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992bd404a73ed0369c1d61aaf2f39b07ac8e18b9c58e3d2a739f6e246bab0126

2. SHOULD---it’s immediate AND certain

Justice Summers 94, Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13

contexts mandate construction of "should" as more than desirability "should" would mean "must" law is immediately effective opposed to in the future

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" may be deemed a ruling in praesenti Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating desirability ( "should" would mean the same as "must" In praesenti means literally "at the present time." the phrase denotes law is immediately effective , as opposed to something that will would become effective in the future

more "must" immediately effective future

['The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge\'s intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.', '[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]', ' "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK\'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, , 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).']

[(8, 18)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

c0b1dd21fa4c07181e015ccff7038e243fefc624c78a679a9b234fb4a3d8bcf0

Extinction!

Gonzales 21 (Kevin Gonzales, PhD, postdoctoral fellow in the lab of Elaine Fuchs @ The Rockefeller University, NY, 3-2-2021 "Can Stem Cell Research Save Endangered Species?," accessed via Wayback Machine )

species facing eradication as Earth undergoes sixth mass extinction Human behavior led to calamitous changes that accelerated extinction rate 100 times causing rapid decline of biod Human innovation slow this through stem cell research role in species conservation exemplified by efforts to save rhino researchers using assisted reproductive technology and novel stem cell techniques embryos create self-sustaining population scientists begun research on reviving ecologically important extinct animals

species are facing eradication as Earth undergoes its sixth mass extinction Human behavior habitat degradation pollution farming led to calamitous changes to the natural world that accelerated the extinction rate 100 times causing rapid decline of biod Human innovation can slow this annihilation of species through stem cell research role in species conservation is exemplified by efforts to save rhino researchers are currently using assisted reproductive technology and novel stem cell techniques embryos create self-sustaining population ers must figure out how to directly convert iPSCs into embryos technology is therefore as applicable to extinct species as it is to endangered ones as long as a viable cell is still available scientists begun research on reviving ecologically important extinct animals passenger pigeon and wooly mammoth

sixth mass extinction 100 times stem cell research embryos wooly mammoth

['', 'Many other species are facing eradication as the Earth undergoes its sixth mass extinction. In the past century alone, we have lost the same number of species that would typically have gone extinct over the course of about 10,000 years. Human behavior, including habitat degradation, pollution, factory farming, and animal exploitation, has led to calamitous changes to the natural world that have accelerated the extinction rate by 100 times or more, causing a rapid decline of biodiversity. Human innovation and changes to behavior, however, can slow down this annihilation of species through conscious environmental preservation, and surprisingly, stem cell research.', 'The role of stem cell research in species conservation is best exemplified by efforts to save the beloved rhino, whose populations have been driven to the brink of extinction by illegal poaching. Loss of the rhinoceros would jeopardize the grassland habitats of Africa and Asia where these megaherbivores play key roles in shaping the earth and vegetation upon which many other species depend. The most pressing case is that of the Northern White Rhino, which at present, has only two known living individuals left in the entire world, both infertile females (Figure 2). Because previous attempts at breeding this species in captivity were unsuccessful, researchers are currently using assisted reproductive technology and novel stem cell techniques to try to save this species.', 'Scientists previously collected sperm and eggs from several Northern White Rhinos. Through in vitro fertilization (IVF) scientists produced five Northern White Rhino embryos, which have the potential to develop into mature animals. The researchers are hoping that the closely-related Southern White Rhino can function as a surrogate mother for these Northern White Rhino embryos and bear healthy Northern White Rhino calves.', 'The supply of eggs, however, is very limited and additional methods are needed. Scientists have therefore turned to stem cell research to try to create additional Northern White Rhino embryos, which could eventually help create a self-sustaining population.', 'In a landmark study in 2006, researchers determined that they could take a skin cell in the body and revert it to a stem cell state by cellular reprogramming. This creates what are known as induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs), which can give rise to all of the cells in an organism. The first Northern White Rhino iPSCs were reprogrammed in 2011, and today, there are iPSCs from 12 Northern White Rhinos, eight of which are not related. This is important for establishing genetic diversity and maintaining a healthy population. With this method, a single rhinoceros skin cell could be all we need to produce new rhinos.', 'In order for iPSCs to be used in conservation efforts, researchers must figure out how to directly convert iPSCs into embryos, or coax them to produce mature sperm and eggs for IVF. Both methods are currently being studied in mice. Once perfected using mouse iPSCs, the protocols will have to be adapted for the rhino. Until this time Northern White Rhino iPSCs can safely be maintained in the laboratory where they will be readily available once science advances. Successful creation of iPSCs from the Northern White Rhino jumpstarted efforts to preserve other endangered species using stem cells, including the Sumatran Rhino, estimated at fewer than 80 in existence.', 'Cellular reprogramming can be performed on virtually any cell from any species. This technology is therefore as applicable to extinct species as it is to endangered ones, as long as a viable cell is still available. The Frozen Zoo® in San Diego, CA, USA, a frozen tissue bank, has already preserved cells from more than 10,000 individuals representing 1,000+ species. With this in mind, scientists have begun research on reviving ecologically important extinct animals such as the passenger pigeon (a migratory bird like the swift parrot) and the wooly mammoth (a megaherbivore like the rhino).', 'Advantgage CP']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Neg-Georgetown-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

7dd7fd7f90ad1eae5c3a3979f8c51560f32c1e6f8a59a7cd5f360bd0cc8f91ac

Divestment and i-law both work, even if there are holdouts to the treaty itself. Prefer the overwhelming empirical record.

Ruff 23, AO, MB, BS (Hons), FRACP is Co-President, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; Founding Chair and Australian Board member for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons; Honorary Principal Fellow of the School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia. (Tilman, “Ending nuclear weapons before they end us: current challenges and paths to avoiding a public health catastrophe,” Journal of Health and Public Policy, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8761508/)

The treaty contains the only internationally agreed and codified framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons powerful military , government , and corporate inertia and vested interests that drive the massive nuclear weapons enterprise are not immovable Treaties work Experience with treaties prohibiting other types of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons shows that they often influence even states that oppose and have not signed on to the treaty Biological and chemical weapons, landmines and cluster munitions are now less often justified, produced, sold, deployed, and used after their prohibition— even by states not having joined the respective ban

The treaty contains the only internationally agreed and codified framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons . As growth in divestment from nuclear weapons producers encouraged by the TPNW demonstrates, powerful military , government , and corporate inertia and vested interests that drive the massive nuclear weapons enterprise are not immovable Treaties work Experience with treaties prohibiting other types of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons shows that they often influence even states that oppose and have not signed on to the treaty Biological and chemical weapons, landmines and cluster munitions are now less often justified, produced, sold, deployed, and used after their prohibition— even by states not having joined the respective ban s

military government corporate inertia and vested interests Treaties work often influence even states that oppose and have not signed on to the treaty even by states not having joined the respective ban s

['', 'The treaty also contains the only internationally agreed and codified framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaty provides flexible pathways for nuclear-armed states to disarm before or after joining the treaty. It specifies plans for time-bound dismantlement of the weapons and the facilities that produce and maintain them. It is subject to verification by a competent international authority. Thus, the treaty provides the most promising pathway for all states to fulfil their obligations to negotiate in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament. Many health and humanitarian organisations, including the World Federation of Public Health Associations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, the World Medical Association, the International Council of Nurses, and the International Federation of Medical Student Associations have joined with International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) to welcome the entry into force of the treaty. These organisations urge all nations to join and faithfully implement it [43].', 'Fundamental questions shadow everyone alive in our nuclear era: Will humanity eradicate weapons that pose the most acute existential threat to human and biosphere health and survival? And will we do so in time—before anyone uses them again, setting off indiscriminate nuclear violence that will bring about the end of us? Too few citizens and leaders worldwide realise and act on this recognition: the stable and hospitable climate needed for our living world requires protection from rampant global heating and from an abrupt nuclear ice age. Planetary health depends on both.', 'Effective evidence-based advocacy by expert custodians of scientific and health evidence has enabled much of the progress towards constraining the nuclear arms race. Prominent, respected figures including Dr. Albert Schweitzer and paediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock drew attention to evidence of markedly increasing levels of strontium-90 in children\'s deciduous teeth from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s and 60s. Their efforts played an important role in the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 that ended Soviet and US atmospheric nuclear testing [19]. Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and US president Ronald Reagan understood the catastrophic effects of nuclear war. Their attention to growing evidence of the cataclysmic consequences of a nuclear winter led them to declare jointly in 1985 that "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". In 1986 they came tantalisingly close to agreeing to eliminate their nuclear arsenals entirely over 15 years [44].', 'Partnerships and coalitions are vital', 'What played the decisive role in the Humanitarian Initiative on nuclear weapons? It was evidence of the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, the impossibility of any effective health or humanitarian response, growing dangers of nuclear war, and severe global impacts likely from even a relatively small scale regional nuclear war—coupled with the powerful testimony of the hibakusha and nuclear test survivors who experienced ongoing devastation of nuclear weapons firsthand [1, 45]. This project of governments and global civil society, from 2010, led to adoption of the TPNW. It was an organisation of health professionals, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, that established the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). This campaign coalition became the major civil society partner with governments in development of the TPNW, a role resulting in award of the Nobel Peace Prize to ICAN in 2017.', 'Scientific and health evidence-based communication and advocacy on impacts and risks of nuclear war continue to play vital roles for citizens, leaders, and governments. Key factors that have prevented nuclear war to date include informed understanding of nuclear weapons dangers by key leaders, widespread revulsion by citizens worldwide of indiscriminate radioactive violence that nuclear war would unleash, and pressure from mobilised citizens [46]. Policies that justify nuclear weapons flow from primitive thinking, not facts and evidence. Evidence shows that nuclear weapons cannot make anyone more secure; instead, they pose an existential threat to the security of all people. If not eliminated before being used again, a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences will be inevitable. As growth in divestment from nuclear weapons producers encouraged by the TPNW demonstrates, powerful military, government, and corporate inertia and vested interests that drive the massive nuclear weapons enterprise are formidable, but not immovable [42].', 'Treaties work', 'Experience with treaties prohibiting other types of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons shows that they often influence even states that oppose and have not signed on to the treaty. Biological and chemical weapons, landmines and cluster munitions are now less often justified, produced, sold, deployed, and used after their prohibition—even by states not having joined the respective bans [45].']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiYa-Neg-1---Missouri-State-Semis.docx

Kansas

WiYa

2ead92f163befcbcbb1491de90e8a947b10e0b91f66dba096a3ddbeaf7f3f025

Nuclear war causes a short term Ice-Age; then causes massive warming in the long term

Duncan Clark 9, editorial environmental consultant to the London Guardian, co-director of GreenProfile, January 2, 2009, “The carbon footprint of nuclear war,” online:

700 million] tonnes of CO2 would be released by even the smallest nuclear conflict just a thousandth of the weaponry of a full-scale nuclear cause 690m tonnes to enter the atmosphere conflict would also generate 313m tonnes of soot creating significant regional cooling effect in the short terms Ultimately CO2 would win out and crank up global temperatures Jacobson calculated the emissions by totting up the burn rate and carbon content of cities

700 m [ million] tonnes of CO2 would be released by even the smallest nuclear conflict atomic warfare is bad for the climate even a very limited nuclear exchange, using just a thousandth of the weaponry of a full-scale nuclear war, would cause up to 690m tonnes of CO2 to enter the atmosphere the conflict would also generate as much as 313m tonnes of soot creating a significant regional cooling effect in the short and medium terms Ultimately , though, the CO2 would win out and crank up global temperatures an extra few notches The paper's author Jacobson , a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford calculated the emissions of such a conflict by totting up the burn rate and carbon content of the fabric of our cities it is a valid exercise to estimate the potential number of immediate deaths and carbon emissions due to the burning of buildings and infrastructure Although concern at the time of an explosion will be the deaths and not carbon emissions , policy makers today must weigh all the potential future risks of mortality and carbon emissions

700 smallest full-scale generate significant cooling short crank up temperatures calculated burn rate carbon buildings infrastructure deaths carbon emissions mortality carbon emissions

['', "Almost 700m [million] tonnes of CO2 would be released into the Earth's atmosphere by even the smallest nuclear conflict, according to a US study that compares the environmental costs of developing various power sources", "Just when you might have thought it was ethically sound to unleash a nuclear attack on a nearby city, along comes a pesky scientist and points out that atomic warfare is bad for the climate. According to a new paper in the journal Energy & Environmental Science, even a very limited nuclear exchange, using just a thousandth of the weaponry of a full-scale nuclear war, would cause up to 690m tonnes of CO2 to enter the atmosphere – more than UK's annual total.", 'The upside (kind of) is that the conflict would also generate as much as 313m tonnes of soot. This would stop a great deal of sunlight reaching the earth, creating a significant regional cooling effect in the short and medium terms – just like when a major volcano erupts. Ultimately, though, the CO2 would win out and crank up global temperatures an extra few notches.', 'The paper\'s author, Mark Z Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University, calculated the emissions of such a conflict by totting up the burn rate and carbon content of the fabric of our cities. "Materials have the following carbon contents: plastics, 38–92%; tyres and other rubbers, 59–91%; synthetic fibres, 63–86%; woody biomass, 41–45%; charcoal, 71%; asphalt, 80%; steel, 0.05–2%. We approximate roughly the carbon content of all combustible material in a city as 40–60%."', "But why would a Stanford engineer bother calculating such a thing? Given that the nuclear exchange would also kill up to 17 million people, who's going to be thinking about the impact on global warming?", 'The purpose of the paper is to compare the total human and environmental costs of a wide range of different power sources, from solar and wind to nuclear and biofuels. One of the side-effects of nuclear power, the report argues, is an increased risk of nuclear war: "Because the production of nuclear weapons material is occurring only in countries that have developed civilian nuclear energy programs, the risk of a limited nuclear exchange between countries or the detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists has increased due to the dissemination of nuclear energy facilities worldwide."', '"As such," Jacobson continues, "it is a valid exercise to estimate the potential number of immediate deaths and carbon emissions due to the burning of buildings and infrastructure associated with the proliferation of nuclear energy facilities and the resulting proliferation of nuclear weapons … Although concern at the time of an explosion will be the deaths and not carbon emissions, policy makers today must weigh all the potential future risks of mortality and carbon emissions when comparing energy sources."', '']

[(7, 14)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaMu-Aff-Indiana-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

912385c224200c5ae964097d329266a3b3fded2748d5ff2a4129bb9b88367fca

SoKo middle power diplomacy fails

Brendan Howe & Min Joung Park, 19. Brendan Howe is Associate Dean and Professor of the Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, South Korea, where he has worked since 2001. Min Joung Park is a PhD candidate in the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Womans University, South Korea. Her research interests involve Korea’s foreign aid policy, ASEAN-Korea relations and middle power diplomacy. "SOUTH KOREA'S (INCOMPLETE) MIDDLE-POWER DIPLOMACY TOWARD ASEAN." International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 15, no. 2 (2019): 117–142.

Korea faced diplomatic challenges in terms of its middle-power the ROK is unable to perform brokering role of middle powers limited by hierarchical conceptualisation constrain Korea due to the power-deficit Korea been stayed out

South Korea has faced considerable diplomatic challenges , however, both in terms of its middle-power activism in general, and more specifically, with regard to its engagement with Southeast Asia. In the security field, due to geopolitical constraints , the ROK is unable to perform the neutral or brokering role of traditional middle powers In terms of regional security, Korea’s middle-powerism towards ASEAN is limited by the hierarchical conceptualisation of middle power which continues to constrain Korea due to the power-deficit vis-à-vis stronger regional players In the ASEAN Regional Forum Seoul had been unable fully to utilise this rare opportunity to engage with major regional players on nuclearising the Korean Peninsula Unlike other middle powers, such as Australia and Japan, which have jointly challenged China on this issue since 2010, South Korea has been stayed out of this regional affairs Seoul’s “strategic” silence has been criticised for its diplomatic naivety since it has been turning a blind eye in hopes of winning China’s future support in the event of any contingency involving North Korea

['South Korea has faced considerable diplomatic challenges, however, both in terms of its middle-power activism in general, and more specifically, with regard to its engagement with Southeast Asia. In the security field, due to geopolitical constraints, the ROK is unable to perform the neutral or brokering role of traditional middle powers (Kalinowski and Cho 2012: 244). In terms of regional security, Korea’s middle-powerism towards ASEAN is limited by the hierarchical conceptualisation of middle power which continues to constrain Korea due to the power-deficit vis-à-vis stronger regional players. In the ASEAN Regional Forum (hereafter, ARF), which has been attended by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 20001 as well as the other five members of the now suspended Six Party Talks (United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia), Seoul had been unable fully to utilise this rare opportunity to engage with major regional players on nuclearising the Korean Peninsula. For example, in 2008, South Korea tried to have the issue of North Korean provocation added to the agenda of the ARF, but ASEAN refused to countenance discussion of such a sensitive issue (Hundt 2012: 202). Although it was treated as one of the main agendas of two successive recent ARF meetings in 2017 and 2018 (ARF 2017, 2018), this would not have been possible without the diplomatic support from the Trump administration on this issue (Lee 2017) as well as the leadership of the Philippines and Singapore, the ASEAN chair for 2017 and 2018, respectively. South Korea’s strategic constraints or restraint is also reflected in Seoul’s engagement on politically sensitive issues such as the South China Sea. Unlike other middle powers, such as Australia and Japan, which have jointly challenged China on this issue since 2010, South Korea has been stayed out of this regional affairs (Jackson 2015; Green 2017). Seoul’s “strategic” silence has been criticised for its diplomatic naivety since it has been turning a blind eye in hopes of winning China’s future support in the event of any contingency involving North Korea (Jackson 2015).', '']

[(8, 14), (25, 33)]

ndtceda

Emory-GaHe-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-4.docx

Emory

GaHe

6a8ca2a1454e355a2d2b6a01f44b6138f9675e6cf29916c1a26d2d1a7b28f2e5

Central planning is innovative---the private sector is risk-averse and rent-seeking

Jeuk & Spang 22. Alexander Jeuk, Magister in Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology from Goethe University, PhD in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati; Friderike Spang, SNSF Senior Researcher, Faculty of Law, Criminal Justice and Public Administration, PhD in Political Science from the University of Western Ontario. “Analytic Marxism and Economic Feasibility. A Defense of Central Planning.” OSF Preprints, 22 August 2022, pp. 29-35. DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/uygvw

little reason to believe innovative progress rests on competition success in US or Germany rests on systems of innovation governments created institutions they also fostered demand the US created their own semi-conductor industry internet financed by government Private firms asked to contribute refused considering involvement a ‘ threat to business ’ companies invest little in R&D and instead patent tech that stems from military or NSF research does not engage in long-term research , is risk-aversive , and rent-seeking USSR invested in r and d yet 70% was military and space knowledge could not be diffused central planning is highly beneficial for innovative success

There is little reason to believe that such innovative progress rests on competition or decentralization strong bureaucratic planning and central governance have continuously been a condition for important innovative processes in successful economies innovative success in the US or in Germany rests on publicly governed so called ‘ systems of innovation ’ governments not only created educational and scientific institutions such as schools, academies, research laboratories and universities, but also actively recruited workers and scientists so that they could bestow their know-how on local industries governments in the US and in Germany not only created the supply of innovative goods, but they also fostered demand for these goods the US government created their own semi-conductor industry and made certain to also create economic demand for these semi-conductors many successful governments do not merely finance innovation, but plan and operate economic systems of innovation the basic foundations for developing the internet were financed and planned by government agencies such as DARPA, the NSF and CERN Private firms that were asked to contribute to the creation of the internet, such as AT&T and IBM, refused to participate , considering such an involvement to be a ‘ threat to their business ’ companies like Apple tend to invest little in in-house R&D and instead patent tech nology that stems from military or NSF research the private sector is often non-innovative , because it does not engage in long-term research , is risk-aversive , and rent-seeking pharma companies often patent research that has been done in the public sector Covid highlights this pattern the private sector funded the Covid vaccine ‘developed’ by Oxford University funding came overwhelmingly from government funds that were used in public laboratories researchers at Oxford University were apparently urged that AstraZeneca as a ‘free market player’ would solely receive royalties for said vaccine, even though the innovation was financed, planned, coordinated and executed publicly innovation is often not only not more efficient if it is conducted in ‘free’ markets, but rather private firms appropriate publicly innovated products USSR innovation problems did not consist in a lack of competition innovative stagnation was caused by the structure of the development state that was at work in the USSR the USSR invested up to 4% of its GDP in to r esearch and d evelopment, yet , of this a staggering 70% was invested in military and space programs the USSR kept its military and space research separated from research on consumer goods and from other industry sectors the knowledge gained from military and space programs could not be diffused into other research and commercial areas empirical evidence strongly suggests that large scale industrial innovation in the last three centuries was strongly supported by decisive central planning and agency central planning , if done correctly, is highly beneficial for innovative success

little reason continuously been a condition for important innovative processes publicly governed systems of innovation created educational and scientific institutions actively recruited workers and scientists fostered demand for these goods created their own semi-conductor industry create economic demand for these semi-conductors plan and operate economic systems of innovation financed and planned by government agencies refused to participate threat to their business invest little patent tech military or NSF research non-innovative not long-term research risk-aversive rent-seeking pharma companies often patent research that has been done in the public sector the private sector funded the Covid vaccine ‘developed’ by Oxford University government funds public laboratories the innovation was financed, planned, coordinated and executed publicly private firms appropriate publicly innovated products did not consist in a lack of competition structure of the development state 4% of its GDP r and d 70% separated from other industry sectors could not be diffused empirical evidence strongly suggests that large scale industrial innovation in the last three centuries was strongly supported by decisive central planning and agency central planning is highly beneficial for innovative success

['There is little reason to believe that such innovative progress rests on competition or decentralization and reversely that the lack thereof does not. In particular, Roemer and Schweickart do not engage with data on innovation, science, R&D or technology. Indeed, research in innovation economics points towards a role for central planning that is very different from the assumptions of Analytic Marxists. According to this research, strong bureaucratic planning and central governance have continuously been a condition for important innovative processes in successful economies (Polanyi 1944; Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995; Ruttan 2006; Mazzucato 2013). For instance, the innovative success in the US or in Germany rests on publicly governed so called ‘systems of innovation’ (Freeman 1995). That is, governments not only created educational and scientific institutions such as schools, academies, research laboratories and universities, but also actively recruited workers and scientists so that they could bestow their know-how on local industries; fostered and protected innovation-heavy industries through tariffs and direct financing; and sent citizens to other countries to acquire technological know-how. These governments were planning the development of innovation-heavy industries, like the machine-tool or chemical industry, over long periods of time (Free- man 1995).', 'Furthermore, for instance, governments in the US and in Germany not only created the supply of innovative goods, but they also fostered demand for these goods, knowing that merely creating innovative industries is not sufficient for lasting innovation, if these industries cannot cooperate with other companies and sell their products. For instance, the US government, by means of the US military, created their own semi-conductor industry and made certain to also create economic demand for these semi-conductors. Both, the “minute man missile program” and the NASA space programs were among the first major demand creators for semi-conductors, without which this industry might have died in its infancy (Mazzucato 2013). Importantly, many successful governments do not merely finance innovation, but plan and operate economic systems of innovation. To exemplify this point, let us take a look at the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (henceforth DARPA). DARPA functions as a “super-firm” that brings scientists and innovators together who lack institutional embedding—often due to the very system of unregulated decentralization and competition that Roemer and Schweickart consider to be the foundation of innovation. DARPA creates infrastructures, such as research labs, acts as a liaison between universities and businesses, takes care of business functions like marketing, and helps scientists to start their own operations. That is, DARPA acts like a mission-oriented super-firm, a central planning agency focusing on societal and technological challenges, bringing together individuals who cannot compete in competitive, deregulated markets which are usually owned by corporations. This way, rather than creating a competitive market, DARPA allows scientists to explore ideas that cannot be immediately monetized (Mazzucato 2013, 144-145).', 'To give another example, consider the development of the internet, which is clearly at the forefront of the IT-revolution. Contrary to Schweickart’s and Roemer’s claim that competition and decentralization enabled the development of the internet, Mazzucato shows with reference to an abundance of empirical evidence that government planning and agency were be- hind its development. Originally, the internet was developed by the US military as a decentralized information platform that could allow for communication in case of a nuclear war. The idea was to create a communication system that could be upheld by means of digital de- centralization, even in case of a military worst-case scenario (Mazzucato 2013, 111).', 'DARPA approaches AT&T and IBM to build such a network, both companies declined the request, believing that such a networks was a threat to their business; with the help of the State-owned British Post Office, DARPA successfully networked various stations from the west to east coast (Abate 1999). From the 1970s through the 1990s, DARPA funded the necessary communication protocol (TCP/IP), operating system (UNIX) and email programs needed for the communication system, while the NSF initiated the development of the first high-speed digital networks in the US (Kenney 2003). Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, British scientist Time Berners-Lee was developing the HTML, uniform resource locaters (URLs) and uniform HTTP (Wright 1997). Berners-Lee, with the hep of another computer scientist Robert Cailliau, implemented the first successful HTTP for the computers installed at CERN. (Mazzucato 2013, 111).13', 'According to Mazzucato, the basic foundations for developing the internet were financed and planned by government agencies such as DARPA, the NSF and CERN.14 Private firms that were asked to contribute to the creation of the internet, such as AT&T and IBM, refused to participate, considering such an involvement to be a ‘threat to their business’ (Mazzucato 2013, 111). Similarly, companies like Apple tend to invest little in in-house R&D and instead patent technology that stems from military or NSF research (Mazzucato 2013). And Angell (2004) argues that the private sector is often non-innovative, because it does not engage in long-term research, is risk-aversive, and rent-seeking. For instance, pharma companies often patent research that has been done in the public sector. The current Covid crisis once again highlights this pattern. Even though capitalist politicians such as Boris Johnson sell the narrative that the fast innovation process that led to Covid vaccines is based on ‘capitalism, based on greed’—compare Cohen’s statements on greed above—Cross et al. (under review) determined that the private sector funded the Covid vaccine ‘developed’ by Oxford University and patented by AstraZeneca by less than 2%. The remainder of funding came overwhelmingly from government funds that were used in public laboratories. Despite this, researchers at Oxford University were apparently urged to or otherwise decided that AstraZeneca as a ‘free market player’ would solely receive royalties for said vaccine, even though the innovation was financed, planned, coordinated and executed publicly.15 Therefore, it seems that innovation is often not only not more efficient if it is conducted in ‘free’ markets, but rather private firms appropriate publicly innovated products—a shocking form of capitalist exploitation concealed by media, economists and the state—that have been developed based on development state strategies that equal central planning.', 'Furthermore, Freeman’s (1995) work on innovation in the USSR reveals several flaws in Roemer’s claim about the alleged reasons why innovation stagnated in Soviet economies. In according with Roemer, Freeman shows that the USSR indeed faced significant innovation problems. But, contrary to Roemer, Freeman also shows that the reasons for these failures did not consist in a lack of competition; instead, innovative stagnation was caused by the structure of the development state that was at work in the USSR. According to Freeman, the USSR invested up to 4% of its GDP into research and development, yet, of this a staggering 70% was invested in military and space programs, compared to, for instance, less than 2% in Japan. However, contrary to the US, the USSR kept its military and space research separated from research on consumer goods and from other industry sectors. Therefore, the knowledge gained from military and space programs could not be diffused into other research and commercial areas, as we witness it for instance in the US. Accordingly, there were only few feed- back loops between military and non-military research and neither did government agencies perform business functions like design and marketing for non-military economic actors, as is the case in the US through institutions like DARPA. Innovation problems in the USSR can therefore be traced back, among other things, to the structure of the USSR’s development state, rather than to a lack of competition.', 'We therefore argue that the competition narrative (see also §2) about innovation brough forth by proponents of Analytic Marxism is as unsubstantiated as the pessimistic narrative of human nature and motivation (§3.1). The idea that competition is an all-important principle for motivating people has become something of a common place. However, there is little empirical evidence showing that competition is the main driver for innovation and economic development or that it is necessary for motivating economic activity in the first place. Furthermore, the higher efficiency of publicly planned services regarding, for instance, research, health care, public transport, energy networks or military compared to private competitors suggests that a non-competitive economic and political structure is more desirable in terms of socio-economic well-being.16 For example, the health care systems of many European countries fare much better in terms of service and cost efficiency than the ‘market system’ in the US, which is overly expensive and ethically problematic because it mostly benefits its wealthier inhabitants, excludes the poor, and thus costs many unnecessary lives each year (Galvani et al. 2020). Or take the recent collapse of the energy infrastructure of Texas in 2021. The state’s inability to offset the damaging consequences of unexpected extreme weather can also be traced back to the fact that the state has been weakened through a so-called decentralized ‘market approach’ (Galbraith 2021). For these reasons, we are optimistic that future work in this area can further establish that central planning and coordination lead to superior results than decentralized, competition-based economic systems.', 'In sum, empirical evidence strongly suggests that large scale industrial innovation in the last three centuries was strongly supported by decisive central planning and agency. Indeed, many innovation advantages in Western capitalist societies are based on such public strategies. As Mazzucato has shown, it is usually the public sector that fosters innovation rather than a rent-seeking, risk-averse private sector, so called free market agents. These findings contradict Roemer’s and Schweickart’s claims that innovation requires entrepreneurial activity and competition and that public intervention, planning and bureaucracy undermine innovative progress. Rather, it seems that central planning, if done correctly, is highly beneficial for innovative success and that accordingly the feasibility constraint from innovation cannot be held against planned economies.']

[(0, 15)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-4.docx

Emory

MiPi

7aaea004fedd49e4ff3918901b7c8bed740d1919edc755e21d11c7d2820352d1

Growth prevents conflict---interdependence

Krugman 22, has been an Opinion columnist since 2000 and is also a distinguished professor at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He won the 2008 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on international trade and economic geography. (Paul, 03-01-2022, “War, What Is It Good For?” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/opinion/ukraine-russia-war-economy.html)

Putin faced major resistance Russia will be left weaker and poorer Conquest doesn’t pay the modern world is different victors in war no longer derive profit from success everything changed with rise of vital interdependence You can’t just seize assets the way conquerors could seize land modern war uses resources require ammunition replacement parts and fuel conquest is a losing proposition

The Ukrainian miracle may not last Putin ’s attempt to win a quick victory on the cheap has faced major resistance it’s still more likely than not that the Russian flag will eventually be planted amid the rubble of Kyiv and Kharkiv even if that happens the Russia n Federation will be left weaker and poorer than it was before the invasion Conquest doesn’t pay there are plenty of examples of powers that enriched themselves through military prowess the modern world is different The British author Norman Angell published his The Great Illusion arguing that war had become obsolete victors in war could no longer derive any profit from their success We’re thankful the Allies prevailed in World War II but Britain emerged as a diminished power , suffering through years of austerity Even the U nited S tates had a harder postwar adjustment than many realize experiencing inflation above 20 percent utter defeat didn’t prevent Germany and Japan from eventually achieving unprecedented prosperity Why and when did conquest become unprofitable everything changed with the rise of a “ vital interdependence ” among nations cutting international frontiers In a global economy it’s hard to conquer another country without cutting that country off from the international division of labor not to mention the international financial system, at great cost We can see that happening to Russia You can’t just seize assets the way preindustrial conquerors could seize land because arbitrary confiscation destroys the incentives and sense of security an advanced society needs to stay productive modern war uses an incredible amount of resources Pre-modern armies used limited amounts of ammunition and could live off the land modern armies require huge amounts of ammunition replacement parts and fuel for their vehicles conquest, even if successful is extremely expensive making it even less likely that it can ever pay we now live in a world of passionate nationalism Ancient and medieval peasants probably didn’t care who was exploiting them modern workers do Putin’s attempt to seize Ukraine appears to be predicated not just on his belief that there is no Ukrainian nation but also on the assumption that the Ukrainians can be persuaded to consider themselves Russians That seems very unlikely conquest is a losing proposition Unfortunately, there are still madmen and fanatics who refuse to believe this some of them control nations and armies.

Putin cheap major resistance Russia weaker poorer doesn’t enriched themselves different Norman Angell The Great Illusion profit success diminished power U S postwar adjustment vital interdependence international frontiers great cost seize land resources Pre-modern armies ammunition replacement parts fuel extremely expensive passionate nationalism modern workers unlikely losing proposition madmen

['The Ukrainian miracle may not last. Vladimir Putin’s attempt to win a quick victory on the cheap, seizing major cities with relatively light forces, has faced major resistance, but the tanks and big guns are moving up. And despite the incredible heroism of Ukraine’s people, it’s still more likely than not that the Russian flag will eventually be planted amid the rubble of Kyiv and Kharkiv. But even if that happens, the Russian Federation will be left weaker and poorer than it was before the invasion. Conquest doesn’t pay. Why not? If you go back in history, there are plenty of examples of powers that enriched themselves through military prowess. The Romans surely profited from the conquest of the Hellenistic world, as did Spain from the conquest of the Aztecs and the Incas. But the modern world is different — where by “modern,” I mean at least the past century and a half. The British author Norman Angell published his famous tract “The Great Illusion” in 1909, arguing that war had become obsolete. His book was widely misinterpreted as saying that war could no longer happen, a proposition proved horribly wrong over the next two generations. What Angell actually said was that even the victors in war could no longer derive any profit from their success. And he was surely right about that. We’re all thankful that the Allies prevailed in World War II, but Britain emerged as a diminished power, suffering through years of austerity as it struggled to overcome a shortage of foreign exchange. Even the United States had a harder postwar adjustment than many realize, experiencing a bout of price increases that for a time pushed inflation above 20 percent. And conversely, even utter defeat didn’t prevent Germany and Japan from eventually achieving unprecedented prosperity. Why and when did conquest become unprofitable? Angell argued that everything changed with the rise of a “vital interdependence” among nations, “cutting athwart international frontiers,” which he suggested was “largely the work of the past forty years” — beginning around 1870. That seems like a fair guess: 1870 was roughly when railroads, steamships and telegraphs made possible the creation of what some economists call the first global economy:', '', 'In such a global economy, it’s hard to conquer another country without cutting that country — and yourself — off from the international division of labor, not to mention the international financial system, at great cost. We can see that dynamic happening to Russia as we speak. Angell also emphasized the limits to confiscation in a modern economy: You can’t just seize industrial assets the way preindustrial conquerors could seize land, because arbitrary confiscation destroys the incentives and sense of security an advanced society needs to stay productive. Again, history vindicated his analysis. For a while, Nazi Germany occupied nations with a combined prewar gross domestic product roughly twice its own — but despite ruthless exploitation, the occupied territories seem to have paid for only about 30 percent of the German war effort, in part because many of the economies Germany tried to exploit collapsed under the burden. An aside: Isn’t it extraordinary and horrible to find ourselves in a situation where Hitler’s economic failures tell us useful things about future prospects? But that’s where we are. Thanks, Putin. I’d add two more factors that explain why conquest is futile. The first is that modern war uses an incredible amount of resources. Pre-modern armies used limited amounts of ammunition and could, to some extent, live off the land. As late as 1864, Union General William Tecumseh Sherman could cut loose from his supply lines and march across Georgia carrying only 20 days’ worth of rations. But modern armies require huge amounts of ammunition, replacement parts and, above all, fuel for their vehicles. Indeed, the latest assessment from Britain’s Ministry of Defense says that the Russian advance on Kyiv has temporarily stalled “probably as a result of continuing logistical difficulties.” What this means for would-be conquerors is that conquest, even if successful, is extremely expensive, making it even less likely that it can ever pay. Second, we now live in a world of passionate nationalism. Ancient and medieval peasants probably didn’t care who was exploiting them; modern workers do. Putin’s attempt to seize Ukraine appears to be predicated not just on his belief that there is no such thing as a Ukrainian nation, but also on the assumption that the Ukrainians themselves can be persuaded to consider themselves Russians. That seems very unlikely to happen, so even if Kyiv and other major cities fall, Russia will find itself spending years trying to hold down a hostile population. So conquest is a losing proposition. This has been true for at least a century and a half; it has been obvious to anyone willing to look at the facts for more than a century. Unfortunately, there are still madmen and fanatics who refuse to believe this — and some of them control nations and armies. Quick Hits The victors tried to make Germany pay for World War I. John Maynard Keynes predicted disaster, and he was right. America learned from that experience, and helped defeated nations recover instead. Tracking the war. You-know-who still thinks Putin is smart.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Neg-8---NDT-Round-2.docx

Kansas

PaSe

f92e29eabd74eeeb7542902a980f85b30a8c8da1a2792aef4862abb325f4846a

2. Turns case AND predictions fail

Rozga 20, J.D. at BU, former FTC merger review and litigation expert (Kai Rozga, 8-31-2020, “How tech forces a reckoning with prediction-based antitrust enforcement,” Tech Law Decoded, , accessed: 9-12-2021)

plaintiffs and defendants rely on economists the result is a reports who reach opposing positions Alarm s should go off academics and policymakers are heard describing rationality they believe neoliberal thinking brought to antitrust reforms are trivial considering none tackle flaws of the s quo antitrust like a captain navigating a ship with stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky

In private antitrust litigation, plaintiffs and defendants alike rely on armies of economists to make out the elements of a case or defend against it the result is a series of warring expert reports submitted by uber-qualified economists with stellar reputations who reach diametrically opposing positions Alarm bell s should be go ing off Instead, academics and policymakers are more likely to be heard describing the rigor and rationality that they believe neoliberal economic thinking has brought to antitrust enforcement reforms are trivial considering how none tackle the fundamental flaws of the s tatus quo as antitrust turns its focus on increasingly difficult-to-predict markets, it does so increasingly with Economism-driven prediction as its lodestar like a captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky .

plaintiffs defendants alike armies of economists warring expert reports diametrically opposing positions Alarm bell s should be go ing off more likely to be heard rigor and rationality neoliberal economic thinking trivial none tackle the fundamental flaws of the s tatus quo like a captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky

['In private antitrust litigation, plaintiffs and defendants alike rely on armies of economists to make out the elements of a case or defend against it. Too often, the result is a series of warring expert reports submitted by uber-qualified economists with stellar reputations who—based on the exact same factual record—reach diametrically opposing positions about a market’s dynamics or likely competitive effects. Equally troubling is how the uncertainty of the expert opinions can be seen fading away by the time the court chooses a winner, as the prevailing view achieves a supreme prescience when cited by the judge in support of its decision.', 'Alarm bells should be going off. An academic field’s reputation would seem to be put in doubt, and with it the foundation of an influential body of law that shapes our economy and society. Instead, academics and policymakers are more likely to be heard describing the rigor and rationality that they believe neoliberal economic thinking has brought to antitrust enforcement. And while some reforms proposed by the mainstream antitrust community might seem dramatic within the existing paradigm, they are trivial when considering how none tackle the fundamental flaws of the status quo.', 'And so, paradoxically, as antitrust turns its focus on increasingly difficult-to-predict markets, it does so increasingly with Economism-driven prediction as its lodestar—like a captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-000-NDT-2022-Round2.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-000-NDT-2022-Round2.docx

98bf53ab0b7f13ea8b93310cd469c4637af49e7fb814c9b0ad94f69a0c2b5f62

AND that solves deterrence---nukes are more threatening.

Geist 21, Policy Researcher, RAND Corporation (Edward Geist, October 18, 2021, “The U.S. Doesn't Need More Nuclear Weapons to Counter China's New Missile Silos,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/10/the-us-doesnt-need-more-nuclear-weapons-to-counter.html)

pursuit of nonnuclear “silo killers” appear inimical to stability . Chinese could perceive as a tool to disarm their deterrent . But nukes would look even more threatening U.S. could pursue silo killers despite risk to stability possibility of nonnuclear weapons might give Chinese leaders pause

The pursuit of nonnuclear “silo killers” might appear inimical to strategic stability . Chinese leaders could perceive them as a tool to disarm their nuclear deterrent . But additional nukes would look even more threatening to Beijing . U.S. officials could decide to pursue nonnuclear “ silo killers ” despite the risk to strategic stability The possibility of nonnuclear weapons that could destroy the new silos might also give Chinese leaders pause : If their goal is a survivable second- strike force, then fields of missile silos may prove to be a hopelessly inadequate solution.

nonnuclear inimical stability disarm deterrent additional nukes even more Beijing despite risk nonnuclear give Chinese pause survivable strike missile silos inadequate

['The pursuit of nonnuclear “silo killers” might appear inimical to strategic stability. Chinese leaders could perceive them as a tool to disarm their nuclear deterrent. But additional nukes would look even more threatening to Beijing. U.S. officials could decide to pursue nonnuclear “silo killers” despite the risk to strategic stability—especially if it is unclear whether the silos host conventional missiles or strategic nuclear ones. The possibility of nonnuclear weapons that could destroy the new silos might also give Chinese leaders pause: If their goal is a survivable second-strike force, then fields of missile silos may prove to be a hopelessly inadequate solution.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiWi-Aff-Sunflower-Swing-Part-1-hosted-by-KU-Round-1.docx

Kansas

WiWi

d58ff914224e4d189dcd6de7dc1ca42285ce038d08a7c4f0b6f319bf24c2db33

Deliberation about immigration policy by adolescents is key to expanding horizons on controversial issues and enacting skills critical in the public square.

Crocco et al, 18 – All Faculty in the College of Education, MSU - Margaret Crocco (Michigan State University), Avner Segall (Michigan State University), Anne-Lise Halvorsen (Michigan State University), Rebecca Jacobsen (Michigan State University), Deliberating Public Policy Issues with Adolescents Classroom Dynamics and Sociocultural Considerations, January 1, 2018, http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol26/iss1/3

deliberation aimed at action plan think with one another about the power they exercise Deliberations bring about greater engagement of youth in civic life opponents will learn from each other and expand each other’s horizons” partners can arrive at acceptable solutions via dialogue deliberation of public policy issues provide an opportunity for adolescents to rehearse and enact skills critical to deliberation in the public the data and analysis provided drawn from the deliberation on immigration discussions on immigration may stimulate greater attention to the pedagogical affordances and hurdles involved with public policy issues

Parker and Hess’s deliberation is aimed at reaching a decision at an action plan that will resolve a problem that a ‘we’ faces. It is the key citizenship behavior of ‘we the people’ in democracies if they are not simply to exercise power but to think with one another about the power they exercise Discussions and deliberations of public policy issues in classrooms have been shown to enhance students’ skills in reasoning and argumentation, use of evidence to back claims, consideration of alternative perspectives, and compromise in pursuit of consensus Deliberations on current controversial issues have been identified as one of the promising practices that can bring about greater engagement of youth in civic life opponents will learn from each other and expand each other’s horizons” and are particularly well-suited to engagement about issues on which “difference exists where partners can arrive at acceptable solutions via dialogue without having to give up on core moral values Classroom contexts involving discussion and deliberation of public policy issues provide an opportunity for adolescents to rehearse and enact the kinds of skills critical to deliberation in the public square the data and analysis provided throughout much of the paper are drawn from the deliberation on immigration we present a set of themes emergent from the deliberation on immigration specifically the interaction of students’ sociocultural identity attributes with the ways they discussed the topic discussions on immigration may stimulate greater attention to the pedagogical affordances and hurdles involved with deliberating public policy issues within the context of contemporary secondary classrooms

['Promoting deliberation of social and public policy issues has a long tradition in K–12 education (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006; Biesta, 2011; Hess, 2002; Parker & Hess, 2001), as does discussion of controversial issues (Hess, 2009; Hess & McAvoy, 2015). Civic education scholars advocate both discussion and deliberation (Kawashima-Ginsberg, 2013; McAvoy & Hess, 2013). Here, we draw on Parker and Hess’s (2001) conceptualization of deliberation, which they define as discussion “that is aimed at reaching a decision at an action plan that will resolve a problem that a ‘we’ faces. It is the key citizenship behavior of ‘we the people’ in democracies if they are not simply to exercise power (e.g., voting; direct action) but to think with one another about the power they exercise” (p. 282). Discussions and deliberations of public policy issues in classrooms have been shown to enhance students’ skills in reasoning and argumentation, use of evidence to back claims, consideration of alternative perspectives, and compromise in pursuit of consensus (Hess, 2009; Kuhn & Crowell, 2011). Deliberations on current controversial issues have been identified as one of the promising practices that can bring about greater engagement of youth in civic life (Levine & Kawashima-Ginsberg, 2017). Deliberation carried out in public arenas has similar goals, for example, that “opponents will learn from each other and expand each other’s horizons” and are particularly well-suited to engagement about issues on which “difference exists, where consensus is not likely and compromise is the best that one can hope for—where partners can arrive at acceptable solutions via dialogue without having to give up on core moral values” (Dahlgren, 2006, p. 278). Classroom contexts involving discussion and deliberation of public policy issues provide an opportunity for adolescents to rehearse and enact the kinds of skills that Dahlgren described as critical to deliberation in the public square. Little empirical research exists, however, about deliberation in secondary social studies classrooms (Samuelsson, 2016), although somewhat more attention has been given to discussion (e.g., Avery, Levy, & Simmons, 2013; Dull & Murrow, 2008; Hess, 2009; Hess & McAvoy, 2015; Parker & Hess, 2001). This article describes an effort to conduct deliberations on two topics—immigration and Internet privacy—in three secondary classrooms. Although the paper broadly explores the deliberations on both topics, the data and analysis provided throughout much of the paper are drawn from the deliberation on immigration. The study described here is part of a larger study investigating the relationships among adolescent sociocultural identity, social and political trust, and evidence use. Although the focus of the larger study is on evidence use, here we present a set of themes emergent from the deliberation on immigration, specifically the interaction of students’ sociocultural identity attributes with the ways they discussed the topic in the three schools. At the outset, we wish to comment on what, in our judgment, might be considered the failure of deliberation in these events (by “event” we are referring to the enactment of the deliberations we planned). If by deliberation, we mean, as Parker has suggested, discussion that allows for decision-making about a course of action related to public policy, then the classroom events we witnessed did not manage to “resolve a problem a ‘we’ faces,” as Parker and Hess (2001) put it (p. 282). In the case of immigration, discussion did occur, even if the use of evidence (the focus of our larger study) fell short of what we had expected. In the case of Internet privacy, even discussion faltered since the students saw so little problem with the perceived trade-offs between the advantages of social media and privacy concerns as to barely generate a conversation. With that in mind, we focus this paper on the discussions on immigration, paying particular attention to the nature of these discussions in each of the three schools and the degree to which what unfolded in them might have prevented these discussions from turning into true deliberations. Such a focus, we believe, may stimulate greater attention to the pedagogical affordances and hurdles involved with deliberating public policy issues within the context of contemporary secondary classrooms.', '']

[(0, 6), (7, 16)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-UMW-Debate-Tournament-Semis.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

c1f7a21807f531efd6ad5528b76ca4365101c6d5b51a42e96f30672865f5cea9

[4] Fetal personhood laws inevitable.

Kate Zernike 8/22/22. national correspondent. “Is a Fetus a Person? An Anti-Abortion Strategy Says Yes.” NYT. Aug 22 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/us/abortion-anti-fetus-person.html

half states have moved to enact bans on abortion activists are pushing laws that grant fetuses rights such laws are starting to have effect Already in Georgia The Court decision opened new interest in the laws Republicans in the House and Senate introduced legislation that establish a right to child support The goal is federal ban on abortion Personhood has always been the ultimate ambition How much support laws find will not be clear until legislative sessions early next year

half the states have moved to enact near-total bans on abortion since June anti-abortion activists are pushing laws that grant fetuses legal rights such laws remained symbolic Now they are starting to have practical effect Already in Georgia , a fetus qualifies for tax credits The laws have potential to criminalize common health care procedures and limit the rights of a pregnant woman The Court decision returning regulation of abortion to the states has opened new interest in the laws , and a new legal path for them In Indiana conservative lawmakers objected that exceptions for rape and incest In Georgia, a law granting fetal personhood took effect Republicans in the U.S. House and Senate urged by anti-abortion groups introduced legislation that would establish a right to child support for fetuses The goal is to establish a federal ban on abortion through legislation or another Supreme Court decision. Personhood has always been the ultimate ambition of the anti-abortion movement How much support laws will find will not be clear until state legislative sessions begin early next year

half near-total bans on abortion have practical effect new interest Indiana U.S. House and Senate legislation right federal ban on abortion or Court decision. ultimate ambition of the anti-abortion movement next year

['Even as roughly half the states have moved to enact near-total bans on abortion since the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade in June, anti-abortion activists are pushing for a long-held and more absolute goal: laws that grant fetuses the same legal rights and protections as any person.', 'So-called fetal personhood laws would make abortion murder, ruling out all or most of the exceptions for abortion allowed in states that already ban it. So long as Roe established a constitutional right to abortion, such laws remained symbolic in the few states that managed to pass them. Now they are starting to have practical effect. Already in Georgia,', '', ' a fetus now qualifies for tax credits and child support, and is to be included in population counts and redistricting.', 'The laws also open up questions well beyond abortion, about immigration and who is entitled to public benefits.', 'They have the potential to criminalize common health care procedures and limit the rights of a pregnant woman in making health care decisions.', 'The U.S. Supreme Court decision returning the regulation of abortion to the states has opened new interest in the laws, and a new legal path for them.', 'In Indiana, where this month the Republican-controlled legislature banned abortion starting at conception — one of the strictest laws in the nation — some conservative lawmakers objected that the law included exceptions for rape and incest. “This bill justifies the wicked, those murdering babies, and punishes the righteous, the preborn human being,” one lawmaker said, pushing instead for a fetal personhood law with no exceptions.', 'In Georgia, a law granting fetal personhood to fetuses after around six weeks of pregnancy took effect after the overturning of Roe. But Georgia Right to Life and other conservative groups are petitioning Governor Brian Kemp to call a special legislative session to pass a fetal personhood amendment to the state constitution. It would eliminate any exceptions for abortion allowed in the law, by declaring a “paramount right to life of all human beings as persons at any stage of development from fertilization to natural death.”', 'And this month, Republicans in the U.S. House and Senate, urged by anti-abortion groups, introduced legislation that would establish a right to child support for fetuses beginning at conception. Such a mandate might be difficult to enforce but would nudge federal law toward an understanding that fetuses have the same right to life as other human beings, including the women who carry them.', 'The goal is to establish a federal ban on abortion, through legislation or another Supreme Court decision.', '“Personhood has always been the ultimate ambition of the anti-abortion movement,” said Mary Ziegler, a law professor and historian of abortion at the University of California, Davis. “The movement very much wants a declaration that abortion is a human rights and constitutional rights violation. Not just that it’s a crime; that it’s unconstitutional. From a symbolic standpoint, that’s a really big deal to a lot of people in the movement.”', 'How much support the laws will find will not be clear until state legislative sessions begin early next year and will depend on whether Republicans take control of Congress in the midterms. But for anti-abortion advocates, simply returning the regulation of abortion to the states was never enough.', '']

[(5, 17)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-CaVa-Aff-Wake-Round-1.docx

Dartmouth

CaVa

ef213333a52feb7d958daff331d3dda35da20fbd6e998b29d794eed506338ed5

Antitrust cases are resource-intensive and intersect with other domains of law. Specifically, spills over to patent litigation.

Warren ’15 [Daniel R. Warren, JD from the Boston University School of Law, BS from Ohio State University, “Stress Fractures: The Need to Stop and Repair the Growing Divide in Circuit Court Application of Summary Judgment in Antitrust Litigation”, Review of Banking and Financial Law, 35 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 380, Lexis]

antitrust involves large organizations , which magnifies costs litigation is slow the vast evidence to prove a claim overwhelm judges judges have difficulty dealing with the variety of evidence that analysis determined abilities to limit costs as "hollow" Costs multiply in antitrust because actions combine with complex areas of law, such as patent law or class actions antitrust make trials "unmanageable." a recipe for prolonged litigation

antitrust litigation normally involves large organizations , which magnifies the costs of those firms going through the discovery process antitrust litigation is normally a slow process that takes a great deal of time . The amount of time necessary to process and review evidence produced by discovery leads to incredible legal costs , often disproportionately placed on the defendant firm. the vast amount of evidence necessary to prove a n antitrust claim overwhelm judges judges have difficulty dealing with the broad variety of evidence that may be called for. One analysis determined judges' abilities to limit discovery costs on their own as "hollow" at best : A magistrate cannot--know the expected productivity of a given request Judicial officers cannot measure costs and benefits and so cannot isolate impositional requests How can a judge distinguish a dry hole from a request that was not justified at the time? Antitrust law is structured in such a way as to have a "special temptation" for what would otherwise be frivolous litigation. there is significant motivation to force costs on to other firms Costs can multiply in antitrust litigation because antitrust actions are often combine d with other particularly complex areas of law, such as patent law or class actions . Class actions particularly in the antitrust context can make trials "unmanageable." Combining complex areas of law is a recipe for large legal costs and prolonged litigation

large organizations magnifies costs slow process great deal of time incredible legal costs disproportionately placed a overwhelm judges difficulty dealing "hollow" at best combine particularly complex patent law class actions trials "unmanageable." recipe large legal costs prolonged litigation

['In antitrust litigation, the value of summary judgment to mitigate discovery costs through shortening litigation is elevated to a special importance even greater than normal for three reasons. First, antitrust litigation normally involves large organizations, which magnifies the costs of those firms going through the discovery process. Large firms have a great number of involved employees and departments, all of which would likely be subject to the broad discovery that is characteristic of antitrust litigation. Summary judgment, though normally considered after discovery, is a procedural weapon available at nearly any point in this process, as "a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery." The existence of a stay for extension of discovery shows that summary judgment need not automatically wait for discovery\'s completion, and thus can be an invaluable safeguard against otherwise incredibly costly discovery. This safeguard allows summary judgment to be a powerful tool to radically lower discovery time and costs without "railroad[ing]" the other party.', "Second, antitrust litigation is normally a slow process that takes a great deal of time. The amount of time necessary to process and review evidence produced by discovery leads to incredible legal costs, often disproportionately placed on the defendant firm. The plaintiff has the advantage over the defendant in deciding the scope of discovery costs, and may often tailor its claim in such a way as to avoid the discovery costs that a defendant's counterclaim may reflect [*390] back on the plaintiff. These lengthy trials can be effectively truncated by summary judgment, and thus summary judgment's normal value is even greater in the world of antitrust litigation where protracted trials are the norm.", 'Finally, the vast amount of evidence necessary to prove the elements of an antitrust claim contribute to the large discovery costs tied to antitrust litigation by overwhelming judges\' ability to reign in discovery costs. Currently, we rely on judges to limit the range of discovery requested, but in the context of antitrust litigation, judges have difficulty dealing with the broad variety of evidence that may be called for. One analysis of the power of discovery described it as a costly and potentially abusive force, and determined judges\' abilities to limit discovery costs on their own as "hollow" at best:', 'A magistrate supervising discovery does not--cannot--know the expected productivity of a given request, because the nature of the requester\'s claim and the contents of the files (or head) of the adverse party are unknown. Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests. Requesters have no reason to disclose their own estimates because they gain from imposing costs on rivals (and may lose from an improvement in accuracy). The portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure calling on judges to trim back excessive demands, therefore, have been, and are doomed to be, hollow. We cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what we cannot define; we cannot define "abusive" discovery except in theory, because in practice we lack essential information. Even in retrospect it is hard to label requests as abusive. How can a judge distinguish a dry hole (common in litigation as well as in the oil business) from a request that was not justified at the time?', ' [*391] Summary judgment can also reduce costs to both parties by reducing time and discovery costs to the parties, and to the judicial system itself, by cutting short lengthy litigation. Both sides often incur costs from employing experts in various areas, researching and producing evidence necessary to prove or disprove elements of antitrust actions, and in the great many legal hours necessary for both plaintiffs and defendants--not to mention costs to the state--during lengthy litigation that is often fruitless due to an "incentive to file potentially equivocal claims." Antitrust law is structured in such a way as to have a "special temptation" for what would otherwise be frivolous litigation. As antitrust law is, by its very nature, between competitors, there is significant motivation to force costs on to other firms, perhaps even through frivolous legal claims or intentionally imposing other large legal costs. Costs can also multiply in antitrust litigation because antitrust actions are often combined with other particularly complex areas of law, such as patent law or class actions. Class actions particularly in the antitrust context can make trials "unmanageable." Combining two already complex areas of law is a recipe for large legal costs and prolonged litigation. The value of cutting costs short cannot be overstated, as antitrust litigation takes place in the arena of business competition. This means that firms are already engaged in close competition for antitrust cases to be relevant, and thus unnecessary costs can further distort the market.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Neg-6%20-%20NDT-Round4.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Neg-6%2520-%2520NDT-Round4.docx

2383aee7581b1c0795329fa35a02f0ff1e049a360f193a7a262119d4d3058133

Asian linguistics come first – our method of dialogue creates communicative spaces where Asians can find community and space for productive engagement.

Mao ‘8 [Luming, Professor of English and Asian American Studies, Morris Young, 2008, “REPRESENTATIONS – Doing Asian American Rhetoric,” Ch. 1, p. 3-7]

Asian American rhetoric as the systematic, effective use and development by Asian Americans of symbolic resources, rhetoric creates a space for Asian where they can resist and reassert their agency intimately tied to particularizing speech settings, communicative purposes performative force bring about material and symbolic consequences destabilize the balance of power and privilege that exists between the majority and minority directly participates in, an ongoing dialogue that aims to reexamine western rhetoric Asian rhetoric serves as example of how language to bring changes that affect the attitudes and actions producing a transformative effect makes it possible for Asian Americans to be transformative, carving out new spaces for critical and productive engagement Rhetoric is also employed by Asian Americans to address specific occasions, whether responding to acts of racism, expressing culture, or forming community constructed as both foreign and domestic, as a site of both containment and community

We define Asian American rhetoric as the systematic, effective use and development by Asian Americans of symbolic resources, including this new American language, in social, cultural, and political contexts. Because these contexts are regularly imbued with highly asymmetrical relations of power, such rhetoric creates a space for Asian Americans where they can resist social and economic injustice and reassert their discursive agency and authority in the dominant culture . Asian American rhetoric is intimately tied to , and indeed constituted by, particularizing speech settings, specific communicative purposes , and situated discursive acts. Its uptake and its performative force bring about material and symbolic consequences that in turn destabilize the balance of power and privilege that exists between the majority and minority cultures. First, Asian American rhetoric has both been mobilized by, and directly participates in, an ongoing dialogue that aims to reexamine and reconceptualize rhetoric’s purposes and functions beyond the paradigm of western rhetoric but also makes it possible for Asian American rhetoric, or any other ethnic rhetoric, for that matter, to find its voice and to secure its uptake. As a minority discourse that has long been ignored, marginalized, and/or excluded, Asian American rhetoric becomes an integral, but no less distinctive, part of this complicated and dynamic American narrative. We also began to experience and consciously perform discursive acts whose rhetorical features and significances had hitherto gone unnoticed or unnamed. The emergence of Asian American rhetoric speaks to this desire to give voice to the voiceless and to accord long-overdue legitimacy to those ways of speaking that have long been the stuff that Asian Americans are made of. challenges the binary discourse that regularly views all other non-western rhetorics as the very antitheses to western rhetoric and as the “unruly borderlands” in want of exploration, cultivation, and conversion draws our much-needed attention to the temporal-spatial nature of language use and to its material and symbolic consequences Asian American rhetoric serves as a compelling example of how Asian Americans have been using language to bring about changes that affect the attitudes , beliefs and actions such rhetoric cannot help but embody internal differences, ambivalences, and even contradictions as each and every specific communicative situation—where Asian American rhetoric is invoked, deployed, or developed—is informed and inflected by diverse contexts, by different relations of asymmetry, and by, most simply put, heterogeneous voices. However, as a performative, Asian American rhetoric also actively engages and impacts such conditions and practices To the extent it does, Asian American rhetoric becomes a rhetoric of becoming: it is a rhetoric that participates in this generative process, yielding an identity that is Asian American and producing a transformative effect that is always occasioned by use . On the other hand, it is this state of becoming or indeterminacy that makes it possible for Asian Americans to be transformative, carving out new spaces for critical and productive engagement . language provides the possibility to realize the rhetorical construction of identity and write oneself literally into the pages of history and culture Rhetoric is also employed by Asian Americans to address specific occasions, whether responding to acts of racism, expressing culture, or forming community . These specific spaces that Asian Americans inhabit, where identities are constructed and negotiated and responses to particular conditions are generated, can be conceptualized as Asian American rhetorical space Her definition is particularly useful in considering the use of rhetoric by Asian Americans. In the case of Asian Americans, the residue of history includes a legacy of U.S. racial ideology that has often placed Asians and Asian Americans in particular spaces, whether metaphorical or material. rhetorical space for Asian Americans is often constructed as both foreign and domestic, as a site of both containment and community .

First, Asian American rhetoric has both been mobilized by, and directly participates in, an ongoing dialogue that aims to reexamine and reconceptualize rhetoric’s purposes and functions beyond the paradigm of western rhetoric

['Chinese rhetoric creates a communicative space to reassert our agency that allows the performative element of the reading of the 1AC to destabalize whiteness’ need to control people both materially and affectively – this indeterminancy of the AFF is what creates the possibility of productive engagement for Asian individuals. ', 'We define Asian American rhetoric as the systematic, effective use and development by Asian Americans of symbolic resources, including this new American language, in social, cultural, and political contexts. Because these contexts are regularly imbued with highly asymmetrical relations of power, such rhetoric creates a space for Asian Americans where they can resist social and economic injustice and reassert their discursive agency and authority in the dominant culture. In this sense, Asian American rhetoric is intimately tied to, and indeed constituted by, particularizing speech settings, specific communicative purposes, and situated discursive acts. Its uptake and its performative force bring about material and symbolic consequences that in turn destabilize the balance of power and privilege that exists between the majority and minority cultures.', 'We credit the emergence of Asian American rhetoric to a number of factors that have been converging in the recent past. First, Asian American rhetoric has both been mobilized by, and directly participates in, an ongoing dialogue that aims to reexamine and reconceptualize rhetoric’s purposes and functions beyond the paradigm of western rhetoric. Such a dialogue not only problematizes the Rhetorical Tradition and its canonical ways of representation, but also makes it possible for Asian American rhetoric, or any other ethnic rhetoric, for that matter, to find its voice and to secure its uptake. As a minority discourse that has long been ignored, marginalized, and/or excluded, Asian American rhetoric becomes an integral, but no less distinctive, part of this complicated and dynamic American narrative. ', 'Second, with the publication of such works as Robert Oliver’s Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China (1971) and Geneva Smitherman’s Talkin and Testifyin: The Language of Black America (1977), we came to realize that rhetoric—the systematic and effective use of symbolic resources—was not an Anglo-American phenomenon only, and that the use and study of rhetoric existed in other communities and in other regions around the world. We also began to experience and consciously perform discursive acts whose rhetorical features and significances had hitherto gone unnoticed or unnamed. The emergence of Asian American rhetoric speaks to this desire to give voice to the voiceless and to accord long-overdue legitimacy to those ways of speaking that have long been the stuff that Asian Americans are made of. It further challenges the binary discourse that regularly views all other non-western rhetorics as the very antitheses to western rhetoric and as the “unruly borderlands” in want of exploration, cultivation, and conversion. ', 'Third, thanks to the interpretative turn that the field of rhetoric and composition has now embraced, rhetoric is seen as more than just the art of discovering the available means of persuasion. Rather, it is part of the knowledge-making process that is situated in every specific occasion of language use and that is always socially and politically constructed. Such an understanding of rhetoric draws our much-needed attention to the temporal-spatial nature of language use and to its material and symbolic consequences. Asian American rhetoric serves as a compelling example of how Asian Americans have been using language to bring about changes that affect the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of their intended audience as well as their very own. It also presents students, teachers, and scholars with new ways to approach rhetoric and to engage specific rhetorical situations and their formal features such as purpose, audience, and context. ', 'While we very much want to claim that Asian American rhetoric commands a sense of unity or collective identity for its users, we want to note that such rhetoric cannot help but embody internal differences, ambivalences, and even contradictions as each and every specific communicative situation—where Asian American rhetoric is invoked, deployed, or developed—is informed and inflected by diverse contexts, by different relations of asymmetry, and by, most simply put, heterogeneous voices. As a minority discourse, Asian American rhetoric reflects and responds to existing social and cultural conditions and practices while gathering and disseminating the illocutionary force of past practices. Or in the words of James Paul Gee, “Words have histories. They have been in other people’s mouths and on other people’s pens. They have circulated other Discourses and within other institutions. They have been part of specific historical events and episodes. Words bring with them as potential situated meanings all the situated meanings they have picked up in history and in other settings and Discourses” (2005, 54; emphasis in the original). ', 'However, as a performative, Asian American rhetoric also actively engages and impacts such conditions and practices. That is to say, as it reflects and responds to these conditions and practices, Asian American rhetoric creates its own illocutionary force, thus challenging or turning against “this constitutive historicity of force” (Butler 1993, 227). To the extent it does, Asian American rhetoric becomes a rhetoric of becoming: it is a rhetoric that participates in this generative process, yielding an identity that is Asian American and producing a transformative effect that is always occasioned by use. ', 'As a rhetoric of becoming, Asian American rhetoric is also an example of hybridity. Operating in a space that is “crisscrossed with a variety of languages, experiences, and voices” and that “intermingles with the weight of particular histories that will not fit into the master narrative of a monolithic culture” (Giroux 1992, 209), Asian American rhetoric draws upon discursive practices both from the European American tradition and from Asian, as well as other ethnic and worldly, traditions. Its emergence and its identity are therefore very much tied to our present-day social-cultural, transnational tendencies marked in part by various forms of cultural and linguistic intertextuality. In addition, since Asian American rhetoric is being produced within the histories of highly asymmetrical relations of 6 REPRESENTATIONS power, its discursive fate can be quite indeterminate, if not perilous. Like Pratt’s autoethnographic texts, it could experience miscomprehension, incomprehension, and/or simply a multitude of meanings (1991, 37). And it could be quickly appropriated or even stereotyped by the dominant tradition, thus losing its otherwise creative, invigorating energy. On the other hand, it is this state of becoming or indeterminacy that makes it possible for Asian Americans to be transformative, carving out new spaces for critical and productive engagement. ', 'For Asian Americans, as with others often placed on the margins of culture, language provides the possibility to realize the rhetorical construction of identity and write oneself literally into the pages of history and culture. In fact, such discursive practices can create and indeed become topoi in the larger narrative of America. Rhetoric is also employed by Asian Americans to address specific occasions, whether responding to acts of racism, expressing culture, or forming community. These specific spaces that Asian Americans inhabit, where identities are constructed and negotiated and responses to particular conditions are generated, can be conceptualized as Asian American rhetorical space. In particular, spatial metaphors are especially important for Asian Americans as rhetorical devices to address travel and mobility, containment and community, and imagined or real geographies. ', 'In her essay “Of Gender and Rhetorical Space,” Roxanne Mountford examines the function of space in rhetorical situations, focusing on the role of the pulpit as both a rhetorical and gendered space that has cultural and material consequences for both speaker and audience. Mountford defines “rhetorical space” as “the geography of a communicative event” that, like all landscapes, “may include both the cultural and material arrangement, whether intended or fortuitous, of space”; such spaces “carry the residue of history upon them, but perhaps, something else: a physical representation of relationships and ideas” (2001, 42). Her definition is particularly useful in considering the use of rhetoric by Asian Americans. ', 'In the case of Asian Americans, the residue of history includes a legacy of U.S. racial ideology that has often placed Asians and Asian Americans in particular spaces, whether metaphorical or material. As Kandice Chuh argues: “Embedded in such terms as ‘immigrant’ and ‘exile’ and in the difference between ‘native’ or ‘birthright’ and ‘naturalized’ citizenship is this spatial logic. Theoretically, according to U.S. nationalism, departure from there and arrival here is a narrative whose Introduction 7 closure may be found in being made like one was native-born through naturalization. Positing the naturalness of the relationship between the native-born and the nation, such an ideology depends upon territoriality for coherence and, more specifically, upon a spatialized logic that holds as discretely and naturally distinct ‘here’ and ‘there’” (2003, 86–87). ', 'Thus, functioning in contradictory ways, rhetorical space for Asian Americans is often constructed as both foreign and domestic, as a site of both containment and community. For example, while the early twentieth-century immigration detention center Angel Island acted to contain Chinese immigrants, keeping them from entering America, it also resulted in rhetorical action by these immigrants, who literally wrote their protests into the walls of their barracks (see Lai, Lim, and Yung 1991). Or, while the Japanese American internment camps of World War II held Japanese and Japanese Americans as threats to the nation without any other evidence than their race, these internees produced camp newspapers protesting their condition and composed tanka poetry expressing their frustration and resistance (see Mizuno 2001, 2003). What complicates Asian American rhetorical space is the apparent necessity, or imposition, of defining Asian America against the Nation rather than as constitutive of it. Thus, in conceptualizing Asian American rhetorical space there is a need to understand the ideological underpinnings that have imagined, and continue to imagine, Asians (whether in America or elsewhere) as Other, and as foreign against the domestic space of the United States.']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Michigan-IpSh-Aff-Wake-Forest-Round-6.docx

Michigan

IpSh

1dc25e4a496b8dc0ea42143faac0d617e58e4b9d2199257e75261574de7db8f2

Lack of motivation makes punishments useless – neg on presumption.

