wanyu/IteraTeR_full_sent huggingface dataset:
Original: <noinclude>Situational logic is a label coined by Karl Popper to identify a logical theory of reasoning capable of expanding reliable knowledge. Human reasoning is prompted by problems which focus the attention of an individual or group on a situation: “the stimulus of practical problems” arising in given “specific initial conditions.” Some kind of habitual practice or belief, once justified by a theory, breaks down, stops “working,” in unique existing conditions. Situational logic tries to solve such a breakdown by rejoining conceptual theory—hypothetical universal regularities or general continuing factors—to operational practice in unique situational conditions.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% John Dewey preceded Popper in recognizing this situational need to reason, but his logical steps defining and solving problems are radically incompatible. For Dewey, a situation prompting reasoning is an operational breakdown with conceptual implications.
Revised: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Situational logic (also situational analysis)Boumans, M. and Davis, John B. (2015), Economic Methodology: Understanding Economics as a Science, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 92. is a concept advanced by Popper in his The Poverty of Historicism.Popper, Karl (2013), The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge, p. 141. Situational logic is a situation prompting reasoning is an operational breakdown with conceptual implications.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Assuming independent criteria of practical and logical judgment contaminates reasoning. It reflects the traditional fact-value distinction between knowledge of concrete situations—particular facts known by induction—and theoretical knowledge of universal regularities—deduced from general laws known intuitively to be right. Objective value-free facts that work may not correlate with subjective fact-free preferences, intentions, expectations.
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Original:  These incompatible criteria are present today in popular approaches to rational problem solving, without acknowledgment of their philosophical origins. Popper's logic underlies the value-free tool labelled SWOT analysis widely applied to conjectural situations in business and government. Situational awareness is a technological application of Dewey's instrumental situational logic. In the fact-free mediation tool labeled Mindfulness, the pre-cognitive starting point of Dewey’s logic appears as a valued end point. Dividing theory from practice and fact from value contaminates rationality.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% This article presents the background of ‘’this’’ still-indeterminate situation of mutually incompatible logics. It draws largely on the Library of Living Philosophers, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, which honored Dewey in its first volume and Popper in its fourteenth volume. Summary of Dewey’s position is followed by a critique by Bertrand Russell, one of 17 scholars offering descriptive and critical essays, and Dewey’s response.Summary of Popper’s position is followed by an essay (one of 33) by Henryk Skolimowski, and Popper’s response.
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Original:  Logic of John Dewey (1859-1952)In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, published in 1938, Dewey reported results of years spent criticizing traditional academic philosophy. He hoped to have resolved philosophers’ perennial debate over how to extend human understanding by relating facts—particular valuation-free means used in practice—to valuations—general fact-free theoretical ends. He made “ situation ” a universal focus to eliminate the imagined autonomy of theory and practice.
Revised:  process by which a social scientist tries to reconstruct the problem situation ” a universal focus to eliminate the imagined autonomy of theory and practice.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% A situation becomes an object of discourse when those experiencing breakdown are forced to reason about it. Is it a breakdown of some known kind of regularity? Can some universal regularity be found conjoined to unique observable traits? Answering such questions requires induction: “… laws of uniform relations are ultimately instrumentalities for control of individualized situations …
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% He referred to a famous example of numerical induction that failed for lack of these operations determining continuing factors: “All swans are white.” It confused all swans-as-observable-birds with the abstraction swan-as-an-abstract-species with conjectured determinate universal traits—found not to include color of feathers.
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Original:  Dewey offered inductive plus deductive situational logic as an alternative to traditional analyses that started with conceptual ”facts” and ended with “known truths.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Critique by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) Russell did not take kindly to Dewey's effort to reconstruct philosophy.
Revised:  %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Critique by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) Russell did not take kindly to Dewey's effort to reconstruct philosophy.
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Original:  Dewey offered inductive plus deductive situational logic as an alternative to traditional analyses that started with conceptual ”facts” and ended with “known truths.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Critique by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) Russell did not take kindly to Dewey's effort to reconstruct philosophy. In 1939, he contributed a critical essay to the Library of Living Philosophers volume entitled The Philosophy of John Dewey. He entitled his contribution “Dewey’s New Logic” which he identified with a doctrine labeled instrumentalism. He suggested that Dewey's logic could be partly explained by the cultural situation or “social system” prevailing in the United States—“the age of industrialism and collective enterprise”—and by the academic context of competition between British analytic philosophy and German synthetic philosophy.
