the Southern states are truly amazing. For ten years, 1954– 1964, virtually nothing happened</u>.” 23 Not a single black child attended an integrated public grade school in South Carolina, Alabama, or Mississippi as of the 1962– 1963 school year. <u>Across the South as a whole, a mere 1 percent of black school children were attending school with whites in 1964</u>— a full decade after Brown was decided. 24 <u><mark>Brown did not end Jim Crow; a <strong>mass movement had to emerge first</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>one that aimed to create a new public consensus opposed to the evils of Jim Crow</u></strong>. This does not mean Brown v. Board was meaningless, as some commentators have claimed. 25 <u><strong><mark>Brown gave critical legitimacy to the demands of civil rights activists</mark> who risked their lives to end Jim Crow</u></strong>, <u>and it helped to inspire <mark>the movement</u></mark> (as well as a fierce backlash). 26 <u><mark>But standing alone, Brown <strong>accomplished </mark>for African Americans <mark>little</strong></mark> more than Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation</u>. A civil war had to be waged to end slavery; a mass movement was necessary to bring a formal end to Jim Crow. <u>Those who imagine that far less is required to dismantle mass incarceration and build a new, egalitarian racial consensus reflecting a compassionate rather than punitive impulse toward poor people of color fail to appreciate the distance between</u> Martin Luther <u>King Jr.’s dream and the ongoing racial nightmare for those locked up and locked out of American society</u>. <u><strong><mark>The foregoing should not be read as a call for movement building to the exclusion of reform work</u></strong></mark>. To the contrary, <u><strong><mark>reform work is the work of movement building</u></strong>, <u><strong>provided that it is done consciously </strong></mark>as movement-building work</u>. <u>If all the reforms mentioned above were actually adopted, <strong>a radical transformation in our society would have taken place. The relevant question is not whether to engage in reform work, but how.</u></strong> <u>There is no shortage of worthy reform efforts</u> and goals. Differences of opinion are inevitable about which reforms are most important and in what order of priority they should be pursued. These debates are worthwhile, but <u>it is critical to keep in mind that <mark>the question of how we do reform work is even more important than the specific reforms we seek.</u> If <u>the way we pursue reforms <strong>does not contribute to</mark> the building of <mark>a movement to dismantle</mark> the system of mass incarceration</u></strong>, and if <u><strong>our advocacy does not upset the prevailing public consensus that supports the new caste system,</u></strong> <u>none of the reforms, even if won, will successfully disrupt the nation’s racial equilibrium</u>. <u><strong><mark>Challenges to the system will be easily absorbed</mark> or deflected, <mark>and the accommodations</mark> made <mark>will</mark> serve primarily to <mark>legitimate the system, not undermine it. We run the risk of winning isolated battles but losing the larger war.</p></u></strong></mark>

1AC

Prostitution 1AC

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tournament

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NYU Itliong-Zhan

Glass, Thoma

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Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention

Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)

Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)

marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

<h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><mark>marijuana legalization</u></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</strong></mark>.</p></u>

Off

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NYU Dellamore-Kuzmenko

Glass, Weddington

1AC - mass mobilization against incarceration - marijuana 1NC - Reg-spec T States CP Academy K Treaties DA 2NC - K CP 1NR - T DA 2NR - T K

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antibiotic-resistance takes out defense

MacKenzie 13

MacKenzie 13 Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html

ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas. More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and ( many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases

ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria our predicament is even worse with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in immunocompromised hosts there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings The epidemiologic reasons include increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries and transplant tourism’

ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, our predicament is even worse than these words suggest, with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control in some areas. What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles. Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious Franco-Paredes 10 Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045 More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number of immunocompromised hosts.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, in the last decade, there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 The epidemiologic reasons for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients include: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 and (4) many individuals traveling overseas for ‘transplant tourism’ in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4

