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SOUTH AFRICA’S LOW- |
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EMISSION |
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DEVELOPMENT |
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STRATEGY 2050 |
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February 2020 |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS |
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ACRONYMS ..ccecssssssssessssscessseessneccanecesnecesnecesneeesnneesnneees |
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.. .. Vill |
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1 INTRODUCTION... |
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TA ‘The global:climate:Crisis scissinnscsennuinimmmcsncnon usin cionennesommunenimamn onan 1 |
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1:2 ‘he Paris Agreement tisrcssssccsmnnsresnnnnnermn cn 2 |
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1.3. The Science of 1.5°C and what it means for the Paris gOalS......... i eeeceeseeeeseesteeseesesteetessesneentenees 3 |
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1.4 Methodological elements for developing LEDS ...0.....c eee 4 |
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1.5 South Africa LEDS — a living COCUMENE.........c.eecescesceseestsseeseesesesteseeseenesueseseeesesiseesseeaeeneeeeneetentenseneeneeaes 6 |
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2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY, EMISSIONS PROFILE AND POLICY LANDSCAPE .. .8 |
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21 -South:Aftica's Econom sscscscsnscarcconn mae 8 |
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2.1.1 — EMe@rgy SUPPLY... eseesceseeseesessesseseeseeseesesnesussnsaessesuesesensaeeaseneeueeeseesasensausaesaeseseeeensassnsensenseneeneaseesensaees 8 |
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2.1.2 Mining and the industrial S@CtOF 0... escseeseeseeseeseeeeseseeseeseeseenesnsseeaeeseseeeteetensenseseesetstenseneateaeeneeees 10 |
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2.1.3 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU)..00.. occ eeenesieaneeesnmenesieinanansenee 11 |
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214 Waste SOCIO «canneries neomncemimna ocean anmannamcemaramenaa 1 |
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21:5: Other sectors cna EER 11 |
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2.2 Greenhouse gas EMissions Profile 0... eee teseenesesteeeesnssnteeteeienneeniesiesenenssnsene 12 |
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2.3 Policy, legislation and strategies that inform SA-LEDS....0... cece eeeeeeeseseeteeieeeenneenesianeaneenee 14 |
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2.3.1 National Development Plan 2030 oo... eeeeeeesneeeesiesieneesesinesesnssmeetessennieaiesneeenananssne 15 |
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2.3.2 National Climate Change Response Policy . |
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2.3.9 Climate Change Bill ssssssisisesesenncanoreie sername |
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2.4 The role of sub-national government and the private SCCtOF wees testes 17 |
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2.4.1 Sub-national QOVErMMentt..........eccesceseesessessesseseeseeseeseeneseeeeeeesesuesnssessesseseeeteetsaseaseseneeneeeeeseneateeeeeeeees 17 |
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2.4.2 The contribution of the private SCCtOP...... ec eeceeeesesneetesteseeniesesineenesneeieateeenneeaieeiesenaneaneene 18 |
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2.5 Vulnerability and resilience ............cccceseeseesecesteseeseeseeseeseseeeeeeeeseeesssensseeaeeueensensaeeaseaseeeeeeeessenseneateaeeeeees 18 |
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3 VISION STATEMENT ....ssesssecsseesssesssecsneesnessnessneesnscsnscsnscsusesusesssesssessnecsusesnsssnsesusesusesusesnsceuesneessnesneeesneeseeeseeens 9 |
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A ‘GHG EMISSIGNS' MITIGATION MEASURES vevcosnmsscessnevarenensouemsemenrnenmserennnennrmenrnneT 21 |
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4.1 EMmergy SUPPLY... eeeeseeseeseeseseseseesesseesessesneeteaeeneenesecsessesucsusssseenesessasensaeeaesusensseeaeenssnesneaeenseeeeeeteatensenees 21 |
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4.1.1 Integrated Energy Plan... ccesceseeseeeceseseeseesecsesseseseesessesnssssnssesseeeesiseneseeaseeseseeeeneeeeeeseseneaneaeeeeaes 21 |
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4.1.2; ‘Integrated RESOUrCE PIAN esses ecweusccrerereeecmeerenercommreanseeeenucereneaeanner enna eenr iene 23 |
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41:3: Biofuelsopportunities vcesseorse sua sevemruneunner neem nra enema 26 |
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4.2 Energy: demand esseuswsverervemner rare nememmn nen nurmermres ancien momen ne eny esmureneer 27 |
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4.2.1 National Energy Efficiency Strategy... cece eeeeeesesesssesseseessessesseeseesuesnessiesnssesaseesesneeneeseeesease 27 |
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4.2.2 Support for uptake of Solar Water Heaters... ese eeeeeesseseestesteseeseesesntesesnesesaneesesneeneesieeneees 31 |
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4.2.3. National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act .......c..ceceeeccesesesteeeestestesteateateeeeeeees 31 |
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4.2.4 Promotion of Cleaner Mobility ...........cccccseeessessesteseesessesesesssessesseeeeneenseeeassissseeeeteeeseseseneeteneeeeaee 32 |
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AS INGUSUIY crvceresersys seen aerecenyrmameeurnrearerine |
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4.3.1 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). |
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4.3.2 Tax incentives for green project development ........... eesti |
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4.4 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU)...0.....ceeceeseeseseeesseseeseesssmetssssatseneesenneeneenieeneeee 36 |
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45 WaStC oneness iesienesesmeesesmenieeiesnienesnssenenssissnieaiesiinnnissussunenesessameaneesesnennieneenieen 37 |
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4.6 ChOSSeCUIIG MOBSUTES sere cc ct cceseccrwenen ean reunnrecere conten eenuneresieearcerereatevtnatect ra ventet ent vesroreniecotateeneaedeecereivers 39 |
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4.6.1 Carbon TaX sisisansusonanmpsoncnmmannennnnan ania nase ieonanaeY 39 |
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4.6.2 Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETS) sisicsnnmnnnmninnmmmnmininmnnmnmnemmmmnn 40 |
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4.6.3 Carbon Budgets... ccc eeesseseeseestsneseesisiesaesssemeiesssnmeaesisneenesssetaissnssnesaneesesneeanesieeneane 41 |
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4.6.4 Phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subSidieS/INCENtIVES occ es ceeeeseeseeseeseseseteetesneeneesteeneeee 41 |
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5 GOING FURTHER TO ACHIEVE THE PARIS GOALS ....escssescssecsssecesnesesneeesneeess 42 |
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5.1 Enhancing the vision for development ............cecsccccestesteseeseeeestestesteeeeeteeees |
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5.2 Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition... eects 44 |
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5.3 Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth ......... 46 |
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5.4 Providing broad access to fUNdS occ eeeeeeseeeeesieeieteeiesienesnsineissneenieeteeiesienssneenananeane 47 |
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5.4.1 Climate finance flows to date oo. eensieeeeeenesisieenenmeiessemeaieeeniennesnsenaneensenee 48 |
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5.4.2 Formalising climate finance Structures... csceeceseeseseeeesseseeseesesneeteseeieatessenneeniestesnteaneansenees 50 |
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54.3. Climate finance opportunities: cicmnnomnenumnimanemanmmnannamummamnmaiN 51 |
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5.5 — Driving innovation, research, and skills for future valUe CAPtUre ow... escent 54 |
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5.6 Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all... cece ieseenmeseieeiesesnieateeesnmenieaiesenaneansene 56 |
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5.7 Promoting sustainable development through education and culture................ 57 |
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5.8 Enhancing information and metrics .............0+ OT |
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS: PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION .....essseeessee 58 |
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6.1 Detailed sectoral work to explore transformation pathwayS ......... cscs 58 |
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6.2 Creation of policy package roadmaps across three phases 00... cseeeeeesneseetesseeneentesneseeneeaneenee 59 |
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7 REFERENCES ..esessssecsssecsssssessscessncssnecesnscesnscesnsscssnsessnecesusecssscesnuscsunsesansessnseesnucessnecesuseesneeesusessuneeesneeenneeesneess 63 |
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LIST OF FIGURES |
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Figure 1: SA-LEDS in the context of prior climate-related work in South Africa... 7 |
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Figure 2: Key contributors to GDP ou... ..eeseeseesecesessestesesseesesnesussnsaeeseeneenseesseeaeeaseaseeeensesensesaneneeneeieeneanentensenseneeees 8 |
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Figure 3: Contribution of main emission categories and energy emission categories to national gross greenhouse |
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GAS EMISSIONS 2015 ess cescevercexcesss een ereceer cero ereceeneerann ne ceeenteerecen verre ener ee earermreneeeeenyee pene eeaner ea 13 |
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Figure 4: Total gross national GHG emissions by economic sector . we 14 |
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Figure 5: South Africa’s Peak, Plateau, Decline Trajectory Range...........c.sccsescesesessseeeseseeseeetsnssnseneeteeteeeeeeees 20 |
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Figure 6: Sectoral energy deMANd oo. ce eceeeseeseesneeeeseseeseeseseeeteeesneeateeteseesessussnseenesnesnieaneesenneeaeeneesneese 22 |
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Figure 7: Share of installed capacity in the 2019 IRP in MW... eee eesneeseeseeseeeeesesneenteeneeneenenneeniees 25 |
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Figuiré:8: Domestic climate finahice (2015 2017) veccicceceacwmnvecerareeneeerereaveranveerinneeeeveneeronminnveernavenveneneiertarns 49 |
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LIST OF TABLES |
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Table 1: Strategic interventions outlined in South Africa’s National Adaptation Strategy 0... 19 |
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Table 2: Energy efficiency targets outlined in the post-2015 NEES oo... eeesessneseeteeseseeeenesiniesneenee 28 |
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Table 3: Measures outlined in the post-2015 NEES .0.... cee seseeesieeessmansseneeniesisenniansenee 29 |
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Table 4: Current institutional arrangements to address climate change response actionS.............cceseeeeeeee 45 |
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Table 5: The three phases of the just transition ............ |
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ACRONYMS |
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ADP |
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AFOLU |
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BRT |
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CA |
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CO2 |
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CoP |
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CSIR |
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CTL |
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DAFF |
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DBSA |
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DEA |
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DoE |
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DSI |
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GDP |
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GHG |
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GJ |
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GTL |
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GTS |
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GWh |
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HySA |
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IDC |
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IEP |
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IGCCC |
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Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action |
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Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use |
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Bus Rapid Transport |
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Conservation Agriculture |
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Carbon dioxide |
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Conference of the Parties |
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Council for Scientific and Industrial Research |
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Coal-to-Liquids |
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Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries |
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Development Bank of Southern Africa |
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Department of Environmental Affairs |
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Department of Energy |
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Department of Science and Innovation |
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Gross Domestic Product |
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Greenhouse Gas |
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Gigajoule |
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Gas-to-liquids (GTL) |
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Green Transport Strategy |
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Gigawatt hour |
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Hydrogen South Africa |
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Industrial Development Corporation |
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Integrated Energy Plan |
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Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change |
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IMCCC |
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IPAP |
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IPCC |
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IPP |
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IRP |
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Kfw |
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LEDS |
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LTAS |
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LTMS |
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MACC. |
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&E |
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MINMEC |
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MINTECH |
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MPA |
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MRF |
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t |
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t CO2-eq |
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W |
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ccc |
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NCCRP |
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NDC |
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NDP |
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EES |
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NEM:WA |
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Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change |
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Industrial Policy Action Plan |
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |
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Independent Power Producer |
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Integrated Resource Plan |
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German KfW Development Bank |
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Low-Emission Development Strategy |
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Long Term Adaptation Scenarios |
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Long Term Mitigation Scenarios |
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Marginal Abatement Cost Curve |
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lonitoring and Evaluation |
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Ministers and Members of Executive Councils |
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Ministerial Technical Advisory Body |
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itigation Potential Analysis |
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Material Recovery Facility |
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Megatonne |
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legatonne Carbon Dioxide Equivalent |
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Megawatt |
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ational Committee on Climate Change |
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National Climate Change Response Policy |
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Nationally Determined Contribution |
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National Development Plan |
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ational Energy Efficiency Strategy |
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National Environmental Management: Waste Act |
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NERSA |
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NEVA |
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NIPF |
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NPC |
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NTCSA |
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NWMS |
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PAMs |
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PCCCC |
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PJ |
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PPD |
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RE |
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REIPPPP |
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REDD |
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SACCS |
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SANS |
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SA-LEDS |
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SDG |
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SET |
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SJRP |
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STEP |
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STI |
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SWH |
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UN |
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UNESCO |
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National Energy Regulator of South Africa |
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National Employment Vulnerability Assessment |
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National Industrial Policy Framework |
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National Planning Commission |
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National Terrestrial Carbon Sinks Assessment |
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National Waste Management Strategy |
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Policies and Measures |
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Presidential Climate Change Coordinating Commission |
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Petajoule |
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Peak, Plateau and Decline |
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Renewable Energy |
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Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme |
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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation |
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South African Centre for Capture and Storage |
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South African National Standard |
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South Africa Low-Emission Development Strategy |
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Sustainable Development Goal |
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Sectoral Emissions Target |
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Sector Jobs Resilience Plan |
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Subtropical Thicket Ecosystem Project |
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Science, Technology and Innovation |
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Solar Water Heater |
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United Nations |
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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
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vi |
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UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
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WtE Waste-to-Energy |
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ZAR South African Rand |
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |
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INTRODUCTION |
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South Africa, like the rest of the world, is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In unmitigated greenhouse |
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gas (GHG) emissions scenarios, warming of up to 5 to 8°C is projected over the interior of the country by the end |
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of this century. Under a range of warming scenarios, drier conditions will be experienced in the west and south of |
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the country and wetter conditions in the east. Rainfall patterns will become more variable and unpredictable. |
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These changes will impact on water resources and food production, and increase the vulnerability of impoverished |
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communities, amongst others. The South African government thus regards climate change as a considerable |
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threat to the country and its socio-economic development. At the same time, if climate change is to be limited |
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through limiting the growth in global GHG emissions, with South Africa contributing its fair share to emission |
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reductions, there will be other implications for the country. As one of the top 20 global emitters, with a high |
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dependency on fossil fuels, substantial emission cuts will be required. The rapid transition that will be required |
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presents a potential risk to economic growth and sustainable development if not managed properly. |
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Through the Paris Agreement, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
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(UNFCCC) have agreed to limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre- |
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industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”. Article |
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4 of the Agreement sets out Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as the instrument countries must |
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develop to present their part of the global effort to “reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon |
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as possible... on the basis of equity and “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate |
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poverty”. To help ensure that the Parties’ national contributions can jointly achieve the collective goal, the Article |
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further states that “Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission |
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development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities |
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and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances’. |
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This document has been prepared in response to that Article, and presents South Africa’s first Low Emission |
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Development Strategy (SA-LEDS). Through submitting this document to the UNFCCC our country reiterates its |
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commitment to achieving the Paris goals. Implementation of the Strategy will also contribute directly and indirectly |
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to the meeting of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). |
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SA-LEDS builds upon years of work on climate change in the country, which has contributed to the establishment |
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of an important set of policy documents. Building on existing plans offers numerous benefits, such as optimizing |
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resources and ensuring buy-in of key stakeholders. Three key climate policy documents provide the foundation |
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on which SA-LEDS has been developed. These are: |
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e The National Development Plan (NDP): With an overarching objective of eliminating poverty and |
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reduce inequality by 2030, the NDP outlines a set of goals and actions to meet the country’s |
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environmental sustainability and resilience needs, and dedicates a full chapter to “Environmental |
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Sustainability - An equitable transition to a low-carbon economy”. |
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e The National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) represents government's comprehensive |
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policy framework for responding to climate change, including provisions for adaptation and mitigation. |
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e The Climate Change Bill (forthcoming) will form the legislative foundation for the climate change |
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adaptation and mitigation response. With respect to mitigation, the Bill provides for future review and |
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determination of the national greenhouse gas emissions trajectory; determination of sectoral emissions |
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targets for emitting sectors and subsectors; and allocation of carbon budgets. It also makes provision |
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for the development of plans to phase down or phase out the use of synthetic greenhouse gases - in |
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line with the Kigali Amendments to the Montreal Protocol. |
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Various other strategies, policies and sector plans have been developed for individual sectors of the economy, |
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which will all contribute to driving emission reductions. These are detailed in later sections of this document to |
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outline the set of discrete measures which serve as a starting point for implementation of the LEDS. At the same |
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time, many of these plans were developed prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and do not consider the |
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long-term, global goals in a coordinated manner and address a shorter timeframe than mid-century. Keeping SA- |
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LEDS as a dynamic and flexible document is important to ensure it keeps pace with domestic policy |
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developments, research, development and innovation, and declining costs of emissions mitigation technologies. |
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Notable here is a process being undertaken by the National Planning Commission (NPC) to develop a common |
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vision for the country in 2050. This vision will be instrumental in driving harmonisation of government plans and |
