wanyu/IteraTeR_v2 huggingface dataset:
Original:  An example of an alleged intrinsic property is 'shape'.
Revised:  An example of an alleged intrinsic property is "shape".
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  According to Lewis (Sider, 2001)  if we know what 'shapes' are, we know them to be properties, not relations.
Revised:  According to Lewis (Sider, 2001) , if we know what 'shapes' are, we know them to be properties, not relations.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  According to Lewis (Sider, 2001)  if we know what 'shapes' are, we know them to be properties, not relations.
Revised:  According to Lewis (Sider, 2001) if we know what "shapes" are, we know them to be properties, not relations.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  However  if properties are had to times, as endurantists say, then no property is intrinsic.
Revised:  However , if properties are had to times, as endurantists say, then no property is intrinsic.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence  the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round  i.e.  it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Revised:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence , the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round i.e. it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence  the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round  i.e.  it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Revised:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence the endurantist must say " for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round i.e. it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence  the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round  i.e.  it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Revised:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round , i.e. it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence  the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round  i.e.  it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Revised:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round i.e. , it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence  the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round  i.e.  it is round at those times , it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Revised:  Even if a ball is round throughout its existence the endurantist must say that: for all times in which the ball exists, the ball is round i.e. it is round at those times ; it has the property 'being round at a time'.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  " So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1 . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 ). However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1 . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic , then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1 . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic then some properties are not had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1 . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic then some properties aren't had to times — they are had simpliciter , C1 . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1 ) . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1 . It might be said that P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:   So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties,  P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic  then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1  . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that  P3 is more controversial.
Revised:  So, if all properties are had to times, then there are no intrinsic properties, P2 . However, if we think that Lewis is right and some properties are intrinsic then some properties aren't had to times , they are had simpliciter , C1 . Beginning with the second part of the argument it might be said that premise P3 is more controversial.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible , if that were so then at that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts , since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension  and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Revised:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible . If that were so then at that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts , since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible , if that were so then at that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts , since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension  and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Revised:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible , if that were so , then in that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts , since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible , if that were so then at that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts , since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension  and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Revised:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible , if that were so then at that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts — since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible , if that were so then at that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts , since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension  and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Revised:  For instance, suppose a timeless world is possible , if that were so then at that world, even if there were intrinsic properties, they would not be had by temporal parts , since by definition a timeless world has no temporal dimension , and therefore in such a world there cannot be temporal parts.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  However  our world is not timeless, and the possibility of timeless worlds is questionable, so it seems reasonable to think that in worlds with a temporal dimension  only temporal parts can have properties simpliciter.
Revised:  However , our world is not timeless, and the possibility of timeless worlds is questionable, so it seems reasonable to think that in worlds with a temporal dimension only temporal parts can have properties simpliciter.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  However  our world is not timeless, and the possibility of timeless worlds is questionable, so it seems reasonable to think that in worlds with a temporal dimension  only temporal parts can have properties simpliciter.
Revised:  However our world is not timeless, and the possibility of timeless worlds is questionable, so it seems reasonable to think that in worlds with a temporal dimension , only temporal parts can have properties simpliciter.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Temporal parts have properties  and have a temporal location.
Revised:  Temporal parts have properties , and have a temporal location.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair  then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Revised:  So if person A changes from having long hair to having short hair then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair  then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Revised:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair , then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair  then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Revised:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A that has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair  then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Revised:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another that has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair  then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence , that supports P3.
Revised:  So if a person A changes from having long hair to having short hair then that can be paraphrased by saying that there is a temporal part of A which has long hair simpliciter and another which has short hair simpliciter, and the latter is after the former in the temporal sequence ; that supports premise P3.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:   C2 follows  so long as we are not considering empty worlds , if such worlds are even possible.
Revised:  Premise C2 follows so long as we are not considering empty worlds , if such worlds are even possible.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:   C2 follows  so long as we are not considering empty worlds , if such worlds are even possible.
Revised:  C2 follows , so long as we are not considering empty worlds , if such worlds are even possible.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:   C2 follows  so long as we are not considering empty worlds , if such worlds are even possible.
Revised:  C2 follows so long as one is not considering empty worlds , if such worlds are even possible.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:   C2 follows  so long as we are not considering empty worlds , if such worlds are even possible.