<h4>antibiotic-resistance takes out defense</h4><p><strong>MacKenzie 13</strong> Debora MacKenzie 13 March 2013 New Scientist Antibiotic resistance an 'apocalyptic threat' http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729084.000-antibiotic-resistance-an-apocalyptic-threat.html </p><p><u><mark>ANTIBIOTIC resistance poses an "apocalyptic" threat to human health. We are facing "nightmare bacteria</u></mark>" and are losing a "war" against them. Such language, in statements made over the past week by the top UK and US medical authorities – normally a very cautious breed – reflects the enormity of the situation they feel we must now confront. In fact, <u><mark>our predicament is even worse</mark> than these words suggest, <mark>with antibiotic-resistant bacteria out of control</mark> in some areas.</u> What's more, New Scientist can reveal that effective new drugs may already exist – but are <strong>stuck in the final stages of development because they cannot overcome economic and regulatory hurdles. </p><p>Increasing reliance on the illegal market means the threat is serious</p><p>Franco-Paredes</strong> <strong>10 </strong> Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa all with Division of Infectious Diseases, Emory University School of Medicine except Redriguez-Morales at Division of Immunoparasitology, Tropical Medicine Institute, Universidad Central de Venezuela International Journal of Infectious Diseases Volume 14, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages e189–e196 Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045</p><p><u><mark>More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in</mark> the number of <mark>immunocompromised hosts</u></mark>.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Most of the literature in infectious diseases in transplantation has focused on common pathogens prevalent in industrialized Western countries, where most transplantation surgeries occur.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 However, <u>in the last decade, <mark>there has been a growing identification of tropical infectious diseases occurring in transplant hosts in endemic and non-endemic settings</u></mark>.3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 <u><mark>The epidemiologic reasons</mark> for the growing number of reports of tropical infections appearing in transplant recipients <mark>include</u></mark>: (1) increasing travel of transplanted patients to the tropics and subtropics;8, 12 and 13 (2) increasing population immigration from endemic areas for tropical infections to non-endemic settings;6, 14 and 15 (3) <u><mark>increasing numbers of transplantation procedures taking place in tropical countries</u></mark>;11, 16, 17, 18 and 19 <u><mark>and</mark> (</u>4) <u>many individuals traveling overseas for ‘<mark>transplant tourism’</mark> in countries with high prevalence of tropical infectious diseases</u>.20 and 21 In general, transmission of these infections occurs through three main routes: donor-derived infections,3, 4, 6, 15 and 22 reactivation or recrudescence of latent infections,16, 22, 23 and 24 or transmission de novo during the post-transplant period.4 and 16 Infectious pathogens may be carried by the graft or the infection may be acquired through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4</p>

Contention 2 is the Illegal market

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George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

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Concede Kelly – it’s not about death – he says that analysis of power relations is necessary to reconstitute the self – they prevent that and leave the individual subservient to broader determinations of value which turns the aff

Salem 99

Salem 99 Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full

institutionalization of death has extended physicians’ role in regulating death doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dyin medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights movements It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide

There is a certain consensus that the institutionalization of death, its transference from the community to the hospital setting and its medicalization, has extended physicians’ role in regulating death. Today some 80 percent of deaths in the United States take place in health care facilities, while as recently as fifty years ago only a small minority of people died in hospitals or long-term care facilities. In the wake of the “right to die” movement, today in theory—and to some extent in actual practice—doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families. In this sense, all contrive to consolidate “managed death” as the predominant way of dying in the United States. Indeed, the American Hospital Association reported that about 70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment.30 Despite the space ceded to patients’ autonomous choices, one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying. This intangible aspect of medicine's power, such a crucial facet of the medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed. The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors to dominate various domains of contemporary life; physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying. There is a paradox in our attitude toward modern medicine: on the one hand, we criticize and wish to counterbalance medicine's power through the enhancement of the patient's autonomy, and on the other, we open up the doors for physicians in the domain of suicide. Yet from another perspective the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology. Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights and right to die movements. It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide.

<h4>Concede Kelly – it’s not about death – he says that analysis of power relations is necessary to reconstitute the self – they prevent that and leave the individual subservient to broader determinations of value which turns the aff</h4><p><strong>Salem 99</strong> Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full</p><p><strong>There is a certain consensus that</strong> the <strong><mark>institutionalization of death</strong></mark>, its transference from the community to the hospital setting and its medicalization, <strong><mark>has extended physicians’ role in regulating death</strong></mark>. Today some 80 percent of deaths in the United States take place in health care facilities, while as recently as fifty years ago only a small minority of people died in hospitals or long-term care facilities.</p><p><strong>In the wake of the “right to die” movement</strong>, today in theory—and to some extent in actual practice—<strong><mark>doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families</strong></mark>. In this sense, all contrive to consolidate “managed death” as the predominant way of dying in the United States. Indeed, the American Hospital Association reported that about <strong>70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment</strong>.30</p><p>Despite the space ceded to patients’ autonomous choices, <strong><mark>one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dyin</mark>g</strong>. This intangible aspect of medicine's power, such a crucial facet of the <strong><mark>medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed</strong></mark>. <strong><mark>The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors</strong></mark> to dominate various domains of contemporary life; <strong><mark>physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying</strong></mark>.</p><p>There is a paradox in our attitude toward modern medicine: on the one hand, we criticize and wish to counterbalance medicine's power through the enhancement of the patient's autonomy, and on the other, we open up the doors for physicians in the domain of suicide. Yet from another perspective <strong>the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology</strong>.</p><p><strong><mark>Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights</mark> and right to die <mark>movements</mark>. <mark>It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide</strong></mark>.</p>

Case

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Navy

2

Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

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Ableism makes ongoing eugenics and extermination inevitable—complexity and diversity are erased in the name of purifying society into a state of sameness. That’s Brown.

