wanyu/IteraTeR_full_sent huggingface dataset:
Original:  capitulation during the so-called Cambridge controversy on the re-switching of techniques in capital theory had implications not only in pointing at supposed internal contradiction of the marginal theory of production and distribution, but also in the pursue of vested interests of vested interests in the academic and political world to this day . Based on a new non-switching theorem (Milana, 2019)
Revised:  capitulation during the so-called Cambridge controversy on the re-switching of techniques in capital theory had implications not only in pointing at supposed internal contradiction of the marginal theory of production and distribution, but also in the pursue of vested interests of vested interests in the academic and political world . Based on a new non-switching theorem (Milana, 2019)
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  capitulation during the so-called Cambridge controversy on the re-switching of techniques in capital theory had implications not only in pointing at supposed internal contradiction of the marginal theory of production and distribution, but also in the pursue of vested interests of vested interests in the academic and political world to this day . Based on a new non-switching theorem (Milana, 2019)
Revised:  capitulation during the so-called Cambridge controversy on the re-switching of techniques in capital theory had implications not only in pointing at supposed internal contradiction of the marginal theory of production and distribution, but also in the pursue of vested interests of vested interests in the academic and political world to this day . Based on a new non-switching theorem 
Edit intent: coherence
Original: We introduce a new pricing mechanism for FX options, which is based on the idea of an intermediate pseudo-currency market. This approach allows us to price options on all FX markets simultaneously under the same risk-neutral measure which ensures consistency of FX option prices across all markets.
Revised: We suggest an intermediate currency approach that allows us to price options on all FX markets simultaneously under the same risk-neutral measure which ensures consistency of FX option prices across all markets.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  We illustrate the new pricing mechanism by applying it to the Heston and SABR stochastic volatility models, to the model in which exchange rates are described by an extended skewed normal distribution, and also to the model-free approach of option pricing .
Revised:  We illustrate the intermediate currency approach by applying it to the Heston and SABR stochastic volatility models, to the model in which exchange rates are described by an extended skewed normal distribution, and also to the model-free approach of option pricing .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  We illustrate the new pricing mechanism by applying it to the Heston and SABR stochastic volatility models, to the model in which exchange rates are described by an extended skewed normal distribution, and also to the model-free approach of option pricing .
Revised:  We illustrate the new pricing mechanism by applying it to the Heston and SABR stochastic volatility models, to the model in which exchange rates are described by an extended skewed normal distribution, and also to the model-free approach of option pricing 
Edit intent: fluency
Original: Let P be a set of n points in \Re^d in general position. A median hyperplane (roughly) splits the point set P in half. The yolk of P is the ball of smallest radius intersecting all median hyperplanes of P. The egg of P is the ball of smallest radius intersecting all hyperplanes which contain exactly d points of P. We present exact \Re{R}  algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, both running in expected time O(n ^{d-1 \log n) .
Revised:  \Re{R} algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, both running in expected time O(n ^{d-1 \log n) .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  We present exact \Re{R}  algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, both running in expected time O(n ^{d-1 \log n) .
Revised:  We present exact \Re{R} We develop a general randomized technique for solving "implic it" linear programming problems, where the collection of constraints are defined implicitly by an underlying ground set of elements. In many cases, the structure of the implicitly defined constraints can be exploited in order to obtain efficient linear program solvers. We apply this technique to obtain near-optimal algorithms for a variety of fundamental problems in geometry. For a given point set P of size n in \Re^d, we develop algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, both running in expected time O(n ^{d-1 \log n) .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  We present exact \Re{R}  algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, both running in expected time O(n ^{d-1 \log n) .
Revised:  We present exact \Re{R} algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, including the centerpoint and the Tukey median, and several other more involved measures of centrality. For d=2, the new algorithms run in O(n ^{d-1 \log n) .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  We present exact \Re{R}  algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, both running in expected time O(n ^{d-1 \log n) . The running timeof the new algorithm is a polynomial time improvement over existing algorithms. We also present algorithms for several related problems, such as computing the Tukey and center balls of a point set, among others .
Revised:  We present exact \Re{R} algorithms for computing the yolk and the egg of a point set, both running in expected time O(n ^{d-1 \log n) expected time, which is optimal, and for higher constant d>2, the expected time bound is within one logarithmic factor of O(n^{d-1 .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original: This paper identifies a new phenomenon: when users interact with physically simulated objects in a virtual environment that is much smaller than usual, there is a mismatch between the object physics that they expect and the object physics that is actually correct .
