wanyu/IteraTeR_full_sent huggingface dataset:
Original:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash , Jr.) in which both India and Pakistan, once they are armed, have no rational incentive to  initiate a conflict  or to disarm.
Revised:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash ), in which both India and Pakistan, once they are armed, have no rational incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash , Jr.) in which both India and Pakistan, once they are armed, have no rational incentive to  initiate a conflict  or to disarm.
Revised:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash , Jr.) in which both India and Pakistan, once armed, has no rational incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash , Jr.) in which both India and Pakistan, once they are armed, have no rational incentive to  initiate a conflict  or to disarm.
Revised:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash , Jr.) in which both India and Pakistan, once they are armed, have no rational incentive to either initiate a conflict or to disarm.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash , Jr.) in which both India and Pakistan, once they are armed, have no rational incentive to  initiate a conflict  or to disarm.
Revised:  It is effectively an ideal form of Nash equilibrium (named after the mathematician John Forbes Nash , Jr.) in which both India and Pakistan, once they are armed, have no rational incentive to initiate a conflict , or to disarm.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif , who had ordered the first atomic tests of Pakistan in Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of a tit-for-tat policy.
Revised:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Nawaz Sharif , who had ordered the first atomic tests of Pakistan in Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of a tit-for-tat policy.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif , who had ordered the first atomic tests of Pakistan in Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of a tit-for-tat policy.
Revised:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Prime minister of Pakistan (at that time) Nawaz Sharif after ordering to perform country's first atomic tests of Pakistan in Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of a tit-for-tat policy.
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif , who had ordered the first atomic tests of Pakistan in Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of a tit-for-tat policy.
Revised:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif , who had ordered the first atomic tests (see the operations: Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of a tit-for-tat policy.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif , who had ordered the first atomic tests of Pakistan in Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of a tit-for-tat policy.
Revised:  Promulgation and enforcement The policy framework was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif , who had ordered the first atomic tests of Pakistan in Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in 1998 as part of tit-for-tat policy.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  In late 1998, the doctrine and the organisation began to be redesigned and proceeded to a full-scope scientific, economical and defence review, involving key  institutions, to develop and test ideas and concepts.
Revised:  In end of 1998, the doctrine and the organisation began to be redesigned and proceeded to a full-scope scientific, economical and defence review, involving key institutions, to develop and test ideas and concepts.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  In late 1998, the doctrine and the organisation began to be redesigned and proceeded to a full-scope scientific, economical and defence review, involving key  institutions, to develop and test ideas and concepts.
Revised:  In late 1998, the doctrine and the organisation began to be redesigned , and a proceeded to a full-scope scientific, economical and defence review, involving key institutions, to develop and test ideas and concepts.
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  In late 1998, the doctrine and the organisation began to be redesigned and proceeded to a full-scope scientific, economical and defence review, involving key  institutions, to develop and test ideas and concepts.
Revised:  In late 1998, the doctrine and the organisation began to be redesigned and proceeded to a full-scope scientific, economical and defence review, involving key country's institutions, to develop and test ideas and concepts.
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine  and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Revised:  The studies and policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine  and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Revised:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various others . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine  and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Revised:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, Pakistan Government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine  and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Revised:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to think through its nuclear doctrine and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine  and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Revised:  The studies and the policy were studied at the National Defence University (NDU), National University of Sciences and Technology, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and various other institutions . Since the public atomic tests in 1998, the Pakistan government has adopted considerable recommendations and suggestions to plan its nuclear doctrine , and to integrate the nuclear power dimension into its defence strategy.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  The most authoritative  statements are provided by the officials of the Atomic Command Authority  in the form of four thresholds that were first mentioned by Khalid Kidwai in late 2001.
Revised:  The most authoritative of these statements are provided by the officials of the Atomic Command Authority in the form of four thresholds that were first mentioned by Khalid Kidwai in late 2001.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  The most authoritative  statements are provided by the officials of the Atomic Command Authority  in the form of four thresholds that were first mentioned by Khalid Kidwai in late 2001.
Revised:  The most authoritative statements are provided by the officials of the Atomic Command Authority , in the form of four thresholds that were first mentioned by Khalid Kidwai in late 2001.