<h4><strong>Ableism makes <u>ongoing eugenics and extermination inevitable</u>—complexity and diversity are erased in the name of purifying society into a state of sameness. That’s Brown. </h4></strong>

Ableism

Impact

2NC K

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Navy

5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

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They say offshoring

<h4>They say offshoring</h4>

WTO

Banks

AT: Inevitable

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N

Navy

8

Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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Worst climate impacts take decades to arrive and don’t assume adaptation

Mendelsohn 9

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

Proponents argue that there is no time to waste ). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences. emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two of no mitigation acts assume that there will be no or little adaptation. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or millennium and many of these will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be develope

that there is no time to wast are largely alarmist and misleading immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences emissions over decades will lead to only mild consequences severe impacts require a century (or two no mitigation impacts assume no adaptation severe impacts will take more than a century or millennium and will never occur because people adapt

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from numerous warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human- induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a, 2007c; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007a), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007a), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007a), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007a), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20 and 30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007a). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets, causing severe sea-level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta and others 2009). Proponents argue that there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well-being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences. The science and economics of climate change are quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two, accord- ing to Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume that there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold, and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long-range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

<h4>Worst climate impacts take decades to arrive and don’t assume adaptation</h4><p>Robert O. <strong>Mendelsohn 9</strong>, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf</p><p>The heart of the debate about climate change comes from numerous warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human- induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a, 2007c; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007a), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007a), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007a), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007a), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20 and 30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007a). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets, causing severe sea-level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta and others 2009). <u>Proponents argue <mark>that there is no time to wast</mark>e</u>. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well-being may be at risk (Stern 2006<u>). These statements <mark>are largely alarmist and misleading</u></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u>society’s <mark>immediate behavior has an</u> <u><strong>extremely low probability</u></strong> <u>of leading to</mark> <mark>catastrophic conse- quences</mark>.</u> The science and economics of climate change are quite clear that <u><mark>emissions over</mark> the next few <mark>decades will lead to only mild consequences</u></mark>. The <u><mark>severe impacts</mark> predicted by alarmists <mark>require</u> <u><strong>a century (or two</u></strong></mark>, accord- ing to Stern 2006) <u>of <mark>no mitigation</u></mark>. Many of the predicted <mark>imp<u>acts assume</mark> that there will be <mark>no</mark> or little <mark>adaptation</mark>. </u>The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. <u>Most of the more <mark>severe impacts will take more than a century or</u></mark> even a <u><mark>millennium</u></mark> to unfold, <u><mark>and</mark> many of these</u> “potential” impacts <u><mark>will never occur because people</mark> will <mark>adapt</mark>. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be develope</u>d to thwart long-range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.</p>

2AC

Politics DA

TPA – 2AC – NDT

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3

Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

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Trade war articles are hype – zero risk – China doesn’t retaliate

Alden 12

Edward Alden, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/31/12, A U.S.-China “Trade War”: Time to Abolish a Silly Notion, thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2012/10/31/a-u-s-china-trade-war-time-to-abolish-a-silly-notion/

it is time to bury the concept of a “trade war The phrase is so ubiquitous it is almost a reflex that every time the U S takes any action that restricts imports in any fashion, reporters jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming. it is a canard The closest historical example is Smoot-Hawley what are the chances of a “trade war zero for two big reasons in 1930, there was no W T O no N A F T A no E U – in short, no rules Today unilateral action is largely forbidden tit-for-tat measures we have seen have all been taken within the framework of WTO rules When Obama curbed purchases of Chinese steel China responded with an “anti-dumping” case the U S challenged that action in the WTO No trade war instead see you in court every nation in the world seems fully aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism trade plunging by 12 percent in 2009 the biggest drop since World War II is how little protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO decision a administration would quickly comply. The “trade war” threat stifles reasonable debate, because every trade action – however modest — is assumed to cause a self-destructive over-reaction

it is time to bury the concept of a “trade war what are the chances of a “trade war” zero in 1930, there was no W T O N A F T A E U no rules Today tit-for-tat measures have all been within WTO rules China responded with anti-dumping the U S challenged that action No war – instead court every nation seems aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism every trade action is assumed to cause self-destructive over-reaction

