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argument against laws prohibiting abortion, and not an argument
against the view that abortion is wrong. This is an important
distinction, often overlooked in the abortion debate.
The present argument well illustrates the distinction, because
one could quite consistently accept it and advocate that the law
should allow abortion on request, while at the same time de-
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Practical Ethics
ciding oneself - if one were pregnant - or counselling another
who was pregnant, that it would be wrong to have an abortion.
It is a mistake to assume that the law should always enforce
morality. It may be that, as alleged in the case of abortion,
attempts to enforce right conduct lead to consequences no one
wants, and no decrease in wrong-doing; or it may be that, as
is proposed by the next argument we shall consider, there is an
area of private ethics with which the law ought not to interfere.
So this first argument is an argument about abortion law, not
about the ethics of abortion. Even within those limits, however,
it is open to challenge, for it fails to meet the conservative claim
that abortion is the deliberate killing of an innocent human
being, and in the same ethical category as murder. Those who
take this view of abortion will not rest content with the assertion
that restrictive abortion laws do no more than drive women to
backyard abortionists. They will insist that this situation can be
changed, and the law properly enforced. They may also suggest
measures to make pregnancy easier to accept for those women
who become pregnant against their wishes. This is a perfectly
reasonable response, given the initial ethical judgment against
abortion, and for this reason the first argument does not succeed
in avoiding the ethical issue.
Not the Law's Business?
The second argument is again an argument about abortion laws
rather than the ethics of abortion. It uses the view that, as the
report of a British government committee inquiring into laws
about homosexuality and prostitution put it: 'There must remain
a realm of private morality and immorality that is, in brief
and crude terms, not the law's business: This view is widely
accepted among liberal thinkers, and can be traced back to John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty. The'one very simple principle' of this
work is, in Mill's words:
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Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others ... He cannot rightfully be compelled
to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise or even right.
Mill's view is often and properly quoted in support of the repeal
of laws that create 'victimless crimes' - like laws prohibiting
homosexual relations between consenting adults, the use of
marijuana and other drugs, prostitution, gambling and so on.
Abortion is often included in this list, for example by the criminologist
Edwin Schur in his book Crimes Without Victims. Those
who consider abortion a victimless crime say that, while everyone
is entitled to hold and act on his or her own view about
the morality of abortion, no section of the community should
try to force others to adhere to its own particular view. In a
pluralist society, we should tolerate others with different moral
views and leave the decision to have an abortion up to the
woman concerned.
The fallacy involved in numbering abortion among the victimless
crimes should be obvious. The dispute about abortion
is, largely, a dispute about whether or not abortion does have
a 'victim'. Opponents of abortion maintain that the victim of
abortion is the fetus. Those not opposed to abortion may deny
that the fetus counts as a victim in any serious way. They might,
for instance, say that a being cannot be a victim unless it has
interests that are violated, and the fetus has no interests. But
however this dispute may go, one cannot simply ignore it on
the grounds that people should not attempt to force others to
follow their own moral views. My view that what Hitler did to
the Jews is wrong is a moral view, and ifthere were any prospect
of a revival of Nazism I would certainly do my best to force
others not to act contrary to this view. Mill's principle is defensible
only if it is restricted, as Mill restricted it, to acts that do
not harm others. To use the principle as a means of avoiding
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Practical Ethics
the difficulties of resolving the ethical dispute over abortion is
to take it for granted that abortion does not harm an 'other' -
which is precisely the point that needs to be proven before we
can legitimately apply the principle to the case of abortion.
A Feminist Argument
The last of the three arguments that seek to justify abortion
without denying that the fetus is an innocent human being is
that a woman has a right to choose what happens to her own
body. This argument became prominent with the rise of the
women's liberation movement and has been elaborated by
American philosophers sympathetic to feminism. An influential
argument has been presented by Judith Jarvis Thomson by
means of an ingenious analogy. Imagine, she says, that you
wake up one morning and find yourself in a hospital bed, somehow
connected to an unconscious man in an adjacent bed. You
are told that this man is a famous violinist with kidney disease.
The only way he can survive is for his circulatory system to be
plugged into the system of someone else with the same blood
type, and you are the only person whose blood is suitable. So
a society of music lovers kidnapped you, had the connecting
operation performed, and there you are. Since you are now in