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means to raise itself out of absolute poverty, the third premise
is vindicated.
I have left the notion of moral significance unexamined in
order to show that the argument does not depend on any specific
values or ethical principles. I think the third premise is true for
most people living in industrialised nations, on any defensible
view of what is morally significant. Our affluence means that
we have income we can dispose of without giving up the basic
necessities of life, and we can use this income to reduce absolute
poverty. Just how much we will think ourselves obliged to give
up will depend on what we consider to be of comparable moral
231
Practical Ethics
significance to the poverty we could prevent: stylish clothes,
expensive dinners, a sophisticated stereo system, overseas holidays,
a (second?) car, a larger house, private schools for our
children, and so on. For a utilitarian, none of these is likely to
be of comparable significance to the reduction of absolute poverty;
and those who are not utilitarians surely must, if they
subscribe to the principle of universalisability, accept that at
least some of these things are of far less moral significance than
the absolute poverty that could be prevented by the money they
cost. So the third premise seems to be true on any plausible
ethical view - although the precise amount of absolute poverty
that can be prevented before anything of moral significance is
sacrificed will vary according to the ethical view one accepts.
Objections to the Argument
Taking care of our own. Anyone who has worked to increase
overseas aid will have come across the argument that we should
look after those near us, our families, and then the poor in our
own country, before we think about poverty in distant places.
No doubt we do instinctively prefer to help those who are
close to us. Few could stand by and watch a child drown; many
can ignore a famine in Mrica. But the question is not what we
usually do, but what we ought to do, and it is difficult to see
any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or
community membership, makes a crucial difference to our
obligations.
Consider, for instance, racial affinities. Should people of European
origin help poor Europeans before helping poor Africans?
Most of us would reject such a suggestion out of hand,
and our discussion of the principle of equal consideration of
interests in Chapter 2 has shown why we should reject it: people's
need for food has nothing to do with their race, and if
Mricans need food more than Europeans, it would be a violation
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Rich and Poor
of the principle of equal consideration to give preference to
Europeans.
The same point applies to citizenship or nationhood .. Every
affluent nation has some relatively poor citizens, but absolute
poverty is limited largely to the poor nations. Those living on
the streets of Calcutta, or in the drought-prone Sahel region of
Mrica, are experiencing poverty unknown in the West. Under
these circumstances it would be wrong to decide that only those
fortunate enough to be citizens of our own community will
share our abundance.
We feel obligations of kinship more strongly than those of
citizenship. Which parents could give away their last bowl of
rice if their own children were starving? To do so would seem
unnatural, contrary to our nature as biologically evolved beings
- although whether it would be wrong is another question
altogether. In any case, we are not faced with that situation,
but with one in which our own children are well-fed, wellclothed,
well-educated, and would now like new bikes, a stereo
set, or their own car. In these circumstances any special obligations
we might have to our children have been fulfilled, and
the needs of strangers make a stronger claim upon us.
The element of truth in the view that we should first take
care of our own, lies in the advantage of a recognised system
of responsibilities. When families and local communities look
after their own poorer members, ties of affection and personal
relationships achieve ends that would otherwise require a large,
impersonal bureaucracy. Hence it would be absurd to propose
that from now on we all regard ourselves as equally responsible
for the welfare of everyone in the world; but the argument for
an obligation to assist does not propose that. It applies only
when some are in absolute poverty, and others can help without
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance. To allow
one's own kin to sink into absolute poverty would be to sacrifice
something of comparable significance; and before that point had
been reached, the breakdown of the system of family and com-
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Practical Ethics
munity responsibility would be a factor to weigh the balance
in favour of a small degree of preference for family and community.
This small degree of preference is, however, decisively
outweighed by existing discrepancies in wealth and property.
Property rights. Do people have a right to private property, a
right that contradicts the view that they are under an obligation
to give some of their wealth away to those in absolute poverty?
According to some theories of rights (for instance, Robert Nozick's),
provided one has acquired one's property without the
use of unjust means like force and fraud, one may be entitled
to enormous wealth while others starve. This individualistic
conception of rights is in contrast to other views, like the early
Christian doctrine to be found in the works of Thomas Aquinas,
which holds that since property exists for the satisfaction of
human needs, 'whatever a man has in superabundance is owed,
of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance'. A socialist