Revised:  Dewey offered inductive plus deductive situational logic as an alternative to traditional analyses that started with conceptual ”facts” and ended with “known truths.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% 
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Original:  Russell named Dewey's logic Instrumentalism and grouped it with other synthetic doctrines critical of traditional academic philosophy—positivism, pragmatism, historicism, holism—all denying the legitimacy of metaphysics (untestable because prior to experience) and the reality of natural kinds with defining properties as universal facts. He felt Dewey was turning philosophy into a tool for solving problem rather than a search for truths. We report three questions Russell asked of Dewey's situational logic to explain why he rejected Dewey's definitions and answers.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% 1) HOW LARGE IS A SITUATION? Russell was troubled by Dewey treating situations as the starting point of new knowledge. If knowledge grows by inquiry that relates unique problematic situations to environmental continuing factors, how can that activity exclude anything in the universe? It merges particular facts into universal regularities. “It is obvious that, in an inquiry into the tides, the sun and moon must be included in the ‘situation . ’ I do not see how, on Dr. Dewey's principles, a ‘situation’ can embrace less than the whole universe;
Revised: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% confronting an agent in order to understand that agent's choice . ’ I do not see how, on Dr. Dewey's principles, a ‘situation’ can embrace less than the whole universe;
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Original:  “It is obvious that, in an inquiry into the tides, the sun and moon must be included in the ‘situation . ’ I do not see how, on Dr. Dewey's principles, a ‘situation’ can embrace less than the whole universe; this is an inevitable consequence of the insistence upon continuity of continuing factors%DIFDELCMD < ]%%% .” Russell could find no starting or stopping point in such situational logic.
Revised:  “It is obvious that, in an inquiry into the tides, the sun and moon must be included in the ‘situation . of continuing factors%DIFDELCMD < ]%%% .” Russell could find no starting or stopping point in such situational logic.
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Original:  this is an inevitable consequence of the insistence upon continuity of continuing factors%DIFDELCMD < ]%%% .” Russell could find no starting or stopping point in such situational logic. He wondered, for example, how astronomers could inquire about the sun and moon without prior knowledge of those unchanging objects: 2) HOW CAN DOUBT STIMULATE INQUIRY?
Revised:  this is an inevitable consequence of the insistence upon continuity of continuing factors%DIFDELCMD < ]%%% .” 2) HOW CAN DOUBT STIMULATE INQUIRY?
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Original:  He wondered, for example, how astronomers could inquire about the sun and moon without prior knowledge of those unchanging objects: 2) HOW CAN DOUBT STIMULATE INQUIRY? While rejecting Dewey’s situation as a unit of analysis, Russell criticized feelings of doubt in particular situations as stimulus to inquiry. He stated what he took to be Dewey’s position:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Contrary to Dewey’s particular feeling of doubt, Russell assumed that cognitive doubt initiates reasoning about what things are “true.” 3) HOW CAN WARRANTED ASSERTION BE DISTINGUISHED FROM IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF FACT, REALITY, TRUTH? Russell couldn't understand why Dewey replaced the word “knowledge” with “warranted assertion” when doubt is eliminated.
Revised:  He wondered, for example, how astronomers could inquire about the sun and moon without prior knowledge of those unchanging objects: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Contrary to Dewey’s particular feeling of doubt, Russell assumed that cognitive doubt initiates reasoning about what things are “true.” 3) HOW CAN WARRANTED ASSERTION BE DISTINGUISHED FROM IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF FACT, REALITY, TRUTH? Russell couldn't understand why Dewey replaced the word “knowledge” with “warranted assertion” when doubt is eliminated.
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Original:  He stated what he took to be Dewey’s position:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Contrary to Dewey’s particular feeling of doubt, Russell assumed that cognitive doubt initiates reasoning about what things are “true.” 3) HOW CAN WARRANTED ASSERTION BE DISTINGUISHED FROM IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF FACT, REALITY, TRUTH? Russell couldn't understand why Dewey replaced the word “knowledge” with “warranted assertion” when doubt is eliminated.
Revised:  He stated what he took to be Dewey’s position:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% 3) HOW CAN WARRANTED ASSERTION BE DISTINGUISHED FROM IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF FACT, REALITY, TRUTH? Russell couldn't understand why Dewey replaced the word “knowledge” with “warranted assertion” when doubt is eliminated.