I have a suggestion for everyone who writes about international trade: it is time to bury, once and for all, the concept of a “trade war.” The phrase is so ubiquitous that it will be awfully hard to abolish; I have probably been guilty of this myself from time to time. Indeed, it is almost a reflex that every time the United States or some other nation takes any action that restricts imports in any fashion, reporters and editorial writers jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming. But it is a canard that makes it far harder to have a sensible discussion about U.S. trade policy. No sooner had President Obama and Mitt Romney finished their latest round of “who’s tougher on trade with China?” in their final debate than the New York Times – to take one of many possible examples – warned that “formally citing Beijing as a currency manipulator may backfire, economic and foreign-policy experts have said. In the worst case, it could set off a trade war, leading to falling American exports to China and more expensive Chinese imports.” But what exactly is a “trade war”? To take the U.S.-China example, the notion seems to be that, if the United States restricts Chinese imports, China will respond by restricting imports of U.S. goods, in turn leading to further U.S. restrictions and so on and so on until trade between the two countries plummets. The closest historical example is the reaction to the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930, which raised the average U.S. tariff on imports to historically high levels. As trade historian Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth has shown persuasively, Smoot-Hawley did not cause the Great Depression, and probably did not even exacerbate it very much since trade was a tiny part of the U.S. economy. But Smoot-Hawley did result in Great Britain, Canada and other U.S. trading partners raising their own tariffs in response. Irwin suggests that the higher tariffs were probably responsible for about a third of the 40 percent drop in imports between 1929 and 1932, and perhaps a slightly higher percentage of export losses. And the new trade barriers put in place took many decades to dismantle. With imports and exports today comprising roughly a third of the U.S. economy, and the few remaining tariffs mostly in the single digits, the consequences of similar tit-for-tat tariff increases today would be far more severe. But what are the chances of such a “trade war” actually occurring? Pretty close to zero, for two big reasons. First, in 1930, there was no World Trade Organization, no North American Free Trade Agreement, no European Community/Union – in short, no rules to prevent countries from jacking up tariffs or imposing quotas whenever governments felt domestic political pressure to do so. Today, such unilateral action is largely forbidden. Indeed, the tit-for-tat measures we have seen in the U.S.-China trade relationship have all been taken within the framework of WTO rules. When the Obama administration curbed purchases of Chinese steel in 2009 under the “Buy America” provisions of the stimulus, for example, China responded with an “anti-dumping” case which led to tariffs on imports of U.S. steel. But the United States challenged that action in the WTO, and earlier this month the WTO ordered China to lift the duties. No trade war – instead the phrase “see you in court” comes to mind. Secondly, almost every nation in the world seems fully aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism. One of the striking things about the Great Recession– which resulted in global trade volumes plunging by more than 12 percent in 2009, the biggest drop since World War II – is how little of the protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred. Chad Bown of the World Bank has documented the surprising low level of new trade barriers imposed during the recession and its aftermath. The danger of competitive currency devaluations – which are not clearly covered under WTO rules – is a greater threat than tariffs. This is one of the reasons that Romney’s pledge to label China a currency manipulator could be playing with fire, particularly after more than seven years in which the value of the renminbi has been creeping up steadily against the dollar. And his suggestion that the United States would impose tariffs in response is just silly – it would be a blatant violation of WTO rules and would quickly be slapped down as such. Again, however, no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO decision with which a Romney administration would quickly comply. The real questions about trade restrictions should be practical ones – are the gains to the economy worth the costs? Generally, the answer is no, because free competition is a good thing for consumers and competitive businesses. But sometimes protecting a viable domestic industry temporarily against a flood of low-priced imports makes sense, which is why the WTO has rules permitting temporary safeguards. Sometimes foreign subsidies make fair competition impossible, which is why the WTO permits tariffs against dumped or subsidized imports. Such actions raise prices for U.S. consumers, but may still on balance bring benefits to the U.S. economy. The “trade war” threat stifles reasonable debate, because every trade action – however modest — is assumed to cause a self-destructive over-reaction by trading partners. So I hereby pledge to abolish the phrase from all my future writings on the subject. I hope others will do the same.

