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also help other countries to make contraception and sterilisation |
widely available. There is a fair chance that these measures will |
239 |
Practical Ethics |
hasten the onset of the demographic transition and bring population |
growth down to a manageable level. According to |
United Nations estimates, in 1965 the average woman in the |
third world gave birth to six children, and only 8 per cent were |
using some form of contraception; by 1991 the average number |
of children had dropped to just below four, and more than half |
the women in the third world were taking contraceptive measures. |
Notable successes in encouraging the use of contraception |
had occurred in Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, |
and Bangladesh. This achievement reflected a relatively low |
expenditure in developing countries - considering the size and |
significance of the problem - of $3 billion annually, with only |
20 per cent of this sum coming from developed nations. So |
expenditure in this area seems likely to be highly cost-effective. |
Success cannot be guaranteed; but the evidence suggests that |
we can reduce population growth by improving economic security |
and education, and making contraceptives more widely |
available. This prospect makes triage ethically unacceptable. We |
cannot allow millions to die from starvation and disease when |
there is a reasonable probability that population can be brought |
under control without such horrors. |
Population growth is therefore not a reason against giving |
overseas aid, although it should make us think about the kind |
of aid to give. Instead of food handouts, it may be better to give |
aid that leads to a slowing of population growth. This may mean |
agricultural assistance for the rural poor, or assistance with education, |
or the provision of contraceptive services. Whatever |
kind of aid proves most effective in specific circumstances, the |
obligation to assist is not reduced. |
One awkward question remains. What should we do about |
a poor and already overpopulated country that, for religious or |
nationalistic reasons, restricts the use of contraceptives and refuses |
to slow its population growth? Should we nevertheless |
offer development assistance? Or should we make our offer |
conditional on effective steps being taken to reduce the birth- |
240 |
Rich and Poor |
rate? To the latter course, some would object that putting conditions |
on aid is an attempt to impose our own ideas on |
independent sovereign nations. So it is - but is this imposition |
unjustifiable? If the argument for an\Jbligation to assist is sound, |
we have an obligation to reduce absolute poverty; but we have |
no obligation to make sacrifices that, to the best of our knowledge, |
have no prospect of reducing poverty in the long run. |
Hence we have no obligation to assist countries whose governments |
have policies that will make our aid ineffective. This could |
be very harsh on poor citizens of these countries - for they may |
have no say in the government's policies - but we will help |
more people in the long run by using our resources where they |
are most effective. (The same principles may apply, incidentally, |
to countries that refuse to take other steps that could make |
assistance effective - like refusing to reform systems of land |
holding that impose intolerable burdens on poor tenant |
farmers.) |
Leaving it to the government. We often hear that overseas aid |
should be a government responsibility, not left to privately run |
charities. Giving privately, it is said, allows the government to |
escape its responsibilities. |
Since increasing government aid is the surest way of making |
a significant increase to the total amount of aid given, I would |
agree that the governments of affluent nations should give much |
more genuine, no-string~-attached, aid than they give now. Less |
than one-sixth of one per cent of GNP is a scandalously small |
amount for a nation as wealthy as the United States to give. |
Even the official UN target of 0.7 per cent seems much less than |
affluent nations can and should give - though it is a target few |
have reached. But is this a reason against each of us giving what |
we can privately, through voluntary agencies? To believe that |
it is seems to assume that the more people there are who give |
through voluntary agencies, the less likely it is that the government |
will do its part. Is this plausible? The opposite view - that |
241 |
Practical Ethics |
if no one gives voluntarily the government will assume that its |
citizens are not in favour of overseas aid, and will cut its programme |
accordingly - is more reasonable. In any case, unless |
there is a definite probability that by refusing to give we would |
be helping to bring about an increase in government assistance, |
refusing to give privately is wrong for the same reason that triage |
is wrong: it is a refusal to prevent a definite evil for the sake of |
a very uncertain gain. The onus of showing how a refusal to |
give privately will make the government give more is on those |
who refuse to give. |
This is not to say that giving privately is enough. Certainly |
we should campaign for entirely new standards for both public |
and private overseas aid. We should also work for fairer trading |
arrangements between rich and poor countries, and less domination |
of the economies of poor countries by multinational |
corporations more concerned about producing profits for shareholders |
back home than food for the local poor. Perhaps it is |
more important to be politically active in the interests of the |
poor than to give to them oneself - but why not do both? |
Unfortunately, many use the view that overseas aid is the government's |
responsibility as a reason against giving, but not as |
a reason for being politically active. |
Too high a standard? The final objection to the argument for an |
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