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obligation to assist is that it sets a standard so high that none |
but a saint could attain it. This objection comes in at least three |
versions. The first maintains that, human nature being what it |
is, we cannot achieve so high a standard, and since it is absurd |
to say that we ought to do what we cannot do, we must reject |
the claim that we ought to give so much. The second version |
asserts that even if we could achieve so high a standard, to do |
so would be undesirable. The third version of the objection is |
that to set so high a standard is undesirable because it will be |
perceived as too difficult to reach, and will discourage many |
from even attempting to do so. |
242 |
Rich and Poor |
Those who put forward the first version of the objection are |
often influenced by the fact that we have evolved from a natural |
process in which those with a high degree of concern for their |
own interests, or the interests of their offspring and kin, can be |
expected to leave more descendants in futJre generations, and |
eventually to completely replace any who are entirely altruistic. |
Thus the biologist Garrett Hardin has argued, in support of his |
'lifeboat ethics', that altruism can only exist 'on a small scale, |
over the short term, and within small, intimate groups'; while |
Richard Dawkins has written, in his provocative book The Selfish |
Gene: 'Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal |
love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts |
which simply do not make evolutionary sense: I have already |
noted, in discussing the objection that we should first take care |
of our own, the very strong tendency for partiality in human |
beings. We naturally have a stronger desire to further our own |
interests, and those of our close kin, than we have to further |
the interests of strangers. What this means is that we would be |
foolish to expect widespread conformity to a standard that demands |
impartial concern, and for that reason it would scarcely |
be appropriate or feasible to condemn all those who fail to reach |
such a standard. Yet to act impartially, though it might be very |
difficult, is not impossible; The commonly quoted assertion that |
'ought' implies 'can' is a reason for rejecting such moral judgments |
as 'You ought to have saved all the people from the |
sinking ship', when in fact if you had taken one more person |
into the lifeboat, it would have sunk and you would not have |
saved any. In that situation, it is absurd to say that you ought |
to have done what you could not possibly do. When we have |
money to spend on luxuries and others are starving, however, |
it is clear that we can all give much more than we do give, and |
we can therefore all come closer to the impartial standard proposed |
in this chapter. Nor is there, as we approach closer to this |
standard, any barrier beyond which we cannot go. For that |
reason there is no basis for saying that the impartial standard |
243 |
Practical Ethics |
is mistaken because 'ought' implies 'can' and we cannot be |
impartial. |
The second version of the objection has been put by several |
philosophers during the past decade, among them Susan Wolf |
in a forceful article entitled 'Moral Saints'. Wolf argues that if |
we all took the kind of moral stance defended in this chapter, |
we would have to do without a great deal that makes life interesting: |
opera, gourmet cooking, elegant clothes, and professional |
sport, for a start. The kind of life we come to see as |
ethically required of us would be a single-minded pursuit of the |
overall good, lacking that broad diversity of interests and activities |
that, on a less demanding view, can be part of our ideal of |
a good life for a human being. To this, however, one can respond |
that while the rich and varied life that Wolf upholds as an ideal |
may be the most desirable form of life for a human being in a |
world of plenty, it is wrong to assume that it remains a good |
life in a world in which buying luxuries for oneself means accepting |
the continued avoidable suffering of others. A doctor |
faced with hundreds of injured victims of a train crash can |
scarcely think it defensible to treat fifty of them and then go to |
the opera, on the grounds that going to the opera is part of a |
well-rounded human life. The life-or-death needs of others must |
take priority. Perhaps we are like the doctor in that we live in |
a time when we all have an opportunity to help to mitigate a |
disaster. |
Associated with this second version of the objection is the |
claim that an impartial ethic of the kind advocated here makes |
it impossible to have serious personal relationships based on |
love and friendship; these relationships are, of their nature, |
partial. We put the interests of our loved ones, our family, and |
our friends ahead of those of strangers; if we did not do so, |
would these relationships survive? I have already indicated, in |
the response I gave when considering the objection that we |
should first take care of our own, that there is a place, within |
an impartially grounded moral framework, for recognising some |
244 |
Rich and Poor |
degree of partiality for kin, and the same can be said for other |
close personal relationships. Clearly, for most people, personal |
relationships are among the necessities of a flourishing life, and |
to give them up would be to sacrifice something of great moral |
significance. Hence no such sacrifice is required by the principle |
for which I am here arguing. |
The third version of the objection asks: might it not be counterproductive |
to demand that people give up so much? Might |
not people say: 'As I can't do what is morally required anyway, |
I won't bother to give at all: If, however, we were to set a more |
realistic standard, people might make a genuine effort to reach |
it. Thus setting a lower standard might actually result in more |
aid being given. |
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