Revised:  C2 follows so long as we are not considering empty worlds — if such worlds are even possible.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  An empty world doesn't have objects which change by having a temporal part with a certain property and another temporal part with a certain other property.
Revised:  An empty world doesn't have objects that change by having a temporal part with a certain property and another temporal part with a certain other property.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Revised:  Premise P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Revised:  Regarding P1, the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Revised:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Revised:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view — the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties , is counterintuitive.
Revised:  Regarding P1, which is the key premise of the argument, it has to be said that it can be coherently denied even if the resulting view , the abandonment of intrinsic properties — is counterintuitive.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  There are, however, ways to support the argument when relationalism about space-time is accepted . References Gallois, A. 1998.
Revised:  There are, however, ways to support the argument if one accepts relationalism about space-time is accepted . References Gallois, A. 1998.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  There are, however, ways to support the argument when relationalism about space-time is accepted . References Gallois, A. 1998.
Revised:  There are, however, ways to support the argument when relationalism about space-time . References Gallois, A. 1998.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  2006. Persistence: Contemporary Readings  .
Revised:  2006. Persistence: Contemporary Readings '' .
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  A temporal part would thus be something like "the first year of a person's life", or "all of a table from between 10:00 a.m. on June 21, 1994 to 11:00 p.m. on July 23, 1996"  .
Revised:  A temporal part would be something like "the first year of a person's life", or "all of a table from between 10:00 a.m. on June 21, 1994 to 11:00 p.m. on July 23, 1996" .
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Some metaphysicians believe objects have temporal parts as well.
Revised:  Some metaphysicists believe objects have temporal parts as well.
Edit intent: clarity
Original: An argument widely held to favor the concept of temporal parts arises from these points (Sider, 2001): David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics, which he first advanced in On The Plurality of Worlds.
Revised: An argument widely held to favor the concept of temporal parts arises from these points (Sider, 2001): David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics, which he first advanced in On the Plurality of Worlds.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Modal Realism with Overlap from Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K.
Revised:  Modal Realism with Overlap , in: Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  A collection of essays on persistence and temporal parts is: Haslanger, Sally & Kurtz, Roxanne Marie.
Revised:  Further reading Haslanger, Sally & Kurtz, Roxanne Marie.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Survivors were rescued by the steamship Olivebank .
Revised:  Survivors were rescued by the steamship Olivebank 
Edit intent: fluency
Original: The Hereford was a 1456-ton iron sailing ship with two decks and one cemented bulkhead which was built in 1869 by J. Elder & Company at Glasgow for the Merchant Shipping Company of London.
Revised:  Hereford was a 1456-ton iron sailing ship with two decks and one cemented bulkhead which was built in 1869 by J. Elder & Company at Glasgow for the Merchant Shipping Company of London.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  The Hereford was sold to Norwegian owners in 1898 and on 1 April 1907 was wrecked at Hatteras  en route from Pensacola  to Buenos Aires  with the loss of three of her crew.
Revised:  The Hereford was sold to Norwegian owners in 1898 and on 1 April 1907 was wrecked at Hatteras en route from Pensacola to Buenos Aires , Argentina, with the loss of three of her crew.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  No medicinal product should ever again be marketed in the European Union without prior authorisation
Revised:  The idea behind the directive was that no medicinal product should ever again be marketed in the European Union without prior authorisation
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  The idea behind the directive was that no medicinal product should ever again be marketed in the European Union without prior authorisation , thereby diminishing potential side effects
Revised:  The directive aimed at harmonising standards for the approval of medicines within the then European Economic Community and required that medicines could not be marketed within the community without prior authorisation , thereby diminishing potential side effects
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  The idea behind the directive was that no medicinal product should ever again be marketed in the European Union without prior authorisation , thereby diminishing potential side effects
Revised:  The idea behind the directive was that no medicinal product should ever again be marketed in the European Union without prior authorisation of the competent authority of at least one member state
Edit intent: clarity
Original:   The directive was a reaction to the Thalidomide tragedy in the early 1960s, when thousands of babies were born with deformities as a result of their mothers taking the drug during pregnancy.
Revised:  Intention The directive was a reaction to the Thalidomide tragedy in the early 1960s, when thousands of babies were born with deformities as a result of their mothers taking the drug during pregnancy.
Edit intent: clarity