Revised: This paper identifies a new phenomenon: when users interact with simulated objects in a virtual environment that is much smaller than usual, there is a mismatch between the object physics that they expect and the object physics that is actually correct .
Edit intent: clarity
Original: This paper identifies a new phenomenon: when users interact with physically simulated objects in a virtual environment that is much smaller than usual, there is a mismatch between the object physics that they expect and the object physics that is actually correct .
Revised: This paper identifies a new phenomenon: when users interact with physically simulated objects in a virtual environment where the user is much smaller than usual, there is a mismatch between the object physics that they expect and the object physics that is actually correct .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original: This paper identifies a new phenomenon: when users interact with physically simulated objects in a virtual environment that is much smaller than usual, there is a mismatch between the object physics that they expect and the object physics that is actually correct .
Revised: This paper identifies a new phenomenon: when users interact with physically simulated objects in a virtual environment that is much smaller than usual, there is a mismatch between the object physics that they expect and the object physics that would be correct at that scale .
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  We conducted a within-subjects experiment in which 44 subjects performed a simple interaction task with objects , using two physics simulation conditions while scaled down by a factor of ten in a virtual reality application. Although both conditions gave the visual impression of a scaled-down user interacting in a normal-sized environment, the physics conditions affecting the objects were different by simulating either correct behavior at that scale, or incorrect behavior similar to as if a normal sized user was interacting in a world that had been scaled up instead .
Revised:  We conducted a within-subjects experiment in which 44 subjects performed a simple interaction task with objects , using two physics simulation conditions .
Edit intent: coherence
Original:   We found that the significant majority of the users considered the latter condition to be the  realistic one.
Revised:  In one condition, the objects, when dropped and thrown, behaved accurately according to the physics that would be correct at that reduced scale in the real world, our true physics condition. In the other condition, the movie physics condition, the objects behaved in a similar manner as they would if no scaling of the user had occurred. We found that the significant majority of the users considered the latter condition to be the realistic one.
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem of a two-sided market:  how much of its available information about  sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its revenue?
Revised:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem of a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate and how much of its available information about sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its revenue?
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem of a two-sided market:  how much of its available information about  sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its revenue? One key innovation in our analysis is to reduce the study of optimal information disclosure policies to a%DIFDELCMD < {\em %%% constrained price discrimination problem.
Revised:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem of a two-sided market: how much of its available information about sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its %DIFDELCMD < {\em %%% constrained price discrimination problem.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  One key innovation in our analysis is to reduce the study of optimal information disclosure policies to a%DIFDELCMD < {\em %%% constrained price discrimination problem. The information shared by the platform induces a "menu" of equilibrium prices and sellers' expected qualities. Optimization over feasible menus yields a price discrimination problem. The problem is constrained because feasible menus are only those that can arise in the equilibrium of the two sided-market for some information disclosure policy. We analyze this constrained price discrimination problem, and apply our insights to two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and  sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which  sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Revised:  One key innovation in our analysis is to reduce the study of optimal information disclosure policies to a%DIFDELCMD < {\em %%% constrained price discrimination own revenue. To study this information disclosure problem, we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  We analyze this constrained price discrimination problem, and apply our insights to two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and  sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which  sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Revised:  We analyze this constrained price discrimination problem, and apply our insights to two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  We analyze this constrained price discrimination problem, and apply our insights to two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and  sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which  sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Revised:  We analyze this constrained price discrimination problem, and apply our insights to two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  We provide conditions under which a simple information structure of banning a certain portion of sellers from the platform , and not sharing any information about the remaining participating sellersmaximizes the platform's revenue  .
Revised:  We provide conditions under which a simple information structure of banning a certain portion of sellers from the platform , and not sharing any information about the remaining participating sellersmaximizes the platform's revenue . An important innovation in our analysis that we leverage to obtain our structural results is to transform the study of the two-sided market platform's optimal information disclosure policy into a constrained price discrimination problem .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate  and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Revised:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate  and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Revised:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided markets: If a platform wants to maximize revenue, which sellers should the platform allow to participate and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate  and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Revised:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate , and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate  and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Revised:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate and how much of its available information about participating sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate  and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue. To study this information disclosure problem , we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Revised:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers ? We study this information disclosure problem , we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  To study this information disclosure problem , we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Revised:  To study this information disclosure problem in the context of two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  An important innovation in our analysis that we leverage to obtain our structural results is to transform the study of the two-sided market platform's optimal information disclosure policy into a constrained price discrimination problem  .