Asaro, 12 -- Associate Professor in the School of Media Studies at the New School

criminal actions require a moral agent and it is not possible to punish a robot Moral agency must be an autonomous subject who has a culpable mind Without moral agency, there can be harm but not guilt deterrence only makes sense when moral agents recogniz the similarity of their choices to other s without reflexivity of choice and recognition of similarity punishment cannot deter

There are two problems with applying criminal law to robots criminal actions require a moral agent to perform them, and it is not possible to punish a robot . Moral agency in criminal law must serve the role of be ing an autonomous subject who has a culpable mind , and who can be punished. Without moral agency, there can be harm but not guilt only a moral agent can be reformed, which implies the development or correction of a moral character deterrence only makes sense when moral agents are capable of recogniz ing the similarity of their potential choices and actions to those of other moral agent s who have been punished for the wrong choices and actions — without this reflexivity of choice and recognition of similarity between and among moral agents, punishment cannot result in deter rence.

moral agent not possible to punish a robot Moral agency autonomous subject culpable mind not guilt deterrence similarity reflexivity of choice recognition of similarity

['[Peter M. Asaro, " A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on Robotics," ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS, 169-181 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/ebooks/bookPdfWithBanner.jsp?fileName=6733967.pdf&bkn=6731157&pdfType=chapter, accessed 9-7-2022; AD]', 'There are two fundamental problems with applying criminal law to robots: (1) criminal actions require a moral agent to perform them, and (2) it is not clear that it is possible to punish a robot. While moral agency is not essential to civil law, moral agency is essential to criminal law, and is deeply connected to our concepts of punishment (retribution, reform, and deterrence). Moral agency might be defined in various ways, but, in criminal law, it ultimately must serve the role of being an autonomous subject who has a culpable mind, and who can be punished. Without moral agency, there can be harm (and hence civil liability), but not guilt. Thus, there is no debt incurred to society unless there is a moral agent to incur it — it is merely an accident or act of nature, but not a crime. Similarly, only a moral agent can be reformed, which implies the development or correction of a moral character — otherwise it is merely the fixing of a problem. And finally, deterrence only makes sense when moral agents are capable of recognizing the similarity of their potential choices and actions to those of other moral agents who have been punished for the wrong choices and actions — without this reflexivity of choice by a moral agent, and recognition of similarity between and among moral agents, punishment cannot possibly result in deterrence.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-YeZi-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

YeZi

e77b72710adc403285a0db207ec3829827787426f3bb3646c01de6eecd627595

Any nuclear posture changes open the floodgates to congressional debate.

Matthew R. Costlow 21. Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy in nuclear deterrence, missile defense policy, arms control, and Russian and Chinese nuclear doctrine, published by Comparative Strategy, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Special Assistant in the office of Nuclear and Missile Defense policy, Department of Defense; Analyst at National Institute, specializing in cybersecurity, emergency management, and foreign airpower acquisition at the Congressional Research Service. “A Net Assessment of “No First Use” and “Sole Purpose” Nuclear Policies.” July 2021. National Institute for Public Policy. https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/OP-7-for-web-final.pdf

adopting such policies would ignite a fractious debate about whether U.S. nuclear systems are compatible have no definitive answers and lead to states like China and Russia weighing in internal U.S. debate should submarine be eliminated how many reductions to which systems officials have to create an entirely new set of justifications An unmoored debate would please potential adversaries and concern allies policy justification to advocate for reductions are, inadvisable

The third significant danger is that adopting such policies , without any likely benefit, would ignite a fractious debate about whether and which U.S. nuclear systems are compatible with the new policy. What is worse, these debates would have no definitive answers and would simply lead to states like China and Russia , as well as domestic non-governmental groups, weighing in on the internal U.S. debate with their own preferred U.S. force posture changes , all without being able to appeal to a common standard. a nuclear no first use policy, should U.S. submarine -launched ballistic missiles be eliminated how many reductions to which U.S. nuclear systems Their suggestions in this regard will be as plentiful as they are self-serving . U.S. officials would necessarily have to create an entirely new set of policy justifications for why each U.S. nuclear weapon system does or does not conform to the new policy and then reconcile those answers with whether those same systems in states like China indicate the Chinese nuclear no first use policy is credible. An unmoored debate about U.S. 117 Occasional Paper nuclear declaratory policy would both please potential adversaries and concern allies and partners , all with the potential of allowing domestic disarmament-focused groups the policy justification to advocate for U.S. nuclear reductions that were, and still are, inadvisable due to the increasingly challenging threat environment.

ignite fractious debate U.S. nuclear systems compatible China and Russia weighing in internal U.S. debate own preferred posture changes how many as plentiful as they are self-serving entirely new set of policy justifications reconcile answers unmoored debate please potential adversaries concern allies and partners increasingly challenging threat environment.

['The third significant danger is that adopting such policies, without any likely benefit, would ignite a fractious debate about whether and which U.S. nuclear systems are compatible with the new policy. What is worse, these debates would have no definitive answers and would simply lead to states like China and Russia, as well as domestic non-governmental groups, weighing in on the internal U.S. debate with their own preferred U.S. force posture changes, all without being able to appeal to a common standard. For example, if the United States adopted a nuclear no first use policy, should U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles be eliminated because they could potentially very effectively be employed first due to their shorter flight times and multiple warhead capability? Or does their value as near-invulnerable second-strike options outweigh the potential for first use? Just how many reductions and to which U.S. nuclear systems will the United States need to undertake before it believes opponents should find it credible? What if opponents say they require more U.S. nuclear reductions before they find it credible? Their suggestions in this regard will be as plentiful as they are self-serving.', 'Ultimately, U.S. officials would necessarily have to create an entirely new set of policy justifications for why each U.S. nuclear weapon system does or does not conform to the new policy, and then reconcile those answers with whether those same systems in states like China indicate the Chinese nuclear no first use policy is credible. U.S. officials would, for instance, likely confront the argument that retaining large numbers of ICBMs is incompatible with a policy of nuclear no first use, an argument likely to be made by proponents who have yet to call into question China’s commitment to its policy of nuclear no first use despite to its large increases in deployed ICBMs. To be clear, the presence of debate on the topic is not a negative per se, only when that debate becomes interminable because there is no common standard about what constitutes a weapon that could be “used first.” An unmoored debate about U.S. 117 Occasional Paper nuclear declaratory policy would both please potential adversaries and concern allies and partners, all with the potential of allowing domestic disarmament-focused groups the policy justification to advocate for U.S. nuclear reductions that were, and still are, inadvisable due to the increasingly challenging threat environment. ']

[(11, 21)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Shirley-Round-5.docx

Emory

KeRa

69d4be3a542debf48b7dd9fe6910dd428bafce8877aff21d9a2a3742f63da675

Decline would shred MAD and cause nuclear war.

Tonnesson 15—(research professor at Peace Research Institute Oslo, leader of East Asia Peace program at Uppsala University). Stein Tonnesson. 2015. “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2015.

If leaders anticipate decline they blame external dependence contemplate use of force to gain cred and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms shift could happen abruptly The greatest risk is changes in the world economy nuclear deterrence could lose cred great powers might gamble the other yield

recent works have made contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict decisions for war are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations If leaders begin to seriously anticipate their own nation’s decline they blame external dependence , appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain cred ibility, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities . Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly in East Asia The greatest risk is not but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon , and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its cred ibility : one of great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional war

negative trade expectations military conflict anticipate decline refuse to be deterred nuclear arms abruptly greatest risk changes in the world economy nuclear deterrence only factor Armageddon lose its cred gamble the other yield

['', 'Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene. ', '', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 1), (1, 2), (2, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Wyoming-Round2.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Wyoming-Round2.docx

ad895457d0ee0e1a80596bb46da6a46cbefe5293c6ce9bc09a47ffc9a4e3dee9

Korean prolif cascades regionally and escalates hotspots—comparatively outweighs any benefits of acquisition.

Chung-in 23 (*Moon Chung-in: Professor Emeritus, Yonsei University; Chairman, Sejong Institute; Former special advisor for unification, diplomacy, and national security affairs for Moon Jae-in; Vice Chairman and Executive Director, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; Chairman, Korea Peace Forum, 2-27-2023, "Nuclear armament is a lose-lose-lose for South Korea," Hankyoreh, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1081423.html)

the path toward acquiring nuc s could have paradoxical results jeopardizing Korea’s survival would set off a nuclear arms race on increase likelihood of nuclear war because of miscalc provoke buildup and countermoves in China and Russia heightening tensions Japan made its own move would center the domino effect in Asia. could rupture alliance with the US . the US would not oppose a misunderstanding . Nonprolif advocates have more sway than supporters of the alliance armament culminating in nightmare scenario

The primary rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons is national security . But the path toward acquiring nuc lear weapon s could have paradoxical results , not only jeopardizing Korea’s survival but also severely damaging its prestige The case for acquiring nuclear weapons is based on the argument the US’ extended deterrence is not reliable But we have more to lose than to gain from such a choice. South Korean nuclear armament would set off a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula but also increase the likelihood of a nuclear war occurring because of a misunderstanding, miscalc ulation or mistake . would provoke a nuclear buildup and countermoves in China and Russia n Far East, heightening military tensions If Japan made its own move to counter South Korea, it would place the Peninsula at the center of the domino effect in Northeast Asia. The greatest risk is it could lead to a rupture in South Korea’s alliance with the US . Advocates of South Korean nuclear armament argue the US would not strongly oppose such a program because it would have the effect of countering China , but that’s a serious misunderstanding . Nonprolif eration advocates have more sway in Washington than supporters of the South Korea-US alliance , and few the naïve expectation South Korea’s nuclear armament would strengthen its alliance is a fantasy . Nuclear armament would lead to a rift in the alliance and deterioration of the Northeast Asia security environment, culminating in a nightmare security scenario

national security paradoxical results prestige more to lose than gain nuclear arms race increase misunderstanding, miscalc or mistake military tensions Japan center domino effect rupture alliance US not oppose China serious misunderstanding more sway fantasy nightmare security scenario

['', 'The primary rationale given for acquiring nuclear weapons is national security. The goals of national security are ensuring the survival of the state, the prosperity of the country, and the prestige of the nation.', 'But the path toward acquiring nuclear weapons could have paradoxical results, not only jeopardizing Korea’s survival and endangering its prosperity but also severely damaging its prestige in the international community. Let’s examine those prospects one by one.', 'The case for acquiring nuclear weapons is based on the argument that the US’ extended deterrence is not reliable and that South Korea should counter North Korea’s nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons of its own. But we have more to lose than to gain from such a choice.', 'South Korean nuclear armament would not only set off a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula if the North then expands its own nuclear arsenal but also increase the likelihood of a nuclear war occurring because of a misunderstanding, miscalculation or mistake.', 'It would also provoke a nuclear buildup and other countermoves in China and the Russian Far East, further heightening military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. If Japan made its own move to acquire nuclear weapons to counter South Korea, it would place the Korean Peninsula at the center of the nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia.', 'The greatest risk of a South Korean nuclear program is that it could lead to a rupture in South Korea’s alliance with the US. Advocates of South Korean nuclear armament argue that the US would not strongly oppose such a program because it would have the effect of countering China, but that’s a serious misunderstanding.', 'Nonproliferation advocates have much more sway in Washington than supporters of the South Korea-US alliance, and very few believe that a nuclear-armed South Korea would be as pliable with the US as it has been in the past.', 'Therefore, the naïve expectation that South Korea’s nuclear armament would strengthen its alliance with the US is essentially a fantasy. Nuclear armament would lead to a rift in the South Korea-US alliance and the deterioration of the Northeast Asia security environment, culminating in a nightmare security scenario for us.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PrWe-Neg-6--Navy-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

PrWe

adc2a824559feb6a736bec39a216f6037559170084d67f618887f0c83409dbdf

Collaborative governance solves compounding societal shocks by legitimizing flexible solutions—otherwise cyberattacks, pandemics, and genetic engineering cause extinction.

Brunnermeier 21 – (Markus Brunnermeier, Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Economics & Director of the Bendheim Center for Finance @ Princeton University; 2021, Endeavor Literary Press, "The Resilient Society," doa: 3-10-2022) ISBN: 9781737403609

humanity will face shocks it is crucial to be resilient could lead to tipping points Cyberattacks could hinder infrastructure , create chaos , and cause death The threat is real . a ransomware attack shut down half the East Coast’s fuel AI will take over might challenge the supremacy of the human genetic bioengineering might cause unpredictable dangers . at the global level some countries with lower standards —will move ahead regardless of concerns. Thus, to develop a resilient way of moving forward, the status-quo is not an option . genetically designed weapons pose prolif challenges individuals might destroy civilization with DIY biohacking Covid seems benign pandemics become more common as the population grows shocks can fuel others . we could be knocked out For example, climate change lead to mosquitos which facilitate pandemics to make sure shocks do not knock us out We need the ability to get back up . The social contract’s implementation relies on the interplay of government , markets , and norms . Covid revealed substantial fractures in social contracts and their implementations . a resilient social contract must leave space for dissenters . They create unexpected solutions to unexpected shocks . Institutions need to remain flexible to adapt to new challenges . Resilience requires flexible responses and open minds to come up with solutions More thoughts , innovation , and flexible adaptation are needed

For all that humanity has achieved and will achieve in the future, we will unavoidably face numerous shocks . Some shocks will be “ unknown unknowns .” Because we cannot avoid shocks as the world evolves, it is crucial for societies to be resilient Resilience can act as a reliable compass In addition to pandemics , other recent developments could lead to unanticipated shocks . They offer great potential and also significant risks . They might lead us closer to dangerous tipping points Cyberattacks could [ hinder ] critical infrastructure , create chaos , and cause death . redundancies could be critical to counteract ransomware cyberattacks . The threat is very real . a ransomware attack forced the US to shut down the Colonial Pipeline , which supplies almost half of the East Coast’s fuel . AI will take over many decisions potentially limiting our freedom to decide. AI might challenge the supremacy of the human mind when we cross singularity . We are also entering a new world of genetic and bioengineering . Right now, a shortage of organs for transplants leads to the deaths of many people. In the future, we will be able to create new organs in the lab or even in a tube. is will eliminate terrible suffering from patients who must wait years before an organ donor emerges. It might eventually be possible to create superhumans who each specialize in various abilities. However, these developments might cause unpredictable dangers . Importantly, these developments are unstoppable at the global level because some countries —possibly those with lower standards —will move ahead regardless of ethical concerns. Thus, to develop a resilient way of moving forward, remaining in the status-quo is not an option . genetically designed weapons pose greater non prolif eration challenges than our current atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons. individuals in the future might be able to destroy civilization with DIY biohacking tools. Covid seems almost benign compared to the challenges associated with these developments. pandemics might become more common in the future as the world’s population grows shocks do not occur alone . One crisis can fuel others . If we are battling a shock and another one hits us from a di ff erent angle , we could be knocked out . One risk can create more risks For example, climate change might lead to more mosquitos , which in turn might facilitate the spread of more illnesses and pandemics Nothing and no one can perfectly protect us from their associated shocks. it is crucial to make sure that possible shocks do not knock us out We need to retain the ability to get back up after taking heavy blows . The “we” should be broadly interpreted . It refers to each individual , to each layer of society , to institutions , and to the entire global society . The social contract’s successful implementation relies on the interplay of the government , markets , and social norms . The Covid -19 crisis has revealed substantial fractures in our societies and major deficiencies in our social contracts and their implementations . a resilient social contract must leave space for mavericks and dissenters . They are the ones who might create unexpected solutions to unexpected shocks . institutions should be resilient on their own they provide the soil in which individuals and families can sink roots . Institutions need to remain flexible enough to adapt to the new challenges of our times . We cannot bury our heads in the sand like an ostrich , and we cannot stay locked in the status quo . Resilience requires flexible responses , extra buffers, and open minds to come up with solutions that allow us to rebound after setbacks. More thoughts , innovation , and flexible adaptation are needed as the future unfolds. All of our minds are needed to build a resilient society

numerous shocks unknown unknowns cannot avoid shocks resilient reliable compass pandemics unanticipated shocks significant risks dangerous tipping points Cyberattacks chaos death redundancies counteract ransomware cyberattacks real ransomware attack shut down the Colonial Pipeline AI take over limiting our freedom challenge the supremacy of the human cross singularity genetic and bioengineering superhumans unpredictable dangers some countries lower standards regardless resilient way not an option genetically designed weapons prolif destroy civilization benign pandemics more common population grows occur alone fuel others knocked out create more risks climate change illnesses pandemics shocks do not knock us out retain the ability get back up broadly interpreted individual layer of society institutions entire global society social contract’s interplay government markets social norms substantial fractures social contracts and their implementations must leave space for mavericks and dissenters unexpected solutions unexpected shocks on their own soil individuals families sink roots flexible new challenges bury our heads ostrich cannot stay locked in the status quo flexible responses open minds More thoughts innovation flexible adaptation All of our minds resilient society

['', 'Conclusion and Outlook', 'For all that humanity has achieved and will achieve in the future, we will unavoidably face numerous shocks. Some shocks can be predicted and understood in advance. Others will be “unknown unknowns.” Because we cannot avoid shocks as the world evolves, it is crucial for societies to be resilient— to be able to bounce back. Resilience, if we stay focused on it, can act as a reliable compass that guides individuals and societies forward through the unknown.', 'In addition to pandemics, other recent developments could lead to unanticipated shocks. Each of these developments is speculative, so take this discussion with a grain of salt. They offer great potential and also significant risks. They might lead us closer to dangerous tipping points, but at this stage we cannot be sure where those tipping points are or what they might entail. A big question is: How should we maintain resilience?', 'Cyberattacks could paralyze [hinder] critical infrastructure, create chaos, and cause death. Do we need laws that ensure resilience by enforcing requirements to build redundant backup data facilities? Such redundancies could be critical to counteract ransomware cyberattacks. The threat is very real. On May 8, 2021, a ransomware attack forced the US to shut down the Colonial Pipeline, which supplies almost half of the East Coast’s fuel. 422', 'Articial intelligence (AI) will take over many decisions, possibly helping us to make some difficult choices but potentially limiting our freedom to decide. More importantly, AI might challenge the supremacy of the human mind when we cross singularity. Singularity occurs when technological progress becomes uncontrollable, perhaps due to a highly advanced form of artificial intelligence.', 'Perhaps we humans can keep up with AI by merging our brains with computer power. Instead of holding a smartphone, we could see chips placed directly in the brain. Such a brain chip could enable one individual to communicate directly to another person through each person’s brain chip. is would simply be a continuation of technology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that used machines to extend our muscle power. The next natural step is new technologies that extend brain power. Companies like Synchron and Elon Musk’s Neuralink work on chip implants for the brain.', 'Similarly, brain doping can boost cognitive capacity. In a competitive environment, written exams are often required to gain admission to top universities. Taking performance-enhancing medications might provide students with an edge over their peers, similar to doping in professional sports. Of course, these developments would not be without risks and unpredictable externalities. Many new ethical questions will emerge.', 'For example, if someone has a brain chip, is he or the chip responsible for his actions? What if the brain chip can be hacked? Would a digital backup of a person’s individuality and a reboot button provide resilience? How do we protect privacy and individual personality?', 'We are also entering a new world of genetic and bioengineering. 423 Right now, a shortage of organs for transplants leads to the deaths of many people. In the future, we will be able to create new organs in the lab or even in a tube. is will eliminate terrible suffering from patients who must wait years before an organ donor emerges. These advances could also enable us to replace weak (or old) parts of the body with “perfect” new and possibly more powerful organs. It might eventually be possible to create superhumans who each specialize in various abilities. However, these developments might cause unpredictable dangers. We need ethical safety buers that preserve our ability to recover if something goes wrong. Importantly, these developments are unstoppable at the global level because some countries—possibly those with lower standards—will move ahead regardless of ethical concerns. Thus, to develop a resilient way of moving forward, remaining in the status-quo is not an option.', 'Then there is the question of genetically designed weapons, which might pose greater nonproliferation challenges than our current atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons. Atomic weapons, for example, cannot be engineered by a solitary individual. However, Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom worries that individuals in the future might be able to destroy civilization with DIY biohacking tools. There will be no bounce back if such a threat materializes. 424', 'The Covid-19 crisis seems almost benign compared to the challenges associated with these developments. Nevertheless, pandemics might become more common in the future as the world’s population grows.', 'Furthermore, shocks often do not occur alone. One crisis can fuel others. If we are battling a shock and another one hits us from a different angle, we could be knocked out. One risk can create more risks. For example, climate change might lead to more mosquitos, which in turn might facilitate the spread of more illnesses and pandemics.', 'These developments will occur in one form or other. Nothing and no one can perfectly protect us from their associated shocks. For this reason, it is crucial to make sure that possible shocks do not knock us out. We need to retain the ability to get back up after taking heavy blows. We need safety buffers, redundancies, and protected areas that we can fall back on.', 'The “we” should be broadly interpreted. It refers to each individual, to each layer of society, to institutions, and to the entire global society. Individual resilience is important for each person and family. There are many psychology books that oer suggestions for how individuals can become more resilient when facing possibly life-altering challenges.', 'Equally important is societal resilience. The glue that holds society together is its social contract. There are two rationales for the social contract. The first reason is to limit externalities that individuals might impose on each other, including those that destroy resilience. The second reason is to provide at least partial insurance against shocks.', 'The social contract’s successful implementation relies on the interplay of the government, markets, and social norms. The Covid-19 crisis has revealed substantial fractures in our societies and major deficiencies in our social contracts and their implementations. Unfairness, inequality, and racial disparity strain the social contract and undermine its resilience. Critically, a resilient social contract must leave space for mavericks and dissenters. They are the ones who might create unexpected solutions to unexpected shocks. Trust in scientific and rational reasoning, and a culture of open communication to advance and react to shocks, will strengthen the resilience of a society. is occurred when scientic breakthroughs developed vaccines in response to the Covid-19 shock.', 'The social contract also encompasses institutions. Many of them govern and impact the interactions of millions of people. They are important for balancing exante and ex-post resilience, as discussed in this book. Importantly, these institutions should be resilient on their own, in part because they provide the soil in which individuals and families can sink roots. Institutions need to remain flexible enough to adapt to the new challenges of our times.', 'Finally, the Covid-19 crisis has made it blatantly clear that we do not live only in our local neighborhoods (be it physical or virtual). We also live in a global society. Therefore, our global order needs to adjust so that all humans and nature can rebound from shocks. For example, a global pandemic early-warning system could facilitate rapid containment of the next pandemic. Resilience is an important part of sustainability. To tackle climate change effectively, we need to stay far away from climate tipping points, which could propel society into adverse feedback loops. Innovation can provide us with sustained economic growth while reducing our carbon footprint.', 'Two solutions are illusory: We cannot bury our heads in the sand like an ostrich, and we cannot stay locked in the status quo. Resilience requires flexible responses, extra buffers, and open minds to come up with solutions that allow us to rebound after setbacks. More thoughts, innovation, and flexible adaptation are needed as the future unfolds. All of our minds are needed to build a resilient society.', '', '']

[(0, 15)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-12---NDT-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

894e6a2f95a99471a752af5c0c7523fb17b0288b633197500fbd811f8e160464

The CP does not abolish civil liability, it combines both liability and relief to augment safety incentives.

Emiliano Marchisio 21, professor, Law Department, “Giustino Fortunato” University, Benevento, Italy, “In support of “no-fault” civil liability rules for artificial intelligence,” SN Social Sciences volume 1, Article number: 54 (2021), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43545-020-00043-z

no-fault show shortcomings in safety incentives, in the absence of the deterrent brought by civil liability This is why the proposed “no-fault” system should not apply outside the scope defined : relief from liability in the absence of negligence and in compliance with scientifically validated standards . Out of this scope, “ no-fault ” would remove the deterrent civil liability produce. I argue no-fault should be combined with “ fault ” to take advantage of benefits each brings

“ no-fault ” legislation is show ing shortcomings in safety incentives, in the absence of the deterrent brought by civil liability The pure “no fault” models raise concerns about their appropriateness to limit the risk of moral hazard This is why the proposed “no-fault” system should not apply outside the scope defined above , namely : relief from liability in the absence of negligence , imprudence or unskillfulness and in compliance with scientifically validated standards . Out of this scope, “ no-fault ” rules would remove the deterrent effect that civil liability can produce. I argue “ no-fault ” should be combined with “ fault ” to take advantage of the benefits each brings , narrowing their flaws through their reciprocal interaction.

“ no-fault ” shortcomings deterrent pure “no fault” appropriateness moral hazard proposed “no-fault” system defined above namely relief from liability negligence scientifically validated standards no-fault rules deterrent effect “ no-fault ” fault benefits flaws reciprocal interaction.

['Third, “no-fault” legislation is currently showing shortcomings in terms of safety incentives, in the absence of the deterrent brought about by “traditional” civil liability.Footnote40 The pure “no fault” models, in fact, raise concerns about their appropriateness to limit the risk of moral hazard, exactly as it happens in New Zealand with respect to medical law, since “the principal weakness of no-fault schemes is the difficulty of ensuring that the socially optimal amount of care is taken by potential loss-causers, as the links between their potential to cause loss and the costs of their actions are severed” (Howell et al. 2002).', 'This is why the proposed “no-fault” system should not apply outside the scope defined above, namely: relief from liability in the absence of negligence, imprudence or unskillfulnessFootnote41and in compliance with scientifically validated standards. Out of this scope, “no-fault” rules would unreasonably remove the deterrent effect that civil liability can still produce. I argue that “no-fault” rules should be combined with “fault” rules in order to take advantage of the benefits each of them brings, narrowing their flaws through their reciprocal interaction.']

[(9, 21)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Triples.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

c50def7c02e0494ff42f40aa68a55b79248eadadcd05f6d1da1b398fabd75d42

The ‘core laws’ of antitrust are the big 3

Kendall Kuntz 21, J.D. Candidate at The University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, “Can the Courts and New Antitrust Laws Break Up Big Tech?,” 2/23/21, https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Business-Law/JBTLOnline/Break-Up-Big-Tech/

There are three core antitrust laws Sherman Clayton and F T C A

There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act , the Clayton Act , and the F T C A These three attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers

three core antitrust laws Sherman Act Clayton Act F T C A

['There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These three antitrust laws attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers. The Sherman Act outlaws monopolies and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. Lastly, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Antitrust laws are not established to punish success, but are focused on preventing anticompetitive effects, exclusionary practices, reduced consumer choice, and hindered innovation.']

[(8, 16)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-NDT%20Districts-Round2.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-NDT%2520Districts-Round2.docx

66084668145a89c736b91a9dfcb1bf81888ed6a46eb88ddd2394d2fedc908b7e

Negative messaging outweighs positive messaging.

Kent Weaver 13. Professor at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, “Policy Leadership and the Blame Trap: Seven Strategies for Avoiding Policy Stalemate”, March 2013 http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/03/29-policy-leadership-blame-weaver

Negative messages increasingly dominate politics dominated by negative messaging tends to result in stalemate people pay more attention to negative info and are more sensitive to losses than gains

Negative messages about political opponents increasingly dominate the policymaking process politics dominated by negative messaging tends to result in policy stalemate Negative messaging is attractive to politicians because people tend to pay more attention to negative info rmation than positive information, and they are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains Political polarization, competitive, nationalized elections, increased fiscal stress and changes in campaign law and practice have all exacerbated pressures to engage in negative messaging

pay more attention to negative info rmation are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains

['Negative messages about political opponents increasingly dominate not just election campaigns in the United States, but the policymaking process as well. And politics dominated by negative messaging (also known as blame-generating) tends to result in policy stalemate. Negative messaging is attractive to politicians because people tend to pay more attention to negative information than positive information, and they are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains. Political polarization, competitive, nationalized elections, increased fiscal stress and changes in campaign law and practice have all exacerbated pressures to engage in negative messaging in recent years. There are a number of strategies that allow politicians to maneuver around the “blame trap” and avoid policy deadlock in some circumstances, including passing the buck to non-elected bodies and putting in place triggering mechanisms that generate politically unpopular policy changes in the future. All of these strategies have limitations and disadvantages, however, so both blame-generating politics and policy stalemate are likely to be the “new normal” in American politics in the near future.', '']

[(5, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-4---Wake-Forest-Round-4.docx

Emory

MiPi

2d4f5ef59edf36221b790a80b147bfddc50b62a9e88a77de016b34247550bf2e

**Futurism isn’t colonial – it can be used as a means to depart from settler arrangements

Powell 10 (Dana E, Assistant Professor of Anthropology @Appalacian State University, “LANDSCAPES OF POWER: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE NAVAJO NATION”, dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010m , ID)

Tracing the effects made real through discourse possibility of future changes has embodied effects and consequences in the present this is a story about how futures are being forged through technologies politics of possibility works now to cultivate ways of being, knowing, and doing futuremaking anchored in visions of how one imagines the world and then build that world

Tracing the contours and effects of something not yet materialized yet made real through discourse the very possibility of future changes in the built environment has embodied effects and consequences in the present this is a story about how futures are being forged technically, culturally, politically, subjectively, and ethically through specific proposed technologies my intent is to bring the materiality of future-making to the fore by tracing how a specific, proposed energy technology mediates and produces these debates. Driving these contestations are hopes for futures that are different than the present politics of possibility works in “the here and now to craft and cultivate different ways of being, knowing, and doing what is being worked out is not considered to be finished or settled the very techniques of futuremaking are experimental and processual anchored in visions of how one imagines the world and then goes about build ing that world

['', 'Tracing the contours and effects of something not yet materialized yet made real through practice and discourse, the dissertation illustrates how the very possibility of future changes in the built environment has embodied effects and cultural political consequences for people in the present. As an ethnography of energy, this is a story about how futures are being forged in the present – technically, culturally, politically, subjectively, and ethically – through specific, proposed technologies. While others have brought ethnography to bear on practices of future-making as a site of socio-cultural contestation, my intent is to bring the materiality of future-making to the fore by tracing how a specific, proposed energy technology mediates and produces these debates. Driving these contestations are hopes for futures that are different than, and better than, the present – such is the work of a diverse range of social movements considered in this project. This “politics of possibility,” to borrow the lexicon of feminist geographers JK Gibson-Graham, works in “the here and now,” to craft and cultivate different ways of being, knowing, and doing. They elaborate: “Cultivating ourselves as thinking subjects within a politics of (economic) possibility has involved us with techniques of ontological reframing (to produce the ground of possibility), rereading (to uncover or excavate the possible), and creativity (to generate actual possibilities where none formerly existed)” (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxix-xxx). Gibson-Graham’s project is to advance what they call a “politics of possibility” – a new social theory of power, an approach that is Foucaultian and phenomenological in its foundations, but also draws heavily on queer theory and social movements studies. Their methodology includes discursive analysis, media analysis, phenomenological, 49 archival/historical, and action research focus groups. It is also actively reflexive, in the sense that part of their aim is to transform their own practices and mode of engagement as researchers, “to cultivate ourselves as theorists of possibility” (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxviii). I draw upon Gibson-Graham’s identified techniques of enacting a politics of possibility to inform a framework of emergence, in that what is being worked out is not considered to be finished, fixed, or settled; on the contrary, the very techniques of futuremaking (enacting the possible) are experimental and processual, anchored in visions of how one imagines the world out there to be and then goes about building that world, brick by brick. My emphasis on the material culture of these processes – the artifacts of the built environment such as coal fired power plants, wind turbines, or solar panels – draws attention to the ways in which such a politics of possibility is brought into being not only through the work done on subjects and places (as Gibson-Graham stress), but through the material world itself. One goal of this dissertation is to contribute an emphasis on materiality to discussions of political possibilities and the way such politics are enacted through contentious, emergent phenomena.']

[(0, 8), (8, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-WeHa-Aff-1--Indiana-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

WeHa

d73621252087342d00e9c411ac800fe1e9f9e46247021cb9e83d249490c18059

The 1AC centers history on the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic model of history essentializes blackness and universalizes a euro-modern cartography.

Zeleza 10 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza is the dean of the Bellarmine College of Liberal Arts and Presidential Professor of African American Studies and History at Loyola Marymount University. He served as the director of the Center for African Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and was the Liberal Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor and head of the Department of African American Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago. African Diasporas: Toward a Global History https://muse.jhu.edu/article/384918

The Atlantic model is problematic applied to other regions because it is premised on a conception of " Africa" in Euroamerica that scholars have sought to deconstruct the Atlantic model remains trapped in Eurocentric cartographic conceptions of Africa conflation of Africa diaspora with Atlantic slavery disregards the histories of other diasporas it fails to problematize the Spanish and Portuguese who began the conquest of the Americas. Among them were peoples of African descent mobilities, experiences, identities, and dialogues of these diasporas differ and intersect the identities of Afro-Atlantic diaporas are not frozen ; they have continually been reshaped by changing economic, social, cultural, and political contexts , The Afro-Atlantic model is clearly inadequate terms of slavery include "blacks" but are not confined to them

our conception of "African diasporas" crucially depends on how we define these very terms definitions have national and transnational contexts that frame them. hegemonic ideas ride on the hegemonies of material power . This is why the Afro-Atlantic and the African American models are dominant, but it is for the same reason that they should not be applied to other world regions unquestioningly The Atlantic model is problematic when applied to other world regions and periods in part because it is premised on a conception of " Africa" as "sub-Saharan Africa ," a racialized construct that haunted African studies in Euroamerica over the last century and that some African scholars have desperately sought to deconstruct . This reflects the dominance in the Euro-American academy of the Atlantic model and of race Quite predictably, " black" is the paradigmatic trope the pivot around which discourses of "African" diaspora identities, subjectivities, transnationalisms, engagements, or dialogues are framed and debated This is quite evident in Manning's The African Diaspora which remains trapped in Eurocentric cartographic conceptions of Africa as sub-Saharan Africa and American preoccupations with the black diaspora. The others openly substitute "Africa" with "black." studies on "Black Europe" largely patterned on "Black America" and remain trapped in the racialized discourses and imaginaries of American studies The conflation of Africa n diaspora formations with the histories and geographies of Atlantic slavery disregards the histories of other African diasporas in the Americas it fails to problematize the identity of the very Iberians Spanish and Portuguese who began the conquest of the Americas. Among them were peoples of African descent Spanish identity only fully dis-Africanized itself following the country's inclusion in the European project In the view of Anouar Majid Al Andalus could be considered "essentially an African kingdom in Europe." in its universalizing ambitions, the Afro-Atlantic model easily yields to a Eurocentric conception of Africa in which Africa entails sub-Saharan Africa and African diasporas are exclusively "black," a paradigm that leads to a preoccupation with the formation of black racial identities among African diasporas . This model also ignores the formation of "new" African diasporas out of voluntary migrations since the abolition of slavery and especially since decolonization Over the last two decades, more African migrants have been arriving in the United States than during the Atlantic slave trade the mobilities, experiences, identities, and dialogues of these diasporas differ and intersect with those of the historic Afro-Atlantic diasporas in complex and contradictory ways The very spaces in which they find themselves are neither already fixed in the diaspora nor imported from Africa the identities of the historic Afro-Atlantic diaporas are not frozen ; they have continually been reconstructed and reshaped by changing economic, social, cultural, and political contexts , and through the dialogic and dialectical interplay of material and discursive processes, the shifting structures of power, and the agencies of resistance the U.S. experience and modes of racialization and identity formation are often generalized to the rest of the Americas, even though Afro-Latin America, which is more than twice as large as Afro-North America, has its own quite distinctive histories Gilroy's Black Atlantic which ignores both Africa and Afro-Latin America, exemplifies this Anglophone analytical conceit The Afro-Atlantic model is clearly inadequate when applied to the much older and more complicated histories of African interactions with, and diasporas in, Europe and Asia. I am struck by the amount of intellectual energy expended in trying to restrict the histories and to force the formation of African diasporas in these regions into the Atlantic model by seeing their movements primarily in terms of slavery Africa" and "Africans" of course include "blacks" but are not confined to them identities were not always framed by American-style regimes of racialization. Other social inscriptions and ideologies such as religion sometimes played a more salient role. Systematic studies of African diasporas in Europe and Asia are a recent phenomenon Some scholarship which seems to borrow uncritically from the Atlantic model, is clearly problematic. These works are often written by African American scholars who discovered their epistemic and existential blackness on American campuses and remained in the United States

how we define these very terms hegemonic ideas ride on the hegemonies of material power should not be applied to other world regions unquestioningly Africa" as "sub-Saharan Africa desperately sought to deconstruct black" is the paradigmatic trope debated trapped in Eurocentric cartographic conceptions of Africa as sub-Saharan Africa and American preoccupations with the black diaspora. substitute "Africa" with "black." American studies other African diasporas in the Americas Spanish Portuguese peoples of African descent exclusively "black," a paradigm preoccupation with the formation of black racial identities among African diasporas differ and intersect the identities of the historic Afro-Atlantic diaporas are not frozen reshaped by changing economic, social, cultural, and political contexts exemplifies this Anglophone analytical conceit clearly inadequate intellectual energy expended terms of slavery include "blacks" but are not confined to them American campuses remained in the United States

['This implies that our conception of "African diasporas" crucially depends on how we define these very terms, and these definitions in turn have national and transnational contexts that frame them. This is merely to stress the obvious point that hegemonic ideas ride on the hegemonies of material power. This is why the Afro-Atlantic and the African American models are dominant, but it is for the same reason that they should not be applied to other world regions unquestioningly, however accurately they capture and explain the historical experiences and struggles in the Afro-Atlantic world and the United States. Even internally, as we all know, these models are not cast in the iron grid of methodological and theoretical rigidity. But as is often the case with discursive exports, they acquire the conceits of suffocating homogeneity as they cross the Atlantic to foreign lands.', 'The Atlantic model is problematic when applied to other world regions and periods in part because it is premised on a conception of "Africa" as "sub-Saharan Africa," a racialized construct that haunted African studies [End Page 6] in Euroamerica over the last century and that some African scholars have desperately sought to deconstruct. This reflects the dominance in the Euro-American academy of the Atlantic model and of race in the fields of African studies in general and African diaspora studies in particular. Quite predictably, "black" is the paradigmatic trope in Afro-Atlantic diaspora studies, the pivot around which discourses of "African" diaspora identities, subjectivities, transnationalisms, engagements, or dialogues are framed and debated.', 'This is quite evident in several recent studies. Let me just mention three, all published in 2009. The first is Patrick Manning\'s The African Diaspora: A History Through Culture, which despite its global ambitions remains trapped in Eurocentric cartographic conceptions of Africa as sub-Saharan Africa and American preoccupations with the black diaspora. The others openly substitute "Africa" with "black." The two-volume Encyclopedia of Blacks in European History and Culture (Martone 2009) focuses on the historical experiences in Europe of peoples from sub-Saharan Africa except where an Afrocentric claim cannot be resisted and North Africa is sneaked in. In Black Europe and the African Diaspora by Hine at al., the mostly U.S.-based authors have great difficulty in explaining what they mean by "Black Europe," and their African diaspora in Europe excludes North Africans, who surely do have a claim to an African origin and identity as much as the descendants of diasporans from the Americas who have relocated to Europe or the offspring of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of studies on "Black Europe" that are largely patterned on "Black America" and remain trapped in the racialized discourses and imaginaries of American studies. Ironically, "Black Europe" has continued to be inscribed long after "Black Americans" have become African Americans.', 'The conflation of African diaspora formations with the histories and geographies of Atlantic slavery disregards the histories of other African diasporas in the Americas, both during the period of the slave trade and after. To begin with, it fails to problematize the identity of the very Iberians—the Spanish and Portuguese—who began the conquest of the Americas. Among them were peoples of African descent who had been resident in Iberia for centuries. On my trip to Spain this summer, an Afro-Spanish scholar and activist insisted that Spanish identity only fully dis-Africanized itself following the country\'s inclusion in the European project (Toasije 2009). The joke that Africa began at the Pyrenees articulates Spain\'s and Portugal\'s mixed historical heritage from the Moors (or, according to some, Muslims, Arabs, or Berbers—the designations are themselves quite revealing) who conquered and ruled large parts of the peninsula between 711 and 1492. In the view of Anouar Majid (2000:77), a Moroccan scholar, Al Andalus could be considered "essentially an African kingdom in Europe." Recent work on the migrations of the Moriscos, Ladinos, and even Cape Verdians to the Americas is pertinent in this regard (Garafalo forthcoming; Molina & López 2001). [End Page 7]', 'The findings on the free Afro-Iberian migrations to the Americas serve to qualify, but do not of course displace, the centrality of forced migrations from western Africa to the Americas. But in its universalizing ambitions, the Afro-Atlantic model easily yields to a Eurocentric conception of Africa in which Africa, Hegel\'s (1956:91) "Africa proper," entails sub-Saharan Africa and African diasporas are exclusively "black," a paradigm that leads to a preoccupation with the formation of black racial identities among African diasporas. This model also ignores the formation of "new" African diasporas out of voluntary migrations since the abolition of slavery and especially since decolonization.', 'Over the last two decades, more African migrants have been arriving in the United States than during the Atlantic slave trade. As shown in the recent capacious collection by Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu, The New African Diaspora (2009), the mobilities, experiences, identities, and dialogues of these diasporas differ and intersect with those of the historic Afro-Atlantic diasporas in complex and contradictory ways.6 The very existence of intercultural and intertextual diaspora spaces in which they find themselves ensures complex negotiations and performances of racial, national, ethnic, and gender identities that are neither already fixed in the diaspora nor imported from Africa. And of course we know the identities of the historic Afro-Atlantic diaporas are not frozen; they have continually been reconstructed and reshaped by changing economic, social, cultural, and political contexts, and through the dialogic and dialectical interplay of material and discursive processes, the shifting structures of power, and the agencies of resistance.', "But even for the historic Afro-Atlantic diasporas, some scholars object to the regionalization of the African American model in which the U.S. experience and modes of racialization and identity formation are often generalized to the rest of the Americas, even though Afro-Latin America, which is more than twice as large as Afro-North America, has its own quite distinctive histories. Paul Gilroy's influential Black Atlantic (1993), which ignores both Africa and Afro-Latin America, exemplifies this Anglophone analytical conceit. Let me hasten to add that in recent years many U.S. diaspora scholars have produced excellent comparative studies of Afro-Atlantic diaspora histories and anthropologies. The works by Sheila Walker (2001), George Andrews (2004), and Kevin Yelvington (2006) readily come to mind. ", 'Historical Mappings', 'The Afro-Atlantic model is clearly inadequate when applied to the much older and more complicated histories of African interactions with, and diasporas in, Europe and Asia. I am struck by the amount of intellectual energy expended in trying to restrict the histories of African movements to Europe and Asia, and to force the formation of African diasporas in these regions into the Atlantic model by seeing their movements primarily in [End Page 8] terms of slavery and sub-Saharan Africans. "Africa" and "Africans" of course include "blacks" but are not confined to them, and before the twentieth century some Africans went to Europe and Asia as enslaved people, but not all, perhaps not even the majority, and their identities were not always framed by American-style regimes of racialization. Other social inscriptions and ideologies such as religion sometimes played a more salient role.', 'Systematic studies of African diasporas in Europe and Asia are a recent phenomenon. Both are inspired by some of the same forces noted earlier. In the case of Europe, additional impetus has been provided by the increased African migrations over the last few decades and by European anxieties, which have manifested themselves both in the development of multiculturalism as public policy and in xenophobic violence. In Europe the definitional challenges are thrown into particularly sharp relief: do we talk of "black" or "African" diasporas, "Black Europe" or "Afro-Europe"? Some of the scholarship on "Black Europe," "Black Britain," "Black France," and so on, is illuminating, but much of it, which seems to borrow uncritically from the Atlantic model, is clearly problematic. These works are often written by African American scholars, specialists in African American studies, or Afro-European scholars who have discovered their epistemic and existential blackness on American campuses and remained in the United States; an example of the latter is Pap Ndiaye (2008), the Afro-French historian, whose celebrated La Condition Noire was inspired by his studies of African American history.7']

[(0, 9), (9, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-2.docx

Kansas

PaMa

b05189471b87b6fa10ddbac2c66b234918d01cd1e92356a08ec55ac2950a096a

Rural development reverses those trends.

Pipa 20—(Senior Fellow at Brookings). Anthony F. Pipa & Natalie Geismar. November 19, 2020. “President-elect Biden: Want to reduce polarization? Modernize federal rural policy”. . Accessed 6/15/21.

partisan divisions reflect economic outcomes. Counties that experienced the least growth provided Trump his largest gains and polarization rem ains pronounced. successful unity will require policy responses that give more diverse places the opportunity to thrive . This must include rural areas . federal policy can support development and build evenly distributed prosperity . COVID has further exposed rural vulnerabilities . compounded by decreasing health care

As Biden comes into office he will face a deeply divided electorate whose partisan divisions reflect stark differences in geographic economic outcomes. Counties that experienced the least job growth provided Trump with his largest gains and political polarization between metros and small towns rem ains pronounced. A successful unity agenda will require policy responses from his new administration that give more diverse places —as well as people— the opportunity to thrive . This must include rural areas . federal policy can support economic and community development in the rural U.S. and build America’s resilience through more evenly distributed prosperity . fallout from the COVID -19 pandemic threatens to further disrupt local economies . Employment in rural areas still had not reached pre-recession levels before COVID-19 hit, while employment in urban areas had more than fully rebounded . The current crisis has further exposed rural areas’ vulnerabilities . Rural residents are now 2.5 times more likely than urban residents to die from the virus. This is compounded by the decreasing access to health care that many rural communities face:

least job growth largest gains political polarization metros and small towns successful unity policy responses more diverse places thrive must include rural areas support economic and community development evenly distributed prosperity further disrupt local economies still had not reached pre-recession levels urban areas rural areas’ vulnerabilities 2.5 times more likely decreasing access to health care

['', 'As President-elect Joe Biden comes into office determined to unify the country, he will face a deeply divided electorate, one whose partisan divisions continue to reflect stark differences in geographic economic outcomes. Counties that experienced the least job growth over the last four years provided President Trump with his largest gains in 2020 from the 2016 election, and political polarization between the nation’s metros and small towns remains pronounced. A successful unity agenda will require policy responses from his new administration that give more diverse places—as well as people—the opportunity to thrive.', 'This must include rural areas. In a new policy brief, we make the case that improved and modernized federal policy can more effectively support economic and community development in the rural U.S., increase equity, and build America’s resilience through more evenly distributed prosperity.', 'The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic threatens to further disrupt local economies that in 2019 were still recovering from the Great Recession and adapting to 21st century shifts in the national and global economy, demographics, and climate. Employment and prime-age labor force participation in rural areas still had not reached pre-recession levels before COVID-19 hit, while employment in urban areas had more than fully rebounded and grown by 9 percent.', 'The current crisis has further exposed rural areas’ vulnerabilities. Just recently, COVID-19 prevalence in nonmetro U.S. areas surpassed those in metro areas for the first time; Rural residents are now almost 2.5 times more likely than urban residents to die from the virus. This is compounded by the decreasing access to health care that many rural communities face: Half of rural hospitals operated at a loss pre-pandemic, and 17 have already closed this year—just one off an all-time annual high set in 2019—maintaining the negative momentum that has shuttered 176 rural hospitals since 2005.', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-1-NUSO-Round2.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-1-NUSO-Round2.docx

da28b5714eeb338cdfd4cedce9fe06f2270748fb47fa8c24f02d628ca3e2442b

Smart grids solve extinction and systemic risk.

Weiss ’19 [Matthew; and Martin Weiss; American Jewish University; UCLA-Olive View Medical Center, “An Assessment of Threats to the American Power Grid,” Energy, Sustainability and Society, 9(1), p. 18]

prolonged collapse through starvation , disease , and societal collapse result in the death of the population vulnerable to solar activity EMP cyber and kinetic attack HV transformers loss of just 9 lead to cascading “coast-to coast blackout” If irreparably damaged replaced take 3 years a Carrington storm is inevitable There has been no hardening EMP blanket the continent Commission test SCADA every system failed detonation would collapse the entire grid megawatts would be dumped onto other transformers , causing them to overheat in cascading fashion many will die for the lack of basic elements to sustain life all tech require electricity Outbreaks result Lack of water cause death in days Food production would stop we would starve

a prolonged collapse of this nation’s electrical grid — through starvation , disease , and societal collapse —could result in the death of 90% of the population The power grid is vulnerable to geomagnetic storms solar activity EMP cyber attack, and kinetic attack HV transformers are the weak link and FERC has identified 30 as being The simultaneous loss of just 9 could lead to a cascading failure , resulting in a “coast-to coast blackout” If the transformers are irreparably damaged it is problematic whether they can be replaced . The great majority are custom built . The lead time between order and delivery is 24 months under benign, low demand conditions Ordered today , delivery of a unit from overseas would take 3 years The factory price for an HV transformer can be in excess of $10 million—too expensive to maintain an inventory solely as spares for emergency a Carrington -level extreme geomagnetic storm is inevitable in the future models and simulations puts the US population at risk at 40 million , with the outages lasting years the likelihood has been placed at 12% per decade There has been no hardening NERC’s position is that the threat is exaggerated the final draft was “written in secret by a small group of employees and utility insiders relied on meetings of industry employees in lieu of data collection or event investigation NERC standards against GMD do not include Carrington storm class levels A single nuclear blast will generate an EMP encompassing half the continental USA Two explosions would blanket the entire continent the EMP Commission funded test s, exposing SCADA components to both radiated electric fields and injected voltages on cables connected to the components every system tested failed when exposed to the simulated EMP environment a nuclear detonation 170 km over the USA would collapse the entire US power grid The vulnerability from a cyberattack is exponentially magnified by dependence on SCADAs Rid states viruses and malware cannot collapse the grid. “(The world has) never seen a cyber- attack kill a single human being The utility industry offers a similar perspective Others however express concern the cyber threat to critical US infrastructure is outpacing efforts to reduce vulnerabilities the U S lives in a glass house destroy nine interconnector substations and a transformer manufacturer and the entire U S grid would be down for 18 months megawatts of voltage would be dumped onto other transformers , causing them to overheat and in cascading fashion cause the entire system overload and fail Information on how to sabotage transformers has been available online Should significant parts of the electrical power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the consequences are likely to be catastrophic , and many people will die for the lack of basic elements to sustain life loss would render synthesis and distribution of oil and gas inoperative Telecom would collapse , as would banking . Virtually all tech infrastructure , and services require electricity . will collapse water infrastructure—the delivery and purification of water and the removal and treatment of wastewater and sewage Outbreaks would result Lack of water will cause death in days Food production would collapse food production of the country would simply stop we would miss the harvest , and starve the following winter” Even if all recommendations were implemented , there is no guarantee that the grid will not sustain prolonged collapse there will be no electricity for a very long time

electrical grid starvation disease societal collapse death 90% of the population geomagnetic storms solar EMP cyber kinetic HV weak link 30 being just 9 cascading failure “coast-to coast blackout” irreparably damaged problematic replaced great majority custom built order and delivery 24 months benign, low demand conditions today overseas 3 years inventory spares emergency geomagnetic storm inevitable models simulations 40 million years 12% per decade no hardening NERC’s exaggerated secret small group employees utility insiders industry employees not include nuclear blast EMP half the continental USA Two entire continent test SCADA every system tested failed collapse entire US power grid cyberattack exponentially magnified SCADAs Rid concern cyber threat outpacing efforts U S glass house nine interconnector substations transformer manufacturer entire U S grid 18 months megawatts dumped other transformers overheat cascading fashion entire system overload and fail sabotage available online consequences catastrophic many people will die basic elements oil and gas Telecom collapse banking all tech infrastructure services water Outbreaks Lack water death days Food simply stop harvest starve all recommendations were implemented no guarantee not sustain prolonged collapse very long time

['In testimony before a Congressional Committee, it has been asserted that a prolonged collapse of this nation’s electrical grid—through starvation, disease, and societal collapse—could result in the death of up to 90% of the American population [1].', 'There is no published model disclosing how these numbers were arrived at, nor are we able to validate a primary source for this claim. Testimony given by the Chairman of the Congressional EMP Commission, while expressing similar concerns, gave no estimate of the deaths that would accrue from a prolonged nationwide grid collapse [2].', 'The power grid is posited to be vulnerable to geomagnetic storms generated by solar activity, electromagnetic pulses (EMP, also referred to as HEMP) produced by high altitude nuclear detonations, cyberattack, and kinetic (physical) attack. Evidence for and against the validity of each of these threats follows below. Much of the knowledge on these matters is classified. The studies for and against EMP, other than for limited testing of a few components of the infrastructure by the EMP commission, are based not on physical demonstrations but mathematical models and simulations. Moreover, the underlying physics and technology involved—the electrical engineering and materials science—is likely beyond the understanding of the reader, and certainly beyond that of these writers. With these limitations in mind, we proceed.', 'The electrical grid', 'HV (high voltage) transformers—transmitting voltages of greater than 100\u2009kV—are what make it possible to send electricity over great distances to thousands of substations, where smaller transformers reduce the voltage.', 'HV transformers are the weak link in the system, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has identified 30 of these as being critical. The simultaneous loss of just 9, in various combinations, could cripple the network and lead to a cascading failure, resulting in a “coast-to coast blackout” [3].', 'If the HV transformers are irreparably damaged it is problematic whether they can be replaced. The great majority of these units are custom built. The lead time between order and delivery for a domestically manufactured HV transformer is between 12 and 24\u2009months [4], and this is under benign, low demand conditions.', 'The first practical application of the transformer was invented in the USA by William Stanley, but largely as a consequence of American trade policy (“It doesn’t make any difference whether a country makes potato chips or computer chips”- attributed to Michael Boskin, Chairman of President George H W Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors) [5] there is little manufacturing capability remaining in the USA. Worldwide production is less than 100 per year and serves the rapidly growing markets of China and India. Only Germany and South Korea produce for export.', 'Ordered today, delivery of a unit from overseas (responsible for 85% of current American purchasing) would take nearly 3\u2009years [6]. The factory price for an HV transformer can be in excess of $10 million—too expensive to maintain an inventory solely as spares for emergency replacement.', 'Potential mechanisms of collapse', 'Geomagnetic storms', 'Geomagnetic storms are due to coronal mass ejections (CMEs)—massive eruptions of plasma expelled from the sun’s corona. Plasma is the fourth fundamental state of matter, consisting of free electrons and positively charged ions. The sun, like all stars, is plasma.', 'Coronal mass ejections often occur with solar flares, but each can also take place in the absence of the other. The latter emits radiation in all bands of the electromagnetic spectrum (e.g., white light, ultraviolet light, X-rays, and gamma rays) and unlike CMEs, affect little more than radio communications.', 'CME’s take several days to reach the Earth. The radiation generated by solar flares on the other hand arrives in 8\u2009min.', 'Coronal mass ejections carry an intense magnetic field. If a storm enters the earth’s magnetosphere, it causes rapid changes in the configuration of the earth’s magnetic field. Electric current is generated in the magnetosphere and ionosphere, generating electromagnetic fields at ground level. The movement of magnetic fields around a conductor, i.e., a wire or pipe, induces an electric current. The longer the wire, the greater the amplification. The current induced is akin to DC (direct current), which the electrical system poorly tolerates. Our grid is based on AC. The excess current can cause voltage collapse, or worse, cause permanent damage to large transformers.', 'The current flowing through HV transformers during a geomagnetic disturbance can be estimated using storm simulation and transmission grid data [7]. From these results, transformer vulnerability to internal heating can be assessed.', 'The largest recorded geomagnetic storm occurred Sept 1–2, 1859—the Carrington event, named after the English amateur astronomer, Richard Carrington. Auroras were seen as far south as the Caribbean. Campers in the Rocky Mountains were awakened shortly after midnight by “an auroral light so bright that one could easily read common print. Some of the party insisted it was daylight and began preparation for breakfast” [8]. Telegraph wires transmitted electric shocks to operators and ignited fires.', 'In May 1921, there was another great geomagnetic disturbance (GMD), the railroad storm. The National Academy of Sciences estimates that if that storm occurred today, it could cause 1–2 trillion dollars damage and full recovery could take 4–10\u2009years [9].', 'The basis for this assertion is a presentation made by J Kappenman of Metatech, the Goleta California engineering consulting firm, given as part of the NAS Space weather workshop titled “Future Solutions, Vulnerabilities and Risks”, on May 23, 2008. The simulation asserts that a 1921 intensity storm could damage or destroy over 300 transformers in the US, and leave 130 million people without power [10]. Elsewhere, Kappenman states that in a worst case situation, geomagnetic disturbances could instantly create loss of over 70% of the nation’s electrical service [11].', 'In March 1989, a geomagnetic storm caused collapse of the power grid in Quebec, leaving 6 million without power for 9\u2009h. NERC (the North American Electric Reliability Council), a self-regulated trade organization formed by the electric utility industry, asserts that the blackout was not due to overheating of transformers from geomagnetically induced current, but to the near-simultaneous tripping of seven relays, and this is correct [12]. The rapid voltage collapse (within 93\u2009s) likely prevented transformer thermal damage. The same storm, however, destroyed a major transformer at the Salem nuclear plant in New Jersey [13]. The 1989 Hydro-Quebec storm was 1/10th the intensity of the 1921 Railroad Storm [14].', 'A report for Lloyd’s in 2013 states a Carrington-level extreme geomagnetic storm is almost inevitable in the future. Using its own models and simulations, it puts the US population at risk at between 20 and 40 million, with the outages lasting up to 1–2\u2009years [15].', 'Because of geography and ground conductivity, the risk of a transformer sustaining damage is 1000 times greater in some US counties than in others. The highest risk is to the counties along the corridor between Washington DC and New York [16].', 'The first written account of a solar storm is possibly in the book of Joshua. Written reports of aural sightings by Greeks and Romans begin in 371\u2009BC.', 'A Carrington-level storm narrowly missed the earth in 2012 [17]. NASA has produced a video on the CME [18]. Formerly considered a 1 in 100-year event, the likelihood of a Carrington intensity storm striking the earth has most recently been placed at 12% per decade [19].', 'Mitigation', 'The EMP Commission, in its 2008 report, found that it is not practical to try to protect the entire electrical power system or even all high-value components. It called however for a plan designed to reduce recovery and restoration times and minimize the net impact of an event [20]. This would be accomplished by “hardening” the grid, i.e., actions to protect the nation’s electrical system from disruption and collapse, either natural or man-made [21]. The shielding is accomplished through surge arrestors and similar devices [22]. The cost to harden the grid, from our tabulation of Congressional EMP figures, is $3.8 billion.', 'There has been no hardening of the grid', 'The commission and organization that are responsible for public policy on grid protection are FERC and NERC. FERC (The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) is an independent agency within the Department of Energy. NERC, the self-regulatory agency formed by the electric utility industry, was renamed the North American Electric Reliability Corporation in 2006.', 'In June of 2007, FERC granted NERC the legal authority to enforce reliability standards for the bulk power system in the USA. FERC cannot mandate any standards. FERC only has the authority to ask NERC to propose standards for protecting the grid.', 'NERC’s position on GMD is that the threat is exaggerated.', 'A report by NERC in 2012 asserts that geomagnetic storms will not cause widespread destruction of transformers, but only a short-term (temporary) grid instability [23]. The NERC report did not use a model that was validated against past storms, and their work was not peer-reviewed.', 'The NERC report has been criticized by members of the Congressional EMP commission. Dr. Peter Pry asserts that the final draft was “written in secret by a small group of NERC employees and electric utility insiders….. The report relied on meetings of industry employees in lieu of data collection or event investigation” [22].', 'NERC, in turn, criticizes Kappenman’s work. NERC states that the Metatech work cannot be independently confirmed [24]. NERC reliability manager Mark Lauby criticized the report for being based on proprietary code [24]. Kappenman’s report, however, received no negative comments in peer review [24].', 'The NERC standards', 'The reliability standards and operational procedures established by NERC, and approved by FERC, are disputed [25]. Among the points are these:', '1. The standards against GMD do not include Carrington storm class levels. The NERC standards were arrived at studying only the storms of the immediate prior 30\u2009years, the largest of which was the Quebec storm. The GMD “benchmark event”, i.e., the strongest storm which the system is expected to withstand, is set by NERC as 8\u2009V/km [26]. NERC asserts this figure defines the upper limit intensity of a 1 in 100-year storm [26]. The Los Alamos National Laboratory, however, puts the intensity of a Carrington-type event at a median of 13.6\u2009V/km, ranging up to 16.6\u2009V/km [27]. Another analysis finds the intensity of a 100-year storm could be higher than 21\u2009V/km [28].', '2. The 15–45 min warning time of a geomagnetic storm provided by space satellites (ACE and DSCOVR) will be insufficient for operators to confer, coordinate, and execute actions to prevent grid damage and collapse.', 'Testimony of Edison Electric Institute official Scott Aaronson under questioning by Senator Ron Johnson in a hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in 2016 encapsulates some of the issues. Video of the exchange is available on the web [29]. The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) is the trade association that represents all US investor-owned electric companies.', 'Johnson: Mr. Aaronson, I just have to ask you – the protocol of warning 15–30\u2009min – who is going to make that call? I mean, who is going to make that for a massive geomagnetic disturbance, that nobody knows how many of these transformers are going to be affected. Who is going to make that call to shut them off line – to take them off line – so those effects do not go through those wires and destroy those large transformers that cannot be replaced?', 'Aaronson: So, the grid operators are tightly aligned. We talked about the fact that there are 1900 entities that make up the bulk electric system. There are transmission operators and so on…', 'Johnson (interrupting): Who makes the call? Who makes the call – we are going to shut them all down in 30\u2009min, in 15\u2009min?', 'Aaronson: It’s not as simple as cutting the power. That’s not how this is going to work but there is again, there is this shared responsibility among the sector.', 'Johnson: Who makes the call?', 'Aaronson: I do not know the answer to that question [29].', 'Mr. Aaronson’s is Managing Director for Cyber and Infrastructure Security at EEI.', 'Congressman Trent Franks, R Az introduced HR 2417, the SHEILD Act, on 6/18/2013. The bill would give FERC the authority to require owners and operators of the bulk power system to take measures to protect the grid from GMD or EMP attack. The costs would be recovered by raising regulated rates.', 'Franks states he had been led to believe that his bill would be brought to the House floor for a vote. But he states House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton R, Mich., let it die in committee. He has been unable to get an explanation from Upton [30].', 'Between 2011 and 2016, Mr. Upton has received $1,180,000 in campaign contributions from the electric utility industry [31].', 'The electric utility industry is heavily involved in campaign donations. During the 2014 federal election cycle, the electric utility industry made $21.6 million in campaign contributions [32]. The electrical utility industry is particularly involved in state politics. For instance, in Florida, between 2004 and 2012 electric utility companies donated $18 million into legislative and state political campaigns. In that state, the electric utilities employ one lobbyist for every two legislators [33].', 'Electric utility revenue in 2015 was 391 billion dollars [34].', 'Electromagnetic pulse', 'Of the scenarios that might lead to electrical network collapse, EMP has received the widest public attention. It has been the subject of television series, films, and novels. HEMP (for high altitude) is the more accurate acronym, but as media and the public use EMP, we will use both interchangeably.', 'The issue has become highly politicized. The most prominent article in the media against EMP as a threat is by Patrick Disney, “The Campaign to Terrify You about EMP” published in the Atlantic in 2011. “From Newt Gingrich to a Congressional ‘EMP Caucus’, some conservatives warn the electronic frying blast could pose gravely underestimated dangers on the U.S…..Ballistic missile defense seems to be the panacea for this groups concern, though a generous dose of preemption and war on terror are often prescribed as well” [35].', 'As of 2009, Mr. Disney was acting Policy Director for the National Iranian American Council (NIAC). NIAC has been accused of acting as a lobby for the Islamic Republic of Iran [36].', 'Mr. Disney is quoted as stating his strategy, in advancing an Iranian interest, is to “create a media controversy” [36].', 'The campaign to discredit EMP has been largely successful. To a very large part of the body politic EMP is identified as a cause limited to the far right.', 'A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is produced when a nuclear device is detonated above the atmosphere. No radiation, blast, or shock wave is felt on the ground, nor are there any adverse health effects, but electromagnetic fields reach the surface.', 'An EMP has three components, E1 through E3, defined by speed of the pulse. Each has specific characteristics, and specific potential effects on the grid. E1, the first and fastest component, affects primarily microelectronics. E3, the later and slower component, affects devices attached to long conductive wires and cables, especially high-voltage transformers.', 'A single nuclear blast will generate an EMP encompassing half the continental USA [37]. Two or three explosions, over different areas, would blanket the entire continental USA.', 'The potential impact of an EMP is determined by the altitude of the nuclear detonation, the gamma yield of the device, the distance from the detonation point, the strength and direction of the earth’s magnetic field at locations within the blast zone and the vulnerability of the infrastructures exposed. The E1 gamma signal is greatest for bursts between 50 and 100\u2009km altitude. E3 signals are optimized at busts between 130 and 500\u2009km altitude, much greater heights than for E1 [38]. Higher altitude widens the area covered, but at the expense of field levels. The 1963 atmospheric test ban has prevented further testing.', 'E1 and its effects', 'The E1 pulse (“fast pulse”) is due to gamma radiation (photons), generated by a nuclear detonation at high altitude, colliding with atoms in the upper atmosphere. The collisions cause electrons to be stripped from the atoms, with the resultant flow of electrons traveling downward to earth at near the speed of light. The interaction of the electrons with the earth’s magnetic field turns the flow into a transverse current that radiates forward as an intense electromagnetic wave. The field generates extremely high voltages and current in electrical conductors that can exceed the voltage tolerance of many electronic devices. All this occurs within a few tens of nanoseconds.', 'The Congressional EMP Commission postulated that E1 would have its primary impact on microelectronics, especially SCADAs (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), DCSs (digital control systems), and PLCs (programmable logic controllers). These are the small computers, numbering now in the millions, that allow for the unmanned operation of our infrastructure.', 'To assess the vulnerability of SCADAs to EMP, and therefore the vulnerability of our infrastructure, the EMP Commission funded a series of tests, exposing SCADA components to both radiated electric fields and injected voltages on cables connected to the components. The intent was to observe the response of the equipment, when in an operational mode, to electromagnetic energy simulating an EMP. “The bottom line observation at the end of the testing was that every system tested failed when exposed to the simulated EMP environment” [6].', 'E1 can generate voltages of 50,000\u2009V. Normal operating voltages of today’s miniaturized electronics tend to be only a few (3-4) volts. States the EMP Commission: “The large number and widespread reliance on such systems by all the nation’s critical infrastructures represent a systemic threat to their continued operation following an EMP event” [39]. A scenario seen in films is all automobiles and trucks being rendered inoperable. This would not be the case. Modern automobiles have as many as 100 microprocessors that control virtually all functions, but the vulnerability has been reduced by the increased application of electromagnetic compatibility standards. The EMP Commission found that only minor damage occurred at an E1 field level of 50\u2009kV/m, but there were minor disruptions of normal operations at lower peak levels as well [40].', 'There is a self-published post (J. Steinberger, Nobel laureate physics, 1988) disputing the potential effects of E1 [41]. This is an isolated opinion.', 'Shielding against E1 could theoretically be accomplished through the construction of a Faraday cage around specific components or an entire facility. The cage is composed of conductive materials and an insulation barrier that absorbs pulse energy and channels it directly into the ground. The cage shields out the EM signals by “shorting out” the electric field and reflecting it.', 'To be an effective Faraday cage, the conductive case must totally enclose the system. Any aperture, even microscopic seams between metal plates, can compromise the protection. To be useful, however, a device must have some connection with the outside world and not be completely isolated. Surge protective devices can be used on metallic cables to prevent large currents from entering a device, or the metallic cables can be replaced by fiber optic cables without any accompanying metal. The US Military has taken extensive measures to protect (“harden”) its equipment against E1. “On the civilian side, the problem has not really been addressed” [42].', 'E3 and its effects', 'E3 is caused by the motion of ionized bomb debris and atmosphere relative to the geomagnetic field, resulting in a perturbation of that field. This induces currents of thousands of amperes in long conductors such as transmission lines that are several kilometers or greater in length. Direct currents of hundreds to thousands of amperes will flow into transformers. As the length of the conductor increases, the amperage amplifies.', 'The physics of E3 are similar to that of a GMD, but not identical. GMD comes from charged particles showering down from space creating current flow in the ionosphere. These currents create magnetic fields on the ground. A nuclear burst on the other hand generates particles which create a magnetic bubble that pushes on the earth’s magnetic field producing a changing magnetic field at the Earth’s surface. A geomagnetic storm will have substorms that can move over the Earth for more than 1\u2009day, while the E3 HEMP occurs only immediately following a nuclear burst.', 'There are three studies on the potential effects of a HEMP E3 on the power grid.', 'The first study, published in 1991, found there would be little damage [43]. Although supporting the utility industry’s position, it has not been subsequently cited by either NERC or the industry. The study is criticized for expressing a smaller threat intensity [44]. The second, published in 2010 by Metatech, calculated that a nuclear detonation 170\u2009km over the USA would collapse the entire US power grid [45]. The third study, by EPRI (an organization funded by the electric utility industry) published in February 2017, asserts that a single high-altitude burst over the continental USA would damage only a few, widely scattered transformers [46]. The study is disputed for underestimating threat levels and using erroneous models [44].', 'These results are incompatible. One’s interpretation of the studies on E3 (and GMD) is based largely on the credibility one gives to the underlying Commission or Institute, and not the published calculations.', 'FERC has decided not to proceed with a GMD standard that includes EMP [47]. It will be recalled the GMD standard is 8\u2009V/km. The EMP Commission, utilizing unclassified measured data from the Soviet era nuclear tests, found an expected peak level for E3 HEMP for a detonation over the continental USA would be 85\u2009V/km [48].', 'The position of the electric utility industry is that E3 from a nuclear detonation is not a critical threat [49]. Others have come to a different conclusion. Israel has hardened her grid [50]. She perceives herself to face an existential threat, and it is not the Sun.', 'The electric utility industry states the cost of hardening the grid against EMP is the government’s responsibility, not the industry’s [51].', 'Cyberattack', 'The vulnerability from a cyberattack is exponentially magnified by our dependence on SCADAs.', 'In 2010, a computer worm attacking SCADA systems was detected. Although widely spread, it was designed to only attack SCADA systems manufactured by Siemens for P-1 centrifuges of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. The attack destroyed between 10 and 20% of Iranian centrifuges. Iran’s program was likely only briefly disrupted [52]. In December 2015, a cyberattack was directed against the Ukrainian power grid. It caused little damage as the grid was not fully automated.', 'There is an argument that the cyber threat is exaggerated. Thomas Rid states that viruses and malware cannot at present collapse the electric grid. “(The world has) never seen a cyber- attack kill a single human being or destroy a building” [53]. The electric utility industry offers a similar perspective. In testimony on cybersecurity before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, its representative states that “There are a lot of threats to the grid…..from squirrels to nation states, and frankly, there have been more blackouts as a result of squirrels (gnawing wire insulation) then there are from nation states” [54].', 'Others however express concern [55]. Moreover, in a report by the Department of Defense in 2017, it is noted that “the cyber threat to critical US infrastructure is outpacing efforts to reduce pervasive vulnerabilities.” [56] That report notes that “due to our extreme dependence on vulnerable information systems, the United States today lives in a virtual glass house” [57].', 'On March 15, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security issued an alert that the Russian government had engineered a series of cyberattacks targeting American and European nuclear power plants and water and electric systems [58]. It is reported these attacks could allow Russia to sabotage or shut down power plants at will [59].', 'The ability to operate a system in the absence of computer-driven actions is fast disappearing. The electric power industry spends over $1.4 billion dollars annually to replace electromechanical systems and devices that involve manual operation with new SCADA equipment [60]. With modest increases in efficiency come exponential increases in vulnerability. The extent to which reduced labor costs (and perhaps reduced energy costs) are passed on to the public is uncertain.', 'Kinetic attack', 'An internal FERC memo obtained by the press in March 2012 states that “destroy nine interconnector substations and a transformer manufacturer and the entire United States grid would be down for 18\u2009months, possibly longer” [61]. The mechanism is through the megawatts of voltage that would be dumped onto other transformers, causing them to overheat and in cascading fashion cause the entire system overload and fail.', 'At Metcalf California (outside of San Jose) on April 16, 2013, a HV Transformer owned by PG&E sustained what NERC and PG&E claimed was merely an act of vandalism [1]. Footprints suggested as many as 6 men executed the attack. They left no fingerprints, not even on the expended shell casings [1]. US FERC Chairman Wellinghoff concluded that the attack was a dry run for future operations [62].', 'Information on how to sabotage transformers has been available online [63].', 'There is a disincentive for management to invest in security. As stated in a report by the Electric Research Power Institute: “Security measures, in themselves, are cost items, with no direct monetary return. The benefits are in the avoided costs of potential attacks whose probability is generally not known. This makes cost-justification very difficult” [64].', 'CEO pay at large American companies is based on the Harvard Business School theory that the best measure of managerial performance is a company’s stock price. This does not necessarily align the interests of CEOs with shareholders, let alone the public. It “encourages short-term boosts to profits rather than investing for long term growth” [65].', 'In 2014, the CEO of PG&E, Anthony Early Jr., had a compensation of $11.6 million dollars. Over 90% was from bonuses based on stock performance. The President of PG&E, Christopher Johns, had a compensation of $6 million dollars [66]. There is no evidence, however, that any of this is in play in the positions of the electric utility industry vis-à-vis securing the grid. States PG&E spokesman Jonathan Marshall, “The majority of compensation for senior executives is shareholder funded and dependent on achieving targets related to safety, reliability and other results” [66].', 'Consequences of a sustained power outage', 'The EMP Commission states “Should significant parts of the electrical power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people will die for the lack of the basic elements necessary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban communities.” [67].', 'Space constraints preclude discussion on how the loss of the grid would render synthesis and distribution of oil and gas inoperative. Telecommunications would collapse, as would finance and banking. Virtually all technology, infrastructure, and services require electricity.', 'An EMP attack that collapses the electric power grid will collapse the water infrastructure—the delivery and purification of water and the removal and treatment of wastewater and sewage. Outbreaks that would result from the failure of these systems include cholera. It is problematic if fuel will be available to boil water. Lack of water will cause death in 3 to 4\u2009days [68].', 'Food production would also collapse. Crops and livestock require water delivered by electronically powered pumps. Tractors, harvesters, and other farm equipment run on petroleum products supplied by an infrastructure (pumps, pipelines) that require electricity. The plants that make fertilizer, insecticides, and feed also require electricity. Gas pumps that fuel the trucks that distribute food require electricity. Food processing requires electricity.', 'In 1900, nearly 40% of the population lived on farms. That percentage is now less than 2% [69]. It is through technology that 2% of the population can feed the other 98% [68]. The acreage under cultivation today is only 6% more than in 1900, yet productivity has increased 50 fold [69].', 'As stated by Dr. Lowell L Wood in Congressional testimony:', '“If we were no longer able to fuel our agricultural machine in the country, the food production of the country would simply stop, because we do not have the horses and mules that used to tow agricultural gear around in the 1880s and 1890s”.', '“So the situation would be exceedingly adverse if both electricity and the fuel that electricity moves around the country……… stayed away for a substantial period of time, we would miss the harvest, and we would starve the following winter” [70].', 'People can live for 1–2\u2009months without food, but after 5\u2009days, they have difficulty thinking and at 2\u2009weeks they are incapacitated [68]. There is typically a 30-day perishable food supply at regional warehouses but most would be destroyed with the loss of refrigeration [69]. The EMP Commission has suggested food be stockpiled for a possible EMP event.', 'A prescription for failure', 'Even if all the recommendations of the Congressional EMP Commission were implemented, there is no guarantee that the grid will not sustain a prolonged collapse. There should therefore be contingency plans for such a failure.', 'There is also another consideration. The foundational pillars of prior American nuclear defense policy, in today’s climate, are of uncertain validity. Mutual assured destruction is the Maginot line of the 21st century. Nonproliferation will prove difficult to resurrect.', 'The consequences of a widespread nuclear attack have been positioned to the public as massive deaths from blast effects, and then further lingering deaths from the effects of radiation. We suspect there will be no electricity, and there will be no electricity for a very long time.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%20-%20NDT-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%2520-%2520NDT-Round3.docx

16d37c7df804a482d4c98de3505e50a0a9d88bd35d4ef7bcbed72d517a923980

Denying mutual vulnerability is good – even if Japan knows its ineffective, they prefer it.