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policies and so it is important that the NPC process and vision takes into account the Paris goals. |
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In addition to policies and measures being implemented by national government, many sub-national (provincial |
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and local) government departments are undertaking activities that contribute to the national mitigation, adaptation |
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and resilience efforts. Sub-national activities have, however, not yet been aligned or coordinated, and different |
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geographical locations see different levels of activity. A diverse range of actions that contribute to GHG emissions |
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mitigation is also being seen across the private sector, with significant gains having been made in certain sectors |
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on both energy efficiency and emissions mitigation. |
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Although this strategy focuses primarily on greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, the vulnerability to climate |
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change impacts, as well as the need to build resilience to these impacts is noted, and will be further elaborated |
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in future iterations of SA-LEDS. South Africa has developed a National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy that |
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highlights nine key vulnerability areas for the country which acts as a complement to this document. |
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VISION STATEMENT |
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The stated vision for SA-LEDS is as follows: |
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South Africa follows a low-carbon growth trajectory while making a fair contribution to the |
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global effort to limit the average temperature increase, while ensuring a just transition and |
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building of the country’s resilience to climate change |
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In the absence of an agreed quantitative articulation of the vision, the Peak, Plateau, Decline Emissions Trajectory |
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Range, as reflected in the NCCRP and NDP, is used as the benchmark against which the performance of SA- |
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LEDS will be measured. The Climate Change Bill, described later, makes provision for regular updates of this |
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trajectory, through which it can be better placed within the context of the Paris Agreement. The outcomes of the |
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National Planning Commission process to develop a common vision for the country in 2050 will be used to update |
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SA-LEDS once released. In the development of the vision, South Africa will give due consideration to the IPCC |
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Special Report on 1.5°C, which represents the latest available science regarding this goal. |
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GHG EMISSIONS MITIGATION MEASURES |
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The strategy centres on measures currently being implemented by government to address mitigation across the |
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four key sectors of the economy, namely energy, industry, AFOLU and waste. It also presents planned cross- |
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sectoral measures that will contribute to driving mitigation action. As indicated previously, many of the measures |
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address only the short term, and are not considered transformational. South Africa puts these forward as a starting |
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point from which to ratchet up our future ambition towards more integrated, transformational strategy. |
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Energy supply |
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Decarbonisation of energy supply will largely be driven through the: |
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e Integrated Energy Plan, which analyses current energy supply and demand trends within the different |
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sectors of the economy, across all energy carriers. It then uses this information along with assumptions |
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about future demand and technology evolution to project the country’s future energy requirements under |
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a variety of different scenarios, including those with emissions limits and carbon prices. |
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Integrated Resource Plan, which guides the evolution of the South African electricity supply sector, in |
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that it identifies the preferred electricity generation technologies to be built to meet projected electricity |
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demand. It thus provides a mechanism for Government to drive the diversification of the country’s |
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electricity generation mix and promote the use of renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. |
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Biofuels Opportunities, offered through the Biofuels Industrial Strategy of 2007 (yet to be implemented) |
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and second and third generation biofuels technologies that could potentially increase the volumes of |
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biofuel that could be produced, without competing with food products for feedstocks. |
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Energy demand |
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SA-LEDS supports the implementation of a selection of measures to reduce energy demand, or limit growth in |
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energy demand, as the economy and population grows: |
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The National Energy Efficiency Strategy: In 2005, the Department of Energy launched the first National |
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Energy Efficiency Strategy (NEES). Building on this document, the Department of Minerals and Energy |
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is finalizing the post-2015 NEES, which outlines a set of goals for energy efficiency improvements across |
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the economy to 2030. The NEES also identifies a set of measures to be implemented in each sector to |
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achieve the stated targets. The Post-2015 NEES makes provision for a review every five years. |
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Support for increased uptake of Solar Water Heaters: Solar Water Heaters (SWH) partially offset use |
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of electricity for water heating in middle- and high-income households, and can service low-income |
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households that did not previously have ready access to hot water or used fuels other than electricity for |
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water heating. Since 2005 a number of goals have been set, and associated support programmes have |
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been established to drive uptake of SWH, with the NDP introducing a goal of five million SWHs by 2030. |
|
The National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act: To further efforts to decrease |
|
energy consumption and associated GHG emissions of new commercial and residential buildings, the |
|
government has implemented energy efficiency and energy consumption standards under the National |
|
Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act. The first of these is South African National Standard |
|
(SANS) 204 - Energy Efficiency in Buildings. This standard “specifies the design requirements for energy |
|
efficiency in buildings and of services in buildings with natural environmental control and artificial |
|
ventilation or air conditioning systems.” The second, SANS 10400-XA — Energy Usage in Buildings, |
|
|
|
includes the provisions of SANS 204 and others, providing a standard for energy efficient buildings. |
|
|
|
xi |
|
e Promotion of cleaner mobility: Emissions from energy supply in the transport sector are addressed |
|
through a number of policy documents. The 2007 Public Transport Strategy sets out an action plan for |
|
accelerated modal shifts and for the development of integrated rapid public transport networks. Since |
|
then, the successful implementation of the bus rapid transport (BRT) system in Johannesburg has led to |
|
it being adapted and implemented in other major South African cities, with further roll-outs being planned. |
|
In 2018 the Green Transport Strategy (GTS) to 2050 was launched. The GTS provides the strategic |
|
direction for the transport sector regarding the reduction of GHG emissions, the contribution of transport |
|
to the green economy and the promotion of sustainable mobility. The Strategy aims to support reductions |
|
in the contribution of the transport sector to national greenhouse gas emissions through interventions that |
|
include local electric vehicle and battery production and roll out of solar powered charging stations; |
|
continued use of fuel economy norms and standards for fuel efficiency and GHG emissions of vehicles; |
|
and facilitating a shift of freight from road to rail. In September 2010 a COz tax was introduced on the |
|
selling price of new motor vehicles that exceed a certain emissions limit. |
|
|
|
Industry |
|
|
|
Two sets of policies that directly and indirectly support emissions reductions in the industrial sector are identified, |
|
beyond those that target energy efficiency. The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), the implementation plan |
|
for the National Industrial Policy Framework, is revised at various intervals. The most recent revision, which covers |
|
the period 2018/19 to 2020/21, provides updates on key focus areas within the industrial sector, one of which is |
|
green industry investment. The implementation of technologies with potential for contribution to emissions |
|
reductions in the industrial sector is also supported by various tax incentives, contained in the Income Tax Act. |
|
Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) |
|
|
|
Mitigation actions identified in the AFOLU sector include Policies and Measures developed by line departments |
|
including the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF)'. These include the draft Climate Change |
|
Adaptation and Mitigation Plan for the South African Agricultural and Forestry sectors, the Conservation |
|
|
|
Agriculture Policy and the Agroforestry Strategic Framework for South Africa. |
|
|
|
1 Note that with a government restructure Forestry and Fisheries has now been combined with Environmental Affairs, while Agriculture |
|
has been combined with agriculture and the department of rural development and land reform. The implications of this restructuring on |
|
policy implementation has not yet been considered. |
|
|
|
xii |
|
Waste |
|
|
|
Waste management activities are legislated through the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, with |
|
further policy direction being provided through the National Waste Management Strategy (NWMS). The Strategy |
|
adopts the waste management hierarchy of waste avoidance and reduction, re-use, recycling, recovery, treatment |
|
and disposal, activities which potentially contribute to a reduction in emissions from material life cycles2. |
|
Subsequent to the Waste Act and NWMS, twenty national waste management initiatives and annual targets have |
|
been established through a process known as the Waste Phakisa. Of the initiatives, five are likely to have direct |
|
and indirect impacts on the total national greenhouse gas emissions. The importance of circular economy thinking |
|
|
|
in guiding the Waste Phakisa initiatives is recognised. |
|
Cross-Cutting Measures |
|
|
|
In addition to the measures specific to individual sectors described, four cross-cutting measures that will support |
|
|
|
low carbon development are in various stages of being implemented. |
|
|
|
e Carbon Tax: The Carbon Tax Act was brought into effect from 1 June 2019, which gives effect to the |
|
“polluter pays principle” and aims to price carbon by internalising the negative costs of emitting GHGs. |
|
The tax rate is set at R120 per tonne of COz-eq. To allow businesses time for transition, a basic tax-free |
|
allowance of 60% will initially apply to all emissions, with further allowances depending on the activities. |
|
The tax structure will be revised post-2021 to align with the proposed mandatory carbon budgets. |
|
|
|
e Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs): The national emissions trajectory will be translated into Sectoral |
|
Emission Targets or SETs, which are quantitative greenhouse gas emission targets allocated to an |
|
emitting sector or sub-sector, over a defined time period. Individual national government departments will |
|
be tasked with developing and implementing Policies and Measures (PAMs) to ensure emissions from |
|
within a sector or sub-sector remain within SET limits. |
|
|
|
e Carbon Budgets: Carbon Budgets set a maximum volume of emissions from certain activities that |
|
individual entities are allowed to emit over three rolling five-year periods. By assigning a Carbon Budget |
|
to an entity, a signal is provided as to the degree of GHG mitigation that is required within a specific time |
|
period, with a penalty being imposed if the budget allocation is exceeded. Furthermore, by providing |
|
|
|
entities with an understanding of how budgets are likely to be assigned in future phases to keep overall |
|
|
|
2 Emissions savings achieved through actions in the waste sector will not all be reflected in that sector's inventory, however they may |
|
contribute indirectly to national emissions savings. |
|
|
|
xill |
|
national emissions within the bounds of the national emissions trajectory, which will continue to be revised |
|
downward in keeping with the Paris Agreement, they are sensitised to how mitigation requirements may |
|
change in the future. The system thereby provides an opportunity for entities to plan ahead. |
|
|
|
e Phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies/incentives: As a member of the G20, where countries |
|
have committed to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, South Africa has indicated willingness to |
|
identify and minimise their harmful impacts, taking cognisance of its developmental state. South Africa |
|
should consider participating in a fossil fuel subsidy peer review within the G20 framework to facilitate |
|
the sharing of experience and mutual learning among G20 members as the next step in identifying |
|
|
|
inefficient fossil subsidies within the economy. |
|
GOING FURTHER TO ACHIEVE THE PARIS GOALS |
|
|
|
A set of stand-alone, sector-based policies and measures as well as a selection of cross-cutting interventions that |
|
government is busy implementing has been presented above. However, a broad range of structural changes will |
|
be necessary, in order to ensure the global economy achieves carbon neutrality within the second half of the |
|
century. Changes will be required in terms of service demand, technology fleet, infrastructure, operating practice, |
|
and energy sources, for all sectors of activity. As South Africa continues to strengthen its response to climate |
|
change as part of a global effort, it will increase its focus on a range of strategic elements that will together promote |
|
the change to low carbon growth, while continuing to align with the goals of the Paris Agreement. These relate |
|
|
|
to: |
|
|
|
e Enhancing the vision for development, including revising the emissions trajectory to reflect a fair |
|
contribution to the global achievement of the Paris Agreement |
|
|
|
e Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition |
|
|
|
e Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth |
|
|
|
e Providing broad access to funds |
|
|
|
e Driving innovation, research, and skills for future value capture |
|
|
|
e Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all |
|
|
|
e Promoting sustainable development through education and culture |
|
|
|
e Enhancing information and metrics |
|
|
|
Each of these is elaborated upon in the main body of the document. |
|
|
|
xiv |
|
CONCLUDING REMARKS: PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION |
|
|
|
SA-LEDS sets out a direction of travel for South Africa as we refine our low carbon emission development pathway |
|
to meet our commitments to the international community and address our developmental agenda/priorities and |
|
needs. We know that success will require decades of dedicated effort. Therefore, this Strategy is a living |
|
|
|
document, the beginning of our journey towards ultimately reaching a net zero carbon economy by 2050. |
|
|
|
The first step will thus be to ensure national targets are aligned with the Paris Agreement. Thereafter, planning |
|
teams with analytical and sectoral expertise will engage in detailed scenario work to develop transformation |
|
pathways towards achieving the national targets. Building a scenario is, however, not enough to plan for its |
|
delivery. The work of translating such a plan to policy is a challenge which all Parties will have to grapple with |
|
over the coming months and years. South Africa aims to inform rollout plans through the use of a dedicated |
|
change framework. SA-LEDS will thus be reviewed at least every five years or earlier, should there be significant |
|
changes in sectoral or national plans/programmes that can result in a big structural changes, growth or decay of |
|
|
|
the economy and major global events that impact on its content or implementation. |
|
Detailed sectoral work to explore transformation pathways |
|
|
|
The Paris Agreement sets out the long-term climate change goals for the international community. While countries |
|
establish their own goals in a nationally determined manner, sectoral details will have to be analyzed in significant |
|
detail, laying out different scenarios to understand trajectories of investment, technology take-up, emissions |
|
|
|
reduction, and market change. This work has already commenced in South Africa through a number of studies: |
|
|
|
e The Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA), the overall objective of which was to conduct an updated, |
|
bottom-up assessment of mitigation potential in key economic sectors to identify a set of viable options |
|
for reducing GHGs. Marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) for key sectors and subsectors were |
|
constructed. The MACCs provide estimates of mitigation potential and marginal abatement costs for |
|
broad mitigation measures. Estimates of national mitigation potential have been derived from the sectoral |
|
MACCs and ranked in terms of level of implementability at national level for each of the technologies. |
|
|
|
e The Pathways study to explore the impact of alternative economic growth trajectories on the country’s |
|
emissions trajectory, looking at the implementation of structural changes rather than the implementation |
|
of purely technical interventions. This study, which also used the single national emissions model, had |
|
|
|
not been released at the time of writing of this document. |
|
|
|
XV |
|
e The Policies and Measures (PAMs) analysis, which explored the impact of existing PAMs, many of which |
|
|
|
were identified previously, on the emissions trajectory. |
|
|
|
Itis recognized that detailed forecasting is unlikely to accurately predict the evolution of markets. However, “failing |
|
to plan is planning to fail’, which is why systematic planning is recommended for all sectors. Common |
|
characteristics between scenarios that succeed and those that do not will help policymakers identify those |
|
conditions which must be met in order for the transition to succeed, aligned with Paris in a manner consistent with |
|
the latest science from the IPCC. Based on the sectoral pathways work, which will identify the requirements of |
|
the different sectors, a cross-cutting analysis of such pathways will help identify common needs. An aggregate |
|
understanding of the evolution over time of such critical factors such as levels of capital investment, consumer |
|
prices of different energy options, and requirements for skilled workers in various industries (increasing and |
|
|
|
decreasing), will set out the parameters for the cross-cutting strategies described previously. |
|
Creation of policy package roadmaps across three phases |
|
|
|
The likelihood of policy action leading to long-term transformation results would require the application of new |
|
planning techniques. Pathway planning is an analytical tool that can inform national policy development over time |
|
towards objectives that sit beyond a typical policy horizon. Pathways visualize the whole timespan between the |
|
present and the time for which a target is set, seeking to establish what steps make sense now in the context of |
|
reaching the long-term goal. When establishing potential pathways, the desired end-state should be linked to the |
|
present, by “backcasting” rather than forecasting. This means that requirements for intermediate steps between |
|
today and the long-term goal are deduced not on the basis of how compatible they may be with the current |
|
context, but rather in terms of what is required for the end-state to be achieved. This leads policy-makers to |
|
consider the question “what would have to be true” regarding short and medium-term checkpoints, deriving the |
|
|
|
answer from the evolution to the goal. |
|
|
|
Once pathways are clearly drawn out, regulatory, institutional, or other structural changes which are required for |
|
the transformation can be identified, from which necessary changes can be deduced and used to suggest |
|
concrete policy action. In this manner, a rigorous pathway analysis towards a long-term target can produce a |
|
number of concrete actions which must be carried out by a certain time, to enable other actions. It can be helpful |
|
to structure the time interval into three parts: short, medium and long-term, organising and communicating such |
|
|
|
actions on a three-stage timeline. These stages are: |
|
|
|
xvi |
|
e Starting Right (to be completed prior to end of 2021 financial year) |
|
e Turning the Corner (to begin in parallel with the Starting Right stage and continue to 2025) |
|
e Massive Rollout (2025 to 2050) |
|
|
|
“Starting Right’ will focus on actions relating to the current government administration, or perhaps also address |
|
the initial years of the following one. The most important aspect of this stage is to ensure that a true transition is |
|
kicked off. On the one hand, rapid implementation must begin in all areas where pathways to achieving the Paris |
|
Goals are already clear while on the other, steps taken will need to enable future action at scale, as much as (or |
|
perhaps more than) drive immediate emissions reductions. Clearly, “Starting Right” cannot be successfully |
|
executed without a long-term pathways analysis to provide confidence on the Paris-compatibility of implemented |
|
measures as well as the overall direction of travel. Indeed, the search for immediate emissions reductions in the |
|
short-term can often lead to investments in technologies or business models which, while emitting less than |
|
traditional options, are not on track to drive the large reductions demanded by the long-term transformation. |
|
|
|
Avoiding decisions which will lead to emissions lock-in is thus a core priority of the “Starting Right” stage. |
|
|
|
“Turning the Corner” would typically take five to seven years. This phase will begin to be implemented in parallel |
|
with the “Starting Right” stage, where appropriate, and continue to 2025. This period is decisive, since within it |
|
new decision and investment criteria are broadly applied, bringing about changes to the day-to-day operation of |
|
many sectors of the economy at the same time. Resistance to change can become challenging if not well handled, |
|
and must be anticipated and addressed with social acceptance and just transition actions. It is at this stage that |
|
multiple policies will need to work in concert for the new technological options to make economic sense for |
|
businesses and consumers. An overall understanding of the sectoral narratives of change and how they |
|
|
|
collectively feed into the national vision will be core to the success of this stage. |
|
|
|
“Massive rollout” is the final phase, in which low-emissions climate resilient options have become the new normal. |
|
The constant application of transformative action will drive large volumes of investment towards transformational |
|
change. Perseverance on the application of all aspects of change will be required to avoid imbalances or injustices |
|
which will compromise the change, and sectors which achieve important milestones must not be allowed to |
|
become complacent, but rather contribute to the broader change by supporting areas of natural synergy. |
|
Examples of activities that might be taken during the three phases of implementation of the transition are shown |
|
in the Table below. All along the way provision needs to be made for regular review of the Strategy and the |
|
|
|
implementation plan, and M&E of implementation. |
|
|
|
xvii |
|
Table E1: The three phases of the just transition |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Starting Right |
|
(start immediately |
|
and complete by |
|
end of 2020/21 |
|
financial year) |
|
|
|
Start the process of developing long term plans for each sector, to avoid lock-in to emissions |
|
intensive infrastructure and establish the basis for transformation at scale |
|
|
|
Develop approaches for allocation of Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs) and carbon budgets to |
|
high emitting entities |
|
|
|
Develop Sector Jobs Resilience Plans (SJRPs) to support the transition to the low carbon |
|
economy and climate resilient society in a Just manner |
|
|
|
Identify the institutional, legislative, finance and other changes required to achieve the |
|
transformation |
|
|
|
Develop an understanding of the relevant government decisions which need to be taken to |
|
achieve the long-term plans |
|
|
|
Develop a monitoring plan |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Turning the corner |
|
(start immediately, |
|
as _ appropriate, |
|
and complete by |
|
2025) |
|
|
|
Develop and begin to implement detailed transformation plans for each sector, which is |
|
supported by the implementation of the SETs, carbon budgets and SJRPs |
|
|
|
Develop investment pathways to support the transformation |
|
|
|
Implement foundational changes to drive down the national trajectory |
|
|
|
Implement the institutional changes to accelerate the rate of transformation and remove barriers |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Massive _ roll-out |
|
|
|
(to 2050) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Roll-out the implementation plans for each sector along with measures to support changes until |
|
they become the new reality |
|
Refine strategies as required, to account for changes in technologies, society and markets |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Successful rollout across the three stages will require policy action to be taken in a coordinated manner. It is |
|
|
|
helpful to present policies not as stand-alone actions but rather as parts of policy packages, combinations of |
|
|
|
measures which may include planning, regulatory, financial, and other instruments to collectively drive towards |
|
|
|
the desired outcome, providing capabilities and overcoming barriers to change. Complementarity and sequencing |
|
|
|
are both crucial to building effective policy packages. Proposed components of policy packages could include |
|
|
|
those that focus on planning; institutional / regulatory considerations; project implementation; financing; |
|
|
|
acceptance, skills and just transition; and avoiding lock-in. Policy packages should be built up in sequence over |
|
|
|
time to ensure the full implementation of the pathway, in the form of a policy pathway which is required to |
|
|
|
implement the low-carbon transition. |
|
|
|
xviii |
|
|
|
|
|
1 INTRODUCTION |
|
|
|
1.1. The global climate crisis |
|
|
|
Robust scientific evidence shows that the earth’s climate system is changing as a result of anthropogenic |
|
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere have been rising steadily since |
|
the industrial revolution (circa 1760), mainly as a result of the burning of fossil fuels, industrial processes, |
|
deforestation and agricultural activities. An extensive global body of research from climate scientists has |
|
confirmed the relationship between human-induced GHG emissions, higher global average surface temperatures |
|
and changes to the earth’s climate system (IPCC, 2014; IPCC, 2018). |
|
|
|
If current trends continue, global average temperatures are likely to increase by at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial |
|
levels between 2030 and 2052. The impacts associated with such temperature increases are significant and far- |
|
reaching; threatening people and ecosystems. The impacts, which become more severe the greater the |
|
temperature increase, include sea level rise as a result of melting polar ice and glaciers, increases in the frequency |
|
