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would also, of course, see wealth as belonging to the community |
rather than the individual, while utilitarians, whether socialist |
or not, would be prepared to override property rights to prevent |
great evils. |
Does the argument for an obligation to assist others therefore |
presuppose one of these other theories of property rights, and |
not an individualistic theory like Nozick's? Not necessarily. A |
theory of property rights can insist on our right to retain wealth |
without pronouncing on whether the rich ought to give to the |
poor. Nozick, for example, rejects the use of compulsory means |
like taxation to redistribute income, but suggests that we can |
achieve the ends we deem morally desirable by voluntary |
means. So Nozick would reject the claim that rich people have |
an 'obligation' to give to the poor, in so far as this implies that |
the poor have a right to our aid, but might accept that giving |
is something we ought to do and failing to give, though within |
one's rights, is wrong - for there is more to an ethical life than |
respecting the rights of others. |
234 |
Rich and Poor |
The argument for an obligation to assist can survive, with |
only minor modifications, even if we accept an individualistic |
theory of property rights. In any cci.e, however, I do not think |
we should accept such a theory. It leaves too much to chance |
to be an acceptable ethical view. For instance, those whose |
forefathers happened to inhabit some sandy wastes around the |
Persian Gulf are now fabulously wealthy, because oil lay under |
those sands; while those whose forefathers settled on better land |
south of the Sahara live in absolute poverty, because of drought |
and bad harvests. Can this distribution be acceptable from an |
impartial point of view? If we imagine ourselves about to begin |
life as a citizen of either Bahrein or Chad - but we do not know |
which - would we accept the principle that citizens of Bahrein |
are under no obligation to assist people living in Chad? |
Population and the ethics of triage. Perhaps the most serious objection |
to the argument that we have an obligation to assist is |
that since the major cause of absolute poverty is overpopulation, |
helping those now in poverty will only ensure that yet more |
people are born to live in poverty in the future. |
In its most extreme form, this objection is taken to show that |
we should adopt a policy of 'triage'. The term comes from medical |
policies adopted in wartime. With too few doctors to cope |
with all the casualties, the wounded were divided into three |
categories: those wl).O would probably survive without medical |
assistance, those who might survive if they received assistance, |
but otherwise probably would not, and those who even with |
medical assistance probably would not survive. Only those in |
the middle category were given medical assistance. The idea, of |
course, was to use limited medical resources as effectively as |
possible. For those in the first category, medical treatment was |
not strictly necessary; for those in the third category, it was |
likely to be useless. It has been suggested that we should apply |
the same policies to countries, according to their prospects of |
becoming self-sustaining. We would not aid countries that even |
235 |
Practical Ethics |
without our help will soon be able to feed their populations. |
We would not aid countries th~t, even with our help, will not |
be able to limit their population to a level they can feed. We |
would aid those countries where our help might make the difference |
between success and failure in bringing food and population |
into balance. |
Advocates of this theory are understandably reluctant to give |
a complete list of the countries they would place into the 'hopeless' |
category; Bangladesh has been cited as an example, and |
so have some of the countries of the Sahel region of Africa. |
Adopting the policy of triage would, then, mean cutting off |
assistance to these countries and allowing famine, disease, and |
natural disasters to reduce the population of those countries to |
the level at which they can provide adequately for all. |
In support of this view Garrett Hardin has offered a metaphor: |
we in the rich nations are like the occupants of a crowded |
lifeboat adrift in a sea full of drowning people. If we try to save |
the drowning by bringing them aboard, our boat will be overloaded |
and we shall all drown. Since it is better that some |
survive than none, we should leave the others to drown. In the |
world today, according to Hardin, 'lifeboat ethics' apply. The |
rich should leave the poor to starve, for otherwise the poor will |
drag the rich down with them. |
Against this view, some writers have argued that overpopulation |
is a myth. The world produces ample food to feed its |
population, and could, according to some estimates, feed ten |
times as many. People are hungry not because there are too |
many but because of inequitable land distribution, the manipulation |
of third world economies by the developed nations, |
wastage of food in the West, and so on. |
Putting aside the controversial issue of the extent to which |
food production might one day be increased, it is true, as we |
have already seen, that the world now produces enough to feed |
its inhabitants - the amount lost by being fed to animals itself |
being enough to meet existing grain shortages. Nevertheless |
236 |
Rich and Poor |
population growth calillot be ignored. Bangladesh could, with |
land reform and using better techniques, feed its present population |
of 115 million; but by the year 2000, according to United |
Nations Population Division estiniates, its population will be |
150 million. The enormous effort that will have to go into feeding |
an extra 35 million people, all added to the population |
within a decade, means that Bangladesh must develop at full |
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