Terence Roehrig 17. Professor of National Security Affairs and the director of the Asia-Pacific studies group at the US Naval War College. Former research fellow at the Harvard University Kennedy School. 2017. “Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War”, Ch. 4

there is greater assurance in Tokyo regarding the U.S. commitment expressed understanding the likelihood of the U S using nuclear weapons was always low Though likelihood is small it is calculated ambiguity [of the nuclear umbrella ] that is needed to counter intimidation and military threat

In the years since the 2010 NPR Japan’s comfort level with U.S. extended deterrence has risen Continued dialogue in the EDD along with formal reassurances in the SCC the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and the overall health of the alliance have buttressed Japanese confidence in the nuclear umbrella there is greater assurance in Tokyo regarding the U.S. defense commitment some have expressed an understanding that the likelihood of the U S using nuclear weapons was always very low Though the likelihood of nuclear use is small , as another Japanese analyst remarked, “ it is the calculated ambiguity [of the nuclear umbrella ] that is needed to counter the intimidation and military threat Japan faces

['Japanese assessments also raised concern about the reduced role of nuclear weapons and the overall credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment. In the years since the release of the 2010 NPR, Japan’s comfort level with U.S. extended deterrence has risen, requiring fewer public and direct pronouncements from Washington to reassure Japanese leaders and the public of its commitment. Continued dialogue in the EDD along with formal reassurances in the SCC, the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and the overall health of the alliance have buttressed Japanese confidence in the nuclear umbrella. Overall, there is greater assurance in Tokyo regarding the U.S. defense commitment, given the strong relationship and the large U.S. forward presence in Japan. Indeed, some have expressed an understanding that the likelihood of the United States using nuclear weapons was always very low, and as one Japanese analyst pointed out, if Washington hit North Korea with a nuclear weapon and fallout drifted over Japan, the Japanese public would be very unhappy.79 Though the likelihood of nuclear use is small, as another Japanese analyst remarked, “it is the calculated ambiguity [of the nuclear umbrella] that is needed to counter the intimidation and military threat Japan faces.”80 As a result, as the NPR notes, Japan also sees the importance of conventional weapons in deterrence calculations and the need for continued U.S. conventional superiority in addition to the nuclear umbrella as crucial elements in overall strategic thinking and planning.']

[(8, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GaSl-Neg-ADA-Nationals-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

GaSl

76a23512b75894e6cdd3451343ba5c38ca0ea005e4f00c74735b5d9ac2058eaa

Populism is structurally inevitable

Daron Acemoglu 11/6/20. Institute Professor at MIT. Trump Won’t Be the Last American Populist The Conditions That Produced Him Need to Be Understood to Be Addressed https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-06/trump-wont-be-last-american-populist

economic resentment come distrust Trust in American institutions collapsed Nor can policymakers hope to lid discontent reeling from the loss of manufacturing jobs including , Hungary, India, , Poland Trumpism Johnson French right Turkish Erdogan s demonstrate a complete unraveling of the political order crosscutting economic trends globalization and automation induced social changes coupled institutions proved unable or unwilling to protect suffering

with economic resentment has come a distrust of all kinds of elites Trust in American institutions collapsed and has parallels in Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey Without more deeply understanding the root of such suspicion, American policymakers can have little hope of convincing millions Nor can policymakers hope to put a lid on the discontent that fueled Trump’s rise it has analogs all over the world democracies reeling from the loss of manufacturing jobs including Brazil , Hungary, India, the Philippines , Poland , and Turkey A GLOBAL UNRAVELING Trump and Trumpism are within a context that is undeniably global Johnson the Tory Party The French right the Turkish right Erdogan these and other case s demonstrate not just polarization but a complete unraveling of the old political order . why this unraveling has happened crosscutting economic trends globalization and automation induced social changes coupled with unshared gains and economic disruptions . As institutions proved unable or unwilling to protect those suffering they also destroyed public trust it isn’t sufficient to decry the collapse of civic behavior or even to defeat toxic populists and authoritarian strongmen

distrust Trust in American institutions collapsed Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey all over the world including Brazil , Hungary, India, the Philippines , Poland , and Turkey A GLOBAL UNRAVELING global Johnson the Tory Party The French right the Turkish right Erdogan unraveling of the old political order crosscutting economic trends globalization and automation unshared gains and economic disruptions unable or unwilling they also destroyed public trust defeat toxic populists and authoritarian strongmen

['Together with economic resentment has come a distrust of all kinds of elites. Much of the American public and many politicians now express a mounting hostility toward policymaking based on expertise. Trust in American institutions, including the judiciary, Congress, the Federal Reserve, and various law enforcement agencies, has collapsed. Neither Trump nor recent party polarization can be held solely to blame for this anti-technocratic shift. The almost complete rejection of scientific facts and competent, objective policymaking among many in the electorate and the Republican Party predates Trump and has parallels in other countries—Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey to name a few. Without more deeply understanding the root of such suspicion, American policymakers can have little hope of convincing millions of people that better policies, designed by experts, will improve their lives enormously and reverse decades of decline. Nor can policymakers hope to put a lid on the discontent that fueled Trump’s rise. POISONOUS SEEDS Populist movements thrive on inequality and on resentment of elites. Yet these conditions alone don’t explain why American voters in 2016 turned right rather than left as inequality rose and the very wealthy benefited at ordinary people’s expense. In the United States, a right-wing populist movement stood ready to make itself the vehicle for the grievances of regular people and to marry those grievances to a stance that was anti-elite, nationalist, and often authoritarian. Right-wing populism did not emerge in the United States because of Trump’s deranged charisma. Nor did it begin with the news media’s infatuation with his outrageous statements, or with Russian meddling, or with social media. Rather, right-wing populism resurged as a potent political force at least two decades before Trump’s takeover of the Republican Party—remember Pat Buchanan? And it has analogs all over the world, not just in mature democracies reeling from the loss of manufacturing jobs but in countries that have benefited economically from globalization, including Brazil, Hungary, India, the Philippines, Poland, and Turkey. That the Republican Party would give itself over to such a movement—and to Donald Trump as its standard-bearer—was never a foregone conclusion. One can argue that Republicans supported Trump because he was willing to execute their agenda: cutting taxes, fighting regulation, and appointing conservative judges. Alas, this is only a small part of the story. Trump’s popularity surged based on positions diametrically opposed to Republican orthodoxy: restricting trade, increasing spending on infrastructure, helping and interfering with manufacturing firms, and weakening the country’s international role. One can point to skyrocketing rates of polarization before Trump or chide the role of money in politics. Yet these factors hardly explain the wholesale abandonment of many of the key policy tenets of a 150-year-old party. Before 2016, few would have believed that the Republican Party would try to dismiss and cover up meddling by a hostile government in a presidential election. A GLOBAL UNRAVELING Trump and Trumpism are American phenomena, but they arose within a context that is undeniably global. Under Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom, the Tory Party is transforming in a manner similar, if more benign, to that of the Republican Party. The French right has fallen behind the National Rally (the new name for the far-right National Front). And the Turkish right has remade itself in the image of a strongman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Together, these and other cases demonstrate not just polarization but a complete unraveling of the old political order. How and why this unraveling has happened is not self-evident. The first place to look for an answer is in the major, crosscutting economic trends of the present era: globalization and the rise of digital and automation technologies, both of which have induced rapid social changes coupled with unshared gains and economic disruptions. As institutions proved unable or unwilling to protect those suffering from these transformations, they also destroyed public trust in establishment parties, the experts claiming to understand and better the world, and the politicians who appear complicit in the most disruptive changes and in cahoots with those who have stealthily benefited from them. From this perspective, it isn’t sufficient to decry the collapse of civic behavior or even to defeat toxic populists and authoritarian strongmen. Those who seek to shore up democratic institutions must build new ones that can better regulate globalization and digital technology, altering their direction and rules so that the economic growth they foster benefits more people (and is perhaps faster and of a higher quality overall). Building trust in public institutions and experts requires proving that they work for the people and with the people.', '']

[(6, 14), (20, 22)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Aff-3---Navy-Quarters.docx

Emory

RuSh

d92ee63930e28db236539720e687cf849916922ab55db36a32796e2d7b313b6e

Only clarifying the legal role of AI solves.

Jason Chung & Amanda Zink 17. Clinical Assistant Professor, PRESTON ROBERT TISCH INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL SPORT. JD, McGill University Faculty of Law. J.D., Brooklyn Law School, M.A. in Bioethics, New York University. “Hey Watson, Can I Sue You for Malpractice? Examining the Liability of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine.” Asia-Pacific Journal of Health Law, Policy and Ethics.

Without clarification AI cases become longer and costlier litigation focuses on who to pursue if Watson is a defendant those suing gain access to Watson’s logs to determine involvement physicians deny responsibility there is limbo where it is uncertain who is involved in patient’s care Allowing Watson to be a party clarify involvement as claimants understand Watson’s role aid triers making determinations ensures hospitals are not disincentivized from “employing” AI provides fault-based regime insulates manufacturers from unpredictable consequences With Watson’s status clarified parties get clarity

Classifying Watson as the Equivalent of a Medical Student misconstrue our suggested classification to mean we believe that Watson should be treated as a human. this is not the case Watson should be classified as a legal person for the purposes of apportioning liability so that Watson’s activities can be insured Without clarification on the status of AI cases promise to become longer and costlier for people as litigation focuses on who to pursue rather than the merits of the case With increased usage of AI these issues only promise to grow legislators and courts would be wise to adopt a consistent approach establishment of Watson as a person equivalent in treatment as a medical student offers additional benefits students are virtually never pursued for medical malpractice as a result of diagnostic error classification of Watson as a person offers courts additional leeway in determining Watson’s involvement establishment of the truth when medical malpractice additional information that would be available to claimants as part of the discovery process if Watson is named as a defendant in a civil suit, those suing may be able to gain greater access to Watson’s logs to determine its exact involvement adding students or residents to lawsuits helps with the attribution of responsibility supervising physicians will deny legal responsibility as will the hospital itself there is often a limbo where it is uncertain who is even involved in the patient’s care making the attribution of fault difficult Allowing Watson to be a party to lawsuits clarify the degree of its involvement establish who may have deviated from Watson’s recommended treatment options analogizing Watson as a person claimants would enjoy greater access to Watson’s determinations better understand Watson’s role in the alleged fault aid triers of fact in making their determinations of fault by keeping Watson’s degree of potential liability as limited it also ensures that hospitals are not disincentivized from “employing” AI such as Watson as a helpful supplement to their medical teams unrealistic is IBM’s position that because Watson will revolutionize healthcare, Congress should “get out of the way”. technology with the potential to affect the morbidity and mortality of millions via little understood algorithmic decision-making processes calls for some level of neutral, thirdparty oversight . where “dependency on the machine is higher oversight of the system might be warranted. Watson isn’t off the regulatory hook just yet our proposed liability scheme is in keeping with the dual goals of avoiding thwarting useful advances in patient care ensuring an appropriate “check” on a novel medical technology some level of oversight is desired e current legislative and regulatory vacuum will most certainly be addressed manufacturers would be wise to embrace a regime that addresses what AI actually does limits the application of standards of strict liability provides a practical fault-based regime insulates manufacturers from the sometimes unpredictable consequences of self-learning machines While it may seem a drastic step this would be perfectly in line with both reality and existing law. AI shares more common capabilities with humans than do other natural beings ability and authority of AI can easily be characterized and analogized with humans Watson can ndently “learn” from texts and apply that knowledge to specific medical cases It also communicates desirable treatment options in a manner intelligible to humans The legal concept of personhood is also flexible enough to encompass AI and it would be easy to create a legal definition of personhood that fits for current and evolving levels of AI. would have immediate legal and administrative benefits With Watson’s legal status being clarified , all parties would get clarity on how to proceed in cases of error simple legal classification allow us to circumvent a key problem that we face now prospect of every case requiring a detailed existential analysis of what Watson represents and does does not mean that an uprising of intelligent AI machines is imminent merely a pre-existing legal fiction used to hold entities accountable there appears to be little harm in attributing legal personhood to Watson and much to gain

this is not the case cases promise to become longer and costlier litigation focuses on who to pursue rather than the merits of the case legislators and courts would be wise to adopt a consistent approach where it is uncertain who is even involved in the patient’s care aid triers of fact in making their determinations of fault calls for some level of neutral, thirdparty oversight . some level of oversight is desired insulates manufacturers from the sometimes unpredictable consequences of self-learning machines would have immediate legal and administrative benefits With Watson’s legal status being clarified , does not mean that an uprising of intelligent AI machines is imminent accountable and much to gain

['Intent and Scope of Classifying Watson as the Equivalent of a Medical Student Some may misconstrue our suggested classification of Watson as a medical student to mean we believe that Watson should be treated as a human. To be clear, this is not the case. What we are arguing is that Watson should be classified as a legal person for the purposes of apportioning liability so that Watson’s activities can be insured at a level that rises to that of a medical student. This is important as the torts system is a crucial hallmark of the American legal process, allowing those directly and negatively affected to sue without intermediaries. Theoretically, this equalizes power between the people and corporations and keeps corporations accountable. Without clarification on the status of AI, cases promise to become longer and costlier for people as litigation focuses on who to pursue rather than the merits of the case. With increased usage of AI, these issues only promise to grow and the legislators and courts would be wise to adopt a consistent approach. The establishment of Watson as a person equivalent in treatment as a medical student is a legal fiction that offers additional benefits. Indeed, we are aware that medical students are virtually never pursued for medical malpractice as a result of diagnostic error, given the overriding responsibility of the attending physician. But the classification of Watson as a person offers courts additional leeway in determining Watson’s involvement in the decision-making process and aids in the establishment of the truth when medical malpractice is alleged. This is due to the additional information that would be available to claimants as part of the discovery process. As noted by New York attorney Eric Turkewitz, those named in a lawsuit have a higher evidentiary burden than “non-party witnesses”. This means that parties to a lawsuit must provide copies of statements and other evidence that may be otherwise privileged during the process of conducting internal committee reviews.56 As such, if Watson is named as a defendant in a civil suit, those suing may be able to gain greater access to Watson’s logs to determine its exact involvement (perhaps overinvolvement) and history on the case. Furthermore, as noted by injury lawyer Max Kennerly, adding students or residents to lawsuits helps with the attribution of responsibility for faults. He notes that many supervising physicians will deny legal responsibility for patient injuries as will the hospital itself. As such, there is often a limbo where it is uncertain who is even involved in the patient’s care, making the attribution of fault difficult.57 Allowing Watson to be a party to lawsuits should help clarify the degree of its involvement in patient care and establish who may have deviated from Watson’s recommended treatment options and for what reasons. In short, by analogizing Watson as a person, claimants would enjoy greater access to Watson’s determinations and better understand Watson’s role in the alleged fault. This also would aid triers of fact in making their determinations of fault. But, by keeping Watson’s degree of potential liability as limited as that of a medical student, it also ensures that hospitals are not disincentivized from “employing” AI such as Watson as a helpful supplement to their medical teams by not subjecting it to the same duty of care as required by supervising or attending physicians. Of course, legislators could choose to create an entirely new legal regime to deal with AI. Indeed, some experts have advocated such a wholesale change.58 But such an approach would be complex and create a raft of unpredictable new legal questions.59 For instance, legal experts might get bogged down on what constitutes the threshold between AI and a simple diagnostic machine. Questions such as whether AI has to have the ability to converse naturally or whether other forms of interaction are sufficient to demonstrate sufficient ‘intelligence’ threaten to dominate any new foray into creating a new legal liability regime specific to AI. Similarly unrealistic is IBM’s position that because Watson will revolutionize healthcare, Congress should “get out of the way”.60 While Watson has yet to demonstrate such a dramatic impact on cancer care, a technology with the potential to affect the morbidity and mortality of millions via little understood algorithmic decision-making processes certainly calls for some level of neutral, thirdparty oversight. Meghan Dierks, director of clinical systems analysis at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, is in the camp asserting that the implications of the new man/machine union to treat patients must be carefully considered. While IBM claims Watson is intended to “democratize” medicine and assist doctors with less specialized expertise in caring for cancer patients, “in advising those doctors, Watson cannot fully explain the rationale for its decisions. It can cite medical literature, but it cannot explain why it selected a particular treatment for a particular patient.”61 Dierks asserts that in such situations, where “dependency on the machine is higher, and the underlying rationale for the decision less clear, more oversight of the system might be warranted.”62 While significant lobbying efforts by IBM have already helped wall off Watson from the types of FDA regulation applied to “higher risk technologies” thus far, Watson isn’t off the regulatory hook just yet. In the coming months the FDA will issue guidelines clarifying exactly which software products will be exempt under the new law, the 21st Century Cures Act, invoking huge implications for Watson for Oncology and related products such as those that match patients to clinical trials and provide treatment recommendations based on genomic data. The FDA’s commissioner, Scott Gottlieb, has expressed a desire to “streamline regulation of digital health technologies,” perhaps via a certification process that enables companies to “commercialize products without pre-market approval, or through a very limited review process.”63 We believe our proposed liability scheme for Watson is in keeping with the dual goals of avoiding thwarting useful advances in patient care, and ensuring an appropriate “check” on a novel medical technology still in the nascent stages of implementation. These comments from practitioners and regulators demonstrates that some level of oversight is desired and, as AI becomes more pervasive, the current legislative and regulatory vacuum will most certainly be addressed. Therefore, IBM, and other AI manufacturers would be wise to embrace a regime that addresses what AI actually does and limits the application of standards of strict liability. The functional approach which we have outlined above provides a practical fault-based regime which insulates manufacturers from the sometimes unpredictable consequences of self-learning machines. In this way, tortfeasors could be identified and classified by the capacity and the authority they have to commit (or share responsibility for) the tort – whether they be human or AI.64 While it may seem a drastic step to grant legal personhood to AI, this would be perfectly in line with both reality and existing law. In the contemporary world, AI shares more common, if reduced, capabilities with humans than do other natural beings. For instance, wild animals are governed by the regime of strict liability because they are viewed as unable to be fully tamed. Their logic and impulses are alien to us and therefore their actions can often be too random and unpredictable to be compatible with our own. As such, they cannot enjoy personhood as they lack a relatable intelligence and organization. By contrast, the ability and authority of AI can easily be characterized and analogized with humans. Much like students, Watson can, with periodic guidance, independently “learn” from texts and apply that knowledge to specific medical cases. It also communicates desirable treatment options in a manner intelligible to humans. As such, it achieves at least the third level of Bloom’s taxonomy and demonstrates quasi-human intelligence. The way we have programmed AI – in our language and image – means that we can already interface and assign tasks to computers in a way that often has a direct correlation with a human counterpart. The legal concept of personhood – in contrast to the term’s colloquial usage – is also flexible enough to encompass AI and it would be easy to create a legal definition of personhood that fits for current and evolving levels of AI. Proceeding as we propose would have immediate legal and administrative benefits. With Watson’s legal status being clarified, all parties would get clarity on how to proceed in cases of error by Watson. The simple legal classification of Watson as a legal person would allow us to circumvent a key problem that we face now – the prospect of every case requiring a detailed existential analysis of what Watson represents and does. Granting legal personhood does not mean that an uprising of intelligent AI machines is imminent. Legal personhood is merely a pre-existing legal fiction used to hold entities, not just natural persons, accountable. As noted by Michael Dorf, professor of law at Cornell, Personhood is a legal status for which sentience is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. It’s not a necessary condition, because as a matter of law artificial entities like corporations can have personhood…65 As such, there appears to be little harm in attributing legal personhood to Watson and much to gain. Watson’s existence doesn’t necessitate a rethink of our entire system of human laws – it just requires flexibility in what we consider a person.', '']

[(6, 13), (21, 28)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-5.docx

Emory

MiPi

59d2a4a7f2709b155a79c2711d0fef9ec7ad48907b9b513f029fb35e7d22f2f7

Say no---justices don’t care about political constraints

Gollom ’22 [Mark; June 1; CBC News, “How a conservative bloc, unrestrained by public opinion, is leading the U.S. Supreme Court,” cbc.ca/news/world/supreme-court-conservative-majority-public-opinion-1.6503495]

decisions by the conservative majority signal a unapologetic and muscular court , willing to buck the mood They're using conservatism in a powerful way we've been looking at a tugboat we're looking at a runaway freight train decisions have not been in line with attitudes the court has become more similar to Republicans

recent decisions by the conservative majority court may not be in tune with average Americans is backed up by recent polling and surveys those rulings also signal a newly unapologetic and muscular court , willing to buck the national mood They're using their conservatism in a powerful way and they're acting like they're in a hurry we've been looking at a conservative tugboat . And now we're looking at a conservative runaway freight train ." That freight train has pushed through some strongly conservative-minded decisions over the past weeks those decisions have not been in line with public attitudes the court has become more conservative than the public and is now more similar to Republicans in its ideological position on key issues Today's court has six conservative judges who are generally more aligned

unapologetic muscular court buck the national mood conservative runaway freight train more similar to Republicans six conservative

['That the recent decisions by the conservative majority court may not be in tune with average Americans is backed up by recent polling and surveys. But those rulings also signal a newly unapologetic and muscular court, willing to buck the national mood.', '"They\'re using their conservatism in a powerful way and they\'re acting like they\'re in a hurry," said Stephen Wermiel, a constitutional law professor at American University Washington College of Law. ', '"For a long time, we\'ve been looking at a conservative tugboat. And now we\'re looking at a conservative runaway freight train."', 'That freight train has pushed through some strongly conservative-minded decisions over the past weeks. Along with overturning Roe v. Wade, the 6-3 conservative majority effectively expanded gun rights in New York state and ruled that a high school football coach had a constitutional right to pray on the field.', 'On Thursday, in a blow to the fight against climate change, the court also ruled 6-3 that the Clean Air Act does not give the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) broad authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. ', '"I would say that [the conservative bloc] view their job as interpreting the Constitution and that is divorced from from public opinion," said Amy Howe, a reporter with SCOTUSblog, which covers the court.', 'Polls show that some of the those decisions have not been in line with public attitudes. For example, a CBS News/YouGov poll found that 59 per cent of Americans disapproved of overturning Roe v. Wade, compared to 41 per cent who approved. As for gun rights, about half of the voters in the 2020 presidential election said gun laws in the U.S. should be made more strict, according to an AP VoteCast survey.', 'A research paper published this month found that the court has, since 2020, become much more conservative than the public and is now more similar to Republicans in its ideological position on key issues.', '"In 2010 and 2020, the court was actually very close to the average American in its decisions," said Neil Malhotra, a professor of political economy at Stanford University, and one of the three researchers of the study.', 'During its 2021 and just-ended 2022 terms, the court was "was much more similar to the average Republican." ', 'This is a very recent phenomenon, he said. ', "For years, the Supreme Court had leaned conservative, with a 5-4 majority, but some justices were considered more moderate and didn't always rule along pure conservative ideological lines.", "But that has since changed. Today's court, led by Chief Justice John Roberts, has six conservative judges who are generally more aligned."]

[(0, 6), (7, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Aff-Indiana-Semis.docx

Michigan

McSk

1b2789dbb518b839df71b92524521c9121e422fcbd501839c44cd41f4f90eddb

Indigeneity doesn’t explain disease – the ALT neither thumps NOR resolves the case

Hirschfeld 17 (Katherine Hirschfeld, Department of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma, “Rethinking “Structural Violence,”” Society, 54(2), April 2017, p.156–162, dml)

scholars substitute moral argument in place of objective historical research Epidemics predictable configured by human immunity and virulence Variables in the social environment play a role But over-reliance on structural violence erases variation and explains all epidemics with one predetermined , unfalsifiable narrative a vaporous , unscientific theory that contributes little to understanding

Rigorous comparative research should be the starting point for scholars interested in social and economic determinants of epidemic infectious disease. But the field does not take this approach. Instead of developing empirical questions contemporary researchers substitute s a moral argument against imperialism in place of objective historical or ethnographic research exploring how macro level structures configure patterns of disease Epidemics move through time and space in predictable ways, configured by variations in human immunity , population density and pathogen virulence . Variables in the social environment like malnutrition, housing, and sanitation also play a role in configuring human vulnerability. But over-reliance on poorly defined concepts like structural violence erases these axes of variation and explains all epidemics with one predetermined , unfalsifiable narrative scholars do not seem interested in conducting grounded empirical research exploring how the unique political economy facilitates resurgent epidemics of preventable disease. They rely instead on a predetermined narrative that implicitly defines epidemics as manifestations of imperial or structural violence . This narrative is often presented without supporting historical research , so the story of imperialism in a given location is not a literal history but moral story of unjust suffering at the hands of temporally and geographically remote , vaguely defined malevolent structures imperialism and structural violence resemble twenty-first century miasma — a vaporous , unscientific theory of disease that draws appeal from scholars’ collective revulsion against anything that smells like colonialism , but contributes little to understanding patterns of emerging infectious disease in the twenty first century

moral argument objective historical research predictable human immunity population density pathogen virulence social environment over-reliance structural violence erases these axes of variation explains all epidemics predetermined unfalsifiable narrative empirical research predetermined narrative manifestations of imperial structural violence without supporting historical research not a literal history moral story unjust suffering temporally geographically remote vaguely defined malevolent structures imperialism structural violence twenty-first century miasma vaporous unscientific theory collective revulsion anything that smells like colonialism contributes little to understanding

["Rigorous comparative ethnographic and archival research that explores the intersection of politics, economics (including illicit economies of political corruption) and the natural environment should be the starting point for scholars interested in social and economic determinants of epidemic infectious disease. But the field does not take this approach. Instead of developing empirical questions that could help refine theory and improve definitional clarity of core concepts, contemporary researchers collect narratives that validate Lenin’s assumptions about imperialism. This approach makes Galtung’s model unfalsifiable and substitutes a moral argument against imperialism in place of objective historical or ethnographic research exploring how macro level structures configure patterns of disease. Epidemics move through time and space in predictable ways, configured by variations in human immunity, population density and pathogen virulence. Variables in the social environment like malnutrition, housing, and sanitation also play a role in configuring human vulnerability. But over-reliance on poorly defined concepts like structural violence erases these axes of variation and explains all epidemics in post-colonial countries with one predetermined, unfalsifiable narrative. Research linking imperialism to poor health conditions in post-colonial countries had more credibility in the 1970s when Galtung’s writing first became popular. But the world has changed since that time and many of his original assumptions are no longer accepted due to their inability to explain or predict events that have occurred in the new millennium. In Galtung’s era, international health and development specialists assumed modernization of mortality patterns was a one-way process that could not be reversed. So a country that underwent modernization of its mortality profile through control of infectious disease was not expected to regress to an earlier developmental stage. But the 1990s and the early 2000s there were many examples of reverse mortality transitions involving resurgence of preventable infectious diseases in industrialized countries. These were common in states with high levels of political corruption, civil wars and conflict between Violent Non-State Actors28 like organized crime groups. One scholar, for instance, described Russia in the 1990s as undergoing a process of “thirdworldization” whereby the former industrial superpower became afflicted by problems typical of impoverished underdeveloped countries. These included “mass poverty, hunger, regional conflicts and ethnic wars, deindustralization and huge foreign debt, corruption of the elites and governing juntas, bloody coups d'etat, outbreaks of long forgotten diseases, refugee problems, environmental degradation and societal and state collapse”.29 The political economy of state failure, epidemiological underdevelopment and “thirdworldization” are still not fully theorized, but some common patterns have been identified.30 The Fund For Peace (a non profit security studies group), for instance, has created an index of fragility to rank states according to their potential for failure or collapse. In 2015 Haiti was categorized as “high alert” status meaning it was in the second riskiest tier, together with other chronically unstable regions with high rates of water borne diseases like Afghanistan, Iraq and Zimbabwe.31 Do the same political and economic processes that create state failure and fragility also produce widespread poverty and epidemics of preventable diseases like cholera? There is some anecdotal evidence to support this argument. One anthropologist, for instance, has described witnessing Haitian officials loot foreign aid intended to alleviate poverty, improve health and promote socioeconomic development in the country.32 According to Schwartz, this has led to a perverse scenario whereby increasing foreign aid has actually resulted in negative health and mortality trends for one region. “When the money, materials and food arrived…the Haitian employees, politicians, administrators, pastors, priests and school directors embezzled it and when they had accrued enough money, most of them migrated to Miami…This left the poorer peasants behind to deal with the disaster…”. Have predatory officials also looted aid money and supplies intended to prevent cholera from spreading? Are life-saving rehydration supplies and equipment being stolen from public clinics so that poor patients have no access to treatment? These are the kinds of questions social scientists should be asking about Haiti’s current health crisis—empirical questions that can be answered through a combination of historical and ethnographic research exploring how interlocking structures at international, state and local levels have configured population vulnerability to lethal infectious disease. But scholars do not seem interested in conducting grounded empirical research exploring how the unique political economy of fragile states facilitates resurgent epidemics of preventable disease. They rely instead on a predetermined Leninist narrative that implicitly defines epidemics in poor countries as manifestations of imperial or structural violence. This narrative is often presented without supporting historical research, so the story of imperialism in a given location is not a literal history of a specific place and time, but moral story of unjust suffering at the hands of temporally and geographically remote, vaguely defined malevolent structures. In this sense, imperialism and structural violence resemble twenty-first century miasma—a vaporous, unscientific theory of disease that draws appeal from scholars’ collective revulsion against anything that smells like colonialism, but contributes little to understanding patterns of emerging infectious disease in the twenty first century.", '', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Aff-Wake-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

a9ea5ea80fb629e8c58dce4323b317dbc952ffefaf2a90fdcae97918e2a5cf7b

Rights of nature causes a crushing, transboundary shock that ripples across global supply chains.

BSR ’21 [BSR's Sustainable Futures Lab; December 2021; Business and consultancy network connecting members to legal experts and financial advisors with a focus on sustainable initiatives; The Fast Forward, “Nature’s Rights Go to Court,” ]

extending personhood increase the amount of litigation against companies Ecuador become the epicenter of r o n litigation As r o n expand , so will compliance and monitoring Businesses expect expanding regulation including diligence process and trade barriers Implications across their entire portfolios All projects require proof they will not violate nature Adding to complexity are r o n applied across borders and at varying rates A responsibility not to impinge on rights across borders have implications for chains and traceable pollution businesses with international chains comply with rights across territories there’s no consensus on rights no definition for “ nature ,” and no understanding

extending legal personhood could increase the amount and severity of litigation brought against companies Since then, Ecuador has become the global epicenter of r ights o f n ature litigation As r ights o f n ature expand , so will the compliance and monitoring processes that companies will need to undertake. Businesses can expect expanding regulation on environmental impacts including mandatory due diligence process and potential trade barriers for non-compliance . Implications could reach across their entire current and future portfolios All projects might require proof that they will not violate the rights of nature Permits, licenses, and other approvals could also come with stricter rights-based conditions Adding to the complexity are indications that the r ights o f n ature could be applied across borders and will likely be adopted at varying rates globally A legal responsibility not to impinge on nature’s rights across borders would have implications for value chains and traceable impacts like transborder air pollution . Germany’s new mandatory supply chain due diligence applies to environmental protection businesses with international value chains may need to comply with a variety of rights -based laws across different territories . For now, there’s no consensus on how to adopt rights -based laws, no standardized definition for terms such as “biodiversity” and “ nature ,” and no shared understanding of their vulnerabilities

legal personhood amount severity litigation Ecuador global epicenter r o n r o n expand compliance monitoring expanding regulation trade barriers non-compliance reach across entire current future portfolios All proof not violate rights-based Adding complexity r o n across borders varying rates legal responsibility nature’s rights borders value chains traceable air pollution Germany’s international variety different territories no consensus rights -based standardized definition nature shared understanding

['Successful lawsuits and constitutional changes in several countries, alongside a widely supported draft legal definition for “ecocide” by prominent International Criminal Court jurists, indicate that the “rights of nature,” a concept rooted in Indigenous worldviews, is being extended into criminal law. Courts and legislatures are increasingly extending legal personhood to rivers, water tables and oceans, forests, wildlife, and whole ecosystems, granting them a defendable right not to be harmed and placing them on the same legal footing as corporations. This could increase the amount and severity of litigation brought against companies by civil society, accusing them of degrading the environment, and present them with a new\xa0enforceable duty of care\xa0towards nature.', 'What’s New', '“Rights of nature” laws recognize that ecosystems, on which all human systems depend, must be allowed to exist, flourish, and evolve free from harm by human actions. They draw on an Indigenous understanding of the world, founded in spiritual beliefs, that recognizes the interdependence of all natural entities, including humans, and an influential 1972 paper by the US law professor Christopher Stone, “Should Trees Have Standing?” which argued that nature has fundamental legal rights.', 'Western legal frameworks with anthropocentric foundations have traditionally been a barrier to the enforcement of nature’s rights, treating nature purely as a resource. Today, however, there is significant global momentum behind emerging concepts such as “,” in what would potentially be a paradigm shift toward a nature-centric approach.', 'In perhaps the clearest sign of this, an international legal team, co-led by barrister and professor Philippe Sands QC and former UN international prosecutor Dior Fall Sow, has drawn up a draft definition for “ecocide.” Its purpose is to amend the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the addition of a fifth international crime alongside genocide and crimes against humanity.\xa0It defines\xa0\xa0as “unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts,” in which the environment encompasses “the earth, its biosphere, cryosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, as well as outer space.” \xa0If adopted by the ICC, it would be the only international crime in which direct human harm is not a prerequisite for prosecution, and individuals responsible for these acts would be subject to criminal investigation. Some legal scholars see this leveling of the legal playing field between all life forms as a\xa0\xa0of establishing rights of nature.', ', the\xa0, and Pope Francis have all backed the idea of an ecocide law, as have the Pacific islands of Vanuatu and the Maldives, which are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. But for the draft law to be adopted by the ICC, one of the Rome Statute’s signatory nations will need to submit it to the UN Secretary General for consideration, thereby triggering a vote at the ICC’s annual assembly. Even if the vote is successful, it could still take years or decades to complete the amendment to the ICC’s founding treaty.', 'Meanwhile, throughout the world, rights of nature are making legal headway. Whether it’s through local laws, constitutional amendments, treaty agreements, or judicial decisions—these rights\xa0. For instance, the New Zealand parliament granted\xa0, which is revered by the Māori. In 2019, the High Court of Bangladesh followed suit by\xa0\xa0with legal rights, which were subsequently applied to all rivers in the country. But few countries have gone as far as Ecuador, which in 2008 became the first country in the world to\xa0, or Mother Earth, in its constitution.', 'Since then, Ecuador has become the global epicenter of rights of nature litigation. But while there have been notable victories in provincial courts, this hasn’t always translated into remedial action on the ground. A significant counterforce is the government’s desire to generate revenue from the country’s mining sector. In 2017, it announced\xa0\xa0for mining exploration over 2.9 million hectares of the country—an increase of 300 percent. Many of these concessions are in protected forests and Indigenous territories, headwater ecosystems, and biodiversity hotspots.', 'And so, despite Ecuador’s groundbreaking constitution, the balance of power seems ultimately to lie with the state and moneyed corporations. This imbalance\xa0appears to be feeding the trend for lower court decisions in favor of nature’s rights to be overturned by higher courts. The fact that the government has appealed several rights of nature victories visibly undermines its commitment to the constitution. Some judges may also be coming under pressure not to scare off much-needed foreign investment.', 'Even when attempts to defend the rights of nature fail in the courts, they can help to generate public support for the cause—which, as the abolitionist, civil rights, and women’s suffrage movements proved, is half the battle.', 'Grassroots action is also raising public awareness of the rights of nature in the US. In 2020, a coalition of farmworkers, farmers, and conservationists filed a federal lawsuit to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) reapproval of glyphosate, citing its risks to pollinators, butterflies, and soil health as well as to the health of farmworkers and their children. The\xa0\xa0while standing by its finding that the pesticide in question, Roundup, does not pose major risks to human health.', 'Efforts to inscribe the rights of nature movement in law share an underlying objective with efforts to recognize the human right to a healthy environment and\xa0, enabling action to drive equitable outcomes without direct damage to individuals. For instance, in October 2021, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) unanimously voted to recognize a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a universal right, following a campaign led by 13,000 civil society organizations and Indigenous peoples’ groups, 90,000 children, private sector stakeholders, and human rights institutions.', 'Such efforts signal a shift in how we value the future life of our planet and the species that depend on it, raising questions about who gets to determine that value in the here and now. Do projects that will generate societal or economic gains today justify an uncertain degree of pain tomorrow? And when should the rights of nature, non-human species, or unborn generations take precedence over rights to land or other resources? Such questions underpin efforts to revise\xa0, which are used to work out how much today’s society should invest in trying to limit the impacts of climate change in the future. There are no easy answers.', '<<SIGNALS OF CHANGE GRAPHIC AND FAST FORWARD TO 2025 BLURB OMITTED>>', 'Implications for Sustainable Business', 'As rights of nature expand, so will the compliance and monitoring processes that companies will need to undertake. Businesses can expect expanding regulation on environmental impacts\xa0just as for human rights impacts, including mandatory due diligence process and potential trade barriers for non-compliance. Implications could reach across their entire current and future portfolios, including feedstock origin, potentially demanding a step change in traceability. All projects might require proof that they will not violate the rights of nature (through damage to biodiversity, ecosystems, and ecological cycles), requiring resources for more detailed Environmental Impact Assessments. Permits, licenses, and other approvals could also come with stricter rights-based conditions. In mining, for instance, independent cost-benefit analysis may be required to obtain exploration permits. The fact that copper and other metals are essential components of wind turbines and other green technologies raises the complicated question of ethical trade-offs regarding mining’s role in tackling climate change vs. the rights of nature.', 'All this means building capacity to conduct nature rights impact assessments across the value chain: at the product level, with tier 2 and 3 suppliers, and at the point of extraction or production for raw materials. For procurement,\xa0\xa0will be required to ensure consistent metrics and standards among supplier impact assessments. End-of-life management will also come under scrutiny, affecting many mainstream products, from batteries and electronics to plastics. This level of transparency and traceability could be challenging and require new governance structures and processes to monitor nature impacts. These could be aligned with the upcoming\xa0\xa0(TNFD), which will support business in assessing emerging nature-related risks and opportunities. For instance, agribusinesses will need to assess exactly how runoff from their operations could affect local lakes and rivers.', 'Solving these emerging challenges could start with increased investment in technological solutions, such as\xa0. Another possibility is “ecological impact tracing,” whereby the impacts of a particular production method or system on nature and ecology would be investigated, analyzed, and recorded. Combined with the rise of smart sensors for detecting everything from particles and chemicals to water flow and biodiversity loss, such an investigation might well unearth impacts beyond the bounds of traditional impact assessments.', 'Adding to the complexity and need for transparency are indications that the rights of nature could be applied across borders and will likely be adopted at varying rates globally. In 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights\xa0\xa0on the environment and human rights, which ruled that states must take measures to prevent significant environmental harm to individuals inside—and outside—their territory. A legal responsibility not to impinge on nature’s rights across borders would have implications for value chains and traceable impacts like transborder air pollution. Germany’s new mandatory supply chain due diligence applies to both human rights and environmental protection, indicating a value chain approach to national laws. The EU is considering similar legislation to make the protection of human rights and the environment in supply chains a legal requirement.', 'Moreover, businesses with international value chains may need to comply with a variety of rights-based laws across different territories. For now, there’s no consensus on how to adopt rights-based laws, no standardized definition for terms such as “biodiversity” and “nature,” and no shared understanding of their vulnerabilities. “What works in one country [or] jurisdiction may not work in another due to a myriad of factors, including how the legal system works, societal values, political will, and so on,” says Michelle Bender, ocean campaigns director at the Earth Law Center.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Michigan-IpSh-Neg-Indiana-Round-2.docx

Michigan

IpSh

1e4776285d6f79ccc25e392c2985a3c363112866ced721e9fa15a2eab763518a

The plan is enforced and modelled globally.

Martin 22 - (Adán Nieto Martin, Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Castilla la Mancha; 10-26-2021, Palgrave Macmillan, "Global Criminal Law: On the Way to Stateless Criminal Law," doa: 2-2-2023) DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84831-6_1

c j s of U S key criminal law has clear e t vocation, and exerts influence on criminal law hence Americanization states interact through missions judges prosecutors , and enforcement help each other sharing sovereignty with organizations networks focus on specific matters states act en bloc

c riminal j ustice s ystems of U S play a key role . US criminal law has a clear e x t raterritorial vocation, and exerts strong influence on other criminal law frameworks, hence Americanization process states interact with each other through diplomatic missions judges prosecutors , and law enforcement help each other relational sovereignty entails sharing sovereignty with international organizations government networks , which focus on specific and specialized global matters networks are rulemakers in global governance there is a myriad of organizations states used to act en bloc , as a unit

c j s U S key role e t strong influence criminal law Americanization interact diplomatic missions judges prosecutors law enforcement sharing international organizations government networks specific specialized rulemakers myriad organizations en bloc unit

['', 'Note that this new global ius puniendi coexists and sometimes interacts with more conventional or treaty-based dimensions of international criminal law or even quasi-federal criminal frameworks, such as that in place among European Union (EU) member states. The situation of transnational and supranational criminal law can be pictured as a set of three legal frameworks, each of them with distinct features and elements and yet with large overlaps: (i) classic international criminal law; (ii) European criminal law, and (iii) global criminal law. It makes no sense to argue about whether a given framework falls within the scope of another. Alongside these legal frameworks, criminal justice systems of the strongest countries, namely that of the United States, can also play a key role. US criminal law has a clear extraterritorial vocation, and it exerts a strong influence on other criminal law frameworks, hence the so-called Americanization process.Footnote7 ', 'Footnote starts. ', '7. Within the context of economic criminal law, I dealt with this issue in Nieto Martín (2007). On this topic, see the remarkable works by Raustiala (2002) and Slaughter A. M. (2014a, b). These works provide an overview of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s strategy regarding stock market law, Environmental Protection Agency’s approach in environmental matters, or the Department of Justice’s stance on antitrust law to expand US law worldwide. Another interesting work is Nye (1990). This work elaborates on the concept of soft power as one of the main instruments implemented by the United States to expand its regulatory models. Soft power means, inter alia (i) taking advantage of training officials from other countries; (ii) providing technical assistance; (iii) establishing coordinating bodies, and (iv) exchanging best practices.', 'Footnote ends. ', 'This work focuses on global criminal law. There will not be a detailed analysis of the other two frameworks or the most influential national legal orders; occasionally, we will discuss them for comparative purposes only.', '2 The Forces of Change', 'The emergence of post-state criminal law, whose patterns differ from those of classic international law, results from two main transformative elements that can be found in the various dimensions discussed below. First, there is relational sovereignty, a new concept of sovereignty downplaying the importance of the state-territory binomial and bringing new actors on the international relations stage. Second, there is a renewed concept of security; it legitimizes the appearance of new actors on stage while providing grounds to justify further control and prohibitions.', '2.1 Relational Sovereignty', 'The first driver of transformation is the metamorphosis of the ever elusive concept of sovereignty. The prevailing conception of sovereignty stems from the Peace of Westphalia. Westphalian sovereignty departs from feudalism and from the first state-building approaches. From then onward, power and authority became tied to a “spatial extension”: the territory (Badie 1995, Ruggie 1993). Within their borders, sovereign rulers exercise their power without any external meddling or interference from other rulers or from papal or imperial power (potestas legibus solutus). Westphalian sovereignty is the right to be left alone, to exclude, to be free from any external meddling or interference within each sovereign ruler’s spatial extension (Slaughter 2004).', 'According to this classic conception of sovereignty, when a sovereign state engages in relations with other states it does so on an equal footing with any others (sovereign equality), being an autonomous agent in the international community (Kelsen 1944). International treaties and conventions, the paramount source of international law, comply with this paradigm. International conventions become legitimate, come into force, and thus are incorporated into domestic law, upon ratification by national parliaments, who are entitled to make reservations or to withdraw from treaties (treaty denunciation) if they see fit. This model of international law barely interferes with state sovereignty. Under this paradigm, international law theory shares some aspects with contract law (pacta sunt servanda, the principle of good faith…), and international law standards are based on a principle that resembles free will: “The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will” (Lotus, PCIJ, Ser. A, no. 10, 18; Caeiro 2010).', 'International organizations also rely on the principle of sovereign equality, and their activity is based on fully respecting states and their territory. An expression of this respectful relationship is that international organizations address their decisions to member states, yet these decisions do not directly affect individuals. There is no doubt that states “own” international organizations. Traditional international institutions do not get involved in state-citizen relations; these are handled exclusively by sovereign authorities.', 'This approach to international relations implies that states interact with each other and with international organizations through a very specific branch: diplomatic missions. The remaining state bodies and officials are not empowered to engage in interstate relations or, let alone, to enter into agreements or strategic alliances. In the international arena, countries act as unitary states, meaning that their bodies, authorities, or internal departments have no international presence. As discussed in detail below, this remains the prevailing conception regarding international cooperation. When asked for assistance, judges, public prosecutors, and law enforcement authorities help each other, but they do not cooperate directly. In its most traditional version, judicial cooperation or assistance must be implemented by diplomatic officials. The same applies to legislatures: they are not involved in any treaty negotiations. National legislatures simply ratify conventions or, at best, they give advice to diplomatic authorities, but they do not negotiate.', 'After World War II, following a steady process beginning with the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the League of Nations, there was a paradigm shift in international law. A new version of classic international law appears, the so-called progressive Grotian tradition, which is now the prevailing paradigm. State sovereignty, that is, sovereignty of authorities over their citizens within their borders, will no longer be absolute. Post-World War II human rights conventions entail that human rights limit sovereign authorities’ scope of action within the territory (Ferrajoli 1998). Now, public international law is mostly concerned about individuals. The Nuremberg trials embody this new paradigm leading to countries’ loss of power. States, and thus individuals acting on their behalf, are no longer invisible for international law, and they can now be held liable subject to international law provisions.Footnote8 International law currently assumes the ability to intervene and to set aside the right to be left alone where states (i) violate human rights on their territory or (ii) are unable either to prevent human rights abuses or to ensure compliance with human rights inside their borders (Slaughter 2004 p. 284; Ferrajoli 1998 p. 177). Alongside this first paradigm shift in international law, there is a second transformation accounting for the rise of global law. As shown below, states no longer have a major role in rulemaking or regarding coercive enforcement. This transformation led to a new concept of sovereignty. There has been a transition from Westphalian sovereignty to a post-Westphalian or relational sovereignty (Chayes and Chayes 1995).', 'Some problems are no longer solved by the states’ ability to exercise their authority freely and in isolation within their borders. Exercising the ius puniendi based on their exclusive jurisdiction over their territory does not guarantee that states will be able to effectively tackle transnational crime, environmental protection issues, or financial market stability. In a globalized world, citizens face problems that are cross-border in nature. In order to solve these problems, states must be able (i) to enter into relations with other states, organizations, and companies as well as to (ii) create areas of joint government. The greater a state’s ability to set up networks with public or private actors, to cooperate with other states, or to impose its views in international institutions, the greater the state’s sovereignty or power. Within this new context, political scientists refer to soft power as the means to achieve certain objectives. Soft power prioritizes dialogue over coercion, by exchanging ideas in international networks, training foreign public officials, and giving advice (Nye 1990).', 'In contrast with traditional sovereignty, relational sovereignty entails sharing sovereignty and power with other states, with international organizations, and even with private stakeholders. The most remarkable players are the so-called government networks, which focus on very specific and highly specialized global matters such as banking supervision and regulation, the environment, as well as antitrust and securities law. These networks are the main rulemakers in global governance. As discussed below, there is a myriad of these informal organizations. Nation-based hierarchies and diplomatic missions do no longer meet. Depending on the network, the meeting participants are, inter alia, senior officials from stock market supervisory bodies, from antitrust authorities, banking supervisors, judges, or law enforcement authorities. Traditionally, states used to act en bloc, as a unit. However, under the new paradigm of international law, states are extremely disaggregated, fragmented, and represented by bodies and officials that freely and directly enter into relations with their foreign counterparts (Slaughter 2004; De Bellis 2020).', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-ADA-Nationals-at-Georgetown-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

b862fa66c062943b4f4609bfdbe921487532b551082085fb8f4b97201dd3f94f

2. DUA increases the risk.

Stoutland et al. 18 [Dr. Page O. Stoutland, PhD Vice President Scientific and Technical Affairs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Samantha Pitts-Kiefer is Senior Director of NTI’s Global Nuclear Policy Program, where she is responsible for NTI’s projects related to U.S.-Russia relations, U.S. nuclear policy, North Korea, and disarmament. “NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE NEW CYBER AGE REPORT OF THE CYBER-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STUDY GROUP REPORT OF THE CYBER-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STUDY GROUP,” DECIDE UNDER ATTACK?” SEPTEMBER 2018, https://www.cndpindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-IN-THE-NEW-CYBER-AGE.pdf, ///k-ng]

d u a after specified lower the bar for to order a nuc attack technical and procedural challenges to reversing a delayed order and leaks trigger attack uncomfortable with removing the human from the loop, arguing order would preclude other options assuming the president w as incapacitated

One option to reduce the pressure of decision time that was debated in the Study Group would be for the president to “ d ecide u nder a ttack ”—in other words, on being advised of an incoming nuclear attack, the president could order a nuclear response to be implemented after a specified period of time (e.g., 10 hours), perhaps in combination with another condition being met, such as confirm ation and attribution of a nuclear attack Others voiced deep concerns that this option could lower the bar for a president to order a nuc lear attack , albeit a delayed one; that there could be technical and procedural challenges to successfully reversing a delayed launch order ; and even that public leaks about the order could trigger a nuclear attack from another country. Moreover , some were generally uncomfortable with the idea of removing the human from the loop, arguing that if the order were carried out on this basis, it would preclude other options for response proportional to the actual scope of the attack and raise legal and chain-of-command issues, who ordered the response assuming the president w as incapacitated before the order was executed. This option requires additional study and debate. Additional decision time options must also be developed.

d u a

['One option to reduce the pressure of decision time that was debated in the Study Group would be for the president to “decide under attack”—in other words, on being advised of an incoming nuclear attack, the president could order a nuclear response to be implemented after a specified period of time (e.g., 10 hours), perhaps in combination with another condition being met, such as confirmation and attribution of a nuclear attack. Proponents of this option argued that it would allow for the possibility of reversal if the incoming attack were determined to be a false warning, but it would ensure a nuclear response if it were not false and would therefore strengthen deterrence. Others voiced deep concerns that this option could lower the bar for a president to order a nuclear attack, albeit a delayed one; that there could be technical and procedural challenges to successfully reversing a delayed launch order; and even that public leaks about the order could trigger a nuclear attack from another country. Moreover, some were generally uncomfortable with the idea of removing the human from the loop, arguing that if the order were carried out on this basis, it would preclude other options for response proportional to the actual scope of the attack and raise legal and chain-of-command issues, who ordered the response assuming the president was incapacitated before the order was executed. This option requires additional study and debate. Additional decision time options must also be developed. ', '']

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ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Aff-Long-Beach-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

a97a5e0a90817a36ebb22620c58dd4feac6f08dfbcdf5f774d53a833559b6194

Kills millions

Fred Guterl 12 – Guterl, executive editor – Scientific American, 11/28/’12 (Fred, “Armageddon 2.0,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

going without power across the U S would be devastating . the economy would cease People would die by the millions nuclear plants would fail causing meltdowns loss in human life would reach Cold War nuclear-exchange scenarios

The consequences of going without power across the U S would be devastating . Backup electrical generators would rely on fuel that would be in high demand. Grocery stores would run out of food no gasoline for trucks and airplanes, trains would be down the economy would cease simply trucking supplies would not be adequate to cover hundreds of millions of people. People would die by the millions nuclear plants would fail , causing meltdowns The loss in human life would quickly reach the worst Cold War nuclear-exchange scenarios . After eight days 72 percent of all economic activity would shut down

U S devastating the economy would cease People would die by the millions causing meltdowns The loss in human life would quickly reach the worst Cold War nuclear-exchange scenarios

["The consequences of going without power for months, across a large swath of the United States, would be devastating. Backup electrical generators in hospitals and other vulnerable facilities would have to rely on fuel that would be in high demand. Diabetics would go without their insulin; heart attack victims would not have their defibrillators; and sick people would have no place to go. Businesses would run out of inventory and extra capacity. Grocery stores would run out of food, and deliveries of all sorts would virtually cease (no gasoline for trucks and airplanes, trains would be down). As we saw with the blackouts caused by Hurricane Sandy, gas stations couldn't pump gas from their tanks, and fuel-carrying trucks wouldn't be able to fill up at refueling stations. Without power, the economy would virtually cease, and if power failed over a large enough portion of the country, simply trucking in supplies from elsewhere would not be adequate to cover the needs of hundreds of millions of people. People would start to die by the thousands, then by the tens of thousands, and eventually the millions. The loss of the power grid would put nuclear plants on backup, but how many of those systems would fail, causing meltdowns, as we saw at Fukushima? The loss in human life would quickly reach, and perhaps exceed, the worst of the Cold War nuclear-exchange scenarios. After eight to 10 days, about 72 percent of all economic activity, as measured by GDP, would shut down, according to an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert."]

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ndtceda

Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%20Aff-Northwestern-Round1.docx

Kentucky

BaDa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/BaDa/Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%2520Aff-Northwestern-Round1.docx

5e4db0f56178169e506e5f9bd85e64b69aeee47c9ad89706a11051881782b54d

Antitrust laws are statutes

Kalbfleisch 61(KALBFLEISCH, District Judge. Opinion in Paul M. Harrod Company v. AB Dick Company, 194 F. Supp. 502 - Dist. Court, ND Ohio 1961. Google scholar caselaw, date accessed 9/11/21)

"antitrust laws" only statutes "antitrust laws" could not be construed as a judgment or decree by a court in connection with an antitrust case Such decrees do not reflect prohibitions of antitrust laws but seek to dissipate effects of conduct To permit such a decree is so obviously beyond the scope of the term as to require no further discussion

The definition of "antitrust laws" embraces only statutes Even without such a definition the term "antitrust laws" could not be construed as pertaining to a judgment or decree entered by a court in connection with an antitrust case filed by the Government. Such decrees do not reflect prohibitions of the antitrust laws but seek to dissipate the effects of the past conduct frequently enjoin performance of acts lawful in themselves To permit such a decree is so obviously beyond the scope of the term "antitrust laws," as used in the statute, as to require no further discussion

embraces only statutes Even without not a judgment or decree entered by a court prohibitions such a decree is so obviously beyond the scope of the term "antitrust laws," as used in the statute, as to require no further discussion

['The definition of "antitrust laws" in 15 U.S.C.A. § 12, clearly embraces only the statutes described therein. Even without such a definition the term "antitrust laws" could not be construed as pertaining to a judgment or decree entered by a court in connection with an antitrust case filed by the Government. Such decrees do not necessarily reflect the prohibitions of the antitrust laws but may, by their terms, seek to dissipate the effects of the past conduct of the parties and, to this end, frequently enjoin performance of acts lawful in themselves. To permit a private party to recover damages for violation of any provision of such a decree is so obviously beyond the scope of the term "antitrust laws," as used in the statute, as to require no further discussion.']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-6%20-%20Texas%20Two%20Step%202-Semis.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-6%2520-%2520Texas%2520Two%2520Step%25202-Semis.docx

a01d898de9c59dba3e799570e9157ba50abc6d3eafc7d7f2569e3cc733549490

Rights spill over, ending animal testing.