Revised:  An important innovation in our analysis that we leverage to obtain our structural results is to transform the study of the two-sided market platform's optimal information disclosure policy into a constrained price discrimination problem . We leverage this transformation to obtain our structural results .
Edit intent: clarity
Original: We propose a new paradigm for robust geometric computations that complements the classical fixed precision paradigm and the exact geometric computation paradigm. We provide a framework where we study algorithmic problems under smoothed analysis of the input, the relaxation of the problem requirements, or the witness of a recognition problem .
Revised: We study algorithmic problems under smoothed analysis of the input, the relaxation of the problem requirements, or the witness of a recognition problem .
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  We provide a framework where we study algorithmic problems under smoothed analysis of the input, the relaxation of the problem requirements, or the witness of a recognition problem .
Revised:  We provide a framework where we study algorithmic problems that belong to the complexity class of the existential theory of the reals (ER). A problem is ER-complete if it is as hard as the problem requirements, or the witness of a recognition problem .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  We provide a framework where we study algorithmic problems under smoothed analysis of the input, the relaxation of the problem requirements, or the witness of a recognition problem . Our framework specifies a widely applicable set of prerequisites that make real RAM algorithms suitable for smoothed analysis. We prove that suitable algorithms can (under smoothed analysis) be robustly executed with expected logarithmic bit-precision. This shows in a formal way that inputs which need high bit-precision are contrived and that these algorithms are likely robust for realistic input. Interestingly our techniques generalize to problems with a natural notion of resource augmentation (geometric packing, the art gallery problem ) and recognition problems (recognition of realizable order types or disk intersection graphs).
Revised:  We provide a framework where we study algorithmic problems under smoothed analysis of the input, the relaxation of the problem ETR and if it can be written as an ETR formula. Traditionally, these problems are studied in the real RAM, a model of computation that assumes that the storage and comparison of real-valued numbers can be done in constant space and time, with infinite precision. The complexity class ER is often called a real RAM analogue of NP, since the problem ETR can be viewed as the real-valued variant of SAT. In this paper we prove a real RAM analogue to the art gallery problem ) and recognition problems (recognition of realizable order types or disk intersection graphs).
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  Interestingly our techniques generalize to problems with a natural notion of resource augmentation (geometric packing, the art gallery problem ) and recognition problems (recognition of realizable order types or disk intersection graphs). Our results also have theoretical implications for some ER-hard problems: These problems have input instances where their real verification algorithm requires at least exponential bit-precision which makes it difficult to place these ER-hard problems in NP. Our results imply for a host of ER-complete problems that this exponential bit-precision phenomenon comes from nearly degenerate instances. It is not evident that problems that have a real verification algorithm belong to ER. Therefore, we conclude with a real RAM analogue to the Cook-Levin Theorem .
Revised:  Interestingly our techniques generalize to problems with a natural notion of resource augmentation (geometric packing, the Cook-Levin theorem which shows that ER membership is equivalent to having a verification algorithm that runs in polynomial-time on a real RAM analogue to the Cook-Levin Theorem .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  This gives an easy proof of ER-membership, as real verification algorithms are much more versatile than ETR-formulas  .
Revised:  This gives an easy proof of ER-membership, as real verification algorithms are much more versatile than ETR-formulas . We use this result to construct a framework to study ER-complete problems under smoothed analysis. We show that for a wide class of ER-complete problems, its witness can be represented with logarithmic input-precision by using smoothed analysis on its real RAM verification algorithm. This shows in a formal way that the boundary between NP and ER (formed by inputs whose solution witness needs high input-precision) consists of contrived input. We apply our framework to well-studied ER-complete recognition problems which have the exponential bit phenomenon such as the recognition of realizable order types or the Steinitz problem in fixed dimension .
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original: Prior work in visual dialog has focused on training deep neural models on the VisDial dataset in isolation, which has led to great progress, but is limiting and wasteful. In this work, following recent trends in representation learning for language, we introduce an approach to leverage pretraining on related large-scale vision-language datasets before transferring to visual dialog.
Revised: Prior work in visual dialog has focused on training deep neural models on VisDial in isolation. Instead, we present an approach to leverage pretraining on related large-scale vision-language datasets before transferring to visual dialog.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Our model is pretrained on the Conceptual Captions and Visual Question Answering datasets, and finetuned on VisDial with a VisDial-specific input representation and the masked language modeling and next sentence prediction objectives (as in BERT) .
Revised:  Our model is pretrained on the Conceptual Captions and Visual Question Answering datasets, and finetuned on VisDial .
Edit intent: coherence