wanyu/IteraTeR_v2 huggingface dataset:
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later , Sider tried to combat the fears of endurantists who could not understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter which an endurantist may say makes no sense given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of " part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter which an endurantist may say makes no sense given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time " or " parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter which an endurantist may say makes no sense given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time " , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter which an endurantist may say makes no sense given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept , unlike parthood simpliciter which an endurantist may say makes no sense given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter — which an endurantist may say makes no sense given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter which an endurantist may say makes no sense , given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter  which an endurantist may say makes no sense  given that all parts are had at a time : although see McDaniel (2004) 146-7, where he argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Revised:  Later Sider tries to combat fears by endurantists that they cannot understand what a temporal part is by defining it in terms of ' part at a time ' or ' parthood at a time ' , a relation that the endurantist should accept ( unlike parthood simpliciter which an endurantist may say makes no sense given that all parts are had at a time . (However, McDaniel argues that even endurantists should accept the notion ).
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ]). Sider gave the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ] the following definition , which is widely used: Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gave an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators "WILL" and "WAS" : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman — troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) - gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Revised:  Sider gives ] the following definition (the use of which has become widespread) Sider also gives an alternative definition that is compatible with presentism, using the tensed operators 'WILL' and 'WAS' : While it is Sider's definition that is most commonly used, Zimmerman - troubled by the demand for instants (which may not exist in a gunky space-time that is such that every region has a sub-region) — gives the following: Temporal parts are sometimes used to account for change.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  The problem of change is just that if an object x and an object y have different properties, then by Leibniz Law we ought to conclude that they are different.
Revised:  The problem of change is just that if an object x and an object y have different properties, then by Leibniz 's Law, one ought to conclude that they are different.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Take this to the case of persons , if a person A changes from having long hair to short hair then the temporal parts theorist can say that change is  difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Revised:  For example , if a person A changes from having long hair to short hair then the temporal parts theorist can say that change is difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Take this to the case of persons , if a person A changes from having long hair to short hair then the temporal parts theorist can say that change is  difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Revised:  Take this to the case of persons , if a person changes from having long hair to short hair then the temporal parts theorist can say that change is difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Take this to the case of persons , if a person A changes from having long hair to short hair then the temporal parts theorist can say that change is  difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Revised:  Take this to the case of persons , if a person A changes from having long hair to short hair , then the temporal-parts theorist can say that change is difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Take this to the case of persons , if a person A changes from having long hair to short hair then the temporal parts theorist can say that change is  difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Revised:  Take this to the case of persons , if a person A changes from having long hair to short hair then the temporal parts theorist can say that change is the difference between the temporal parts of a temporally extended object : the person.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So A changes by having a temporal part with long hair  and a temporal part with short hair , the temporal parts are different, which is consistent with Leibniz Law.
Revised:  So A changes by having a temporal part with long hair , and a temporal part with short hair , the temporal parts are different, which is consistent with Leibniz Law.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So A changes by having a temporal part with long hair  and a temporal part with short hair , the temporal parts are different, which is consistent with Leibniz Law.
Revised:  So A changes by having a temporal part with long hair and a temporal part with short hair ; the temporal parts are different, which is consistent with Leibniz Law.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So A changes by having a temporal part with long hair  and a temporal part with short hair , the temporal parts are different, which is consistent with Leibniz Law.
Revised:  So A changes by having a temporal part with long hair and a temporal part with short hair , the temporal parts are different, which is consistent with Leibniz 's Law.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  However, those who reject  that ordinary objects, like people, have temporal parts usually adopt a more common-sensical view.
Revised:  However, those who reject the notion that ordinary objects, like people, have temporal parts usually adopt a more common-sensical view.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  However, those who reject  that ordinary objects, like people, have temporal parts usually adopt a more common-sensical view.
Revised:  However, those who reject that ordinary objects, like people, have temporal parts usually adopt a more common-sense view.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  So A changes by having long hair at t, to short hair at t '.
Revised:  In this view, the person changes by having long hair at t, to short hair at t '.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  There is no contradiction in thinking an object  capable of having different properties at different times.
Revised:  There is no contradiction in thinking an object is capable of having different properties at different times.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Related to these points there arises an argument widely held to favor temporal parts (Sider, 2001) .
Revised:  An argument widely held to favor temporal parts (Sider, 2001) .
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics which he advanced first in ' On The Plurality of Worlds ' . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties  i.e.  properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Revised:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics , which he first advanced in On The Plurality of Worlds ' . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties i.e. properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics which he advanced first in ' On The Plurality of Worlds ' . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties  i.e.  properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Revised:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics which he advanced first in ' On The Plurality of Worlds . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties i.e. properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics which he advanced first in ' On The Plurality of Worlds ' . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties  i.e.  properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Revised:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics which he advanced first in ' On The Plurality of Worlds ' . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties , i.e. properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics which he advanced first in ' On The Plurality of Worlds ' . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties  i.e.  properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Revised:  This is David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics which he advanced first in ' On The Plurality of Worlds ' . The outline of the argument is as follows: P1: There are intrinsic properties i.e. , properties had by an object independently of anything in the world.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Objects have some of their properties intrinsically  i.e.  simpliciter.
Revised:  Objects have some of their properties intrinsically , i.e. simpliciter.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Objects have some of their properties intrinsically  i.e.  simpliciter.
Revised:  Objects have some of their properties intrinsically i.e. , simpliciter.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  P1 is an intuitive premise , generally we distinguish between properties and relations.
Revised:  P1 is an intuitive premise ; generally we distinguish between properties and relations.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  An intrinsic property is just a property which something has independently of anything else , an extrinsic property is had only in relation to something.
Revised:  An intrinsic property is just a property that something has independently of anything else , an extrinsic property is had only in relation to something.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  An intrinsic property is just a property which something has independently of anything else , an extrinsic property is had only in relation to something.
Revised:  An intrinsic property is just a property which something has independently of anything else ; an extrinsic property is had only in relation to something.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  A typical example of an extrinsic property is 'fatherhood', something is a father only if that something is a male and has a child.
Revised:  An example of an extrinsic property is 'fatherhood', something is a father only if that something is a male and has a child.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  A typical example of an extrinsic property is 'fatherhood', something is a father only if that something is a male and has a child.
Revised:  A typical example of an extrinsic property is "fatherhood": something is a father only if that something is a male and has a child.
Edit intent: fluency