Richard L. Cupp 09, John W. Wade Professor of Law in the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine University, J.D. from the University of California, Davis School of Law, “Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Contractualist Critique,” San Diego Law Review, Vol. 46, Winter 2009, accessed via Nexis Advance

Regarding scientific research rights inflict significant costs animals in scientific research has been instrumental in medical advances improved veterinary medicine if animals were given rights experiments that do not involve pain could be halted because consent activists see this as a stepping stone toward broader rights would [ destroy ] research

Regarding scientific research , assignment of rights would inflict significant costs Use of animals in scientific research has been instrumental in most major medical advances In addition to saving countless human lives, research using animals improved animals' lives through advancements in veterinary medicine if all animals capable of suffering were given rights , even experiments that do not involve pain could be halted because animals are not capable of consent ing to the treatment Even if only particularly intelligent animals were immediately assigned rights, many activists see this as a mere stepping stone toward a broader assignment of rights to all animals capable of suffering such a broad assignment of rights would [ destroy ] scientific research involving animals assigning rights would destroy the ability to use many primates in research

significant costs instrumental most major medical advances not capable consent stepping stone destroy primates

["Regarding scientific research, assignment of rights would inflict significant costs on both humans and animals. Use of animals in scientific research has been instrumental in most major medical advances in the past century. 303 In addition to saving countless human lives, research using animals has also improved animals' lives through advancements in veterinary medicine. 304 According to a 1997 study by the United States Department of Agriculture, in ninety-two percent of animal research experiments the animal does not experience pain. 305 However, if all animals capable of suffering were given dignity rights, even experiments that do not involve pain could arguably be halted because the animals are not capable of consenting to the treatment. 306 Even if only particularly intelligent animals were immediately assigned rights, many rights activists would see this as a mere stepping stone toward a broader assignment of rights to all animals capable of suffering; such a broad assignment of rights would [destroy] cripple most scientific research involving animals. 307 Further, even in the short term, assigning rights to particularly intelligent animals would destroy the ability to use many primates - the animals whose bodies are closest to human bodies - in research. 308"]

[(11, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Indiana-Round-1.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

ae22db0f0b2814a777eb34a97284b2dce851264c1a27ac58335d976147fa7c72

US human rights pressure on China backfires and bolsters Chinese nationalism

Gruffydd-Jones 18 (Jamie Gruffydd-Jones will be a lecturer (assistant professor) in politics and international relations at the University of Kent from September 2018. He graduated with a PhD in public affairs from Princeton University. “Citizens and Condemnation: Strategic Uses of International Human Rights Pressure in Authoritarian States.” Comparative Political Studies. Vol 52, Issue 4, 2019. First Published August 14, 2018 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414018784066)

people rely on political identities to interpret foreign comment s in China the main source of group identity is the nation people’s attachment to their nation is a major factor in determining their response to foreign pressure People are motivated to defend their group International pressure on h r may do this this may evoke concerns that the country is being denigrated internationally people are “ emotionally” motivated to interpret information in ways that defends their group’s image when citizens hear that their country has been denounced they feel the need to defend against the threat and as a result that h r are respected when there is a link between the pressure and geopolitical competition citizens consider a threat to their nation’s standing when the pressure appears to be part of a deliberate attempt to denigrate the nation . if human rights pressure comes from a geopolitical rival authoritarian rulers internationalize” h r to make their public interpret information about those violations in terms of defending their nation

citizens are not always rational actors Studies of transnational persuasion have shown that people may not act in a Bayesian manner, but instead rely on their own partisan political identities to cue how they interpret foreign comment s , in autocracies like China there is little clear political polarization in the country due to the lack of political opposition and, as a result, the ideological spectrum in the country “does not delineate a cleavage between those who support regime policies and those who oppose them the main source of group identity is the nation 98% of Chinese citizens said that they saw themselves as part of the Chinese nation In countries like China, people’s attachment to their nation is likely to be a major factor in determining their response to foreign pressure people wish to maintain a positive image of their group in relation to other groups to maintain their self-esteem People are therefore motivated to defend their group against anything that might threaten that positive comparison International pressure on one’s nation’s h uman r ights situation may do precisely this , by suggesting that the nation does not respect human rights, and that other countries or organizations disapprove of its actions when citizens hear criticism of their country’s treatment of its minority groups this may evoke concerns that the country is being denigrated internationally people do not just look to form accurate opinions, but also opinions that fit a particular self-interested goal, such as maintaining a positive self-image people are “ emotionally” motivated to interpret new information in ways that defends their group’s image If the threatening information comes from outsiders, people may be even more likely to reject it ( on encountering information that threatens their preexisting beliefs or group image, people develop counterarguments This backfire effect may be particularly strong when people encounter information that directly threatens their social group For human rights pressure, this implies that when citizens hear that their country has been denounced over its human rights conditions, if they feel the need to defend against the threat to their nation’s image, then they may develop counterarguments, thinking through reasons for why human rights are in fact well respected at home, and as a result become more likely to believe that h uman r ights are indeed well respected . when there is a salient link between the pressure and citizens’ sense of their country’s standing in geopolitical competition citizens consider the issue not just in terms of the content of the human rights issues themselves, the individual injustices or repression, but also in terms of a threat to their nation’s standing This should be especially likely when the pressure appears to be part of a deliberate attempt to denigrate the nation . the sense of threat to their own self-worth is activated, and so is the need to fight back. They develop counterarguments against this threat and, as a result, become more positive about their country’s human rights. geopolitical competition will be particularly salient is if human rights pressure comes from a source that is a major geopolitical rival authoritarian rulers have incentives to “ internationalize” h uman r ights violations to make their public interpret information about those violations in terms of defending their nation Leaders therefore have incentives to use their control of state media to strategically pass on pressure from geopolitical rivals, especially when that rivalry is most hostile, and to censor pressure from other sources

citizens are not always rational actors partisan political identities to cue how they interpret foreign comment lack of political opposition the main source of group identity is the nation people’s attachment to their nation International pressure on one’s nation’s h uman r ights situation may do precisely this concerns that the country is being denigrated internationally emotionally” motivated to interpret new information they feel the need to defend against the threat become more likely to believe that h uman r ights are indeed well respected . their country’s standing in geopolitical competition in terms of a threat to their nation’s standing deliberate attempt to denigrate the nation the sense of threat to their own self-worth is activated, and so is the need to fight back. become more positive about their country’s human rights. if human rights pressure comes from a source that is a major geopolitical rival to make their public interpret information about those violations in terms of defending their nation

['A common thread in these arguments is that criticism itself is damaging for the regime. This damage may not be great enough to worry about, or may be outweighed by the benefits from being seen to report it, but the assumption is that all else being equal, rulers would rather their population not hear disparaging remarks about their rule. In this view, citizens are rational Bayesian updaters (Gerber & Green, 1999), taking in information from credible sources that human rights are not well respected in their country and downgrading their views about human rights conditions. They will then be more likely to support domestic activism and challenge their government over these conditions.', 'But citizens are not always rational actors. They bring their own biases and motivations, which may influence how they respond to new information about their country. If we are to fully understand the impacts of international pressure, we need to examine how individuals actually respond to critical information and what this means for their support for their government’s actions. Studies of transnational persuasion have shown that people may not act in a Bayesian manner, but instead rely on their own partisan political identities to cue how they interpret foreign comments (Bush & Jamal, 2014; Dragojlovic, 2015; Hayes & Guardino, 2011). Marinov (n.d.), for example, shows that disparaging foreign comments about democracy in Turkey could downgrade people’s beliefs about freedoms in the country—but only if those comments were supported by their partisan political elites.', 'However, in autocracies like China with few political parties, partisan political identities are not the clear identity markers that they might be in the United States or Turkey. Pan and Xu (n.d.) argue that there is little clear political polarization in the country due to the lack of political opposition and, as a result, the ideological spectrum in the country “does not delineate a cleavage between those who support regime policies and those who oppose them” (p. 1). Instead, the main source of group identity is the nation: In the 2012 World Values Survey, 98% of Chinese citizens said that they saw themselves as part of the Chinese nation, while 90% said they were proud of their country.9 According to Rosen and Fewsmith (2001), nationalist sentiments are some of the main ways through which citizens express their opinions in public in China.', 'In countries like China, people’s attachment to their nation is likely to be a major factor in determining their response to foreign pressure. According to social identity theory, part of a person’s self-concept comes from his or her membership in this kind of social group (Tajfel, 1978). The theory argues that people wish to maintain a positive image of their group in relation to other groups to maintain their self-esteem (Abrahms & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), such that “the better one’s group looks in comparison with other groups, the more status the group gains, and the more self-esteem it can provide for its members” (Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009, p. 661).', 'People are therefore motivated to defend their group against anything that might threaten that positive comparison (Sherman & Kim, 2005; Steele, 1988). One direct way in which the group’s image (and its members’ self-esteem) may be threatened is through information that frames the group in a bad light. International pressure on one’s nation’s human rights situation may do precisely this, by suggesting that the nation does not respect human rights, and that other countries or organizations disapprove of its actions.', 'In this case, when citizens hear criticism of their country’s treatment of its minority groups, for example, this may evoke not just concerns about minority rights, but also concerns that the country is being denigrated internationally. To defend their country (and their self-worth) from this kind of threat, group members have a number of options. One way is through defensive biases in how they process the threatening information (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). According to the theory of motivated reasoning, people do not just look to form accurate opinions, but also opinions that fit a particular self-interested goal, such as maintaining a positive self-image (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Extensive scholarship has shown that people undergo “biased assimilation” of new information to fit it to their partisan prior beliefs (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) and the prevalent beliefs of their social group (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006).', 'Others have shown how people are “emotionally” motivated to interpret new information in ways that defends their group’s image (Green et al., 2004; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Steele, 1988). On hearing information that threatens the positive image of their social group, people disregard any desire to form accurate opinions, and instead reject the information (De Hoog, 2013). If the threatening information comes from outsiders, people may be even more likely to reject it (Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthorpe, 2004). This effect appears to be limited to critical information (people are no more likely to believe praise from ingroups than outgroups), leading Hornsey and colleagues (2004) to argue that group-based criticisms are a “unique subset of persuasive messages in the sense that they directly threaten the (collective) self-concept” (p. 501).', 'Patriots rejecting out of hand information that criticizes their nation is, perhaps, not surprising. However, importantly, studies have also shown that on encountering information that threatens their preexisting beliefs or group image, people do not merely reject the information, but also spend longer time processing it, taking time to develop counterarguments (De Hoog, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006). De Hoog (2013) shows that on reading a passage that criticized their social group, people who identified with that group perceived the information to be more threatening and spent considerably longer time reading the passage. By developing these counterarguments, people may develop stronger opinions in the opposite direction, in what is known as a “boomerang” or “backfire” effect. A number of authors have shown that upon encountering information incongruent with their prior opinions, people may hold their original belief even more strongly (Lodge & Taber, 2000; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, & Udan, 2013; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Schaffner and Roche (2016) find, for example, that Republicans surveyed following news of the drop in the unemployment rate in 2012 believed that the level of unemployment was higher than those surveyed before the news.', 'This backfire effect may be particularly strong when people encounter information that directly threatens their social group. Trevors, Muis, Pekrun, Sinatra, and Winne (2016) find that people feel confusion and frustration when they encounter information that challenges a valued part of their identity, and that the backfire effect in response to this challenging information comes as a direct result of these negative emotions. For human rights pressure, this implies that when citizens hear that their country has been denounced over its human rights conditions, if they feel the need to defend against the threat to their nation’s image, then they may develop counterarguments, thinking through reasons for why human rights are in fact well respected at home, and as a result become more likely to believe that human rights are indeed well respected.', 'When do people respond to critical information as rational actors, and when does pressure backfire in this manner? Nyhan and Reifler (2015) acknowledge that the backfire effect in response to the correction of misperceptions is itself rare and has only been documented on certain issues, what they call the most “affect-laden” issues. It is only on controversial topics that have come to symbolically represent bipartisan competition in the United States, like the war in Iraq (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) or the Affordable Care Act (Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel, 2013)—topics that people see in terms of their partisan disagreements, not the content of the issues themselves—that partisans strengthen their misperceptions. On matters less clearly linked to this competition, people generally act in a Bayesian fashion (Wood & Porter, 2016).', 'In the same way, I argue that in most cases citizens do indeed interpret human rights pressure in terms of the human rights issue being discussed. They respond as rational Bayesian updaters to the information that human rights are not well respected, becoming more likely to believe that those rights need to be improved. However, when there is a salient link between the pressure and citizens’ sense of their country’s standing in geopolitical competition, citizens consider the issue not just in terms of the content of the human rights issues themselves, the individual injustices or repression, but also in terms of a threat to their nation’s standing. This should be especially likely when the pressure appears to be part of a deliberate attempt to denigrate the nation. If this occurs, then the sense of threat to their own self-worth is activated, and so is the need to fight back. They develop counterarguments against this threat and, as a result, become more positive about their country’s human rights.', 'One way in which this sense of geopolitical competition will be particularly salient is if human rights pressure comes from a source that is a major geopolitical rival. As Rousseau (1999) shows, people’s attention to relative versus absolute gains increases significantly when they are considering states that are economic or military opponents. Pressure on the Soviet Union from the United States would have been intimately tied to relative standings in Cold War competition, in a way that pressure from Cuba would not. Pressure from a geopolitical rival like the United States would have been more likely to appear hostile, a deliberate attempt to use the pressure to denigrate the Soviet nation and its image, to bring the country down in Cold War competition. The threat to the nation’s image becomes particularly clear and salient, and so does the need to fight back, to defend against this attempt to denigrate the nation. This threat will also vary over time, as the rivalry increases and decreases in intensity. If the Soviet Union were involved in an ongoing conflict or geopolitical dispute with the United States, then international competition would have been even more salient, pressure would have been seen as even more hostile, and should have evoked an even greater backfire effect. If relations were benign, then this sense of hostility (and therefore the backfire effect) should have been lower.', 'This argument implies that authoritarian rulers have incentives to “internationalize” human rights violations—to make their public interpret information about those violations in terms of defending their nation. Leaders therefore have incentives to use their control of state media to strategically pass on pressure from geopolitical rivals, especially when that rivalry is most hostile, and to censor pressure from other sources.', '']

[(0, 17)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

3799d284dcf3069d3f4f40e15f8388287d1569b94887c2f32bc13213b0b97931

It’s less than 1% of media and history disproves the impact.

Pinker ’19 [Dr. Steven, Johnstone Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, “Why We Are Not Living in a Post‑Truth Era”, https://www.skeptic.com/reading_room/steven-pinker-on-why-we-are-not-living-in-a-post-truth-era/]

Aren’t we post-truth “no.” retire this cliché politicians always lied leading to Spanish-American war First World War Vietnam and Iraq “fake news.” is not new long history is by no means confined fake news took up a minuscule proportion of communications (far less than 1 percent) and was mainly at partisans impervious to persuasion hardly surprising : unless you were already in a rightwing fever if you came across a post you treat it as what it is

Aren’t we living in a post-truth era? “no.” Consider the statement “We are living in a post-truth era.” Is it true? If so, it cannot be true. As for the “post-truth era,” journalists should retire this cliché It comes from the observation that politicians lies a lot. But politicians have always lied the bending of truth has long been consequential, leading to the Spanish-American war , the First World War , the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War, right up to the near miss in the Persian Gulf in 2019 Another inspiration is the recent prominence of “fake news.” But this, too, is not a new development the long history is by no means confined to America fake news took up a minuscule proportion of the online communications (far less than 1 percent) and was mainly directed at partisans who were impervious to persuasion This is hardly surprising : unless you were already marinated in a rightwing fever swamp, if you came across a social media post claiming Clinton was running a child sex ring you would treat it as exactly what it is

“no.” cliché lies always long Spanish-American war First World War Vietnam Iraq “fake news.” not a new development long history no means minuscule proportion (far less than 1 percent) mainly partisans impervious to persuasion hardly surprising rightwing fever exactly what it is

['Anyone who urges universities to live up to their mission of promoting knowledge, truth, and reason is bound to be confronted with the objection that these aspirations are just so 20th century. Aren’t we living in a post-truth era? Haven’t cognitive psychologists shown that humans are fundamentally irrational? Mustn’t we acknowledge that the pursuit of disinterested reason and objective truth are Enlightenment anachronisms?', 'The answer to all of these questions is “no.”', 'First, we are not living in a post-truth era. Why not? Consider the statement “We are living in a post-truth era.” Is it true? If so, it cannot be true.', 'Likewise, it is not the case that humans are irrational. Consider the statement, “Humans are irrational.” Is that statement rational? If it is, it cannot be true—at least, if it is uttered and understood by humans. (It would be another thing if it was an observation exchanged among an advanced race of space aliens.) If humans were truly irrational, who specified the benchmark of rationality against which humans don’t measure up? How did they conduct the comparison? Why should we believe them? Indeed, how could we understand them?', 'In his book The Last Word, the philosopher Thomas Nagel showed that truth, objectivity, and reason are not negotiable.2 As soon as you start making a case against them, you are making a case, which means you are implicitly committed to reason. Nagel calls this argument Cartesian, after Descartes’ famous argument that just as the very fact that one is pondering one’s existence shows that one must exist, the very fact that one is examining the validity of reason shows that one is committed to reason. A corollary is that we don’t defend or justify or believe in reason, and we certainly do not, as it is sometimes claimed, have faith in reason. As Nagel puts it, each of these is “one thought too many.” We don’t believe in reason; we use reason.', 'This may sound like logic-chopping, but it’s built into the way we make everyday arguments. As long as you’re not bribing or threatening your listeners to mouth agreement with you, but trying to persuade them that you’re right—that they should believe you, that you’re not lying, or full of crap— then you have conceded the primacy of reason. As soon as you try to argue that we should believe things by any route other than reason, you’ve lost the argument, because you’ve appealed to reason. That is why a defense of reason is unnecessary, perhaps even impossible.', 'As for the “post-truth era,” journalists should retire this cliché unless they can keep up a tone of scathing irony. It comes from the observation that some politicians—one in particular—lies a lot. But politicians have always lied. They say that in war, truth is the first casualty, and that can be true of political war as well. (The expression “credibility gap” had its heyday during the administration of Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s.) And the bending or inverting of truth by people in power has long been consequential, leading, for example, to the Spanish-American war, the First World War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War, right up to the near miss in the Persian Gulf in 2019.', 'Another inspiration for the post-truth cliché is the recent prominence of “fake news.” But this, too, is not a new development. The title of the James Cortada and William Aspray’s forthcoming Fake News Nation: The Long History of Lies and Misinterpretations in America, is self-explanatory, though the long history is by no means confined to America.3 The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the hoaxed proceedings of a secret meeting of Jews plotting global domination, was advanced as fact by a number of prominent people in subsequent decades, including the industrialist Henry Ford. Countless pogroms, lynchings, and deadly ethnic riots have been sparked by rumors of the alleged perfidy of some minority group.', 'And the belief that fake news is displacing the truth itself needs to be examined for its truth. In their analysis of fake news in the 2016 American presidential election, Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler found that it took up a minuscule proportion of the online communications (far less than 1 percent) and was mainly directed at partisans who were impervious to persuasion.4 This is hardly surprising: unless you were already marinated in a rightwing fever swamp, if you came across a social media post claiming that Hillary Clinton was running a child sex ring out of a Washington DC pizzeria, you would treat it as exactly what it is.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-CEDA-Round5.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-CEDA-Round5.docx

3f53225438d42a9f14ebac8c2fdbc6847cffb274e9eff1d44ce0f133121e2b80

Political capital doesn’t solve OR deplete.

Waldman ’20 [Paul; December 2; Communication PhD at the University of Pennsylvania, Politics Columnist at the Washington Post; Washington Post, “Joe Biden has to move fast,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/12/02/joe-biden-has-move-fast/]

Obama made mistake of thinking initiatives had to be one at time because finite p c But p c is not apart from issue isn’t special parties polarized p c become meaningless no account Biden can draw to turn no to “ yes .” nothing to be gained by putting off any agenda Republicans implementing total opposition only option is not to care

Obama made the mistake of thinking major initiatives had to be rolled out one at a time because he had finite p c But p c is not something that exists apart from any issue isn’t a special sauce that has to be poured to make it palatable with the parties as polarized p c has become meaningless There is no account Biden can draw on to turn Republican “ no ” to “ yes .” There’s nothing to be gained by putting off any part of Biden’s agenda . Whatever he can do he should do a s s oon a s p ossible Republicans will complain Biden is being partisan , uncompromising It will be a strategy to convince everyone of the lie Biden and Democrats might be able to find some way of winning them over , when in fact they’ll be implementing total opposition only option is not to care about Republican whining

mistake major initiatives one at a time finite p c p c any issue a special sauce poured palatable polarized p c meaningless no account no yes nothing any part agenda a s a p will partisan uncompromising everyone winning them over total opposition only option not to care Republican whining

['As David Roberts of Vox observes: In 2009, Obama and his aides made the mistake of thinking that their major initiatives had to be rolled out one at a time in sequence, because he had a finite store of “political capital” that had to be spent carefully. But political capital is not something that exists apart from any particular issue; it isn’t a special sauce that has to be poured on a policy in order to make it palatable.', 'And with the parties as polarized and unified as they are, political capital has become all but meaningless. There may have been a time when a popular president possessed so much capital that a senator from the opposition party would feel compelled to support him on part of that president’s agenda, but that time is long gone. There is no account Biden can draw on to turn Republican “no” votes into “yes.”', 'So setting up a series of high-profile policy battles may be the opposite of what Biden should do. The unfortunate fact is that he may not have the opportunity to do much in the way of big legislation on health care or climate change or anything else, and if he has only executive power to work with, it makes it all the more urgent to move quickly.', 'Which means getting staff in place immediately and then unleashing them. The Revolving Door Project argues that Biden should give as much authority as possible to the agencies to let them dismantle their particular corners of the Trump legacy on their own, because the task “simply will not happen if approached sequentially or micromanaged” by a White House staff with limited bandwidth.', 'That means moving on every policy area all at once. There’s nothing to be gained by putting off any part of Biden’s agenda. Whatever he can do given the limits of his power, he should do as soon as possible, in a flood of policymaking.', 'Even if Democrats win both Georgia races and control the Senate, Biden should acknowledge that he likely has two years until the 2022 midterm elections to pass whatever legislation he can. Not only will Democrats probably lose one or both houses in the inevitable backlash (as happens to most presidents in their first midterm), the only possible chance at forestalling that result is to get results, as many as possible, that he can show the voters.', 'Republicans will complain that Biden is being partisan, uncompromising, taking a “my way or the highway” approach. It will be a strategy to convince everyone of the lie that Biden and Democrats might be able to find some way of winning them over, when in fact they’ll be implementing a strategy of total opposition.', 'If Biden follows them on that fruitless quest, he’ll be running in circles while crucial time passes and nothing gets done. The only option for him is to decide not to care about Republican whining and do what he got elected to do with all haste. The alternative is failure.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Aff-Wake-Round-7.docx

Michigan

ShGa

fb4ed5059661e5622984ed54a5bc019761dc53d30f366bbd7526cc33c85ae5ec

Defining our nuclear redlines causes Japanese nuclearization absent confidence building measures.

Nobumasa Akiyama 22, Professor at the School of International and Public Policy and the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Senior Associate Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Ph.D. in Law from Hitotsubashi University, “‘No first use’ in the context of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Asian Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015652

interest of the U S and Japan to keep Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang guessing about the threshold at which the U S will consider nuc s avoiding red lines, is necessary for the alliance Not many believe Beijing would be more restrained if the U S would not resort to nuclear weapons China’s NFU does not seem to have had a positive impact on U.S. policy as capabilities improved it has become difficult to separate conventional from nuclear There is not common understanding about the role of nuclear weapons it is necessary for the U S and Japan) to work together to design arms control and confidence measures Japan finds it difficult to foresee how the U S and China will approach challenges preventing a bold step toward disarmament and is strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance to reinforce the credibility of extended deterrence For Japan, a U.S. NFU would only be a positive if it would not be a pathway toward, but an outcome of confidence-building . What is needed is multilayered strategic and arms control dialogue among primary players of regional security dynamics common understandings grow strategic stability, and the reduced role of nuclear weapons Mutually agreed NFU declarations would be more effective if they emerge from this process

it is in the interest s of the U nited S tates and Japan to keep Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang guessing about the threshold at which the U nited S tates will consider nuc lear weapon s avoiding red lines, is necessary for the alliance Not many in the U.S.-Japan strategic community believe Beijing would be more restrained if it were assured the U nited S tates would not resort to nuclear weapons It is hard to ignore the fact that China’s NFU does not seem to have had a positive impact on U.S. declaratory policy as the capabilities of conventional weapons significantly improved and their strategic value increased, it has become difficult to separate conventional from nuclear weapons There is not a common understanding among countries about the appropriate role of nuclear weapons it is necessary for the U nited S tates ( and Japan) to work together to design arms control and confidence building measures Japan finds it difficult to foresee how the U nited S tates and China will approach these challenges this uncertainty is preventing Japan from a bold step toward nuclear disarmament and instead is strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and leading allies to try to reinforce the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence For Japan, a U.S. NFU declaration would only be seen in a positive light if it would not be a pathway toward, but an outcome of confidence-building . What is needed is a multilayered strategic and arms control dialogue among primary players of regional security dynamics , namely the U nited S tates and China among the U nited S tates, China and Japan, and another that adds Russia, South Korea and Australia Through this common understandings can grow on the management of strategic competition, modalities of strategic stability, and the reduced role of nuclear weapons in these relationships. Mutually agreed NFU declarations among regional nuclear armed states would be more effective in reducing nuclear risks if they emerge from this process

U S U S necessary for the alliance U S does not not a common understanding U S work together difficult to foresee U S bold step strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance reinforce the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence only be seen in a positive light if it would not be a pathway toward, but an outcome of confidence-building U S U S common understandings can grow reduced role of nuclear weapons Mutually agreed

['Therefore, it is in the interests of the United States and Japan to keep Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang guessing about the exact threshold at which the United States will consider using nuclear weapons. Such “calculated ambiguity,” or avoiding a clear indication of red lines, is seen as a smart and necessary policy for the alliance. This is because the more certain adversaries are about the threshold at which the United States and Japan will use a certain level of force, the more confident they can be about taking the initiative below that threshold. Not many in the U.S.-Japan strategic community believe Beijing would be any more restrained in a crisis if it were assured that the United States would not resort to nuclear weapons unless China attacked first, i.e., if it were assured that it would strictly adhere to NFU. Conversely, if a NFU pledge is not seriously believed by its adversaries, will this declaratory policy really lead to a reduction in tensions and the role of nuclear weapons as intended? It is hard to ignore the fact that China’s long-standing NFU declaration does not seem to have had a positive impact on U.S. declaratory policy or posture.', 'Changes in the current strategic environment could also have a negative impact on the effectiveness of NFU declarations. Today, as the capabilities of conventional weapons, such as missile defense, hypersonic glide vehicles, and drones, have significantly improved and their strategic value has increased, it has become difficult to clearly separate conventional weapons from nuclear weapons in terms of their strategic roles. In addition, because the geographic areas that define the strategic interests of the United States and China are different, it has become difficult to distinguish between so-called “strategic weapons” and “sub-strategic weapons.” There is not necessarily a common understanding among countries about the appropriate role of nuclear weapons in this new strategic environment. Rather, there is concern about the possibility of over-reliance on nuclear weapons.', 'In order to reduce nuclear risks in such a complex security environment and hence build an effective and stable strategic relationship between the United States and China, it is necessary for the United States (and Japan) to: (1) comprehensively assess each country’s nuclear policy, including the consistency of nuclear posture, force structure and doctrine, rather than simply seeking a simple quantitative balance and (2) conceive a deterrence strategy that integrates conventional and nuclear forces, taking into account everything from deterrence in the “gray zone” to management of nuclear escalation.29 Japan and the United States should work together to design arms control and confidence building measures based on these assessments, while developing a strategy for deterrence in this complex security environment. In this context, it is easy to imagine Japan and the United States asking China, Russia, and North Korea to improve transparency.', 'At the same time, Japan finds it difficult to foresee how the United States and China will approach these challenges. It can be said that this uncertainty is preventing Japan from taking a bold step toward nuclear disarmament and instead is strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and leading allies to try to reinforce the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.', 'For Japan, a U.S. NFU declaration would only be seen in a positive light if it would not be a pathway toward, but an outcome of confidence-building. What is needed is a multilayered (more precisely three-layered) strategic and arms control dialogue among primary players of regional security dynamics, namely one between the United States and China, one among the United States, China and Japan, and another that adds Russia, South Korea and Australia.30 Through this dialogue mechanism, common understandings can grow on the management of strategic competition, modalities of strategic stability, and the reduced role of nuclear weapons in these relationships. Mutually agreed NFU declarations among regional nuclear armed states would be more effective in reducing nuclear risks if they emerge from this type of confidence-building process.']

[(9, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-NU-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

47608a42049cf29d48adba3c7135d3c061c2fca76bf760dbae7d174f0010cbe8

They’ll quickly proliferate—they have the resources—NFU puts the nail in the coffin.

Chilton ’17 [Kevin P. Chilton, Gen.(ret.), U.S. Air Force and former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, “On US Nuclear Deterrence,” STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY, Winter 2017, p. 10-11]

assurance support alliances and nonprolif So Ko have the knowhow , tools , and materials available to field nuc s countries hang in the balance between assurance and prolif So Ko are capable . They could join the nuclear club quickly if no longer assured

assurance is critical to support US alliances and nonprolif eration policy So uth Ko rea have the knowhow , tools , and materials available to field nuc s countries hang in the balance between assurance and possible prolif eration So uth Ko rea are capable . They could join the nuclear club quickly if no longer assured

assurance critical alliances nonprolif eration knowhow tools materials field nuc s hang balance assurance prolif eration capable quickly no longer

['', 'To rebuild assurance the United States successfully persuaded Japan that the bomber leg of the triad could be deployed in theater and was flexible enough to deliver capabilities similar to the TLAM/N, for example, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and/or gravity bombs. Subsequent deployments of elements of the bomber leg to Guam have served to reassure the Japanese and the South Koreans. Indeed, when bomber training missions are flown over the Korean peninsula or in the Western Pacific they serve two purposes: to deter North Korean aggression and, just as importantly, to assure the South Koreans and the Japanese that the US nuclear umbrella is very real and credible. Again, assurance is critical to support US alliances and US nonproliferation policy. Japan and South Korea certainly have the knowhow, tools, and materials available to field a nuclear arsenal, but the United States does not currently believe that their doing so would be in either their interests or ours.', 'During the 2016 presidential campaign, a candidate suggested it might be cheaper if Japan and South Korea developed their own nuclear weapons. But we must ask ourselves, would that result in a safer world? Today, several countries hang in the balance between assurance and possible proliferation. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are capable. They could join the nuclear club quickly if no longer assured. If Shiite Iran were to build a nuclear weapon, it is likely Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia would respond in kind. And if Saudi Arabia went nuclear, would Turkey be interested in doing the same? Egypt? While none of these proliferation scenarios are certain, they are possible, and it is not likely that a world with this level of proliferation would be a safer place. ', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-1---NU-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

b9ace74913f30c3327467d17715a306f5662e733e8d00a23f5cab2f0addda9f6

US-EU trade relations are strong.

Reuters 21, published in Al Jazeera. (6-15-2021, "EU and US call truce in Trump-era trade war", Al Jazeera, )

Biden ended a Trump trade war when he met E U leaders by agreeing to a truce in a transatlantic dispute over aircraft The two agreed to remove tariffs This meeting started with a breakthrough on aircraft Biden is seeking European support to defend liberal democracies in the face of a assertive Russia and China Freezing trade conflicts gives both sides time to focus on broader agendas such as China Biden sees the EU as an ally in promoting free trade fighting climate change and ending the pandemic

Biden ended a Trump -era trade war when he met E U leaders Tuesday by agreeing to a truce in a transatlantic dispute over aircraft subsidies we have great opportunities to work closely with the EU as well as NATO The two sides agreed to remove tariffs on 11.5bn of goods from wine to tobacco for five years. The tariffs were imposed on a tit-for-tat basis over mutual frustration with subsidies for US planemaker Boeing and European rival Airbus This meeting has started with a breakthrough on aircraft we move from litigation to cooperation on aircraft Biden repeated his mantra – “America is back” He is seeking European support to defend Western liberal democracies in the face of a more assertive Russia and China ’s military and economic rise . Russia and China are seeking to drive a wedge in our transatlantic solidarity Freezing trade conflicts gives both sides time to focus on broader agendas such as China The EU and the US are the world’s top trading powers Biden sees the EU as an ally in promoting free trade , as well as in fighting climate change and ending the COVID-19 pandemic .

ended truce transatlantic dispute aircraft subsidies great opportunities remove tariffs 11.5bn breakthrough on aircraft cooperation seeking European support defend Western liberal democracies more assertive Russia China ’s rise drive a wedge in our transatlantic solidarity Freezing trade conflicts gives both sides time to focus on broader agendas such as China top trading powers ally promoting free trade fighting climate change ending the COVID-19 pandemic

['', 'United States President Joe Biden ended one front in a Trump-era trade war when he met European Union leaders on Tuesday by agreeing to a truce in a transatlantic dispute over aircraft subsidies that has dragged on for 17 years. Quoting Irish poet WB Yeats at the start of his first EU-US summit as president, Biden also said the world was shifting and that Western democracies needed to come together. “The world has changed, changed utterly,” Biden, an Irish-American, said, citing from the poem Easter 1916, in remarks that pointed towards the themes of his eight-day trip through Europe: China’s rise, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. Sitting at an oval table in the EU’s headquarters with US cabinet officials, he told EU institution leaders that the bloc and the US working together was “the best answer to deal with these changes” that he said brought “great anxiety”. He earlier told reporters he had very different opinions from his predecessor. Former President Donald Trump also visited the EU institutions, in May 2017, but later imposed tariffs on the EU and promoted Brexit – the United Kingdom’s departure from the bloc. “I think we have great opportunities to work closely with the EU as well as NATO and we feel quite good about it,” Biden said after walking through the futuristic glass Europa Building, also known as The Egg, to the summit meeting room with EU institution leaders. “It’s overwhelmingly in the interest of the USA to have a great relationship with NATO and the EU. I have very different views than my predecessor,” he said. The two sides agreed to remove tariffs on $11.5bn of goods from EU wine to US tobacco and spirits for five years. The tariffs were imposed on a tit-for-tat basis over mutual frustration with state subsidies for US planemaker Boeing and European rival Airbus. “This meeting has started with a breakthrough on aircraft,” European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen said. “This really opens a new chapter in our relationship because we move from litigation to cooperation on aircraft – after 17 years of dispute … Today we have delivered.” Biden’s summit is with von der Leyen and the European Council President Charles Michel, who represents EU governments. Biden also repeated his mantra – “America is back” – and spoke of the need to provide good jobs for European and American workers, particularly after the economic impact of COVID-19. He spoke of his father saying that a job “was more than just a paycheque” because it brought dignity. He is seeking European support to defend Western liberal democracies in the face of a more assertive Russia and China’s military and economic rise. “We’re facing a once in a century global health crisis,” Biden said at NATO on Monday evening, while adding “Russia and China are both seeking to drive a wedge in our transatlantic solidarity.” According to an EU-US draft summit statement seen by Reuters news agency and still being negotiated up until the end of the gathering, Washington and Brussels will commit to ending another dispute over punitive tariffs related to steel and aluminium. Broader agenda US Trade Representative Katherine Tai discussed the aircraft dispute in her first face-to-face meeting with EU counterpart Valdis Dombrovskis before the US-EU summit. The pair are due to speak on Tuesday afternoon. Freezing the trade conflicts gives both sides more time to focus on broader agendas such as concerns over China’s state-driven economic model, diplomats said. Biden and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken earlier met Belgian King Philippe, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo and Foreign Minister Sophie Wilmes in Brussels’ royal palace. On Wednesday, he meets Russian President Vladimir Putin in Geneva. The summit draft statement to be released at the end of the meeting said they had “a chance and a responsibility to help people make a living and keep them safe, fight climate change, and stand up for democracy and human rights”. There are no firm new transatlantic pledges on climate in the draft summit statement, however, and both sides will steer clear of setting a date to stop burning coal. The EU and the US are the world’s top trading powers, along with China, but Trump sought to sideline the EU. After scotching a free-trade agreement with the EU, the Trump administration focused on shrinking a growing US deficit in goods trade. Biden, however, sees the EU as an ally in promoting free trade, as well as in fighting climate change and ending the COVID-19 pandemic.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Ottinger-Rahaman-Neg-Texas%20Swing%20Part%201-Round2.docx

Kansas

OtRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/OtRa/Kansas-Ottinger-Rahaman-Neg-Texas%2520Swing%2520Part%25201-Round2.docx

d86d01625b4221c834817fd84b450d12193d4f750047fa0f25366ff856f9c521

Instrumentality is key to create better solutions, not error replication.

Graham HARRIS 7, Adjunct Professor at the Centre for Environment at the University of Tasmania [Seeking Sustainability in an Age of Complexity, 2007, p. 235-236]

Models are continuously updated This improves forecasting necessary science, technology and institutional arrangements are in place to assimilate data and turn them into useful outcomes realisation of the 'ozone hole' were turned into the Montreal protocol Other examples are reduction in sulphur and nitrogen oxides data led to changing practices and regulation leading to desirable outcomes Success achieved where data are clear and science explicit

In global science there is a need for technological, institutional and intellectual resources to store, conceptualise, process and visualise the data coming in What are required are data about resources and trends over time models and prediction engines to assimilate the data and turn it into information, and institutions and systems to enable action to be taken where required. With the explosion of data it is the institutional systems that we are lacking the most Models of the global atmospheric circulation are continuously updated This improves forecasting skill This is one case where the necessary science, technology and institutional arrangements are in place to effectively assimilate the data and turn them into useful outcomes . Other examples of action taken on the basis of monitoring information may be cited. These include the observation of rising CFC concentrations in the atmosphere and the realisation of a connection to the 'ozone hole' The observations and process understandings were effectively turned into desirable outcomes through the Montreal protocol Other examples are the reduction in emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides which were shown to cause 'acid rain' there are clear examples where data on meteorology, global atmospheric chemistry, water quality and anthropogenic impacts on 'charismatic megafauna' have led to changing practices and regulation leading to desirable outcomes . Success seems to be achieved where the data are clear and the science is explicit , the models are not complex and easily communicated to both the public and managers

['', 'In global science and remote sensing programmes there is a need for technological, institutional and intellectual resources to store, conceptualise, process and visualise the data coming in. There is a real data assimilation problem, which has to deal with errors and uncertainties as well as parameterisation and scaling issues. What are required are sources of data about the present status of resources and trends over time, conceptual models and prediction engines to assimilate the data and turn it into information, and institutions and systems to enable action to be taken where required. With the explosion of data and information systems in the past two or three decades, it is the institutional and governance systems that we are lacking the most. Data systems provide information, institutional and governance systems allow management action to be taken, but it is values and beliefs that ultimately determine whether anything is done.', "In global meteorological observation and weather forecasting we now have some very sophisticated systems to receive the satellite observations as well as predictive models to assimilate the data as they are received. Models of the global atmospheric circulation are continuously updated by streams of detailed information about the present state of the atmosphere. Huge investments have been made in solving some of the problems of data fusion and assimilation across scales and between image and point source data. This improves forecasting skill and, as we can all see in our daily newspapers, four- to five-day forecasts are now routine and accurate. This is one case where the necessary science, technology, infrastructure and institutional arrangements are in place to effectively assimilate the data and turn them into useful products and outcomes. Other examples of action taken on the basis of monitoring information may be cited. These include the observation of rising CFC concentrations in the atmosphere and the realisation of a connection to the so-called 'ozone hole' in the stratosphere. The observations and process understandings were effectively turned into desirable outcomes through the Montreal protocol and the banning of CFCs in refrigeration and other industrial processes. Other examples are the reduction in emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides in North America and Europe, which were shown to cause 'acid rain' and an increase in the acidity of soils and surface waters with consequent damage to forests and fish populations, and the control of nutrient discharges to lakes, which caused nutrient [END PAGE 235] enrichment (eutrophication) and widespread toxic algal blooms. Finally, I may cite the example of the international Whaling Commission, where clear evidence of declining whale numbers led to an international ban on whaling and the declaration of large marine reserves to protect whale species.", "So there are clear examples where data on meteorology, global atmospheric chemistry, water quality and anthropogenic impacts on the populations of 'charismatic megafauna' have led to changing practices and regulation leading to desirable outcomes. Success seems to be achieved where the data are clear and the science is explicit, the models are not complex and easily communicated to both the public and managers, the alternatives are simple and effective, the political and economic pain is not too great and a strong lobby for action exists. In addition, there is a link between strong institutional and governance mechanisms and effective action. If society decides on a change in management practice, it is important to be able to make the decision 'stick'. ", '']

[(7, 15)]

ndtceda

Emory-DoSa-Aff-Georgetown-Round-6.docx

Emory

DoSa

c1a4ee3f85702ea7e601263e2873c8bfd14a2f75afb16aaa353dce9a3171d425

The aff makes privacy impossible—patchwork opens gates for hackers and scattered privacy regs

Rodgers 19 (Cathy McMorris Rodgers represents Washington’s 5th Congressional District and is the Republican leader on the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce, which has jurisdiction over data privacy and other technology issues, along with consumer protection. 5-3-2019, accessed on 4-2-2022, Morning Consult, "4 Warnings About What a Patchwork of State Privacy Laws Could Mean for You", https://morningconsult.com/opinions/4-warnings-about-what-a-patchwork-of-state-privacy-laws-could-mean-for-you/)

a patchwork will become complicated won’t keep your data secure give hackers more loopholes companies won’t be able to innovate keep you in the dark on how your data is collected Imagine the hardship it would be impossible trust or have a say over how your data is being collected . in one state you may know while in another you could be in the dark? there’s no way to guarantee the transparency and accountability

a patchwork of state laws like California’s law, Washington state’s proposal and more will become a complicated and confusing reality. Here are just four warnings could fragment the internet A company may be forced to completely black out sales and services in some states if they can’t comply with conflicting and onerous data privacy laws. The internet could fragment, drastically changing the convenient and seamless consumer experience we expect. This means that someone in Washington state may not have the same options or platforms available as someone in San Francisco A patchwork will drive up costs for you and your family lead to increased compliance costs for startups and small businesses, and result in increased costs for you. won’t keep your data secure patchwork will also give hackers more loopholes to exploit, making it easier for them to tap into your smart home devices, Wi-Fi baby monitors, health trackers and more. If companies are forced to work overtime to comply they won’t be able to innovate and keep up with the evolving ways bad actors That creates more opportunities for your privacy to be invaded. keep you in the dark on how your data is collected Imagine the hardship 50 different state laws would create. if you live in Washington, buy something online from a small business in Oregon, and ship it to your family in Idaho? it would be nearly impossible for you to trust or have a say over how your data is being collected and used . Especially in cases where technology is tracking personal health data, companies need to earn and keep your trust. There shouldn’t be any surprises over data use However, how can you trust a system where in one state you may know how your data is used while in another you could be left in the dark? You can’t. With changing rules across state lines, there’s no way to guarantee the transparency and accountability that you rightfully expect.

won’t keep your data secure keep you in the dark on how your data is collected there’s no way to guarantee the transparency and accountability

['', 'In an interview with Recode, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said a national standard for data privacy that pre-empts state laws “won’t happen.” If she blocks efforts for a single national standard on data privacy, a patchwork of state laws like California’s law, Washington state’s proposal and more will become a complicated and confusing reality. Here are just four warnings about what this could mean for your data privacy. Spoiler alert — it isn’t good.', 'A patchwork of 50 different state laws could fragment the internet', 'Right now, no matter where you are, the internet is seamless. However, if a patchwork of 50 different state laws goes into effect, that will change. A company may be forced to completely black out sales and services in some states if they can’t comply with conflicting and onerous data privacy laws. The internet could fragment, drastically changing the convenient and seamless consumer experience we expect. This means that someone in Washington state may not have the same options or platforms available as someone in San Francisco and Silicon Valley. How is that fair or even workable?', 'A patchwork will drive up costs for you and your family', 'A patchwork of state laws will also lead to increased compliance costs for startups and small businesses, and result in increased costs for you. This is already happening in the European Union under its General Data Protection Regulation. Their overbearing rules are forcing compliance costs between $1 million and $10 million. And this is just under one set of rules. Imagine if small businesses had to comply with 50 different laws? Compliance costs would skyrocket, and so would the costs of the products you purchase.', 'A patchwork won’t keep your data secure', 'A patchwork of state laws will also give hackers more loopholes to exploit, making it easier for them to tap into your smart home devices, Wi-Fi baby monitors, health trackers and more. If companies are forced to work overtime to comply with 50 different regulatory regimes, they won’t be able to innovate and keep up with the evolving ways bad actors seek to access your information. That creates more opportunities for your privacy to be invaded. A national standard, on the other hand, will provide clear rules of the road and give you the same data protections wherever you go.', 'A patchwork of laws could keep you in the dark on how your data is collected', 'Imagine the hardship 50 different state laws would create. What would it mean if you live in Washington, buy something online from a small business in Oregon, and ship it to your family in Idaho? Not only would this provide an arduous patchwork of laws for small businesses and startups to navigate, but it would be nearly impossible for you to trust or have a say over how your data is being collected and used.', 'Especially in cases where technology is tracking personal health data, companies need to earn and keep your trust. There shouldn’t be any surprises over data use, and most Americans feel that way. According to a recent survey, more than 90 percent of respondents want online companies to get permission before sharing or selling personal data. However, how can you trust a system where in one state you may know how your data is used while in another you could be left in the dark? You can’t. With changing rules across state lines, there’s no way to guarantee the transparency and accountability that you rightfully expect.', '', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-00%20NDT-Round4.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-00%2520NDT-Round4.docx

85f89a906a4fcb440c76613a4557e729996c2286d058cc4d81a83729a6085644

Antitrust doesn’t solve misinformation or polarization

Jason Furman 20, professor of the practice of economics and former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Obama, 12/16/20, “The value and challenges of regulating Big Tech,” https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/business-regulation/value-and-challenges-regulating-big-tech

Big tech companies stand accused of threatening democracy . What cannot be solved by antitrust cases Pro-competition regulation is not the way to solve all of the social problems of Big Tech,

Big tech companies stand accused of threatening democracy . What can and cannot be solved by antitrust cases Pro-competition regulation works to advance issues that consumers care about Pro-competition regulation is not the way to solve all of the social problems of Big Tech, of which the biggest is the contribution they are making to spreading fake news and reinforcing polarization. Additional approaches are needed to address those issues

threatening democracy not the way to solve all of the social problems

['Q: Big tech companies currently stand accused of all sorts of things, all the way up to threatening democracy. What can and cannot be solved by antitrust cases, or by the regulation you suggest?', 'Pro-competition regulation works well to advance issues that consumers care about. We have more privacy in mobile phones because Apple competes with Google on the basis of its claims about greater privacy protections. We have fewer choices in social networks and thus they do less to serve the consumer’s desires on privacy and the like. Pro-competition regulation is not, however, the way to solve all of the social problems of Big Tech, of which the biggest is the contribution many believe they are making to spreading fake news and reinforcing polarization. Additional approaches are needed to address those issues, and it may not be fully possible to address them in the context of the First Amendment in the United States, which protects freedom of speech.', '']

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Kentucky%20Round%20Robin-Round1.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Kentucky%2520Round%2520Robin-Round1.docx

7023e0c1fe9a3b6619134f7e81109c55233aa2ccbbb2579761f3c4de14abbf8c

It decks certainty AND makes the U.S. unpredictable---global war.

Dr. G. John Ikenberry 15, PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, “Getting Hegemony Right”, in Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics, Ed. Steinberg, p. 17-18

critical in stabilizing i r in a world of radical power disparities is character of America The outside world can see policymaking at work reach of heg has been driven by efforts to render power predictable mature institutions made it predictable The regularized way policy is made reduces surprises s o p create a system that reduces abrupt moves messiness can confuse foreign observers

A critical ingredient in stabilizing i r in a world of radical power disparities is the character of America itself. The U S is a global hegemon, but because of its democratic institutions and political traditions it is relatively benign When other major states consider whether to work with the U S or resist it , the fact that it is stable matters . The outside world can see American policymaking at work The global reach of American heg emony has been driven by efforts to render power predictable The result has been a vast system of economic and security partnerships America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The regularized way in which U.S. policy is made reduces surprises s eparation o f p owers create a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states The messiness of a democracy can frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers

critical ingredient stabilizing i r radical power disparities character U S because institutions political traditions relatively benign work with U S resist it stable matters outside world see American policymaking at work heg predictable political institutions rule of law predictable cooperative regularized way reduces surprises s eparation o f p owers create shared opens up reduces abrupt or aggressive moves messiness confuse foreign observers

['A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is the character of America itself. The United States is indeed a global hegemon, but because of its democratic institutions and political traditions it is--or can be--a relatively benign one. Joseph Nye\'s arguments on "soft power" of course come to mind here, and there is much to his point. But, in fact, there are other, more significant aspects of the American way in foreign policy that protect the United States from the consequences of its own greatness.', 'When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it, the fact that it is an open, stable democracy matters. The outside world can see American policymaking at work and can even find opportunities to enter the process and help shape how the overall order operates. Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo and even Beijing--in each of these capitals officials can readily find reasons to conclude that an engagement policy toward the United States will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power.', 'America in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, as it sought to rebuild the postwar world and to counter Soviet communism. In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today\'s situation, the United States was the world\'s dominant state--constituting 45 percent of world GNP, leading in military power, technology, finance and industry, and brimming with natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order around stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security protection. But the intensity of political and economic cooperation between the United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter the Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad has observed, the expanding American political order in the half century after World War II was in important respects an "empire by invitation." The remarkable global reach of American postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of European and Asian governments to harness U.S. power, render that power more predictable, and use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partnerships.', "Even though the United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies--policies that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat."]

[(12, 23), (23, 24)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Aff-Harvard-Round-7.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

1c0bbf60ffb5dcb9bf96d32e76c929dc1918d124cdb606a1378cf0b91324ca9f

Agricultural technology is improving now—will increase production

Lynch, Stanford staff, ’18 [Shana Lynch, staff, “The Future of Food,” Insights, Stanford Business, 5—8—18, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/future-food, accessed 7-10-21[

tech is rushing into ag farming is ripe for change we see a big wave of tech reshaping traditional industries and ag is the most basic ones Driverless tractors produce growing in climate-controlled warehouses seeds genetically altered to require less water tech are making farms smarter productive

tech nology is rushing into ag riculture farming is ripe for change as need couples with opportunity we see a nother big wave of tech nology reshaping our traditional industries , and certainly ag riculture is one of the most basic ones .” Driverless tractors produce growing in climate-controlled warehouses , and seeds genetically altered to require less water are among the high-tech innovations changing, or about to change, agriculture. These tech nologies are making farms smarter , more productive , and increasingly efficient . as technology reshapes the field, the benefits will compound. “This is one industry that everybody needs

['', 'Today’s technology is rushing into one of the last traditional industries: agriculture. A field largely still unaffected by the technological revolution, farming is ripe for change as need couples with opportunity.', '“We’ve seen a wave of technology impact our information industries,” says Stanford Graduate School of Business professor Haim Mendelson. “Now we see another big wave of technology reshaping our traditional industries, and certainly agriculture is one of the most basic ones.”', 'Driverless tractors tilling acres of crops, produce growing in massive climate-controlled warehouses, and seeds genetically altered to require less water are among the high-tech innovations changing, or about to change, agriculture. These technologies are making farms smarter, more productive, and increasingly efficient.', 'And as technology reshapes the field, the benefits will compound. “This is one industry that everybody needs,” Mendelson says. “Everybody eats. So, changes that improve productivity for a relatively small number of farmers will scale to help everyone.”', 'In a new paper, Mendelson, with coauthors Stanford GSB professor Hau Lee, Value Chain Innovation Initiative Director Sonali Rammohan, and 2017 Sloan Fellow Akhil Srivastava, shows what trends are pushing this food revolution and highlights the areas that are increasingly attracting startups and investors.', '']

[(0, 26)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Northwestern-Round1.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Northwestern-Round1.docx

65891048cbbe26d9e991be5a534b29b88596da02cbd60b1fc7c9790cefdc8761

2. BUT, even on Buddhist assumptions, extinction is samsarically futile AND hurts conditions for practice

Calvin Baker 22, Ph.D. student at Princeton University, former researcher at Stanford University, Chappell Lougee Scholar at Stanford University, “Buddhism and Effective Altruism,” Effective Altruism and Religion: Synergies, Tension, Dialogue, 2022, pp. 17–45

Buddhists working to establish ideal society adopt the priority of minimizing existential risk , not for its own sake, but to preserve conditions conducive to awakening though all conditions are ultimately impermanent certain conditions are more conducive to Buddhist practice than others therefore instrumental reason to maintain propitious conditions

In the short and medium run, Buddhists working to establish the ideal Buddhist society might share and collaborate on goals such as improving global health Such Buddhists might even adopt the EA priority of minimizing existential risk , not to prolong existence for its own sake, but to preserve a set of conditions that was unusually conducive to awakening on Buddhist assumptions, an existential catastrophe on Earth would simply result in Earth’s inhabitants being reborn elsewhere in samsāra, so there is no reason Buddhists would welcome such an event Extinction also suffers samsāric futility Rather , al though Buddhists hold that all societal conditions are ultimately impermanent , they accept that certain conditions are more conducive to successful Buddhist practice than others . Relative to the end of awakening, Buddhists therefore have instrumental reason to maintain propitious societal conditions to whatever extent possible .

short medium ideal Buddhist society share collaborate improving global health adopt the EA priority of minimizing existential risk own conditions conducive to awakening Buddhist reborn no reason Buddhists would welcome such an event also suffers samsāric futility Rather though all ultimately accept certain more conducive to successful Buddhist practice than others instrumental reason propitious whatever extent possible

['It is nonetheless productive to consider the ideal Buddhist society, for it serves as a further counterpoint to EA. In the short and medium run, Buddhists working to establish the ideal Buddhist society and EAs might share and even collaborate on goals such as improving global health and putting an end to factory farming. Such Buddhists might even adopt the EA priority of minimizing existential risk, not to prolong existence in sam. sāra for its own sake, but to preserve a set of conditions that was unusually conducive to awakening. After all, on Buddhist assumptions, an existential catastrophe on Earth would simply result in Earth’s inhabitants being reborn elsewhere in samsāra, so there is no reason Buddhists would welcome such an event. (Extinction, whether voluntary or not, also suffers from the samsāric futility problem.) Rather, although Buddhists hold that all societal conditions are ultimately impermanent, they accept that certain conditions are more conducive to successful Buddhist practice than others. Relative to the end of awakening, Buddhists therefore have instrumental reason to maintain propitious societal conditions to whatever extent possible. ']

[(7, 15)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Neg-UMW-Debate-Tournament-Round-6.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

cb70a4be38878cb464388b34e358e3a2805b34c2958e2bec6bff36801372c096

EU splintering intensifies transnational risks due to multilateral breakdown.

Barfrod ’19 [Mikael; May 2019; Visiting Professor at the University of Huddersfield; American Diplomacy, “Can the European Union Save Multilateralism?” ]

we will hardly survive unless we agree on climate water resources pandemics tech and migration . Without multilat it will be impossible to find solutions to planet-wide problems only one actor can fill the vacuum left by the US , the E U committed to multilat the largest contributor to the UN supports reform to face irregular conflicts pandemics , climate the E U is the best choice for mitigating world problems

Science claims we will hardly survive on this planet unless we can agree on a set of common solutions to problems. climate , energy , water and other resources , pandemics , pollution, regulation of tech nology such as growing inequality and migration . Without multilat eral organizations seeking global solutions, it will be almost impossible for countries to find common solutions to planet-wide problems There is only one actor that can aspire to fill the vacuum currently left by the US , the E uropean U nion The EU is committed to effective multilat eralism . Support for the UN remains a cornerstone of Union The EU is the largest financial contributor to the UN providing 30% of all the budget The EU supports the UN reform agenda equipped to face modern threats as irregular conflicts , global pandemics , climate the E uropean U nion is the best choice for representing the UN remains a representative , legitimate , and global structure , uniquely suited to serve as a forum for mitigating the world ’s problems The EU might have internal squabbles But which other international actor could keep multilateralism on track when we need it the most?

hardly survive agree common solutions climate energy water pandemics tech inequality migration multilat eral organizations impossible common solutions planet-wide one actor fill the vacuum left by the US E U effective multilat eralism cornerstone financial contributor supports reform agenda irregular conflicts global pandemics climate E U best choice representative legitimate global structure mitigating the world ’s problems multilateralism on track

['Science increasingly claims that that we will hardly survive on this planet unless we can agree on a set of common solutions to its main problems. Mankind has basically got its back against the wall when it comes to climate, energy, water and other resources, pandemics, pollution, regulation of technology, numerous socio-economic challenges such as growing inequality and migration. Without multilateral organizations seeking global solutions, it will be almost impossible for the countries of the world to find common solutions to international or planet-wide problems, which no country can handle on its own.', 'Donald Trump entered the international scene in 2017. His electoral promise of “America First” is now supported by a philosophy that “national sovereignty rules”. He sees international relations not as sustained international cooperation for mutual benefit but rather as a zero-sum game.', 'Mr Trump has threatened Europe, China, and other countries with trade wars and has shown little concern for human right abuses by authoritarian regimes around the world. He has also shown contempt and disregard for the institutions and principles of both NATO and the EU. He has directed US withdrawal from a host of multilateral institutions and programmes, including:', 'The Paris climate deal', 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership', 'UN female reproduction programmes', 'The Iran nuclear deal', 'The UN Global Compact for Migration.', 'The Universal Postal Union (UPU) (dating from 1874)', 'Trump has also cut back US aid to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and support to the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine. There will probably be more to come.', 'The UN founding fathers started during the chaos of World War II to rebuild multilateralism into the shape of the UN. But today, who can effectively replace a USA withdrawing from its multilateral commitments? There is in my opinion only one actor that can aspire to fill the vacuum currently left by the US, the European Union. There are several reasons why:', 'The EU is committed to effective multilateralism. Support for the UN remains a cornerstone of European Union policy. The Union’s unwavering political support of the UN is an expression of its commitment to effective multilateralism.', 'The EU is the only fully participant non-state actor in the UN.', 'The EU is the largest financial contributor to the UN. Collectively, the European Union and its Member States remain by far the largest financial contributor to the UN, providing 30% of all contributions to the budget and 31% of peace-keeping activities in addition to substantial contributions towards voluntary funding.', 'The EU supports the UN reform agenda. The European Union has actively supported UN reform with the idea that the UN should be better equipped to face such modern threats as irregular conflicts, global pandemics, climate etc. The reform debate, which is still ongoing, shows a clear tendency towards regional/sub-regional representation to boost the legitimacy of the UN and provide broader input to the organization. Some may object that the European Union has been hampered by the lack of a common position among EU Member States on the future of the UN Security Council (UNSC), where two member-states, UK and France, currently have permanent seats and one, Germany, is desperate to get one. There is an obvious solution: the European Union is the best choice for representing its member states on the UNSC and the European region in accordance with well-defined coordination procedures.', 'For all its flaws, the UN remains a representative, legitimate, and global structure, uniquely suited to serve as a forum for mitigating the world’s problems. The European Union understands this and, due to its self-interest, is likely to continue exerting significant pressure on the UN to reform. The European Union could in turn be trusted to encourage the US to return to its traditional international role in the future. The EU might have its own internal squabbles at times. But which other international actor could aspire to keep multilateralism on track when we need it the most?']

[(0, 7), (8, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Harvard-Quarters.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Harvard-Quarters.docx

bc6a363a2e6de33104923ab1d4ca4276ca0e3bc65362be5dd8c86bfbf1bc4566

Sanctions fail.

Richard Hanania 20, Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University 2/18/20 “Ineffective, Immoral, Politically Convenient: America’s Overreliance on Economic Sanctions and What to Do about It” Policy Analysis No. 884 cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/ineffective-immoral-politically-convenient-americas-overreliance#conclusion

sanctions only serve domestic ends no empirical research no requirement for agencies to assess effectiveness policymakers show little interest in actually using leverage to achieve goals admin s demand the impossible and cut off contact U S sanctions Iran No Ko despite no path to change Politicians attack to negotiate Sanctions are easy to address immediate harms

sanctions only serve domestic political ends A political understanding of sanctions is the only way to make sense of their overuse in U.S. policy policymakers have shown no interest in empirical research on this issue unless it can be cherry‐​picked in order to support current practices policymakers remain ignorant of the empir­ical research because findings are politically inconvenient there is no requirement for agencies to assess the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving goals policymakers show little interest in actually using the leverage sanctions give them to achieve foreign policy goals American admin istration s have done the opposite demand ing the impossible from their adversaries and cut ting off all contact The U nited S tates sanctions Cuba, Iran , No rth Ko rea , Syria, and Venezuela to remove their governments despite no clear path to change and little communication that would be necessary to facilitate a bargain Politicians often attack opponents for even wanting to negotiate the political theory of American sanctions provides a satisfying expla­nation Because foreign publics do not get a say there is little reason to suspect that their inter­ests will be protected presidents seemingly feel compelled to dramatize their opposition to foreign misdeeds, even when the likelihood of changing the target country’s behavior is remot Sanctions are easy because the death and destruction they cause are unlikely to stir large‐​scale domestic opposition Governments face pressure to address immediate harms a tendency rooted in availability bias sanctions … may have contributed to more deaths during the post–Cold War than all weapons of mass destruction

only serve domestic political ends their overuse no interest in empirical research on this issue actually using the leverage demand ing the impossible despite no clear path to change that would be necessary to facilitate a bargain even wanting to negotiate

['Given that they cause widespread suffering and are counterproductive, why do policymakers continue to use economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy? While they are sold to the public as being important for achieving geopolitical goals, economic sanctions in reality only serve domestic political ends. Thus, to understand Washington’s overreliance on economic sanctions, it is more useful to look at domestic political constraints, and the polit\xadical objectives sought, than it is to assume that such polices are designed to accomplish something in the realm of foreign policy. The former perspective can be called the political explanation, while the latter perspective we can call the instrumental explanation.73', 'A political understanding of sanctions is the only way to make sense of their overuse in U.S. policy, as there are two reasons not to take the instrumental case at face value. First, policymakers have shown no interest in the empirical research on this issue, unless it can be cherry‐\u200bpicked in order to support current practices. While earlier work purporting to show that sanctions can work has had some impact on American policy, later scholarship refuting it has had no discernible influence.74 This is despite the later research on sanctions being covered in some of the most prominent newspapers in the country and being widely promoted by human rights organizations.75 If policymakers remain ignorant of the empir\xadical research, it is because the findings are politically inconvenient for them. This disinterest in evidence is also reflected in a 2019 Government Accountability Office report which notes that, although the National Security Council may make higher level judgments about the geopolitical impacts of sanctions, officials in the State, Treasury, and Commerce departments emphasized that “there is no policy or requirement for agencies to assess the effectiveness of sanctions programs in achieving broad policy goals.”76', 'Second, policymakers show little interest in actually using the leverage that sanctions give them to achieve foreign policy goals. If the instrumental explanation of sanctions is correct, then the United States should, at the very least, talk to targeted regimes in order to make its demands clear and provide a clear path toward the removal of sanctions. Yet American administrations have done the opposite, in certain cases both demanding the impossible from their adversaries and cutting off all contact. As Tariq Aziz, former foreign minister of Iraq, told his American captors, “[w]e didn’t have any opportunity to talk to a U.S. official during the Bush, Clinton, or new Bush administration, so there was no opportunity to talk face‐\u200bto‐\u200bface and address matters of concern. They always rejected us.”77 The United States today sanctions Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela in order to remove their governments or significantly change their behavior, despite no clear path to regime change and little in the way of the most rudimentary channels of communication that would be necessary in order to facilitate a bargain. Politicians often attack opponents for even wanting to negotiate with certain regimes, as former senator John McCain did during the 2008 election when he called then senator Obama “reckless” for being in favor of talking to adversaries.78 Interestingly, after President Obama assumed office he mostly stuck to the policy of not speaking to adversaries, indicating that political pressures coming from within the bureaucracy and the media lead presidents away from diplomacy. When the Obama administration did begin to openly engage in bilateral negotiations with Iran, it was only after years of engaging in secret back channels that were hidden from the public.79', 'Thus, from the perspective of the instrumental approach, American policy makes no sense. In contrast, the political theory of American sanctions provides a satisfying expla\xadnation of why the United States continues to exert economic pressure and place embargoes on other countries. Because foreign publics do not get a say in the American polit\xadical system, there is little reason to suspect that their inter\xadests will be protected or significantly taken into account. Leaders themselves have recognized this point, occasionally acknowledging that they place sanctions on foreign countries out of political necessity. In talking about sanctions against Italy in 1935, British Prime Minister Lloyd George quipped that “They came too late to save Abyssinia, but they are just in the nick of time to save the government.”80 After the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft wrote that he told Deng Xiaoping that President Bush did not want to place new sanctions on China in order to preserve Sino‐\u200bAmerican relations, but he was feeling domestic pressure to act.81 As Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott have acknowledged, “U.S. presidents seemingly feel compelled to dramatize their opposition to foreign misdeeds, even when the likelihood of changing the target country’s behavior is remote.”82', 'Political psychology can explain the appeal of sanctions. A leader who engages in an unpopular foreign intervention can see his presidency destroyed. That happened during the presidencies of Lyndon Baines Johnson, who decided not to run again when facing pressure over his policies in Vietnam, and George W. Bush, who, although he won reelection, saw Iraq contribute to the collapse of his approval ratings during his second term and damage the electoral prospects of his party. At the same time, there is often domestic pressure to “do something” about human rights violations and cases of military aggression.83 Sanctions can thus appear to be a moderate and measured response to unacceptable behavior abroad. British diplomat Jeremy Greenstock was expressing a common frustration when he said that “there is nothing else between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government.”84', 'Sanctions are an “easy” option because the death and destruction that they cause are unlikely to stir large‐\u200bscale domestic opposition. In addition to the fact that foreigners cannot easily influence American politics, people are subject to psychological barriers that impede a full appreciation of the damages caused by sanctions. Governments face pressure to address immediate harms that produce easily identifiable victims, a tendency that is rooted in what is called the availability bias.85 Relative to the harms caused, as a general matter we pay too much attention to school shootings, terrorism, and shark attacks, and not enough to marginal changes in death rates from more mundane problems such as smoking, obesity, and car accidents.', 'John Mueller and Karl Mueller compare the limited threat from chemical and biological weapons, which are treated as out of bounds by all civilized nations, to the large‐\u200bscale death and destruction caused by economic sanctions, which are a normal part of American foreign policy.86 The authors write that “sanctions … may have contributed to more deaths during the post–Cold War era than all weapons of mass destruction throughout history” but nonetheless “this loss of human life has failed to make a great impression in the United States.”87 The availability bias helps explains why. Even if the possibility of chemical and biological weapons causing a large number of deaths is extremely remote, they can appear more threatening to policymakers and the public than economic embargoes that are certain to kill large numbers of people from such causes as infant mortality and lack of access to adequate health care. While nationalism and in‐\u200bgroup bias ensure that our politics values the lives of Americans more than those of foreigners, immediate and clear harms to those living abroad, such as the bombing of civilians, can occasionally cause a domestic backlash. By contrast, economic sanctions, with harms that are largely hidden, have no hope of stirring up even a limited reaction similar to what we see when innocent foreigners are directly killed in American military strikes. If bombings caused as much economic and humanitarian destruction as sanctions did, the harm would be indis\xadputable and such policies would be widely acknowledged as war crimes.']

[(8, 17), (17, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Aff-Indiana-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

30191aaaf4d25531dd3a461be38966af265c12aaaea27417bb9b6e5edfd463a6

NATO relations strong

AP 3/23, “NATO affirms unity, tries to put Trump era behind it,” US News.com, https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-03-23/nato-affirms-unity-as-minsters-put-trump-era-behind-them

NATO reaffirmed their commitment to defend each other and underlined the strength of relations between North America and Europe We are opening a new chapter Stoltenberg thanked Biden for committing “to the alliance ministers committed to Article 5 the alliance “are making good progress on fairer trans-Atlantic burden sharing the U.S. is “determined to revitalize our alliances

NATO reaffirmed their commitment to defend each other attack and underlined the strength of relations between North America and Europe We are now opening a new chapter in our trans-Atlantic relationship Stoltenberg thanked Biden for committing “to rebuild the strength of this alliance We are meeting in Brussels to reaffirm the enduring transatlantic bond between Europe and North America, with NATO at its heart.” ministers committed to the collective defense clause — Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty the 30-nation alliance “are making good progress on fairer trans-Atlantic burden sharing ; we welcome the efforts made by all Allies in Europe and North America that contribute to our indivisible securit NATO would continue to adapt in the face of “rising threats and systemic competition,” the U.S. is “determined to revitalize our alliances We need to use NATO as a platform and consult when there are differences," he said, expressing hope that a series of proposals he has drafted to address problems within the alliance will be endorsed by Biden and fellow NATO leaders when they meet in Brussels in June.

strength of relations between North America and Europe a new chapter rebuild the strength of this alliance committed to Article 5 the U.S. is “determined to revitalize our alliances

['BRUSSELS (AP) — NATO foreign ministers on Tuesday reaffirmed their commitment to defend each other against outside attack and underlined the strength of relations between North America and Europe, after four years of doubt and concern among some allies under the Trump administration.', '“We are now opening a new chapter in our trans-Atlantic relationship,” NATO-Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters after chairing the talks. He thanked President Joe Biden for committing “to rebuild the strength of this alliance” and make it “future-proof in a more competitive world.”', 'In a formal joint statement aimed at turning a page on the Trump era, the ministers said: “We are meeting in Brussels to reaffirm the enduring transatlantic bond between Europe and North America, with NATO at its heart.”', 'The ministers, including U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, also committed to the collective defense clause — Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty — under which an attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against them all. It has only been activated once by NATO, after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.', 'Former U.S. President Donald Trump often criticized NATO partners for failing to pay their defense dues, claiming falsely that they owed the alliance or the United States money.', 'Early in his tenure, he threatened not to come to the defense of any country that did not meet NATO spending guidelines, causing deep concern among member nations close to Russia’s borders, like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.', 'The ministers noted that members of the 30-nation alliance “are making good progress on fairer trans-Atlantic burden sharing; we welcome the efforts made by all Allies in Europe and North America that contribute to our indivisible security. We must and will do more.”', 'They also vowed that NATO would continue to adapt in the face of “rising threats and systemic competition,” and underlined that “Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security.”', 'Earlier, Blinken said that the U.S. is “determined to revitalize our alliances, to revitalize our partnerships, starting with NATO.”', '"When we look at virtually all of the challenges that we face as a country and that are actually going to potentially affect the lives of our citizens, not a single one of them can be effectively dealt with by any one country acting alone, even the United States with all of the resources that we have," he said.', 'he U.S. is by far the biggest and most influential member of NATO, and Trump also surprised, confounded and sometimes angered allies with unilateral decisions, like pulling U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and northern Syria. France complained about a lack of U.S. leadership at NATO.', "Asked about NATO member Turkey, Stoltenberg acknowledged that the allies have differences over Ankara's decision to buy Russian anti-aircraft missiles or its aggressive behavior in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, notably a standoff over energy exploration with Greece and Cyprus.", '“We need to use NATO as a platform and consult when there are differences," he said, expressing hope that a series of proposals he has drafted to address problems within the alliance will be endorsed by Biden and fellow NATO leaders when they meet in Brussels in June.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%20-%20NDT-Finals.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%2520-%2520NDT-Finals.docx

fecb0716bfa7cd9155a4becb335f89ebf6e324b8a7def549b72a68ed462c7bda

China blocks enforcement- this is from the majority VitC decision

Nardini and Cabranes, 21 -- United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit judges

The judgment would require collection from foreign defendants which China may not tolerate Civil Procedure Law of China provides "[i]f any foreign court would harm the interest of China, the [Chinese] court shall refuse to comply

Effectiveness of Enforcement The judgment would require collection from foreign defendants and enforcement of a permanent injunction abroad, which China may not tolerate Article 276 of Civil Procedure Law of China provides that "[i]f any matter in which a foreign court would harm the sovereignty or interest of China, the [Chinese] court shall refuse to comply with the request

China may not tolerate the [Chinese] court shall refuse to comply

['[William, and José A., Animal Sci. Prods. v. Hebei Welcome Pharma. Co. Ltd., majority decision, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, decided 8-10-21, No. 13-4791-cv, https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-4791/13-4791-2021-08-10.pdf?ts=1628605810, accessed 1-5-22, footnote 40 inserted]', '2. Effectiveness of Enforcement and Alternative Remedies', 'The judgment entered below would require collection from foreign defendants and enforcement of a permanent injunction abroad, which China may not tolerate.40 [FN 40] 40 Notably, Article 276 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People\'s Republic of China (2017) provides that "[i]f any matter in which a foreign court requests assistance would harm the sovereignty, security or public interest of the People\'s Republic of China, the [Chinese] court shall refuse to comply with the request." Similarly, Article 282 forbids Chinese courts from executing any foreign judgment which "contradicts the basic principles of the law of the People\'s Republic of China or violates State sovereignty, security or the public interest." [FN 40 ENDS] If enforced, the trebled damage award and threat of future sanctions from violating a permanent injunction would be likely to deter defendants from future anticompetitive behavior. Yet it also seems likely that China will continue to set minimum prices. The consequences of enforcing the judgment are therefore uncertain.']