<h4>Trade war articles are hype – zero risk – China doesn’t retaliate</h4><p>Edward <strong>Alden</strong>, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/31/<strong>12</strong>, A U.S.-China “Trade War”: Time to Abolish a Silly Notion, thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2012/10/31/a-u-s-china-trade-war-time-to-abolish-a-silly-notion/</p><p>I have a suggestion for everyone who writes about international trade: <u><mark>it is time to bury</u></mark>, once and for all, <u><mark>the concept of a “trade war</u></mark>.” <u>The phrase is so ubiquitous </u>that it will be awfully hard to abolish; I have probably been guilty of this myself from time to time. Indeed, <u>it is</u> <u>almost a reflex that every time the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates or some other nation <u>takes any action that restricts imports in any fashion, reporters</u> and editorial writers <u>jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming.</u> But <u>it is a canard</u> that makes it far harder to have a sensible discussion about U.S. trade policy. No sooner had President Obama and Mitt Romney finished their latest round of “who’s tougher on trade with China?” in their final debate than the New York Times – to take one of many possible examples – warned that “formally citing Beijing as a currency manipulator may backfire, economic and foreign-policy experts have said. In the worst case, it could set off a trade war, leading to falling American exports to China and more expensive Chinese imports.” But what exactly is a “trade war”? To take the U.S.-China example, the notion seems to be that, if the United States restricts Chinese imports, China will respond by restricting imports of U.S. goods, in turn leading to further U.S. restrictions and so on and so on until trade between the two countries plummets. <u>The closest historical example is</u> the reaction to the infamous <u>Smoot-Hawley</u> tariff act of 1930, which raised the average U.S. tariff on imports to historically high levels. As trade historian Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth has shown persuasively, Smoot-Hawley did not cause the Great Depression, and probably did not even exacerbate it very much since trade was a tiny part of the U.S. economy. But Smoot-Hawley did result in Great Britain, Canada and other U.S. trading partners raising their own tariffs in response. Irwin suggests that the higher tariffs were probably responsible for about a third of the 40 percent drop in imports between 1929 and 1932, and perhaps a slightly higher percentage of export losses. And the new trade barriers put in place took many decades to dismantle. With imports and exports today comprising roughly a third of the U.S. economy, and the few remaining tariffs mostly in the single digits, the consequences of similar tit-for-tat tariff increases today would be far more severe. But <u><mark>what are the chances of</u></mark> such <u><mark>a “trade war</u>”</mark> actually occurring? Pretty close to <u><strong><mark>zero</u></strong></mark>, <u>for two big reasons</u>. First, <u><mark>in 1930, there was no W</u></mark>orld <u><mark>T</u></mark>rade <u><mark>O</u></mark>rganization, <u>no <mark>N</u></mark>orth <u><mark>A</u></mark>merican <u><mark>F</u></mark>ree <u><mark>T</u></mark>rade <u><mark>A</u></mark>greement, <u>no <mark>E</u></mark>uropean Community/<u><mark>U</u></mark>nion <u>– in short, <mark>no rules</u></mark> to prevent countries from jacking up tariffs or imposing quotas whenever governments felt domestic political pressure to do so. <u><mark>Today</u></mark>, such <u>unilateral action is largely forbidden</u>. Indeed, the <u><mark>tit-for-tat measures</mark> we have seen</u> in the U.S.-China trade relationship <u><mark>have all been</mark> taken <mark>within</mark> the framework of <mark>WTO rules</u></mark>. <u>When</u> the <u>Obama</u> administration <u>curbed purchases of Chinese steel</u> in 2009 under the “Buy America” provisions of the stimulus, for example, <u><mark>China responded with</mark> an “<mark>anti-dumping</mark>” case</u> which led to tariffs on imports of U.S. steel. But <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>challenged that action</mark> in the WTO</u>, and earlier this month the WTO ordered China to lift the duties. <u><mark>No</mark> trade <mark>war</u> – <u>instead</u></mark> the phrase “<u>see you in <mark>court</u></mark>” comes to mind. Secondly, almost <u><mark>every nation</mark> in the world <mark>seems</mark> fully <mark>aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism</u></mark>. One of the striking things about the Great Recession– which resulted in global <u>trade</u> volumes <u>plunging by</u> more than <u>12 percent in 2009</u>, <u>the biggest drop since World War II</u> – <u>is how little</u> of the <u>protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred</u>. Chad Bown of the World Bank has documented the surprising low level of new trade barriers imposed during the recession and its aftermath. The danger of competitive currency devaluations – which are not clearly covered under WTO rules – is a greater threat than tariffs. This is one of the reasons that Romney’s pledge to label China a currency manipulator could be playing with fire, particularly after more than seven years in which the value of the renminbi has been creeping up steadily against the dollar. And his suggestion that the United States would impose tariffs in response is just silly – it would be a blatant violation of WTO rules and would quickly be slapped down as such. Again, however, <u>no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO decision</u> with which <u>a</u> Romney <u>administration would quickly comply. </u>The real questions about trade restrictions should be practical ones – are the gains to the economy worth the costs? Generally, the answer is no, because free competition is a good thing for consumers and competitive businesses. But sometimes protecting a viable domestic industry temporarily against a flood of low-priced imports makes sense, which is why the WTO has rules permitting temporary safeguards. Sometimes foreign subsidies make fair competition impossible, which is why the WTO permits tariffs against dumped or subsidized imports. Such actions raise prices for U.S. consumers, but may still on balance bring benefits to the U.S. economy. <u>The “trade war” threat stifles reasonable debate, because <mark>every trade action</mark> – however modest — <mark>is assumed to cause</mark> a <mark>self-destructive over-reaction</u></mark> by trading partners. So I hereby pledge to abolish the phrase from all my future writings on the subject. I hope others will do the same.</p>

AT: China Trade War

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx

N

Navy

4

Wake Forest Manchester-Stirrat

Bobbitt

1AC Gambling (Costa Rica Laundering WTO) 1NC Security K Ban CP Politics 2NR K

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Planning for the future is futile. Only embracing the negativity projected onto the queer reveals the recurring violence of reproductive futurism. Refuse futurism to set the queer free of the figural Child, and the violent future it both replicates and intends.

