Datasets:
DebateLabKIT
/
deepa2-corpus

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
 Community
text
stringlengths
0
1.71k
the taste of their flesh.
The comparison between the fetus and other animals leads
us to one more point. Where the balance of conflicting interests
does make it necessary to kill a sentient creature, it is important
that the killing be done as painlessly as possible. In the case of
nonhuman animals the importance of humane killing is widely
accepted; oddly, in the case of abortion little attention is paid
to it. This is not because abortion is known to kill the fetus
SWiftly and humanely. Late abortions - which are the very ones
151
Pradical Ethics
in which the fetus may be able to suffer - are sometimes performed
by injecting a salt solution into the amniotic sac that
surrounds the fetus. It has been claimed that the effect of this
is to cause the fetus to have convulsions and die between one
and three hours later. Afterwards the dead fetus is expelled from
the womb. If there are grounds for thinking that a method of
abortion causes the fetus to suffer, that method should be
avoided.
THE FETUS AS POTENTIAL LIFE
One likely objection to the argument I have offered in the preceding
section is that it takes into account only the actual characteristics
of the fetus, and not its potential characteristics. On
the basis of its actual characteristics, some opponents of abortion
will admit, the fetus compares unfavourably with many nonhuman
animals; it is when we consider its potential to become
a mature human being that membership of the species Homo
sapiens becomes important, and the fetus far surpasses any
chicken, pig or calf.
Up to this point I have not raised the question of the potential
of the fetus because I thought it best to concentrate on the central
argument against abortion; but it is true that a different argument,
based on the potential of the fetus, can be mounted. Now
is the time to look at this other argument. We can state it as
follows:
First premise: It is wrong to kill a potential human being.
Second premise: A human fetus is a potential human being.
Conclusion: Therefore it is wrong to kill a human fetus.
The second premise of this argument is stronger than the
second premise of the preceding argument. Whereas it is problematic
whether a fetus actually is a human being - it depends
on what we mean by the term - it cannot be denied that the
152
I
I I I
I I I
f
I I I I I I I
f
I
\
I
!
t
f
I
I
i
Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
fetus is a potential human being. This is true whether by 'human
being' we mean 'member of the species Homo sapiens' or a
rational and self-conscious being, a person. The strong second
premise of the new argument is, however, purchased at the cost
of a weaker first premise, for the wrongness of killing a potential
human being - even a potential person - is more open to challenge
than the wrongness of killing an actual human being.
It is of course true that the potential rationality, selfconsciousness
and so on of a fetal Homo sapiens surpasses that
of a cow or pig; but it does not follow that the fetus has a
stronger claim to life. There is no rule that says that a potential
X has the same value as an X, or has all the rights of an X.
There are many examples that show just the contrary. To pull
out a sprouting acorn is not the same as cutting down a venerable
oak. To drop a live chicken into a pot of boiling water
would be much worse than doing the same to an egg. Prince
Charles is a potential King of England, but he does not now
have the rights of a king.
In the absence of any general inference from 'A is a potential
X' to 'A has the rights of an X', we should not accept that a
potential person should have the rights of a person, unless we
can be given some specific reason why this should hold in this
particular case. But what could that reason be? This question
becomes especially pertinent if we recall the grounds on which,
in the previous chapter, it was suggested that the life of a person
merits greater protection than the life of a being who is not a
person. These reasons - from the indirect classical utilitarian
concern with not arousing in others the fear that they may be
the next killed, the weight given by the preference utilitarian
to a person's desires, Tooley's link between a right to life and
the capacity to see oneself as a continuing mental subject, and
the principle of respect for autonomy - are all based on the fact
that persons see themselves as distinct entities with a past and
future. They do not apply to those who are not now and never
153
Practical Ethics
have been capable of seeing themselves in this way. If these are
the grounds for not killing persons, the mere potential for becoming
a person does not count against killing.
It might be said that this reply misunderstands the relevance
of the potential of the human fetus, and that this potential is