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Original:  He stated what he took to be Dewey’s position:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Contrary to Dewey’s particular feeling of doubt, Russell assumed that cognitive doubt initiates reasoning about what things are “true.” 3) HOW CAN WARRANTED ASSERTION BE DISTINGUISHED FROM IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF FACT, REALITY, TRUTH? Russell couldn't understand why Dewey replaced the word “knowledge” with “warranted assertion” when doubt is eliminated. The definition appeared arbitrary and unnecessary. He quoted Dewey:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Russell found this just another name for instrumental consequences of logically groundless inductive reasoning: if what you do achieves what you want, then what you want is validated—it is TRUE. Russell continued to insist that logical deduction can provide knowledge of truth.
Revised:  He stated what he took to be Dewey’s position:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Contrary to Dewey’s particular feeling of doubt, Russell assumed that cognitive doubt initiates reasoning about what things are “true.” %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Russell found this just another name for instrumental consequences of logically groundless inductive reasoning: if what you do achieves what you want, then what you want is validated—it is TRUE. Russell continued to insist that logical deduction can provide knowledge of truth.
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Original:  He quoted Dewey:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Russell found this just another name for instrumental consequences of logically groundless inductive reasoning: if what you do achieves what you want, then what you want is validated—it is TRUE. Russell continued to insist that logical deduction can provide knowledge of truth.
Revised:  He quoted Dewey:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Russell continued to insist that logical deduction can provide knowledge of truth.
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Original:  He quoted Dewey:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Russell found this just another name for instrumental consequences of logically groundless inductive reasoning: if what you do achieves what you want, then what you want is validated—it is TRUE. Russell continued to insist that logical deduction can provide knowledge of truth. He closed his critique by suggesting that Dewey's redefinition of induction and deduction made discourse between analytic and synthetic philosophers incapable of rational resolution .
Revised:  He quoted Dewey:%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Russell found this just another name for instrumental consequences of logically groundless inductive reasoning: if what you do achieves what you want, then what you want is validated—it is TRUE. Koertge (1975) provides a helpful clarificatory summary.This use of this summary is from Boumans and Davis (2010) .
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Original:  He responded by explaining that he chose “ situation ” as the unit of inquiry to escape units used by both atomistic-analytic and holistic-synthetic philosophers. “I have called experiences situations as%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% a viable alternative to an atomism which logically involves a denial of connections and to an absolutistic block monism which …
Revised:  He responded by explaining that he chose “ situation as%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% a viable alternative to an atomism which logically involves a denial of connections and to an absolutistic block monism which …
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Logic of Karl Popper (1902-1994)In The Poverty of Historicism, published in 1957, Popper reported results of years spent criticizing perennial philosophical debate over whether reliable scientific knowledge arises from observation leading to theory, or from theory guiding observation. That essay was a critique of the kinds of synthetic philosophy to which Russell had linked Dewey—instrumentalism, pragmatism, historicism, holism—all of which claim that observation in situations precedes cognition, practice precedes theory.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Throughout this essay and subsequent publications, Popper rejected Dewey's kind of logic, without naming Dewey, claiming it to be inductive sociological or psychological “science,” producing only conditional and subjective knowledge—warranted assertions. He considered his kind of logic to be deductive and objectively true, as much as is humanly possible.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% He developed a criterion for distinguishing scientific from unreliable metaphysical reasoning. He called that criterion “demarcation,” measured by the degree to which a conjecture or theory is testable. A situationis an event in which a theory has failed a test, prompting reasoning to replace the failed conjecture. “… there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation. All observation is an activity with an aim (to find, or to check, some regularity which is ‘’at least’’ vaguely conjectured);… .…. There is no such thing as a perception except in the context of interests and expectations, and hence of regularities or ‘’laws’’.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% For Popper, a situation prompting reasoning is a theoretical breakdown, and its solution involves conceiving a rational analytic model of the breakdown in order to conjecture solutions to repair it, restoring unity to theory and practice.
Revised: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% : ''Agent A was in a theoretical breakdown, and its solution involves conceiving a rational analytic model of the breakdown in order to conjecture solutions to repair it, restoring unity to theory and practice.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% For Popper, a situation prompting reasoning is a theoretical breakdown, and its solution involves conceiving a rational analytic model of the breakdown in order to conjecture solutions to repair it, restoring unity to theory and practice. His situational logic locates regularities in physical laws and in social institutions—prescribed patterns of correlated behavior.