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  One military perspectiveis the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race"  but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region although it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Revised:  On military perspective, for instance, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race" but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region although it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  One military perspectiveis the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race"  but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region although it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Revised:  One military perspectiveis the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race" but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region although it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  One military perspectiveis the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race"  but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region although it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Revised:  One military perspectiveis the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race" , but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region although it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  One military perspectiveis the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race"  but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region although it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Revised:  One military perspectiveis the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which has retrospectively contended that "MCD is not view to enter into a "nuclear race" but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the region , it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."
Edit intent: coherence
Original:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior  officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Revised:  Writing to the world and Western leaders, Bhutto made it clear and maintained: Rationale Senior officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior  officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Revised:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale and Persuasion officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior  officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Revised:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior The senior officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior  officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Revised:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government has persuaded multiple times for maintaining the Minimum Credible Deterrence . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior  officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials pointed out that the "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Revised:  Bhutto clarified and maintained: Rationale Senior officials, economists, game theorists, and strategists affiliated with Pakistan's government have repeatedly supported the maintaining of MCD . The government officials points out that "Indo-US nuclear deal as well as cooperation in conventional field is likely to grow in India's favour, thus accelerating arms race in the region".
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  In 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and noted : In 2010, a high-ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science to delegations of foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Revised:  In 2012, Prime minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and noted : In 2010, a high-ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science to delegations of foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  In 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and noted : In 2010, a high-ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science to delegations of foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Revised:  In 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and quoted : In 2010, a high-ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science to delegations of foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  In 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and noted : In 2010, a high-ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science to delegations of foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Revised:  In 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and noted : In 2010, a high ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science to delegations of foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Edit intent: fluency
Original:  In 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and noted : In 2010, a high-ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science to delegations of foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Revised:  In 2012, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani stated the comprehensive policy and noted : In 2010, a high-ranking science minister of government of Pakistan publicly announced at the international conference on science after delegating foreign ambassadors and scientists from all over the world: "Our nuclear capability is purely for defensive purposes, first believing in peaceful co-existence and reconciliation and will always strive for peace and prosperity in our region".
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  A war erupted between those countries and the Sahrawi Polisario Front, which proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) with a government-in-exile in Tindouf, Algeria.
Revised:  A war erupted between Morocco and the Sahrawi Polisario Front, which proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) with a government-in-exile in Tindouf, Algeria.
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original:  The Battle of Guelta Zemmur occurred on 7 October 1989, when POLISARIO guerrillas commanded by Lahbib Ayub attacked the village of Guelta Zemmur on the Moroccan side of the Moroccan Western Sahara Wall.
Revised: Infobox military conflict | conflict = Battle of Guelta Zemmour | partof = the Western Sahara War | image = | image_size = | caption = | date = 7 October 1989 | place = Guelta Zemmur, Western Sahara | territory = | result = Moroccan victory. | combatant1 = | combatant2 = POLISARIO | commander1 = The Battle of Guelta Zemmur occurred on 7 October 1989, when POLISARIO guerrillas commanded by Lahbib Ayub attacked the village of Guelta Zemmur on the Moroccan side of the Moroccan Western Sahara Wall.
Edit intent: meaning-changed
Original: Infobox military conflict | conflict = Battle of Guelta Zemmour | partof = the Western Sahara War | image = | image_size = | caption = | date = 7 October 1989 | place = Guelta Zemmur, Western Sahara | territory = | result = Moroccan victory. | combatant1 = | combatant2 = POLISARIO | commander1 = The Battle of Guelta Zemmur occurred on 7 October 1989, when POLISARIO guerrillas commanded by Lahbib Ayub attacked the village of Guelta Zemmur on the Moroccan side of the Moroccan Western Sahara Wall.
Revised:  The Battle of Guelta Zemmur occurred on 7 October 1989, when POLISARIO guerrillas commanded by Lahbib Ayub attacked the village of Guelta Zemmur on the Moroccan side of the Moroccan Western Sahara Wall.
Edit intent: clarity
Original:  Igniting Business Investments in Resource Efficiency Igniting Business Investments in Resource-efficiency (IBIRE) developed as part of the United Nations 10 Year Framework Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production, aims at boosting private investments in support of the advancement of sustainable lifestyles worldwide, by identifying funding sources and making them aware of promising business innovations, and by facilitating and supporting access of entrepreneurs to the new global markets that serve the emergence of sustainable lifestyles worldwide. Building upon decades of good work on Cleaner Production and related concepts, as well as on development cooperation and innovation programs, the IBIRE program ignites worldwide attention of various types of investors and donors to the business opportunities that the shift to more sustainable lifestyles has to offer.
Edit intent: coherence