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obligation to assist is that it sets a standard so high that none
but a saint could attain it. This objection comes in at least three
versions. The first maintains that, human nature being what it
is, we cannot achieve so high a standard, and since it is absurd
to say that we ought to do what we cannot do, we must reject
the claim that we ought to give so much. The second version
asserts that even if we could achieve so high a standard, to do
so would be undesirable. The third version of the objection is
that to set so high a standard is undesirable because it will be
perceived as too difficult to reach, and will discourage many
from even attempting to do so.
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Rich and Poor
Those who put forward the first version of the objection are
often influenced by the fact that we have evolved from a natural
process in which those with a high degree of concern for their
own interests, or the interests of their offspring and kin, can be
expected to leave more descendants in futJre generations, and
eventually to completely replace any who are entirely altruistic.
Thus the biologist Garrett Hardin has argued, in support of his
'lifeboat ethics', that altruism can only exist 'on a small scale,
over the short term, and within small, intimate groups'; while
Richard Dawkins has written, in his provocative book The Selfish
Gene: 'Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal
love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts
which simply do not make evolutionary sense: I have already
noted, in discussing the objection that we should first take care
of our own, the very strong tendency for partiality in human
beings. We naturally have a stronger desire to further our own
interests, and those of our close kin, than we have to further
the interests of strangers. What this means is that we would be
foolish to expect widespread conformity to a standard that demands
impartial concern, and for that reason it would scarcely
be appropriate or feasible to condemn all those who fail to reach
such a standard. Yet to act impartially, though it might be very
difficult, is not impossible; The commonly quoted assertion that
'ought' implies 'can' is a reason for rejecting such moral judgments
as 'You ought to have saved all the people from the
sinking ship', when in fact if you had taken one more person
into the lifeboat, it would have sunk and you would not have
saved any. In that situation, it is absurd to say that you ought
to have done what you could not possibly do. When we have
money to spend on luxuries and others are starving, however,
it is clear that we can all give much more than we do give, and
we can therefore all come closer to the impartial standard proposed
in this chapter. Nor is there, as we approach closer to this
standard, any barrier beyond which we cannot go. For that
reason there is no basis for saying that the impartial standard
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Practical Ethics
is mistaken because 'ought' implies 'can' and we cannot be
impartial.
The second version of the objection has been put by several
philosophers during the past decade, among them Susan Wolf
in a forceful article entitled 'Moral Saints'. Wolf argues that if
we all took the kind of moral stance defended in this chapter,
we would have to do without a great deal that makes life interesting:
opera, gourmet cooking, elegant clothes, and professional
sport, for a start. The kind of life we come to see as
ethically required of us would be a single-minded pursuit of the
overall good, lacking that broad diversity of interests and activities
that, on a less demanding view, can be part of our ideal of
a good life for a human being. To this, however, one can respond
that while the rich and varied life that Wolf upholds as an ideal
may be the most desirable form of life for a human being in a
world of plenty, it is wrong to assume that it remains a good
life in a world in which buying luxuries for oneself means accepting
the continued avoidable suffering of others. A doctor
faced with hundreds of injured victims of a train crash can
scarcely think it defensible to treat fifty of them and then go to
the opera, on the grounds that going to the opera is part of a
well-rounded human life. The life-or-death needs of others must
take priority. Perhaps we are like the doctor in that we live in
a time when we all have an opportunity to help to mitigate a
disaster.
Associated with this second version of the objection is the
claim that an impartial ethic of the kind advocated here makes
it impossible to have serious personal relationships based on
love and friendship; these relationships are, of their nature,
partial. We put the interests of our loved ones, our family, and
our friends ahead of those of strangers; if we did not do so,
would these relationships survive? I have already indicated, in
the response I gave when considering the objection that we
should first take care of our own, that there is a place, within
an impartially grounded moral framework, for recognising some
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Rich and Poor
degree of partiality for kin, and the same can be said for other
close personal relationships. Clearly, for most people, personal
relationships are among the necessities of a flourishing life, and
to give them up would be to sacrifice something of great moral
significance. Hence no such sacrifice is required by the principle
for which I am here arguing.
The third version of the objection asks: might it not be counterproductive
to demand that people give up so much? Might
not people say: 'As I can't do what is morally required anyway,
I won't bother to give at all: If, however, we were to set a more
realistic standard, people might make a genuine effort to reach
it. Thus setting a lower standard might actually result in more
aid being given.