and severity of extreme weather events, changing ecosystems and desertification, ocean acidification, and loss |
|
of biodiversity. The knock-on effects on human populations include health risks due to increasing temperatures |
|
and heatwaves, water shortages, food insecurity, increased spread of diseases and pests as well as damage to |
|
|
|
infrastructure due to extreme weather events. All of these impacts have economic repercussions (IPCC, 2014). |
|
|
|
The severity of impacts is not only a function of the magnitude and rate of warming that is experienced, but also |
|
geographic location and levels of development and vulnerability. Along with other developing nations, South Africa |
|
is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In unmitigated GHG emissions scenarios, warming of |
|
up to 5 to 8°C is projected over the interior of the country by the end of this century. Under a range of warming |
|
scenarios, drier conditions will be experienced in the west and south of the country and wetter conditions in the |
|
east. Rainfall patterns will become more variable and unpredictable. These changes will impact on water |
|
resources and food production, and increase the vulnerability of impoverished communities, amongst others |
|
(DEA, 2013). For this reason, the South African government regards climate change as a considerable threat to |
|
the country and its socio-economic development, having the potential to undermine many of the advances made |
|
in recent years. At the same time, if climate change is to be limited through limiting the growth in global GHG |
|
emissions, with South Africa contributing its fair share to emission reductions, there will be other implications for |
|
|
|
the country. As one of the top 20 emitters globally, with a high dependency on fossil fuels, substantial emission |
|
cuts will be required. The rapid transition that will be required presents a potential risk to economic growth and |
|
|
|
sustainable development if not managed properly. |
|
|
|
1.2 The Paris Agreement |
|
|
|
The international community has a long history of working to address the climate challenge. The United Nations |
|
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 to "stabilize greenhouse gas |
|
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the |
|
Climate system". All 197 member states of the UN are parties to the Convention, and South Africa ratified the |
|
|
|
Convention in August 1997. |
|
|
|
Annual Conferences of the Parties (or COPs) have achieved different milestones since the first meeting in 1994. |
|
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, set out the first concrete emissions reductions targets, which were adopted |
|
by some Annex | (developed) countries. However, these reductions were insufficient to stop climate change. A |
|
global deal, seeking to involve all countries, was pursued at COP 15 in 2009 but was not achieved, leaving many |
|
Parties concerned about the complexity of agreeing such a deal. At COP 17, held in Durban, South Africa in 2011, |
|
the “Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” (ADP) was established to "develop a |
|
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all |
|
Parties". The work of the ADP culminated in the drafting of the text which was negotiated and ultimately adopted |
|
|
|
in 2015 by the Parties to the Convention, including South Africa, as the Paris Agreement. |
|
|
|
In the Paris Agreement, Parties collectively agree to limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well |
|
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre- |
|
industrial levels”. Article 4 of the Agreement sets out Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as the |
|
instrument countries must develop to present their part of the global effort to “reach global peaking of greenhouse |
|
gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and |
|
to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance |
|
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of |
|
this century, on the basis of equity and “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty” |
|
(UNFCCC, 2015). |
|
|
|
In order to help ensure that the Parties’ national contributions can jointly achieve the collective goal, the Article |
|
further states that “Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission |
|
|
|
development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities |
|
and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”. This document has been prepared in |
|
|
|
response to that Article. |
|
|
|
1.3 The Science of 1.5°C and what it means for the Paris goals |
|
|
|
At the time of adoption of the Paris Agreement there was limited scientific literature available regarding the goal |
|
of 1.5°C, making it difficult for Parties to gauge the effort required of their NDCs to achieve it. Parties therefore |
|
invited the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide a special report on the impacts of global |
|
warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, and the related global greenhouse gas emission pathways. This |
|
Special Report, published in 2018, sets out the latest available science for countries to refer to when planning |
|
|
|
their implementation of the Agreement (IPCC, 2018). |
|
|
|
The Special Report makes clear the scale of the challenge facing all Parties in achieving the objectives of the |
|
Paris Agreement. With regards to the temperature goal, it shows that every tenth of a degree centigrade in |
|
warming makes a significant difference to the impacts on people and ecosystems, making 1.5°C of warming much |
|
more closely aligned with the objective of the Convention, than 1.6°C, 1.6°C preferable to 1.7°C, and so on. |
|
Furthermore, the Special Report shows that, to be consistent with 1.5°C, global CO2 emissions by 2030 must be |
|
about 45% lower than those of 2010, reaching net zero emissions around 2050. Since global emissions have |
|
continued to grow practically every year since the convention was signed, despite climate efforts to date, anumber |
|
of important in-depth changes will have to take place very quickly around the world for this to be credible. The |
|
IPCC describes these as “deep emissions reductions” in energy, industrial, urban, agricultural, and land |
|
management systems, which will transform key aspects of the world economy (IPCC, 2018). For this to succeed, |
|
|
|
the coming decade will be decisive. |
|
|
|
The challenge of incorporating this rapid transformation into country plans must be resolved in a nationally |
|
determined manner. Developed countries, which have committed to take the lead, must rapidly change the nature |
|
of their investments both nationally and internationally to avoid locking in emissions. At the same time, the scale |
|
|
|
of the reductions required means developing countries must also start to implement transformational changes. |
|
|
|
For example, if a developing country were to commit to the target of 45% emissions reduction in double the time |
|
recommended by the IPCC (which could be consistent with the IPCC global scenario provided developed |
|
countries acted much earlier), and at the same time maintained a dynamic economic growth to reduce poverty, |
|
that country’s emissions intensity per unit of GDP by the year 2042 would need to be under a quarter of its present |
|
|
|
value. This has very clear implications: for developing as well as developed countries, before 2050 the core |
|
technologies in operation must be fundamentally different from today’s. This is because there is no technological |
|
scenario possible which achieves such a reduction while maintaining electric power primarily generated from coal, |
|
oil or gas (without carbon capture), or in which passenger transport is provided primarily by petrol/diesel internal |
|
combustion engine vehicles. Fossil fuel participation in power generation, where still present, will be only a minor |
|
share of the total, and will continue to decline. Urban infrastructure and planning will have reduced the demand |
|
for passenger kilometers travelled per person for a broad range of activities, and these will be provided far more |
|
through shared platforms than today (be these traditional public transport, or new asset types serving through |
|
innovative business models). The majority of these passenger kilometers will be provided by zero-emissions |
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vehicles/platforms, with energy supplied from renewable sources. |
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The availability of sustainable bioenergy and biomaterials will be limited by global constraints of forest coverage, |
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biodiversity, and food security. These products must be channeled to applications with limited alternatives (such |
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as long-haul aviation), reducing their potential availability as a drop-in substitute for fossil fuels in the bulk of |
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traditional power, energy, or transport applications. Industrial and commercial energy use will incentivise resource |
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efficiency at every turn, with service fulfilment models and product specification, design, and production processes |
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all re-engineered to practically eliminate emissions. |
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1.4 Methodological elements for developing LEDS |
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The broad scope of change required to achieve the Paris Agreement presents several important planning |
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challenges and opportunities. The LEDS planning process provides a space for Parties to use to reflect upon how |
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their national plans can achieve emissions pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement, within their common |
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but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. While the timelines, targets and sectorial details of |
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the transformation will vary by country, the expectation is that all targets should follow a downward trajectory. To |
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achieve such a trajectory, transformational rather than incremental change is needed: while most national policies |
|
aim to effect limited change within one area of national life over a timeframe of one to five years, the transformation |
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described in the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees will require planning over a 30-year timeframe to ensure |
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broad-based change across all sectors in a coordinated manner. |
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The decisive change of operating technologies requires a concerted, planned effort if it is to occur in an |
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economically rational manner over such a short timeframe. The timing dimension is crucial. While 2050 may seem |
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a long way off for citizens going about their daily life, or indeed in terms of changing government administrations, |
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the speed of technological change is determined by the lifetime of assets and their rate of replacement. If we |
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consider power generation plants which consume coal, many of these can operate 30 or 40 years after |
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commissioning, and while an internal combustion engine vehicle lifetime may extend to 15 years in the |
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industrialized world, vehicles of 25 years of age or more can be regularly seen on the streets of Africa. Investments |
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in city and transport infrastructure are also built with the expectation they should last for over 30 years. This means |
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that the investments made today and during the current NDC period will determine much of the activity, and |
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associated emissions, of 2050. |
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Creating a LEDS which aligns with the Paris Agreement thus requires new planning approaches and tools. Clear, |
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ambitious long-term targets must be set, consistent with the Paris goals. From these, policy makers must establish |
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what are the medium and short-term requirements needed to ensure the achievement of the long-term goals, to |
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inform actions taken on a much shorter timeframe so they can help rather than hinder success and avoid long- |
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term lock-in to emissions intensive options. |
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Transformation pathways, which show how changes must occur over time, must be developed, linking the desired |
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end-state with the current economic and technological structures. Enough is known about the direction of travel |
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required in all sectors to identify some key components of such trajectories in parallel to the process of agreeing |
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the long-term targets. |
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Specialist analytical work should feed into the transformation pathways across all sectors of activity, so the |
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credible projections of national emissions can be made, and to allow clear visibility of the trade-offs which will |
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emerge. Once the technology scenario options have been outlined, specific policies must be considered to guide |
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the transformation. Single policies will not be enough to effect such change, however: policy packages including |
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regulatory, financial, planning, project execution, social justice, and lock-in considerations must be built up so |
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their coordinated impact can achieve the transformation. In addition, Parties must identify the enablers of the |
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transition which are required but cannot be provided by the country alone, but rather by the international |
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community through collaboration. |
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The implementation of the policies and interventions can be thought of three stages. In the first stage, the in- |
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depth plans and changes which will be required in order for the transformation to take place will be identified, and |
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the most pressing lock-in threats avoided. The second is the inflection stage (beginning in parallel with the first |
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stage where appropriate) in which climate policies become an ongoing consideration in an ever-larger number of |
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decisions, changing the character of investments and policy decisions to leave behind development models which |
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imply GHG emissions. The final rollout stage follows during which climate-compatible modalities are fully adopted |
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in all sectors, and implemented continuously to achieve the transformation through ongoing technology |
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replacement. The benefits of economies of scale and the global transition will provide a positive feedback to the |
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rollout, making Paris-compatible options the most viable throughout this stage. |
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1.5 South Africa LEDS — a living document |
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This document presents South Africa’s first Low Emission Development Strategy (SA-LEDS) generated after the |
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adoption of the Paris Agreement. Through submitting this document to the UNFCCC our country reiterates its |
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commitment to achieving the Paris goals. It also highlights that implementation of the Strategy will contribute |
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directly and indirectly to the meeting of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). |
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SA-LEDS builds upon years of work on climate change in the country, which has culminated in the establishment |
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of an important set of policy documents (Figure 1). Building on existing plans, policies and aligned research, and |
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particularly the work that is supported by robust analytical and domestic engagement processes, offers numerous |
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benefits, such as optimizing resources and ensuring buy-in of key stakeholders. At the same time, many of these |
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plans were developed prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and therefore do not consider the long-term, |
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global goals embedded therein in the coordinated fashion that is required. Furthermore, most of these pre-existing |
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plans and policies address a shorter timeframe than mid-century. |
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The National Planning Commission (NPC) is currently undertaking a process to develop a common vision for the |
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country in 2050. This vision will be instrumental in driving harmonisation of government plans and policies and so |
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in order to make these more aligned with the methodological elements of developing a LEDS presented in Section |
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1.4, itis important that the NPC process and the vision it develops takes into account the Paris goals. |
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UNFCCC |
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Paris Agreement |
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Low Emissions |
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Development |
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Strategy (LEDS) |
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National Planning |
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aE alta cy |
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Mer me rE |
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Analytical Studies |
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ning and |
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National Development Plan (NDP) |
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NPC vision process (ongoing) |
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Ne een Cun ele re |
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National Policy (MPA) |
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(EIR realest) D |
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National Climate Change |
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Response Policy (2011) |
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Carbon tax |
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Climate Change Bill (forthcoming) |
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Other departments’ policies |
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UNFCCC: Has an objective to "stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with |
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the climate system" |
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Paris Agreement: Refers to post-2020 climate actions countries intend to take under the Agreement |
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Low Emissions Development Strategy (LEDS): Communication of mid-century long-term low GHG emissions development strategies, towards the goal of limiting |
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global warming to well below 2°C and to pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C |
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National Development Plan (NDP): Long-term development plan that aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. Recognises the need for a just low |
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carbon transition |
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NPC vision process (ongoing): Process to develop a low-carbon vision for the country to guide mitigation and adaptation action |
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National Climate Change Response Policy (2011): Framework for South Africa’s climate mitigation and adaptation response |
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Carbon Tax: Sets a price on greenhouse gas emissions from certain activities |
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Climate Change Bill (forthcoming): Establishes the legal framework for implementation instruments to drive mitigation and adaptation |
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Other departments’ policies: Other government policies across many departments either increase or decrease GHGs |
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Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA): Projections of National Greenhouse Gas emissions under “technically feasible” mitigation action |
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Pathways study: National emissions trajectories under alternative economic futures and enhanced/step change mitigation action |
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Policies and Measures (PAMs) study: Impact of existing PAMs on the national emissions trajectory |
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Figure 1: SA-LEDS in the context of prior climate-related work in South Africa |
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Despite being based largely on current knowledge and legislative context, SA-LEDS will be updated as new and |
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critical areas of work are completed by relevant government departments. Keeping SA-LEDS as a dynamic and |
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flexible document is important to ensure that it keeps pace with domestic policy developments, research, |
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development and innovation, and the declining costs of emissions mitigation technologies. |
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2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY, EMISSIONS PROFILE AND POLICY LANDSCAPE |
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An overview of the local economy, greenhouse gas emissions profile and relevant policy, legislation and strategies |
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is provided to set the context in which SA-LEDS has been developed. |
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2.1 South Africa’s Economy |
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South Africa has the second largest economy in Africa, after Nigeria, with a nominal 2019 GDP of US$ 371.298 |
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billion and nominal GDP per capita in that year of US$ 6,331 (IMF, 2019). Figure 2 shows the sectoral |
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contributions to GDP. At the same time, South Africa is amongst the most economically unequal countries in the |
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world, as reflected by the Gini Coefficient of 0.63 in 2014 (World Bank, 2019). |
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Agriculture, 3% Other, 3% |
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Construction, 4% |
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Finance, real estate and |
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business services, 22% |
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Trade, catering and |
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accommodation , 15% |
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Government services, |
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17% |
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Transport, 7% |
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Personal services, 8% |
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Mining , 8% |
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Manufacturing , 14% |
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Figure 2: Key contributors to GDP |
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Source: (Stats-SA, 2017a) |
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2.1.1. Energy supply |
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In 2016, the country’s total primary energy supply was approximately 5,880 Petajoules (PJ), with fossil-fuels (coal, |
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crude oil petroleum products and natural gas) supplying about 88% of the energy needs (IEA Bioenergy, 2018). |
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According to the 2018 Energy Sustainability Index, developed by the World Energy Council, South Africa is ranked |
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85! on the Energy Sustainability Index out of 125 countries. Low performance in environmental sustainability in |
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this index is due to the electricity sector's heavy reliance on coal, while increasing petroleum prices, coupled with |
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rising electricity tariffs, contributed to the low score on energy equity (WEC, 2014). While approximately 84% of |
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households in South Africa are electrified, energy poverty is still a significant challenge. As many as 2 million |
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South African households are still without access to electricity (Stats SA, 2017b). Universal access is a key priority |
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for the South African government. |
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More than 90% of the country’s electricity is generated from coal by the national utility, Eskom. In recent years, |
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a number of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) have entered the electricity market, predominately generating |
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renewable energy. The main driver of growth in IPPs is the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer |
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Procurement Programme (REIPPPP). The REIPPPP is a competitive tender process that is designed to |
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incentivise renewable energy project development. By the end of June 2019, the REIPPPP had achieved the |
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following (DoE, 201 9a): |
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e 6,422 MW of electricity had been procured from 112 Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers |
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(IPPs) in seven bid rounds; |
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e 3,976 MW ofelectricity generation capacity from 64 IPP projects has been connected to the national grid; |
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e 35,669 GWh of energy has been generated by renewable energy sources procured under the REIPPPP |
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since the first project became operational. |
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Eskom also has an active research programme which looks at renewable energy development amongst topics. |
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Eskom’s efforts in this regard have mainly been centred on the development of wind energy, pumped storage |
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and PV projects. The Ingula Pumped Storage Scheme is in commercial operation with four 333 MW generators. |
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Furthermore, Eskom’s Sere Wind Farm became fully commercially operational in 2015, with a capacity of 100 |
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MW (DoE, 2019b). |
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A number of South Africa’s existing coal-fired power stations will be retired between 2030 and 2050, and so large |
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investments in additional generation capacity will be needed in order to meet the projected electricity demand |
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and sustain economic growth. Across the country favourable conditions for wind power are found, and the high |
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levels of solar irradiation make it ideal for solar power. Biomass opportunities are available, many of which are |
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along the east coast which is tropical and characterised by large wood and sugar plantations. There is also some |
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potential for small and micro scale hydropower. |