[(0, 24)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-6%20-%20Texas%20Two%20Step%202-Round2.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-6%2520-%2520Texas%2520Two%2520Step%25202-Round2.docx

351cc89ed86bd42bfe3ee190d69b07b5c629b20583dc8a01285aab59f81786cc

8. China pockets unilateral nuclear concessions. Leverage is key to reciprocity.

Costlow 21, MS, PhD candidate at George Mason University, Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy. (Matthew R., Fall 2021, “An Overlooked Aid to Arms Control: US Nuclear Modernization,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15 Issue 3, pg. 42-44, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-3/Costlow.pdf)

leveraging a capable US nuclear arsenal has proven successful there is no ev unilateral reductions produce reciprocity unilateral reductions reduce chances for future agreements by eliminating necessary US leverage If the U S were to eliminate its ICBM it would have no leverage over China They would pocket the concession and hold out for more since withholding netted them that Future prospects hinge not only on the negotiating leverage provided by a modernized arsenal but also the recognition leverage itself is the superior negotiation tactic over unilateral concessions

Why has it become standard practice recommend that the U S engage in unilateral reductions for a better environment there is no good example of success in adopting that strategy. On the other hand, the approach of leveraging a capable US nuclear arsenal has proven successful there is no ev that unilateral reductions will produce reciprocity Calls for unilateral nuclear reductions appear self-defeating because they would reduce chances for future agreements by eliminating necessary US leverage If the U S were to for example eliminate its ICBM force it would then have no leverage over Russia and China to do the same They would pocket the concession and hold out for more since withholding from an agreement netted them that much the US arsenal would then have no credible counters to the Russian or Chinese nuclear arsenal in type the leaderships of Russia and China are pursuing ways to increase their countries’ security at the expense of the U S Leverage matters when negotiating with other states on nuclear arms control measures You Americans don’t have anything going on in this arena. Why should we negotiate? Future prospects hinge not only on the negotiating leverage provided by a modernized US nuclear arsenal but also on the recognition that leverage itself is most likely to be the superior negotiation tactic over unilateral concessions

unilateral reductions no good example leveraging capable US nuclear arsenal successful no ev unilateral reductions will produce reciprocity self-defeating reduce chances future agreements eliminating necessary US leverage ICBM force no leverage China do the same pocket the concession and hold out for more netted them that much no credible counters Leverage matters nuclear measures Future prospects hinge negotiating leverage leverage itself superior negotiation tactic unilateral concessions

['', 'Analysts must ask the question then, Why has it become standard practice in the arms control community to recommend that the United States engage in unilateral reductions for the sake of a better arms control environment? This question is especially puzzling when there is no good example of success in adopting that strategy. On the other hand, the approach of leveraging a capable, credible US nuclear arsenal has proven successful. As former secretary of defense Harold Brown observed, “Appropriate restraint in our programs and actions is still warranted. But there is no evidence from history that unilateral reductions in our posture will produce Soviet reciprocity. An important function of our various arms control negotiations is precisely to achieve equitable and verifiable mutual reductions without undue risk. To substitute unilateral reductions for these negotiations does not seem to be either prudent or realistic.”21 Calls for unilateral US nuclear reductions thus appear self-defeating because, if implemented, they would reduce chances for future arms control agreements by limiting or eliminating necessary US leverage.', 'If the United States were to, for example, eliminate its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, past experience indicates that it would then have no leverage over Russia and China to do the same. They would likely pocket the concession and hold out for more since withholding from an agreement netted them that much. Even worse, the US arsenal would then have no credible counters or offsets comparable to the Russian or Chinese nuclear arsenal in type, making further opportunities for nuclear arms control agreements more difficult.', 'What is the ultimate reason then why leverage in the form of a modernized US nuclear arsenal is to be preferred over unilateral US nuclear reductions in maximizing the benefits of arms control? The answer comes down to differences in national goals. While many US arms control proponents are seeking ways to solve the problem of nuclear war, the leaderships of Russia and China are pursuing ways to increase their countries’ security at the expense of the United States. Ambassador Ed Rowny, who had decades of experience in negotiations with the Soviets, assessed that “the Soviets simply do not negotiate in a spirit of problem-solving. Those of us who have negotiated with the Soviets do not expect them to. We have come to understand that, whereas we would like to work out solutions, the Soviets would rather compete.”22 Equally experienced, Ambassador Paul Nitze explained why the Soviet Union saw little need for urgency on significant nuclear arms reductions in the 1970s during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks:', 'We [the United States] could not get the Soviets to agree to tight limitations on offensive arms comparable to those applied to ABM systems or reductions in such arms. Indeed, limiting defenses did not appear to have any effect on the Soviet offensive buildup. Part of the problem was that the Soviets were doing well concerning offensive systems. We had ceased building new ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers some years earlier; we were improving them through qualitative changes. The Soviet Union was actively deploying large numbers and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Momentum thus tended to favor the Soviets; they saw no reason to sign a piece of paper that would cause them to forgo that advantage.23', 'Leverage matters when negotiating with other states on nuclear arms control measures. Former under secretary of defense for policy James Miller lent credence to the US need for leverage, noting, “When the Obama administration asked the Russians, ‘Ok, we want to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. We are open to talking about them as an entity by themselves or to roll them together with strategic for conversation,’ the answer that we got was nyet. And it was, ‘. . . You Americans don’t have anything going on in this arena. Why should we negotiate?’ ”24 Future nuclear arms control prospects hinge not only on the negotiating leverage provided by a modernized US nuclear arsenal but also on the recognition that leverage itself is most likely to be the superior negotiation tactic over unilateral concessions.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiYa-Neg-2---Kentucky-Round-5.docx

Kansas

WiYa

b7631da414501c830809a0ce3ff31e0283422ce7e4945017d821d6b56b4abe7a

Plan causes fights---rights of personhood are controversial, especially beyond humans

Lance Eliot 22. Stanford Fellow, executive entrepreneur, with industry and academic experience, former professor at USC and UCLA, and head of a pioneering AI Lab. “AI Legal Personhood Distresses AI Ethicists Since People Could Deviously Scapegoat Machines To Avoid Apt Human Responsibility, Including In The Case Of AI-Based Self-Driving Cars.” Forbes Magazine, 4 March 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/2022/03/04/ai-legal-personhood-distresses-ai-ethicists-since-people-could-deviously-scapegoat-machines-to-avoid-apt-human-responsibility-including-in-the-case-of-ai-based-self-driving-cars/?sh=16bce0a710ac

personhood is a controversial topic there has been a longstanding morass underlying legal personhood What rights are associated inflammatory topic obvious thought everyone should have personhood you can argue varying levels of legal personhood Getting rubric of personhood is just the table stakes then comes directly to divisive fore rationale could be demonstrative logic in extending personhood to what is not a human

Legal personhood is a surprisingly controversial topic there has been a longstanding historical morass underlying the notion and scope of legal personhood Are all humans imbued with legal personhood? What legal rights and restrictions are associated with legal personhood? reflection reveals that this is indeed a highly and at times exceedingly inflammatory topic The obvious thought is that everyone should have legal personhood that declaration alone won’t settle the matter because you can then argue about varying levels of legal personhood Getting into the rubric of legal personhood is just the table stakes while defining various degrees of personhood then comes directly to the divisive fore Part of the asserted rationale could be that since a company is ostensibly run by and employs people, perhaps there is a demonstrative logic in extending personhood to encompass what is otherwise decidedly not a human unto itself

controversial topic longstanding morass What rights indeed inflammatory topic varying levels rubric just the table stakes divisive fore not a human

['Legal personhood is a perhaps surprisingly controversial topic.', 'Actually, when you think mindfully about it, there has been a longstanding historical morass underlying the notion and scope of legal personhood. Are all humans imbued with legal personhood? What legal rights and restrictions are associated with legal personhood? If society deems that some people are to be denied legal personhood, is there any recourse to overcome such a rejection?', 'On and on it goes.', 'A momentary reflection reveals that this is indeed a highly and at times exceedingly inflammatory topic. Whether this is dutifully sensible to have such controversy is a matter of keen debate. The obvious thought is that everyone should have legal personhood and we would summarily be done with any contentious discourse thereof. Regrettably, that declaration alone won’t settle the matter because you can then argue about varying levels of legal personhood. Getting into the rubric of legal personhood is just the table stakes while defining various degrees of personhood then comes directly to the divisive fore.', 'Suppose that we expand our viewpoint about the “person” aspects of legal personhood and decide that something other than human beings per se could be squeezed into the personhood categorization.', 'For example, you might be aware that in some respects and some cultures and at varying times in history and even the present, businesses or corporations have often been construed as having a semblance of legal personhood. Keeping in mind that a company is actually an entity and not a living breathing human, you would certainly and rightfully be hesitant to believe that a corporation or similar legally formulated business ought to be in the esteemed realm of personhood. Part of the asserted rationale could be that since a company is ostensibly run by and employs people, perhaps there is a demonstrative logic in extending personhood to encompass what is otherwise decidedly not a human unto itself.']

[(6, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-KiLo-Neg-01---NUSO-Round-2.docx

Emory

KiLo

5be136f9801a14ed62493e6f4a35a43dc857ee0535a44e0e94cc95a5aad99bfa

Aid is key to the DIB. Solves global war.

Dalibor Rohac 10-20. Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. "US isn’t ‘stretched’ by helping both Ukraine and Israel — we’re rising to meet a new axis of evil". New York Post. 10-20-2023. https://nypost.com/2023/10/20/us-isnt-stretched-by-helping-both-ukraine-and-israel-were-rising-to-meet-a-new-axis-of-evil/

assistance to Ukraine reveal shortcomings in d i b impetus to fix flaws contracts enable suppliers to scale up and open lines if faced with Taiwan defense is in terrible shape best way to deter conflicts is to maintain a large defense industry , capable of springing into action quickly . Expanding production would mean hiring workers only if sustained contracts Ukrainian demand replenishing reserves makes it easier to produce more helping Ukraine Taiwan and Israel pay dividends for security there is a thread through Russian , Chinese and Iranian revisionism

is US assistance to Ukraine has already helped reveal shortcomings in our d i b . And it has already provided an impetus to fix some of the flaws . new contracts enable suppliers to scale up their production and open new lines which will come in handy if America is faced with Chinese aggression over Taiwan . The fact America’s defense industry , is in terrible shape is not Ukraine’s fault . leaders took full advantage of the “peace dividend” assuming large-scale armed conflicts were a thing of the past. the best way to deter such conflicts is for the U S and its allies to maintain a large defense industry , capable of springing into action quickly . The reason for this success was the growth in demand for US military equipment both before and during the war Expanding production further would mean hiring another shift of workers — something that makes sense only if there is a sustained flow of money from US and overseas contracts . governments are pushing manufacturing to scale up their production capabilities. the more important point is that Ukrainian demand for shells and our willingness to provide them while replenishing our own reserves makes it easier to produce even more , should the need arise. US aid to Ukraine is not only an important deterrent measure keeping Beijing at bay — it helps accelerate production , which would have otherwise been much slower at lower volumes of output . Biden was entirely correct to say in his speech Thursday that helping Ukraine , Taiwan and Israel was “a smart investment that’s going pay dividends for American security for generations .” What he didn’t say is there is a common thread going through Russian , Chinese and Iranian revisionism — and that how strongly we respond to each of those directly affects our chances in the remaining two conflicts . Our d i b is a big reason why

Ukraine reveal shortcomings d i b already provided impetus fix some of the flaws scale up their production open new lines America Chinese aggression Taiwan America’s defense industry terrible shape Ukraine’s fault deter such conflicts U S allies large defense industry springing action quickly growth in demand US military equipment before during Expanding production hiring shift of workers sustained flow of money US overseas contracts replenishing easier to produce even more should need arise. accelerate production otherwise much slower lower volumes of output Biden Ukraine Taiwan Israel smart investment dividends American security generations common thread Russian Chinese Iranian revisionism remaining two conflicts Our d i b is a big reason why

['On its face, the Pentagon’s reported decision to send thousands of 155mm artillery, originally destined for Ukraine, to Israel seems to validate the argument critics of US assistance to the besieged Eastern European nation make: Aid to Ukraine is a distraction from America’s true priorities, both in the Middle East and in the Indo-Pacific.', 'Nothing can be further from the truth.', 'In the immediate short run, policymakers might have to make delicate judgment calls.', 'What matters more, however, is US assistance to Ukraine has already helped reveal shortcomings in our defense-industrial base.', 'And it has already provided an initial impetus, however modest, to fix some of the flaws.', 'Roughly 60% of US aid to Ukraine, or $68 billion, is spent in the United States on contracts that help replenish the Pentagon’s reserves with new equipment.', 'And the new contracts enable suppliers to scale up their production and open new lines — not to speak of job creation — which will come in handy if America is faced with Chinese aggression over Taiwan.', 'The fact America’s defense industry, along with European allies’, is in terrible shape is not Ukraine’s fault.', 'Responsibility lies with leaders on both sides of the Atlantic who took full advantage of the “peace dividend” after 1990, assuming large-scale armed conflicts were a thing of the past.', 'In reality, the best way to deter such conflicts is for the United States and its allies to maintain a large defense industry, capable of springing into action quickly.', 'The World War II experience is instructive.', 'At the war’s start, the US defense industry was already the largest in the world; yet in the four subsequent years it doubled in size, producing two-thirds of all allied military equipment.', '“During an 11-month span in 1942,” my AEI colleague Mackenzie Eaglen notes, “over 8,000 of the United States’ standard tank during World War II, the M4A3 Sherman, were built — a monthly average of 729.”', 'The reason for this success was the growth in demand for US military equipment both before and during the war, which was facilitated by the Lend-Lease program.', 'If it hadn’t been for those early orders before America entered the war, the United States would have been in a much worse starting position once it entered the conflict.', 'Today, the Army-owned plant in Lima, Ohio, builds between 15 and 20 Abrams tanks a month (down from almost 70 a month during the Cold War), which it could boost to 33.', 'Expanding production further would mean hiring another shift of workers — something that makes sense only if there is a sustained flow of money from US and overseas contracts.', 'The production of 155mm shells suffers from a similar predicament — or at least did until recently.', 'Every day, Ukrainians fire between 6,000 and 8,000 rounds, burning through available reserves quickly, particularly those of NATO countries.', 'At the same time, governments are pushing manufacturing to scale up their production capabilities.', 'The United States produces around 28,000 shells each month, double the monthly output from half a year ago.', 'By 2025, the Pentagon aims to bring the monthly total to 100,000.', 'Even French manufacturers are on track to triple production in the course of this year, albeit starting from very modest levels (1,000 shells a month).', 'Barring the possibility of a large regional conflagration instead of a targeted intervention in Gaza, Israel’s needs for 155mm shells are not going to be anywhere near those of Ukrainians’.', 'But the more important point is that Ukrainian demand for shells (or other equipment) and our willingness to provide them while replenishing our own reserves makes it easier to produce even more, should the need arise.', 'For policymakers in Taiwan, the waiting times for US-made equipment ordered years ago is a source of frustration.', 'Yet Taiwanese policymakers understand US aid to Ukraine is not only an important deterrent measure keeping Beijing at bay — it helps accelerate production, which would have otherwise been much slower at lower volumes of output.', 'Whatever his many flaws, President Biden was entirely correct to say in his speech Thursday that helping Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel was “a smart investment that’s going pay dividends for American security for generations.”', 'What he didn’t say is there is a common thread going through Russian, Chinese and Iranian revisionism — and that how strongly we respond to each of those directly affects our chances in the remaining two conflicts.', 'Our defense-industrial base is a big reason why.', '', 'T NFU Policy']

[(8, 19)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-3---Harvard-Round-4.docx

Emory

MiPi

8316eec78dc9821d069ec6fbcf986794aa558d9ed64074061d36e8fb398a440d

Bill won’t pass the senate---the GOP hates it

Kelley Drye & Warren 7/21 (Kelley Drye & Warren LLP. “With Partisan Tensions Running High, House Passes Legislation to Strengthen FTC’s 13(b) Enforcement Authority” , , July 21, 2021, date accessed 9/18/21)

the House passed H.R. 2668 to clarify the F T C ’s authority under 13(b The bill was passed with two Republicans Republicans have stressed the need for statutory “guardrails” to ensure due process Republicans have sought to amend the legislation Republicans have expressed concerns about retroactivity questioning the legality Republicans argue any 13(b) fix should be part of a broader package in concert with privacy an issue itself full of partisan landmines H.R. 2668 now heads to the Senate where Dem s don’t have the luxury of disregarding Republican opposition

the U.S. House passed H.R. 2668 , the Consumer Protection and Recovery Act, to clarify the F ederal T rade C ommission ’s enforcement authority under Section 13(b The bill was passed by a vote of 221-205, with two Republicans joining all Democrats in support. Republicans have also stressed the need for statutory “guardrails” to ensure due process Republicans have sought to amend the legislation Republicans have also expressed concerns about retroactivity questioning the legality Republicans argue that any 13(b) fix should be part of a broader package of FTC reforms and should move in concert with legislation establishing a national privacy framework an issue itself full of partisan landmines . H.R. 2668 now heads to the Senate where Dem s don’t have the luxury of disregarding Republican opposition

F T C ’s two Republicans questioning the legality an issue itself full of partisan landmines . don’t have the luxury of disregarding Republican opposition

['On July 20, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 2668, the Consumer Protection and Recovery Act, to clarify the Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement authority under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. H.R. 2668, authored by Representative Tony Cárdenas (D-CA), would explicitly authorize the FTC to seek permanent injunctions and other equitable relief, including restitution and disgorgement, to redress perceived consumer injury. The bill was passed by a vote of 221-205, with two Republicans joining all Democrats in support. In a joint statement issued after the vote, House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Consumer Protection and Commerce Subcommittee Chair Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) said: “The Consumer Protection and Recovery Act will restore the FTC’s ability to force scammers that have broken the law to repay those who have been harmed or defrauded.” Chairs Pallone and Schakowsky moved quickly to usher the bill through their committee and the House just three months after the Supreme Court ruled in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC that the Federal Trade Commission did not have the authority to pursue monetary penalties under Section 13(b). Facing increasing legal uncertainty in the months leading up to the AMG decision, bipartisan FTC Commissioners had urged Congress to clarify the agency’s enforcement authority – and bipartisan Members of Congress expressed support, citing a shared desire to protect consumers and hold fraudsters accountable. Those bipartisan sentiments, however, did not translate to bipartisan legislative text. As we’ve written previously, House Energy and Commerce Committee Republicans have voiced process concerns, accusing Democrats of rushing the legislation through the House. Republicans have also stressed the need for statutory “guardrails” to ensure due process and protect legitimate businesses. Throughout the legislative process, for instance, Republicans have sought to amend the legislation to reduce the 10-year statute of limitations and to more narrowly tailor the language to target outright fraudulent acts. Republicans have also expressed concerns about retroactivity, questioning the legality of allowing the FTC to go after prior conduct with the expanded authorities included in H.R. 2668. Ahead of the vote, Consumer Protection and Commerce Subcommittee Ranking Member Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) said, “…this bill before us will provide the FTC with new authorities that far outpace the need supported by a consensus of the FTC Commissioners.” He went on to say that the expanded authority granted to the agency in the legislation “signals a return to the broad overreach we saw with the FTC in previous decades – a situation so bad that a Democratic Congress crippled the FTC’s funding and stripped it of its authority at that time.” Additionally, House Republicans argue that any 13(b) fix should be part of a broader package of FTC reforms and should move in concert with legislation establishing a national privacy framework – an issue itself full of partisan landmines. H.R. 2668 now heads to the Senate, where bipartisan Members of the Commerce Committee have expressed interest in a legislative fix – and where Democrats don’t have the luxury of disregarding Republican opposition. Perhaps in a nod to that reality, ahead of the bill’s passage, Representative Cárdenas said on the floor, “It’s unfortunate that we weren’t able to negotiate more into this bill and make it bipartisan, but there will be other opportunities as we are a two-chamber legislature, and I’m sure the Senate has some ideas about how to make this bill better. And we’re all open to that opportunity.”']

[(0, 6), (7, 11), (12, 25)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-2%20-%20Kentucky-Round6.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-2%2520-%2520Kentucky-Round6.docx

400af55890e38027b0657a6c83cb0ced37bc0fdbdb8940545384df5c2b804c7a

Turkey has zero capability for nukes---intention is irrelevant and Western projection

Muhammad Ali Alkis 23, Research Affiliate at the Odesa Center for Nonproliferation in Ukraine, World Institute for Nuclear Security Ambassador to Türkiye, PhD candidate at Hacettepe University, Türkiye, “Türkiye in the New World Order: The Nuclear Debate,” May 2023, https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/alumninotes-muhammedalialkis-may2023

no evidence indicates the Türkiye nuclear weapons capability the IAEA has completed a holistic examination of the entire infrastructure and confirmed the country is adhering to all norms and standards recent discussions seem to be based on political motivations rather than facts confirmed by IAEA this perspective emanates from US analysts , who project their own mindsets Even though assessment of intent might vary capability is easier to assess it is based on material facts Türkiye lacks infrastructure for uranium mining enrichment, and fabrication ownership of power plants remain in the hands of Rosatom Rosatom takes spent fuel leaving no possibility to divert it Türkiye’s plans are prolif resistant

Türkiye has been supporting all international WMD non-proliferation efforts and envisages adopting a nuclear programme only as a means to access cheap, clean, and reliable energy no material evidence indicates the possibility of Türkiye establishing a nuclear weapons capability . The country simply does not have the technical capacity to support nuclear weapons development the IAEA has completed a holistic examination of the country’s entire nuclear infrastructure and confirmed that the country is adhering to all norms and standards indicating that its nuclear efforts are being designed solely to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes recent discussions about Türkiye’s alleged nuclear weapons seem to be based on political motivations rather than on the facts confirmed by regular IAEA inspections this perspective emanates almost exclusively from US and European policymakers and analysts , who se assessments project their own mindsets onto Turkish policymakers nuclear proliferation is defined by not only the intent but also the capability Even though the assessment of intent might vary , the issue of capability is easier to assess , because it is based on material facts Türkiye lacks the necessary infrastructure for uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication the country’s missile capabilities seem to be aimed at providing better defence against regional missile proliferation, and are not designed to provide a nuclear-capable delivery system ownership of nuclear power plants will remain in the hands of suppliers Akkuyu will be operated and owned by Rosatom Rosatom supplies the fuel and takes back spent fuel leaving no possibility to divert it Türkiye’s nuclear plans are clearly prolif eration- resistant Türkiye does not have the material capability to implement a nuclear weapons development programme nor the intent to initiate such a programme

all energy no material evidence simply does not have holistic examination entire nuclear infrastructure all norms and standards political motivations facts confirmed by regular IAEA inspections almost exclusively from US and European policymakers and analysts their own mindsets intent capability vary easier to assess material facts no possibility prolif eration- resistant material capability nor the intent

['As the debate now stands, there are two broad perspectives on Türkiye’s position on nuclear weapons. On the one hand, a growing body of literature has been arguing that Türkiye allegedly has nuclear weapons ambitions. Building their arguments on the Iranian nuclear programme, the country’s changing security and foreign policies, and President Erdoğan’s off-the-cuff statement discussed earlier, they make serious allegations regarding the risk that Türkiye could develop nuclear weapons. The other strand in the literature, on the other hand, continues to argue that Türkiye has been supporting all international WMD non-proliferation efforts; has maintained its security policy in line with that of NATO; and envisages adopting a nuclear programme only as a means to access cheap, clean, and reliable energy.', 'If we put arguments about “intentions” to one side, no material evidence indicates the possibility of Türkiye establishing a nuclear weapons capability. The country simply does not have the technical capacity to support nuclear weapons development, and has long been a party to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, Türkiye has been awarded an IAEA “broader conclusion” since 2012, meaning that the IAEA has completed a holistic examination of the country’s entire nuclear infrastructure and programme and confirmed that the country is adhering to all norms and standards indicating that its nuclear efforts are being designed solely to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.36 Thus, the recent discussions about Türkiye’s alleged possible future development of nuclear weapons seem to be based on political motivations rather than on the facts confirmed by regular IAEA inspections. As Varnum states, “this perspective emanates almost exclusively from US and European policymakers and analysts, whose assessments of Türkiye’s policymaking are often heavily influenced by mirror-imaging” (i.e. projecting their own mindsets onto Turkish policymakers). 37', 'In theory, a propensity for nuclear proliferation is defined by a simple equation that requires not only the intent to acquire nuclear weapons, but also the capability to do so. 38 Even though the assessment of intent might vary, the issue of capability is easier to assess, because it is based on material facts, i.e. the capability of a country’s nuclear infrastructure and its possession of delivery systems. In this regard, Türkiye lacks the necessary infrastructure for uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication to produce an indigenous supply of nuclear weapons materials.39 In addition, while Türkiye has been investing in missile technology to target possible threats and reinforce its defence against a ballistic missile attack with a robust intelligence-gathering capability dependent on space-based and unmanned systems, the country’s missile capabilities seem to be aimed at providing better defence against regional missile proliferation, and are not designed to provide it with a nuclear-capable delivery system.40', 'Furthermore, the new Turkish approach to accessing nuclear energy has been based on the BOO approach, in terms of which ownership of nuclear power plants will remain in the hands of the suppliers responsible for their construction and operation. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant – the first BOO nuclear project in the world – will be operated and owned by Rosatom. In addition, Türkiye has concluded fuel guarantee and take-back arrangements under which Rosatom supplies the fuel and takes back spent fuel, thus leaving no possibility to divert it for non-peaceful uses. When the BOO model and Türkiye’s relevant infrastructure, including delivery systems, are combined with the country’s international commitments, such as the IAEA Additional Protocol, Türkiye’s nuclear plans are clearly proliferation-resistant.41', 'In short, Türkiye does not have the material capability to implement a nuclear weapons development programme nor the intent to initiate such a programme. President Erdoğan’s criticism of the global nuclear order has been referred to as a sign of intent. In that speech Erdoğan had simply stated that nuclear weapons should either be forbidden or permissible to all states of the world in terms of Article VI of the NPT. He was therefore calling out Western states’ failure to treat Türkiye equally.42', '']

[(13, 21)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-NDT-Round-3.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

0f421730772ea5ffdcef1234413308a8266a419feb521555bdef880b6baa84a0

Ending strategic ambiguity causes proliferation and destroys alliances. That causes war faster than the plan can solve.

Costlow ’21 [Matthew; Senior Analyst @ National Institute for Public Policy; Occasional Paper, “A Net Assessment of “No First Use” and “Sole Purpose” Nuclear Policies,” vol. 1; AS]

allies believe threats threaten existence This could lead to proliferation but U.S. extend deterrence as assurance they do not need independent nuc s declaratory policy leaves open first use Judging by reporting and writings of senior officials allies value first use no first use may contribut to nuclear war it will fracture alliances and increase proliferation adversaries perceiv U.S. weakened will such shift could lead to nuclear conflict and preemption

The location of U.S. allies neighboring hostile revisionist states with nuclear arsenals creates great allied and partner interest in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy allies believe there are nuclear threats that threaten their continued existence This dynamic could lead to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons among U.S. allies, but U.S. policy has been to extend deterrence to allies as a means of assurance that they do not need to pursue their own independent nuc lear weapon program s To further assure allies of the credibility of security assurances declaratory policy leaves open the option of nuclear first use to defend allies Judging by open source reporting and the writings of senior Obama officials , U.S. allies greatly value the United States keeping the nuclear first use option open no first use over the objections of allies and partners could have a chilling effect on other cooperation with allies no first use may end up contribut ing to nuclear war A nuclear no first use has the potential to become a selfdefeating prophecy by falsely promising security allies will believe the policy signals a reduction in the risks the United States is willing to undertake in their defense it will lead to fracture d alliances reduced opportunities for cooperation, and an increase d chance of nuclear proliferation These consequences could have unforeseen follow-on effects , such as potential U.S. adversaries perceiv ing the U.S. policy shift as indicative of weakened political will such a U.S. policy shift could lead to an increased chance of regional nuclear conflict and maybe even preemption if an adversary believes a U.S. ally is pursuing its own nuclear arsenal

U.S. allies revisionist states U.S. nuclear declaratory policy continued existence further proliferation extend deterrence assurance independent nuc lear weapon program s credibility nuclear first use open source reporting writings greatly value open chilling effect cooperation no first use nuclear war selfdefeating prophecy allies willing to undertake fracture d alliances nuclear proliferation follow-on effects political will increased chance nuclear conflict preemption pursuing nuclear arsenal

['Given the U.S. geographic position in the world, its network of alliances is absolutely fundamental to its defense strategy and ability to project power. The location of U.S. allies and partners often directly neighboring hostile revisionist states with nuclear and strategic non-nuclear arsenals creates great allied and partner interest in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy. The fact is, U.S. allies and partners believe there are nuclear and strategic non-nuclear threats that threaten their continued existence—so it is only reasonable when faced with such threats that allies and partners seek capabilities and threats sufficient for credible deterrence. This dynamic could lead to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons among U.S. allies, but U.S. policy has been to extend deterrence to allies and partners as a means of assurance that they do not need to pursue their own independent nuclear weapon programs. To further assure allies and partners of the credibility of U.S. security assurances under extreme circumstances, U.S. nuclear declaratory policy leaves open the option of nuclear first use to defend allies and partners against nuclear and strategic non-nuclear threats.', 'Judging by open source reporting and the writings of senior Obama administration officials, U.S. allies greatly value the United States keeping the nuclear first use option open. U.S. officials have thus likely been hesitant to adopt a nuclear no first use policy not only because allies and partners have objected, but because doing so over the objections of allies and partners could have a chilling effect on other areas of cooperation with allies as well as provide pause for states who may be considering allying themselves with the United States.', 'Conclusion', 'The ultimate irony of a nuclear no first use or sole purpose policy is that, when adopted, it may end up contributing to the very condition that it was meant to avoid: nuclear war. By eliminating one final deterrence step before war—the threat of nuclear first use—there would be less chance to prevent conflict, a conflict that could threaten U.S. and allied vital interests so severely that over time and after much bloodshed the United States must threaten to employ nuclear weapons first to prevent even more, thus raising the risk of nuclear escalation. Put more succinctly by then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, “The danger of a ‘No First Use’ pledge remains that it could increase the chances of war and thus increase the chances of nuclear conflict.”188', 'The nuclear strategist Herman Kahn examined two concepts at the beginning of his book Thinking About the Unthinkable—“self-fulfilling prophecies” and “selfdefeating prophecies.” Most people are familiar with the concept of a self-fulfilling prophecy, where some people predict a future event so often and with such fervor that their actions help create the conditions for it to come true. A self-defeating prophecy, however, is where some people believe so fervently in a future event that their actions help create the conditions for failure.189 A nuclear no first use or sole purpose policy has the potential to become a selfdefeating prophecy by falsely promising greater safety and security, but as U.S. officials try to achieve those benefits, they may inadvertently create the conditions to make war below the nuclear threshold more likely—war that could easily escalate to nuclear use.', 'However, the primary danger of a U.S. nuclear no first use or sole purpose policy is not so much that potential adversaries will believe the policy and act aggressively up to just below the nuclear “red line;” indeed, the case studies examined here suggest U.S. opponents are unlikely to believe such policies in the first place. U.S. officials certainly cannot dismiss the possibility that an opponent will act aggressively just under the nuclear threshold; it is and will remain a real danger. Instead, the above analysis indicates there are three very significant dangers of a U.S. nuclear no first use or sole purpose policy that policymakers must consider before pledging their support for those policies.', 'First, allies and partners will rightly believe that the newly-adopted policy signals a reduction in the risks the United States is willing to undertake in their defense. Should U.S. allies and partners come to this conclusion, a mindset clearly already present among some allies, it will lead to frayed or fractured alliances, reduced opportunities for cooperation, and an increased chance of nuclear proliferation. These negative consequences could have unforeseen follow-on effects, such as potential U.S. adversaries perceiving the U.S. policy shift as indicative of weakened political will. Or, perhaps, such a U.S. policy shift could lead to an increased chance of regional nuclear conflict and maybe even preemption if an adversary believes a U.S. ally is pursuing its own nuclear arsenal as a consequence.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-KoLe-Neg-4---CSU-Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

MichiganState

KoLe

2de4355d1855f71fcdbc3a0aaf42460d2f744e03bc189a196f081b75ed92d04c

Always a human-in-the-loop --- the human developer who created the AI that created the autonomous AI and allowed it to run without oversight

Cofone 19 --- Ignacio N. Cofone, Assistant Professor, McGill University, Faculty of Law, ARTICLE: Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 Hastings L.J. 1389, August, 2019, Lexis

Algorithms are never autonomous Any decision requires a human to determine the output learning consist of a person ordering output same under unsupervised learning humans must choose the input data to develop

Algorithms are never autonomous Any decision -making algorithm requires a human to determine the desired output Under examples above learning would consist of a person ordering "here is an email, output the probability of this email being spam" or "here is a potential tenant's data, output the probability of this tenant defaulting on payment." The same can be said under unsupervised learning humans must choose the input data to develop

never autonomous requires a human humans must choose the input data to develop

['Algorithms are never entirely autonomous. 57 Any decision-making algorithm requires a human to determine the desired output under a conditional probability ("given input X produce this output Y"). 58 Under the examples mentioned above, supervised learning would consist of a person ordering "here is an email, output the probability of this email being spam" or "here is a potential tenant\'s data, output the probability of this tenant defaulting on payment." The same can be said under unsupervised learning, given that humans must choose the input data to develop (unlabeled) features and the output variable that serves as a proxy for the desired characteristic.', '', '', '']

[(0, 6), (7, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GlMi-Neg-ADA-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

GlMi

0f40e973f76a72ec5777a6a477fd593db9eddb79824ea1f2b6b66b0f10bfbc47

There’s a narrow window to establish international norms for safe development---the FTC’s key.

Jessica Newman 21, Research Fellow at the UC Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, AI Policy Specialist with the Future of Life Institute, Research Advisor with The Future Society, 2016-17 International and Global Affairs Student Fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center, MPP from Harvard University, BA from the University of California, Berkeley, “Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Georgetown Journal on International Affairs, 7/13/2021, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/07/13/now-is-the-time-for-transatlantic-cooperation-on-artificial-intelligence/

close coop is needed to prevent prolif of harmful a i and shape global norms recent EU-US Council provide a critical window of opportunity EU and US are actively courting coop It remains to be seen how much either will invest US does already some protections Companies adhere to FTC guidelines FTC has teeth in the near-term US and EU support help establish shared norms and governance coop on AI is “a once-in-a-generation opportunity .” US and EU can work together to clarify and prevent high-risk uses , and establish shared standards a alliance to counter rising digital authoritarianism will be stronger if it facilitates international dialogues There is a narrow window to prevent prolif of AI and shape norms

close r coop eration is needed to prevent the prolif eration of harmful a rtificial i ntelligence and to help shape global AI norms that support democratic values, equity, and human rights. The recent launch of the EU-US Council provide a critical window of opportunity framing of a “ gulf” between EU and US is overstated AI’s risks , like algorithmic amplification of polarization and extremism, cut across borders they are actively courting further coop eration on common challenges In mid-June Biden and E C President Leyen launched a TTC with issues including standards cooperation for emerging tech It remains to be seen , however, how much either ally will invest Failing to take advantage of this opportunity for transatlantic cooperation on AI would be a mistake with wide-ranging consequences for both AI and the state of democracy The US does already have some protections in place against high-risk AI systems the F T C explains that AI products are not outside the scope of its consumer protection laws. Companies will need to adhere to FTC guidelines to ensure AI systems are transparent, explainable, fair, and empirically sound the FTC ’s notice has more teeth in the near-term More important than the US’s and EU’s willingness to establish regulatory frameworks is the significant overlap in what their frameworks intend to accomplish. The US and EU aim for not only the development of AI, but the development of trustworthy AI. Both have adopted AI Principles including sustainable development, human rights, democratic values and diversity, and accountability The US ’s and EU ’s support has help ed to establish a shared language for global AI norms and governance Greater transatlantic coop eration on AI is “a once-in-a-generation opportunity .” The US and EU can now work together to further clarify and prevent high-risk AI uses , and establish shared AI standards . TTC will support regulatory convergence pathways that deserve consideration include pooling resources for research While the U S has worked to develop standards for the use of AI around the world these actions have failed Concrete cooperation with the E U could create a stronger alliance to counter the rising wave of digital authoritarianism greater transatlantic cooperation on AI can benefit democracies and human rights around the world . The alliance will be even stronger if it looks outward and facilitates international dialogues , including with countries from the Global South Forgoing greater cooperation on AI between the US and EU would be a shortsighted mistake. There is a narrow window of opportunity to prevent the prolif eration of harmful AI and to help shape global AI norms

close r coop eration needed prolif eration of harmful a rtificial i ntelligence shape global AI norms critical window of opportunity overstated risks cut across borders actively courting coop mid-June E C a tech remains to be seen invest Failing mistake wide-ranging consequences already some F T C adhere to FTC guidelines FTC more teeth near-term trustworthy US EU support help shared language global AI norms governance coop once-in-a-generation opportunity work together clarify prevent high-risk AI uses establish shared AI standards convergence resources research U S around the world failed E U stronger alliance counter the rising wave around the world international dialogues Global South There is a narrow window of opportunity to prevent the prolif eration of harmful AI and to help shape global AI norms

['The European Union and the United States have not always agreed on the regulation of digital technologies, but closer cooperation is needed to prevent the proliferation of harmful artificial intelligence and to help shape global AI norms that support democratic values, equity, and human rights. The recent launch of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, together with the new EU AI regulatory proposal, provide a critical window of opportunity for deeper engagement.', 'Many assume that the European Union is the world’s technology watchdog, while in contrast the United States is an unruly digital Wild West. Media, policymakers, and the general public have been quick to fit the long-awaited EU regulatory proposal on artificial intelligence (the Artificial Intelligence Act, or AIA) into this bifurcated framing. Journalists have suggested that the AIA may “widen the regulatory gulf” between the EU and the US when it comes to reining in the riskiest AI applications. Researchers have called it “a direct challenge to Silicon Valley’s common view that law should leave emerging technology alone.”', 'However, this framing of a “gulf” between the EU and US on AI regulations is both overstated and counterproductive. The under-regulated AI industry is hurting Americans and Europeans alike, and AI’s risks, like algorithmic amplification of polarization and extremism, cut across borders. Not only do the allies’ perspectives align on various issues, but they are actively courting further cooperation on common challenges.', 'In mid-June, US President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen launched an EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) at the US-EU Summit in Brussels. The TTC comprises ten working groups, with issues including standards cooperation for emerging technologies, data governance and technology platforms, and the threat posed to human rights by technology’s misuse. It remains to be seen, however, how much either ally will invest in this Council or how effective the TTC will be at advancing cooperation on critical AI issues going forward.', 'The release of the AIA, and the more recent launch of the TTC, present critical and time-sensitive opportunities for engagement. Failing to take advantage of this opportunity for transatlantic cooperation on AI would be a mistake with wide-ranging consequences for both AI and the state of democracy. ', 'Divergent Approaches?', 'The EU’s proposed AI regulation differs from previous US federal government attempts by establishing oversight mechanisms to mitigate the risks of AI systems. The AIA views some applications of AI, such as AI-based social scoring, as presenting unacceptable risks that must be banned outright because they pose a clear threat to people’s safety and rights. It considers other applications, like using AI to evaluate eligibility for public services or a job, high risk because of their impact on people’s livelihoods and the potential for bias. High risk AI systems are subject to significant obligations before they can be placed on the market.', 'In contrast, a 2020 memo from the White House Office of Management and Budget on Guidance for Regulation of AI highlights a distrust of regulation that defined the Trump Administration’s approach to AI policy. The memo states, “Federal agencies must avoid regulatory or non-regulatory actions that needlessly hamper AI innovation and growth.” The memo also suggests that AI’s risks should be considered alongside potential benefits.', 'However, there has been a shift in the US AI policy environment under the Biden Administration, with louder calls for accountability and regulation. Although Biden has yet to make AI a priority, there is greater recognition of the risks the technology can pose and signals that the administration will take AI policy seriously. Vice President Harris has previously endorsed a bill to establish federal AI policy and has criticized the ways that AI can perpetuate bias. An Executive Order signed on Biden’s first day in office established an Equitable Data Working Group and the appointment of Dr. Alondra Nelson to lead the Office of Science and Technology Policy promises a commitment to pursue equitable AI.', 'The US does already have some protections in place against high-risk AI systems. Real-time biometric surveillance by law enforcement, prohibited in the AIA with some exceptions, has already been banned by numerous cities in the US. A statement of intent issued by the Federal Trade Commission the same week as the AIA release explains that AI products are not outside the scope of its consumer protection laws. Companies will need to adhere to FTC guidelines to ensure AI systems are transparent, explainable, fair, and empirically sound.', 'In fact, some have asserted that the FTC’s notice has more teeth than the AIA in the near-term. For example, the FTC has committed to holding companies accountable for preventing the proliferation of racially-biased or unreliable algorithms. Meanwhile, it may take years for individual EU member states to adopt the AIA, lessening the immediate impact on Big Tech compared to what some had expected. Under the AIA, most AI technology will not be subject to any regulation and while producers of high-risk AI systems face regulatory requirements it appears that assessments will not be made available to the public. In short, the EU approach may be less of a “burden” than some feared, while the US policy landscape may be less permissive than it may first appear.', 'More important than the US’s and EU’s willingness to establish regulatory frameworks is the significant overlap in what their frameworks intend to accomplish. The US and EU aim for not only the development of AI, but the development of trustworthy AI. Both have adopted the OECD AI Principles, which provide common benchmarks on issues including sustainable development, human rights, democratic values and diversity, and accountability, among others. The US’s and EU’s support of the Principles has helped to establish a shared language for global AI norms and governance.', 'Cooperation as a Strategic Goal', 'Greater transatlantic cooperation on AI is a stated goal of both the US and the EU. A European Commission program for a transatlantic agenda from December 2020 first proposed the EU-US Trade and Technology Council. The Council was an opportunity for allies to work together on critical technologies and to encourage the establishment of digital governance that promotes shared values of human dignity, individual rights, and democratic principles. The agenda described this as “a once-in-a-generation opportunity.”', 'The US has also highlighted the importance of international cooperation on AI, most recently by accepting the EU’s invitation to launch the TTC. The US has launched the National AI Initiative which intends to support further opportunities for cooperation with strategic allies on research and development, assessment, and resources for trustworthy AI systems. “International Cooperation” is also one of the six strategic pillars outlined on the newly re-launched AI.gov website detailing US AI priorities.', 'Transatlantic cooperation is widely supported by US industry stakeholders, in part to promote regulatory compatibility. For example, the TTC was endorsed in a blog post by Karan Bhatia, Google’s Vice President of Government Affairs & Public Policy, and in a statement of support from the Information Technology Industry Council. The final report from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), a multistakeholder group including numerous AI industry leaders, also has a chapter on creating a favorable international technology order. The NSCAI advises the US to establish an International Science and Technology Strategy and argues that “like-minded countries must work together to advance an international rules-based order, protect free and open societies, and unleash economic innovation.”', 'Given the allies’ many common goals, the AIA should not be seen as a challenge to the US. Instead, the proposal is an important first step and an opportunity to prevent AI uses that violate human safety and fundamental rights. The US and EU can now work together to further clarify and prevent high-risk AI uses, and establish shared AI standards. While the recently-launched TTC provides a valuable platform for this work and will support regulatory policy cooperation and convergence, a handful of working groups only partially focused on AI may struggle to meet these objectives. Additional pathways that deserve consideration include increasing capacity for information sharing and pooling resources for larger scale research on critical topics.', 'Why Now?', 'As governments scrambled to control the spread of COVID-19, many turned to AI technologies for help – to better understand the virus, track outbreaks, and help provide care. In some cases, this has justified the implementation of pervasive surveillance systems, which are now being used for troubling ends. As just one example, a facial recognition camera network in Moscow, originally implemented to help enforce quarantine restrictions, was later used to detain dozens of protestors voicing opposition to President Vladimir Putin. AI-enabled surveillance systems have proliferated across the globe, and the scale and scope of “digital authoritarianism” has increased for years, amplified by the use of AI to automate censorship and surveillance systems.', 'While the United States has worked to develop standards and principles for the use of AI around the world and sought to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, these actions have failed to stop the misuse of AI. Concrete cooperation with the European Union, which has been lacking, could create a stronger alliance to counter the rising wave of digital authoritarianism. The launch of the TTC shows that President Joe Biden understands this dynamic. He recently said the “transatlantic alliance is back,” and explicitly highlighted the need to shape the rules that will govern the advance of AI, among other consequential technologies.', 'Importantly, greater transatlantic cooperation on AI is not just in the self-interest of the US and the EU; it can benefit democracies and human rights around the world. The alliance will be even stronger if it looks outward and facilitates international, inclusive dialogues, including with countries from the Global South. Fostering an equitable and responsible digital future requires incorporating critical, yet underrepresented, voices into AI governance discussions and decision-making.', 'Forgoing greater cooperation on AI between the US and EU would be a shortsighted mistake. There is a narrow window of opportunity to prevent the proliferation of harmful AI and to help shape global AI norms. The time for transatlantic cooperation on AI is now.']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Aff-Fullertown-Round1.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Aff-Fullertown-Round1.docx

d7d5c5046e104c0a88e60e5af108cd39485ca4485bb1b0caa945a7310e82c234

It protects labor and buyer power---expansion undermines industry competition.

Kennedy ’18 [Joe; 2018; Ph.D. in Economics from George Washington, former Chief Economist with the U.S. Department of Commerce; Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, “Why the Consumer Welfare Standard Should Remain the Bedrock of Antitrust Policy,” ]

criticism of c w s is it ignores criticized labor the consumer covers cases in reality, “consumer” is substitute for “ counterparty .” does not mean only consumers also protects sellers quality and innovation Existing competition policy applies to anticompetitive behavior toward suppliers within the labor markets The DOJ will criminally investigate allegations employers agreed on employee compensation or not to hire

A key criticism of the c onsumer w elfare s tandard is it ignores buyer power whether of labor or goods Steinbaum criticized Walmart and other big retailers for squeezing small suppliers Others argue that big companies are exerting monopsony power within labor markets The other is the general argument that every time a company merges there is one fewer potential buyer or employer It is clear the consumer welfare standard covers the former cases because in reality, “consumer” is just a convenient substitute for “ counterparty .” A report put out by the Antitrust Institute points out: “[C] onsumer welfare” does not mean that antitrust protects only consumers Antitrust also protects sellers from being exploited by powerful buyers and it promotes open markets and entrepreneurial freedom properly conceived consumer welfare takes into account not only effects on price and output, but also product or service quality and innovation Existing competition policy also applies not just to monopsony but to anticompetitive behavior toward suppliers when a company takes specific action to limit competition within the labor markets , antitrust laws apply. the DOJ filed a civil antitrust complaint against six hightech companies that had agreed not to cold call one another’s employees the Department sued two railroad equipment suppliers for entering into agreements not to solicit each other’s employees A joint document by the two leading antitrust agencies clearly states, “ The DOJ will criminally investigate allegations that employers have agreed among themselves on employee compensation or not to solicit or hire each other’s employees More recently, several national fast-food chains dropped the practice of using noncompete agreements after being challenged by a group of state attorneys general

c w s ignores buyer power Steinbaum labor markets former cases counterparty does not mean only consumers sellers exploited quality innovation monopsony suppliers limit labor markets DOJ suppliers criminally investigate compensation attorneys general

['A key criticism of the consumer welfare standard is it ignores buyer power—whether of labor or goods. Marshall Steinbaum et al. have criticized Walmart and other big retailers for squeezing small suppliers.28 Others argue that big companies are exerting monopsony power within labor markets.29 Carl Bogus, for example, complains that after a merger, “workers at all levels face a reduction in potential employers.”30 ', 'There are two possibilities here. One is the case in which, because of anticompetitive behavior or a merger, a company gets monopsony power over a specific market and uses it to engage in deliberate anticompetitive acts to harm suppliers, including labor. These cases can create harms even though the company is a buyer rather than a seller. The other is the general argument that every time a company merges there is one fewer potential buyer or employer (but not necessarily less demand or fewer jobs). It is clear the consumer welfare standard covers the former cases, because in reality, “consumer” is just a convenient substitute for “counterparty.” A report put out by the American Antitrust Institute, which favors tougher antitrust policy, points out: “[C]onsumer welfare” does not mean that antitrust protects only consumers. It protects all buyers, including companies, from seller market power. Antitrust also protects sellers from being exploited by powerful buyers and it promotes open markets and entrepreneurial freedom. Moreover, properly conceived, consumer welfare takes into account not only effects on price and output, but also product or service quality and innovation.31 ', 'In a recent article, Herbert Hovenkamp and Carl Shapiro stated: “As we use this term, applying the ‘consumer welfare’ standard means that a merger is judged to be anticompetitive if it disrupts the competitive process and harms trading parties on the other side of the market.”32', 'Existing competition policy also applies not just to monopsony, but to anticompetitive behavior toward suppliers, whether businesses or workers. For example, when a company takes specific action to limit competition within the labor markets, antitrust laws apply. In 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil antitrust complaint against six hightech companies that had agreed not to cold call one another’s employees but used other means to attract workers.33 A class action suit resulted in a recovery of $415 million.34 Earlier this year, the Department sued two railroad equipment suppliers for entering into agreements not to solicit each other’s employees.35 A joint document by the two leading antitrust agencies clearly states, “The DOJ will criminally investigate allegations that employers have agreed among themselves on employee compensation or not to solicit or hire each other’s employees.”36 More recently, several national fast-food chains dropped the practice of using noncompete agreements after being challenged by a group of state attorneys general. 37']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Harvard-Semis.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Harvard-Semis.docx

87266f821fce47130f2f1786ed600a6f83ac051392d9268b5e2a4859df03ad53

Lobbyists control the debate – spending billions to campaign against changes

Cirincione 22 [Joseph Cirincione is a distinguished fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He has studied and worked on nuclear policy for 40 years. 2-15-2022 https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/15/nuclear-review-first-use-biden/]

The s quo is protected by a powerful consortium of arms corporations that realize vast profits from maintaining arsenals To protect contracts companies deploy a small army of lobbyists spending $2.5 billion to fund 700 a year companies run a revolving door that shuttles officials between top policy jobs also disperse contracts to nearly every district contribute to lawmakers on key committees and flood think tanks with grants to mute criticism

The s tatus quo is further protected by a powerful consortium of arms corporations that realize vast profits from manufacturing and maintaining these arsenals To protect their contracts , arms companies deploy a small army of lobbyists in Washington, spending $2.5 billion over the past two decades to fund an average of 700 lobbyists a year . The companies run a revolving door that shuttles officials between top policy jobs and top contractor jobs The companies also disperse contracts to nearly every congressional district , contribute generously to lawmakers on the key committees that oversee their programs and flood Washington think tanks with grants to mute criticism .

powerful consortium arms corporations vast profits small army of lobbyists revolving door

['The status quo is further protected by a powerful consortium of arms corporations that realize vast profits from manufacturing and maintaining these arsenals. Since the start of the Afghanistan war, Pentagon spending has totaled $14 trillion, with one-third to one-half going directly to military contractors. The annual budget is now at its highest level since World War II. Nuclear spending is soaring as the Pentagon orders new fleets of nuclear-armed bombers, submarines and missiles.', 'To protect their contracts, arms companies deploy a small army of lobbyists in Washington, spending $2.5 billion over the past two decades to fund an average of 700 lobbyists a year. The companies run a revolving door that shuttles officials between top policy jobs and top contractor jobs. The companies also disperse contracts to nearly every congressional district, contribute generously to lawmakers on the key committees that oversee their programs (the five major nuclear weapons contractors made $31 million in campaign contributions in 2020 alone) and flood Washington think tanks with grants to mute criticism.', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BeMo-Neg-6---D5-Districts-Round-1.docx

MichiganState

BeMo

a6e1c9125ce0d02d159010240a8a9afec2fa1cc822f17feb4417a40bc54cacca

‘Red innovation’ causes global backlash and fails.

Tudoreanu ‘20 [Mihnea; 9/23/20; doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; David M. Kotz; professor emeritus of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; "Stable Jobs or iPhones? The Dilemma of Innovation in Socialism," Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 52, Vol. 4, p. 642-649]

innovation is slower in socialism Dem majorities are not immune to factors that caused Soviet s to be conservative innovation is disruptive Even with employment guarantee some will be scrapped and introduced at slow pace If there is international rivalry citizens compare lifestyles those under socialism will be attracted by introduction A common response to flaws has been other models of socialism would not have flaws . But the trade-off between job security and innovation is not easily eliminated military innovation put DPS at disadvantage which would hurt socialist side in i r even if no conflict takes place. one side will act timidly The Cold War was struggle Any future socialist order will likely similar struggle

One advantage for innovation in DPS is it can take into account social and environmental costs , But this can also be problematic , i n that it is likely to make innovation slower in socialism than in capitalism . Dem ocratic majorities are not immune to the same factors that caused Soviet manager s to be technologically conservative innovation is always disruptive in any kind of economic system . As old technologies are superseded , product lines become obsolete and production processes are changed, and as a result certain jobs are no longer needed . Even with employment guarantee , the loss of one’s job may have to involve retraining , changing careers , or moving it is reasonable to expect workers will resist new technologies This is Stable jobs or iPhones?” dilemma. We can prioritize consumer products, or stable employment, but not both some innovations will be scrapped because of their disruptive effects , and some introduced at a deliberately slow pace . Meanwhile, capitalism always comes down in favor Since socialism will not it is likely that socialism will have fewer cutting-edge products than capitalism If there is international rivalry between socialism and capitalism , the citizens of the two societies will compare their lifestyles those under socialism will likely also be attracted by the rapid introduction of new goods under capitalism as long as the speed of innovation in socialism is lower the “ consumer gap ” with capitalism would grow we have a category of people with a material interest in supporting capitalism , which values a new technology even though they are part of the working class A common response to flaws of Soviet socialism has been propose other models of socialism that would not have those flaws . But the trade-off between job security and innovation is not one that can be easily eliminated within socialism. It is not due to overly centralized or undemocratic nature of Soviet socialism military innovation put DPS at a military disadvantage with respect to capitalism, which would hurt the socialist side in i nternational r elations even if no military conflict takes place. If one side knows it would lose any war that side will act timidly and avoid even nonviolent confrontation to avoid provoking the other side For both sides to stand good chance of success in a peaceful rivalry, they must be evenly matched so that neither feels that it can do whatever it wants with impunity The Cold War was multifaceted struggle Any future socialist economic order will most likely face capitalism in a similar struggle

problematic innovation slower socialism capitalism not immune same factors Soviet manager s always disruptive economic system superseded obsolete no longer needed retraining changing careers moving resist new technologies not both disruptive effects deliberately slow pace cutting-edge international rivalry socialism capitalism attracted rapid introduction speed of innovation lower consumer gap grow material interest supporting capitalism new technology other models of socialism flaws trade-off job security innovation easily eliminated military disadvantage hurt socialist side i nternational r elations lose any war act timidly avoid provoking

['Note: DPS = Democratically Planned Socialism', 'One of the advantages for innovation in DPS is that it can effectively take into account social and environmental costs, including the jobs lost or disrupted by the introduction of a new technology.8 But this can also be problematic, in that it is likely to make innovation slower in socialism than in capitalism. Democratic majorities are not immune to some of the same factors that caused Soviet managers to be technologically conservative.', 'On the one hand, DPS should not suffer from taut planning, unrealistic plan targets imposed from the top down, or an incentive structure that discourages risk-taking by trying out new technologies. But on the other hand, innovation is always disruptive in any kind of economic system. As old technologies are superseded, product lines become obsolete and production processes are changed, and as a result certain kinds of jobs are no longer needed. Even with an employment guarantee, the loss of one’s job may have to involve retraining, changing careers, or moving across the country. So, it is reasonable to expect that workers will resist new technologies.9 Yet at the same time, in their capacity as consumers, they will demand new and better products.', 'This is the “Stable jobs or iPhones?” dilemma. We can prioritize cutting-edge consumer products, or we can prioritize stable employment, but perhaps not both.10 In DPS, the people will be able to decide between one and the other, on a case-by-case basis, so that some innovations will be pursued, others will be scrapped because of their disruptive effects, and some will be introduced at a deliberately slow pace. Meanwhile, capitalism always comes down in favor of the iPhones despite the conflict with stable jobs. Since socialism will not always do this, it is likely that socialism will have more job security but fewer cutting-edge consumer products than capitalism.', 'If there is an international rivalry between socialism and capitalism, the citizens of the two kinds of societies will be able to compare their lifestyles with those in the other economic system. Workers living under capitalism may be attracted by the stable jobs, shorter working hours, democratic workplaces, and social benefits provided by socialism. However, those living under socialism will likely also be attracted by the rapid introduction of new consumer goods under capitalism. Moreover, as long as the speed of innovation in socialism is lower than that in capitalism, the “consumer gap” with capitalism would grow over time.', 'This may not be considered a problem for socialism if most of the population value stable jobs more than iPhones, but there would likely be a minority who do not. If the consumer gap is large enough, and/or that dissenting minority has an overriding preference for new consumer goods, then we have a category of people with a material interest in supporting capitalism, which values a new technology over job stability, even though they are part of the working class.', 'A common response to the flaws of Soviet socialism has been to propose other models of socialism that would not have those flaws. But the trade-off between job security and innovation is not one that can be easily eliminated within socialism. It is not due to the overly centralized or undemocratic nature of Soviet socialism.', 'Furthermore, there is a military aspect to the innovation problem. Innovations that aid the military are also likely to have a disruptive effect on employment, as in the case of consumer-oriented innovations. This is a problem because it might put DPS at a military disadvantage with respect to capitalism, which would hurt the socialist side in international relations even if no military conflict takes place. If one side knows it would lose any war that did take place, then that side will act timidly and avoid even nonviolent confrontation, so as to avoid provoking the other side into war. For both sides to stand a good chance of success in a peaceful rivalry, they must be more or less evenly matched militarily, so that neither feels that it can do whatever it wants with impunity or that it must tread lightly to avoid confrontation.', 'The Cold War was a multifaceted struggle between two different systems. Any future socialist economic order will most likely face capitalism in a somewhat similar struggle. Can such a struggle be won by socialism without matching capitalism’s rate of technological development? That is the question.', '']

[(0, 9), (9, 9), (10, 11), (11, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Aff-Texas-Open-Round-1.docx

Kansas

PaMa

3187b6ceb91abc4cf2881044cfe2550aaaa762d254323ff1f1061def55b52168

3. The threshold for the link is low---the strategy is finely tuned and every hour counts.

Gitanjali Poonia 10/24, staff writer at Deseret News, bachelor’s in electronic media from San Francisco State University and a master’s in journalism from Columbia Journalism School, “Is the Biden administration playing a role in Israel’s delayed ground invasion?,” Deseret News, 10/24/23, https://www.deseret.com/2023/10/24/23929125/biden-administration-israel-ground-invasion-response-delay

ground invasion looms reports indicate Biden is advising Israel to delay in hopes of deescalating But the possibility isn’t going away Biden is saving Israel from Israel It is literally an hour-by-hour effort at the White House and State

It’s the 18th day of war and the possibility of a ground invasion of Gaza still looms Civilians in northern Gaza and bordering Israeli towns have been ordered to evacuate in anticipation reports indicate Biden is advising Israel to delay in hopes of deescalating the war But the possibility of a ground invasion isn’t going away Biden can say to Bibi , don’t go in The I D F have indicated that it is ready for a ground invasion But the timeline of such an attack is uncertain “This is a momentous decision for Israel , and it must absolutely get it right the stakes are so high “ Biden is saving Israel from Israel the president “ understands the need to whack Hamas but is also super sensitive to humanitarian needs saying that the U.S. will advocate for Palestinian people’s right to dignity “The actions of Hamas don’t take that away “ It is literally an hour-by-hour effort at the White House and State

Gaza still looms reports Biden advising Israel delay deescalating the war possibility isn’t going away Bibi don’t go in I D F ready ground invasion timeline uncertain momentous decision Israel must absolutely get it right so high saving Israel from Israel understands the need whack Hamas super sensitive humanitarian needs advocate Palestinian people’s right dignity Hamas don’t take that away literally hour-by-hour effort White House State

['It’s the 18th day of war since Hamas attacked Israeli civilians on Oct. 7, and the possibility of a ground invasion of Gaza still looms.', 'Civilians in northern parts of Gaza and bordering Israeli towns have already been ordered to evacuate in anticipation of a ground war. Hamas, a terrorist organization responsible for the killing of at least 1,400 Israelis, also took more than 200 hostages during the attack.', 'Several reports indicate the Biden administration is advising Israel to delay putting boots on the ground, in hopes of saving more hostages and deescalating the war.', 'But an official from the Israeli Prime Minister’s office told CNN on Friday that the possibility of a ground invasion isn’t going away.', '“That (military) pressure isn’t going to go because they were released,” the official said. “It won’t change the mission, which is to dismantle Hamas.”', 'White House national security spokesperson John Kirby did not outright respond to whether the reports about the U.S. guiding Israel’s military moves were true.', '“It’s our view that the Israeli Defense Forces ... need to decide for themselves how they’re going to conduct operations. We’re not in the business of dictating terms to them and we’re certainly not going to be in the business here from the White House of previewing any future operations one way or another,” said Kirby in a press briefing on Monday. “That would be inappropriate.”', 'Amos N. Guiora, a law professor at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah, who is currently in Jerusalem, told the Deseret News that Hamas is playing “a wicked psychological game” — releasing two American hostages on Friday, and two other hostages on Monday while not allowing direct communication with Israel.', '“Biden can say to (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu), ‘Bibi, don’t go in because you’ll get more hostages released,’” said Guiora.', 'Guiora said he believes Netanyahu also has a hard time making decisions, a trait he has been accused of by others.', 'The Israeli Defense Forces have indicated that it is ready for a ground invasion with the goal of eliminating Hamas, according to The Times of Israel. But the timeline of such an attack is uncertain.', 'To Chuck Freilich, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, there isn’t a delay in the ground offensive, as Israel works to reduce damage while preparing its military for such an undertaking.', '“This is a momentous decision for Israel, and it must absolutely get it right,” Freilich told ABC News. “This time, the stakes are so high.”', 'Biden’s connections to Israel guide his administration’s strategy', 'Guiora said that while ripping out Hamas seems like a good idea, the hostages can become collateral damage, which makes the situation complicated.', '“Biden is saving Israel from Israel,” he said, adding that the president “understands the need to whack the guys from Hamas who committed war crimes” but he is also “super, super sensitive to the humanitarian needs.”', 'Biden, in a post on X, formerly known as Twitter, exemplified this sensitivity, saying that the U.S. will advocate for “the Palestinian people’s right to dignity and to self-determination.”', '“The actions of Hamas terrorists don’t take that right away,” he said.', 'The professor said he thinks Biden may be the last American president to have a deep understanding of the Holocaust. The president previously revealed that he took all his children and grandchildren to Dachau, a Nazi concentration camp, to teach them about the Holocaust.', 'Biden has already spoken to the two American hostages, a mother and a daughter, who were released on Friday.', '“It is literally an hour-by-hour effort here at the White House and at the State Department to find out where these folks are and to try to make the effort to get them out and get them back,” said Kirby.']

[(10, 22)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-Shirley-Round-2.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

e28abf9c181923f6b110877c9f4ee839cb455e9d0b78b8a35814b30825458a2a

They’re v clogged

WSJ 22 (Wall Street Journal, “Covid-19 pummeled the U.S. legal system. It may take years to catch up,”

courts fac overwhelming backlogs because of Covid could take years to dig out Tens of thousands stuck in courts Large cities face the steepest challenges stringent public health measures limited court s shut down for months

courts are fac ing overwhelming case backlogs because of the Covid -19 pandemic and it could take years for the legal system to dig out . Tens of thousands stuck in limbo in courts around the country Large cities face some of the steepest challenges New York Chicago and San Francisco stringent public health measures limited court operation s Many courts had to shut down in-person proceedings for weeks or months

overwhelming case backlogs years Tens of thousands steepest challenges New York Chicago San Francisco limited court operation s

['The nation’s courts are facing overwhelming case backlogs because of the Covid-19 pandemic and it could take years for the legal system to dig out.', 'Tens of thousands of legal cases ranging from minor thefts to civil disputes to murder are stuck in limbo in state courts around the country, a situation that has left some defendants waiting in jail and strained prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ ability to do their jobs.', 'Large cities face some of the steepest challenges. Places like New York, Chicago and San Francisco handle large volumes of cases each year and have seen rates of some violent crimes soar. They have also been home to stringent public health measures that limited court operations.', 'Many courts had to shut down in-person proceedings for weeks or months at a time over the last couple of years, most recently when the Omicron variant swept ', '']

[(0, 3), (4, 6)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-4.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

ea5ff22d781bfc381d7244503a64d21c68c439007d6c6faac5936bf1d502eab6

It swamps the case and US is key—adaptive competition norms prevent collapse of the liberal order that undergirds the AFF and caps every impact.

