Spaces:
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| [Japan] | |
| name = "Japan" | |
| description = """ | |
| Our results converge with qualitative and quantitative assessments of economic development (Bassino et al. | |
| (2019); Farris (2009); Nakabayashi et al. (2020)). | |
| We observe a rise of cultural production from the 7th c. (Nara era) to the 10th c. (Heian era) during which it is estimated that GDP per capita | |
| increased by 80% (Bassino et al. (2019); Nakabayashi et al. (2020)). We also observe a continuous rise of | |
| cultural production from the 16th c. onward during which it is estimated that population tripled (from 10 | |
| to 32 million people), GDP per capita increased by 80%, urbanization was multiplied by 5 from 2.5% to | |
| 12,5%, with the size of Tokyo and Osaka rivaling that of London or Paris (Bassino et al. (2019); Nakabayashi | |
| et al. (2020)). Whereas the previous estimates of the GDP per capita showed extended stagnancy between | |
| the ninth and 14th c., our results converge with the most recent study, showing a sharp decline in the 12th | |
| century and recovery from the 13th to 16th centuries (Nakabayashi et al. (2020)). | |
| In line with this study( Nakabayashi et al. (2020)), our results also suggest that the recovery of the economic development began in | |
| the 13th during the Kamakura shogunate, earlier than what was previously estimated. | |
| Our result also allows to have finer temporal estimation. For instance, we observe that the isolation of | |
| the country (the sakoku policy) starting in 1633 did not impact economic cultural production. At the other | |
| end of the period, we can see that cultural production was already very robust before the Meiji reforms | |
| (1868). | |
| Also, we document the relative importance of the Kanta and Kansai plains in Japanese history, and | |
| the progressive shift from the East to the West. Despite the political domination of the Kansai | |
| plain from the 13th onward, the shift in cultural production only occurred during the late 18th c. (Edo | |
| period). | |
| """ | |
| time_range = [800, 1800] | |
| ["Western Europe"] | |
| name = "Western Europe" | |
| description = """ | |
| The evolution of economic development during the late medieval and early modern period is well-known for | |
| Europe. Quantitative estimates exist for urbanization (Bosker et al. (2013)), GDP (Fouquet and Broadberry | |
| (2015)), wages (Allen et al. (2011); Humphries and Weisdorf (2019)), building activities (Buringh et al. (2020); | |
| Ljungqvist et al. (2022)), land use (Brugger et al. (2021)) or book production (Buringh and Van Zanden (2009)). | |
| Here, however, we are able to go deeper in time. The evolution of cultural production suggests that | |
| the low point of economic development in Europe is the 7th and 8th c. In line with qualitative observations | |
| by historians (Duby (1974); Le Goff (2009)) and economic historians (Izdebski et al. (2016); Milanovic | |
| (2013)), our results also suggest that Europe’s economic take-off would not have started with the Industrial | |
| Revolution, nor the Protestant Revolution, the Black Death or even the Renaissance of the 12th c. but could | |
| be traced back to the central medieval period (9th-11th). Specifically, the evolution of cultural production | |
| suggests that Europe experienced a first phase of growth that ends around 1200 followed by a short period of | |
| stagnation until 1350, a second phase of growth, stronger than before, until 1550, followed by a short period | |
| of stagnation and a third phase of growth starting in 1700. | |
| Second, cultural production has a higher resolution than existing estimate of economic production. We capture short and local periods of economic development such as the Siglo de Oro in Spain and | |
| Portugal (16th c.) and the ’Dutch Miracle’ age (17th c.). but also smaller periods of economic growth such | |
| as Carolingian Renaissance in France and Germany (9th c.), the Viking golden age in Scandinavia (9-10th | |
| c.), the Kievan Rus golden age in the Slavic world (12th c.) for which there are currently no quantitative | |
| data. We are also able to date the sequence of European regional development, with the phase of acceleration | |
| starting first in Western Europe (11th c. in France, Belgium, Italy, England), later in Germany (13th c.), in | |
| the Low countries (14th c.), in Scandinavia (15th), Eastern Europe and the Slavic world (16th c.). | |
| We can also detect the ’Little Divergence’ between Southwestern Europe and Northwestern Europe | |
| (De Pleijt and Van Zanden (2016); Fochesato (2018)). While both Southwestern Europe and Northwestern | |
| Europe experienced an increase in economic development during the medieval period, this dynamic seemed to | |
| have continued in Northwestern Europe but stopped in Southwestern Europe. Intra-European | |
| divergences are also visible, within Italy or within France between the Northern part, and the Southern | |
| Mediterranean part. | |
| """ | |
| time_range = [500, 1800] | |
| # This is a TOML configuration file example | |
| ["Chinese world"] | |
| name = "Chinese world" | |
| description = """ | |
| The economic history of the Chinese late Imperial period (960-1912) is relatively well studied, with quantita- | |