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South Africa's liquid fuels requirements are met through local refining of imported crude oil, sourced mainly from |
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the Middle East and other African countries, through synthetic fuel produced from coal-to-liquids (CTL) and gas- |
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to-liquids (GTL) processes and through refined product imports. The six main liquid fuel producers are Sapref, |
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Enref, Natref and Chevref (refining crude oil) and Sasol and PetroSA (producing synthetic fuels from coal and |
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gas) (SAPIA, 2017). Apart from the production of liquid fuels, crude oil and coal are both used to produce a variety |
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of petrochemical products such as lubricants, bitumen and solvents. Being a net crude oil importer leaves South |
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Africa vulnerable to price fluctuations and volatility on global oil markets. |
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Natural gas plays a relatively minor role in the primary energy supply. Local production is mainly from the |
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Bredasdorp Basin, which lies offshore on the southern coastline. This basin supplies natural gas to PetroSA’s |
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Mossel Bay GTL facility. The bulk of the country’s natural gas demand is, however, met through imports from |
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Mozambique’s Temane and Pande gas fields. The gas is imported via a high-pressure pipeline and supplied to |
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Sasol and other industrial and commercial customers mainly within Gauteng Province. The finalisation of the Gas |
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Utilisation Master Plan, which has been under development for a number of years, will help to provide policy |
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certainty on the role that gas will play in the energy mix moving into the future. |
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2.1.2. Mining and the industrial sector |
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South Africa accounts for a substantial proportion of the world’s mineral resource reserves, with non-energy |
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minerals having an estimated value of approximately US$ 2.5 trillion (DMR, 2011). Key mineral outputs include |
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gold, coal, manganese, chrome, platinum and diamonds (dti, 2015). Domestically, coal provides over 70% of the |
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country’s primary energy supply (South African Government, 2012). South Africa is also major producer of non- |
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ferrous metals (aluminium, copper, brass, lead, zinc and tin). Non-ferrous metals and stainless steel accounts for |
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about a third of all the country’s manufactured products output. Minerals represent an important source of export |
|
revenue. Having said that, coal prices and markets are demonstrating volatility due in part to global |
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decarbonisation efforts. This is likely to become even more relevant moving into the future. |
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The chemical industry is dominated by the emissions-intensive synthetic coal and natural gas-based liquid fuels |
|
industry, as well as the petrochemicals industry. South Africa has the largest chemical industry in Africa and is |
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the world leader in coal-based synthetic fuel and gas-to-liquids (GTL) technologies. Other chemicals produced in |
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South Africa include ammonia, nitric acid, carbide, titanium oxide and carbon black. |
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South Africa also has an active manufacturing sector. However, liberalisation of the markets at the end of |
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|
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apartheid resulted in manufacturing industries in South Africa struggling to remain competitive against more |
|
diversified manufacturing industries in countries such as China, Vietnam and Bangladesh (Bhorat and Rooney, |
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2017). |
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2.1.3 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) |
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South Africa’s agricultural sector is diverse, with distinct farming regions that vary with climate, soil type and |
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farming practices. The sector includes field crops, horticulture and animal products. Animal products currently |
|
generate the highest proportion of gross farm sector income, although the contribution from horticulture products |
|
is growing (DAFF, 2017a). Commodities produced include maize, wheat, sugar, deciduous fruit and citrus, wine, |
|
beef, dairy, lamb, pork, poultry and game. Livestock farming is the biggest contributor to the sector, and also the |
|
largest contributor to AFOLU GHG emissions. Even though its contribution to total GDP is relatively small, and |
|
has declined over the years due to the rise of other economic sectors, agriculture, forestry and fishing remains a |
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key provider of rural employment and export earnings (DAFF, 2017a). |
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2.1.4 Waste sector |
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As in many other countries, a growing population, a growing middle class and increased rates of urbanisation are |
|
putting pressure on solid waste and waste water management facilities. Waste streams are also becoming |
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increasingly diverse in their composition, which affects the complexity of management processes. |
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The amount of waste landfilled in South Africa significantly exceeds the amount that is diverted, either through |
|
reuse or recycling. The recently published Draft South African State of Waste Report shows that around 42 Mt of |
|
general waste was generated in South Africa in 2017 (DEA, 2018a). Only about 11% of this was recycled, with |
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the remainder being disposed of to landfill. |
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Several landfills in the eight larger metropolitan areas are close to reaching their available air space or have |
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already reached their limits. Rapid urbanisation and high costs of building new engineered landfills has led to less |
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suitable landfill space being available. Moreover, the practice of landfilling is becoming less socially acceptable. |
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As such, government is pursuing initiatives to reduce waste generation and divert waste from landfill. These |
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initiatives are discussed further in Section 4.5 . |
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2.1.5 Other sectors |
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Tourism remains a priority growth area due to it being highly labour intensive, supports for small businesses and |
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generation of foreign direct investment (dti, 2015, South African Government, 2012). The trade sector is made up |
|
of several divisions, including retail and wholesale, motor, accommodation and catering, food and beverages (dti, |
|
2017). The remaining sectors contributing towards the economy are finance, real estate and business services, |
|
government services, personal services and construction (dti, 2017). Finance real estate and business services |
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in particular continue to contribute positively to GDP growth. |
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2.2 Greenhouse gas emissions profile |
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The latest National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report (2015) shows that South Africa’s total gross GHG |
|
emissions (excluding forestry and other land use) increased by 23% from 439 Mt CO2-eq in 2000 to 541 Mt CO2- |
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eq in 2015 (DEA, 2019a). Forestry and land use are a CO2 sink and reduced gross emissions by 5% in 2015. |
|
South Africa’s net GHG emissions are 512 Mt COo-eq. |
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The Energy sector accounted for 79.5% of the total gross emissions for South Africa in 2015 (Figure 3), with the |
|
percentage contribution of this sector to overall emissions growing by 25% between 2000 and 2015. Energy |
|
industries (which includes electricity generation and liquid fuels production from both crude oil and coal) were the |
|
main contributor, accounting for 60.4% of emissions from the energy sector and almost half of gross emissions. |
|
This was followed by transport, other sectors, and manufacturing industries and construction. Fugitive emissions |
|
from fuels contributed another 5% to overall emissions in 2015. Agriculture, Industrial Processes and Product |
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Use and Waste contributed 9.0%, 7.7% and 3.6% to gross national GHG emissions in 2015 respectively. |
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aisle) Melee toi) |
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AFOLU (excl. FOLU) |
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% |
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ae ENERGY |
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79% |
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Manufacturing Industires and |
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construction 7% |
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Bie-lasjecenam ley |
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Le) iT -TeeS Les oleh) |
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Fugitive emissions from fuels 5%. |
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Figure 3: Contribution of main emission categories and energy emission categories to national gross greenhouse gas emissions |
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in 2015 |
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If national emissions are expressed in terms of economic sectors rather than emission categories (see Figure 4), |
|
electricity generation contributes 42% of gross national emissions. Industry accounts for 27% of national |
|
emissions, with approximately a third of industry emissions associated with process emissions and the other two |
|
thirds are as a result of energy use. Emissions from transport and agriculture contribute 10% each, with the |
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residential, commercial and waste sectors making up the remainder. Figure 4 also shows that 85% of greenhouse |
|
gas emissions in 2015 are in the form of COz. Methane (CHa) contributes 9%, with over half of these emissions |
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being from agriculture. |
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13 |
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42% |
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__ Methane(CH, |
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Nitrous Oxide (N,Q) ~ |
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4) |
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’ HRstoy, |
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HFCs, PFCs |
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27% . Carbon dioxide (CO,) |
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10% 10% |
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5% |
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3% 4% |
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ii ZZ ian |
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Electricity Industry Transport Agriculture Commercial Residential Waste |
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generation |
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Figure 4: Total gross national GHG emissions by economic sector |
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The carbon intensity of the economy (tonnes CO2-eq per R1,000) and the energy intensity of the economy (tonnes |
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oil equivalent (toe) of energy per R1,000) have decreased between 2000 and 2015, by 18.7% and 12.4% |
|
respectively. This is attributed to growth in the less energy intensive services and financial sectors together with |
|
a decline in manufacturing and mining (DEA, 2019a). |
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2.3 Policy, legislation and strategies that inform SA-LEDS |
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Three key climate policy documents provide the foundation on which SA-LEDS has been developed. These are: |
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e The National Development Plan (NDP) |
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e The National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) |
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e The Climate Change Bill (forthcoming) |
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In addition to these three central documents, various strategies, policies and sector plans have been developed |
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for individual sectors of the economy, which will all contribute to driving emission reductions. These documents |
|
are detailed in later sections to outline a set of discrete measures which serve as a starting point for |
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implementation of the LEDS. |
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2.3.1 National Development Plan 2030 |
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The overarching objective of the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) is to eliminate poverty and reduce |
|
inequality by 2030. Climate change impacts and mitigation are highlighted as critical issues throughout the |
|
document. Chapter 5 is dedicated to “Environmental Sustainability - An equitable transition to a low-carbon |
|
economy” and addresses both the use of natural resources and mineral deposits to support the transition of the |
|
economy to a diverse, inclusive and low-carbon future, and tackling developmental challenges towards building |
|
resilience to the impacts of climate change, particularly in poorer communities. In Chapter 3, economic |
|
development and the key drivers of change are discussed — one of which relates to the need for a just transition |
|
to a low carbon economy. Chapter 4 focuses on infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, noting the need |
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for diversification of energy supply and for cleaner coal technologies (South African Government, 2012). |
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The NDP outlines a set of goals and actions to meet the country’s environmental sustainability and resilience |
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needs. Those that contribute to climate mitigation include: |
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¢ Achieving the peak, plateau and decline trajectory for GHG emissions (See Section 3); |
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¢ Entrenching an economy-wide carbon price by 2030; |
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¢ Implementing zero emission building standards by 2030; and |
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¢ Achieving absolute reductions in the total volume of waste disposed to landfill each year. |
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The Plan also highlights co-benefits of mitigation action which include increasing energy security and enhancing |
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socio-economic and environmentally sustainable growth. |
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2.3.2 National Climate Change Response Policy |
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In 2011, the South African government published a National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP), which |
|
represents government's comprehensive policy framework for responding to climate change (DEA, 2011)?. The |
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two key objectives of the NCCRP are: |
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3 Note that this document was published as a white paper but is now considered as a policy document |
|
Effectively managing inevitable climate change impacts through interventions that build and sustain |
|
South Africa’s social, economic and environmental resilience and emergency response capacity; and |
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Making a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the |
|
atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, within |
|
a timeframe that enables economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a sustainable |
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manner. |
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The Policy presents a vision for an effective climate change response and the long-term transition to a climate- |
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resilient, equitable and internationally competitive low carbon economy and society. This vision is premised on |
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government's commitment to sustainable development and a better life for all. |
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In support of achieving these objectives and achieving the vision, the Policy outlines a strategic approach to both |
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mitigation and adaptation. The mitigation components of the strategic approach were later captured in the Climate |
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Change Bill, as discussed in Section 2.3.3 below. |
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The four key principles that underpin the approach are that actions need to be: |
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|
Needs driven and customised: Employ a wide range of adaptation and mitigation approaches, policies, |
|
measures, programmes interventions and actions, including those that meet the special needs and |
|
circumstances of those most vulnerable; |
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Developmental: Prioritise climate change responses that have both mitigation and adaptation benefits |
|
and that also have significant economic growth, job creation, public health, risk management and poverty |
|
alleviation benefits; |
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Transformational, empowering and participatory: Include policies and measures to address climate |
|
change at a scale that enables and supports the required level of innovation, sector and skills |
|
development, finance and investment flows needed to realise the full benefit of a transition to a low |
|
carbon, efficient, job-creating, equitable and competitive economy; dynamic and evidence-based; and |
|
Balanced and cost effective: Incorporate a balanced approach to both climate change mitigation and |
|
adaptation responses in terms of cost-benefit, prioritisation, focus, action and resource allocation; and |
|
provide for the integration of sector-related climate change responses into the relevant sector planning |
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|
processes and their developmental policies and measures. |
|
The Policy was the culmination of an iterative and participatory policy development process started in October |
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2005, that involved a wide range of stakeholders, including national departments, provincial and local |
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governments, parastatals, academia, research institutions, business, civil society and labour. |
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2.3.3 Climate Change Bill |
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The South African government is finalising its Climate Change Bill. Upon adoption, the Bill will form the legislative |
|
foundation for the climate change adaptation and mitigation response. With respect to the mitigation response, |
|
the Bill provides for future review and determination of the national greenhouse gas emissions trajectory; |
|
determination of sectoral emissions targets for emitting sectors and subsectors; and allocation of carbon budgets. |
|
Sectoral emissions targets and carbon budgets are discussed further in Section 4.6.3 and 4.6.4. The Bill also |
|
makes provision for the development of plans to phase down or phase out the use of synthetic greenhouse gases |
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— in line with the Kigali Amendments to the Montreal Protocol. |
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2.4 The role of sub-national government and the private sector |
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In addition to the policies and measures being implemented by national government, sub-national government |
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and the private sector also have a role to play in achieving the vision of SA-LEDS. |
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2.4.1. Sub-national government |
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Many of the sub-national (provincial and local) government departments are already undertaking activities that |
|
contribute to the national mitigation, adaptation and resilience efforts. Such activities include the development of |
|
urban low emissions development strategies and broader climate change strategies, and the implementation of |
|
a wide range of projects from embedded generation installations on their own buildings to implementing local |
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|
building codes that support energy efficiency to interventions in the waste sector. |
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|
Sub-national activities have, however, not yet been aligned or coordinated, and different geographical locations |
|
see different levels of activity. The Climate Change Act will seek to address this consideration. In terms of the |
|
Act, provincial and district municipality intergovernmental forums will be required to serve as Provincial Forums |
|
on Climate Change. The Forums will be responsible for coordinating climate change response actions and |
|
reporting in their jurisdictions. Furthermore, provinces and district and metropolitan municipalities are required to |
|
prepare climate change needs and response assessments (which are updated every five years), and thereafter |
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|
|
develop and implement a climate change response implementation plan, which also requires five yearly updates. |
|
A number of Cities are also members of global City movements relating to climate action and city networks that |
|
contribute to the climate change agenda such as 100 Resilient Cities, ICLE! Local Governments for Sustainability, |
|
and C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Many have internal (through their statutory planning documents) and |
|
global carbon commitments and targets that apply to the functions of Transport planning, Urban development and |
|
Spatial planning, Infrastructure investment and service delivery. Furthermore, there is increasing regional |
|
coordination and horizontal integration of climate change responses as municipalities are sharing practice and |
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learning with one another, such as through the Kwazulu-Natal Climate Change Compact. |
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Some of South Africa’s metros are pioneering Net Zero Carbon Building policy and regulations. This requires that |
|
buildings exceed the country’s energy efficiency and energy consumption standards, and that their remaining |
|
energy demand is met by renewable energy. These initiatives are expected to scale the market for zero emission |
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buildings and support the national pathway to net zero carbon buildings. |
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2.4.2 The contribution of the private sector |
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|
A diverse range of actions that contribute to GHG emissions mitigation is being seen across the private sector in |
|
South Africa, with significant gains having been made in certain sectors on both energy efficiency and emissions |
|
mitigation. The private sector action is being driven by a growth in understanding of the business opportunities, |
|
local and global market pressure and existing and forthcoming legislation. Actions range from adopting new |
|
products and processes to new service offerings to retrofitting of existing operations to make them more energy |
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|
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efficient and less emissions intensive. With suitable support this growth in action will continue. |
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2.5 Vulnerability and resilience |
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Although this strategy focuses primarily on greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, the vulnerability to climate |
|
change impacts, as well as the need to build resilience to these impacts is noted, and will be further elaborated |
|
in future iterations of SA-LEDS. South Africa has already developed a National Climate Change Adaptation |
|
Strategy that highlights nine key vulnerability areas for the country (DEA, 201 9b): |
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e Unreliable and uncertain access to water; |
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e Risks to agricultural productivity and livestock; |
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e Human safety from climate related extreme events; |
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e Poor service delivery in human settlements; |
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e Vulnerable energy systems and other infrastructure; |
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e Diminished labour force productivity through exposure and health impacts; |
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e Risks to markets due to supply and demand volatility; |
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e Economic risks due to carbon intensity and dependence of the economy; and |
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e Impacts on ecosystems and challenges for conservation. |
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The National Adaptation Strategy also outlines a set of six strategic interventions that will contribute to the vision |
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of a climate resilient South Africa. The interventions and target outcomes are shown in Table 1. |
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Table 1: Strategic interventions outlined in South Africa’s National Adaptation Strategy |
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Intervention |
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Target outcome |
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Achieve an effective adaptation planning regime that |
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|
|
adequately responds to climate change threats |
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|
Achieve an effective adaptation planning regime that |
|
covers at least 80% of the South African economy by |
|
2025 |
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Define adaptation practice that integrates biophysical |
|
and socio-economic aspects of vulnerability and |
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|
|
resilience |
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|
|
Define an adaptation vulnerability and resilience |
|
framework implemented from 2020 across 100% of |
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|
|
key adaptation sectors |
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|
Establish effective governance & legislative processes |
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|
|
to integrate climate change in development planning |
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|
|
Define and legislate for adaptation governance |
|
through the Climate Change Act by 2019 |
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|
National and sectoral implementation of adaptation |
|
actions |
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Achieve a 100% coverage of climate change |
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|
|
considerations in sectoral operational plans by 2025 |
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Achieve adequate and predictable financial resourcing |
|
of adaptation actions and needs, from a variety of |
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|
sources |
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|
Achieve 80% resourcing of national adaptation |
|
needs, primarily from national fiscus, including |
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international sources |
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Develop an M&E system that tracks implementation of |
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|
adaptation actions and their effectiveness |
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Development of a national M&E system to track |
|
vulnerability, resilience, implementation and resource |
|