Manyika 20—(senior partner at McKinsey & Company, DPhil, MS, and MA from Oxford in AI and robotics, mathematics, and computer science, and a BS first class in electrical engineering from the University of Zimbabwe). James Manyika, Gary Pinkus, & Monique Tuin. November 12, 2020. “Rethinking the future of American capitalism”. . Accessed 8/6/21.

at a time of rising inequality competition with different models , and existential threats critiques of cap in its current form have grown louder. Benefits of the US spread around the world through competition However Now more than ever, the American model faces growing challenges COVID provided a glimpse into the challenge market systems face Climate change also poses a challenge cap has been unsuccessful and regions have seen flooding , extreme weather , and wildfires . the past 50 years centered on Western democracies a multipolar global economy poses complicated choices for America America’s model need to evolve to remain the unmatched mechanism for delivering prosperity In previous eras, new ideas emerged and institutional actors enacted market-based mechanisms

Capitalism has contributed to significant gains in economic growth and prosperity throughout its history. But at a time of rising inequality competition from economies with different models , and existential threats including from climate change , capitalism in its current form —and American cap italism in particular—may face its most serious test . Talk of change had already begun prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. when many are feeling left behind by globalization and inequality has risen , critiques of cap italism in its current form have grown louder. calls for reform have come not only from economists but also from business leaders; Benefits of the US model have not only accrued to the American economy and people but have spread around the world , through competition , trade , investment , and the proliferation of globally relevant innovations . However for the bottom three quintiles by income which include about 150 million adults in the United States —the results in the past 20 years have been mixed Now more than ever, the American model faces growing challenges especially deteriorating outcomes and prospects for many individuals challenges facing capitalism have become increasingly apparent in recent decades. Many challenges are generally the case found in most advanced economies, but particularly in the U nited S tates. inequality within countries has increased, most acutely in the U nited S tates. the middle class celebrated as critical to the American economy has been especially squeezed declining from 61 percent to 52 percent. COVID has demonstrated the need for a dedicated effort by the public and private sectors to respond to both a humanitarian and an economic crisis through coordinated investment The crisis thus provided a glimpse into the challenge that liberal market systems , like America’s, can face in addressing large-scale interventions in response to external shocks. Climate change also poses a challenge to capitalism through potentially the largest disruption to the market economy. American cap italism has so far been unsuccessful in putting a price on carbon and regulating it through a market-based intervention and regions worldwide have seen increased occurrence of flooding , extreme weather , and wildfires . Trends over the past 50 years have largely played out in a global economy centered on Western democracies , with the United States at the forefront. But China has evolved to become a global economic power. challenges facing the American model of capitalism in the 21st century in a multipolar global economy go beyond the United States. multilateral institutions that govern how the global economy functions. This evolving global economy poses new and complicated choices for the evolution of the America n model and for other large economies and their corporations. America’s model of capitalism may need to evolve if it is to remain the unmatched mechanism for delivering prosperity for all that it has been. However it is important to retain the strengths of the current model critical to capturing the opportunities in the decades ahead In previous eras, new ideas emerged and institutional actors enacted a number o f market-based mechanisms that attempted to address the issues that capitalism faced

significant gains But rising inequality competition from economies with different models existential threats climate change current form cap most serious test already begun inequality has risen cap in its current form reform spread around the world competition trade investment globally relevant innovations However bottom three quintiles by income 150 million adults in the United States growing challenges challenges facing capitalism U S inequality U S especially squeezed COVID humanitarian and an economic crisis glimpse liberal market systems also American cap unsuccessful flooding extreme weather wildfires past 50 years Western democracies multipolar global economy new and complicated choices America need to evolve unmatched mechanism for delivering prosperity However retain the strengths of the current model new ideas emerged institutional actors

['', 'Capitalism has contributed to significant gains in economic growth and prosperity throughout its history. But at a time of growing public discontent about rising inequality, heightened competition from economies with different models, and existential threats including from climate change, capitalism in its current form—and American capitalism in particular—may face its most serious test.', 'Talk of change had already begun prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. At a time when many are feeling left behind by globalization, the impact of technology, and other trends, and inequality has risen, critiques of capitalism in its current form have grown louder. The calls for reform—which range from tweaks to wholesale change—have come not only from economists but also from business leaders; for example, the US Business Roundtable, representing the CEOs of America’s largest corporations, in 2019 redefined the purpose of corporations as going beyond serving shareholders to commitments to all stakeholders, promoting “an economy that serves all Americans.” The pandemic has shone a harsh spotlight on challenges both old and new facing the American model of capitalism. Policy makers from across the political spectrum and business leaders, as well as leaders of multilateral institutions, have called for moves toward greater inclusiveness, resilience, and fairness.', 'Evolution of American capitalism would not be new. Indeed, capitalism has evolved in keeping with the changing nature of the economy itself, including the role of capital and labor, trade and monetary policy, and changing ideas about the political economy. The neoliberal model of capitalism present in the United States today and to varying degrees in other Western economies was shaped in the 1960s and 1970s. Commonly cited as a defining moment for this shift was Milton Friedman’s 1970 article for the New York Times, in which he argued that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.” This itself was a move away from Keynesian economics, which emerged as the standard model in advanced economies after the Great Depression of the 1930s.', 'Today, we may be poised for another such shift. American capitalism faces the question of the nature and degree of change necessary to ensure growth and prosperity for all in the 21st century.', 'What follows is a brief recap of the strengths and the challenges. While by no means comprehensive, it serves to frame some key questions ahead.', 'American capitalism has delivered unmatched growth and prosperity', 'America’s brand of capitalism—the version that has been in place for the past half-century or so—has delivered unmatched economic growth and prosperity. GDP per capita has more than doubled over the past 50 years, while personal consumption expenditure per capita has almost tripled, and there have been significant improvements in longevity and leisure. The private sector—large and small businesses and entrepreneurship—is at the center of America’s model of capitalism. In a forthcoming paper, we catalog the contributions that the private sector has made to American economic growth and prosperity. They include a fourfold increase in domestic business contribution to US GDP per capita, even as domestic business has declined from about 85 percent to 75 percent of net national income. Non-agriculture business activity accounts for 71 percent of value added of the US economy (excluding real estate) and 64 percent of employed labor income. As economic engines, businesses account for 83 percent of US technology investment, 76 percent of R&D investment, and 81 percent of labor productivity growth in the 21st century.', 'American capitalism has flourished by providing incentives for innovation and bold risk-taking by entrepreneurs and investors. It has fueled competitive markets, from which the innovations with the best market fit emerge and succeed, and it has created mechanisms for capital formation and investment to underwrite, commercialize, and scale the best ideas and propel the growth of the most successful companies. In addition to financing innovation in the private sector, large capital markets have been effective partners to government in moments of crisis and company distress, as has been evident in the COVID-19 pandemic. By scaling down or eliminating unsuccessful ideas and companies, American capitalism has also enabled a process of creative destruction and business dynamism unparalleled in other large economies, including those with capitalist models.', 'Although growth slowed in the first 20 years of the 21st century, America’s model of capitalism has continued to lead in the global economy. While US real GDP growth has averaged just above 2 percent, it has outperformed the six other advanced economies of the G-7. The nation continues to lead the world in investment in research and development. Many of the breakthroughs fueling 21st-century growth, from digitization and artificial intelligence to innovations in the life sciences, have emerged from its ecosystem. And American firms rank among the most widely known and the most profitable globally: in economic profit, they make up 38 percent of the top 10 percent of firms and two-thirds of the top 1 percent of firms globally.', 'Benefits of the US model have not only accrued to the American economy and people but have spread around the world, through competition, trade, investment, and the proliferation of globally relevant innovations in areas like technology, medicine, and financial and capital markets, as well as in managerial and business model innovations. Rapid economic growth in emerging economies during the past 30 years has lifted a billion people out of poverty. This growth in prosperity is in large part due to effects of trade and participation in a global economy in which the American model and its related institutions and ecosystems have played a central role.', 'For participants in the American model, outcomes over the past 20 years have been positive for the innovators, entrepreneurs, and investors; the most innovative, fast-growing, and often large companies; the high-skill and high-wage workers; and the cities and dynamic hubs where much of this activity has taken place. Returns on investment, wealth accumulation and income growth, and overall standard of living for these individuals have continued to rise and even accelerated. However, for the rest of society—roughly the bottom three quintiles by income, which include about 150 million adults in the United States—the results in the past 20 years have been mixed, as we describe in the next section, and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have worsened those outcomes for many.', 'Now more than ever, the American model faces growing challenges, especially deteriorating outcomes and prospects for many individuals', 'Several challenges facing capitalism have become increasingly apparent in recent decades. Some come from within the system itself; others, from extrinsic challenges it must grapple with. Most have been brought into sharp relief during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of the challenges we highlight are generally the case found in most advanced economies, but particularly in the United States.', 'Unequal and increasingly disparate outcomes for people and places', 'While inequality between countries has decreased, inequality within countries has increased, most acutely in the United States. Economic mobility has slowed, and the middle class that has been much celebrated as critical to the American economy has been especially squeezed, declining over the past half-century from 61 percent of American households to 52 percent. A primary source of this inequality is a fundamental change in the US economy from one driven by manufacturing to one driven by services and consumption, which has reduced the income available to workers, and this inexorable shift is unlikely to reverse itself. The unequal outcomes for individuals and households over the past 20 years become clearer when considered through the lens of individuals as workers, consumers, and savers, as we outlined in research earlier this year on the evolving social contract.', 'For workers, average wages in the United States grew by only 0.9 percent annually from 2000 to 2019. Labor market polarization toward high- and low-wage employment eliminated one million middle-wage American jobs. Median wages for middle-wage jobs grew by just 1.1 percent over that time, while median wages for high-skill and low-skill workers grew faster, at 7.3 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. Labor share of national income has continued to decline, and wages have lagged behind productivity growth. And despite overall gains in employment and an expansion of income-earning opportunities before the pandemic, most of the jobs created have been in lower-wage occupations, often in the service sector. Further, most of the employment gains have been driven by alternative work arrangements and part-time work, increasing job and income fragility.', 'Consumers have benefited from improved access and lower prices for discretionary goods, especially traded goods such as electronics, appliances, and furniture. But rising prices of basic goods such as housing, healthcare, and education—which make up a large share of consumption for low-income households—have outpaced inflation, eating up 54 percent of any gains in income over the last 20 years for the average US household. Household savings rates have fallen at a time when individuals have to save for longer retirements and assume greater responsibility for saving. Almost half of individuals in the United States over the age of 15 did not save for old age last year.', 'Many of these outcomes have come down hardest on particular groups of people. Younger people are having a harder time finding full-time employment, spend a larger share of income on basic goods and services, and save less than other groups. While access to employment has improved substantially, women still are paid only 82 cents per dollar earned by men. And the racial wealth gap is especially pronounced in the United States. In 2016, the wealth of the median white family was ten times higher than that of the median black family, and 7.5 times higher than that of the median Hispanic family. Such differences persist, even among college-educated individuals.', 'Geography matters, too: more than two-thirds of US job growth since 2007 has been concentrated in 25 cities and dynamic hubs, while low-growth and rural counties where 77 million people live had flat or falling employment growth even during the recovery from the last financial crisis. Research has highlighted wide geographical variation in intergenerational mobility.', 'The health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are exacerbating these inequalities between people and between places, with many low-income individuals either in high-contact essential jobs with greater health risks, or facing temporary or permanent unemployment. Low-wage workers earning less than $40,000 per year accounted for more than 80 percent of workers vulnerable to layoffs, furloughs, and reductions in hours or income during the pandemic; a disproportionate share were women and people of color. Black and Hispanic and Latino Americans are overrepresented in nine of the ten lowest-paid, high-contact essential services, exposing them to greater health risks.', 'Addressing inequality is both a social issue and an economic issue. Rising inequality in the medium term could contribute to reduced aggregate demand, as high-income families typically spend a lower share of their income than other groups. Economists and social scientists also argue that inequalities of wealth, income, and consumption can harm economic growth in the long run, by hindering educational opportunities, human capital formation, and intergenerational mobility. These are critical success factors for the innovation and opportunities that capitalist development itself seeks to propel.', 'Increasing superstar effects', 'Capitalism’s effectiveness in directing capital formation toward the most promising investments has implications for market structure and concentration of economic power. Gains over the past 20 years have been concentrated in a small subset of sectors, including finance, real estate, technology, pharmaceuticals, and some business services. This concentration has driven strong wealth effects, through higher returns to holders of physical and intangible assets and capital. The “superstar” sectors of the past 20 years are less capital- and labor-intensive than those of prior decades, according to our research, and they have been more geographically concentrated, further driving inequality in income and wealth. In the United States, just 6 percent of counties account for two-thirds of GDP output. Concentration of talent, intellectual property, and other intangible assets reinforce these geographically concentrated gains to superstar cities, from New York to Los Angeles to Atlanta, which have 40 percent higher GDP per capita than peer cities but also considerably higher levels of inequality.', 'Superstar effects have been most apparent with the growth of superstar firms. Globally, among firms with more than $1 billion in revenue, the top 10 percent of companies capture 80 percent of all economic profit. Many of the superstar firms are characterized by large investments in intangibles, high-skill workforces, and business models enabled by digital capabilities, and often a higher proportion of international sales. They frequently access inputs globally and offer products and services that are relevant to multiple markets. To be clear, it is tough to stay a superstar: nearly half of them fall out of the superstar ranks every business cycle and, of those that fall, 40 percent drop to the bottom decile. It should also be noted that the bottom 10 percent of firms of economic performance destroy nearly as much economic value as that created by the top 10 percent, and don’t turn over as frequently as those at the top—which, some would argue, should happen in a well-functioning capitalist model.', 'The COVID-19 pandemic has further amplified these superstar effects. The top-performing firms are better positioned to weather the economic crisis, with greater access to liquidity and more diversified markets. Moreover, many superstar firms have stronger digital capabilities that have helped them thrive during the pandemic. Some lead in the innovation and services such as healthcare and the life sciences that are much needed as economies navigate through COVID-19. No wonder a basket of large, profitable firms has outperformed the market over the past ten months while the rest of the economy has struggled.', 'Declining investment in public goods and the shrinking role of institutions', 'Investment in public goods, from education, training, and skills for human capital development to foundational R&D and infrastructure, has declined relative both to what is needed to enable individuals to have equality of opportunity and participate fully in the economy and to what is required for productivity, growth, and competitiveness. Federal spending on education, infrastructure, and scientific research fell from approximately 2.5 percent of GDP in 1980 to less than 1.5 percent of GDP today. At a time when technology and other forces drive a greater need for workforce retraining, the share of workers receiving employer-sponsored training fell, while public funding for worker training and other labor market interventions has also declined. Private-sector investments in public infrastructure, including in the form of public-private partnerships, have also fallen over the past 35 years, and declined at an even faster rate following the 2008 recession. Investment in public goods, including infrastructure, health, and workforce skills, are critical factors which contribute to the competitiveness and productivity of an economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has in many ways highlighted existing gaps in the nation’s public goods as a result of this declining public and private investment, from healthcare systems and employment safety nets to access to essential digital infrastructure and investment in basic scientific research. Many of these shortfalls in public goods have had disparate effects on demographic groups and localities in the US economy, and are often a function of the economic dynamism and activity in different places.', 'In addition, changes in individual outcomes have been propelled in part by the shrinking role of institutions, both public and private, which are cushioning individuals to a lesser degree from the effects of the forces at work in the economy. For example, employment protections are now lower, a higher share of healthcare and education costs is private, and guaranteed pension levels have dropped. This pattern of greater “individualization” of the social contract prevailed in the majority of the advanced economies we examined, despite differing market systems and levels of government spending.', 'Climate change and other global externalities', 'The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the need for a dedicated effort by the public and private sectors to respond to both a humanitarian and an economic crisis, for example through coordinated investment in the manufacturing of personal protective equipment (PPE) or support for the most vulnerable workers and small businesses affected by lockdowns. The crisis thus provided a glimpse into the challenge that liberal market systems, like America’s, can face in addressing large-scale and coordinated interventions in response to external shocks.', 'Climate change also poses a challenge to capitalism through potentially the largest disruption to the market economy. Addressing it will likewise require coordinated, collective actions by firms, governments, and individuals, not just within but also between economies, and likely at levels beyond what the market itself will drive in the time required to address it. American capitalism has so far been unsuccessful in putting a price on carbon and regulating it through a market-based intervention, such as a cap-and-trade program. The past five years have been the warmest on record, and regions worldwide have seen increased occurrence of flooding, extreme weather, and wildfires. Over the coming years, we will likely see global socioeconomic impacts that affect human beings and physical and natural capital, as well as economic systems. These impacts will be nonlinear as system thresholds are breached and have knock-on effects. Moreover, the impacts on society are likely to be regressive, affecting the most economically vulnerable segments of society.', 'Competition (and cooperation) with different economic systems', 'Trends over the past 50 years have largely played out in a global economy centered on Western democracies, with the United States at the forefront. But emerging economies, once viewed primarily as sources of affordable labor or resources, are emerging as large and competitive economies in their own right and proving more dynamic in some respects than the United States. This is leading to an increasingly multipolar global economy. This challenge is best exemplified by the rapid growth and global scale of China.', 'China has evolved to become a global economic power. It became the world’s largest economy in purchasing-power-parity terms in 2014, and its nominal GDP has reached two-thirds of that of the United States. It is already the leading manufacturer in the world, producing 20 percent of global manufacturing output. Moreover, China has itself become a large market for consumption, with a population of 1.4 billion people and increasing prosperity giving rise to growth in domestic consumption that now contributes more to China’s economic growth than exports. By 2030, the Chinese working-age population will account for 12 cents of every dollar of urban consumption worldwide. This large domestic market is also attracting companies from around the world, including the United States.', 'China’s economy is intertwined with that of the United States in other ways. China today owns about 4 percent of US national debt, because of its large trade surplus and need to maintain foreign exchange reserves. Its system of state capitalism has started to produce companies that are competitive on the global stage and look to opportunities worldwide. The Fortune Global 500 list of the world’s largest public companies for the first time in 2020 included more companies based in mainland China and Hong Kong (124) than in the United States (121).', 'Through extensive industrial policy, China is making large investments in R&D and innovations, and is starting to close the gap in its aim to become a technology superpower, in areas including advanced communications and 5G, artificial intelligence, and biotech, among others. Historically, the United States had led the world in technology research, development, and commercialization since World War II, and still does. However, US federal R&D funding as a share of GDP peaked at over 2 percent in the 1970s and has declined since, falling to 0.7 percent in 2018. American companies continue to expand private-sector investment in R&D, but their ability to compete in areas of innovation as well as infrastructure investment that requires long-term investment decisions, while meeting shorter-term market expectations, is already being tested.', 'The challenges facing the American model of capitalism in the 21st century in a multipolar global economy go beyond the United States. They will involve other large economies (and economic regions) and their companies in terms of where they compete and partner and in areas of trade, technology, economic alliances, as well as the nature of multilateral institutions that facilitate, govern, arbitrate, and regulate how the global economy functions. This evolving global economy poses new and complicated choices for the evolution of the American model and for other large economies and their corporations.', 'The next era of American capitalism', 'The 21st century provides remarkable opportunities for business and economic growth domestically and internationally. Our own research and that of others highlight many different opportunities for innovation and growth in the coming decades. The strengths of American capitalism could position the United States to take advantage of these opportunities. But for its individuals, firms, and overall economy to fully participate in and benefit from these opportunities, America’s model of capitalism may need to evolve if it is to remain the unmatched mechanism for delivering prosperity for all that it has been.', 'However, in any such evolution, it is important to retain the strengths of the current model, especially those that will be critical to capturing the opportunities in the decades ahead, and focus on addressing the weaknesses, such as the ones we have highlighted in this article.', 'In previous eras, new ideas emerged and institutional actors enacted a number of market-based mechanisms that attempted to address the issues that capitalism faced. Modern forms of intervention may be needed, given the growing and pervasive role of technology, the emergence of new business models, the growing importance of intangible assets, and the changing ways in which individuals participate in the economy as workers, consumers, and savers.']

[(0, 7), (8, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Munson-Neg-JV%20Nats%20%20WVU-Round3.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaMu/Minnesota-Davis-Munson-Neg-JV%2520Nats%2520%2520WVU-Round3.docx

9e8bd179c77c12b9f26b8e270e34ebd0381ea6a8df104f560d2974c2a216658f

Solves the case better---avoids Congress.

David Allen Green 5/4/22. Lawyer and journalist. Consultant at the law firm Preiskel & Co LLP in the Temple, London. "Fundamental rights vs legal rights vs constitutional rights – the case of abortion and the United States Supreme Court". Law and Policy Blog. https://davidallengreen.com/2022/05/fundamental-rights-vs-legal-rights-vs-constitutional-rights-the-case-of-abortion-and-the-united-states-supreme-court/

different rights legal rights , constitutional rights, and so on because Roe was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of what was constitutional, the right is a ‘constitutional right’ This is not open to Congress A legal right a right provided for in laws made by Congress legal right may be struck down Legal rights are useful constitutional rights are stronger

different rights fundamental rights, legal rights , constitutional rights, and so on . Some know what they mean by each of these Others may find the terms confusing This post is to better understand such terms Sometimes rights are expressly articulated in a formal code sometimes they arise by implication because of a certain legal state of affairs The right under Roe is an example of the latter The Supreme Court held that it would be unconstitutional for there to be certain legal prohibitions This rested on a right to privacy, which was implied into the constitution by the court. because Roe was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of what was constitutional, the right is a ‘constitutional right’ . This means that it is not open to Congress to interfere A lower level of right would be a legal right for example, a right to an abortion provided for in laws made by Congress or an individual state This means legal right may be struck down by the Supreme Court Legal rights are useful , but constitutional rights are stronger

different rights legal rights better understand such terms because Roe was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of what was constitutional, the right is a ‘constitutional right’ . Congress to interfere lower level legal right a right to an abortion provided for in laws made by Congress or an individual state struck down by the Supreme Court Legal rights are useful , but constitutional rights are stronger

['Those with too much interest in law or politics will talk about different sorts or rights – fundamental rights, legal rights, constitutional rights, and so on. Some of those people will even know what they mean by each of these (similar) terms. Others, however, may find the feast of terms confusing. This post is for those who want to better understand such terms. And for the purpose of exposition, I will take the topical issue of abortion in the United States (which this blog covered yesterday) * First, what is a ‘right’? A right is the absolute ability to elect to do something in a given situation. If that ability can be withdrawn by another, then it is better understood as a privilege, and not as a right. If you need to obtain the prior consent of another before exercising that ability then it is not a right but a permission. What makes it a right is that no prior permission is required and it cannot (easily) be withdrawn. Sometimes these rights are expressly articulated and set out in a formal code. And sometimes they arise by implication because of a certain legal state of affairs. The right to an abortion under Roe v Wade in the United States is an example of the latter. The Supreme Court held that it would be unconstitutional for there to be certain legal prohibitions on abortion. This rested on a right to privacy, which is not expressly stated in the constitution, but was implied into the constitution by the court. The right to abortion therefore is the implication of it being unconstitutional for there to be certain legal prohibitions in respect of people’s private lives. And because Roe v Wade was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of what was constitutional, the right is a ‘constitutional right’ . This means that it is not open to Congress (on a federal level) or individual states to interfere with the right. A lower level of right would be a legal right – for example, a right to an abortion as provided for in laws made by Congress or an individual state. But such legal rights are subject to the constitution, and so if they do not conform with the constitution then they can be quashed. This means that, if the Supreme Court holds that it is a matter for individual states to regulate access to abortions, but Congress purports to enact a nation-wide right to abortion, such a legal right may be struck down by the Supreme Court. (Legal rights are useful, but constitutional rights are stronger.)', '']

[(12, 17), (18, 22), (22, 24)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-4.docx

Emory

MiPi

4d12db2a123c1ed957f4c367f385749e936408b0d4cc83bcc948f70ca2d06432

One, forum-shopping. Prospective losers will forum-shop the generalist option. Only a complete transfer of jurisdiction solves.

Zimmer 9, Judicial Systems Advisor and former U.S. District Court Clerk/District Court Executive (Markus, “Overview of Specialized Courts,” International Journal for Court Administration)

As the specialized court’s jurisdiction stabilizes and becomes predictable litigants will assess odds of winning and losing To the extent that a loss is certain, attorneys may take the initiative to restructure within the jurisdiction of a different tribunal in which the odds are better, such as a general court The result of this forum shopping is adjudication on peripheral issues The generalist court expends judicial time and effort on issues that, were it not for the specialized court, would not have been raised

As the case law in the area of the specialized court’s jurisdiction stabilizes and becomes more predictable , prospective litigants will be increasingly capable of assess ing the relative odds of winning and losing To the extent that a loss is fairly certain, attorneys may take the initiative to restructure within the jurisdiction of a different tribunal in which the odds are better, such as a regional general - court The result of this forum shopping is adjudication on peripheral issues leading to the creation of what sometimes is referred to as "boundary law." The generalist court expends judicial time and effort on issues that, were it not for the specialized court, would not have been raised

the jurisdiction of a different tribunal general court judicial time and effort

['', 'Inefficiency: Specialization has the potential to produce inefficiencies as well as efficiencies. As the case law in the area of the specialized court’s jurisdiction stabilizes and becomes more predictable, prospective litigants will be increasingly capable of assessing the relative odds of winning and losing. To the extent that a loss is fairly certain, attorneys may take the initiative to restructure the legal issues to fall within the jurisdiction of a different tribunal in which the odds are better, such as a regional general-jurisdiction court. The result of this forum shopping is adjudication on peripheral issues leading to the creation of what sometimes is referred to as "boundary law." The generalist court, in effect, expends judicial time and effort on issues that, were it not for the specialized court, would not have been raised. Another direction this inefficiency can take is when the specialized tribunal focuses too narrowly on particular issues in the case, and the litigants, acting in good faith, determine that they must pursue further litigation in other tribunals to seek resolution on broader issues in the case that the specialized court did not -- or would not -- consider. The result is that fully litigating the initial dispute can be a protracted and costly process, both to the litigants and to the court system, that may result in confusion, loss of rights, and more delay than having taken the matter to a generalist court for resolution in the first place would have entailed. ']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaSo-Neg-ADA-Round-2.docx

Kansas

HaSo

45aec8aaacf37d69b829e46e679e2aa1b220832009847cccb46ad19807fb124c

China trusts it.

Ai 21, Research Associate at the Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Ph.D. Candidate, Diplomacy & Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, M.A., Education, University of Essex, B.A., Business, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics (Zhong Ai, 2021, “VARYING PERCEPTIONS OF NUCLEAR NO-FIRST-USE: CHINESE– UNITED STATES CONVERGENCES AND DISCORDANCE,” International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXXVIII No. 2, University of Kansas Libraries, ProQuest)

NFU being privileged in China and in U.S. virtual practices reflect a proximity of policy. Both need to clarify varying interpretations of each other’s doctrines both China and U.S. need to appreciate risks of inadvertent war due to miscalc most immediate question is whether NFU as declaration without enforcement in force planning can be trusted is simple commitment sufficient to strategic stability ? Starting from commitment both U.S. and China have sufficient shared faith in sanctity of NFU to begin exploring NFU at least at the level of making a commitment . Specifics of future posture can follow from there

NFU being privileged in China ’s pronouncements and in U.S. virtual practices reflect a certain proximity of policy. Both countries need to clarify on their varying interpretations of each other’s doctrines For the part of the U.S. , rather than assuming China’s NFU pledge as a hypocritical statement, China’s distinct nuclear thinking deserves more serious engagement. In the meantime, both China and the U.S. need to consider examining various overlapping and shared elements in their nuclear policies as also appreciate various risks of inadvertent nuclear war due to the miscalc ulation and miscommunication. The most immediate question is whether a NFU pledge, as a declaration without enforcement in terms of requisite changes in force planning and deployments can be trusted by others is simple political commitment sufficient to ensure regional strategic stability ? Starting from their shared commitment on ensuring strategic stability and strengthening the norm of nuclear taboo , both the U.S. and China have sufficient ly shared faith in the sanctity of NFU doctrine to begin exploring their shared understanding on the NFU at least at the level of making a political commitment . Specifics of future direction of the nuclear force posture and deployment and policies can follow from there .

privileged in China and in U.S. virtual practices proximity clarify doctrines U.S. assuming NFU hypocritical nuclear serious China U.S. overlapping policies risks war miscalc immediate NFU without enforcement trusted sufficient stability commitment stability norm taboo U.S. China sufficient ly shared faith in the sanctity of NFU exploring at least at commitment direction deployment can follow from there

['NFU being privileged in China’s pronouncements and in U.S. virtual practices reflect a certain proximity of policy. Both countries need to clarify on their varying and often contentious interpretations of each other’s doctrines. Instead of presuming U.S. refusal to adopt NFU doctrine as a provocative policy, Chinese nuclear experts might take an in-depth insight into U.S. praxis. This can help understand why the U.S. has been insisting on retaining a first-use option. For the part of the U.S., rather than assuming China’s NFU pledge as a hypocritical statement, China’s distinct nuclear thinking deserves more serious engagement. In the meantime, both China and the U.S. need to consider examining various overlapping and shared elements in their nuclear policies as also appreciate various risks of inadvertent nuclear war due to the miscalculation and miscommunication.', 'The most immediate question is whether a NFU pledge, as a declaration without enforcement in terms of requisite changes in force planning and deployments can be trusted by others and could stand the test in extreme circumstances. Or is simple political commitment sufficient to ensure regional strategic stability? It has been frequently criticized that it makes no sense to declare NFU unless the problem of political trust is resolved to ensure adversaries trust each other. This paper argues that the trust deficit between two countries political elites remains most critical first step for adopting NFU as an instrument for ensuring regional strategic stability. Starting from their shared commitment on ensuring strategic stability and strengthening the norm of nuclear taboo, both the U.S. and China have sufficiently shared faith in the sanctity of NFU doctrine to begin exploring their shared understanding on the NFU at least at the level of making a political commitment. Specifics of future direction of the nuclear force posture and deployment and policies can follow from there.']

[(0, 5)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiWi-Aff-Harvard-College-Tournament-Round-1.docx

Kansas

WiWi

f87a44599f8fbdbb57b993138a97a42d09cd7b899633d9252aec9a3bb3fec5ad

No bioterrorism.

Blum & Neumann ’20 [Marc-Michael and Peter; June 22; Former Head of Laboratory at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. He holds a PhD in Biochemistry from the University of Frankfurt; Professor of Security Studies at King’s College London, and served as Director of its International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation from 2008-18. War on the Rocks, “CORONA AND BIOTERRORISM: HOW SERIOUS IS THE THREAT?” ] KS

tech challenges proven insurmountable the use has been rarer Of thousands of people groups murdered , not a single one died from biological agents As well as advanced training isolating requires experience It has to be done in a safe environment programs needed years of testing and experimentation it is unlikely terrorist s possess resources stable environment , and patience None of the viruses could be easily “weaponized chances that terrorists engineer a virus are virtually zero

coronavirus put bioterrorism back in the spotlight How serious is the threat? the tech nical challenges associated with weaponizing biological agents have proven insurmountable Among terrorists the use of biological weapons has been rarer Yet none of these efforts succeeded . The only al-Qaeda plot in which bioterrorism featured prominently was interrupted at such an early stage that none of the toxin had actually been produced. The Islamic State’s most serious attempt, only fatality was the hamster on which it was tested. Of the tens of thousands of people that [ groups ] have murdered , not a single one has died from biological agents so many would-be bioterrorists failed launching a sophisticated, large-scale bioterrorist attack involves a toxin or a pathogen which needs to be isolated and disseminated. But this is more difficult than it seems. As well as advanced training in biology or chemistry , isolating the agent requires significant experience . It also has to be done in a safe , contained environment , to stop it from spreading within the terrorist group. you can’t just make a (biological) weapon “in the kitchen of your mom!” there is the challenge of dissemination a powerful biological attack relies on a large number of initial infections in perfect conditions State-sponsored programs often needed years of testing and experimentation to understand how their weapons could be used. it is unlikely that terrorist group s possess the resources , stable environment , and patience to do likewise it is nearly inconceivable that the resulting “weapon” would be as powerful as the recent coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 None of the viruses on the list of the most dangerous biological agents could be easily “weaponized ” Pathogenic viruses are extremely hard to find , isolate , and spread The chances that terrorists would be capable of engineer ing a virus without access to a state’s resources are virtually zero . the risk of a highly advanced, weaponized pathogen that spreads among large populations is very low

How serious tech nical challenges proven insurmountable use rarer none efforts succeeded interrupted early stage tens of thousands of people murdered not a single one died from biological agents failed difficult advanced training biology or chemistry isolating significant experience safe contained environment challenge of dissemination years of testing and experimentation understand unlikely resources stable environment patience inconceivable powerful None easily “weaponized extremely hard to find isolate spread capable of engineer ing a virus virtually zero spreads very low

['*edited for language*', '', 'The novel coronavirus pandemic has put the threat of bioterrorism back in the spotlight. White supremacist chat rooms are teeming with talk about “biological warfare.” ISIL even called the virus “one of Allah’s soldiers” because of its devastating effect on Western countries. According to a recent memo by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, terrorists are “[making] bioterrorism a popular topic among themselves.” Both the United Nations and the Council of Europe have warned of bioterrorist attacks.', 'How serious is the threat? There is a long history of terrorists being fascinated by biological weapons, but it is also one of failures. For the vast majority, the technical challenges associated with weaponizing biological agents have proven insurmountable. The only reason this could change is if terrorists were to receive support from a state. Rather than panic about terrorists engaging in biological warfare, governments should be vigilant, secure their own facilities, and focus on strengthening international diplomacy.', 'A History of Failures', 'Biological warfare, which uses organisms and pathogens to cause disease, is nearly as old as war itself. The first known use of biological agents as a weapon dates back to 600 B.C., when an ancient Greek leader poisoned his enemies’ water supply. Throughout the Middle Ages, especially during the time of the Black Death, it was common to hurl infected corpses into besieged cities. And during the two world wars, all major powers maintained biological weapons programs (although only Japan used them in combat).', 'Among terrorists, however, the use of biological weapons has been rarer, although groups from nearly all ideological persuasions have contemplated it. Recent examples include a plot to contaminate Chicago’s water supply in the 1970s; food poisoning by a religious cult in Oregon in the 1980s; and the stockpiling of ricin by members of the Minnesota Patriot Council during the 1990s. No one died in any of these instances.', 'The same is true for the biological warfare programs of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group. Both groups have sought to buy, steal, or develop biological agents. For al-Qaeda, this seems to have been a priority in the 1990s, when its program was overseen by (then) deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, a trained physician. With the Islamic State, evidence dates back to 2014, when Iraqi forces discovered thousands of files related to biological warfare on a detainee’s laptop.', 'Yet none of these efforts succeeded. The only al-Qaeda plot in which bioterrorism featured prominently — the so-called “ricin plot” in England in 2002 — was interrupted at such an early stage that none of the toxin had actually been produced. The Islamic State’s most serious attempt, in 2017, involved a small amount of ricin, whose only fatality was the hamster on which it was tested. Of the tens of thousands of people that jihadists [groups] have murdered, not a single one has died from biological agents.', 'It may be no accident that the most lethal bioterrorist attack in recent decades was perpetrated by a scientist and government employee. In late 2001, the offices of several U.S. senators and news organizations received so-called “anthrax letters,” which killed five people and injured 17. Following years of investigation, the FBI identified the sender as Bruce Ivins, a PhD microbiologist and senior researcher at the U.S. Army’s Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Unlike the others, he was no amateur or hoaxer, but a trained expert with years of experience and full access to the world’s largest repository of lethal biological agents.', 'Technical Challenges', 'Ivins’ case helps to explain why so many would-be bioterrorists have failed. At a technical level, launching a sophisticated, large-scale bioterrorist attack involves a toxin or a pathogen — generally a bacterium or a virus — which needs to be isolated and disseminated. But this is more difficult than it seems. As well as advanced training in biology or chemistry, isolating the agent requires significant experience. It also has to be done in a safe, contained environment, to stop it from spreading within the terrorist group. Contrary to what al-Qaeda said in one of its online magazines, you can’t just make a (biological) weapon “in the kitchen of your mom!”', 'In addition, there is the challenge of dissemination. Unless the agent is super-contagious, a powerful biological attack relies on a large number of initial infections in perfect conditions. In the case of the bacterium anthrax, for example, only spores of a particular size are likely to be effective in certain kinds of weather. State-sponsored programs often needed years of testing and experimentation to understand how their weapons could be used. Though not impossible, it is unlikely that terrorist groups possess the resources, stable environment, and patience to do likewise.', 'Doomsday Scenarios', 'Even if terrorists somehow succeeded, it is nearly inconceivable that the resulting “weapon” would be as powerful as the recent coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2. One of its uniquely devastating features has been that people are infectious while experiencing no symptoms. As it spread across the globe, there was no treatment, no vaccine, an incomplete understanding of its pathological modes of action, and no easy, cheap and widely available testing. It was the viral equivalent of a “zero-day exploit” — a cyber-attack that happens before any patch is available.', 'None of the viruses on the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s list of the most dangerous biological agents could be easily “weaponized” or would have the same, devastating effects as SARS-CoV-2. Pathogenic viruses such as smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa are extremely hard to find, isolate, and spread. Botulinum and ricin are dangerous toxins, but not contagious, while Tularemia cannot be transmitted from human to human. The plague is, of course, capable of causing pandemics, but most countries are nowadays well prepared for this particular virus, and will be able to limit — and cope with — localized outbreaks.', 'This leaves only anthrax, a soil bacterium which is relatively easy to obtain. Even so, isolating a highly pathogenic strain is difficult. More importantly, anthrax is not contagious, and while its spores are durable and affected areas can be hard to de-contaminate, it is unable to spread on its own.', 'Regarding SARS-CoV-2, it is important to distinguish between the possibility that the virus occurred naturally and escaped from a laboratory, and the idea that it was engineered for maximum infectiousness and deliberately released. The first remains a possibility, although other explanations are equally — if not more — plausible, while the second has been debunked by a comprehensive examination in the journal Nature Medicine, which concluded that SARS-CoV-2 was “not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus.”', 'The chances that terrorists would be capable of engineering a virus such as SARS-CoV-2 without access to a state’s resources are virtually zero. If anything, the possibility of a lab escape — however remote — highlights the importance of biosafety. While governments have paid much attention to laboratories with the highest biosafety level (level 4), work on bat-born coronaviruses is regularly performed at lower levels (level 3, and even level 2), and should instead be subject to similar safety requirements.', 'In sum, small-scale attacks using anthrax or other agents may be possible, but the risk of a highly advanced, weaponized pathogen that spreads among large populations — a terrorist-initiated biological doomsday — is very low. The only exception, of course, is if terrorists received support from a state, acted as its proxies, or were able to draw on its resources — as in Ivins’ case.', '']

[(0, 18)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Doubles.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

d8f9c0b648d99fda7a533987872d38716cadecb23a0ce01a884605dd87e32d32

The aff makes it a substantive issue---that magnifies the link.

Stephen Calkins 6, Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies at the Wayne State University Law School, J.D. from Harvard Law School, “The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution: Antitrust Modernization: Looking Backwards,” Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 31, Winter 2006, accessed via Lexis

successes of commissions have been on procedure and remedy procedure is easier to influence Congress is more likely to defer to experts about procedural rules of uncertain effect than substantive with obvious consequences procedure can be critical to outcomes, it does not seem as important

striking successes of antitrust commissions have been on matters of procedure and remedy procedure is easier to influence than substance Congress is more likely to defer to experts about procedural rules of uncertain effect than substantive rules with obvious consequences Even though procedure can be critical to outcomes, it does not seem as important

procedure and remedy easier to influence than substance it does not seem as important

['The striking successes of antitrust commissions have not been on matters of substance, but rather on matters of procedure and remedy. The 1955 Report led quickly to a federal statute of limitations, to a government right to recover single damages, to government access to pre-complaint discovery, to increased fines, and, a little later, to Civil Investigative Demand authority. 217 The call of the Neal and Stigler Reports to limit the length of government decrees was eventually heeded, as were the calls by one or the other report to require premerger notification, increase penalties, and repeal the Expediting Act. 218 The Shenefield Report led to the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 and provided important encouragement to federal judges to manage trials including the massive AT&T trial effectively. 219 These accomplishments stand in stark contrast to the uneven record of more substantive recommendations.', 'It is not surprising that procedure is easier to influence than substance. Congress is more likely to defer to experts about procedural rules of uncertain effect than about substantive rules with obvious consequences. Even though procedure can be critical to outcomes, it does not seem as important. Similarly, courts may be more willing to listen to suggestions about managing cases than about the wisdom of departing from perceived Supreme Court precedents.']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%20National%20Debate%20Tournament-Round8.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%2520National%2520Debate%2520Tournament-Round8.docx

bc2a785dce957b8b983f8fc9f298dfadbd065309dce7e3251bfe3f9f97e769c1

America’s ahead in the 5G race – cloud advantage and global consensus against Huawei.

Mitchell '20 [Billy; 10/27/20; FedScoop's Editor in Chief, citing Chris Kreb, director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; "CISA’s Krebs: The US will win 5G race because ‘we own the cloud space’," https://www.fedscoop.com/krebs-us-5g-race-china-cloud/]

Many projections place China ahead in 5G the U.S has the advantage in race because of cloud infrastructure 5G, it’s about moving data which translates to cloud 5G will be critical for the D o D and military We own the cloud space Amid the battle the U.S. banned Huawei Western nations are following the U.S. got early start putting its foot cloud leadership the public and private sectors been resilient during COVID

Many projections place China ahead of the U.S. in 5G But the U.S . actually has the advantage in this global race because of existing cloud -based infrastructure when you think about the advantage of 5G, it’s all about moving data . It’s all about massive communication , which really translates to cloud The development of 5G will be critical for federal agencies — particularly the D epartment o f D efense and the military — as they look to move more IT and computing resources to remote, edge environments We really own the cloud space . So we should be able to have that next generation of technology built on top of cloud to get us the diversity in an open, competitive global market Amid the battle with China for 5G dominance, the U.S. government has banned any 5G developed by Huawei many other Western nations are following suit , worried the Chinese government can use Huawei to spy on their sensitive networks Because the U.S. got an early start putting its foot down the federal government hasn’t had to suddenly “rip and replace” its networks touted America’s cloud leadership the reason U.S., in both the public and private sectors , has been resilient during the COVID -19 pandemic cloud providers have long been “ preparing us for this moment

has the advantage global race cloud infrastructure moving data massive communication cloud critical federal agencies D o D military own the cloud space battle Western nations following suit early start putting its foot down resilient preparing us

['Many projections place China ahead of the U.S. in the development of 5G wireless networks. But according to Chris Krebs, director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the U.S. actually has the advantage in this global race because of existing cloud-based infrastructure.', '“Really, when you think about the advantage of 5G, it’s all about moving data. It’s all about massive communication, which really translates to cloud,” Krebs said Tuesday during a panel at ACT-IAC’s annual ELC conference. “And who does cloud better than the United States of America?”', 'The development of 5G will be critical for federal agencies — particularly the Department of Defense and the military — as they look to move more IT and computing resources to remote, edge environments. The Pentagon has been experimenting with testbeds on military bases to support different 5G use cases. Elsewhere, federal agencies are beginning to build the technology into next-generation IT contracting vehicles.', 'Krebs continued: “We really own the cloud space. So we should be able to have that next generation of technology that is going to be just built on top of cloud to get us the diversity in an open, competitive global market of trustworthy, dependable componentry.”', 'Amid the battle with China for 5G dominance, the U.S. government has banned use of any 5G technology developed by Huawei. And now many other Western nations are following suit, worried that the Chinese government can use Huawei devices to spy on their sensitive networks.', 'Because the U.S. got an early start putting its foot down against Huawei and other technology firms thought to be linked to the Chinese government, the federal government hasn’t had to suddenly “rip and replace” its networks like many European countries, Krebs said.', 'Krebs also touted America’s cloud leadership as the reason why the U.S., in both the public and private sectors, has been so resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic. He said cloud providers have long been “preparing us for this moment, whether you knew it or not, because of fiber,” referring to the infrastructure they’ve been developing over the past decade and before.', '“When you look at some of our European counterparts, they still have a whole bunch of copper throughout their networks. They were not able to expand as well,” Krebs said. “And most importantly, the agencies and the organizations you saw that were truly cloud-ready, those were the ones that made the more seamless transition into the work-from-home model.”', '', '', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 10), (10, 12)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-ADA-Round2.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-ADA-Round2.docx

18d80c9c20afb5128a328c61727883926c6dd412ccb1d5f4c3f30f24adddeb82

2. PENALTIES---success extracts fiscal sanctions, recirculating into future cases.

Martynsizyn ’21 [Marek; September 2021; Senior Lecturer in Law at Queen’s University Belfast, PhD from University College Dublin, LLM from the Saarland University’s European Institute, MA Degree from the Warsaw School of Economics; Journal of Competition Law and Economics, “Competitive Harm Crossing Borders: Regulatory Gaps And A Way Forward,” vol. 17]

cartelists should face severe sanctions most common are fines fines levied could be left in agencies’ budgets to facilitate future enforcement and advocacy activities

cartelists should face more severe sanctions for their violations the most common sanctions for cartel conduct are corporate fines fines levied on could be left in domestic competition agencies’ budgets to facilitate future enforcement and advocacy activities The system should incentivize risks

severe sanctions common sanctions corporate fines fines competition agencies’ budgets future enforcement advocacy

['Furthermore, international cartelists should face more severe sanctions for their violations. Despite the increasing interest in criminalization and individual liability more broadly, the most common sanctions for cartel conduct are corporate fines. The prevalent fining methodology is to impose fines that are benchmarked to the relevant in-country turnover of the culprits.71 Given the nature of the present regulatory regime, this practice is friendly to cartelists. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that corporate fines and fine-setting methodology are both sufficient and just, an international cartel would face appropriate sanctions only if it were to be held responsible in each and every affected jurisdiction. That is virtually impossible. Moreover, the common practice is to introduce maximum limits on fines. Quite often fines cannot exceed either a specific monetary amount, provided for in the relevant domestic rules, or a fixed percentage of the violator’s last year-relevant in-forum turnover, typically ten per cent.72 There is no theory or empirical evidence supporting such thresholds. Even if there were, in practice such thresholds are never met. The imposed fines are set at astonishingly low levels compared to illegal profits, even within the sanctioning jurisdictions.73 Given the practical impossibility of effective enforcement in every harmed state, those jurisdictions which have the capacity to bring transnational cases should increase the severity of their sanctions to increase deterrence. They should do so by, at least, both increasing permissible fine limits and by utilizing the full available spectrum of punitive measures. In this context, the transnational nature of a violation, leading to a transfer of wealth abroad, should be taken into account.', 'From the deterrence perspective it would be advisable to relate fines to overall, not just in-forum turnover. This would undoubtedly lead to the defendants’ bar raising the double jeopardy argument, conflating the question of which harm is being addressed and which legal interest is being protected with the issue of appropriate sanctions. In the current regulatory framework, each jurisdiction addresses the harm caused on its own market. Therefore, double jeopardy is not and would not become an issue. To avoid this misleading double jeopardy argument, it may be worth considering replacing turnover as a sanctioning benchmark with the overall value of the violator’s assets. In general, the type and severity of sanctions is a sovereign matter. For example, the US provides for imprisonment of up to ten years for individuals involved in a cartel,74 although in many other countries around the world such conduct is not subject to any criminal sanctions, or even to any individual sanctions. Since this is a sovereign choice and there are no binding universal norms to the contrary, it cannot be contested. That said, there is no reason why agencies and courts should not continue with the good practice, which has already emerged, of taking into account sanctions already imposed by other jurisdictions. This practice should continue as a matter of comity, especially in cases involving non-financial sanctions.', 'Moreover, fines levied on foreign violators could be left, at least partially, in domestic competition agencies’ budgets to facilitate future enforcement and advocacy activities. Sceptics may argue that this would skew the incentives, making the agencies more likely to bring such cases. That is, in fact, the very objective of this proposal. As explained above transnational cases are generally more complicated, presenting higher risks for enforcers. The system should reflect that and incentivize the taking of such risks. More fundamentally, given that transnational violations tend to cause greater harm and lead to outflow of wealth, they warrant agencies’ enhanced attention.']

[(0, 11), (12, 15)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Dartmouth%20Round%20Robin-Round5.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Dartmouth%2520Round%2520Robin-Round5.docx

d5a932e52c3d25375700d2eab88f3f844f88af6978ae03a476cb2bffceb3e889

The ban treaty will work in the long term and immediate risks are overstated

Rebecca Davis Gibbons 17, Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University, Visiting assistant Bowdoin College, 7-14-2017, "The Nuclear Ban Treaty: How Did We Get Here, What Does it Mean for the United States?,"

immediate worries about the treaty are unlikely to play out , criticism misrepresents the strategy of ban campaigners. disarmament advocates will call attention to illegitimacy of nuclear weapons Having the treaty in place provides a tool to increase public awareness Because states spend little time explaining why they possess nuclear weapons the humanitarian frame will become relevant The U S has influence on partners, but if the campaign becomes popular within countries domestic constituency . There is precedent for this The prohibition treaty is unlikely to undermine the NPT or affect NATO but with sufficient pressure from the treaty could undermine nuclear weapons

The immediate worries about the treaty are unlikely to play out , but in the longer term, this milestone could challenge public perceptions about morality of possessing nuclear weapons. A common criticism is that that the treaty will not . In the near future, this is correct. Yet t criticism misrepresents the strategy of the nuclear ban campaigners. Advocates envision the treaty as an interim step through its role in delegitimizing nuclear weapons and the doctrines of nuclear deterrence With the adoption of a legally binding treaty disarmament advocates will call attention to the illegitimacy of all nuclear weapons -related activities we will work to rally the public in countries.” Having the treaty in place provides the campaign with a tool to increase public awareness and spread its message about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The treaty allows citizens to ask their governments, “Why are we not members of this treaty?” Because most nuclear weapons states spend little time explaining to their populations the reasons why they possess nuclear weapons , it is plausible the humanitarian frame for nuclear weapons will , in the long run, become more relevant to the public The humanitarian frame could gain prominence as more states sign on to the treaty and pressure others to join The U nited S tates has significant influence on its alliance partners, but if the nuclear ban campaign becomes a popular movement within these countries , domestic pressure will compete with pressure from foreign governments – and the domestic constituency . There is precedent for this One way the ban movement could gain salience sooner would be an event that reminds people of th effects of nuclear weapons, such as an accident involving a nuclear weapon or limited use. The newly adopted nuclear weapons prohibition treaty is unlikely to undermine the NPT or affect NATO cohesion in the near term, but it does reflect the deep division between states that rely on nuclear weapons and those that do not. In the long term, with sufficient pressure from domestic publics and non-nuclear weapons states, the treaty has the potential to bring about a changed narrative that could ultimately undermine the legitimacy of relying on nuclear weapons for national security.

immediate worries about the treaty are unlikely to play out and the domestic constituency

['', 'Looking Ahead', 'The immediate worries about the treaty are unlikely to play out, but in the longer term, this milestone could challenge public perceptions about morality of possessing nuclear weapons.', 'A common criticism of the ban effort is that that the treaty will not\xa0. In the near future, this is correct. Yet this criticism misrepresents the strategy of the nuclear ban campaigners. Advocates envision the treaty as an interim step to nuclear disarmament through its role in delegitimizing nuclear weapons and the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence. With the adoption of a legally binding treaty, negotiated at the United Nations, disarmament advocates will call attention to the illegitimacy of all nuclear weapons-related activities. As Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons,\xa0\xa0in March, “We will identify what kind of behavior is now illegal, under this treaty, and start criticizing governments for doing those actions, even if they haven’t signed on to the treaty … It’s a long-term perspective. I think we will work to rally the public in countries.” Having the treaty in place provides the campaign with a tool to increase public awareness and spread its message about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The treaty allows citizens to ask their governments, “Why are we not members of this treaty?”', 'Because most nuclear weapons states spend little time explaining to their populations the reasons why they possess nuclear weapons, it is plausible the humanitarian frame for nuclear weapons will, in the long run, become more relevant to the public (). The humanitarian frame and the treaty could gain prominence as more states sign on to the treaty and pressure others to join. If one or several states under the nuclear umbrella join the treaty due to domestic and international pressure, it could help push other reluctant states in this direction, in what scholars call a “.”', 'The United States has significant influence on its alliance partners, but if the nuclear ban campaign becomes a popular movement within these countries, domestic pressure will compete with pressure from foreign governments – and the domestic constituency\xa0. There is precedent for this: In the 1980s, public opinion in New Zealand favored rejecting visits from U.S. naval vessels due to concerns about nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons. The U.S. visits became a topic in the 1984 election, and the winning Labor government\xa0.', 'One way the ban movement could gain salience sooner would be an event that reminds people of the horrific effects of nuclear weapons, such as an accident involving a nuclear weapon or limited use. The nuclear ban campaign is small compared to the\xa0, in part because there is less fear surrounding nuclear weapons. Were this to change, the campaign could become much more widespread.', 'The newly adopted nuclear weapons prohibition treaty is unlikely to undermine the NPT or affect NATO cohesion in the near term, but it does reflect the deep division between states that rely on nuclear weapons and those that do not. In the long term, with sufficient pressure from domestic publics and non-nuclear weapons states, the treaty has the potential to bring about a changed narrative that could ultimately undermine the legitimacy of relying on nuclear weapons for national security.']

[(14, 24)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-at-UK-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

c9052aec1cc927ee2cf252086d0027aac00281594bcb083afddfcf4a7c0bd8c4

Perm do both – affirm abolition as dis-epistemology as a framework for Maoist movements – the net benefit is the abolition of carceral logics which are key to prevent the re-expansion of incarceration onto vulnerable populations

Simoun Magsalin 22 Abolitionist Organizer, “Against Carceral Communism, For Abolition Communism!” Hater’s Café, 3/26/2022,

socialist cops are not bad is mistaken that police can have a proletarian character when policing and incarceration were established to cement the rule of capital over proletarians already infused with carcerality “who polices?” the CPP and NPA a young man Batman was ordered to defect and was recaptured It mattered little that Batman was coerced the cadre decided he should die that and was that. the CPP-NPA systematically tortured and executed scores of them in anti-infiltration purges The CPP-NPA were not actually infiltrated but hundreds were executed and mass graves are still being found today backed Duterte’s War on Drugs even without taking State power, communist movements can reproduce carceral logic to lethal conclusions in the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest individuals who took it upon themselves to act as the new people’s police shot and killed Black teens Even for radicals, the ideology of police and prisons presents itself as natural, Carcerality has always meant the social control of the proletarianized The term “carceral capitalism” is redundant for capitalism cannot exist without carcerality Without prison and police abolition, communists will never transcend capitalist ideology. both abolition and communism aim to abolish the current order and establish a qualitatively different kind of life We fight carcerality we oppose carceral capitalism with abolition communism.

While the abolitionists exclaim “ACAB! All Cops Are Bad,” the pitiful spectacle of the carceral communists would instead amend “ACAB” with drivel saying, “it’s ACCAB, All Capitalist Cops Are Bad.” They continue, “ socialist cops are not bad because they are proletarian in character and protect the proletarian State.” Such convolution is mistaken in its belief that police can somehow have a proletarian character when historically the institutions of policing and incarceration were established to cement the rule of capital over proletarians . Not to mention that the notion that “socialist” cops protect the common good against criminal or “counterrevolutionary” elements is identical in content to bourgeois police apologia. Carceral communists merely oppose these police and prisons and wish to propose their own “people’s” police and prisons. presents this false image of communism to obscure what communism actually means in practice—the movement to abolish the current state of things. In a certain sense, this spectacular image is already infused with carcerality from the 1917 Russian Revolution onward where communists thought that carcerality could be used for proletarian ends—abolishing only the bourgeois statesmen but retaining all other features of capitalist society. Carceral communism has so far been the main narrative of communism due to the prevalence of “communist” States from the former Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, other socialist States, and their aligned Western parties Carceral communists such as Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin may have opposed the Czar’s police and prisons, but only for the sake for their own institutions of oppression. communism is intrinsically a movement of proletarians struggling to abolish their class reconstituting “communist” police and prisons merely reproduced institutions of proletarianization and all that entailed ACAB means “communist” cops too. Abolition means abolish “communist” police and prisons. “who polices?” fascist and right-wing militias do take part in policing, but there is also a para-State entity that espouses communism while reproducing carcerality: the Communist Party of the Philippines ( CPP ) and their armed wing the New Peoples Army ( NPA ). a young man codenamed “ Batman was ordered by his uncle in a right-wing militia to defect from the NPA and provide intel for the military was eventually recaptured by the NPA It mattered little that Batman was coerced into defecting; the cadre decided he should die that and was that. the CPP-NPA detained hundreds of its own cadre and systematically tortured and executed scores of them in anti-infiltration purges The CPP-NPA were not actually infiltrated by government agents, but by the time the cadre found out, hundreds were already executed and mass graves are still being found today survivors are still tagged as counter-revolutionaries today the CPP-NPA wholeheartedly backed Duterte’s War on Drugs with the NPA even conducting their own drug raids in support of Duterte’s fascist agenda even without taking State power, communist movements can reproduce carceral logic to lethal conclusions we have seen carcerality reproduced in radical projects like the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest . individuals who took it upon themselves to act as the new people’s police shot and killed Black teens . It matters not if the anarcho-concentration camp was leagues better than Stalinist gulags or if the anarcho-police are somehow better; abolition means the doing away of the anarcho-police and anarcho-prisons as well. Even for radicals, the ideology of police and prisons presents itself as natural, carcerality has presented itself as natural long before, to the point where Bolsheviks considered it only natural that the dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily includes police and prisons. emancipatory politics must always destroy the appearance of a ‘natural order’, must reveal what is presented as necessary and inevitable to be a mere contingency, just as it must make what was previously deemed to be impossible seem attainable. carcerality is historically contingent—it did not always exist nor has it always been generalized to exist everywhere In the Philippines, carcerality was introduced with colonialism; in the United States, it was introduced with slave patrols; in Europe it was implemented to control the working class. Carcerality has always meant the social control of the proletarianized . The term “carceral capitalism” is redundant for capitalism cannot exist without carcerality . Capitalism needs carcerality to allow the enforcement of wage-labor. Without prison and police abolition, communists will never transcend capitalist ideology. To talk of an abolition communism is a redundancy because regimes of policing and incarceration could not possibly exist in a society that has done away with classes and the State , both abolition and communism aim to abolish the current order and establish a qualitatively different kind of life . because communist politics has become imbued with carcerality for more than a century, it becomes necessary to explicitly articulate a communism that wholly rejects carceral logic abolition communism necessarily opposes the tradition of carcerality within communist thought and necessarily opposes the carcerality of “communist” States. We do not fight carcerality with carcerality; we oppose carceral capitalism not with carceral communism, but with abolition communism.

Such convolution is mistaken in its belief that police can somehow have a proletarian character when historically the institutions of policing and incarceration were established to cement the rule of capital over proletarians . Not to mention that the notion that “socialist” cops protect the common good against criminal or “counterrevolutionary” elements is identical in content to bourgeois police apologia. this spectacular image is already infused with carcerality “who polices?” It mattered little that Batman was coerced into defecting; the cadre decided he should die that and was that. not actually infiltrated hundreds were already executed and mass graves are still being found today even without taking State power, communist movements can reproduce carceral logic to lethal conclusions Even for radicals, the ideology of police and prisons presents itself as natural, Without prison and police abolition, communists will never transcend capitalist ideology. We do not fight carcerality with carcerality; we oppose carceral capitalism not with carceral communism, but with abolition communism.

['While the anarchists and abolitionists exclaim “ACAB! All Cops Are Bad,” the pitiful spectacle of the carceral communists would instead amend “ACAB” with drivel saying, “it’s ACCAB, All Capitalist Cops Are Bad.” They continue, “socialist cops are not bad because they are proletarian in character and protect the proletarian State.” Such convolution is mistaken in its belief that police can somehow have a proletarian character when historically the institutions of policing and incarceration were established to cement the rule of capital over proletarians. Not to mention that the notion that “socialist” cops protect the common good against criminal or “counterrevolutionary” elements is identical in content to bourgeois police apologia. Likely nobody would identify as a carceral communist—much like nobody would identify as a carceral feminist—but carceral communists exist. Carceral communists are the people who would defend mass incarceration and deportations under the former Soviet Union and in the current People’s Republic of China. Carceral communists merely oppose these police and prisons and wish to propose their own “people’s” police and prisons. Carceral communism is a marriage of a spectacular image of “communism” with carcerality. By “spectacular” we mean in the sense of Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle where the real is substituted by reified images of the false. Meanwhile, “carcerality” is the logic of the systems of policing and incarceration. A spectacular image of communism is the images and aesthetics of “communist” States: righteous people’s armies, waving red flags, and tightly planned economies. This spectacular image of communism is not communism itself; it is merely a false image of it—a Spectacle. Ultimately, the Spectacle presents this false image of communism to obscure what communism actually means in practice—the movement to abolish the current state of things. In a certain sense, this spectacular image is already infused with carcerality from the 1917 Russian Revolution onward where communists thought that carcerality could be used for proletarian ends—abolishing only the bourgeois statesmen but retaining all other features of capitalist society. Carceral communism has so far been the main narrative of communism due to the prevalence of “communist” States from the former Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, other socialist States, and their aligned Western parties. After the Bolshevik coup during the Russian Revolution, the party of Lenin constituted a secret police—the Cheka—and even set up their headquarters at the Lubyanka, built on the same site as the secret police of Czarina Catherine. While the revolutionary upsurge emptied the Czar’s prisons and forced labor camps, the party of Lenin reconstituted these as gulags which Stalin would later inherit to incredibly bloody effect. Carceral communists such as Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin may have opposed the Czar’s police and prisons, but only for the sake for their own institutions of oppression. What Lenin and the Bolsheviks failed to realize is that communism is intrinsically a movement of proletarians struggling to abolish their class. By reconstituting “communist” police and prisons the Bolsheviks merely reproduced institutions of proletarianization and all that entailed. Bolshevik “communism” merely universalized the proletarian condition instead of its abolition and married this proletarianization with the spectacular image of communism. ACAB means “communist” cops too. Abolition means abolish “communist” police and prisons. When the question “who polices?” is posed, the abolitionist group Critical Resistance identifies right-wing and fascist militias as those who take part in policing in the so-called United States. Here in the Philippines, fascist and right-wing militias do take part in policing, but there is also a para-State entity that espouses communism while reproducing carcerality: the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and their armed wing the New Peoples Army (NPA). In Nettie Wild’s 1988 documentary about the communist movement, A Rustling of Leaves: Inside the Philippine Revolution, party cadre in a guerrilla front had to deal with a young man who defected from the NPA. The young man, codenamed “Batman” in the documentary, was ordered by his uncle in a right-wing militia to defect from the NPA and provide intel for the military. Batman was eventually recaptured by the NPA. While the cadre who captured Batman made a show of giving the local community a voice in their trial of Batman in a People’s Court, the NPA headquarters found the people’s verdict unsatisfactory. In the end, NPA cadre were ultimately Batman’s judges, jury, and executioners. It mattered little that Batman was coerced into defecting; the cadre decided he should die that and was that. Then in the 90s, the CPP-NPA detained hundreds of its own cadre and systematically tortured and executed scores of them in what became known as the anti-infiltration purges. The CPP-NPA were not actually infiltrated by government agents, but by the time the cadre found out, hundreds were already executed and mass graves are still being found today. The survivors are still tagged as counter-revolutionaries by the CPP up to today. More recently, after the 2016 elections which saw the fascist Rodrigo Duterte win the presidency, the CPP-NPA wholeheartedly backed Duterte’s War on Drugs with the NPA even conducting their own drug raids in support of Duterte’s fascist agenda. In all three of these cases, it is clear that even without taking State power, communist movements can reproduce carceral logic to lethal conclusions. Abolition in the Philippines will also mean abolishing the New Peoples Army alongside the Philippine National Police, the military, and paramilitary groups. Even anarchists are not immune to reproducing carcerality. There have been moments where revolutionary anarchists in the Spanish and Ukrainian Revolutions reproduced policing with militants of the Federación Anarquista Ibérica even operating a concentration camp for fascists. More recently, we have seen carcerality reproduced in radical projects like the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest. There, individuals who took it upon themselves to act as the new people’s police shot and killed Black teens. It matters not if the anarcho-concentration camp was leagues better than Stalinist gulags or if the anarcho-police are somehow better; abolition means the doing away of the anarcho-police and anarcho-prisons as well. What explains the endurance of carcerality among supposedly communist movements? Even for radicals, the ideology of police and prisons presents itself as natural, even inevitable. In this sense, carcerality is similar to Mark Fisher’s conception of Capitalist Realism from the book by the same name. While the perspective of capitalist realism constantly propagandizes that “there is no alternative to capitalism,” capitalist realism has only been generalized with the fall of so-called actually existing socialism. In comparison, carcerality has presented itself as natural long before, to the point where Bolsheviks considered it only natural that the dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily includes police and prisons. As Fisher argued, emancipatory politics must always destroy the appearance of a ‘natural order’, must reveal what is presented as necessary and inevitable to be a mere contingency, just as it must make what was previously deemed to be impossible seem attainable. (Captialist Realism) The truth of the matter is that carcerality is historically contingent—it did not always exist nor has it always been generalized to exist everywhere. In the Philippines, carcerality was introduced with colonialism; in the United States, it was introduced with slave patrols; in Europe it was implemented to control the working class. Carcerality has always meant the social control of the proletarianized. The term “carceral capitalism” is redundant for capitalism cannot exist without carcerality. Capitalism needs carcerality to allow the enforcement of wage-labor. This is the key contribution in “The Anarchy of Colored Girls Assembled in a Riotous Manner” by Saidiya Hartman where Black women who resisted working had to be criminalized by the State under vagrancy laws to enforce the regime of proletarianization upon them. That the Bolsheviks found nothing wrong with combining their spectacular image of communism with the false “realism” of carcerality allowed the reconstruction of bourgeois society in communist aesthetics. A society without carcerality was inconceivable for the Bolsheviks, just as it was impossible for them to imagine a world without authority and the State. Without prison and police abolition, communists will never transcend capitalist ideology. II. For Abolition Communism In her 2014 article “Against Carceral Feminism,” the anarchist and abolitionist Victoria Law described carceral feminism as “an approach that sees increased policing, prosecution, and imprisonment as the primary solution to violence against women.”In short, carceral feminism is the idea that cops and prisons can keep women safe, yet as Victoria shows, women and queer folk are often subjected to police violence when they call on the police to help and are at times themselves incarcerated. Abolitionists understand that police and prisons do not keep women safe and instead exacerbate harm. Against carceral feminism is an abolition feminism that struggles for the abolition of policing and incarceration and argues for measures such as transformative justice that can keep women safe. In a certain sense, carceral communism is alike with carceral feminism in its unwavering belief that systems of policing and incarceration can be used benevolently; it cannot. That is to say, carceral communism is the belief that police and prisons are compatible or even necessary for communism. Just as carceral feminism is incompatible with feminism due to exacerbating violence against feminized bodies, carceral communism is wholly incompatible with a coherent vision of communism. Police and prisons cannot possibly be communized, proletarianized, decolonized, indigenized or what have you as these are features that are ultimately tied up with the development of capitalism and the modern State system and are features of capitalist society that proletarianizes. In the Philippines, as in many parts of the world, police and prisons are instruments of colonization and counter-insurgency and up to this day indigenous communities feel that prisons divest their communities of true justice. Communist measures requires the abolition of police and prisons. Communism is ultimately a movement that abolishes the current state of things, that state being the constant proletarianization that marks us as proles in this capitalist world. Because communism is the self-abolition of the proletariat, communist measures are activities and actions that attack proletarianization. Thus abolitionist steps that assault policing and incarceration are ultimately communist measures. Proletarianization is ultimately a social relation imposed by capital and is the class distinction that distinguishes the proletariat. As a social relation, proletarianization is the imposition of wage-labor, the imposition of work as a separate field of human activity, and the alienation from their fruits of production. Proletarianization is a hierarchical condition of domination where capital, the State, and the ruling class dominate the proletariat. In their 2020 booklet, Our Communities, Our Solutions: An Organizer’s Toolkit for Developing Campaigns to Abolish Policing, Critical Resistance defines policing as “a social relationship made up of a set of practices that are empowered by the state to enforce law and social control through the use of force.” As a social relation, Critical Resistance points out that policing “reinforces oppressive dynamics” such as slavery, segregation, racism and enforces compliance among criminalized communities. It is in this sense that policing is also a social relation that reinforces proletarianization. The proletarianized have always been a criminalized class. Witness the difference in policing among different classes: if a worker steals food they are sent to prison, but if bosses steal from workers usually nothing at all happens for wage-theft is a daily occurrence. It is in this way that policing forms part of proletarianization. Keeping the proles in line has always been the function of policing since it was invented. Indeed, whether in bourgeois or “communist” States, the police have always been used to combat militant proletarians. This is indeed the case in imperialized countries whether in the Philippines or in former Soviet Poland. Whether it be the Mendiola Massacre in the Philippines or the harsh suppression of Solidarność in Soviet Poland, the same regime of carcerality reigns. As radical traditions, abolition arose from the Black radical tradition while communism from the European proletarian milieu. Both abolition and communism share roots among dominated classes, one enslaved, and the other proletarianized. While anti-state communists have always had an implicitly abolitionist consciousness in their desire to eliminate policing and incarceration, the fusing of communism and abolition has rarely been articulated.To talk of an abolition communism is in a way a redundancy because regimes of policing and incarceration could not possibly exist in a society that has done away with classes and the State. After all, both abolition and communism aim to abolish the current order and establish a qualitatively different kind of life. In this way abolition and communism are alike. However, because communist politics has become imbued with carcerality for more than a century, it becomes necessary to explicitly articulate a communism that wholly rejects carceral logic. Counterpoised to carceral communism, abolition communism necessarily opposes the tradition of carcerality within communist thought and necessarily opposes the carcerality of “communist” States. To paraphrase Bobby Seale: We do not fight carcerality with carcerality; we oppose carceral capitalism not with carceral communism, but with abolition communism. Mao once said that “without a People’s army, the people have nothing,” yet counterbalancing the New Peoples Army against the Philippine National Police does nothing for liberation if both institutions reproduce carcerality. Qualitatively new forms of social relations that break with carcerality is needed to definitively combat policing and incarceration. What was once presented as necessary and inevitable must be shown to be mere contingency, and what was once impossible must be shown to be attainable. ', '']

[(7, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-McWi-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

McWi

d710565303edf7ecebe4fd04e53ab17357527d43526fab2f5770c982585e5c19

It undermines competition, innovation, and prices.