| tive estimates for urbanization (Xu et al. (2015)), per capita GDP (Broadberry et al. (2018); Solar (2021); Xu | |
| (2017)), book production (Xu (2017)) and wages (Allen et al. (2011)). | |
| The CPI is in line with existing works on economic development, suggesting several periods of high economic development during the Northern Song | |
| dynasty, the Yuan dynasty, the early Ming and the High Qing era, with decline during the Mongol invasion, | |
| the fall of the Ming dynasty, and the late Qing dynasty. | |
| It is worth noting that while the Song dynasty is often celebrated as China’s Golden Age (probably | |
| because of the contrast with the rather low level of development in Europe at the time), our estimate | |
| suggests that the Song dynasty is not the high point of China’s economic development periods. This is | |
| consistent with recent estimates of economic development (Broadberry et al. (2018)). This suggests that | |
| China was not trapped in economic stagnation during the last millennium, as has long been thought. Based | |
| on estimates of cultural production, economic development increased steadily during the last millennium, | |
| especially during the early modern period (Ming and high Qing periods). | |
| Just as for Europe, we are also able to go deeper in time, and explore the dynamics of the pre-Imperial | |
| (1046 BC - 256 BC) and Early Imperial period (256 BC - 960 CE). To the extent that CPI can be taken as a | |
| proxy for economic growth, our method provides the first quantitative assessment of economic development | |
| during the pre-Imperial and early Imperial periods. We observe two peaks of cultural production, the first | |
| during the late Han (25 - 220 CE), and the second, during the Tang Dynasty (619 - 907) (Von Glahn (2016)). | |
| Cultural production also allows us to capture the geographical shift in Chinese history. Here, | |
| cultural production is remarkably in line with population estimates, suggesting that the Southern part took | |
| over in terms global economic production around 1000 CE (Broadberry and Guan (2022); Chen and Kung | |
| (2022)). Interestingly, this is due to both a decline of the Northern part and a rise of the Southern part, in | |
| line with previous quantitative studies (Chen and Kung (2022)). | |
| """ | |
| ["Muslim world"] | |
| name = "Muslim world" | |
| description = """ | |
| The Middle-East and North-Africa (MENA) region experienced its golden age between the 8th and 14th | |
| centuries. It is traditionally equated with the beginning of the reign of Caliph Harun al-Rashid (786-809) | |
| and the inauguration of the House of Wisdom in Baghdad. Although there are some quantitative estimates | |
| of economic development, such as urbanization (Bosker et al. (2013)), per capita GDP (Pamuk and Shatzmiller | |
| (2014)) and various indirect cues of economic development such as taxes, wages, books, coin hoards, mills | |
| and cranes (Allen and Heldring (2022); Chaney (2016); Shatzmiller (2011); Van Bavel et al. (2018)), the | |
| exact dynamics of economic development are not well known. | |
| In line with existing scholarship about economic development, the CPI increase drastically during the | |
| 6th to 8th c. with the rise of the Islam. However, contrary to the common view about the decline | |
| of the Muslim world after the Golden Age, we do not observe a real decline in cultural production until | |
| at least the 12thc. This last result could be due to the fact that the dynamic of economic development | |
| was very different in the Arab speaking part and in the Persian speaking parts of the MENA region. | |
| Cultural production in the Arab areas developed earlier, during the very first Muslim dynasties, but | |
| was more volatile. The Abbasid peak in cultural production ends as early as 850 CE, but we also identify | |
| another peak during the 12th and 13th c. (the Fatimid dynasty). By contrast, cultural production in the | |
| Persian areas developed later, when they integrate the Abbasid Caliphate (9th c.). | |
| """ | |
| ["Indian world"] | |
| name = "Indian world" | |
| description = """ | |
| The evolution of economic development in India is not well known. There are no quantitative indicators | |
| (e.g. population, urbanization, wages, GDP estimates) for the ancient and medieval eras (Dyson (2018); | |
| Raychaudhuri et al. (1983)). | |
| Qualitative works suggest that India underwent a first period of economic growth during the Classical period (c. 320 – 650 CE). However, not much is known about the length and | |
| the intensity of this period of economic growth. The following period, the ’medieval period’ (650 - 1526 | |
| CE), is also very much unknown. It is hypothesized that population decreased or stagnated during the early | |
| medieval period, but increased slowly until the 17th c (Dyson (2018); Eaton (2019)). | |
| By contrast, cultural production is rather abundant. Sanskrit and Tamil literature developed during the | |
| first millennium, leading notably to the emergence of Tamil epics such as Cilappatikaram and Manimekalai, | |
| Sanskrit dramas with Kalidasa and Shri Harsha, fables collections with Vishnu Sharma and a vibrant scientific | |