allocation by 2025 |
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3 VISION STATEMENT |
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SA-LEDS is grounded in South Africa’s climate change response as encapsulated in the documents described in |
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|
the previous section, while taking cognisance of the country’s international climate change commitments and |
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|
|
aspirations. The stated vision for SA-LEDS is as follows: |
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“South Africa follows a low-carbon growth trajectory while making a fair contribution to the global effort to |
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|
limit the average temperature increase, while ensuring a just transition and building of the country’s |
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|
|
resilience to climate change”. |
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|
In the absence of an agreed quantitative articulation of the vision, the national GHG emissions trajectory, as |
|
reflected in the National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) and the NDP, is used as the benchmark |
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|
|
against which the performance of SA-LEDS will be measured. The GHG trajectory, also referred to as the peak, |
|
plateau and decline (PPD), shown in Figure 5 below, indicates that SA’s GHG emissions should peak in the period |
|
2020 to 2025 in a range with a lower limit of 398 Mt CO2-eq and upper limits of 583 Mt CO2-eq and 614 Mt CO2- |
|
eq for 2020 and 2025 respectively. Emissions will then plateau for up to ten years after the peak within the range |
|
with a lower limit of 398 Mt CO2-eq and upper limit of 614 Mt CO2-eq. From 2036 onwards, emissions will decline |
|
in absolute terms to a range with a lower limit of 212 Mt CO2-eq and an upper limit of 428 Mt CO2-eq by 2050. |
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The Climate Change Bill makes provision for regular updates of this trajectory, through which it can be better |
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|
|
placed within the context of the Paris Agreement. |
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MtCO,-eq |
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|
1000 |
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900 |
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800 |
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|
700 |
|
2025,... 2035, 614 |
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2020, 583 |
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600 |
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2050, 428 |
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500 |
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400 |
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2025, 398 |
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300 2035, 398 |
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200 |
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2050, 212 |
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100 |
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0 |
|
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 |
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|
Figure 5: South Africa’s Peak, Plateau, Decline Trajectory Range |
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20 |
|
As indicated previously, a process is currently being undertaken by the National Planning Commission to develop |
|
a common vision for the country in 2050. The vision will be used to update SA-LEDS once released. In the |
|
development of this vision, South Africa will give due consideration to the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C, which |
|
represents the latest available science regarding this goal. This report sheds new light on the global rate of |
|
emissions reductions required to keep warming to 1.5°C with no or low overshoot. While it is agreed that |
|
developed countries must take the lead in reducing emissions, in is also imperative that global totals not be |
|
exceeded, because developing countries will suffer most from the negative impacts of such a collective failure to |
|
limit global emissions. These challenges — which the IPCC Special Report has presented so clearly to the |
|
international community — will play a key role in setting our national goals. We thus commit to ultimately moving |
|
towards a goal of net zero carbon emissions by 2050, which will require various interventions to reduce |
|
greenhouse gas emissions. This goal, how it will be achieved to ensure a just transition, and how the economic |
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|
|
advantages of the transition will be maximised, will be formally communicated in future iterations of this strategy. |
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4 GHG EMISSIONS MITIGATION MEASURES |
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|
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This section describes measures currently being implemented by government to address GHG emissions |
|
mitigation across the four key sectors of the economy, namely energy (supply and demand), industry, AFOLU |
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|
|
and waste. It also presents further planned cross-sectoral measures that will contribute to driving mitigation action. |
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|
It is recognised that many of the measures presented here address only the short term, and are not considered |
|
to be transformational. South Africa puts these forward as a starting point from which we will be able to ratchet |
|
up our future ambition towards more integrated, transformational strategy, through the approach described in |
|
Section 5 and 6 of this document. |
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4.1 Energy supply |
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|
Energy supply is the mandate of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy. Decarbonisation of energy |
|
supply will largely be driven through the Integrated Energy Plan, the Integrated Resource Plan and the Industrial |
|
Biofuels Strategy, issued by the Department of Energy, the predecessor of this Department. |
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|
|
4.1.1 Integrated Energy Plan |
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|
Energy planning is guided by the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP). The White Paper on Energy Policy of the |
|
Republic of South Africa of 1998 identified the requirement for development of the IEP, with the National Energy |
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|
|
21 |
|
Act of 2008 further defining the objectives thereof. The Energy Act also mandates the Minister of Energy to |
|
develop, review and publish the IEP. |
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|
|
The IEP approach analyses current energy supply and demand trends within the different sectors of the economy, |
|
across all energy carriers. It then uses this information along with assumptions about future demand and |
|
technology evolution to project the country’s future energy requirements under a variety of different scenarios, |
|
including those with emissions limits and different carbon prices. Based on an analysis of the scenario outcomes, |
|
the IEP can define the future trajectories for electricity, liquid fuels and gas in the country. |
|
|
|
The current IEP dates from 2003, and the Department of Energy has been working on updates thereof, with a |
|
draft IEP outlining various energy scenarios having been issued in 2016 (DoE, 2016a). The draft IEP provides an |
|
indication of the sectoral energy demand, as shown in Figure 6. This breakdown is relevant in this document in |
|
that it helps to contextualise the mitigation measures presented below. The IEP update with a clear trajectory for |
|
the energy sector is critical to guiding overall energy planning for the country, including in the context of this |
|
|
|
document to support a just transition away from fossil fuels towards a low carbon future. |
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|
Transport |
|
32% |
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|
Residential |
|
14% |
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|
Mining |
|
. 7% |
|
Commerce Agriculture |
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|
7% 3% |
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|
Figure 6: Sectoral energy demand |
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Source: DoE, 2016a |
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22 |
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|
4.1.2 Integrated Resource Plan |
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|
|
The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) guides the evolution of the South African electricity supply sector, in that it |
|
identifies the preferred electricity generation technologies to be built to meet projected electricity demand. It thus |
|
provides a mechanism for Government to drive the diversification of the country’s electricity generation mix and |
|
promote the use of renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. |
|
|
|
The 2019 IRP represents South Africa’s current policy position, an update on the 2010 IRP (DoE, 2019c). The |
|
2019 update includes: |
|
|
|
e Extension of the period of analysis to look at the period to 2050 (the IRP 2010 only looked to 2030), |
|
however 2019 IRP only provides a build plan to 2030; |
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|
|
e Updated demand projections; and |
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|
|
e Updated technology costs. |
|
By extending the coverage to 2050, the impact of decommissioning Eskom’s coal fired generation capacity on |
|
the long-term requirements for new capacity is clearer. According to the IRP, the decommissioning schedule |
|
shows that about 10,599 MW of Eskom’s coal generation capacity will be decommissioned by 2030, with the |
|
figure increasing to 35,000 MW by 2050. For reference, the installed capacity in in 2018 was 37,149 MW. |
|
|
|
The IRP is developed by first projecting the country’s long-term electricity demand, taking into account the impact |
|
of both population growth and economic development, and the role that energy-efficiency and demand-side |
|
interventions can play. It then presents a base case and a number of scenarios‘ which all provide an electricity |
|
generation supply mix which can meet future electricity demand at least cost, taking into account the need for |
|
ensuring security of supply. To explore how the build plan could contribute to a decline in South Africa’s GHG |
|
|
|
4 Scenarios explored included those which have no cap on annual build on renewables, changes to gas prices and the application of a |
|
carbon budget |
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|
23 |
|
emissions in line with the current commitments, modelling of the base case included a carbon constraint to |
|
account for the electricity sector's proportional contribution to meeting the PPD trajectory. A scenario was also |
|
tested in the 2019 IRP where the emissions space available to the sector under the PPD (5,470 Mt COz) is divided |
|
|
|
into three ten-year carbon budgets. |
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|
|
Drawing on the scenarios analysed in the IRP 2019, an “emerging long-term plan” to 2030 has been developed. |
|
The IRP proposes a set of policy adjustments to ensure “a practical plan that will be flexible to accommodate |
|
new, innovative technologies that are not currently cost competitive, the minimization of the impact of |
|
decommissioning of coal power plants and the changing demand profile.” It is noted that although demand |
|
projections and decommissioning profiles to 2050 are discussed, the 2019 IRP only provides an indicative |
|
|
|
generation build plan to 2030. This is attributed to technology uncertainties beyond that time frame. |
|
|
|
For the first time, a provision for embedded generation is included in the IRP. Embedded Generation (also referred |
|
to as distributed generation) refers to electricity generation installations of capacities of between 1MW and 10MW |
|
that are connected to the national grid. Embedded generation using renewable technologies is attracting |
|
substantial investment and funding in both the private and public sector (with the latter typically being at sub- |
|
national government level), and is set to grow exponentially. In recognition of this growth potential, a provision for |
|
4,000 MW of other generation by 2030 is made, which includes embedded generation as well as co-generation, |
|
biomass and landfill gas generation. Government, through the National Energy Regulator of South Africa |
|
(NERSA) has been in the process of finalising the regulations governing embedded generation for an extended |
|
period, an activity which requires urgent resolution. Although this has not yet been resolved at the national level, |
|
|
|
number of individual municipalities have already put in place grid feed-in tariffs. |
|
|
|
The IRP also proposes a set of research and analysis activities to be undertaken to support the low carbon |
|
transition of the electricity supply sector. These include detailed studies on the impact of gas supply options on |
|
electricity supply, the appropriate level of penetration of RE in the South African national grid, the cost and |
|
economic benefits associated with other clean energy options as well as socio-economic impacts of communities |
|
affected by the decommissioning of coal fired power stations. Such activities can help contribute to low emissions |
|
|
|
transformation of the electricity sector in a manner that is informed, feasible and just. |
|
|
|
24 |
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|
|
Transformation of the electricity supply sector |
|
The IRP (2019) makes provision for renewables being added to the electricity supply mix, both to meet growing |
|
demand and to replace power stations that will be decommissioned. Short-term additions to the mix include: |
|
e 2,500 MW of new hydro capacity being built by 2030 |
|
e 6,814 MW of new PV capacity being built between 2019 and 2030 |
|
e 15,762 MW of new wind capacity being built between 2019 and 2030 |
|
e 4,000 MW other generation being added to the grid between 2019 and 2030 |
|
e 300 MW of Concentrated Solar Power to be built in 2019 |
|
Provision is also made for 1,500 MW of new coal-fired power station capacity, beyond that which has already |
|
been committed to. The resulting electricity supply mix in 2030 is shown in Figure 7. |
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|
8% |
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|
1% |
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|
Coal |
|
a Hydro |
|
Nuclear |
|
44% Storage |
|
a Pv |
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|
23% |
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|
B wind |
|
csP |
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|
a Gas/diesel |
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|
7% 2% 3% |
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|
|
Figure 7: Share of installed capacity in the 2019 IRP in MW® |
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|
Through regular updates to the IRP, and making early commitments to deep transformation of the sector post |
|
2030, ambition can be increased. However, including new coal-fired power stations in the build plan will result |
|
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|
|
|
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|
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|
|
in further lock-in to carbon intensive electricity supply, or the potential for stranded assets in the sector. |
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|
5 Note that the figure excludes embedded generation, due to a lack of information on how much has already been installed. |
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25 |
|
The 2019 IRP is based on the current articulation of the PPD trajectory. Future updates to the IRP will need to |
|
take into account any future modifications to the emissions trajectory. In this way electricity supply planning will |
|
|
|
be aligned with the country’s increasing national ambition. |
|
|
|
4.1.3 Biofuels opportunities |
|
|
|
The Biofuels Industrial Strategy of the Republic of South Africa (DMR, 2007) outlines Government's approach to |
|
the development of a biofuel sector in the country. The primary aim of the Strategy is to address poverty and |
|
unemployment, although the role in climate change mitigation in the liquid fuels sector is recognised. The Strategy |
|
proposed a 2% penetration of biofuels in the national liquid fuel supply (400 million litres per annum), within five |
|
|
|
years of its publication. |
|
|
|
In support of the strategy, the Regulations Regarding the Mandatory Blending of Biofuels with Petrol and Diesel |
|
were published in the Government Gazette in August 2012. The Regulations describe the eligibility and process |
|
for purchasing biofuels for blending and specify the type of records that need to be kept. The Regulations also |
|
specify that (i) the minimum concentration to be allowed for biodiesel blending is 5% by volume; and (ii) the |
|
|
|
permitted range for bio-ethanol blending is between 2 and 10% by volume. |
|
|
|
Although the regulations were published in 2012, implementation has not yet begun. However, in 2019 the Energy |
|
Minister signalled a commitment to implementing the biofuels regulatory framework to support a local biofuels |
|
|
|
industry. Through inclusion in SA-LEDS the intention to support implementation of the Strategy is signalled. |
|
|
|
Since the development of the Strategy, advancements have been made on second and third generation biofuels |
|
technologies. These process routes could potentially increase the volumes of biofuel that could be produced in |
|
|
|
South Africa, without competing with food products for feedstocks. |
|
|
|
6 Second generation biofuels are made from lignocellulosic feedstocks, and thus do not compete with food crops for feedstocks. Third |
|
generation biofuels are made from algae. |
|
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|
26 |
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|
|
4.2 Energy demand |
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|
|
SA-LEDS supports the implementation of a selection of measures to reduce energy demand, or limit growth in |
|
energy demand, as the economy and population grows: |
|
|
|
e The National Energy Efficiency Strategy; |
|
e Support for increased uptake of Solar Water Heaters; |
|
e The National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act; and |
|
|
|
e Promotion of cleaner mobility. |
|
|
|
These measures not only contribute to reductions in emissions associated with fossil fuels, but also to energy |
|
security and energy access. |
|
|
|
4.2.1 National Energy Efficiency Strategy |
|
|
|
In 2005, the Department of Energy launched the first National Energy Efficiency Strategy (2005). Building on this |
|
document, the Department of Minerals and Energy is finalizing the post-2015 National Energy Efficiency Strategy |
|
(NEES), which outlines a set of goals for energy efficiency improvements across the economy to 2030 (DoE, |
|
2016b). Table 2 captures the targets included in the NEES, with the explanation of how each of these targets was |
|
established being provided in the NEES document. |
|
|
|
27 |
|
Table 2: Energy efficiency targets outlined in the post-2015 NEES |
|
|
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|
|
Sector/subsector |
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|
|
Goal |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public buildings sector |
|
|
|
- 50% reduction in specific energy consumption (measured as GJ annual energy |
|
|
|
consumption per m2 of occupied floor area), by 2030. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Municipal services |
|
|
|
- 20% reduction in the energy intensity (measured as energy consumption per |
|
capita of population served) of municipal service provision, by 2030. The |
|
specific services included are street lighting, traffic lights, water supply and |
|
waste water treatment. |
|
|
|
- 30% reduction in the fossil fuel intensity of municipality vehicle fleets |
|
(measured as total fossil fuel consumption by municipal vehicles per capita of |
|
|
|
population served), by 2030. |
|
|
|
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|
|
|
Residential sector |
|
|
|
- 33% reduction in the average specific energy consumption of new household |
|
appliances purchased in South Africa, by 2030. |
|
|
|
- 20% reduction in the average specific energy consumption of the residential |
|
building stock, by 2030. |
|
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|
|
|
|
|
Commercial sector |
|
|
|
- 37% reduction in the specific energy consumption (measured as GJ annual |
|
|
|
energy consumption per m? of lettable/habitable floor area), by 2030. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Industry sector |
|
|
|
- 16% reduction in the weighted mean specific energy consumption for the |
|
manufacturing industry, by 2030 |
|
- 40 PJ cumulative total annual energy saving from specific energy saving |
|
|
|
interventions undertaken by in the mining subsector. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agriculture sector |
|
|
|
1 PJ verified electricity saving from officially supported projects, annually |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Transport sector |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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20% reduction in the average vehicle energy intensity (measured in MJ/km) of |
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the South African road vehicle fleet, by 2030. |
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The NEES also identifies a set of measures to be implemented in each sector to achieve the stated targets. These |
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are shown in Table 3. |
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28 |
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Table 3: Measures outlined in the post-2015 NEES |
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Sector Measures fae |
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rame |
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Introduce mandatory Energy Performance Certificates in all rented properties and 2 |
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: : 7 years |
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publicly accessible buildings |
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Develop the public sector awareness raising campaign to facilitate the “leading by 5.Vears |
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example” approach y |
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Publie Introduce standards and labelling relevant for public sector appliances and |
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sector : 2 years |
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equipment |
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Announce a 15-year trajectory for the successive tightening of the energy B years |
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performance component of building standards and successively tighten standards y |
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Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data to the public sector 1 year |
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Municipal _| Develop municipal energy efficiency strategies 3 years |
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sector Support the implementation of energy savings measures 5 years |
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Announce a 15-year trajectory for the successive tightening of minimum energy |
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performance standards for household appliances and successively tighten | 5 years |
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standards |
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Develop a strongly branded energy performance certification mark for household |
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appliances (modelled on the “Energy Star“ brand), in addition to the planned | 5 years |
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energy efficiency labels. |
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Residential | Announce a 15-year trajectory for the successive tightening of the energy |
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sector performance component of building standards for residential buildings and | 5 years |
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successively tighten standards |
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Build on the existing awareness-raising activities targeting households and the 5 years |
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school curriculum y |
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Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data from the residential sector 1 year |
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Support technology innovation and dissemination of energy efficient cookstove 5 years |
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technologies y |
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Introduce mandatory Energy Performance Certificates in all rented properties and 2 |
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; 5 7 years |
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publicly accessible buildings |
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Commercial | Revise 12L to ensure it provides an incentive to commercial property owners 4 years |
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sector Introduce standards and labelling relevant for commercial sector appliances and 9 vests |
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equipment y |
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Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data from the commercial sector 1 year |
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Adjust the 12L tax incentive scheme 4 years |
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29 |
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Time |
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Sector Measures frame |
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Develop minimum energy performance standards for motors and motor-driven 4 |
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years |
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systems |
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Provide targeted support and advice on energy efficiency to enterprises 3 years |
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Incentivise enterprises to introduce Energy Management Systems and achieve errs |
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Industrial 1$050001 certification standards y |
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sector Roll-out the provision of energy and production data from the manufacturing sub- 4 year |
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sector y |
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Develop standardised tools for voluntary reporting of energy savings from 2 |
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eee th ts as years |
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initiatives in the mining sector |
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Create technology/ learning hubs for energy efficiency 2 years |
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Explore the potential for savings in agricultural vehicle use, and develop 2 Weare |
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appropriate awareness-raising material y |
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Agricultural | Develop targeted awareness-raising and training material on potential savings in 9 years |
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sector motor-driven systems y |
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Provide direct grants to small farmers / smallholders for all or part of the cost of 4 years |
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interventions |
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Develop fuel efficiency standards for light and heavy vehicles to improve the 5 years |
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Transport overall efficiency of the vehicle stock |
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sector Improve systems for ensuring road worthiness 5 years |
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Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data from the transport sector 1 year |
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Production | Develop the enabling framework for cogeneration and trigeneration 3 years |
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and |
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ost ibution | Expand intemal efficiency programmes for producers 3 years |
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sector |
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The Post-2015 NEES makes provision for a review every five years. |
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30 |
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4.2.2 Support for uptake of Solar Water Heaters |
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Solar Water Heaters (SWH) provide the opportunity to partially offset use of electricity for water heating in middle- |
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and high-income households, and to service low-income households that did not previously have ready access |
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to hot water or used fuels other than electricity for water heating. |
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Since 2005 a number of goals have been set, and associated support programmes have been established, to |