Edelman ’04 , p. 2-7

Edelman ’04, English prof at Tufts, Ph.D and M. Phil from Yale, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, p. 2-7

But what helped him most in these public appeals on behalf of children is impossible to refuse. logic compels us to submit to the framing of political debate as defined by the terms of what this book describes as reproductive futurism: terms that , impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering un thinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations. however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention. ow could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side at all necessarily constrains one to take the side by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children,” the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure. the pervasive invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value and propose against it the impossible project of queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests a refusal Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable political future, far from per perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form. Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane And the trump card of affirmation Always the question: if not this, what? — I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured , I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act taking the Symbolic’s negativity to the very letter of the law attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws —even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.’ The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social by figuring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social—and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms , the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as “the letter It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears us al . It is to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures that shape them. queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the letter’s cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, queer theory marks the “other” side of politics: the “side” where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves; the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good

appeal on behalf of children is impossible to refuse terms of reproductive futurism: impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving the absolute privilege of heteronormativity , by casting outside the political domain, queer resistance to this principle . politics however radical the attempt to produce a more desirable social order remains conservative insofar as it works to authenticate social order, to transmit to the future That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics How could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children queerness attains its ethical value insofar as it accept its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure. the impossible project of queer oppositionality would oppose itself to the logic of opposition Rather than rejecting, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might consider embracing it. Not in the hope of forging some more perfect social order such hope would only reproduce the mandate of futurism, but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane structuring optimism of politics , is always, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act taking the Symbolic’s negativity can expose , the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; order can access jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy onto the queer. . The embrace of queer negativity can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social by figuring a refusal in the value of futurity the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social subject that politics affirms queer theory marks the “other” side of politics: the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good

But what helped him most in these public appeals on behalf of America’s children was the social consensus that such an appeal is impossible to refuse. Indeed, though these public service announcements concluded with the sort of rhetorical flourish associated with hard-fought political campaigns (“We’re fighting for the children. Whose side are you on”), that rhetoric was intended to avow that this issue, like an ideological Möbius strip, only permitted one side. Such “self-evident” one-sidedness— the affirmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the Child whose innocence solicits our defense— is precisely, of course, what distinguishes public service announcements from the partisan discourse of political argumentation. But it is also, I suggest, what makes such announcements so oppressively political— political not in the partisan terms implied by the media consultant, but political in a far more insidious way: political insofar as the fantasy sub- tending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought. That logic compels us, to the extent that we would register as politically responsible, to submit to the framing of political debate —and, indeed, of the political field—as defined by the terms of what this book describes as reproductive futurism: terms that , impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering un thinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations. For politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention. Even proponents of abortion rights, while promoting the freedom of women to control their own bodies through reproductive choice, recurrently frame their political struggle, mirroring their anti-abortion foes, as a “fight for our children — for our daughters and our sons,” and thus as a fight for the future.’ What, in that case, would it signify not to be “fighting for the children” How could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side at all necessarily constrains one to take the side by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends? Impossibly, against all reasons my project stakes its claim w the very space that politics” makes unthinkable: the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their pre supposition that the body politic must survive. Indeed, at the heart of my polemical engagement with the cultural text of politics and the politics of cultural texts lies a simple provocation: that queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children,” the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism. The ups and downs of political fortune may measure the social order’s pulse, but queerness, by contrast, figures, outside and beyond its political symptoms, the place of the social order’s death drive: a place, to be sure, of abjection expressed in the stigma, sometimes fatal, that follows from reading that figure literally, and hence a place from which liberal politics strives—and strives quite reasonably, given its unlimited faith in reason—to disassociate the queer. More radically, though, as I argue here, queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure. To make such a claim I examine in this book the pervasive invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value and propose against it the impossible project of queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests a refusal —the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes queer theory—of every substantialization of identity, which is always oppositionally defined and, by extension, of history as linear narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in which meaning succeeds in revealing itself—as itself—through time. Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable political future, far from per perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form. Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order—such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer—but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: if not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or “position” whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible — to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism— I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured. To toe contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that’s always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic’s undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for “none of the above,” for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law’s foundational act, its self- constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic’s negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. In contrast to what Theodor Adorno describes as the “grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and substantial,” the queerness of which I speak would deliberately sever us from ourselves, from the assurance, that is, of knowing ourselves and hence of knowing our “good.”4 Such queerness proposes, in place of the good, something I want to call “better,” though it promises, in more than one sense of the phrase, absolutely nothing. ¡ connect this something better with Lacan’s characterization of what he calls “truth,” where truth does not assure happiness, or even, as Lacan makes clear, the good.5 Instead, it names only the insistent particularity of the subject, impossible fully to articulate and “tend[ing] toward the real.” Lacan, therefore, can write of this truth: The quality that best characterizes it is that of being the true Wunsch, which was at the origin of an aberrant or atypical behavior. We encounter this Wunsch with its particular, irreducible character as a modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible form. The Wunsch does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws —even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.’ Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the “aberrant or atypical,” to what chafes against “normalization,” finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself. For by figuring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical access to meaning, the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social—and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms. Divesting such politics of its thematic trappings, bracketing the particularity of its various proposals for social organization, the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as “the letter’ It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee. To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears—and thereby bears down on— us all. It is, rather, to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures that shape them. If it aims effectively to intervene in the reproduction of such a reality—an intervention that may well take the form of figuring that reality’s abortion— then queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the letter’s cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself. As a particular story, in other words, of why storytelling tells, one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, queer theory, as I construe it, marks the “other” side of politics: the “side” where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves; the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good. The rest of this book attempts to explain the implications of this assertion, but first, let me sketch some connections between politics and the politics of the sign by establishing the psychoanalytic context within which my argument takes shape.