| and philosophical tradition (Aryabhata, Brahmagupta, V ̄atsy ̄ayana). Also, during the medieval period, | |
| vernacular literatures gradually emerged and became more popular throughout India (Datta (1989)). | |
| Using this abundant cultural production as a proxy, our results confirms a first period of economic development | |
| around 600, a decrease during the early medieval period, and an increase from 1000 CE on to the modern | |
| period, that correspond to important change in Indian economy such as the transformation of vast tracts of land from jungle to fields of grain and the integration of tribal clans into the Hindu social | |
| order as castes (Eaton (2019)). | |
| In line with qualitative works (Habib (2011); Raychaudhuri et al. (1983)), we also document a decrease in cultural production during the medieval period that correspond to a decline in | |
| economic development, followed by a recovery and an increase in economic development during the early | |
| modern period. These results contribute to the debate about economic development in India during the early modern | |
| period (Parthasarathi (2005); Roy (2013)). Some studies suggest that wages and GDP per capita declined | |
| during this period (Allen et al. (2011); Broadberry et al. (2015b); De Zwart and Lucassen (2020)). By | |
| contrast, other works have revealed increasing levels of cultivation, commercialization and urbanization | |
| (Bayly (1988); Datta (1989); Dyson (2018); Eaton (2019); Mukherjee (2013)). The CPI is more in line with | |
| these later conclusions and further suggest two periods of economic growth, the first one during the golden | |
| age of the Delhi Sultanate (12th and 13th c.), the second from the 15th c. on, with a crisis during the 17th, | |
| possibly related to climate cooling (Dyson (2018)). Cultural production also suggests regional differences in | |
| economic development: during the medieval period, economic growth is higher in South India while during | |
| the modern period, economic growth is stronger in North India. | |
| """ | |
| ["mediterranean World"] | |
| name = "mediterranean World" | |
| description = """ | |
| The broad dynamics of the Greco-Roman economic development is relatively well-known( Morris (2013); | |
| Ober (2016); Ward-Perkins (2006)). However, quantitative estimates are very limited (Bowman and Wilson | |
| (2009, 2011); McConnell et al. (2018)). Furthermore, they tend to focus on the two periods of highest | |
| economic development, namely 4th c. BCE Greece and 1st c. Rome (Bowman and Wilson (2009)). | |
| Estimating cultural production allow us to go further. First, the Classical period (6th to 4th c. BCE) | |
| stands out as very productive. In fact, after the 4th c. BCE, the Greek world never managed | |
| to recover their level of cultural production, even during the peace of the early Roman Empire. Similar | |
| observations can be made for the Latin world. we observe a peak in cultural production during the Augustan | |
| era, with several lower peaks during the Nerva-Antonine dynasty (the co-called ”Five Good | |
| Emperors”), the Severan dynasty, and during the Constantinian dynasty, and a clear crisis during the third | |
| century (also known as the ”Military Anarchy”). | |
| These estimations of cultural production contribute to the debate about the existence of economic growth | |
| in the ancient world (Jongman (2014); Temin (2012)). Our results strongly suggest an increase in economic | |
| development during the Classical period in Greece, and during the Republican and early Imperial periods in | |
| Rome. These estimations also contribute to the debate about the absolute level of development of the Greek | |
| and Roman golden age Morris ((2010); Ober (2016); Temin (2012)). | |
| While the population of the Latin World during the 1st century was probably three of four more important than the population of the Greek world | |
| during the Classical period, the cultural production of the Latin world is lower than the cultural production | |
| of the Greek world. This is consistent with recent works emphasizing the unique level of Greek | |
| development in terms of urbanization, per capita production, living standards during the Athenian period | |
| (Ober (2016)). | |
| Our results also contribute to the debate about the decline of the ancient world. First, while some | |
| historians have proposed to rehabilitate the period Late Antiquity (Brown (1971)), with the development | |
| of the Western Civilization, our results suggest that the fall of the Antique civilization is rather brutal | |
| (especially in the West), in line with recent quantitative assessments (Harper (2017); Jongman (2007); | |
| Ward-Perkins (2006)). Second, the decline seems to occur very early on. In Greece, economic development | |
| starts declining during the 4th c. BCE, that is during the life of Aristotle, and before the war of Alexander. | |
| In Rome, economic development starts declining during the 1st c. CE, that is just at the beginning of the | |
| Empire. Third, declines are not monotonous. We observe partial recoveries during the Roman era, during | |
| the Antonine dynasty for the Greek world, and during the Severan and Valentinianic dynasties for the Latin | |
| world. | |
| """ | |