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drive the uptake of SWH in South Africa, with the National Development Plan introducing a goal of five million |
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SWHs by 2030. In 2015 Department of Energy (DoE) took over responsibility for the National SWH programme |
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from Eskom, making 5,000 subsidies available (further to those that had already been granted). The DoE aims to |
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roll out new, fully subsidised low-income installations as part of their Social Programme, and is seeking to drive |
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an increase in localised manufacture to have the positive co-benefit of local economic development. In addition |
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to government programmes that act as drivers, the uptake of SWH continues to be supported by rising energy |
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prices and electricity supply challenges. |
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4.2.3 National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act |
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To further efforts to decrease energy consumption and the associated GHG emissions of new commercial and |
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residential buildings, the South African government has implemented energy efficiency and energy consumption |
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standards under the National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act. Compliance with the Standards |
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is required in order to ensure compliance with the Act. |
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The first of the relevant standards is South African National Standard (SANS) 204 — Energy Efficiency in Buildings. |
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This standard “specifies the design requirements for energy efficiency in buildings and of services in buildings |
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with natural environmental control and artificial ventilation or air conditioning systems.” It includes provisions for |
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orientation, maximum energy demand and the maximum annual energy consumption for various kinds of buildings |
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31 |
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in various climate zones across the country, and design provisions for all parts of buildings’ construction. The |
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second standard, SANS 10400-XA — Energy Usage in Buildings includes the provisions of SANS 204 and other |
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standards, towards providing a standard for energy efficient buildings. |
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4.2.4 Promotion of Cleaner Mobility |
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Emissions from energy supply in the transport sector are addressed through a number of policy documents. The |
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Public Transport Strategy of 2007 set out an action plan for accelerated modal shifts and for the development of |
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integrated rapid public transport networks (DoT, 2007). Since then, the successful implementation of the bus rapid |
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transport (BRT) system in Johannesburg has led to it being adapted and implemented in other major South African |
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cities, including Cape Town, Rustenburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane, with further roll-outs being planned. |
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In 2018 the Green Transport Strategy (GTS) for 2018 to 2050 was launched (DoT, 2018). The GTS provides the |
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strategic direction for the transport sector regarding the reduction of GHG emissions, the contribution of transport |
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to the green economy and the promotion of sustainable mobility. The Strategy aims to support reductions in the |
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contribution of the transport sector to national greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% by 2050. |
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Some examples of the measures in the GTS that are relevant to SA-LEDS include: |
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e Exploring the potential for local electric vehicle and battery production, and growing the number of public |
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charging stations, powered by solar panels, by 40 stations per year’; |
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TItis recognised that for the full mitigation benefit of electric vehicles to be realised, concurrent electricity grid decarbonisation is required. |
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32 |
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e The continued use of fuel economy norms and standards for fuel efficiency and GHG emissions of |
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vehicles. Baseline studies on the adoption of more stringent fuel standards will help to provide a platform |
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for introducing cleaner fuel standards; and |
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e Facilitating a shift of freight from road to rail. This is in recognition that freight transport was previously |
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moved off rail onto road as a result of constraints in the country’s rail service, with road-based freight |
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transport currently accounting for around 75% of total freight moved. The road-to-rail shift will be |
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supported by the implementation of Transnet’s® Market Demand Strategy. The Market Demand Strategy |
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aims to create a more balanced and appropriate market between road and rail freight transport, thereby |
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reducing overloading of the road network and road infrastructure deterioration and contributing to a |
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reduction in GHGs associated with rail transport. |
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In September 2010 a COz tax was introduced on the selling price of new motor vehicles that exceed a certain |
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emissions limit, in order to increase the move towards lower emissions vehicles. The levy has grown incrementally |
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over time, and offers an established instrument that government could use for ratcheting up ambition in the |
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transport sector. |
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4.3 Industry |
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Two sets of policies that directly and indirectly support emissions reductions in the industrial sector are identified, |
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beyond those discussed in Section 4.2.1 that target energy efficiency. These are the Industrial Policy Action Plan |
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(IPAP) and tax rebates for green project development. |
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8 Transnet is the state-owned entity responsible for managing rail infrastructure and operation, ports and pipelines |
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33 |
|
4.3.1 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) |
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The National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) was adopted as a broad framework governing industrial policy |
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in South Africa, and thus articulates the overarching approach to industrial development (dti, 2007). The |
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implementation plan for the framework is contained in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), which is revised |
|
at various intervals. The most recent revision of the IPAP, which covers the period 2018/19 to 2020/21, provides |
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updates on key focus areas within the industrial sector, one of which is green industry investment. Some of the |
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green industry Action Programmes that will contribute to climate mitigation in the short term included in the IPAP |
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are: |
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e Developing a Policy Roadmap for Climate-Compatible Industrial Development; |
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e Systemised resource efficiency data collection and reporting; |
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e The Industrial Water Efficiency Project (which has a primary focus on water savings which is a resource |
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efficiency/adaptation focus, but will have a mitigation benefit through saving energy associated with water |
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supply); |
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e The Industrial Energy Efficiency Project; |
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e Resource-efficient and cleaner production skills development; and |
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e Specialist skills development in resource-efficiency and cleaner production. |
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The IPAP also supports fuel cell industry development. |
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34 |
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4.3.2 |
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Tax incentives for green project development |
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The implementation of technologies with potential for contribution to emissions reductions in the industrial sector |
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is supported by various tax incentives, contained in the Income Tax Act of South Africa: |
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Section 12B allows companies to deduct the cost incurred from investing in assets that are used directly |
|
for the production of renewable energy from their taxable income; |
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Section 12I offers support for both capital investment and training related to Greenfield (new) and |
|
Brownfield (expansions or upgrades) projects within South Africa’s manufacturing sector. A mandatory |
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requirement for qualification for this incentive is that projects demonstrate use of energy efficient |
|
equipment (in the case of greenfield projects) or at least 15% energy improvement relative to a baseline |
|
(brownfield projects) |
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Section 12K provides for tax exemptions on proceeds gained from the disposal of certified emission |
|
reductions derived from activities registered with the Clean Development Mechanism. The tax window |
|
runs up to 31 December 2020, in line with termination of the second commitment period of the Kyoto |
|
Protocol; |
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Section 12L provides for a tax incentive to support implementation of energy savings. Since its inception |
|
in 2013, major benefits have been realised in terms of energy savings of approximately 5.9 GWh, with |
|
associated avoidance of GHG emissions, through a spend of ZAR 3 billion by government. Major |
|
beneficiaries have been the mining and manufacturing subsectors. This incentive has been extended |
|
until the end of the first phase of the carbon tax (31 December 2022) in line with requests from |
|
stakeholders; and |
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Section 37B allows companies to deduct the costs, incurred due to expenditures on environmental |
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pollution control and monitoring equipment and/or disposal sites, from their taxable revenues. |
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35 |
|
4.4 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) |
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South Africa’s land cover is dominated by open ecosystems in the form of shrublands (covering just under 40% |
|
of the total land area), savanna woodlands (33%) and grasslands (27%). Both indigenous forests and exotic forest |
|
plantations make up the remainder, with indigenous forests occupying less than 0.3% of South Africa’s land area |
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|
(GeoTerralmage, 2013) and forest plantations occupying 1% of the overall land area. |
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|
Changes in land use can result in the release of carbon stocks. The National Terrestrial Carbon Sinks Assessment |
|
(NTCSA) (2015) indicated that transformation of land through land uses including crop agriculture can reduce soil |
|
carbon by 40 to 60% from what existed in a natural grassland and savannah. Further, urban expansion and mining |
|
reduces above and below ground carbon, as does degradation, which increases soil erosion. In terms of total |
|
carbon sequestration, despite the small overall land coverage by forests, over 90% of CO2 absorbed in 2015 was |
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|
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attributed to forest land, with the remainder being absorbed by grassland and savannah. |
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|
Mitigation actions identified in the AFOLU sector include Policies and Measures developed by line departments |
|
including the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). These include the draft Climate Change |
|
Adaptation and Mitigation Plan for the South African Agricultural and Forestry sectors, the Conservation |
|
Agriculture Policy (DAFF, 2017b) and the Agroforestry Strategic Framework for South Africa (DAFF, 2017c). |
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|
In terms of the draft Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Plan, for mitigation in the agricultural sector it is |
|
proposed that a strategic and integrated approach is taken that addresses sustainable agriculture more broadly |
|
and “to build synergies and avoid conflicts between climate change mitigation and other policy objectives, and to |
|
avoid offsetting mitigation efforts through intensification of production or land use change." In the forestry sector, |
|
there is a specific objective to reduce GHG emissions through afforesting 100,000 hectares of land in the Eastern |
|
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal as well as strengthening and expanding current initiatives including forest rehabilitation, |
|
working for woodlands and the Subtropical Thicket Ecosystem Project (STEP). The implementation of the national |
|
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) will lead to conservation of forest carbon |
|
stocks, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of the forest carbon stocks. Protecting and |
|
preserving existing carbon stocks in other ecosystems (those with high organic soil carbon, wetlands and some |
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|
|
grasslands) is also identified as a mitigation priority. |
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|
9 Note that with a government restructure Forestry and Fisheries has now been combined with Environmental Affairs, while Agriculture |
|
has been combined with agriculture and the department of rural development and land reform. The implications of this restructuring on |
|
policy implementation has not yet been considered. |
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36 |
|
The DAFF Draft Conservation Agriculture Policy (DAFF, 2017b) provides a basis for national and sector policy |
|
support for increasing the uptake of conservation agriculture (CA), including no-till, conservation till, precision |
|
agriculture and meat production efficiency. GHG emission reduction occurs by reducing fuel consumption of farm |
|
vehicles, increasing yields and reduced fertiliser use. Current CA adoption by grain growers is between 20 and |
|
30% at a national scale. |
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|
Both the establishment of plantations and agroforestry could lead to the sequestration of atmospheric carbon in |
|
soils and biomass. The DAFF Agroforestry Strategic Framework for South Africa (DAFF, 2017c) presents a broad |
|
overview of the potential for agroforestry in a South African context by providing a set of principles and strategic |
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|
|
themes and goals. It recognises the carbon sequestration potential role of agroforestry. |
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4.5 Waste |
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|
Waste management activities in South Africa are legislated through the National Environmental Management: |
|
Waste Act (NEM:WA) (DEA, 2009). To provide further policy direction in terms of establishing fully integrated |
|
waste management practices in the country, the National Waste Management Strategy (NWMS) was developed |
|
(DEA, 2012). The Strategy adopts the internationally accepted waste management hierarchy of waste avoidance |
|
and reduction, re-use, recycling, recovery, treatment and disposal. Implementing activities in accordance with the |
|
prioritisation afforded by the hierarchy potentially contributes to a reduction in emissions from material life cycles’? |
|
as follows: |
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¢ Avoidance and reduction of waste avoids emissions with production and transport of the waste that |
|
would have been ultimately sent to landfill; |
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|
10 Emissions savings achieved through actions in the waste sector will not all be reflected in that sector's inventory, however they may |
|
contribute indirectly to national emissions savings. |
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37 |
|
Reducing the quantity of recyclable waste sent to landfill, through the implementation of separation at |
|
source programmes in metropolitan municipalities and through the establishment of material recovery |
|
facilities (MRFs) for separation after the waste has been collected, avoids emissions with primary |
|
material production in the case of inert materials and avoids generation of methane in landfill in the |
|
case of organics; and |
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|
Recovery of value through waste-to-energy (WIE) facilities avoids generation of methane from organics |
|
sent to landfill, and at the same time the electricity generated offsets electricity generation from fossil |
|
fuels. It is noted that, although included in the 2012 Strategy, WIE is no longer considered to be a |
|
preferred technology option, but is rather recognised to be a last resort for managing wastes for which |
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higher value cannot be recovered. |
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|
Subsequent to the Waste Act and National Waste Management Strategy, twenty national waste management |
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|
initiatives, with annual targets, have been established by the DEA through a process known as the Waste Phakisa. |
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|
Jointly, these initiatives aim to achieve landfill diversion of 20 million tonnes of waste per year (75% industrial and |
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50% municipal). Of the twenty initiatives, those that are likely to have direct and indirect impacts on the total |
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national greenhouse gas emissions include (GreenCape, 2018): |
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Achieving a minimum of 50% of households separating organics at source by 2023; |
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|
Introduction of Material Recovery Facilities (MRFs) and pelletising plants to increase plastic recycling |
|
rates, and formalising packaging industry producer responsibility plans; |
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Developing capacity through a specialised programme which upskills agri-stakeholders to minimise food |
|
loss, and running a consumer awareness campaign to use and consume “ugly” food, towards saving |
|
245,000 tonnes of food waste to landfill per year; |
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Establishing refuse derived fuel plants across South Africa, towards diverting 120,000 tonnes of waste |
|
from landfill; and |
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|
Establishing a refrigerant reclamation and reusable cylinder industry to reduce emissions of refrigerant |
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gases. |
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|
The importance of circular economy thinking in guiding the Waste Phakisa initiatives was noted. A circular |
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economy framing has positive benefits in terms of reducing greenhouse gases. |
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38 |
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4.6 Cross-Cutting Measures |
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|
In addition to the measures specific to individual sectors, four cross-cutting measures that will support low carbon |
|
development are in various stages of being implemented. |
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|
4.6.1 Carbon Tax |
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|
The Carbon Tax Act was brought into effect from 1 June 2019. The Act gives effect to the “polluter pays principle” |
|
and aims to price carbon by internalising the negative costs of emitting GHGs. The tax rate is set at R120 per |
|
tonne of CO2-eq produced. To allow businesses time for transition, a basic tax-free allowance of 60% will initially |
|
apply to all emissions, with a number of further allowances depending on the activities. These provide for |
|
maximum tax-free allowances of between 60 and 95%. The allowances include those on fugitive emissions; for |
|
trade exposure; for performance above the industry benchmark; for purchasing offsets; and for voluntarily being |
|
allocated a (non-enforceable) carbon budget. The allowances bring the effective tax rate to between ZAR 6 and |
|
ZAR 48 per tonne. |
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|
Post-2020, the carbon tax and the carbon budgeting system (discussed in Section 4.6.3 below) will be aligned. |
|
This may include the option of imposing a higher tax rate as a penalty for emissions exceeding the carbon budget. |
|
This interface option will help to ensure a credible price signal to drive mitigation and provide the required |
|
regulatory policy certainty. At this stage some of the allowances are likely to be reduced, and the voluntary carbon |
|
budget allowance will be completely removed. |
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39 |
|
Emissions covered by the carbon tax are those that need to be reported in terms of the Department of |
|
Environmental Affairs’ Mandatory Reporting Regulations, although the tax is administered by the South African |
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|
|
Revenue Services in the same way as other environmental levies. |
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The role of the carbon tax |
|
e Through passing of the Carbon Tax Act, the government is providing a strong signal of an intention to |
|
implement the “polluter pays principle”. |
|
e At present, with the prescribed allowances, the tax rate is low. However, the ratcheting of this policy |
|
intervention will be achieved through reducing the allowances and increasing the tax rate. |
|
e Ahigher rate of tax on emissions exceeding the carbon budgets, as is being proposed once the carbon |
|
budgets are mandatory, will further drive mitigation action. |
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4.6.2 Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs) |
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|
South Africa’s national emissions trajectory will be translated into Sectoral Emission Targets or SETs, which are |
|
quantitative greenhouse gas emission targets allocated to an emitting sector or sub-sector, over a defined time |
|
period. The sectors or sub-sectors to which SETs are allocated are still being defined, but will be aligned with the |
|
IPCC (2006) emissions categories to facilitate alignment with other GHG reporting. Individual national government |
|
departments will be tasked with developing and implementing Policies and Measures (PAMs) to ensure emissions |
|
from within a sector or sub-sector remain within SET limits. The allocation of the SETs will be based on the socio- |
|
economic benefits of introducing the Sectoral Emissions Targets; the best available science, evidence and |
|
information; and the mitigation options available to the sector. SETs will be determined for three rolling five-year |
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|
periods. |
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Sectoral Emissions Targets |
|
e Constraining the cumulative SETs applied across the sectors and sub-sectors within the GHG |
|
emissions trajectory will ensure that, as the trajectory is revised towards meeting the requirements of |
|
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|
the Paris Agreement, a consistent message will be sent to all government departments about the |
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requirements for implementation of PAMs to drive down emissions. |
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40 |
|
4.6.3 Carbon Budgets |
|
|
|
Carbon Budgets set a maximum volume of emissions from certain activities that individual entities are allowed to |
|
emit over three rolling five-year periods. By assigning a Carbon Budget to an entity, a signal is provided as to the |
|
degree of GHG mitigation that is required within a specific time period, with a penalty being imposed if the budget |
|
allocation is exceeded. Furthermore, by providing entities with an understanding of how the budgets are likely to |
|
be assigned in future phases to keep overall national emissions within the bounds of the national emissions |
|
trajectory, which will continue to be revised downward in keeping with the Paris Agreement, they are sensitised |
|
to how mitigation requirements may change in the future. The system thereby provides an opportunity for entities |
|
to plan ahead. |
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|
The first phase of the Carbon Budgets, which runs from 2016 to 2020, is currently being implemented, with the |
|
allocation of company-level Carbon Budgets for a small group of companies. This phase is voluntary as there is |
|
no legal basis to set emission limits for sectors or companies. The second and subsequent phases (i.e. the post- |
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2020 period) will become mandatory when the Climate Change Bill is formally approved by government. |
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4.6.4 Phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies/incentives |
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|
Fossil fuels are used across a number of the economic sectors in South Africa. As a member of the G20, where |
|
countries have committed to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, South Africa has indicated willingness to |
|
identify and minimise their harmful impacts, taking cognisance of its developmental state. The subsidies |
|
undermine the competitiveness of renewable energy, divert financial resources from development of priority |
|
sectors and services such as education, health, and infrastructure; and encourage the extraction and |
|
overconsumption of fossil fuels (as they are under-priced). Inefficient fossil fuel subsidies act as a negative fuel |
|
tax or work as a negative price on carbon, and hence their phase-out entails removing market distortions which |
|
would result in greater efficiencies in the economy, including restructuring taxes to reflect their environmental |
|
impacts. An economy-wide carbon tax has been implemented from 1 June 2019 (as described above) and this |
|
provides a price signal to nudge the economy towards low carbon development. South Africa should consider |
|
participating in a fossil fuel subsidy peer review within the G20 framework to facilitate the sharing of experience |
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41 |
|
and mutual learning among G20 members as the next step in identifying inefficient fossil subsidies within the |
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economy. |
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5 GOING FURTHER TO ACHIEVE THE PARIS GOALS |
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Section 4 focused on a set of stand-alone, sector-based policies and measures as well as a selection of cross- |
|
cutting interventions that government is busy implementing. However, Section 1 highlighted that a broad range |
|
of structural changes will be necessary across economic sectors, in order to ensure the global economy achieves |
|
carbon neutrality within the second half of the century. Changes will be required in terms of service demand, |
|
technology fleet, infrastructure, operating practice, and energy sources, for all sectors of activity. |
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|
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Ensuring South Africa plays its role in the achievement of the Paris Agreement is the overarching purpose of this |