Camilla Jain Holtse 20, Associate General Counsel in Maersk Line, LL.M in European Law from King’s College, Master’s Degree from University of Aarhus, “Navigating Through Uncertain Waters—The Importance of Legal Certainty, Predictability, and Transparency in Future Antitrust Enforcement”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 11, Issue 8, October 2020, p. 448

markets need? simplicity and predictability predictable rules lead to level playing fields When lines are unclear, companies lose ability to compete these inefficiencies hurt consumers in higher prices and lower innovation

What do markets need? simplicity , transparency, and predictability Simple, transparent, and predictable rules lead to level playing fields competition policy enables companies to analyze strategy, and invest in resources designed to effectively counter rival actions. When boundary lines are unclear, companies lose the ability to compete All of these inefficiencies ultimately hurt consumers in the form of higher prices and lower innovation

simplicity predictability level playing fields analyze invest lose the ability to compete inefficiencies hurt consumers higher prices lower innovation

['IV. What do markets need? simplicity, transparency, and predictability', 'With the complexity of today’s world, the need for simplicity, transparency, and predictability is now more compelling than ever.', 'Simple, transparent, and predictable rules lead to level playing fields. Like the sidelines on a football field, competition policy enables companies to analyze strategy, and invest in resources designed to effectively counter rival actions. When boundary lines are unclear, companies lose the ability to compete—some operate outside the playing field, others receive aid from sponsors to account for perceived ‘unfairness’, and those companies seeking to avoid penalty often miss opportunities that would have been obvious if the field were clearly marked. All of these inefficiencies ultimately hurt consumers in the form of higher prices and lower innovation.']

[(13, 22)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%20Aff-Northwestern-Round4.docx

Kentucky

BaDa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/BaDa/Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%2520Aff-Northwestern-Round4.docx

3175dea28ec14a2ca1d0fa5e7315103005606d900a2cf63f3921688dc13c545e

Trump wins and no link --- the election is a referendum on Trump not policy

Agiesta 2/1 [Jennifer Agiesta is Director of Polling and Election Analytics at CNN; Ariel Edwards-Levy is a polling and analytics editor for CNN; February 1st 2024; “CNN Poll: Trump narrowly leads Biden in general election rematch” ; Go Green!!]

new poll shows Trump ahead of Biden sizable minority express a desire for another option if Biden and Trump are the nominees 49% back Trump 45% Biden 5% someone else demographic dynamics appear to be steady Biden’s support among blocs not grown since the fall: younger than 35 remain split, voters of color 57% Biden voters on both sides more likely to say choice is about Trump than Biden 68% of Biden supporters say voting against Trump rather than for Biden 60% of Trump supporters voting for him than against Biden

a new CNN poll conducted by SSRS shows former President Donald Trump narrowly ahead of President Joe Biden The poll highlights voters’ conflicted feelings about the leading candidates Broad majorities of Democrats and Republicans say they’d be satisfied if their party’s candidate won such a rematch sizable minority of voters express a desire for another option if Biden and Trump are the nominees Overall, 49% of registered voters say they would back Trump if an election between the two were held today, while 45% support Biden 5% someone else . identical to CNN polling on the contest in the fall, and the demographic dynamics of the contest appear to be steady Biden’s support among traditionally Democratic-leaning blocs such as younger voters and voters of color has not grown since the fall: Voters younger than 35 remain about evenly split, while voters of color break 57% Biden to 35% Trump. Most voters on both sides of the hypothetical matchup continue to be more likely to say their choice is about Trump than that it is about Biden 68% of Biden supporters say they’d be voting against Trump rather than for Biden , while 60% of Trump supporters say they’d be voting more for him than against Biden ).

Trump narrowly ahead of President Joe Biden sizable minority of voters express a desire for another option appear to be steady not grown since the fall: Most voters on both sides of the hypothetical matchup continue to be more likely to say their choice is about Trump than that it is about Biden

['With presidential primaries underway and a 2020 general election rematch seemingly the most likely outcome, a new CNN poll conducted by SSRS shows former President Donald Trump narrowly ahead of President Joe Biden in what’s shaping up to be a close contest nationally.', 'The poll highlights voters’ conflicted feelings about the leading candidates. Broad majorities of Democrats and Republicans say they’d be satisfied if their party’s candidate won such a rematch. Still, a sizable minority of voters express a desire for another option if Biden and Trump are the nominees.', 'Overall, 49% of registered voters say they would back Trump if an election between the two were held today, while 45% support Biden and 5% say they’d vote for someone else. Those numbers are identical to CNN polling on the contest in the fall, and the demographic dynamics of the contest appear to be steady – with a wide education gap among the most notable demographic divides, and smaller differences by age or race than in other recent presidential elections.', 'Biden’s support among traditionally Democratic-leaning blocs such as younger voters and voters of color has not grown since the fall: Voters younger than 35 remain about evenly split, 49% back Biden and 46% Trump, while voters of color break 57% Biden to 35% Trump.', 'Most voters on both sides of the hypothetical matchup continue to be more likely to say their choice is about Trump than that it is about Biden (68% of Biden supporters say they’d be voting against Trump rather than for Biden, while 60% of Trump supporters say they’d be voting more for him than against Biden).', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Aff-Texas-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

e79a415690e85ffe67fa2e539421bddeb86c381cd87fcaa63dd23c53d67e9a29

Prevents extinction.

Torres 19 [Phil Torres, Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, Founder of the X-Risks Institute, Writer Appearing in Skeptic, Free Inquiry, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Truthout, Erkenntnis, Metaphilosophy, “Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable To Climate Change,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 11, 2016, rahulpenu

we may approach a tipping point in global ecosystem catastrophic for civilization a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “ substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population results could be unrest econ instability and loss of life Biod loss is a “threat multiplier” pushing societies to collapse will exacerbate conflicts and fuel terrorism biod constitutes an existential threat as significant risk to human survival

The consequences of rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, we may be approach ing a tipping point in the global ecosystem , beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “ substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population .” the results could be “ widespread social unrest , econ omic instability , and loss of human life .” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change Biod iversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse , will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected biod iversity loss constitutes an existential threat it ought to be considered along side climate change as one of the most significant contemporary risk s to human prosperity and survival

abrupt irreversible tipping approach tipping point global catastrophic for civilization planetary-scale transition substantial losses required to sustain the human population widespread social unrest econ omic instability loss of human life Biod “threat multiplier” exacerbate existing conflicts terrorism biod existential threat along climate change most significant contemporary risk s human prosperity and survival

['Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.', '']

[(0, 9), (9, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Indiana-HaFl-Aff-ADA-Round-4.docx

Minnesota-Indiana

HaFl

d70526110be8aa404f29b3ab5679dc22b532be5727f1ddec1d21479b30d7ce14

Roberts and Kavanaugh are charged with personal motives.

David Litt 22. A former speechwriter for President Barack Obama. He is a best-selling author and the publisher of the newsletter How Democracy Lives "A Court Without Precedent." Atlantic. 7-24-2022. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/supreme-court-stare-decisis-roe-v-wade/670576/

Roberts found ways to justify sweeping decisions Warren avoided revisiting Plessy They overturned because they had no other viable choice . Kavanaugh laid out his own set of rules for disregarding precedent prior decision is egregiously wrong caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world consequences overruling the prior decision would not unduly upset legitimate reliance interests each of its elements is completely subjective Kavanaugh believes judges should abide by past decisions unless they really don’t want to not a way to apply stare decisis. a way to scrap it Court reverses course today : because the composition of court changed

Roberts ’s understanding of stare decisis is hardly welcome news for liberals—he’s found ways to justify all kinds of sweeping conservative decisions Warren pointed out that the Court had recently heard six cases involving segregation in education, but had expressly avoided revisiting Plessy Warren argued, questions involving segregated K–12 public schools raised in Brown were so sweeping and wide-ranging that the only way to address them was to address the doctrine that allowed them while the 1954 Court felt Plessy was egregiously wrong, its egregious wrongess was not in itself enough for the Justices to overturn the ruling They overturned Plessy, they argued, only because they had no other viable choice . Kavanaugh laid out his own set of rules for disregarding precedent the prior decision is not just wrong, but is egregiously wrong the prior decision has caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world consequences overruling the prior decision would not unduly upset legitimate reliance interests .” problem with Kavanaugh’s checklist is that each of its elements is completely subjective Kavanaugh believes judges should unfailingly abide by past decisions unless they really don’t want to That’s not a way to apply stare decisis. It’s a way to scrap it . major difference between Brown and Dobbs Brown was decided by a 9–0 vote This unanimity sent a message that the Court’s decision was not only overdue but obvious The majority in Dobbs made no such argument Five judges supported overturning Roe The remaining four did not The Court reverses course today for one reason and one reason only : because the composition of this court has changed

Roberts found ways justify overturned no other choice egregiously wrong subjective Kavanaugh abide don’t want scrap it 9–0 vote composition court changed

['Roberts’s understanding of stare decisis is hardly welcome news for liberals—he’s found ways to justify all kinds of sweeping conservative decisions—but it does point to a major difference between Brown and Dobbs. Writing for the majority in Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren pointed out that the Court had recently heard six cases involving segregation in education, but had expressly avoided revisiting Plessy. “In none of these cases,” he wrote, “was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief.”', 'In contrast, Warren argued, questions involving segregated K–12 public schools raised in Brown were so sweeping and wide-ranging that the only way to address them was to address the doctrine that allowed them. One of the opinion’s most famous lines, “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” is not just a repudiation of Jim Crow. It’s a legal rationale for overturning past precedent.', 'In other words, while the 1954 Court felt Plessy was egregiously wrong, its egregious wrongess was not in itself enough for the Justices to overturn the ruling. They overturned Plessy, they argued, only because they had no other viable choice.', 'Perhaps the conservatives in Dobbs felt similarly about Roe, but that’s not the standard they used to justify their decision. Instead, in a concurring opinion, Kavanaugh laid out his own set of rules for disregarding precedent: “(i) the prior decision is not just wrong, but is egregiously wrong, (ii) the prior decision has caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world consequences, and (iii) overruling the prior decision would not unduly upset legitimate reliance interests.”', 'The problem with Kavanaugh’s checklist is that each of its elements is completely subjective. In essence, Kavanaugh believes judges should unfailingly abide by past decisions unless they really don’t want to. That’s not a way to apply stare decisis. It’s a way to scrap it. In his concurrence, Roberts seems to recognize that he disagrees with his fellow conservatives about the value of sticking to the Court’s historic principles. “The Court’s decision to overrule Roe and Casey is a serious jolt to the legal system—regardless of how you view those cases,” he wrote.', 'Which leads to the other major difference between Brown and Dobbs. Brown was decided by a 9–0 vote. This unanimity sent a message that the Court’s decision was not only overdue but obvious: Justices from across the ideological spectrum were able to agree that Plessy was wrongly decided. In his opinion, Warren further argued that the Court’s change of heart was not just motivated by changing public sentiment or the 1954 justices holding a different set of views from those in 1896. In a way that may not have been understood or appreciated when Plessy was issued, Warren wrote, segregated schools created a psychological “sense of inferiority” that made them fundamentally unequal. In much the way a jury, when presented with exculpatory evidence, might change its verdict from guilty to innocent, the Court changed its opinion as new facts came to light.', 'The majority in Dobbs made no such argument. Five judges—Alito, Barrett, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas—supported overturning Roe. The remaining four did not. The only reason these numbers were not 5–4 in the other direction is that Ruth Bader Ginsburg died while President Donald Trump was still in office and a conservative nominee was rushed through the Senate. If she had been replaced by President Joe Biden instead (or if, four years earlier, Republicans hadn’t broken with Senate tradition and refused to allow President Barack Obama to fill an open seat on the Court), conservatives would not have been able to overturn Roe. Women were deprived of a right they had held for nearly 50 years not because jurisprudence evolved or judges gained a new understanding of the real-world impact of a past decision, but because one judge was swapped for another.', 'As the Court’s three liberals wrote in their joint dissent, “The Court reverses course today for one reason and one reason only: because the composition of this court has changed.”', '']

[(6, 13)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCh-Aff-kentucky-Octas.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

ffd57780bf5a5d48a02d3eb456f38d3372f45c1b4394bc428655011c0298a4c8

NOT SUFFICIENT---the grid’s 18% of emissions

Samuel Alexander & Brendan Gleeson 19, co-director of the Simplicity Institute, is a lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, Australia, teaching a course called ‘Consumerism and the Growth Economy: Critical Interdisciplinary Perspectives’ into the Master of Environment, also a Research Fellow with the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute; Gleeson is the Director of the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, and Professor of Urban Policy Studies at the University of Melbourne, “Light Green Illusions and the ‘Blind Field’ of Techno-optimism,” Degrowth in the Suburbs, Springer Singapore, 2019, pp. 59–86, DOI.org (Crossref),

Even if it is possible to convert electricity that is only 18% of global energy supply

Even if it is possible to convert existing electricity supply to renewable energy, what must be recognised is that electricity is only about 18% of global final energy supply If the challenge of meeting base load and peak load electricity is difficult and expensive even when this is merely 18% of global demand imagine if the other 82% is converted to electricity

possible electricity electricity 18% of global final energy supply even when this is merely 18% of global demand imagine other 82% converted electricity

['But now we arrive at what is perhaps the biggest obstacle in the way of a 100% renewable energy transition within a growth economy. Even if it is possible to convert existing electricity supply to renewable energy, what must be recognised is that electricity is only about 18% of global final energy supply (IEA 2017a). If the challenge of meeting base load and peak load electricity is difficult and expensive even when this is merely 18% of global final energy demand, imagine the magnitude of the challenge if the other 82% of demand (especially that portion cur- rently met via oil) is converted to electricity. Oil analyst Robert Hirsch and his colleagues are right to describe the challenge of peak oil mitiga- tion as first and foremost being a liquid fuels transportation challenge (Hirsch et al. 2010). The climate challenge is similar: how can a glo- balised industrial economy continue without oil?']

[(7, 18), (27, 37)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-CaVa-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-2.docx

Dartmouth

CaVa

eaf64326d4d6a44c0e9f5c4438c2f4b25796251c45166a5fa70bcdf7eb27b718

Capitalism can only be beat by a counter-universal because it will happily cohabitate with localized politics.

Wiliams and Srnicek 15, Visiting Lecturer in Sociology at City University London; lecturer in Digital Economy in the Department of Digital Humanities, King's College London (Alex; Nick, November 17, 2015, “Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work,” Verso Books)

What should the future look like? And whose future is it? the left found its home in the future The future was an improvement in material terms the right were defined by tradition and reactionary nature This reversed during neoliberalism Philosophers assert we have to resist the idea of the future Such folk-political sentiments [ignorantly] accept neoliberal common sense shy away from grand visions and replace with posturing resistance a one-size-fits-all model of progress positioned non-Western societies as lacking and in need of colonial practices disastrous record of the twentieth century demonstrated there was nothing inherent in history cultural condition has not been decline of metanarratives but disenchantment with the left Capitalist modernity was never necessary but driven by imperative towards accumulation new visions of the future are essential for the left In the absence there can only be reactivity local resistance and bunker mentality progress must be understood as fiction that aims to transform into truth Progress is political struggle following no natural tendency Capitalism is an expansionary universal Anything less than a competing universal will be smothered by all-embracing capitalist relations particularisms cohabitate with ease capitalism differentiates into Chinese American Brazilian Indian Nigerian capitalism, and so on European modernity wa genocide Linked to this wa belief the universal was homogeneous There appears no solidarity in the absence of some common factor. The universal operates as transcendent ideal always open to striving for better the universalism does not entail homogeneity power of capitalism is versatility A leftist universal must integrate difference rather than erasing The universal is a placeholder that hegemonic particulars come to occupy

What should the future look like? And whose future is it? Suggesting that history can progress through deliberate human action, it is the nature of this progress that competing definitions of modernity have struggled over. the left has found its natural home in being oriented towards the future From early communist visions of technological progress, to Soviet space utopias, to the social democratic rhetoric of the ‘white heat of technology’, what set the left apart from the right was its unambiguous embrace of the future The future was to be an improvement over the present in material , social and political terms . By contrast, the forces of the political right were , with a few notable exceptions, defined by their defence of tradition and their essentially reactionary nature . This situation was reversed during the rise of neoliberalism Co-opting these terms and mobilising them into a new hegemonic common sense, neoliberalism’s vision of modernity has held sway ever since Philosophers assert we have to resist the idea of the future Such folk-political sentiments blindly [ignorantly] accept the neoliberal common sense , preferring to shy away from grand visions and replace them with a posturing resistance If the left is to recover a sense of progress, however, it cannot simply adopt the classic images of history headed towards a singular destination a one-size-fits-all model of historical progress positioned non-Western societies as lacking and in need of development – a position that served to justify colonial and imperial practices . The complex and often disastrous record of the twentieth century demonstrated conclusively that history could not be relied upon to follow any predetermined course there was nothing inherent in the nature of history postmodernity was identified as the era that has grown to be suspicious of the grand metanarrative postmodernity is a cultural condition of disillusionment with the kinds of grandiose narratives represented by capitalist, liberal and communist accounts of progress. the broader impact of the cultural condition diagnosed by Lyotard has not been the decline of belief in metanarratives per se, but rather a broad disenchantment with those offered by the left path of capitalist modernisation is therefore instantiated in different cultures following different trajectories Progress is therefore not bound to a single European path, but is instead filtered through a variety of political and cultural constellations, all directed towards instantiating capitalist relations. Today, modernisers simply fight over which variant of capitalism to install. Recuperating the idea of progress under such circumstances means, first and foremost, contesting the dogma of this inevitable endpoint Capitalist modernity was never a necessary outcome but instead a successful project driven by various classes and a systemic imperative towards accumulation and expansion new visions of the future are essential for the left In the absence of images of progress, there can only be reactivity , defensive battles, local resistance and a bunker mentality – what we have characterised as folk politics progress must be understood as hyperstitional : as a kind of fiction , but one that aims to transform itself into a truth Progress is a matter of political struggle , following no pre-plotted trajectory or natural tendency , and with no guarantee of success If the supplanting of capitalism is impossible from the standpoint of one or even many defensive stances, it is because any form of prospective politics must set out to construct the new Pathways of progress must be cut and paved Capitalism , as we have argued, is an expansionary universal that weaves itself through multiple cultural fabrics, reworking them as it goes along. Anything less than a competing universal will end up be ing smothered by an all-embracing series of capitalist relations . Various particularisms – localised , specific forms of politics and culture – cohabitate with ease in the world of capitalism capitalism differentiates into Chinese capitalism, American capitalism, Brazilian capitalism, Indian capitalism, Nigerian capitalism, and so on While a universal politics must move beyond any local struggles, generalising itself at the global scale and across cultural variations, it is for these very reasons that it has been criticised European modernity wa s inseparable from its exploited colonial dominions genocide slave trade and plundering resources Linked to this wa s a belief that the universal was equivalent to the homogeneous Europe dissimulated its own parochial position by deploying a series of mechanisms to efface the subjects who made these claims – white, heterosexual, property-owning males Given this heritage, it might seem that the simplest response would be to rescind the universal from our conceptual arsenal. But, for all the difficulties with the idea, it nevertheless remains necessary giving up on the category leaves us with nothing but a series of diverse particulars There appears no way to build meaningful solidarity in the absence of some common factor. The universal also operates as a transcendent ideal – never satisfied with any particular embodiment, and always open to striving for better On the other hand, one risks licensing all sorts of oppressions as simply the inevitable consequence of plural cultural form As capitalism makes clear, universalism does not entail homogeneity the power of capitalism is precisely its versatility and capacity to accommodate difference A similar prospect must also hold for any leftist universal – it must be one that integrate s difference rather than erasing it. What then does all of this mean for the project of modernity? The universal , then, is a n empty placeholder that hegemonic particulars (specific demands, ideals and collectives) come to occupy

What should the future look like? And whose future is it? the future material terms right were defined by reactionary nature neoliberalism we have to resist the idea of the future neoliberal common grand visions posturing resistance model of progress lacking colonial practices nothing inherent decline of belief in metanarratives disenchantment with the left following different trajectories necessary outcome accumulation new visions of the future are essential for the left bunker mentality fiction transform truth construct the new genocide slave trade universal homogeneous meaningful solidarity common universal transcendent ideal versatility capacity to accommodate difference

['To invoke modernity is ultimately to raise the question of the future. What should the future look like? What courses should we set? What does it mean to be contemporary? And whose future is it? Since the emergence of the term, modernity has been concerned with unravelling a circular or retrospective notion of time and introducing a rupture between the present and the past. With this break, the future is projected as being potentially different from and better than the past. Modernity is tantamount to ‘the discovery of the future’ and has therefore found itself intimately linked with notions such as ‘progress, advance, development, emancipation, liberation, growth, accumulation, Enlightenment, embetterment, [and the] avant-garde’. Suggesting that history can progress through deliberate human action, it is the nature of this progress that competing definitions of modernity have struggled over. Historically, the left has found its natural home in being oriented towards the future. From early communist visions of technological progress, to Soviet space utopias, to the social democratic rhetoric of the ‘white heat of technology’, what set the left apart from the right was its unambiguous embrace of the future. The future was to be an improvement over the present in material, social and political terms. By contrast, the forces of the political right were, with a few notable exceptions, defined by their defence of tradition and their essentially reactionary nature. ', 'This situation was reversed during the rise of neoliberalism, with politicians like Thatcher commanding the rhetoric of modernisation and the future to great effect. Co-opting these terms and mobilising them into a new hegemonic common sense, neoliberalism’s vision of modernity has held sway ever since. Consequently, discussions of the left in terms of the future now seem aberrant, even absurd. With the postmodern moment, the seemingly intrinsic links between the future, modernity and emancipation were prized apart. Philosophers like Simon Critchley can now confidently assert that ‘we have to resist the idea and ideology of the future, which is always the ultimate trump card of capitalist ideas of progress’. Such folk-political sentiments blindly [ignorantly] accept the neoliberal common sense, preferring to shy away from grand visions and replace them with a posturing resistance. From the radical left’s discomfort with technological modernity to the social democratic left’s inability to envision an alternative world, everywhere today the future has largely been ceded to the right. A skill that the left once excelled at – building enticing visions for a better world – has deteriorated after years of neglect. If the left is to recover a sense of progress, however, it cannot simply adopt the classic images of history headed towards a singular destination. Progress, for these approaches, was not only possible, but in fact woven as a necessity into the very fabric of history. Human societies were thought to travel along a pre-defined pathway towards a single outcome modelled after Europe. The nations of Europe were deemed to have developed capitalist modernity independently, and their historical experiences of development were considered to be both necessary and superior to those of other cultures. Such ideas dominated traditional European philosophy and continued on in the influential modernisation literature of the 1950s and 1960s, with their attempts to naturalise capitalism against a Soviet opponent. Partly endorsed by both early Marxism and later Keynesian and neoliberal capitalisms, a one-size-fits-all model of historical progress positioned non-Western societies as lacking and in need of development – a position that served to justify colonial and imperial practices. ', 'From the standpoint of their philosophical critics, these notions of progress were disparaged precisely for their belief in preconceived destinations – whether in the liberal progression towards capitalist democracy or in the Marxist progression towards communism. The complex and often disastrous record of the twentieth century demonstrated conclusively that history could not be relied upon to follow any predetermined course. Regression was as likely as progress, genocide as possible as democratisation. In other words, there was nothing inherent in the nature of history, the development of economic systems, or sequences of political struggle that could guarantee any particular outcome. From a broadly left perspective, for example, even those limited but not insignificant political gains that have been achieved – such as welfare provision, women’s rights and worker protections – can be rolled back. Moreover, even in states where nominally communist governments took power, it proved far more difficult than expected to transition from a capitalist system of production to a fully communist one. This series of historical experiences fuelled an internal critique of European modernity by way of psychoanalysis, critical theory and poststructuralism. For the thinkers of postmodernism, modernity came to be associated with a credulous naivety. In Jean-François Lyotard’s epochal definition, postmodernity was identified as the era that has grown to be suspicious of the grand metanarrative. On this account, postmodernity is a cultural condition of disillusionment with the kinds of grandiose narratives represented by capitalist, liberal and communist accounts of progress. ', 'To be sure, these critiques capture something important about the chronological texture of our time. And yet, the announcement of the end of grand narratives has often been viewed by those outside Europe as being absolutely of a piece with modernity. Further, with the benefit of thirty years’ hindsight, the broader impact of the cultural condition diagnosed by Lyotard has not been the decline of belief in metanarratives per se, but rather a broad disenchantment with those offered by the left. The association between capitalism and modernisation remains, while properly progressive notions of the future have wilted und', '', '', '', 'er postmodern critique and been quashed beneath the social wreckage of neoliberalism. Most significantly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of globalisation, history does appear to have a grand narrative. Throughout the world, markets, wage labour, commodities and productivity-enhancing technologies have all expanded under the systemic imperative to accumulate. Capitalism has become the destiny of contemporary societies, happily coexisting with national differences and paying little heed to clashes between civilisations. But we can draw a distinction here between the endpoint (capitalism) and the pathway towards it. Indeed, the mutual entanglement of countries means that the European pathway (heavily reliant on exploiting colonies and slavery) is barred for many of the newly developing countries. While there are broad paradigms of development, each country has had to find its own unique way to respond to the imperatives of global capitalism. The path of capitalist modernisation is therefore instantiated in different cultures, following different trajectories and with different rhythms of development. Uneven and combined development is the order of the day. Progress is therefore not bound to a single European path, but is instead filtered through a variety of political and cultural constellations, all directed towards instantiating capitalist relations. Today, modernisers simply fight over which variant of capitalism to install. ', 'Recuperating the idea of progress under such circumstances means, first and foremost, contesting the dogma of this inevitable endpoint. Capitalist modernity was never a necessary outcome, but instead a successful project driven by various classes and a systemic imperative towards accumulation and expansion. Various modernities are possible, and new visions of the future are essential for the left. Such images are a necessary supplement to any transformative political project. They give a direction to political struggles and generate a set of criteria to adjudicate which struggles to support, which movements to resist, what to invent, and so on. In the absence of images of progress, there can only be reactivity, defensive battles, local resistance and a bunker mentality – what we have characterised as folk politics. Visions of the future are therefore indispensable for elaborating a movement against capitalism. Contra the earlier thinkers of modernity, there is no necessity to progress, nor a singular pathway from which to adjudicate the extent of development. Instead, progress must be understood as hyperstitional: as a kind of fiction, but one that aims to transform itself into a truth. Hyperstitions operate by catalysing dispersed sentiment into a historical force that brings the future into existence. They have the temporal form of ‘will have been’. Such hyperstitions of progress form orienting narratives with which to navigate forward, rather than being an established or necessary property of the world. Progress is a matter of political struggle, following no pre-plotted trajectory or natural tendency, and with no guarantee of success. If the supplanting of capitalism is impossible from the standpoint of one or even many defensive stances, it is because any form of prospective politics must set out to construct the new. Pathways of progress must be cut and paved, not merely travelled along in some pre-ordained fashion; they are a matter of political achievement rather than divine or earthly providence.', 'SUBVERSIVE UNIVERSALS', 'Any elaboration of an alternative image of progress must inevitably face up to the problem of universalism – the idea that certain values, ideas and goals may hold across all cultures. Capitalism, as we have argued, is an expansionary universal that weaves itself through multiple cultural fabrics, reworking them as it goes along. Anything less than a competing universal will end up being smothered by an all-embracing series of capitalist relations. Various particularisms – localised, specific forms of politics and culture – cohabitate with ease in the world of capitalism. The list of possibilities continues to grow as capitalism differentiates into Chinese capitalism, American capitalism, Brazilian capitalism, Indian capitalism, Nigerian capitalism, and so on. If defending a particularism is insufficient, it is because history shows us that the global space of universalism is a space of conflict, with each contender requiring the relative provincialisation of its competitors. If the left is to compete with global capitalism, it needs to rethink the project of universalism.', 'But to invoke such an idea is to call forth a number of fundamental critiques directed against universalism in recent decades. While a universal politics must move beyond any local struggles, generalising itself at the global scale and across cultural variations, it is for these very reasons that it has been criticised. As a matter of historical record, European modernity was inseparable from its ‘dark side’ – a vast network of exploited colonial dominions, the genocide of indigenous peoples, the slave trade, and the plundering of colonised nations’ resources. In this conquest, Europe presented itself as embodying the universal way of life. All other peoples were simply residual particulars that would inevitably come to be subsumed under the European way – even if this required ruthless physical violence and cognitive assault to guarantee the outcome. Linked to this was a belief that the universal was equivalent to the homogeneous. Differences between cultures would therefore be erased in the process of particulars being subsumed under the universal, creating a culture modelled in the image of European civilisation. This was a universalism indistinguishable from pure chauvinism. Throughout this process, Europe dissimulated its own parochial position by deploying a series of mechanisms to efface the subjects who made these claims – white, heterosexual, property-owning males. Europe and its intellectuals abstracted away from their location and identity, presenting their claims as grounded in a ‘view from nowhere’. This perspective was taken to be untarnished by racial, sexual, national or any other particularities, providing the basis for both the alleged universality of Europe’s claims and the illegitimacy of other perspectives. While Europeans could speak and embody the universal, other cultures could only be represented as particular and parochial. Universalism has therefore been central to the worst aspects of modernity’s history.', 'Given this heritage, it might seem that the simplest response would be to rescind the universal from our conceptual arsenal. But, for all the difficulties with the idea, it nevertheless remains necessary. The problem is partly that one cannot simply reject the concept of the universal without generating other significant problems. Most notably, giving up on the category leaves us with nothing but a series of diverse particulars. There appears no way to build meaningful solidarity in the absence of some common factor. The universal also operates as a transcendent ideal – never satisfied with any particular embodiment, and always open to striving for better. It contains the conceptual impulse to undo its own limits. Rejecting this category also risks Orientalising other cultures, transforming them into an exotic Other. If there are only particularisms, and provincial Europe is associated with reason, science, progress and freedom, then the unpleasant implication is that non-Western cultures must be devoid of these. The old Orientalist divides are inadvertently sustained in the name of a misguided anti-universalism. On the other hand, one risks licensing all sorts of oppressions as simply the inevitable consequence of plural cultural forms. All the problems of cultural relativism reappear if there are no criteria to discern which global knowledges, politics and practices support a politics of emancipation. Given all of this, it is unsurprising to see aspects of universalism pop up throughout history and across cultures, to see even its critics begrudgingly accept its necessity, and to see a variety of attempts to revise the category.', 'We can turn now to one final aspect of universalism, which is its heterogeneous nature. As capitalism makes clear, universalism does not entail homogeneity – it does not necessarily involve converting diverse things into the same kind of thing. In fact, the power of capitalism is precisely its versatility in the face of changing conditions on the ground and its capacity to accommodate difference. A similar prospect must also hold for any leftist universal – it must be one that integrates difference rather than erasing it. What then does all of this mean for the project of modernity? It means that any particular image of modernity must be open to co-creation, and further transformation and alteration. And in a globalized world where different peoples necessarily co-exist, it means building systems to live in common despite the plurality of ways of life. Contrary to Eurocentric accounts and classic images of universalism, it must recognize the agency of those outside Europe, and the necessity of their voices inbuilding truly planetary and universal futures. The universal, then, is an empty placeholder that hegemonic particulars (specific demands, ideals and collectives) come to occupy. It can operate as a subversive and emancipatory vector of change with respect to established universalisms, and it is heterogeneous and includes differences, rather than eliminating them.']

[(0, 7), (20, 22)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiYa1-Neg-1---MAC-Round-3.docx

Kansas

WiYa1

cf1fe8436138bc35110d8c980e6425ae8a150cd1e7082c6cbeaed227cac5bbd7

Attempts at meaning don’t inherently cause violence---contingent beliefs that are currently dominant do---we can resist those without abandoning meaning entirely

Andy Robinson 4, Zizek hater, Baudrillard, Zizek and Laclau on "common sense" - a critique, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html

Baudrillard admits that an accident, an irruption of Otherness, or an event which breaks control exerted by information can disrupt the machine" of media control If this is the case there is no basis for assuming its totality, and it is still meaningful to try to win people over to alternatives to conflate existing dominant beliefs with meaning leaves it impossible to critique dominant ideas he poses political problems in terms of "resistance to the social", with the social in general conflated with the EXISTING social system ditto the existing sign system, which Baudrillard identifies with meaning per se. Baudrillard misses the whole question of creation of alternative hegemonies . conflation of meaning per se with dominant beliefs leads to a refusal to countenance transforming mass beliefs Baudrillard claims the masses are resistant to "rational communication though he never tells us how he deduces this

Baudrillard though he thinks the risk of it is low, he admits that an accident, an irruption of Otherness, or an event which breaks the control exerted by information can disrupt the "celibate machine" of media control If this is the case , however, there is no basis for assuming its totality, and it is still meaningful to try to win people over to alternatives . Baudrillard tends to conflate existing dominant beliefs with thought and meaning per se. As a result, he leaves it impossible to critique dominant ideas in a meaningful way. he poses political problems in terms of "resistance to the social", with the social in general being conflated with the EXISTING social system ditto on the existing sign system, which Baudrillard identifies with meaning per se. In such cases, Baudrillard misses the whole question of countercultural practices and the creation of alternative hegemonies . Baudrillard's conflation of meaning per se with dominant beliefs leads to a refusal to countenance the possibility of transforming mass beliefs Baudrillard claims the masses , who want spectacle rather than meaning, are resistant to "rational communication An "autonomous change in consciousness" by the masses, Baudrillard tells us, is a "glaring impossibility" though he never tells us how he deduces this . he also claims that people who try to raise consciousness are acting in accordance with the system

there is no basis for assuming its totality, and it is still meaningful to try to win people over to alternatives . meaning per se. in general EXISTING social system meaning per se. creation of alternative hegemonies though he never tells us how he deduces this .

['Similarly, at times, Baudrillard admits both the unsatisfactory nature of the society of the spectacle for many of its participants, and the existence of spheres of belief and discourse beyond its borders. For instance, people don\'t fully believe the hyperreality which substitutes for reality (SSM 99); some groups, so-called "savages" such as the Arab masses, are not submerged in simulation and can still become passionately involved in, for instance, war (GW 32); the real still exists underground (GW 63). Indeed, although his analysis of the Gulf War suggests that the WEST is trapped in simulacra, his account of the rest of the world suggests it follows a different logic (eg GW 65). Wars or non-wars today are waged by the west against symbolic logics which break with the dominant system, such as Islam (GW 85-6), to absorb everything which is singular and irreducible (GW 86). Also, though he thinks the risk of it is low, he admits that an accident, an irruption of Otherness, or an event which breaks the control exerted by information can disrupt the "celibate machine" of media control (GW 36, 48). If this is the case, however, there is no basis for assuming its totality, and it is still meaningful to try to win people over to alternatives. In SSM Baudrillard retreats from this analysis, suggesting the reduction of society to a rat race is a result of the masses\' resistance to \'objective\' economic management (SSM 45) - the system benefits as a result but that is not the main issue. This contrasts with Baudrillard\'s earlier analyses and also those of others such as Illich, who see the destructive social effects of such competition. However, Baudrillard does attack "the social", which he identifies with control through information, simulation, security and deterrence (SSM 50-1) - though how it can be resisted since he thinks it "produces" us is never explained. ¶ Baudrillard tends to conflate existing dominant beliefs with thought and meaning per se. As a result, he leaves it impossible to critique dominant ideas in a meaningful way. For instance, he poses political problems in terms of "resistance to the social", with the social in general being conflated with the EXISTING social system (SSM 41); ditto on the existing sign system, which Baudrillard identifies with meaning per se. In such cases, Baudrillard misses the whole question of countercultural practices and the creation of alternative hegemonies.¶ Baudrillard\'s conflation of meaning per se with dominant beliefs leads to a refusal to countenance the possibility of transforming mass beliefs. Raising the cultural level of the masses, Baudrillard claims, is "Nonsense" because the masses, who want spectacle rather than meaning, are resistant to "rational communication" (SSM 10). An "autonomous change in consciousness" by the masses, Baudrillard tells us, is a "glaring impossibility" (SSM 30) - though he never tells us how he deduces this. Furthermore, he also claims that people who try to raise consciousness, liberate the unconscious or promote subjectivity "are acting in accordance with the system" (SSM 109). This anathematisation is a result of Baudrillard\'s strange claim that the system\'s logic is based on total inclusion and speech! It is on this basis that Baudrillard rejects argument based on empirical claims and locates truth outside such claims (SSM 121-2). ']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Aff-Hoosier-Invitational-HIT-Round-1.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

3aa4a7e4f23db445908702a18cdd853c380f1df3bf1ff62382ff1727b46c8918

1. Solves certainty and clarity for energy---that solves European and Asian alliances, competitiveness, and emissions reductions.

David L. Goldwyn 22. Served as Special Envoy for International Energy under President Obama and Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Relations under President Clinton. He is chair of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group. "The balance President Biden needed: How the IRA achieves a durable energy and climate policy". Atlantic Council. 8-9-2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/how-the-ira-achieves-a-durable-energy-and-climate-policy/

oil and gas remain strategic permitting reform will provide certainty and clarity for producers and operators export of natural gas is increasingly essential to keeping Europe warm and Asia prosperous indispensable supporter of the energy transition LNG markets more affordable than emissions-intensive fuels like coal essential to renewable energy hydrogen and CO2 pipelines for the competitiveness and resilience of the economy

oil and gas remain strategic commodities The IRA acknowledges this in its insistence on continuing offshore oil and gas leasing in the United States as well as a future permitting reform bill which will provide greater certainty and clarity for US fossil fuel producers and infrastructure operators if passed and signed. US production and export of natural gas is increasingly essential to keeping Europe warm and Asia prosperous and natural gas remains an indispensable supporter of the energy transition in nearly every region of the world US exports increase the competitiveness of LNG markets driving down costs and helping make gas more affordable than more emissions-intensive fuels like coal which continues to dominate in Asia Manchin’s insistence on permitting reform will be essential to achieving the administration’s renewable energy goals but also to the siting of electricity transmission lines, hydrogen and CO2 pipelines , and the oil and gas pipelines necessary for the competitiveness and resilience of the US economy and future exports of both The United States can be a low-risk , low-cost , and low-carbon producer of hydrocarbons.

oil gas strategic commodities permitting reform bill certainty clarity fossil fuel producers infrastructure operators production export natural gas essential warm Asia prosperous indispensable supporter energy transition costs affordable emissions-intensive fuels like coal essential administration’s renewable energy hydrogen CO2 competitiveness resilience US economy future exports low-risk low-cost low-carbon

['The bill also adds a crucial dose of realism to the administration’s broader energy policy. Recent months have brought stark reminders that oil and gas remain strategic commodities. The United States’ major contribution to the diversification of the oil market therefore remains essential. The IRA acknowledges this, both in its insistence on continuing offshore oil and gas leasing in the United States as well as the promise of a future permitting reform bill which will provide greater certainty and clarity for US fossil fuel producers and infrastructure operators if passed and signed.', 'Likewise, US production and export of natural gas is increasingly essential to keeping Europe warm and Asia prosperous, and natural gas remains an indispensable supporter of the energy transition in nearly every region of the world. US exports increase the competitiveness of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets, driving down costs and helping make gas more affordable than more emissions-intensive fuels like coal, which continues to dominate in South and Southeast Asia. The Biden administration has only been willing to acknowledge this role for US natural gas exports when forced to, but a more public acknowledgment and firmer commitment is required. Senator Manchin’s insistence on permitting reform will be essential to achieving the administration’s renewable energy goals (such as 30 GW of offshore wind energy by 2030) but also to the siting of electricity transmission lines, hydrogen and CO2 pipelines, and the oil and gas pipelines necessary for the competitiveness and resilience of the US economy and future exports of both. The United States can—and absolutely should—be a low-risk, low-cost, and low-carbon producer of hydrocarbons.']

[(9, 19)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Neg-Georgetown-Round-1.docx

Emory

GiKe

2da4f9f75ba66d90e32f193ff9850dd9fac124c3eb0218ed94f64287f8dfcf30

It spills into the Middle East and South Asia---nuclear war

Walter Mead 13, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, “Peace in The Congo? Why the World Should Care”, The American Interest, 12/15/2013,

wars spread instability rip nuclear Pakistan apart trigger conflict India Africa is of importance to security line between Africa and Middle East is soft weak states are ideal for Al Qaeda war in the Congo create swirling underworld of arms trading illegal commerce destabilizes states

The problem is that these wars spread . They may start in places that we don’t care much about but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear -armed Pakistan apart or with trigger wider conflict India Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends Africa , and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand . The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one . The weak states are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support . There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds , fighters , training and weapons from the Middle Ea st . A war in the eastern Congo helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading , money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters —and know no other way to make a living . It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us

spread rip nuclear -armed Pakistan apart with trigger wider conflict India Africa more importance to American security Africa Middle East weak states ideal petri dishes Al Qaeda type groups networks funds fighters training weapons war in the eastern Congo swirling underworld experienced fighters destabilizes

['The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or with trigger wider conflict India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends.', 'Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.']

[(7, 14)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Stockstill-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

Kentucky

AdSt

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdSt/Kentucky-Adam-Stockstill-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

308151efce4689bcb568f593debb8f316dac3b4112d5d32d22969c0859ffa0ea

Recent, robust studies prove our impact

Julian Adorney 20, Contributing Writer at the Hinrich Foundation, Young Voices Advocate, Senior SEO Analyst for Colorado SEO Pros, Writing Appeared at The Federalist, Fox Nation, The Hill, and the Mises Institute, BA from the University of Colorado, Boulder, “Want Peace? Promote Free Trade”, Hinrich Foundation for Advancing Sustainable Free Trade, 9/10/2020, https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/tradevistas/sustainable/trade-and-peace/

“if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will.” trade forges connections and gives each incentive to avoid war recent research confirms Bastiat’s claim McDonald empirically tested every country for the past 40 years analysis showed a correlation between trade and conflict for causation McDonald controls also for growth even proximity takeaway is protectionism lead to conflict

protectionism lead to conflict and free trade help prevent it “if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will.” trade forges connections between nations and gives each country an incentive to avoid war with its trading partners. If every nation were an economic island , the lack of positive interaction created by trade could leave more room for conflict as recent research shows, the historical evidence confirms Bastiat’s famous claim McDonald empirically tested whether greater protectionism would increase the probability of international conflict He used dyads to analyze every country’s international relations from 60 until 2000 He broke this down into dyad-years Using these dyad-years, McDonald analyzed every country in the world for the past 40 years . His analysis showed a negative correlation between free trade and conflict : The more freely a country trades, the fewer wars it engages in. Countries that engage in free trade are less likely to invade and less likely to be invaded this finding might be confusing correlation for causation But McDonald controls for these variables McDonald also controlled for growth McDonald even controlled for geographic proximity The takeaway from analysis is that protectionism can actually lead to conflict a country in the bottom 10 percent for protectionism is 70 percent less likely to engage in a new conflict than one in the top 10 percent for protectionism

“if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will.” connections incentive economic island positive interaction conflict recent research confirms empirically 60 negative correlation fewer wars causation controls for these variables takeaway protectionism can actually lead to conflict

['Why does protectionism lead to conflict and why does free trade help prevent it? Learn about the connection between peace and free trade.', 'Frédéric Bastiat famously claimed that “if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will.”', 'Bastiat argued that free trade between countries could reduce international conflict because trade forges connections between nations and gives each country an incentive to avoid war with its trading partners. If every nation were an economic island, the lack of positive interaction created by trade could leave more room for conflict. Two hundred years after Bastiat, libertarians take this idea as gospel. Unfortunately, not everyone does. But as recent research shows, the historical evidence confirms Bastiat’s famous claim.', 'To trade or to raid', 'In “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” professor Patrick J. McDonald, from the University of Texas at Austin, empirically tested whether greater levels of protectionism in a country (tariffs, quotas, etc.) would increase the probability of international conflict in that nation. He used a tool called dyads to analyze every country’s international relations from 1960 until 2000. A dyad is the interaction between one country and another country: German and French relations would be one dyad, German and Russian relations would be a second, French and Australian relations would be a third. He further broke this down into dyad-years; the relations between Germany and France in 1965 would be one dyad-year, the relations between France and Australia in 1973 would be a second, and so on.', 'Using these dyad-years, McDonald analyzed the behavior of every country in the world for the past 40 years. His analysis showed a negative correlation between free trade and conflict: The more freely a country trades, the fewer wars it engages in. Countries that engage in free trade are less likely to invade and less likely to be invaded.', 'Trading partners', 'The causal arrow', 'Of course, this finding might be a matter of confusing correlation for causation. Maybe countries engaging in free trade fight less often for some other reason, like the fact that they tend also to be more democratic. Democratic countries make war less often than empires do. But McDonald controls for these variables. Controlling for a state’s political structure is important, because democracies and republics tend to fight less than authoritarian regimes.', 'McDonald also controlled for a country’s economic growth, because countries in a recession are more likely to go to war than those in a boom, often in order to distract their people from their economic woes. McDonald even controlled for factors like geographic proximity: It’s easier for Germany and France to fight each other than it is for the United States and China, because troops in the former group only have to cross a shared border.', 'The takeaway from McDonald’s analysis is that protectionism can actually lead to conflict. McDonald found that a country in the bottom 10 percent for protectionism (meaning it is less protectionist than 90 percent of other countries) is 70 percent less likely to engage in a new conflict (either as invader or as target) than one in the top 10 percent for protectionism.']

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Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-ADA-Quarters.docx

Michigan

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Decoupling makes growth sustainable.

McAfee 19—(principal research scientist and codirector of the Initiative on the Digital Economy at MIT, PHD in business administration from Harvard, MS in mechanical engineering from MIT, unrelated to the crazy McAfee). McAfee, Andrew. 2019. More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next. Scribner.

We have not embraced degrowth . we’ve decoupled growth From 80 to 15 , emissions of six pollutants decreased . Jevons was wrong. Materials cost money competition spurs dematerialization . companies use less . This happened with aluminum . sub one resource for another. coal or oil energy could be uranium mak better use a smartphone use less than devices they replaced renewable solar wind and hydroelectric use no resources . Innovation is going to surpris us . tech are recombinations of existing things. new tech increases over time because the number of building blocks does. cap is not without oversight . The government establish laws settl disputes tax , control money and other things “market failures” need to be corrected . Limits to Growth underestimated new reserves .

a plea for us to consume less for the planet’s sake has largely fallen on deaf ears growth of consumption has slowed in recent years. But growth in resource use has reversed course and is now negative . We have not as a society embraced degrowth . Instead we’ve decoupled growth in consumption, prosperity, and our economy—from resource use. Recycling: Big, and Beside the Point Back to the Land Is Bad for the Land Imposing Limits: The Worst Idea, and the Best One The Population Implosion People’s Republic of China announced its new family planning policy missile scientist Song Jian came to believe that even faster birth rate reductions were required. the one-child policy soon became a central fact of Chinese family life . officials terrorized parents. Rational Restrictions Imposing limits on family size is a terrible . But it’s an excellent idea to impose limits on pollution . Such restrictions have yielded the great triumphs of environmental movements in America and other countries . levels of sulfur dioxide in the United States have dropped to levels not seen since the twentieth century . From 19 80 to 20 15 , total emissions of six principal air pollutants decreased by 65 percent . As lead was banned concentration in the blood of young children dropped 80 percent between 1976 and 1999. CHAPTER 7 How have we got more from less? Cap italism and technological progress force dematerialization . let’s look at a few recent examples Fertile Farms America agricultural cropland reversed . material productivity of ag riculture in the United States improved dramatically Thin Cans In 1959 At 85 g the first aluminum cans were heavy; by 2011 it was reduced to 12.75 g Gone Gizmos From Peak Oil to… Peak Oil Remember Peak Oil? Demand May Top Out Before Supply Does. energy from the sun, wind, and the nuclei of uranium atoms is getting cheaper faster and becoming much more widely available. oil prices might be ‘lower forever. Taking Stock of Rolling Stock The Rare Earth Scare What’s Going On? There is no shortage of examples of dematerialization . I chose the ones in this chapter because they illustrate a set of fundamental principles at the intersection of business, economics, innovation, and our impact on our planet. They are: We do want more all the time, but not more resources . Jevons was wrong. desires grow without end But use of resources does not . We want more beverage options, but don’t want to keep using more aluminum . We want to communicate compute and listen to music , but we don’t want an arsenal of gadgets we’re happy with a smartphone. we want more food, but don’t desire to consume more fertilizer Jevons was correct that price elasticity of demand for coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s . But he was wrong to conclude that this would be permanent. Elasticities of demand change over time for technological change. When fracking made gas cheaper, demand for coal in the United States went down even though its price decreased. Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather not spend . resources cost money. competition spurs dematerialization . There are multiple paths to dematerialization As profit-hungry companies seek to use fewer resources First they use less of a given material . This happened as beverage companies with teamed up to use less aluminum . American farmers keep getting bigger harvests while using less land, water, and fertilizer. Second it becomes possible to sub stitute one resource for another. coal started to decrease because fracking made natural gas attractive . uranium contains 2 million times as much energy as the same mass of coal or oil . the total amount of energy humans consume each year could be supplied by just seven thousand tons of uranium . Third companies can mak better use of the materials they already own. Companies that own expensive physical assets tend to be fanatics about getting as much use as possible out of them commercial airlines improved percentage of seats occupied from 56 percent to 81 percent in 2018. Finally some materials get replaced by nothing at all. a smartphone . are champions of dematerialization . They use vastly less metal , plastic , glass , and silicon than the devices they replaced . renewable energy replac coal, gas, oil, and uranium with solar power wind power and hydroelectric power . these are also dematerialization’s champions, since they use no resources once running . I call these paths to dematerialization slim , swap , optimize , and evaporate . Innovation is hard to foresee The iPhone was “just” a cellular telephone plus a bunch of sensors . Combinatorial innovation is exciting because it’s unpredictable. as the number of building blocks and innovators increases, we should have confidence more breakthroughs such as fracking and smartphones are ahead. Innovation is highly decentralized and largely uncoordinated , occurring as the result of interactions among complex social, technological, and economic systems. it’s going to keep surpris ing us . As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization accelerates . Computer-aided design tools help design aluminum cans that keep getting lighter. Technology: The Human Interface with the Material World technologies accumulate. We haven’t forgotten about the lever, the plow, or the steam engine and we haven’t had to give them up . tech nologies are combinatorial; recombinations of existing things. the number of powerful new tech nologies increases over time because the number of building blocks does. These help me understand why we didn’t start to dematerialize sooner . we didn’t have the tech building blocks to allow large-scale dematerialization. Capitalism: Means of Production The important features of this approach are: Profit-seeking companies Free market entry and competition Strong property rights and contract enforcement Absence of central planning Private ownership Voluntary exchange cap italism is not without oversight . The government has clear roles to play in establish ing laws settl ing disputes ( to say nothing of setting tax rates , control ling the money supply, and doing other things of critical economic importance). every sane advocate of capitalism recognizes “market failures” need to be corrected by government action . Overcoming the Limits The Limits to Growth computer models showed the planet would run out of gold within twenty-nine years ; silver within forty-two years; copper and petroleum within fifty; and aluminum within fifty-five. These weren’t accurate predictions. we still have large reserves of them. Limits to Growth underestimated dematerialization and new reserves . Capitalism and tech progress combine to drive both of these trends—the use of fewer resources and the hunt for more of them—and neither of these two drivers is about to become less powerful. resource scarcity isn’t something we need to worry about . The Second Enlightenment Innovators come up with new and useful technologies. Because of free market entry, the next innovators and start-ups can come from anywhere. It’s not necessary to plan this process. it’s a terrible idea to try to do so. Any central planner will miss actual innovators or squelch them to protect the status quo of which planners are a part. Tech progress and capitalism reinforce each other , and to cause economies to get bigger and people to become more prosperous. But instead of also causing greater use of natural resources, they spark dematerialization , something truly new under the sun.

has largely fallen on deaf ears slowed reversed course negative We have not embraced degrowth Instead we’ve decoupled growth Recycling: Big, and Beside the Point Back to the Land Is Bad for the Land Imposing Limits: The Worst Idea, and the Best One The Population Implosion Rational Restrictions and other countries sulfur dioxide 80 15 six principal air pollutants 65 percent CHAPTER 7 How have we got more from less? Cap force dematerialization recent examples Fertile Farms reversed ag Thin Cans In 1959 85 g 12.75 g Gone Gizmos From Peak Oil to… Peak Oil Taking Stock of Rolling Stock The Rare Earth Scare What’s Going On? no shortage of examples of dematerialization We do want more all the time, but not more resources Jevons was wrong. communicate compute listen to music arsenal of gadgets coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s technological change. Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather not spend competition spurs dematerialization There are multiple paths to dematerialization First use less aluminum Second sub uranium 2 coal or oil just seven thousand tons uranium Third better use Finally a smartphone champions of dematerialization metal plastic glass silicon replaced renewable energy replac solar power wind power hydroelectric power no resources slim swap optimize evaporate Innovation is hard to foresee fracking smartphones highly decentralized largely uncoordinated it’s going to keep surpris us As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization accelerates Technology: The Human Interface with the Material World tech recombinations number tech increases over time building blocks why we didn’t start to dematerialize sooner building blocks Capitalism: Means of Production Profit-seeking companies Free market entry and competition Strong property rights and contract enforcement Absence of central planning Private ownership Voluntary exchange cap oversight government establish settl disputes tax control other things corrected Overcoming the Limits The Limits to Growth These weren’t accurate predictions. large reserves Limits to Growth dematerialization new reserves resource scarcity isn’t something we need to worry about The Second Enlightenment terrible idea actual innovators squelch them status quo reinforce each other dematerialization

