Original: The Programme included more than $103 billion in transactions (over $64 billion in oil sales and almost $39 billion for food). Responsibility for what went wrong with the Programme is assigned to the UN Secretariat, members of the Security Council, its 661 Committee, and the Iraqi regime. In a change from past practice, the Security Council had retained substantial elements of administrative control through its 661 Committee. This caused neither the Secretariat leadership nor the Security Council to be in overall control. 125px|Kofi Annan, current UN Secretary-General. (Ricardo Stuckert/ABr) There was reluctance of both the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General to recognize their own responsibility for the Programme’s shortcomings and they failed to ensure that critical evidence was brought to the attention of the Security Council and the 661 Committee. They only made minimal efforts to address sanctions violations with Iraqi officials, and both failed to provide oversight of the Programme’s Executive Director, Benon Sevan. Saddam Hussein, leader of Iraqi regime. As the Programme expanded and continued, Saddam Hussein found ways and means of turning it to his own advantage, primarily through demands for surcharges and kickbacks from companies doing business with the Programme. For UN agencies, the work went beyond their core competencies of overseeing the distribution of humanitarian goods—from monitoring, planning, and consulting—to infrastructure rebuilding, thus multiplying problems. Nor was there much success in coordinating so large a program among UN Agencies accustomed to zealously defending their institutional autonomy. There were Iraqi attempts to pass money to former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, principally through an Iraqi-American businessman, Samir Vincent, and a Korean lobbyist, Tongsun Park. The Committee has determined that well over $ 1 million was paid to Mr. Vincent and Mr. Park.
Revised: The Programme included more than $103 billion in transactions (over $64 billion in oil sales and almost $39 billion for food). Responsibility for what went wrong with the Programme is assigned to the UN Secretariat, members of the Security Council, its 661 Committee, and the Iraqi regime. In a change from past practice, the Security Council had retained substantial elements of administrative control through its 661 Committee. This caused neither the Secretariat leadership nor the Security Council to be in overall control. 125px|Kofi Annan, current UN Secretary-General. (Ricardo Stuckert/ABr) There was reluctance of both the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General to recognize their own responsibility for the Programme's shortcomings and they failed to ensure that critical evidence was brought to the attention of the Security Council and the 661 Committee. They only made minimal efforts to address sanctions violations with Iraqi officials, and both failed to provide oversight of the Programme's Executive Director, Benon Sevan. Saddam Hussein, leader of Iraqi regime. As the Programme expanded and continued, Saddam Hussein found ways and means of turning it to his own advantage, primarily through demands for surcharges and kickbacks from companies doing business with the Programme. For UN agencies, the work went beyond their core competencies of overseeing the distribution of humanitarian goods—from monitoring, planning, and consulting—to infrastructure rebuilding, thus multiplying problems. Nor was there much success in coordinating so large a program among UN Agencies accustomed to zealously defending their institutional autonomy. There were Iraqi attempts to pass money to former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, principally through an Iraqi-American businessman, Samir Vincent, and a Korean lobbyist, Tongsun Park. The Committee has determined that well over $ 1 million was paid to Mr. Vincent and Mr. Park.
Edit intent: clarity