|
strategy. Therefore, as the science of climate change evolves, and our understanding matures to permeate our |
|
public awareness and policy processes, we will adjust our strategy accordingly. This is a living document, and |
|
ongoing work will ensure adequate updates are brought forward at appropriate times. |
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As it continues to strengthen its response to climate change as part of a global effort, South Africa will increase |
|
its focus on a range of strategic elements that will together promote the change to low carbon growth, while |
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continuing to align with the goals of the Paris Agreement. These are: |
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|
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e Enhancing the vision for development |
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|
|
e Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition |
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e Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth |
|
e Providing broad access to funds |
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|
e Driving innovation, research, and skills for future value capture |
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e Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all |
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42 |
|
e Promoting sustainable development through education and culture |
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e Enhancing information and metrics |
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Each of these is elaborated upon in the sections that follow. |
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|
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5.1 Enhancing the vision for development |
|
The SA-LEDS vision described in Section 3 is guided by the peak-plateau-decline trajectory as defined in the |
|
NCCRP and the NDC. The trajectory represents the contribution South Africa commits to the global response to |
|
|
|
climate change at this time, aligned with its vision of development. |
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|
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As a signatory to the Paris Agreement, South Africa subscribes to the view that a progression in climate ambition |
|
will be necessary to achieve the global long-term goals, with all parties taking part in this progression in ambition |
|
with regards to mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation, in accordance with the principles of the |
|
Convention. As climate science continues to further our understanding of the challenges and potential solutions |
|
to climate change, and economic reality broadens the range of options and global willingness to invest in them, |
|
South Africa will continue to both strengthen its commitments and communicate in a compelling manner how they |
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|
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represent our fair contribution to the global achievement of the Paris Agreement. |
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|
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The IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C has provided significant new understanding |
|
on the targets of the Paris Agreement, as briefly discussed in Section 1.2. Itis clear that Parties must find a way |
|
to ensure that emissions over time decrease rapidly as part of a sustainable development pathway, consistent |
|
with the goal of carbon neutrality in the second half of this century. Changes in all productive sectors, and |
|
important enhancements of international cooperation, are required. All of these elements must be kept in mind as |
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|
|
we enhance our long-term development vision. |
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|
|
Determining a trajectory to carbon neutrality will require a number of processes. Sectoral scenario analyses will |
|
be required to inform on the range of options. For these, traditional “incremental” modeling techniques will be |
|
insufficient, so a transformational approach will be required. Uncertainties in speed of response and investments |
|
required should not limit the scenario work, but rather become part of the output, to enable policymakers to |
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|
|
appreciate what conditions will be required to enable different trajectories. |
|
|
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Creating a national picture out of sectoral pathways will be essential to ensure balance between the sectors can |
|
inform national deliberations. Stakeholders from all sectors will play a vital part, providing insights into |
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|
|
opportunities, challenges, trade-offs and requirements which will inform the national debate and also enrich our |
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43 |
|
position with regards to the international community, be it as part of the UNFCCC negotiations or in discussions |
|
|
|
with donors and investors. |
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|
|
The analyses will seek to determine requirements for enablers from other participants in the global community, |
|
as appropriate. As South Africa play its part within a global effort, a range of technical pathways will be developed |
|
for low carbon development. The strategy development process will evaluate the opportunities within a new model |
|
of development, and the benefits of achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050, alongside the challenges to |
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|
|
the transition and the international enablers available. |
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|
National life, from local politics, business decisions, and mass media communications, will have to reflect these |
|
ideas, preparing citizens and decision-makers for a new perspective on economic development. The climate |
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challenge will only be tackled under the paradigm of sustainable development. |
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5.2 Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition |
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|
Regardless of the details of the path followed towards a carbon-neutral world, in-depth sectorial transformation |
|
plans will need to be developed over the coming years, with significant public and private sector collaboration, to |
|
lay out the transformation pathways which will lead South Africa to achieve its goals. Such planning requires |
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|
|
political will, coordination, a participatory process, and specific analytical resources and expertise. |
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|
|
Thus, a critical area in which institutional capabilities and arrangements should be enhanced is for the planning |
|
and policy-making processes themselves. These processes will have to develop targets across the whole |
|
economy, plan detailed actions over several timescales, and ensure the right changes can take place in the right |
|
way. The institutional capabilities required for these planning efforts and their implementation will require improved |
|
|
|
capabilities, as well as closer links to the research community, civil society, and the business community. |
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|
As the sectoral pathways are fully identified, the required sequence of steps for their implementation should be |
|
mapped onto the current institutional framework in order to establish where current coordination arrangements, |
|
as shown in Table 4, are suitable, and where it would make sense to consider adjustments. It is important to recall |
|
that these will be pathways of transformation, spanning 30 years and requiring multi-step processes which should |
|
be mapped out in somewhat detailed sequence. Topics such as ministerial attributions, levels of government, |
|
chains of command, and decision-making, as well as the scope for different institutions to access resources such |
|
as finance, skills, or regulatory authorization, should all be taken into consideration, as they can make a significant |
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|
|
difference to the success of the transformation. |
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44 |
|
Table 4: Current institutional arrangements to address climate change response actions |
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|
|
Structure |
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|
|
Function |
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|
|
Parliament and Portfolio Committees |
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|
|
Oversee and monitor the implementation of the |
|
national climate change responses |
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|
|
|
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|
|
Make laws to support climate change responses in |
|
the country |
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|
|
|
|
|
|
Presidential Climate Change |
|
|
|
Commission (PCCCC): (Yet to be established) |
|
|
|
Coordinating |
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|
|
Coordinate and oversee the low carbon and just |
|
transition, including how to maximise the |
|
opportunities for jobs. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change |
|
(IMCCC): Executive level committee. The Minister of |
|
the Environment and Minister responsible for planning |
|
monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency co-chair |
|
meetings |
|
|
|
Coordinate and align climate change response |
|
efforts, including statutory and regulatory needs |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change |
|
(IGCCC): Consists of relevant national, provincial |
|
departments and local government |
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|
|
Operationalise cooperative governance on the |
|
climate change issues |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ministers and Members of Executive Councils |
|
(MINMEC) and the Ministerial Technical Advisory |
|
Body (MINTECH): Facilitate a high level of policy and |
|
strategy coherence among the three spheres of |
|
government - national, provincial and __ local |
|
government |
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|
|
Guide climate change work across the three spheres |
|
of government |
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|
|
|
|
|
|
National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC): |
|
Multi-stakeholder Committee |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Consult with stakeholders from key sectors that |
|
impact on or are impacted by climate change - |
|
academia, business, NGOs, labour, government and |
|
civil society |
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|
|
|
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|
|
Advise on matters relating to national responsibilities |
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Advise on the implementation of climate change- |
|
related activities |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In addition to the institutional arrangements, training and capacity building that will be required to support the |
|
|
|
transition at the national government level, infrastructure and skills will need to be developed at the sub-national |
|
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|
45 |
|
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|
|
level. Many of the sub-national government structures are currently dysfunctional and lack the capacity to support |
|
|
|
implementation of and manage funding for the actions required to support the low carbon transition. |
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|
|
5.3 Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth |
|
|
|
The need for investment at scale and the change in purchasing choices of businesses and citizens over the |
|
coming years makes the fiscal regime of a country a determining factor in its ability to achieve the structural |
|
changes required by the joint objectives of achieving the Paris Agreement aims and eradicating poverty. The |
|
|
|
correct incentives will accelerate positive change, while misalignment can hold back action. |
|
|
|
Several considerations should inform fiscal adjustments over time. Overall tax revenue must be decoupled from |
|
volumes of fossil fuel sales and exports in order to ensure that financial sustainability of the state does not become |
|
a brake to the changes which are needed. Negative externalities should be considered for a greater share of |
|
intake, supported by detailed analysis including market responses over time, which itself should inform the |
|
|
|
pathway planning approach. |
|
|
|
Capital investment should be encouraged in technology and implementation choices to support Paris-compatible |
|
pathways. The incentives provided will have to be coherent with the long-term development pathway in order to |
|
ensure short-term mitigation actions do not lead to emissions lock-in, nor a boost for assets which may become |
|
|
|
stranded later. |
|
|
|
Fossil fuels subsidies and incentives which have the effect of fostering inefficient management of resources such |
|
as water, food, fertilizers, or public goods should be reviewed to support the transition to cleaner development. |
|
While such a subsidy review may cause resistance in some sectors, it provides an opportunity to ensure the use |
|
of state funds is progressive in terms of its distribution and enhances growth through the development of new |
|
businesses and investments which align fully with national objectives. Support for renewable energy options must |
|
be considered to accelerate their market acceptance, without building excessive distortions which may limit future |
|
|
|
competitiveness or stagnate the transformation. |
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|
|
Significant work will be required to create an environment which is nurturing and inviting to new business models. |
|
From shared ownership to provision of service/experience rather than goods/commodities, different ways of |
|
satisfying demand — supported by ever more powerful and accessible digital platforms and networks — will |
|
generate tremendous growth opportunities within a population increasing its per-capita income as poverty is |
|
|
|
reduced. A forward-looking fiscal strategy, aware of the options and flexible to the evolution of new markets, will |
|
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|
46 |
|
enhance such opportunities for South Africa, which will in turn bring export opportunities to Africa and the rest of |
|
|
|
the world. |
|
|
|
Additional opportunities for investment and growth will follow if the fiscal regime is inviting to new business which |
|
seek to on-shore significant portions of the value chain of the industries which will lead the sustainable transition; |
|
rather than zero-sum tariffs or restrictions, long-term policies which encourage investment, innovation, skills |
|
development, and early leadership of local markets which are likely to evolve later in neighboring countries, will |
|
|
|
all contribute to national wealth creation. |
|
|
|
Carbon prices must evolve over time to effectively discourage fossil fuel and other emissions, while providing |
|
clear market signals to investors in zero emission technologies that their investments will provide suitable returns |
|
over their useful lifetimes. Visibility over future carbon prices, such as legislating for a ramp-up over several years, |
|
provides clarity that carbon-intense investments will become uncompetitive and thus stranded, thereby informing |
|
|
|
decisions which may lock the country into future emissions. |
|
|
|
In summary, fiscal strategy over time must reconsider the balance of taxation, planning for falling sales of fossil |
|
fuels and seeking to reduce negative externalities, while incentives will focus on both the emissions implications |
|
of investments, favoring the route to net zero, and stimulating investments which take advantage of the |
|
opportunities created by this transition, both in the short term (such as business creation) and in the medium to |
|
|
|
long term, (such as by favoring skills development, innovation, and research). |
|
|
|
The fiscal strategy must therefore form its own pathway to 2050, balancing the needs of the transformation, |
|
|
|
economic and social development, with the viability of private sector companies and the state. |
|
|
|
5.4 Providing broad access to funds |
|
Access to funds in sufficient volume to meet the investment needs across a broad range of activities will be crucial |
|
to the success of our efforts to tackle climate change. Significant work is already underway to illustrate this need |
|
|
|
and help facilitate such access. |
|
|
|
South Africa’s National Climate Change Response Policy emphasises the importance of mobilising a wide range |
|
of financial and non-financial resources for both mitigation and adaptation. The Policy emphasises the need to |
|
draw on all available sources of domestic and international financing (DEA, 2011). South Africa’s National |
|
Determined Contribution goes further, and frames the ability to “catalyse, at an economy-wide scale, financing of |
|
and investment in the transition to a low carbon and climate resilient economy and society” as a key challenge |
|
|
|
for South Africa (DEA, 2015). Both these documents highlight the importance of international support given South |
|
|
|
47 |
|
Africa’s status as a developing country, and the magnitude of the challenge. Adaptation costs are difficult to |
|
quantify, but it could cost South Africa more than US$ 30 billion per annum to adapt to climate change for the |
|
period 2021-2030, and the incremental cost of mitigation action is estimated at more than US$ 1,350 billion in |
|
total over the period 2020-2050, or roughly US$ 44 billion per year (DEA, 2015; DEA, 2019b). Furthermore, |
|
Diffenbaugh and Burke (2019) find that the 1°C increase in global temperatures over the last century has already |
|
|
|
reduced the size of the South African economy by between 10 and 20%." |
|
|
|
Internationally, it is estimated that an additional US$ 13.5 trillion (in 2014 dollars) is required to remain below two |
|
degrees of climate change from 2015 to 2030 (Meltzer, 2016; Bhattacharya et al, 2016). This additional |
|
investment is, however, coupled with a reduction in investment in fossil fuel energy generation, transmission and |
|
distribution of US$ 5.7 trillion and US$ 3.7 trillion in upstream oil, coal and gas investments. A further |
|
US$ 5.1 trillion could also be saved in operating expenditure because of the reliance on low carbon technologies |
|
like renewables. Meltzer (2016) points out that the challenge is thus how to deal with the high upfront cost of |
|
|
|
these investments, since they are likely to more than pay for themselves over time. |
|
|
|
5.4.1 Climate finance flows to date |
|
|
|
Oliver et al (2018) find that US$ 472 billion of climate finance was deployed in 2015, US$ 455 billion in 2016 and |
|
between US$ 510 billion and US$ 530 billion in 2017. Of the US$ 463 billion average annual flow over 2015 and |
|
2016, an average of US$ 45 billion flowed from developed to developing countries, and only US$ 12 billion per |
|
annum (including domestic resources) was deployed in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the US$ 463 billion average |
|
annual value, more than 80% originated from domestic sources (US$ 162 billion from within OECD countries and |
|
US$ 214 billion from within non-OECD countries). These numbers, however, cover all climate finance deployed, |
|
and are not comparable to the pledge by developed countries, first made at COP15 in Copenhagen, to provide |
|
US$ 100 billion of climate finance to developing countries by 2020. Timperley (2018) mentions that there is |
|
disagreement about how close this pledge is to being met. According to the UNFCCC (2018), US$ 74.5 billion of |
|
climate finance flowed to developing countries in 2016. International public climate finance flows to developing |
|
countries, however, averaged US$ 58 billion for 2015 and 2016. Oxfam (2018) believes public climate finance |
|
flows from developed to developing countries are much lower at between US$ 16 billion to US$ 21 billion. The |
|
OECD (2019) estimated the value to be US$ 46.9 billion in 2016 and US$ 54.5 billion in 2017. Using project-level |
|
|
|
11 According to the World Bank Development Indicators the size of the South African Economy was US$ 366 billion in 2018. |
|
|
|
48 |
|
data which doesn’t cover all climate finance flows, Timperley (2018), calculates a lower value for OECD climate |
|
finance to developing countries of US$ 37 billion in 2016. |
|
|
|
For 2015 to 2017, approximately US$ 160.7 million of bilateral and US$ 45.4 million of multilateral climate finance |
|
flowed to South Africa. Over the same period, however, the South African government deployed almost |
|
US$ 690 million of climate finance (DEA, 2019c).'2 The distribution of local public sector climate finance is shown |
|
in Figure 8. Even though South African climate finance deployment was small by international standards, it is |
|
nowhere near the levels that will be required from 2020 as discussed in the previous section. The percentage of |
|
climate finance generated from domestic versus international sources is in line with international trends over this |
|
period. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Energy Efficiency and Municipal Disaster 4 |
|
Der a Municipal Disaster |
|
Management funding _ 4.9% Recovery Grant |
|
Loans program (EEDSM) ~ 4.1% — integrated National |
|
~ Electrification |
|
_— Programme (INEP) |
|
0.1% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
45.38 million |
|
uso |
|
|
|
an |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Manufacturing |
|
Competitiveness |
|
Enhancement |
|
programme (MCEP) |
|
2.9% |
|
|
|
National Expanded_—~ |
|
Public Works |
|
Programme: |
|
Environmental |
|
protection & |
|
infrastructure All Grants |
|
|
|
= Conditional Grants 8.7% |
|
= Grants |
|
|
|
@ Loans Domestic Finance |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Figure 8: Domestic climate finance (2015 - 2017) |
|
Source: DEA (2019c) |
|
|
|
‘South Africa’s 3 Biennial Update Report (BUR-3) mentions that lags in reporting may lead to an underestimate of 2017 values. |
|
Climate finance information for the periods 2000-2010 and 2010-2014 can be found in BUR-1 and BUR-2. |
|
|
|
49 |
|
Even without considering the contribution of domestic private sector financing for climate change-related activities, |
|
which is likely to be significant given recent investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency in South |
|
Africa, it is clear that international support contributes a relatively small proportion of climate finance being utilised |
|
in South Africa. The contribution of domestic climate finance is also likely to increase further given the broad- |
|
|
|
based carbon tax that was put in place during 2019. |
|
|
|
International support is also highly concentrated in the form of one bilateral and one multilateral development |
|
partner for the period under consideration. Germany contributed 55% of bilateral and 43% of total international |
|
climate finance to South Africa, while the Global Environment Facility accounted for 93% of multilateral and 20% |
|
of total international climate finance. The bulk of international climate finance was in the form of grants, with only |
|
US$ 950,000 (0.5%) originating from multilateral loans (DEA, 2019c). |
|
|
|
5.4.2 Formalising climate finance structures |
|
|
|
While South Africa has made great strides in understanding its mitigation and adaptation challenge, and |
|
particularly in understanding the availability and attractiveness of mitigation policies and measures and the ways |
|
these will have to be combined to meet its international climate commitments, it has not been successful in |
|
accessing climate finance on a transformational scale. The climate finance that has been accessed is |
|
concentrated in two entities, and this creates risks in terms of the long-term certainty of flows and climate |
|
|
|
governance and independence. |
|
|
|
To address this shortcoming, South Africa is developing a comprehensive climate finance strategy. The strategy |
|
will take a holistic view of climate finance activities and will cover all aspects of climate finance, including: the |
|
quantum of climate finance required; identifying stakeholders and activities along the climate finance value-chain; |
|
increasing climate finance flows from different types of finance providers (e.g. bilateral finance, multilateral |
|
finance, domestic public finance and private sector finance), monitoring and evaluation, and climate finance |
|
governance structures. The strategy will ensure that climate finance frameworks are compatible with local |
|
conditions and ambition. Furthermore, in order to best contribute to the strategy development process, it should |
|
seek to identify financing pathways commensurate with technology transformation pathways and economic |
|
development pathways required by the transformation to a low-emissions economy (see remarks on planning for |
|
implementation contained in Section 6). |
|
|
|
South Africa has a framework for tracking climate finance in place, which is being operationalised as part of the |
|
|
|
national integrated climate change monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. The climate change M&E system, |
|
|
|
50 |
|
however, is still under development and monitoring and reporting activities will only be automated during the final |
|
phase of implementation (2021-2025) (DEA, 2017; DEA, 2019c). At present climate finance is therefore being |
|
tracked on an ad hoc basis via informal engagements between the Department of Environmental Affairs and the |
|
National Treasury. The national climate finance strategy will formalise local climate finance governance, |
|
coordination and reporting structures. M&E will be a key focus area of the strategy, and it will seek to strengthen |
|
the current climate finance M&E framework by extending monitoring and reporting to include all elements of the |
|
climate finance value chain, including private sector finance. Furthermore, the strategy will consider the |
|
development of mechanisms for evaluating the outcomes of climate finance to understand the extent to which it |
|
is accelerating South Africa’s climate change mitigation and adaptation responses. In addition to supporting |
|
climate change planning by the government, it will reassure the providers of finance that it is being effectively |
|
|
|
deployed. It will also serve to illustrate the positive impact that climate finance can have in South Africa. |
|
|
|
5.4.3 Climate finance opportunities |
|
|
|
South Africa’s climate finance strategy will seek to quantify the financing requirements and identify areas where |
|
climate finance should be targeted. This will complement significant research that has been undertaken to identify |
|
sectors and activities that should be prioritised in terms of mitigation and adaptation actions. Research already |
|
undertaken includes the Technology Needs Assessment (which is currently being updated) (DST, 2007), the Long |
|
Term Adaptation Scenarios (LTAS), Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS), the latest GHG Inventory, the |
|
Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA), Climate Change Mitigation Technology Implementation Plan (DEA and DST, |
|
2015), Global Change Research Plan and national government departmental plans (DEA, 2018b; DEA 2019c). |
|
Explicitly linking climate finance requirements with mitigation and adaptation needs could also create the |
|
opportunity to use climate finance to support technology development and transfer. Both the Green Climate Fund |
|
and the Global Environment Facility, for example, provide support for the development of Technology Needs |
|
Assessments and/or consider the results of these assessments in their lending programmes (Resende, 2019; |
|
Kaung-Idba, 2019). |
|
|
|
The climate finance strategy will also seek to understand why South Africa has not been successful in attracting |
|
more climate finance, and will attempt to significantly increase the amount of climate finance flowing to South |
|
Africa. As part of this process, a 5-year high-level climate finance implementation plan will be developed that will |
|
|
|
include a pipeline of financeable projects. |
|
|
|
51 |
|
One area where South Africa has demonstrated that it has the capacity to effectively absorb large amounts of |
|
climate finance, and where a scaling up of climate finance could have a positive mitigation impact relevant on a |
|
global scale, is the electricity supply sector (as outlined in Section 4.1.2). South Africa’s electricity supply industry |
|
is set for significant change in coming years as a result of an electricity supply crisis and reform of the current |
|
poorly performing vertically integrated utility model. South Africa has one of the most carbon-intensive electricity |
|
grids in the world, and recent research has shown that aggressive decarbonisation can have significant economic, |
|
social and environment benefits (Wright, et al., 2017; Steyn, Burton, & Steenkamp, 2017; Bischof-Niemz & |
|
Creamer, 2019). Significant decarbonisation of the electricity grid in the short term, however, is likely to incur |
|
significant transition costs, and may not happen without significant international support. The current situation, |
|
however, provides and unprecedented opportunity to avoid long-term carbon lock-in and significantly accelerate |
|
|
|
a just transition to a low carbon and inclusive economy. |
|
|
|
South Africa has a number of features that make it attractive as a destination for climate finance. The country has |
|
a well-developed financial system and a history of developing and rolling out innovative instruments for raising |
|
and deploying donor, public and private sector climate finance. The well-regarded Renewable Energy |
|
