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we do not hold that total dependence on another person means |
that that person may decide whether one lives or dies. A newborn |
baby is totally dependent on its mother, if it happens to |
140 |
Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus |
be born in an isolated area in which there is no other lactating |
woman, nor the means for bottle feeding. An elderly woman |
may be totally dependent on her son looking after her, and a |
hiker who breaks her leg five days' walk from the nearest road |
may die if her companion does not bring help. We do not think |
that in these situations the mother may take the life ~fher baby, |
the son of his aged mother, or the hiker of her injured companion. |
So it is not plausible to suggest that the dependence of |
the nonviable fetus on its mother gives her the right to kill it; |
and if dependence does not justify making viability the dividing |
line, it is hard to see what does. |
Quickening |
If neither birth nor viability marks a morally significant distinction, |
there is less still to be said for a third candidate, |
quickening. Quickening is the time when the mother first feels |
the fetus move, and in traditional Catholic theology, this was |
thought to be the moment at which the fetus gained its soul. |
If we accepted that view, we might think quickening important, |
since the soul is, on the Christian view, what marks |
humans off from animals. But the idea that the soul enters |
the fetus at quickening is an outmoded piece of superstition, |
discarded now even by Catholic theologians. Putting aside |
these religious doctrines makes quickening insignificant. It is |
no more than the time when the fetus is first felt to move of |
its own accord; the fetus is alive before this moment, and |
ultrasound studies have shown that fetuses do in fact start |
moving as early as six weeks after fertilization, long before |
they can be felt to move. In any case, the capacity for physical |
motion - or the lack of it - has nothing to do with the |
seriousness of one's claim for continued life. We do not see |
the lack of such a capacity as negating the claims of paralysed |
people to go on living. |
141 |
Practical Ethics |
Consciousness |
Movement might be thought to be indirectly of moral significance, |
in so far as it is an indication of some form of awareness |
- and as we have already seen, consciousness, and the capaCity |
to feel pleasure or pain, are of real moral significance. Despite |
this, neither side in the abortion debate has made much mention |
of the development of consciousness in the fetus. Those |
opposed to abortion may show films about the 'silent scream' |
of the fetus when aborted, but the intention behind such films |
is merely to stir the emotions of the uncommitted. Opponents |
of abortion really want to uphold the right to life of the human |
being from conception, irrespective of whether it is conscious |
or not. For those in favour of abortion, to appeal to the absence |
of a capacity for consciousness has seemed a risky strategy. |
On the basis of the studies showing that movement takes place |
as early as six weeks after fertilization, coupled with other |
studies that have found some brain activity as early as the |
seventh week, it has been suggested that the fetus could be |
capable of feeling pain at this early stage of pregnancy. That |
possibility has made liberals very wary of appealing to the |
onset of consciousness as a point at which the fetus has a |
right to life. We shall return to the issue of consciousness in |
the fetus later in this chapter, because it is relevant to the |
issue of embryo and fetal experimentation. We will also then |
consider an earlier marker that could be relevant to embryo |
experimentation, but not to the abortion debate. As far as |
abortion is concerned, the discussion up to now has shown |
that the liberal search for a morally crucial dividing line between |
the newborn baby and the fetus has failed to yield any |
event or stage of development that can bear the weight of |
separating those with a right to life from those who lack such, |
a right, in a way that clearly shows fetuses to be in the latter |
category at the stage of development when most abortions |
take place. The conservative is on solid ground in insisting |
142 |
Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus |
that the development from the embryo to the infant is a gradual |
process. |
SOME LIBERAL ARGUMENTS |
Some liberals do not challenge the conservative claim that the |
fetus is an innocent human being, but argue that abortion is |
nonetheless permissible. I shall consider three arguments for |
this view. |
The Consequences of Restrictive Laws |
The first argument is that laws prohibiting abortion do not stop |
abortions, but merely drive them underground. Women who |
want to have abortions are often desperate. They will go to |
backyard abortionists or try folk remedies. Abortion performed |
by a qualified medical practitioner is as safe as any medical |
operation, but attempts to procure abortions by unqualified people |
often result in serious medical complications and sometimes |
death. Thus the effect of prohibiting abortion is not so much to |
reduce the number of abortions performed as to increase the |
difficulties and dangers for women with unwanted pregnancies. |
This argument has been influential in gaining support for |
more liberal abortion laws. It was accepted by the Canadian |
Royal Commission on the Status of Women, which concluded |
that: 'A law that has more bad effects than good ones is a bad |
law ... As long as it exists in its present form thousands of |
women will break it.' |
The main point to note about this argument is that it is an |
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