['', 'What’s behind the broad and deep dematerialization of the American economy? Why are we now post-peak in our consumption of so many resources? In the next chapters I’ll present my explanation of the causes of dematerialization. First, though, I want to give a short explanation of what the causes are not. In particular, I want to show that the CRIB strategies born around Earth Day and promoted since then for reducing our planetary footprint—consume less, recycle, impose limits, and go back to the land—have not been important contributors to the dematerialization we’ve seen. Since Earth Day, we have demonstrably not consumed much less or gone back to the land in large numbers. We have recycled a lot, but this fact is irrelevant because recycling is a separate phenomenon from dematerialization. Much more relevant than recycling are the limits we’ve imposed in a couple of areas. The history of these limits is instructive because it helps us separate great ideas (limits on pollution and hunting animals) from truly terrible ones (limits on family size). All, Consuming The C part of the CRIB strategy—a plea for us to consume less for the planet’s sake—has largely fallen on deaf ears. To see this, let’s look at change in the real GDP of the United States. It grew by an average of 3.2 percent per year between the end of World War II and Earth Day. From 1971 to 2017, it grew by an annual average of 2.8 percent. Population growth also slowed down after the postwar baby boom, but it remained positive. America’s population increased by an average of 1.5 percent a year from 1946 to 1970, and by 1 percent annually from 1971 to 2016. So while we have slowed down some, we certainly haven’t come close to embracing degrowth in our population or consumption. But the American economy has changed significantly since Earth Day and has become relatively less oriented around making and building things. Services, ranging from haircuts to insurance policies to concerts, now make up a much larger share of the economy than they did in 1970. US personal consumption of services has risen from 30 percent of GDP in 1970 to 47 percent in 2017. So, has the decline in resource use come about because we don’t make or consume as many products as we used to? No. While it’s true that products have been declining in relative terms (in other words, as a percentage of total GDP) compared to services, our total consumption of products has still been increasing in absolute terms. So has our industrial production—the total amount of things made in America. What’s more, the United States has not recently shifted away from “heavy” manufacturing. We still make lots of vehicles, machinery, and other big-ticket items, just as we used to. But we don’t make them the same way we used to. We now make them using fewer resources. To see this, let’s add a line showing US industrial production to our graph from the previous chapter of GDP and total metal consumption. This updated chart makes clear that the country hasn’t stopped producing things. Instead, America’s manufacturers have learned to produce more things from less metal. So to summarize, growth of consumption has in some cases slowed down in recent years. But growth in resource use has done much more than slow down—it has reversed course and is now generally negative. We have not as a society embraced degrowth. Instead, we’ve done something far stranger and more profound: we’ve decoupled growth—in consumption, prosperity, and our economy—from resource use. Early in the Industrial Era, the French diplomat Alexis de Tocqueville published his 1835 book, Democracy in America. One of the first major investigations into the character of the then-young country, it remains one of the best.I De Tocqueville observed almost two centuries ago that the people of the United States liked their things: “In America, the passion for material well-being… is general.… Minds are universally preoccupied with meeting the body’s every need and attending to life’s little comforts.” What’s new is that providing for our needs and comforts now requires fewer materials, not more. Recycling: Big, and Beside the Point Recycling is big business: 47 percent, 33 percent, 68 percent, and 49 percent of all the tonnage of aluminum, copper, lead, and iron and steel (respectively) consumed in the United States in 2015 came from scrap metal rather than ore taken from the earth. Similarly, almost 65 percent of paper products came from recycled newspapers, pizza boxes, and so on rather than from felled trees. Yet recycling is irrelevant for dematerialization. Why? Because recycling is about where resource-producing factories get their inputs, while dematerialization is about what’s happened to total demand for their outputs. Paper mills, for example, get their raw material from two main sources: recycling centers and forests. American consumption of output from all paper mills combined has been declining since 1990, the year of peak paper in the United States. This decline is purely a matter of how much total demand there is for paper; it has no direct relationship to the amount of recycling taking place. But is there any indirect relationship? How much would our total consumption of resources such as paper or steel change without recycling? It’s impossible to answer with certainty, but my intuition is that if recycling didn’t exist, our total consumption of resources such as aluminum, copper, iron, and steel would be declining even more quickly. This seems counterintuitive; the conclusion is supported by a simple chain of reasoning. Recycling metals makes economic sense exactly because it’s cheaper to melt down and reuse scrap than it is to dig out and process ore. Without this scrap, a ton of metal would probably cost more, all other things being equal. And as a general rule, we use less of a thing when it costs more. So it seems most likely to me that we’d use less metal overall in a hypothetical zero-recycling economy than we do in our actual enthusiastic-about-scrap-metal-recycling economy. This does not mean that I think metal recycling is bad. I think it’s great, since it gives us cheaper metal products and reduces total greenhouse gas emissions (since it takes much less energy to obtain metal from scrap than from ore). But recycling, whatever its merits, is not part of the dematerialization story. It’s a different story. Back to the Land Is Bad for the Land The back-to-the-land movement is a fascinating chapter in the history of American environmentalism, but a largely insignificant one. There were simply never enough homesteaders and others who turned away from modern, technologically sophisticated life to make much of a difference. Which is a good thing for the environment. As Jeffrey Jacob documents in his book New Pioneers, the back-to-the-land movement in the United States began in the mid-1960s and continued into the next decade. According to one estimate, as many as 1 million North American back-to-the-landers were living on small farms by the end of the 1970s. This, though, was a weak current against the strong tide of urban growth; the number of American city dwellers increased by more than 17 million between 1970 and 1980. Going back to the land might have been widely discussed, but it was comparatively rarely practiced. We should be thankful for this because homesteading is not great for the environment, for two reasons. First, small-scale farming is less efficient in its use of resources than massive, industrialized, mechanized agriculture. To get the same harvest, homesteaders use more land, water, and fertilizer than do “factory farmers.” Farms of less than one hundred acres, for example, grow 15 percent less corn per acre than farms with more than a thousand acres. And bigger farms get better faster. Between 1982 and 2012 farms under one hundred acres grew their total factor productivity by 15 percent, whereas farms over a thousand acres grew theirs by 51 percent. So more homesteaders would have meant more land under cultivation, more water and fertilizer used, and so on. Second, rural life is less environmentally friendly than urban or suburban dwelling. City folk live in high-density, energy-efficient apartments and condos, travel only short distances for work and errands, and frequently use public transportation. None of these things is true of country living. As economist Edward Glaeser summarizes, “If you want to be good to the environment, stay away from it. Move to high-rise apartments surrounded by plenty of concrete.… Living in the country is not the right way to care for the Earth. The best thing that we can do for the planet is build more skyscrapers.” And if homesteaders decide not only to ignore Glaeser’s advice but also to leave modernity further behind and heat their homes with coal or wood, they do still more environmental harm. Coal home furnaces create lots of atmospheric pollution, much more than comes from other kinds of fuel. Poland, for example, today has 80 percent of all homes in Europe that burn coal, and thirty-three of the Continent’s fifty most polluted cities. And burning wood means chopping down trees. A lot of them. It’s almost certainly the case that the English turned to coal for home heating in the middle of the sixteenth century because they’d cut down such a huge percentage of their trees that the price of wood skyrocketed. So if we care about the environment, we should probably be glad that the back-to-the-land movement stalled out, and that industrial-scale, high-yield agriculture has become the norm. A comprehensive review published in Nature Sustainability in 2018 concluded, “The data… do not suggest that environmental costs are generally larger for [high-yield] farming systems.… If anything, positive associations—in which high-yield, land-efficient systems also have lower costs in other dimensions—appear more common.” Imposing Limits: The Worst Idea, and the Best One Of the four elements of the CRIB strategy, the drive to impose limits has by far the most checkered history. It yielded both the most harmful strategies, and the most helpful ones. The Population Implosion In 1979 the government of the People’s Republic of China announced its new family planning policy, which soon became known as the one-child policy. It was enacted despite the steady decline in the country’s birth rate throughout the 1970s. But after reading Limits to Growth, A Blueprint for Survival, and other books limning the looming dangers of unchecked population expansion, the missile scientist Song Jian came to believe that even faster birth rate reductions were required. He became the architect of the new policy, the main effect of which was to limit ethnic Han Chinese families to a single child. Exceptions to this restriction included giving some couples the right to a second child if their first was a girl, but the one-child policy soon became a central fact of Chinese family life. It is hard to see it in a positive light. After the policy was officially abandoned in late 2015, journalist Barbara Demick wrote its unflattering obituary: “Family planning became a powerful bureaucracy, with officials who terrorized parents. They beat and burned down the houses of people who violated the family-planning limits. They snatched over-quota baby girls from the arms of their mothers and gave them to orphanages, which in turn put them up for adoption, earning a three-thousand-dollar ‘donation’ for each baby.” The Chinese government maintains that approximately 400 million births were prevented by the one-child policy, but this is probably a large overestimate. As the economist Amartya Sen points out, “The additional contribution of coercion to reducing fertility in China is by no means clear, since compulsion was superimposed on a society that was already reducing its birth rate.” In their 2013 essay “How Will History Judge China’s One-Child Policy?” the demographers Wang Feng, Yong Cai, and Baochang Gu compared the policy unfavorably to two of their country’s great twentieth-century convulsions: the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward. They wrote, “While those grave mistakes both cost tens of millions of lives, the harms done were relatively short-lived and were corrected quickly afterward. The one-child policy, in contrast, will surpass them in impact by its role in creating a society with a seriously undermined family and kin structure, and a whole generation of future elderly and their children whose well-being will be seriously jeopardized.” History, in short, will judge this government-imposed limit on family size harshly.II Rational Restrictions Imposing limits on family size is a terrible idea for reasons both practical and moral. But it’s an excellent idea to impose limits on pollution, and on hunting some animals and selling products that come from their bodies. Such restrictions have yielded the great triumphs of the conservation and environmental movements in America and other countries. In 1970, the same year as the original Earth Day festival, the United States established the federal Environmental Protection Agency and made major amendments to 1963’s Clean Air Act. This was the start of a cascade of laws and regulations aimed at reducing pollution and other environmental harms. These have worked amazingly well. For example, atmospheric levels of sulfur dioxide in the United States have dropped to levels not seen since the first years of the twentieth century, and other kinds of air pollution have also dropped sharply. From 1980 to 2015, total emissions of six principal air pollutants decreased by 65 percent. As lead was banned from paint and gasoline, the concentration of that element in the blood of young children dropped by more than 80 percent between 1976 and 1999. Because lead retards brain development during youth, these declines are tremendously important. According to one study, American children in 1999 had IQs that were on average 2.2 to 4.7 points higher than they would have been had lead concentrations remained at their 1970 levels. More work certainly remains, but thanks to the limits imposed on pollutants, America’s soil, air, and water are all much cleaner than they were on Earth Day. The conservationists who grew concerned in the early years of the twentieth century about what hunting was doing to the populations of many animals were the predecessors of Earth Day’s environmentalists. Conservationists were spurred to action by the shocking extinction of the passenger pigeon. That such an abundant bird could be eradicated stunned many and spurred new laws restricting trade in animal products. The first of these was the Lacey Act, passed by Congress in 1900 and named for John Lacey, a Republican representative from Iowa. As he said during debate on the bill, “The wild pigeon, formerly in flocks of millions, has entirely disappeared from the face of the earth. We have given an awful exhibition of slaughter and destruction, which may serve as a warning to all mankind. Let us now give an example of wise conservation of what remains of the gifts of nature.” The Lacey Act and its successors imposed three kinds of limits on taking and consuming animals. First, hunting of some animals was fully banned. Protected species include the sea otter, which was protected by a 1911 international moratorium; the snowy egret, which was ruthlessly hunted for its gorgeous plumes until passage of the Weeks-McLean Law Act in 1913; and dolphins and manatees, which were sheltered by 1972’s Marine Mammal Protection Act. Second, many limits have been imposed on when and where animals can be hunted. Sport and food hunting are illegal in most national parks, for example, and duck, bear, deer, and many other animals have well-defined hunting seasons. Third, bans have been imposed on the commercial trade in many animal products. The most sweeping of these is probably the nationwide ban on the sale of hunted meat. You may see venison or bison meat at a butcher’s counter or on a menu in America, but it always comes from a ranch, not a hunt. These imposed limits have brought many iconic American animals back from the brink of extinction. North America now has more than half a million bison, for example, and over three thousand sea otters live off the coast of Northern California. Some previously threatened animals have come back so well that they’re now widely considered pests. People in many American neighborhoods today feel that there are too many white-tailed deer, Canada geese, and beaver. The story of dematerialization is not the story of following the CRIB strategies. Except for the excellent idea of imposing limits on polluting and pursuing animals, these strategies were ignored (we didn’t embrace degrowth and stop consuming), abandoned (we stopping going back to the land), irrelevant (dematerialization has nothing to do with recycling), or deeply misguided (China’s attempt to limit family size was a huge mistake). So how did we finally start getting more from less? How did we become post-peak in our use of so many resources? The next three chapters will take up this critical question. CHAPTER 7 What Causes Dematerialization? Markets and Marvels The triumph of the industrial arts will advance the cause of civilization more rapidly than its warmest advocates could have hoped. —Charles Babbage, The Exposition of 1851; or, Views of the Industry, the Science, and the Government of England, 1851 If CRIB strategies aren’t responsible for the large-scale dematerialization of the American economy that has taken place since Earth Day, then what is? How have we got more from less? I believe that four main forces are responsible, and that it’s helpful to think of them as two pairs. In this chapter we’ll look at the first pair, then take up the second in chapter 9. Capitalism and technological progress are the first pair of forces driving dematerialization. This statement will come as a surprise to many, and for good reason. After all, it’s exactly this combination that caused us to massively increase our resource consumption throughout the Industrial Era. As we saw in chapter 3, the ideas of William Jevons and Alfred Marshall point to the distressing conclusion that capitalism and tech progress always lead to more from more: more economic growth, but also more resource consumption. So what changed? How are capitalism and tech progress now getting us more from less? To get answers to these important questions, let’s start by looking at a few recent examples of dematerialization. Fertile Farms America has long been an agricultural juggernaut. In 1982, after more than a decade of steady expansion due in part to rising grain prices, total cropland in the country stood at approximately 380 million acres. Over the next ten years, however, almost all of this increase was reversed. So much acreage was abandoned by farmers and given back to nature that cropland in 1992 was almost back to where it had been almost twenty-five years before. This decline had several causes, including falling grain prices, a severe recession, over-indebted farmers, and increased international competition. A final factor, though, was the ability to get ever-more corn, wheat, soybeans, and other crops from the same acre of land, pound of fertilizer and pesticide, and gallon of water. The material productivity of agriculture in the United States has improved dramatically in recent decades, as we saw in chapter 5. Between 1982 and 2015 over 45 million acres—an amount of cropland equal in size to the state of Washington—was returned to nature. Over the same time potassium, phosphate, and nitrogen (the three main fertilizers) all saw declines in absolute use. Meanwhile, the total tonnage of crops produced in the country increased by more than 35 percent. As impressive as this is, it’s dwarfed by the productivity improvements of American dairy cows. In 1950 we got 117 billion pounds of milk from 22 million cows. In 2015 we got 209 billion pounds from just 9 million animals. The average milk cow’s productivity thus improved by over 330 percent during that time. Thin Cans Tin cans are actually made of steel coated with a thin layer of tin to improve corrosion resistance. They’ve been used since the nineteenth century to store food. Starting in the 1930s, they began also to be used to hold beer and soft drinks.I In 1959 Coors pioneered beer cans made of aluminum, which is much lighter and more corrosion resistant than steel. Royal Crown Cola followed suit for soda five years later. As Vaclav Smil relates, “A decade later steel cans were on the way out, and none of them have been used for beer since 1994 and for soft drinks since 1996.… At 85 g the first aluminum cans were surprisingly heavy; by 1972 the weight of a two-piece can dropped to just below 21 g, by 1988 it was less than 16 g, a decade later it averaged 13.6 g, and by 2011 it was reduced to 12.75 g.” Manufacturers accomplished these reductions by making aluminum cans’ walls thinner, and by making the sides and bottom from a single sheet of metal so that only one comparatively heavy seam was needed (to join the top to the rest of the can). Smil points out that if all beverage cans used in 2010 weighed what they did in 1980, they would have required an extra 580,000 tons of aluminum. And aluminum cans kept getting lighter. In 2012 Ball packaging introduced into the European market a 330 ml can that held 7.5 percent less than the US standard, yet at 9.5 g weighed 25 percent less. Gone Gizmos In 2014 Steve Cichon, a “writer, historian, and retired radio newsman in Buffalo, NY,” paid $3 for a large stack of front sections of the Buffalo News newspaper from the early months of 1991. On the back page of the Saturday, February 16, issue was an ad from the electronics retailer Radio Shack. Cichon noticed something striking about the ad: “There are 15 electronic gimzo type items on this page.… 13 of the 15 you now always have in your pocket.” The “gizmo type items” that had vanished into the iPhone Cichon kept in his pocket included a calculator, camcorder, clock radio, mobile telephone, and tape recorder. While the ad didn’t include a compass, camera, barometer, altimeter, accelerometer, or GPS device, these, too, have vanished into the iPhone and other smartphones, as have countless atlases and compact discs. The success of the iPhone was almost totally unanticipated. A November 2007 cover story in Forbes magazine touted that the Finnish mobile phone maker Nokia had over a billion customers around the world and asked, “Can anyone catch the cell phone king?” Yes. Apple sold more than a billion iPhones within a decade of its June 2007 launch and became the most valuable publicly traded company in history. Nokia, meanwhile, sold its mobile phone business to Microsoft in 2013 for $7.2 billion to get “more combined muscle to truly break through with consumers,” as the Finnish company’s CEO Stephen Elop said at the time of the deal. It didn’t work. Microsoft sold what remained of Nokia’s mobile phone business and brand to a subsidiary of the Taiwanese electronics manufacturer Foxconn for $350 million in May of 2016. Radio Shack filed for bankruptcy in 2015, and again in 2017. From Peak Oil to… Peak Oil In 2007 US coal consumption reached a new high of 1,128 million short tons, over 90 percent of which was burned to generate electricity. Total coal use had increased by more than 35 percent since 1990, and the US Energy Information Administration (the official energy statisticians of the US government) forecast further growth of up to 65 percent by 2030. Also in 2007 the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), a federal agency known as “the congressional watchdog,” published a report with an admirably explanatory title: “Crude Oil: Uncertainty about Future Oil Supply Makes It Important to Develop a Strategy for Addressing a Peak and Decline in Oil Production.” It took seriously the idea of “peak oil,” a phrase coined in 1956 by M. King Hubbert, a geologist working for Shell Oil. As originally conceived, peak oil referred to the maximum amount of oil that we could annually produce for all of humanity’s needs. The first oil wells pumped out the crude oil that was closest to the earth’s surface or otherwise easiest to access. As those wells dried up, we had to drill deeper ones, both on land and at sea. As the world’s economies kept growing, so did total demand for oil, which kept getting harder and harder to obtain. Peak oil captured the idea that despite our best efforts and ample incentive, we would come to a time after which we would only be able to extract less and less oil year after year from the earth. Most of the estimates summarized in the GAO report found that peak oil would occur no later than 2040. The report did not mention fracking, which in retrospect looks like a serious omission. Fracking is short for “hydraulic fracturing” and is a means of obtaining oil and natural gas from rock formations lying deep underground. It uses a high-pressure fluid to cause fractures in the rock, through which oil and gas can flow and be extracted. The United States and other countries have long been known to have huge reserves of hydrocarbons in deep rock formations, which are often called shales. Companies had been experimenting with fracking to get at them since the middle of the twentieth century, but had made little progress. In 2000 fracking accounted for just 2 percent of US oil production. That figure began to increase quickly right around the time of the GAO report. Not because of any single breakthrough, but instead because the suite of tools and techniques needed for profitable fracking had all improved enough. A gusher of shale oil and gas ensued. Thanks to fracking, US crude oil production almost doubled between 2007 and 2017, when it approached the benchmark of 10 million barrels per day. By September of 2018 America had surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest producer of oil. American natural gas production, which had been essentially flat since the mid-1970s, jumped by nearly 43 percent between 2007 and 2017. As a result of the fracking boom the United States has experienced peak coal rather than peak oil. And the peak in coal is not in total annual supply, but instead in demand. Fracking made natural gas cheap enough that it became preferred over coal for much electricity generation. By 2017 total US coal consumption was down 36 percent from its 2007 high point. The phrase peak oil is still around, but, as is the case with coal, it usually no longer refers to supply. As a 2017 Bloomberg headline put it, “Remember Peak Oil? Demand May Top Out Before Supply Does.” Even though the extra supply from fracking has helped push down oil and gas prices, many observers now believe that energy from other sources—the sun, wind, and the nuclei of uranium atoms—is getting cheaper faster and becoming much more widely available. So much so that, as a 2018 article in Fortune about the future of oil hypothesized, “This wouldn’t be just another oil-price cycle, a familiar roller coaster in which every down is followed by an up. It would be the start of a decades-long decline of the Oil Age itself—an uncharted world in which… oil prices might be ‘lower forever.’\u2009” Analysts at Shell, the company from which the phrase peak oil originated, now estimate that global peak oil demand might come as soon as 2028. Taking Stock of Rolling Stock My friend Bo Cutter started his career in 1968 working for Northwest Industries, a conglomerate that owned the Chicago and North Western Railway. One of his first assignments was to help a team tasked with solving a problem that sounds odd to modern ears: figuring out where CNW’s railcars were. These cars are massive metal assemblies, each weighing thirty tons or more. In the late 1960s CNW owned thousands of them, representing a huge commitment of both material and money. Across the railroad industry, the rule of thumb then was that about 5 percent of a company’s railcars moved on any given day. This was not because the other 95 percent needed to rest. It was because their owners didn’t know where they were. CNW owned thousands of miles of track in places as far from Chicago as North Dakota and Wyoming. Its rolling stock (as locomotives and railcars are called) could also travel outside the company’s network on tracks owned by other railroads. So these assets could be almost anywhere in the country. When the railcars weren’t moving, they sat in freight yards. At the time Cutter started his job, freight yards didn’t keep up-to-date records of the idle rolling stock they contained because, in the days before widespread digital computers, sensors, and networks, there was no way to cost-effectively know or communicate the location of each car. So it was impossible for CNW or any other railroad to systematically track its most important inventory, even though doing so would be hugely beneficial to the company’s bottom line. For example, Cutter’s team knew that if they could increase the percentage of cars moving each day from 5 percent to 10 percent, they would need only half as many of them. Even a single percentage point increase in freight-car use would yield major financial benefits. When Cutter started his assignment, CNW and all other railroads employed spotters, who visited yards and watched trains pass, then telegraphed their findings to the head office. Other railroads passed on similar information to collect the demurrage charges they were owed for each CNW car on their tracks and in their yards. Cutter’s team improved on these methods by making them more systematic and efficient. They put in place a better baseline audit of where railcars were, employed more spotters, painted CNW cars differently so they were easier to see, and explored how to make more use of a new tool for businesses: the digital computer. That tool and its kin are now pervasive in the railroad industry. In the early 1990s, for example, companies started putting radio-frequency identification tags on each piece of rolling stock. These tags would be read by trackside sensors, thus automating the work of spotting. At present over 5 million messages about railcar status and location are generated and sent throughout the American railway system every day, and the country’s more than 450 railroads have nearly real-time visibility over all their rolling stock. The Rare Earth Scare In September of 2010 the Japanese government took into custody the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that had collided with Japanese patrol vessels near a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea claimed by both countries. China responded by imposing an embargo on shipments of rare earth elements (REE) to the Land of the Rising Sun. Even though Japan relented almost immediately and released the captain, a global panic began. This is because rare earths are “vitamins of chemistry,” as USGS scientist Daniel Cordier puts it. “They help everything perform better, and they have their own unique characteristics, particularly in terms of magnetism, temperature resistance, and resistance to corrosion.” By 2010 China produced well over 90 percent of the world’s REE. Its actions in the wake of the maritime incident convinced many that it could and would take unilateral action to control the flow of these important materials, and panicked buying soon followed (along with its close cousin rampant speculation). A bundle of REE that would have sold for less than $10,000 in early 2010 soared to more than $42,000 by April of 2011. In September of that year the US House of Representatives held a hearing called “China’s Monopoly on Rare Earths: Implications for US Foreign and Security Policy.” China didn’t attain its near monopoly because it possessed anything close to 90 percent of global reserves of REE. In fact, rare earths aren’t rare at all (one, cerium, is about as common in the earth’s crust as copper). However, they’re difficult to extract from ore. Obtaining them requires a great deal of acid and generates tons of salt and crushed rock as by-products. Most other countries didn’t want to bear the environmental burden of this heavy processing and so left the market to China. In the wake of the embargo, this seemed like a bad idea. As Representative Brad Sherman put it during the congressional hearing, “Chinese control over rare earth elements gives them one more argument as to why we should kowtow to China.” But there was never much kowtowing. By the time of the hearing, prices for REE were already in free fall. Why? What happened to the apparently tight Chinese stranglehold over REE? Several factors caused it to ease, including the availability of other supply sources and incomplete maintenance of the embargo. But as public affairs professor Eugene Gholz noted in a 2014 report on the “crisis,” many users of REE simply innovated their way out of the problem. “Companies such as Hitachi Metals [and its subsidiary in North Carolina] that make rare earth magnets found ways to make equivalent magnets using smaller amounts of rare earths in the alloys.… Meanwhile, some users remembered that they did not need the high performance of specialized rare earth magnets; they were merely using them because, at least until the 2010 episode, they were relatively inexpensive and convenient.” Overall, the companies using REE found many inexpensive and convenient alternatives. By the end of 2017 the same bundle of rare earths that had been trading above $42,000 in 2011 was available for about $1,000. What’s Going On? There is no shortage of examples of dematerialization. I chose the ones in this chapter because they illustrate a set of fundamental principles at the intersection of business, economics, innovation, and our impact on our planet. They are: We do want more all the time, but not more resources. Alfred Marshall was right, but William Jevons was wrong. Our wants and desires keep growing, evidently without end, and therefore so do our economies. But our use of the earth’s resources does not. We do want more beverage options, but we don’t want to keep using more aluminum in drink cans. We want to communicate and compute and listen to music, but we don’t want an arsenal of gadgets; we’re happy with a single smartphone. As our population increases, we want more food, but we don’t have any desire to consume more fertilizer or use more land for crops. Jevons was correct at the time he wrote that total British demand for coal was increasing even though steam engines were becoming much more efficient. He was right, in other words, that the price elasticity of demand for coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s. But he was wrong to conclude that this would be permanent. Elasticities of demand can change over time for several reasons, the most fundamental of which is technological change. Coal provides a clear example of this. When fracking made natural gas much cheaper, total demand for coal in the United States went down even though its price decreased. With the help of innovation and new technologies, economic growth in America and other rich countries—growth in all of the wants and needs that we spend money on—has become decoupled from resource consumption. This is a recent development and a profound one. Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather not spend. The root of Jevons’s mistake is simple and boring: resources cost money. He realized this, of course. What he didn’t sufficiently realize was how strong the incentive is for a company in a contested market to reduce its spending on resources (or anything else) and so eke out a bit more profit. After all, a penny saved is a penny earned. Monopolists can just pass costs on to their customers, but companies with a lot of competitors can’t. So American farmers who battle with each other (and increasingly with tough rivals in other countries) are eager to cut their spending on land, water, and fertilizer. Beer and soda companies want to minimize their aluminum purchases. Producers of magnets and high-tech gear run away from REE as soon as prices start to spike. In the United States, the 1980 Staggers Act removed government subsidies for freight-hauling railroads, forcing them into competition and cost cutting and making them all the more eager to not have expensive railcars sit idle. Again and again, we see that competition spurs dematerialization. There are multiple paths to dematerialization. As profit-hungry companies seek to use fewer resources, they can go down four main paths. First, they can simply find ways to use less of a given material. This is what happened as beverage companies and the companies that supply them with cans teamed up to use less aluminum. It’s also the story with American farmers, who keep getting bigger harvests while using less land, water, and fertilizer. Magnet makers found ways to use fewer rare earth metals when it looked as if China might cut off their supply. Second, it often becomes possible to substitute one resource for another. Total US coal consumption started to decrease after 2007 because fracking made natural gas more attractive to electricity generators. If nuclear power becomes more popular in the United States (a topic we’ll take up in chapter 15), we could use both less coal and less gas and generate our electricity from a small amount of material indeed. A kilogram of uranium-235 fuel contains approximately 2–3 million times as much energy as the same mass of coal or oil. According to one estimate, the total amount of energy that humans consume each year could be supplied by just seven thousand tons of uranium fuel. Third, companies can use fewer molecules overall by making better use of the materials they already own. Improving CNW’s railcar utilization from 5 percent to 10 percent would mean that the company could cut its stock of these thirty-ton behemoths in half. Companies that own expensive physical assets tend to be fanatics about getting as much use as possible out of them, for clear and compelling financial reasons. For example, the world’s commercial airlines have improved their load factors—essentially the percentage of seats occupied on flights—from 56 percent in 1971 to more than 81 percent in 2018. Finally, some materials get replaced by nothing at all. When a telephone, camcorder, and tape recorder are separate devices, three total microphones are needed. When they all collapse into a smartphone, only one microphone is necessary. That smartphone also uses no audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, or camera film. The iPhone and its descendants are among the world champions of dematerialization. They use vastly less metal, plastic, glass, and silicon than did the devices they have replaced and don’t need media such as paper, discs, tape, or film. If we use more renewable energy, we’ll be replacing coal, gas, oil, and uranium with photons from the sun (solar power) and the movement of air (wind power) and water (hydroelectric power) on the earth. All three of these types of power are also among dematerialization’s champions, since they use up essentially no resources once they’re up and running. I call these four paths to dematerialization slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. They’re not mutually exclusive. Companies can and do pursue all four at the same time, and all four are going on all the time in ways both obvious and subtle. Innovation is hard to foresee. Neither the fracking revolution nor the world-changing impact of the iPhone’s introduction were well understood in advance. Both continued to be underestimated even after they occurred. The iPhone was introduced in June of 2007, with no shortage of fanfare from Apple and Steve Jobs. Yet several months later the cover of Forbes was still asking if anyone could catch Nokia. Innovation is not steady and predictable like the orbit of the Moon or the accumulation of interest on a certificate of deposit. It’s instead inherently jumpy, uneven, and random. It’s also combinatorial, as Erik Brynjolfsson and I discussed in our book The Second Machine Age. Most new technologies and other innovations, we argued, are combinations or recombinations of preexisting elements. The iPhone was “just” a cellular telephone plus a bunch of sensors plus a touch screen plus an operating system and population of programs, or apps. All these elements had been around for a while before 2007. It took the vision of Steve Jobs to see what they could become when combined. Fracking was the combination of multiple abilities: to “see” where hydrocarbons were to be found in rock formations deep underground; to pump down pressurized liquid to fracture the rock; to pump up the oil and gas once they were released by the fracturing; and so on. Again, none of these was new. Their effective combination was what changed the world’s energy situation. Erik and I described the set of innovations and technologies available at any time as building blocks that ingenious people could combine and recombine into useful new configurations. These new configurations then serve as more blocks that later innovators can use. Combinatorial innovation is exciting because it’s unpredictable. It’s not easy to foresee when or where powerful new combinations are going to appear, or who’s going to come up with them. But as the number of both building blocks and innovators increases, we should have confidence that more breakthroughs such as fracking and smartphones are ahead. Innovation is highly decentralized and largely uncoordinated, occurring as the result of interactions among complex and interlocking social, technological, and economic systems. So it’s going to keep surprising us. As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization accelerates. Erik and I coined the phrase Second Machine Age to draw a contrast with the Industrial Era, which as we’ve seen transformed the planet by allowing us to overcome the limitations of muscle power. Our current time of great progress with all things related to computing is allowing us to overcome the limitations of our mental power and is transformative in a different way: it’s allowing us to reverse the Industrial Era’s bad habit of taking more and more from the earth every year. Computer-aided design tools help engineers at packaging companies design generations of aluminum cans that keep getting lighter. Fracking took off in part because oil and gas exploration companies learned how to build accurate computer models of the rock formations that lay deep underground—models that predicted where hydrocarbons were to be found. Smartphones took the place of many separate pieces of gear. Because they serve as GPS devices, they’ve also led us to print out many fewer maps and so contributed to our current trend of using less paper. It’s easy to look at generations of computer paper, from 1960s punch cards to the eleven-by-seventeen-inch fanfold paper of the 1980s, and conclude that the Second Machine Age has caused us to chop down ever more trees. The year of peak paper consumption in the United States, however, was 1990. As our devices have become more capable and interconnected, always on and always with us, we’ve sharply turned away from paper. Humanity as a whole probably hit peak paper in 2013. As these examples indicate, computers and their kin help us with all four paths to dematerialization. Hardware, software, and networks let us slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. I contend that they’re the best tools we’ve ever invented for letting us tread more lightly on our planet. All of these principles are about the combination of technological progress and capitalism, which are the first of the two pairs of forces causing dematerialization. Technology: The Human Interface with the Material World One of my favorite definitions of technology comes from the philosopher Emmanuel Mesthene, who called it “the organization of knowledge for the achievement of practical purposes.” Sometimes that knowledge is crystallized into products such as hammers and iPhones, and sometimes it exists as techniques such as those for fracking or precision agriculture. Like knowledge itself, technologies accumulate. We haven’t forgotten about the lever, the plow, or the steam engine in the Second Machine Age, and we haven’t had to give them up to use cloud computing or drones. Like innovation itself, technologies are combinatorial; most of them are combinations or recombinations of existing things. This implies that the number of potentially powerful new technologies increases over time because the number of available building blocks does. These facts help me understand why we didn’t start to dematerialize sooner. It could simply be that we didn’t have the right technologies, or enough building blocks, to allow large-scale dematerialization. We had technologies that made it feasible and profitable for us to grow by taking more and more from the earth—more and more metals, fuels, water, fertilizers, and so on—but not ones that made it possible to profitably grow while taking less and less. In the Second Machine Age, that has changed. My other preferred definition of technology comes from the great science fiction author Ursula K. Le Guin, who wrote, “Technology is the active human interface with the material world. Its technology is how a society copes with physical reality: how people get and keep and cook food, how they clothe themselves, what their power sources are (animal? human? water? wind? electricity? other?), what they build with and what they build, their medicine—and so on and on. Perhaps very ethereal people aren’t interested in these mundane, bodily matters, but I’m fascinated by them.” So am I, because these “mundane matters” have twice reshaped the world—first during the Industrial Era, when technological progress allowed us to prosper by taking more from the planet, and now in the Second Machine Age, when we’ve finally figured out how to prosper while taking less. Capitalism: Means of Production Capitalism and religion are the two subjects that leave the fewest people on the sidelines. People have very firmly held opinions on both topics, and few change their minds no matter what evidence and arguments are presented to them. Yet despite this clear history of intransigence, many thinkers and writers have tried to bring others around to their point of view on both topics. Most have failed. I’m going to join this long sad parade by arguing in favor of capitalism. Before I do that, though, I want to define what I’m talking about. Even more than is the case with technology, clear definitions are important with capitalism because it’s such a triggering word. As the psychologist Jonathan Haidt has pointed out, some hear it as a synonym for liberation, others for exploitation. But let me put the dictionary before the thesaurus and offer a definition of what capitalism is before suggesting what it’s like. For our purposes, capitalism is a way to come up with goods and services and get them to people. Every society that doesn’t want its people to starve or die of exposure has to accomplish this task; capitalism is simply one approach to doing it. The important features of this approach are: Profit-seeking companies. Under capitalism, most goods and services are produced by for-profit companies rather than nonprofits, the government, or individuals. Companies can be owned by only a few people (such as the partners in a law firm) or a great many (publicly traded companies have shareholders all over the world) and are assumed to last over time; they don’t have a predefined end date. Free market entry and competition. Companies can go after one another’s markets and customers; there are few if any protected monopolies. It might not be legal to completely copy a rival’s patented product, but it’s perfectly legal to try to come up with something better. In economist-speak, markets are contested. Similarly, people can take their skills from one market to another; they’re not tied to a single geography or job. Strong property rights and contract enforcement. Patents are a form of intellectual property. They can be bought and sold just as other kinds of property—from land to houses to cars—can. Laws and courts ensure that none of these kinds of property can be stolen or destroyed, even by large, powerful entities such as billionaires, giant corporations, or the government. Similarly, if a small company and a big one sign a contract to work together, neither party gets to unilaterally walk away from the agreement without fear of getting sued. Absence of central planning, control, and price setting. The government does not decide what goods and services are needed by people, or which companies should be allowed to produce them. No central body decides if there is “enough” volume and variety in smartphones, caffeinated beverages, steel girders, and so on. The prices of these and most other goods and services are allowed to vary based on the balance of supply and demand, rather than being set in advance or adjusted by any central authority. Private ownership of most things. Smartphones, cups of coffee, steel girders, and most other products are owned by the people or companies that bought them. The companies that produced these things are also owned by people. Many shares of Apple, Starbucks, US Steel, and other public companies are held by mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds, but all these funds are themselves ultimately owned by people. Most houses, cars, land, gold, Bitcoin, and other assets are also owned by people rather than the government. Voluntary exchange. The phrase most closely associated with capitalism is voluntary exchange. People can’t be forced to buy specific products, take a certain job, or move across the country. Companies don’t have to sell themselves if they don’t want to. They also don’t have to make some products and not others, or stay within specific markets. The Waffle House chain doesn’t have any of its breakfast restaurants in my state of Massachusetts, but that’s not because lawmakers there are keeping it out. The legislature in Boston doesn’t have that power. I want to highlight a couple of things about this definition. First, capitalism is not without oversight. The government has clear roles to play in establishing laws and settling disputes (to say nothing of setting tax rates, controlling the money supply, and doing other things of critical economic importance). As we’ll see in the next two chapters, every sane advocate of capitalism also recognizes that while voluntary exchange and free market entry are great, they don’t create utopia. Some important “market failures” need to be corrected by government action. The second thing I want to point out is that all of today’s rich countries are capitalist, by this definition. This is not to say that all capitalist countries are alike. Denmark, South Korea, and the United States are very different places. They have dissimilar trade policies, tax systems, social safety nets, industrial structures, and so on. But they all have all of the things listed above; they are all inherently capitalist. Denmark’s economy is not planned and controlled out of Copenhagen, people in Korea own their own houses and furniture,III and contracts in America are generally respected and enforced. Today’s poorer countries, in sharp contrast, reliably do not have all of the things listed above. Their governments tend to run such things as airlines and telephone networks that are run by private companies in rich countries. It’s generally much harder to start a company in less affluent countries, so free market entry and competition are constrained. According to the World Bank, in 2017 it took less than six days to start a business in America, Denmark, Singapore, Australia, and Canada, and seventy days or more in Somalia, Brazil, and Cambodia. The world champion of entrepreneurial sclerosis was Venezuela (a country we’ll talk more about in the next chapter), at two hundred and thirty days. In poorer countries, it’s also often not clear who owns what. Things that are taken for granted in the rich world, such as unambiguous land registries and clear title to houses and other property, are problematic in many developing countries. The biggest difference between rich and poor countries might be whether laws are clearly and consistently enforced. Poorer countries don’t lack laws; they often have extensive legal codes. What’s in short supply is justice for all. Officials are corrupt; the elite get special treatment and rarely lose in court; police, regulators, and inspectors can expect bribes; and contested markets, property rights, and voluntary exchange suffer in countless other ways. It’s not that these abuses don’t occur in rich countries, but they occur much, much less often. I’ll make some more points about capitalism in the next chapter. To wrap up this one, I want to emphasize how well technological progress and capitalism work together. Overcoming the Limits A great way to see what happens when capitalism and tech progress combine is to look back at 1972’s The Limits to Growth, which we first came across in chapter 4. It’s a fascinating document for two reasons. First, it’s one of the most Malthusian books written since Malthus. It’s far gloomier than anything Jevons came up with. The team behind The Limits to Growth tried to model the future of the exponentially growing world economy and concluded, “We can thus say with some confidence that, under the assumption of no major change in the present system, population and industrial growth will certainly stop within the [twenty-first] century, at the latest. The system… collapses because of a resource crisis.” Second, The Limits to Growth provided an invaluable service by recording what the known global reserves of important resources were in 1972. “Known global reserves” are the deposits of a resource that can be profitably extracted given the prevailing knowledge and state of technology. The authors of The Limits to Growth included the known reserves of many resources to show how inadequate they were in the face of exponential growth of both output and resource consumption. The authors had little reason to suppose in the early 1970s that either kind of growth would stop on its own. As we saw in chapter 4, resource consumption went up in lockstep with overall economic output all throughout the twentieth century up to Earth Day. Few people expected that to change. The team behind The Limits to Growth certainly didn’t. The most generous estimate of future resource availability included in The Limits to Growth assumed that exponential consumption would continue, and that proven reserves were actually five times greater than commonly assumed. Under these conditions, the team’s computer models showed that the planet would run out of gold within twenty-nine years of 1972; silver within forty-two years; copper and petroleum within fifty; and aluminum within fifty-five. These weren’t accurate predictions. We still have gold and silver, and we still have large reserves of them. In fact, the reserves of both are actually much bigger than in 1972, despite almost half a century of additional consumption. Known global reserves of gold are almost 400 percent larger today than in 1972, and silver reserves are more than 200 percent larger. And it’s probably not too early to say that we’re not going to run out of copper, aluminum, and petroleum as quickly as estimated in The Limits to Growth. Known reserves of all are much larger than they were when the book was published. Known aluminum reserves are almost twenty-five times what they were in the early 1970s. How could these predictions about resource availability, which were taken seriously when they were released, have been so wrong? Because the Limits to Growth team pretty clearly underestimated both dematerialization and the endless search for new reserves. Capitalism and tech progress combine to drive both of these trends—the use of fewer resources and the hunt for more of them—and neither of these two drivers is about to become less powerful. So we’ll continue to innovate our way to greater dematerialization while we keep finding more reserves. The counterintuitive conclusion from this line of reasoning is that resource scarcity isn’t something we need to worry about. The earth is finite, so the total quantity of resources such as gold and petroleum is limited. But the earth is also very, very big—big enough to contain all we need of these and other resources, for as long as we’ll need them. The image of a thinly supplied Spaceship Earth hurtling through the cosmos with us aboard is compelling, but deeply misleading. Our planet has amply supplied us for our journey. Especially since we’re quickly slimming, swapping, optimizing, and evaporating our way to dematerialization. The Second Enlightenment Abraham Lincoln, the only US president to hold a patent,IV had a deep insight about capitalism. He wrote that the patent system “added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius in the discovery and production of new and useful things.” “The fire of genius” is a wonderful label for technological progress. “The fuel of interest” is equally good as a summary of capitalism. They interact in a self-reinforcing and ever-expanding cycle, and they’re now creating a dematerializing world. Innovators come up with new and useful technologies. They then partner with entrepreneurs or become entrepreneurs themselves as James Watt did. A new company is the result. Investors such as steam-engine backer Matthew Boulton often join in to provide the capital needed for growth in its early days. The start-up enters a market and takes on incumbents like the Newcomen steam engine. Customers like the new technology better and are free to choose it. Rivals can’t just copy the new technology because it’s protected by patents. So they either have to license it or come up with innovations themselves. The start-up grows and prospers and eventually becomes the new incumbent. Its success inspires the next round of innovators, entrepreneurs, and investors, who once again take aim at the incumbent by offering something better to their customers. Because of free market entry, the next innovators and start-ups can come from anywhere. And because innovation is such a distributed, dynamic, and unpredictable activity, it often comes from an unexpected place. It’s not necessary to plan this process. In fact, it’s a terrible idea to try to do so. Any central planner will miss many of the actual innovators or actively try to squelch them to protect the status quo of which the planners themselves are a part. This cycle of capitalist, technology-rich “creative destruction” was beautifully described in the middle of the twentieth century by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. But since the late nineteenth century and the work of Alfred Marshall and William Jevons, we’ve believed that this cycle would cause us to use up more and more of our planet’s resources. This was true throughout the Industrial Era, and especially in the years around Earth Day and the birth of the modern environmental movement. Environmentalists’ urgent cautions about resource use and planetary depletion were born out of an awareness of how powerfully technological progress and capitalism interacted. But then, for the reasons described in this chapter, that interaction changed. Tech progress and capitalism continued to reinforce each other, and to cause economies to get bigger and people to become more prosperous. But instead of also causing greater use of natural resources, they instead sparked dematerialization, something truly new under the sun. The fuel of interest in eliminating costs was added to the fire of the computer revolution, and the world began to dematerialize. The economic historian Joel Mokyr argues that the Industrial Era was made possible by the values of the Enlightenment. This intellectual movement began in the second half of the eighteenth century with many societies in the West embracing what Steven Pinker characterizes as four values: reason, science, humanism, and progress. According to Mokyr, the Enlightenment created a “culture of growth” that let both capitalism and technological progress flourish. I see an interesting inversion taking place now. If the Enlightenment led to the Industrial Era, then the Second Machine Age has led to a Second Enlightenment—a more literal one. We are now lightening our total consumption and treading more lightly on our planet. In America, the United Kingdom, and other rich countries, we are past “peak stuff” and are now using fewer total resources year after year. We’re accomplishing this because of the combination of technological progress and capitalism, which now let us get more from less.', '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Parrish-Sun-Aff-1-Kentucky-Round6.docx

Minnesota

PaSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PaSu/Minnesota-Parrish-Sun-Aff-1-Kentucky-Round6.docx

133b9c5fc78b24a6031e2e21c3abf2f28e30bff1aba4ed286641e15dae6c3f9f

4---Winning the AI race gives the U.S. the ability to destroy adversaries’ nuclear arsenals through improved anti-sub warfare and mobile missile tracking

Li Xiang 19, assistant engineer with the China Shipbuilding Information Center, master’s degree from Renmin University, Beijing, October 2019, “Artificial intelligence and its impact on weaponization and arms control,” in The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume II: East Asian Perspectives, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/the_impact_of_artificial_intelligence_on_strategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk_volume_ii.pdf

application of AI may undermine mutual vulnerability and strategic stability improving recon of UAVs country that possess nuclear superiority will gain intell on opponent’s deployment This will enhance confidence in ability to disarm with a first strike this make preemptive strike advantageous weakening stability during crisis AI can improve capability to collect sub signature a s w UUVs can detect SSBNs this reduces survivability weakening deterrence Facing huge advantages of US in nuc s , China maintained a slim force based on mobile missiles predicated on first-strike uncertainty to ensure deterrence once the US effectively employ AI against mobile missiles enabling discovery first strike uncertainty’ would be eliminated US would gain advantage of being able to decapitate China’s arsenal China would increase alert This lead both sides toward pre-emption increasing risk of nuclear conflict At current state of tech USA has begun to use AI in reconn this faced many difficulties US has recognized potential advantages

application of AI has a marked impact on strategic stability among nuclear powers and may undermine mutual vulnerability and strategic stability of nuclear-armed states of unequal power. Because AI boasts strong capabilities in image and pattern recognition its ability to recognize still images is strong and it will greatly enhance the effectiveness of strategic reconnaissance improving deep recon naissance of long-distance UAVs , the country that possess es nuclear superiority will be able to gain further intell igence on the basic characteristics and procedures of its opponent’s nuclear force deployment and movements. This will enhance confidence in its ability to disarm its opponent’s nuclear weapons with a first strike this will make a preemptive strike by the more powerful one more advantageous weakening strategic stability during a crisis AI can improve capability to collect a sub marine’s sound signature . In a nti- s ubmarine w arfare, UUVs can conduct close-range reconnaissance, which can detect enemy SSBNs this reduces the survivability of the enemy SSBNs, thereby weakening the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and reducing strategic stability Facing the huge quantitative and qualitative advantages of the US A in nuc lear weapon s , China has maintained a slim retaliatory nuclear force based on mobile strategic missiles predicated on increasing the opponent’s ‘ first-strike uncertainty ’ to ensure credible deterrence once the US A is able to effectively employ AI to improve its reconnaissance capabilities against China’s mobile strategic missiles enabling discovery of deployment rules, manoeuvring routes and launch site locations—this ‘ first strike uncertainty’ would be eliminated US A would thereby gain the advantage of being able to decapitate China’s nuclear arsenal China would increase alert level of its nuclear weapons This would lead to a state in which both sides tend toward pre-emption , weakening the strategic stability of the two countries and increasing the risk of nuclear conflict AI-based detection technology and offensive UUVs may have similar effects it would be difficult for these weapon platforms to receive onshore command and control signals in a timely manner. This would make it difficult to control, much less recall such platforms At the current state of tech nological development , the USA has already begun to use AI in strategic reconn aissance and strategic anti-submarine search While this procedure faced many difficulties in the identification of camouflaged positions, the US A has recognized the potential advantages of these technologies

undermine mutual vulnerability and strategic stability recon country that possess es nuclear superiority intell enhance confidence in its ability to disarm its opponent’s nuclear weapons weakening strategic stability during a crisis sub a s w SSBNs huge quantitative and qualitative advantages US nuc s once the US A is able to effectively employ AI first strike uncertainty’ would be eliminated US gain the advantage of being able to decapitate China’s nuclear arsenal both sides tend toward pre-emption current state of tech nological development reconn faced many difficulties US potential

['Further, the application of AI technology has a marked impact on strategic stability among nuclear powers and may undermine the mutual vulnerability and strategic stability of nuclear-armed states of unequal power. Because AI boasts strong capabilities in image and pattern recognition, similar to facial recognition, its ability to recognize still images is strong and it will greatly enhance the effectiveness of strategic reconnaissance. By improving the ability to interpret satellite images and the deep reconnaissance of long-distance UAVs, the country that possesses nuclear superiority will be able to gain further intelligence on the basic characteristics and procedures of its opponent’s nuclear force deployment and movements. This will enhance a country’s confidence in its ability to disarm its opponent’s nuclear weapons with a first strike. When there is a large gap between the nuclear forces of the two countries, this situation will make a preemptive strike by the more powerful one more advantageous, thus weakening the strategic stability of the two countries during a crisis.', 'At sea, AI technology can be used to improve the capability to collect and process a submarine’s sound signature. In anti-submarine warfare, UUVs can also be used to conduct close-range reconnaissance, which can strengthen the capacity to detect and recognize enemy nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). On the one hand, this reduces the survivability of the enemy SSBNs, thereby weakening the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and reducing strategic stability.1 On the other hand, this AI technology can reduce the probability of accidental nuclear war: by improving the ability to identify SSBNs, a country can avoid accidentally hitting an SSBN as part of conventional anti-submarine warfare.', 'Facing the huge quantitative and qualitative advantages of the USA in nuclear weapons, China has maintained a slim and effective retaliatory nuclear force based on mobile strategic missiles with relatively strong concealment, manoeuvrability and survivability. This force is predicated on increasing the opponent’s ‘first-strike uncertainty’ (第一次打击的不确定性) to ensure credible deterrence.2 However, once the USA is able to effectively employ AI technology to improve its reconnaissance capabilities against China’s mobile strategic missiles—enabling discovery of deployment rules, manoeuvring routes and launch site locations—this ‘first strike uncertainty’ would be eliminated. ', 'The USA would thereby gain the advantage of being able to decapitate China’s nuclear arsenal. To overcome concerns over this potential, China would have to increase the alert level of its nuclear weapons to ensure the credibility of its deterrent. This would lead to a state in which both sides tend toward pre-emption, weakening the strategic stability of the two countries and increasing the risk of nuclear conflict. In the case of sea-based nuclear deterrence, the employment of AI-based detection technology and offensive UUVs may also have similar effects. In particular, due to the difficulty of underwater communication, it would be difficult for these weapon platforms to receive onshore command and control signals in a timely manner. This would make it difficult to control, much less recall such platforms when engaged in operations. ', 'At the current state of technological development, the USA has already begun to use AI in strategic reconnaissance and strategic anti-submarine search. In 2017 researchers at the University of Missouri, USA, published a deep learning model for remote sensing satellite image recognition, which was trained using 2200 satellite images of surface-to-air missile positions.3 It was able to identify in 42 minutes Chinese defensive air-to-air missile positions that would normally take a human nearly 60 hours to identify visually, with an accuracy rate of approximately 90 per cent. While this procedure faced many difficulties in the identification of camouflaged positions, the USA has recognized the potential advantages of these technologies. Thus, by December 2018 the US Office of Naval Research requested a white paper to study analytical research on the relationship between physical oceanographic changes and sound transmission, including field operations to collect relevant data sets.4 It also engaged in analysis of large oceanographic and acoustic data sets, which factored in the development and use of AI and machine learning techniques.']

[(3, 11)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AvLe-Neg-5---Texas-Open-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

AvLe

d65cf55f4c1cc4689f067cbb06902878b111c55d2f796ac36fe26a14e34a5fa6

Operational changes don’t check.

William A. Chambers et al., 21. Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Headquarters U. S. Air Force, Washington D.C. BS in History from US Air Force Academy. MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the College of Naval Warfare. “No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Policy Assessment.” 2021. https://man.fas.org/eprint/ida-nfu.pdf

risk of miscalc can never be zero given adversary perceptions the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how adversaries perceive NFU NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive the U S IDA’s interviews suggests even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in readiness Russia and China will continue to doubt U.S. objectives have changed NFU policy is not likely to change planning, operations, or crisis due to speed accuracy , and survivability of SLBM NFU cannot have a significant impact on risk of miscalculation The historical record is mixed, at best a host of factors affect nationstate’s decisions one of which is state’s self interests outcome could produce the opposite effect

The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation cannot be captured precisely The risk of miscalc ulation can never be driven to zero given the closely held nature of adversary perceptions , an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU Applying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself. Moscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal a NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the U nited S tates will approach a crisis. Strikingly IDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces Russia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed . While material evidence of NFU might give adversaries pause,” other aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. an NFU policy is not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed , accuracy , and survivability of U.S. SLBM forces The barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe NFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis there are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy The historical record is mixed, at best regarding the effect of declaratory policy on operational behavior, Scholars point to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is state’s own self interests . there is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory, that make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons to achieve their objectives in a regional conflict a U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action Deterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus , and this outcome could produce the opposite effect .

cannot be captured precisely never be driven to zero closely held nature characterized by uncertainty authoritative and empirically driven foundation consider and assimilate unlikely to alter how they perceive attended by a downgrade probably continue to doubt ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. an NFU policy not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis speed accuracy survivability appear severe far more fundamental factors mixed, at best operational behavior, host of factors own self interests . theories of victory, their willingness to employ nuclear weapons raise perceived risk complicate the adversary’s decision calculus opposite effect .

['The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation—be it discouraging, conducive, or trivial—cannot be captured precisely. The risk of miscalculation can never be driven to zero, and only history will determine whether a decision-maker’s risk tolerance was correct. Furthermore, given the closely held nature of adversary perceptions on matters related to nuclear weapons, an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty.76 That said, the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU pronouncement by the United States. Their interpretation will go far in determining the policy’s ultimate impact, if any, on the risk of miscalculation in a crisis.77 From the vantage point of Moscow or Beijing, how clearly would NFU signal U.S. intent about the circumstances under which it would consider employing nuclear weapons? In other words, to what extent could they rely on an NFU policy as a predictor of U.S. behavior? Consider how CDRUSSTRATCOM describes his framework for posturing U.S. nuclear forces in light of China’s NFU policy: “It’s my responsibility to make sure that I have thought through what we have to do to deter what they’re capable of doing as opposed to what they say they’re going to do.”78 Applying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself.79 As a statement of intent, and a quickly reversible one at that, declaratory policy may not necessarily guide decision making in a crisis-to-conflict transition or during active hostilities. Perceptions of the credibility of an NFU pledge thus combine with a host of other factors, including U.S. capabilities, doctrine, and operational war plans, to be important.80 Our research concludes that as Moscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal about U.S. nuclear forces, a policy pronouncement of NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the United States will approach a crisis.81 Consistent with the NFU empirical record thus far, a concomitant change in U.S. posture or capability might help convince Russia and China that the pledge is genuine, but there is little guarantee. Strikingly, IDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces, Russia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed. While material evidence of NFU might “give adversaries pause,” according to one former official, the superiority of other aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. For example, an NFU policy complemented by an effort to dealert ICBMs is not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed, accuracy, and survivability and the targeting coverage implications of U.S. SLBM forces. The barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe, especially for a country like the United States, which would pursue the policy after developing and deploying a large, diverse nuclear arsenal structured to provide a flexible set of deterrent options. Assuming that the United States takes all necessary steps to ensure that an NFU policy is implemented and sufficiently messaged to adversaries and that, despite evidence to the contrary, the adversaries believe that pledge, will that belief alter the risk of miscalculation? Again, the available evidence suggests that NFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis. As one former senior leader said, there are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy that can be instantly changed. The historical record is mixed, at best, regarding the effect of declaratory policy on the decision making, operational behavior, and policy of other nation-states. Scholars of international relations and strategic thought point to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is that state’s determination of its own self interests. National decisions to act, including the use of force, are also driven by a state’s interpretation of the strategic setting at the time and its stakes and risks in the midst of a crisis. To this end, there is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory, operational doctrines, and fielded capabilities that make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons, at least in a limited way, to achieve their objectives in a regional conflict under certain circumstances.82 Indeed, U.S. policy and military leaders believe that this scenario is, among all the very unlikely uses of nuclear weapons, the more likely, and it is the scenario currently emphasized in planning and exercises. Given what is known about the adversary, a U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action, particularly action enabled by posture and planning that provide them the option to initiate nuclear use and thus achieve their objectives in a regional conflict. Creating such a perception might also lead adversaries to think that they can better control escalation. Deterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus, and this outcome could produce the opposite effect.']

[(11, 19), (20, 30), (274, 274)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Neg-4---Texas-Round-4.docx

Emory

RuSh

deaf4fb54a11d49a07c0c9593ec6951b07adf7d59747e08718146a1089b558da

Extinction. The risk of lash-out and nuclear war is comparatively most likely in a world of conventional arms racing.

Peter James Mackenzie Rautenbach 20. MSC in political science and international relations. “The Threat of Conventional Weapons to Nuclear Security: A New Reality for Deterrence.” 2020. Journal of International Analytics. Vol 11. No 4. https://www.interanalytics.org/jour/article/view/290?locale=en_US

CPGS degrade nuclear security because missiles are more usea ble These weapons lack the stigma that comes with nuclear weapons This circumvents taboo and makes for more attractive prospect which degrades deterrence a first strike becomes an possibility CPGS danger lies in instability A state with first-strike can adopt a aggressive foreign policy a policy could lead state to overconfidently conduct a first strike only to trigger a nuclear response nations tend to lower their own threshold for nuclear use other states can be backed into a corner which could lead them to lash out This domination makes war likely

Traditionally, the less accurate missiles are the more powerful they need to be to achieve their objective that first-strike targets are often incredibly far away from launchers and may be hidden or moving. a nuclear silo can withstand at least 10,000 pounds per square inch or more so the strike must be able to produce this amount as accuracy increases, fewer launches and smaller payloads will theoretically be required to achieve a successfully first strike on an adversary. A missile targeting a nuclear silo could theoretically be armed with a conventional payload if confidence in the missile’s accuracy was great enough The super- fuze increases the effective accuracy of ballistic missiles by giving them a “flexible height-of- burst capability that enables to detonate at any height within the lethal volume over a target the super- fuze technology increases the ability for weapons to strike their targets with lethal force. Both the addition of GPS systems to conventional weapons and the creation of super- fuze systems effectively increase accuracy, and they indicate that CPGS are becoming increasingly viable tools . This technological advancement degrade s nuclear security because conventional missiles are more usea ble than nuclear missiles and because this increased viability will further exasperate the pre-existing ambiguity of missile launches. If successful, this preemptive actor would avoid suffering the ramifications of MAD These weapons are “useable” in the sense that they lack the well-deserved stigma that comes with strategic nuclear weapons . This circumvents the taboo of nuclear genocide and makes for a much more attractive prospect which again degrades nuclear deterrence Without both the psychological effect of nuclear weapons and the very real environmental devastation that would occur with nuclear use, a first strike on an adversary becomes an actual possibility . CPGS weapons are not nuclear weapons Where they differ from other once emerging technologies is that while they too will not come close to restricting conflict they may directly impact how nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy function Their danger lies in the instability they create with regard to nuclear weapons. Having a useable first-strike weapon increases international instability A state with realistic first-strike capabilities can adopt a much more aggressive foreign policy . Such a policy could lead that state to overconfidently conduct a first strike using CPGS weapons only to trigger a nuclear response when they almost certainly fail to completely eliminate the adversary’s nuclear deterrent a realistic first strike further degrades nuclear stability because other nations tend to lower their own nuclear threshold for nuclear use or adopt more aggressive postures to deter a conventional first strike Due to the offensive advantage that comes with CPGS programs, other states can be backed into a corner which could lead them to lash out and fight This offensive domination thus makes war more likely Instability will occur no matter who has the offensive advantage as states will struggle to escape this utterly disadvantageous situation

the more powerful incredibly far away at least 10,000 pounds fewer launches and smaller payloads to detonate at any height strike lethal force. addition of GPS systems super- fuze systems increasingly viable tools degrade s nuclear security more usea ble will further exasperate lack the well-deserved stigma much more attractive prospect both the psychological effect very real environmental devastation first strike becomes an actual possibility . come close to restricting conflict directly impact instability international instability adopt a much more aggressive overconfidently conduct nuclear response degrades nuclear stability lower nuclear threshold offensive advantage backed into a corner lash out and fight offensive domination no matter who has the offensive advantage

['Traditionally, the less accurate missiles are, the more powerful they need to be to achieve their objective. A direct hit may not be possible, but this can be accommodated for with a larger payload or by launching more missiles. It is important to remember that first-strike targets are often incredibly far away from launchers and may be hidden or moving. With this in mind, a nuclear silo can withstand at least 10,000 pounds per square inch or more of blast pressure on the ground, so the strike must be able to produce this amount.1 However, as accuracy increases, fewer launches and smaller payloads will theoretically be required to achieve a successfully first strike on an adversary. The potential reduction of the payload yield is what turns this into a discussion about developments in conventional weapons technology. A missile targeting a nuclear silo could theoretically be armed with a conventional payload if confidence in the missile’s accuracy was great enough. To that end, modern developments in missile accuracy seems to indicate that this level of confidence may be a realistic possibility. One of the more “promising [approaches] to boosting accuracy is the addition of a Global Position System (GPS) receiver.”2 Ballistic missiles within the United States have traditionally relied on inertial navigation, and while this is accurate enough for nuclear weapons with their larger yield, it would not be enough for conventional weapons.3 Another development in accuracy is super-fuze technology. The super-fuze increases the effective accuracy of ballistic missiles by giving them a “flexible height-of- burst capability that enables [them] to detonate at any height within the lethal volume over a target.”4 Thus, weapons, warheads and missiles that would have overshot their objective can now be detonated anywhere above their target, close enough to ensure a successful strike. Before the addition of the super-fuze, only half of the U.S. Trident II 100-kt W76-1 ballistic missile warheads would have hit their target with enough force to take out a nuclear silo.5 While technically not increasing the actual accuracy of the missile, the super-fuze technology increases the ability for weapons to strike their targets with lethal force. Despite its potential, the creation of super-fuze technology should not be viewed as a single moment in time that signifies the advent of useable CPGS weapons. It should instead be seen as part of an overarching push or movement toward the development of long-range conventional weapons that can be used in a counterforce or disarming first strike. Both the addition of GPS systems to conventional weapons and the creation of super-fuze systems effectively increase accuracy, and they indicate that CPGS are becoming increasingly viable tools. This technological advancement degrades nuclear security because conventional missiles are more useable than nuclear missiles and because this increased viability will further exasperate the pre-existing ambiguity of missile launches. In theory, a state could achieve total victory over another nuclear state by conducting a first strike on its nuclear deterrent. If successful, this preemptive actor would avoid suffering the ramifications of MAD. However, as long as strategic nuclear weapons are used to conduct the first strike, a preemptive nuclear attack has never been a realistic option. This lack of realism is due to the devastation that would be inflicted on the global environmental. For example, even a “nuclear war between new nuclear states, say India and Pakistan, using much less than 1% of the current global arsenal, could produce so much smoke that [...] it could produce global environmental change unprecedented in recorded human history.”1 Considering that the three large powers discussed in this paper have approximately 5,800 (in the case of the United States),2 6,370 (Russia),3 and 290 (China)4 nuclear warheads, respectively, a first strike to eliminate any one of these state’s nuclear arsenals, particularly those of the United States or Russia, would have to be large enough that mutually assured destruction would be almost inevitable without a second strike even being launched. It is far more likely that, alongside the potential environmental devastation of a first strike, part of the deterrent would survive and then be used on the aggressor’s cities. Bismarck’s observation that a preemptive strike was akin to committing suicide out of a fear of death has never held more relevance than with nuclear weapons. This fact alone, barring all others, should be enough to prevent a disarming first strike. However, this changes as soon as states develop the ability to use nuclear weapons with conventional warheads. These weapons are “useable” in the sense that they lack the well-deserved stigma that comes with strategic nuclear weapons. For example, when considering a first strike on China, even if the targets are too hardened for current conventional capabilities, a combination strike that uses low-yield nuclear warheads alongside conventional weapons could result in a successful first strike and as few as 700 casualties in total.5 This circumvents the taboo of nuclear genocide and makes for a much more attractive prospect, which again degrades nuclear deterrence.6 Without both the psychological effect of nuclear weapons and the very real environmental devastation that would occur with nuclear use, a first strike on an adversary becomes an actual possibility. This should not be taken as the belief that this technology will drastically change the face of war or guarantee the use of nuclear weapons. Some thinkers have rightly pointed out that discussions on emerging technologies often amount to a dangerous form of alarmism.7 Historically, other technologies, such as chemical weapons, which were predicted to change the nature of warfare failed to live up to these expectations.8 Other times, “even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates.”9 The notable exception to this was the advent of nuclear weapons. The undeniability of their sheer destructive power has dominated international security and great power interactions since their conception. CPGS weapons are not nuclear weapons, nor will they come close to reshaping the very nature of war. Where they differ from other once emerging technologies is that while they too will not come close to restricting conflict, they may directly impact how nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy function. The importance of studying these weapons comes from their secondary effects. Their danger lies in the instability they create with regard to nuclear weapons. Having a useable first-strike weapon increases international instability in a multitude of ways. A state with realistic first-strike capabilities can adopt a much more aggressive foreign policy. Such a policy could lead that state to overconfidently conduct a first strike using CPGS weapons, only to trigger a nuclear response when they almost certainly fail to completely eliminate the adversary’s nuclear deterrent. Additionally, a realistic first strike further degrades nuclear stability because other nations tend to lower their own nuclear threshold for nuclear use or adopt more aggressive postures to deter a conventional first strike. Due to the offensive advantage that comes with CPGS programs, other states can be backed into a corner, which could lead them to lash out and fight even if they are at a disadvantage. This offensive domination thus makes war more likely. Instability will occur no matter who has the offensive advantage, as states will struggle to escape this utterly disadvantageous situation – and struggle can hold the seeds of war.1', '', '']

[(22, 36)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoSh-Neg-Sunflower-Swing-1-Round-1.docx

Emory

CoSh

b1c7cb8bf5c52debf94d988ac194bc2d04148ea97cf6232bb6e59c4c3ef86ae6

b) Follow-on---the plan creates the fear of future unrelated AND politicized amendments

Gregory E. Neppl 19, Partner at Foley and Lardner LLP, JD from Duke University School of Law, BA from Duke University, “Antitrust Enforcement “Reform” as a Political Issue: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”, 11/7/2019, https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/11/antitrust-enforcement-reform-political-issue

One problem with “new guidelines” – unhinged is successive admin s might amend (or reinterpret ) in whatever political issue du jour new guidelines open the door and increase likelihood partisan politics replace factual analysis Such would not promote bus con

New merger guidelines that reflect non-competition considerations (such as job security ) would modify the consumer welfare standard and likely contravene Section 7 of the Clayton Act as currently drafted. One problem with such “new guidelines” – unhinged from “competition” is that successive admin istration s might amend (or reinterpret ) such guidelines in response to whatever political issue du jour allowed that administration to win political power. While antitrust enforcement is not free of politics currently both DOJ and FTC have a respectable history of pursuing enforcement efforts generally free from partisan politics . The issuance of new merger guidelines that reflect non-competition considerations may open the door to regular amendments to the guidelines and increase the likelihood that partisan politics could replace factual and economic analysis in merger evaluations. Such an outcome would not promote bus iness con fidence

non-competition job security modify the consumer welfare standard unhinged successive admin istration s amend reinterpret political issue du jour respectable history free from partisan politics open the door regular amendments partisan politics factual and economic analysis not promote bus iness con fidence

['New Merger Guidelines', 'New merger guidelines that reflect non-competition considerations (such as job security) would modify the consumer welfare standard discussed above and, in the absence of new statutory authority, likely contravene Section 7 of the Clayton Act as currently drafted. One problem with such “new guidelines” – unhinged from “competition” or “competitive effects” – is that successive administrations might amend (or reinterpret) such guidelines in response to whatever political issue du jour allowed that administration to win political power. While antitrust enforcement is not free of politics currently (i.e., the President does nominate the Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Division), appoint the FTC Chairperson, and nominate FTC commissioners when openings arise, and the House and Senate subcommittees with antitrust enforcement oversight regularly hold hearings on high-profile mergers), both DOJ and FTC have a respectable history of pursuing enforcement efforts generally free from partisan politics. The issuance of new merger guidelines that reflect non-competition considerations may open the door to regular amendments to the guidelines and increase the likelihood that partisan politics could replace factual and economic analysis in merger evaluations. Such an outcome would not promote business confidence. Moreover, “bright-line” merger guidelines – setting caps for vertical mergers, horizontal mergers, and total market share – would ignore the fact that vertical foreclosure risks and “market power” are in practice not so easily quantifiable. The agencies already employ market share screens (such as HHI) to identify those mergers more likely to require close scrutiny. Bright-line caps, however, would necessarily threaten certain mergers that are competitively neutral, or even pro-competitive, through resulting efficiencies and synergies. ']

[(11, 16), (17, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-Fullertown-Octas.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-Fullertown-Octas.docx

61b8747dc45dfdf4a90cd0fe2fcb58c139de026c3376125a25fb9bf2aee895a8

Extinction.

Martinez and Cuautle ’21 [Nestor and Mariana; February 4; Universidad de Las Americas Puebla; Springer International, “Impact of Pharmaceutical Waste on Biodiversity,” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322127132_Impact_of_Pharmaceutical_Waste_on_Biodiversity]

increase in levels of pharma substances in environment and their adverse effects on bio systems a problem of global relevance that puts species at risk waste can cause cascade effects waste affect plants the base of trophic chain changes can affect survival or reproductive success linked to bio fitness , and can precede extinction

The increase in levels of pharma cological substances in environment and their potential adverse effects on bio logical systems are a problem of global relevance that puts species diversity at risk waste pharmaceuticals can cause trophic cascade effects waste water can affect plants the base of the trophic chain changes can affect organisms’ survival or reproductive success linked to their bio logical fitness , and can precede species extinction s

pharma cological substances environment potential adverse effects bio logical systems global relevance species risk waste pharmaceuticals trophic cascade effects waste water trophic chain organisms’ survival reproductive success bio logical fitness species extinction

['The increase in levels of pharmacological substances in the environment and their potential adverse effects on biological systems are a problem of global relevance that will pose greater challenges to countries with high rates of population growth. There is evidence that the incorporation of pharmacological substances into organisms and ecosystems puts genetic diversity, species diversity, and community diversity at risk.', 'There are several pathways through which waste pharmaceuticals can reach to organisms; the main one is through sewage discharge into aquatic ecosystems affecting organism such as microorganisms, fishes, and invertebrates, which can be consumed by higher trophic levels and cause trophic cascade effects. Also the use of treated wastewater for agricultural irrigation can affect the plants which are at the base of the trophic chain. Most of the studies about the effect of pharmaceutical on organisms have omitted to test nonlethal effects, such as change in behavior, reproduction, and stress and changes in community composition and structure. The few studies that have addressed these effects have showed that these changes can affect organisms’ survival or reproductive success, which are linked to their biological fitness, and can affect population and community dynamics and precede species extinctions.']

[(0, 12), (13, 20), (21, 24)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Mikelson-Flashner-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round2.docx

Michigan

MiFl

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MiFl/Michigan-Mikelson-Flashner-Neg-Wake%2520Forest-Round2.docx

9fc161c49ffdf4120bed4a82bf1fb5c87ce5a0a8a7b8f9aebc6a1f1c0aa8b157

Biden is irrelevant.

Ariel Edwards-Levy 9-10, Polling & Analytics Editor, CNN, "Why A 2024 Trump-Biden Rematch Might Be More of a Referendum on Trump Than Biden," CNN, 09/10/2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/10/politics/2024-trump-biden-referendum/index.html.

reelection rematch upend that dynamic with most voters saying decisions come down to feelings about Trump those backing saw choice as support those backing Biden viewed their choice as against Only a third as a referendum on the sitting president

reelection bids tend to revolve around the incumbent’s performance in office But a rematch between Biden and Trump could upend that dynamic polling suggests, with most voters saying their decisions would come down largely to their feelings about Trump those backing Trump said they saw choice mainly as a show of support for him with a similar of those backing Biden saying they viewed their choice largely as a vote against Trump Only about a third treated the decision as a referendum on the sitting president

incumbent’s performance rematch Biden Trump upend that dynamic feelings about Trump backing Trump support for him Biden against Trump third sitting president

['CNN — Presidential reelection bids tend to revolve around the incumbent’s performance in office. But a potential rematch between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump could upend that dynamic, polling suggests, with most voters saying their decisions would come down largely to their feelings about Trump.', 'In the latest CNN poll, which finds registered voters deadlocked in a hypothetical contest between Biden and Trump, 62% of those backing Trump said they saw their choice mainly as a show of support for him, with a similar 64% of those backing Biden saying they viewed their choice largely as a vote against Trump. Only about a third on either side treated the decision as primarily a referendum on the sitting president.', '']

[(6, 23)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Aff-UK-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

b01789f2edf22a3b0fd6c275f284034cafc05301b985e910240b62025d6d6d1e

The AFF deters any business activity.

Alex Brown 19, Staff writer at Pew Research Center, covers environmental issues, “Cities, Tribes Try a New Environmental Approach: Give Nature Rights,” 10/30/19, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/10/30/cities-tribes-try-a-new-environmental-approach-give-nature-rights

business groups say r o n would make businesses vulnerable to suits over any action with an impact on the environment allow any resident to sue “ any business for undefined violations people are going to have different views on what might violate You can’t do anything farm put roads landscaping Giving rights would create too much liability could stifle any human activity. Legal experts not "(E)stablishing the balance between human development and nature’s rights will prove challenging for the courts

agricultural interests and business groups say recognizing r ights o f n ature would make businesses and governments vulnerable to law suits over almost any action with an impact on the environment would allow any resident to sue “ any business within the watershed for really undefined potential violations When you’re talking about the right for soil or mosquitoes to naturally evolve, people are going to have different views on what might violate that,” You can’t do anything to the land You can’t farm it, you can’t put new roads in, you can’t do landscaping .” Giving rights to the lake, would create too much liability for farmers. Opponents note it defines the Lake Erie ecosystem as including all natural water features, communities of organisms and soil, which could stifle any human activity. Legal experts have raised this question as well, not ing that "(E)stablishing the right balance between human development and the respect of nature’s rights will prove challenging for the courts

agricultural interests business groups r ights o f n ature vulnerable law suits any action impact environment any business undefined potential violations soil mosquitoes different views anything too much liability any human activity. Legal experts balance human development nature’s rights challenging courts

['Some state attorneys general, agricultural interests and business groups say recognizing rights of nature would make businesses and governments vulnerable to lawsuits over almost any action with an impact on the environment. Thomas Fusonie, a lawyer representing one of the plaintiffs in the Lake Erie lawsuit, said the Toledo measure would allow any city resident to sue “any business or government within the watershed for really undefined potential violations.”', '“When you’re talking about the right for soil or mosquitoes to naturally evolve, people are going to have different views on what might violate that,” Fusonie said. “You can’t do anything to the land. You can’t farm it, you can’t put new roads in, you can’t do landscaping.”', 'Tribes Lead the Way', 'Several U.S. tribes already have enacted rights of nature laws, pointing out that indigenous people have long treated nature as a shared resource that must be preserved.', '“These are the natural laws that have always existed prior to the poisoning of the land by the extractive industry,” said Casey Camp-Horinek, a councilwoman in the Ponca Nation in Oklahoma and a leader in the rights of nature movement. “If you eat, if you breathe, if you drink water, then it’s an undeniable connection between human and nature.”', 'In 2017, the Ponca Nation became one of the first tribes in the country to enact a rights of nature law, an anti-fracking measure aimed at protecting the tribe from an increasing number of earthquakes and rising cancer and asthma rates. ', 'Soon after, the White Earth band of Ojibwe enacted its own law recognizing the rights of wild rice, as well as its freshwater resources and habitats. The Ojibwe signed a treaty with the federal government in 1837, granting it access to wild rice on ceded territory.', 'But that treaty means nothing if there is no wild rice left to be harvested, said tribal attorney Frank Bibeau.', '“Wild rice has a right to exist, it has a right to flourish,” Bibeau said. “We have a right to defend it and protect it.”', 'For the tribe, harvesting wild rice is not just a matter of economic or nutritional importance, but a continuation of cultural and spiritual practices. It also carries strategic value, as the tribe’s treaty guarantees continued access to the resource, and protecting the rice means protecting the water on which it grows.', '“Wild rice is the most important cultural aspect of our livelihood,” Bibeau said. “Our migration path took us here to the Great Lakes, where the food grows on the water. If we can protect the water, then we’re probably protecting everything else.”', 'The White Earth band is hopeful it can use the law to block future threats to the resource, such as oil pipelines and mines. But like many other aspects of tribal law, questions of jurisdiction remain a challenge. ', '“It’s very difficult to get standing [to sue],” said Rain Bear Stands Last, executive director of the Global Indigenous Council. “When you come to wild rice protection or protection of rivers or salmon, you can go into a tribal court theoretically with a case, but you actually would have to get the defendant to show up. … The tribe doesn’t have jurisdiction outside the boundaries of the reservation.”', 'Bear Stands Last helped assemble support in 2016 for the Grizzly Treaty, a document signed by more than 200 U.S. and Canadian tribal nations recognizing the grizzly bear’s right to exist in a healthy ecosystem. That coalition won a court victory in 2018 that overturned the Trump administration’s attempt to remove Endangered Species Act protections for the bears. ', 'It isn’t clear whether a tribe’s treaty rights — or its connection to a resource that crosses boundary lines — are enough to establish jurisdiction.', 'Questions Remain', 'The rights of nature movement started in 2006 with a law in Pennsylvania’s Tamaqua Borough to prevent the dumping of toxic sludge. Since then, about two dozen communities have crafted their own measures, including an anti-fracking provision in Pittsburgh, a ballot measure to stop aerial pesticide spraying in Lincoln County, Oregon, and a climate bill of rights that banned fossil fuel extraction in Lafayette, Colorado.', 'Advocates on both sides say the movement is poised to face crucial questions about its place in U.S. law in the years ahead.', '“The law as we know it recognizes the earth and ecosystems as human property,” said Shannon Biggs, a co-founder of Movement Rights, which advocates for nature’s rights. “Corporations can frack in communities or blow off the tops of mountains — that’s a privilege that’s been granted to corporations in this country. That’s not going to go easily.” ', 'Following the passage of the Lake Erie Bill of Rights, the Ohio General Assembly approved a budget that expressly prohibits legal standing for ecosystems, a provision inserted by Republican state Rep. Jim Hoops at the behest of the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, according to emails obtained by Ohio activist Bill Lyons in a public records request. ', 'Hoops did not respond to requests for comment; a spokesperson for the chamber was unable to be reached before publication. ', 'Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost, a Republican, joined the lawsuit against the Lake Erie Bill of Rights, “to ensure that Ohio’s ability to regulate Lake Erie is not impeded or impaired,” his office said in a statement.', 'Rights of nature advocates say they recognize the state’s regulatory authority. But they argue that environmental problems — toxic algae blooms in Lake Erie shut down Toledo’s water supply in 2014 — prove those regulations don’t go far enough.', '“It’s not that the law isn’t being followed, it’s that the law isn’t written to protect you or the environment,” said Markie Miller of Toledoans for Safe Water, which pushed for the Lake Erie Bill of Rights. “It’s the structure of law that’s inherently unsustainable. It makes sustainability downright illegal.”', 'The Ohio Farm Bureau disagrees, saying its members have changed their practices and supported research on how to reduce the runoff of fertilizer shown to cause the toxic algae. Giving rights to the lake, the organization said, would create too much liability for farmers.', '“[Farmers] are not bad actors, and they’re not polluting intentionally, and they’re not doing bad things on their farms,” said Yvonne Lesicko, the Ohio Farm Bureau’s vice president of public policy.', 'As the rights of nature movement tries to gain traction, it will have to grapple with which pieces of nature it seeks to protect and what the fallout of those protections will be. Prior to the Toledo measure, most municipal — though not tribal — rights of nature laws were written generally, rather than focused on a specific ecosystem. Opponents of that law note that it defines the Lake Erie ecosystem as including all natural water features, communities of organisms and soil, which they believe could stifle nearly any human activity.', "Legal experts have raised this question as well, noting that the movement may need to endure a trial-and-error period before it's answered.", '"(E)stablishing the right balance between human development and the respect of nature’s rights will prove challenging for the courts," wrote attorney Lidia Cano Pecharromán in a journal article published last year.']

[(5, 13)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AvLe-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

AvLe