<h4>Planning for the future is futile. Only embracing the negativity projected onto the queer reveals the recurring violence of reproductive futurism. Refuse futurism to set the queer free of the figural Child, and the violent future it both replicates and intends. </h4><p><strong>Edelman ’04</strong>, English prof at Tufts, Ph.D and M. Phil from Yale, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive<u><strong>, p. 2-7</p><p></strong>But what helped him most in these public <mark>appeal</mark>s<mark> on behalf of</u></mark> America’s <u><mark>children</u></mark> was the social consensus that such an appeal <u><mark>is impossible to refuse</mark>.</u> Indeed, though these public service announcements concluded with the sort of rhetorical flourish associated with hard-fought political campaigns (“We’re fighting for the children. Whose side are you on”), that rhetoric was intended to avow that this issue, like an ideological Möbius strip, only permitted one side. Such “self-evident” one-sidedness— the affirmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the Child whose innocence solicits our defense— is precisely, of course, what distinguishes public service announcements from the partisan discourse of political argumentation. But it is also, I suggest, what makes such announcements so oppressively political— political not in the partisan terms implied by the media consultant, but political in a far more insidious way: political insofar as the fantasy sub- tending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought. That <u>logic compels us</u>, to the extent that we would register as politically responsible, <u><strong>to submit to the framing of political debate</u></strong> —and, indeed, of the political field—<u>as defined by the <mark>terms of</mark> what this book describes as <strong><mark>reproductive futurism: </mark>terms that , <mark>impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving </mark>in the process <mark>the absolute privilege of heteronormativity </mark>by rendering un thinkable<mark>, by casting outside the political domain, </mark>the possibility of a <mark>queer resistance to this</mark> organizing <mark>principle</mark> of communal relations<mark>.</p><p></u></strong></mark>For <mark>politics</mark>, <u><mark>however radical the </mark>means by which specific constituencies <mark>attempt to produce a more desirable social order</mark>, <mark>remains</u></mark>, at its core, <u><mark>conservative insofar as it works to</mark> affirm a structure, to <mark>authenticate social order, </mark>which it then intends <mark>to transmit to the future</mark> in the form of its inner Child</u>. <u><mark>That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics</mark>, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention.</u> Even proponents of abortion rights, while promoting the freedom of women to control their own bodies through reproductive choice, recurrently frame their political struggle, mirroring their anti-abortion foes, as a “fight for our children — for our daughters and our sons,” and thus as a fight for the future.’ What, in that case, would it signify not to be “fighting for the children” <mark>H<u>ow could one take the other ‘side,” when taking any side</mark> at all necessarily constrains one to take the side by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that <mark>returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends</u></mark>? Impossibly, against all reasons my project stakes its claim w the very space that politics” makes unthinkable: the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their pre supposition that the body politic must survive. Indeed, at the heart of my polemical engagement with the cultural text of politics and the politics of cultural texts lies a simple provocation: that <u><mark>queerness names the side of those not “fighting for the children</mark>,” the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism</u>. The ups and downs of political fortune may measure the social order’s pulse, but queerness, by contrast, figures, outside and beyond its political symptoms, the place of the social order’s death drive: a place, to be sure, of abjection expressed in the stigma, sometimes fatal, that follows from reading that figure literally, and hence a place from which liberal politics strives—and strives quite reasonably, given its unlimited faith in reason—to disassociate the queer. More radically, though, as I argue here, <u><mark>queerness attains its ethical value</mark> precisely <mark>insofar as it</mark> accedes to that place, <mark>accept</mark>ing <mark>its</mark> <mark>figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure.</mark> </p><p></u>To make such a claim I examine in this book <u>the pervasive invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value and propose against it<mark> the impossible project of queer oppositionality</mark> that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that <mark>would oppose itself to the logic of opposition</mark>. This paradoxical formulation suggests a refusal</u> —the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes queer theory—of every substantialization of identity, which is always oppositionally defined and, by extension, of history as linear narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in which meaning succeeds in revealing itself—as itself—through time. <u>Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable political future, far from per perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form. </p><p><strong><mark>Rather than rejecting, </mark>with liberal discourse, <mark>this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might</u></strong></mark>, as I argue, <u><strong>do better to <mark>consider </mark>accepting and even <mark>embracing it.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>Not in the hope of forging </mark>thereby <mark>some more perfect social order</u></mark>—<u><mark>such</mark> a <mark>hope</mark>, after all, <mark>would only reproduce the</mark> constraining <mark>mandate of futurism,</mark> just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer</u>—<u><strong><mark>but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane</u></strong></mark>. <u>And the trump card of affirmation</u>? <u>Always the question: if not this, what?</u> Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or “position” whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible — to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism<u>— I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured</u>. To toe contrary<u>, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic</u>. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that’s always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic’s undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for “none of the above,” for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law’s foundational act, its self- constituting negation. <u>The <mark>structuring optimism of politics</mark> to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification<mark>, is always, </mark>I would argue,<mark> a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act</u></mark>. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that <u><mark>taking the Symbolic’s negativity</mark> to the very letter of the law</u>, that <u>attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses</u>, that <u>turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us</u>. <u>Or better: <mark>can expose </mark>the constancy<mark>, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself; </mark>even if that <mark>order can access</mark> its constant access to <mark>jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy </mark>of access <mark>onto the queer.</mark> </p><p></u>In contrast to what Theodor Adorno describes as the “grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and substantial,” the queerness of which I speak would deliberately sever us from ourselves, from the assurance, that is, of knowing ourselves and hence of knowing our “good.”4 Such queerness proposes, in place of the good, something I want to call “better,” though it promises, in more than one sense of the phrase, absolutely nothing. ¡ connect this something better with Lacan’s characterization of what he calls “truth,” where truth does not assure happiness, or even, as Lacan makes clear, the good.5 Instead, it names only the insistent particularity of the subject, impossible fully to articulate and “tend[ing] toward the real.” Lacan, therefore, can write of this truth:</p><p>The quality that best characterizes it is that of being the true Wunsch, which was at the origin of an aberrant or atypical behavior. </p><p>We encounter this Wunsch with its particular, irreducible character as a modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible form. The Wunsch<u> does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws —even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.’</p><p></u>Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the “aberrant or atypical,” to what chafes against “normalization,” finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good<mark>. <u>The embrace of queer negativity</mark>, then, <mark>can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value,</mark> instead, <mark>resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social</u></mark>, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself.</p><p>For <u><mark>by figuring a refusal</mark> of the coercive belief <mark>in the</mark> paramount <mark>value of futurity</u></mark>, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical access to meaning, <u><mark>the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the </mark>social—and by extension, of the <mark>social subject</mark>; a faith <mark>that politics</mark>, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly <mark>affirms</u></mark>. Divesting such politics of its thematic trappings, bracketing the particularity of its various proposals for social organization<u>, the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as “the letter</u>’ <u>It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee</u>. <u>To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears</u>—and thereby bears down on— <u>us al</u>l<u>. It is</u>, rather, <u>to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures that shape them.</u> If it aims effectively to intervene in the reproduction of such a reality—an intervention that may well take the form of figuring that reality’s abortion— then <u>queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the letter’s cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself</u>. As a particular story, in other words, of why storytelling tells, <u>one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, <mark>queer theory</u></mark>, as I construe it, <u><mark>marks the “other” side of politics: </mark>the “side” where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves;<mark> the “side” outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism’s unquestioned good</u><strong></mark>. The rest of this book attempts to explain the implications of this assertion, but first, let me sketch some connections between politics and the politics of the sign by establishing the psychoanalytic context within which my argument takes shape.</p></strong>

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CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it

Bewley-Taylor et al 2014

Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)

The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops

The United States invested more than any other nation to influence the global control regime If the U.S. proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution if, the U.S. interpretation attracted ceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops

The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.

<h4>CP keeps the treaty regime intact but the plan the destroys it</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>The United States</u></mark> has <u><mark>invested</u></mark> probably <u><mark>more</mark> effort <mark>than any other nation</u></mark> over the past century <u><mark>to</u> <u>influence the</mark> design of the <mark>global control regime</u></mark> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S.</mark> now <mark>proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong>, <u>claiming <mark>that the U.S. is not violating the treaties</mark> <mark>because</mark> <mark>cultivation, trade and possession</u></mark> of cannabis <u><mark>are <strong>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>and</mark> <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u></mark> for considerable <u><mark>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices</mark>, especially <mark>when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution</mark> and domestic legal system.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u><mark>if, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level of <u>political ac<mark>ceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u><mark>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u></mark> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u><mark>coffeeshops</u></mark> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p>

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Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18