Revised: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% For Popper, a situation prompting reasoning is a 
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Popper later (1974) agreed with Dewey's position that problems arise as unspeakable, pre-conscious feelings, but denied that this origin can provide situational data to which possible solutions must adapt. He never viewed a situation as a “qualified existential whole” as Dewey did. He attributed any sense of maladjustment or breakdown to inborn universal expectations and knowledge, not to conditional feelings experienced in each unique situation. Theory is involved in observation, and needs logical coherence independently of operational continuity.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% He had multiple reasons for denying the possibility of situations determining relevant data, “ultimate components” defining properties of kinds and causes. He viewed names as arbitrary conventions, incapable of defining abstract universals to function as signs of inductive particulars. He assumed the need for undefined theoretical terms.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% From his earliest publications in the 1930 to his autobiography in 1974, Popper maintained that his demarcation conjecture established the fallacy of induction—inferences based on “repetition of instances.” Instances named cannot be defining properties, continuing factors, determinate universal traits.
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% He supported his rejection of induction with one traditional example of an inductive failure: “All swans are white.” “… no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion%DIFDELCMD < [%%% theory%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% that all swans are white.
Revised: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% %DIFDELCMD < [%%% theory%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% that all swans are white.
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Original:  “… no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion%DIFDELCMD < [%%% theory%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% that all swans are white.
Revised:  “… no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion%DIFDELCMD < [%%% %DIFDELCMD < ] %%% that all swans are white.
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Original:  “… no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion%DIFDELCMD < [%%% theory%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% that all swans are white.
Revised:  “… no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion%DIFDELCMD < [%%% theory%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% 
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Original: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Popper refined his rejection of induction by locating regularities with determinate universal traits in a third world, separate from the two sources of generalization earlier specified: initial situational conditions and universal laws. He conjectured that situational conditions, universal laws, and problem solutions occur in autonomous worlds. He found this metaphysical conjecture—unobservable and untestable—instrumentally useful for making predictions based on conjectural situations. “Theories or propositions or statements are the most important third world linguistic entities.”. Historicists are mistaken to believe that “social entities such as institutions or associations are concrete natural entities … rather than abstract models constructed to interpret certain selected abstract%DIFDELCMD < [%%% situational%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% relations between individuals.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Defense by Henryk Skolimowski (1930-2018) Skolimowski opened his contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper in 1974 with a quote from Popper's 1963 Conjectures and Refutations to highlight how central to Popper's philosophy was his situational logic.
Revised: %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% %DIFDELCMD < [%%% situational%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% relations between individuals.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Defense by Henryk Skolimowski (1930-2018) Skolimowski opened his contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper in 1974 with a quote from Popper's 1963 Conjectures and Refutations to highlight how central to Popper's philosophy was his situational logic.
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Original:  rather than abstract models constructed to interpret certain selected abstract%DIFDELCMD < [%%% situational%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% relations between individuals.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Defense by Henryk Skolimowski (1930-2018) Skolimowski opened his contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper in 1974 with a quote from Popper's 1963 Conjectures and Refutations to highlight how central to Popper's philosophy was his situational logic.
Revised:  rather than abstract models constructed to interpret certain selected abstract%DIFDELCMD < [%%% %DIFDELCMD < ] %%% relations between individuals.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Defense by Henryk Skolimowski (1930-2018) Skolimowski opened his contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper in 1974 with a quote from Popper's 1963 Conjectures and Refutations to highlight how central to Popper's philosophy was his situational logic.
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Original:  rather than abstract models constructed to interpret certain selected abstract%DIFDELCMD < [%%% situational%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% relations between individuals.”%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Defense by Henryk Skolimowski (1930-2018) Skolimowski opened his contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper in 1974 with a quote from Popper's 1963 Conjectures and Refutations to highlight how central to Popper's philosophy was his situational logic.
Revised:  rather than abstract models constructed to interpret certain selected abstract%DIFDELCMD < [%%% situational%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Defense by Henryk Skolimowski (1930-2018) Skolimowski opened his contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper in 1974 with a quote from Popper's 1963 Conjectures and Refutations to highlight how central to Popper's philosophy was his situational logic.
Edit intent: clarity