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), for example, managed to raise |
|
US$ 15.83 billion of finance for utility-scale renewable energy projects, 80% of which originated from domestic |
|
sources (IPPP Office, 2019).13 By the end of March 2019, the REIPPPP had procured 6,422 MW of capacity |
|
(3,976 MW of which had been connected to the national grid). 35,669 GWh of renewable electricity had been |
|
generated, saving 36.2 Mt of CO2 and 42.8 million kilolitres of water. 53,339 full-time equivalent (FTE)'4 jobs were |
|
also created, 48,085 of which went to locals (DoE, 2019a). The economics of energy generation has changed in |
|
South Africa, and a growing body of evidence shows that renewable energy is now the cheapest form of electricity |
|
generation locally. Given the very carbon-intensive nature of South Africa’s national grid, and local energy |
|
investment needs going forward, this creates an unprecedented opportunity for South Africa to absorb climate |
|
|
|
finance. |
|
|
|
South African banks have also started developing financing tools aimed at the smaller-scale renewables market |
|
(GreenCape, 2019). Tools for aggregating and effectively deploying public sector climate finance also exist in the |
|
|
|
form of, for example, the Green Fund managed by the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and the |
|
|
|
13 Calculated at the annual average South Africa Rand-US dollar exchange rate for 2018 from the South African Reserve Bank. |
|
14“ETE” means Full Time Employment Created. It refers to one person-year of employment. In the calculation of this number one person |
|
year is equivalent to 230 person days of work. |
|
|
|
52 |
|
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and the Energy Efficiency and Demand-side Management Fund |
|
managed by the Department of Energy. |
|
|
|
The REIPPPP is also an example of using green public procurement to raise climate finance. This is an approach |
|
that is also being considered in other countries (see, for example, the UK Government’s Green Finance Strategy |
|
(HM Government, 2019)) and could be expanded in South Africa. |
|
|
|
Two municipal green bonds have been released in South Africa, by the City of Cape Town and the City of |
|
Johannesburg, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange currently has three green bonds listed by financial |
|
institutions with a total value of US$ 385 million (PWC, 2019; Khumalo, 2019) |
|
|
|
South Africa has well capacitated development finance institutions, like the DBSA and the Industrial Development |
|
Corporation (IDC) that routinely channel climate finance from multilateral and bilateral donors, and private sector |
|
banks have also partnered with international donors to roll out innovative climate finance vehicles. An example of |
|
this is the US$ 98 million FIRST fund that offers long term debt finance to local small renewable energy projects |
|
(FIRST fund, undated). The fund is a collaboration between a local bank and the German KfW Development Bank |
|
|
|
(KfW), and is underpinned by a first-loss debt facility and grant-type funding from KfW (Hawarden, undated). |
|
|
|
Despite the sophistication and depth of South African financial markets, a number of barriers remain that restrict |
|
the flow of funding to climate change projects. These are not unique to South Africa and include, amongst others, |
|
a relatively high degree of risk aversion among local financial institutions, difficulty in accessing longer-term |
|
financing, credibility of off-takers, high transaction costs for smaller projects, relatively long pay-back periods and |
|
a lack of attractive large low carbon investment options, difficulty in raising financing for technologies that have |
|
not been proven locally, a lack of concessionary wholesale finance, uncertainty about future electricity prices, |
|
complexity and regulatory burden of environmental regulation, a lack of public sector capacity in key areas, and |
|
an investment environment that is not conducive to investment due to policy uncertainty (Nicholls et al, 2015; |
|
Cloete et al, 2016; Cloete et al, 2018). These barriers, coupled with the scale of funding that is required to address |
|
mitigation and adaptation, means that there is a significant need for scaled-up international support to finance the |
|
|
|
transition to a climate-resilient inclusive low-carbon economy in South Africa. |
|
|
|
Positioning South Africa as an attractive destination for climate finance offers opportunities beyond enabling a |
|
transition to a just, sustainable and prosperous low carbon economy as discussed below. It also creates the |
|
opportunity to leverage its sophisticated and deep financial markets to serve as a gateway for climate finance to |
|
the rest of the continent, which, as mentioned earlier, is struggling to access its fair share of climate finance. |
|
|
|
Following the example of a country like the UK (see HM Government (2019)), South Africa should use its climate |
|
|
|
53 |
|
finance strategy to support the local financial sector to develop a competitive advantage in accessing and |
|
channelling climate finance. To do this, however, the emphasis should be placed on greening the financial sector |
|
|
|
as a whole, and not just developing a climate finance niche. |
|
|
|
The reasons for this are multiple. Not only is the scale of the challenge such that countries cannot afford to |
|
misallocate capital, particularly while domestic sources still make up the bulk of climate finance, but carbon lock- |
|
in and a reluctance to allow stranded assets could jeopardise mitigation targets. Finance is a critical driver of the |
|
low carbon transition, and without targeting finance effectively, climate goals will not be achieved. Equally |
|
important, it is now well understood that neglecting to asses and price the risks inherent in climate change creates |
|
systemic risk within financial systems (see, for example, TCFD (2017), Vermeulen et al (2018), Poloz et al (2019), |
|
Giuzio et al (2019)). The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure has created a common language |
|
for considering both physical and transition risk related to climate change. It is important that the |
|
recommendations of the Task Force be mainstreamed into the South African financial sector to ensure that these |
|
risks are understood and managed, to provide the information required to effectively deploy finance in a climate |
|
compatible way (TCFD, 2017). Furthermore, as illustrated by the UK’s Green Finance Strategy, it is also important |
|
that all local financial regulators recognise climate-related financial factors as part of their mandate and actively |
|
|
|
monitor climate-related risk and exposure within the South African financial sector. |
|
|
|
During the transition it is critical that the financial sector enables the redirection of funds from the high-carbon |
|
activities that are no longer consistent with a just, sustainable and prosperous low carbon economy to the new |
|
|
|
industries and activities that will underpin it. |
|
|
|
5.5 Driving innovation, research, and skills for future value capture |
|
|
|
Boosting innovation, research and skills is a crucial lever to increase South Africa’s international competitiveness, |
|
and to ensure that higher-value economic activity spearheads future growth by becoming an ever-greater |
|
proportion of GDP over time. The transitions required to support low-carbon development present clear |
|
opportunities for the innovation, research, and skills agenda, particularly given that global compliance with Paris |
|
|
|
implies a large, ongoing investment over decades. |
|
|
|
South Africa’s existing research and industrial capabilities, as well as its natural resources, present a compelling |
|
starting point for such an expansion. The national research agenda is largely guided by the priorities set by |
|
national government and in particular the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI), as the national department |
|
|
|
responsible for provision of leadership, an enabling environment and resources for science, technology and |
|
|
|
54 |
|
innovation. With 17% of funding for the South African climate change research and technology development |
|
|
|
system coming from international sources, international research agendas also have some impact on the local |
|
|
|
agenda. The White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) (DST, 2019) also emphasises the core |
|
|
|
themes of inclusivity, transformation, and partnerships, and recognises the important role that STI would play in |
|
|
|
mitigating and adapting to climate change impacts. The paper recognises the role of a circular economy in driving |
|
|
|
the shift to a green economy by accelerating eco-innovation. |
|
|
|
A range of existing research activities are already setting the basis for the low carbon transition. These include: |
|
|
|
The Hydrogen South Africa (HySA) Research Programme, that aims to make South Africa a global player |
|
in fuel cell technology, through prototyping, demonstration and commercialisation of fuel cell |
|
technologies; |
|
|
|
The Renewable Energy Hub and Spokes initiative aims to develop national technical capacity in wind, |
|
solar photovoltaic and solar thermal power. Research capacity is built at various universities throughout |
|
the country. Research focusses on specific individual components, as well as system design and |
|
production. |
|
|
|
The Lithium lon Battery Programme that was established to initiate the development of advanced energy |
|
storage technologies which play an essential role regarding the integration of solar and wind power. |
|
The South African Centre for Capture and Storage (SACCS) was established to drive the activities |
|
required to realise commercial scale Carbon Capture and Storage in South Africa, towards sequestering |
|
a portion of the emissions from coal-fired power plants, iron and steel, cement and coal gasification. |
|
The Waste Research, Development and Innovation Roadmap implemented by the CSIR was developed |
|
to assist DEA in realising the ambitions of the NWMS through research, science, technology and |
|
innovation. If a recycling and circular economy is realised this will drastically reduce the volumes of waste |
|
|
|
to landfill and mitigate GHG emissions. |
|
|
|
Over time, the scale of the planning related to the low-carbon transition will increase, and further research and |
|
|
|
innovation challenges will arise. Preliminary sectoral analyses have already suggested such specific research |
|
|
|
and innovation challenge areas that will need to be addressed. Examples of future research direction include: |
|
|
|
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, the IRP proposes a set of research and analysis activities to be undertaken |
|
to support the low carbon transition of the electricity supply sector. These include detailed studies on the |
|
|
|
impact of gas supply options, the appropriate level of penetration of RE in the South African national grid, |
|
|
|
55 |
|
the cost and economic benefits associated with other clean energy options as well as socio-economic |
|
impacts of communities affected by the decommissioning of coal fired power stations. |
|
|
|
e Developing robust data on the long-term implications of implementing mitigation policies and measures |
|
across the sectors, where such information does not exist. Notable here are the transport, waste and |
|
AFOLU sectors. |
|
|
|
A rigorous analysis of South Africas competitiveness in the different commercial and industrial sectors which are |
|
likely to present the greatest opportunities from the sustainable transformation should inform the specific support |
|
provided to this agenda. This analysis should look across a spectrum of economic benefits, from value-chain |
|
|
|
analysis of likely technology rollouts, to regional and global competitive advantages under different scenarios. |
|
|
|
Key to the innovation, skills and value capture strategy is the idea of a 30-year transition. The planning approach |
|
presented in Section 6 allows for a staged approach to building up the necessary policy environment, drive |
|
investment, and train a diverse workforce while supporting entrepreneurial activity. Coupling this planning with |
|
sectoral scenario analyses will help identify concrete areas of opportunity, for which additional work will be |
|
|
|
required to fully flesh out plans. |
|
|
|
5.6 Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all |
|
|
|
South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon society and economy will have uneven socio-economic impacts. The |
|
transition will bring about efficiencies, investment and growth, opening up many opportunities in new areas of |
|
activity. However, activity will also reduce in areas linked with GHG emissions, leading to declining operations, |
|
diminished returns for companies, and fewer jobs in specific sectors. Impacts will differ across scales, timeframes, |
|
and locations. The South African government is committed to ensuring that the transition is just; that its negative |
|
impacts are not disproportionally borne by the most vulnerable poor and working-class communities who are |
|
|
|
simultaneously bearing the brunt of the physical impacts of climate change. |
|
|
|
To ensure that government's commitment to a just transition is realised will require a clear vision around which |
|
the various initiatives, policies, sectors, geographical areas and communities can organize. The vision being |
|
developed by the National Planning Commission (NPC), through a consultative, bottom-up process, will help to |
|
|
|
define such an end-state, together with pathways to achieve this in the key areas of land, water and energy. |
|
|
|
Appropriate and sufficiently resourced plans and policies will be necessary. International examples exist of |
|
initiatives to support workers and communities who currently depend on fossil fuel and other industries, on which |
|
|
|
the South African government can draw. These include initiatives in training, re-tooling, relocation, early |
|
|
|
56 |
|
retirement, and other forms of support. A number of such initiatives are in the planning or pilot phase, led by |
|
various stakeholders. A broader macro-economic view is also important. Two key policy instruments are being |
|
developed to manage the just transition to a low carbon economy: the National Employment Vulnerability |
|
Assessment (NEVA), and Sector Jobs Resilience Plans (SURPs). The NEVA will assess the employment |
|
characteristics of key economic sectors in the context of the low carbon transition. The SJRPs will be tailored to |
|
|
|
address the job losses in each sector, together with future opportunities. |
|
|
|
All policy measures targeting the low carbon transition should be aligned with the fulfilment of the country’s |
|
developmental objectives, which include alleviating poverty and reducing inequality, creating sustainable jobs and |
|
increasing the provision of basic services to all South Africans. In addition, specific policies and interventions will |
|
|
|
be required to support vulnerable communities in particular locations and scales, at particular times. |
|
|
|
5.7 Promoting sustainable development through education and culture |
|
|
|
Education can be a key factor in promoting sustainable development, by helping people develop knowledge, |
|
skills, values and behaviors which enhance their understanding and appreciation of how sustainability means a |
|
better life for them and their communities. Specific actions range vary the education curriculum, and must also |
|
include cultural and citizen awareness campaigns. Significant work is already underway globally to promote |
|
education surrounding climate change and sustainable development, and best practices are available, such as |
|
through the “Education for Sustainable Development’ program of UNESCO.'5 The concepts of economic |
|
|
|
transformation, pathways, and just transition must also be included into the educational and cultural work. |
|
|
|
South Africa should see the opportunity to obtain support for education for sustainable development as a core |
|
element of its overall strategy to improve education, and so should urgently set about developing a |
|
|
|
comprehensive, integrated approach to realising this opportunity. |
|
|
|
5.8 Enhancing information and metrics |
|
|
|
Ensuring availability of data is central to tracking the low carbon transition, and monitoring that this transition is |
|
being achieved in a way that is just to all. South Africa has already implemented mandatory reporting regulations |
|
to support reporting by emitters falling within certain emissions categories. Furthermore, the Department of |
|
|
|
Environmental Affairs is in the process of establishing the national M&E system, which will be used to monitor |
|
|
|
15 See http:/Avww.unesco.org/new/en/harare/about-this-office/single- |
|
view/news/southern_africa_celebrates_awarding_of_unesco_japan_esd_priz/ |
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57 |
|
implementation of mitigation actions by stakeholders across the economy and ultimately to the implementation of |
|
this and subsequent versions of SA-LEDS. |
|
|
|
Future work needs to ensure that data is collected in a coherent, consistent and transparent manner, and that the |
|
“tight” data to support decision making and planning is collected — including towards informing future updates of |
|
this strategy. |
|
|
|
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS: PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION |
|
|
|
This strategy sets out a direction of travel for South Africa as we refine our low carbon emission development |
|
pathway to meet our commitments to the international community and address our developmental |
|
agenda/priorities and needs. We know that success will require decades of dedicated effort. Therefore, we |
|
present this Strategy as a living document, the beginning of our journey towards ultimately reaching a net zero |
|
|
|
carbon economy by 2050. |
|
|
|
The first step will thus be to ensure national targets are aligned with the Paris Agreement, as stated in Section |
|
5.1. Thereafter, planning teams with analytical and sectoral expertise will engage in detailed scenario work to |
|
develop transformation pathways towards achieving the national targets (see discussion in Section 6.1 below). |
|
Building a scenario is, however, not enough to plan for its delivery. The work of translating such a plan to policy |
|
is a challenge which all Parties will have to grapple with over the coming months and years. South Africa aims to |
|
|
|
inform rollout plans through the use of a dedicated change framework (Section 6.2). |
|
|
|
SA-LEDS will thus be reviewed at least every five years or at an earlier date, should there be significant changes |
|
in sectoral or national plans/programmes that can result in a big structural changes, growth or decay of the |
|
|
|
economy and major global events that impact on its content or implementation. |
|
|
|
6.1 Detailed sectoral work to explore transformation pathways |
|
|
|
The Paris Agreement sets out the long-term climate change goals for the international community. While countries |
|
establish their own goals in a nationally determined manner, sectoral details will have to be analyzed in significant |
|
detail, laying out different scenarios to understand trajectories of investment, technology take-up, emissions |
|
|
|
reduction, and market change. This work has already commenced in South Africa through a number of studies: |
|
|
|
e The Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA), the overall objective of which was |
|
|
|
to conduct an updated, bottom-up assessment of mitigation potential in key economic sectors in order to |
|
|
|
58 |
|
identify a set of viable options for reducing GHGs. Marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) for key |
|
sectors and subsectors were constructed. The MACCs provide estimates of mitigation potential and |
|
marginal abatement costs for broad mitigation measures. Estimates of national mitigation potential have |
|
been derived from the sectoral MACCs and ranked in terms of level of implementability at national level |
|
for each of the technologies. |
|
|
|
e The Pathways study to explore the impact of alternative economic growth trajectories on the country’s |
|
emissions trajectory, looking at the implementation of structural changes rather than the implementation |
|
of purely technical interventions. This study, which also used the single national emissions model, had |
|
not been released at the time of writing of this document. |
|
|
|
e The Policies and Measures (PAMs) analysis, which explored the impact of existing PAMs, many of which |
|
|
|
were included in Section 4 of this document, on the emissions trajectory. |
|
|
|
Itis recognized that detailed forecasting is unlikely to accurately predict the evolution of markets. However, “failing |
|
to plan is planning to fail’, which is why systematic planning is recommended for all sectors. Common |
|
characteristics between scenarios that succeed and those that do not will help policymakers identify those |
|
conditions which must be met in order for the transition to succeed, aligned with Paris in a manner consistent with |
|
|
|
the latest science from the IPCC. |
|
|
|
Based on the sectoral pathways work, which will identify the requirements of the different sectors, a cross-cutting |
|
analysis of such pathways will help identify common needs. An aggregate understanding of the evolution over |
|
time of such critical factors such as levels of capital investment, consumer prices of different energy options, and |
|
requirements for skilled workers in various industries (increasing and decreasing), will set out the parameters for |
|
|
|
the cross-cutting approaches detailed in Section 6.2. |
|
|
|
6.2 Creation of policy package roadmaps across three phases |
|
The likelihood of policy action leading to long-term transformation results would require the application of new |
|
|
|
planning techniques. |
|
|
|
Pathway planning has emerged as an analytical tool that can inform national policy development over time |
|
towards objectives that sit beyond a typical policy horizon. Pathways aim to visualize the whole timespan between |
|
the present and the time for which a target is set, seeking to establish what steps make sense now in the context |
|
of reaching the long-term goal. When establishing potential pathways, the desired end-state should be linked to |
|
|
|
the present, but by “backcasting” rather than forecasting. This means that requirements for intermediate steps |
|
|
|
59 |
|
between today and the long-term goal are deduced not on the basis of how compatible they may be with the |
|
current context, but rather in terms of what is required for the end-state to be achieved. This leads policy-makers |
|
to consider the question “what would have to be true” regarding short and medium-term checkpoints, deriving the |
|
answer from the evolution to the goal. Since many actions have long lead times to achieve full effect, backcasting |
|
|
|
can help identify by when core changes must take place. |
|
|
|
Once pathways are clearly drawn out, regulatory, institutional, or other structural changes which are required for |
|
the transformation can be identified, from which necessary changes can be deduced and used to suggest |
|
concrete policy action. In this manner, a rigorous pathway analysis towards a long-term target can produce a |
|
number of concrete actions which must be carried out by a certain time, to enable other actions. It can be helpful |
|
to structure the time interval into three parts: short, medium and long-term, organising and communicating such |
|
|
|
actions on a three-stage timeline. These stages are: |
|
|
|
e Starting Right (to be completed prior to end of 2021 financial year) |
|
e Turning the Corner (to begin in parallel with the Starting Right stage and continue to 2025) |
|
e Massive Rollout (2025 to 2050) |
|
|
|
The “Starting Right” stage will focus on actions relating to the current government administration, or perhaps also |
|
address the initial years of the following one. The most important aspect of the “Starting Right” stage is to ensure |
|
that a true transition is kicked off. On the one hand, rapid implementation must begin in all areas where pathways |
|
to achieving the Paris Goals are already clear (such as investments in renewable energy power generation, solar |
|
water heaters, etc) while on the other, steps taken will need to enable future action at scale, as much as (or |
|
perhaps more than) drive immediate emissions reductions. Clearly, the “Starting Right” stage cannot be |
|
successfully executed without a long-term pathways analysis to provide confidence on the Paris-compatibility of |
|
implemented measures as well as the overall direction of travel. Indeed, the search for immediate emissions |
|
reductions in the short-term can often lead to investments in technologies or business models which, while |
|
emitting less than traditional options, are not on track to drive the large reductions demanded by the long-term |
|
transformation. Because of this, avoiding decisions which will lead to emissions lock-in is a core priority of the |
|
|
|
“Starting Right” stage. |
|
|
|
The second stage, “Turning the Corner” would typically take five to seven years. This phase will begin to be |
|
implemented in parallel with the “Starting Right” stage, where appropriate, and continue to 2025. This period is |
|
decisive, since within it new decision and investment criteria are broadly applied, bringing about changes to the |
|
|
|
day-to-day operation of many sectors of the economy at the same time. Resistance to change can become |
|
|
|
60 |
|
challenging if not well handled, and must be anticipated and addressed with social acceptance and just transition |
|
actions. It is at this stage that multiple policies will need to work in concert for the new technological options to |
|
make economic sense for businesses and consumers. An overall understanding of the sectoral narratives of |
|
|
|
change and how they collectively feed into the national vision will be core to the success of this stage. |
|
|
|
“Massive rollout” is the final phase, in which the low-emissions climate resilient options have become the new |
|
normal. The constant application of transformative action will drive large volumes of investment towards |
|
transformational change. Perseverance on the application of all aspects of change will be required to avoid |
|
imbalances or injustices which will compromise the change, and sectors which achieve important milestones must |
|
not be allowed to become complacent, but rather contribute to the broader change by supporting areas of natural |
|
synergy. |
|
|
|
Examples of activities that might be taken during the three phases of implementation of the transition are shown |
|
in Table 5. All along the way provision needs to be made for regular review of the Strategy and the implementation |
|
|
|
plan, and M&E of implementation. |
|
|
|
Table 5: The three phases of the just transition |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
e Start the process of developing long term plans for each sector, to avoid lock-in to emissions |
|
intensive infrastructure and establish the basis for transformation at scale |
|
e Develop approaches for allocation of Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs) and carbon budgets |
|
|
|
Starting Right to high emitting entities |
|
|
|
and complete by |
|
end of 2020/21 |
|
financial year) |
|
|
|
(start immediately | ¢ |
|
|
|
Develop Sector Jobs Resilience Plans (SJRPs) to support the transition to the low carbon |
|
economy and climate resilient society in a Just manner |
|
|
|
Identify the institutional, legislative, finance and other changes required to achieve the |
|
transformation |
|
|
|
Develop an understanding of the relevant government decisions which need to be taken to |
|
achieve the long-term plans |
|
|
|
Develop a monitoring plan |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Turning the corner |
|
(start immediately, |
|
as _—_ appropriate, |
|
and complete by |
|
2025) |
|
|
|
Develop and begin to implement detailed transformation plans for each sector, which is |
|
supported by the implementation of the SETs, carbon budgets and SJRPs |
|
|
|
Develop investment pathways to support the transformation |
|
|
|
Implement foundational changes to drive down the national trajectory |
|
|
|
Implement the institutional changes to accelerate the rate of transformation and remove |
|
barriers |
|
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|
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|
|
Massive __ roll-out |
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|
|
(to 2050) |
|
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|
|
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|
|
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|
|
Roll-out the implementation plans for each sector along with measures to support changes |
|
until they become the new reality |
|
Refine strategies as required, to account for changes in technologies, society and markets |
|
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61 |
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|
|
Successful rollout of the pathway across the three stages will thus require policy action to be taken in a |
|
coordinated manner. It is helpful to present policies not as stand-alone actions but rather as parts of policy |
|
packages, that is to say, combinations of measures which may include planning, regulatory, financial, and other |
|
instruments to collectively drive towards the desired outcome, providing capabilities and overcoming barriers to |
|
|
|
change. Complementarity and sequencing are both crucial to building effective policy packages. |
|
Proposed components of policy packages could include those that focus on: |
|
|
|
e Planning; |
|
e Institutional / regulatory; |
|
e Project implementation; |
|
e Financing; |
|
e Acceptance, skills and just transition; and |
|
e Avoiding lock-in. |
|
Policy packages should be built up in sequence over time to ensure the full implementation of the pathway, in the |
|
|
|
form of a policy pathway which is required to implement the low-carbon transition. |
|
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|
62 |
|
7 REFERENCES |
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