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a reputable hospital you could, if you choose, order a doctor to
disconnect you from the violinist; but the violinist will then
certainly die. On the other hand, if you remain connected for
only (only?) nine months, the violinist will have recovered and
you can be unplugged without endangering him.
Thomson believes that if you found yourself in this unexpected
predicament you would not be morally required to allow
the violinist to use your kidneys for nine months. It might be
generous or kind of you to do so, but to say this is, Thomson
claims, quite different from saying that you would be doing
wrong if you did not do it.
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Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
Note that Thomson's conclusion does not depend on denying
that the violinist is an innocent human being, with the same
right to life as any other innocent human being. On the contrary,
Thomson affirms that the violinist does have a right to life -
but to have a right to life does not, she says, entail a right to
the use of another's body, even if without that use one will die.
The parallel with pregnancy, especially pregnancy due to rape
should be obvious. A woman pregnant through rape finds herself,
through no choice of her own, linked to a fetus in much
the same way as the person is linked to the violinist. True, a
pregnant woman does not normally have to spend nine months
in bed, but opponents of abortion would not regard this as a
sufficient justification for abortion. Giving up a newborn baby
for adoption might be more difficult, psychologically, than parting
from the violinist at the end of his illness; but this in itself
does not seem a sufficient reason for killing the fetus. Accepting
for the sake of the argument that the fetus does count as a fullyfledged
human being, having an abortion when the fetus is not
viable has the same moral significance as unplugging oneself
from the violinist. So if we agree with Thomson that it would
not be wrong to unplug oneself from the violinist, we must also
accept that, whatever the status of the fetus, abortion is not
wrong - at least not when the pregnancy results from rape.
Thomson's argument can probably be extended beyond cases
of rape. Suppose that you found yourself connected to the violinist,
not because you were kidnapped by music lovers, but
because you had intended to enter the hospital to visit a sick
friend, and when you got into the elevator, you carelessly
pressed the wrong button, and ended up in a section of the
hospital normally visited only by those who have volunteered
to be connected to patients who would not otherwise survive.
A team of doctors, waiting for the next volunteer, assumed you
were it, jabbed you with an anaesthetic, and connected you. If
Thomson's argument was sound in the kidnap case it is
probably sound here too, since nine months unwillingly sup-
147
Practical Ethics
porting another is a high price to pay for ignorance or carelessness.
In this way the argument might apply beyond rape
cases to the much larger number of women who become pregnant
through ignorance, carelessness, or contraceptive failure.
But is the argument sound? The short answer is this: It is
sound if the particular theory of rights that lies behind it is
sound; and it is unsound if that theory of rights is unsound.
The theory of rights in question can be illustrated by another
of Thomson's fanciful examples: suppose I am desperately ill
and the only thing that can save my life is the touch of my
favourite film star's cool hand on my fevered brow. Well, Thomson
says, even though I have a right to life, this does not mean
that I have a right to force the film star to come to me, or that
he is under any. moral obligation to fly over and save me -
although it would be frightfully nice of him to do so. Thus
Thomson does not accept that we are always obliged to take
the best course of action, all things considered, or to do what
has the best consequences. She accepts, instead, a system of
rights and obligations that allows us to justify our actions independently
of their consequences.
I shall say more about this conception of rights in Chapter 8.
At this stage it is enough to notice that a utilitarian would reject
this theory of rights, and would reject Thomson's judgment in
the case of the violinist. The utilitarian would hold that, however
outraged I may be at having been kidnapped, if the consequences
of disconnecting myself from the violinist are, on balance,
and taking into account the interests of everyone affected,
worse than the consequences of remaining connected, I ought
to remain connected. This does not necessarily mean that utilitarians
would regard a woman who disconnected herself as
wicked or deserving of blame. They might recognize that she
has been placed in an extraordinarily difficult situation, one in
which to do what is right involves a considerable sacrifice. They
might even grant that most people in this situation would follow
148
Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
self-interest rather than do the right thing. Nevertheless, they
would hold that to disconnect oneself is wrong.
In rejecting Thomson's theory of rights, and with it her judgment
in the case of the violinist, the utilitarian would also be
rejecting her argument for abortion. Thomson claimed that her